Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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In "The Origins of Christian Realism," a previously unpublished lecture presented at Regis College in 1961, Lonergan gives his account of the emergence of a Christian realist philosophy. The philosophic problem of the meaning of 'reality', Lonergan argues, was implicit in the exegetic problem posed to Clement of Alexandria as he attempted to defeat the gnostic exegesis of Scripture. The critical realist solution emerged from this effort only to remain in constant tension with the naive realism from which Trinitarian and Christological difficulties were originally attacked.

"Verification": A Survey of Lonergan's Usage," by Des O'Grady of the Milltown Institute, gathers together and compares usages of 'verification', 'verifiable' and 'verify' from Lonergan's earliest to his latest writings. It should serve as a thorough research base for further interpretive and critical studies of Lonergan's central notion of judgment.

Darrell J. Fasching, in "Theology and Public Policy," examines three responses to the challenge posed to theological social ethics by the classicist-to-modern shift. He compares and contrasts the efforts to Segundo, Ellul and Doran (under Lonergan's influence) to identify and promote "a culturally transcendent religious vision which can be applied to empirical culture in order to suggest a normative direction for private (corporate) and public (political) policy."

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Thank you for your support of METHOD.
The topic I have chosen, "The Origins of Christian Realism", is derived directly from a set of notes I put together last year [1960] on the positive part of the treatise De Deo Trino. If you want further details you can consult the first one hundred and sixty-five pages of that manual.

The question can be approached in four different ways. The title will probably suggest to many of you, if not all, the disputed question that was raised about thirty years ago in France and Belgium first of all when, in 1928, Emile Bréhier held a lecture in Brussels on the question of the existence of a Christian philosophy. His opinion was that there is no more a Christian philosophy than there is a Christian mathematics or a Christian physics; that philosophy is philosophy, and there is nothing specifically Christian about it. In 1931 Etienne Gilson, in a paper read before the Société française de Philosophie, took issue with M. Bréhier. He didn't want any confusion whatever of philosophy and theology, any mixture of their procedures, and de jure he doesn't believe too much in the capacity of unaided reason to arrive at truth. But he put forward the historical point that de facto the Greek philosophers did not anticipate and did not work out the specifically Christian conception of God as Creator, and the conception of divine providence. The philosophy that arrived at God as Creator and God as Providence was something that de facto, historically, is Christian. It arose in a Christian milieu. So at least historically there is such a thing as a Christian philosophy. And most recently he has returned to the issue in his book Un philosophe et la théologie.

In 1933 Maurice Blondel took issue with both Bréhier and Gilson. He denied that there was any parallel whatever between philosophy and mathematics, and that consequently there was no point in saying that there is no more a Catholic philosophy than there is a Catholic mathematics. He considered
Gilson's introduction of the historical element as irrelevant; and he came to his point, namely, that philosophy is not a closed, abstract system: philosophy is worked out in the concrete, and in a Christian milieu develops differently than it does in a non-Christian milieu.

Now there are three opinions there, and I think a great deal can be said for them. I think that any ultimate view of the matter is going to take something from all three. This question of Christian philosophy is not the same as my question of Christian realism, but it does provide something of an antecedent for it.

The issue can be put in more abstract terms, in more specifically philosophic terms, namely, "What precisely do you mean by a 'realism'?" And, as I have discovered, there are people who seem to think that if you hold that intellect is intelligent, then you're bound to be an idealist. And that conclusion follows if one holds certain ideas about realism. Realism is not just one type of philosophy: there is a series of different meanings of realism. And that is the point I propose to illustrate tonight by discussing an issue that is historical, namely, the origins of the Christian type of realism, that will pin down just what type of realism is specifically Christian. In its historical form -- a third approach to the issue -- one will ask, "How is it that Christianity became involved in philosophic issues, that it gravitated toward a realist position, and that it gravitated toward the specific type of realism that is characteristic of Christianity?"

There is a fourth approach to the question -- and this might be called the popular approach, one that is in everyone's mind, more or less, at the present time. It is of course an old question. Blaise Pascal in his Pensées contrasted the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of our Fathers, on the one hand, and on the other, the God of the philosophers. The God of the philosophers is an actus purus, an ens necessarium, or, if you wish, 'an unrestricted act of understanding'. It is a God that is concluded and demonstrated and proved, worked out as the conclusion to a series of theorems. On the other hand, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of our Fathers, is the God of revelation as recital. The God of Abraham is the One who did this and this and that, who said this and this and that, who promised this and this and that, who threatened this and this and that. He is conceived in what we would call the category of a person -- the One
'who', a personal pronoun --, is characterized as a man is characterized, by his deeds, by his words, by his promises, by his threats. He is a personal force acting in and forming the Hebraic tradition. So conceived, there is no attempt made to say that the symbol is merely the symbol. The one element that bears witness to that philosophic concern is the prohibition of images. Similarly, in the revelation of our Lord in the Gospels, He is set forth in exactly the same type of category. He is the one who was promised; He is the only-begotten Son of God. He is the one who did and said this and this and that, as narrated in the Gospels; who suffered and died and rose again; who sitteth at the right hand of the Father; who will come to judge the living and the dead. You have two entirely different modes of conceiving God: the one of recital of deeds about a person, in the Old Testament about God, in the New Testament about our Lord; and the other, the God of the philosophers.

But between those two conceptions of God there is a third, the God of the theologians. And it is with that conception of God that we are concerned tonight.

The theologians (or the Fathers, rather) from the second to the fourth centuries were concerned with trinitarian questions; from the fifth to the seventh, with Christological questions. And in that time they moved from the Old Testament conception of God to the conception of one divine substance in three persons; and again, from the New Testament conception of our Lord to the conception of one person with two natures, two properties, two wills, and two operations. That historical process has been a subject of historical and theological discussion for a number of centuries, in fact since Petavius. And in Scholastik, 1958, Fr. Grillmeier has two long articles, on the interpretation of the history of that discussion, and on contemporary efforts along that line. It is within this process from the God of the New Testament to the God of the theologians, of the Fathers and theologians and Councils, that I think are to be located the origins of Christian realism. In that period it was gradually discovered -- and not too explicitly; rather by results than by any reflexive and methodical formulations -- that a technical development was needed to state the truths of revelation, on the one hand without departing from Scripture and tradition, and on the other hand without exposing the Church to Christian ridicule.
The process unfolds on a rather large background. The first type, at least in, so to speak, a logical order, of Christian thinking upon the revelation concerning God and His Son was that of the Jewish Christians. And on Jewish Christianity as a specific type of thinking, Fr. Daniélou has written his Théologie du judéo-christianisme. And as he shows, in a series of works -- the Ascensio Isaiae, Pastor Hermæ, in Irenæus (in the Demonstratio Evangelica), and in Origen -- there are to be found traces of a conception, and an explicit conception, of the Son and the Holy Ghost as angels. The passage in Is. 6:3 in which the two seraphim with six wings continually cry, "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of Sabaoth", is interpreted of the Father as God, and the Son and Holy Ghost as the two seraphim. In other words, Jewish Christianity was an attempt to understand the Christian revelation within the symbols of the Old Testament. The person who first went into this matter of the angelology of the Jewish Christians was Barbel in his Christos Angelos. Werner, in his Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas, held the view that for the Jewish Christians the Son and Holy Ghost were not God, were merely creatures. And that, I think, has generally been rejected as imposing upon the Jewish Christians Greek categories which they simply did not have. What they were doing was conceiving the Son and Holy Ghost as persons, namely as angels, and angels of the highest possible order, with the greatest proximity to God. It was an attempt to conceive the Trinity within the symbolism of the Old Testament.

Another type of symbolic, or rather pseudo-symbolic, thinking was Christian gnosticism. As you know, there are four types of gnosticism: pagan, Jewish, the gnosticism (or traces of it) found in the New Testament, and finally, heretical Christian sects of maybe the second century, in which the speculative interest was dominant. As Karl Prümml says of them in his article in LTK, the fundamental aspiration or inspiration of Christian gnosticism is represented by a passage from the Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria: "Up to baptism, the Fates are true; but after baptism the astrologers no longer predict our lives. But it is not only the washing that brings us to liberty, but also knowledge (gnòsis) of what we were, what we have become, where we were, or were cast, whither we hurry, whence we have been redeemed, what is generation and what regeneration." The gnostics had
a speculative interest. But it was a speculative interest that was satisfied with a pseudo-symbolic type of thinking. Their symbols were not properly sensible; they were using abstract terms, numerology and so on, to cover over profundities and pseudo-profundities. They had a fantastic conception of the divinity as consisting of thirty eons, with all sorts of psychological and other analogies running through it. They could prove everything in their doctrine -- and did -- by appealing to the spiritual sense. The parable of the vineyard in which the lord of the vineyard goes out at the first hour, the third, the sixth, the ninth, and the eleventh -- if you add those numbers up you get thirty; therefore the Gospels testify that there are thirty eons. Not, of course, to everyone, but to those able to read the scriptures spiritually. And so on all along the line. The Ogdoad and the Decad were proved by the fact that the name 'Jesus' begins with I, the iota standing for 10 and the eta standing for 8 -- 18; and the Eight and the Ten also give you 18. They had endless proofs from Scripture, and they were almost impossible to refute, simply because they were fantastic. Irenaeus is full of this constantly recurring fantastic exegesis of the gnostic sects. If he is not refuting it, at least he is reprimanding them for what they're saying. There we have two of the types of thinking, the Jewish symbolic interpretation of the New Testament in terms of the symbols of the Old, and a gentile Greek interpretation of the New Testament in terms of the pseudo-symbolism of gnosticism.

There are more rationalistic types. The Marcionites had no interest whatever in the emanations; but they give the impression of being anti-Semitic, and they conceived the God of the Old Testament as a fierce, repellent deity from whom we have been redeemed by the God of the New Testament. Redemption, then, is from the wicked God of the Old Testament by the good God of the New. And they also practised the Higher Criticism: they accepted Paul and Luke, nothing else, and not all of them. Finally, there were the obvious antitheses with regard to our Lord. The Sabellians acknowledged His divinity but denied distinction from God the Father; the Adoptionists admitted that the Son was distinct from God the Father and concluded that He was only a man.

Now these are, as it were, background problems; they were not problems within the Greek Church. They represented
rather the lunatic fringe, so to speak, people that were not within the mainstream of thought of Christianity. But there also were problems within the orthodox or general stream of Christianity. M. Spanneut has published in Paris in 1956 *Le stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise, de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie*. He has found continuous similarities, analogies, and contacts with stoicism in Christian writers from Clement of Rome to Clement of Alexandria. Just how much this is due to the influence of stoicism and how much it is a matter of just ordinary human nature would be a difficult question to solve. Probably much more of the latter than stoic influence; they used stoic categories. But there was an influence of what we would call today 'naive realism'.

In Irenaeus there is the traditional concept of God: God is the God of the Old Testament and of the New, against the Marcionites; the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and of the Prophets; the God of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the God of the Apostolic Preaching, the God that is believed by the Church. But he also undertakes to prove that there is only one God, and his argument is largely that of the container and the contained. There must be one God that has dominion over absolutely everything, that contains everything; and it is very difficult not to find in Irenaeus a rather materialist conception behind his proof of the unity of God.

The same thing appears in Tertullian. In Tertullian the Son undoubtedly is God. Why? Because God, though He is a spirit, He certainly is a body; otherwise He wouldn't be real. A spirit to be real has to have a body, has to be a substance. And out of the divine substance there proceeds a spirit informed by the divine Word; and that is the Son. It's what has been called Tertullian's organic monotheism. Father, Son and Holy Ghost are, as it were, organic parts of one Divinity. And behind that is the type of naive realism to which Tertullian perhaps did not consciously subscribe, but de facto it was the way in which he thought. Because of that, Tertullian can hold that the Son is not eternal but came forth in time. Whether he is eternal or not is of no importance in settling His divinity; He is divine if He is made of the divine Matter, the divine Stuff. The Son can be subordinate: the Father can give the orders and the Son execute them; and that won't be against the divinity of the Son, because it isn't whether the Son is subordinate or superior that settles whether He
is divine, but what He's made of. Is He made of the divine Stuff or not? Now Tertullian doesn't put it quite so bluntly as that, but that's what his position comes to. In other words, when Tertullian makes his subordinationist utterances, for us they imply denial of the divinity. But they do not imply denial of divinity in Tertullian's mind.

In Clement of Alexandria there is a series of passages from the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* ("Excerpts from Theodotus"); Theodotus was a gnostic, and the *Excerpta* are a notebook of Clement's, and in that notebook part is Clement's own thinking and part quotations from Theodotus) -- in that work, in parts that scholars attribute to Clement himself and not to quotations, Clement is quite clearly involved in a naive realism. He speaks of the angels of the little ones, who continuously gaze upon the face of the Father; and "Blessed are the pure of heart, because they see God". But how could there be a face of the Father to see if He has no shape? The Apostle, then, knew about celestial bodies that are beautiful and intelligent, when he said, "Other is the glory of the heavenly beings and other is that of the terrestrial, other that of the angels and other that of the archangels." Compare them with the corporeal bodies we see on earth, and of course they're invisible, they're far too subtle for us to see them; but they're bodies none the less. Similarly the demons; if they had no body, they wouldn't be able to suffer from the fire of hell. And he has a series of arguments -- not only philosophical, but some are also from Scripture -- to prove that God and the angels and so on have bodies in a sense. This is a confusion of the notion of body with the notion of reality. He argues, as also Irenaeus seems to have argued before him, from the parable of Lazarus. The rich man asks Abraham to have Lazarus dip his finger in a glass of water and place it on his tongue. Well, both Lazarus and the rich man are dead, have departed from the crass bodies of this world. But obviously Lazarus couldn't have a finger to dip in the water and the rich man couldn't have a tongue on which to place the water if they had no bodies at all. There is, then, a great deal of what we would call 'naive realism'. What do you mean by the 'real'? It's what you can put your hand on. And if you extend that idea of the real, if you acknowledge the reality of God, then you have to conceive God in a manner that we should reject.
Now what pulled these thinkers and what pulled the Christian tradition out of that naive realism was the exegetical problem set by the gnostics (less by the Jewish Christians, because they received less attention). Irenaeus makes no systematic effort to get to the roots of gnostic exegesis. He proceeds much as the boxer described by Demosthenes: the barbarian boxer puts his hand up not where the blow is coming, but where he's been hit. In a similar manner Irenaeus is meeting each objection as it arises. But Clement of Alexandria in the eighth book of his *Stromateis* sets about setting up a systematic type of exegesis. He says that first of all, if you use a name, define it, and define it in terms better known than the name itself. Define it in a way that everyone will accept. And after you have agreed on its definition, ask whether anything corresponding to the name exists. And when you have settled that it exists, inquire about its nature. And then he goes on giving all the precepts of Greek hermeneutics, which he followed.

