Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.
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IN THIS ISSUE OF METHOD

In "Matthew Arnold Re-Applied (2)" Joseph Fitzpatrick continues an investigation begun in an earlier essay [Method 5, 2: 18-38] into the influence of Arnold’s ideas on Lonergan’s views. The earlier essay explored clues to Arnold’s influence in Chapter VII of Insight. The present essay looks into the possibility that some of Lonergan’s key theological notions derive from his engagement with Arnold’s religious writings.

In "From Crisis to Insight" Hugo Meynell attempts to show that Lonergan’s generalized empirical method may be able to resolve various aporiae of Husserlian phenomenology. The 'reduction', Meynell argues, can be carried out in a thoroughgoing manner, and yet the apparent transcendental solipsism which empiricists and critical realists alike find unacceptable may be avoided.

In "B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorist Theory of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness: A Lonerganian Critique" L. Cooley attempts to show that both the behaviorist and the critical realist methodologies lead to the judgment that consciousness (as self-presence immanent in mental operations) exists, and he lays the groundwork for a methodological synthesis of critical realist and behaviorist theories of human behavior.

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Thank you for your continuing support of METHOD.
Matthew Arnold had a profound concern for religion. He said that had he been born in a previous generation he would most likely have been an Anglican clergyman, like his father and many of his forebears. But Arnold belonged to a generation of English men and women whose religious faith had been assailed by developments in science and in scholarship: the Darwinian theory of evolution in his native England and the historical criticism of the Bible emanating at that time mainly from Germany. Arnold witnessed the painful loss of faith of his close friend and fellow poet, Arthur Hugh Clough, and the memory of Clough's experience remained with him in the years following his friend's premature death at the age of 43 in 1861. When at the end of the 1860s Arnold elected to address the religious issue it was with the intention of effecting a reconciliation between traditional faith and the modern mind shaped by the new criticism and the new scientific outlook. Arnold set out his new interpretation of Christian belief in four books, all published within the space of a decade. "The thing," he wrote, "is to recast religion."¹

I shall argue that some of Lonergan's key theological notions, notions that were to help determine the basic orientation of his reflections on theological method, have their source in his engagement with Arnold's religious writings. I put it this way to deflect any suggestion that Lonergan simply repeats Arnold on religion, that he merely "takes over" Arnold. Far from it. As one might expect, a considerable intellectual distance separates the twentieth century Roman Catholic theologian of professed conservative views and the nineteenth century literary critic who has with justice been called "the founder of English modernism";² the systematic and technical thinker from the man of letters who championed "flexible common sense". When comparing Lonergan and Arnold the differences are as instructive as the similarities.

This article, then, has two objectives. The first is to argue, on the basis of a range of distinctive ideas held in common, that Matthew Arnold's religious writings positively influenced Lonergan's development of a method for theology.
This objective will serve as a principle of selection in the first part of the article where I offer a summary of Arnold’s religious thought. But while this part will be selective Arnold’s central position will, I trust, emerge without distortion. The second objective will be to suggest further how the intellectual disagreement between Arnold and Lonergan influenced Lonergan to write *Method in Theology* as he did.

I. Arnold’s Religious Thought

It is fairly safe to say that Arnold’s religious writings are today the least read of all his work. But in his day Arnold’s religious books were, if anything, more widely read and discussed and the cause of greater controversy than his literary criticism or even his polemical essays on society and culture, which have stood up well to the passage of time. His religious thought is outlined in *St. Paul and Protestantism*, published in 1870; *Literature and Dogma*, published in 1873; *God and the Bible*, published in 1875; and *Last Essays on Church and Religion*, published in 1877. A shorter, popular edition of *Literature and Dogma* was published in 1883.

In the opening paragraph of *St. Paul and Protestantism* Arnold challenges Renan’s claim that Paul, who is identified with Protestantism, is coming to the end of his reign. Paul is not coming to the end of his reign, Arnold contends; indeed his reign is just beginning. What is coming to an end is Protestantism: "The Protestantism which has so used and abused St. Paul is coming to an end; its organizations, strong and active as they look are touched with the finger of death" [pp. 1-2]. Arnold sets about rehabilitating Paul and to achieve this he lays down a key methodological principle. What is important in a religious teacher, he says, and "gives him his permanent worth and vitality" is "the scientific value of his teaching," the "facts which can be verified" [p. 5]. He continues, "The license of affirmation about God and his proceedings . . . is more and more met by the demand for verification" [Ibid.]. Terms like 'science', 'the scientific sense', 'verification', 'facts' abound in the early pages of the essay and recur in the books that follow. Arnold is propounding a critical instrument he hopes will be effective in religious discourse and put a stop to the theologians' habit of "proving anything about anything". In all his religious writings Arnold suggests the need for Christian theology to look again
at its foundations because science and critical scholarship have called in question much that was once taken for granted or considered susceptible of proof.

St. Paul and Protestantism is a sustained attack on the Calvinistic theological scheme or system, characterized by "original sin, free election, effectual calling, [and] justification through imputed righteousness" [p. 10]. As Calvinism has developed, its doctrines have become harsher and more rigid: "and to complete the whole, a machinery of covenants, conditions, bargains and parties contractors, such as could have proceeded from no one but the Anglo-Saxon man of business, British or American" [p. 12]. The basic mistake of the Puritan approach to Paul, according to Arnold, is to treat poetry as if it were a scientific treatise. Paul is a Hebrew, he "orientalizes" -- i.e. he speaks figuratively, metaphorically, symbolically. It is the methodology of Puritanism that is at fault. To read the bible correctly it is necessary to have an understanding of the human mind and its history, and acquaintance with many great writers [p. 19]; "no man . . . who knows nothing else, knows even his Bible" [p. 31].

Focussing in particular on The Epistle to the Romans, Paul's "mature and greatest work", Arnold picks out what was for Paul the guiding thread in all he did and wrote. This was Paul's "desire for righteousness", his master impulse, "the governing word of St. Paul's entire mind and life" [p. 34]. Although Paul was not a scientific writer, he seized hold of a scientific fact: that all men have a natural desire for righteousness, for right conduct. This is "the law as reason and conscience, God as moral law" [p. 31]. The rule of reason and conscience is "an aim to which science does homage as a satisfying rational conception" [Ibid.]. To serve God is "to follow that central clue in our moral being which unites us to the universal order" [p. 32]. Sin and righteousness can prove themselves scientifically, because they are based on human experience, on human self-knowledge. It is this basis in experience that establishes the desire for righteousness as scientific: "the moral law in human nature, however this law may have originated, is in our actual experience among the greatest of facts" [p. 30]. Arnold's argument in the first chapter of St. Paul and Protestantism is curious but perfectly logical. On the one hand, Paul must not be mistaken for a scientific writer, the author of a scientific treatise; he is oriental, figurative, poetical. On the other
hand, Paul's writing is not purely imaginative or fictional; because it is based on one crucial, scientific fact, the fact that men seek righteousness.

Arnold cites many texts from the psalms, the gospels and Paul's epistles to support his contention that the desire for righteousness was a central preoccupation of the Old Testament Jews and that Paul continued in the same vein. He refers to Paul's lists of moral habits to be pursued or avoided, and several times [pp. 25, 31, 46] he repeats Paul's catalogue of the fruits of the spirit: "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith, mildness, self control" in Galatians V, 22-23, Romans vii, 4 and Titus ii, 12. The "superstructure" of Paul's theology, he says, was built on "the solid ground of his hearty desire for righteousness" [pp. 24-5].

In the second chapter Arnold considers two sides to Paul's thinking. There is "The voluntary, rational and human world of righteousness, moral choice, effort, [which] filled the first place in his spirit." But he also regarded God as "the power by which we have been 'upholden ever since we were born' . . . By this element we are receptive and influenced, not originative and influencing; now, we all receive far more than we originate" [pp. 39-40]. Where the Puritan stresses man's passivity before God, concentrating exclusively on God's activity, Paul combines the influence of God's power in us, "that produces results transcending all our expectations", with our own agencies of reason and conscience [p. 40]. It is a two-way process of acting and being acted upon. Arnold offers an analogy from human experience.

"Of such a mysterious power and its operation some clear notion may be got by anybody who has ever had any overpowering attachment. Everyone knows how being in love changes for the time a man's spiritual atmosphere and makes animation and buoyancy where before there was flatness and dullness . . . And not only does it change the atmosphere of our spirits . . . but it also sensibly and powerfully increases our faculties of action... An indolent man... will show energy quite easily from being in love. This, I say, we learn from the analogy of the most everyday experience" [pp. 40-41].

It is on the basis of such an analogy that Arnold explains Paul's conversion to Christ. It was for the sake of righteousness that Paul "felt himself apprehended, to use his own expression, by Christ" [p. 41]. "For us, who approach Christianity through a scholastic theology, it is Christ's divinity which establishes his being without sin. For Paul, who approached
Christianity through his personal experience, it was Jesus Christ's being without sin which establishes his divinity" [pp. 42-3]. Arnold is here attacking the Puritan notion of conversion as instantaneous and mechanical, a "miraculous" process in which man takes no active part but is simply the passive recipient of imputed righteousness. This is nonsense and lies at the heart of the Puritan misunderstanding of Paul. Rather, Paul felt that by perfectly identifying himself with Jesus, "by appropriating Jesus and in no other way", he could "get the confidence and the force to do as Jesus did" [p. 47]. This was "faith. More fully he [Paul] calls it: 'Faith that worketh through love'." [Ibid.] Paul combined "the world of reason and morals and the world of sympathy and emotion. The world of reason and duty has an excellent clue to action, but wants motive power; the world of sympathy and influence has an irresistible force of motive-power, but wants a clue for directing its action" [p. 51].

By dying with Christ, Arnold continues, "you become transformed by the renewing of your mind and rise with him... You rise with him to that harmonious conformity with the real and eternal order" [p. 52]. This is how faith, working through love, helped Paul. And because Jesus identified himself with our neighbors the process is completed by our attachment to all men [p. 54]. "The three essential terms of Pauline theology are not, therefore, as popular theology makes them: calling, justification, sanctification. They are rather these: dying with Christ, resurrection from the dead, growing into Christ" [p. 55].

Arnold goes on to dispute belief in a physical resurrection, claiming that in Paul's mature writing it was the spiritual significance of resurrection that predominated -- it is "a resurrection now, and a resurrection to righteousness". He accepts, however, that Paul believed in a physical resurrection and in life after death. There are other aspects of Pauline belief that Arnold finds uncongenial and these he tends to attribute to Paul's habit of "judaizing", his importation into his theology of the tenets and methods of Judaic scholasticism. Such habits were natural in someone with Paul's training and background, but they were secondary. Arnold's way with those aspects of Pauline belief that clash with his own interpretation is rather glib and sweeping. In a manner that as to become more pronounced in Literature and Dogma, he appears to fabricate a critical notion -- in this case Paul's
regrettable habit of "judaizing" -- which is invaluable in excising from the "central" Pauline theology whatever Arnold considers to be a disposable accretion. Not unnaturally, Arnold's way with difficulties gave rise to the many objecting voices that were raised against him. Unfortunately, for many this meant that Matthew Arnold was cast as the author who called in question traditional Christian beliefs and the positive case he puts forward was overlooked.

In the final section of St. Paul and Protestantism Arnold reflects on a theme that he develops more fully in Literature and Dogma -- namely, the mischief done to theology by the introduction of metaphysics and "the habits of the Greek and Roman schools". This is a process in which St. Augustine, albeit a great religious genius, was instrumental. Then came the "Protestant Phillistine". "Sincere, gross of perception, prosaic," he translated "Paul's mystical idea" into "a legal transaction, and reserved all his imagination for Hell and the New Jerusalem" [p. 79]. Arnold concludes by re-emphasizing the need to adopt a scientific approach to theology [p. 80]. Clearly, by appealing to righteousness, a notion he feels can be vouched for on grounds of experience, Arnold believes he has found the key to what such an approach would be.

In Literature and Dogma Arnold makes a bold and forthright statement of his position with all the power of rhetoric he can command. In the Preface he indicates that his object "is to reassure those who feel attachment to Christianity, to the Bible, but who recognize the growing discredit befalling miracles and the supernatural" [p. vii of the popular edition]. Henceforth Christianity must be vindicated, not by miracles, but by "its natural truth". This truth is encapsulated in the Old Testament as "Salvation by righteousness" and in the New Testament as "Righteousness by Jesus Christ" [p. x].

Arnold develops the distinction made in his earlier essay between science and literature, and asserts that the bible should be read as literature. Metaphysics should have nothing to do with religion which is not about ideas but about conduct, and as such is easy to understand, albeit difficult in performance. "Conduct is three fourths of human life," Arnold tells us again and again. "Religion is . . . ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling . . ., morality touched by emotion" [pp. 15-16]. The Jews of the Old Testament saw God as a moral power and not as a First Cause whose existence is deduced by abstract reasoning. They had an experimental awareness
of God because they perceived that there is so much in morality that is "not ourselves -- its source lies elsewhere". The moral differentiation of consciousness (to employ Lonergan's term) arose when men looked to their permanent and not just their transitory happiness; the religious when they were thrilled at doing this [p. 37]. The antithesis frequently posited between natural and revealed religion is false. "For that in us which is really natural is, in truth, revealed. We awake to the consciousness of it, we are aware of it coming forth in our mind; but we feel that we did not make it, that it discovered us, that it is what it is whether we will or no" [Ibid.].

The major perception of the ancient Jews was that "righteousness tendeth to life". Similarly God for them was no abstract idea but the "Eternal" or "the enduring power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness" [p. 46]. We should revert to the Jewish perception, place religion once more on a solid experimental basis, and be done with the metaphysics and dogma that are the source of disputes and disagreements [p. 44].

Arnold gives a number of naturalistic explanations of how, even among the Old Testament Jews, certain doctrines and beliefs came about. The experience of exile, for example, gave birth to the notion of the Messiah [p. 56]. Such a belief shores up the will to live by righteousness, it lends support to the basic tenet that "righteousness tendeth to life". But unlike the basic tenet such a doctrine does not have a "firm experimental ground", is not verifiable. "It is exactly what is expressed by the German word, 'Auberglaube', extra-belief, belief beyond what is certain and verifiable" [p. 58]. As far as miracles are concerned, Arnold does not attempt to prove that they are impossible -- in God and the Bible he accepts that there is no valid inductive proof of the impossibility of miracles; he simply asserts that they are impossible. The reason is that we know whence stories of miracles come: "the Time-Spirit is sapping the proof from miracles -- it is the 'Zeit-Geist' itself" [p. 96]. The eschatology attributed to Jesus is said to have been imported by the reporters who frequently failed to understand the words of Jesus they reported. Jesus transcended his time and his disciples, "and yet, . . . planting his profound views of thought in their memory along with their own notions and prepossessions, to come out all mixed up together, but still distinguishable
one day and separable; and leaving his word thus to bear fruit for the future" [p. 120].

