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IN THIS ISSUE OF METHOD

Andrew Beards brings to bear upon 'analytic' efforts to handle the issues of naming and reference (Kripke, Putnam, Searle) Lonergan's Generalized Empirical Method.

F. E. Crowe critiques a recent criticism of Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the will.

Fred Lawrence comments on the Lonergan-Gadamer relationship and responds at length to issues raised by Michael Baur's interview with Gadamer and to Baur's interpretation of the fundamental differences between Lonergan and Gadamer.

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ON KNOWING AND NAMING

Andrew Beards
University of Calgary

For those who consider themselves to be outside observers of the analytical tradition in philosophy, the shifts in fashion within that tradition, be they of revolutionary proportions or merely palace coups, may appear of little interest. However, a number of these developments do, I believe, offer opportunities for demonstrating the explanatory efficacy of Generalized Empirical Method.

One such revolution within the Anglo-American tradition in the last few years has resulted from the challenge made to what was regarded as the orthodox account of naming and reference which emerged from the work of Frege and Russell. This Frege-Russell position has been attacked over the last two decades by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and Keith Donnellan, and has been defended, usually in some modified form, by such notables as Strawson, Dummett and John Searle.

From the viewpoint of Lonergan's philosophy this debate on the philosophy of language within the analytical tradition has some interesting features. Nathan Salmon has argued in his book, Reference and Essence [1], that the new position in the philosophy of language sketched out by Kripke and Putnam implies a metaphysics, which Salmon names 'essentialist', that goes beyond the confines of the philosophy of language and beyond the philosophies of science current in the analytical tradition. Such an opening to metaphysics may, at least, arouse the interest of those who have not found themselves in sympathy with the anti-metaphysical prejudices which have characterized most analytical philosophy in its recent past.

Of further interest may be the fact that some contributors to the debate, of the Kripkean persuasion, attempt to explicate the notion of 'reference' in terms knowingly adopted from some traditions within scholastic philosophy: the idea of 'haecceity', or "concept of thisness", has been employed by some of these philosophers.

For those impressed by the Marechalian and Lonerganian hermeneutic of medieval philosophy, such allusions to Scotism will, of course, immediately arouse suspicion. What sort of metaphysics is it that is emerging from these developments in the philosophy of language? From what epistemological foundations does it arise? Attempting to answer such questions will,
I think, provide yet further evidence for the thesis that most of modern philosophy stands within, and inherits the weaknesses of, a tradition which, for all the acuity of their archaeological investigations, Foucault and Derrida fail to detect [2]: the tradition which is the manifestation of an aspect of the polymorphism of human consciousness; the tradition which arises from the failure to distinguish between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning; which thinks of knowing as animal extroversion; the Scotist tradition in which intellect is exclusively concerned with concepts, arising from some kind of 'look' at an 'outside' reality.

An analysis of these debates in terms of Lonergan's methodology is to some extent facilitated by the fact that one of the contributors to the debate, John Searle, makes a number of points, in defending a much modified version of the Frege-Russell account, which come closer to elements in Lonergan's position than any of the approaches taken by the other disputants. Searle, although a philosopher in the mainstream of the analytical tradition, has recently offered an analysis of the problems identified in the naming and reference debate in terms of the intentional acts involved and, in this regard, takes a stand which is not very popular among many analytical philosophers who, following Quine, wish to avoid an account of meaning as something mysteriously "in the head". Searle's account, however, suffers from the inevitable shortcomings consequent upon a naive realism. Although analyzed in terms of intentionality, the problems are still seen in the context of how an 'in-here' mind can successfully 'refer' to an 'out-there' world. Some of these weaknesses in Searle's position will be treated towards the end of this article.

In what follows I hope to substantiate the claim that Generalized Empirical Method provides, in the approaches it suggests, a more successful resolution of the problems regarding naming and reference which are at issue in the debate between the upholders of the Frege-Russell thesis and its detractors. To this end I shall present an outline of the Kripke-Putnam position, some of the criticisms of this position offered by Searle, and an analysis of both these approaches from the viewpoint of Lonergan's philosophy. I think it will become evident, in the course of the argument, that despite the water which is thought to have passed beneath the bridge since Anglo-American philosophy appeared to be explicitly empiricist,
since such empiricism was itself attacked as 'metaphysical' by linguistic analysts, nevertheless the old empiricist epistemological models are still operative and exert their influence. What may at first seem a surprising interest taken by some analytical philosophers in Scotist concepts, and fourteenth-century analyses of possible worlds, may not appear so surprising to those who would detect historical continuity between these elements in mediaeval philosophy and the philosophical stance of those now interested in their reappraisal.

Kripke and Putnam vs. the Frege-Russell Thesis

In his book A System of Logic J. S. Mill held the position that proper names have denotation but not connotation. A place name like 'Dartmouth', for example, denotes a locality in England, but it has no connotation, no meaning content. The name originally derived from the fact that the town was at the mouth of the river Dart, but that does not constitute the meaning of the name 'Dartmouth'; many people use it to refer to the place without knowing its history.

In reaction to this position, that a proper name is a contentless reference mark or indicator, Frege offered an opposing theory in his celebrated essay, On Sense and Reference. Mill's view cannot be accepted, according to Frege, for it fails to make sense of a number of telling counter-examples. Notable among these is the case, which Frege describes in a letter, where we employ two different names to refer to what we consider are two different objects, only to discover subsequently that they are one and the same. A traveller in an unexplored region sees a mountain on the southern horizon and names it 'Afla'. Another traveller in another part of the same region sees a different-looking mountain to the north-west and calls it 'Ateb'. At first it is thought that two mountains have been discovered, but later it turns out that they are the same. If, as on Mill's account, we immediately knew to what the name referred, in this case the particular mountain, then we should simply know, without further investigation, that both names referred to one and the same object. But this is not the case.

In Frege's view, then, when using a name one does not have simple knowledge that there is some "that which is": rather, the meaning of the name is a description or a set of descriptions. Of course, in insisting that one cannot know that something is without knowing what it is, Frege's remarks form part of a venerable tradition. Dummett, in his defense
of Frege's position, alludes to a similarity with St. Thomas' denial of the validity of the ontological argument [3]. And, with regard to this point, G. E. M. Anscombe draws attention to a passage in Aristotle's Physics, "There is no such kind of thing as the things that there are; that there is such a thing as it is not what anything is" [4].

I have been describing the 'orthodox' thesis concerning naming and reference as the Frege-Russell position. Although such a designation is standard it has to be understood that Russell's contribution differed from Frege's, in accord with his somewhat differing epistemological views.

Russell agreed with Frege that in using a proper name in ordinary speech, we are employing it as a kind of shorthand for a bundle of descriptions. Names, therefore, have sense, meaning, as standing for descriptions and are not just empty pointers. However, Russell thought that at some stage we should be able to get beyond abstract descriptions and simply refer to the spatio-temporally locatable object. Such reference occurs in the use of demonstratives, such as 'this', or 'those'. But these do not have sense, they are indeed simply references, pointers. The demonstratives for Russell were "logical proper names", most of the terms we think of as 'names' being a second-class version of these. For Russell, then, the demonstratives are such that, as Dummett puts it, their sense "shrinks down to reference" [5].

Another aspect of the orthodox, or 'descriptive', theory of naming which Russell's account spells out clearly is the notion that the description or descriptions which are 'concealed' within a name must uniquely identify an individual, if the name is to refer successfully. Thus, if I say "Aristotle existed", I will have some such description in mind concerning Aristotle as, "The last great philosopher of antiquity who taught Alexander." If 'Aristotle' did not do these things, or if more than one individual fits such a description, then, according to Russell, our attempt to refer to an individual using the name 'Aristotle', understood in this way, fails.

The position that proper names are really concealed descriptions, which uniquely specify an individual in cases of successful reference, is criticized in different, yet convergent, ways by Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan. Kripke's attack on the orthodox view, outlined in his Naming and Necessity, is considered to have been the most far-reaching critique of 'descriptivism'. 
Putnam provides a succinct summary of some of the key points made in this critique of the Frege-Russell thesis. With regard to the puzzles which arise concerning names and reference, he writes,

Kripke's solution is ... to assume a set of objects called possible worlds which are, in structure, just models for the non-modal part of the language; i.e. each possible world determines a universe of discourse. And once again there is an accessibility relation. But there is an additional relation as well: the relation of trans-world identity. That is some individuals have to be identified across possible worlds ... Consider two possible worlds which both contain the same individual, say Aristotle, but in which that individual is assigned different predicates. For example, in one of the two worlds he might be born in Stagirus and in the other Athens. The phrase "the great philosopher born in Stagirus" refers to Aristotle in the actual world (which we shall identify with the former of the two worlds just postulated), but not in the second of the two worlds. Indeed, it might even refer to a different individual altogether in the second world; perhaps Plato was born in Stagirus in the second possible world. So the same descriptive phrase, "the great philosopher born in Stagirus" can denote different individuals in different worlds. In Kripke's terminology, the description is non-rigid.

What about the proper name 'Aristotle'? How do we customarily use this name in referring to hypothetical worlds? When we say "Aristotle might have been born in Athens", we do not just mean that someone named Aristotle might have been born in Athens. Indeed, when we say "Aristotle might have been born in China", we are also likely to add "If he had been born in China, he probably would not have been named 'Aristotle'". What we mean is that the same individual who was born in Stagirus, named Aristotle and became the star pupil in Plato's Academy etc. in the actual world, might have been born in Athens (or in China), might have been named Diogenes (or Tu Fu), etc. ...

Since the name 'Aristotle' is customarily used to refer to the same individual when we talk about non-actual worlds (even if that individual is not named 'Aristotle' in those non-actual worlds), the proper name 'Aristotle' is a rigid designator in Kripke's terminology. [6]

One of Kripke's main arguments against the Frege-Russell descriptive theory is, then, that we want to say that a name still refers to an individual even when the description or descriptions associated with the name we use for the individual do not hold. Another example Kripke gives is of Richard Nixon. "The man who was President of the U. S. A. in the years 1970-74", is what we may understand by the name 'Richard Nixon'. Now it is surely true that Nixon might never have entered politics in the first place. But, Kripke avers, we would still want to say that we can refer to the person we refer to with the name 'Nixon' if it had not been the case that Nixon went into politics; or even if the baby we refer to
AS "little Dickie Nixon" had not been so named. If talk of 'possible worlds' is somewhat daunting we can, according to Kripke, understand 'trans-world identification' as simply a matter of talking about what might have been the case with regard to a particular individual, as opposed to what actually is the case. As Kripke puts it, "We can point to the man and ask what might have happened to him, had events been different"[7].

Summarizing various arguments of those opposed to the 'descriptive' theory of names, those who hold some version of what is called the 'causal theory', N. Salmon points out that some have found support for their position in the work of mediaeval philosophers. If a name, according to the 'causal theory', does not refer to an individual with regard to a set of descriptions concerning that individual, that set being merely contingently true of him, then perhaps we may say it refers to a unique property. "This property is what Robert Adams, following Duns Scotus, calls haecceity ('thisness')... It is the property of being this very thing..." [8].

