Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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In "Matthew Arnold Re-applied," the first of two articles, Joseph Fitzpatrick explores the many echoes of Matthew Arnold in Lonergan's treatment in Insight of the objective field of common sense.

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In "Mysterium Tremendum" Peter J. Drilling undertakes to locate the fear of God in the subjective field and then to raise the question of its authenticity as a response to unrestricted love.

A NOTE TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS

In Volume VI of METHOD we shall continue to make available previously unpublished material from the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, in addition to scholarly articles focussing upon issues and questions of concern to professors and students of philosophy and theology. Please renew your subscription now. A self-addressed envelope and subscription blank have been enclosed for your convenience.

Thank you for your support of METHOD.
In two important articles Hugo Meynell has examined aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in the light of Lonergan's generalized empirical method. Meynell concludes that one may see in Lonergan's work a synthesis of the antithetical stages in Wittgenstein's development represented by the Tractatus, on the one hand, and the Philosophical Investigations, on the other. This Lonerganian synthesis, Meynell suggests, does justice both to the Tractarian concern with the way language "hooks onto the world", and to the later Wittgensteinian preoccupation with forms of human meaning unconcerned with a metaphysical account of reality. Further, the way Lonergan handles the topic of objective knowledge stands outside the self-destructive strategy of the Tractatus.

Lonergan himself did not write at great length on the relation between his thought and that of the tradition of linguistic analysis. Apart from a number of significant allusions to linguistic analysis in essays published after 1965, Lonergan's main statement on the question is to be found in the section on Dialectic in Method in Theology.

The kind of analysis envisaged by Lonergan, in Method in Theology, would be one which rejected the methodological enterprise as so much "language gone on holiday", as a deformation of our everyday language which alone is meaningful. Lonergan's suspicion is that analysts dismiss mental acts as occult entities because of the repeated failure of many philosophers to successfully formulate and answer the questions involved. However, he identifies the fundamental oversight in such a position as the inability to distinguish between language expressing original insights and language which expresses insights which have become common property. So, at one time, expressions such as 'neurotic' or 'inferiority complex' were reserved for the few initiated into the mysteries of Freud and Jung. But later such terminology entered into the fabric of the everyday languages of western culture. And, perhaps, one can witness such, previously recondite, expressions as 'quantum leap' following suit. For Lonergan, then, the confusion of originary with ordinary expression allows one the
option of proclaiming language that is not ordinary language meaningless.

Given Lonergan's remarks, in Method in Theology, and Meynell's work of critical comparison, may we not further inquire as to whether Wittgenstein's later work manifests a number of inconsistencies which render it, to a large extent, self-destructive. In terms familiar from Insight, what are the positions, which invite development, and the counter-positions, which invite reversal, in Wittgenstein's later work?

As regards what may be seen as positive in the later Wittgenstein, from the perspective of Lonergan's method, we may note that any attempt to throw light on the diversity of human expressions of meaning through the use of pragmatics and linguistics can only be welcome. Lonergan notes the specific contribution linguistic analysis has made to the clarification of, what he terms, constitutive and effective meaning linguistically expressed. Further, in the allusions to linguistic analysis scattered through various essays, Lonergan endorses the insistence of the analyst that terms be understood from the context of their use. Thus, in "The Origins of Christian Realism" Lonergan asserts that Fr. Schoonenberg has failed to learn the analyst's lesson insofar as he is insufficiently attentive to the historical context of Chalcedon's use of the terms 'person', 'nature' and 'hypostasis'.

Broadly speaking one can say that Lonergan is in agreement with the evaluation of Wittgenstein's later work given by continental philosophers such as H. G. Gadamer, J. Habermas and K. O. Apel. These writers welcome Wittgenstein's repudiation of the positivist ideal of the 'reform' of ordinary language in the name of some logical meta-language, for which the methodological rigor of the physical sciences is paradigmatic. Gadamer, Habermas and Apel feel very much at home with the later Wittgenstein's insistence on the social dimensions of linguistic meaning. The phenomenology of various meaningful human activities presented in the Philosophical Investigations may be seen as complementing similar analyses provided by Gadamer and by Lonergan -- the various "patterns of experience" of Insight and the analyses offered in chapter three of Method in Theology.

However, if philosophers like Gadamer and Habermas praise the later Wittgenstein's appreciation of the social dimensions of meaning they are nevertheless critical of Wittgenstein's
work as insufficiently sensitive to the historical nature of language. Peter Winch has argued that a basic unity can be discerned in Wittgenstein's work in terms of his search for the 'logical space' of the proposition. The self-imposed inability of the *Tractatus* to speak of statements which are logically first, led, in Winch's opinion, to Wittgenstein's later analysis of the way the proposition is grounded in the everyday workings of ordinary language.\(^6\) If this be an appropriate way of describing Wittgenstein's development then one would say that, for Gadamer and Habermas, Wittgenstein failed to fully appreciate that the 'logical space' of the proposition is not only social but historical. N. Gier has drawn attention to a number of texts which demonstrate Wittgenstein's appreciation of the historical nature of language-games and forms of life,\(^7\) but it can hardly be concluded from Gier's evidence that this appreciation was very developed.\(^8\)

Such a criticism of Wittgenstein's work is not simply a matter of saying that it would have been nice of him to mention history. Rather, Gadamer and Habermas believe that Wittgenstein fails to observe the essential historical fluidity and transformability of language.\(^9\) For Gadamer the possession of a language implies an opening to the meanings expressed in all languages, actual or potential. Wittgenstein's position, that no one language-game provides a vantage point from which to judge another, would seem to imply, however, that there is no possibility of a hermeneutic of "recovery and suspicion". Indeed, if W. Sharrock and R. Anderson are correct in their analysis of his position,\(^10\) Wittgenstein implies that whether one language-game or culture is able to understand another will be a matter decided in the particular case -- another human culture might just turn out to be unintelligible. Unlike Gadamer, who insists that a "fusion of horizons" is always to be anticipated, Wittgenstein allows of no transcendental norms whereby one language-game participant could anticipate the intelligibility of an alien language-game. Nor, on Wittgenstein's account, could one evaluate the moral worth of an alien culture in terms of its promotion of freedom, solidarity and friendly dialogue, as Gadamer suggests one can and should.\(^11\)

Whether Wittgenstein is entirely consistent or coherent in his discussion of matters hermeneutical is a question which I wish to raise in this article. However, before turning to that topic, I would like to indicate what I believe to be
the central incoherence in the standpoint of the later Wittgenstein.

Hugo Meynell has drawn attention to the similarity between a number of passages in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Langer's position. In a number of passages in *On Certainty* we find Wittgenstein employing a retorsive argument against the universal doubt of the skeptic. Such scepticism involves itself in incoherence, Wittgenstein avers, for the skeptic cannot doubt the meaning of the words in which his doubt is expressed. G. Baker and P. Hacker comment that this, what they term 'Kantian', strategy was used in Wittgenstein's arguments against scepticism from as early as 1915 and remained an abiding feature of his philosophical writing.

What is striking about this retorsive move against scepticism is that it is classically philosophical: it is not very different from the arguments against scepticism of Aristotle and Descartes. As such it is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's later position as a whole and with his other approach to scepticism which dismisses it as the asking of idle, inappropriate questions; as regards the interests of ordinary language universal doubt is otiose. However, nowhere did Wittgenstein renege on the effectiveness of such arguments, and it is worth bearing this in mind as we go on to consider whether certain retorsive arguments may be applied to Wittgenstein's own philosophy of ordinary language.

An argument which Gadamer could well have employed against Wittgenstein's later philosophy is one which we find him using to defend Heidegger's historical ontology from the criticisms of Karl Löwith. Gadamer writes:

He reflects about unreflectiveness; he philosophizes against philosophy in the name of naturalness and appeals to common sense. But if common sense were really a philosophical argument, then that would be the end of all philosophy and, with it, the end of any appeal to common sense. It is impossible for Löwith to get out of this difficulty except by acknowledging that an appeal to nature and naturalness is neither nature nor natural.

Baker and Hacker assert that both Wittgenstein's earlier and later work was concerned to descry the bounds of sense. In the later work ordinary language is seen as the only meaningful discourse. But discourse on meaningful and non-meaningful language is patently not the discourse of ordinary language. Therefore, if ordinary language alone is meaningful, such discourse is itself meaningless. Rather like the man who
asserts in eloquent English that any statement not made in
the Cantonese tongue is nonsensical, Wittgenstein's strategy
shows itself to be self-destructive. The similarity between
the incoherence of this position and Kant's attempt to know
that he could not know, has been noted in a recent review
by Vincent M. Cooke of David Bloor's Wittgenstein: A Social
Theory of Knowledge.¹⁷

One can develop this argument further in terms of Loner-
gan's criticism of the way linguistic analysis tends to over-
look language as expressing original insights. Wittgenstein
makes use of such explanatory terms as 'language-game', 'forms
of life' and 'surface and depth Grammar'. Now, as Baker and
Hacker point out¹⁸ these terms can only be understood in their
"argumentative context", for if one wants to know the meaning
of a term one must have recourse to its use. However, the
use implied here is clearly not the use of ordinary language.
In ordinary language 'forms of life' might be taken to indicate
the inhabitants of the Zoo, and 'language-game' some form
of cross-word puzzle. Wittgenstein's terms express original
insights which await general assimilation before they can
be said to be part of ordinary language. But on his own account
such terms must be disqualified as meaningless in view of
their lack of general currency.

Such a charge of self-destructiveness will, no doubt,
appear rude and harsh to a Wittgensteinian. Various kinds
of counter arguments may be proffered. Baker and Hacker sense
the difficulty here and attempt to deal with it in the follow-
ing manner:

... Philosophy describes language 'from within',...
The reason for this harks back to the Tractatus distinc-
tion between showing and saying. The bounds of sense
cannot be described, for there is nothing beyond the
bounds of sense to be described.¹⁹

Is there anything in such a defense which allows escape
from the incoherence which, I have alleged, is present in
Wittgenstein's position? I think not. To begin with, Wittgen-
stein's later position does not seem to allow escape from
incoherence on the basis of the Tractatus distinction between
saying and showing. For the distinction between saying and
showing as demonstrated in the Tractatus was 'mystical' and
philosophical. Nowhere in ordinary language do we find such
a 'technical' distinction. And if such a distinction is not
to be found in ordinary language then, surely, it must be
meaningless. Never in everyday discourse do we meet such
expressions as, "Language is unique, so cannot be explained. It must how itself".\textsuperscript{20}

Further, if the image of philosophy describing language 'from within' is anything more than a pretty metaphor, if it is asserted as, in some sense, a description of what is the case as regards language and the bounds of meaningful discourse, then such a description cannot escape the charge that it implies a transcendental viewpoint, that is, a viewpoint which itself goes beyond the viewpoints of ordinary language in its everyday working.

The Wittgensteinian might, further, respond that the argument so far has been mistaken in ascribing to Wittgenstein a meta-view which is still philosophical. It will be argued that his own proposal for a therapeutic healing of the self-inflicted wounds of philosophy was not yet more philosophy. Rather, Wittgenstein described what he was doing as a kind of "Natural history of human beings".\textsuperscript{21} In this sense, therefore, one must take seriously Wittgenstein's repeated protestations to do away with all explanation so that a simple description of ordinary language remains.\textsuperscript{22}

The argument that Wittgenstein was not concerned with anything which could be called 'philosophy', in the traditional sense, is, however, sophistical. Take, for example, the above-mentioned distinction between 'explanation' and 'description'. What is to be made of Wittgenstein's use of these terms and the distinction he draws between them? If we wish to clarify this issue it is obviously no good turning to ordinary language for help. For ordinary language does not involve itself in a general description, an Übersicht, of itself. Rather, attempting to state what Wittgenstein means by 'explanation' and 'description' immediately involves one in the philosophical question, "What am I doing when I am knowing?"

The attempt to describe Wittgenstein's enterprise as a non-philosophical 'natural history' or, perhaps, 'Sociology' also becomes involved in a circularity which is vicious. For the claims to knowledge made by these disciplines are bound up with the philosophical questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing?" and "What do I know when I do that?" If one doubts that such questions arise with regard to cognitive disciplines then one only has to turn to Wittgenstein's later work to see the way in which they do. For Wittgenstein's remarks on Freud, Darwin and Copernicus\textsuperscript{23} demonstrate the way
in which his own position has implications for the methodology of the sciences.

With regard to the designation of Wittgenstein's program as purely descriptive of ordinary language, further problems arise. Wittgenstein tells us that his description of ordinary language is done in the light of, receives its direction from, the philosophical problems. But it is no less evident that his phenomenological analysis also, and primarily, receives direction from the central thesis of his work: that there is a constant temptation for us to yield to the bewitchment of our intelligence by language, such bewitchment having produced the philosophical systems. As P. Christopher Smith has remarked, such a concern with the way language can lead us astray has been a theme treated by philosophy since the time of Plato. Lonergan's work has provided a self-authenticating way by which we can arrive at correct or probable judgments without the fear that we have been misled from some "suspect source", be it language or any other. As it stands, then, a warning on the possibility of linguistic obfuscation is nothing controversial. But what is problematic is Wittgenstein's insistence that, de jure, all philosophy is the result of the bewitchment of mind by language; not simply that, de facto, all philosophies in the past have been the result of linguistic illusion. The only cure for such mythomania, for Wittgenstein, is a return of language to its only meaningful locus: the practical use made of it by common sense. In view of all this it is difficult to rest content with Wittgenstein's assertion that "in the end" all philosophy does is describe the workings of ordinary language.

We appear, then, to be left with two alternatives. Either we take it that Wittgenstein proposes the self-destructive thesis that only ordinary language is meaningful, or, we must conclude, he dogmatically asserts that only ordinary language plus his meta-view of it are meaningful. Now although this may strike one as a position as eccentric as that of the Bellman in Lewis Carroll's The Hunting of the Snark, who asserted that whatever he stated three times was true, it is intelligible in terms of Wittgenstein's personal development. For it has often been remarked that Wittgenstein assumed all philosophy had failed with the failure of his own early work. However, such dogmatism is, in the end, itself incoherent. For Wittgenstein, like any other reasonable author, would only
have us agree with him on the strength of the evidence for his position; evidence which, he informs us, we simply have to "look and see". Like any other philosopher he dismisses positions for which the evidence is inadequate. The dogmatic assertion of a position by such a writer can only invite the reasonable response, *gratis assertitur gratis negatur.*

If there is, then, a self-destructive circularity at the heart of Wittgenstein's attempt to condemn philosophy in the name of ordinary language, there are no less evident examples in his later work of the incoherence which results from trespassing across boundaries which one has drawn for oneself. Wittgenstein's venturing into the field of hermeneutics is a case in point.

In the *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'* Wittgenstein's stance appears somewhat ambivalent. In the earlier sections of the work he espouses a hermeneutic position which exemplifies what for Gadamer is the original sin in Interpretation, and for Lonergan is the "Myth of the Empty Head". In opposition to Frazer's explanation of primitive myth and ritual as proto-science, Wittgenstein asserts that the interpreter must rid himself of such prejudices if he is to see his material aright. He must come to his subject-matter "theory free" so as to let the facts "speak for themselves".

N. Gier observes that such a hermeneutic is not very different from that of W. Dilthey. In other words, Wittgenstein's position would, like Dilthey's, demand a passive cataloging of alien cultural worlds without the possibility of a real acknowledgement of the way in which the stance of the observer is itself historically conditioned. What Matthew Lamb has written on the anomalies operative in Dilthey's hermeneutics would equally well apply to his position of Wittgenstein.