Jesus' basic contribution to the basic and verifiable Jewish belief in righteousness was to shift the focus from conduct to "the feelings and dispositions whence conduct proceeds" [pp. 67-68]. Jesus refined the idea of righteousness by means of his method and his secret. His method is revealed in his emphasis on conscience, on man's heart and thoughts as the source of his actions; his secret is the law of the cross, the way of self-renunciation [pp. 126-28]. Catholicism lays hold of Jesus' secret and therein lies its greatness; Protestantism lays hold of Jesus' method, stressing individual conscience and conversion, and therein lies its greatness. What is required is a balance of the two. Jesus' truth is grasped by living it; it is a practical rule. Arnold vehemently distances Jesus from philosophers and all metaphysics. It is true that Jesus applied certain traditional titles to himself but Arnold attempts to show that he used these terms in a spiritual sense only. Indeed Jesus seems to have foreseen how his words would be misinterpreted by his disciples, by Paul and Peter, by the author of the Fourth gospel. He "foresaw the growth of creeds, the growth of dogma, and so through all the confusion worse confounded of councils, schoolmen, and confessions of faith . . ." [p. 149]. One cannot help wondering why if Jesus foresaw these dangers he did not take better care to ensure that they did not come about, but at this stage in his exposition Arnold is not disposed to pause and consider such objections.

Arnold's attitude to doctrines is ambiguous. He appears to consider it fairly inevitable that doctrines should have arisen and speaks of them in affectionate tones as "fairy-tales", "extra-beliefs". At other times "auberglaube" becomes a term of abuse. The reason is that he wishes to deal gently with "popular religion" but harshly with "the pseudo-science of dogmatic theology" [pp. 198-99]. His attacks on councils, schoolmen and creeds are sharp and sarcastic -- the Athanasian creed is described as "learned science with a strong dash of violent and vindictive temper" [p. 152]; again, "the age which developed dogma had neither the resources nor the faculty for such a criticism" [p. 155]. This harshness derives from a belief that there has been a tragic reversal in the Christian order of things. From being "extra-beliefs" doctrines have developed to become the very point of Christianity, obscuring
its true nature, causing dissension and bringing Christianity into intellectual disrepute by making its validity reliant on miracles and the fulfilment of prophecies. The true theological doctors are not Augustine, Luther, Bossuet or Butler but men such as the author of the _Imitation of Christ_ (a book Arnold loved), St. Frances de Sales and the Anglican Bishop Wilson. "Religion has been made to stand on its apex instead of on its base. Righteousness is supported by ecclesiastical dogma, instead of ecclesiastical dogma being supported on righteousness" [p. 161]. He clearly hopes that his own efforts to rid Christianity of the clutter of dogma will clear the way for "the better time which will arrive" [p. 202]. It was Arnold's hope that as time went on and legend and miracle ceased to be regarded as facts, the Christian legends would still be loved "as poetry".

God and the Bible is Arnold's response to the many criticisms provoked by _Literature and Dogma_. For the most part he is content to rehearse the arguments put forward in the earlier book, adding some new instances and illustrations. One remark may, however, be thought relevant to the present inquiry. Arnold accepts as true the observation of a "judicious Catholic" that the Protestant nations have greater freedom, order and stability than the Catholic nations; this he attributes not to the Protestant theology of the sixteenth century, but to the Protestant "return to the individual conscience -- to the method of Jesus". If Protestantism could restore to Catholicism the method of Jesus, "it will have given to the Catholic nations what enables them to do the rest for themselves" [p. xix]. This agrees with Arnold's general position on the future of Christianity and is reinforced when at the end of _Last Essays on Church and Religion_ he says, "A Catholic Church transformed is, I believe, the Church of the future" [p. 227].

In the second chapter of _Last Essays_, entitled "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist", Arnold attacks what he perceives to be the attempt of the great English eighteenth century divine to ground Christian belief on rational argument. Whatever the merits of Arnold's observations in respect of Bishop Butler, they do reveal his advocacy of an approach that differs from any attempt to argue opponents into intellectual submission. The "ground belief" of Christianity is not demonstration based on miracles and metaphysics. But to believe that righteousness is salvation and that this is found in
Jesus -- this is "the ground-belief of all Christians . . . [and] is in itself an indestructible basis of fellowship" [pp. 58-60]. What might be termed the "apologetics" approach to Christian belief is, in Arnold's reckoning, doomed to failure. The way of Jesus was not to argue but to reveal to men what they are; it is this which transforms them and makes them want to change their behavior. Arnold continues, "the object of religion is conversion, and to change people's behaviour" [p. 92]. Butler, he says, was on surer ground when he referred men "to a law of nature or virtue, written on their hearts . . . Butler did believe in the certainty of this law. It was the real foundation of things for him" [p. 143].

II. Criticism of Arnold

It is not very difficult to find fault with the cogency of many of Arnold's arguments or to indicate the weaknesses in his position. Referring among other things to Arnold's religious writings, T. S. Eliot has remarked with some justice that "Arnold has little gift for consistency or for definition. Nor had he the power of connected reasoning at any length: his flights are either short flights or circular flights." The most trenchant criticism of Arnold on religion came from F. H. Bradley who as a metaphysical thinker of some standing appears to have lost patience with Arnold's attacks on metaphysics and habit of disarming criticism by protesting his "inaptitude" for "abstruse reasoning". My concern in this article is not to conduct a wholesale critique of Arnold but to present his position as source material for Lonergan's reflections on theological method. A critique of Arnold should emerge in the process of relating Arnold's thinking to Lonergan's. Nevertheless, Bradley's attack in his Ethical Studies should provide vivid illustration, should any be required, of the hazardous task facing anyone daring enough to 'take over' Arnold. Bradley's attack can conveniently be offered here as representative of the questions -- there are many more -- anyone defending Arnold would have to answer.

Nor does it help us to say [Bradley writes] that religion is "morality touched with emotion" . . . All morality is, in one sense or another, "touched by emotion". Most emotions, high or low, can go with and "touch" morality; and the moment we leave our phrase-making and begin to reflect, we see that all that is meant is that morality "touched" by religious emotion is religious . . . Religion is more than morality. In the religious consciousness we find the belief, however vague and indistinct, in an object, a not-myself; an object, further, which is
real. An ideal which is not real, which is only in our heads, cannot be the object of religion. But when "culture" went on to tell us what God is for science, we heard words we did not understand—about "stream", and "tendencies" and "the Eternal"; and had it been anyone else we were reading, we should have said that, in some literary excursion, they had picked up a metaphysical theory, now out of date, and putting it in phrases, the meaning of which they had never asked themselves, had then served it up... as the last result of speculation, or of that "flexible common sense" which is so much better. When the literary varnish is removed is there anything more? [Bradley adds in a footnote:] We hear the word "verifiable" from Mr. Arnold pretty often. What is to verify? Has Mr. Arnold put "such a tyro's question" to himself? If to verify means to find in outward experience, then the object of true religion can not be found as this or that outward thing or quality, and so can not be verified. It is of its essence that in this sense it should be unverifiable.

III. Arnold's Influence on Lonergan

My case suggesting that Matthew Arnold's religious writings provide important source material for Lonergan's elaboration of his theological method rests on a wide range of points on which Lonergan's position contains similarities to Arnold's. The case is cumulative. No one strand of evidence is strong enough by itself to establish the link between Arnold and Lonergan, but a multiplicity of strands do constitute a strong bond linking the two authors. Of course, such a "strong bond" is not conclusive proof. What I am offering is a guess, an informed speculation. In these matters we cannot establish certainties. We can be certain on the negative front: we can, for example, say that Lonergan did not accept Arnold's position on the status of doctrines or on the nature of dogmatic development since Lonergan flatly contradicts Arnold on these points. But we cannot with certainty claim that Lonergan was positively influenced by this or that feature of Arnold's theological thought. As Lonergan himself puts it when speaking of the nature of historical investigation, "we aim at certitude only in the negative conclusions; in positive ones we are content with probability. The degree of probability attained will appear from the nature of the induction to be made".

Let me now attempt to indicate those features of Lonergan's that bear a resemblance to features we have found in Arnold. When I have completed this positive task—the task of positing telling similarities— I shall turn to the negative task, the task of positing telling disagreements between Lonergan's thought and Arnold's. There is good reason to believe that the dissimilarities are as significant as the
similarity: as we shall see, Arnold could easily be cast as the prototype of a way of thinking Lonergan was assiduously to oppose. It should perhaps be added that in claiming this type of negative influence on Lonergan I cannot speak with certainty either. This is because I am still involved in guesswork. I am making the positive claim that Lonergan reacted in a negative or adversarial way to certain aspects of Arnold's thought.

A. The Similarities

(1) The first of the significant similarities between the two authors is indicated by Arnold's quest for a verifiable theology or at least a verifiable basis for theology. We have also seen that for Arnold verifiability is an essential condition for theology or religious belief being considered scientific. As Bradley noted, Arnold is not exactly forthcoming in defining what he means by verification, in answering the question, "What is to verify?", though he does offer more clues than Bradley is willing to concede. In his article on "Verification: A Survey of Lonergan's Usage", Des O'Grady shows that "Verification was present as an ideal in Lonergan's work from the outset". Moreover, in Lonergan's early usage of the term "verification", "it is part of what it means for a discipline such as history to be 'scientific'"; "an historical method that would lead to verifiable results would be scientific". Anyone reading the early Lonergan's Introduction to his dissertation on "gratia operans" cannot fail to be struck by his repeated references to "verification", "verifiable", "science" and "scientific", and what it is that makes historical inquiry scientific.

Lonergan's early quest for verification in theological inquiry appears to accompany his growing suspicion of the method of establishing theological conclusions by means of logical deduction. Logical deduction, Lonergan argues, is not an appropriate method in empirical investigations such as history or the interpretation of a writer's meaning. Verification is of an hypothesis. It involves reference to the data or text. It does not yield certainties but probabilities. Lonergan's analysis of verification betokens his early concern with theological method and his concern to establish theology as a properly empirical discipline. This concern is satisfied by Lonergan's proposal in Method in Theology that the first phase of theology comprises research, interpretation,
history and dialectic. Each of these four functional specialties employs empirical methods of investigation, seeking to establish conclusions as verified hypotheses. But more than that. The very manner in which these four functional specialties relate to each other represents the methodology of empirical inquiry on a larger scale. Lonergan sees the four functional specialties of theology's positive phase, the specialties of mediated theology, as being devoted to the assimilation of the past, and this is a thoroughly empirical endeavor. Research establishes the data, interpretation is concerned to understand their meaning, while history contextualizes the meanings and narrates what happened; dialectic in turn attempts to sort out conflicts concerning values, facts, meanings and experiences. Lonergan's quest from an early date for verification to be allotted its rightful place in the intellectual discipline of theology finds its fulfilment in the first phase of theology as set out in *Method in Theology*.

(2) We have seen how Arnold time and again insists that the scientific, verifiable component of Pauline theology is that man has a natural desire for righteousness. The Old Testament tenet, to which Arnold attaches preeminence, is that "righteousness tendeth to life". This can, he claims, be tested by experience; it is verifiable because based on human experience, on man's self-knowledge. It was this tenet which Jesus refined through his method and his secret. The notion of righteousness is Arnold's major methodological principle. It determines the only definition of God that Arnold will allow. It is his Occam's Razor which he uses to exclude all metaphysical propositions about God as First Cause, etc. and to refuse ontological status to all but a very few religious propositions. It is, indeed, a somewhat severe Occam's Razor, one which cuts out just about everything not reducible to itself. But granted a certain absurdity in Arnold's position, it can be seen to be a sincere attempt to impose discipline on theology and to prevent theologians "proving anything about anything". As an enterprise it has its virtues.

Is it merely a coincidence that from early in his career Lonergan was inspired by a similar enterprise? Crowe says that "the young Lonergan is already in search of 'a matrix or system of thought' that would stand outside of, and be a guide for, actual theology". Lonergan sees such a matrix as parallel to the service rendered to science by mathematics: "The quantitative sciences are objective simply because they
are given by mathematics an *a priori* scheme of such generality that there can be no tendency to do violence to the data for the sake of maintaining the scheme".14 Immediately we can see the superior sophistication of Lonergan's definition of what such a matrix should be, compared with Arnold's unwieldy instrument which repeatedly does do violence to the data in order to maintain its own integrity. But is it not possible that Lonergan saw the germ of his idea in Arnold? More weight is given to this supposition when we consider the nature of Arnold's *a priori* matrix. It is, as we have seen, man's natural desire for righteousness and the belief that righteousness tendeth to life. Religion provides the motive force for man's quest for righteousness. Now it took Lonergan many years to work out his transcendental method which was in turn to provide the framework for the method of theology, providing as it does the basis for the eight functional specialties he assigns to theology. What is transcendental method but an unravelling of man's natural desire for righteousness? Of course, the unravelling is the work of arduous philosophical inquiry and profound insight; to set forth an integral view of human conscious intentionality which can be summarized in the transcendental precepts -- be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible--is an immense achievement. I make no attempt to compare Arnold with Lonergan as a methodologist of theology. But, like Arnold, Lonergan considers man's natural desire for the good to be an empirically verifiable truth, not in the sense that man knows it through his senses but in the sense that man knows it through introspective awareness, insight and judgment — i.e., through self-knowledge.

What is more, Arnold believes that man's desire for righteousness puts him in touch with the source of universal order and provides an acceptable definition of God, "The Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness". Now Lonergan too believes that man's disinterested desire to know the truth and his desire for the good are part and parcel of his natural desire to see God: "the intellectual, the moral and the religious are three phases in the single thrust to self-transcendence".15 And Lonergan's argument for the existence of God can, I believe, be squared with the Arnoldian definition just quoted. Lonergan conceives God as the condition for man's intellectual and moral life; the transcendental framework within which man operates, though it is the source of man's freedom and creativity, is also
not of man's making or doing. Arnold's limitation of God as the condition of man's righteous conduct reveals a significant omission of reference to man's intellectual nature, on which I shall comment later. But when one has made all the appropriate qualifications -- to the effect that Lonergan explains at length what he means whereas Arnold substitutes assertion for argument and analysis -- the fact remains that there is basic, fundamental agreement between our two authors on this central feature of man's makeup and that it is methodologically crucial to both.

(3) One of the most innovative and surprising features of Lonergan's proposed method for theology is his displacement of fundamental theology. Traditionally, a student embarking on a Roman Catholic theological course began by studying fundamental theology under a series of headings: Inspiration, Revelation, The Church, etc. The doctrines selected were considered fundamental because they acted as a foundation for the theological courses to be followed over the succeeding years. Once it was shown that scripture was the inspired word of God, or that Jesus claimed to be God and "proved" it by his miracles and fulfilment of prophecies, or that the Church was founded with the authority to teach all nations, the way was open for a deductivist method of establishing theological conclusions. This approach to theology was not unlike the approach Arnold saw and criticized in Bishop Butler. It purported to place theology on a basis of rational argument. Now Lonergan would agree with Arnold's strictures on Butler: you cannot argue people into faith. "The apologist's task," Lonergan writes, "is neither to produce in others nor to justify for them God's gift of his love. Only God can give that gift and the gift itself is self-justifying. People in love have not reasoned themselves into being in love."16 Instead of attempting to rest one set of doctrines on another set considered to have some logical priority, Lonergan displaces fundamental theology and proposes a new basis for theology's normative, mediating phase. This new basis is conversion.