Kripke argues that the older theory of naming failed to take account of its social and historical dimensions. The older theory was happy with the picture of a man going into the privacy of his room and fixing the reference of a name by listing to himself the descriptions he would associate with it. On the contrary, Kripke suggests, the normal course of events is that a name is passed through a community and a tradition from those who first had contact with an individual to others; it passes along a causal chain [9].

It has been noted by some that Kripke does not directly tackle in any detail the Fregean argument, noted above, concerning the way in which we learn 'Ateb=Afla' (that they are the same mountain), through subsequent investigation, not through simple acts of reference. However, he does argue at some length that when, in modern logical notation, we symbolize the law of Identity as 'a=a', the symbolism 'a=b' should be taken as also expressing something of the law of Identity, and not as indicating the assignment of contingent properties to a thing, as might be suggested by Frege's argument. He asserts that "identity should just be taken to be the relation between a thing and itself" [10]. And to those philosophers who would object to the cogency of such a notion, Kripke answers that examples of such a relation, between a thing and itself, are not hard to find; someone can be his own worst enemy, or severest critic [11].
Searle's Critique

In an early article Searle defended the Fregean thesis that a name was employed in referring as associated with some set of descriptions of an individual. In a later presentation of this theory Searle takes an approach which, he admits, may depart substantially from Frege's *obiter dicta*, but is one which Searle believes clears away some of the muddle created by Kripke and Putnam with their new proposals for dealing with the problem of naming. Searle's new approach occurs in the context of a larger work on intentionality, and may have much in it that is nearer to Husserl than to Frege [12].

One of the central concepts Searle expounds in his book *Intentionality* is what he terms the 'self-referential' nature of intentional acts. Intentional acts, which include seeing, believing, thirsting, fearing, to name but a few, 'represent' in themselves the objective to which they are oriented. As such the acts have built-in awareness of conditions of satisfaction or frustration. Hunger anticipates eating and therefore 'represents' within itself the conditions which, if they occur, will provide satisfaction.

The 'self-referentiality' of intentional acts can be seen in the example of visual experience. Searle writes,

> for visual experience the specification of the conditions of satisfaction makes reference to the visual experience itself. If I see my hand in front of my face then the conditions of satisfaction are

\[ \text{Vis Exp (there is a hand there and the fact that there is a hand there is causing this Vis Exp).} \]

On the basis of this approach Searle attempts to criticize the Kripke-Putnam thesis on proper names and reference.

One of the problems which causal theorists find with Frege's position is that reference to individual things cannot occur via general concepts but only through the referential use of the indexicals (or demonstratives), 'I', 'he', 'this', 'now', 'then', etc. As has been mentioned, Russell thought that such demonstratives had no sense, only reference. How then, it is asked, can one have a complete set of descriptions which uniquely identify a particular individual? For one needs to refer to the individual via demonstratives and, on Russell's account, these have no sense or meaning and are, therefore, not themselves further descriptions or abstract concepts.

Anthony O'Hear makes this point against Frege in the following passage:
... as Colin McGinn has put it, "an accurate description of the phenomenological content of an experience will employ only general terms to specify how the experience represents the world."

We often regard our thoughts and other experiences as being thoughts about particular individuals in the world, but on McGinn's account we are able to do this because we are in direct causal and perceptual contact with some of those particulars ... This inherent generality of experience may also be part of what Wittgenstein was referring to when he said "If God had looked into our minds, he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of." [14]

To such objections to the Fregean account Searle responds, some authors think that the descriptionist holds that proper names are associated with a 'dossier' in the speaker's mind and that the issue is between this dossier conception and the conception of the use of a proper name as analogous to pointing. But that again is a misconception of descriptivism. On the descriptivist account, pointing is precisely an example that fits his thesis, since pointing succeeds only in virtue of the intentions of the pointer. [15]

Searle attempts to elucidate the way in which pointing or ostensive reference has 'sense' using his analysis of the self-referentiality of intentional acts. When someone says, "I am now hungry", this will be a true statement if the person uttering the sentence is hungry at the time of utterance. The statement has conditions for its satisfaction 'within' it and these are, "(the person making this utterance, 'I', is hungry at the time of this utterance, 'now')" [16]. The indexical expressions, 'I' and 'now', then, have conditions for satisfaction which may be satisfied in the particular situation in which the person finds himself. These conditions are the 'sense' of the expressions. But, of course, when someone says, "I am hungry" they do not, as a rule, 'unpack' into concepts the 'I' as meaning, "the person uttering this statement", or the 'now' as, "the time of utterance". These 'senses', meanings, as intended by the speaker are, maintains Searle, employing Wittgenstein's distinction, shown but not said in the act of utterance. Expressions like 'this', then, do have a sense derived from the particular locus of use and not simply from general concepts.

On the basis of this analysis Searle argues that Kripke misses the most important part of the causal story of the way in which names get passed through the community. The missing link is precisely the point at which the first users ascribe the name to a particular individual. Searle believes that his own account remedies that deficiency in a way which explains
what Frege failed to explain: the nature of the act of reference to a particular, involving general descriptions but also acts of reference which still have sense, or meaning.

**Empiricist Presuppositions**

It should have become fairly clear from the outline given of the various positions taken in the debate on naming and reference, that the philosophical approaches adopted would, in varying degrees, be regarded from the Lonerganian viewpoint as manifesting an absence of intellectual conversion. The cognitional models in the accounts, to a greater or lesser extent, render a picture of the human subject as truncated; alienation is evident between the subject and the image which he presents of himself. To be more specific, one may identify, in these debates, the dominant epistemological model at work as being an empiricist one.

Central to the issue is the Fregean distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*. Whatever Frege's own intentions were in employing the distinction, the analytical tradition has understood it, for the most part, in the way in which it is seen in Russell's philosophy: as the distinction between descriptive concepts and their application to a 'this' or a 'that' which we refer to when we bump into them in the world. In fact, it is not so much 'when' we bump into things that we refer to them; in much of the writing on the topic our 'bumping into' them is in some ill-defined way our actual 'referring' to them. In this fashion 'meaning' is identified with abstract concepts which are the province of intellect and are, indeed, the sole occupants of that province. What, then, do we make of reference? That is obviously not a matter of further concepts, for it concerns the way we apply them, and in that case it has not really to do with intellect, or human understanding.

With regard to the problem there seem to emerge at least three different reactions among the philosophers we have been concerned with. Some, the Kripkean admirers of Scotus, attempt to squeeze even more into concepts than other analytic philosophers think is possible. Thus, even on the level of concepts, the second level of human knowing according to Lonergan, concepts of 'thisness' or 'haecceity' already refer to the entity in reality. The second, and more standard route among analytical philosophers is to deny conceptual status to the act of reference and thereby deny that acts of reference have 'meaning' or have to do with intelligence. This latter point is not
spelled out in detail by many of those who write on the topic. As we can see from the O'Hear passage cited above, vague statements about "coming into causal contact with the world" suffice rather than protracted analysis. However, the image hinted at is of reference as being some conscious or semi-conscious unintelligent knee-jerk "at reality out-there"; as unintelligent as Wittgenstein supposed (wrongly) his 'grunts' to be. This lack of understanding of the intelligent nature of reference is to be found in the work of one devotee of Wittgenstein who is also acquainted with St. Thomas' philosophy and even, a little, with Lonergan's. On the topic of this philosopher's confusion over 'reference' I have written elsewhere [17].

A third approach is suggested by Searle. Although Searle's philosophy is also under the sway of the empiricist model, one of its merits is to have challenged the idea that since the mind deals only with abstract concepts our referring of these "to reality" is something akin to a senseless knee-jerk. His use of the Wittgensteinian distinction between saying and showing is, I think, particularly helpful in this regard. Searle's analysis of the self-referentiality of intentional acts is, again, encumbered by empiricist notions; however, in his use of this analysis he is trying to get at something very important which most analysts, trapped in empiricist conceptualism, overlook. One might suggest that what Searle describes, in terms of the distinction between saying and showing, Lonergan explains in the course of his cognitional analysis.

That one understands what one means in using the demonstrative 'this' to refer to something does not entail that one expresses the insight involved in concepts. As Searle insists, one 'shows' that one understands (that Searle does not use the term 'understands' in this regard is indicative of the empiricism implicit in his analysis), one does not 'say' (conceptually unpack) all that is involved in one's understanding. Indeed, the 'showing/saying' distinction is rather a useful way of highlighting other examples of what Lonergan explains in terms of a distinction between insight and conception. When someone tells me a clever joke he may realize from the way I laugh, if he knows me well, that I have 'got' the joke, including the many nuances involved: I 'show' that I understand. However, I may attempt, in turn, to explain the details of the joke to a third party who is present, who is unfamiliar with the elements necessary to appreciate it fully.
But in such explaining I may be quite unsuccessful in expressing conceptually, in 'saying', all that I have grasped in 'getting' the joke.

Lonergan on Reference and Demonstratives

It would perhaps be useful, at this point, to survey some of the features of Lonergan's approach to the matters under discussion, before going on to offer some assessment of the positions of Kripke, Putnam and Searle.

The hard and fast distinction between 'meaning' and 'reference', which was seen to be essential to much of the recent literature, disappears in Generalized Empirical Method. Indeed, just as Lonergan sees talk of intentionality as synonymous with talk about meaning [18], so the notion of 'reference' could be regarded, perhaps, as interchangeable with these terms. One might wish to be a little cautious, however, for just as the term 'substance' has acquired unfortunate philosophical associations, so, it might be urged, has the term 'reference'. In the literature we have been considering 'reference' is employed in the context of 'confrontationist' epistemologies, and while Lonergan believes 'confrontation' to mark certain moments in the process of coming to know (the moments of conceptualization), the essential mark of insight as knowledge is identity with the known. Be that as it may, it is clear that what the analysts would carve up into 'meaning' and 'reference' Lonergan would relate as different acts of meaning in the one process of coming to know, decide, love.

It has been observed that for many analytical philosophers reference is some non-intellectual act by which the concepts of intellect get applied to reality. On Lonergan's account there are no conscious acts of intention or reference which are not either attentive, or intelligent, or reasonable, or responsible, or loving ('loving' being understood in an 'intellectualist', not 'voluntarist', fashion). As such there is no act of reference which is not also an act of meaning, as Searle, in his own terms, has attempted to argue.

On the basis of his cognitional analysis Lonergan identifies three different acts of meaning as emergent within the three stages involved in the process of coming to know. These are the formal, the full, and the instrumental. Of these Lonergan writes:

The formal act of meaning is the act of conceiving, thinking, considering, supposing, formulating. The full act of meaning is an act of judging. The instrumental act
of meaning is the implementation of a formal or a full act by the use of words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance. [19]

When analysts talk of 'reference', then, they are alluding to what may be more correctly described as a "full term of meaning". That is the act by which we 'refer' to reality and determine that a concept is not merely a concept but is a meaning which corresponds to an objective meant. Such an act is anything but a mindless twitch by means of which we somehow refer to a real world 'out-there'.

It may also be observed that, with a failure to distinguish a level of judgment in knowing, many philosophers do not distinguish between a full act of meaning and an instrumental act in their account of reference. This is manifest in accounts of what role demonstratives play. As has been stated above, demonstratives are either seen, in the Russellian way, as verbalized expressions, manifesting the fact that we have 'bumped into' something 'in reality' which corresponds to one of our concepts, or, in the more recent Kripkean fashion, they are taken to be another kind of concept, the concept of 'thisness', employing which we refer to individuals across possible worlds.

