Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF METHOD

Frank Paul Braio brings together the many elements needed for a thorough understanding of a Lonerganian 'pluralism.'

F. E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, of the Lonergan Research Institute, make available a previously unpublished, early essay by Lonergan on the "restoration of all things."

METHOD CEASES PUBLICATION WITH THIS ISSUE

For nearly a decade, METHOD has shared with the LONERGAN WORKSHOP JOURNAL, edited by F. Lawrence, and the LONERGAN STUDIES NEWSLETTER, produced first by T. Tekippe and M. O'Callaghan and now edited by F. E. Crowe, S.J., the privilege of promoting Lonergan Studies. For its part, METHOD has made available to hundreds of individuals and libraries throughout the world over a thousand pages of studies which illuminate various facets of Lonergan's thought. With the kind cooperation and assistance of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, moreover, METHOD has made accessible to scholars-at-large a number of Lonergan's previously unpublished writings. Recent years have witnessed rising interest in Lonergan's thought outside what has been, for some time, a small circle of dedicated scholars. Lonerganian approaches, interpretations, and categories are showing up, with increasing frequency, in the publications of mainstream publishing houses, in the pages of mainstream philosophical and theological journals, in the presented papers and respondents' remarks at scholarly conferences, in doctoral dissertations completed at well-respected universities. I bring the journal METHOD to an end, then, not merely with an expression of regret that I am no longer able to meet the demands its editorship and publication make upon my time and resources, but with a certain hopefulness and optimism that a new era in Lonergan Studies -- an era of 'cultural diffusion,' as it were -- has begun. To METHOD's Board of Editors, to those who contributed the fruits of their scholarly labors, to our subscribers over the years, I want to express my appreciation and gratitude.

Mark D. Morelli
Twine in the Labyrinth:
Lonergan, the Non-Relative,
and
the Horizon of Three Pluralisms [1]

Dr. Frank Paul Braio

"...I too was thinking about a title for these conversations.... I had reread a few pages of your Journal, and I was thinking of Ulysses, of his experience in the labyrinth. Ulysses in the Labyrinth?" [2]

Preface

"...he who would approach the investigation of truth must hold to this rule as closely as he who enters the labyrinth must follow the thread which guided Theseus." [3]

I believe that adequate self-interpretation through or realization of Lonergan's method lies far in the future. In the meantime, I offer what I hope are some limited, suggestive, systematically arrayed clues concerning what Lonergan thought was the adequate, human response to the problem of relativism as it is to be raised in our time. As picked up on and reversed and/or developed by functional specialists within and without the contemporary university, perhaps some of them will not be entirely alien to that adequate future context.

Introduction

"...I thought of a labyrinth of labyrinths, of one spreading labyrinth that would encompass the past and the future and in some way involve the stars." [4]

As far as I can make out, some of the important premisses affirmed by the relativist are that: (1) human inquiry is interminable; (2) short of "absolute knowledge" which, minimally, finite human beings do not, in fact, possess, all human knowledge is "relative;" (3) the meaning and truth of any subject's, any community's claim to know is, therefore, relative to its context; (4) contexts, themselves, are subject to change and, therefore, stand within history with its currents of progress and decline; (5) it is not possible to predict what the future contexts will be.

If the positions of the "foundationalist" have been consistently eroded by developments in the modern natural and human sciences and arts, [5] the five stated premisses of the
relativist's position are true. On the other hand, they are true only in a limited sense and not without qualification [6].

Again, on the assumption that foundationalism has been largely discredited, it exhibits many historical faces. Thus, classical Greeks noticed that the habits of animal living are uniform and that they, therefore, pertain to "nature." They noticed, by contrast, that human domestic, civil and cultural practises differed from city to city and from age to age. And they asked whether beneath these merely conventional variations there was not a constant which could be attributed to human nature itself. But such a constant is subject to at least two opposed interpretations. It may be placed in some foundational object of intuitive cognition, whether this be "universal propositions, self-evident truths, naturally known certitudes," or the impressions of sense or reflection known by direct acquaintance or other forms of immediate access, etc. On the other hand, it may be placed in [i.e., human] nature itself... as concretely operating" (NRH, 172b). Aristotle defines a nature as "an immanent principle of motion and rest" (Physics, II, I, 192b 22) [7]. But by construing Aristotle's definition heuristically, the operation of nature as distinctly human can be accessed phenomenologically. And his proposed inquiry in search of the immanent principle which differentiates it can be construed as a long and exacting form of self-reflection [8]. It is through such inquiry that I believe a viewpoint which both properly avoids the foundationalist recourse to intuitive cognition but also sublates and qualifies the relativist premisses has been won. And if it yields only the de facto invariants immanent in the "movement" of human conscious intentionality, and a basic context which embraces three differentiable forms of pluralism, this is faithful to the second sense of nature indicated, above.

In this paper, then, I hope to sketch the non-relative position of an authentic if complex pluralism. And I will distinguish it, briefly, from the constitutive premisses of both the classical foundationalist and relativist. Again, that distinction will arise in the course of interpreting and developing relevant themes in the work of the contemporary thinker, Bernard Lonergan [9]. Thus, this paper will proceed in six steps.

First, the transcendental method which informs Lonergan's efforts at self-reflection and whose yield is parsed in this paper will be introduced. Secondly, the "noetic-noematic"
structure of human intentional consciousness and, then, the four levels on which the noetic "pole" of that structure operates will be sketched. But these analyses yield the lineaments of the basic context of the subject's intentional dwelling.

But the intentional life of human beings is neither solitary nor a-temporal. In a third section, then, we will describe the structure of the "two-phase" processes which inform the use of basic context by a community of human subjects in history. Again, the consequence of this analysis will be the specification of a first, non-radical, if complex form of pluralism.

Fourthly, if the intentional consciousness of the subject is structured on four levels, if two-phase process informs its communo-historical engagement, that structured engagement always pertains to one or more "patterns" of experience. Thus, depending upon its pattern, human consciousness is subject to various forms and combinations of "differentiation" and its lack. Again, the consequence of this analysis will be the specification of a second, non-radical, if no less complex form of pluralism.

In a fifth section, the sensitive, intellectual, and moral "displacements" of the conscious life of the subject will be described and the indefeasibility of the complementary demands which they place upon it will be established. These analyses will then be expanded.

In a first expansion, an account will be given of the "reality" towards which human intentional consciousness is displaced, and the "objectivity" which characterizes its proper use. But these accounts of the displacement, objectivity, and the reality intended by the subject, specify the "positions" of human intentional consciousness. On this basis, flaws in the relativist account of objectivity will be brought to light. In a second expansion, then, the basic "counter-positions" of human intentional consciousness will be specified. And some of their consequences for the differentiated life of the subject within two-phase process will be drawn. In a third expansion, the complex oppositions between possible positional and counter-positional horizons of the conscious life of the subject will be explicated. But, then, these expansions have specified the third form of pluralism to which the structured, differentiated engagement of human intentional life is subject. And this
further, complex pluralism is both radical, dialectical and, in
its counter-positions, the material for dialectical reversal.

I. Method and Intentionality

"That symbolism [of the labyrinth] is the model of all
existence, which passes through many ordeals in order
to journey toward its own center, toward itself,
toward atman, as the Hindus call it." [10]

To access and study the principle of nature as human,
method presupposes a matter of fact. The fact is that incarnate
human beings address each other within, inquire into, make and
share judgments about, and live their lives together in a
"surrounding world." In doing so but also in saying that they
are doing so, they are performing meaning-intending acts of many
distinct but related kinds. These former acts open out upon
sense-mediated objects in the world which they first intend.
But, then, on pain of rendering the preceding three claims
incomprehensible, both the subjects and the human referents of
such acts must be present to themselves in the fact of their
conscious, intentional performance. And it is on this basis,
that they must be capable of making and understanding adequately
grounded assertions about what they are doing in the very
performance of such acts.

Thus, it must be possible for the subject to shift the
weight of her attention from the data of sense with its common
world of meaningful objects to the data of consciousness. And
she can make that field of data the meaningful theme for query
of a second order. That shift, then, turned methodical, becomes
transcendental method. Its ultimate term is Self-knowledge, as
well as the Self-determining freedom with which it is intimately
connected. Proximately, it grasps, affirms, and deliberately
implements the relative invariants which, in fact, structure the
movement of human consciousness. The "noetic-noematic" polarity
and four-leveled dynamic of human intentional consciousness are
two aspects of that invariant structure. And given the de facto
involvement of human beings in communities and traditions of
learning of various kinds, "two-phase process" becomes a
third [12].
II. The Noetic-Noematic Polarity and Four-fold Dynamic of Human Intentional Consciousness

"Everything is still there, and you can see that there is a goal to guide us— an orientation." [13]

A first conclusion of transcendental method is that human intentional performance is composed of two aspects or poles. The two poles are correlative to each other and can, therefore, only be defined by their mutual relations.

In the general case, the "noetic" or "subject"-pole comprises an open, ordered set of questions of a specifiable type. In accord with Aristotle's definition of nature, it is this ordered set, and the underlying desire which it manifests, which orients and structures the motion and rest of the conscious operations of the human subject. Meaning-ful questions, then, emerge from and are addressed to the data of human sense or consciousness. Again, the "noematic" or "object"-pole of the subject's performance is fixed by reflecting on the character of the noetic pole. "Noema" comprise a response of a certain kind, a field of possible objects, that is answers, meaning-contents, or value-responses, which is prefigured in outline and awaits application by the noetic component. Finally, once the subject and object-poles of the given structure have been specified, the context, horizon, or bounding circle of the form of human intentional consciousness in question has been made determinate. But such contexts can be basic or relative.

Given the preceding account, "basic context" could only be reached by discovering, upon reflection, the ordered set of questions and conditions which, with appropriate refinements and adjustments, is relevantly applied to the human subject's conscious performance in any and all fields of full human intention [14]. If that is correct, then "relative context" could only be the result of the application and adaptation of basic context to the exigences of some limited field of meaningful inquiry, in one or more of its particular differentiations [15].

Of initial interest here, then, is Lonergan's explanatory characterization of the noetic pole of basic context as "intentionality structure." In form, this characterization interdefines a set of terms and relations in a way reminiscent of Hilbert's founding use of implicit definition in his attempt to axiomatize geometry [16]. But, generically, the terms of the
definition comprise a series of kinds of conscious, intentional acts. These conscious acts are arrayed on successive levels. And what links them are relations of complementation and presupposition. Through these relations, then, prior acts on any given level, and prior levels within the ordered whole, call forth their successors and sublate their predecessors [17]. As thus expressed, these operative terms and relations articulate the subject's: insight into the noetic data of his own conscious performance; [18] attempt to answer the second order, but basic question, "What am I doing when I am knowing and doing anything?" We cannot, here, mediate the reader's reflective discovery and appropriation of that structure [19]. But, then, we must, at least, give it schematic application and so represent a second conclusion of transcendental method.

A. Levels of Consciousness and "Intentional" Structure

The first level of human consciousness, or that of experience is that into and through whose contents the other levels inquire. It includes the subject's acts of such kinds as seeing and hearing, imagining and anticipating, remembering, desiring and fearing, etc. Again, its contents include, not only the noemic data of sense, but also the concomitant, noetic data of the subject's consciousness [20].

The inquiries proper to the second or intelligent level, may be stated, roughly, as "What?" or "Why is it?" They are called forth by the results of operations on the first level. They engage the subject's efforts at understanding and, thereby, integrating the data, and formulating (or otherwise expressing) what has been understood. Thus, its contents can range from facial expressions, to singular propositions, to complex webs of implicitly defined terms and relations, etc. [21].

The inquiries proper to the third or rational level, may be stated as "Is it so?" They are called forth by the results of operations on the second level. Thus, they direct the subject's concern to discovering all of the relevant questions, all of the operant conditions relevant to determining whether the subject's formulated understanding "is so." And it directs her, further, to effect such a determination. The subject's third level operation, then, culminates in the "Yes!" or "No!" of judgments of fact and, through them, the claim to know what is really so. Or it may fail to complete itself when one admits with an "I don't know" or the throwing up of hands,
the insufficiency of evidence, of the good judgment necessary to assess it, or both. Again, a culminating act may be suffixed with any modality ranging from "certainly" to "probably" to "possibly." They qualify the state of the evidence, its subject's capacity to "weigh" it, and the extent of the rational commitment that she thinks can be made [22].

The inquiries proper to the fourth level of human consciousness, pertain to the subject's rational choice under the preceding set of known conditions. In a first or deliberative stage, and under those conditions, he asks "What to do?" His projectful grasp and expression of practical possibility spontaneously if, perhaps, only eventually carries him beyond such questions as "What's in it for me?" or "for us?" to the even more demanding question "Is it really good?" Now the conscious subject has become conscience. And with all the subtlety involved in the discernment of relevant feelings, the weighing of all the relevant factors and reasons which arise in but go beyond the concrete, the subject heads for a judgment of value. When arrived at, such judgments admit all of the suffixes, all of the qualifications which we have identified in the case of judgments of fact. And they invite, even if they do not guarantee in consequence, the subject's action in accord with judgment. But this merely repeats the ancient insight that the subject's responsible decision is never necessitated by her knowledge [23].

The subject's conscientious engagement of the levels and operations implicit in her own conscious being, involves her in self-correcting and self-developing processes. The resultant of such processes is her ongoing learning and discovery. Thus, experience which firmly resists assimilation to already stabilized instances or contexts of insight, judgment and action calls forth further relevant questions. These further questions de-center the prior stabilizations. And they set the conditions which the correct or next higher stabilization will have to meet. Again, in any given field, context, or horizon of human query, there will be some set of successive decenterings and stabilizations. And the process will head to and sometimes reach the limit, n, of the series, at which all further relevant questions have been identified, linked to conditions, and appropriately addressed [24]. Again, whether judgments are being made within or of a given context, and whether his performance is within or at the point of transition or
complementation between successive contexts, the same basic set of terms, e.g., intentional operations, and relations, e.g., of complementarity and presupposition, is being applied.

But, then, as previously contended, the subject's basic questions are the proximate and remote "operators" of the motion and rest of her intentional consciousness. Thus, they intend what she is to know before she actually does so, setting human query in motion. And at the proximate or remote "end" of each inquiry in any field, her intention proximately or finally rests, since the criterion of no further relevant questions has been relevantly approached or fulfilled. Thus, the questions constitutive of the intentionality structure, of the ordered motion and rest of the subject's intentional life, determine her nature as intelligent, moral, and intrinsically dynamic. And the precepts "be attentive," "be intelligent," "be rational," "be responsible" are transcendental, precisely because they express the normative, everywhere relevant exigences immanent in the noetic pole of basic context. Again, fidelity to such precepts is the result of a life-long effort. And it is constitutive of the conscientiousness, of the authenticity of the subject [25].

III. Two-Phase Process and the Problem of Pluralism

"The past questions us and calls us into question before we question it or call it into question." [26]

As said, basic context mediates the emergence and development of relative contexts. Such contexts comprise the relatively closed fields of prized and/or meaningful objects upon which finite, virtual nests of actions, answers, questions and conditions open out. Such contexts are effected, constituted and/or disclosed precisely through the adaptation of the exigences of basic context to some limited field of query. And, except at the limit, such contexts will be intrinsically dynamic. Again, with, maximally, extremely rare exceptions, their constitution and/or disclosure is not the work of solitaries. Thus, in the general case, the relative contexts of the subject are variable, communal, historical, and subject to development, etc. But these facts can be highlighted by clarifying the nature of the "two-phase" process implicit in human communicative interaction. But such a clarification brings out a further conclusion of transcendental method [27].
Consider the first of the two stages within "first phase" process. The supposition of this first stage is that there is a subject, K, who is external to some relative context, C, functioning at some stage of development, some form(s) of differentiation, etc. In that first stage, K is asked to engage intentional structure in order to "learn." Through a self-correcting process, K must appropriate the specific sets of questions, sensibilities, symbols, methods, answers, and capacities for insight, expression, judgment and action which the community has judged to be cognitive, constitutive of and/or efficient in the particular context, C, of its life.

Again, K's assimilation of these specific manners of deploying basic context, represents her gradual appropriation of the field of meaningful objects to be reached by that community of life. This process heads for a judgment by the community that she has achieved minimal levels of competence, that she can be allowed to apply what she has learned on her own. In a second stage, K has achieved recognition as a full member of her community, as co-participant in dealings with the objects of its query and concern. Again, this is done through formal and informal evaluations of her relatively independent practise. K may now be asked to evaluate those who would enter the relative context and community in question. K is a "mediated" subject. Her practise has been informed by the meanings, motives and values constitutive of the relative community and the context of objects in question.

But unless the actual context of application is without limitations or errors, it places before the subject a further task.

Thus, in a first stage of the "second phase" of two-phase process, the relative context in question tasks K's use of intentional structure with sooner or later discovering the further conditions, the further data, the further sets of relevant questions which it either does not address or does not address adequately [28]. But it is these further relevant questions which, when pursued, will eventually call forth the correction, destabilization or progressive transformation of the old answers and practises and, therefore, the prior context of the community. Such processes of problem-recognition, correction and/or transcendence may be accomplished by K or by his followers at some later stage in the life of the community.
Assume that such, potentially, long-term processes have gone forward conscientiously.

In a second stage of the second phase, there are the further tasks of circulating the transformation within the community, presenting evidence, meeting objections and/or the claims of competitor transformations, expanding its sphere of relevance, developing its virtual meanings without changing them fundamentally: of convincing the established members of the relative context to accept the needed shift of context and practise. They will have to consent to learn and to be critical. If they, too, then, are conscientious, the needed transformation will go into effect. But, then, the conditions of teaching within which the next, higher wave of phase one processes will go forward, will have been progressively re-set for B. For B would enter, has no real choice but to enter the relative context in its higher state. Again, in this ideal case, the re-setting of conditions was initiated (or advanced) by K and his creative minority of followers within the community. It was they who hit and/or followed up upon the relevant, unanswered questions raised by their initial mediation. In this use of intentional structure, he and they are "mediating" subjects. Their discoveries have mediated but also motivated the transformations of relative context constitutive of the higher state of the community in question and the new conditions of B's learning and development.

The cycle, then, has now been re-set for B at stage one of phase one process. It has been re-set in a context and community that has, contingently, moved on, progressed. Again, relative to some predecessor state, the same could have been said for the context and community at the stage at which K sought and gained entry. But, then, the differentiated subject operating with others, in a context, and at some stage of two-phase process, belongs to a historical "tradition" of stages or sub-contexts. And these stages represent integrative, "synchronic" elements within the context as "diachronic": an ongoing genesis of meanings and values. Finally, both K, B and the other members of the given or larger communities can participate in the multiple stages and phases within the context's ongoing life, because they each share a common, dynamic, intentional structure. And it is this common structure which makes entry into, operation within, transformation of, and exit from contexts possible [29].
To sum up, it is through the successive oscillations of such a two-phase, intentionally grounded process that communal, self-correcting, differentiated processes of learning and discovery take place. In the long-run and supposing the conscientiousness of the participant subjects, such processes lead to successive, progressive transformations of the relative context and praxis of the community in question.

Again, even supposing such conscientiousness, the path of such transformations need not be unique. It may be filled with oppositions between competing, contrary or contradictory sub-frameworks, sub-communities, sub-praxes. Such oppositions may take years, decades, or centuries to adjudicate. Nor need it describe an upward move within the relatively ideal, "cumulative," development described above. Thus, either independent communities or distinct sub-communities within a single larger community may reach the same limit or sub-limit, n, through distinct, incomplete, but complementary pathways. And they may do so at different paces. Again, before or once such a limit is reached, the paths of relevant questioning and community may have shifted to divergent, legitimate but related ends, each with its own implicit limits. Finally, the limits towards which two communities or sub-communities are oriented by their queries may be related not merely as minor developments, but as successive higher, more developed and refined viewpoints, etc. [30].

Thus, such relations of opposition, [31] development, complementarity, divergence, and higher viewpoint, specify the five-fold pathway of context transformation. In so doing they also determine in advance the basic kinds of relations between contexts which can emerge. Again, the movement of query along such pathways and through such relations, presupposes the operant basic context of human questioning and the conscientiousness discussed in the preceding section. And such query determines basic context and is determined by it in specifiably variable and, thereby, ineradicably communal, contextual, historical, and flexible ways.

But, then, the flexibility of human query and action, immanent in two-phase process, yields a plurality of intricately related, relative contexts and sub-contexts. Again, such a pluralism is neither radical nor eradicable. It is not radical because, if conscientious human intentional query can and, in fact, does take many, unpredictable, twists and turns, (1) the
general forms which these variations will take can be heuristically specified in advance; [32] (2) there are, in fact, limits upon which such processes converge and which they must respect. Again, on the twin suppositions that human life continues and that human beings are free to inquire, such pluralism is ineradicable [33]. Thus, query and the communal, dual-phased, self-completing processes of learning and discovery go hand in hand. And such processes cannot, except in the long run, rule out false starts, dead or unexpected ends, divergence and opposition, the need to correct, complement, catch up with or transcend previous achievements, etc. [34].

IV. Patterns of Experience and Differentiations of Consciousness

"Exile helps you to understand that the world is never foreign to you once you have a central stance in it. I have not merely understood this "symbolism of the center" intellectually: I live it." [35]

That is our condition: we are neither angels nor pure heroes. Once the center has been reached, we are enriched, our consciousness is broadened and deepened, so that everything becomes clear, meaningful; but life goes on: another labyrinth, other encounter, other kinds of trials, on another level. These conversations of ours, for example, have led me into a kind of labyrinth. [36]

In section II, above, we distinguished (1) the subject and object of human intentional consciousness, (2) the basic, four-leveled, group structure of its intentional operations. In section III, we specified (3) the two-phase process through which the basic intentionality of the subject is engaged in community, history. From this there followed a specifiable, remediable, non-radical pluralism of relative, contextual locations. In this section we must show that that same, four-fold structure admits a second form of non-radical pluralism. Thus, this basic intentional structure: (4) can function in a pre-differentiated manner, but admits undifferentiation, as well as particular, or multiple and hybrid forms of differentiation; (5) opens out upon, correspondingly, a world of immediacy or an array of locally, singly, multiply or integrally differentiated "worlds" mediated by meaning and motivated by value. In clarifying this second form of pluralism, we must keep in mind
that two-phase process, along with its accompanying forms of pluralism, cuts across all of these forms and combinations of differentiation. Finally, for the sake of convenience, let me refer to (1) the subject-object correlation, its (2) intentional structure, and (3) the two-phase processes in which they engage their subject as "ground factors." And let me begin my explication of the differentiations [37] by supplementing the notion of context with that of the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value mentioned in (5), immediately above.

Consider, then, any specific relative context within which the subject is co-operating. Consider any way in which the ground factors have functioned to uncover, effect, or constitute her context at its current stage of development and in relation to other contexts. In any such case, the subject is "inhabiting" a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. To say this, then, is to claim that the objects within any such context, are what are: intended by an empirically motivated, self-correcting movement of intelligent, reasonable, and responsible questions. It is to say that they are known, uncovered, constructed, or constituted by conscientiously arrived at actions and answers. And it is to add that they are approached or arrived at in community and history, through a two-phased process.