Matthew Arnold lamented the fact that doctrines had taken priority over faith and conversion in the course of Christian history. Religion had been made to stand upon its "apex" instead of on its true base. "Righteousness is supported by ecclesiastical dogma, instead of ecclesiastical dogma being supported by righteousness."17 To put on the
righteousness found in Jesus was the proper "ground-belief" of all Christians and a basis for fellowship.\textsuperscript{18} Arnold very clearly gives priority to faith and conversion over doctrines. By making conversion the foundation (along with the first four functional specialties) of theology's normative phase, Lonergan appears to be in agreement with Arnold. He also stresses the scope provided by this "new" foundation for ecumenical encounter and fellowship: "Beliefs do differ, but behind this difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgments of value, and the judgments of value relevant to religious belief come from faith, the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God's self-disclosure."\textsuperscript{19}

Lonergan's conception of conversion is not dissimilar to Arnold's. Like Arnold, he repudiates what he calls the "Old Protestants'" notion of imputed merit\textsuperscript{20} as well as any notion of conversion as a passive, mechanistic process. Rather conversion is a falling in love with God, an act of self-transcendence that grounds all self-transcendence.\textsuperscript{21} Faith, in turn, is the knowledge born of religious love.\textsuperscript{22} A similar connection between faith and love in the context of conversion is made by Arnold. For both men conversion is not usually an instantaneous affair but rather something that takes time and effort.\textsuperscript{23} For both, conversion yields "that harvest of the Spirit that is love, joy, peace, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness and self-control".\textsuperscript{24} There is, then, a sympathy of understanding between Lonergan and Arnold on the nature of conversion and its place in Christian belief. This sympathy is reinforced by the analogy between being converted and falling in love. We have already heard Arnold on this. In Method in Theology Lonergan quotes the old Latin tag, "Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, Knowledge precedes love", and instances two exceptions to this rule.

There is a minor exception . . . inasmuch as people do fall in love, and that falling in love is something disproportionate to its causes, conditions, occasions, antecedents. For falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise of vertical liberty in which one's world undergoes a new organization. But the major exception to the Latin tag is God's gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love . . .\textsuperscript{25}

Lonergan makes use of the analogy of a man and woman in love elsewhere in his writings but nowhere does Matthew Arnold appear among his sources. But might it not be that Lonergan had encountered the notion in Arnold and seen its appropriateness as an analogy for understanding how God's love works
in man? For Arnold's use of what he calls "the analogy of the most everyday experience" is remarkable in its similarity to the use made by Lonergan of the same analogy. For both authors religious conversion makes righteousness joyful. As Lonergan puts it, a man who has undergone conversion acts "with the easy freedom of those who do all good because they are in love". Arnold pushes the analogy further to illustrate how in Pauline thought man is depicted not only as acting and striving through reason and conscience, but as being "receptive and influenced": "This element in which we live and move and have our being, which stretches around and beyond the strictly moral element in us, around and beyond the finite sphere of what is originated, measured and controlled by our own understanding and will -- this infinite element is very present to Paul's thoughts." Paul, he says, could "pass naturally" between the two worlds, the one voluntary, rational, morally striving, the other "the divine world of influence, sympathy, emotion". It is true that Arnold's account, as so often, remains vague and that his later writings do not explore this theme further and indeed have the effect of curtailing the notion of divine revelation, of God speaking to man. But the notion is there, albeit in fairly rudimentary form.

In the case of Lonergan further exploration did occur. It is well established that as Lonergan's thinking developed he came to an enlarged understanding of the significance of human and divine love. The relationship between the two "vectors", one from below upwards and the other from above downwards, while it informs the thought in Method in Theology, is probably best expressed in his later essays.

For human development is of two quite different kinds. There is development from below upwards, from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of action, from fruitful courses of action to the new situations that call forth the further understanding, profounder judgment, richer courses of action. But there also is development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling in love . . . Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values. At once it commands commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent, short-sighted common sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope.
Let me briefly itemize the points of similarity between Arnold and Lonergan that lead me to suggest a positive influence by the former on the latter's reflections on theological method.

-- The crisis of religion in a critical and scientific age calls for a new approach.
-- Religion needs to be recast. Theology needs to find new foundations.
-- Theologians need a critical methodology to guide their work.
-- What is needed is an empirical theology, one that yields verifiable knowledge and is truly scientific.
-- Theological beliefs can no longer rest on so-called rational arguments such as "proofs" from miracles or appeals to inspired authority.
-- They should rest on the "natural truth" of Christianity, on what it makes of man as he is.
-- Man's quest for righteousness, his moral nature, is the point of contact with the divine.
-- Man is morally striving but also receptive of God's influence.
-- The object of religion is conversion.
-- Conversion is like falling in love.
-- Conversion is faith acting through love.
-- Conversion is taking on Jesus' method and secret, it involves a change of heart, the practice of self-renunciation.
-- Conversion is the true "ground-belief" of Christians. Doctrines should be grounded on conversion, on righteousness, rather than righteousness on doctrines. Religion in the recent past has been made to stand on its apex instead of on its true base.
-- Conversion provides a basis for true fellowship and should help to overcome the dissension caused by disagreement over doctrine.
-- The main hope for Christianity is a reformed Roman Catholic Church, one in which the importance of conversion, of conscience and self-transformation, has been rediscovered.

Now if I am right in claiming that these ideas are to be found in Arnold and that they are also key conceptions in understanding the work of Lonergan, then I conclude that Arnold influenced Lonergan in a profound and positive way. Arnold's major agreement with Lonergan lies in the central role he ascribes to conversion. His major disagreement is that for him conversion is a substitute for doctrines whereas for Lonergan conversion is a precondition for doctrines. It now remains for me to indicate more exactly just why Matthew Arnold's attempt to recast religion failed. We can gain a
measure of Lonergan's achievement in *Method in Theology* by examining the failures of the past. I recall Lonergan, at the conclusion of one of his seminars on method in Rome, holding up a copy of *Honest to God* and saying (in effect), "Anyone who wonders whether the issue of theological method is important should read this book."

B. The Dissimilarities

I am tempted to change the above heading from the plural to the singular and call it simply "the dissimilarity". The reason is that there is one decisive feature of Arnold's thought that sets it apart from Lonergan's. That is Arnold's belief in the omnicompetence of common sense. Lonergan appears to have made use of Matthew Arnold in his investigations of the uses and limitations of common sense. In a previous article I argued that Lonergan uses Arnold's reflections on nineteenth century England to work out his notions of progress, decline, group bias, general bias and "cosmopolis" in the seventh chapter of *Insight*, which is entitled, "Common Sense as Object". I would suggest that Arnold is also the prototype exemplar of the limitations of common sense which Lonergan is at pains to point out. If Lonergan is correct in stating that "theological development is fundamentally a long delayed response to the development of modern science, modern scholarship, modern philosophy"; then Arnold was not well equipped to recast religion. He knew little science and was positively hostile to philosophy; he viewed theory and system with suspicion and placed complete reliance on the common sense of the man of letters that he was. But Arnold's philosophical innocence leaves his statement of his position very vulnerable. To begin with, while purporting to exclude all metaphysics from Christian theology, he makes the criterion of experiential verification the test of the validity of Christian teaching. This is suspiciously like metaphysics and, as Bradley notes, so also are his definition of God and his statement that "righteousness tendeth to life". Furthermore, Arnold's suggestion that man's natural desire for righteousness is experiential and thereby satisfying to science is problematic: the experiential verification science invokes involves the use of the senses and, as Bradley also notes, Arnold's notion of verification appears not to rely on the senses. The distinction between the data of sense and the data of consciousness would have been of use to Arnold. Finally, by speaking of righteousness as a
universal law of nature, Arnold is guilty of drawing conclusions which his form of naive realism, his supposed reliance on that alone of which we have direct experience, cannot warrant.

Arnold's epistemological innocence also induces him to adopt a thoroughly ahistorical approach to the Christian tradition. He is, in fact, an archaist, discarding all the developments that have taken place in the formulation of Christian belief between the New Testament and his own age. Arnold the man of letters believes that metaphysical formulations of Christian beliefs result from the blunder of treating poetry as if it were science. He is unaware that in the course of history there are ongoing differentiations of human consciousness and that "with every differentiation of consciousness the same object becomes apprehended in a different and more adequate fashion". Arnold has no conception of what common sense knowledge is, of what theoretical knowledge is, and how the two relate. He cannot, therefore, see how the common sense and the systematic modes of thinking can be two different ways of apprehending the same reality; and so he is driven to the conclusion that the systematic development of theology is nothing less than a gross distortion of the original message. It is to this brand of thinking that Lonergan refers when he writes, "Scholarship builds an impenetrable wall between systematic theology and its historical sources."

There is a somewhat bland absence in Arnold of any awareness that his own intellectual horizon determines what he finds intelligible and unintelligible in the Christian tradition, determines his own selective approach to the interpretation of the bible and his understanding of history. His horizon makes him reject miracles on the bare grounds that they are "incompatible" with the modern mind. He is at once an archaist and a modernist. Arnold's approach to miracles is in some ways surprising in view of his highly developed literary and religious sensibility. He sees them, like Hume, as nothing more than freakish occurrences, violations of the established laws of nature. He fails to grasp their significance as enacted parables. Given Arnold's sensibility, this is surely a prime example of the self-deluding blindness of common sense which Lonergan excoriates so roundly.

Also curious, in view of his previous writings, is Arnold's reduction of religion to conduct. In Culture and Anarchy he considers hellenism, representative of reason, understanding and "light", and hebraism, which refers to conduct, duty and
conscience, and comes to the conclusion that England has too much of the latter and not enough of the former. Right reason and those who follow its dictates are the heroes of *Culture and Anarchy*, though Arnold does insist that hellenism and hebraism have the same goal, the goal of perfection. But in his strictly religious writings Arnold is thoroughly hebraic, according to his own definition. He limits religion to conduct and sets up a barrier between doing and thinking. His reason appears to be the wish to demolish the dogmas of Christianity which he considers to be cloaking and obscuring "the one thing necessary" -- self-transformation, conversion. But this amounts to the supremacy of practicality over thought in a way he condemns in *Culture and Anarchy*. For similar reasons Arnold speaks of God only as a moral force and not as an intelligent being. Lonergan's transcendental method is not restricted to the moral imperative "Be responsible" but embraces also the intellectual and rational imperatives, "Be intelligent" and "Be rational". Hence it is quite appropriate in Lonergan's scheme for faith to seek understanding: God is not only a moral force but the source of the universe's rationality and intelligibility. Arnold's reduction of religion to conduct overlooks man's need for intellectual satisfaction and hence also for emotional and aesthetic satisfaction. It is doubtful if his austere religion could inspire men to build cathedrals, write poetry and produce great art as traditional Christianity has done. It is ironic that Matthew Arnold, the poet and lover of literature and liturgy, the author of *Culture and Anarchy*, should find himself in this position.

**Conclusion**

Writing previously about Lonergan's intellectual relationship with Matthew Arnold, I said that reading Arnold was like taking a peek at Lonergan's notebook: you come across rough sketches of an idea, questions to be answered, an agenda for future consideration and development -- certainly not a finished product. As I read Arnold's religious writings I became increasingly convinced that Lonergan had been through this material, that he had been engaged and challenged by it and that it had influenced his thinking. I could, of course, be wrong. Other explanations of the similarities I have indicated are possible. It could be that Arnold and Lonergan fed from the same or a similar source. Trilling places Arnold's religious writings in the line of Kant, Ritchl and Schleiermacher...
and Lonergan had good knowledge and understanding of all three. But Trilling goes on to say that Arnold was influenced more by Spinoza and Coleridge than by the German Kantians or post-Kantians, especially in respect of what we might call the "natural law" element in his thinking, the notion that morality is God's law written on man's nature. In other words, Arnold developed his own synthesis. It is this unusual blend of ideas common to Arnold and Lonergan, together with the evidence that Lonergan found Arnold a very useful exemplar of both the virtues and the vices of common sense, that persuades me that Arnold was an important influence on Lonergan's thinking.

Having said this much I must immediately reaffirm the modesty of my proposal. That Lonergan absorbed influences from scores of other sources is not in question. Neither is there any question that, supposing my hypothesis to be correct, that are acres of Lonergan's writings and key aspects of his thought in which no trace of Matthew Arnold can be detected. Nor can there be any doubt about the immensely superior sophistication of Lonergan's thought -- that goes without saying. Arnold was a distinctly crude thinker whose ideas, as we have seen, were scorned by critics of the stature of Eliot and Bradley. But if I am correct, this last point reflects great credit on Lonergan. If he has made use of Arnold he has done so only by transforming him. He is rather like the architect of (let us say) a new university center who makes use of sections of a curious, imaginative, but rather down-at-heel old mansion, incorporating them in his new design. Some parts have had to be rejected as unfit, others repaired and strengthened, some extended, others gives a surer foundation. But when complete it is difficult to tell where the old sections begin and end for all have been blended into the new and much vaster structure. What an example of sympathetic understanding! What an example of vision and imagination being brought into unison with rigor and system! What would Arnold, that notorious enemy of system, have made of this transformation of his position? Given the verdict of history on his position, Matthew Arnold could, I feel, be nothing less than flattered.

NOTES

1 Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma, London, 1873, p. xviii. In the rest of this article, when reference is made to Literature and Dogma, it is to the shorter, popular edition of 1883.

Arnold’s religious works were out of print for decades; they are by now included in the Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, edited by R. H. Super. P. J. Keating expresses a widely shared view when explaining the exclusion of any of Arnold’s religious writings from Arnold’s Selected Prose [Penguin, 1970], which he edited. "The writings on religion, to which Arnold gave pride of place when he anthologized himself in 1880, I have omitted completely, because, of all Arnold’s work, these seem to me to carry least well to the modern reader" [p. 7]. F. R. Leavis makes a similar point when considering Arnold’s essay on "The Study of Poetry": "The element that 'dates' in the worst sense is that represented by the famous opening in which Arnold suggests that religion is going to be replaced by poetry. Few now would care to endorse the unqualified intention of that passage, and Arnold as a theological or philosophical thinker had better be abandoned explicitly at once" [p. 56, The Critic as Anti-Philosopher, F. R. Leavis, edited by A. Singh, London, 1982]. Just about the only 'modern' academic to place himself in the line of Arnold is R. B. Braithwaite who argued in a famous essay that religious language is ethically but not factually significant, in the course of which he said, "But the patron saint whom I claim for my way of thinking is that great but neglected Christian thinker Matthew Arnold..." See "An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief," [1953] in The Existence of God, edited by John Hick, London, 1964, p. 247.

5See Literature and Dogma, p. 5.
9Ibid., p. 18. 10Ibid., pp. 19-20. 11Ibid.
16Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 123.
17M. Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 161.
19Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 119.
22Ibid., p. 115.