Now the necessity of that systematic procedure set up by Clement of Alexandria is seen when one thinks of gnostic exegesis. If the only interpretation of Scripture were symbolic, then you could never settle what the symbols are symbols of. And if you're going to say that the symbols are not just symbols of more symbols, then you have to have some idea of reality. And if Clement was to contribute to defeating the gnostic exegesis of Scripture (which reduced it to nonsense, really), he had to appeal to some reality, and he had to appeal to some method that settled just what the real was. You have in the exegetical problem the implicit philosophic problem, "What do you mean by reality?" And that problem of reality implicit in the exegetical problem was met by the Alexandrians by turning to Platonism. The idea that the early Christians held a spiritualist philosophy in the contemporary sense of the term is not only weakened by the examples I have indicated, but if you take Origen's *De Principiis*, Book I, he treats of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. And his treatment of God the Father, which runs over pages, is devoted entirely to proving that God the Father is a purely spiritual being, and making it absolutely clear what he meant by 'spiritual'. Moreover, Origen conceived the generation of the Son from the Father in a purely spiritual fashion. The Son proceeds from the Father by contemplation
CHRISTIAN REALISM

and love. But Origen was involved in his Platonism (it was a middle Platonism, pretty similar to that of Albinus), and while he conceived the Father as the absolute good and God simpliciter, he conceived the Son as good and God by participation. The Son is Wisdom itself and Truth itself and Revelation itself and Resurrection itself, where the 'itself' refers to the Platonist abstract idea; but the Father is something greater than these. On the other hand, the Son is not God, Divinity itself, but a participation of Divinity, not Goodness itself, but a participation of Goodness. That was Origen's Platonist solution to the problem raised by Sabellianism on the one hand and Adoptionism on the other. In Origen, naive realism has been transcended, but it has been transcended in the direction of Platonism. While Tertullian held the divinity of the Son, and truly held it, on false philosophic assumptions, Origen has a conception of the Son as a really subordinate being, not 'true God' in the sense of Nicea. We have moved to the second step in which philosophic issues were involved in Christian thinking.

A century later the Arians had brought the question back to the Hebraic and Christian categories: "Is the Son Creator or is He creature?" And they argued that the Son is not unbegotten. He is begotten, He is generated, He has an origin, He depends on someone else; therefore He cannot be the First Principle, He cannot be the Creator, He cannot be God in the proper sense of the term. On the other hand, in Athanasius, who represented and defended the Council of Nicea, the distinction, which had been clarified earlier and then obscured by the Arians, between agennêtos and agenêtos (the first is from gennaô, 'to generate', the second from gignomai, 'to become'; what is agenêton is increatum, not created; what is agennêton has not been generated) -- in Athanasius one finds fundamental reflections on the notion of creation, on the notion of God as He-who-is. The Greeks, Aristotle and Plato, had spoken of to on, what-is; but with the Old Testament, the LXX, Athanasius speaks of ho ôn, He-who-is, the masculine of the present participle of the verb 'to be'. From the fact that the Son is indeed not ungenerated (agennêtos) it doesn't follow that He has been created, that He is not agenêtos. You have fundamental reflections on the being of God in Athanasius' refutation of Arius, in his distinction between agennêtos and agenêtos, in his reflection on ho ôn, and most of all in his notion
of the consubstantiality of the Son. What does consubstantiality mean? Well, it has several meanings; but the meaning in Alexander of Alexandria, who condemned Arius, in Athanasius, and in the Christian tradition, is put very briefly in the formula, "The same statements are made of the Son as of the Father, apart from the name 'Father'." As it is put in the Preface of the Blessed Trinity in the Mass, "Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu Sancto, sine differentia discretionis sentimus." "What we believe about your glory, the kabod Yahweh, through your revelation, all that is known about the divine glory, the same of the Son, the same of the Holy Ghost, without any distinction, is what we hold." And note the difference between that formula, which was finally crystallized in the Latin Preface to the Mass, and Tertullian's position -- the difference between that naive realist conception of the divinity of the Son and the conception implicit in Nicea and explicit in Athanasius and subsequent writers. For Tertullian (and not only Tertullian, of course; that same type of thinking runs through all the writers of the Western Church, and a good deal of the East too, that naive realism) the Son is divine if He's made of the same matter as God the Father, of the same stuff. Whether He comes out early or late, whether He is subordinate or not, makes no difference; He is still divine because He is made of the right stuff. And that is a possible meaning also of 'consubstantial'. But on the other hand, when you take the real as what is known by a true affirmation, then the Son is God if you affirm the same things about the Son as about the Father. The difference there is the difference between two realisms. Is a thing real because of what it's made of, its matter, its stuff -- is that what constitutes it as reality? And that by a contact with that reality you know the real? Or is the real what you know when you truly affirm? There is an antithesis here between two meanings of the word 'realism', a fundamental antithesis, and there is an historical transition from one to the other as one follows the evolution of Christian theology in the early centuries.

Now that same realism, the realism of judgement, of truth (where 'truth' means not the truth of saying but the truth of affirming) is at the root not only of all dogmatic definitions ("Si quis dixerit..., anathema sit"), but also at the
root of the whole scholastic method in its fundamental conception. Abélard in his *Sic et Non* with regard to, I think, 158 topics, quoted the Fathers and the Scriptures both for and against these 158 propositions: "Yes, that is so; no, it is not." Exactly the same procedure had been used by the canon lawyer Gratian in his *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*. Gilbert de la Porrée defines the question. He says there is a question if, and only if, sound authorities and good reasons can be given for and against both sides of a contradiction. And the question is the fundamental tool of mediaeval thought. It has become somewhat formalized and dead, at least it seems dead, for example, in the *Summa* of St. Thomas, where automatically there is the *videtur quod non* with three reasons on one side, and *sed contra* with usually one, sometimes two, reasons for the other side, the response, and then the solutions. But if you want to see St. Thomas using the *quaestio* as a tool that's fully alive, take *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 12, where he is contradicting the position he had held in the *Sentences*. You will find that in the *videtur quod non* there are twenty-four authorities, and they're all authorities, and they're all against what he held in the *Sentences*; and then eleven more on the other side. His solution runs through about nine columns in the Vives edition. But implicit in that method of the question the issue always is saying what is true. It's the same type of thinking as you have in the dogmas: "Si quis dixerit..., anathema sit." It's the same type of thinking as you have in the meaning of 'homoousion', when 'homoousion' is taken not as identity of matter, but identity of predication.

Now, what is the origin of that Christian realism, the realism of the true affirmation? Clearly, it is the scriptural word of God. It is the word of God as a command in the law; it is the word of God as a correction in the Prophets. It is the precept of our Lord to the Apostles in the Sermon on the Mount: "Let your speech be 'Yea, yea; nay, nay'." "Sic sermo vester 'Est, est; non, non'." It is the word of God as conceived by St. Paul in Gal. 1: "If an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel different from the one I have preached to you, let him be anathema." The word of God! To say it is not true would be a blasphemy; to say it does not regard reality would be an impious trifling. And those implications of the word of God as received by the Christian communion
are the real foundations and origins, I would suggest, of Christian realism.

I thank you for your very kind attention.

NOTES


Lonergan's reference in the text is to De Deo Trino Pars Analytica, Romae, apud aedes Univ. Gregorianae, 1961.

I haven't read all of it myself, but I was told by a Frenchman that it is an extremely well-written work, just the sort of work that justifies Gilson's membership in the Académie Française.
The goal of this essay is an understanding of Lonergan's use of the term 'verify', and of its derivatives, 'verifiable' and 'verification'. The terms recur throughout the whole of Lonergan's writing career. The earliest occurrence of which I am aware is in the first paper he submitted to the Blandyke Papers, the student journal of Heythrop College where Lonergan studied philosophy. His paper was on the principles of mathematical inference. His thesis was that mathematical principles are the fruit of insight into phantasm. However, he was not in a position to apply his thesis to more than a few simple cases, and so he apologized to the reader for presenting a hypothesis "without attempting to verify it with any scientific thoroughness." At the other end of his career the term 'verified' is to be found in his comment on the method of history and the study of religions in "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion," first published in 1982. During the intervening years the term recurs, with varying frequency, in a wide variety of contexts.

1. Stages of Development

It is possible to distinguish four stages in the development of Lonergan's use of the terms 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification'.

There is an initial stage, running up to the time of Insight, when 'verification' occurs as an ordinary part of Lonergan's vocabulary. It is used without any explanation: the reader's familiarity with the term is taken for granted. The principle use of the term during this period is to refer to the process of checking one's position, which Lonergan considered an essential element of scholarly work.

The second stage begins with the writing of Insight. In the first part of that book the terms are used to denote the process of checking one's hypotheses that is such a notable feature of the method of the natural sciences. In the course of the study of scientific method the meaning of 'verification'
is filled out considerably by reference to the details of scientific procedures. Thus what was implicit in the earlier usage is made explicit, and what was previously understood mainly in relation to his own theological work, is now also understood as an element of the method of the empirical sciences.

As well as leading to a more concrete and a more detailed grasp of the meaning of 'verification' Insight also led to an extension of its use. In moving from the method of the natural sciences to generalized empirical method, Lonergan extended the understanding of data to embrace the data of consciousness as well as the data of sense. While this development does not involve any change in the process of verification, it does extend its possible relevance into new areas. Indeed, one of the major features of Insight is the claim that it contains a verifiable metaphysics and philosophy.

The use of the concept of verification in the analysis of the history of western culture marks the third stage in Lonergan's use of the term 'verify' and its derivatives. Aristotle's failure to appreciate the nature and importance of verification in human knowing was a major reason for the replacement of Aristotelian science by modern empirical science. It was a change with far-reaching consequences. It meant the emergence of a new ideal of knowledge that affected not only the scientists, but society as a whole. The obvious success of the new sciences ensured that they would be thought of as the ideal form of knowledge. What does not measure up to the standards of the empirical sciences, especially what is not verifiable in publicly accessible evidence, is suspect. When to the change in the ideal of knowledge operative in western culture is added the impact of that change upon traditional concepts of wisdom, it is clear that the development of the empirical sciences, and so of the criterion of verifiability, has been instrumental in the emergence of modern western culture.

The fourth stage in the development of Lonergan's usage of the term 'verification' was closely related to the third, and more or less contemporaneous with it. Since Lonergan understands theology as mediating "between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix" it is only to be expected that his understanding of theology will be related to his understanding of culture. He finds conceptions of theology that are based on the Aristotelian
ideal of knowledge ill adapted to the needs of contemporary culture. Only a theology that is in some sense empirical will be able to meet the needs of the present situation. So it is that we find emerging a new understanding of the role of scripture and tradition in theology.

First, then, theology was deductive, and it has become largely an empirical science. It was a deductive science in the sense that its theses were conclusions to be proved from the premisses provided by Scripture and Tradition. It has become an empirical science in the sense that Scripture and Tradition now supply not premisses, but data. ... Where before the step from premisses to conclusions was brief, simple, and certain, today the steps from data to interpretation are long, arduous and, at best, probable.

In spite of the wide variety of usages, and of occurrences at every stage of Lonergan's writing career, the meaning of the terms 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification' does not change. This is because they are descriptive terms rather than explanatory terms. Their use predates the elaboration of Lonergan's cognitional theory. They denote the process of checking one's understanding in appropriate data, a process that is exemplified most clearly in the methods of the natural sciences, but which may be found to occur in other disciplines also. It is a process that may be differentiated to meet the specific requirements of different fields of investigation, and so there may be a variety of forms of verification. Growing understanding of the verification process may show the initial use of the term, based as it is upon perceptible rather than intelligible similarities, to be either too extensive or too restrictive. In such a case there will be a change in the use or application of the term; but this does not necessarily imply a change in the meaning of the term. The only variation in meaning that can be found in Lonergan's writings are a few instances of a broad usage when verification approximates to judgment; they are of no theoretical significance.

It is now possible to specify the goal of this essay a little more precisely. It is to show that throughout Lonergan's writings 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification' are used to refer to the process of checking an understanding against the relevant data, a process that is an integral element of the method of the natural sciences. The prestige of the sciences within the modern west has established verification as an important part of the contemporary understanding of knowledge. Verification was present as an ideal in Lonergan's
work from the outset, and later as a heuristic element in his creative mediation of the traditional wisdom of Aristotle and St. Thomas to contemporary culture.

There is much that must be left for another day. I do not explore here the many differentiations of verification that can be found in Lonergan's writings. Also left aside for the present are the many questions regarding the relation between Lonergan's understanding of the process of verification and that current in contemporary philosophy of science. Left over too is the question of the validity of Lonergan's claim to have established a verifiable philosophy and metaphysics, and a theological method capable of meeting the needs and the demands of our contemporary empirically-minded culture.

2. The Early Writings: Ordinary English Usage

We have already seen that the term 'verify' occurs in the first of Lonergan's extant writings. It occurs in the introduction to the paper, in a remark that indicates to the reader the limitations of the paper. We must presume then that Lonergan intends to use the word in the way in which it was normally understood at the time, i.e., to indicate the process of checking one's ideas against the evidence. It is a process clearly associated in Lonergan's mind with science: science provides the norm of "thoroughness".15

Turning to the Oxford English Dictionary16 we find that both 'verify' and 'verification' are well established in the English language. The verb can be traced back to the 14th century; the substantive to the 16th. The earliest recorded instances of 'verify' occur within a legal setting; the reference is to acts of testifying in support of the claims of a third party. By the end of the century, however, the term seems to have been in general use, meaning "to show to be true by demonstration or evidence, to confirm the truth or authenticity of, to substantiate...", and in the passive "to be proved true or correct ... by some confirming fact or circumstance".

The connotation of empirical investigation usually associated with the word today seems to have been prominent from the 16th century onwards. Since that time 'verify' usually has meant "to establish by investigation", "to ascertain
or test the accuracy or correctness of (something), especially by examination or by comparison with known data, an original or some standard; to check or correct in this way".

It is with this more empirical meaning of the word 'verify' that the derivative, 'verification' -- first occurring in the 16th century, is particularly associated. It means the "demonstration of truth or correctness by fact or circumstances", "the action of establishing the truth or correctness of a fact, theory, statement, etc., by means of special investigation or comparison of data". A common context was that of medical investigation.