A. Pre-Differentiated Consciousness

Contrast, then, the preceding, preliminary sketch of the world as mediated and motivated, with the "world of immediacy." All of the ground factors are "leveled down." Thus, in the general case, the basic context of the subject either only admits or contracts to unmediated acts and immediate objects on the first level of consciousness. But, then, the subject is "pre-differentiated" and inhabits the "world of immediacy." [38] The human infant is a full time inhabitant of this world. And if differentiation withdraws his performance from its borders, nevertheless the adult subject's returns will be statistically intermittent, partial, and motivated by such needs as those to relax, play, enjoy, rest, reflect and love, to forget, avoid, ignore, refuse, postpone, or to desire or fear, resist or surrender, succumb to pleasure or pain, etc., etc. [39]. Thus, habitation of this world can take a number of different forms. Two of these forms will be illustrated, below, by the development of the human infant. And it is the philosophic signifi-
In a first sense, the spontaneous horizon of intersubjective relationships, in which each member pre-reflectively contributes to the fulfillment of the complementary needs of the other(s), is the world of immediacy. At least initially, such relations are not mediated linguistically [40]. They are founded and develop on the basis of shared, elemental feelings and gestures of tenderness and belonging together. And, they are, invariably, "I-Thou" rather than "I-It" relations [41]. Again, when such relationships prevail, "it is as if "we" were members of one another prior to our distinction," prior to any felt separateness in space and time, or differences in age, maturation, knowledge, responsibility, etc. [42]. Such, paradigmatically, is the relationship of mother and infant. Again, such a relationship may radiate out from one's immediate to one's extended family and neighbors. It may eventually complement the social dimensions of one's interactions at school and work, to set the stage either for the further sets of personal relations constitutive of a family of one's own, some limited set of inter-personal, philosophic reflections, etc.

On the other hand, by mid- to late-infancy, the infant finally will have acquired the ability to suck his own thumb. His acquisition "is dependable, and is independent of evoking the good mother; the infant can bring it into being, as it were, without cooperation...." [43] Furthermore, unlike his mother's nipple or any object, when the infant sucks his own thumb, his thumb feels sucked! According to Sullivan, this experience is developmentally decisive for the infant because it grounds:

the differentiation of the infant's body [thereafter, experienced as "my body"] from everything else in the universe. [44]

Henceforth, the elemental continuity of the world of immediacy in its initial form is broken. The infant becomes aware of (1) himself as an independent center of power for "self"-satisfaction and of (2) the object as, increasingly, what can satisfy him when, increasingly through memory and foresight, he appropriately links means to that end [45].

Thus, the experience of the infant will now oscillate between the two, irreducible forms of immediacy until the second predominates, while that of the adult human subject will periodically shed its differentiation(s) to slip back into either or both. Again, Lonergan abbreviates the horizon of this
"second" world of immediacy as "already-in-here-" and "already-out-there-now-real." [46] And it is his abbreviation which must now, in turn, be explicated briefly.

The object and intentional subject of this horizon are "already" out there and in here, since they, as well as the acts of the subject, are given in the fullest possible sense, prior to the asking and answering of any questions about them.

They are already "out" there or "in" here, because: the consciousness which intends them is, respectively, extroverted or introverted; depending on these respective attitudes, they are experienced as spatially exterior or interior to "my body."

They are out "there," because "my body" as a medium of perception as well as the object sensed through it are "spatial."

They are out there as well as "in" here "now," because the objects of the subject's introverted acts (e.g., his feelings, intentional acts, etc.) are temporal but not spatial, and the time of the subject's sensing runs along concurrently with the time of the spatial objects sensed.

On the previous showing, the subject of this world is cognitively related to his object by "taking a look at it," by registering the presence of the relevant inner or outer act or term of meaning. When that look or registration leaves nothing out and, thereby, fits him for successful action with respect to it, its subject is "objective." Precisely, then, as a possible object or subject and object of such cognition, the "non-ego" and "ego" of the second world of immediacy are "real." Further, in such a world, two-phase process also is operative. However, it contracts towards elemental forms of mimesis, memory, and groping, and towards the first of its two phases. And relative context(s) shrink to ecologies of biological opportunity, danger, territorial dominance, succor and satisfaction [47].

The infant is temporarily confined to the world of immediacy. Again, the rupture of inter-subjective unity associated with immediacy of the second type, opens the problem for the ego-subject of re-establishing a unity with the other which is not merely a reversion to immediacy of the first type. Thus, the differentiation process must continue beyond the contrary limitations of these linked, oscillating, but inadequate extremes, and the compacted deployment of the ground factors they imply. On the other hand, it is such limitations which the child has at least incipiently transcended when he has
suddenly learned "to ask questions" or "to speak to someone" "about something." [48]

Such transcendence represents the differentiation of consciousness necessary for the child's passage into the world mediated by meaning. But it only sets the conditions for a set of further differentiations and, incidentally, for a periodic return to pre-differentiation of various kinds. Again, within that "larger world," there can be distinguished most readily, perhaps, the relatively differentiated consciousness of common sense, [49] and the scientific, aesthetic-artistic, scholarly, and philosophic differentiations [50].

Finally, communities of each form or multiple forms of the differentiations mentioned are not exclusive. Where they exist, each, as well as relations between each, presuppose the existence of subjects operative on four levels of consciousness. And, therefore, each, as well as relations between each, will manifest interlocking contexts of objects, self-correcting processes of learning and discovery, and cycles of first and second phase process. If, then, the ground factors are being deployed in each form of differentiation, and if these forms admit multiple, interactive, or hybrid combinations, still, for expository reasons we will sketch each separately, briefly, and, in turn.

B. The Undifferentiated Consciousness of Common Sense

First, then, consider a community of common sense subjects. Generically, the ground factors no longer approximate to the first level of human consciousness, to the first phase of two-phase process, etc. Still, their full engagement advances informally and under a characteristic restriction. Thus, their engagement will involve simple processes of mimesis, admiration and disdain, trial and error. They will involve communicative interactions that are relatively spontaneous, local in significance and relevance, and rich in proverb and story, allusion and metaphor, indirection and exhibition, symbol and gesture. But the processes of questioning which motivate their employment are practically, vitally, and concretely oriented. Thus, such questions arise from and pertain to particular, immediate, and relatively short-term conditions and issues. Again, further questions are excluded, not when their exclusion would lead, exactly, to falsity. But they are excluded when they are found to lead to consequences that make no appreciable difference to
matters of daily life. As, thus, delimited, the ground factors go forward in specific ways, for specific ends and for specific reasons. Again, in doing so, they generate, effect or disclose contexts which: reflect these specializations; manifest any or all of the five context or sub-context relations associated with two-phase process.

Thus, the practise of the common sense subjects who inhabit them, will tend not to venture out beyond the field of human apprehensions and interests, of particular descriptions and circumstances, of the experienced facts and projects which the relations of the things "to us" circumscribe. Again, if the resultant yield of insight, judgment, and responsible facility is adapted to the concrete life situation of the subjects at issue, it cannot even be applied without further insights into the situation at hand. Thus, these further insights are always needed to determine whether conditions have changed, whether re-adjustment is necessary before application can be attempted, etc. And if the contexts which emerge, survive, interact and/or develop through such processes are not arbitrary, still they will vary almost with the place, the time and task(s) of the subject and his community. Thus, the ways of the stranger are strange. And communicative blocks develop between parents and children, members of different social classes, sexes, geographic locales, races, cultures, etc. [51].

C. Differentiations of Consciousness

Secondly, consider a community of aesthetically and/or artistically differentiated subjects in history. Ground factors would go forward, oriented both generically and specifically. Generically, then, they are specialized in sensitivity to and the creation of beauty. Specifically, such a generic orientation has itself become specialized in: patterns of sensitivity to the worlds of nature, culture, and/or human conscious interiority, etc.; such divergent but related artistic areas as dance, painting, drama, architecture, poetry and literature, sculpture, music, fashion, cuisine, etc. Again, two-phase process, with its associated forms of non-radical context plurality and, therefore, its ways of historically relating styles or sensibilities, will be operative both within and between such specializations. Through such operations, it will generate or disclose contexts of artistic objects as well as the subjects who can appreciate and/or create them. And these
contexts will both reflect these specializations and manifest any or all of the five context relations which we have associated with the interaction of its two phases [52].

Again, the sensitivity and creativity common to each of the ongoing specializations of the subject in the aesthetic-artistic pattern, refer to but imply degrees of release from various kinds of limiting factors. Such factors may include the rigors and constraints of biological, common sense, scientific, cultural, philosophic or other patterns of human life, concern, and growth. And they are addressed to discerning and articulating local or new and relatively universal possibilities of exhibiting and, thereby, articulating the meaning of the world, of human being within that world, etc. They are addressed, further, to the specific modes of discerning and showing forth the wonder, the sense of unplumbed depths of meaning, the sense of freedom or the multiple alienations thereof. Again, such modes are implicit in the human capacities to care, to question and grow, to groove, suffer, and face disappointment and limitation, to live within and be open to the world, to oneself, and others at all. And since they may either shape or come to shape the meanings and value commitments of the community to which they are addressed, they may have cultural, social, and other forms of intersubjective import as well.

Thirdly, then, consider a community of natural, scientifically differentiated subjects [53]. Generically, ground factors are applied with explanatory intent and increasing levels of formality and rigor. Thus, the incipient scientific subject is still thrown into question by the data, and still wants answers back. But, the limitations which the attitude of common sense had imposed on that query are progressively lifted. Thus, the phase one teaching and learning processes, through which the liberated questioning of the subject is scientifically mediated, expand to encompass the insights necessary to query with, grasp, and operate rigorously upon relationships between constants and variables in successive sets of functions. Still, this adaptation takes place in the proximate or remote context of learning to "read" and "interpret" the data. Again, it will not be any kind of data which one could specify. It will be the data delivered by instituting the kinds of sets of standardized measurement interactions through which, within limits, those functions have already been probably verified. In such contexts, then, one learns to shift from non-technical and techni-
cal forms of description of the data to instrumentally, formally, but non-inferentially mediated forms of observation, query, speech, explanation and intervention. Again, the subject's assimilation of this shift corresponds to her ability to tack back and forth between the common sense horizon defined by the eminently practical relations of the things "to us" and the explanatory, only apparently, remotely practical horizon which would grasp the relations of the things to "each other." Finally, the subject's achievement of scientific literacy will involve, further, her acquisition of a proven familiarity with the meaning and relevance of the latest research projects in the field and proven competencies in accessing and contributing to the issues they raise [54].

But conscientiously acquired literacy in such procedures eventually sets the stage for phase two processes. Thus, it conditions the subject's discovery or mediated appropriation of the "known unknown" signaled by the emergence of anomalous data and expressed in the circulation and acceptance of further, relevant but unanswered questions in the community, etc. Again, the function, use and pace of text writing, the founding of and publication of articles in journals, curriculum design, the organization of learned conferences, the granting of sabbaticals, and investment in measuring instruments and laboratory equipment will shift with the community's successive oscillations between the two phases. Thus, during "normal" periods, their function within the community will be to bring its members up to the level of a recently achieved but narrowly assimilated scientific breakthrough or development. On the other hand, at other times it may be to: disseminate the loci of unanswered, phase two questions, in hopes of calling forth creative solutions; focus attention on the relationships between and relative merits of two or three competing, theoretic solutions to such questions, etc. Again, the scientific community's oscillations between phases of learning and discovery, and its consequent long or short term passage through successive transformations of explanatory context, has a personal condition. But this condition is its participants' commitment to the "conscientious," explanatory deployment of the first three levels of human consciousness.

Again, in book two, chapters one and two of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle establishes the equivalence of the "what?" and "why?" questions posed by the scientific subject. Again, he
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discovers that the conscientious answering of these questions is related to the giving of the "explanatory definition" of the thing queried. But such definition specifies, roughly, the formal cause or nature of the thing at issue. On the other hand, the contemporary scientist, no less than his Aristotelian progenitor asks the questions "what?" and "why?" [55]

But, if Aristotle's discovery of the "intentional" connection between the subject asking these questions and the explanatory definition which specifies "the nature of..." is correct, it must be and, in fact, has been shorn of its associations with the intuitive, deductivist, and pre-explanatory elements intrinsic to his ideals of scientific knowing and system. Thus, the nature sought in query as well as the premisses formulated to articulate it can be regarded not as necessary but as, respectively, contingent and intrinsically hypothetical. The subject's grasp of, and consequent explanatory definition of, the "nature" in question would correspond to her insight or set of insights into the data, now as measured and, consequently, quantified. And it would only grasp a possible and, even, only a probably coherent "intelligibility" in that data. Again, such a grasp would not, even at the limit, be self-evident, necessary, indemonstrable, immediate, intuitive. Rather, it could only be advanced to the status of truth insofar as it was verified. Again, such processes of verification: will involve the use of sampling techniques and, therefore, can be no more than highly probable; get us back to communal, two-phase, short or long term processes of self-correction, transcendence, convergence and, only through them, proximate and remote claims to objectivity.

Again, on the preceding interpretation, "the nature of..." can be re-associated with "what" the subject of the scientific community: proximately affirms on the basis of the best available scientific evidence; remotely seeks to understand correctly by pursuing an answer to the "what?" or "why?" questions within the self-completing and self-correcting dynamic of two-phase process. Thus, the human subject's notion of nature is profoundly heuristic, for it mediates successive expressions of and approximations to an ever fuller, ever more adequate understanding of the relevant data. Again, on this transposition of the Aristotelian conception, the great breakthroughs of the modern sciences can be construed as distinct but
related ways of re-appropriating the notions of explanatory system and nature in post-classicist contexts [56].

Thus, in the face of the relevantly prepared data, at least three distinct but related "heuristics" of nature inform the scientific subject's contemporary project. Animating the "classical" heuristic structure of contemporary scientific query is the search for the explanatory, probably verified, implicitly defined terms and relations operative in functions, principles, and laws. Again, in physics, such principles must be invariant under the appropriate transformations of specifiable reference frames [57]. Underlying the "statistical" heuristic structure is the search for ideal frequency norms which probably specify the non-systematically diverging "states" of classical systems [58]. Underlying the still incipient "genetic" heuristic structure is the search for the "operators" that successively transform the classically specifiable states of dynamic system according to successive schedules of probability [59]. Again, the use of differential equations and eigen-functions augments the search for the verified principles and laws relevant to understanding systematic and non-systematic processes, respectively. And the still incipient notion and corollaries of the notion of "development" guide the third. Again, the two-phase, dynamic process of the contemporary scientific community heads, remotely, through these mediations, for the complete explanation of all phenomena.

Finally, the process of the scientific community specializes by field. Thus, we might reflect upon the ongoing physical, chemical, biological, and zoological field-specializations within scientific enterprise as well as the multiple, diverging, sub- and co-specializations within and among them. But it is tempting to construe them as, at least, inchoatively revelatory of progressively emergent, successively "higher 'forms'" integrating, on successively higher levels, the "lowest" level manifolds and fields within surrounding world process. Again, two-phase process will operate within and between these specializations and sub- or co-specializations. And on the preceding hypothesis, its successive, intentionally and communally mediated phases would reflect the higher order, humanly instituted, mediated and motivated movements within and of the same world process [60].

Fourthly, then, consider a community of subjects whose differentiation is "scholarly." Generically, such a differenti-
ation represents the further, four-fold adaptation of the use of the ground factors methodically to dispel the obscurity and/or ambiguity in the meaning of texts. Specifically, the source of the obscurity is that the world mediated by meaning is nearly as diverse as there are places and times! Thus, the contexts of, respectively, the prospective reader and author of a text may diverge widely. Proximately, it is the role of the scholar-subject to make up for this defect, to make what the text is saying come forward and/or across to the reader, to restore the blocked or awkward communication. Remotely, it is his function to make that communication critical and, if need be, corrective. But to do this for some text or group of texts, or some community or communities of human subjects is quite difficult. Thus, the scholar-subject will tend to specialize his study to what is going forward in the context(s) of some particular place and time, and for some community.

More specifically, both local and relatively alien texts make reference to "things" in their author's world. It is the scholar-subject's task to reconstruct and to be critical in his interpretation of the meaning of both the text and the secondary literature which has grown up around it. Thus, his reading should be informed by the most advanced, sophisticated, and contemporary knowledge of the things earlier and/or elsewhere addressed in the text. Similarly, it should be informed by the greatest possible differentiation of the scholar's sensitivity, the most refined and well-rounded development of his understanding, judgment, and conscience. But thus informed, the greater will be the chances that he will be able to: enter and reconstruct the context achieved within differentiated two-phase process at some earlier or contemporary stage, route, and moment within its dynamic; respond to, select out, and interpret critically, important facets of the text(s).

Again, once familiar with its author's language, the scholar may discover slips in the text [61]. Thus, when its author's confusion of two or more terms is uncovered, the meaning of the text becomes plain. But how was the slippage in the text caught? A question had to arise in the mind of the scholar. Insights had to give rise to answers and to further questions which would not have been asked had the preceding issues not been raised and addressed. Again, inquiries of such kinds had to work through the words, sentences, paragraphs, chapters, sections, and parts of the text at issue towards the
meaning of the whole. They had to be continued until the understanding of each part of the text had filled out, qualified, and corrected the understanding reached in the other parts. Again, the self-correcting process of learning had to turn many times through many areas of the text. Separate and, apparently, opposed results achieved had to be allowed to contest with each other. And such processes had to be allowed to continue until they converged upon a limit of no further unanswered questions [62].

Some interpretive problems pertain not solely to the understanding of the things referred to or the expressions used by the author of the text. They may pertain, instead, to the author of the text herself, her way of life, her socio-economic system, culture, language, in short, her mentality. To address these questions, the scholar must re-orient his commitment to the self-correcting process of learning. He must allow it to draw him out of his own context and insert him into the common sense context, the culture of another time and/or place. But the subject can only do this by: working through the author's corpus; working through other texts written at similar times in proximate places; studying the remains of local architecture and economy, dress and religion, politics and culture; appropriating the works of other scholars on the same period, etc. This lengthy and difficult process heads for the "fusion," without confusion, of the relative context(s) or horizon(s) of the scholar and the author of the text.

On the other hand, the classic texts in history, philosophy, religion (and, perhaps, even science) may create a further problem. Thus, the meanings which they would express, the meanings which he set out to read and interpret, may transcend the achieved horizon of the scholar's understanding of the basic context of his own intentional performance. Then, if they are to be fathomed, they may demand of the scholar a revolution, a major "displacement" in her sensitive, intellectual, and/or moral self-understanding. Such displacements may take even more time and come only at the price of even greater labor and energy. Still, on their proper negotiation will depend the adequacy of the tradition of interpretation in terms of which a text, set of texts, or set of interpretations of such texts is read, interpreted, criticized, communicated, carried forward.
Again, the criterion of the truth of interpretation is twofold. Its "proximate" criterion is the self-correcting process of learning and discovery. Thus, it will have to work through the ground factors and, therefore, two-phase processes. Again, such processes will pervade the first three of the preceding tasks and structure the relations between them. Its "remote" criterion is the interpretation's ability to "recover" or "retrieve" the tradition from which the text in question has originated or of which it is a part. Such retrieval can be minor or major. It is "minor" when it represents the scholar's breakthrough into a new faithfulness to the tradition as context which he has inherited. It is "major" when it restores such an inheritance to its proper roots in basic context and, thereby, actualizes virtualities which are latent within it, its history of interpretation, and the history of the interpreters who discovered, sustained and developed it. But the conditions of the recovery of the text in these last two senses, pertain to the scholar's conscientious application of herself to the fourth task.

Finally, the mediated and mediating achievements which are characteristic of the scholarly differentiation are usually only the fruit of: a life-long effort, a life-long devotion to authenticity; a socio-historically expanded collaboration in two-phases of similarly motivated subjects [63].

Fifthly, besides the common sense, scientific, scholarly, and aesthetic differentiations, there is the contemporary "philosophic" differentiation of the consciousness of the subject.

"First philosophy" for the ancient Greek and medieval philosophers was done by the metaphysician. Metaphysics was the first science because it articulated and gave legitimacy to the philosopher's concern with the most general and, therefore, the trans-categorical principles and causes of empirical "substances." As first, it was a special perfection or habit of the human soul. Thus, it was the apex of the good human life, sustained with practical virtuosity in the polis, and the fulfillment of underlying material conditions, etc. Again, if the metaphysician's claims were more general and transcendent than those of scientists in other fields, his achievements and basic categories did not differ from theirs in kind.

With modernity, on the other hand, the starting point reflecting the philosopher's concern shifted. Again, that shift
was, increasingly, from the data of sense to the data of consciousness, from the "object as object" to the "object as subject." That shift began with an epistemological and systematic focus in the work of Descartes. It reflected his project both philosophically to integrate but also to sustain the acceleration of the new scientific revolution. But that revolution increasingly liberated the modern scientist from the classical Aristotelian categories, methodology, and starting point. But with the failures of the Kantian compromise and both Hegel's and Husserl's attempts to restore, respectively, speculative and apodictic knowledge, the focus within the new starting point has tended to shift, increasingly, to questions of human practise and finitude, existence and contingency, context and history.

This further movement within or beyond modernity is evident in the priority given in Schopenhauer's, Nietzsche's and, even, Ricoeur's thought to the will. It is clear in Kierkegaard's surrender to faith. It is clear in William James' insistence that, when the options she faces are live, forced, vitally important and, in consequence, logically intractable, the subject should trust her "passionate nature." It pervades Dilthey's attempt to articulate a "Lebensphilosophie" and Sartre's to render existentialism. It relates, by way of the notion of perspective, philosophies as different as those of Jaspers and Buchler. Again, it is present in Heidegger's venture in recovering the "historicity" of both the Being-question and the Dasein who, having completed his existential analytic, is called forth to raise it, Hannah Arendt's attempt to revive and articulate the taste for action in a modern polis, and the contemporary opening to Eastern thoughts. And it is, perhaps, also clear in Dewey's stress on the consequences of action, as well as Rorty's option for coping, edification, and the refinement of the arts of irony in the face of classical and modernist philosophical pretensions. But the philosophically differentiated subject is a participant in the movement of the reflections some of whose major western turning points I have just attempted to compress and narrate, and whose Eastern and Southern dimensions I would not currently venture. He is bound to that history and community by his concern for questions about the nature of reality in general, of human reality, cognition, and the good life in itself and with others, etc. And in the western world, he is
bound to them by the legacy of modernist and post-modernist assumptions which he has had no choice but to inherit. On the other hand, even should he determine that the philosophical differentiation is the disease from which he must find delivery, his differentiated reflections to this effect and to this end set what he is doing by saying this apart from his habitual deployment of intentional structure in the other patterns [64].

D. Differentiation and Pluralism

Each of the foregoing differentiations of consciousness can be incipient or mature or receding [65]. Still, we have briefly distinguished four differentiations and communities of differentiated consciousness, the scientific, the aesthetic, the scholarly, and the modern philosophic. But besides such single differentiations and single communities of differentiation, there are double, triple, and fourfold differentiations. Thus, there are four possibilities of single differentiation: scholarly, scientific, aesthetic/artistic, philosophic. But there are six possibilities of twofold differentiation [66]. There are four possibilities of threefold differentiation [67]. There is one possibility of a fourfold differentiation of consciousness in which scientific, aesthetic, scholarly, and philosophic differentiations are combined. Finally, there is one case of only relatively differentiated or undifferentiated consciousness which is at home only in its local realm of common sense!

There are, then, on this analysis, sixteen different types of differentiated and undifferentiated consciousness. Again, from the sixteen possibilities of differentiation there results sixteen different "worlds." Again, there are many different routes through which the subject might advance to the fourfold differentiation. And the highly schematic division could be further complicated by adding a fifth, religious, a sixth, psychic or organic or other differentiations.