FROM CRISIS TO INSIGHT

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A less concise, but probably more accurately descriptive, title for this article would have been, "From Phenomenology to Generalized Empirical Method." I intend to show, as simply and clearly as possible, how some basic problems raised by Husserl's philosophy are resolved by that of Lonergan.¹

How are we to justify our claims to knowledge of the real world, and distinguish actual knowledge from knowledge falsely so called? This has been a recurrent problem for philosophers from the Greeks onwards, but has been especially pressing, as it seems, since the time of Descartes. Edmund Husserl developed the 'phenomenological' style of philosophy largely as an attempt to answer this question; as he saw it, such a philosophy would have to be free from any a priori metaphysical commitment, and indeed from any presuppositions whatever, being based on a thorough examination of experience. For so far as a philosophy retains any starting-point or method of proceeding which is not clarified and justified, it may reasonably be objected to as uncritical and dogmatic.² Husserl complains of the 'unscientific' character of all philosophy previous to his own; he sees the continuing divergence of philosophical opinions and points of view as symptomatic of this.³

Phenomenologists are apt to be at one with positivists in the aversion which they feel to traditional metaphysics. However, while all positivists aim at the abolition of metaphysics, some phenomenologists wish rather to provide foundations for the erection of a new metaphysics.⁴ Again, while the phenomenologist as such would not be inclined to dispute the existence of an external world, she would insist that the doctrine that such a world existed should be justified on a phenomenological basis, through an analysis of actual experience. To say that the external world exists, with the objects and events which make it up, without such justification, is to be no less dogmatic than the idealist metaphysician, in his insistence that what pass for external things are really products of mind. We may well conclude that we may make meaningful and true statements about such an external world; all

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that the phenomenologist insists is that we should be able
to explain and provide grounds for such a claim.

Basic to phenomenology is the notion of "phenomenological
constitution". This aims to show how, starting from basic
and indisputable phenomenological facts, "we advance from
subjective experiences where our analysis must begin to an
objective world which we share with other people". Cognitive
experiences [here the phenomenologist differs from the posi-
tivist] are of object-constituting events which are to be
explained in reflective consciousness. But how are we to deter-
mine and to justify our starting assumptions, and the principles
according to which we build upon them, in this "phenomenologi-
cal constitution"? Husserl insists that knowledge not only
has "objective-logical" conditions, but also "noetic" ones.
This is as much as to say, that while one has to bear in mind
that the facts that we know must be objective, independent
of human subjects, it is also to be emphasized that they are
able to be known by subjects who employ their minds in an
appropriate way. He would agree with such sticklers for objec-
tivity as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that truth is
not merely a matter of what one person or even many persons
may believe; but he vigorously contests the kind of "objec-
tivism" that would fail to take into account the subjective
aspect of knowledge. This last is the burden of Husserl's
attack on "naturalism". It is an inevitable reaction to "natural-
alism", as he sees it, that a "historicism" has grown up which
sees all ideas and conceptions as equally historical creations,
"true for" the persons and groups who evolved them. "How
are we to understand the fact that the 'in-itself' of the
objectivity can be thought of by us and moreover 'apprehended'
in cognition and thus in the end yet become 'subjective';
what does it mean that the object exists 'in itself' and is
at the same time 'given' in knowledge . . .?"

What we have to get to grips with is our "object-consti-
tuting subjectivity"; the activity underlying, for example,
the formation of scientific theories, which activity the theor-
ist herself generally fails to advert to because she takes
it for granted. "We must rise above the self-obliviousness
of the theoretician who while preoccupied with things, theories
and methods is quite unaware of the interiority of his produc-
tive thought and who while living in these things, theories,
methods, never focusses his attention on his own productive
activity."
Now there is an important distinction to be made between those mental acts which presuppose the real extra-mental existence of their objects, and those which do not. For example, I can think about or desire something which is unreal (like a bank-account upon which I can draw indefinitely without putting any money in, or a lap-dog which never urinates or defecates). On the other hand, I can only know or perceive states of affairs which are real. (Thus it is to be concluded that I did not actually perceive, but only seemed to perceive, the oasis in the desert which turned out to be a mirage. Similarly, however confidently you assert that there is a highest prime number or a hereditary monarch of the United States, you cannot properly be said to know either proposition, given that neither is in fact true.) But if objects are given to us, as they appear to be, only in or through mental acts, how do we establish whether any object is real or merely imaginary? Furthermore, of what nature is the self-unity which stamps my mental acts as mine, as opposed to those of some other person? In attempting to solve problems such as these, Husserl eventually came to postulate "transcendental subjectivity" and the "transcendental ego", in order to avoid the "psychologism" which seems inevitably to result from making everything dependent on the empirical ego, and the thoroughgoing relativism which is its inevitable consequence.¹²

Those mental acts by which we mean "general objects" or "essences" such as species and attributes, are fundamentally different, in Husserl's view, from those by which we mean individual objects or particulars.¹³ However, we can apprehend such general objects no less directly than we can particular objects.¹⁴ We cannot, as he sees it, get very far in our account of meaning unless we acknowledge this fact. The history of classical empiricism is full of unsuccessful attempts to show how our ideas of general objects are derived from our experience of particular objects (for example, our conceptions of 'horse' or 'green' from particular experiences of horses or green things). Berkeley, for instance, argued that we can form a mental image of a triangle from our particular experience of some triangle, and that this image may then be employed by our thought to stand for all triangles. But the trouble here is that the image of a triangle must be of an equilateral or right-angled or some other particular kind of triangle; yet the meaning of 'triangle' remains the same whatever sort of image we may happen to have conjured up in our minds. The
fact is that we cannot account for our apprehension of the meaning of such general terms as 'red' and 'triangle' without postulating what Husserl calls an act of "ideating abstraction" or "ideation", as a result of which the existence of any perceived object falls into the background and we are able to reach its "essence". "... We apprehend the species red directly, in itself as it were, on the basis of a single perception of something real. We look at the red colour of an object as given to us in a perception, but we do this in a special kind of act; an act which aims at the 'ideal', the 'universal'."\(^{15}\) Empiricists are apt to attempt to wriggle out of these difficulties by trying to account for the meanings of terms as a matter of their extensions (for example, the meaning of 'horse' is somehow just a matter of reference to actual horses). But evidently this will not do for meanings of terms which are not instantiated in the real world, and hence have no extension. (And it would be ridiculous to maintain, for all that it would follow from an account of meaning in terms of extension, that the terms 'dragon' and 'unicorn' are meaningless merely by virtue of the fact that there are no dragons or unicorns.)

Descartes tried to discover the foundations of knowledge by doubting everything that could be doubted, and building on the basic certainties which seemed to survive the purge.\(^{16}\) What Husserl called the "transcendental epochē" is a rather similar performance intended to achieve the same end.\(^{17}\) In carrying it out, I suspend the "natural attitude", and all judgments about the existence of things which I normally assume to be out there and independent of myself; this is an arduous task.\(^{18}\) The philosopher's business is to discover how that world of facts is possible of which the natural scientist, like the person of common sense, assumes the existence -- science being a development of "the natural attitude". What the philosopher must do is to "try to explain what is basically involved in our relationship with the world, how the world comes into being, as it were."\(^{19}\)

Since we may not assume uncritically the existence of a reality independent of ourselves, such an assumption cannot any longer form the basis of our understanding of the concept of truth. (It is natural to say, that the judgment made by someone, "House-martins are summer residents in Europe", is true if and only if it is a fact, independent of all conscious judgments, that house-martins are summer residents in Europe.
But it is the very existence of such facts which, on Husserl's view, ought to be problematic to the philosopher. If conformity with outer reality cannot be the criterion of truth, this would at first sight seem to have as a consequence that each individual person is the arbiter of truth. We find here a principal reason which appears to justify Husserl in postulating a transcendental ego or consciousness; truth can then be correlative with transcendental though not with empirical consciousness, and "psychologism" is avoided. But there remain problems, quite apart from the obvious metaphysical extravagance of postulating a transcendental consciousness over and above the ordinary empirical consciousness clearly characteristic of human beings, and attributing to it remarkable world-constituting capacities. Perhaps the greatest of these problems is, how we are to regain the real world once its existence is rendered problematic by the epoche, and thus is no longer treated as a basic fact to be taken for granted. It is quite largely a conviction that Husserl has dug an unbridgable chasm before his own feet at this point, which has made so many of his followers protest that philosophers must indeed take for granted the existence of the world, and confine themselves to an account of the vicissitudes of human existence within that world.\(^{20}\)

How is one to make the leap from descriptive psychology to transcendental philosophy?\(^{21}\) (And how is it that the latter enterprise is not fatally infected with the relativistic implications of the former, when it is taken as providing the foundations of knowledge in general?) As Husserl sees it, Kant was moving in the right direction with his doctrine of the a priori,\(^{22}\) but did not take far enough the implications of his own apprehension of "the intimate connection between the structure of subjectivity and the structure of 'the world'." This defect is illustrated by Kant's doctrine of the "thing in itself", which is supposed to exist independently of the cognitive subject, and to be inaccessible to it. But Husserl is far more critical of those opponents of Kant who would deny altogether the possibility or usefulness of a transcendental and a priori analysis of human cognition such as Kant attempted to provide. In contrast to that of Kant, Husserl's transcendental analysis has a bearing not only on the structure of knowledge, but also on that of the world; it has implications such as Kant's did not have.\(^{23}\) The ultimate effect of the phenomenological reduction — here once again Husserl
is very reminiscent of Descartes -- is to set up the "transcendental consciousness" as something which cannot be "put in brackets", or be subject to the *epoche*; in fact, it turns out to be that on which everything else depends for its existence. "The whole spatio-temporal world in which man and the human Ego view themselves as subordinate realities is such that it has merely intentional existence; in other words, it exists in a secondary, relative sense of the word . . . for a consciousness."² But if it is thus "merely intentional", in what sense and by what token, one might ask, is it real rather than a fiction? Why should not the so-called "natural world" be just a dream or a mirage? Furthermore, once one has "bracketed" the external world, and changed one's particular stream of conscious experiences into transcendental consciousness by the process of phenomenological reduction, it becomes difficult if not impossible to see how there could be different streams of consciousness, different consciousnesses, or different egos. Is it possible to carry out the *epoche* in a thoroughgoing manner without being committed to a transcendental solipsism, where one's own ego is the only one that exists? Such problems, apparently, could never be satisfactorily resolved by Husserl.²⁵

II

The apparent failure of Husserl's programme, and of the analogous programme of the empiricists, has led many contemporary philosophers to conclude that the very attempt was mistaken; that knowledge has no foundations, and consequently philosophers should not waste their time looking for them.²⁶ I have no space here to criticize this extraordinary view at length; but it is perhaps worth pointing out that, if it is taken literally, it follows that no knowledge claim is better *founded* than any other, and it is consequently wrong to maintain that there is more adequate *foundation* for the claim that the moon is not made of green cheese, than for the claim that it is made of green cheese. I have pointed out a number of difficulties in the carrying-out of Husserl's programme; yet it remains, I believe, that what he wanted to do, to provide foundations for knowledge, is of the utmost importance. Is it possible to point a way to the resolution of these difficulties? It seems to me that it is. What has to be done is to advert to the following two propositions
and their ramifications: [1] It is self-destructive to deny that knowledge, or true belief founded on good reasons, is possible; [2] The real world, as opposed to the merely apparent world or the world of or for a particular conscious subject or group of conscious subjects, can be nothing other than what true beliefs are about, and beliefs founded on good reasons tend to be about.

There is no room here to defend these two propositions at length, but some attempt must be made at a sketch of a defense. If I maintain that knowledge, or true belief based on adequate grounds, is impossible, I may reasonably be confronted with the following dilemma. Is what I maintain true, and based on adequate grounds? If it is, it is itself knowledge, and so inconsistent with itself. If it is not, if it is either untrue or based on inadequate grounds, then it is clearly pointless to take any notice of it. Furthermore, unless my existence as a being capable of making reasonable affirmations is presupposed, I am not worth arguing with, and am not to be supposed to be putting forth arguments worth listening to.

And any idea of "the world" or "reality" other than what true judgments are about, and judgments well-founded in reason tend to be about, turns out in the last analysis to be incoherent. Our knowledge could not conceivably be ineluctably of a merely apparent world, or a world-merely-for-us, since any distinction between "appearance" and "reality", between a "world-merely-for-us" and a "world-as-it-is-in-itself", only gets a purchase on our thought in terms of what it may be reasonable to suppose at one stage, and what it would be reasonable to suppose when judgment is more adequately grounded, when inquiry into experience has been more thoroughly carried out. My experiences (for example, the speck in my visual field as of the planet Jupiter) may in some sense be internal to myself; but it would be merely confused to infer from this that the objects of the judgments based on my experiences (like the planet Jupiter itself) must be so.

I have good reason to affirm my own existence; but, equally, I have good reason to affirm the existence of what is other than myself. If the criterion of real existence is judgment for good reason, I have good reason to believe that an English politician called Margaret Thatcher exists, and that she is other than myself. A large amount of interlocking evidence, which is hardly if at all to be accounted for
otherwise, converges in support of the judgment that she spent
much of her childhood in Grantham, England, whereas I did
not; that she spends a high proportion of her time in the
British House of Commons, which I do not; that she will figure
quite prominently in future histories of the twentieth century,
whereas I will not. So much for the existence of entities,
whether persons or otherwise, which are other than myself.28
Where the persons are concerned, the evidence is just as over-
whelming that each of them thinks, wishes, fears, undergoes
sensations and feelings, and so on, much as I do myself. That
I cannot directly experience these is beside the point, given
that the ultimate criterion of the real is judgment based
on the evidence provided by experience, rather than experience
itself.29 That people seldom if ever share streams of conscious-
ness is again confirmed by a vast weight of evidence. When
Henry is hacked on the shin, it is Henry and not George who
wincs and complains; and however sympathetic Mildred may
be about Euphemia's headache, the headache belongs ineluctably
within Euphemia's consciousness. Indeed, excellent evidence
for Henry's sharp pain or the throbbing sensation inside Eu-
phemia's head may be a part of George's or Mildred's experience;
and this is quite enough, on the conception of knowledge and
its grounds just outlined, for us to have knowledge of the
contents of one another's consciousness.

In what sense, if at all, can one say that everything
is for consciousness on this view? It would seem that there
is a great deal which is not known to any human being; but
it does seem incoherent in the last analysis to suppose that
something could be such that it was unknowable to any con-
sciousness whatever on the basis of any evidence whatever.
It is notorious that this is the trouble with Kant's "things
in themselves", which at once are supposed to be real, and
systematically elude all clearly conceivable criteria of "real-
ity" and "thing-hood". For x to be real is for x actually
or potentially to be judged for good reason to be other than
unreal, to exist rather than to fail to exist; for y to be
a thing is for y actually or potentially to be judged for
good reason to be identical within itself and distinct from
other things, as the Duke of Wellington is identical with
the victor of Waterloo and distinct from the captive of St.
Helena.30
The distinction just drawn between actual and potential knowledge is of the greatest importance for epistemology and metaphysics, since there is an obvious prima facie absurdity in denying that a great deal existed and does exist without actually being known. Oxygen and quasars (assuming that entities of these kinds would survive in a fully explanatory account of the natural world) existed long before the late eighteenth century or the nineteen-sixties, when they were respectively first stated by human beings to exist. But their existence was all the same a matter of the fact that inquiry by conscious subjects into the relevant data would issue in an assertion for good reason that they existed. That the structure of the actually and potentially known, in other words of the actual world itself, does not imply that the world actually depends on the human knower. The distinction between actual and potential knowledge also enables one to dispense with the troublesome Husserlian dichotomy between the "transcendental ego" and "empirical egos". Sure enough, as I have briefly argued, a fundamental clue to the ultimate nature and structure of the universe is that it is potentially knowable; it is indeed nothing other than what is in principle knowable to human persons so far as they apply their minds appropriately to the data of experience. (Whether this provides any ground for asserting that there exists at the basis of the universe something analogous to the human ego is a separate and not immediately relevant question.31 The human person is cognitively "transcendental" as in principle potential knower of the whole universe; but much less than "transcendental" in her empirical nature as very limited by education and environment with respect to actual knowledge.