With regard to the second option, Fr. Crowe has recently noted the way in which Lonergan's analysis reveals the vacuity of the Scotist notion of 'haecceity' [20]. Demonstratives, like 'this', are used by the intelligent and reasonable subject to refer to the data of sense or consciousness; to the level of the empirical residue or, in metaphysical terms, potentiality. Such use occurs when we are referring to particular data in questions for intelligence, 'what's that?', in acts of judgment, when we indicate that 'this' data provides the fulfillment of conditions necessary for something to be the case, and in acts of instrumental meaning, when we indicate to ourselves or to another a possible source of meaning in the data. The latter two uses are quite distinct. But as Lonergan noted in a passage in Insight, as relevant to diagnosing empiricist confusions in Anglo-American philosophy today as it was over thirty years ago, "for the empiricist the ostensive act not merely indicates a source of meaning but also a full term of meaning" [21].

Lonergan's point here is that since the empiricist lacks an adequate theory of the notion of being, as that which is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, he identifies the realm of full terms of meaning not with being, as he should,
but with the field of sensible presentations. In this way the use of demonstratives is thought of as direct reference to reality, unmediated by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.

On Lonergan's account, then, the use of demonstratives is not dumb, but open-eyed and intelligent. One uses them when one returns from the level of conception to the field of presentations, and in a way which endorses Searle's distinction here between 'saying' and 'showing' what we understand when we employ demonstratives, Lonergan writes that it is not necessary to be a cognitional theorist to understand what one is doing when one refers using a demonstrative, for "questions relevant to cognitional theory are not relevant to every instance of knowing. They are not universally relevant because, in fact, there is no cognitional obscurity about meanings that cognitional theory elucidates . . . such elementary meanings are fixed, in a manner which surpasses determination by definition . . ." [22].

According to Lonergan, however, one needs to go further to grasp the full implications for human knowing involved in the meaning of demonstratives. "I am sitting here now", "that book is over there", are expressions involving demonstratives which may be transposed into their equivalences in various, diverse spatio-temporal reference frames. One may locate such expressions on a public map and calendar so that 'now, here' becomes "an office in the University of Calgary, on 24th August, 1989". These issues are discussed by philosophers such as Husserl and Searle. However, Lonergan's critically established distinction between explanatory and descriptive knowledge requires that a further transposition take place if we are to grasp the significance of expressions like 'this', 'these', 'here', and 'now'.

A man who understood everything might proceed from his grasp of metaphysical analysis through its determinations in appropriate sciences to the nature and occurrence of his own sensations and acts of imagining. Still that all-inclusive act of understanding would account no less for past and future sensations and images than for the experiences of the present; and inasmuch as it accounted for present experiences, it would be independent of the experiencing for it would consist in assigning laws and probabilities to instances labelled with the ultimate conceptual determinations named 'here' and 'now'.[23]

Lonergan's position demands a further transposition. From the heuristic viewpoint of explanation as it is to be anticipated in the procedures of present or future science,
demonstrative expressions, as acts of meaning referring to
the empirical residue, would be transposed into terms which
denote particular, concrete extensions and durations, that
is 'matters' and 'forms' of which are to be understood as
part of the intelligibility immanent in emergent world
process [24].

Assessment of Kripke and Putnam

Now that we have noted some of the elements of Generalized
Empirical Method relevant to the discussion of reference,
we may be in a better position to offer an assessment of
the positions of Kripke and Putnam based upon Lonergan's
analysis.

Turning to the main argument which Kripke and Putnam
urge against the descriptive theory of naming, it can be
readily seen that there are errors involved which stem from
a faulty cognitional analysis. The various cognitional levels,
attention to data, insight into data and conceptual formul-
ation, and judgment, are not properly distinguished. As a
result, in true Scotist fashion, the activity of conceptual
formulation is taken to be the totality of operations involved
in human knowing. This conceptual level becomes the playground
in which logical analyses are not seen in their true perspec-
tive, but usurp the roles which insight into the particular,
and judgment with regard to the particular, rightfully play
in coming to know.

To talk, as Kripke and Putnam do, of trans-world identi-
fication of this same, actual individual across possible
and actual worlds is precisely to confuse this arena of imagi-
nation and logical hypothesis with the real world of cogni-
tional operations, through which we come to know the real
world. For demonstratives such as 'this' and 'that' have
their meaning from the intelligent use made of them in cogni-
tional process when one returns from the level of conception
to the level of the given of sense or consciousness. The
data of sense or consciousness are what is known to exist
in judgments which issue in descriptive knowledge; and, fur-
ther, this data provides the fulfilling conditions for issuing
judgments of fact in explanatory knowledge. Therefore,
these data are known to be real, actual. They do not pertain
to a world of general abstractions or concepts. Therefore,
to talk of 'this' or 'that' being used to refer to an individ-
ual in a 'possible world' is to be involved in metaphysics
gone on holiday.
If one finds talk of 'trans-world identification' too much to swallow, there is Kripke's apparently more modest suggestion that all we need to understand here is simply talk of alternative situations for the same individual. We say that Richard Nixon would still be this man, 'Richard Nixon', even if he had not gone into politics, and Aristotle would still be the same individual if he had not gone into philosophy. Similarly I would still be the same individual if I had not come into this office this morning. The descriptive theory insists that the name must have sense from a list of descriptions, but Kripke maintains that we can still refer to the same individual using his name, even if the contingent facts originally associated with the name in our initial use of it do not obtain.

To illustrate what is wrong with Kripke's account, and the way in which a better account of what is really at issue may be offered, let us consider a little story. I enter a pub one evening and across the bar, on the opposite side from which I sit down, I make out the face of a man who is drinking a pint of beer. The man moves about a bit, as he talks to the publican, and through the smoke I glimpse various aspects of his features and clothes. Now I decide to name this chap 'Jim'; a bit artificial, this kind of baptism, but we can imagine that I am a private detective, or some kind of person who is new to the area, who wants to make a mental note of the people he spots in the local pubs.

In terms of an analysis which results from answering the question "What do I know when I am knowing?", one could say that I have come to know a unity-identity-whole in the data understood as individual, a person whom I name, refer to as, 'Jim'. The various movements, noises, appearances which are the data understood to be relevant are series of conjugate potencies, forms and acts, through which I come to differentiate the unity, the person, Jim.

Now, as Lonergan writes, "Just as potency, form and act are the many components of a single reality, so central and conjugate forms equally are the many components of a single reality"[25]. Therefore, the claim that Jim could be the same reality if the conjugates by which I differentiate him were different is a somewhat ambiguous one. If we imagine me sitting in the pub and saying, "Jim is the man doing x, y, and z, but he can be the man not doing these things", it becomes clear that such a claim is nonsensical. It is
to claim that this reality can, at the same time, be what it is and not what it is. The tense is, of course, the clue here to disambiguating the claim made. "Jim cannot be doing other than he is doing, if he is to be the same reality, but Jim could have done something different and still have remained the same person, unity, that he is", seems a clearer way of expressing what is meant.

However, this is precisely the point at which confusion ensues in the accounts of Putnam and Kripke. If we say "Jim would still be Jim even if all I know of him were not the case", it may appear to follow that the name by which I refer to him could be stripped of all the associations it acquired that evening in the pub. He might never have come into the pub that evening, he might not have looked as he did (he might have worn different clothes, or have undergone plastic surgery). Surely I can refer to the same him, using the same name, even if all the differentiae are different. So Kripke reasons. However, what is implicit in the process of knowing and naming Jim, and my subsequent speculations about him, shows such reasoning to be mistaken.

Having come to know, and thereby name, Jim, that knowledge being of both conjugate and central potency, form and act, whenever, from that moment on, I refer to Jim, I refer to the reality which in my knowing I know could not be other than it was. What Kripke and Putnam overlook is that there is a multiple referentiality operative in my subsequent thinking about, and referring to, Jim. For I come to know the reality Jim as a unity differentiated by conjugates, in a judgment of fact. That judgment of fact, that successful (if it is correct) reference to reality, may then enter into further contexts of thinking and knowing. But in such further thinking and knowing concerning Jim, I will be referring to Jim precisely as the reality I knew could not be other than it was.

In human knowing and living there is an ever widening context in which the 'references' implicit in our acts of meaning multiply. As a human subject advances from attention to data, to understanding, judgment, evaluation and action, the sublation of the intentional levels involved means that the higher the level the more complex will be the 'references' involved. In a concrete judgment of fact I 'refer' to the universe of being, to an existent or occurrence, but in such a judgment I also 'refer' to the prior activities of insight and conceptual formulation, and to the data which provides
the fulfilling of conditions necessary for a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. What Lonergan names the "habitual texture of the mind" is the ever widening context of interrelated thoughts and judgments which accumulate through a lifetime. Our judgments, then, always refer to other more proximate or remote judgments, increments of knowledge, as these condition them.

When I refer to Jim, then, in thoughts or judgments subsequent to my first coming to know him, I refer to the reality which I knew; the conjugates of that reality being intrinsic to it. What do I do when I say "Jim might not have come into the pub this evening"? What I do not do is strip, in Lockean fashion, the differentiae away until I reach a bare 'it' which I then reclothe in different accidents. Rather, now I know and name Jim, I am given certain facts about reality to work with. Given what I know I can speculate about possibilities in hypothetical judgments which also have reference to that which, in part, grounds them, the judgment about the reality, Jim, as I knew him at time \( t_1 \), conjugates, warts and all.

I can speculate as to what Jim might have done; I know, at time \( t_1 \), that Jim is sitting on the other side of the bar, having a pint of beer, etc. I may think, "he might never have come here to drink this evening; it was possible for him not to have come in here; he might have gone to see a film; he might have worn different clothes". What I am doing here, as is suggested by the tenses of the verbs involved, is referring to past situations when the future contained a number of possible courses which became more or less probable as the various conditions in world process became fulfilled. On the basis of my knowledge of reality, on the basis of my knowledge of Jim, at time \( t_1 \), I am extrapolating to earlier times and situations in world process in which, I have reason to believe, Jim would have been involved. All the while in such speculation, I am making reference to Jim, as I know him; that knowledge being of him as he was at time \( t_1 \).

What I refer to, in my speculations concerning what Jim might have done, is not some other 'possible world', floating free of this one, but to the actual world at times earlier than \( t_1 \), and I therefore refer to the potentiality (not mere abstract possibility) which world process involving Jim had at those times for realizing this or that possibility.

I think that this account, based as it is upon an epistemology and metaphysics critically grounded in self-affirmation,
provides a better solution to the problems at issue concerning naming and reference, than does that offered by Kripke.

Putnam's claim that the same person, say Aristotle, could remain the same person while having been born in a completely different epoch of history is, perhaps, even bolder than anything Kripke is prepared to argue for [26]. To imagine that this is a real possibility is, again, to have a mistaken metaphysical notion regarding the constitution of a person. The particular person that I am is constituted, in part, by physical, biological and neurological and cultural factors (not to give an exhaustive list), which, in accord with the emergent probability of world process, are manifested in the concrete particular which I am, such that conditions at a different time and place in world process are hardly likely to produce a similar individual; let alone the metaphysical impossibility of their producing the same one! Again, one of the fundamental weaknesses in such philosophy is apparent in its failure to understand what it is to know the particular.