Lonergan's earliest use of 'verify' is fully in accord with what is given in the O.E.D., as is a second use in the same paper, when he writes of verifying a guess by checking the implications against the information given.17

Something not mentioned in the dictionary is the note of probability usually associated with 'verify' and 'verification' today. Since the revolution in physics at the turn of the century it has become clear that verification -- notwithstanding the meaning of the Latin roots -- establishes a probability of truth rather than truth itself. No scientist today would be surprised to hear of a theory having to be revised; revisions are part of the development of scientific understanding. However, it is possible that the connotation of probability was not part of the generally accepted meaning of the terms in 1933 when the O.E.D. was published.18 It is clear, however, that Lonergan was aware of the association of probability with verification even at this time.

In 1929 Lonergan submitted a paper entitled "True Judgment and Science" to the Blandyke Papers.19 In that paper we read:

According to logic, which is the form of demonstrative science, the only certain conclusions are deductions from self-evident propositions; hypotheses, theories, views may have any degree of probability but cannot be certainties, for absolute verification is logically impossible. The illative sense is just such an absolute verification.20

Here verification is distinguished from demonstrative knowledge -- associated with the world of ideas -- and related, through the illative sense, with knowledge of reality. It is recognized that the normal meaning of verification implies that verified knowledge cannot be certain, and this seems to be understood to mean that we cannot have any certain knowledge of existence, a conclusion the young Lonergan vigorously
rejects. He seeks a remedy for the situation by appealing to Newman's notion of the "illative sense", or more fundamentally to the criterion provided by the mind itself. Already the issues that were the life-long concerns of Lonergan are taking shape in his mind.

Lonergan's commitment in the early part of his academic career, to making the Aristotelian-Thomistic heritage his own, is well known. What time was not taken up by teaching went into historical research. The enduring results of his work are the series of articles on the thought of St. Thomas, first on the idea of operative grace, later on the meaning of word and idea in the Thomist writings. There were also occasional pieces on one or other theological issue, "Finality, Love, and Marriage" probably being the most important of them. Verification is not a thematic element in any of these studies. The term does, however, occasionally occur in them -- usually when Lonergan reflects on his method, or wishes to make the nature of his argument explicit at some particular point.

An almost classical locus for reflection upon method is the introduction to doctoral dissertations, and Lonergan's dissertation is no exception. Many of the disputes about the nature of grace and freedom, in Lonergan's opinion, were the result of unverifiable readings of the text of St. Thomas. To meet this problem Lonergan proposed an historical method that would lead to verifiable conclusions. His method was based on an understanding of the way in which the human mind works.

This 'form' of the development automatically provides a scientific viewpoint for the rest of the investigation ... it enables one who lives in a later age to understand those whose thought belongs to almost a different world, and it does so, not only by the slow and incommunicable apprehension that comes to the specialist after years of study, but logically through ideas that are defined, arguments that can be tested, conclusions that need only be verified. Thus the finer fruits of historical study are taken out of the realm of personal study and made part of the common heritage of science.

This does not give us any information on how Lonergan conceived the process of verification, but it does situate it clearly within the context of methodical research, and shows that it is part of what it means for a discipline such as history to be 'scientific'.

Two occurrences of 'verify' within the body of the thesis give some idea of how Lonergan understood the term at the
time. In each case it is a matter of returning to the text of St. Thomas' writings to show that his own interpretation of them is correct. On page 68 of Grace and Freedom he wrote: "In the two passages quoted below the reader will be able to verify the following six propositions." The six propositions, each suitably labelled, follow immediately. They are followed by the two passages from St. Thomas, with the passages relevant to the verification of the six propositions identified by the appropriate labels. The second instance, on page 114, is similar: "It will serve both to clarify the foregoing and to verify the hypothesis that we have been developing, if we turn to the manner in which St. Thomas contrasts predestination and reprobation." Clearly, interpretations are verified in the texts being interpreted.

We find an explicit account of Lonergan's understanding of the verification of historical interpretations in his review of Fr. E. Iglesias, De Deo in operatione naturae vel voluntatis operante, which he published in 1946.26 In his review Lonergan claims his criticism of Iglesias' historical method to be based on the "absolute criteria of the logic of positive investigation."27

Among other things, Iglesias claims that the view of the Thomist doctrine "Deus operatur in omni operatione naturae et voluntas" which he presents in the book is demonstrable.28 It is this claim, coupled with what Lonergan considers a very inadequate demonstration, that provokes Lonergan's criticism. Basically the criticism is that Iglesias has not provided anything like enough textual support to justify his claim. If St. Thomas' work had been systematic, then one could validly argue from a relatively small number of basic texts. But Aquinas' work is not of that sort. As Lonergan had already discovered when preparing his dissertation, Aquinas' language involves many traps for the over-hasty theorizer. There is for instance the ambiguity in St. Thomas' theory of operations -- studied by both Lonergan and Iglesias -- arising from the duality of sources, Aristotle and Avicenna, informing St. Thomas' own thought. In such a situation one will not arrive at an understanding of St. Thomas' thought from the study of a few texts.

Logically, the interpretation of a writer is a matter of formulating an hypothesis, working out its presuppositions and its implications, and verifying in the text the presuppositions, the hypothesis itself, and the
implications. Deductions of what a writer must have meant are just so much fancy; in reality they are deductions from the hypothesis assumed by the interpreter; and whether or not that hypothesis is correct can be determined only with probability, a probability that increases only with the extent and the variety of the verification. 29

All the major elements of verification are explicitly mentioned in this passage. Verification is to determine what is in fact the case. It involves an appeal to the data, the text. The interpretation to be verified is an hypothesis. Verification leads to a probability, not to a certainty.

It was not only in his historical work that Lonergan wished to verify his conclusions. In "Finality, Love, Marriage" we find that he applied the concept of verification to his work in speculative theology as well. He seeks to verify both the central thesis of the paper and particular statements occurring within the overall development of the basic thesis. Having presented his thesis he writes, "Such is the thesis; we proceed to verify it." 30 We are told that it is possible to verify that love displays a multiplicity of aspects "in any instance of love." 31 In similar fashion the upward drive which is vertical finality can be verified in at least some instances.

In the vegetal and animal kingdom it has its verification in the measure of truth that may be attributed to theories of evolution in terms of statistical laws and probabilities regarding combinations of genes through random mating. 32

The same article offers an interesting insight into the exigences underlying Lonergan's theological work. Commenting on his own work he writes:

Now if this analysis satisfies the exigences of modern data and insights, it is no less true that it leads immediately to the traditional position on the ends of marriage. 33

He is explicitly aware of two criteria governing his work as a theologian: the need to be faithful to the tradition of the Church and the need to do justice to the findings of modern science and scholarship. Though he does not mention them, his way of working suggests that he was also aware of a need to do justice to the methods of modern science and scholarship.

There are in fact clear indications that the terms 'verify' and 'verification' are associated with the notion of science in Lonergan's mind. It is science that provides the norm for verification; 34 verification belongs to the methods of positive
investigation;\textsuperscript{35} an historical method that would lead to verifiable results would be scientific;\textsuperscript{36} and finally "experimental verification" provides "a test of the sciences."\textsuperscript{37}


In Insight Lonergan distinguishes between pure and experiential conjugates. Pure conjugates occur within explanatory systems. They relate things to one another, rather than to us.\textsuperscript{38} They are implicitly defined by the sets of relations that form the system.\textsuperscript{39} 'Mass', for instance, may be thought of as the conjugate defined implicitly by Newton's law of universal gravitation -- the pattern of relationships constituted by the verified equation "would fix the meaning of the pair of coefficients m\textsubscript{1}, m\textsubscript{2}; and the meaning so determined would be the meaning of the name, mass."\textsuperscript{40} An instance of the pure conjugates occurring within Lonergan's cognitional theory is the term, 'the given'. It is defined, "not by appealing to sensitive process, but by the pure desire regarding the flow of empirical consciousness as the materials for its operation."\textsuperscript{41}

Experiential conjugates, on the other hand, describe things in their relation to us. They are descriptive rather than explanatory. They arise, not from systematic understanding, but from the insights into experience and language that enable us to classify and arrange things on the basis of sensible similarities.\textsuperscript{42} Thus flowers, fruit and vegetables are distinguished from one another on the basis of appearance and of the uses to which people put them. Different fruits are distinguished from each other by such perceptible characteristics as taste, color, size, etc. All the classifications are rooted in ordinary experience.

The two sets of conjugates differ as scientific explanation differs from commonsense description. Bodies were known to be heavy long before Newton formulated the laws of gravity; Newton's laws explain heaviness. In general, scientific questions arise from commonsense experience, and, until the science has advanced to the stage of being able to formulate theoretical correlations between the various elements of experience, they depend upon the experiential conjugates to keep their objects in focus. They are the 'tweezers' that pick out the specific areas of experience preliminary to their scientific investigation and explanation.\textsuperscript{43}
In *Insight* the terms 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification' occur as experiential conjugates. It is clear that some such terms are called for by the moving viewpoint that Lonergan adopted in the writing of the book. The first eight chapters of *Insight* are devoted to the operations of intelligence on the second level of intentional consciousness, to the direct insight. Intelligence is illustrated by the work of mathematicians, scientists and people of common sense. Only afterwards are we introduced to the notion of judgment and to the level of reflective understanding. But before that, in writing about the method of the natural sciences, Lonergan has had to explain the hypothetical nature of the scientific insight and the various ways in which scientists check their hypotheses. Verification is this process of checking, and so the term appears in *Insight* long before the nature of the judgment is analyzed. Its use is based, not on an understanding of the nature of judgment, but on the experience of the process of checking characteristic of science. It is sufficiently identified by distinguishing between what belongs to the process of discovering and formulating a scientific law, and what belongs to the subsequent process of checking or verifying it.

This understanding of Lonergan's usage finds some support in a statement that occurs in chapter eight, i.e., shortly before the judgment is explained. Towards the end of a description of "fully human knowing" he writes:

> Through questions for reflection it attains a further component which hitherto has been referred to as verification and presently will have to be examined more closely in a series of chapters on judgment, its suppositions, and its implications."

'Verification' is the 'tweezers' that keeps the object in view while the technical vocabulary of intentionality analysis is being worked out."

This understanding is borne out also by a simple comparison of the frequency of occurrence of the terms in chapters two to five, and eight, with the frequency of occurrence in chapters nine and ten. The earlier chapters deal with the direct insight in science, the later with judgment. In chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and eight respectively the frequencies are 23, 49, 34, 21 and 29. The corresponding frequencies in chapters 9 and 10 are 0 and 6. The difference can be explained very easily on the supposition that 'verify' and its derivatives
are experiential conjugates whose place is largely filled in the later parts of the book by the pure conjugates arising from the analysis of the process of reflection.

What is verification? Verification is an essential element of scientific method. It is the criterion of knowledge within the empirical sciences; what is not verified is not known, and what is not verifiable is unknowable.

Now, the empirical investigator cannot be said to know what is not verified and he cannot be said to be able to know the unverifiable. Because, then, verification is essential to his method, the canon of parsimony in its most elementary form excludes from scientific affirmation all statements that are unverified and, still more so, all that are unverifiable ...."7

Verification is what is distinctive of the empirical sciences—it makes them empirical.

... empirical science rests upon two distinct grounds. As insight grasping possibility, it is science. As verification selecting the possibilities that are in fact realized, it is empirical. 58

Verification is necessary because of the nature of scientific understanding. The intelligibility grasped by the scientist is merely a possible intelligibility. 69 It may govern the data; but it is also possible that any of a vast range of more complex hypotheses would explain it even better. 59

In general, there is no one necessary way of understanding a given finite set of data, and so there is no guarantee that the intelligibility discovered by the scientist is the correct one, the intelligibility actually immanent in the data. Verification is meant to meet this issue, distinguishing between the possibilities realized in the data and those which are not.

In its essentials the process of verification is very simple. The formulated hypotheses provide scientists both with a basis for "deduction and calculation" and with a basis for "further observations and experiments."

It is such observation and experimentation, directed by a hypothesis, that sooner or later turns attention to data that initially were overlooked or neglected; and it is attention to such further data that forces the revision of initial viewpoints and effects the development of empirical science. 81

Verification is a matter of working out the implications of the formulated laws and theories, determining the sensible consequences, devising experiments to check whether or not the sensible consequences are in fact realized.
In brief, verification is an appropriate pattern of acts of checking; acts of checking are reversals from formulations of what would be perceived to the corresponding but more rudimentary cognitional contents of acts of perceiving or sensing. In the formulation there always are elements derived from inquiry, insight, conceiving. But in virtue of the checking one can say that the formulation is not pure theory, that it is not merely supposed or merely postulated or merely inferred, that its sensible component is given. Lonergan identifies this checking with what "commonly is meant by verification."

Clearly, the process of verification involves much more than mere sensible awareness of the given. It does indeed involve such attention to the data. But the attention is guided by understanding, and particularly by an understanding of the sensible consequences implicit in the hypothesis to be verified. It also involves a reflective grasp of the significance of the realization of those consequences in the data.

...if the law of falling bodies is verified, it is not experienced. All that is experienced is a large aggregate of contents of acts of observing. It is not experience but understanding that unifies the aggregate by referring them to a hypothetical law of falling bodies. It is not experience but critical reflection that asks whether the data correspond to the law and whether the correspondence suffices for an affirmation of the law. It is not experience but a reflective grasp of the fulfillment of the conditions for a probable affirmation that constitutes the only act of verifying that exists for the law of falling bodies; and similarly it is the reflective grasp of the unconditioned that grounds every other judgment.

Underpinning Lonergan's understanding of verification is his theory of judgment as a grasp of the virtually unconditioned: "Indeed, it is in the unconditioned that we place the whole meaning and force of verification."

Verification is related to the unconditioned through the process by which insights into concrete situations are known to be correct. No matter how elaborate an empirical theory may be it must be rooted in some insight into concretely given data; otherwise it would cease to be empirical. Scientific questions are questions about data. Scientific theories answer those questions, and so they purport to be theories about the data. Now insights into data are like insights into concrete situations in that, if they are correct, they must be able to meet all the questions arising from the situation. Thus the criterion for the correctness of insights into concrete situations, including scientific insights, is that they be able to answer all the relevant questions. Verification
is the methodical implementation of this criterion in the domain of the empirical sciences. By working out the implications of an hypothesis it brings to light the further questions. By devising suitable experimental procedures it strives to answer those questions. So the process of verification is grasped by rational consciousness as headed towards the unconditioned.

By the same token it is realized that verification cannot attain the virtually unconditioned. The generalization of classical laws, for instance, always raises more questions than it can answer. All verification involves checking the laws against a finite set of discrete data. But the laws themselves refer to an abstract continuum, and so to an infinity of possible data. Consequently, there is always the possibility of further questions relating to any classical law. Again, there is a limit to the accuracy of measurements so that one may always wonder whether or not greater precision would lead to the discovery of some inadequacy in the theory. The result is that the ideal of answering all the relevant questions is unattainable, and consequently the unconditioned is unattainable. Even verified hypotheses are open to revision.