I can inquire about the world in the usual manner, both in matters of common sense and in the sciences. However, I may also inquire about myself as an inquirer, and about the overall nature and structure that the world cannot but have in virtue of the fact that I can fruitfully inquire into it and obtain knowledge. If the "transcendental époche" is conceived in this kind of way, as the movement of thought from the former kind of inquiry to the latter, there seems to be no difficulty about the return to "the natural attitude", given that the existence of things and of persons with minds other than myself, once one has come to conceive the "transcendental époche" rightly, is vindicated rather than put in jeopardy. And substantial gains for the "natural attitude" may
be achieved by resort to the epoche; a world to which we are intimitely and as it were internally related by our thought may seem a far more spiritually attractive abode for us than a merely "external" world with which we have no intimate connection, and which for that reason we may be disposed not so much to understand as to dominate and subdue.

But there is, after all, a world of things and facts which exists prior to and independently of human conscious inquiry; this comes to be known, fundamentally (from the point of view of the generalized empirical method), by the threefold process of attending to evidence, envisaging hypotheses, and accepting in each case the hypothesis which best fits the evidence. The upshot of this is that the traditional correspondence theory of truth, once suitable qualifications have been made, turns out to be correct after all. I speak the truth so far as my statements correspond with the facts; my statement "the City of Calgary is in the Province of Alberta", or "there are aegithognathous birds with webbed feet", is true if and only if the city of Calgary is within the Province of Alberta, or there are aegithognathous birds with webbed feet -- neither of which putative fact is in the least dependent on what I may happen to affirm or deny. What seems to subvert the correspondence theory of truth is merely a fallacious account of what it is for statements to correspond to facts; one whereby, say, one somehow directly confronts the facts to which one's true statements correspond, or directly apprehends them through sense experience. Plainly such a conception of truth will not account for true statements about the remote past, or the particles of nuclear physics, or other minds (where the facts concerned seem by no means to be apprehended directly by the senses); and even as applied to the things and states of affairs in our immediate environment, it may well appear to break down under analysis. But these objections simply fall to the ground, if the facts of the world are supposed to exist by and large prior to and independently of the conscious operations of conscious subjects, but nevertheless to be nothing other than what true statements state, and statements made for good reason (as a result of adequate consideration of relevant evidence, and adequate envisagement of relevant hypotheses) tend to state. Phenomenology indeed subverts crude versions of the correspondence theory of truth; but the generalized empirical method, in
which I am arguing that phenomenology issues when fully and consistently worked through, vindicates after all what is essential to the theory.

Why is the phrase "generalized empirical method" appropriate to the kind of approach to philosophy which I have set forward as resolving various aporiae of phenomenology? The main point of the phrase is that not only the data of sensation and feeling are matters of experience, but so are the operations of our minds upon these data, and they ought to be taken seriously as such. I am aware after all of the questioning, the hypothesizing, the marshalling of evidence, and the judgment, which I carry out on the basis of and with reference to sensations and feelings, as well as of the sensations and feelings themselves. This is what John Locke was getting at when he maintained that we have ideas of "reflection" as well as of "sensation"; from the point of view of phenomenology or of generalized empirical method, it is a pity that his insight was lost by subsequent empiricists.

It is often assumed that phenomenology, for better or worse, is essentially indifferent to science or even anti-scientific, whereas positivism is the properly scientific philosophy. That many phenomenologists have been hostile to science may well be true. But the assumption seems quite wrong as applied to Husserl, and it is even more so in relation to the generalized empirical method of Lonergan. Husserl rightly emphasized the crucial role of conscious activity, largely neglected or repressed by positivists, in scientific discovery and progress. For Lonergan, science comes about simply by a thoroughgoing application and refinement of conscious processes universal among humankind. A hunter in a primitive society notices a flicker or rustle among the leaves of the jungle; hypothesizes that there may be a poisonous snake in the vicinity; and judges that this is indeed so (and so is able to save her life by taking evasive action). Similarly, a contemporary scientist in her laboratory notices a streak on a photographic plate; hypothesizes that this may be due to the presence of a previously unknown type of fundamental particle; and judges that this is actually the case (and so is able very considerably to advance her career, perhaps winning a Nobel prize). However, neither the primitive hunter nor the contemporary scientist is liable to attend to the conscious processes involved; this is what the phenomenologist and the practitioner of generalized empirical method set
METHOD

themselves to do. But whatever may be true of phenomenology
*de jure* or *de facto*, the generalized empirical method both
accounts for science, and vindicates it as tending to inform
us of the real truth about those aspects of the world with
which it deals; all the same, unlike the "scientism" closely
associated with positivism, it does not immediately or dog-
matically foreclose the question of whether truth about some
aspects of the world or the human condition is not available
by some method which is not "scientific" at least in any nar-
row sense. Indeed, by providing and vindicating norms for
rational inquiry in general, it supplies means by which answers
to this question may be found.16

NOTES

1 For "generalized empirical method" as Lonergan's term
for his own philosophical procedure, see *Insight* [London,
1957], p. 243.

2 See E. Pivcevic, *Husserl and Phenomenology* [London,
1970], pp. 12-13, 20. "Generally speaking," as Pivcevic says,
"the method of phenomenological reduction is a means of de-
tecting what is constitutive and essential in our cognitive
relationship with the world" [op. cit., 65]. In extenuation
of my frequent references to Pivcevic's book in what follows,
I should say that I have found this author as admirable in
conveying clearly and distinctly what seems to be implied
by Husserl's "labyrinthine prose" [74], as in stating the
*prima facie* objections to it.

3 See Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in *Pheno-
menology and the Crisis of Philosophy* [New York, 1965], pp.
74-5; *Cartesian Meditations* [The Hague, 1960], p. 5.

4 The latter was true of Husserl himself, at least towards
the end of his career: "To bring latent reason to the under-
standing of its own possibilities and thus to bring to insight
the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility -- this
is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy
on the strenuous road to realization" [*The Crisis of European
Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, 1970),
p. 15].

5 Pivcevic, p. 17.

6 According to Husserl, the positivist's preoccupation
with sense-data makes her miss the essentially "intentional"
character of mental life, that is, the fact that sensations,
concepts and so on are of and about things. "Even Hume says
(and how could he avoid it?): impressions of, perceptions
of, trees, stones, etc." [*Crisis*, p. 242.] Cf. *Cartesian Medi-
* tations*, p. 33.

7 Pivcevic, pp. 19-20, 40-42. On Frege's charge against
Husserl that the latter was guilty of "psychologism", and
the manner in which Husserl later took this to heart, see
Pivcevic, pp. 30-35.

8 *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, pp. 78-9.
FROM CRISIS TO INSIGHT


10 "What was lacking, and what is still lacking, is the actual self-evidence through which he who knows and accomplishes can give himself an account . . . of the implications of meaning which are closed off through sedimentation or traditionalization -- i.e., of the constant presuppositions of his [own] constructions, concepts, propositions, theories" [Crisis, p. 52].

11 Husserl, Formale und Transzendental Logik; quoted by Pivcevic, pp. 43-4.

12Pivcevic, pp. 46-7, 49, 51.

13On "essences", see Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 111.

14Ibid., p. 115: "The whole thing . . . depends on one's seeing and making entirely one's own the truth that just as immediately as one can hear a sound, so one can intuit an 'essence' -- the essence 'sound', the essence 'appearance of thing', the essence 'apparition'", etc. [Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 115.] In the first volume of the Ideen, Husserl writes of "phenomenology, whose only aim is to be a doctrine of essences in the framework of pure intuition" [Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 93, note].

15Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II/1; Pivcevic, p. 62.

16Descartes is described by Husserl as "the primal founder not only of the modern idea of objectivistic rationalism but also of the transcendental motif which explodes it" [Crisis, p. 73]. He adds, "Even today, and perhaps especially today, everyone who would think for himself ought, it seems to me, to study these first Meditations [of Descartes] in the utmost depth, not being frightened off by the appearance of primitiveness, by the well-known use of the new ideas for the paradoxical and basically wrong proofs of the existence of God, or by many other obscurities and ambiguities -- and also not being too quickly comforted by one's own refutations" [Ibid., p. 745].

17In the Crisis, Husserl writes of "a sort of radical, skeptical epoche which places in question all [one's] hitherto existing convictions, which forbids in advance any judgmental use of them, forbids taking any position as to their validity or invalidity. Once in his life every philosopher must proceed in this way . . . Prior to the epoche 'his philosophy' is to be treated like any other prejudice" [p. 76].

18 "We do not easily overcome the inborn habit of living and thinking according to the naturalistic attitude, and thus of naturalistically adulterating the psychical" [Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 109].


20Pivcevic, pp. 69-70, 73, 82.

21The trouble with descriptive psychology in its usual sense is that it must by its very nature overlook the norms essentially implicit in knowledge. How people happen to think, and why they happen to think as they do, is one thing; how they ought to think if they are to get to know the truth about things, and why they should think in this way if they are to do so, is another. See Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, pp. 88, 92, 102, 119.
22 "In so far as phenomenological investigation is essence investigation and is thus a priori in the authentic sense, it takes into account all the justified motives of a priorism" [Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 121].

23 This last is Pivcevic's judgment, which I shall assume to be broadly correct [Pivcevic, pp. 76-7]. "... If knowledge theory will ... investigate the problems of the relationship between consciousness and being, it can have before its eyes only being as the correlate of consciousness, as something 'intended' after the manner of consciousness; as perceived, remembered, expected, represented pictorially, imagined, identified, distinguished, believed, ... evaluated, etc." [Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 89]. On the virtues and limitations of Kant, see Crisis, pp. 91-3, 97, 103.

24 "Ideen, I; quoted Pivcevic, 77. 25 Pivcevic, 74-8, 80.


27 Cf. Insight, Chapter XI.


29 It may thus reasonably if unkindly be said, that the so-called "problem of other minds" is an artifact of empiricism.

30 Cf. Insight, Chapter VIII.

31 In Chapter XIX of Insight it is argued that the intelligibility of the universe is only fully to be explained if God exists. Husserl also sees a connection between the question of God and the intelligibility of the universe [Crisis, pp. 288-89].

32 Insight, Chapter XI. With Lonergan's phrase "generalized empirical method", one may compare Husserl's remark about phenomenologists, "We are the true empiricists".

33 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, I, 4; II, VI, 1 and 2. The point has been well made by J. Douglas Rabb. See his John Locke on Reflection: A Phenomenology Lost [Lanham, 1985].

34 Cf. Pivcevic, p. 84. 35 Insight, Chs. II to IV.

All knowledge has its origin in wonder about a concretely given reality.¹ Few realities have created more wonder than human consciousness and few have given rise to such theoretical dispute. Two of the most significant interpreters of human consciousness -- B. F. Skinner and B. Lonergan -- have produced two of the most incompatible interpretations of consciousness.

Concerning consciousness Skinner concludes, "There was no more reason to make a permanent place for 'consciousness' . . . [in a scientific description of behavior] than for 'phlogiston' or *vis anima*."² Having eliminated consciousness from the explanation of human behavior Skinner, quite consistently, proceeds to reject the "human subject." "A proper theory," he tells us, "... must abolish the conception of the individual as a doer, as an originator of action."³ "The concept of self is not essential in an analysis of behavior . . ." ⁴ Thus, as Winokur concludes, for Skinner, "Man himself has been eliminated as a causal variable; he is just a place where causal variables interact to produce talking."⁵

Lonergan is in strong disagreement with each of these conclusions. Concerning consciousness he states:

But one cannot deny that, within the cognitional act as it occurs, there is a factor or element or component over and above its content, and that this factor is what differentiates cognitional acts from unconscious occurrences.⁶ Lonergan affirms the existence of the human subject. The subject, for Lonergan, is constituted by consciousness, "For consciousness does not reveal a prime substance; it reveals a psychological subject . . ." ⁷ Concerning the role of the subject in his or her own development Lonergan is emphatic. The subject is not only a knower but also a doer and this doing affects the subject him/herself because:

By his own acts the human subject makes himself what he is to be, and he does so freely and responsibly; indeed, he does so precisely because his acts are the free and responsible expressions of himself.⁸

Thus for Lonergan there is no suggestion of "eliminating
man himself" from the account of human behavior. Such an elimination results in the truncated subject -- the one who "not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance and . . . concludes that what he does not know does not exist."^9

The traditional wonder about consciousness is therefore not without its significance, for the affirmation of consciousness entails an affirmation of the freedom and dignity of the human individual, while the denial of consciousness entails the denial of both properties.

It is the purpose of this essay to provide a Lonerganian critique of Skinner's explanation of human consciousness. For Lonergan, consciousness is both cognitive and constitutive. It is cognitive in that it "is knowledge of the subject sub ratione experti (under the formal aspect of 'the experienced')". This experience is "original, immediate, and non-reflective."^11 Consciousness is constitutive in that it is what makes us capable of experience, understanding, judgment, and responsible action.^12 The constitutive dimension presupposes the cognitive.^13 In this essay I will deal only with the cognitive dimension of consciousness and, within that dimension, only with the immediate and non-reflective aspects of the experience of the subject. A further consideration, which could be described as occurring in the background of this paper, is the relation between the methods of Lonergan and Skinner. The hypothesis is that Skinner's method is a specialized method for analysis of the environmental contingencies which are generated by, and in turn interact with, the generalized empirical method. Prior to the critique of Skinner's theory of consciousness, an account will be given for the explanations, provided by Skinner and Lonergan, of the immediate and non-reflective properties of the cognitive dimension of human consciousness. In doing so an exposition of the methods used by each will be provided, in the hope that such an exposition can facilitate a new synthesis of the methods of Lonergan and Skinner.

1. Skinner on the Nature of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness

A. Skinner's Method for Explaining Consciousness

Skinner clearly describes the way in which psychological theories should be constructed if they are to be productive of both basic knowledge and technological applications.^14 There are three stages in the process of constructing such a theory.
In the first stage the basic data that psychology can meaningfully study are determined. For Skinner the basic data for psychology are the probability of action and the environmental stimuli that control this probability.

The second stage, which we will now examine in greater depth, involves the attempt to discover the lawful relations that actually do exist within the specified data. Norman Malcolm has succinctly articulated the goal of this stage of theory building.