Mention was also made, earlier in this article, of Kripke's stance with regard to the law of identity. Frege held that 'a=b' symbolizes the discovery that what one had thought were two objects turned out to be one. But in the course of his argument concerning naming and reference, Kripke puts forward the idea that 'a=b' is as much a symbol for the law of identity as is 'a=a'.

I do not wish to go into detail with regard to Kripke's argument here, but a few remarks, suggested by Lonergan's work, may not be out of place. I believe that we find here another example of the way in which modern logical theory fails, in its attempts to resolve problems, to advert to the insights which lie behind the symbols used in logical expressions; a point which Lonergan made in Insight [27]. In this instance there is a failure to notice that 'a=a' expresses the metaphysical principle of identity, whereas 'a=b' expresses a type of concrete judgment of fact. The former involves insight into insight into data. When I notice a car across the road, I do not, as a rule, explicitly formulate the phrase, "there is a car over there; it is what it is and not anything else". However, such a notion is operative in my understanding, and it is made explicit in a metaphysics which results from investigating what I know when I know. However, what is symbolized as 'a=b' does not express this kind of insight into insight. It expresses a concrete judgment of fact in which one grasps
a unity-identity-whole in two sets of data understood as individual. So I come to realize that the man I see playing cricket is none other than Jim, although his appearance had led me to think otherwise initially. I could, of course, go on to enjoy insight into this insight and formulate that in terms of identity, "there is only one individual (in these two sets of data), and he is what he is and not another".

Frege was right, therefore, to insist that 'a=a' and 'a=b' symbolize quite distinct matters.

**Problems in Searle**

It was suggested that Searle's position on reference and naming is, in a number of ways, superior to those of Kripke and Putnam. Searle acknowledges that reference to the particular involves something which is more like descriptive, or conceptual knowledge than unintelligent physiological acts, in that reference is an intelligent act which must have some kind of meaning or sense. Searle tries to indicate the way such reference involves understanding, without explicit conceptual formulation, by employing the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'.

However, I have summarized Searle's position here using terms which do not occur in his own account. The term 'understand' is a case in point. Searle's analysis of intentionality is still very much in the empiricist mould. There is no distinction made between intentional acts such as fear, on the one hand, and thinking and reference, on the other, in terms of the empirical, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible phases of human consciousness. What Searle does appear to understand by 'understanding' is presented in terms of his analysis of the 'self-referentiality' of intentional acts: the property they have of representing in themselves the states they aim at, this property enabling them to recognize satisfaction of aims when this is achieved. Such an insight approaches what can be critically established in self-appropriation: the elements within cognitional process are self-authenticating; for example, we have the ability, as Plato noted, to recognize a correct answer when we get one. However, Searle's analysis does not recognize the differences involved in appetite as empirically conscious and appetite as intelligently, reasonably and responsibly conscious.
The consequences of such oversights are manifested throughout Searle's book, *Intentionality*. For example, Searle gives us a case where we may observe the way in which the self-referentiality analysis supposedly illuminates what occurs in understanding [28]. You tell me over the telephone that you are at a party, and that there is a drunken man standing in the opposite corner of the room. In terms of Searle's self-referentiality your understanding of the drunken man's being there runs:

(Visual Experience) "There is a drunk over there who is causing experience".

On the basis of this analysis Searle argues that I do not understand the fact that there is a drunk at the party in the way you do, for only you have the visual experience.

However, it seems rather odd to say that we do not understand the proposition in the same way. What is more to the point is that Searle does not analyze the way the understandings differ; what makes my understanding, when I am at the other end of the phone, understanding at all? On Lonergan's account, of course, the similarities and differences are easy to pinpoint. We both understand the same proposition which may be expressed in different formulas: "there is a drunk here", "there is a drunk at the party which he is attending". Besides this, given the differences in our sensible experiences, the fact that there is a drunk at the party is for you, given your access to the data, a matter of immanently generated knowledge, but for me it is a matter of belief; the kind of belief necessary for the day-to-day survival of society.

As can be seen from Searle's characterization of coming to know a fact in terms of "visual experience", he is implicated in the most basic of empiricist errors: the assumption that what is most obvious in knowing is what knowing most obviously is. 'Facts' just come in through the senses. This means that Searle's naive realism is easy prey for the sceptic and the idealist. Searle, in fact, attempts to counter the Humean argument that we cannot know causality as real in the world, but his attempt is unsatisfactory.

Searle argues that his self-referential analysis of intentional acts demonstrates that we have immediate awareness of causality. Again, from the Lonerganian perspective, this might sound promising, but given Searle's empiricist background the only examples he can offer are those of awareness of
processes on the level of empirical consciousness, and such cases are often those which may be dismissed by the sceptic.

Thus Searle avers that we can notice our immediate awareness of causality in the case where I wish to imagine the front of my house, and this image comes to me: I am indubitably aware of causing the image [29]. But need the sceptic grant this? The Humean or Derridian can still argue that although one wanted this image to appear before one, one simply cannot prove that one’s wanting it caused the image to appear; it might be mere continuous conjunction which leads you to think this.

Searle attempts to deal with a similar objection in the case of a man who thinks that he is raising his arm, and sees it rise, only to discover that he has come round from an operation in which a complicated machine has been installed to do the arm-raising for him, when he sends nerve messages to the areas of his body which usually achieve this end [30]. Searle tries to parry the sceptic here by arguing that the man can learn that this has happened and can, therefore, come to use this new system now aware that he does cause the arm-raising, but via the machine.

However, Searle seems unaware of the more global sweep of the sceptical move. It may satisfy someone who asks whether we can know that the stick seen through water is really bent or not by pointing out that we can take it out and have a look, but the sceptic and idealist argue that there is no universal vantage point from which we can look to see if our ideas "fit reality" or not. In Searle’s stories such a vantage point is assumed, not argued for.

The attempt to counter scepticism with empiricist weapons is, then, not likely to be successful. However, it is quite another matter to point out to the sceptic that he is aware of the operation of the principle of sufficient reason in his criticism of Searle or anyone else. To deny that is to be involved in incoherence, for the very denial is the assertion that there is not sufficient reason for this to be the case. One can grant the Humean that one is not directly aware of causing the image of the front of one’s house to appear before the mind when one wants it to (although one can ask if his doubt is reasonable here). But one can retort that one is aware that one wanted to imagine one’s house because one judged it to be of value to perform the experiment to see whether Searle or the Humean had the stronger argument.
Conclusion

In attempting the interest analytical philosophers in Generalized Empirical Method, perhaps the best one could hope for would be some stirring of interest insofar as method was seen as capable of illuminating and even solving some of the problems with which analysts are currently concerned. However, as becomes apparent sooner rather than later in such attempts at dialogue, little progress can be made before the radical issue is faced of the required shift from one philosophical horizon into another: the need for intellectual conversion. Still, the more attractive Generalized Empirical Method is made to appear, as regards its explanatory power, and the more often its insights are implemented with regard to problems emergent within other philosophical traditions, the higher the probability that some will accept the invitation to move into the horizon offered by intellectual conversion. After all, such an 'invitation' is already operative within the human subject as an invitation to develop positions and reverse counter-positions, so as to move toward a coherence between the subject and his own self-image.

Regarding the recent developments in the analytical tradition concerning reference and naming which has been the subject of this article, I would add two further concluding comments.

Firstly, Putnam writes of the revolution which many believe Kripke has effected in the analytical tradition, "Kripke was led to his discoveries in the philosophy of language partly by work he had done previously in a branch of mathematical logic, modal logic, in which he is the world's outstanding authority" [31]. If some of the criticisms of this new position which I have offered above appear apposite then, taking account of Putnam's comment on the origins and importance of Kripke's work, the present article may provide a piece of evidence in support of the claim Lonergan made in Insight, a claim reiterated over the years by Philip McShane [32], that modern logical theory requires the coherence offered by the perspective of Generalized Empirical Method.

Secondly, as was noted in the course of this article, it is perhaps an interesting fact that some analytical philosophers are finding themselves compelled by their researches to move beyond the bounds of language analysis per se into the realms of ontology and metaphysics. It was also noted that some of these philosophers have found aspects of
scolastic philosophy helpful in this regard. In the light
of these facts it perhaps appears a little tragic that analyti-
cal philosophers continue to ignore the philosophical corpus
of a thinker of the stature of Bernard Lonergan. For that
philosophy might assist them to look beyond the sterility
of fourteenth-century logic and Scotist epistemology to dis-
cover something of what was achieved in the thought of Thomas
Aquinas.

NOTES
1981].
[2] Not least because their positions arise from this tradition.
[3] M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Logic and Language [Lon-
don, 1973], p. 118.
[4] Posterior Analytics [92b 14]; cited in Three Philosophers,
p. 56-57.
1972], p. 46.
1985], p. 167.
2 [1986]: 115-123.
[18] B. Lonergan, A Second Collection [Darton, Longman & Todd,
London, 1974], p. 42.
[20] Note C, in Editorial Notes to Lonergan's essay "Isomorphism
of Thomist and Scientific Thought" in Collected Works of Bern-
ard Lonergan, Vol. 4: Collection, eds. F. E. Crowe & R. Doran
[26] Kripke is not definite about this possibility. Cf. Naming
and Necessity, p. 62.
[29] Ibid., p. 124, n. 9. [30] Ibid., pp. 139-140.
Schoolman, 40 [1962-63]: 373-387; Wealth of Self & Wealth

I should like to thank Prof. Hugo Meynell for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
A recent issue of Gregorianum carries an article by Terry J. Tekippe, in which he begins by quoting Bernard Lonergan on "a method for exploiting a discovered error," and proposes to use the method to analyze an error Lonergan himself allegedly made in interpreting the theory of will of Thomas Aquinas [1].

It is a curious beginning. Lonergan's "method for exploiting ... error" was concerned with "the problem of eliminating from one's own mind the rubbish that may have settled there in a lifelong symbiosis of personal inquiry and of believing," [2] and his whole long critique of mistaken beliefs focuses on the application of the method to oneself. Fr. Tekippe has chosen to apply it not to himself but to another -- a somewhat different matter, the human race being what it is, one that seems to require a certain transposition of procedures, one that in any case is not to be undertaken, in an article so concerned with error, without an acknowledgement of what is occurring.

This initial lapse is followed by more serious flaws in the body of the article. The charge is that Lonergan erred in his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the will, and most egregiously in his interpretation of the later Thomas of the De Malo period. One would expect that the very first step in proving this charge would be an examination of what Lonergan said: the "extremely careful and thorough construction ... necessary for a convincing proof" -- Tekippe's words [3] -- should begin with a study of the interpretation that is said to be in error. In fact that study is just what is most conspicuously missing from Tekippe's article.