However, D. Z. Phillips has pointed out that a rather different interpretative principle emerges from the latter part of *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'* Wittgenstein suggests that we should understand a primitive culture in terms of a 'deep' coherence manifest in the life and ritual of its people. In Wittgenstein's later work it is this 'principle' which functions as the acknowledged and unacknowledged hermeneutical principle of "recovery and suspicion". Despite the fact, noted earlier, that Wittgenstein insisted that one language-game could not pass judgment on another, it is evident
that what Wittgenstein found worthy of respect was the coherence of the primitive religious world where meaning was compact and undifferentiated. It is this simplicity which is seen as the element to be 'recovered'. In the early 1930's Wittgenstein wrote:

I think now that the right thing would be to begin my book with remarks about metaphysics as a kind of magic.

But in doing this I must neither speak in defence of magic nor ridicule it.

What it is that is deep about magic would be kept.---

On the other hand, Wittgenstein is suspicious of the intrusion of 'theory' or philosophy into that primitive world.

On the first page of Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough' we read:

Was Augustine mistaken, then, when he called on God on every page of the Confessions?

Well - one might say - if he was not mistaken, then the Buddhist holyman, or some other, whose religion expresses quite different notions, surely was. But none of them was making a mistake except where he was putting forward a theory."

In Wittgenstein's opinion Frazer's early twentieth-century imperious rationalism reveals him as inferior to the primitive societies which he would 'criticize'. Philosophers such as Rush Rhees and Peter Winch have been influenced by this respect for the primitive and distain for the modern, evident in Wittgenstein's later writing. In his, much discussed, Understanding a Primitive Society Winch states that our problem in understanding an alien culture may be related to the relative incoherence and meaninglessness of our own."

In fact Wittgenstein's hermeneutical position can be seen as an expression of that tragic Romanticism which has become a conspicuous element in our western intellectual Weltanschauung during the last two centuries. The desire of such tragic Romanticism to return to a simpler world, uninhibited by modern 'theory' and untroubled by further questions is to be found expressed throughout Wittgenstein's later work."

The recognition of this "tragic sense" in Wittgenstein's writing invites a comparison of his work with a work of philosophy pre-eminently concerned with the tragedy of the modern "loss of innocence": Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes. In the Phänomenologie Hegel examines the tragic nature of the necessary destruction of more primitive cultural life-worlds in the process of the emergence of cultural worlds characterized by a greater differentiation of human consciousness.
Hegel, in a way analogous to Wittgenstein, admired the simple, undifferentiated world of the ancient Greek polis, but where his insight is superior to that of Wittgenstein is, I believe, in his recognition of the impossibility of a return from a more differentiated to a less differentiated stage of cultural development. The dream of some Rousseau-like return to primitive 'innocence' is what Lonergan has variously identified as the myth of the automatic solution or the desire for infantile regression. One cannot effect cultural amnesia, any more than one can dis-invent the atomic bomb.

In attempting to analyze why it is impossible to realize such cultural amnesia one begins to see, I believe, yet another far-reaching incoherence in the later Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce meaningful discourse to the discourse of everyday language. Wittgenstein's proposal for a therapeutic dissolution of philosophy in the name of ordinary language, which would "leave everything as it is", would not, in fact, leave our ordinary languages as they are. What Wittgenstein is really proposing is the creation of a philosopher's Utopia, a 'thought-experiment' world where people only ever ask for red apples or bricks; a linguistic world every bit as artificial as that sketched out in the Tractatus.

The self-destructiveness of Wittgenstein's program has nowhere better been revealed than in the various attempts to develop theologies based on his later work. In answer to the criticism that Wittgensteinian fideism appears to leave religions free to develop in any bizarre fashion they choose, theologians such as D. Z. Phillips and G. Hallett have replied that religions have their own communal criteria for decision making. Religions have their own prophets, reformers and traditions which facilitate progress. However, such a line of argument tends to overlook the difficulty which the history of Christianity and, it can be argued, of other world religions presents for the Wittgensteinian. For during most of its near two thousand year history Christianity has been involved in a commitment to the theoretical differentiation of consciousness. Here one is not simply talking about the Leonine revival of Thomism or even of the influence of mediaeval scholasticism, but of the profound effect which the Greek discovery of mind had on the development of the Christian religion. Indeed, in this respect Wittgenstein was more consistent than those theologians who have utilized his work. For, since he regarded
the use of philosophy in religion as superstitious and believed that Vatican I demonstrated Catholicism's commitment to philosophy, he stated that it was impossible for him to embrace Catholicism.

Theologians like Phillips and Hallett are, then, faced with a dilemma. Their professed desire is to leave as it is the religious language of the ordinary believer, yet if their proposed systematic dissolution of philosophy were taken to its logical conclusion there would result a radical reform of ordinary religious language. Yet if such a central element in our cultural tradition as Christianity is seen to have been so radically affected, or 'infected', by the theoretical differentiation of consciousness, then this can only serve to indicate how deeply our culture and its ordinary languages are involved in traditions bound up with the development of philosophy.

The tradition of philosophy which built upon Hegel's historical 'turn' has never ceased to draw attention to the way philosophy developed as an integral element in the cultural evolution of the West. And I believe that manifestations of the theoretical differentiation of consciousness have not been lacking in Eastern cultures. The theoretical and scientific differentiations of consciousness have become a major element in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value in our culture.

In Method in Theology Lonergan notes the way that there has been a kind of feed-back from philosophy into the ordinary language which was the condition of possibility for philosophy's emergence. He writes:

For if creative thought in philosophy and science is too austere for general consumption, creative thinkers are usually rare. They have their brief day, only to be followed by the commentators, the teachers, the popularizers that illuminate, complete, transpose, simplify. So the worlds of theory and common sense partly interpenetrate and partly merge. ...  

... In a people united by common language, common loyalties, common moral and religious traditions as well as by economic interdependence, the culture of the educated may affect many of the uneducated, much as theory affected pre-theoretical common sense. So by successive adaptations the innovations of theory can penetrate in ever weaker forms through all layers of a society ...

Lonergan refers to Bruno Snell's analysis of the way in which the Greek philosophical achievement affected Greek literature to produce a classical humanism which prevailed
in European culture until the late middle ages. In modern European culture a scientific humanism has largely replaced the classical one. On the influence of the scientific achievement on our culture, Lonergan writes:

"Modern science has its progeny. As a form of knowledge, it pertains to man's development and grounds a new and fuller humanism. As a rigorous form of knowledge, it calls forth teachers and popularizers and even the fantasy of science fiction. It is the power of the mass media to write for, speak to, to be seen by all men. It is the power of an educational system to fashion the nation's youth."  

The fruits of this interpenetration of theory and common sense can be far from beneficial. In a way that recalls Antonio Gramsci's analysis of 'Egemonia', or the analyses of the Critical Theorists, Lonergan points out,

"The results are ambivalent. It will happen that the exaggerations of philosophic error are abandoned, while the profundities of philosophic truth find a vehicle that compensates for the loss of the discredited myths. But it will also happen that theory fuses more with common nonsense than with common sense, to make the nonsense pretentious and, because it is common, dangerous and even disastrous."  

The presence of theory within common sense and ordinary language is usually manifested as a varying admixture of 'reasoning' and, what Gadamer would term, prejudgments; of beliefs and immanently-generated knowledge. So I may give a number of reasons why I shall vote for a socialist government at an election, but there will normally be a point where, sooner rather than later, my reasons give out and I assert, perhaps, that socialism is what any "sane person" should support. Although, as Lonergan avers, common sense shows a bias to omnicompetence, it is equally the case that it defers to the 'expert' or 'authority' in the process of its reasoning. The "syllogistic form" often recognizable in ordinary language will run: "x 'stands to reason' because Y says so", where 'Y' is the politician, the media demagogue, the scientific 'expert' or, even, the religious authority.

But what would be the implications for ordinary language of a culture-wide diffusion of the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, with its 'therapeutic' dissolution of theory? For Wittgenstein, Karl Barth's writing on the Trinity, Freud's interpretation of dreams, and the scientific theories of Darwin and Copernicus are mythologies which, like the alienating ideologies of the Marxists, have obscured the authentic substructure of everyday action and praxis. Wittgenstein wrote that he
wished to change a 'style' of thinking so that one would no longer oppose a "correct theory" to an "erroneous one" but would see that both were superfluous. Would not a generalized diffusion of such an attitude require a shift of perception on the part of ordinary language which would be little short of axial? What would become of the prevailing scientific humanism, so impressed, as it is, by the march of true theory, overturning ignorance? Further, if the various theoretical traditions to which common sense and ordinary language have looked as 'authoritative' were dissolved, how would this leave ordinary language unchanged? Ordinary language would be told to look to itself as its own authority.

Far from "leaving everything as it is" in ordinary language the systematic carrying through of what Wittgenstein proposes would involve a gradual moulding of language not very different from that imagined by George Orwell in his novel, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

The basic objection to Wittgenstein's program which I have in mind is not, then, that it ignores the part played by, what Habermas would term, pre-linguistic forces such as labor or, more fundamentally, individual and group bias in ordinary language, valid as these objections are. Rather, I believe that one of Wittgenstein's fundamental errors was to have overlooked the fact that the common-sense differentiation of consciousness was not the only differentiation of consciousness to have contributed to the emergence of the complex historical phenomena which we know as the ordinary languages of Eastern and Western culture. Such an oversight results in Wittgenstein's stance being involved in incoherence. For what Wittgenstein forbade was that violence be done to ordinary language, and yet his own attempt to banish philosophers from his Republic can only result in such violence being done.

Some years ago Fergus Kerr attempted a critique of Lonergan's work, based on various "end of philosophy" philosophies. Kerr argued that Lonergan's method was but one more example of bewitched language and of an imperialistic hellenism that had had its day. In the course of his argument, Kerr wrote, "The alternative to analysing and dissolving one philosophical theory is not necessarily to propose another." For those, like Kerr, who are concerned to harmonize the Wittgensteinian
with the Heideggerian "end of philosophy" a recent book comparing the later Wittgenstein with the deconstructive writing of J. Derrida should prove a useful contribution. However, I tend to find the comparison illuminating in a way which Kerr would probably not. For it does not appear difficult to detect that Derrida's attempts to provide strategies for reading texts which facilitate a move beyond philosophy have no meaning other than for those who have filled their heads with the old philosophical questions. To employ the Hegelian expression, all negation is determinate. And if Kerr and others fail to notice that negation only reveals the one who negates as intellectually and morally committed, then they need look no further than Wittgenstein's work to learn the lesson. For Wittgenstein maintained, in both phases of his philosophical development, that the sceptic cannot speak without disclosing something of the 'self' of his self-involvement.

NOTES


5 Method in Theology, p. 252.


8 In his Autobiography, Collingwood remarked on the lack of historical awareness evident among his English philosophical contemporaries. Wittgenstein was no exception to the rule. At 4.11 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein states that the totality of true propositions is identical with the corpus of the natural sciences. Anthony Kenny asks where this leaves the factual judgments of the historian. See Kenny, Wittgenstein [Penguin, 1973], p. 99.

9 For the evaluation of Wittgenstein from the Gadamerian stance, see H. G. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement" in Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. & ed. David E. Linge


16 Baker and Hacker, op. cit., p. 480.


18 Baker and Hacker, op. cit., p. 480. Ibid.


20 Philosophical Investigations, section 415. Ibid., 126.


23 P. Christopher Smith, op. cit., p. 300.

24 Philosophical Investigations, section 124.

25 N. Gier, op. cit., p. 223.

26 Matthew Lamb, History, Method and Theology [Scholars Press, 1978].

27 D. Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation [OUP, 1976], p. 120.

28 Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough', ed. R. Rhees [Brynmill, 1979], pp. 16e-18e. John B. Thompson has noted that Wittgenstein's suggestion that we interpret other cultures in terms of the basic constants of birth, death and reproduction proves, in practice, to be hermeneutically sterile. See his Critical Hermeneutics [Cambridge U. Press, 1981], pp. 116-120, 154-155. Why such a notion remains sterile is not too difficult to explain. For plants, animals and men die, and animals and men manifest some "conscious reaction" to death, but Wittgenstein does not, and cannot, specify the way human cultures differ from animal groups in their reaction to death. John W. Cook and Stanley Cavell, among others, have strenuously defended Wittgenstein against the charge of Behaviorism, often levelled against him, but in this instance,
as in others, his position does not appear notably different from a behaviorist stance.

31 Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough', vi. 32 Ibid., p. 1e.


34 It is well-known, from the biographical literature, that Wittgenstein was a man deeply concerned with religion. Indeed, just as the author of The Imitation of Christ wished to protect genuine religion from the sophistries of decadent Scholastic theology, so Wittgenstein wished to preserve the important, 'deep' area of religious sentiment and morality from the incursions of jejune intellectual theory. Wittgenstein's work, then, like that of Unamuno, manifested that tragic alienation of 'Reason' from religion, so characteristic of modern Western culture. One might venture to suggest that Wittgenstein's 'tragedy' was that of one who struggled for authenticity within what was, to a large extent, an unauthentic intellectual tradition.

35 Insight, p. 525; A Second Collection, p. 29.


37 Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, p. 59.


42 Culture and Value, p. 85e.

43 Cf. Lectures and Conversations.

44 Culture and Value, p. 18e.

45 Lectures and Conversations, pp. 28, 32.

46 On the creation of 'Newspeak': George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four [Penguin, 1949], pp. 44ff.


48 Ibid. p. 69.


50 To contrast Lonergan's thought with Derrida's 'deconstruction' is not to simply slot Lonergan into the philosophical tradition with which Derrida is ill at ease. That would be to overlook the far-reaching implications of the fact that, for Lonergan, the term 'philosophy' denotes two distinct, but related, differentiations of consciousness: the world of theory and the world of interiority. Moreover, if some of Derrida's pronouncements on "The Tradition" appear shocking, there are no doubt those who have found difficulty in accepting
such broad Lonerganian brush strokes as, "Five hundred years separate Hegel from Scotus ...; that notable interval of time was largely devoted to working out in a variety of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look" [Insight, p. 372]. Indeed, if 'deconstruction' is understood as exploiting Heidegger's characterization of western metaphysics as a metaphysics of 'presencing', and if such a metaphysics is understood as the corollary of epistemologies of 'looking' (as F. Lawrence has indicated in "Self-Knowledge in History," in Language, Truth and Meaning, note 66, p. 334), then the identification of certain basic anomalies within "The Tradition", which Derrida's work achieves will cause little surprise from the viewpoint of generalized empirical method.
MATTHEW ARNOLD RE-APPLIED (1)

Joseph Fitzpatrick

In this article I shall argue that much of what Lonergan says in chapter seven of *Insight* about ideas, progress, decline and 'cosmopolis' has its source in writings of Matthew Arnold. I hope to furnish internal evidence that Lonergan was influenced by Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* and by his essay "On the Literary Influences of Academies". But there is much to be gained from setting these works in the unfolding evolution of Arnold's social philosophy so that the reader can grasp clearly the recurrent themes and concerns of Arnold, the basic pattern of his ideas. This should help the reader to place *Cultures and Anarchy* and the "Academies" essay in their historical and social context and thereby distinguish Arnold's purposes from those of Lonergan. Besides, the fact that Arnold's ideas from a recurrent pattern leaves open the possibility that Lonergan could have read more of Arnold than his well known and more easily accessible writings, or that he could have been spurred to read *Culture and Anarchy*, for example, following a brief encounter with one of Arnold's lesser known writings. It could even -- just possibly -- have suggested to Lonergan how Arnold's thinking could most fruitfully be adapted to his own purposes. In what follows I shall, first, by means of quotations from a range of Arnold's writings, set out in chronological order, attempt to let Arnold speak for himself as much as possible. I shall then attempt to persuade the reader by virtue of the high degree of agreement between Arnold and Lonergan that Arnold's writings are, in fact, Lonergan's source materials for *Insight* in the areas indicated. I shall conclude by saying something on the manner of Lonergan's re-application of Arnold. Finally, let it be said quite clearly that what I am proposing is a hypothesis, by definition open to disconfirmation. Confirmation of the hypothesis, or greater or lesser disconfirmation, cannot as yet be expected from the Lonergan archives. Let us hope that further archival investigations will in the future throw light on the degree of influence, if any, that Matthew Arnold exerted on Lonergan's thought. It may well transpire that Arnold is only one of the nineteenth century "British school" to have
provided a context, themes and ideas for Lonergan's consideration. In a sequel to the present article, which I have in preparation, I shall argue that Arnold's influence on Lonergan extends to the latter's Method in Theology.