Skinner is an exponent of a "functional analysis" of human behavior. He holds that every piece of human behavior is a "function" of some condition, that is describable in physical terms, as is the behavior itself. The conditions of which behavior is a function are, for the most part, external to the organism, although sometimes they may be "within the organism's skin." The physical conditions of which behavior is a function are called "independent variables," and the pieces of behavior are the "dependent variables." A dependent variable is said to be under the "control" of an independent variable. The relations between independent and dependent variables are scientific laws. The aim of behavioristic psychology is to uncover these laws, thus making possible the prediction and control of human behavior. "A synthesis of these laws expressed in quantitative terms yields a comprehensive picture of the organism as a behaving system." 15

Skinner's activity at stage two revealed a brilliant scientist, for the fruition of his efforts was nothing less than the discovery of the principles of operant conditioning.

The central principle of operant conditioning is the three-term contingency of reinforcement. This principle describes the relation between three events: a discriminative stimulus, a response, and a reinforcing or punishing stimulus. The relation can be schematized as follows:

\[ \text{SD} \longrightarrow \text{R} \longrightarrow \text{Sr+/-} \]

A discriminative stimulus can be any event in the presence of which a specific response is characteristically reinforced. For example, the verbal community characteristically reinforces a child, learning to label objects, for saying 'tree' in the presence of any type of tree.

The response which constitutes the middle term is an operant response; that is, one which has its probability of occurrence modified by the effects that it has on the environment. The probability of the child saying 'tree' in the presence of trees is increased when the listener says "that's right" or "good" and pats the child on the shoulder. Operant responses cover the category of responses which was traditionally considered to be "voluntary".
The reinforcer is the event which increases the probability of the response in the presence of its discriminative stimulus. This occurs in such a way that the discriminative stimulus eventually gains control over the response, which means that the response will continue to be emitted in the presence of the discriminative stimulus even when it is only being reinforced once in a while, as would be the case in the example above.

Two properties of the relationship between the response and its discriminative stimulus are significant for the discussion of Skinner's explanation of consciousness. These properties are, first, that the response is controlled in a probabilistic way by its discriminative stimulus, and second, that the response is only externally related to its discriminative stimulus.

Concerning the nature of the control that the discriminative stimulus acquires over the response, the three-term contingency -- stimulus, response, consequence -- acts as an independent variable which exerts functional control over the probability of future responses being emitted in the presence of similar discriminative stimuli. More precisely, the three-term contingency exerts functional control over the covariation of an antecedent discriminative stimulus and a response. Thus, the control of the response by its antecedent discriminative stimulus develops as a dependent variable. Skinner refers to the relation between the discriminative stimulus and the response as a relation of stimulus control. For example, a relation of stimulus control exists between the actual tree and the verbal response 'tree' because the child has been exposed to a type of three-term contingency in which the first term has been actual trees and the second term has been the vocal response of 'tree'.

According to Skinner this relationship between the response and its discriminative stimulus is also only an external relationship. As he states it, "The contingencies which affect an organism are not stored by it. They are never inside it; they simply change it." Thus, the discriminative stimulus and its properties are always separate from, or external to, the response. They never become part of, or are assimilated to, the response.
Though Skinner describes the topography of the response he never defines an operant response without referring to all three terms of the contingency. A response is always defined through its controlling relations.17

Without doubt the three-term contingency of reinforcement will be one of the most important discoveries of twentieth-century psychology. It is this principle and those which derive primarily from it that constitute the tools to be used at the third and final stage of theory building.

It is only at the third stage that "theory" in its proper sense enters. Events which cannot yet be experimentally manipulated, and thereby empirically explained, are theoretically explained. At this stage, concepts such as, "wants, faculties, attitudes, drives, ideas, interests and capacities ... will be put in good scientific order."18 The phenomenon called consciousness belongs in this category of psychological events.

Skinner's objective at stage three is to perform a functional analysis of the theoretical verbal behavior of the scientist. As Day succinctly puts it, "The task of a scientific analysis of 'sentences' is to specify within the statement of functional relations, the kinds of stimulation that can reasonably be said to control the verbal behavior in question."19 Thus, Skinner will attempt to determine which type or types of three-term contingency(ies) are actually influencing the probability of the verbal behavior of the scientist when that scientist engages in the explanation of phenomena such as consciousness. Using the three-term contingency as a tool for defining scientific terms operationally, he has been able to demonstrate that the verbal behavior of the scientist is under multiple control.

One source of control is operational -- influences from operations, and contacts with data. Discriminative stimuli of this sort lead to the effective prediction and control of natural events.20 Following Moore we can schematize these contingencies as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
SD & & \rightarrow \text{R} & \rightarrow \text{Sr} \\
\text{Operations and} & \text{Scientific} & \text{Outcomes leading to} \\
\text{contacts with data} & \text{behavior} & \text{prediction and control} \\
\end{array}
\]

Verbal behavior, determined in this manner, is referred to by Skinner as the abstract tact. In Skinner's own words:
A tact may be defined as a verbal operant in which a response of a given form (the second term of the contingency) is evoked (or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event or property of an object or event (the first term of the contingency). We account for the strength by showing that in the presence of the object or event a response of that form is characteristically reinforced (the third term of the contingency) in a given verbal community.21

A tact is abstract when it is under the control of a specific property of the antecedent event.22 Such a tact is objective because it is controlled by the actual properties of the event in question.

A second general source of control over the verbal behavior of the scientist is social or cultural — more specifically those traditions and preconceptions within the culture which bear directly on the issues that the scientist is investigating. Moore23 schematizes these contingencies in the following manner:

\[
SD \rightarrow R \rightarrow Sr
\]

Social and cultural stimuli

Behavior

Social and cultural reinforcers

Thus, the discriminative stimuli from this class of contingencies lead the scientist to emit behavior that results in social acceptance for following the culture's established rules, rather than behavior that results in the prediction and control of nature.24 As Moore25 points out, when it comes to the issue of human nature, the prevailing cultural traditions have been "mentalistic." The traditions which split human nature into mind and body have always appealed to mental concepts in explaining human behavior.

Social-cultural influences enter into the control of the scientist's verbal behavior in several ways. First, there is that class of operants which Skinner refers to as the intra-verbal. This is a verbal response which is under the stimulus control of other verbal stimuli. One's verbal responses are influenced by what one says, and what one speaks today is determined in part by what one has said, heard, and read yesterday.26

Another operant by which the prevailing culture influences the verbal behavior of the scientist is the mand. This is a verbal utterance which is under the functional control of a particular reinforcer. Thus, one is manding when one says "pay attention to me." Many of the reinforcers for scientific behavior are things such as prestige, social attention, and
advancement. Thus, the influence of the society which administers these consequences enters into the control of the scientist's behavior. As Skinner notes, it takes considerable training to refrain from drawing premature conclusions on the basis of insufficient evidence, and to avoid creating explanatory fictions.27

A third way that culture influences the scientist's verbal behavior is by means of audience control. The audience that one is speaking to sets the occasion for the emission of a specific part of one's repertoire, and then either reinforces this behavior or punishes behavior incompatible with this behavior. Thus, the audience plays a powerful role in selecting the verbal behavior emitted by the scientist.28

On the basis of these three processes we can see how profoundly social-cultural influences enter into the determination of the scientist's verbal behavior.

The tact, intraverbal, mand, and audience control are all third-level constructions in Skinner's method of building a natural scientific theory of human nature. They are all based upon a very skillful use of the three-term contingency of reinforcement as an analytic tool. As a result of these astute analyses, which from the viewpoint of traditional philosophy are fundamentally epistemological in nature, we are able to develop a very refined grasp of the multiply-controlled nature of scientific verbal behavior.

Moore29 schematizes the results of this analysis the following way:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
SD & \longrightarrow & S \\
Tact, intraverbal, mand & \longrightarrow & Scientific behavior \\
Social influences & \longrightarrow & Outcomes leading to prediction and control \\
& & Outcomes leading to social reinforcers
\end{array}
\]

Given this theory of the way in which various types of three-term contingencies simultaneously operate on the verbal behavior of the scientist to interactively modulate the probability of his or her theoretical utterances, how does Skinner proceed to offer third-level explanations of events such as consciousness? What is consciousness? How does it come into existence? How do we come to talk about it?

To begin with it must be noted that Skinner's radical behaviorism does in fact deal with events occurring inside the organism, events which he refers to as private.30 For him the "skin is not that important as a boundary."31 The central
question is, what types of private events will he allow into his science? Skinner has long been concerned about the use of mental concepts in the explanation of behavior. The methodological orientation which uses psychological or mental concepts in its explanation of behavior is known as mentalism. Moore, a radical behaviorist, points out that mentalism is characterized by three properties. First, it divides human experience into pre-behavioral and behavioral dimensions. Second, it uses psychological or mental terms such as wishes, motives, cognition, and consciousness to refer to organocentric entities that exist in the pre-behavioral dimension. Once placed in this dimension they take on an autonomy from behavioral principles of explanation. Finally, mentalism treats these organocentric entities as antecedent causes which explain behavior. Yet these organocentric or mental events must in turn be explained in a complete explanation of behavior. This is one of the reasons why Skinner rejects this mentalistic method for explaining behavior.

Does this mean that Skinner cannot deal with those types of private events that mental concepts are taken to refer to? The answer is no. As he states, "The objection is not that these things are mental but that they offer us no real explanation and stand in the way of a more effective analysis." Skinner will deal with the mental event by treating it as a private event and will then operationalize the mental term by applying his method for explaining public events to the private event in question. That is, to use his own words, he will turn "to the contingencies of reinforcement which account for the functional relation between a term, as a verbal response [the mental concept], and a given stimulus [the mental event]." In essence, Skinner will attempt to determine which types of three-term contingencies the verbal behavior of the theorician belongs to.

Only that theoretical verbal behavior that belongs to the abstract self-tact, where the verbal response is under the control of discriminative stimuli that are the objective properties of the private event, will be accepted in Skinner's account of behavior. For Skinner only that behavior is controlled by reality states and processes. Verbal behavior which has only social and cultural events for its discriminative stimuli will be rejected as descriptive and/or explanatory fictions.
Skinner treats of three categories of mental concepts. First, there are those mental concepts which lack both descriptive and explanatory validity. These concepts do not describe palpable realities and therefore they can have no place in the explanation of behavior. They are merely fictional inventions which are nothing more than metaphors. "Memory," based as it is upon the metaphor of "storage system," is an example of such a mental concept.36

The second category contains mental concepts that possess descriptive validity but lack explanatory value. These do describe palpable realities such as aches, pains, and emotions and thus are valid descriptively. However, when the private events referred to by these concepts are treated as causes of behavior, in the sense meant by the statement, "He is eating because he is hungry," then Skinner considers these concepts to be explanatory fictions. Rather than treat the events referred to by these concepts as causes, Skinner considers them to be either "mental way-stations" -- intervening links between the environment and the behavior, links that can be ignored in a causal explanation of behavior -- or collateral effects of the actual causes of the behavior.37

Finally, there is a third category of mental concepts which Skinner considers to have full descriptive and explanatory status. These concepts refer to mental events that have both descriptive and explanatory validity. The clearest examples of this category of mental events are those which function as discriminative stimuli for self-descriptive verbal behavior, as in "I feel hungry." The force of this view is brought out in Skinner's statement, about a hypothetical person, that "internal states are the 'referents' of his descriptions of his feelings, and as such are among the independent variables controlling his verbal behavior."38 Zuriff has determined that there are ten different categories of mental events that have causal status for Skinner.39 However, these mental events, though it seems that they can be organocentric, as in the case of pain, are never treated as existing in a pre-behavioral dimension.

Skinner therefore does deal with internal events. As Schnaitter has noted, the line of demarcation between the mental terms which Skinner accepts and those which he rejects is clear. "An ordinary-language mental term is at least roughly acceptable for descriptive purposes if its referent is a phenomenon with direct sensory qualities; but a term is not
I to

METHOD

acceptable for descriptive purposes if its referent is relatively abstract, or inferred. Thus, as Schnaitter concludes, for Skinner, "good mentalisms are conscious mentalisms subject to introspection; bad mentalisms are unconscious mentalisms, the subject of inference.

Skinner's method of dealing with internal events without falling into the pit of explanatory fictions is very astute. His first step is to insure that his own verbal behavior is under the control of data rather than of metaphoric extensions that are usually transmitted by social traditions. His second step is to insure that the internal event does not function as an autonomous cause, by placing it into the three-term contingency as one of its terms -- usually the discriminative stimulus.

In the next section of the essay I shall examine the way in which Skinner applies his theoretical method to the issue of the nature of consciousness.

B. Skinner's Explanation of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness

The term consciousness has been used to refer to many different forms of awareness. These have been very ably described by Lonergan, Malott and Whaley, Natsoulas, and Strasser. This discussion of consciousness will be based on only one of these forms of awareness -- that which the etymology of the word reveals as its referent. Etymologically the term consciousness derives from the Latin cum scire, which means to know together or at the same time. As the term denotes, consciousness has traditionally been taken to refer to a non-objective or non-reflexive experience of ourselves as knowers, an experience which accompanies all our acts of knowledge and willing. Thus, we are taken as experiencing ourselves as knowers together and simultaneously with our knowledge of the object. Natsoulas defines a mental episode as being self-intimating "if all it takes to be aware of its occurrence is its occurrence." The experience of the subject which is given in and by consciousness is taken as being self-intimating in this sense. We are unreflexively or immediately present to ourselves as subjects in our knowing and willing activities.

Skinner treats consciousness as operant behavior which is brought into existence by operant conditioning. He is emphatic about the fact that, "It is only through the gradual growth of a verbal community that the individual becomes conscious."
Skinner, in an interview by Guly, makes his position on the nature of consciousness very clear. "So far as I am concerned all behavior is unconscious, but some of it becomes conscious when people ask us what we are doing, why we are doing that, and so on. We begin to learn, as the human species began to learn many thousands of years ago to observe itself." These statements imply that Skinner simply rejects, as a descriptive and explanatory fiction, the existence of consciousness in the sense that we have defined it.

This conclusion is supported by Natsoulas who rejects the doctrine of self-intimation as absurd. Consciousness, then, is identified for Skinner with what Lonergan refers to as reflexive knowing and what Skinner refers to as self-tacting operant behavior.

Moore states the position very clearly:

For radical behaviorism, these terms [consciousness and awareness] relate to the extent to which persons respond discriminatively on the basis of past and present behavior, behavior they are likely to exhibit in the future, and the conditions of which such behavior is a function ... Most often, of course, we are likely to be aware when we learn something new, because self-descriptive behavior in such cases is extremely useful. But we behave with respect to stimuli, and all behavior can be said to be unconscious in the sense that it is shaped and maintained through contingencies that exert their effects even though they are not described.

For radical behaviorism, to the extent that these phenomena [thinking and consciousness] involve private events, they are private behaviors. As private behaviors, they do not differ in principle from public behaviors, although they are executed on such a small scale and at such a reduced level that the behavior is not observable by others.

In some cases, the private or covert form of the behavior involves fully the same musculature as does the public, overt form .... In other cases, the covert behavior ... involves the activity of the neuromuscular substratum that is also active during the overt form of the behavior.