Lonergan's views on the Thomist doctrine of will and freedom are set forth in his book Grace and Freedom, especially in chapter 5, with application to the doctrine of grace in chapter 6 [4]. Early in chapter 5 he asserts a change in Thomas around the time of the De Malo, and throughout chapters 5 and 6 takes up various points which explain how he understands the complex doctrine of the later Thomas. What is more obvious, as a procedural step in challenging Lonergan's interpretation,
than a study of the interpretation found in those two chapters? But the single passage Tekippe quotes from Lonergan is the one in which the change is asserted [5]. He does not quote a word of the evidence that Lonergan, in page after page of analysis, subsequently provides. Instead he leaps immediately to the "tediousness" [6] of a long series of quotations from Thomas, in which we are told often enough what Lonergan overlooked but are not informed what Lonergan said on the very question at issue.

This is a good deal more than curious. It is a failure of due procedure. It is like bringing Peter to court on a charge of misinterpreting Paul, and then devoting long study to the doctrine of Paul, forgetting that the charge is against Peter, that the absolutely basic step is an examination of what Peter said about Paul, that without that examination the whole study of Paul is so much wasted labor.

On the point of procedure no more need be said, but to give a hint of the analysis provided by Lonergan and omitted from Tekippe's study, let me indicate some of the points made in the last two chapters of Grace and Freedom.

A key step in Lonergan's interpretation is the recognition that, in the analysis of a free act, we are dealing with a complex process, that in this process the role of deliberation (consilium) is crucial to freedom of choice, and that a study of the causes bringing deliberation to act enables us to discriminate between free acts and acts that are not free. Thus he finds Thomas making a major point when in the De Malo a distinction is drawn between the two lines of causation that converge in effecting the act of choice in the will: there is the line of causation quoad specificationem actus; there is another line quoad exercitium actus. Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means. [7]

Further analysis of the process bringing about the act of deliberation reveals more clearly the difference between acts of will that are free and acts of will that are not free. The will, Thomas says, begins to will something it did not previously will. This cannot happen without a cause. The will itself is the cause insofar as it moves itself through deliberation to will of the means. But this self-motion in willing the means supposes that already there is will of the end,
and what brings that about? If it were another case of the
will moving itself, we would need another deliberation on
means, which would again suppose a will already in act with
regard to the end. If we are not to embark on an infinite
process backwards, we have to posit an initial act in which
will does not move itself but is moved by an external agent.
This for Aquinas is God [8].

Without this first and universal causation from God man
cannot will anything [9]. The argument is especially clear
when there is a change of will, and applies of course a for-
tiori in the special case of conversion from evil to good,
which Lonergan attributes to actual grace [10]. This is spelled
out more fully in chapter 6, where Lonergan studies "how
St. Thomas applies his analysis of the will and his theorem
of universal instrumentality to the doctrine of grace" [11].
Grace, he says, following the Thomist treatise in the Prima
secundae, effects "the will of the end in the case of conver-
sion" and, it seems, "in all instances of divinely inspired
action" [12].

The chief interest for Lonergan at this point is in the
relation of operative grace and cooperative grace, but that
relation is directly pertinent to our question. For there
is an effect "in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus
autem Deus movens," and then the operation is attributed to
God (gratia operans); and there is an effect "in quo mens
nostra et movet et movetur," and then the operation is attrib-
uted not just to God but to the soul as well (gratia coop-
erans) [13]. Thus, Lonergan adds, "one and the same grace
is both operative and cooperative; it is operative when God
alone acts; it is cooperative when both God and the will combine
to produce an effect" [14].

This agrees perfectly with the general Thomist doctrine
that Lonergan had set forth in chapter 5: the effect in which
"mens ... et movet et movetur" is, in Thomist analysis of
the will, the election, the choice of means; but such choice
supposes will of the end, and that will of the end is the
effect in which "mens ... est mota et non movens, solus autem
Deus movens" [15].

Lonergan was not writing to answer a charge that would
be laid fifty years later, but my brief sketch of his position
shows that the elements relevant to the charge are easily
discernible in the last two chapters of Grace and Freedom.
There is even a shorter route available in the concise statements found in Collection:

In the *De Malo* and in the *Prima secundae*, the intellectual apprehension of the good is the efficient cause only of the specification of the act; the exercise of the act of willing a means has its efficient cause in the will actuated with respect to an end; the exercise of the act of will an end has its efficient cause in an external mover who is God.

Hence, the *voluntas mota et non movens* of *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2, is

a passive act produced in the will by God without any efficiency exerted by the will itself. It is true that in later Thomist doctrine not only is such passivity incompatible with freedom, but also that the act of willing an end is not free. [16]

But whether one takes this shorter route or studies the analyses given in *Grace and Freedom*, some such exposition is simply de rigueur as a first step for one who would establish an error in Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas.

One consequence of omitting this exposition is that Tekippe is unable to tell us clearly just what is wrong with Lonergan's interpretation; obviously that should have been his second step, but how could he state with any clarity what is wrong with an interpretation which he has not examined?

One gathers that the charge regards the relation of "freedom and necessity" which "are to some extent compatible" [17]; "necessity and freedom are compatible in some way" [18]. Of course; who denies it? Not Lonergan certainly. But "some way" and "to some extent" are not good enough. How are necessity and freedom compatible? In what way, and to what extent? That is the whole question, a question that cannot be answered without an analysis of the structure and process of human willing, but on that analysis Tekippe is strangely reticent.

Lonergan's position, however, is clear as a bell. Willing is a complex process, it has to be analyzed, and in the analysis discrimination of different acts is required. Freedom and necessity are compatible in the whole process, but not in one and the same act; they are qualities of different acts in the integral process: the will of the end is not free, however spontaneous it be, but willing the means is free and not necessitated. Until Tekippe provides an analysis of comparable clarity, and a clear and specific statement on what is wrong with Lonergan's analysis, his whole long study of Thomas is a war without an enemy, his study of the sources, motives, consequences, etc., of Lonergan's error, is a superstructure without a foundation, and engaging in further discussion is pointless.
For those, however, who may wish to study the question of the will in itself, I suggest a parallel I find illuminating between Lonergan's analysis of cognitional process and his analysis of process in the will. Human knowing, he insists, is "a dynamic structure ... not some single operation or activity but ... a whole whose parts are cognitional activities." Further, "the parts of a structure are related to one another, not by similarity, but functionally ... there is no reason to expect the several cognitional activities to resemble one another ... each ... must be examined in and for itself and ... in its functional relations to other cognitional activities" [19]. In a similar way, I suggest, willing is a dynamic structure, the parts are related to one another functionally, and there is no reason to expect the several activities of will to resemble one another -- for example, to attribute freedom and necessity in the same way to every activity.

Advertence to this might have made Tekippe somewhat less confident that his final quotations from Thomas Aquinas are "fatal to Lonergan's position" [20]. He quotes Thomas as writing: "the faculty's movement or act, which is also called will, is sometimes naturally determined and necessary, as it is with respect to happiness ..." Well and good; Lonergan would agree wholeheartedly; we have here the first half of his position. Thomas, however, goes on to give the other half, not quoted by Tekippe: "but sometimes it proceeds from the free determination of the reason, in which case it is neither necessary nor naturally determined" [21]. Exactly. In some activities the will is necessitated, in some activities it is free; just what Lonergan holds. Analysis of willing as a dynamic structure combining different activities enables Lonergan to hold both halves of the passage in harmonious relation. Without such analysis necessity and freedom, and their compatibility, become foggy questions indeed.

NOTES
WILL


[15] "Mens" here includes will; Thomas goes on to make the same remark about "voluntas": "voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens" (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c.).


Many students of Lonergan will remember how he would diagram his understanding of this doctrine of Thomas.

A --------> B

C --------> D

Here A is the judgment of good or value, the "appetibile apprehensum" that moves the will in the specification of its basic act. B is that basic act; it is the will of the end; in its exercise it is not produced by the will, it is produced by the external mover, God, but it is produced in the will and is truly an act of the will. C is the deliberation of intellect with respect to means, and D is the free choice of means, the electio. The process through C and D is carried out under the mandate of B, and terminates in a free act of choice produced by B, but B is not itself a free act. Thus, there are two acts of will: one is the will of the end, and this act is not free, it is a case of voluntas mota et non movens; the other is will of the means, and this is a free act, an act of the will moving itself, a case of voluntas mota et se movens.

I am grateful for Mark Morelli's invitation to participate in the conversation initiated in this journal [Vol. 8, No. 1 (1990): 1-23] by Michael Baur. Indeed, on the very day Baur's interview with Gadamer took place I received from him a letter (the miracle of the U.S. Mail Service!) telling me about it and inviting me to suggest any questions I thought should be asked of Gadamer. After the conversation with Gadamer had been transcribed and translated Baur sent me a copy together with his contribution, along with a friendly invitation to comment on those pieces. So for all the kindness extended me by Michael Baur I am also most grateful. It is a real honor for me to contribute to the overall exchange of ideas, and it is a pleasure for me to do so.

Before proceeding with my reaction proper, I think it might be helpful to give some background on the Gadamer-Lonergan relationship based on my having been together with them during their overlapping stays at Boston College in the 1970s and 1980s.

(1) Lonergan read Wahrheit und Methode soon after it was published in 1960 in connection with his work on method in theology and in relation to his exercitatio courses taught at the Gregorian University. To my knowledge he always made rather frequent and positive references to that work.

(2) Lonergan used Gadamer in the way he used so many other authors, invoking them to confirm a point he was intent upon making, which may or may not have been exactly congruent with the original intent of the authors. Lonergan agreed with Gadamer's critique of the Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice and his rehabilitation of tradition. Whenever Lonergan uses authors this way he generally "makes the best" of their thought from his own point of view. This was also true of his references to Gadamer.

(3) From his earliest days lecturing in the States at Catholic University in the late 1960s, Gadamer had been found immensely attractive by people already familiar with Lonergan.
who sensed the real affinity of their orientations. They would eagerly give Gadamer certain works of Lonergan (*Verbum* and *Insight* were given by David Tracy in those early days, and *Method in Theology* came to him later on) in hopes that he might do with Lonergan what Lonergan had done with his thought.

(4) Although Gadamer had had opportunities to read at least these works of Lonergan, it would be difficult to claim that he ever did read them in his serious sense of "to read".

But the mystery of taste intervenes here as at least one factor. More than once Gadamer quoted to me a statement made to him by one of my colleagues from the theology department who was his housemate at the Jesuit residence where Gadamer usually lived during his BC sojourns. It was to the effect that there were some authors whose style was such that no matter how hard he tried, he just couldn't get into them—Lonergan being the chief case in point. Gadamer never told me this by way of blaming Lonergan, but rather as a way of apologizing for never having read him. Another hypothesis is suggested by Lonergan's reminder to his students doing doctorates: "Don't expect your directors to take two or three years from busy careers to learn my stuff!"

(5) Gadamer and Lonergan met occasionally, mostly in social contexts in the 1970s and perhaps in the early 1980s. As I recall, these meetings were always marked by an odd combination of pleasantness and awkwardness.

(a) At least at the meetings at which I was a witness, Lonergan professed familiarity with Gadamer's thought ("hundreds of pages of fine print in German!") but made on pretense of expertise. He also demonstrated that notorious combination of *l'esprit de l'escalier* (his oft-admitted incapacity to be "quick on his feet" in grasping "the overarching thrust" of an interlocutor's comment or question and making it into something to which he could give an appropriate answer on the spot) and quasi-embarrassed joviality. So he would make puzzlingly elliptical statements about the topic of conversation and tell jokes of which he was reminded. He was always the soul of graciousness and politeness.