Of England's great nineteenth century men of letters and cultural prophets, Matthew Arnold was probably the most rounded (a quality he personally admired): poet, literary critic, classicist, Oxford Professor of Poetry, political and social commentator, innovative religious writer, he earned his living for more than thirty years as a member of the Inspectorship of Schools. In many respects Arnold's views on culture and society were learned and tested "on the hoof" -- through his meetings with people in England from all walks of life in his work as a school inspector, as well as by his travels abroad to study the educational systems of other European nations. His father, Dr. Thomas Arnold, the famous educationist and headmaster of Rugby School, was a vigorous clergyman of the Church of England zealous to promote the educational, social and religious changes he considered necessary while preserving those parts of church and state he most loved; he said that if he had had two necks he would have been hanged twice! Matthew was in many ways the son of his father; but as a school inspector he was freed from any specialist role, such as the one that constrained his father, and was able to play the role of the generalist man of letters, a role that appears to have suited his temperament and his purposes.

He had broad sympathies with each of the three classes -- aristocracy, middle class and working class -- which, on his diagnosis, constituted English society in his time (a three-part classification that remains the matrix of any analysis of British society to this day). From 1847 to 1851, before becoming a school inspector, he worked as private secretary to the Liberal peer, the Marquis of Lansdowne, a post which left him free to pursue his own interests while bringing him into contact with the aristocratic Whig ruling clique which could form and change governments without allowing any major office to get outside a few select families. Although not himself an aristocrat, Arnold nevertheless retained courteous contacts with aristocratic friends and acquaintances all through his life. By birth Arnold belonged to the middle class, albeit on his father's side we have to go back to his great grandfather to find anyone who actually engaged in trade and on
his mother's side his immediate ancestors and relatives were almost exclusively Anglican clergymen. Through his membership of the professional class and his family's connections with the ruling Establishment, and also through his own quality of inwardness, Matthew Arnold had a profound sense of being outside or beyond ordinary class distinctions. With regard to the working class, Arnold in some respects saw further than most of his contemporaries: in a letter to his wife as early as 1851 he wrote that "the lower classes ... will have most of the political power of the country in their hands ...".

As Arnold's political and social thought develops and matures during the 1850s and 1860s his writing reflects a central preoccupation: that he is living in a time of change when power will be transferred from the aristocracy to the emerging middle classes before being transferred finally to the lower working classes. He seems to sense an inevitability in this gradual transfer of political power; the wheel of history is ineluctably turning in one direction and while change can be delayed it cannot be prevented. But if change is inevitable, Arnold is deeply conscious that there is no inevitability that change will be for the better. In many ways his life's work can be summed up as an effort to ensure that when change does occur it will be for the better; or at least that what is best in English and European culture will not be destroyed in the process. He does not see the working class coming into its inheritance of power in his own time. Therefore he concentrates mainly on the improvement through culture and civilizing forces of the middle classes.

The middle classes were, by and large, the mercantile and capitalist classes. They were the merchants, tradesmen, factory owners, financiers and entrepreneurs whose wealth derived from the industrial revolution. In religion many were dissenters wedded to the Protestant ideal of individualism as well as to the utilitarian values of Bentham and Mill. They had struggled to overcome their religious and political disabilities and were deeply distrustful of the Established Church and of State interference; they had a passionate belief in personal and economic freedom. Matthew Arnold encountered them frequently in his educational travels and was dismayed by their narrowness and provincialism, their cultivation of materialism and financial success, and by their estimation of worth by the utilitarian criterion of practicality and
value for money. The vehicle for promoting the needed improvement of the middle classes, he believed, was education which, as a school inspector, he was in a strong position to advocate. In one of his earlier, non-polemical essays, which formed the introduction to his report on "Popular Education in France," first published in 1861 (and reprinted separately in 1879 with the title "Democracy"), Arnold sets out to win the middle classes to his conception of education. But Arnold's conception of education is one which he believes only the modern State can deliver and his intended audience was committed to the notion of voluntaryism and free enterprise in education as in other matters and was notoriously resistant to any suggestion of state interference. He sets about his task, accordingly, by attempting to allay his audience's suspicions of state interference.

I propose to submit to those who have been accustomed to regard all State action with jealousy, some reasons for thinking that the circumstances which once made that jealousy prudent and natural have undergone an essential change ... The dissolution of the old political parties which have governed this country since the Revolution of 1688 has long been remarked ... These parties, differing in so much else, were yet alike in this, that they were both, in a certain broad sense, aristocratical parties.5

But despite its many virtues, Arnold goes on to say, "The time has arrived ... when it is becoming impossible for the aristocracy of England to conduct and wield the English nation any longer".6 The reason is that democracy is making inroads on aristocratic rule.

It is because aristocracies almost inevitably fail to appreciate justly, or even to take into their mind, the instinct pushing the masses towards expansion and fuller life, that they lose their hold over them. It is the old story of the incapacity of aristocracies for ideas, -- the secret of their want of success in modern epochs. The people treats them with flagrant injustice, when it denies all obligation to them. They can, and often do, impart a high spirit, a fine ideal of grandeur, to the people; thus they lay the foundations of a great nation. But they leave the people still the multitude, the crowd; they have small belief in the power of the ideas which are its life. Themselves a power reposing on all which is most solid, material and visible, they are slow to attach any great importance to influences impalpable, spiritual, and viewless ... And it must in fairness be added, that as in one most important part of human culture, -- openness to ideas and ardour for them, -- aristocracy is less advanced than democracy, to replace or keep the latter under tutelage to the former would in some respects be actually unfavourable to the progress of the world.7
Democracy's day has dawned, Arnold contends, but "The difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high ideals". For Arnold America is a warning to England and the rest of Europe, for America is the exemplar of "the dangers which come from the multitude being in power, with no adequate ideal to elevate or guide the multitude".

Arnold has now wish to abolish the great public schools, like Eton or Harrow, which serve the aristocracy so well, but he does wish to replace the private schools of the middle classes, which he clearly considers to be shrines of mediocrity indifferent to high cultural values, with state schools like the French Lyceums. This would bring the instruction in the schools to the middle classes "under a criticism which the stock of knowledge and judgment in our middle classes is not in itself able to supply ... it can confer on them a greatness and a noble spirit, which the tone of these classes is not of itself at present able to impart". The reason for the present deficiency of the middle class is that while aristocracy has "culture and dignity" and "democracy has readiness for new ideas and ardour for what ideas it possesses", the middle class has only "ardour for the ideas it already possesses". Arnold goes on to pay tribute to the role of Protestant Dissent, "that genuine product of the English middle class", for the "negative achievement" of liberty of conscience and freedom of opinion. But liberty and industry will not ensure "a high reason and a fine culture", the only guarantors of a "great nation", as opposed to a merely wealthy or energetic nation. He concludes his persuasive essay by suggesting that what will preserve England's greatness and allow her to prosper as a people, like the ancient Athenians, responsive to art and beauty, are "Openness and flexibility of mind ... Perfection will never be reached; but to recognize a period of transformation when it comes, and to adapt themselves honestly and rationally to its laws, is perhaps the nearest approach to perfection of which men and nations are capable".

Remaining within the context of education, Arnold virtually repeats this argument in his essay of 1864, "A French Eton," subtitled "Middle Class Education and the State." As in "Democracy" Arnold is looking beyond the day when power will reside in the middle class to the day when "this obscure embryo, travailing in labour and darkness" -- the working class -- will hold office. It is a prospect that fills him
with not a little dread unless there is an "adequate ideal, ... a cultured, liberalised, ennobled, transformed middle class" to act as "a point towards which it [the lower class] may hopefully work, a goal towards which it may with joy direct its aspirations". In advocating the transformation of the middle class Arnold has an ulterior motive -- the transformation of the middle class is a necessary precondition for the transformation of the lower class. The alternative is graphically indicated in "Democracy".

But the calamity appears far more serious still when we consider that the middle classes, remaining as they are now, with their narrow, harsh, unintelligent, and unattractive spirit and culture, will almost certainly fail to mould or assimilate the masses below them, whose sympathies are at the present moment wilder and more liberal than theirs."

The pattern of Arnold's argument is now quite clear. The aristocracy is about to be supplanted by the middle class; notwithstanding the high tone and ideals bestowed by aristocratic rule, particularly in England, its demise seems inevitable and, at least in part, is due to aristocracy's incapacity for new ideas. The middle class, however, is itself somewhat obtuse in the realm of ideas; it lacks culture, refinement and the capacity to respond to things of the spirit. The fact that it is successful in business, Arnold is saying, does not make it fit to govern, at least not a country that aspires to greatness. Finally, if the middle class cannot be reformed, shedding its limitations and its narrow 'Millite' values, what hope is there for the transformation of the working class?

In "Democracy" and "A French Eton" Arnold's argument is offered as supporting the introduction of a state system of education along the lines of the great French state schools. In his essay on "The Literary Influences of Academies", published in 1864, Arnold deploys similar reflections on the condition of England to support the desirability of an English counterpart to another French institution, the French Academy. The French Academy was founded by Richelieu in 1637 with the aim of protecting and upholding the French language, and of being "a literary tribunal" or "a high court of letters"; quoting Renan, Arnold sees the academy as "a recognised master in matters of tone and taste ... creating a form of intellectual culture which shall impose itself on all around". The notion of an authority in matters of intellect and taste Arnold finds attractive but is aware that it is contrary to the English
character and habits of mind. It has, however, served the French well, fostering that "openness of mind and flexibility of intelligence" the French have in common with the Athenians. The qualities of England are, by contrast, "energy and honesty". Energy, Arnold continues, is the characteristic of genius and England has produced Shakespeare in the realm of poetry and Newton in the realm of science. But this same energy makes England impatient with the idea of an authority in intellectual matters, with anything that would curb its freedom. Arnold's point at this juncture in the argument is that in terms of human advancement occasional bursts of genius are not adequate compensation for the absence of the generally high level of intelligence such as the French Academy helps to generate and sustain.

This is of a piece with the other line of argument Arnold develops in favor of the influence of academies. He observes that "the journeyman-work of literature, as I may call it [is] so much worse here than it is in France". Comparing the work of English scholars with their French counterparts he detects in the former curious and regrettable lapses in judgment and tone, and a distinctly provincial note; this he attributes to the absence of any institution similar in function to the French Academy. "I say that in the bulk of the intellectual work of a nation which has no centre, no intellectual metropolis like an academy, ... like M. Renan's 'recognised authority in matters of tone and taste' -- there is observable a note of provinciality". The lapses and provinciality, the eccentricities of opinion and stylistic solecisms Arnold discerns even in reputable English authors are put down "to the critic's isolated position in this country, to his feeling himself too much left to take his own way, too much without any central authority representing high culture and sound judgment, by which he may be, on the one hand, confirmed against the ignorant, on the other, held in respect when he himself is inclined to take liberties".

In the "Academies" essay Arnold is not discussing the class divisions in England or the characteristics of any one class. He simply argues, with a wealth of examples, the advantages to a society of a "sovereign organ of opinion", a central institution which by setting and maintaining standards helps to raise the general level of performance of its scholarly and literary output. Arnold's advocacy of two public bodies—
a state system of education and an academy -- should not be misunderstood; he is not advocating socialist ideas. Rather his support for institutions of this kind stems from his belief as a classicist in the power of right reason. This is the central tenet of Arnold's philosophy. It underlies just about everything he says on just about any subject. Another of his names for right reason is 'disinterestedness'. It is "the free play" of the mind, the freedom of the intellect to range over, to consider, to ponder without fear or favor; it is all that Arnold means by 'light'. Arnold sees the state as the instrument of right reason in matters of education because the state stands above classes and sectarian divisions and allegiances. As such it has the power to smash the narrow outlook that would perpetuate the mediocrity of middle class education. In the same way an English version of the French Academy is another means of enlarging the scope of right reason in public events. In "Friendship's Garland" Arnold has Arminius say, 'The victory of Geist over Ungeist' we think the great matter in the world. The same idea is at the bottom of democracy; the victory of reason and intelligence over blind custom and prejudice'. And the advice of Arminius, who represents continental rationality and openness to ideas, to England and the English is: "Get Geist".

"Friendship's Garland" was written in the form of twelve letters between July 1866 and November 1870, and published in book form in 1871. Although it reworks many of Arnold's familiar themes it broadens the scope of their application and marks a change in Arnold's style. Its tone is satirical, mockingly ironic, as Arnold pretends to defend the good sense and probity of England and her customs against the penetrating criticism of an intelligent, rational if somewhat choleric, continental upstart from Prussia. The format allows Arnold to be much freer in the targets he selects for mockery; the amused, satirical tone differs greatly from the tone of judicious reasonableness of his previous writings. It is as if, having tried judicious reasonableness without much success, Arnold has decided to assault his countrymen's minds and emotions by means of satire. The success of "Friendship's Garland" must have encouraged Arnold to continue in the same satirical vein in his next series of articles, which came to be published in book form under the title Culture and Anarchy (first published in 1869; in revised form in 1875).
was to prove to be Arnold's most popular and enduring work, a book whose phrases worked their way into the language, a set text in almost every English liberal arts course of higher education. Although there is evidence to believe that Lonergan had read widely in Matthew Arnold, it is *Culture and Anarchy* which appears to have been most obviously at the forefront of his mind when he wrote of bias and cosmopolis in chapter seven of *Insight*. It was Arnold's constant aim, as he said it was of Sophocles, "to see life steady and to see it whole". The success of *Culture and Anarchy* must owe something to its being Arnold's most complete attempt to diagnose the ills besetting England as he understood them and, as a corollary of this, his most sustained prognosis of the principles and approaches that could reverse England's decline.