We may conclude that for Skinner the only aspects of our own being that ever become conscious are those aspects which come, as a result of operant conditioning, to function as discriminative stimuli for a self-tact response. This means that we are never conscious of the middle terms of either the self-tact or the tact, qua middle term of these contingencies. Consciousness is always of the content of noetic acts and never of the acts qua acts. To put it differently, we are never conscious of ourselves as knowers or subjects.
That is, while we are emitting the knowing act or tacting response, we are never conscious of this act or response. In Skinner's terms, it is impossible to self-tact a tacting tact; a tact that is currently in the process of being emitted. Therefore, it is impossible to be conscious of a tacting tact response. The tacting tact is, in Skinner's use of the term, unconscious.

Skinner's explanation of consciousness is therefore a version of the theory which Lonergan labelled as "conscientia-perceptio" where consciousness is conceived as being completely intentional, reflexive, and introspective in nature. The premise of this theory is:

that cognitional self-presence is correlative with reflection; it occurs only insofar as the subject's acts, initially oriented toward contents distinct from themselves, return upon themselves, receiving themselves as their own contents.

On the basis of this premise the conscientia-perceptio theory of consciousness concludes that none of the subject's cognitional acts possess consciousness -- a primitive internal experience of self-presence in cognitional acts, an experience which is non-intentional, non-reflexive, and non-objective.

As we have seen, for Skinner some mentalistic concepts are simply descriptive and explanatory fictions, and psychology does not require their redefinition or reinterpretation. As he states:

The reinterpretation of an established set of explanatory fictions was not the way to secure the tools then needed for a scientific description of behavior .... There was no more reason to make a permanent place for "consciousness," "will," "feeling," and so on, than for "phlogiston" or "vis anima."

Thus, consciousness, taken as a self-intimating activity, is a mere explanatory fiction, verbal behavior emitted by the scientist, which refers to pre-behavioral "entities." Such behavior of the scientist is multiply-controlled by the social-cultural stimuli and by reinforcers that enter into the intra-verbal and mand contingencies of reinforcement. It would seem that Skinner's examination of his own private events did not produce any direct sensory and conscious data that could function as discriminative stimuli for the abstract self-tact of "an immediate or nonreflexive experience of myself as subject in all my acts of knowing and willing," an experience that occurs simultaneously with the experience of the discriminative stimulus or object of each of these "acts." Finding
no such data he concluded that "consciousness" is not an abstract self-tact. Rather, "consciousness" is likely the middle term of both intraverbal and mand three-term contingencies. "Consciousness" would be an intraverbal because its discriminative stimuli are the verbally mediated and mentalistically biased traditions of Western Culture. "Consciousness" would be a mand because it is based on strong subjective desires that human nature transcend physical reality. As a mand "consciousness" would therefore function as a "request" that human reality be so structured.

As we proceed to Lonergan's account of consciousness we move toward a very different understanding of our subject matter.

2. Lonergan on the Nature of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness

Lonergan, like Skinner, was a systematic thinker. Like Skinner, his conclusions on the nature of consciousness were based upon the astute use of method.

A. Lonergan's Method for Explaining Consciousness

One of the central goals of Lonergan's life project was to discover the "foundations for method in general." This search for foundations lead to the formulation of a generalized empirical or transcendental method, a method that "is essentially the same" as the empirical method and that "stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of sense." As Lonergan formulated it, the generalized empirical method operates in two ways. Utilized in the first way it is simply the "dynamic pattern of interrelated operations which constitute human knowing," which Tyrrell refers to as the 'radical' transcendental method. On this level the generalized empirical method is what is common to all methods and what grounds all methods. When used in the second way the generalized empirical method thematizes, in an explanatory manner, the dynamic pattern of operations that constitute human cognitive structure. As such the method takes the form of "intentionality analysis" which refers to the heightening of attention, "to the data of consciousness, to the experiences of acting consciously, followed by questions and answers that ... [arise] from such heightened awareness." This analysis led Lonergan to the conclusion that the foundation for all methods is to be found in the subject as subject.
When the individual applies intentionality analysis to his or her own cognitive process it leads that individual to self-appropriate the dynamic pattern of operations that constitutes his or her own cognitive structure.62

It is through intentionality analysis, whereby the generalized empirical method, taken as the "radical dynamic pattern" reduplicates itself into a pattern that is "explicitly understood, verified, and embraced,"63 that Lonergan will formulate the nature of consciousness. In order to understand and verify his formulation of consciousness we must grasp what he means by: (1) explanation, (2) the structure of the generalized empirical method when it is taken as the radical dynamic pattern which constitutes human knowing and doing, and (3) self-appropriation.

Proceeding with explanation, the distinction which Lonergan draws between description and explanation must be noted. Description involves formulations of relations between things and our senses. In description an appeal is always made to the contents of human experiences.64 Byrne gives a nice example of the description of ammonia. "Ammonia is whatever smells like this smell I am presently smelling."65 Thus, the understanding that is given by description depends upon experience or memory.

Explanation involves formulations of the relations between things. In explanation the appeal is always to "correlatives defined implicitly by empirically established correlations, functions, laws, theories, systems."66 Implicit definitions specify only the relations between the correlated elements and prescind from formulating the specific natures of the elements. Thus, materially distinct things can be defined by the same implicit definition. Implicit definition gives the highest degree of generality.67

The development of modern science involved the movement from description towards explanation.

Skinner's formulation of the three-term contingency of reinforcement is a fine example of explanation. This formulation expresses a functional relation between three elements -- the discriminative stimulus, the operant response, and the reinforcer. No appeal is made to specific sensory experience in this formulation. For example, a reinforcer is not defined as a thing that gives sensory pleasure. Further, the terms are defined implicitly through their relations. A
reinforcer is a thing or event that, when contingent upon the occurrence of the response, increases the probability of the response occurring in the presence of the discriminative stimulus. The response is defined as an action that has its probability altered by its consequent reinforcer and so on. The actual things and events that can enter into this functional relationship constitute a huge class of materially distinct realities. This is why the relation that Skinner discovered has such vast generality.

Although Lonergan used description in his formulation of the dynamic pattern of the generalized empirical method, his goal was explanation. The explanation of the generalized empirical method is the second topic to be dealt with.

For Lonergan, human knowing and doing involve a basic pattern of operations. These operations are schematically outlined in Table 1 on p. 122. Each operation is both intrinsically intentional and intrinsically conscious, for by each operation an object becomes present to the subject and the subject becomes present to him or herself. The operations occur on four qualitatively different levels and therefore give rise to four qualitatively different levels of intentionality and consciousness. What is intended respectively on the four levels is: (a) the given -- both sensory data and the data of consciousness, (b) the intelligible, (c) the true and the real, and (d) the good. On the four levels the subject is present to him or herself respectively as a sentient, intellectual, rational, and responsible subject. The basic pattern of operations forms a wholistic structure: one where internal relations determine that, "Each part is what it is in virtue of its functional relations to other parts; there is no part that is not determined by the exigences of other parts . . ." This structure is materially dynamic because its parts are activities or operations, and it is formally dynamic because it is self-assembling or self-constituting. Experience spontaneously gives rise to inquiry and understanding. Understanding gives rise to the need to weigh the evidence, to judge whether or not one's understanding of experience is factually true or false. Finally, knowledge of facts gives rise to deliberation on what actions should be emitted in the light of these facts. Although operations may be initiated at any of the levels of the structure, the usual direction of this self-assembling pattern is depicted by the arrows in Table 1.
### TABLE I
**GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL METHOD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Operations</th>
<th>Empirical Sensing</th>
<th>Perceiving</th>
<th>Imagining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Inquiry</td>
<td>What is it?</td>
<td>How often?</td>
<td>Grasp of the in-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Direct Insight</td>
<td>Intelligible law, ideal frequency</td>
<td>Intelligible unity</td>
<td>ideal frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Formulation</td>
<td>Formula-</td>
<td>Formulation of the in-</td>
<td>Ideal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>law ideal</td>
<td>law ideal</td>
<td>Intelligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Levels of Operation

**Intellectual (Understanding)**
- **Rational Inquiry**
  - Is it so?
  - Are the insights and formulations of the intellectual level correct?

**Rational (Judgement)**
- **Rational Reflective Insight**
  - Grasp of evidence as sufficient or not sufficient for the prospective judgement that “It is so,” i.e., to grasp the prospective judgement as a virtually unconditioned.

**Responsible (Action)**
- **Responsible Inquiry: Phase A**
  - Practical Direct Insight and Intentional Feeling Responses
  - Grasp of possible courses of action \(a, y \& z\) and potential values \(x, y'\) and \(z'\).
- **Responsible Inquiry: Phase B**
  - Apprehension of Value
  - Intentional feeling response which apprehends \(x'\) as a true value
- **Judgement of Value**
  - Affirmation of \(x'\) and denial of \(y'\) and \(z'\). Felt to be true because generates a peaceful conscience

#### Reasoning Method

- **Deliberation**
  - What-is-to-be-done?

- **Evaluation**
  - Is-it-to-be-done? \(re: x, y \& z\)

- **Decision**
  - Choice of action \(x\)

- **Action**
  - Doing action \(x\).

---
*The empirical level is the level of experience and includes both the data of sense and consciousness.*
Here we see Lonergan constructing implicit definitions of the operations. Experience is what is presupposed by understanding, understanding is what follows from experience and is presupposed by reflection, and so on.

The dynamic pattern does not function blindly as it would if it were ultimately due to external determinisms. Rather, it is consciously "attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible." As Lonergan states:

the many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit. To know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true; to know the true, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the data."

This pattern of operations is the generalized empirical or transcendental method. It is a method because it conforms to Lonergan's definition of method as "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." It is transcendental because, unlike other methods which meet the needs of specialized fields of study, it is open to and applicable to all the exigences of the human mind. It is the "underpinning of special methods," the developments of which "are just fresh instances of attending to the data, grasping their intelligibility, formulating the content of the new insights, and checking as thoroughly as possible their validity."

Finally, this pattern of operations is not revisable because such a revision would appeal to new data, to a better explanation of the data, to a new judgment that the better explanation is more probably true, and to a choice to act in accordance with the revision. Thus, the revision would have to presuppose the empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible levels of consciousness. What is revisable is therefore the objectification of the structure but not the structure itself.

This explanation that Lonergan has given of human knowing and doing has been based only on the empirical and intellectual levels of the generalized empirical method. The question which spontaneously follows formulated understanding is "Is it so?" or "Is this explanation factually true?" These are of course questions for the rational operations. Lonergan would view his generalized empirical method as foundational to Skinner's method. It is likely that, had Lonergan had the opportunity to examine the evidence for Skinner's empirical
principles -- the three-term contingency of reinforcement and its derivative principles -- he would have judged, "It is so." However, he would have gone on to ask about the foundation, in nature, of these contingencies. I expect that he would have replied that nonverbal contingencies presuppose the natural capacity for empirical operations, while verbal contingencies -- the tact, intraverbal, mand, and so on -- which appear to be only natural to the human species, presuppose the natural capacity for intellectual, rational, and responsible operations.

Skinner, on the other hand, would hold the reverse. for him, of course, operations, taken as activities that are intrinsically self-constituting and self-present, do not exist. However, their behavioral counterparts, where they have counterparts, are ultimately due to operant conditioning. Thus, he would object to the mentalistic nature of Lonergan's explanation of these operations and would point out that Lonergan's accounts of insight and consciousness are descriptive and explanatory fictions. The answer to the question "Is it so?", with reference to both Lonergan's and Skinner's theoretical formulations of understandings of the foundations of human behavior, is beyond the scope of this essay. We are dealing only with the judgment on one component of these formulations, that of consciousness. A later work will deal with the larger issue.

Proceeding to the third general topic, self-appropriation is the use of intentionality analysis to move into the subject operating empirically, intelligently, rationally, and responsibly. Self-appropriation involves the application of the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious. The four steps involved lead one through the processes of:

1. experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding,
2. understanding the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding,
3. affirming the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and
4. deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

Having outlined the dynamic pattern of operations which constitutes the generalized empirical method, I shall focus now on Lonergan's intentionality analysis of consciousness. In carrying out this analysis of consciousness Lonergan applies all of the operations on the level of understanding to those
of the level of experiencing; in this way he attempts to answer the question "What is it?" by gaining a direct insight into the intelligibility of consciousness and by formulating this insight.

B. Lonergan's Explanation of the Cognitive Dimension of Consciousness

Lonergan defines consciousness as "an internal experience, in the strict sense of the word, of the self and its acts." Experience taken in its strict sense is the "prior and unpatterned knowledge . . . which is presupposed and completed by intellectual inquiry." It is prior because it is what inquiry is about. It is unpatterned because if it were already intelligibly patterned there would be no need for inquiry.

The external experience of a thing occurs through proper acts such as sensing, and the thing is experienced as an object. However, the internal experience of the self and his/her acts does not occur by way of a proper act such as sensing, understanding, or judging. Neither does it occur as the perception of an object. In the act of sensing not only is the sensible manifested on the side of the object, but also the one who senses and his/her act of sensing is manifested on the side of the subject. In the act of understanding not only is the intelligible manifested on the side of the object, but also the one who understand and his/her act of understanding is manifested on the side of the subject. In the act of judging, not only is the true and being manifested on the side of the object, but also the one who judges and his/her act of judging are manifested on the side of the subject, and so on.

Three things of note follow from the formulation above. First, it is only on the basis of his/her acts that the subject is conscious of him or herself. This is so because moral self-consciousness only occurs when one is deliberating on and choosing the good, rational self-consciousness only occurs when one is reflecting on and judging the true and the real, intellectual self-consciousness only occurs when one is understanding and formulating the intelligible, and empirical self-consciousness only occurs when one is experiencing the sensible or the conscious subject and his or her acts. It follows that unconsciousness only occurs when one ceases to operate, as occurs in a state of dreamless sleep or a coma.
Second, "in proportion to the quality of operation, consciousness divides into empirical, intellectual, rational, and moral." 86

Third, through consciousness the subject and his/her acts are only known under the formality of the experienced, even when the subject is operating on the levels of understanding, judgment, and action. Through consciousness the subject and his/her acts are never known under the formalities of the true and being or the intelligible and quiddity. Thus, since through introspection and, we might add, self-tacting, experience is attained under the formalities of the intelligible, quiddity, the true, and being, being conscious is not being in an act of introspection or self-tacting. 86

It is thus that, in Insight, Lonergan is able to state that consciousness is "an awareness immanent in cognitional acts," that this awareness is not the intentional awareness of the content of the act but a "concomitant 'awareness of awareness,'" and that this concomitant factor is what "radically" distinguishes cognitional acts from "such unconscious acts as the metabolism of one's cells." 87

If such is the nature of consciousness, how then does Lonergan formulate the nature of the subject? His understanding of the subject follows directly from that of consciousness. The subject, he tells us, is to be conceived, "[as] this existent man [or woman] who is operating psychologically, considered precisely as being made manifest on the side of the subject and under the formality of the experienced." 88

What is perhaps Lonergan's finest description of the subject and consciousness is found in Method in Theology. It is worth quoting in full.

He [the subject] . . . is subject in the psychological sense that he operates consciously. In fact none of the operations in the list [e.g., experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding] is to be performed in a dreamless sleep or in a coma. Again, whenever any of the operations are performed, the subject is aware of himself operating, present to himself operating, experiencing himself operating ....