It was only with the revolution in physics at the turn of the century that the scientific community really came to appreciate the fact that a verified theory is not more than probably true.

Only when Euclid and Newton and Maxwell bowed to Riemann and Einstein and Heisenberg did it become obvious that earlier mistakes could not be knowledge of necessity and that, like earlier views, the new systems were not deductions from necessary truths, but verified conclusions from hypothetical theories. This did not mean a change in scientific procedures, not even in the process of verification. It did not even mean a change in the meaning of the word 'verification'. What it meant was a fuller understanding of the nature of science and of the nature of verification. It is the kind of development characteristic of experiential conjugates, and provides further evidence that 'verification' is such an experiential conjugate.

What we have so far considered is what Lonergan calls "direct verification". Verification may also be "indirect". Direct verification is the deliberate checking of a specific hypothesis by working out its implications and determining whether or not their sensible consequences are in fact realized.
Indirect verification is a more massive and ultimately more significant affair. It arises whenever an hypothesis is used to guide a successful operation as, for instance, when the laws of gravity and motion are used to determine the path of a projectile. "For laws guide operations successfully in the measure that they are correct. Hence, in so far as laws and their implications in a vast variety of situations are repeatedly found successful guides of operations, their initial verification is cumulatively confirmed." Indirect verification also occurs in so far as hypotheses are related to one another by the logic of the theories within which they occur, for the verification of one hypothesis is also, to some extent at least, a verification of its suppositions and consequences. The result is the cumulative verification of scientific theories.

It is easy to grasp in the foregoing account of the process of verification the importance of verification in science. It is verification that constitutes science as knowledge. In fact Lonergan on occasion summarizes his own position on reality in the phrase, "the real is the verified", and it is in such terms that the scientist too must conceive of knowledge -- "he has to think of the real ... as the verifiable". On the basis of this identification of scientific knowledge with the verifiable and the verified Lonergan is able to show the inadequacy of the Galilean distinction between the primary and secondary qualities, and also to explain his rejection of mechanistic determinism. But these are larger matters than can be dealt with here.

So far I have considered verification as involving a return to the sensibly given, and this is in accord with the common view "that empirical science is concerned with sensibly verified laws and expectations." It is also in accord with Lonergan's practice in the first part of Insight. But there is no reason why verification should not appeal to the data of consciousness as well as the data of sense. Lonergan does just this in his discussion of the self-affirmation of the knower. Having explained what "commonly is meant by verification" by describing how Boyle's Law might be verified, he goes on immediately to explain how the judgment of self-affirmation is to be verified.

Now just as there is reversal to what is sensibly given, so there is reversal to what is given consciously. Just as the former reversal is away from the understood as understood, the formulated as formulated, the affirmed as affirmed, and to the merely sensed, so also the latter
reversal is from the understood, formulated, affirmed as such, to the merely given. Hence, in the self-affirmation of the knower ... the fulfilment of conditions in consciousness is to be had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary state of the formulated where there is no formulation but merely experience.79

By this extension of the data of verification to include the data of consciousness Lonergan extends the understanding of empirical method, derived from his study of natural sciences, to include the study of the data of consciousness, and so to establish what he calls "generalized empirical method".71 It is this enlargement of the scope of empirical method and empirical verification that enables him to develop his verifiable metaphysics and philosophy. His understanding of human knowing is verified in the work of mathematicians, scientists and men and women of common sense, and also in the consciousness of each individual person. His philosophy and metaphysics are based upon his cognitional theory in such a way that "just as every statement in theoretical science can be shown to imply statements regarding sensible fact, so every statement in philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional fact."72

The understanding of verification presented in Insight is a development on that presented in the earlier writings. The major points of the earlier usage73 can still be found in Insight. Verification still involves an appeal to data; it is of formulations or hypotheses; it establishes a probability rather than a certainty of truth; it gives knowledge of the real. As in the earlier works, Lonergan still turns to the natural sciences as the most striking examples of verified theory. He also continues to write of the verification of interpretations,74 though not, to the best of my knowledge, of history. He goes beyond earlier works by explaining the relation between the process of verification and the exigences of rational consciousness: the ultimate significance of verification lies in its relation to the demand for the unconditioned. He also goes beyond his earlier usage when he expands the category of the given to include the data of consciousness. This expands the range of possible verifications enormously, and opens the way to a verifiable metaphysics.

There were other developments as well, but space permits only a brief mention of two. Firstly, some of the differentiations of verification were articulated. Pure and experiential conjugates are differently verified;75 so too are classical
and statistical laws. Direct and indirect verification are also distinguished from one another. Secondly, common sense is not verifiable. Since the nucleus of insights constitutive of common sense cannot be given precise formulation, common sense lacks the correspondence with concrete situations necessary for its verification. This exclusion of common sense from the field of the verifiable highlights the obvious fact that verification depends on a certain precision of formulation; and the not so obvious fact that there are bona fide judgments that are not verifiable. Verification is an adaptation of the demand for the unconditioned to the special case of systematic understanding of the data of experience, a case exemplified in our culture by the empirical sciences.

This development of understanding without a change in the terminology is possible because the terms 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification' have a heuristic function and not an explanatory one. What is going on in Insight is a discovery of the nature of verification. The term verification serves to identify what it is that is being studied, and ensures that what is eventually understood is what initially one sought to understand. It provides the element of continuity in the development in much the same way as the enduring notion of a "free fall" enables one to find the common object that unites theories in Aristotle, Galileo, Newton and Einstein.

It is an easy matter to show the continuity of the understanding of verification presented in Insight with that occurring in later writings. However, there is no need to give it separate consideration, as the rest of the present essay is concerned with the later writings.

4. Classical and Modern Cultures

The Epilogue to Insight reveals some of Lonergan's concerns at the time. They are the concerns of the Catholic theologian rather than those of the modern philosopher. He is concerned with the difficulties that the development of scientific reason has caused for Catholics. Insight, in so far as it works out an adequate cognitional theory, goes some distance towards meeting that problem. But there remains the issue of theological method, and to that Insight can be no more than a remote contribution. Part of the issue is the need to understand the relation between theology and the empirical human sciences. The emergence of the empirical human
sciences has posed for the modern theologian a problem which Lonergan likens to that posed for the medievals by the introduction of Aristotelianism into their world. It was Lonergan's belief that the reconciliation of theology with the other sciences lies in the "inner dynamism of inquiry." If he is right in this, then clearly his claim that Insight is a remote contribution to the method of theology is justified.

It was through his analysis of the history of European culture that Lonergan was able to exploit this understanding of the needs of contemporary theology. In the wake of the scientific revolution, and because of it, European culture underwent a major change. Modern culture is far removed from its Aristotelian predecessor -- the culture which formed much of our theological heritage. Indeed, scientific theology was a creation of Aristotelianism! In a number of papers presented or published in the mid and late '60's Lonergan contrasted the two cultures. The following treatment is typical:

On point after point the two conceptions were opposed. In the Aristotelian notion necessity was a key category; in modern science it is marginal; it has been replaced by verifiable possibility. For the Aristotelian science is certain; for the modern, science is no more than probable, the best available scientific opinion. For the Aristotelian, causality was material, formal, efficient, exemplary or final; for the modern, causality is correlation. For the Aristotelian, science was a habit in the mind of an individual; for the modern, science is knowledge divided up among the scientific community; no one knows the whole of modern mathematics, modern physics, modern chemistry, or modern biology, and so on.

The theological context of the paper from which this quotation is drawn, and Lonergan's own intellectual interests, clearly influence the aspects of culture that Lonergan singles out for consideration. His interest is in the scientific ideals of the two cultures. There are three basic contrasts: between individual possession and community possession; between causality and correlation; between the certain and necessary and the probability of verified possibilities.

Lonergan attributes the shift from causality to correlation to Galileo. "Galileo inaugurated modern science by insisting that the nature of weight was not enough; from sensible similarity, which resides in the relation of things to our senses, one must proceed to relations that hold directly between things themselves." Since the correlations discovered are no more than possible understandings of the data, the new science needed the check of experimental verification
if it was to escape arbitrariness. Thus, implicit in the shift from causality to correlation is the shift from the certain and necessary to verified possibility. This shift was assured by the "ground rule of the Royal Society that excluded from consideration questions that could not be settled by an appeal to observation or experiment." It was this rule that formally established the empirical sciences as autonomous disciplines. Natural science was at last effectively freed from its long subordination to metaphysics.

The development of the natural sciences effectively created a new ideal of knowledge that has gradually become operative throughout the whole of western culture. Its impact has been felt in every area of modern scholarship. It was the ideal of knowledge implicit in the Newtonian sciences that gave rise to the empiricism of Hume and the critical philosophy of Kant. It has led to new standards of scholarship in interpretation, history and the study of religion. By their success the empirical sciences have established themselves in the culture as a whole, both at the popular and scholarly levels, as the valid instances of knowledge.

Unfortunately, the ideal of verification is usually associated, in modern thought, with the positivistic insistence on sensible evidence. In so far as this is the case, "the only discourse that is considered meaningful is discourse that can be reduced to, or verified in, or at least falsifiable by sensible objects." It is also commonly associated with the simplistic view that reduces knowledge to observation. "Vulgarly, verification seems to be conceived as a matter of taking a look, of making an observation."

This analysis of modern culture throws light upon the significance of Lonergan's methodological investigations. They show his methodology to involve a critique of the modern ideal of knowledge. It is not a negative critique; the ideals of empirical science are affirmed. It is a dialectical critique, for that ideal is shown to be caught up, in many instances, with the positivistic counterposition. It is a liberating critique, for it makes clear the shortcomings of the classical ideal, thereby enabling it to transcend the limitations of the earlier ideal.

The rejection of positivism was not new to Lonergan. But it was only in the articulation of the differences between
the Aristotelian and the modern cultures that the inadequacy of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge in the present empirically-minded culture was recognized fully.

Necessity had been a key notion in the Aristotelian position.\(^6\) It resulted in a "mistaken notion of system that supposes that it comprehends eternal verities."\(^7\) Lonergan proposes, in place of that notion of system, an "empirical notion of system that regards systems as successive expressions of an ever fuller understanding of the relevant data and that considers the currently accepted system as the best available scientific opinion."\(^8\) The basic truths of such a system, are found to be, not necessities, but verified possibilities. In this it follows modern scientific method rather than Aristotelian.\(^9\)

The change is advocated, not as a matter of expediency, bringing Catholic theology into line with contemporary scientific practice, but because modern science has proven its superiority to the Aristotelian logical ideal.\(^10\) The necessary premises for necessary deductions simply do not exist. Commenting on Aristotle's account of the derivation of the first principles of knowledge, Lonergan writes:

> But it is not at all clear that a necessary truth will be discovered and not a mere hypothesis, a mere possibility that has to be verified if it is to merit the name not of truth but of probability. If the only premises the *Posterior Analytics* can provide are just hypotheses, verifiable possibilities, then we have many words about causal necessity but no knowledge of the reality.\(^11\)

The basic issue, in the development of modern culture, is the choice of the verifiable possibility rather than the necessary truth. Lonergan's use of the concept of verification as a tool for the analysis of the historical development brings the issues into sharp focus, articulates the differences between the two cultures, and, without rejecting the values of the old, makes possible an informed choice of the new. It also provides the clues needed for the articulation of theological method.

5. An Empirical Theology

Up to the beginning of the present century, and even beyond, theology was conceived of along classical lines. It was concerned with certainty rather than understanding, and it owed its mode of proof to the dogmatic theology of Melchior Cano. It searched the Scriptures and the Tradition for its premises, and from them it deduced the various theological
doctrines that were to be upheld. Its goal was certain proof of universal and eternal verities. It was innocent of any sense of history.\textsuperscript{102}

Lonergan finds this conception of theology incompatible with the methods and the standards of modern science.\textsuperscript{103} Its basic defect, in his view, is its failure to take the historical nature of its sources into account.\textsuperscript{109} It is also a conception of theology that is on the wane. Its limitations have been recognized by theologians for some time, and over the past century a new empirical theology has gradually established itself among them. In view of his understanding of culture and of the relation between theology and culture, it is hardly surprising that Lonergan finds this a welcome development.\textsuperscript{105}

It is, however, a development that has created problems of integration for theologians. It has cut the dogmatic theologian off from his or her sources. No individual could hope to master the varied specializations relevant to the data of even one of the traditional theological tracts. This was one of the problems that motivated Lonergan's own work on theological method.

But modern scholarship set up an endless array of specialists between the dogmatic theologian and his sources. ... Along with the changes in the notion of science and the notion of philosophy, it has been my motive in devoting years to working out a Method in Theology.\textsuperscript{106}

The conception of theology presented in Method in Theology is empirical. The proper function of the first phase -- research, interpretation, history and dialectic -- is to establish results by an appeal to the data. These results, along with the objectification of conversion in foundations, ground the specialties doctrines, systematics and communications.\textsuperscript{107}

Lonergan, perhaps contrary to expectations, does not claim that this empirical theology is verifiable. We have seen that Lonergan wrote earlier of interpretation and history as verifiable. The specialty, foundations, seems to be an extension of the foundational work of Insight. Insight's foundations he claims to be verifiable, and to be the verifiable grounds of metaphysics and philosophy.\textsuperscript{108} Why, then, does Lonergan not extend this usage in Method in Theology?

The distinction between the sciences and common sense was introduced in Insight, and we have seen that one of the differences between them is that the basic core of commonsense
VERIFICATION

judgments is not verifiable. Method in Theology makes this a threefold distinction between science, scholarship and common sense.

I wish to propose a convention. Let the term, science, be reserved for knowledge that is contained in principles and laws and either is verified universally or else is revised. Let the term, scholarship, be employed to denote the learning that consists in a commonsense grasp of the commonsense thought, speech, action of distant places and/or times. Men of letters, linguists, exegetes, historians generally would be named, not scientists, but scholars.109

Lonergan does not seem to comment on the way in which this is a departure from his earlier usage, even from the usage of Insight. He does, however, explain the new position rather fully in Method in Theology.

Explaining the nature of historical judgments, Lonergan writes:

Because they have no claim to universality, the discoveries of the historian are not verifiable in the fashion proper to the natural sciences; in history verification is parallel to the procedures by which an interpretation is judged correct.110

Turning to his account of interpretation, we find that interpretation involves the self-correcting process of learning,111 and that judgments on the correctness of an interpretation have the same criterion "as any judgment on the correctness of commonsense insights," i.e., whether or not they meet all the relevant questions.112 Thus, interpretation and history are assimilated to commonsense rather than to science. Their dependence on the data is not being denied, but the process of checking is no longer considered comparable with the scientific process of verification. This is a clear departure from the usage of the dissertation, of the article "On God and Secondary Causes," and even from the usage of Insight.