(b) Gadamer, probably the most widely known of the two and surely one of the most influential persons in German intellectual and university life, would be typically charming and always friendly with Lonergan. He would invariably excuse himself from the duty of having to read Lonergan due to the language barrier (and those of us whose mother tongue is English
know what this means even better than Gadamer did!). Even though he was never quite sure of what Lonergan was up to, he made clear by his overall demeanor that he respected Lonergan and found him endearing; but the respect was certainly not based on his own appreciation of Lonergan's works, but perhaps on his liking for Lonergan's students whose esteem for Lonergan had broadened out into esteem for him.

(6) In regard to their conversations, I am reminded of a famous statement from John Courtney Murray's correspondence with one of his more well-known debating partners, the secularist R. M. MacIver: "our minds are not meeting -- in the sense, I mean, that they are not even clashing."

Something of the same quality holds true, I feel, of the Conversation with Baur when it comes to Gadamer's comprehension of Lonergan's thought. Perhaps symptomatic of the whole Conversation is the way Gadamer shows himself needlessly defensive vis-a-vis Lonergan's Verbum, published long before his own writing upon verbum in Truth and Method, when he asks, "In order to show that I don't see things correctly?" (3)

Almost everything Gadamer has to say about Lonergan shows his misapprehension of how Lonergan engaged the issue so central to both of them: the fact of science in the modern world. Gadamer's lack of firsthand knowledge and his misunderstanding, oddly enough, are somehow amplified by Baur's strategy of trying, in spite of this lack of accurate knowledge of Lonergan's thought on Gadamer's part, to find common ground in relation to the "neutral" scholastic topics of intellectus agens, matter, and will.

Of course, any scholastic ground could not be neutral for Gadamer. He could truly assert with respect to the scholastics' anachronistic readings of Aristotle and Aquinas what he also wants to accuse Lonergan of doing as well: they had been led astray by modern science and the epistemological problems regarding realism, idealism, and relativism -- about which Aristotle and Aquinas themselves were never bothered. Anyone who had given the first two chapters of Lonergan's Verbum even a cursory reading could not have failed to see that Lonergan was acutely aware of the differences in these respects between the ancients and the moderns.

Indeed, whatever may be true of Thomistic (in contrast to Lonergan's own) complicity in 'post-modern scientific' epistemological issues (8, top), it is an irony that Gadamer's post-Kantian notion of finitude bedevils his discussion with
Baur of "intellectus agens": For Gadamer "intellectus agens" is immanentist (2-3) and without any objective referent (3); in order to attain an external referent other than the mind's fabrication itself, "we would need the Creator" (3). Gadamer cannot follow Aquinas' Augustinian rendition of Aristotle's theory of intellect in which the light of intellect is an immanent source of transcendence, as Lonergan, in contrast, can. Gadamer "cannot see how some other approach [than his utterly immanentist interpretation of agent intellect] would suffice, unless one appeals to the Creator-like character of the 'intellectus agens.' But then one would be God" (3). Clearly, the framework being assumed for Gadamer's analysis here is really not Aquinas's (or Lonergan's) but Kant's famous contrast between the finite human intellect's need of Anschauung and the intuitus originarius proper to God.

Baur realizes that as extrinsically conditioned by space and time in a manner that God is not conditioned, human intelligence is infinite in potency alone. So I admire the way he tries to use Gadamer's interpretation of matter according to Aristotle to reach a correct interpretation of human finitude upon which Lonergan, Gadamer, and perhaps even Heidegger might converge. And this strategy is almost, but only almost, successful:

Baur: This whole issue of limitation returns us in a way to the question of the ground of human finitude. It's what has been called 'hyle,' the "always-not-yet" in human existence.

Gadamer: Yes. Yes. That is the finitude of human existence. We are not Creators.

Baur: And what the neo-Thomists call "matter" or "materiality" is also a concept for that.

Gadamer: Oh yes. Good. Go on. (9-10)

Baur then returns to the topic of individuation of form by matter. Gadamer finds the notion of matter as a cause or principle of individuation suspect as a relevant interpretation of Aristotle's teaching (4). Instead of heading the conversation more deeply into a possibly correct interpretation of human finitude, this topic gets Gadamer going on the theme of the limitations of scientific knowing, on the dangers of any kind of Calvinist gnosis (by which he means being too sure one exhaustively understands the truths affirmed as true by faith), of the peculiarities of Heidegger's reaction to what Harnack called the "Hellenization of dogma" (in the sense of trying to transpose the meanings of religion into the categories of Greek science or philosophy) (10-11).
All this blends quite naturally into the key points Gadamer was inclined to make throughout the Conversation (and which recur in Baur's Contribution), namely, the similarity between Lonergan's project and that of Hegel (1, 8, 9); and Gadamer's claim that religious truths are not susceptible of "intellectual mediation" in the sense of scientific retrieval in terms of system (12-13).

Here I would simply note several points.

To begin with, Lonergan is not insensible to the limitations of theoretic or systematic knowing in respect to the subject matter of theology, which is God. Lonergan's technical grasp of the meaning of 'mystery' [1] is relevant here. For both Aquinas and Lonergan the adequate or proportionate object of finite human understanding and knowing is intrinsically or at least extrinsically conditioned by space and time, but God is not so conditioned. Hence for them neither philosophical nor theological knowledge of God claims the sort of gnosis of which Gadamer is so suspicious. Gadamer seems to acknowledge this in Aquinas (4), but not in Lonergan.

Next, it may be that scholastics or neo-Thomists tended to hypostatize Aristotle's material cause. But Lonergan never deviated from recognizing it as a principium quo rather than a principium quod, as is clear both from De Verbo Incarnato and De Constitutione Christi of the Latin works, and from the distinction between central and conjugate potency in Insight. Way back in the Gratia operans articles, Lonergan had written: "In Aristotle, ... events happened contingently because there was no cause to which they could be reduced except prime matter, and prime matter was not a determinate cause" [2].

Further, Lonergan's work in interpretation and history with respect to the Ante-Nicene evolution of doctrine demolishes the salicnts of Harnack's thesis on the Hellenization of dogma about which Gadamer indicates that Heidegger was right to be concerned to reverse (7)[3]. Lonergan saw that what the Greek philosophers contributed to Patristic theology (which was of lasting value) was something much more modest than what Harnack, Heidegger, and Gadamer envisaged: the use of the technique of reflecting upon propositions in the first order of simple assertions of faith in order to exercise a logical control of meaning. Lonergan focuses on the technique of heuristic definition, not insights into the divine mystery drawn from Greek philosophy supposedly imported into Christian
theology. The person who perhaps came closest to doing this latter, Eunomius, was condemned as unorthodox and not agnostic enough! I suggest that if Gadamer grasped Lonergan's point in this regard (along with his deep respect for mystery), he would not object so strenuously to the so-called use of philosophy or science in theology. (I will return to this theme of what Gadamer alleges as "the inadequacy of the appropriation of the Greek philosophy through the Christian church" (6-7) later one.)

Further along these same lines, Gadamer is suspicious of any "intellectual mediation" of the truth of faith or of religious meanings. He assigns the phrase "intellectual mediation" a range of fairly cognate meanings: (a) turning anything apprehended in a non-objectified way (actu exercito) into an objectified account (actu signato) (1); (b) grasping "what is objectifiable, for example through measuring, counting, and weighing" (5); (c) "fusing [some subject matter] into a concept" or "conceptualizing" (8); (d) "to deal conceptually with ..." (9); (e) "attempt at systematization" (12).

The least we can say without going into the matter at length is that Gadamer does not at all make clear that he has grasped the (for Lonergan) central role of intelligere (insight, act of understanding) in intellectual mediation. On the other hand, there is every reason to assign this Hegelian-sounding phrase ("intellectual mediation") as Gadamer uses it in this Conversation a "conceptualist" interpretation which follows the neglect of the act of understanding as night follows day.

With respect to every salient point about which Gadamer wants to object in what he takes Lonergan to be doing -- and many other points could have been mentioned -- Gadamer has Lonergan wrong.

But perhaps the most frustrating thing about the way the interview turned out is that you cannot tell from it how many preoccupations Gadamer shares with Lonergan. Unless readers were in possession of a fairly extensive knowledge of both authors on their own, they would never discern from the Conversation that Lonergan is out to reverse counterpositions very much in line with the ones Gadamer tilts against in his works. Instead we have the disconcerting impression of Gadamer's failing to understand Lonergan's meaning at every turn. The Conversation, not intentionally but in fact, puts him in the unpleasant position of having to pronounce judgments based
not on evidence but on vague impressions. Thank God for the repeated disclaimers at pages 2 and 3: "You know, I really haven't read Lonergan sufficiently;" 6 and 8: "But that's not my area." Otherwise his characteristically good-willed determination not to let his interviewer down would have been quite unfortunate.

And so one looks to Baur's Contribution for relief and for the consoling reconciliation. Here, surely, what unfortunately could not be accomplished in the Conversation by way of rapprochement between Lonergan's thought and that of Gadamer might be remedied. Instead, I am afraid that although I know ex aliunde that Michael Baur has a rather good grasp of Lonergan, in this article what is plain is that he shares some of Gadamer's misunderstandings of Lonergan. Consequently, the frustration of a discussion too much at cross-purposes induced by the Conversation gets deepened upon reading Baur's Contribution.

I suggest that the problems I have with both pieces stem chiefly from the ambiguity of Gadamer's thought itself. As a German academic philosopher of the twentieth century one has to be a Kantian in accord with the laws of the sociology of knowledge. I have already indicated (but not made fully explicit) how Gadamer's Kantianism affects his construal of "intellectual agens." But we see his Kantianism come to dominate the entire Conversation with his appeal to his essay, "Burger zweier Welten". In the Conversation Gadamer frames the modern problem of the discrepancy between the predominance of modern science and the scope of significant realities falling outside its competence in terms of the notorious Kantian dichotomies. Thus framed, the issue is held to be unresolvable in fact, if not in principle, by such worthies as Heidegger, Carl Friedrich von Weizacker, and himself. The implication is forwarded that Lonergan and the other neo-Thomists have been superficial enough to have pretended to have solved the issue, but they are mistaken, or they have done so by the pyrrhic victory of a false account of human finitude.

It has often been observed that to bad questions there can never be an adequate answer. So too with Gadamer's problem of the fact of science as posed in Kantian terms.

As I see it then, Kant lies at the heart of the problem that Heidegger and Gadamer at their best have begun to diagnose; and it is their only partially acknowledged followership of Kant that keeps them from coherently resolving it or from
even being consistently faithful to their own deepest dialectical and therapeutic insights. Gadamer believes that Kant not only has respected the most important insights he, with Heidegger's help, has retrieved from Aristotle, but also adds dimensions beyond Aristotle. Notice how he appeals to both Aristotle and Kant in his essays on philosophical ethics.