The argument of *Culture and Anarchy* is set within the framework of the threefold division of English society -- the aristocracy, the middle classes and the lower classes, now amusingly and famously entitled respectively the Barbarians, the Philistines and the Populace. The strengths and faults of each class are indicated. The Barbarians have a belief in personal liberty and a love of sport and physical accomplishment. But with them culture tends to be an exterior matter of "looks, manners, accomplishments, prowess". They are not resistant to ideas so much as inaccessible to them. To the Philistines, Arnold concedes, England owes most of her wealth and her standing in the world as a prosperous nation of free individuals. But the Philistines are resistant to ideas; seduced by coal and property, free trade and money-making, they worship 'machinery' and regard culture as frivolous and insignificant, adopting in this a thoroughly 'realist' approach. Finally, the Populace deserves our admiration on account of the toil and grinding labor it is subject to, but it is absorbed in its own struggle to achieve power, and hence it thinks only of promoting its own class. Indeed class promotion is common to all three groups as is the dogma that freedom is doing as one likes. Culture, by contrast, aims at "a general expansion of the human family", at "a harmonious expansion of human nature" and so is at variance with "our strong individualism, our hatred of all limits to the unrestricted swing of the individual's personality ... with our inaptitude for seeing more than one side of a thing ...". Arnold wishes to see the love of culture supplant the mere promotion of
class interest. He perceives a tension between our "ordinary self" and "our best self" -- the former is a prisoner of the class to which it belongs; the latter is free of class bias, recognizing "the paramount authority of ... right reason". He notes that "in each class there are born a certain number of natures with a curiosity about their best self, with a bent for seeing things as they are, for disentangling themselves from machinery, for simply concerning themselves with reason and the will of God, and doing their best to make these prevail; -- for the pursuit, in a word, of perfection". Since this bent always tends to take such people out of their class, Arnold calls them 'aliens'.

The remnant of 'aliens' is yet another instance, along with the state and the notion of an academy, of a body or agency that stands beyond class divisions and can bring the force of right reason to bear on national affairs. But this particular expression of the idea is new. So also are the categories of Hebraism and Hellenism by which he strives to analyze the English character. The hebraic tradition derives from England's Jewish inheritance and stands for energy, practicality, duty and self-control. At present, Arnold argues, it has ascendancy over hellenism, the Greek tradition of intelligence, light, flexibility and openness of mind. This has lost out to the hebraizing tendency in recent centuries, particularly under the influence of Puritanism. Arnold makes no secret of his dislike of Puritanism and what he sees to be the negative side of Protestantism. He believes it has checked and frustrated the wonderful effect of the Renaissance in unleashing ideas, and has distracted England from the main current of modern thought. "For more than two hundred years the main stream of man's advance has moved towards knowing himself, the world, seeing things as they are, spontaneity of consciousness; the main impulse of a great part, and that the strongest part, of our nation has been towards strictness of conscience". What is needed at present is "the development of our Hellenising instincts, seeking ardently the intelligible law of things, and making a stream of fresh thought play freely about our stock notions and habits". Hellenism can break down the fanaticism and narrowness of hebraism; it was because St. Paul adapted his hebraism by hellenizing it that he was able to destroy the mechanical worship of a fixed rule. We (Arnold continues) need to go further than
Paul, who persisted in perceiving man's moral nature to be his all, and apply fresh ideas in all our activities. Hebraism and hellenism are at one in the final aim, the aim of perfection; and hebraism, like hellenism, is opposed to "the conception of free-trade, on which our Liberal friends vaunt themselves, and in which they think they have found the secret of national prosperity"; but which, Arnold believes, "threatens to create for us, if it has not created already, those vast, miserable, unmanageable masses of sunken people" -- paupers. But by itself hebraism cannot devise a system that would rectify the situation; for that the hellenistic spirit -- understanding and not just moral exhortation -- is needed. It is the hellenistic spirit that is needed if the mechanical worship of the fetish of free trade is to be destroyed.

Arnold concludes his argument by proposing to give "the heritage neither to the Barbarians nor to the Philistines, nor yet to the Populace; but we are for the transformation of each and all of these according to the law of perfection. Through the length and breadth of our nation a sense, -- vague and obscure as yet, -- of weariness with the old organisations, of desire for transformation, works and grows". And he rounds off by calling the members of this invisible army of "best selfers", those capable of realizing the Socrates in themselves, "docile echoes of the eternal voice, pliant organs of the infinite will ...".

That Arnold is a central source of Lonergan's commentary on ideas in chapter seven of Insight is a point that can be quickly established beyond reasonable controversy. The message Lonergan like Arnold wishes to drive home is that if you want to make progress and reverse decline, "Get Geist". Both authors share the same fundamental belief that right reason, Lonergan's "free, unrestricted desire to know the truth", is the motor of progress and its opposite -- bias, distortion, Arnold's 'Ungieist' -- is the motor of decline. Lonergan's account contains the familiar Arnoldian nomenclature: "the multitude", "sweetness and light", "academy", "court", "claptrap", "culture", "class". More significant is the strong community of feeling and the shared concern that culture should retain its function of being critical of the operations of common sense and practical men of affairs. Should culture lose this function, either by being trivialized or restricted to an ivory tower or by being reduced to a mere prop or function of common sense practicality, then not only is its essential
function gone but by that same token practicality is itself condemned to ruin. And what is Lonergan's 'cosmopolis' but a universalization of Arnold's notion of an academy, "an intellectual metropolis", a supreme arbiter in matters of taste and judgment, because itself nothing more than the representative of right reason? Lonergan's plea that cosmopolis stands above all the claims of class or state because founded on "the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence" is in its way a mirror reflection of Arnold's urging that the remedy for England's ills rests in a remnant of 'aliens' or "best-selfers", capable of rising above mere class interest because their first allegiance is to the paramount authority of right reason.

But Lonergan's analysis of the principles of progress and decline and his notion of cosmopolis are more than a simple repetition in the twentieth century of what Matthew Arnold said in the nineteenth. F. R. Leavis makes the valuable point that authors who stand later in a tradition serve to illuminate and give meaning to the tradition by drawing out where the tradition was heading for. Lonergan takes up the themes of Matthew Arnold and by reworking them, systematizing them and placing them in a more contemporary and, it must be said, a much richer context, he gives fresh meaning to the position Arnold stood for. Lonergan places Arnold's notions of class allegiance and resistance to ideas within the framework of a threefold bias to which men are prone. The treatment of the biases follows his outline of the development of community and his diagnosis of the tension within community. This tension is generated by the differing tendencies of intelligently devised social order, on the one hand, and the spontaneous drives and fears of individuals and groups, on the other. It is in the context of this tension in community that Lonergan carries out his analyses of the three biases he identifies in man and which he adds to a further bias stemming from the depths of the individual psyche, analyzed in a previous chapter. The three biases are individual bias, group bias, and general bias. On individual bias, the bias of the self-seeking egoist, Arnold is, to the best of my knowledge, silent and so Lonergan's fascinating treatment of this topic will not be summarized here. Group bias corresponds to the class interest Arnold perceives to be at work respectively among the Barbarians, the Philistines and the Populace. Lonergan radicalizes this idea by broadening the scope of its application beyond that
of a social class. Groups are found in society, to be sure, but different functions within a technology, an economy or a political system are also performed by groups of people and Lonergan includes all of these within his designation of group bias.

Human sensitivity is not human intelligence and, if sensitivity can be adapted to implement easily and readily one set of intelligent dictates, it has to undergo a fresh adaptation before it will cease resisting a second set of more intelligent dictates. Now social progress is a succession of changes .... Were all the responses [to new ideas] made by pure intelligences, continuous progress might be inevitable. In fact, the responses are made by intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and the interests of the groups and, while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good of society. Just as the individual egoist put further questions up to a point, but desists before reaching conclusions incompatible with his egoism, so also the group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end.35

Group bias, Lonergan continues, leads to its own reversal. For it is prone to generate a distortion of the social reality so palpable as to be "exposed to the inspection of the multitude" and a reversal, that may be more or less peaceful, is eventually summoned.36 This is of a piece with Arnold's reflections on the inevitability of the transfer of political power from the aristocracy to the middle classes in his day. But Lonergan's treatment is more universally applicable than that of Arnold who restricts his analysis to a single society and who habitually argues by citing individual instances, events or personalities. Lonergan moves beyond the individual instance and the affairs of an individual nation to state a rule or generalization: group bias brings about its own reversal. And the reason is that beyond the group there is the much vaster multitude, whose interests are increasingly ill-served by one or several groups whose contribution to the general good has diminished or vanished but which, notwithstanding, is intent on promoting its own survival or even advancement. Lonergan's analysis can be vindicated by reference to such recent events in world politics as the fall of Marcos in the Phillipines, the overthrow of Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti, or the decline of Maoist doctrines in China. In the end the shorter cycle of decline is brought to an end by force of the numerical superiority of those whose interests are poorly served.
General bias is the bias of common sense itself, a bias to which all men are prone. Common sense regards the practical, the here and now, getting on with the world's business, achieving short-term objectives. The higher viewpoint that would consider the general good of society, that would insist on due weight being given to the long-term results of any enterprise, falls outside the sphere of the practical here and now, and so is dismissed by common sense. Where group bias generates the shorter cycle of decline, common sense colludes with group bias in producing the longer cycle of decline. For common sense lacks the theoretical framework that would guide its choices and allow it to take the longer view. Consequently common sense on its own fails to appropriate the norms inherent in its own rationality that would permit it to be critical. Faced with the distortion of the reality generated by the systematic resistance to the cumulative emergence of new ideas, common sense is powerless to propose an antidote that could be effective. Such an antidote would require the emergence of a human science for which common sense has no regard. In the midst of the social anomalies that proliferate under the impact of the biases of dominant groups, culture retreats into irrelevance, the proposals of the detached and disinterested intelligence are scorned as impractical idealism and common sense conforms. Facts are facts. The longer cycle of decline is initiated by this surrender on the speculative level, when the norms inherent in human intelligence are systematically ignored and there is a consequent "increasing demand for further contractions of the claims of intelligence, for further dropping of old principles and norms, for closer conformity to an ever growing man-made incoherence immanent in man-made facts". What emerges, in the limit, is the totalitarian regime which erects its own conscious myth to sustain the reality that has emerged, backed up by appropriate force. Amusingly (almost) common sense will in turn reject the ideological justifications of the totalitarian state which common sense has helped to foster, because it has no use for any theoretical apparatus, and desert to individual or group interests. But it is powerless by itself to reverse the process it has allowed to develop.

This rather crude summary of Lonergan's long and nuanced analysis of general bias should suffice to reveal at once how his notion is rooted in aspects of Arnold's thinking and yet takes us far beyond Arnold and the Victorian world he
inhabits. Arnold's notion of hebraism, the besetting fault of all classes of English society in his day, is akin to Lonergan's notion of general bias. Hebraism is concerned with doing, with energy, with practicality. It is contemptuous of thinking, of understanding, of seeing how things truly are. Against the habits of hebraism Arnold enlists hellenism, declaring that it is not the case, despite "what the majority of people tell us, ... that things are for the most part to be settled first and understood afterwards". But Lonergan's treatment is at once more radical and more contemporary. And more radical because more contemporary, since the neglect of the norms of rationality have by his day led to decline on a scale Arnold could not possibly have envisaged. As Leavis says in the opening words of Mass Civilization and Minority Culture, "For Matthew Arnold it was in some ways less difficult". Lonergan's account refers to the availability today of a terrifying range of means for the suppression of that liberty which is the principle of progress.

Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilised man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported and extirpated minorities, and of total war.

And if Lonergan joins Arnold in impugning the "old liberal views of automatic progress", he is also critical of Marxist dialectics which he considers to be founded on the grave error of erecting an instance of the corrective process of the shorter cycle of decline -- class warfare -- into the main principle of all progress. That is to confuse progress with decline.

Matthew Arnold's invocation in the Conclusion of Culture and Anarchy of "the State [as] no expression of our ordinary self, but even already, as it were, the appointed frame and prepared vessel of our best self, and, for the future, our best self's powerful, beneficent and sacred expression and organ" clearly resembles what Lonergan intends by his notion of 'cosmopolis'. Its main business is to save practicality from itself; like cosmopolis, Arnold is less concerned with the transfer of power from one class to another, which he believes will be inevitable (as Lonergan observes, "the dialectic sooner or later upsets the short-sighted calculations of dominant groups"), then with releasing new and fresh ideas,
with ousting us from the "comfortable straw of our old habits". But Lonergan, in the light of his analysis of the longer cycle of decline, confers on cosmopolis a more precisely defined role than any conceived by Arnold in his rather loose evocation of 'hellenism'. "The business of cosmopolis is to make operative the ideas that, in the light of the general bias of common sense, are inoperative." Its function is "to prevent dominant groups from deluding mankind by the rationalisation of their sins; if the sins of dominant groups are bad enough, still the erection of their sinning into universal principles is indefinitely worse; it is the universalization of the sin by rationalization that contributes to the longer cycle of decline; it is the rationalization that cosmopolis has to ridicule, explode, destroy". Lonergan's cosmopolis is conceived as commensurate with the depth and breadth of the evil he has analyzed. There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history. There is needed an exploration of the movements, the changes, the epochs of a civilization's genesis, development, and vicissitudes. The opinions and attitudes of the present have to be traced to their origins, and the origins have to be criticized ...." Cosmopolis, as Lonergan conceives it, is not identifiable with the state, an academy or any institution. As the evil it addresses is pervasive so cosmopolis itself has to be pervasive: "It invites the vast potentialities and pent-up energies of our time to contribute to [the] solution by developing an art and a literature, a theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and the help they need and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense". Matthew Arnold calls for the release of fresh ideas to disturb our stock notions and habits. Lonergan acts in the spirit of his source material by taking up Arnold's suggestions and defining with precision what the fresh ideas need to be; by adopting the Arnoldian agenda and filling in the details by means of analysis and precisely worded recommendations; Lonergan offers a program that is much more fully elaborated than Arnold's and is designed to meet the different order of magnitude of the problems encountered by men in this later day.
It is worth pausing to examine carefully the exact use Lonergan makes of the Arnoldian material. It appears to be similar to the use he perceives Aquinas to make of his source material. Aquinas was a technical and systematic thinker who adopted common notions, gave them a strict technical definition and assigned them a role in a system of thought: he transformed "common notions" into "theorems". As an example of what such a transformation accomplishes Lonergan compares the common notion of "going faster" with the scientific concept of 'acceleration'. Although both apprehend one and the same fact, the common notion has been enriched by the "endless implications of \( \frac{d^2s}{dt^2} \)." (Lonergan continues) "the 'theorem' is the scientific elaboration of a common notion. It denotes, not the notion as elaborated, but simply the elaboration:... solely the generalization, the analysis, the enrichment with implication and with significance for a system of thought." In several places in his writing Lonergan dwells on the difference between common-sense understanding and theoretical understanding. A key difference is that in the realm of theory terms are defined by their relations to one another and the relations are defined by the terms; both are grounded on insight into the situation at hand. Common-sense understanding, by contrast, is based simply on our accumulated experience and wisdom, and is expressed in everyday language that relates things to us. The shift from common-sense starting-points to the realm of theory results from the "systematic exigence" which Lonergan considers to give birth to scientific language and understanding; science apprehends objects not in their common-sense relations to us but in their verifiable relations to one another and speaks of these relations in a specially developed technical language. The scholar or man of letters, significantly, inhabits the world not of theory but of common sense.

If we look closely at Lonergan's treatment of Matthew Arnold we can see that he is effecting a shift from scholarly common sense to theory. Lonergan's analysis places two sets of people in two different kinds of relationship with each other; depending on the interaction of the multitude with the self-promoting group(s) there results either the shorter or the longer cycle of decline (or both -- the relationships are not mutually exclusive). The result is quite strictly a function of the relationship, and the relationship between
the two sets of people can be in the field of commerce, economics, politics or whatever. Cosmopolis, in turn, is compatible with any body that performs the designated critical function relative to general bias. Lonergan extracts the basic pattern of Arnold's ideas from their context in Arnold's writings; his analysis is detached from the arguments Arnold pursues, and there is no implication that Lonergan agrees or disagrees with Arnold's reflections on England in the 1860s and 1870s. He works out the implications of some of the relationships Arnold speaks about so that they come to form a model of human behavior, a model free of any particular cultural context. He then applies the model in order to understand and interpret modern history. Matthew Arnold is not trying to establish general laws or principles of human behavior, but rather to understand the words and actions of men in his own country at a particular time. He speaks from his experience and from his stock of inherited wisdom; he does not share the general bias of common sense but his understanding is, nevertheless, a type of developed common sense. Lonergan's use of Arnold brings about a transition from the scholarly differentiation of consciousness to the theoretical differentiation of consciousness. Scholarly reflection has been transposed into theory, a conceptual structure of virtually unlimited application. The local color and the topical references to be found in Arnold are gone; but there is an immense, if unglamorous, gain in precision, system and range of application.