The new position is explained further in the chapter on history and historians. There Lonergan distinguishes explicitly between the ways in which scientists and historians check their results. Because of the universality of science its conclusions "can be checked in endless different manners"; historical description and narrative, on the other hand, "while it can come under suspicion in various ways, is really checked only by repeating the initial investigation."113 Science and history differ further in the matter of rigor and system.

Scientists define their terms systematically, formulate their hypotheses precisely, work out rigorously the suppositions and implications of the hypotheses, and
carry out elaborate programs of observational or experimental verification .... But the historian finds his way in the complexity of historical reality by the same type and mode of developing understanding, as the rest of us employ in day-to-day living.\textsuperscript{114}

The historian, like the person of common sense, "operates in the light of his whole personal development, and that development does not admit complete and explicit formulation and acknowledgement."\textsuperscript{115}

A full explanation of this change in Lonergan's usage would require an historical study of Lonergan's own development, and that remains to be done. As far as the evidence we have considered goes, it seems that the change is due both to a fuller grasp of the nature of the methods of the scientist and of the historian or exegete, and to a shift in the context of Lonergan's own thinking. In his earlier work Lonergan was stressing the need for a more methodical, empirical approach to theology, and so stressed the similarities between science and theology. In \textit{Method in Theology}, however, the goal is an accurate account of the methods of the various specialties, and this brings the differences into prominence.

In spite of this, the meaning of 'verification' itself has not changed. It still denotes the process of checking particularly associated with the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{116} What has changed is Lonergan's understanding of the relation between the sciences and the other disciplines, and of course, with it, the connotations of the term.

Turning to the functional specialty, foundations, we again find Lonergan unwilling to speak of them as verifiable. The foundational reality is conversion,\textsuperscript{117} and it is objectified in the functional specialty, foundations.\textsuperscript{118} Now, intellectual conversion is foundational in philosophy, and so there is a sense in which \textit{Insight} is a work in foundations -- the foundations of philosophy. Lonergan does not hesitate to write that the cognitional theory presented in \textit{Insight}, upon which he develops his metaphysics and philosophy, is verifiable, and indeed verified.\textsuperscript{119} By analogy, then, we might expect to find that the theological foundations are also verifiable. But Lonergan is very noncommittal on the matter. He affirms that the gift of grace, though not always adverted to, understood, and verified, is nevertheless conscious.\textsuperscript{120} Thus it provides an empirical basis for foundations. But whether or not it grounds a verifiable discipline is another matter.
Lonergan seems to suggest the opposite: "Cognitional self-transcendence [i.e., intellectual conversion] is neither an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible datum of consciousness to be verified." If intellectual conversion is so in accessible, it is not likely that moral and religious conversion are open to easy verification either. A fortiori the objectification of intellectual, moral and religious conversion will be difficult to verify.

Briefly, the evidence is that *Method in Theology* presents a theology that is grounded in the data, and so is an empirical theology. But it does not claim that it is a verifiable theology. Theological conclusions are justified by the self-correcting process of learning, a process characteristic of common sense rather than of science. Lonergan suggests that such knowledge, exemplified by exegesis and history, be called scholarship to distinguish it from science, on the one hand, and common sense, on the other.

**Conclusion**

My goal has been an understanding of Lonergan's use of the words 'verify', 'verifiable' and 'verification'. My hypothesis is that they are descriptive terms denoting the process of reflective understanding that is most clearly exemplified by the method of the natural sciences. Though the hypothesis is not without its difficulties, the evidence, drawn from every period of Lonergan's writings, is that that is the basic meaning of the term, even if it is occasionally used more broadly, i.e., to include commonsense or even as a synonym for judgment.

In spite of the continuity of denotation, however, the connotation of the terms has not been constant. In the early period, when Lonergan was trying to move away from a deductivist theology, verification was thought of as opposed to demonstration, so that any study that appealed to data rather than to demonstration was thought of as verifiable, assimilated to the ideal represented by the natural sciences. In this period interpretation and history were counted among the verifiable disciplines. By the time he came to write *Method in Theology*, however, the struggle with deductivist theology was a thing of the past. Empirical theology had established its claim to a hearing. The concern in *Method in Theology* was to understand the method proper to each of the functional
specialties as accurately as possible. Within that context of thought the differences between the methods of history and interpretation and the methods of the sciences seemed considerable, and history and interpretation were assimilated to common sense rather than to the sciences. Thus it seems best to explain the change in Lonergan's later usage of the terms by the changed context of his thought rather than by a change in the meaning of 'verification'.

The present study, of course, does no more than open up the field for further investigation. As Lonergan might say, it has been concerned with the meaning of the words, and not with an understanding of the objects to which the words refer. However, it does make that further study more accessible. It has identified the primary meaning of the terms, and the different ways in which they occur at different times in Lonergan's writings. Thus it brings to light the basic questions relevant to a study of verification. It also points the way to their orderly treatment.

NOTES

1 "The Form of Mathematical Inference," Blandyke Papers 283 (January 1928), 126. The Blandyke Papers were circulated privately within the college. Copies of Lonergan's contributions are available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto.


"The explanation of verification in "On God and Secondary Causes" is prompted by the need to explain the grounds of his criticism of Fr. Iglesias' book. The article first appeared as a book review in Theological Studies, 7 (1946): 602-613. It has been reprinted in Collection, ed. F. Crowe [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967]. The relevant passage is on p. 62 of that printing.

5 Insight, p. 72; see also p. 326. 6 Ibid., xi.


9 "...In our day the obvious instance of valid knowledge is science. Science is empirical." "Natural Knowledge of God," A Second Collection, p. 120. First published in Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 23 (1968): 54-69.


Two applications of the term 'verification' that Lonergan questions in his later work are the application to history and interpretation, and to the proof of God's existence. On history and interpretation, see Method, pp. 162, 180, and on God's existence see "Natural Knowledge of God," A Second Collection, pp. 120ff.

Sometimes common-sense judgments seem to be included within the scope of verification; see, for instance, The Philosophy of God, and Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973], pp. 5 and 28.

See n. 1 above. 16 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933.

Blandyke Papers, 283 (January 1928), pp. 135ff.

The new edition, currently in preparation, has not reached 'V' yet.

291 (Feb. 1929), 195-216. 20 Ibid., 195ff. 21 Ibid., 209ff.

Ibid., 210.


Collection, p. 61. 28 Ibid., 54. 29 Ibid., 62. 30 Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 23. 32 Ibid., 44. 33 Ibid., 49. 34 See n. 1 above.

35 See n. 27 above. 36 See n. 25 above.


Insight, 79, 37ff. 39 Ibid., 80. 40 Ibid., 383.

See Ibid., 37ff., 79ff. 3 Ibid., 291ff. 44 See Ibid., 34ff.

4 Ibid., 252. 46 Ibid., 291.
"The Scientist may affirm what he can verify, and may not affirm what he cannot verify." Ibid., 135.

"Fifthly, it notes that this intelligibility is hypothetical. It does not impose itself upon us .... It announces itself as a possibility, .... Now the necessary must be, but the possible, though it can be, may, in fact, be or not be." Ibid., 78.

"...any of a vast range of more elaborate curves could equally well pass through all the known points." Ibid., 34.

"The self-correcting process of learning consists in a sequence of questions, insights, further questions, and further insights that moves towards a limit in which no further pertinent questions arise .... Because the self-correcting process of learning is an approach to a limit of no further pertinent questions, there are probable judgments that are probably true in the sense that they approximate to a truth that as yet is not known." Ibid., 300.

"At once it follows that the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further pertinent questions." Ibid., 284.

This is most concisely explained in the lectures on Insight which Lonergan gave at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1958. They have since been published under the title Understanding and Being: An Introduction and Companion to INSIGHT, eds. E. A. Morelli and M. D. Morelli [New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980]. See pp. 153ff.


"Natural Knowledge of God," A Second Collection, pp. 124ff. Also Method, p. 43.

"Insight," p. 75; Understanding and Being, p. 153.

"Insight," p. 75; Understanding and Being, p. 99.

"The empirical investigator cannot be said to know what is not verified and he cannot be said to be able to know the unverifiable." Insight, p. 79.

"... Galileo's repudiation of secondary qualities as mere appearance is a rejection of the verifiable as mere appearance." Ibid., p. 85.

"But we cannot but reject the mechanist belief that reality consists in imaginable elements as imagined, for such images as images are unverifiable; ...." Ibid., p. 480.

"Ibid., 72. Ibid., 327ff. Ibid., 72. "Ibid., xi.

"See, for instance, n. 29 above." Insight, 581, 590.


"Insight, 576. "Ibid., 733.

"...there is a contribution to the method of theology itself and though this contribution is remote, it may prove to be nonetheless fruitful." Ibid., 733.
81 Ibid., 743. 82 Ibid., 744.

83 On the impact of the scientific revolution, see "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," A Second Collection, 103ff.

84 "The Future of Thomism," A Second Collection, p. 51. This paper was first delivered at St. Paul's Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on March 15, 1968. For other examples see A Second Collection, 91-93, 103ff, 139ff, 201, 235-237.


86 Insight, 38.

87 "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," A Second Collection, p. 106.

88 Ibid., 108.

89 Alan Richardson, History, Sacred and Profane [London: SCM, 1964], p. 79 stresses the extension of the scientific revolution into history.


93 "Natural Knowledge of God," A Second Collection, 122.

94 Ibid., 124. "...Verification is imagined by the naive to be a matter of looking .... verification in fact is found to be ... a cumulative convergence of direct and indirect confirmation ...." "The Dehellenization of Dogma," A Second Collection, 31. First published as a book review in Theological Studies, 28 (1967): 336-351. See also A Second Collection, p. 273.

95 See, for instance, Insight, 671ff.

96 "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," A Second Collection, 103ff.

97 Philosophy of God, and Theology, 49. 98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., 8.


103 "Philosophy and Theology," A Second Collection, 196.


105 Ibid., 57-60. Lonergan conceives of theology as a reflection upon religion that mediates between religion and culture; see, for instance, Method, xi; Philosophy of God, and Theology, 22.
"Philosophy of God, and Theology," 32.

As the first phase arises from the almost endless multiplicity of data to an interpretative, then to a narrative, and then to a dialectical unity, the second phase descends from the unity of a grounding horizon towards the almost endlessly varied sensibilities, mentalities, interests, and tastes of mankind." Method, 142.

Method, 233ff. See also pp. 274 and 281. Lonergan himself does not always adhere to this convention. In "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" he writes of history as verifiable; Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Society, 51 (1977): 139. And in "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion" he writes of history and religious studies as verifiable; Lonergan Workshop III, p. 179.

Method, p. 180. Note the ambiguous use of the terms "verifiable" and 'verification' in this text.

Ibid., 158ff. Ibid., 162. Italics in original. Also, 167.

Ibid., 219. Ibid., 216.

See ibid., 43, 216, 259, 264. Also A Second Collection, 31, 65 and 126.

Method, 130, 267-70. Ibid., 355; also see 266, 299.

See Method, 257, 286, 343; also A Second Collection, 236, and Philosophy of God, and Theology, 8.


Method, 243.

See, for instance, Philosophy of God, and Theology, 5, 28.


1. Introduction

An enormous gulf separates modern culture from all previous cultures. It is a gulf which has far-reaching consequences for human self-understanding and conduct. Traditional societies, since the beginning of the human adventure, have understood themselves normatively; that is, their social structures were thought of as being fixed and given with a sacrally originated order of nature as established by the sacred power(s) (e.g., the sacred ancestors, the gods, God, etc.). The human self likewise was understood as a fixed "human nature" embedded in the cosmic order. Whether this "human nature" was understood in terms of myth or metaphysics, it followed that the way things are (i.e., "in the time of origins," or "in essence") is the way things ought to be, and any departure from this order was viewed as unnatural and immoral. In such fashion, says Peter Berger, religion served to cosmicize the contingent and arbitrary order of society, so as to make it appear as part of the fixed and normative order of nature.1

Modern society represents a profound shift in human self-understanding. Modern culture, Bernard Lonergan observes, "is not normative but empirical .... so it is that modern culture is the culture that knows about other cultures, that relates them to one another genetically, that knows all of them to be man-made."2 With the emergence of critical historical consciousness in the nineteenth century, came an awareness of the variety of concepts of "nature," and "human nature" throughout history and across cultures. The very emergence of this awareness marked a loss of innocence which spelled the end of our understanding of culture as a normative expression of the order of nature.

In addition, modern society differs from traditional societies in being more highly differentiated. Modern society
is divided into three semi-autonomous systems: (1) the techno-economic, (2) the political and (3) the cultural. The first two belong to the infrastructure of social systems. The third is the superstructural realm of culture in which the symbolic sources of legitimation and delegitimation of social order emerge in education, art, religion, etc. In traditional societies these three systems tend to be unified in the compact symbolism of the cosmic (natural) order expressed in myth. The institutions of such a society are seen as part of the natural landscape, like trees and mountains. You do not ask them to become other than what they are, only to realize their natural inner telos.

In a modern society institutions themselves, which had been the backdrop for the drama of individual actors, come to be seen as a new set of actors. For the first time in human history we have come to think of human institutions as themselves "agents" in some sense analogous to human agency (as modern law acknowledges by recognizing corporations as "artificial persons"). In fact, what separates our technological civilization from all previous civilizations is the idea of "management." This concept expresses our awareness of institutions as artificial constructs, created by human intentionality, which therefore are capable of being shaped and changed.

Rooted in the emergence of the socio-historical and psychological sciences in the nineteenth century, managerial consciousness came to be embodied most completely in the techno-economic system with the emergence of the modern business corporation. This same intentionality reappears in the political system as the process of "public policy" whereby society as a whole can be shaped and changed. Finally, this intentionality appears in the cultural system with the emergence of social ethics. It is no longer sufficient for ethical reflection to simply focus on the agency of individuals. Today we are forced to reflect on the agency of institutions which set the parameters for individual agency. Thus the uniqueness of modern consciousness is summed up in the conjunction of these three cultural innovations which express the tripartite differentiated unity of modern civilization: management, public policy and social ethics.

Socio-historical consciousness forced us to see culture as a human artifact capable of being shaped and changed. It forced us into a technological understanding of self and society
(e.g., the existential self and the managerial society). We became aware that we do not dwell so much in nature as in culture, a linguistic world of mediated meaning in which language is inherently technological and utopian -- expressing the distinctively human capacity to rearrange nature and transform society. Such a self-understanding makes us a civilization uniquely preoccupied with public policy, i.e., with forging a consensus on the norms and techniques by which society is to be transformed.