Interestingly enough, however, in the essay "Citizens of Two Worlds" itself Gadamer does not take exactly the same tack as the one he took in Conversation. Here is where the ambiguity of his thought comes in. Instead of letting the readers hang, as it were, between Kant's phenomenal and noumenal worlds, in the essay he steers us by way of his congenial interpretation of Plato's anametic account of coming to know into the sapiential viewpoint of Aristotle's practical philosophy. So he helps us to ascend to a perspective from which we can handle the tension between the world of science and the world of common sense in the intelligently integrated manner of practical wisdom. This way is never resolved once and for all, but has to be performed in an ongoing way through time and in history. It stands as a higher viewpoint irreducible to either the standpoint of science or that of common sense. Gadamer does not acknowledge this position very well in the Conversation; and Baur does not bring it out in his Contribution. Let me examine it a bit more fully here.

"Recognition," Gadamer writes, "is not the mere repetition of an act of knowing, but 'experience' in the truest sense of the word: a journey at whose goal the already known is united with new knowledge in a knowing that persists" [4]. In Lonergan's terms, one knows by proceeding from the use of what one already knows to finding out what one has yet to learn about the unknown. This attainment allows one then to name the unknown more adequately, to inquiry further; it does not stop further questions.

Now if the core of what Gadamer has learned from Plato is that finite human knowing is always-on-the-way, in contrast with God who "knows everything about everything" in the simplicity of an infinite act of understanding, then in this sense Lonergan is as much a Platonist as Gadamer.

According to Gadamer, Aristotle's practical philosophy teaches us that "action" as "the activity on the basis of which an ethical decision, a prohairesis is brought into play" fits into "an involved system of action and reaction, of doing and suffering" both on the part of the individual and that
of the community" [5]. Moreover, "praxis does not mean action in accord with rules and applying already attained knowledge, but the entire primordial situatedness of people in their natural and social environment." So practical philosophy "emerges out of the experience of praxis itself in virtue of the reason and rationality inherent in it" [6]. Concretely, he follows Aristotle in insisting, this is exercised within a common orientation and within already commonly understood and known and decided upon ways of doing things which make up the ethos. The concrete context for praxis and for philosophical reflection upon praxis is the kind of solidarity the Greeks unromantically and unsentimentally called friendship.

My sense is that the philosophy of Kant and whatever of Kant which Gadamer has also assimilated and takes for granted cannot do justice to these Aristotelian themes in a way that Lonergan's philosophy and theology not only can but do. We see the commonality of starting point when Lonergan not only makes good but presses Gadamer's primacy of the practical even further than a Kantian following the strictures of the transcendental dialectic upon religious discourse in philosophy cares to do when Lonergan claims that both moral and religious conversion furnish the concrete conditions for intellectual conversion (or radically consistent self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness). In this claim, all that Aristotle could mean about the aretai or excellences and about friendship comes home.

Just as idealism is the halfway house between materialism and critical realism, so too does Gadamer's Heideggerian Aristotelianism only reach halfway towards resolving the modern crisis that gravitates about "the two cultures." And so we have this ironic situation in which Lonergan's effort to lay the foundations for the resolution of the modern crisis in a method which rests upon the unity of differentiated and converted consciousness will get accused of being too idealist and Kantian by people like Gadamer whose foundations are at least ambiguously Kantian. Unless one can come up with a theory of consciousness which is empirically verifiable and not involved in Kantian immanentism or Nietzschean nihilism, the chances of resolving the modern crisis are nil. Be that as it may, I think that the discrepancy between Gadamer and Lonergan may be best brought out by saying that both are against naive realism, but Gadamer only gets halfway to the solution attained by Lonergan.
Even more ironically, as a matter of fact Lonergan's knowledge of mathematics and modern science were instrumental in his ability to see through the scholasticism of Suarez and Molina to which he had been exposed as a young man, and to realize that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had made the mistakes about understanding and knowing that the conceptualist tradition had fallen into. If Lonergan was able to discern the isomorphism between the accounts of knowing on the part of Aquinas and of modern science respectively, this was not at all due to anachronism but to his introspective understanding of his own understanding. This put him on the same performative ground as Aristotle and Aquinas and the performing modern mathematicians and scientists (in contrast to such mistaken thematizations of that performance by ideologists of the Enlightenment such as Bacon, Descartes, and Comte). Lonergan's well-known fondness for quoting Einstein's advice to young scientists to watch what scientists do rather than listen to what they say they do actually typifies the difference between his critique of scientism and that of continental thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, and Leo Strauss. These latter focus not upon scientific performance but upon the accounts given of scientific method by people who have Machiavellian programs to execute -- Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. On account of his more empirical approach Lonergan was able to distinguish between the normative achievements of modern science and the ideologically-based cover stories (to adopt the coinage of my colleague, Patrick H. Byrne) manufactured for science by those ideologues mentioned above.

Just to mention an example which happens to have come up in the Conversation, Lonergan can explain in detail and in a phenomenologically ostensible way the difference between the hypothetical character of mathematical formulas (say, of Riemannian geometry) and the verified referentiality of such formulas after they have been put to use in the discrete experiments of the modern physicist. Whereas someone like Heidegger will go on and on about the impoverishment of experience induced by logical control and objectifying techniques, Lonergan can give an account of the enriching character of scientific abstraction and of the referential import of science's probable judgments; as well as describe and explain the rich interplay between classical, statistical, and genetic methods in modern science.

Whereas Lonergan distinguishes precisely between probabilities on the level of hypothesis-formation and probabilities
on the level of verification, Gadamer usually characterizes the scientific conception of probability in the old-fashioned manner of J. S. Mill as a cloak for ignorance. Unfortunately, in his Contribution Michael Baur is not as clear as he might have been about the relationship between the contingency of classical law and the role of statistical intelligibility when he describes how "beings which are less determined by a material component will be less subject to scientific generalization" (18). In this context he speaks of a decrease in "the possibilities of scientific generalization" when I think he wants to convey that higher conjugate and central forms (attained by scientific generalization -- although that is a misleadingly conceptualist way of putting the matter) are decreasingly determined by the manifolds of lower forms they integrate at higher levels of intelligibility. Nevertheless, at every level of classical or systematic intelligibility there is involvement in "the non-systematic character of material multiplicity, continuity, and frequency" (7). And, to some extent or other, what is unintelligible from the standpoint of classical method may be understood in terms of statistical and genetic method. When these methods are used complementarily, there is the possibility of scientific generalization in relation to the static systems of physics and chemistry, the dynamic systems of the organic and the psychic, and the spiritual systems at the level of distinctively human operations.

Baur's lack of clarity about the roles of classical in relation to statistical and genetic (to say nothing for the moment of dialectical) methods seems to be reflected throughout Baur's essay where I suspect that like Gadamer and most continental phenomenologists he tends to make the term science conterminous with classical and systematic intelligibility. What he means when he speaks about being "very hard pressed to articulate some kind of non-tautological 'law' which could apply to all human beings as such" (18) is a puzzle to me. What does he think the formally dynamic structure of conscious intentionality as disclosed and verified by the self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness is? What does he think the theoretic dimension of cognitional theory consists in?

Hence, it comes as a distinct disappointment to hear Baur say the following:

For Gadamer, this distinctiveness [of spiritual reality] cannot be demonstrated [for Lonergan nothing can be proved in this sense] or even mediated intellectually. Any attempt to do so would already imply a kind of violation of the
inviolable. Of course the claim here is not that we can know nothing at all concerning the spiritual reality which we are; the claim is rather that what we may know concerning this distinctive spiritual reality cannot be mediated through any theory of 'actus signatus.' To express it in Kantian terminology: knowledge concerning the distinctive spiritual reality which we are can be had only through the ideas of practical reason. (21)

When you read this, you wonder what Baur means by knowledge. He not only seems to be pointing in the direction of restricting knowledge to the domain of classical and systematic method, but of restricting its range to the realm of apodictic proof or demonstration, which Lonergan clearly realizes is unattainable. For Lonergan, classical laws and theories are only verified possibilities. On the other hand, Baur does not wish to unjustifiably restrict the meaning of the term knowledge, so he widens it to include Kant's ideas of practical reason. But what is the cognitive status of such ideas? For Kant, I believe, they fall under the scope not of objective knowledge but only of the rationally thinkable postulate. Gadamer may want to affirm the Kantian restriction here, but does Baur? I would argue against Baur and against Gadamer himself that even Gadamer doesn't coherently hold the Kantian position to the extent that he is irritated by Kant's confinement of artistic knowing to the realm of the 'bloss subjektiv.' I would also argue that to reach coherence across the board as regards what one means by knowing would require the thorough-going appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness that towards the end of his life Lonergan tended to call intellectual conversion.

I am willing to concede that, due to its naive realism, much of scholastic philosophy probably did lead people in the schools to hypostatize Aristotle's material and formal causes, and to attribute a kind of efficient causality (a sort of imaginable 'agency') to matter and form, especially in its talk about matter as a principle of individuation. I hope that Baur is not guilty of this. But Gadamer certainly is reacting to such a tendency in the scholastic tradition in his responses to Baur's bringing up the topic of matter in the Conversation.

The point is that both in the realm of interiority where we are focused upon "the distinctive spirituality which we are" and in the world of theory generally the criteria imported by a horizon for which the real corresponds to the "already-out-there-now" is catastrophic. The scholastics at large and
Hegel may have been guilty of this mixture, but I see no reason
to suspect Lonergan of it.

This brings me to the last issue I wish to discuss in this article, the topic of will. In the Conversation, Gadamer uses it as the incontrovertible evidence for his allegation about "the inadequacy of the appropriation of the Greek philosophy through the Christian church" (6-7).

Let me ask you: what is the Greek word for 'will,' for 'voluntas'? There is none. It doesn't exist in Greek. It's a voluntarism to think everything in Latin. That's one of the points that Heidegger made. He had gotten to know a Thomistic Aristotle at first. Then he read Meister Eckhart and Luther, and then he read Aristotle. And there is no 'voluntas' in Aristotle ... (7)

Gadamer is saying an awful lot here, not just about the absence of voluntas in Aristotle but also about the suspect nature of the Latinization of Greek philosophy: the Latin language (on account of Stoic influence?) carries with it the imaginatively loaded connotations associated indissolubly with a voluntarism. He also telescopes for us here a neat picture of the young Heidegger's gradually coming to see how incompatible this set of imaginative connotations was with an adequate exegesis of Greek philosophical texts, and of his earliest realizations that eventually led to the project of 'overcoming metaphysics' both as premodern ontologies of substance and as modern ontologies of subject. And at stake in all this is the underlying voluntarism first diagnosed by Nietzsche.

Following along this line of thought, Gadamer tells us how much more at ease he is with Plato's and Aristotle's speech about to theion than he is with the Christian language of ho theos, which implies a being transcendent to all finite beings who creates them ex nihilo by efficient causality. Why is Gadamer uncomfortable with the latter (at least in his role as philosopher)? Perhaps Onto-theologie, or voluntarism and objectifying hypostatization writ large.

In a somewhat characteristic lacuna, in all this talk about voluntarism there is no acknowledgement at all of the fact that in Aquinas's discussion of voluntas there is no voluntarism.

This oversight has to do with the importation into the theory of the will of images of efficient causality on the part of the will that are strictly beside the point. This error is one of the ramifications of oversight about insight.
and the role of intelligence, of intelligible emanations, of the precise make-up of will as an intellectual appetite.