The task I have been engaged with in this article clearly falls within the first of the eight functional specialties which Lonergan considers to be common to the practice of theology and of human studies: the specialty of research. Essentially I have been tracing the source of the ideas Lonergan expounds in a relatively small section of his vast work, Insight. But it has not been pure research and I have found myself impelled towards the second of the functional specialties, interpretation. It is indeed difficult to avoid this further step. For the tracing of an author's sources confers singular benefits on interpretation or commentary on his text. Provided appropriate distinctions are made where necessary, the source material can assist us in grasping the fundamental concerns of our author and the essential lines of his argument. Moreover, the gap between the content of the source material
and the content of our author's text throws valuable light on how the author uses his source, and this in turn can suggest or imply what may well have been a customary mode of operation and one which those with the necessary acumen might emulate. In this instance the gap may also indicate the reason why we do not find Matthew Arnold's name in Insight's copious index. For Lonergan is not presenting the views of Matthew Arnold, as he frequently presents the views of Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant, for example. He is presenting his own views. He has, to be sure, made creative use of Arnold; but it would be exceedingly tedious and distracting of him to present his source along with the necessary notes on how he has adapted him. He has to get on with the central task of saying what he has to say in Insight. And I would hazard the opinion that the author of Insight made use of a good many other sources in a similar way.

Matthew Arnold can be regarded as one of a series of authors and thinkers who provided the questions, the agenda and some of the raw materials for Lonergan's own thinking and writing. Arnold is not a technical thinker and he is distrustful of systems and system-makers. Lonergan is a technical and systematic thinker. Reading Arnold is rather like catching occasional glimpses of Lonergan's diary or note-book: we do not find a systematic or elaborated outline but the sketch of an idea, a brief clue on attitudes or overall direction, or possibly a pointer to the questions that need to be tackled. I am suggesting that Lonergan's debt to Arnold is more pervasive than has so far been argued. It is not a thesis I am in a position to justify by detailed references, but there are many hints and nudges from the pages of Arnold's various essays. In particular there is Arnold's most profound belief -- it is fundamental to all his thinking -- that the solution to the problems he diagnoses is to be found in a renewed program of inwardness; that an understanding of what is within man is fundamental to an understanding of what lies without, of the external, man-made world; and that this turn to the subject is the mark of modernity. Moreover, Arnold fears the uncommitted intellect. He believes in enlightened commitment, and asserts that personal and social transformation is the key to personal and social growth towards perfection. We have here, in a general way, much of what Lonergan stands for. I believe it will emerge that Arnold is an important
influence on Lonergan's thought, indeed a seminal influence, sowing seeds that Lonergan cultivates and brings to maturity in his own technical and systematic fashion.

NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 54. 3 Ibid., p. 107. "Ibid.


6 Ibid., p. 6. 7 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 8 Ibid., p. 17.

9 Ibid., p. 18. 10 Ibid., p. 22. 11 Ibid., p. 23.


16 Ibid., p. 38. First italics mine. 17 Ibid., p. 45.

18 Arnold does not make his proposals for state controlled education and for an academy with equal force. In the case of the former he is in deadly earnest; he was able to exert crucial influence on his brother-in-law, William Forster, author of the English Education Act of 1870. With regard to the academy, Arnold concludes his essay by suggesting that he hardly expects such an institution to emerge in the form he describes and urges, in turn, that writers enforce their own self-discipline. The germ of Arnold's proposal for an academy was earlier contained in the original version of his survey of "Popular Education in France", where the institution held up for English emulation is the French Institute (see Super, op. cit., pp. 156ff). This supports the view that Arnold was less concerned with the practical aspects of his proposal and more with the general philosophical point that right reason should be brought to bear on national affairs.


20 Ibid., p. 306.

21 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson [Cambridge, 1950], p. 64.

22 Ibid., p. 105. 23 Ibid., p. 49. 24 Ibid., p. 110.

25 Ibid., p. 108. 26 Ibid., p. 142. 27 Ibid., p. 143.

28 Ibid., p. 162. 29 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 30 Ibid., p. 193.


34 F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition [London, 1948; Peregrine edition], p. 13. Leavis is speaking of Jane Austen's relation to the tradition of the English novel: "If the influences bearing on her hadn't comprised something fairly to be called tradition she couldn't have found herself and her true direction; but her relation to tradition is a creative
one. She not only makes tradition for those coming after, but her achievement has for us a retroactive effect: as we look back beyond her we see in what goes before, and see because of her, potentialities and significances brought out in such a way that, for us, she creates the tradition we see leading down to her. Her work, like the work of all great creative writers, gives a meaning to the past."

35 Lonergan, op. cit., p. 223. 36 Ibid., p. 225. 37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 232. 39 Culture and Anarchy, p. 205.
40 Lonergan, op. cit., p. 232. 41 Ibid., p. 235.
42 Ibid., p. 239. 43 Ibid., p. 240-41. 44 Ibid., p. 241.
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 See Arnold's essay on Heinrich Heine in Essays Literary and Critical, p. 105, where he says of Goethe, "he puts the standard, once for all, inside every man instead of outside him" etc; also Culture and Anarchy, pp. 6-7.
50 See Arnold's comments on Wilhelm von Humboldt in Super, op. cit., pp. 312-313; also the Conclusion of Culture and Anarchy.
The perennial dispute over the foundations of ethics show that to establish satisfactory foundations may not be as simple as one, two, three. Still, it may be as simple as one, two, four, eight. That is, it may be as simple as establishing, first, the origin of foundations; secondly, the support from the foundations for both morality and ethics; thirdly, the set of four questions to be answered on each of these levels; and, finally, the set of eight classes of issues produced by the combination of the two levels of morality and ethics with the four kinds of questions to be answered on each level. These are the foundations, I shall contend, that are necessary and sufficient for ethics.

1. The Origin of the Foundations

Neither the necessity nor the possibility of establishing foundations for ethics can be either presumed or denied without begging the question. To presume the possibility would deny any necessity, just as to presume the necessity would deny the possibility. Dogmatism and skepticism would be equally presumptuous and futile. For it would be just as presumptuous (and, therefore, futile) to think the question of foundations for ethics could be answered merely by articulating the rational implications of the self-evident possibility of morality as it would be to think, on the contrary, that it must be answered by demonstrating a self-evident foundation in ethics for the rationality of morality.

The former position, dogmatism, would eliminate any need for ethics by presuming that the rationality of morality was so obvious in appearance and so univocal in interpretation that there could be no need for any explicit and deliberate reflection -- at least none beyond the everyday, common-sense evaluation implicit in morality itself -- to establish its inherent rationality. But this would presume a degree of uniformity in morality and of unanimity in its evaluation unknown in a modern and pluralistic society. Disagreement about the nature and the possibility of morality is today so endemic as to have to be resolved, in practice, by a tolerance for whatever behavior is not expressly prohibited by law and,
in theory, by the liberal policy of tolerance before the law of whatever behavior does not constitute a clear and present public danger. A moral code becomes in this context nothing but a private option. And ethics takes the form of a skeptical metaethics, out to argue that such an option has nothing for a foundation but emotion. Under the circumstances, it would be futile as well as presumptuous to act as if the rationality of morality needed no explicit and methodical justification.

But skepticism, the alternative, is no better off. For it would presume that the lack of a self-evident justification for morality -- that is, the evidence of a need for ethics to justify the rationality of morality -- demonstrated the impossibility of ever giving it any justification at all. This would be to forget that moral discord and moral failure, though they have been endemic and perennial, have never succeeded in being condoned or justified, practically or theoretically. Always and everywhere, not just in the modern Western world, moral ideals have, indeed, exceeded moral achievements, without ever leading, however, to the belief that morality is therefore illusory. The reaction has been rather to promote and safeguard morality all the more vigorously.

This effort takes the form less of theoretical justification than of pragmatic enforcement. Mature and responsible adults do try to figure out what to do in each case, and they hold everyone else responsible for doing the same -- except, of course, for children, who are presumed to be the responsibility of the adults who care for them, and the insane, who are put under the care of the adults who become responsible for them. Contracts formalize in important transactions the mutual accountability characteristic of every exchange in daily life.

This accountability holds not only on the individual and the private level; it is true on the public and social level as well. Communities consist of members with common conceptions of social responsibility; to maintain these conceptions, they employ sanctions, both rewards and punishments, forcible as well as persuasive; and without these sanctions they could not hope to endure, much less to prosper or progress. From this interlocking web of shared responsibilities -- norms legitimizing sanctions, sanctions enforcing norms -- the texture of social life is woven.
The tacit rationality of this everyday morality is the source of the very conception of rationality as a practical achievement. Without it, there could not even be such a thing as immorality. Because of it, the need for ethics to justify the rationality of morality does not mean that ethics must somehow lend morality a rationality it lacks on its own. It means only that ethics must explicate the rationality already implicit in the morality of everyday life.

If, therefore, both dogmatism and skepticism are unfounded, what is the origin of the foundations of ethics? The question itself. For if morality is neither unquestionable nor indefensible, it must be questionable and defensible. The origin of ethics is the question, Do we know what we ought to do? And the answer to that question is the defense of the rationality of morality.

The question, Do we know what we ought to do? arises within morality itself. It is implicit in every responsible act, for a responsible action is one in which we first want to know and then decide we do know what we ought to do. The question becomes explicit, however, when we face a moral crisis: when we do not know what to do to act responsibly. The thought may then occur that if we do not know what to do in one case, we may not really know what to do in any case. If we pursue the answer to that question, we are at the origin of ethics. When Meno realized that his ignorance about the meaning of piety betrayed an ignorance about the nature of knowledge as well, he was ready to join Socrates in his quest for the kind of knowledge necessary to know what was good.

The quest for ethics in Western philosophy has followed two trails. Rationalists have sought it where the mind meets the meaning of being, in the wonder at the origin of metaphysics, in the belief in the speculative realm. "For it is owing to wonder," Aristotle said, "that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize." Just as a crisis in speculative knowledge -- in science or, more generally, in the effort to understand the nature of the world about us -- may precipitate an explicit and methodical consideration of whether we really do know the conditions for understanding the nature of the world, so a crisis in practical knowledge -- in morality, that is, in the effort to understand what we ought to do -- may precipitate an explicit and methodical considerations of whether we really do know the conditions for understanding
what we ought to do. For rationalists, therefore, ethics is to morality as metaphysics is to science: the reflective and mediate counterpart of a direct and immediate form of knowledge -- in the former case, practical; in the latter, speculative. And both practical and speculative knowledge, whether direct and immediate or reflective and mediate, they believe, are united ultimately in the aboriginal wonder of the mind before the prospect of being. This is the legacy to Western philosophy of Plato's extension of Socrates' quest for a foundation for ethics into a quest for the foundation of metaphysics. Behind the mask of the Good was Being itself. Thus, only by establishing the conditions for knowing the meaning of being, Plato believed, could we discover the conditions for knowing the basis for action. This is the idealist, the absolutist, the transcendental, the deontological -- the formal -- conception of the origin of ethics.

The alternative approach is the empiricist. From this viewpoint, the origin of ethics is to be found, not in the mind, but in the world -- in the problems it presents to the mind. The empiricist does not deny that to our practical concern about how to cope with these problems there corresponds a theoretical concern about the natures of the things providing them, but for the empiricist this theoretical concern functions within a pragmatic framework and abides by the same pragmatic criterion of truth as our practical concern. "Experience becomes an affair," John Dewey said, "primarily of doing." So if the origins of Western philosophy are to be found in the attempt to discover in metaphysics a foundation for ethics, the end has been the attempt to expand the foundations of ethics into a foundation for metaphysics. From this perspective, the foundation of ethics is the infinite problematicity of the world we live in. And metaphysics has the corresponding task of elaborating the asymptotic conditions for things to have the uses to which we find we can put them. This is the realist, the naturalist, the pragmatic, the instrumentalist, the consequentialist -- the substantive -- conception of the foundation of ethics.

The origin of the foundation of ethics is, therefore, from either a rationalist or an empiricist perspective, the question of how and whether we know what we ought to do. But by attending only to the wonder of the mind before the prospect of being, rationalism has exaggerated the subjectivity
of the origin of the ethical quest, as it has also overestimated the prospects for the conclusion of the quest by locating it in a chimerical vision of the meaning of being. Yet empiricism has, by contrast, exaggerated the objectivity of the origins of ethics by attending only to the problematicity of everyday life, while it has also unnecessarily abandoned the prospects for understanding, speculative as well as practical, by reducing the function of knowledge to the discovery of the use rather than the nature of the world.

The foundation of ethics must be built, therefore, on the dialectic between wonder and problem at the origin of knowledge and between the meaning of being and the function of the world at the end. This both preserves the central impulse and eliminates the one-sidedness of either rationalism or empiricism. It is, more importantly, also faithful to the origins of ethics from a crisis in morality and congenial to the interminability of the consequent quest for a foundation for its rationality. Neither in the mind by itself nor in the world by itself is the origin of ethics therefore to be found. It is to be found in the dialectic between the mind and the world that generates the question, Do we know what we ought to do?

The dual perspective from which this single question arises, however, means that there are two levels on which it must be answered, the levels of morality and of ethics.

2. The Levels of Morality and Ethics

The moral problem arises, as we have seen, on the level of direct understanding, where we are concerned with the concrete and immediate issue of knowing what we ought to do in particular cases. On the level of reflective understanding, where we are concerned with the abstract and mediate issue of the general conditions for knowing what we ought to do, the question recurs as an ethical problem.

2.1. The Level of Moral Analysis

On the level of moral analysis, our concern is with basic values. These are the values necessary for the pursuit of other values. They are the conditions necessary for the establishment of the basic set of relationships between the moral agent and the objects of one's activity. These objects are nature, to which the agent must adapt for the sake of survival;
the self, for which the agent must develop an identity to become happy; society, which the agent needs for the pursuit of progress; and being itself, from which the agent derives the inspiration to seek autonomy. Survival, happiness, progress, and autonomy are, therefore, our basic values. Without these values no other values are attainable.

Morality emerges from the responses we make to the challenges from the environment to these values. By developing the ability to perceive and meet the challenges, we convert problems into opportunities. We learn what we ought to do. Economy enables us to survive, culture to seek happiness, society to foster progress, and religion or philosophy, as the case may be, to develop autonomy. Morality is, therefore, what is distinctive about human existence.

By contrast, immorality is obviously whatever threatens our existence in any of its ramifications. It arises from a failure to discern the significance of a crisis presented by the environment; it consists in a failure to learn how to convert the problem presented by the crisis into an opportunity; it results in a failure to enhance the chances for survival, happiness, progress, or autonomy. The consequence is that these values come to seem futile, the means to achieve them illusory, the environment hostile. To the extent immorality becomes prevalent, life becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

Thus morality and immorality are matters of life and death. They are not extraneous to ordinary living, nor are they either arbitrary or self-serving evaluations of human actions. They represent the implicit assessment of the success or failure of our efforts to achieve the values without which life is impossible. Morality is rationality in the concrete; immorality, irrationality.