But, then, there is a second kind of non-radical pluralism intrinsic to the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. It has its branches in the multiple differentiations of human consciousness and its root in the intentional structure and two-phase processes of the subject which undergo differentiation. Like the pluralism we have associated with two-phase process within a given pattern of operation, the pluralism we now associate with the differentiation of human consciousness is "invisible" to the subject of inadequately differentiated
consciousness. Thus, prior to reflection, it functions, figuratively, "behind our backs," to disorient the communicative interactions of incarnate, human subjects in history and community. It confuses the subject who is less differentiated than her place and time and, therefore, her context, demands. It imposes a frustration upon subjects who have achieved a greater differentiation than most other people in their communal context. Again, the pluralism is non-radical, precisely because the routes exist by which the relevant differentiations of subject and community, and the various combinations thereof can be, in one way or another, learned or spanned. Again, the pluralism is non-radical, precisely because the routes exist by which the relevant differentiations of subject and community, and the various combinations thereof, in one way or another, can be learned or spanned. But these routes exist precisely because of the common basis of those routes and those differentiations in the four-fold structure and community of human consciousness, in what I have called the ground factors [68].

V. Displacement, Dialectic, and Radical Pluralism

I think the myth of Ulysses is very important for us all. We shall all of us turn out to be a little like Ulysses, seeking for ourselves, hoping to reach the end of our journey, and then, when we reach our home and homeland once again, no doubt discovering ourselves. But, as with the Labyrinth, as with every guest, there is a danger that we may lose ourselves. [69]

The perspectivist must not engage in dialectical argument with Socrates, for that way would lie what from our point of view would be involvement in a tradition of rational enquiry, and from Nietzsche's point of view subjection to the tyranny of reason. Socrates in not to be argued with; he is to be mocked.... [70]

The intentional life of the human subject is "displaced" when its dynamic orientation corresponds to the transcendental precepts. But, then, paralleling, respectively, the first, second and third, and fourth levels of human consciousness, such displacement can be, minimally, sensitive, intellectual, and/or moral. The aforesaid levels of the consciousness of the subject, as well as the respective displacements which they can undergo, are complementary in character. But, then, the intentional life of the displaced subject is determined, on successive, complementary levels, by its orientation, respec-
tively, if minimally, to the "beautiful," the "intelligible," the "true," and the "good." But such an orientation sooner or later will issue in processes of self-correction and, also, self-transcendence. Eventually, then, it will function correctly to implement relations of development, higher viewpoint, opposition, divergence, and complementarity among the contexts it discloses, effects, constitutes, differentiates. Again, such displacement itself admits differences of degree, and can develop or regress. Finally, since the proper orientation of her intentional life is implicated in all of the phases, contexts and differentiated forms of consciousness in which she is involved, the question of the displacement of the subject's performance is relevant in every order of human involvement.

Such displacement can be relatively spontaneous. Thus, pre-reflectively, it will inform the subject's praxis. And it will do so insofar as she is: using her common sense, or deploying the methodical praxes of science and mathematics, pursuing normal scholarship, enjoying or making art, doing philosophy; doing these things within some stage of two-phase process(es); doing them conscientiously without knowing that that is what she is doing.

On the other hand, because such displacement is only pre-reflective, it is insecure. And it is insecure because the subject has neither made the proper orientation of her intentional life an issue for query nor pursued that query to the term of relevant self-knowledge. In lacking such self-knowledge, then, she lacks second order controls on the orientation of her praxis. Thus, she lacks an understanding of the second order, basic context in terms of which the orientation of that practise is to be situated, as well as the explicit evidence which would ground its fully conscientious deployment.

But, then, we need not only consider the displacements of the conscious life of the subject insofar as they are spontaneously lived. They are also to be considered insofar as they are reflectively thematized, theoretically understood and articulated, rationally affirmed and, even, deliberately opted for by their subject. As said, the sensitive, intellectual, and moral displacements of the consciousness of the subject correspond to the proper, complementary orientations of the relevant levels of the intentional structure of human conscious life [71]. But, then, in the limited space that follows, a threefold purpose must be pursued.
First, evidence for the indefeasibility of the displacements and, therefore, of the basic intentional structure which, in fact, they re-orient, will be presented. Again, the presentation of the three-fold displacement will be followed by a brief description of the "counter"-orientation or "opposed" attitude of the subject.

Secondly, the intentional "positions" on "reality" and "objectivity" which follow from the displacements of the subject will be presented. And this presentation, too, will be followed by a brief description of those to which they are opposed.

Thirdly, relativist denials of the possibility of "objective" knowledge which admit resolution in terms of the preceding analyses will be addressed.

Finally, the "positions" and linked but opposed "counter-positions" on human "intentionality," "reality," and "objectivity," which were laid out in the first three sub-sections mentioned, above, will be used to define the further, radical, "dialectical" pluralism which, also, in fact, informs the human subject and his world.

A. The Displacements of Human Consciousness

First, then, as noted, the subject's shift towards a second order context has begun, when the process of reflective query opens.

Such a reflective shift has advanced to a breakthrough in the area of his "intellectual" displacement, when its subject has come to understand and affirm with certainty his own understanding and affirming. But this is tantamount to the "self-affirmation" of the subject [72].

It involves his use of the cognitional facet of the intentional structure which he spontaneously engages to experience, grasp and render judgment about anything, to reflect upon, understand and affirm himself as a knower. Again, the breakthrough is stabilized when the subject of self-affirmation adverts and re-adverts to the data of consciousness, to the empirical evidence that these are the operations which he, in fact, performs when he knows. It is stabilized, further, when he realizes that his use of cognitional structure is presupposed by any of her conscientiously made, revised or improved judgments of fact. Further evidence for his self-affirmation is afforded when he discovers that any attempt on his part to revise the three-fold structure itself only can be legitimate
if, in his hypothetical attempt at self-revision, certain conditions are fulfilled. But to fulfill these conditions, he refutes his own attempt. This is so because in his attempt he will, inevitably, have to invoke experience, e.g., the data of consciousness accessed in self-reflection; understanding, e.g., his better or corrected account of that data; and judgment, e.g., his affirmation that that account is so. It is stabilized, again, when he discovers that his own explicit denial of self-affirmation is always, performatively, either at odds with what he has just done to make the denial or else, simply, arbitrary [73].

Finally, the subject of self-affirmation advances her breakthrough a further step, when she has come to understand and affirm that the "noematic" correlate to the three-fold structure of her cognitional performance can be specified heuristically. Thus, it can be specified as "whatever," as any "object" which lies within: the complex world mediated by meaning; the circle of empirical apprehension, intelligent grasp, [74] and reasonable affirmation; the horizon of her desire to know.

The subject's turn to the data of consciousness has proceeded to a breakthrough in the area of "moral" displacement, when she has freely and deliberately opted for herself as a locus of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. But this is tantamount to the existential self-choice of the subject, and her founding option for responsible self-determination [75].

It involves her use of the practical facet of the intentional structure which she spontaneously engages in her living in the world. But now it is used, reflectively, to self-dispose her free option for herself as a subject of responsible practise. The breakthrough is stabilized when the subject of self-choice reflects that these are, indeed, the operations with which she enriches her cognitive performance when, in fact, she opts responsibly. It is stabilized, further, when she realizes that on her way to action, her use of practical structure is presupposed by any of her conscientiously made, revised or improved judgments of value. She discovers, further, that any attempt on her part to revise the four-fold structure of her own responsible practise only can be legitimate if, in her hypothetical attempt at self-revision, she undercuts her own attempt by deliberating about the alternatives to it, evaluating them, and deciding and acting on that evaluative basis. It is
stabilized, again, when she discovers that her own option against her own responsible practice is performatively at odds with both the freedom of that option and its implicit claim to non-arbitrariness [76].

Finally, if she is also sufficiently developed in her intellectual displacement, the subject of moral self-choice may advance a step further. Thus, she may come to understand, affirm, and opt for the noematic correlate of the four-fold structure of her practice as specified heuristically. This correlate can be specified as "whatever," as any "object" which: lies within the complex world motivated by value; falls within the circle, not only of empirical apprehension, intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, but also of deliberate consideration, conscientious evaluation, and responsible choice and action [77].

The subject's reflective turn also can advance to a breakthrough in the area of his "sensitive" or "aesthetic" displacement. This breakthrough is difficult to characterize and explicitly ground without presupposing the other two displacements. Perhaps the following is relevant.

Such a breakthrough involves the aesthetically displaced subject in becoming explicitly sensitive to and settled in response to the fact of his own sensitive displacement.

But the fact is that the sensitivity of the subject is properly displaced when it is oriented to objects which, minimally, are either contextualized or are open to some form of adequate contextualization within the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. Again, suppose that the sensitivity of the subject were closed to such actual or potential contextualization, to the intentional openness which such contextualization both presupposes and involves. But, then, it would have lost both its correspondence to and relevance for the dynamic of questioning.

Furthermore, as we have seen, above, the dynamic to the subject's questioning not only unfolds on four conscious levels. Rather, by directing it to his own intentional performance, the subject, in fact, can double back upon himself intentionally, critically to know and to opt for himself. But if the sensitive consciousness of the subject could not be explicitly present to its own activity precisely as open to intentionally mediated or mediable objects, this would be impossible. This is so, since such openness is, precisely, a proper part of the data for the
subject's second order, reflective query. But, then, a necessary condition of self-affirmation and existential self-choice must be: their subject's sensitive capacity to heighten and explicitly to advert to his own implicitly operative presence to himself; the qualified but explicit reflexivity of his sensitive consciousness.

These conditions of reflection can be explicitly reflected upon and affirmed. On the other hand, their pre-affirmative complement is the subject's explicit, ongoing sensitivity to and appreciation of the openness of his own sensitive life. I would call such ongoing, cumulative sensitivity the "self-affection" of the subject. And whether it takes place in concert with its intellectual and moral complements or independent of them, its occurrence marks the sensitive displacement of its subject.

As said, were his self-affection impossible not only as an ongoing attitude but even as an isolated event, the subject could not access the data necessary for his reflective query. But such an impossibility would be tantamount to the negation of his sensitivity as the sensitivity of a human conscious subject. And this would be so since human sensitivity at least must be capable of: co-operating and corresponding intimately with the intellectual and moral displacements of the subject; being both aware and appreciative of what it is doing while it is doing so.

Again, objects in the worlds of nature and humanly perfected art, can carry for the sensibility of the subject, different affective modalities of the sense of: self-affection; the intentional openness of her sensitivity to the world mediated by meaning and motivated world [78]. Such objects can carry this sense without their subject being explicitly capable of articulating what she is undergoing. And they can mediate the subject's explicit, sensitive breakthrough into the event of intentional displacement they express [79].

Finally, in our description of the second form of pre-differentiated consciousness, we saw that its biologically patterned subject lives or slips back into living as if her knowing, deciding, and sensitivity were equivalent to "taking a look" at what is "there." As noted, should the philosopher mistake her own or other's consciousness in such a pattern for its fully displaced intentional life, her reflections will tend to generate theories of cognition organized around ocular metaphors. But such reflections will tend to systematize and
intellectually legitimate the exclusion of the three-fold displacement.

B. Displacement, World, Reality

Secondly, the subject displaced in any or, preferably, all of the preceding three ways, reflectively may advance a series of further steps.

The reflection of the displaced subject advances a first step further, by clarifying the limits of both the intentionality which structures her conscious acts as well the world upon which her acts open out.

Thus, the subject may reflect that in every generation, and not merely her own, the scope of what one actually knows is restricted by the questions which one knows how to ask, answer, and act upon. In every vital generation, in fact, there will be those who have learned to ask the questions which only those in some succeeding generation will have learned to answer. Again, there are the further questions which no one may ever learn to ask. Still, whatever is or would be the object of a legitimate, empirically motivated question, falls within the scope of the intentionality of the subject. But, then, there is nothing about anything which, in principle, is "external" to what must now be characterized as the "unrestricted" scope of the intentional structure of the subject. Thus, any attempt to specify such an object will result either in using that structure to do so or in contradicting the proper conditions for its use [80].

Again, if the scope of the basic structure of the subject is unrestricted, then no object which fulfills its intention could lie "outside" its scope. But the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value comprises the totality of such objects, as well as the totality of relative contexts through which they are or are to be reached. Therefore, the scope of that world: must encompass all that is in any way real; must be as unrestricted as that of the intention in terms of which it is heuristically specified. And this is so, even if, in the name of progress, the unrestricted intention of the subject is always proximately and manifoldly restricted, etc. Again, such proximate restriction of a, remotely, unrestricted intention always, in fact, will fall within two-phase process. It will always, in fact, manifest both the level and extent of the subject's differentiation. And it also always will commit him, not only to the limited, ongoing fields of objects upon which
his questions, answers, and actions open out, but also to the complex, specifiable relationships which obtain between such fields within the world as a whole.

Finally, in Section IV A, above, we named the horizon of the pre-differentiated subject, in his second form, the "already-out-there-now-real," and identified it with a "world of immediacy." But on this description, the world of the pre-differentiated subject can represent, at best, a sub-division within and, at worst, a radical limitation, truncation and distortion of the world mediated by meaning.... Again, second order reflection upon such a notion of world, will tend to generate metaphysical theories organized around metaphors of separate realms of entities. But such separation opens problems of participation, bridging, immanence and transcendence, and the classic problems in the philosophy of mind, etc., which, in turn, call forth various deficient strategies for closing it.

C. Displacement and Objectivity

The reflection of the displaced subject advances a second step further, when he realizes that "objectivity" is the fruit of the "conscientious" deployment of the basic intentional structure which she is [81].

On the one hand, then, in a "first sense," objectivity cannot be merely extrinsic to the subject's relevant, conscientious deployment of operations on four conscious levels. Thus, it cannot be extrinsic to such intentional processes as questioning and the reflection on relevant evidence only through which it is achieved. It cannot, therefore, be independent of the relevantly differentiated, communally and historically mediated processes of development and self-correction, which inform her actual situation (context), differentiation, and phase within the world. Nor can it be independent of the particular, informal and formal methods, systems, norms, etc. which function as integrators of such processes at successive stages of their development and/or correction [82].

On the other hand, if it is only through such processes that the judgment of the subject is, thus, objective, this is not the whole story. Thus, as objective, the judgment of the subject implicitly posits or heads for the positing of its object as distinct from and not merely relative to: the intentional act which affirms it; the socio-historical, dynamic context in terms of which it is framed and through which it is
affirmed. Again, to deny this "second sense" of objectivity, is also to render the facts of the subject's intentional performance unintelligible. But such facts are multiform.

Thus, recalcitrant experience, and the further relevant questions which through the attentive human representatives it calls forth, de-stabilizes the inadequate, extant contexts within which the data are brought to account. Once destabilized, such contexts are, in fact, eventually transcended and/or corrected until, at the limit of a series of successive approximations, all the relevant questions are answered. Again, even when not as yet actually reached, the limit is posited, precisely in order to account for the successive processes of context destabilization, transcendence and/or correction which would be needed to reach it.

Again, the somewhat vague criterion of "no further relevant questions," which guides the movement of successive context transformations, does admit further specification. For example, then, by a canon of "selection," the subject knows in advance that the contexts of his descriptive statements, though themselves liable to revision and development, are less subject to change than those of his explanatory statements. Further, by canons of "selection," "operation" and "complete explanation," [83] the subject knows in advance that a theory which would, for example, radically revise the periodic table of elements, must account for all the data it can account for as well as a "substantial range" of further data, etc. But, then, if it is not possible to predict what the limit or even the next context in a tradition of query will be, still one can say a number of things about the way in which that further context will be objectively constituted, the kinds of relationships in which it will stand, the kinds of evidential constraints to which its discovery and affirmation will be subject, etc. Again, unless there were such an adequate, limit context, ultimately it would not make sense to talk about the "cognition" of the subject, about the "rational" adjudication of the question at issue within the socio-historical community of subjects, about progressive and regressive context shifts, flexibility in the routes of query, the movement of query off in different directions, etc. [84].

Finally, the notion of objectivity cannot be equated with the "extroverted" attitude of the subject of pre-differentiated consciousness attempting to "take a good look" at the "world of
immediacy," at what is "already in here" or "already out there now." Thus, even at the hypothesized limit of inquiry, the objectivity of the subject has nothing to do with: determining the "correspondence" of the objects of two such looks; mapping from a given set or one set of such looked at objects to some other; getting and comparing two sets of such objects in a super-look; mirroring what is "out-there" within the "interior" "container" of human conscious life "in here." It has nothing to do with the subject's "intuitive grasp," at the limit, of the "self-evidence" of a set of concepts and relations, of a set of "eternal truths." It has nothing to do with: elimination from the "world mediated by meaning..." of everything that is not given in the world of sensory or intellectual immediacy; regarding the experiencing, understanding, judging and believing of the subject as mere "subjective" entities, etc., etc. [85].

Rather, objective truths that are neither "in here" and eternal, nor "out there" and relative to a given place and time, proximately, are relative to the "context" of a place and time. Such contexts are related to each other. They are related because: they represent moments within relevantly differentiated, two-phase process, within the community's self-correcting and self-completing dynamic of learning and discovery; each is related, remotely, to the contingent, terminal context in the series which they, in fact, occupy [86]. Again, by appropriately studying such relations, by appropriating the data, the questions, the phase and, further, the specific differentiation(s) which mediated their determination, it becomes possible to transpose true statements from less to more developed contexts, from more to less erroneous contexts, and vice versa [87]. Again, as query converges towards its limit, such transpositions make it possible for the subject to reach a truth that extends over places and times, to properly situate or interpret earlier, less adequate expressions, to do what could not be done at the earlier stages of the query, etc. [88].

D. Objectivity and the Relativist

In our discussion of the displacements of the subject, cf. the self-affirmation of the knower [89], objective judgments in the second sense, described above, were reached. In these judgments, the first sense of objectivity was operative but not central. It was operative, since the historical context of the discussion was set by the tradition of reflective inquiry on the
data of consciousness which dates back, conveniently, to the time of Descartes. It was not central in that we could take such a tradition relatively for granted and marshal arguments which presuppose that its assumptions are, minimally, in place.

Thus, in the self-affirmation of the subject, the limit of no further relevant questions is definitively reached. And this is so even granted that the subject's articulation of the cognitional component of her intentional structure is historically conditioned and, therefore, admits a measure of development. Again, this admission is not self-defeating precisely because what self-affirmation intends, is the reality of the subject who knows. And to access, evidence, and affirm this reality, the subject need only reflect upon what he is actually doing when he: denies that he is a knower; would radically revise the self-description affirmed; inquires in any field, etc., etc. Thus, the evidence for the self-affirmation of the subject, as well as the data which might lead to non-radical advances in its self-expression or explicit engagement, depends only upon such pre-reflective, performative inevitabilities and the subject's self-reflection upon them.

But, then, precisely because, in the case of her self-affirmation, the movement of further questions, contingently, reaches a limit, such a movement is not intrinsically interminable [90]. And its subject does not need to know everything about everything, to have absolute knowledge [91] in order to reach it. Again, the case is exemplary rather than exceptional. Thus, with due conscientiousness, human subjects similarly reach such a limit in many less extraordinary or non-reflectively buttressed cases, i.e., "I am reading a philosophy paper published in the journal Method;" "Method is the journal for Lonergan studies." Finally, the sense of the objectivity of self-affirmation which has been defended is not Cartesian. This is so since it does not depend upon an intuitive model of cognition. Thus, it associates objectivity with neither the inner inspection and grasp of formally universal and necessary propositions, nor indubitable internal data. And it is not, therefore, the appendage to either a deductivist epistemic or metaphysical project.

As said, the subject's self-affirmation is made in the context of a contingent historical tradition. That tradition has, minimally, in its latest phases, increasingly legitimated both inquiry into and, to some extent, a language for discour-
sing about the performative data of consciousness. Still, it is only through the creative transformation of the resources which that tradition and its language recently have made available, that the nature of the subject's intentional reality is adequately specified and affirmed. On the other hand, the affirmed reality of that intentional nature is merely the product of neither that tradition nor that language. Again, that nature's conscientious functioning was the human condition of the emergence, survival and increasingly differentiated social, cultural, and personal arrangements within which a philosophic tradition and language could emerge. It was the human source of the increasingly radical scientific, cultural and artistic breakthroughs upon which the similarly, socio-culturally situated philosophic traditions could increasingly reflect. It was the motive for the emergence, within that philosophic tradition, of the "turn to the subject." And, finally, it was both the remote object of that turn's attempts at self-reflection and part of the proximate, non-intuitive evidence for the judgment of self-affirmation.

On the one hand, then, there is the meaning affirmed by the subject in her self-affirmation. It could not fully have been grasped or expressed independently of either its subject's explicit acts of reflection upon the data of consciousness or, probably, the differentiated twists and turns of the most recent phases of the western philosophic tradition of reflection upon it. In these senses, the meaning of the self-affirmation of the subject is "context relative." On the other hand, the truth that has been achieved and is being expressed through such reflection and self-affirmation, is distinct from the tradition in terms of whose dynamic it was arrived at and expressed. Thus, it is "objective" in this "second sense." And it is precisely because it is objective in this sense, that what it affirms would demand appropriate, preferably, locally informed and transformed expression in all/any other context(s) or tradition(s) which either probed the meaning of the same reality or sought to interpret the tradition and second order context in question.

E. Position/Counter-Position: Radical Pluralism

Collecting the results of the preceding analyses, the reflection of the displaced subject advances a third step further, when she realizes that the orientation of her inten-
tional life is "confined" to a basic set of "dialectical" oppositions. The base of that set has been located in the intentional stance of the subject. And that base, as well as the set of dialectical oppositions it implies, has been expanded to include the stances towards reality and objectivity which the subject's intentional life, in fact, incarnates. But such a three-fold stance, in determining the most global, defining relations between the subject and his object, specifies the "basic" horizon of the subject's conscious acts in that stance. Thus, the result of the reflections of this section has been its contribution to specifying, briefly, the set of dialectically linked but opposed basic horizons of human being in the world.

In what follows of this section, then, first, we will recap that contribution by determining the extreme cases within the set of oppositions. This will be done by specifying the linked but opposed "positions" and "counter-positions" which define the three-fold stance of the subject and, thus, fix her basic horizon at the extremes. Then the character of the radical opposition which they embody will be reflected upon. Next the radicality of the opposition will be nuanced and, perhaps, somewhat qualified. Then, the larger, more complex set of oppositions, of linked but opposed horizons implicit in the original set, will be outlined. Finally, the complex "radical pluralism" of basic horizons, which the basic set opens to reveal, will be reflected upon.

F. Position/Counter-Position. Dialectic

On the one hand, then, there are the basic "positions" of the human subject. The subject occupies the "first" position, on human intentional activity, generally, when her conscious performance is intellectually, morally, and aesthetically displaced. The subject occupies the "second" position, when she identifies reality with the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value and situates his own reality within its unrestricted expansiveness. The subject occupies the "third" position, on human objectivity, in being faithful to the transcendental precepts. Through such faithfulness, she comes to affirm meanings, act upon values, and respond to both as: certainly or probably true; therefore, compelling or probably compelling independent of the query, method, context, history, and community without whose mediation, motivation and dynamic
she probably would never have uncovered, effected, or constituted them in the first place.