I have already mentioned Baur's vagueness about the relationship between the contingency of classical or systematic intelligibility due to the "non-systematic character of material multiplicity, continuity, and frequency" in which it is involved, on the one hand; and the domains of statistical and genetic intelligibility. But, more seriously in this context, Baur leaves unhighlighted "the radical difference between the contingency of the act of willing and the general contingency of existence and occurrence in the rest of the domain of proportionate being" [8]. As Lonergan puts it:

Freedom, then, is a special kind of contingency. It is contingency that arises, not from the empirical residue that grounds materiality and the non-systematic, but in the order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will. It has the twofold basis that its object is merely a possibility and that its agent is contingent not only in his existence but also in the extension of his rational consciousness into rational self-consciousness. For it is one and the same act of willing that both decides in favour of the object or against it and that constitutes the subject as deciding reasonably or unreasonably, as succeeding or failing in the extension of rational consciousness into an effectively rational self-consciousness. [9]

Lonergan mixes the language of faculty psychology (will as a potency; willingness as a habit; willing as an act) with the language of intentionality analysis (practical insights, rational reflection, decision) in Insight's account of moral self-consciousness. The former corresponds with the Latin of Aquinas, in which he was able to give an amazingly comprehensive account of the complex interplay between the faculty of intellect and that of will in the unfolding of human action. But even when Lonergan uses a set of terms more in line with intentionality analysis, his account is in remarkable harmony with that of Aquinas. Thus when he speaks of freedom as a "contingent that arises ... in the order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will," he is integrating and reaffirming Aquinas's teaching in his own. Neither account is voluntarist.

I take "voluntarism" to mean the opinion that will is a faculty prior to and superior to intellect, so that intellect and all other faculties are subject to and instrumental to it. This also implies that the moment of arbitrariness is integral to the power to choose freely, so that freedom is virtually consonant with willfulness.
The following summary by Lonergan of Aquinas's theory of the will shows how little it has to do with voluntarism:

Up to the Pars Prima inclusively, the will, for Aquinas, was a passive faculty moved by an intellectual apprehension of the good: 'appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum.' In the De Malo and the Prima Secundae, the intellectual apprehension of the good is the efficient cause only of the specification of the act; the exercise of the act of willing a means has its efficient cause actuated with respect to an end; the exercise of the act of willing an end has its efficient cause in an external mover who is God. At no time did Aquinas advance or suppose that an immanent act has to be caused efficiently by the faculty in which it occurs though, of course, it is possible to construct arguments to the contrary based upon the equivocation of the terms actio and operatio, which sometimes mean efficient causality and sometimes simply second act, energeia.... [The voluntas mota et non movens of Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2, is what it claims to be, a passive act produced in the will by God without any efficiency exerted by the will itself. It is true that in later Thomist doctrine not only is such passivity incompatible with freedom, but also that the act of willing an end is not free. Nonetheless, it is a vital, immanent, voluntary act, just as the act of understanding in the intellectus possibilis is a vital, immanent, intellectual act though intelligere est pati. [10]

When we become clear that any voluntarist account of the will is eliminated for either Aquinas or Lonergan, we can also clarify what Lonergan means by the legislative function exercised by spirit when will confers laws on lower levels of being. The law being conferred originates with practical insights ('intelligent grasp') that arise in answer to the question, What should I do? and with reflective and affective insights ('rational reflection') that respond to the question, Should I do it? by eliciting responsible judgments of value. On the Thomist account, whenever a judgment of value occurs an intelligible emanation proceeds (consciously, intelligently, reasonably, responsibly) from the intellect into the will. This is what constitutes what Lonergan calls the "morally guided will."

The spiritually intelligible and intelligent law imposed upon lower levels of being ("realized in the underlying sensitive flow") is not manufactured by the will itself, but is either effectively followed through on or not by the act of will on the level of moral self-consciousness.

Baur's critique of Lonergan on will gives the impression that it makes sense to think of the intelligibility of the act of will or decision apart from practical insight and reflective evaluation. But in the legislative function of the spirit all three are solidary in their relationships of
presupposition and complementarity. You can't have the later members of the series without the former; but you don't have the latter simply because you have the former, since each latter member is not necessitated by the earlier, and the last member, decision, is free. Nevertheless the rationality involved in decision is not the invention of an intelligible course of action other than the one already generated by practical insight and approved by rational reflection. Rather, I take it, the act of will's rationality is constituted by the effective follow-through on that understanding and evaluation which is free, because it is necessitated neither from without (for the course of action is only possible) nor from within (since we are not coerced to follow through).

The failure to follow through keeps new existence or occurrence (the actuation of the possible course of action) from freely and contingently coming to be. One does not have to reach this conclusion by way of a deduction from metaphysics as Baur seems to imply (20); it is experientially ostensible each time we realize that free acts that are evil (Baur's "act which confers disorder upon existing reality" (20)) reduce to omissions rather than commissions: failures to follow through.

Nor is Baur's dichotomy on page 20 ("Either one can maintain ...; or else one can argue ...") convincing as a point scored against Lonergan. It is stated as if Lonergan had never mentioned inverse insight or spoken of sin as an objective surd. What does Baur think Lonergan means by 'surd'?

Here again I am not sure that when Baur speaks about Lonergan's "explanatory world-view" (22) he is thinking either about emergent probability (which is open to breakdowns and surds) or about vertical finality (which is open to surprises par excellence, such as the supernatural yet complex intelligibility of the redemption) instead of some "blow-up" of systematic intelligibility. But these are integral to Lonergan's explanatory world-view.

However, if Baur accepts Kantian assumptions about the meaning of intelligibility itself (in terms of universality and absolute necessity), then (with Gadamer) he will not only misunderstand what Lonergan means by explanatory world-view, but also fail to see how Lonergan's idea of rationality is not "unjustifiably restricted" (23n13). If one does accept the Kantian presuppositions, one is left with the disembodied
Vernunftfaktum der Freiheit which has no concrete protection against the disorientation of a Nietzschean Will-to-Power; or against Heidegger's virtual presupposition of the darkness and negativity of evil as the condition for human freedom.

Far from achieving the overcoming of voluntarism, Heidegger managed its reductio ad absurdum by making it almost impossible on the basis of his criteria to distinguish "fleeing self-consciousness, ... mitigating the moral code by rationalization, and ... giving up hope in the struggle" [11] from their opposites.

Finally, I believe that Gadamer would have no problems with Aquinas's and Lonergan's intellectualist (as opposed to voluntarist) account of will and freedom if only he knew it. That account is implicit in his performative difference from Heidegger in relation to National Socialism and in his willingness to try to use the language of consciousness (as in wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) in a non-Kantian and so more Heidegger-compatible sense.

NOTES


Professor of systematic theology since 1971 at Regis College, Toronto, Jean-Marc Laporte had already demonstrated his competence in the thought of Thomas Aquinas when he published *Les structures dynamiques de la grâce: grâce médicinale et grâce élevante d'après Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1974). Almost fifteen years later, he now graces us with a work which is at the same time broader and more personal. Its title, *Patience and Power*, alludes to the two traditional sides of grace: operative (where God alone is active, and the human person passive) and cooperative (where both are active). Hence a journey from powerlessness, through empowerment, to "a power ... permeated with patience and respect" (14).

The subtitle of the book indicates that the author writes a theology of grace for the first world. As he draws mostly from Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and from the resources of sociology, psychology and personalistic philosophy (especially John Macmurray), he offers his readers the best that Western tradition -- both ancient and modern -- has in store for them. Laporte is nevertheless in frequent dialogue with Christian thinking done in the second and third world (see, for example, sections of chapters 1, 2, and 3). The influence of Bernard Lonergan is likewise often felt (in chapter 2, as the author assesses the growth and decline of the Western tradition on grace; occasionally also in chapters 5 and 6).

Before exploring the riches of the book, I shall briefly mention a few minor mistakes. First, a couple of misprints: p. 231, l. 5, read "apart from grace"; p. 273, l. 18, read "Chapter Three". Secondly, the many diagrams, generally useful, show a tendency to oversketch, sometimes at the cost of truth. For instance, p. 233: Isn't even healing more a matter of infused than of acquired virtues? Isn't the supernatural as gradual (actual grace) as instantaneous (justification)?

Chapter 1 presents a precise and insightful phenomenology of the struggle between sin and grace as it takes place in contemporary institutions. Chapter 2 retraces the main historical steps of the Western contribution to the theology of grace and sketches present possibilities. Chapters 3 and 4 successively introduce the thought of Paul, Augustine and Aquinas.
on grace. Each chapter specifies the overall historical context wherein these thinkers were writing. Paul announces "grace for the between-time," in an apocalyptic vision which resembles our situation at the end of the second millennium after Christ. Augustine presents "grace for a dying age," while the Roman empire was crumbling. Aquinas reflects on "grace for an emerging world," in a culture which was both stable and creative.

Laporte is a fine interpreter of Paul, Augustine and Aquinas. In each case, after taking account of the historical context, he focuses on the structures that render the elements intelligible; he also unpacks their meaning by comparing them with contemporary reflections drawn from sociologists, psychologists and educationists (e.g., Paulo Freire).

This method has an advantage and a drawback. On the one hand, the reader can easily grasp the spiritual and practical consequences of writing styles which are very different from ours. See, for instance, in Chapter 4 and 5, the mutually illuminating overlappings between Augustine and Aquinas, and some present-day psychologists. On the other hand, the texts are dealt with as if they did not belong to distinct stages of theological method. In Chapter 3, the author's premature transposition of the dynamics of grace according to St. Paul and to Paulo Freire bypasses the mediation of systematic theology. Such systematization -- the one done by Aquinas -- is introduced in Chapter 5, but it is not clearly shown to be a kind of thinking very different from the previous reflections it systematizes.

The syntheses of Paul, Augustine and Aquinas, as well as the complements Laporte finds in contemporary authors, are treated as though they were on the same level of theologizing. Most of the time, even the categories used by Aquinas are seen in a descriptive way, that is to say, as illustrating the relationships between humans, and between humans and God, from the viewpoint of commonsense experience. On p. 232, paragraph 4 (including note 79), one can spot the limitations of a personalism which remains descriptive. With Laporte, I very much appreciate the personalism of Thomas Aquinas. The problem, however, is not personalism in itself, but a theological personalism which does not explicitly tend toward the explanatory stage. Laporte has shied away from that task. He write: "It is better to accept the ambiguity and tension that flows from unresolved plurality than to get stuck in a premature synthesis" (262).
I have insisted on that shortcoming because I think it is regrettable that, since Rahner (who himself was not very explanatory but at least offered a synthetic view of grace), no theologian (to my knowledge) has tried to develop a systematic theology of grace. As a matter of fact, because of his structural approach, his theological formation and his intellectual acumen, Laporte is closer to systematic theology than De Lubac, Schillebeeckx, Leonardo Boff and Segundo (to mention some of those who have written on grace since the Second Vatican Council). Despite my reservations, I would venture to say that, owing to the richness of its analyses, its creative parallels and its novel perspectives, Laporte's book is the best one to have been published on grace in the last twenty years.

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