The operations then not only intend objects. There is to them a further psychological dimension. They occur consciously and by them the operating subject is conscious. Just as operations by their intentionality make objects present to the subject, so also by consciousness they make the subject present to himself.

I have used the adjective, present, both of the object and of the subject. But I have used it ambiguously, for
the presence of the object is quite different from the presence of the subject. The object is present as what is gazed upon, attended to, intended. But the presence of the subject resides in the gazing, the attending, the intending. For this reason the subject can be conscious, as attending, and yet give his whole attention to the object as attended to.

Again I spoke of the subject experiencing himself operating. But do not suppose that this experiencing is another operation to be added to the list, for this experiencing is not intending but being conscious. It is not another operation over and above the operation that is experienced. It is that very operation which besides being intrinsically intentional, also is intrinsically conscious.

As Lonergan notes, the word 'presence' is ambiguous. There are three ways in which it is used. First, there is material presence: the physical presence of chairs in a room. Second, there is intentional presence: the cognitive presence of the chair to the subject. Third, there is conscious presence: the cognitive presence of the subject to him or herself.

This self-presence is an immediate experience of the subject and his/her acts which is non-reflective, non-intentional, non-objective, and "concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object." Because it occurs on the first level of operation, self-presence has the indistinctness of the pre-predicative, pre-conceptual, and the pre-judgmental. This conscious presence of the subject is the condition of the possibility of all forms of intentional presence because if the subject is not immediately present to him or herself, as occurs in dreamless sleep, coma, anesthetization, and somnambulation, then no other thing can be present to him/her.

As Lonergan states, "If there were no one there to see, there would be nothing present to the seer."

It is thus that Lonergan can say: Now by both direct and reflexive operations the subject in act is constituted and known, not as object, but as subject; this constitutive knowing and being known is consciousness. Hence, in direct activity the subject is known once, and as subject; but in reflexive activity the subject is known twice, as subject by consciousness, and as object by the reflexive activity.

This then is Lonergan's formulation of his direct insights into the nature of consciousness. He refers to it as "conscientia-experientia". On every property Lonergan's formulation of consciousness is directly opposite to Skinner's. For Lonergan consciousness is the immediate self-presence of the subject that is primitively and indistinctly experienced in each operation at all the levels of operation. Consciousness is not the subject as known reflexively, for in reflexive knowing
the operations as intentional are applied to the operations as conscious. When this is done the subject is known as an intentional object. However, the subject *qua* object is never equivalent to the subject *qua* subject because the subject is self-present in the very operations that are intending the subject *qua* object. Thus, the subject *qua* object is never fully co-extensive with the subject *qua* subject. Total intentional mediation or abstract formulation of the subject is impossible. However, a partial formulation that is correct is possible.

Therefore, for Lonergan the subject is always present by consciousness in each operation.

For Skinner the opposite is the case. Consciousness *qua* experience of the subject and his/her operations is an explanatory fiction. Consciousness as such does not exist. All operations are intrinsically unconscious. They only become conscious by way of the mediation of reflexive knowing or self-tasting, and when they are so mediated or formulated they are known only as objects which lack the dimension of consciousness *qua* experience of the subject and his/her acts. Since consciousness *qua* experience of the subject is not found to be an intrinsic dimension of the operations, Skinner concludes that the concept of the subject is also an explanatory fiction.

As noted above, Lonergan refers to Skinner's type of formulation of consciousness as "conscientia-perceptio" -- the perception of an object.

The question which now emerges is which one of these formulations is correct? It is to this issue that we shall now turn.

3. The Judgment of Skinner's and Lonergan's Formulations of Consciousness

In order to come to the judgment about which of these two formulations of the nature of consciousness is correct, we must proceed to the third step in self-appropriation. In the present case this step will involve the application of the rational operations to the two formulations of consciousness which have been constructed at the intellectual level. In doing this we must gain, for each formulation, a reflective insight into the conditions that must be met if either of the conditioned formulations of consciousness is to be transformed into a virtually unconditioned -- a conditioned whose conditions are known, linked to it, and in fact fulfilled.36
We will proceed then to determine the two conditioned statements, their respective conditions, and whether or not their conditions are in fact fulfilled.97

The conditioned statement in Skinner's case would be: I, as an operating/behaving organism, am unconscious of myself as the one who is emitting the operations/behavior by which I both directly know external things and reflexively know myself. That is, the middle terms of both the tacting-tact and the self-tacting-tact are unconscious.

The link between this conditioned and its conditions can be formulated in the proposition that, when I reflexively or self-tactingly know my operations, as they are applied to direct knowing/tacting, they will be known simply as activities that lack the experience of conscious (self) presence. This implies that I will not know myself as a subject but as an object which cannot be the conscious subject of empirical operations such as the experience of pain, of intellectual operations such as understanding the nature of consciousness, of rational operations such as judging the correctness of my understanding of the nature of consciousness, and of responsible operations such as choosing to live in accordance with the norms immanent in my spontaneous operations as judged to be conscious. Said differently, since I am only a prime substance which lacks self-presence, then I am one who unconsciously experiences, understands, judges, and responsibly decides.

This link between the conditioned and its conditions is based upon two premises. The first premise is that reflexive knowing and self-tacting do not create the properties of their objects or discriminative stimuli. Therefore they do not create the property of the experience of self-presence in the operations they are reflecting on.98 The second premise is that the operations being reflected on do in fact lack self-presence.

The fulfillment of the above condition will be given in the data constituted by the operations that are being reflected upon.

The conditioned statement in Lonergan's case would be: I, as an operating organism, am conscious of myself as the one who is emitting the operations by which I both directly know external things and reflexively know myself. That is, my operations are conscious.
The link between this conditioned and its conditions can be formulated in the proposition that, when I reflexively know my operations, as they are applied to direct knowing, they will be known as activities that possess the experience of conscious (self) presence. This implies that I will know myself as a subject who is the conscious subject of empirical, intellectual, rational and responsible operations. Said differently, since I am a psychological subject, who subsequently may be categorized as a prime substance, then I am one who consciously experiences, understands, judges, and responsibly decides.

The link between Lonergan's conditioned and its conditions is also based upon two premises: (a) that reflexive knowing does not create the properties of its object; and (b) that the operations being reflected on do in fact possess self-presence.

Once again the fulfillment of the above condition will be given in the data constituted by the operations that are being reflected upon.

When we turn to the data constituted by our operations in order to see which of the two conditions are fulfilled, it is clear that the conditions required by Lonergan's conditioned proposition are those that are met in the data. Reflexive knowing does not reveal empirical operations such as the experience of pain, intellectual operations such as the understanding of the nature of consciousness, and so on, that occur unconsciously, i.e., without the experience of the one who is the one for whom they are pains, understandings, judgments, and decisions.

There are no such things as unconscious pains, understandings, judgments, and decisions. It makes no sense to say that one unconsciously suffers pain, understands consciousness, judges the correctness of one's understanding of consciousness, and makes the decision to live in accordance with this knowledge. The person who engages in these operations is not unconscious but conscious, not experientially absent but experientially present. His/her consciousness does not consist in reflecting on these operations because he/she has to experience them before he/she can reflect upon them. He/she must be present in order for the experience of these operations to occur. If he/she does not experience them then there is no data, pertaining to the operations, to reflect on.99
We may conclude that of the two conditioned prospective judgments that we have examined it is Lonergan's which can be transformed into a virtually unconditioned judgment. Only it has its conditions fulfilled. However, one may still ask the question, how did we self-appropriate the data that verified the existence of consciousness, taken as an experience of the subject and his/her operations? If consciousness cannot be completely understood and formulated by reflexive knowing and if such an astute analyst of human behavior as B. F. Skinner completely overlooked this data, then the grasping of consciousness must be a very subtle process indeed. As Lonergan puts it, "What on earth does one do to get that presence of oneself to oneself? Does one crane one's neck around and look into oneself to see if one is there?" This approach will not work because even if it were possible to do it, it would result in the second type of presence rather than the third. He concludes that, "What is important . . . is the looker, not the looked-at, even when the self is what is looked at."\(^{100}\)

In order to experience the looker -- "that which must be present to itself for other things to be present to it" -- we must not revert to reflexive knowing.\(^{101}\) Rather, when we are absorbed in the object we must heighten our consciousness. We do this, not by engaging in a qualitatively different operation that would have as a new intentional object ourselves, but by adverting to the fact that while we are thus absorbed in the object we are also present to ourselves. Just as we can simultaneously intend an object and shift from a peripheral to a central awareness of a toothache, by adverting to the ache, so we can simultaneously intend an object and shift from a peripheral to a central awareness of consciousness, by adverting to consciousness. It is in this way that we can come to experience ourselves as co-present with the objects of our intentional operations. However, it is important to understand that the heightening of consciousness by adverting to it is not a new reflexive operation which creates consciousness. Reflexive knowing does not create the properties of the object that it reflects on. It only formulates the direct insights that it gains into the intelligibility of the data being reflected upon.\(^{102}\)

The judgment of fact that Lonergan's notion of conscientia-experientia is not an explanatory fiction but is indeed verified in the data of our operations is given strong support
by Hayes.\textsuperscript{103} Since Hayes is a well-known radical behaviorist, the fact that he comes to a conclusion very similar to Lonergan's is evidence against any judgment that Lonergan's judgment is due to his critical realist bias. Hayes states:

What seems to be missing in most behavioral accounts is that seeing seeing (reflexive knowing) cannot be all there is to self-awareness. It is also critical to the verbal community that this behavior occurs from a given and consistent perspective, locus, or point of view. That is, we [the verbal community] must not only know that you see [direct knowing] and that you see that you see, but that you see that you see. Reports of seeing [i.e., seeing seeing] must be from the point of view of you [consciousness].\textsuperscript{104}

Concerning this experience of oneself as perspective or locus Hayes states, "So far as you can directly know, you have never been anywhere you-as-perspective have not been. There is nothing you have ever done or experienced that you know about that wasn't known in the context called you."\textsuperscript{105}

Thus, it seems clear that Hayes has experienced the same data of consciousness as Lonergan. Unlike Lonergan, he formulates his insights into this data within the radical behaviorist theory of behavior. However, both agree that we have an experience of ourselves as present in a manner that is "concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object."\textsuperscript{106}

Conclusions and Extensions

Concerning the cognitive dimension of consciousness, we have come to the judgment that consciousness qua experience of the subject does exist. The remarkable thing about this judgment is that, in the final analysis, accurate use of the methods of both Skinner and Lonergan lead to it. The above intentionality analysis has made it clear why this judgment occurs when Lonergan's method is used. It is rather surprising that it also occurs as a result of the astute use of Skinner's method. However, it was noted above that Skinner is in principle prepared to grant both descriptive and explanatory status to mental events that are conscious events that, since they can be known by reflection or experience, are not the product of inference, and which therefore can function as discriminative stimuli for self-tacts. The experience of the subject possesses all of these properties. Verbal behavior which (self) tacts such events is considered by Skinner to be objective because it is under the control of data and operations rather than socio-cultural stimuli.

Such being the case why did Skinner come to the conclusion that consciousness is an explanatory fiction? It would
seem to be due to incompleteness in his self-tacting repertoire. This incompleteness may in part be explained by the intraverbal contingencies that he is subject to as a member of a verbal community that strenuously advocates a physicalistic view of human nature.

Be that as it may, the finding that both the radical behaviorist and critical realist methodologies lead to the judgment that consciousness, in its cognitive dimension, exists, is important, not only because of what it affirms, but because it raises the possibility of synthesis of critical realism and behavior analysis on both the levels of methodology and knowledge. However, a prerequisite to the formulation of such a synthesis is the determination of which of these two systems will provide the foundation and context for the synthesis. Fundamental to this issue are the questions of whether or not the cognitive dimension of consciousness is not only immediate and non-reflexive but also original, and whether or not consciousness is not only cognitive but also constitutive of what it knows. Lonergan claims that consciousness is both original (in its cognitive dimension) and constitutive. However, Hayes claims that the cognitive dimension is not original but derived by way of operant conditioning. In addition he claims that what is known by consciousness is not constituted by consciousness but rather by operant conditioning. However, the resolution of this issue is a topic for further discussion.

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NOTES


8 Lonergan, "The Subject," in Ryan and Tyrrell, eds., A Second Collection, p. 79.

9 Ibid., p. 73.


12 Lonergan, "Christ as Subject," p. 177.

13 Vertin, "Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies," p. 82.


21 Skinner, Verbal Behavior [NY, 1957], pp. 81-82.

22 J. Moore, "On Behaviorism, Knowledge, and Causal Explanation," The Psychological Record 34 [1984]: 76.


24 Ibid.


26 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 27 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 28 Ibid., p. 77.


Note the similarity between Skinner and Lonergan. Both vigorously stress that their formulations about behavior must be based on data, either external or internal.


Ibid., p. 219.


Ibid., p. 463.


Vertin, "Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies of Knowing," p. 76.


Skinner, "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms," p. 381.
56 Lonergan, Insight, pp. 72, 243.
64 Lonergan, Insight, p. 79.
66 Lonergan, Insight, p. 80.
67 Lonergan, Understanding and Being, p. 53.
68 The contents of Table I are taken from G. Barden and P. McShane, Towards Self-Meaning [Dublin, 1969], pp. 54-62; Lonergan, Insight, pp. 271-281; Method in Theology, pp. 7-20, 30-41; Vertin, "Lonergan's 'Three Basic Questions'," p. 25.
69 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 7-8.
70 Ibid., pp. 9-12.
72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., pp. 222-3; Method in Theology, p. 9.
74 Ibid., p. 13. 75 Ibid., p. 4
77 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 18-19; Insight, p. 335.
78 Lonergan, Understanding and Being, p. 15.
81 Ibid. 82 Ibid., p. 67. 83 Ibid., p. 70. 84 Ibid., p. 69.
85 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 86 Ibid., p. 69.
87 Lonergan, Insight, pp. 320, 321.
88 Lonergan, De Constitutione Christi, p. 74.
89 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 7-8.
90 Lonergan, Understanding and Being, pp. 15-16.
I am, of course, using the Lonerganian understanding of the way in which things are established. For the Skinnerian these two formulations of consciousness would be taken as verbal behavior. He or she would establish the correctness of one or the other of these utterances by analyzing the contingencies that control their emission. Only the utterance which belongs to a self-tact contingency will be accepted as correct. As conditioned formulations these behaviors would be intraverbal operants under the stimulus control of other verbal behavior. The links between the conditioned statements and their conditions would be further instances of intraverbal behavior. The virtually unconditioned would be verbal behavior that belongs to a self-tact contingency where the response is under the stimulus control of private data -- concretely experienced self-presence or lack of it. Thus, the Lonerganian approach that I am using can readily be translated into the approach which is accepted by Skinnerians. In the final analysis both approaches are concerned that their theoretical formulation be grounded in data and both accept private as well as public data.

See Lonergan, "Christ as Subject," p. 176, for a demonstration of the truth of this premise.

Ibid., p. 319; Lonergan, "Christ as Subject," pp. 175-177, 182.

Lonergan, Understanding and Being, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 18.

Tyrrell, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, p. 78.


Ibid., p. 102.

Ibid., p. 105.

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