It is the tragic paradox of our time that the increase of our power over nature and society has been in inverse proportion with our capacity to discover a normative consensus by which to govern the exercise of this power. With the disappearance of the normative notion of culture and its replacement with an empirical and technological understanding of culture, we are faced with what I believe to be the most serious and pressing problem of our time: the discovery and articulation of the philosophical and theological foundations of a normative social ethics whereby culture and social institutions can be critiqued and hence shaped and changed through those public policies and personal commitments which will truly promote the human good.

The problem we face is that the right ordering of the techno-economic and political systems of our society depends on value orientations which come from a cultural sphere now understood as empirical, technological and normless in its pluralistic relativism. The crisis of our time, as Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, is that we live in a Nietzschean world of normlessness, in which all ethical choice is reduced to arbitrary personal preference. As a result moral disagreements are reduced to ideological struggles based on the will to power.5

The task of social ethics is the distinctively modern one of bringing normative judgments to bear on institutional behavior. And once you begin to reflect on the behavior of institutions, you soon discover that you are engaged in the task of applying normative judgments to the entire complex of institutions and cultural legitimations which constitute a society. This leads to the realization, as Paul Tillich once pointed out, that in a modern culture traditional ethics has to be replaced (or at least supplemented) by a theology of culture, -- a normative critique of culture as a whole.6
The task and challenge of a theology of culture (i.e., theological social ethics) in this situation is to identify and promote a culturally transcendent religious vision which can be applied to empirical culture in order to suggest a normative direction for private (corporate) and public (political) policy. A religious vision, however, is not immune to the problems of cultural relativity and therefore must itself be prepared to meet some publicly intelligible, self-authenticating definition of transcendence. Apart from such a notion, any religious claim to promote transcendence will itself appear to be just another arbitrary expression of the will to power.

The project which I am undertaking here is to analyze three important theological approaches to this challenge -- the tradition of Barthian neo-orthodoxy as represented by Jacques Ellul, the liberation theology tradition as represented by Juan Luis Segundo and the tradition of Bernard Lonergan's transcendental theology as represented by Robert Doran. My concern will be to do a comparative analysis of the way in which each understands the relation of transcendence to social process and by implication, the way in which the church and the theologian can and ought to influence the shape of public policy.

The procedure for carrying out this task will be rather straightforward. I shall compare and contrast the theological positions of Segundo, Ellul and Doran first regarding their understanding of "society, ideology and transcendence" and then concerning the relation of "ideology, transcendence and theological method." I shall first address Segundo in Section 2, then contrast him with Ellul in Section 3 and finally contrast both with Doran in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, I shall conclude with some comparisons concerning these three authors and make some final suggestions concerning the role that theology ought to play in shaping public policy.7

2. Juan Luis Segundo

A. Society, Ideology and Transcendence

In contemporary society, as Segundo sees it, both personal and societal transcendence are blocked by social structures which are frozen in place by ideological legitimations masquerading as common sense. The infrastructure of functional social and economic relationships is so arranged that it favors certain classes at the expense of others. And at the same time
the fundamental interpretation of reality embodied in the
superstructure serves to legitimate the bias built into society
in favor of the "ruling elite" by making it seem as if the
social structure simply expresses the fundamental laws of
reality. The goal of a liberation theology as he imagines
it, is to unmask this ideological bias and inaugurate a social
revolution which would seek to transform society so as to
make its social structures more just and equitable. The problem
is how to identify and promote transcendence within the struc-
tures of social process so as to open up a closed society.8

While much of Segundo's analysis is rooted in Marx, he
modifies Marx on two fundamental points. He insists (1) that
Marx was inconsistent in holding that religion, unlike other
elements of the superstructure, can only serve as an ideology
and never as an instrument of social transformation. And he
insists (2) that Marx is likewise inconsistent in holding
that revolution can only begin in the infrastructure, since
he himself also engaged in criticism of superstructural ideolo-
gies in an attempt to help promote such revolution.9 Here
Segundo sides with Max Weber, whom, he argues, complements
rather than contradicts Marx's fundamental position. For Weber
showed that the emergence of a capitalist infrastructure de-
pended in significant ways on the emergence of a "protestant
ethic" in the superstructure, and that the relation between
the two is fundamentally dialectical.10

In Segundo's view, religion (and specifically Christianity)
ought to introduce transcendence into society. What transformed
Christianity from an instrument of social change into an in-
strument for the ideological justification of the status quo, in
his view, is the fundamental theological decision that
was made in the early church to understand its mission as
saving the whole world through a process of conversion.11 Thus,
from the time of Constantine, Catholicism became a religion
of the masses.

Following Max Weber's analysis, he argues that as Chris-
tianity went from being a minority religion to a religion
of the masses, it abandoned its charismatic characteristics
and underwent routinization. To the degree that Christianity
became a religion of the masses, it accommodated itself to
the ideologies of the status quo. Such a process "is the psy-
cho-social precondition ... for the social consensus that
permits a socio-political system to continue in operation."12
This accommodation to the status quo, which is simply seen as accepting the reality of our commonsense world, continues to play a decisive role among many Latin American (and other) bishops, who, Segundo argues, remain inclined to favor popular folk Catholicism over the minority movements which express liberation theology. These bishops see their vocation as serving the goal of realizing a universal church. But Segundo is personally convinced that the original message of the Gospel was aimed not at the masses so much as "at minorities who were destined to play an essential role in the transformation and liberation of the masses."¹³

For Segundo, it is a matter of sociological and historical consciousness to recognize that social transformation requires a break with dominant patterns of societal routine which can only be initiated by a minority. Only a minority, which is not participating fully in the rewards of the dominant ideology, is in a position to be conscious of the dominant ideology and unmask its role in promoting injustice. "Freedom becomes an intolerable burden, and only a 'heroic' minority can bear its weight."¹⁴ The logical conclusion, then, is that if Christianity is to serve as a force for human liberation, liberation theology must not shrink from promoting a minority form of Christianity. Such a decision, he argues, is methodologically crucial. For "whether they realize it or not, theologies will be methodologically distinct and opposed depending on the way in which they tend to relate the Christian message to either mass or minority ideas and lines of conduct."¹⁵

B. Ideology, Transcendence and Theological Method

It follows from Segundo's social analysis that a liberation theology must be socially located among the minority groups of a society in order to effect a critique of its superstructure and inaugurate a revolution in its infrastructure. There are, however, at least two accusations which might be leveled against this conclusion: religiously it sounds like sectarianism and socially it sounds like elitism.

To answer the religious problem, Segundo appeals to the theology of Karl Barth. For "in Barth's eyes a universal victory of Christ over Adam implied that even faith ceases to be a precondition for justification and salvation. For him faith is not a human disposition for winning divine salvation but rather a recognition of the fact that redemption and salvation
has been granted to all." What Barth does is sever the relation between conversion and salvation. Salvation is universal while conversion is understood as a call to vocation -- a call to be a "leaven" for the transformation of society. Thus Christianity can be a minority movement without being sectarian in the strict sense, since being Christian gains one no special ticket into the kingdom. The message of the Gospel, says Segundo, is that "God does not divide humanity thus to save the few and hurl the many into perdition .... Instead we could say that he uses the numerical few as a leverage point for raising up the many."  

At the same time Segundo argues that his position is not socially elitist either. "There is no scientific value at all," he argues, "in dividing human beings into masses and minorities without specifying what fields or attitudes or activities we are talking about. All of us ... are by definition, masses and minorities." Like Luther's saint who is also always a sinner, we all find ourselves being both at the same time. We all belong to both categories because it is a condition of finitude that we must conserve energy. "In order to save energy for attitudes we value more highly in existence, we choose not to choose in most of the rest of our lines of conduct."  

Transcendence occurs in society precisely through the dialectical interaction of masses and minorities, in which the mass routines of society represent the factors of finitude and limitation and the minority movements the factors of transcendence and transformation. "All minority growth simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by the rise in the level of mass conduct. And that signifies a cultural revolution."  

Once one grasps the necessity for the social location of liberation theology among minorities, one can understand the logic of Segundo's theological methodology. In Segundo's view, all human thought is ideological, i.e., represents particular interests and a particular viewpoint. That in itself is not necessarily bad. Only when interests of minorities are contrasted to those of the majorities does the reality of the injustice of some ideologies become visible.  

Segundo does not believe there is such a thing as an objective point of view. Among sociologists, he would argue, those who most claim to be objective tend to be those who have accepted the ideology of the status quo (e.g., positivists
Likewise every theological hermeneutic is "partisan in its viewpoint, even when it believes itself to be neutral.\textsuperscript{22} And when certain bishops or "academic theologians" advocate that the church should not directly intervene in economics or politics but remain neutral, they are simply captives of the current ideology. His conclusion, then, is that all viewpoints are necessarily political. And the unique role of the politician "is precisely to make critical decisions without any scientific proof as a backup."\textsuperscript{23}

All of this leads Segundo to outline his understanding of the methodological approach to liberation theology. "The one and only thing that can maintain the liberative character of any theology is not its content but its methodology."\textsuperscript{24} One cannot simply begin with the Bible, because our understanding and interpretation of the Bible reflects the ideological bias of our everyday world of common sense.

The foundational starting-point which grounds his "hermeneutical circle" is not some absolute truth taken from the Bible but radical questions. All creative theology, he argues, begins in questions which spring out of our present situation and "force us to change our customary conceptions of life, death, knowledge, society, politics and the world in general."\textsuperscript{25} Transcendence emerges in our capacity to question, to doubt, to be suspicious.

Segundo describes his hermeneutic circle as a "methodology for ideological analysis" and the basis of human liberation.\textsuperscript{28} It is a methodology for calling the present situation into question in order to open it up to new and more humanizing possibilities. Segundo breaks this hermeneutic down into four stages:

\textbf{Firstly} there is our way of experiencing reality, which leads us to ideological suspicion. \textbf{Secondly} there is the application of our ideological suspicion to the whole ideological superstructure in general and to theology in particular. \textbf{Thirdly} there comes a new way of experiencing theological reality that leads us to exegetical suspicion, that is, to the suspicion that the prevailing interpretation of the Bible has not taken important pieces of data into account. \textbf{Fourthly} we have our new hermeneutic, that is, our new way of interpreting the fountainhead of our faith (i.e., Scripture) with the new elements at our disposal.\textsuperscript{27}

The moment of transcendence begins in the moment of suspicion which occurs within the alienated consciousness of one experiencing minority status. This suspicion separates one from the present horizon of interpreted reality and is carried...
through in the systematic critique of one's society and its influence on one's understanding of the Bible. Finally, as the distortions of the prevailing ideology are removed, a new insight occurs into the meaning of the Gospel as the basis of a liberating praxis which can open up the future.

Segundo is prepared to admit that this new liberating praxis also expresses itself ideologically. However, he makes a curious move at this point, telling us that although he has been using ideology in a negative sense (in the tradition of Marx and Karl Mannheim) he now wishes to use it in a more neutral sense. So he redefines ideology. It is no longer to be thought of necessarily as a mask for biased interests but simply as "the system of goals and means that serves as the necessary backdrop for any human option or line of action."28

The role of faith, it seems, is to introduce an element of transcendence into one's relation to ideology. Ideologies represent our historical options, but faith represents our capacity for transcendence through which we choose one option over another. Faith expresses "the spirit of freedom for history, ... for the future, openness for the provisional and relative."29 If ideology represents the learning or knowledge which is defined by the horizon of one's culture, then faith represents for Segundo a deuto- learning, a learning to learn.30 The biblical record itself represents such deuto-learning, he argues, which has expressed itself in the different ideologies of its historical layers without being reduced to any of these ideologies.

The relativization of ideology requires a delicate balance between those who would reject all ideologies in the name of Gospel neutrality, and those who would embrace some ideology so absolutely as to make it ultimate truth. Authentic faith, however, uses ideology as an expression of its transcendent freedom. God's grace provides a freedom from ideology as an absolute, but also a freedom for ideology as a means of carrying out the work of his kingdom or new creation.31

The problem, as Segundo sees it, is what ideology to choose and by what criterion.32 The answer, he suggests, lies in the capacity of faith to guide critical rationality and appropriately evaluate the ideological options. For faith, says Segundo, (quoting Vatican II, Gaudiem et spes, no. 11) "throws new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions
which are fully human." However, we must not look for "the absolute element" of faith in any doctrine or value but rather in "an educational process." In fact "we must look for it in perfectly reasonable human decision-making, which centers a person's whole life around some value that thereby becomes an absolute and an object of faith for mankind's freedom."

Faith as deutero-learning is, then, the absolutization, not of an ideology but of a process of critical self-transcending intelligence which must both judge and utilize ideologies. Faith, it seems, manifests itself as that transcendent capacity to judge and transform the ideologies in which we dwell. It is that restless, utopian or liberating capacity which makes us dissatisfied with the given and opens us to the future. Faith as deutero-learning, as Segundo envisions it, gives rise to a renewal of intelligence and imagination, whose fruit is a "secular inventiveness and creativity." Faith "consists in entrusting the meaning of our life to a process of illumination and knowledge directed by God himself, to an objective process that has taken place in history -- in a specific history."

In the final analysis, however, Segundo does not really provide us with a criterion for judging ideologies. He does seek such a criterion in his understanding of cultural transformation as a product of a self-transcending, faith-guided, critical rationality. But the normative structure of his self-transcendence remains opaque and ambiguous.

3. Jacques Ellul
   A. Society, Ideology and Transcendence

Both Segundo and Ellul approach theology from a sociological perspective. Ellul, however, as a professional sociologist, has greater depth here, having written sociological studies on politics, technology, mass media, revolution, etc. Both also have deep roots in Marx. And yet both go beyond Marx in agreeing, for instance, that the transformation of society can be initiated in the superstructure as well as the infrastructure. And they agree in seeing the task of theology as one of delegitimizing the status quo. "The singular task of Christians," says Ellul, "is the attempt to transform the ideological and intellectual milieu," for unless this is accomplished, no real institutional change will be possible.
both call for "revolution". However, the way in which they understand that revolution, as we shall see, suggests some disagreement.

Ellul too sees both personal and societal transcendence blocked by ideological legitimations masquerading as common sense. But unlike Segundo, he is not convinced that this problem can be explained by appealing to class differences or to the choice between Capitalism or Socialism. He argues that it is no longer economics which is determining the social structure but rather technology (even when it is uneconomical). Thus both capitalist and socialist societies, shaped by the same modern techniques, are more similar than they are different. The core of the problem of liberation has to do, not with economic class conflict but with the sacred. The problem of freedom and transcendence, for Ellul, is a religious problem, because both the ideological superstructure and the technological infrastructure of society have become closed and oppressive through a process of sacralization.