On the other hand, there are the basic "counter-positions." They represent the subject dispossessed of the three basic positions. Thus, the subject inhabiting the "first" counter-position has either lost, refused or else failed to achieve displacement. Her intentional activity has contracted towards "taking a look." The subject occupies the "second" counter-position, when she identifies reality with the world of immediacy, with what is already "out-there" and/or "in-here-now," and situates her own reality at some point within that world. The subject occupies the "third" counter-position, on human objectivity, in being faithful to the extroversion of conscious attitude which both anticipates and achieves a good and complete look at what is there.

Secondly, the two horizons specified by the position/counter-position opposition, address, in some sense, the same basic issues. And they would integrate, orient and provide the setting for the same data field of human consciousness [92]. Again, under appropriate conditions, there is a certain legitimacy to the subject's occupation of the horizon of pre-differentiated, biological consciousness. Thus, the horizon involves an instinctual or quasi-cognitional component whose survival value is manifest in the patterns of animal living adapted to niches in their respective habitats. But, then, if they both are to situate and represent the fact and implications of his intentional consciousness, there is a sense in which, under appropriate conditions, both of the fundamental horizons of the subject do so legitimately.

Again, consider the pre-differentiated subject of the biological pattern who communicates and affirms the sense of her horizon, of the counter-positions which specify it. As soon as and whenever she does so, her intentional performance, on the one hand, and the horizon which she is attempting to articulate, on the other, stand in a relationship of performative self-contradiction. Thus, if there is a certain legitimacy to the pre-differentiated horizon, it is dissolved and becomes illegitimate as soon as its subject ventures upon the intelligent grasp, reasonable affirmation, and responsible choice of herself, or of any other object; as soon as she would address her object from and commensurate it to the standpoint and horizon of the positions. But, again, this she cannot help
doing without: abandoning both the multi-phased differentiations of human consciousness and the undifferentiated, but conscienc- tious performance of common sense; transcending the standpoint of the counter-positions which she had sought to defend ratio- nally.

But, then, the resultant, basic horizons of the subject are opposed. Thus, they are neither reducible, nor is there an integral, higher viewpoint in terms of which they both can be sublated, within which they both can be regarded as lower, complementary, if limited aspects. Again, it is because, on the one hand, there is a certain legitimacy to both horizons and, on the other, that they cannot be commensurated without the emergence of a performative self-contradiction in the subject or community of the attempt, that they can be said to be both "incommensurable" and "dialectically opposed." But, then, for a human subject whose mature conscious life circulates through acts on four differentiated levels, such an opposition, such a polymorphism, is as existentially and, should he reflect, as philosophically inevitable as the fact that he must have passed through infancy and must continue to perform conscious acts on the first level.

Again, the reader may be struck by the fact that it has been possible to thematize and reflect upon the polymorphism of human consciousness. But precisely because, in this way, the viewpoint of the reflecting subject can expand to encompass without unifying incommensurables, the basic horizon to which his conscious acts are confined is, in this further sense, both universal and dialectical.

Thirdly, if the basic, "position"-"counter-position" opposition reflectively can be specified with relative clarity, the reader must keep in mind that, in the concrete, neither pole so far specified exists in a pure state. Thus, if displacement is a precarious achievement, that achievement always may be more of a withdrawal from its absence, more of a promissory note, than a settled, positive possession. Again, while the displacement (or failure of the displacement) of the subject will manifest itself in the deeds, words, and creations of human beings, still that manifestation will itself vary with the level and forms of his differentiation, the phase and character of his query and, therefore, the culture and/or sub-culture within which he lives and grows. But, in this way, the viewpoint of the reflecting subject can expand to encompass without unifying incommen-
surables, distinguish position from counter-position within that compass, range over and, in principle, recover any phase or differentiation of consciousness. But precisely for these reasons, then, the basic horizon to which the conscious acts of the subject are confined is, in this further sense, both dialectical and universal. And, finally, as the reader may have already surmised, the counter-positions, themselves, can take many, even dialectically opposed forms. But if this does not vitiate the relative clarity of our characterization of the extremes in dialectical opposition, if the remarks of this paragraph extend, also, to these other forms, it certainly complicates what would be their full expression. Again, even the displacements are subject to a measure of development.

Fourthly, as said, the base, in terms of which the subject's positions and counter-positions on reality and objectivity can be specified, corresponds to the presence or absence of his three-fold, intentional displacement. In effect, then, once expanded, the disposition of the intentional base, determines the horizon of the subject. But not withstanding the extreme, position/counter-position opposition which we have specified, there are six other ways in which that base can be determined. Thus, there is the one, already stated possibility of the three-fold displacement of the subject. But there are three possibilities of two-fold displacement [93]. And there are three other possibilities of a single displacement which does not involve the other two [94]. Finally, there is the single case in which displacement is completely absent. But, then, with the expansion provided by the six other possibilities of displacement, a total of eight possible fundamental horizons of the subject has been generically if incipiently determined! And each will stand in various complex, but specifiable, dialectical relations to the other specifiable forms.

But, fifthly, all human intentional activity takes place within some basic horizon. Again, as just stated, even prescinding from the dialectic of the counter-positions, the thoroughness of the displacements achieved, etc., the possibilities of the displacement of the subject break down, minimally, into eight distinct types. And this remains true even if the inquirers in question are, in fact, unaware of these facts or set out to make no assumptions.

Again, all of the intentions, statements, deeds, and creations of the subject stand within basic horizons of, approxi-
mately, one of these eight types. To such horizons, the subject implicitly or explicitly appeals when he outlines the reasons for his goals, clarifies the meaning of his statements, or explains his deeds. Again, implicitly or explicitly, these horizons determine the nature, role and relevance of data, attentiveness, questions, evidence, judgment and decision in his cognition, the character of the objectivity to which he will or will not aspire, the meaning of the reality which he takes up or would institute. But, then, whether they are or are not explicitly acknowledged, the eight-fold division of dialectically opposed horizons will lead to specifiable, opposed judgments of value and fact, to different sensibilities and decisions, to different inquiries and understandings of the data in question, to different selections of data to be attended to. And uninformed attempts at communication and discussion across that eight-fold division will result, not merely in the tensions which inform any legitimate inquiry, not merely in the non-radical pluralism which we have associated with two-phase process and the fact of differentiation, but in something akin to a babel.

Again, since some single or hybrid form of the counter-displacements is its source, that babel reflects and implies the fundamental bias of the subject, his inauthenticity, his failure or refusal, in some respect, to observe the transcendental precepts. Again, such bias further will be relative to the phase and differentiation(s) of the subject or community at issue and this added complexity further will heighten the complexity of the distortions inherent in the situation and block efforts at communication and reasonable discussion.

But, then, in a seven-fold multitude of such complex ways, probabilities will decrease that human subjects and communities will either grasp, select, or carry to term the relevant questions, inquiries, programs, solutions, commitments. Their failure will pervade either or both phases within two phase process(es), within some differentiation(s) of their subject's conscious lives. But this will interfere with the advance of the self-correcting and self-transcending process of learning within their communities in history. It will interfere with it in whatever context, inter-related set of contexts, differentiation or set of differentiations it arises. And if it is sufficiently severe or widespread, it will mediate processes of decline. We might single out several generic instances.
Thus, there is the inauthenticity of the neurotic. He evades the full integral character of the question of meaning and value in his life and resists and transfers the resultant conflicts upon the psychologist who would raise it, ask him to face it. There is the inauthenticity of the individual egoist. She limits her questions to those that would enable her to exploit each successive context to her own advantage. There is the inauthenticity of the group which has outlived its once considerable usefulness to the situation of the community as a whole. Now it merely resists the transfers of power to authentic carriers of phase two processes by all the maneuvers which in one way or another block the self-correcting process of development and impede the dynamic of the community. There is the general inauthenticity of the common sense of the community. By it, the community refuses to face the further questions which are theoretical, abstract, philosophical, multi- or transcultural and, therefore, long term in consequence or import. There is the inauthenticity of the philosopher. Its remote origin lies in its subject's failure or refusal adequately to thematize the basic horizon implicit in his use of the four levels of human consciousness, his participation in two-phase process, his ongoing differentiation and displacement. And its fruit is the explicit, faulty self-interpretation of the subject. On this last over-sight, the philosophic subject confuses: intentionality with taking a look; reality with the "out there" or "in here" to be looked at; objectivity with "extroversion." Thus, in one of, minimally, seven generic ways he distorts the description of the proper horizon of human creation, choice, affirmation, sensibility, community, and history. And he distorts the philosophic dialectic in which answers to further relevant questions and the expansion of adequate but untimely answers to old ones depend on correctly approaching answers to the basic issues of human existence. And, finally, he fails to complement the preceding analyses with a sufficiently general account of the phases and differentiations of human intentional consciousness [95].

As said, the fruit of the subject's inauthenticity, will pervade either or both phases within the two phase processes which inform her differentiation(s). Thus, in highly complex ways but ways that can be empirically traced, inauthenticity interferes with and even enters into the normative dynamic of such processes and their products. And it does so in whatever
differentiated context or interrelated set of contexts it arises. But, then, the subject is himself mediated by the reality or the fruits of other's inauthenticity, and/or mediates other's directly or indirectly with his own. It is for such a reason, that the variously differentiated subject must: not only strive to transcend the limitations he has inherited within phase one process, but also reverse the errors and counterpositions which have, in fact, become part of her intentional life; remain ever conscientious in this expanded sense. Thus, processes of decline in the community raise the question of the reversal of inauthenticity in both the subject, her community, and the objects and institutions which they have uncovered, effected, or constituted. Again, it raises the question of the dialectical and dialogal "techniques," virtues, etc., necessary for slowly drawing displacement and recovery from the minor and major, short and long-term breakdowns which are the fruit of decline [96].

Finally, as said, the first, second and third, and fourth levels of the consciousness of the subject are distinct but complementary. Thus, if displacement can occur on one level without taking place in the other two, or in two without occurring in the other one, the integral functioning of the subject requires, respectively, the integrated, threefold displacement of his intentional life. Again, displacement in one area will tend to call forth displacement in the others, and the breakdown of one prepares for the breakdown of others. But, then, the devising of the "techniques" for effecting the reversal of such breakdowns and the development of such complementary displacement also will be to the communicative and restorative point. As, again, would be the subject's appropriation, in its full sweep, of the intentional structure which opens the possibility of all such distinctions, displacements, integrations, and their communication [97].

**XVII. Concluding Remarks**

Encountering unfamiliar races, cultures, points of view, people react in various ways. They may be surprised, curious and eager to learn; they may feel contempt and a natural sense of superiority; they may show aversion and plain hatred. Being equipped with a brain and a mouth they not only feel, they also talk— they articulate their emotions and try to justify them. Relativism is one of the views that emerged from this process. It is an attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of cultural variety. [98]
The relativists were led to their position, not only by their environment, but also by the extreme variability of notions, modes of expression, etc., of the properly human sciences, from age to age and from culture to culture. Their solution was equivalent to the denial of the possibility of a transition to a universal, or transcultural viewpoint. Such a viewpoint involves an appreciation of the invariant element in the human make-up, and hence looks to a philosophy. [99]

We tend to read a man's book or hear a man's words in detachment from the meaning and mystery of him and ourselves. [100]

There have been occasions when I have been aware of emerging from a labyrinth, or of coming across the thread. [101]

This paper began by calling the reader's attention to and asking her to reflect upon the four-fold structure informing the conscious and intentional acts which she, in fact, performs.

First, then, it was pointed out that the subject performs these acts in community and history with others. But that performance conditions and is conditioned by the similar performance of such acts by the other members of her community. But in the process of that joint performance, two phases of activity can be discerned. In a first, subjects are mediated. In a second, the limitations of the initial mediation emerge. Again, they emerge because the further relevant questions it fails to answer: are called forth by the data; guide query's correction or transcendence of the prior mediation. On the way to the latter end, new mediations will emerge. And they may be opposed as contraries or contradictories. They may be complementary aspects of a single higher integration. They may represent the minor or major developments of the initial issue that meet it squarely. Or they may simply diverge from the initial issue to move off in other or further directions. But these possibilities or combinations and expansions thereof are both intrinsic to the group process of query and also proceed according to schedules of probability. Again, any or all may recur on each successively higher (or lower) level of context mediation. And the resultant pluralism is neither radical nor eradicable.

Secondly, human intentional consciousness is always subject to various forms of differentiation. Thus, there is the pre-differentiated consciousness of the subject of the world of immediacy. There is the undifferentiated consciousness of the
common sense subject, at home only in her local brand of common sense. And we have discussed, briefly, the further aesthetic, scientific, scholarly, and philosophic differentiations that complement common sense. But this yields a pluralism of sixteen forms of differentiated consciousness and an equal number of corresponding worlds mediated by meaning and motivated by value. Each form can be incipient, mature, or receding. And the resultant pluralism also is neither radical nor eradicable. Again, the community and history of on-going, two-phase processes and the contexts set by the differentiation(s) of human consciousness are mutually conditioning.

Thirdly, the intentionally structured, variously differentiated engagement of human consciousness in the two-phase processes of history and community, is subject to the presence or absence of, minimally, three displacements.

First, then, reflection on the aesthetic, intellectual, and moral displacement of the data of the subject's conscious life, yields indefeasible evidence for the relative invariance of its four-fold, intentional structure. Secondly, then, the objectivity of the subject can be identified, first, with his conscientious fidelity to the transcendental precepts within the relevantly differentiated, on-going dynamic of two-phase process. And it can be identified, secondly, with the intentional fact that as objective, the preceding processes head for, or, sometimes, actually affirm an object, which exists independently of the dynamic, act, and context in terms of which it was posited or opted for. But if objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, then, thirdly, the real can be identified, heuristically, as: the term of the objective intentional activity of the relevantly differentiated, displaced subject operating in history and community. Finally, the preceding three positions are constitutive of the horizon of the triply displaced subject. But, then, the absence of one, two, or all three of the displacements, places him, within the preceding process, increasingly, in the dialectically opposed counterposition, increasingly in a distorted horizon.

But the dialectical engagement of the subject within community and history, introduces various forms of bias, incomprehension, distorted communication and, in consequence, decline and even breakdown into both the lives of human beings and the various movements of differentiated, two-phase process. But the pluralism implicit in the dialectical engagement of the
subject is both radical and eradicable. It is radical because there is no higher, integral viewpoint in terms of which the positions and counter-positions can be sublated. It is eradicable, because displacement always remains, to some extent, a probable possibility. Again, on the realization of such possibilities, the reversal of decline ultimately depends.

Again, there has been for millennia a vast multitude of individuals in whom the basic, four-fold structure of human intentional consciousness can be verified. For they too attend, understand, judge, decide [102]. Verifiable, too, are its corollaries in the variously differentiated, displaced and combined movements of, within, and between two-phase processes and contexts. Thus, the exigences of that relatively invariant structure task the reader with the difficult, long-term, reflective appropriation of the horizon of such a three-fold pluralism.

But the subject and community of the ongoing horizon of the three pluralisms excludes no mansions. On the other hand, even if this is true, knowledge and response may be not nearly as simple as acquaintance; have no intuitive guarantees. And living with and waiting upon either the unknown or, even, a truly communicative word, frequently may force the subject to stretch forth in hope and anticipation even beyond her time and community. Still, the communo-historical genesis and/or dialectic of no context, "subject" or object, or any combination(s) thereof, is either, in principle, unknowable to him or immune from possible criticism [103].

Thus, does she, thus, does he strive to be at home in the "world," in its trans-cultural but, also, its local and, uniquely personal and inter-personal phases, currents and eddies. Thus, does she, thus does he reserve some time for community with those who are of a like mind [104].

Finally, the subject of such a horizon is under no illusions about the labyrinthine dimensions of human meaning. She is not unaware of the difficulty of living and communicating within the horizon of such an expansive, proliferating pluralism. On the other hand, she does not confuse that difficulty with the belief that there is not a non-relative matrix to be appropriated, that there is no twine within the labyrinth upon which it opens.
I have written this paper in order to honor my teacher and dear friend, Professor K. Irani.


I take this to be one of the direct or indirect theses of Richard Rorty in his masterful, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). Again, many other contemporary thinkers deserve mention here.

In fact, after we have developed our position, each of the five premises of the relativist will be referred to by number and qualified. Cf. Section 5, subsections C-D, below.


The differences of this approach from the Husserlian method of phenomenological self-reflection should emerge implicitly in the course of this paper.

In this paper, I will be drawing freely upon Lonergan's reflections, especially in the areas of relativism and pluralism. They are drawn from all of the major periods of his work, except the very earliest. Thus, they manifest minor but real shifts in viewpoint, accent, etc. It is not the purpose of this paper specifically to research these shifts. Rather, I have used my source creatively and have tried to read earlier texts in light of later developments. Again, I have not tried to bring out all of the dimensions of Lonergan's thought. For example, then, I have deliberately omitted significant discussion of what, in his last works, Lonergan referred to as the "fifth" level of human consciousness, etc., etc. Finally, my efforts, here, are primarily constructive, heuristic, and analytical. Thus, I reserve for work in coming years, and with hopes of a functional specialist collaboration, the task of dialoguing with the full spectrum of contemporary thinkers who have opted for explicit and/or implicit variants of the relativist attitude.

Eliade, p. 185ff.

Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), Chapter I. In his earlier work, *Insight* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), p. 243c and many of his later works, Lonergan refers, instead, to "generalized empirical method." The method mediates the subject's reflection upon his own performance as a conscious subject. Thus, it asks him to grapple with such questions as: (1) What am I doing when I am performing intentionally, whatever the field? (2) Why is that activity to be regarded as intentional? (3) What is the character of the "reality" known, effected, or constituted through such activity? I would contend that such questions
cannot be answered adequately without covering, minimally, the topics set forth in this paper. On the other hand, adequate and immanently, well grounded response to the premisses affirmed and opted for by the relativist, presupposes the nuanced, conscientious, long term use of the method. Finally, it can only be my purpose in this paper to use the results of but not fully to lay bare the structure, strategy, and ramifications of this method.

[12] Two other aspects of that invariant structure, to be discussed, respectively, in Sections IV and V of this paper, are the "differentiations" and "displacements" of the consciousness of the human subject.


[14] The levels of consciousness immanent in the dynamic of basic context are intimated, immediately below. Again, by the time this paper has arrived at Section V and its overall conclusion, the notion of basic context will have been significantly enriched.

[15] The point admits an alternative formulation. Thus, if "relative context" is what is known through the use of "basic context," then in the case of her "self-knowledge" and only in that case, the "absolute" and "relative" contexts of the subject coincide, are identical. Finally, this case is what is under discussion in Section V of this paper, below.


[17] To the complex, "ordered whole" which Lonergan is characterizing, the reader might be tempted to give the name of "system." On the other hand, she should note how different this notion of system is from those of, say, Hegel or Aristotle. Again, relations of "priority" and "posteriority" in its working can be inverted without transforming its basic structure. Thus, the group structure of human consciousness, in different contexts, can operate, inversely, from the "top" "down" as well as from the "bottom" "up." If this theme will not be developed in this paper, it is, nevertheless, operative in the ensuing discussion of two-phase process, etc.

[18] Thus, minimally, Lonergan's characterization (1) pre-supposes the subject's recognition of the data of his own consciousness as, simultaneously, a potential act and term of meaning; (2) is itself a formal act and term of meaning.

[19] In Insight, this is done by guiding the reader's performance through a series of examples and, then, asking her to reflect on what she is doing and what the implications of that doing are. Again, if such an approach of self-discovery is, ultimately, necessary, it has been judged to be unwieldy in a short paper.

[20] The dynamic of the first level of human consciousness itself integrates the lower order, developing, neuro-organic demand functions of the incarnate human subject. Again, these demand functions are called forth by her life in a complex
natural-human environment. Lonergan invokes and transposes the Freudian notion of the "censor" in order to offer clues for accounting for how such an integrative process takes place. He does this in Insight, pp. 73-74; 181-82; 188-203; 532-533n. Secondly, Vincent Potter distinguishes three factors relevant for understanding the first level of human consciousness: "sensation," "perception," and "lived perceptual experience." The first corresponds to the underlying, purely causal component of human experience. Perception represents the bodily synthesis of sensory profiles into a constant object. Lived perceptual-motor experience reflects the variable "concern" of the subject with and for her world. And it is non-inferentially laden with the contexts constituted, effected or uncovered by the subject's higher order, intentional functions. Unlike sensation, then, it is fully intentional. And unlike perception, it will fully reflect the subject's life-worldly concerns. Thus, it is not independent of what we shall later characterize as the phase-state(s), differentiation(s), and displacement(s) of the consciousness of the subject. Finally, the neuro-organic, sensory component to the dynamic of the subject's sensitive consciousness can cooperate with and/or prove refractory to the ongoing, integrative efforts of the subject to "live experience." Cf. Vincent Potter, The Philosophy of Knowledge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1985), Chapter III.

[21] Lonergan specifically analyzes the second level of the consciousness of the subject in Insight, Chapters I-VIII. On the expression of insight, and of human meaning generally, see Insight, Chapter XVII, Section 3.3; Method in Theology, Chapter 3, Section 1, and Chapter 14, etc., etc.

[22] Lonergan specifically analyzes the third level of consciousness in Insight, Chapters IX-X.

[23] Cf. Insight, Chapter XVIII; Method in Theology, Chapter 2.

[24] The limit may or may not be reached in the lifetime of the subject whose question opens his intentional relation to it. Thus, it is what would be reached were the legitimate query of the subject to proceed to its proper limits.

[25] What is, in effect, the "non-relativity," the relative "invariance" of these precepts is implicitly established in Section VA of this paper (cf. the sub-section entitled "The Displacements of Consciousness"). Again, in that section, the question of authenticity is again taken up, now in relation to its negation. Finally, the reader might also consider the discussion of the scholar's major or minor "retrieval" of a text in Section IVC.


[27] I have kept my preliminary account of two-phase process simple. More refined versions will be presented in later papers. Finally, although I have re-worked his terminology and laid the stresses differently, I believe that two-phase process is what Lonergan was getting at in his largely unstudied analyses of the notion of "belief." Cf. Insight, Chapter XX.4; Method in Theology, Chapter 2.5. Also see Lonergan's important, unpublished lecture of 1963, entitled, "Horizon," available in the Lonergan Institute.

[28] The subject may discover these questions for herself. On the other hand, she may sometimes "learn" them from members of her community, or some sub-community within it. Again, the odds
that this will happen will tend to increase as the level of one's authentic education by and within the relevant community rises.

[29] First, a purely static community can be regarded as a limit case of two-phase process, even as constant velocity can be regarded as the limit of acceleration. Secondly, the issue and fact of decline, briefly is discussed in Section VF, below. Finally, on pp. 99 and 140 of his Course in General Linguistics (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), trans. by Bade Barkin, Ferdinand de Saussure makes the synchronic/diachronic distinction in the context of linguistic theory.

[30] To introduce the central notion of "higher viewpoint," Lonergan asks his reader to reflect upon what she is doing when she advances from doing arithmetic, to algebra, to calculus, etc. Later he asks her to reflect upon his grasp of the successive sets of invariants under transformation constitutive of the laws of, successively, Euclidean, affine, projective, and topological geometries. Cf. Insight, pp. 13-17; 146-47, etc.

[31] The fact of genuinely "opposed," non-complementary contexts, raises the issue of "faulty judgments," and the need both to correct them and to transform the viewpoints and attitudes which spawned them. The issue and the need briefly will be addressed in Section V, below.