2.2. The Level of Ethical Analysis

Ethical problems arise on the level of reflection -- when we are concerned with the abstract and mediate question of the general conditions for knowing what we ought to do. This kind of question arises, as we have seen, from a crisis on the level of morality. As morality is the source and object of ethics, ethics is the validation and foundation of morality. But on the level of morality, the question of moral knowledge arises only implicitly, insofar as morality, as opposed to
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instinct, implies the capacity for inquiry and critical reflection, the prerequisites of responsible action. The focus of our attention is, however, upon what is to be done, not upon how and whether we know how to do it. This question arises explicitly only when there is a moral crisis: when, in fact, we do not know what to do. Then we have to ask how and perhaps whether we actually know what to do, and ethics begins.

This kind of question can arise for a particular individual, for an entire society, or for the world at large. For the individual, it arises when one falls out of step with society. Questioning conventional morality on a particular issue or set of issues leads one to shift from the direct and practical consideration of what is to be done -- on the assumption that, of course, everyone knows how to settle such questions -- to a reflective and theoretical consideration of the cognitive assumptions underlying conventional norms. One becomes a social critic with the ambition of becoming a social reformer. This was the tack Socrates took, and, following Plato, it became, at least until recently, the normal course of academic ethics. Conventional morality may as a result become a little more refined or sophisticated, but in its presuppositions or its prescriptions it usually remains essentially unaffected.

Sometimes, though, a single dissenter is too typical, so articulate, so powerful, that the individual's question becomes an entire society's. The social protest the critic voices, the social forces one unleashes, overcome the countervailing forces of the state. Confucius and Buddha; Moses, Jesus, Mohammed; Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli; Hutcheson, Williams, Penn; Marx and Gandhi were all prophets, charismatic leaders, who precipitated a reconsideration and a reconstitution of the meaning of human existence. They became, in effect if not always in intent, the founders of new societies. The ethic they exemplified and preached -- their personal style and approach to morality -- their followers codified into an ethics -- an integral and detailed program for handling life's problems and reconstituting the bases of society.

But the ethical question may sweep over several societies at once. War or migration may suddenly shatter the fabric of international relations. More gradually, exploration, commerce, and cultural exchange may undermine the hubris of any society to have constituted itself the "last, best hope" of humankind. As anomie threatens to annul law and order, society
may verge on a return to a Hobbesian state of nature. Force and fear can then paralyze not just action but reason itself. In the event, morality can no longer be the matrix for the crystallization of reason into ethics. Then the task for ethics becomes, not simply a critique of social conventions, nor just the constitution of the bases for a new society, but it must be the creation of a renewed faith in the possibility and power of rationality in social life.

There are, then, two levels of analysis, moral and ethical. On either level there can be crises. On the moral level, they arise from environmental challenges to the realization of our basic values: survival, happiness, progress, and autonomy. On the ethical level, they arise from a suspicion in various situations that conventional morality may not be up to the task of coping with these challenges. Therefore, while the function of morality is to learn, directly and immediately, what to do about crises presented by the environment, the function of ethics is the reflective and mediate task of learning what to do about crises arising in morality.

3. Kinds of Question

To know what we ought to do, however, we make take into consideration not just the moral and the ethical levels of analysis. We must also be able to answer the kinds of questions that can arise on either level. These questions are of four kinds. They correspond both to the kinds of things we want to know and to the ways we get to know them.

The determination of the questions by the things we want to know is an approach we owe to Aristotle. To get to know a fact, he said, we ask whether x happened to y; to learn the reason for it, we ask why it happened. At the same time, simply to discover the existence of something we ask if y exists, and we ask what y is to get to understand its nature. In the answers to these questions knowledge consists. Aristotle illustrated his point with the example of an eclipse of the sun [Table 1].

Besides the complementarity between the questions of fact and reason and the questions of existence and nature, there is also a dialectic between the questions of fact and existence, between the questions of reason and nature, and between these two sets of questions as well. We cannot ask if x is happening to y unless we know y exists, but we are
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions To Be Asked</th>
<th>Things To Know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is x happening to y; e.g., Is the sun being eclipsed?</td>
<td><strong>Fact:</strong> The sun is being eclipsed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why is it happening?</td>
<td><strong>Reason/Cause:</strong> The moon is coming between the sun and the earth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is y; e.g., a solar eclipse?</td>
<td><strong>Nature:</strong> A solar eclipse is the obscuring of the sun or darkening of the earth because of the interposition of the moon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there such a thing as y; e.g., a solar eclipse?</td>
<td><strong>Existence:</strong> Everything must have a natural explanation.</td>
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prompted to ask if y exists if something seems to be happening to it. Otherwise we could never get to know, for example, about an eclipse. To depict the darkening of the sun as an eclipse presupposes that such an event is to be explained and the explanation is to be a natural one. We would not be prompted to recognize the possibility of an eclipse, however, unless we happened to see what appeared to be one.

Likewise, we discover the nature of something by asking why things happen to it as they do, and we use our grasp of the meaning of an event to explain the nature of the things involved in it. In the case of an eclipse, this means that to give a natural explanation for it, we have to discover why the sun is being obscured. Having discovered, though, that it is because the moon is coming between it and the earth, we have the grounds for defining the nature of an eclipse.

Moreover, only by answering the mediate questions of reason/cause and nature are we in a position to be sure about the initial answers we gave to the immediate questions of fact and existence. We would not, that is, have undertaken an investigation into the cause of the darkening of the sun or sought to define it as an eclipse unless we had suspected that the darkening was indeed the kind of natural event that could be called an eclipse. Yet we would not be entitled to rest content with that belief -- it would remain a matter of opinion and not of scientific knowledge -- unless we had succeeded in finding sufficient evidence to establish that that was indeed the case and no other explanation was likely.
Why this set of questions is both necessary and sufficient for gaining knowledge can perhaps be made clearer by considering how they are required not just by what we want to know but by how we get to know it. This is the approach that since Kant developed it has been known as a transcendental critique of knowledge. My analysis is based more immediately, however, on Bernard Lonergan's variation of the approach.5

Upon reflection, it becomes evident that knowledge is the self-corrective process of learning. It comprises a dynamic structure originating in the interaction between wonder and experience, continuing through the reciprocation of imagination and reflection, and terminating in virtually unconditioned claims. Each of the four operations in this dynamic structure generates a specific question, and each must be answered before a cycle of knowledge is complete (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Fact: Is x happening to y?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>Reason/Cause: Why is it happening?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reflection</td>
<td>Nature: What is y?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wonder</td>
<td>Existence: Is there such a thing as y?</td>
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</table>

Whatever we know is, immediately, the product of what we want to know about the data of experience. Paying attention to the data enables us, first, to perceive the problems they present, and, secondly, to try to imagine why they have happened. At the same time, the impact of the data upon our minds prompts us, first, to wonder if things are as they appear to be and, secondly, to reflect whether they really are as we imagine them to be. The mediating interaction between imagination and reflection generates for reflection configurations of imagery apt to settle our questions about the problems arising from experience, while reflection stimulates the imagination to seek within experience for the data relevant and sufficient to generate the apt imagery. A successful outcome either confirms or refutes the original hypothesis produced by the immediate dialectic between wonder and experience and enables a determination of the facts according to our outlook upon the world.
Although each cycle of the process is provisionally complete when, according to our lights, we determine the facts in a particular case, the process as a whole is interminable because of the complementary infinitudes of wonder and data. We can always raise new questions, and the data present new problems. Likewise, we can also imagine alternative explanations and reconsider the adequacy of the evidence for any of them. So the process is forever verging toward completion, about this or that issue and about the nature of the world as a whole, each operation provoking and complementing the others, but without ever reaching perfection or precluding the possibility of criticism or revision.

Yet this self-correcting process of learning is neither chaotic nor frustrating -- not in any individual case, not in the long run. In each case, temporal and spatial bounds are imposed by the concreteness of our personal experience and the exigency of finding practical solutions for pressing problems. The search for a solution leads the reciprocating action of imagination and reflection to reach practical cloture on the answer warranted by the evidence presently available. And the dynamism of wonder, while it is never satiated, can be satisfied that, here and now, enough is enough.

In the long run, of course, there is the urgency and the satisfaction of meeting the transcendental imperatives imposed by wonder upon each of the other operations of knowledge. Be attentive to experience if you want to know whether x is happening to y. Be imaginative if you want to understand why it is happening. Be reasonable if you want to know what y really is. And wonder itself is the transcendental imperative. Ask if you want to know at all; in each case, ask if there can be such a thing. The gradual, if fitful, realization of these imperatives is the way to wisdom.

What are the implications for ethics of this framework of questioning? First, there is the transcendental imperative for the practical order, Be responsible. That is, find out what you ought to do and do it. For there is no reason to act except on the basis of knowledge. Whatever opportunities or obstacles we may encounter in our environment, whatever pleasures or pains we may expect from responding to them, whatever social pressures may come to bear upon us, they cannot predetermine for us what we ought to do. They may determine what we have to do, but if they do, we are not responsible
for it. To do what we ought to do requires knowledge. Responsible action is a consequence of finding out what to do, deciding to do it, and then actually doing it.

The second implication is the effect of a sense of responsibility upon the adaptation to the practical order of the set of four questions necessary for knowledge. Facts become cases, making the first question, Is x what I should do to y? Reasons become values, so the next question is, Why should I do x to y? Natures become norms, with the corresponding question becoming, What should I really do about y? And the ultimate issue is not existence but goodness, leading to the question, Is x good to do? The outcome is the development within the practical as well as the theoretical order of the self-corrective process of learning [Table 3].

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Should I do x to y?</td>
<td>Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>Why should I do x to y?</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection</td>
<td>What really is (or Is x really) the thing to do?</td>
<td>Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonder</td>
<td>Is x good?</td>
<td>Goodness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The adaptation of this framework to the practical order has implications for the short cycle of deciding each case and for moral development in the long term as well. In deciding each case, there is a dialectic between the two immediate questions, between the two mediate questions, and between both sets of questions. We wonder if x is good when a case arises in which we are confronted with the question whether we should do x, and we consider x a possible response in the case if we believe it may be good to do. But to answer these questions we first have to settle why x could be good for y at all and whether in this case x is really the thing to do. Only if we can satisfy ourselves about the value of x -- and not just in itself, but all things considered -- can we be justified in deciding it is a good and, under the circumstances, the right thing to do. The cycle of practical knowledge in each case is similar, therefore, to the cycle of theoretical knowledge for each problem.
The implications for moral development are just as decisive. Because of the dialectic between wonder and experience, we are concerned in each case about what is good to do -- thus incorporating every responsible act into the moral realm and leaving nothing to mere expediency or technical expertise -- and we develop through experience a sense of responsibility -- thus allowing for both the inexperience that excuses irresponsibility in the young and the practice of placing responsibilities upon people of experience. Because of the dialectic between imagination and reflection, we can appreciate the difference between establishing a scale of values in the abstract and having to determine in the concrete the norms necessary for assuring justice. Thus, categorical imperatives and a deontological morality are operative in the realm of values, where the question is one of understanding the ideal relationships -- rights and duties -- between a moral agent and the agent's interests. But in the realm of norms, where the question is, instead, one of establishing the concrete conditions for meting out justice, hypothetical imperatives and a consequentialist morality are operative. Finally, because of the dialectic between the two sets of operations, the immediate and the mediate, there is a priority of morality at the beginning of moral development, when the impact of cases evokes a sense of responsibility, but at the end of moral development, when practice has been gained in choosing values and establishing justice, ethics comes into its own -- without, however, a dichotomy ever arising between the two approaches.

Thus, the application to the practical order of the framework of questions operative in the dynamic structure of the self-corrective process of learning enables a grasp of the cognitive demands of each case and of moral development as well. We can see that the original question of how we are to know what we ought to do differentiates itself into a set of questions specific enough to be answered precisely. Combined with the distinction between the moral and the ethical levels, this set of questions yields two sets of four classes of issues.

4. The Classes of Issues

The final stage in establishing the foundations of ethics is to classify the kinds of ethical issues. Without a framework of classification it is too difficult to sort out the distinctions and the connections among the issues. The combination of the levels of moral and ethical analysis with the four
objects of practical questions yields a framework capable of accommodating every class of ethical issue (Table 4).

### Table 4

**The Classification of Ethical Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical Objects</th>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Prudential Judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Moral Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Moral Imperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness</td>
<td>Moral Perspective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The movement on the moral level is essentially from the bottom up, from practical experience in deciding particular cases to the explicit recognition of the necessity for a basic moral perspective. It is just the opposite on the ethical level. Here, the movement is essentially from the top down, as the development of a fundamental ethical theory leads eventually to the application of the theory to particular kinds of cases. This is not to deny, however, that in both cases a countervailing current pushes from the other direction because of the dialectical relationship within and between the immediate and the mediate questions to be asked. There is also, of course, the effect upon each class of issues of the dialectic between the moral and the ethical levels of analysis.

On the moral level, the classes are simply more refined categories of the objects of practical knowledge. Prudential judgments invest cases with moral importance, immediately, because of bringing to bear upon an issue the moral perspective of whether something is good to do and, mediate, because of applying to an issue the resolution of the dialectic between the relevant moral principles and moral imperatives. Thus, for judgments to be prudential, they cannot be merely expeditious or technical; they must proceed from an analysis of a case in light of the parameters of human perfection.

The parameters of human perfection are moral principles. These are, as we have seen, the values to be achieved in the realization of the basic set of human relationships. These relationships -- to nature, to self, to society, and to being itself -- make survival, happiness, progress, and autonomy the kinds of values too dear to be denied. They function, therefore, as principles for our actions, the guidelines for
prudential judgments. In each of these relationships, however, the question to be decided is how to achieve the realization of the condign value. Is survival, for instance, to be achieved by the exploitation or the conservation of nature, by competition or by cooperation with other human beings? Thus, although the form of moral principles is categorical in the Kantian sense, it is not immediately obvious what the substance of each of them should be.

To settle questions of substance, it is necessary to consider the issue of moral imperatives; that is, the concrete and historical conditions for the realization of moral principles. In the modern era, these conditions have been the object of ideological dispute. Conceptions of justice, in theory as well as in practice, have reflected partisan viewpoints. Despite the constitution of the modern nation-state on the basis of certain inalienable human or natural rights, national policies and international relations have emerged from the rationalization of self-interest rather than from a prior commitment to the common good. On the national level, this ideological bias has been manifested in the creation of political parties -- conservative, liberal, socialist -- to advance the interests of particular social and economic classes. Thus social policy has been decided essentially on the basis of political pressure and only coincidentally in the name of constitutional ideals. Likewise, on the international level, ideological policy-making has led to the primacy of national interests over human rights or world peace in the pursuit of international order. Democratic capitalism, state socialism, third-world development, these are less theories of political and social justice than archetypes of national self-interest. Under the circumstances, the determination of moral imperatives is complex and arduous. Whether it is a matter of obtaining equality for minorities, negotiating a viable international nuclear policy, or promoting the peaceable exploration of outer space, the appropriate moral imperatives are not clear or obvious. Yet, without settling the concrete conditions for the realization of justice, the affirmation of moral principles remains an exercise in futility.