The shape and legitimacy of institutions in any given historical period, says Ellul, is decisively influenced by the sacred. Their structures have been understood to be constituted by the sacred ancestors, the gods, God, or whatever power is believed to be ultimate and foundational. It is this sacral aura which legitimates a social order and renders it impervious to change. Hence if sacralization is what closes a society to transcendence and transformation, only a desacralization of society can recover its eschatological openness to transformation in the direction of freedom and justice.

Ellul describes the process of desacralization as one of rehabilitating the sacred. This rehabilitation presupposes that the sacred "is no longer close to God, it is part of this world." It is not, however, something within human control but "something which constitutes the order of the world willed by God for its preservation." The sacred is created by God to establish order, stability and limits (the routines of social order) and yet it is intended to remain open to the eschatological reality of its source and goal. When it does, it restores human beings to their "genuine function" of transcendent freedom in the direction of justice.

But the eschatological function of institutions intended in Creation is not automatically operative under the fallen conditions of history. Instead the sacred, separated from
God, becomes demonic, a reverse image of the Holy. Ellul takes these terms ("sacred" and "holy") which are normally used as synonyms and turns them into antonyms. The Holy, when related to the sacred, produces an eschatological dialectic of limitation and transcendence which promotes societal openness to transformation. But when the sacred is separated and closed off from the Holy, transcendence is eliminated from social process and the social structure as "limit" is absolutized. The result is the ideological enclosure of society in the status quo.  

When the state assumes the sacral status of an absolute, for instance, then the law becomes an ideological instrument of the status quo. However, when the status of the state is desacralized, limited and relativized, then the state becomes the guardian of the law and itself answerable to the demands of justice. Then the law is permitted its own spontaneous and autonomous development which keeps the nation centered in justice. When this happens the law provides for order and routine while remaining eschatologically open to further development, and the individual is restored to the possibility of his or her "genuine function" of transcending freedom.

The kind of revolution that is required in order to introduce transcendence into society is not political but spiritual (i.e., one which attacks the ultimate claims to meaning embodied in the social structure). Every political revolution since 1789 has only succeeded in reestablishing the authority of the centralized nation-state, says Ellul, because a society is shaped by its sacral values. Changing leaders and policies (whether violently or non-violently) will affect nothing unless the sacred is relativized.

The present social order, which has absolutized its values as if they were ultimate, sacred and untouchable, must be delegitimized through a process of desacralizing its functional infrastructure and demythologizing its ideological superstructure. And this can be accomplished only if transcendence is once more brought into dialectical relation with the social order. When that occurs the claims of that order are relativized, the sacred is rehabilitated and society recovers its eschatological openness to the future.

In pre-modern societies, Ellul argues, nature was experienced as that sacral power upon which one depended for one's existence and to which one conformed through myth and ritual.
But then scientific technology desacralized nature and (as a result) itself became the bearer of sacral value. Unlike traditional societies, where techniques were subordinated to other social values, modern society is governed by the most efficient techniques in every area of human endeavor. Efficiency has become a sacred and absolute value to which the social order is made to conform. The less efficient simply cannot compete.

The social order, dominated by efficient technique, has become closed to transcendence. Indeed, politicians are becoming more and more constrained to choose the most efficient solutions provided by their bureaucracies of technical experts. At the same time mass media creates the political illusion that politicians are in fact governing technology. The result is a society in which mass media functions to maintain the myth of political autonomy even while politics is turned into an empty ritual whose hidden function is to conform human action to the demands of efficiency. It is the great irony of our secular and technological age, says Ellul, that in embracing it we find ourselves "at the sacred heart of a technical universe."

Whether consciously or unconsciously, we have surrendered our critical faculties to a sacral awe at the power(s) of technical efficiency and the ideological myth of the political illusion. Political and liberation theologies succumb precisely to this illusion, in Ellul's view, and become conformed, at the extreme, to the meaningless rituals of political violence--i.e., revolution. Where Segundo argues that sometimes violence is justified and necessary, if only to overcome the violence of the ideological order of the status quo, Ellul denies that physical violence can ever bring liberation. And yet Ellul advocates that Christians should be actively involved in political revolutions, seeking to introduce an element of non-violence which might relativize the ideological commitments of those involved. "The revolutionary act in any form ... is the closest to an act of Christian freedom." It is the exact opposite of a transcending freedom, for it will result in the absolutizing of some "new order". Nevertheless, even a reverse image "in a mirror, ... is still an image."

The Christian ought to remain involved in revolutionary movements precisely in the hope of inverting that reverse image and "rehabilitating the sacred;" of acting as a leaven
which can transform a political revolution into an authentic revolution. What the ideologies of revolution fail to take into account is that all social orders impose a limit on our capacity for transcendence. Transcending freedom is realized not in some absolute, final and definitive transformation but in relativizing the present social order continuously in order to permit transcendence within it.  

B. Ideology, Transcendence and Theological Method

Ellul agrees with Segundo's analysis of mass society as resistant to transcendence and transformation. As long as human beings place all their hope in technique and all that it seems to offer us, says Ellul, they will be conformed to the demands of the technological society. And so the majority of the citizens of such a civilization abandon transcendence for the security of the status quo.

Ellul is also in agreement with Segundo that transcendence can only be introduced into society by minorities. It is the function of such minority communities to present a limit to the absolute claims of the social order by introducing tensions into society created by embodying other values in an alternative way of life. The very existence of such minorities limits and therefore relativizes the absolute claims of the larger society. But for Ellul these minorities are more strictly defined than for Segundo. Only those minorities who live by hope in something other than this society can introduce freedom and transcendence.

Ellul describes such hope as apocalyptic, not because it literally expects the end, but because the hope embodied in the book of Revelation is just such a hope which radically breaks with the present order of things in order to inaugurate a new creation. An apocalyptic hope is a hope in the one who is both "Wholly Other" and the end of all things. And every person who so hopes, participates in the transcending freedom of God and introduces that freedom into the closed order of society. That is, such a hope ruptures one's psychological dependence on "this [technological] world," permitting one to break free and engage in those acts which violate the sacral status of efficient technique and the ideological hopes of political illusion.

Only one whose hope was not in this world would even think to contravene the present order. Every act of inefficiency
in the name of other values, every act of intelligent compromise in a world of politically absolute positions serves to delegitimize the present order and introduce new possibilities, not only for Jews and Christians, but for others who follow their lead as well.53

Ellul goes so far as to claim that only Jews and Christians are capable of introducing transcendence into society.54 As with Segundo's notions of a liberating minority, Ellul's notions of Jews and Christians as the transforming minority invite accusations of elitism and sectarianism. And interestingly enough, he handles these accusations in exactly the same way, that is, by an appeal to Barth's notions, on the one hand, of "election" or "conversion" as a vocation in which some are called to be a transforming "leaven" within history while, on the other hand, "salvation" is affirmed for the whole human race.55

Equally interesting is the fact that Ellul handles the problem of freedom as a problem of conservation of energy in the same way as Segundo. For Ellul, freedom is always the dialectical transcendence of a limit.56 So, he insists, "man comes into being through revolutionary acts" through which he transcends the limits which determine him and "enters upon a new existence and changes in the process of changing his environment."57 Indeed, "if there is no resistance, freedom is an illusion .... The yachtsman has to take account of wind and tide. His freedom is freedom to use determinations. Without them he can do almost anything. Without them he can do nothing. Nothing is worse than a calm."58 Ellul even insists that limits must be invented in some situations if freedom is to occur.59 But we are never absolutely free. Rather, we must accept determination in some areas of our life in order to be free to contest determinations in other areas.60

Despite these similarities, the theological foundation of transcending freedom is fundamentally different for Segundo and Ellul. For Segundo, it is ideological suspicion which ruptures one's relation to the prevailing limits of the present social order and makes it possible to introduce a moment of freedom out of which a revolution may start. For Ellul it is apocalyptic hope which accomplishes this task. Everything else in his theology flows from this.

What apocalyptic hope does is place the individual in a unique position of tension between God and the world, such
that one is (psychologically) in but not of it. That very experience of tension limits and relativizes the claims of the world upon the self and creates a unique perspective. It permits the Christian to identify and unmask the "spiritual nucleus" of the problems of the technological society -- i.e., its claims to provide ultimate meaning and purpose for human existence.

The tension introduced by apocalyptic hope, then, lies at the core of Ellul's theological methodology -- a methodology which itself promotes tension by having its roots in the unlikely combination of Karl Marx and Karl Barth. At the age of nineteen, says Ellul, he read Das Kapital and became a Marxist. Then at age twenty-two his reading of the Bible led him to his conversion "with a certain brutality."

From that moment on, I lived through the conflict and contradiction between what came to be the center of my life -- this faith, this reference to the Bible, ... and what I knew of Marx and did not wish to abandon .... I was sometimes torn between the two .... But I absolutely refused to abandon either one .... I was progressively led to develop a mode of dialectical thinking which I constantly made my foundation .... Marx changed the way I read the Bible .... I absolutely could not divorce the Biblical demand from the concrete economic or political reality. For me the two necessarily went together.61

This statement is quite illuminating. Segundo has argued that liberation must always begin from the side of the human situation of the oppressed.62 Ellul generally has taken the Barthian position that the Word of God comes from outside the human situation. And yet here Ellul admits that "Marx changed the way I read the Bible." Thus, for Ellul, as for Segundo, the result is the setting up of a dialectical relation between the Gospel and the world -- as Segundo puts it, to "keep biblical interpretation moving back and forth between its sources and present-day reality."63

What drew Ellul to Karl Barth, in fact, was his ability to sustain this dialectical tradition. He found in Barth a "dialectical adventure" capable of moving one "beyond pure and simple contradiction between Christian faith and Karl Marx."64 He finds in Barth the dialectical mode of Biblical revelation -- the No and Yes of God's judgment and grace over the world. And he insists that to proclaim grace without judgment is to lose the tension which makes the Gospel liberating and turns it into an ideology of the status quo.
Ellul has only one real problem with Barth -- he is too abstract. He does not allow his theology to address the concrete issues of the world as it is. For instance, Barth says Christians have the freedom to choose their vocation. The problem with such a statement is that there is no realistic assessment of the difficulties of exercising this freedom in a technological society. And so Ellul concludes: "It pains me to have to say that Barth's deliberations here are no more than academic hypotheses." 65

Ellul's project has been to supply what was lacking by rethinking Barthian theology in terms of his own sociological analysis of the technological society. He describes his approach as a method of dialectical confrontation. On the one hand, one "must seek the deepest possible sociological understanding of the world ... [with] complete realism ... in order to find out ... where we are and what lines of action are open to us." On the other hand, one must "also develop and deepen his knowledge in the biblical and theological fields." By this confrontation one is made to experience "two factors that are contradictory and irreconcilable and at the same time inseparable," i.e., the demands of faith and the reality of the world. 66

Thus, for each sociological work such as The Political Illusion Ellul has written a theological counterpart such as The Politics of God and the Politics of Man.

As a sociologist and as a Christian, I can pursue this twofold quest. I am able to say that man is doing harm and that he is a sinner, that he is unfortunate and that he is separated from God. But that correlation is already established in my own thinking, by my own life experience. It is not something impersonal which can be passed around. For the person who shares the same faith as I, it can make sense, but not otherwise. 67

It is out of the tension of this dialectical confrontation that his Christian ethic of desacralization emerges.

While Segundo's ethic places the emphasis on the consciousness of the minority community (as the locus of hermeneutic suspicion) as the vehicle for introducing transcendence into society, 68 Ellul, following Kierkegaard, holds that only the individual can introduce freedom into society. 69

And unlike Segundo, Ellul does claim a certain kind of objectivity can be realized in sociological analysis. The function of sociology for the theologian is to provide a critical analysis of the social structure so as to isolate those points at which it is vulnerable to revolutionary action.
But in order to do that, the sociologist must be completely realistic. As long as he or she has any hope in this society, he or she will be tempted to introduce an illusory element which will bias the analysis. Thus Ellul argues that only one who lives by an apocalyptic hope can be objective and "able to accept reality as it is, no matter how black ...." The possibility of objectivity in the social sciences, finally, is made to depend on a religious predisposition.

While Ellul holds that sociology, so understood, can objectively assess the social structure, he does agree with Segundo that sociology cannot produce a scientifically prescribed course of action for transforming society. That has to be invented through intellectual and moral creativity. In fact he does not believe that even a Christian ethics can prescribe any single course of action. What apocalyptic hope does is free the individual to exercise his or her own intelligence and inventiveness. The Gospel provides, not a system of absolutes, but the freedom to liberate this relative and provisional world from all absolutes.

This attitude carries over into Ellul's views on political involvement as well. Like Segundo, Ellul argues that the Gospel gives us freedom from ideologies in order to engage in freedom for ideologies (once relativized). But I think he allows far more diversity than Segundo is prepared to derive from this position. Ellul encourages political commitments, so long as they are relative and not absolute commitments. We might be a sociologist or a capitalist, conservative or liberal or even an anarchist, -- as long as we admit that these positions are our own inventions and do not claim that they are the only legitimate possibilities somehow derived directly from the Gospel. What is essential is that Christians relativize the absoluteness of political positions by showing that these differences are less important than their unity in Christ. When political positions are so relativized, then politics as the art of compromise is once more possible. If all hope for salvation can be eliminated from politics, then political life could assume the modest but necessary task of providing society with "the best possible management, ... an honest concrete exercise in administration."

This freedom for politics includes a freedom to utilize all techniques as well, once they have been relativized and included in a larger civilizational vision, for "life is given
us in order to accomplish these works and make scientific progress." The larger vision, which Ellul proposes, calls for a "total reconversion of the West's economic and technical system" in order to assist the Third World in achieving "some kind of affluence and also the possibility of future development in the social, political and human sense ...." Such a radical conversion of culture, he insists, could provide "a reason for continuing to exist, change and live."

Apocalyptic hope does not provide us with ready-made solutions for these monumental tasks but simply frees us to use our own imagination and creativity, which are no longer held captive by prevailing ideologies and absolute positions. Like Segundo, then, Ellul also holds that the appropriation of transcendence and its introduction into social process must be closely linked to a renewal of intelligence and imagination. Participation in a transcending freedom provides us with no blueprints. Rather, as Segundo says, it invites "secular inventiveness and creativity." At this point Segundo appealed to the somewhat vagueness of deuterological.