[32] If this is true, then the following conclusion should follow. Thus, assume that we are given two contexts, L and M, as well as the conditions and questions which they claim to integrate. In the general case, it should be possible to identify, at least but not necessarily only in retrospect, whether (a) M represents a forward or regressive move with respect to L; (b) L and M are sub-contexts of the higher viewpoint O; (c) L and M are heading for divergent, complementary, contrary or contradictory ends. Finally, the case is further complicated when the contexts are philosophic. On this last point, see Section VE, below, where the issue of the "incommensurability" of the positions and counter-positions of human intentional activity briefly is addressed.

[33] Thus, the physical, economic, technical, domestic or political abolition of the basic context of human query and practise would correspond to the abolition of either the life or spirit of human being itself. On the other hand, its personal and communal admission and engagement makes the pluralism associated with two-phase process inevitable.

[34] In this section, we have specified relative contexts as the variables generated or uncovered by conscientious, ongoing, communal use of basic context in some limited area of human query. In some sense, two-phase process also informs the context, community and history of philosophic reflection. But in that case, although the subject at the start of his inquiry is multiply mediated, he possesses sources of philosophic discovery and evidence which are "immanent," i.e., the data of his own consciousness, what he actually does when he knows and decides responsibly, etc. But, then the "subject" but also the "object" of that reflection is basic context in its full range of implications. The function of teaching and learning philosophic texts in this basic field is to mediate, through the self-reflections of others, an adequate self-appropriation, a basic "literacy" or "scholarship" in the area of one's own conscious Self as basic "text." Again, if there are controls on the process which stem from this immanent access of performative data, once the philosopher begins to formulate his self-under
standing, an element of relativity enters into the philosophic enterprise. For speech can take place without or with only limited, nominal, or faulty understanding. And self-appropriation in a context mediated by reflection on either Aristotelian, Galilean, Newtonian physics or some species of an exclusively European history, art, psychology, and common sense will lack the additional resources currently available for improving on their accounts. Cf. Insight, 429b.

[35] Eliade, p. 100c.
[37] Because the common sense subject, in fact, is differentiated relative to his counterpart, inhabiting the "world of immediacy," I will, sometimes, when the alternative is unwieldy, use "differentiation" locutions to include her "undifferentiated" consciousness. The reader must discern from the context which sense I am giving to such locutions.

[38] I have introduced the adjective "pre-differentiated" to stand to the consciousness of the subject operating within the world of immediacy, as the adjective "undifferentiated" stands to the consciousness of the subject operating within his everyday, common sense world. Sub-patterns of the pre-differentiated activity of the subject, will be distinguished shortly. Finally, these distinctions are clarified further in the next two subsections of this paper.

[39] Whatever the differentiation, pattern, or sub-pattern of the subject's intentional operation, there are, eventually, organically rooted neural demands for intussusception, survival, and reproduction to be met. Again, such demands are always, in fact, tied to some natural and human environment (cf. Insight, pp. 182d-184b, and 263b for the explicit explanatory context of the preceding text). In the human infant, these demands are remote anticipations of his further needs for, respectively, understanding, a good life, community and, therefore, a fully integrated existence in the world. Thus, as she differentiates under many non-personal and personal influences, the intentional context within which the subject's neuro-organic demand functions are to be met expands, becomes more complex and flexible, and actualizes its own anticipated, integral demands correspondingly.

[40] On the other hand, intersubjective relations may evolve a speech which is neither pragmatic nor technical in the ordinary sense.

[41] Cf. Lonergan's Notes on Insight, p. 36; Insight, Chapter VII, Sections 3ff. Lonergan's "Notes" are unpublished. They were composed by him during a summer graduate course at Saint Mary's College of California, Morage, in 1961. They are available through the Lonergan Institute. For the "I-Thou" and "I-It" locutions, which Lonergan uses in the notes cited, immediately above, cf. M. Buber, I and Thou trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970).

[42] Buber claims that it is possible for the subject to enter into some form of I-Thou relationship even with "the living wholeness and unity of a tree," e.g., with pre-human existents within the universe proportionate to possible human experience. Cf. Buber's "postscript" to I and Thou, p. 171b.

[44] Ibid., p. 136b.

[46] Cf. **Method in Theology**, p. 263b; Insight, pp. 251-52. In the former text, Lonergan's articulation of the "already-out-there..." and "in-here-now-real," is set in the context of a discussion of the basic horizon of the subject of the "world of immediacy" in, what I have termed, its second sense. The context of the latter text, is Lonergan's articulation of the basic context of the subject of the biological "pattern of experience." For the purposes of this paper, I will not attempt to bring out sharply the differences between the two contexts or, more generally, the distinction between "patterns of experience" (cf. Insight, Chapters VI and VII) and "differentiations of consciousness" (cf. Method in Theology, pp. 302ff).

[47] Thus, there is a dialectical opposition, within the world of immediacy, between sub-patterns which, alternatively, (1) inadequately "objectify" the self and other as already "in" or "out" there now, and (2) preserve self and other in a pre-reflective, inter-subjective unity. This opposition requires much further study. Again, further sub-patterns of, what might be called, the intersubjective kind can be identified on the first, but also on what the later work of Lonergan identifies as the fifth level of consciousness. Cf. **Philosophy of God and Theology** (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973). Again, evidence of one's excursion into and within such a multiplicity of sub-patterns is the aesthetic and religious experience of the subject, the "climax of making love," play, (cf. Method in Theology, pp. 29b-30a) and, perhaps, even the initial moment of reflection in which there is only a heightening of one's implicit presence to oneself. The character and relations of these sub-patterns, as well as their roles in the drama of dialectical opposition specified immediately above, also require exacting, further study.

[48] In Chapter 2.5.3 of his so far unpublished **Process: Introducing Themselves to Young Minders**, Phil McShane asks the reader to reflect upon the experience of Helen Keller just prior to the occurrence of her breakthrough into the meaning and use of a public sign language. He asks us to reflect upon the questions and answers she posed to herself both before and after the touches, the proddings, the initiatives of Ann Sullivan, etc. But, then, one should not confuse the public sign of entry into the world mediated by meaning with the break-through itself. Finally, a fully reflective knowledge by identity, which extends both to the other and to oneself, only becomes a possibility once entry into the world mediated by meaning has taken place. But, then, in light of the rupture which we have associated with entry into the second world of immediacy, the very adumbration of such an expansive possibility may constitute the existential motivation of the vertical option for differentiation which each of us has made. Cf. Insight, p. 552c and the "Concluding Remarks" of this paper. Almost immediately following the preceding text in Insight, are remarks by Lonergan concerning the nature of scholarship.

[49] In relation to the higher differentiations immediately to be discussed, the consciousness of the common sense subject could also be regarded as relatively "undifferentiated" or, even, "pre-differentiated" as the case may be. Again, the point
is that "differentiation" locutions, applied to the human subject, are always relative.

[50] Again, once his activity has become assimilated to that larger world, the subject may turn to philosophy. If he does, he may not be too aware of what he is doing, but assimilate it to his periodically recurrent, pre-differentiated performance. Thus, he blunders by thinking that his intentionality, as a whole, is akin to taking a look, that the objectivity of his intentional acts of meaning is a variant of introversion or extroversion, and that reality is what satisfies upon being given, etc. The fact of this blunder is taken up in Section V, below. Also cf. Sebastian Moore's paper "The Social Dump and Naive Realism," a paper presented at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, summer 1991.

[51] Three points are relevant here. First, starting from the the distorted situation with which the text, above, leaves off, how might it be possible to advance to a better one? But such an advance may involve some measure of the kind of self-understanding discussed in Section V of this paper, and hinted at in the conclusion. Thus, perhaps only some relevantly "displaced" and differentiated subject, aware of the local currents and mixes of two-phase processes, perhaps, then, only some contemporary approximation to the Aristotelian "good human," will know how to go on! Secondly, for lack of space, I have been forced to abstract from determining further the "practical" component of common sense. Thus, there are domestic, technical, economic, political and cultural manifestations and, later, specializations, integrations and transpositions of the common sense of the subject and his community. And two-phase processes may operate within and/or through the interactions between any or all of these differentiations. Cf. Insight, Chapter VII; Lonergan's Retrieval, Chapter IIIB. Finally, when the consciousness of the subject differentiates, e.g., scientifically, the function and sphere of relevance of the common sense of the subject is changed. But since there are always concrete situations and "relations of things to us" to be negotiated, it is not abolished.

[52] Thus, the young Picasso had learned to paint like Raphael. But it was only when his own further questions arose and matured, perhaps in dialogue with non-western and "ancient" art, the work of Cezanne and the early experiments of Braques in integrating Cezanne's perspectival innovations with a liberated palate, that his progressive, cubist transformations of the traditions of painting and sculpture became possible. Again, different aspects of his innovations have themselves been taken up, transformed, and passed on in different ways by the surrealists, the abstract expressionists, neo-plasticists, "pop" artists, etc. Cf. Roger Lipsey, An Art of Our Time (Boston: Shambhala, 1989), pp. 51-65.

[53] For lack of space, I have left out a discussion of the pure mathematical component of the scientific differentiation of the subject. Cf. Insight, Chapter I; Lonergan's Retrieval, Chapter IIIA.

[54] Perhaps the reader has discerned that the first three levels of the consciousness of the subject are being "scientifically" differentiated through such learning processes.

[55] The position, which this paper has attempted to explicate in a reflective context, is that "What?"- and "Why?"-asking are constitutive of the dynamic of the incarnate subject's conscious life on its second level. With Aristotle's further help, we may
now add, first, that the performance of such asking, always already manifests its subject's "notion of 'the nature of....'". But, secondly, then, and again with Aristotle's help, its subject discovers that only an "explanatory definition" will suffice to specify "the nature of....". But does definition by genus, species, and observable difference constitute explanatory definition? Thus, the explicit understanding and conception of the notion of explanatory definition has developed historically in tandem with major methodological breakthroughs and, therefore, inverse insights in the sciences and arts. Again, ways in which to specify the notion of "nature," implicit in the subject called forth to query, have emerged and continue to develop. And these further ways of specifying the notion, Aristotle could not have anticipated. Cf. Insight, pp. 736d-738a, 254-270; Lonergan's Retrieval, pp. 137-142, 226-252; Patrick Byrne, "Insight and the Retrieval of Nature," paper delivered at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, summer, 1987.

[56] A first major break with the Aristotelian notion of "system" came, perhaps, with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. Thus, it was discovered that such systems: are "contingent" integrations of data which has been prepared according to a certain physically or imaginatively reproducible method; can be arrayed according to the successively higher viewpoints and preparations, beyond that of Euclid, which they describe; are competing candidates for "verification" in the "natural order" through the physical theories which deploy them. This first break was further enlarged by Godel's theorem that non-trivial mathematical systems will be either incoherent or incomplete. Cf. Carl B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 585-90; 665ff. Paralleling these developments in mathematics are methodological discoveries in the "natural sciences." Thus, in relativity theory, "place" and "time" are not Newtonian absolutes independent of the disposition and explanatory matrix of the observer; what is absolute are only principles that are invariant across inertial or all relevant transformations of reference frame. In quantum mechanics and evolutionary theory, one arrives at, perhaps, only a fundamental "indeterminism" covered over by "statistical" regularities governing the emergence and survival of system. Finally, modern scientific systems do not fall under first principles defined by metaphysics. Rather, they work out their own basic terms and relations to account for the systematic component of the data. And if that is not sufficient, they relate successive sets of such terms and relations in terms of the schedules of probability which account for the non-systematic relations between successive systems. Finally, if Lonergan's discoveries are correct, he has mediated a second break with the classical, Aristotelian notion of system. Thus, the human subject reflectively can discover, affirm, and opt for the basic intentional system of terms and relations which contingently but surely mediates and motivates the dynamic of his incarnate, conscious life in history and community.

[57] The use and refinement of classical heuristic structure is properly associated with the work of Galileo, Newton, Clerk-Maxwell and Einstein. Again, if we regard the periodic table of elements as the implicit definition of one-hundred and thirteen terms by probably verifiable relations such as those of atomic weight and number, then we may include Mendeleev, etc. Cf. Insight, Chapter II; Lonergan's Retrieval, Chapter VB3. Finally, in his "Husserl, Hilbert and the Critique of Galilean Science," Patrick Heelan correctly relates the formation of the


[60] Cf. *Insight*, Chapters IV and V; *Lonergan's Retrieval*, Chapter VB6-8; Phil McShane, *The Wealth of Self and the Wealth of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1975), Epilogue. For Lonergan, it is genuinely explanatory to discover that: the contemporary contexts of the relatively independent physical, chemical, biological and zoological specializations of scientific query can be construed as successive "higher viewpoints." On the other hand, the invariants structuring "basic context" are studied and used by both the contemporary practise of "generalized empirical method" and each of the preceding, ongoing lines of scientific research. Thus, they specify the next "higher viewpoint" within the series and are studied by "generalized empirical method." Cf. Section I, above. Finally, the full, five-fold battery of possible context relations is verifiable, minimally, within each of these generic specializations of contemporary scientific and philosophical enterprise.

[61] The author's "language," here, may not be confined to the linguistic function of communicating meaning. For what one human subject means may be carried for another not only linguistically, and that in many ways, but also inter-subjectively, artistically, symbolically, or incarnately. Thus, a text may consist in: the specifics of a weaning technique used in contemporary Italo-American families; a set of early statues by Michelangelo; the reactions of a citizenry as a column of flower-bedecked tanks exits their city; the legislation which a politician initiated and supported during the first of his two terms in office; the change in the rates of orders for a new line of capital equipment; a recently discovered fragment from the corpus of Immanuel Kant dealing with the a priori category of "reality," etc. Cf. *Method in Theology*, pp. 78c-81b.

[62] The fact is that sometimes meaning does become plain and the criterion of no further relevant questions is met. But sometimes it is not met. Still, even in such cases, relevant qualifications can be placed on assertions made to convey the limits of legitimate scholarly achievement.


[64] The relationship between two-phase process, generally, and the subject of the philosophic differentiation was touched upon further in the final lines and footnote of Section III, above. Also, within Section V of this paper, see sub-section VA, entitled "Position/ Counter-Position, Dialectic." This
sub-section explores, respectively, the philosophically adequate (position), and inadequate (counter-position) orientations of the subject, as well as the fundamental opposition between them (dialectic). In that sub-section, then, the question is pursued briefly, whether the opposed horizons which these orientations determine, are "incommensurable." Finally, by philosophically appropriating the notion of nature, addressed in our discussion of the contemporary scientific differentiation, it is possible to specify a contemporary, metaphysics of experience. Like the notion of nature properly conceived, such a metaphysics would be both heuristic but also integrative of the ongoing, empirical results of the other differentiations, e.g., the modern arts and sciences as well as all the culturally embedded forms of common sense studied by the scholar, etc. Cf. Insight, XIV-XVII; Lonergan's Retrieval, pp. 348-65.

[65] Again, the differentiations emerge within the consciousness of incarnate human subjects in community and history. Thus, the ongoing process of refinement within the various differentiations, can be expected to manifest the five-fold battery of relations sketched in our discussion of context and two-phase process. In the best case, the differentiations would interact, complement each other and, thus, foster each others' development. Again, this would take place within each individual and in the community as a whole. But not even one of these possibilities need be realized.

[66] The six are: scholarly and aesthetic; scientific and scholarly; scientific and philosophic; aesthetic and scientific; aesthetic and philosophic; scholarly and philosophic.

[67] The four are: aesthetic, scientific and philosophic; scientific, aesthetic and scholarly; scholarly, aesthetic and philosophic; scientific, scholarly, and philosophic.


[69] Eliade, p. 95b.


[71] Cf. Section IIB of this paper.

[72] Thus, the subject and object of one's self-affirmation are identical. One might also imagine the case of a community of subjects, each of whom affirms the intentional unity of herself and of each and every one of the others in the community. Finally, the latter situation is not inconsistent with the fact of difference. Thus, no two members of the group may share the same number or levels of differentiations, the same common sense world, the same sets or levels of displacement, the same "second nature," etc.

[73] Cf. Insight, Chapter XI; Lonergan's Retrieval, Chapter VI. Also see Mark Morelli, "Reversing the Counter-Position: The Argumentum ad Hominem in Philosphic Dialogue," Lonergan Workshop, ed. by Fred Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), Vol. 6, pp. 195-230; James Marsh, "Strategies of Evasion: The Paradox of Self-Referentiality and the Post-Modern Critique of Rationality," International Philosophical Quarterly, 29 (1989), pp. 337-49. Finally, upon reflection, the reader will notice that the point of these "arguments" is remarkably concrete,
e.g., the subject him- or herself. Again, the formality of my presentation should not obscure the basic point. They are invitations, addressed to the one for whom one cares, to self-acceptance. And they always at least implicitly include the request—RSVP. Again, the communication of and responses to such an invitation would seem to admit as many variations, shadings and expansions as there are contexts in which human beings act.

[74] In the best case, then, what is grasped and affirmed is "the nature of" the thing in question. But, then, in self-affirmation, the subject posits her formulated understanding of her own conscious "nature" with respect to the "world mediated by meaning..." in its totality. In this way, then, it implicitly and heuristically relates the nature of her own conscious being to: the histories which human meaning-making communally has constituted, effected, and disclosed; the underlying manifolds which are interpreted within these histories and, also, extrinsically condition and become conditioned by the cumulative unfolding of its operations.

[75] The subject and object of the subject's existential self-choice are identical. Thus, in her option for responsible self-determination, one and the same subject: determines and is determined by her choice; is simultaneously the active and passive potency actualized through that choice, the originating and terminal value of that choice; is, at least, proximately established as a ground from which all her future acts are to proceed. Again, one might also imagine the case of a community of subjects, each of whom opts for himself and for both each and every one of its other members as centers of responsible, existential self-choice, etc., etc.

[76] Cf. Insight, p. 602a; Understanding and Being, 233b. Finally, since it abstracts from the issue of religious consciousness, this paper does not take up the important role of affectivity in the subject's apprehension of value, an adequate hierarchy values, etc. Still, on these topics, cf., respectively, Lonergan's Retrieval, pp. 366-69; 393-97. Also see the papers in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1988.

[77] Thus, in her explicit, responsible self-choice, the existential subject is opting for the implementation of her own conscious nature, in all its essential relations, within the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value in its totality.

[78] We will seek to establish, in succeeding paragraphs, that this openness is, in fact, "unrestricted."

[79] Thus, in her explicit "self-affection," the subject is responding to her own conscious nature as situated within and open to the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value in its totality. And she is doing that even if she has not or cannot explicitly grasp and affirm that that is what she is doing. Thus, the potential subject and object of one's self-affection are identical. Finally, one might also imagine the case of a community of subjects, each of whom is "self-affective" as well as affective towards each and every one of its members as centers of self-affection, etc., etc.

[80] I believe that the preceding arguments are similar to those used by Charles Peirce to show the impossibility of the Kantian "noumenon." Cf. his "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," and "Some Consequences of Four

[81] Cf. *Insight*, Chapter XIII.

[82] The reader may want to compare the claims set forth in the preceding paragraph with premisses (3) and (4), affirmed by the relativist, set forth in the first paragraph of this paper. Cf. *Doctrinal Pluralism*, p. 10bff.

[83] Cf. *Insight*, Chapter III, Sections 1, 2, and 5.

[84] The reader may want to compare the claims set forth in the preceding paragraph with premiss (5), affirmed by the relativist, set forth in the first paragraph of the introduction of this paper. Cf. *Doctrinal Pluralism*, p. 10bff.

[85] The mutually contradictory theories of empirical, intellectual, rational and moral "intuition," which lace the western philosophical tradition, represent variations especially on the first and third "counter"-positional attitudes of the subject. Such theories posit a "gap" between the "inner" and the "outer" of the intentional, conscious life of the subject. They make the issue of the gap central. And they surround it with: (1) the epistemic problems of immanence, correspondence, and the universal and necessary cognition of the object; (2) the metaphysical problem of specifying the entities which, because they are, or can be made, immediately and, therefore, objectively present in intuitive cognition are, therefore, basic. Again, to resolve while preserving the issue of the gap, they introduce and naively frame distinctions of reference and sense, impression and cause, phenomenon and noumenon, internal and external questions, sensible particular and intelligible form, secondary and primary qualities, natural and and non-natural qualities, etc. Again, as drawn, these distinctions function as separations. They preserve the issue of the gap while withdrawing the positional resources necessary to dispel the metaphor and reveal the pseudo-problem. Thus, it is not only that they improperly legitimate "anti-foundationalist" and "deconstructivist" efforts to overcome philosophy. They, also, block and divert the paths of query and intelligent action which it can only be their tasks to open, contextualize, guide, and foster. And, in so doing, they cover over the subject's legitimate sense of the gap between what she already knows and has appropriated, and the "known-unknown" which always calls forth her further questions and fills her sensitivity with the correspondents of wonder.

[86] Thus, one might consider the successive Aristotelian, impetus theorist, Galilean, Newtonian, and Einsteinian contexts in which the question of "the nature of," say, "free fall" has been raised. Or one might consider the successive contexts which Aristotle, pre- and post-Lavoisier, and Mendeleev, etc. opened for addressing the question "What is fire?" In both cases, an underlying question links the successive, discontinuous contexts in which successively less incorrect or limited answers are given. In both cases, there is a relatively constant, describable factor in experience from which questioning can move off and return, e.g., the fire which warmed hearths and cooked stew in Macedonia now cooks franks in July 4th, back-yard barbecues. Finally, in neither case is it likely that the terminal context in the series has been reached. Or that even the history of the respective questions has been done justice to by these remarks.
Although they are not always entirely clear in their meaning, Heisenberg, Bohr and others among its orthodox representatives, thought that quantum physics is related to classical physics through a "correspondence principle." On one formulation, Heisenberg claimed that the theories correspond because usually, but not always, the formulae of quantum theory pass into the corresponding classical formulae whenever $h$ (Planck's constant) can be neglected. If Lonergan's reflections are to the point, the two explanatory "contexts" are, probably, related as successive higher viewpoints. And the correspondence principle is the sign that, within limits, it is possible, non-mechanically and in light of one's "understanding of the two, successively less limited systems, to transpose "statements" from the one to the other system. Thus, one may recognize that when Planck's constant tends to zero, Liouville's equation for classical mechanics results from quantum mechanics. Cf. Werner Heisenberg, Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930), p. 101; Patrick Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 113-15. Finally, for clues to Lonergan's unique understanding of the relationship between relativity theory and quantum mechanics, see Insight, Chapter V.

The reader may, again, want to compare the claims set forth in the preceding paragraph with two texts. First, he may want to compare it with premiss (3), affirmed by the relativist, set forth in the first paragraph of the introduction of this paper. Cf. Doctrinal Pluralism, p. 10bff. Secondly, he may want to consider Lonergan's completely overlooked remarks in "Philosophy and Theology." Cf. A Second Collection, ed. by F. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 193b-94a and pp. 206c-208a.

For the sake of convenience and space, I will confine my actual discussion to the intellectual displacement which I first described.

The reader may want to compare the claim made with premiss (1), affirmed by the relativist, set forth in the first paragraph of the introduction of this paper. Cf. Insight, XI.11.

The reader may want to compare the claim made here with premiss (2), affirmed by the relativist, set forth in the first paragraph of the introduction of this paper. Cf. Insight, XI.11.

Again, Section VE, below, takes up the issue of the relationship between the positions and counter-positions.

These would be: aesthetic and intellectual; intellectual and moral; aesthetic and moral.