At this point there arises the issue of a basic moral perspective. In anything good? The original as well as the ultimate question to be decided in the moral order is whether goodness is rational. What we have to decide -- and this is
the perennial crisis of morality -- is whether existence is basically good or evil. Objectively, this means asking if the world is good; subjectively, if human beings are. If our answer is no, we renounce morality. The only rational thing to do then is to treat other practical issues as questions of immediate self-interest. This is the path of what is often called realism. It finds expression in the rationalization of self-interest, in the creation of a consumer society at home and imperialism abroad, and, above all, in the development of an imperturbable cynicism. But if our answer is yes, existence is good, we act as if morality were a given, and goodness a fact. This is the path of what is often called idealism. It finds expression in the conception of utopias, in a longing for the millenium, in the hope, at last, of heaven. The conflict between realism and idealism arises within each of us and among all of us. It means that the crisis of morality is not an occasional phenomenon but the predicament endemic to human existence. On the level of moral perspective, therefore, the issue is whether we are going to follow the ineluctable orientation of the human spirit to do what is good or join in the conspiracy of evil lurking in the shadows of human failure.

On the ethical level, the first issue is to develop a metaethics consonant with one's moral perspective. A renunciation of morality, moral realism, generates a skeptical metaethics, which employs linguistic analysis to denigrate what it presumes is the emotivist foundation of morality. If goodness is indeed chimerical, morality irrational, there is nothing for the moral philosopher to do but to point this out and draw the logical consequences. By contrast, moral idealism calls for a dogmatic metaethics, cognitivist in its assumptions and dedicated to normative analyses. The moral philosopher who believes goodness is self-evident and morality rational has the happy task of elaborating a comprehensive view of moral obligation. For those, however, who believe the endemic crisis of morality renders both realism and idealism suspect, there is the consequent necessity of having to admit that ethics is likewise in crisis, with little help to be expected from either skepticism or dogmatism. Metaethics becomes in this case an essay at establishing foundations upon the experience of questioning the rationality of goodness rather than upon the acceptance of any answer, favorable or unfavorable, to the question. What it might be like is the burden of this essay.
A metaethics without historical sophistication would be an aberration. It is necessary, therefore, to flesh out the foundations of ethics with a comparative study of morals as well as of ethics. The history of morality is, it might be argued, the entire function of history and, more generally, the social sciences. It is, at least, a task that cannot be accomplished without the benefit of these disciplines. And without a grasp of how people have actually acted throughout the world and over time, there cannot be an appreciation of the moral imperatives operative within the modern Western world nor of the necessity for complementing a rigorous articulation of moral principles with a realistic analysis of moral imperatives. Within the history of morality, the study of ethical theories is the task of comparative ethics in the strict sense. This is an attempt to determine the perennial value as well as to decipher the historical relativity of ethical theories. The aim is not so much, however, to rank theories on a scale as to grasp the range of issues any ethical theory must address.

With a background in comparative ethics it becomes possible to articulate an ethical system responsive not just to the exigencies of moral principles but also to the lessons of history. Such a system will comprise both substantive and formal principles. It will rebut the pretensions of counter-systems as well as establish its own credentials. As is the case for epistemology more generally, the force of an argument for a particular system will come from its capacity for self-instantiation, just as the basis for rejection would be any evidence of self-refutation. The logical limits of formal self-sufficiency, however, make the quest for a perfect system asymptotic. Hence, the classical importance of any ethical system tends to come from the kinds of questions it raises, while its historical relativity is more a product of the answers it gives.

Applied ethics, finally, lies at the intersection of ethical systems with prudential judgments. From the prevailing practices of experts or practitioners in a particular field come the codes of ethics they devise to govern and evaluate their own behavior. These codes are, however, as much a product of the rationalization of failure as of the institution of success. They need to be complemented by the application of standards derived from the rigor of ethical systems and suitable
for a range of different fields. Yet, without an accommodation to the particularity of each field, these standards would remain too abstract and generic to be genuinely useful. Applied ethics is, therefore, a task to be taken up either by people competent in both ethics and a particular field or by committees of the relevant experts and interested ethicists.

These are, then, the classes of issues, the functional specialties, in the field of ethics. Everyone must develop to some degree the ability to handle the various classes of moral issues. Moral philosophers are those who undertake a specialization in ethical issues. No harm can come from developing an expertise in any class or specialty as long as one keeps in mind the larger framework. Nor is there any drawback to concentrating upon the entire framework as long as one recognizes the necessity for the complementary task of specialization.

5. Summary

The establishment of foundations for ethics has taken us from the origin of the foundations in the question whether we know what we ought to do, to the bifurcation of this question into the levels of moral and ethical analysis, on to the exploration of the set of four questions operative on both levels, and, finally, to the eight classes of issues produced by the combination of the two levels of analysis with the four kinds of questions. This is not a full or complete ethical theory. It is hardly a satisfactory statement of the foundations for one. But it may help to clear the ground for the eventual laying of adequate foundations. That may be, in fact, all that any ethical theory may ever really do.

NOTES


5The full argument is to be found in Bernard J. P. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* [London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1957]; a refined summary, in his *Method in Theology* [NY: Herder and Herder, 1972], ch. 1. In this case, too, my analysis is more an adaptation than a strict interpretation of the author's theory.


7Ibid., pp. 36-41.

8This mode of classification is inspired by, but is not identical with, the theory of functional specialties in theology developed by Lonergan in *Method in Theology*, ch. 5.
It has happened often enough in earlier stages of religious development that fear constituted religious experience more than love. Religious devotees of more primitive cultures cringed before deities that seemed to determine their destiny by whims no less powerful for their arbitrariness. In the more recent past of the great world religions, love, both on the part of a caring God and on the part of a grateful human creation, has more often than not replaced the sort of fear before arbitrary deities that is associated with primitive religions. Fear itself, nevertheless, may persist in the great world religions too, in the consciousness of sinners who experience themselves and their attitudes and actions as an affront to the goodness of the deity. The sinner knows that he or she is deserving of rejection, and this knowledge may generate fear.

Fear before an arbitrary God and fear before a just God are common enough, if not in our experience, then at least in our knowledge of the experience of others. There seems to be another fear that is part of religious experience, however, which we would do well to uncover more distinctly. For fear may well be a dimension of our loving response itself to that unrestricted love that Bernard Lonergan describes as the most characteristic feature of religious experience.

What might be the qualities of such a fear? Can such a fearful dimension, as well as other dimensions of religious experience, be rescued from the vague realism of imprecise language and questionable meaning to be more exactly located within human consciousness? Once located, can this fear be determined to be an authentic, although intermediate, response on the way to full love of God? By employing several components of Lonergan's articulation of transcendental method, I propose to address these three questions in the three sections of this essay.

The Terrifying Dimension of Religious Experience

In religious experience a person becomes conscious of being drawn into mystery, and of submitting to the pull.
Lonergan identifies the most comprehensive component of this experience as the unrestricted love that finds expression in the fruits of the Spirit named in Galatians 5: 22-23. But there is also a sense of terror connected with such love. Lonergan recognizes the terrifying dimension of religious conversion in his discussion of the components of the event.

His brief remarks can be brought to greater relief by articulating the elements of the feeling of terror in religious experience.

The terror relates both to the personal source of the pull into mystery, and also to the subject being pulled. Relative to the source there is terror because one feels oneself being drawn into a love so powerful that it seems to be giving itself in an unrestricted, unlimited way. Such self-giving is so far beyond human love that it strikes terror into the heart of the person undergoing conversion. Lonergan refers to this terrifying character of God vis-à-vis humanity in Method in Theology:

> the love of God is penetrated with awe. God's thoughts and God's ways are very different from man's and by that difference God is terrifying.

Even an analogical understanding of God's total love based upon instances of extraordinary human self-giving hints at its awesome character. I think of the courageous love that motivated the bystander in Washington, D.C., who spontaneously plunged into the icy waters of the Potomac River on a January day in 1982 to rescue the struggling victim, personally unknown to the rescuer, of an airplane crash. The less dramatic, but often more profound, devotion of parents for their children and of spouses whose love perdures in sickness and in health until death also indicates the extent of human love. But the power of unrestricted love is so much more even than extraordinary human love as to be terrifying to the human creature, fraught with limitations, who experiences it.

That unrestricted love is at once creative, saving, and terrifying is indicated in the image of holiness in the prophets, Hosea and Isaiah. Hosea proclaims the radical opposition between God and human beings which is God's holiness: "I am God, and not man, the Holy One in your midst" [11:9, RSV]. Otto Proksch claims that this holiness is the "creative love which kills but also gives life anew."? It is a love which is alone "the undestructible force" that can save alienated human beings from their alienation.
This same holiness that is a creative and saving love is terrifying in Isaiah [6:3f.]. "The fearfulness of the holy God, the numen tremendum, is inimitably expressed in the holy awe of Isaiah. His trembling seems to be part of the shaking threshold on which he stands at the entrance to the sanctuary, and in the manifestation of the divine he feels the deadly contrast to his own nature . . . so that he believes he must die." Putting Hosea and Isaiah together one may conclude that God's love is fearful precisely because it is so total. Thus, it is an awesome love, which continues to be treated as such in the New Testament.

St. John of the Cross may have in mind the fearfulness here described when he refers to the "terrors that keep watch by night" in the twenty-ninth stanza of the Spiritual Canticle. Religious experience, he writes, includes a terror that comes from God, when He desires to grant such persons certain favors, . . . and is wont to bring fear and affright to their spirit, and likewise a shrinking to their flesh and senses.

St. John maintains that such fear can be especially acute "in spiritual persons that have not yet reached this estate of the Spiritual Marriage," persons, therefore, still on pilgrimage toward submission to perfect love.

The person undergoing religious experience does not simply stand in terror before the awesome power of unrestricted love being directed toward her or him. There is also the invitation to respond that is always a part of love. And who is going to let himself or herself submit to such love with unhesitating abandon? Such submission leads inevitably to a transformation of everything one has thus far become, learned to love, and is at home with regarding self, God and world. Such experience, therefore, of being pulled by unrestricted love "remains within subjectivity," Lonergan writes, as a "fateful call to a dreaded holiness." Thus, terror also accompanies the invitation to respond.

No one could wish to embrace the terror that can come into religious experience. One alternative to living through it in hope of arriving at the achievement of perfect love is to hide in the false consciousness of presumption. A common expression of presumption is the domestication of religious love through a cozy complacency about one's possession of the love of God. Think, for example, of the sureness with which some Christians consider that their fulfillment of the
external requirements of their denomination assures their salvation, or of the mistaken equation of being in love with God with feeling good about oneself without any sense of the overwhelming, awesome character of the divine demand to love unhesitatingly.

Eric Voegelin's interpretation of the Platonic metaxy is of assistance in appreciating the tension between mystery and the familiar world -- a tension that is the ontological basis for the terror of religious experience. Human beings, Voegelin writes, are the intersection between time-laden realities and timelessness. Metaxy expresses the pull within human interiority to move toward existence in the timeless truth that transcends this-worldliness. But tension arises because of the pull, on the other side, of human time-ladenness. Moreover, since to be human is to be historical, even our existence in the truth that is timeless finds expression in time-laden concretizations.

The terror that is part of the religious experience of letting oneself be led into other-worldly mystery is concretized in a this-worldly way in the shrinking back that accompanies those religious decisions in which a person gives up seeking security in material goods, success, prestige or power. All are inevitably relativized by one's submission to the mystery of unrestricted love. Accompanying one's surrender to this-worldly security, there is a terror here that is unlike the terror associated with primitive fear, with the occult or with emotional breakdown. It is the terror experienced when one knows one must risk one's whole self and all the props that make for this-worldly security and let oneself be led into the mystery of God's love.

To let go of such this-worldly security -- to live with a keen sense of how little support there is in material goods, success, prestige, power, and even of how interpersonal relationships must not be used simply as props for one's self-security -- is to experience in the concreteness of everyday living the terror of mystery. At times one feels adrift with regard to any this-worldly security even as one knows in one's heart of hearts, by other-worldly trust, that we do live in a friendly universe. Or to put it another way, to be grasped by ultimate concern means that those concerns that are less than ultimate may have to go untended, resulting in who knows what sorts of confusion in everyday living.
One can try to avoid the terror of giving up this-worldly security for the sake of the mystery of awe and love. Such avoidance comes, I suppose, from the false desire of the human heart to withdraw from the risk of living in consciousness of mystery. It is the option for the time-laden to the exclusion of the timeless. It is easy enough to understand the motivation of such avoidance, since the risk of submitting to mystery is always unsettling for someone trying to establish a secure base of operations for the business of living. To take the risk is terrifying. Is there not, instead, the longing to be in control? Is there not the attempt to transfer "the other-worldly fulfillment, joy, peace, bliss," to a highly structured, well-ordered, domesticated establishment of security here and now? But to live in consciousness of being grasped by mystery one has to exchange control and comfort for readiness to be controlled by the power of mystery. In this sense unrestricted love is anything but cozy; it is awesome and fearful, and we only gradually submit ourselves wholeheartedly to its power.

Lonergan also points out a danger involved in acknowledging the terrifying aspect of God's love. As religious experience on the part of the subject, terror can predominate, while the consoling aspects of God's love are forgotten. If it is divorced from the all-embracing love of God, if the experience of fundamental trust is lost, "then the cult of a God that is terrifying can slip over into the demonic, into an exultant destructiveness of oneself and of others." But the terrifying dimension of religious experience is not due to a wrath or arbitrariness in God: it is precisely a part of unrestricted love. It is the penetrating demand of such love that terrifies us at those moments when we become alert to what it means to be loved by a love that is unrestricted.

Nor is the terrifying aspect of religious experience to be confused with the fear of judgment that often comes when an honest human conscience faces its sinfulness. In this case fear results from failure to be responsible to God's will. Actually the result of our failure to respond to God's will may more likely lead the religiously converted person to be disappointed and sad rather than fearful. Authentic terror in religious experience, on the other hand, is not the result of failure, but of the tension always existing in human interiority as the locus where the timeless and the
time-laden intersect. Since this tension persists as part of the human condition, some degree of terror seems permanently destined to be part of religious experience, remaining even after one experiences purification of one's sinfulness.

Situating the Terror in Consciousness

In his autobiographical work, *A Small Boy in Search of God*, Isaac Bashevis Singer raises the eventually inevitable question about every experience that emerges within interiority, and *a fortiori* about religious experience: what is its truth-value? Granted that every individual has strong subjective experiences, what is their value inter-subjectively and objectively? Do such experiences refer to anything more than passing emotional states, hallucinations, illusions?

Questions of this sort are pertinent to the love, wonder, awe, consolation, terror and every other feeling that seems to arise in response to the experience of being overtaken by an overwhelming, transcendent love. The remainder of the present essay attempts to answer questions about the intelligibility, truth, and value of subjective religious feelings. The present section seeks intelligibility by naming the conscious activities that produce feelings and by relating feelings to the other activities of consciousness.

Feelings are sometimes free-floating and sometimes they relate a person toward an object. In the latter case they are intentional, exercising considerable influence upon knowledge and decisions. As the subject moves out to the world beyond its own self, it is feelings that give "intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin." Lonergan describes intentional feelings that may be characterized as religious experience in terms of values. They are intentional responses to religious values.

Feelings are located at the level of first emergence of consciousness. They are active in the symbol-inducing creativity of dreaming, but they are just as active as the undertow in our wakeful life as well. The first moment we notice a feeling is not necessarily the first moment the feeling is working. Feelings precede our attention to them, our attempts to distinguish and name them, and our interpretations of their meaning. Feelings are spontaneous movements within the interiority of persons. Persons do not at first decide to feel
happy or sad, anxious or calm, although their feelings can be educated to coincide somewhat with values they have chosen. Education, however, may never be expected to re-route altogether the spontaneity of our feelings.