These would be: aesthetic; intellectual; moral.

Cf. Insight, pp. 191-206; 217-42; 475b-79a; Method in Theology, p. 104.

Cf. Section VE, below.

Thus, there is a specialized, heuristic, subtle deployment of basic context which both anticipates and grasps: the "absence" of sensitivity, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility both in people and the contexts which they fashion and by which they are fashioned; ways of reversing absurdity by restoring authenticity. Such a deployment is "dialectical" in character. Thus, to classical, statistical, and genetic heuristic structures, there is to be added a "dialectical" complement solely proportioned to the humanly
effected and/or constituted world. Cf. Insight, pp. 217-18. Also cf. my "Lorergan's Recovery of the Notion of Natural Right: Introduction to a New Context for an Old Discussion," Vera Lex, 10/2, 1990, pp. 4-5, 10.


[101] Eliade, p. 185.

[102] I have quoted the preceding two lines from Method in Theology, p. 286b.

[103] Of course, this statement also can be applied consistently by the subject to herself; by the subject's community to itself. Finally, consider Insight, pp. 564-68, where Lonergan discusses the notion of a "universal viewpoint," i.e., one which is heuristic but open to the totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints.

[104] Perhaps, the "locus post-classicus" of such a community might be the university, with all its, potentially, interactive specializations of the generalized, personal calling of each. Cf. Method in Theology, pp. 125ff.
Editors' Preface
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran

On Bernard Lonergan's death in November 1984 a preliminary catalogue of his papers was made, largely through the labor of the late John Hochban. Among Lonergan's carefully numbered files he found one of unusual interest marked simply '713-History'[1]. He showed it to Robert Doran, who soon had a doctoral candidate at work on one group of papers in the file. Ever since interest has been growing steadily, so it seems desirable to begin publishing selected items from these papers.

The file contains other documents,[2] but this group has exceptional importance as a window into the hidden area of Lonergan's early thinking. It consists of eight items, varying in length from one page to thirty-six pages [3]. We cannot assign a boundary date for their beginning, though one surmises that they began during his period of study in Rome, where he went in November 1933 [4]. If, however, the papers can be grouped in the same period, the boundary for their ending can be set at February 1939 when Pius XI died; internal evidence in some of them points to that pontiff as still reigning [5]; it also strongly suggests that the war of 1939-45 has not yet broken out [6]. Reference to the atrocities of the Spanish Civil War [7] dates one paper at least as later than the summer of 1936. Further, Lonergan himself reported long after, 'It was about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history'; he went on to give an account of his theory of history and it corresponds quite closely to what we find in File 713 [8].

But if the papers that focus on the analysis of history are to be dated somewhat later in the 1930s, other papers that show more of a sociological concern seem to be earlier. That is the view of Michael Shute, who recently completed a doctoral dissertation on the subject and divides the papers into two roughly defined 'batches' [9]. He is supported by a letter Lonergan wrote in January 1935 [10] where, in the context of what seems to him the decadent state of Catholic thought and his hope of contributing to its renewal, he speaks of papers already drafted toward that goal.
Whatever be the case for the other seven papers, there is no uncertainty about the one offered in publication here: it is dated quite exactly 'Dominica in Albis 1935,' three months after the January letter. The very title shows it to be a step toward the renewal the letter affirms as so great a need. The paper is therefore of absorbing interest to those who would track Lonergan's development from its beginnings, through his Thomist studies, to Insight and the following thirty years; but quite apart from that historical interest the paper is intriguing in its own right as a study of human solidarity.

Such topics, however, are beyond the scope of an editors' preface. Our task here is simply to give an account of our stewardship in the editing. Our general policy is that of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [11]; for the most part this will be presumed here, but we add a few details special to this paper.

Lonergan's rather carefully typed manuscript has three pages numbered in roman, twenty-five pages numbered in arabic -- both of these with double-spacing -- and two pages with single-spacing entitled 'Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity' [12]. There are also two hand-written pages by a critic to whom Lonergan had submitted his work [13]; they are especially helpful for tying the three parts together, since the criticisms refer to pages i to iii, then to pages 1, 3, 7, and so on, and finally to 'Your Sketch.' On this basis we have called the opening pages an Introduction -- the roman and arabic numbering suggests that relation -- and the 'Sketch' an Appendix. The 'Introduction' gives a table of contents with page numbers for the six sections, so was written, presumably, after the body of the work, but it is not clear whether the 'Appendix' was written before or after.

One of our regular procedures of editing is modified here: Lonergan's frequent Latin words and phrases are transferred to endnotes, and an English translation substituted in the text [14]. When he quotes scripture in English we leave it the way he wrote it; when he quotes scripture in Latin, we substitute the Revised Standard Version in the text, and give his Latin in the endnotes. When his underlining is clearly for emphasis we have retained the emphasis but substituted italics for his capitals. Lonergan's use of
capitals was especially generous in this paper, and we followed
the Collected Works policy of using lower case as much as
possible. In general our authority in regard to italics, quota-
tion marks, and the mechanics of editing remains The Chicago
Manual of Style.

Marginal notes of his that seem meant as comment on the
text are put in the endnotes; of course, it is possible that
he added some of these in later years. Any editorial insertion
in the text, such as section headings and the occasional word
change ('there' for 'their,' 'there' for 'this') is put in
square brackets, as is any notable addition to the endnotes.
His sometimes unusual ('economic'--for 'economy'?) and sometimes
antiquated English ('Holy Ghost') we have left alone. It is
perhaps worth noting that in the Italian seminary where he
was studying he would have little access to books in English
or on English -- remarkable then that so few corrections were
needed. His use of 'phantasm' is a special case; his verbum
articles of 1946-49 made 'insight into phantasm' a technical
phrase with a very precise and extremely important meaning;
that meaning is implicit here, though the word refers more
to one's cumulative experience or traditional mentality than
to the precise Euclidean diagram that was his favorite illus-
tration for 'phantasm' in 1946. Some foreign language words
that seem to have a technical sense (energeia, Geist) are
left as he wrote them.

The editorial notes are a category distinct from the
endnotes, though there is some overlapping; they are intended,
not as authoritative interpretations, but simply as aids to
research: crossreferences to the later Lonergan, more interest-
ing corrections he made in the manuscript, biographical points,
remarks on the context in which he wrote, and so on. The index
for these is given by letters rather than the numbers used
for the endnotes.

Present-day readers will find Lonergan's language sexist,
his attitudes very uncumenical indeed, his 'enemies' those
of a strongly held tradition, some of his theology (of Adam,
for example) rather unreal. We need not waste time in apology
for this; it was 1935, not 1991. Our general attitude, the
mind with which we began to publish Lonergan's works, is that
it is far more profitable to see what we can learn from him
than to look for flaws in his work. That applies even to this
early paper, and we are happy that its publication finds a
welcome in the pages of METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, years in advance (how many, who can tell?) of its appearance in the Collected Works.

Endnotes to Editors' Preface

[1] The file was not found in the filing cabinets where Lonergan had stored in numerical order files 101 to 938; presumably, it was somewhere in the disordered mass of papers he left lying around his room at Boston College when he moved to the Campion Center in Weston in March 1983. These papers were collected into boxes on his return to Canada in November of that year, and File 713 turned up in 'Box 4' as numbered by John Hochban; it is unnerving to think how easily it might have been lost.

[2] Most notably, a '39-page summary of A Study of History, Vols. 1-3, OUP, 1934 by Arnold Toynbee' (p. 28 of the Hochban catalog for Box 4). This is surely to be dated later, for we know Lonergan read Toynbee while teaching in Montreal, 1940-46; see Caring about Meaning: patterns in the life of Bernard Lonergan (eds P. Lambert, C. Tansey, C. Goings, Montreal, 1982) 88: 'When I was teaching at L'Immaculee Conception I read the first six volumes of Toynbee's A Study of History in the long winter evenings. (Jim Shaw used to procure them from the McGill library for me.)' Shaw was a student at the College from 1940-1942, the likely period for his performing this library service; a reference Lonergan made in Theological Studies (the December 1942 issue) to volumes 5 and 6 of Toynbee confirms this dating.

[3] Three of the papers deal under varying titles with the analytic concept of history, two with the restoration of all things, two others with the theory and the philosophy of history respectively, and there is a single sheet, obviously meant at title-page for an 'Essay in Fundamental Sociology' -- lost, it seems though one of the papers may have been a chapter in it (see note 13 below).

[4] Detective work on the typewriters he used might solve some problems of chronology, since he acquired one for himself in late 1933 or early 1934 (letter of January 22, 1935, to 'Reverend Father Provincial,' at that time Henry Keane), and presumably used it in what he wrote from that time on; even an amateur can see that not all the papers were typed on the same machine.

[5] The tenses used in referring to the Pope (for example, in 'Philosophy of History': 'Pope Pius XI has laid the foundations ...') suggests a still reigning pontiff; there is no mention anywhere of Pius XII.

[6] There is no mention of the war, but there is reference to 'the New Paganism of Germany' ('Analytic Concept of History') and to 'National Socialism on the mysticism of race' ('Outline of an Analytic Concept of History').

[7] In 'Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline.'


[11] See the editorial prefaces to the volumes that have appeared: Collection, and Understanding and Being (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1988, 1990), volumes 4 and 5, respectively, in the series. It is expected that the paper being published here will form part of volume 21.

[12] As John Hochban found the papers, the 'Sketch' preceded the other two items and all thirty-one pages were clipped together, but some of the papers had become disordered (see note 13 below); in any case Lonergan's critic seems to have received the papers in the order we have followed.

[13] These two pages were not with the Pantôm paper in the order Hochban found and catalogued, but followed the thirty-six pages (numbered 95-126, hence part of some longer work that has been lost) of 'Philosophy of History'; the critic's page references show, however, that he had the present paper in hand.

Who was this critic? At one point he writes, 'So it is, by Jove,' the phrase surely of an Englishman; this strongly suggests Bernard Leeming, then on the faculty of the Gregorian University and a good friend of Lonergan. Another member of the faculty, Leo W. Keeler, was also a friend and had seen some of Lonergan's work (the same letter of January 1935), but would an American write 'by Jove'?

... we have to consider that our intellect progresses from potency to act. But everything that progresses from potency to act arrives first at an incomplete act, one that is intermediate between potency and act, before arriving at perfect act ... Now [for intellect] an incomplete act is imperfect science, through which things are known indistinctly and with a certain confusion ...[1]

Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 3, c.

Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis [2]

A Theory of Human Solidarity
A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of S. Paul
A Theology for the Social Order,
Catholic Action,
And the Kingship of Christ,
In incipient outline

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Note: I trust the reader will be more inclined to be satisfied with suggestive ideas than to be exigent in the matter of logical development, exhaustive citation, careful exposition. The former is to some extent within the range of possibility for a student; the latter is not. Especially is this the case in the subject of this essay: for to write on the Pauline conception of our Blessed Lord as the anakaphalaïôsis of all things presupposes very definite views on all things, theological, philosophic, historical, social, political, even economic. Now plainly it is one thing to justify one's position in this multiple field of science and quite another to pluck as the fruit therefrom a synthetic view revealing the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus, our Lord. On the other hand, the achievement of such synthesis constitutes of itself a manner of proof, proof that may be conceived in terms of Newman's integration of probabilities (3) or, more simply, in terms of the neat French phrase: la vérité s'impose; on this ground, it will be seen, synthesis is to no slight extent independent of its presuppositions, and the procedure of this essay has an intrinsic justification as well as the extrinsic excuse of a student's manifold limitations.

The fundamental assumption of the essay is that a metaphysic is the necessary key to St Paul, as its fundamental contention is that the Thomist synthesis (pushed, indeed, to a few conclusions [a] which, if they seem new, may be regarded, I trust as a legitimate development) provides such a key. The cardinal points of the conception we present are such as the theologian commonly fights shy of on the ground that they are too speculative to be of use to theology -- a principle that would certainly have clipped the wings of St Thomas himself. Thus we make of capital importance the alternative of material and intelligible (by specific difference) individuation; we regard as a minor reality all potency, for potency is not an imitation of the divine essence but a condition for such imitation, which is to be found in essence and act alone; we argue that personality, as it is known to us, is the emergence of an intelligible individuation for which material individuation is a prerequisite (matter has its end in form [4]); finally, we find this intelligible individuation in the actuation of intellect and will in human operation, and we synthesize human operation in terms of the solidarity of human intellects and the statistical uniformity, as it
were, of human wills. It is from the basis of a metaphysical conception of man, one in nature and operation, working through a material to an intelligible plurality in a transient dynamism in which no man is more than an instrumental cause and no causation fails to affect all men, that we attempt to interpret St Paul. This metaphysical conception we find to square accurately with the conception of humanity as an organism: the purely instrumental causality of man and the way in which this causality affects all men is exactly parallel to the purely instrumental causality of the members of a body and the way in which the operation of the members affects the whole body. This gives the 'individually members one of another' [5] of Romans 12.5. But more; the principle of premotion makes these instrumental causes into a solidary chain of causation in which each instrument transfers the motion received from those before, transmitting it to those that follow; thus, a place of singular responsibility falls to the first mover among men, to the first and the second Adam. Adam corrupted the premotion and set up the reign of sin, a reign of disharmony and maladjustment in the corporate unity of man. Christ set up a new motion to harmonize, readjust, redintegrate a humanity that had reached the peak of disintegration and death described in the first chapter of Romans. This is the anakephalaiōsis. And it is in virtue of this new motion that men again live, live as though 'alive from the dead' [Romans 6.13], live 'yielding their members as instruments of justice unto God' [Romans 6.13], live not indeed of themselves but only in virtue of the premotion according to the word: 'I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me' [Galatians 2.20]. '... so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another' [Romans 12.5][6]. Thus, the material unity of man in Adam is replaced by the intelligible unity of man in Christ, the blind course of nature by the voluntary course of faith, the sinful course of the reign of a premotion from the serpent by the current of charity that has its formal cause in Christ as Wisdom and its efficient cause in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost as Love. Man is indeed made to the image and likeness of God when the actuation of his being is from the Father, the actuation of his adoptive sonship is from the Son, the light of the world, and the actuation of his effective unity is from the Holy Ghost.
In so vast a field of thought it is impossible to be complete; it may well be that I have defeated my purpose in attempting in so short a space so much; for the effort to include further aspects tends to give the impression more of audacious assertion than of sober speculation. However, let me do something to counteract this influence by expressing my willingness to go on any point to the 'ultimate why' [7]. I append an outline of the argument.

1 Liberty as a disjunctive determination (p. x).
2 The historical determination of intellect (p. x).
3 The unity of human operation (p. x).
4 The synthesis of human operation (p. x).
5 The unity of man in the ontological ground of his being (p. x).
6 Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis (p. x).

Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis: A Theory of Human Solidarity

1 [Liberty as a Dijunctive Determination]

The human will is a 'natural inclination that follows the form of intellect' [8].

a The form of intellect in question can be nothing but the dictate of reason, for the will is the faculty by which men not merely act but act reasonably; to follow the dictate of reason is to act well, not to follow it is to sin; the act of will is following this dictate; the non-act of will is the failure to follow this dictate; the non-act is sin.

b It is natural to man to follow the dictate of reason; when he does follow it, he is simply failing to do violence to his nature; hence, when we do all that is commanded of us, we remain unprofitable servants [Luke 17.10]. Plainly so, for to allow events to take their natural course, to permit one's faculties their natural operation and expansion, is not a title to merit but simply the absence of evil. Hence the Augustinian doctrine that sin is from man [9] and everything else from God, who gives both the rational motives to our will and gives us wills naturally appetitive of rational motives: the naturalness of this appetite may be seen in the spiritual malady of remorse, which is the phenomenon of violence done the will.
c The non-act of will is the failure of the will to inhibit a motion that is contrary to reason: since only the will is free, it is clear that when the will does not act then the event is determinate, that is, determined exactly as any other physical event.

d The act of will is the positive following of a dictate of reason: but what is reasonable under any given set of circumstances may be either objectively or subjectively reasonable. If objectively reasonable, then the human act of will is determinate in the order of pure reason. If only subjectively reasonable, then the human act is again determinate as a function of historical causation: for there will be a reason why this man does not know what is objectively right, and this reason why will lie in the field of history. This last point will become clearer later. As is plain, we may speak of objective reasonableness as equally due to historical causation.

e Hence human freedom is simply a choice between different determinate orders of events: if the will does not act, there is physical determination; if the will does act, then there is historical determination. Both are equally determined even though we cannot perform the psychological analysis necessary to prove the determination in that fashion, just as the distribution of the stars has some determining cause even though astronomy may be ignorant of it.

2 [The Historical Determination of Intellect]

We now proceed to investigate the historical determination of the form or dictate presented by intellect to the will.

a We first note that every act of intellect will be specified and so determined by a phantasm and that the phantasm has to be drawn from some historical situation. The historical situation gives the outer limits to what men can think about: what they actually will think about will be discovered by proceeding to the limit, casting up the sum \( b \) of a man's momentum of interests, experience, mental development, and actual position.

b Second, it is to be noted that every act of intellect is a universal. The consequence is of importance in his inquiry, inasmuch as the universal act of intellect will be a premise to an indefinite number of acts of will. We are here at the root of the philosophy of history: the one act of intellect
guides a man's many actions till it is replaced by a contradictory idea; it guides not only the actions of the originator but also the actions of those to whom he has communicated the idea either directly or by a secular tradition: think of Buddha, Confucius. Further, the emergence of a contradictory idea is as much a determinate event as the emergence of the first idea, for it has to be based upon phantasm and phantasms come from historical situations.

c Consequent to the relation between intellect and human act, one act of intellect being capable of informing an indefinite number of acts of will, is the following principle for the analysis of history: the flow of human operations are determined by a single set of ideas; a change in all the flow of operations follows from the emergence of one new idea; the form of a flow of changes follows from the form of the flow of new ideas, that is, from a purely logical dialectic. In mathematical terminology, abstract thought is the second differential of human operation, while concrete thought is the first differential.

d We arrive at the third differential by considering the form of human thought as such. As St Thomas remarked, it is a progress from potency to perfect act (perfect science from every viewpoint) through a series of incomplete acts [10].

e It is to be noted that this progress from potency through incomplete act to perfect act is to be predicated not of the individual but of humanity. Perfect science does not exist yet; our science is an incomplete act of intellect. Further, it follows from the analogy of the angel, who in the instant (aevum) of his being solves all the problems relative to his specific nature, that man in the instant (tempus) of his being should solve the problems of his specific nature. Finally, the point is evident from the solidarity of human thought: the achievements and the errors of the past live on into the present and form the basis of the guidance intellect gives to will; with regard to this basis of traditional thought there is by the mass of men the application of the traditional principles to concrete situations and by the very few [c] the addition of a new idea, a development or a higher synthesis of the old.

f Matter, the principle of individuation, isolates the individual from the unity of the species; but this isolation exists only for the sake of a higher unity, the unity of men by intellect. The exploitation of natural resources calls
for a higher organization of men than the natural unit of the family or tribe; the organization gives rise to the need of political and juridical forms of society; the advance in the manner of satisfying physical needs at once exercises intellect, reveals its power, and gives the leisure necessary for the pursuit of culture, that is, the development of the higher faculties of man.

The unity of man achieved by intellect has to be a unity in truth, if it is to be stable. Peace fundamentally is this unity in truth and only phenomenally is it 'order with tranquility' [11]. Opposed to peace is the atomization of humanity, the Zersplitterung that follows from error and sin, and the false substitutes of national self-idolatry or the deification of emperors to secure what reason is powerless to secure.

There is in the natural order a threefold dialectic in the historic progress of intellect.

First, the dialectic of fact. The objective situation gives a phantasm which specifies an idea. The idea is an incomplete act of intellect, but it is put into execution as though it were complete: the result is a false historic situation which reveals the incompleteness of the old idea and leads to the emergence of a compensating idea.

Second, there is the dialectic of sin. False situations may be created not only by following incomplete acts of intellect as though they were complete but also by not following intellect at all. Thus, the depraved polytheism of the ancients arose from habit which made sin seek an intellectual justification; similarly, the theory of liberalism is a consequent of the sixteenth-century heresy with the consequent religious wars [d] while the theory of communism is a consequent of the pharisaical religiosity of capitalist exploitation and oppression.

Third, there is the dialectic of thought. As a pure dialectic it is the development of the 'perennial philosophy' [12] as new phantasms make a greater distinctness and precision possible. As contaminated with the dialectic of sin, the pure dialectic gives us the actual course of abstract thought since the emergence of philosophy as a human science with Socrates.

The potential character of intellect results through ignorance in an internal and external disharmony called concupiscence. The low energeia [13] of intellect leads men to
believe that the sensible is the real, that is, the particular concrete object which if accepted without qualification as the real leaves William of Ockham [e] the 'unconquerable doctor' [14]. The fact that because of this potentiality men develop first as animals and very gradually come to the use of reason, supplied the dynamic basis for concupiscence in the narrow sense; for it is under these circumstances that the subconscious development of nervous paths and patterns takes place in a way that later interferes with human autonomy over the flesh. Finally, the blunders and the sins of men create objective situations that should never exist and that easily become intolerable, whether we consider the microcosmic tragedies of passion and cruelty and suicide or the more terrible fruits of so-called economic and political forces.

3 [The Unity of Human Operation]

What has been said of intellect reveals the unity of all human operation. The individual's intellectual pattern is determined by phantasms which come from objective situations containing both a tradition of past intellectual achievement and the data for future development. Any new idea is gestated by the situation of successive centuries, is brought to birth by some chance individual meeting the postulate of the situation, immediately becomes the property of all affected by the situation as though the individual were but the instrument for general development. Thus it is that a first-year theologian today can solve the problem of baptism by heretics that left Cyprian and the early church utterly at a loss; and, on the other hand, it takes a Newman some fifteen years of very slow progress to arrive at the truth of Catholicism, so great is the all-pervasive power of traditional mentality. This point may be to some extent obscured to the reader if he thinks of the great variety of opinion at the present day: the fact is that at the present time we have not a burst of originality but the decay of intellect, the Zersplitterung, that results from men being out of touch with a tradition and fancying their primitively incomplete acts of intellect to be valid for the time; really, intellect has ceased to be a principle of unity among men; instead, we have the mass propaganda of national education, national newspapers, national morality, and the peace that comes of police, armaments, and forced military service. The nineteenth century's romantic liberalism
in the cult of shoddy 'originality' might be tolerable if, as Bernard Shaw suggested, we went back to Methuselah [15] and men lived a millennium instead of dying off, as now, at the age of eighty when they are but beginning to have a few glimmerings of sense. But the providential dispensation that compensated for the patriarch's lack of tradition by longevity is merely fantastic as a solution to modern problems: modern men have to think in development of previous thought if they are to think at all.

The unity of intellect, that follows from its potential character and the need of specification by phantasm, results in an effective uniformity of will. Free will is but the choice between following the dictates of intellect and not attempting to control by reason the mere impulses of blind nature: it is a choice between two determinate orders. Moreover, there is a uniformity in this choosing. We speak of moral certitude with regard to the future free acts of men, and we recognize heroic virtue and inhuman vice as exceptions to a settled constancy. Thus, though the will is not determined, it remains that there is a statistical uniformity to the operations of will. In consequence, we may regard mankind as a machine of low efficiency that receives from the objective situation specifications of intellect and premonitions but turns out operations that only in a certain percentage are according to intellect and the rest as if there was no intellectual control whatever.

We may conclude this section by putting the thought in the form of an argument. Men either think as they are taught or they think for themselves; in the latter case they either bring forth ideas that are real advances in the field of intellect or they merely add to the atomization of humanity by proposing as true what is merely incomplete and false. In all three cases their thought is the thought of what may be called an objective Geist, the common mind of man [f]: the traditionalist is merely another who thinks the same way, a numerical addition; the true originator is but the instrument for the advance of the objective Geist; the false originator is equally an instrument, not for advance but for destruction, the penalty of man's forgetting that he is but a member of a species and cannot do all the thinking of the species himself. Next, the good will that follows intellect does nothing but make the actions of man an instrument for fulfilling the practical aims of the objective Geist; on the other hand, the
evil will makes human operation an instrument for the subintellectual determinate order. In either case, man is simply an instrument.

4 [The Synthesis of Human Operation]

We may now attempt the synthesis of human operation. There is as the extrinsic basis of this operation the succession of nonhuman world events in the physical and biological orders. As intrinsic basis there is the succession of individuals being born, begetting others, dying. In relation to both of these and to one another is the succession of human acts. Finally, arising from these three, controlling them, and being modified by them as a result of this control, is the succession of human thoughts, the development of the objective Geist.

Pr Portalié in his article on St Augustine in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique [16] considers the fundamental point in the Augustinian explanation of grace to be the psychological fact that man has not the initiation of his thoughts.

To a Thomist, this truth is self-evident. 'Whatever is moved is moved by something else'[17]. Will has to be premoved by intellect; intellect has to be premoved by phantasm; phantasm has to be premoved by an objective situation and environment; finally, the objective situation and environment is partly the determinate work of nature, partly the accumulated work of mankind acting now according to its limited knowledge and now against this knowledge.

Clearly, to a scientist with some highly refined mathematical calculus able to contemplate not only the multitudinous data of the problem but also the response of free wills to the precise intellectual forms that would arise from this complex scene, the whole course of history would be as simple and intelligible as is the course of the earth round the sun to a modern astronomer. It would be evident to this scientist that the principal cause of every event was the designer, creator and first mover of the universe. He made the potencies what they are, set them in their intrinsic relations to one another, gave them their initial positions and their initial premotion, foresaw and intended the modification of position and of motion that would result as this premotion was transferred from one potency to another. What can operate only as the result of a premotion and only according to pre-established laws is simply an instrument, a machine; it does not
cease to have a merely instrumental causality because of the freedom of selecting between the determinate order of an objective Geist and the determinate order of subintellectual operation. The omniscient sower who casts seed by the wayside, on stones, among thorns, is not surprised when he reaps no harvest there! A printer who hires men who use handpresses is as much the principal cause of what is printed as the printer who buys more elaborate machinery and hires fewer men.

It is to be noted, however, that the 'first agent' uses human instruments to transfer his premotion and his predetermination. If you read a discerning autobiography you see a human life presented in terms of a number of influences from accidents of time and place and from other persons; now the lives of these influencing persons are similarly the product of previous influences; and so on till one gets back to the first man. Thus, while God is the principal cause of all operation insofar as he gave the initial premotion and predetermination, and infallibly knew and deliberately intended all that would follow therefrom, the human instruments that transfer this premotion and predetermination differ from the physical or merely biological transference and instrumentality. For men by sin can make the motion to be transferred weaker, they can muddy the stream that descends to posterity. Man makes man [g]. Man is his brother's keeper for human operation is one operation, one successive transference of one premotion and one predetermination. Man is no more than an instrument but he may be an instrument of righteousness or of sin; he may pass on to others what he has received or he may pass on less; but he can do nothing else.

It is to be recalled that sin does not make man a principal cause of anything; sin is non-act, non-ens; it is not a motion or a causality but a failure to move and to cause; it is not a principal causality but an instrumental non-causality. On the other hand, when man does not sin, it is not because he is doing something of himself: the intellectual form was given him; the power of willing was given him; the premotion of will by intellect was given him; the act of will in response to the premotion of intellect is simply the spontaneous activity of the will in virtue of its natural inclination [19]; man does not add anything to the natural inclination to make it go into act; he simply allows nature to take its course, does all that is required of him and remains an unprofitable servant [Luke 17.10].
The reader may be unsatisfied with this; the reason will be that he considers there must be some act making the difference between the act of will and the non-act of will [h], some choice prior to both that is the true act of will. This, I beg to suggest, is the fundamental blunder of the whole question. The non-act of will is 'against reason' [20]; when you try to explain what is against reason you try to make a contradiction intelligible; sin is the unintelligible, because it is against reason; and the explanation of the unintelligible is critical thought, the doubling back to the assertion that the explanation is the demonstration that explanation is intrinsically impossible. Do not confuse this with mystery: mystery is intelligible in relation to itself [21] though not in relation to us [22]; sin is intelligible neither in relation to itself nor in relation to us. Hence the good act is explained by the promotion from intellect and the natural inclination; the evil act is unintelligible, intrinsically so, for it is the irrationality of a rational creature and a rational potency; to look for the reason of irrationality is absurd; did it have reason, it would not be irrational; if sin had a reason or a cause, it would not be sin.

Finally, it is to be observed that I speak of the exclusively natural order. If man is merely an instrument in the natural order, a fortiori he is merely an instrument in the supernatural. But I am not speaking of the supernatural order; I am speaking as a psychologist of the school of St Augustine and St Thomas [i].

5 [The Unity of Man in the Ontological Ground of His Being]

We now turn to consider the basis of the unity of human operation. Why are there economic forces, making it impossible for industrialists to pay workmen a wage and for workmen to raise a family? Why are there political forces holding the world in the unstable equilibrium of a balance of power secured by Realpolitik? [k] Why are the sins of the monarchs and antipopes and reformers and enlighteners and Marxians visited upon the twentieth century in a measure so terrible that men refuse to face the plain facts of the situation? What is Adam to us that we should bear the penalty of original sin? What is the metaphysical principle of Redemption? It is all one question, and it would seem to merit an answer.
The answer is that man is not simply [1] an individual; angels are individuals; man is never more than a member of a species; he is not in his operation as we have already demonstrated; he is not in the ontological ground of his being.

Philosophically, man is one universal nature in regard to what he is [23], and man is many merely in virtue of the modality of his being, in regard to the way he is [24]. Man is one in virtue of his form, and he is many merely in virtue of matter, the principle of individuation of universal forms. The individual man really is an individual: undivided in himself [25] and divided from any other being [26]; but that reality is not pure reality but a compound of pure reality (what is participated of the divine essence) and a twofold potency, contingency and materiality, neither of which are in the divine essence, nor imitations of the divine essence, nor participations of the divine essence, but conditions of [there] being any imitation or participation of the divine essence besides the full possession enjoyed by the divine persons. Man as these many particulars is contingency and materiality; man as a universal nature is an intelligible essence and a limited aspect of the divine essence. Now as potency is because of act, it follows that the laws of mankind, that what is right and just for mankind, should proceed from the universal nature and be in terms of the universal nature and be irrespective of material difference.

Theologically, we may arrive at the same conclusion. Man is made in the image and likeness of God; the Father generates the Son in a generation, strictly so called; the Father and Son are consubstantial; therefore, men are consubstantial, not indeed in the same way as the Father and Son but in the image and likeness of that consubstantiality. Men are not strictly consubstantial but analogically so; they are different substances not by reason of essence [27] but by reason of quantitatively designated matter [28]; but insofar as man fails to resemble the divinity, insofar he falls short of reality; and so the difference between men is less real than the unity of men.

This is a hard pill to swallow for those tending to be [m] members of the 'unconquered school of nominalists' [29]; but let us hear their arguments! Meanwhile, let us push further the analogy between the human and the divine.
First, we must distinguish between individuality and personality. I do not say between the individual and the person, since, by reason of the supposit [30], these two are identical. I inquire into the difference between the formal aspects [31], individuality and personality.

Now a person is an individual with intellect and will. What is a personality? We argue as follows: the individuality results from matter, the principle of individuation; but matter is for the sake of some higher form; therefore personality is the individuating form that can be brought forth in a material individuality by intellect and will. But what intellect and will bring forth in the way of an individuating form is a given -- personal, as we say -- orientation in life. Therefore, actual personality is the ultimate difference of intellectual pattern and habit of will called character that results from the operation of intellect and will in a material individual. On the other hand, potential personality is mere individuality with unactuated intellect and will. According to the measure of this actuation, we distinguish persons as majors and minors; on the analogy of an orientation of intellect and will in the individual, we speak of moral persons.

Second, we discover the reason for the continuous variety of the objective Geist, its differentiations in time as one idea is complemented by another, its differentiations in space as each individual arrives at a viewpoint that is the integral [n] of the influences exerted upon him.

Third, we discover a moral personality emerging from the flux of birth and death and change, the moral personality of humanity, of the human race, the 'one and many.' For the personality arrived at by each individual is the product of previous personalities and the producer of future personalities: man makes man what he is, even though he does so as an instrumental cause that now acts and now fails to act. Thus there is in all men a responsibility and a debt to all men; no person is self-determined; no person fails to make things better or worse for the emergence of future personalities. This orientation of all men to all men is a moral personality.

Fourth, we complete our analogy to the Blessed Trinity. As the Trinity of persons are subsistent relations in the eternal and equilibrated dynamism or energeia of unlimited intellect and will, so upon the transient dynamism of physical and biological nature emerge the physical personalities that
should be the adoptive sons of God and the moral personality that should be the spirit of love for all men. In fact, human personalities are of three kinds: the fleshly man [32] who is orientated towards sensible satisfaction; the psychic man [33] who is orientated towards the true, the good, and the beautiful; the spiritual man [34] who is orientated towards God in his transcendence of the transcendentals and as he is known only by faith through revelation. Why are not all men in the last category? It is the fault of men. Why are graces sufficient but not efficacious? It is the fault of the human instruments whose duty it is to transfer to others the motion they receive. Why does God draw some and not others? Because he made man to his own image and likeness, one in nature and in operation, because he uses instruments to draw men according to the law, 'Whatever is moved is moved by something else' [35]; because, finally, the instruments will not be even unprofitable servants [Luke 17.10], will not live exclusively for his Truth, and so cannot love as does his Love, will not love reason, and image of the Word, and so cannot love man as did the Word. But the divine plan of man in God's own image and likeness remains: persons that in an orientation of filial subordination to our Father in heaven constitute a moral personality of love for all men that all may be orientated to the Father of all.

6 [Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis]

We come to our final point, the pantôn anakephalaiôsis, the Pauline conception of the role of Christ in creation.

We have argued that, since man's operation is necessarily an instrumental operation, then there is a particular significance to leadership, to being the first agent in human history. We set forth the fundamental antitheses of the first and second Adam as follows.

a Adam, premoved by Eve, premoved by the serpent, set up the reign of sin (Romans 5.12).

Christ, conceived by the Blessed Virgin Mary at the annunciation of the angel Gabriel, set up the kingdom of God.

N.B. The function of the angels is of importance for the cosmic implications of the theory: we return to the point later.
b Adam communicates human nature to his progeny; parents are quasi instruments in the communication of Adam's sin, for they communicate nature that no longer has something it would have had if Adam had not sinned.

Christ communicates the divine adoption by regeneration of water and the Holy Ghost; the church and parents are instrumental causes of this communication.

N.B. The difference between quasi instrumentality of communicating sin and true instrumentality (however remote) in communicating grace lies in the difference between grace and sin: grace is something and sin is a privation of something; you do not communicate a privation of something, but communicate the something without communicating what is deprived.

c Adam and his progeny die the death that is the penalty for sin.

Christ transmutes death into the rite of sacrifice -- greater love than this no man hath [John 15.13] -- and makes of death the seed of resurrection, for he is 'the first-born from the dead' [36] (Colossians 1.18).

d Adam by his forfeiture of the gift of infused knowledge reversed the course of history and set up the tradition of concupiscence. He reversed the course of history, for man had to develop from the mere potency of intellect, had to progress under the leadership of phantasms specifying intellect as chance offered them, became unable to plan progress but had to proceed in a series of more or less blind leaps of incomplete acts of intellect. This constitutes fundamentally, we have already argued, the ignorance and difficulty called concupiscence.

Christ restored the harmony of man by the grace of dogma, an absolute Geist above the wandering objective Geist of humanity. This point needs some expansion.

First, the coming of Christ coincides with the breakdown of philosophy and its recognized impotence to solve the problem of intellectual unity. Philosophy had to be discovered before Christ, else the Christian dogmas could not be expressed: prephilosophic symbolism led necessarily to idolatry; the Hebrews avoided it to some extent only by making the divinity inexpressible. Philosophy had to be bankrupt before Christ to make plain to man his impotence [37] without Christ: 'even the philosopher emperors stooped to apotheosis.
Second, the supernatural revelation to which Christ was a witness is not only a content but premoves a living and developing mind: the mind of the mystical body [o]; 'we have the mind of Christ' [1 Corinthians 2.16]. The patristic period only established the principle of despoiling the Egyptians: for instance, the bishops at Nicea who in the name of traditional mentality objected to defining the consubstantiality of the Son were overruled. This principle received its full application in scholasticism, which did not fear to reason about anything and which so enriched ordinary Catholic thought that the early church with its misty conceptions on many points seems strange to us. The purely scientific character of the appeal to reason, as well as the definition of the limits of that appeal, was more than emphasized by the audacity of St Thomas of Aquin, who based his thought on Aristotle's precisely because Aristotle's was the most scientific. Finally, the bull, Aeterni Patris [38], was the official recognition of the social need of a philosophy, the necessity for human society that in some sense the philosopher be king, have a dictature over lesser minds and the Zeitgeist.

Third, the development of the absolute Geist through dogma cannot be a development of the dogma [39], the revelation as such: that is a contradiction in terms, for the pure dogma is above reason. However, we may see in this development what the development of man's intellect would have been, had Adam not sinned. The development through dogma is not by the acceptance of incomplete acts of intellect and their factual refutation when put in practice (for example, economic science creating a world crisis); it is by the selection of what is true in the incomplete acts of intellect of the objective Geist; and this selection takes place in virtue of the light of the supernatural truth, in virtue of the illumination that proceeds from the light of the world, the divine Word [40]. What the progeny of Adam would have done through infused knowledge, we do through Christ our Lord.

Fourth, the intellectual benefit of the absolute Geist is something that man, fallen man with his fatal tendency to sensism and nominalism, easily overlooks. To those outside the church the endless intransigence of the church against heretics from the Gnostics to the modernists is incomprehensible; they prize moral goodness; they constantly forget that no man is better than he knows how; above all, they overlook the impotence of the traditional mentality (as opposed to
the philosophic with its defined abstractions) to make issue with the expanding objective Geist of humanity; the breakup of Protestantism and the insolvency of the Orientals who call a dead tradition orthodoxy demonstrate which view is right. But there is more than this to the intellectualist position of the church: not only is reason and the Thomistic canon, the human good consists in living according to reason [41], the sole possibility of a Catholicity that overrides the petty differences of nationality and other tribal instincts and therefore the sole possibility of a practical human unity; there are two further points. In the first place, any reflection on modern history and its consequent 'Crisis in the West' [p] reveals unmistakably the necessity of a Summa Sociologica [q]. A metaphysic of history is not only imperative [42] for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and economic forces are to be subjected to the rule of reason, if cultural values and all the achievement of the past are to be saved both from the onslaughts of purblind statesmen and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism. But to establish the intellectual unity of men by appealing to reason is impossible; men refuse to be reasonable enough to take the League of Nations seriously, and that is too elementary a notion to be called a metaphysic. The only possible unity of men is dogma: the dogma of communism unites by terrorism to destroy; the dogma of race unites to protect, but it is meaningless as a principle of advance, and it is impotent as a principle of human unity; in plain language, it is not big enough an idea to meet the problem; it is a nostrum that increases the malady. There remains only the dogma of Christ. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Christ as King [43], King as the rallying point for all men of good will, King of the historic process. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Catholic Action [44], for Catholics are the leaven that leaveneth the whole mass [Matthew 13.33, 1 Corinthians 5.6, Galatians 5.9]. Finally, we have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's command that 'all candidates for the sacred priesthood must be adequately prepared ... by intense study of social matters' [45]. This command has not yet been put into effect, nor can it be till
there is a *Summa Sociologica*: without that we would only flounder in the blundering and false science that created the problem. The second benefit of the absolute *Geist* as an intellectualism is that this is the natural means for man to overcome the evils consequent upon the low *energeia* of intellect, that is, the internal and external disharmony called concupiscence. For, first, it would seem that the sacraments are not intended to exorcise the evil; second, it would seem that concupiscence, being the extrinsic privation of an instrumental means to an end, can be overcome by Christ; third, it is evident that wise laws wisely administered and adapted do much to mitigate the external disharmony; fourth, it is evident that intellectual culture does much to blunt the crudity of passion; fifth, there is reason to believe that an intelligently ruled economic and the continued advance of science will give man much more leisure for the development of his higher faculties in the future than in the past; sixth, we are beginning to understand more of human physiology and of the subconscious activity of the soul on the organism so that a development of educational theory may enable man to solve problems he now views with all the scientific penetration of a Mongolian herdsman.

So much for the brief expansion we have permitted ourselves on the development of the mind of the mystical body and its expansion from the primitive tradition of dogma so as eventually to include a conscious body of social science illuminated by supernatural light.

It is in this sphere of the role of the absolute *Geist* that Christ most luminously appears as *pantòn anakephalaiôsis*. By one man sin entered into the world, and in virtue of that one entry sin reigned. Now the reign of sin is a progressive atomization of humanity. Matter individuates man, and then man to overcome matter unites economically, politically, culturally, religiously; in every case, the basis of the union of men is an idea, an act of intellect; in every case, man is better off for having followed the idea; in every case, sin destroys the progress so that men are left with only the idea and without its fruit and come to look with suspicion on everything intellectual as a vain delusion. But it is not the idea that is to blame but the sin, the refusal to follow reason in all things. The idea is the principle of unity, but sin, acting contrary to reason, destroys the unity; the idea is a formal cause, but it must be joined with
the effective causality of will to give effective unity, to give unity in truth whose phenomenon is the 'order with tranquility' [46] called peace. Thus it is that the reign of sin culminates in that Zersplitterung of humanity described by St Paul: men 'foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy' [Romans 1.31]. More could not be said.

Christ as the new head of humanity, as the reunification and redintegration of what is torn asunder by sin, is the originator of the absolute Geist of dogma, is the absolute of intellect in which participates the church, the koinônia [1 Corinthians 1.9,10,16, etc.], the communion. For it is the absolute Geist of dogma that progresses without ever falling back; it is the light of the world that selects the pure element of truth in the incomplete acts of the objective Geist. Next, intellect is the principle of human operation in unity; it is the principle of peace. But whether we read the Messianic prophecies, muse over the angel's hymn at Bethlehem, recall the discourse of the Last Supper, or turn to the texts in St Paul on the anakephalaiôsis, we always find the work of Christ described as the work of peace, the peace of a universal king, the peace that comes to men of good will, the peace that the world of sin with its balance of power and its economic imperialism cannot give. 'For in him all the fulness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross' [47] (Colossians 1.19,20). 'For he has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth' [48] (Ephesians 1.9,10). It is, then, the 'mystery' [49] [Ephesians 1.9] of the anakephalaiôsis that Christ is Plato's philosopher king. Plato saw the social necessity of philosophy [r], and before he died he renounced philosophy to play the ancient sage that gave men wise laws. But what Plato dreamt of, Christ would realize. The means are at his disposal. The church holds in check false speculation by anathemas; the church prevents the rationalization of making out that what is sin is no sin by imposing the obligation of auricular confession; the church gives the human will the support of grace that flows through the sacraments; the church teaches the distinctive doctrine of Christ, which is charity, the
only means of overcoming the evil of error and sin, the only alternative to the dialectic of sin which takes objective evil as a premise and elaborates false principles as laws for the greater misery of mankind.

Christ is the anakaphalaiôsis of humanity as the light of the world, the principle of human unity, the prince of peace. But the divine Word [50] is not only a source of intellectual light but also the object for the love of the will; for the will is a 'natural inclination that follows the form of intellect' [51]. From Christ by the sending of the Holy Ghost proceeds the active spiration in the human image of the Trinity; and in response to this active influence is the passive supernatural love of man, the theological virtue of charity. 'Who then,' asks St Paul, 'shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress? Or famine? Or nakedness? Or danger? Or persecution? Or the sword? As it is written: For thy sake are we put to death all the day long. We are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. But in all these things we overcome, because of him that hath loved us. For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor might, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Saviour' (Romans 8.35-39). In this love Christ is the center of the love which all men must have for all men in the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human operation. For to love one's neighbor and to love Christ is all one. 'Lord, when did we see thee hungry and fed thee: thirsty and gave thee to drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and took thee in? Or naked and covered thee? Or when did we see thee sick or in prison and came to thee?' (Matthew 25.31-39)

'Without me you can do nothing' [1 John 15.5]. This is true not only of the supernatural order of attaining the beatific vision. It is equally true of the social order; all things must be restored in Christ or there can be no restoration. For the twofold problem of intellectual unity and effective will is beyond the reach of man. Man is not willing to take himself as no more than an instrument. It is hard for him to see the truth of the alternative set him by St Paul: 'Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin: but present yourselves to
God, as those that are alive from the dead; and your members as instruments of justice unto God' (Romans 6.12-13). Man can choose only between the service of reason and of passion, only between the service of God or of sin, only between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of Satan. Man can be no more than an instrument. Man has to live as one alive from the dead, in perpetual rite of sacrifice. Sacrifice, the shedding of blood, that is the whole meaning of life; and in this eternal oblation Christ is the first agent [52]. Let me close this aspect of our question with a citation from Donoso Cortés: "Die Stadt Gottes und die Stadt der Welt stehen zueinander in schürfsten Gegensatz, nicht etwa weil man in der einen Blut vergießt, in der andern nicht, sondern weil in der einen die Liebe das Blut vergießt, in der andern der Hass' [53].

We now come to the final antithesis between the first and second Adam; this is at the same time the final synthesis of history, Christ as the formal cause and through the Holy Spirit the efficient cause of the end of all creation, the manifestation of divine wisdom in heaven as well as on earth.

First, we must ask why God did not create a universe in which there would be no sin, for obviously he could have created such a universe, and that irrespective of the liberty of creatures and the temptations they were subjected to. God has created those creatures that would sin. We ask why? The answer is well known: the divine wisdom in its transcendence of mystery and grace is better revealed when there are some creatures that actually do sin; and it is not in the manifestation of divine justice by the punishment of sinners that this greater manifestation arises, for any penalty is a privation, and God does not reveal himself by negations, however terrible; the greater manifestation of divine wisdom lies in the need for grace that is created by sin. In the first place, there must be such a need: for God is intelligent and so cannot do things unnecessarily. In the second place, sin creates such a need. But this need is specifically different, as it were, in the sin of the angels and in the sin of man. The sin of the angels is in the case of each angel a purely individual sin, for each angel is strictly an individual with a specific difference from all the rest of creation: no one but himself is involved in the sin of each angel. The sin of man, on the other hand, is the sin of a potential individual that is not confined to the potential individual but, through
the metaphysical unity that makes the many potential individuals one in nature and in operation, extends from the one potential individual to the nature and the operation of all the potential individuals. Thus the sin of Adam is, as it were, an anomaly: for in virtue of what man actually is (one nature potentially many individuals) reason requires that all sin in Adam; but in virtue of what man potentially is (many intelligibly distinct individuals proceeding from one nature) reason would require that not all sin in Adam. I say: 'Reason would require it.' The condition implied is that reason would require it, if the many potential individuals were not merely potential individuals; thus the condition is really an impossibility, a contradiction, for the many men can be intelligibly distinct only through their potentiality in the one human nature. It is on the basis of this quasi anomaly that divine mercy finds an opportunity to intervene and bring forth the 'new creation' [2 Corinthians 5.17; Galatians 6.15] through Christ Jesus, a creation that in its transcendence of mystery and grace reveals the Word by the Word in a way that no single creation could achieve: to reveal the infinite there must be an infinite to be made issue with; infinite wisdom conquers the infinity of sin.