Intentional feelings are induced by the self in its dynamism or by values inherent in subjects or objects other than the self. The source produces an attraction or repulsion or a combination of the two. The feeling of terror described in this essay has been located within the experience of other-worldly, unrestricted, unhesitating, overwhelming love. In response to this love there are the attractive feelings of wonder, fascination, longing, and love. But there are also feelings of hesitation, horror, and terror in the face of so radically upsetting a love as unrestricted love. A person experiences the pull of this loving source. One feels deeply attracted to a love that promises to fulfill one's most urgent hopes and longings. But one is at the same time terrified by the prospect of being caught up in an overwhelming love and by the prospect of the demands such love makes.

It must not be presumed that all these several feelings are distinguished so neatly at their first appearance. At first the subject who notices these feelings may be able only to identify a free-floating anxiety such as can overtake a person in many situations and that seems to be unrelated to an object. Anxiety of that sort is often associated with indistinct feelings before the reflective process of distinguishing and interpreting begins. We know neither precisely what we feel nor why we feel as we do.

The process of distinguishing and interpreting belongs to the task of situating in consciousness the feelings that are being experienced. The feeling itself first emerges and continues to exist on the level of immediacy. It can only be distinguished from and related to other feelings and come to be understood with reference to its source and object by discerning the ways in which the feeling is mediated.

In Insight, Lonergan discerns the process of moving from sensible data to distinction and interpretation of the data by insight. He takes the circle as an example. Between the original experience of data such as the visual or tactile experiences of wheels on vehicles or ships' portholes and the conception of equal radii emanating from a central point to any point along the perimeter, there is the image that
patterns the data and becomes the pivot for the bright idea that leads to the definition of the circle. Mediating between experience and conception there is imagination.

When we are dealing with a reality that pertains to interior data within a subject, it is not possible to imagine a visually perceptible figure that is comparable to the object in the way that a circular drawing is comparable to a wheel or a porthole. Instead the subject's contact with the reality is mediated by feelings and by symbols that the imagination creates under the impulse of feelings. Together the two take the subject from the immediacy of experience to the selection of data that move the subject to seek intelligibility in the data and the truth of what is intelligible.

The terrifying dimension of religious experience may now be brought forward to illustrate what is here explained. As has been noted above, the feeling of terror that is part of religious experience becomes distinguishable and intelligible through the subject's hesitancy to submit completely to the awesome power of unrestricted love. The subject in touch with such love manifested towards her or him longs to respond with a total love in return, but this means relativizing in the most radical way one's attachment to career, wealth, prestige, good times, health and even persons. These objects of attachment are quite concrete. A person's fear is quite precise when, relative to those objects, the person feels urged to shift his or her priority of interests. It is precisely the image of those interests, and the way in which the subject is conscious of being drawn to rearrange their relative priority, that becomes a vehicle for the feeling of terror. Simultaneously, the subject longs to rearrange priorities and yet fears to go ahead with the attitudinal and practical shift. The combination of longing and fear alerts the subject to the transcendent source of the unrestricted love and the transcendent object of the terrifying longing to love all the way in response.

The feeling of terror belonging to the response to unrestricted love is also mediated through symbols. Human imagination creates symbols to represent the focus of the combined feelings of wonder, awe, longing, terror, sorrow and love. Mystery, darkness, unapproachable light, the all and the nothing, the cloud of unknowing, the cloud of forgetting -- these are words and phrases which imagination uses to mean
a love that is totally beyond every this-worldly—security and that beckons the human subject to respond by lovingly taking the risk to step across the threshold into a security of an entirely different order. Connected with these images are qualitative responses on the part of the subject who submits: selflessness, service, abandonment, poverty of spirit, disinterestedness, self-giving. Together these images and their qualitative responses are likely to be terrifyingly unsettling, even as they also evoke wonder, awe, gratitude, longing, sorrow over inadequacies and failures in our response, and above all, love, because the finite person is being drawn into the embrace of infinite love and into a response that keeps moving toward the infinite.

Terror as a True and Authentic Component of Religious Love

We have caught a glimpse of the intelligibility of the uncanny feeling of terror. But a further question arises about the objective reference of the feeling of terror. Recall the three questions raised at the beginning of the second section of this essay: What is the truth-value of so-called religious experience? Granted that every individual has strong subjective experiences, what is their value intersubjectively and objectively? Does such consciousness refer to anything more than passing emotional states, hallucinations, illusions? More particularly, our question has to do with the religious truth toward which the feeling of terror points. Is it really God to whom the terror described in the first part of this essay relates us?

Finally, there is a question of value beyond truth. For even if the terror described in this essay does indeed have a transcendent source whom we may name God, it still remains to determine whether that terror is authentic in its reference. Does it bespeak a healthy and wholesome relationship with God, or is it aberrant, such that it refers to God but in a way that distorts our relationship with God? One thinks here of Jim Jones, the demagogue of his religious devotees in Guyana, who may have had the experience of longing for God, but let his longing go awry into a tyrannical fanaticism. May something similar be true of the terrifying dimension of religious experience, that it is longing for God gone awry?
To determine the truth and authenticity of any so-called religious experience it is first necessary to acknowledge the difference of two distinct but complementary horizons within reality, the world of interiority and the world of exteriority.\textsuperscript{25} The latter is the visible world of sights and sounds, touches, tastes and smells. It is the world of food, clothing, shelter, business, economy, government, church, and much of domestic living and other relationships. The world of interiority is the world of the subject in his or her immediate, internal experience. Religious experience may find its expression in the exteriorly appearing sights and sounds of the rituals of worship, in the gentle touch of Mother Teresa's hand upon a person dying in the streets of Calcutta, in the smell of incense in a Buddhist temple. But originally religious experience happens within the realm of interiority. Its matrix is within the consciousness of persons overtaken by wonder, awe, longing, sadness, terror, love that intimates ultimacy. Only the person who acknowledges that the data of the inner as well as the outer world might be data on objective, self-transcendent reality is capable of determining the truth of the source and object of terror and of the other feelings that respond to unrestricted love.

In addition, two further horizons need to be distinguished and acknowledged as validly distinct: the world of immanent concerns and the world that reaches into a realm of transcendent meaning. In the world of immanent concerns one is conscious of oneself with one's needs, of waking and sleeping, of surviving and prospering. With regard to the realm of transcendent meaning one is conscious of oneself as reaching beyond the immanent toward ultimate concerns. Here there are needs too that can take the form of restless longing that is not satisfied by any human interpersonal relationship, of a wonder that seeks complete intelligibility, of an awe whereby the subject senses itself to be in the presence of a power beyond anything limited to this world. Again, it is only the person who is prepared to acknowledge the objective validity of the data both of the world of immanent concerns and of the world of transcendent concerns who can determine the truth of the source and object of terror in response to unrestricted love. For the truth of religious terror cannot be determined by anyone who rejects out of hand the possibility of a reality that transcends immanent references.
Once an investigator acknowledges the realms of interiority and transcendent meaning the issue of the truth of terror as a part of religious experience, i.e., its adequacy as a feeling with religious meaning, may be resolved by determining whether such experience on the part of a subject can trace its cause to any external or psychological source.\textsuperscript{26} If the feeling is interpreted correctly as terror, and if the feeling cannot be fully accounted for by the methods of the natural sciences or the humanities, then it may be concluded that there is sufficient evidence to identify the reason for the feeling to be the presence of a reality that transcends the human subject and that is drawing the subject toward transcendent reality. Moreover, since the terror is one dimension of an irresistible attraction, a being in love in an unrestricted way, its transcendent object must be a loving and lovable subject, somehow personal. If the transcendent object who is subject may be named God, it may be concluded that relationship with the personal God is the reason we are afraid to love all the way.

The authenticity of the feeling of terror is another matter. The authenticity of the terrifying dimension of religious experience has to do with its appropriateness as religious. Granted that the human fear attendant upon unrestricted love happens, and granted that it relates to God, is it a wholesome feeling? Is such terror in the presence of the transcendent a healthy way for the finite person to respond to unrestricted love? The answer to this question can be achieved by determining whether the terror actually belongs to love of God on the part of the human subject of the terror, i.e., whether it leads one more clearly to discern God's love and more honestly to respond to it, or whether it either detracts from that love by debasing it or detracts from it by suppressing it.

In the case of detraction, terror would be a failure to follow through with self-transcendence, either intellectually or morally. If the detraction were on the level of intelligence and reason, fear would lead the human subject to shrink from pursuing the complete intelligibility of God. Instead it would allow itself to stop at a God who is fearsome, perhaps by affirming God to be a deity which uses its absolute power in an arbitrary way or which is vengeful or unforgiving. In this case fear would be unauthentic because God's character
is to be affirmed to be consistent with the experience of unrestricted, absolute love, and neither arbitrary nor vengeful.

If the detraction were on the level of moral action fear might be analogous to the way some people relate to authority in their lives. They prefer to be excessively nonassertive and fearful before authority rather than exercising the responsibility to relate to the real meaning of authority and submission. The person chooses to remain comfortable with the fear to which he or she has become accustomed, and is unwilling to make the effort to dispel the dishonest relationships to which fear leads. When fear of this sort is part of religious experience it keeps the subject from pursuing a relationship with the transcendent which is morally responsible, i.e., based upon the freedom of the human subject who knows and loves a God whose love invites human creatures freely and creatively to develop themselves, in interaction with nature, one another, and with the deity.

Besides detracting from genuine love of God on the part of the religious human subject, fear can unauthentically distract the subject from loving all the way. In this case it can drive the subject to suppress the "fateful call" to holiness that it knows will mean giving up all this-worldly security. Fear of the this-worldly insecurity connected with loving God can so distract a person that she or he plunges into a frenetic pursuit of wealth, prestige, power, human contact, so-called useful work, and so on, deliberately to forget the pull toward other-worldly insecurity that rests on transcendent love.

On the other hand, when the human subject is terrified in the presence of an unrestricted love that demands total committed love in return, and feels this terror precisely because she or he honestly longs to love all the way in return, but is increasingly aware of possible devastating implications for all this-worldly security if one gives in to such love, this terror represents not a suppression of but a submission to the fateful call to holiness. When one feels terror precisely about letting oneself move toward a free and creative love without limits, such terror is a responsible mediation of movement beyond childish and adolescent to adult religious feeling. When a subject feels terror precisely because he or she is in the presence of a love that is unrestricted, inviting unrestricted love in return, then this is a terror
that belongs to a subject willing to pursue the question of
divine reality despite the dread provoked by the impending
answer. In cases such as these fear belongs authentically
to religious experience.

Finally, therefore, it seems both adequate and appropriate
to claim that there is an authentic terrifying dimension of
religious experience. It is not a cringing before an arbitrary
God nor a despairing fear before a vengeful God, but rather
a terror before the pull of unrestricted love drawing us into
the risk of loving all the way in return. Such terror does
not arise because the subject will not relate to infinite
love or because the subject will not move beyond the morbid
comfort of remaining at an earlier stage of development. The
terror described above is just the opposite of those detracting
responses to unrestricted love because it makes the subject's
awareness even keener that it is unrestricted love that is
exerting a pull within consciousness.

Nor does the terror authentically associated with re-
ligious experience encourage the subject to pursue the distrac-
tions of insufficient modes of this-worldly security. It arises
because the subject knows it cannot submit to such limited
promises of security. The subject knows it must risk all else
to seek its security only in unreserved submission to the
pull of a mysterious, unrestricted love.

NOTES

1 See Raffaele Pettazoni, "The Supreme Being: Phenomenolo-
gical Structure and Historical Development," in The History
of Religions: Essays in Methodology, ed. Mircea Eliade and
62.

2 See Friedrich Heiler, "The History of Religions as a
Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions," in Eliade

105-107. See also "Religious Commitment," in The Pilgrim Peo-
ple: A New Vision With Hope, Vol. IV of the Villanova Univ.
Symposium [Villanova: Villanova U. Press, 1970], p. 57, and
"The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern
World," in A Second Collection, ed. William F. J. Ryan, SJ
and Bernard J. Tyrrell, SJ (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,

4 Method in Theology, pp. 111, 113. See also "Religious
view of the terrifying dimension of religious experience.
He notes that fear is paradoxical in Christian religious expe-
rience since strong assurances not to be afraid are included
in the New Testament. See Holmes' Ministry and Imagination
The anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing maintains that "the superabundant love and worthiness of God himself" is so overwhelming that "at the sign of this, all nature trembles, all learned men are fools, and all the saints and angels are blinded," ed. James Walsh [NY: Paulist Press, 1981], chapter XIII, p. 148.


Does the rich young man of the Gospels choose not to follow Jesus merely because he is too much attached to wealth, or might he not also be shrinking from the demands of Jesus' love to give up all his earthly possessions in order to be free to be a disciple? See Mark 10: 17-31, and parallels.

Is Jesus' agony in Gethsemane only a fear in the face of the nothingness of death or a disgust with sin, or might it not be also a terror in the face of God whose love is so totally demanding that the uncontrollable nothingness of death is the only way to go? See Mark 14: 32-42, and parallels.


For readers unfamiliar with his work, I note that Lonergan articulates a distinction in consciousness between questions for intelligence that seek to understand, questions for reflection that seek to know the truth of one's understanding, and questions for deliberation that seek to determine decisions and action. The first type of questions looks to coherence, while the second looks to sufficient evidence for one's insights or hypotheses. The third type of question asks what one ought to do about what one knows and in what order to do it. See Method in Theology, p. 9, where the set of conscious operations implementing the first type of question is named the intellectual level of consciousness, the second the rational level, and the third the responsible level. For a fuller development of Lonergan's conception of intelligent and rational consciousness, see Insight: A Study of Human Understanding [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957], pp. 271-278. On deliberative consciousness, see Method in Theology, pp. 34-41.

Method in Theology, pp. 30-31.

See Insight, pp. 7-9, 10. See also, Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, eds. Elizabeth and Mark Morelli [NY: Mellen Press, 1980], pp. 49-51. Both texts distinguish empirical data, image and concept, and discuss the relationship among them.
Lonergan addresses the relationship between feelings and symbols in "Time and Meaning," a 1962 lecture in Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures [Montreal: Thomas More Institute for Adult Education, 1975]: "By affects and our affections (affections are something more elaborate than affects), we have our orientation in life, in the world. They reveal the direction of our living, our attitudes to the world, to other persons, to things. A symbol is an image that either induces an effect, causes the effect to arise, or, on the other hand, expresses an effect: one has the effect first and the image emerges. Images that are symbols, that is, expressions or causes of affects, also reveal the attitude and the orientation of a person in the world and towards other persons" [p. 33].

The dangerous possibility of aberrant terror has already been raised above.

Lonergan discusses the worlds of meaning: exterior, interior, theoretical, and transcendent in "Time and Meaning," pp. 44-48. See also, Method in Theology, pp. 81-85.

"Adequate" and, below, "appropriate" are used here in the sense developed by David Tracy in Blessed Rage for Order [NY: The Seabury Press, 1975]. Adequate expresses the sufficient ground for a claim (in the present case, that the fearfulness connected with unrestricted love is actually an intimation of the transcendent, loving God). See p. 55, and p. 57, n. 4, where Tracy acknowledges Schubert Ogden's original use of the terms. Appropriate expresses value (in the present case, of the terrifying dimension of religious experience as consistent with the Christian tradition about God, that it pertains to the richness of the Christian witness to God). See p. 72.