Hence as matter is for form so, in some analogous way, the sin of the first Adam is for the mystery of faith in Christ Jesus. But the Savior is not merely the supernatural pendent to Adam's infranatural sin: his significance is cosmic; he restores all things whether on earth or in heaven. Now this restoration of all things must be the final settling of accounts with sin. How is it such?

First we note the peculiarity of a creature that is 'one and many.' The unity of human nature and operation -- a unity that unfolds through a material to an intelligible plurality -- is the connatural instrument for a victory over sin: for in this one nature and operation sin is not an isolated and instantaneous emergence of evil; it dilutes itself in time and spreads out into a reign of sin till sin culminates in monstrosity and topples over from its own enormity. Thus the antinomy of church and state, in modern times, through the dialectic of sin, became first the heresies, then the liberal states, and finally Bolshevik Russia where sin in its pure form is organized by error, rules by terrorism, and attains security by the perversion of youth: the Bolshevik is ridiculous
in his premise that man is merely an animal, but he is terrible in his power to make man merely an animal; and, if you blame the Bolshevik, you are blind: for Bolshevism is the social consequent of liberalism, and liberalism is the social consequent of heresy, and heresy is the social consequent of the opposition of church and state, and the opposition of church and state is inevitable as long as men are children of Adam -- a predication that neither churchmen nor statesmen can avoid. (Is then the situation hopeless? Certainly, unless we settle down, face the facts, and think on the abstract level of modern history. But it is not in itself hopeless for to God all things are possible even when he uses human instruments.) Second, we note the solidarity between the sin of the angels and the sin of man. On the principle of 'whatever is moved is moved by something else' [54] it would have been impossible for Adam to think of sinning unless the serpent had intervened to tempt him through Eve. Adam was not as we are; he was not ignorant; he was not weak; he suffered no premotion contrary to his nature; the premotion to sin had to have an extrinsic origin. Thus the reign of sin on earth takes its origin in the father of lies; Adam by sin made himself the instrument of Satan's premotion; the reign of sin is the reign of Satan and a terrestrial repercussion of the sin of the angels; therefore, the kingdom of God, Christ, the Messianic King, the Prince of Peace, the eternal High Priest and Victim, the Light of the world and the 'First Agent' [55] of the reillumination of man, through the 'fulness' [56] (Ephesians 1.23, 3.19, 4.13; Colossians 1.19, 2.9) of the achievement in his first advent, shall in his second advent finally settle all accounts with sin whether on heaven or on earth.

'He is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent. For in him all the fulness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross' (Colossians 1.18-20) [57].

Palazzo Borromeo [s], Dominica in Albis [t], 1935

Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.
METHOD

[Appendix]

Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity

1 The real is exhausted by the terms: existence, individuation, essence; that is, everything that is exists as a particular of a certain kind [u].

2 Existence is either intelligible or empirical. Intelligible existence is the existence known per se in regard to itself [58]. Empirical existence is the existence that is not known per se in regard to itself. Empirical existence does not exclude all intelligibility: it is not intelligible in itself; to be known it has to be known as a matter of fact, empirically; once it is so known, it may be understood, but not in terms of itself but only in terms of a purely intelligible existence.

   Empirical existence is also called contingent.

   Empirical existence is what is called the supposit [59], that is, what is presupposed to exist by intellect in its pure discourse; pure discourse in regard to itself [60] could treat of God, it could treat of human nature, it could treat of an n-dimensional space; the existence of the last two, however, has either to be presupposed or to be prescinded from by pure discourse; on the other hand, pure discourse in regard to itself [60] includes the existence of God.

   It is in the order of empirical existence that the axiom holds: things that are identical with the same third thing are identical with one another [61]. Thus this intellectual and this sensible are really one thing; they are really one thing, empirically, as a matter of fact, because they are both found in the one contingent being though either may be found separately in contingent beings (angels and animals). On the other hand, this principle has a strictly limited application in the order of purely intelligible existence, that is, the Blessed Trinity.

3 Individuation is either intelligible or empirical. Intelligible differentiation is in virtue of an intelligible difference: thus the Father differs intelligibly from the Son according to the opposition of the relations; similarly one angel differs intelligibly from another.

   Empirical differentiation is not in virtue of an ultimate intelligible difference; it is difference simply as a matter of fact. This plea is similar to that [v], but it is not the
same as that; why not? It is simply a fact; there is not a reason.

Positively, empirical differentiation is in virtue of matter: matter is the unlimited passive potentiality of unintelligible difference; it explains why all the points in a line are each different from all the others. This is not quantity, for quantity adds continuity to this mere potentiality of difference: matter is the potentiality of difference as such.

4 Reality is either pure or impure.

Pure Reality is the aspect of the divine essence that is imitated or participated; it is necessarily intelligible in itself, for it is an aspect of the absolutely intelligible.

Impure reality is what must be besides this aspect as such for there to be more than the divine essence; thus if the participated aspect is to be real, it cannot be a pure participation for it necessarily is something that the Participated is not, namely, partial; similarly for imitation: the imitation cannot be the real original, else it would not be merely an imitation.

Impure reality is termed passive potency and pure reality act; hence, act is limited by potency [62].

Further, in God there is no potency; in all creatures there is potency; therefore, in all creatures there is something that there is not in God. Finally, both contingency and materiality are in themselves unintelligible; neither is found in God; both are found in all creatures in the world; therefore, contingency and materiality are impure reality; also, as the real is positively real by participation or imitation of the Absolute, it remains that essence is the pure participation.

5 We draw two corollaries.

a The reality of a thing is to be measured not by its existence nor by its particularity, if these are merely empirical, but by its measure of essence, of participation of the divine essence.

b The lower grades of being are differentiated by affirmation and negation according to their measure of imitation: thus, existing but not living; living but not rational; rational but not immaterial.

This is the scope of differentiation by absolute being [63].

The same is true, possibly, of the differentiation of the angels.
In the Trinity, differentiation cannot be by the absolute being [64] since each person is God exhaustively; hence it is by relative being [65], by the reality of opposed yet mutually implicit function.

6 Pure reality is dynamic.

God, whence all pure reality has its foundation, is a dynamic eternity of unlimited and immutable intellect and will; from this proceed all the attributes as well as the Persons; the attributes, for Wisdom is infinite intellect with infinite will; Goodness is infinite will with infinite intellect; omnipotence is the illimitation of will; immensity is the spiritual character of omnipotent will; etc., etc.

Physical reality, apart from its being a particular something, is, as the physicists tell us, energy; and a clear conception of the calculus is a great help to understanding the processions of St Thomas.

Biological reality, apart from its being particular somethings, is reproductive, self-adaptive, life.

The dynamism of reality is either motion [66] or \textit{energeia}[67].

Motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency [68].

\textit{Energeia} is the act of a being in act insofar as it is in act [69] (procession).

The dynamism of reality is somewhat obscured (ungroundedly) by the distinction between essence and nature. Essence is (that) by which a thing is what it is [70]. Nature is the intrinsic principle of an action of a certain kind [71]. These two really coincide. To say that the essence of man is 'rational animal' is to think of man not in his absolute measure of reality but in his measure as a measure relative to that of animals. Man considered in himself is a particular conjunction of physical, organic, sensitive, and intellectual active potencies; abstract from the particularity and the contingent supposit of the conjunction and we have the pure essence, a set of potencies. Now the actuation of these potencies does not regard man as such but man as existing and particular; hence the essence is merely the set of active potencies. But a nature is also a set of active potencies. Therefore, essence, considered absolutely, coincides with nature.

7 Individuation and Personality

Individuation is not the same as personality. An infant is actually individual but only potentially a personality.
Formally, a personality is a combination of a habit of intellect and a habit of will, a particular mentality and character. This personality is constituted either by the light and charity that come of the Holy Ghost, and this gives the spiritual man [72]; or in relation to the true, good, and beautiful, and this gives the psychic man [73]; or finally in relation to the sensible lower self of desire, and this gives the fleshly man [74].

Hence it would seem that even among men personality is a relation; but it is a relation that arises from the spiritual potencies used well or abused, and corresponds to the passive potency of individuation by matter, which supplies its initial possibility; we outgrow our individuation by matter, but we need it to begin with; further, we see the ground of immaterial existence in the intellectual and moral development of man.

Endnotes

[1] '...oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de poten-
tia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia
in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius
inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum ... Actus
autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta , per quam sciunturn
res indistincte sub quadam confusione ...' [Our translation uses
Lonergan's own terms, as they occur in the text; for example,
'progresses' for 'procedit.' His use of quotation marks for
Latin varies throughout the work; the difference does not
seem significant, and we regularly use quotation marks. His
underlining, however, and sometimes his capitals seem meant
for emphasis, in Latin as in English; we retain that emphasis
in our translations.]

[2] [The title is based on Ephesians 1.10, with a noun substi-
tuted for Paul's verb form: 'restoration of' instead of 'to
restore.' 'Restoration' is not the perfect translation, but
it is close to the Vulgate 'instaurare' and the Douay 'to
re-establish,' both of which would be familiar to Lonergan;
the Revised Standard Version has 'to unite,' which would sug-
gest 'unification.' He himself used various terms: synthesis,
reunification and redintegration, as well as restoration.
--We have left the column of titles as Lonergan typed it;
his commas show a hierarchy in the subtitles, and in fact
they are not all repeated in the heading Lonergan gave the
body of the work.]

but Newman's terms are regularly, not integration, but conver-
genence, cumulation, summation, combination, coalescence of
probabilities.]

[4] 'materia propter formam.' [The indices to Thomas Aquinas
give numerous references under 'Materia est propter formam,'
'Materia perfectur per formam,' etc.]
I singuli autem alter alterius membra.'

'Ita multi unum corpus sumus in Christo, singuli autem alter alterius membra.'

'ultimum cur.' [A phrase that captures perfectly Lonergan's drive to get to the bottom of things, with a special application to sin, where there is no 'cur' whatever.]

'appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus.' [Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 4 c.: 'actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam'; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 48 (ad fin.): '... cum intellectus per formam apprehensam moveat voluntatem'; similarly passim in St Thomas. --We have translated 'appetitus' by 'inclination'; Lonergan occasionally uses 'appetite' but seems to prefer to leave the term in Latin.]

['Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum' was an Augustinian doctrine given authority by the Council of Orange in 529 A.D. (Denzinger/Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum..., 392, with reference to Augustine's In Evangelium Iohannem tract. 5, 1), and familiar to theology students; the same Council repeatedly affirms the parallel Augustinian doctrine that everything else is from God.]

Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 3 c.

'ordo cum tranquillitate.' [The reference is probably, here and in section 6 below, to Augustine's 'tranquillitas ordinis' [De civitate Dei 19, 13].]

'philosophia perennis.'

[Energeia is almost identified with dynamism (see below his explanation in the 'Sketch'); we leave the Greek from as Lonergan typed it.]

'doctor invincible.'

[George Bernard Shaw, Back to Methuselah (1921). Lonergan, no doubt writing from memory, got two of the vowels wrong.]

Eugène Portalié, 'Augustin (Saint). Vie, oeuvres et doctrine.' Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, tome 1/2 (Paris: Letouzey, 1931), cols. 2268-2472. [The reference may be to col. 2389. See the translation by Ralph J. Bastian, A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960) 199: 'St. Augustine noted this truth of universal experience that man is not master of his first thoughts. ']

'Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.' [See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 2, a. 3 c.: 'Omne ... quod movetur ab alio movetur. ']

'Primum Agens.'

'appetitus naturalis.' [Thus also in the next line and in the next paragraph.]

'contra rationem.' [Thus also twice more in this paragraph.]

'quoad se.' [Thus also in the next line.]

'quoad nos.' [Also in the next line.]

'quoad id quod est.' [24] 'quoad modum quo est.'

'indivisum in se.' [26] 'divisum a quolibet alio.'

'ratione essentiae.'

'ratione materiae quantitate signatae.' [Lonergan had first typed 'ratione existentiae' but while typing corrected it to the present phrase.]
[29] 'invicta schola nominalium.' ['nominalium' could be a mistake for 'nominalisterum,' the usual textbook term.]

[30] 'ratione suppositi.' [31] 'rationes formales.'

[32] 'anthropos sarkikos.' [33] 'anthropos psykhikos.'

[34] 'anthropos pneumatikos.'

[35] 'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.'

[36] 'primogenitus ex mortuis.'

[37] 'cf Pauline "impotence of the Law". [This marginal note, handwritten along the length of the paragraph, is probably to be attached to the word 'impotence' of the text.]

[38] Leo XIII, 1879—on Christian philosophy according to Thomas Aquinas in Catholic schools.

[39] 'N.B. The development of dogma is the developed Absolute Geist turning back upon the content of revelation and seeing more there than was seen before.' [This marginal note, handwritten along the length of the paragraph, is probably to be attached to the phrase 'through dogma' in order to emphasize the contrast: twice 'through dogma' is substituted by hand for 'of dogma.]

[40] 'Verbum Divinum.'

[41] 'bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse.' [St Thomas will say 'bonum rationis ... est proprium hominis bonum' (for example, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 129, a. 3 c.), but more often will quote Dionysius, 'bonum animae est secundum rationem esse' (ibid., 1-2, q. 55, q. 4 ad 2m, and passim.).]

[42] 'Had Hitler had something better than Gobineau [sic] and Chamberlain in the restoration of Germany, for instance:' [This marginal phrase, handwritten along the length of the paragraph, is attached by an arrow to the line 'A metaphysic of history is ... imperative for the church to meet the attack...'

Joseph Arthur Gobineau (1816-82), French diplomat and man of letters, taught the inequality of humankind, only the white race being creative of culture.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927), British-born political philosopher, owed much to Gobineau, regarded 'Germanism' as source of all that is best in European culture, was an influence on Hitler.--With thanks to Jacques Monet for these notes.]

[43] Pius XI [Quas Primas (1925), Denzinger-Schönnmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum, 3675; see Acta Apostolicae Sedis 17 (1925) 593-610.]


[45] Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno (1931), London: Catholic Truth Society, p. 67. [Denzinger-Schönnmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum, 3725-3744, has excerpts, but for Lonergan's point see Acta Apostolicae Sedis 23 (1931) 226, on the difficult role of priests, 'ad quam obeundam acri de re sociali studio rite parandi sunt quicumque in spem Ecclesiae adolescenti.

[46] 'or do cum tranquillitate.'

[47] 'Quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, et per eum reconciliare omnia in ipsum pacificam per san- guinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in coelis sunt (Colossians 1.20).']
'Ut notum faceret nobis sacramentum voluntatis suae secundum beneplacitum eius quod proposuit in eo, in dispensatione plenitudinis temporum, instaurare omnia in Christo quae in coelis et quae in terra sunt in ipso (Ephesians 1.10).

'mystērion.' 'Verbum Divinum.'

'appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus.'

'primum agens.'

'(cited by Erich Przywara in Stimmen der Zeit, p. 14, April 1935).'] A slight inaccuracy in the quotation (omission of dots between 'Welt' and 'stehen') has been corrected.

Przywara's article, 'Dionysisches und christliches Opfer,' vol. 129, pp. 11-24, studied Nietzsche and Donoso Cortés as representatives and prophets of the two ways of thinking indicated in the title.

A few years later, reviewing Caryll Houselander's This War Is the Passion, Lonergan will write, '... the question is not whether one chooses to suffer. Too obviously Donoso Cortés, that profound and neglected philosopher of 19th-century Spain, was right in summing up the vast long scroll of mankind in a single phrase: "Blood must flow; the only question is whether it flow in hatred or in love"' (The Canadian Register, April 11, 1942, p. 5). Donoso is quoted also in 'Analytic Concept of History' in File 713.

'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.'

'Primum Agens.' 'plerōma.'

'St ipse est caput corporis ecclesiae, qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis, ut sit ipse in omnibus praesum tenens. Quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, et per eum reconcilire omnia in ipsum, pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in coelis sunt' (Colossians 1.19-20).

'per se nota quoad se.' 'suppositum.' 'quoad se.'

'quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se.' [This was a standard objection to the distinction of the three divine persons; see Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3, arg. 1: 'Quae-cumque ... uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem.' St Thomas derives both the objection and its solution from Aristotle.]

'actus limitatur per potentiam.'

'esse absoluto.' 'esse absolutum.'

'esse relativum.' 'motus.'

[We have left energeia in the original wherever Lonergan used it.]

'Motus est actus entis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi.'

'Energeia est actus entis in actu in quantum huiusmodi.'

'quo quid est quod est.'

'principium intrinsecum actionis talis.'

'anēr pneumatikos.' [Lonergan wrote in Greek characters here; we have transliterated the way he did in notes 32-34 above. But here he uses anēr, not anthrōpos; it is the difference generally between vir and homo; Scripture does sometimes use anēr in the wider sense, but anthrōpos for spiritual man.]

'anēr psykhikos.' 'anēr sarkikos.'
a a few conclusions: The rest of the bracketed phrase is a correction by hand of the previously typed 'that do not figure, at least prominently, in the current Thomist mentality.'

b casting up the sum: compare Lonergan on summation many years later; 'Intentional acts are summated into living, the accumulation of experience, the acquisition of skills, habits, ways of doing things. Objects are summated into situations, and the summation of situations is the environment, the world, the horizon. Subjects are summated into the intersubjectivity of community ...' ('The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,' METHODS: Journal of Lonergan Studies 2/1 [March 1984] 1-20, at p. 9).

c by the mass of men ... by the very few: compare De scientia atque voluntate Dei (1950, unpublished), c. 23: 'Omnis ... motus historicus quantumvis magnus, profundus, diuturnus ex "minoritate creativa" [Toynbee] ortum sumpsit: minoritas enim inquirit, cogitat, intelligit, vult, ducit; maioritas docetur, commovetur, ducitur.'

d liberalism a consequent of ... heresy with the consequent religious wars: a sequence. Lonergan would expand later in this paper and affirm over and over in other works; for example, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957) 231, 'The medieval synthesis through the conflict of Church and State shattered into the several religions of the reformation. The wars of religion provided the evidence that man has to live not by revelation but by reason. The disagreement of reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he also must practise the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called for the totalitarian ...' It may be that Lonergan had already done a historical study of this sequence--other papers in File 713 suggest that—but if so it has been lost.

e William of Ockham: though there is no evidence he was an Ockhamist, Lonergan says of his student days, 'I thought of myself as a nominalist' (A Second Collection [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974] 263, but also, 'My nominalism had been an opposition, not to intelligence or understanding, but to the central role ascribed to universal concepts' (ibid. 264); this phase 'vanished when I read J. A. Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas' (ibid.)—which was a year or two before he wrote this essay. But nominalism persists in his memory, and he comes back to it later in this same paper.

f objective Geist, the common mind of man: Lonergan speaks in his letter of January 1935 of the great influence Hegel (and Marx) had on his view of history; perhaps it appears here.

g Man makes man: over twenty years later, in his lectures on existentialism and elsewhere, Lonergan will pursue the idea sketched so briefly here (and later in this essay) in the context of human solidarity; see Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 422, in note b to lecture 10.

h the difference between the act of will and the non-act of will: in his doctoral dissertation Lonergan will insist on the Thomist doctrine 'that the objective difference between
posse agere and actu agere is attained without any change emerging in the cause as such,' and will comment: 'To later scholastics this seemed impossible a priori: they held that "Peter not acting" must be really different from "Peter acting." They refused to believe that St. Thomas could disagree with them on this; in fact, St. Thomas disagreed' (Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971] 69). The present point is the obverse of that made in the dissertation: there the explanation of a cause acting, here the explanation of a cause not acting, in both the principle that causation does not involve any real change in the cause as cause (Grace and Freedom 68).

1 a psychologist of the school of St Augustine and St Thomas: Lonergan already identifies himself as a Thomist, though his discipleship began in earnest only with his doctoral dissertation, 1938-40.

j workmen to raise a family: the Catholic doctrine that employers must pay workmen a living wage for a family keeps recurring in Lonergan's later writings on economics, but there it is to underline the need of a valid economics if we would issue precepts in the area of economics; here his interest is in deeper questions of metaphysics.

k Realpolitik: Lonergan substituted this by hand, crossing out his typed phrase, 'unscrupulous diplomacy.'

l simply: this qualification was added by hand.

m those tending to be: substituted by hand for 'the innumerable.'

n integral: see note b above, on summation of objects, of situations.

o mystical body: a central doctrine for Lonergan in these years and long after; see Understanding and Being 423-24, note 1 to lecture 4.

p 'Crisis in the West': Lonergan seems to have a specific reference in mind—to what? Possibly Spengler, who is mentioned in 'Analytic Concept of History,' possibly the world economic crisis, mentioned earlier in the paper.

We are similarly in the dark with regard to Zersplitterung, which occurs three times in the Pantôn paper, and also in 'Analytic Concept of History.' A few years later Lonergan will refer to Toynbee's long account of disintegration: 'On bipolar disintegration in the general historical field, cf. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History (Oxford, 1939), V, 376-VI, 132'; but his own chosen term in Insight will be 'breakdown.'

q Summa Sociologica: a phrase that almost epitomizes Lonergan's interest at this time; to track this interest through his later writings would be a valuable piece of research.

r Plato saw the social necessity of philosophy: Over forty years later Lonergan had forgotten this insight of his youth and will say he learned it from Voegelin: 'I had always been given the impression that Plato's dialogues were concerned with pure intellect until I read Dr. Voegelin and learned that they were concerned with social decline, the break-up of the Greek city-states. It was human reasonableness trying to deal with an objective social, political mess' (in E. Cahn and C. Going [eds], The Question as Commitment: A Symposium [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1977], 119.

s Palazzo Borromeo: the Jesuit seminary in Rome, Via del Seminario, 120, for students in basic philosophy and theology;
after the war, and called Collegio Bellarmino, it became the international house for graduate students. The year of this essay, it was a community of 103, already international with about ten countries represented. Some theology students whose names may be familiar: R. Lombardi, S. Stefanu, W. Ciszek.

The place, date, and signature are handwritten.

t Dominica in Albis: the first Sunday after Easter and therefore April 28 in 1935.

u exists as a particular of a certain kind: See 'Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought' just thirty years later: 'the scientist conceives as his ideal goal knowledge of theories verified in any number of different instances ... the Thomist will add that by verification the scientist knows contingent existence, by theories he knows essences and forms, and by appealing to instances he acknowledges matter as well as form and existence' (Collection [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988] 137).

v This pea is similar to that: See Insight 504, 'Why is this pea different from that, this Ford from that? Even though the two peas or the two Fords might not be similar in every respect, still they could be absolutely alike and yet different. Such difference would not be grounded in ... anything to be known by a direct act of understanding. It is grounded in what is to be known merely empirically.'