From the very beginning, in his early work The Presence of the Kingdom, Ellul similarly suggests that an authentic conversion which leads to a renewal of the intelligence could be the basis for a new public language which might be shared between Christians and non-Christians in the shaping of public policy. The problem, as he sees it, is that "intelligence has become technical." And a technicized intellect exhibits a positivist or materialistic bias which reduces all of reality to what the method can measure and dismisses everything else. In this way modern technique "destroys this spiritual reality which lies at the heart of intelligence." As a result, intelligence becomes a slave of its methods.

What is required is a spiritual liberation of intelligence in order "to restore intellectual techniques." "Only the Holy Spirit ... can transform our intelligence in such a way that it will not be swallowed up by our systems." This can only occur when we learn that the human mind must not transgress the limits of the Holy. The human mind must learn to submit to an authority higher than itself for "it ought not to wish to do everything that it can." And Ellul holds that only the Christian and Jew, through prayer and meditation, have the experience of this spiritual reality at the heart of intelligence, which calls the inquiring mind to accept limits in the name of the Holy.
Nevertheless, Ellul is unable to link faith and the renewal of intelligence in any other way than psychologically. That is, once one is freed from psychological dependency on this world, through conversion to an apocalyptic hope, one gains a new perspective from which to see and critique the world. But like Segundo, he is unable to specify how conversion actually affects the thinking process so as to link fruitfully transcendence and technique. For Ellul, God remains the Kierkegaardian limit to all thought, the point at which the mind must turn back and recognize and accept its finitude.

4. Robert Doran
   A. Ideology, Transcendence and Theological Method

   Concerning the intersection of theology with the human sciences, it seems to me that Robert Doran has been the most lucid and creative interpreter of the transcendental theology of Bernard Lonergan. I find his work invaluable for reflecting on the theological foundations of public policy and the problem of ideology. In considering his work, I am going to alter the order I followed with Segundo and Ellul and begin with Doran's appropriation of Lonergan's understanding of method and transcendence, and then proceed to his understanding of ideology and transcendence in the social process and, finally, add a third section on his unique contribution to transcendental method -- the concept of "psychic conversion".

   Unlike our previous two thinkers, Doran's focus (in Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung and the Search for Foundations) has been, not on theology and sociology, but on the foundational intersection of theology and depth psychology.81 Nevertheless, his foundational work led him, in Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences, to propose "a reorientation of the human sciences" as a whole (including sociology, economics, etc.).82 We have seen that both Segundo and Ellul ascribe a central role to the psychological in analyzing and explaining the ideological organization of society. Segundo even goes so far as to claim that "authentic ideological analysis is an analysis of the collective unconscious."83 Doran's work explores this suggestive but undeveloped theme in the work of Ellul and Segundo. In the process, I am convinced, he illuminates some of the obscurities which remain in their respective projects and may even offer the possibility of reconciling the differences between them on many points.
Both Segundo and Ellul are modern theologians, that is, they work out of a consciousness of the empirical and artificial nature of culture. Both recognize the demise of the normative notion of culture which provides a fixed notion of "human nature". Both recognize that normative notions of culture invariably have implicit ideological functions which serve to legitimate the status quo and block the processes of transcendence and transformation. Both, therefore, define the task of theology as delegitimating the status quo (although each defines the status quo differently) in order to inaugurate a revolution based on either an eschatological or apocalyptic mode of Christian faith.

Finally, Segundo and Ellul both take personal and cultural self-transcendence as normative. Each presupposes that what makes human life human is its capacity to remain open to further transformation. The human is no longer understood in terms of the fixed order of nature but in terms of an eschatological openness to transcendence (Segundo in terms of deutero-learning and Ellul in terms of apocalyptic hope). And each affirms that Christian faith or hope ought to free persons to use their imagination and intellect to invent the needed strategies which will promote a humanizing openness within society, approximating the parousiastic ideals of freedom and justice. And yet both Segundo and Ellul seem to be at their weakest when they try to suggest how divine transcendence intersects with and promotes human imagination and intelligence. But here is where I think the work of Lonergan and Doran is most helpful.

"Culture," says Doran, "is a function of the development of human consciousness." Culture, understood empirically "as the operative meanings and values that inform a way of life," for all its diversity, can be characterized by the universal human "search for direction in the movement of life." But while the quest is universal, its symbolization, as Eric Voegelin has argued, has undergone degrees of differentiation out of the original compactness of early cosmological civilizations. Our Western cultural heritage has been decisively shaped by certain epochal cultural breakthroughs, each of which represents a "leap in being": (1) The anthropological-noetic differentiation of the Greek order of the soul as the "sensorium of transcendence" through which "man is the measure of all things" so long as the measure of the human is the
world transcending "unseen measure"; (2) The historical-soteriological order of existence differentiated in the history of Israel and witnessed to in the two testaments -- in which the Greek eros from below upward is met by the agapic movement of the "unseen measure" from above downward. For Vögelin, the classic integration and expression of these differentiations occurred in the theology of Augustine.85

These differentiations, concomitant with urbanization and the emergence of empire, represented a "leap in being" beyond the compact symbolism of the earlier cosmological empires of the Near East and belong to what Lonergan calls the second stage in the history of meaning. This is the stage in which theory becomes differentiated from common sense as the governance of meaning is shifted from myth to logic and metaphysics.

Today however, says Doran, "modern intellectual, technological, and socio-political developments have been coincidentally anticipating the "leap in being" that Lonergan has called transcendental method."86 This leap in being represents the transition to a third stage of meaning forced upon us by historical consciousness. Today, culturally normative theories of human nature have to give way to the task of integrating all the relevant cross-cultural differentiations of human experience through a further quest for direction in the movement of life.87 Such a quest cannot begin with theory (as if we could have the answers before we have formulated the questions); rather, it must be guided by method properly understood as the capacity for self-transcendence.

Moreover, even when theory emerges from methodical questioning, in the third stage of meaning it no longer functions as a "description" of reality, as if knowing were "taking a look"; rather, we treat theories as heuristic notions. We expect from them, not so much pictures of reality as procedures for arriving at virtually unconditioned truths. By this we mean affirmations which have met the test of all relevant objections and whose confirmation leads us on to yet further questions for reflection and judgment in an unending, open-ended process of coming to know the truth.

Thus, in the third stage of meaning, truth is not so much a fixed quantity as it is an authenticating process leading to yet further insights. And in this context, "theology is ... left with the enormous and quite new task of mediating
the significance of Christian faith with ongoing and changing sets of cultural meanings and values." If there is to be a normativity that can authenticate the mediation of meaning in this third stage, therefore, it will not be discovered in theories but in the process by which theories are generated. Normativity will be found, not in theory, but in method. Method, however, must not be understood as some kind of unimaginative rote procedure but rather as meta-method, the foundational process which underlies the discovery of all particular methods. What is needed is an account of the procedures of inquiry as we experience them -- as a self-correcting, self-transcending process.

Ellul is only able to imagine methods or techniques as imposed on the inquirer as a form of ideology which blocks transcendent freedom, so he insists that technique in no way characterizes the human. And yet he would like to see intellectual techniques once more grounded in transcendence. Segundo is inclined to think that all methods are arbitrary and ideological and that objectivity is impossible. Lonergan's position, on the other hand, implies that human self-transcendence occurs precisely through method or technique and that objectivity is authentically possible as self-transcending subjectivity.

Both Segundo and Ellul suggest the possibility of imagination and intelligence mediating transcendence, but neither is able to give a satisfactory account of this process so as to generate criteria by which to separate knowing from ideology. And although they take self-transcendence as normative for the human, neither satisfactorily suggests why his particular religious understanding of transcendence should be understood to be more authentic and normative than, say, the seemingly normless notion of transcendence offered by Sartre. Doran's work, I believe, provides us with the needed self-authenticating criterion by which to separate knowing from ideology. This is done in two stages. First, Doran appropriates Lonergan's account of intentional consciousness as transculturally normative. Second, he completes the account and brings it full circle by grounding intentional consciousness in psychic conversion.

Lonergan suggests that there is an invariant set of operations which belong to the experience of knowing. The intentionality of consciousness oriented by an unrestricted desire
to know, and pursued toward the horizon opened up by specific questions, operates dynamically, moving from experience (attending to the data) to insight (understanding the data) to judgment (raising all the relevant objections so as to determine whether the insight is in fact the case) to decision (or appropriating the insight as a guide to further action). As the subject moves from insight to judgment, if all relevant objections are met, one must either flee into self-contradiction or self-deception or make the inescapable judgment, "It is so".

The implicit moral exigencies which emerge in the very process of inquiry, says Lonergan, force the inquiring self to the foundational decision to either flee from or embrace self-transcendence. Hence self-transcendence and method or technique can be understood to be more than accidentally linked. And transcendental method is simply the process of self-consciously appropriating the spontaneous exigencies which emerge at each stage of inquiring consciousness as normative for human authenticity. This appropriation can be summarized in the precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. By faithfulness to these exigencies the self transcends its own most narrow preferences and biases in an act of freedom which embodies what is true and what is good.

The task of self-appropriation, whereby we not only know but know how we come to know, Lonergan names interiority. Transcendental method is "a reflexive technique by means of which consciousness is able to bring the operations as intentional to bear upon the operations as conscious." It permits the inquiring self to deliberatively affirm the normative exigencies of each stage of consciousness in the process of inquiry and to move comfortably between the modes of inquiry of common sense, theory and transcendence. Interiority is the fully differentiated, conscious self-possession of the inquiring subject.

Transcendence manifests itself in human experience as the unrestricted "otherworldly" passion which lures the self beyond itself toward what is true and what is worthwhile. This infinite passion is not of this world, precisely because it drives the self beyond itself and its every finite horizon and is presupposed in every horizon through which we grasp and transform this world. Transcendence manifests itself methodologically in that conjunction of logical and non-logical
operations wherein the "logical tend to consolidate what has been achieved. The non-logical keep all achievement open to further advance."91

Once the normativity of the differentiated appropriation of the transcendental precepts is recognized as the foundation of human authenticity, it is possible to define the nature of ideology and with it the criterion for identifying progress and decline in society.

The basic form of alienation is man's disregard of the transcendental precepts .... The basic form of ideology is a doctrine that justifies such alienation. From these basic forms, all others can be derived. For the basic forms corrupt the social good. As self-transcendence promotes progress, so the refusal of self-transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline.92

Ideology, then, is the refusal of transcendence, a refusal which is most likely to emerge when what is to be affirmed as true or good would be inconvenient or unfavorable to the individual or group interests involved. The root of ideology, in the Marxist sense of the term, is individual and group bias which corrupts the integrity of the intentional self.93

B. Ideology, Society and Transcendence

Like Segundo and Ellul, Lonergan and Doran affirm that what prevents transcendence from occurring within social process is the capacity of ideology to deform both theory and common sense. The task of foundational theology, in the third stage of meaning, says Doran, is to reorient contemporary common sense and contemporary scientific knowledge through a foundational appropriation of interiority.94

As Doran has rightly insisted, culture is a product of human consciousness (I would add, of socio-linguistic consciousness). The cultural task, unique to our humanity and expressed as a transcending freedom is, as both Lonergan and Doran have affirmed, the technological task of the making of the human.95 A society in the third stage of meaning, I would say, is characterized by an existential understanding of self and a managerial understanding of society. For, as I argued in the Introduction, culture is the artificial product of our technological or utopian (i.e., linguistic) capacity to define a world (of mediated meaning) rather than be confined to the world as a given. Ideology is a linguistic illusion, created by a refusal of transcendence, which makes the world as artifact appear as if it were fixed and given with the
order of nature. Whether there is progress or decline within any society depends on whether this artificial (i.e., humanly created) world of mediated meaning is mediated ideologically or methodologically.

For Ellul, transcendence can only occur in a state of tension with some limit (like the yachtsman tacking against the wind). The dialectical revolt against a limit is not meant to abolish that limit, but rather to relativize its claims to absoluteness. The claim to absoluteness is a function of its sacralization, and its relativization is a function of the Holy. Segundo also seems to recognize the necessity of the dialectic in his treatment of masses and minorities, in which mass routines represent the limits which must be overcome by minority acts of revolutionary transcendence -- for he insists that we all belong to both categories (masses and minorities) and must accept some limits in order to exercise freedom against other limits. We have also seen that these two positions are complementary, since Ellul sees mass society as the bearer of the sacred and the Jewish and Christian minorities as the bearers of the Holy.

We find in Doran's treatment of the subject of progress and decline in society a further instance of complementarity in which additional light is shed on the difference of focus between Segundo and Ellul in their respective treatments of the problem of ideology. Doran too affirms that progress depends on the work of minorities who insert the "leaven" of self-transcending authenticity into the surd of a society dominated by ideology. And like Segundo and Ellul, he calls upon the church to be such a "leaven". And like them he understands transcendence as always being related dialectically to limitation.

The reorientation of society toward authentic transcendence, Doran adds, requires a recovery of the dialectical tension of transcendence and limitation based on a scale of values grounded in the authenticity of the differentiated consciousness of interiority. And "there is a scale of values because there are degrees of existential self-transcendence." So, following Lonergan, Doran argues that the scale of values which promotes transcendence begins with the vital values of health and well-being. These, in turn, make possible the emergence of social value, that is, the good of order in society. The good of order, in turn, makes possible the
pursuit of cultural values which embody "the meanings and orientations that inform human living." Finally, within the cultural sphere personal value occurs whenever a person originates value through personal self-transcendence realized by embracing religious value, that is, those final and 'terminal' values which illuminate the ultimate horizon of human existence.

Doran refines Lonergan's proposed scale of values by observing that "the differentiation of their ascending order is a matter of emergent probability; but the actual functioning of the levels depends upon the fact that the lower order values are conditioned by the successful functioning in a social order of the intention of the higher values." What ideology does is truncate the scale of values so that, while promising transcendence, it actually reinforces limitation by limiting the scale of values to vital goods and the good of order. The result is a Hobbesian world of conflicting individual and group interests imposing a contractual order upon themselves out of fear of mutual annihilation.

In the Introduction I suggested that modern society is differentiated into three semi-autonomous systems: (1) the techno-economic, (2) the political and (3) the cultural. Doran, however, differentiates this society into five components by separating technology and economics and adding a "primordial base" of "intersubjective spontaneity", i.e., that sense of belonging embodied in family, kinship and the spontaneous sense of group loyalty based on common interests which precedes the development of every complex society and to which it reverts as it disintegrates.

On the basis of intersubjective spontaneity, Doran suggests, a society extends its order beyond conflicting group interests through the social routines or "schemes of recurrence" of an infrastructure made up of technological, economic and political institutions. "An integral society's infrastructure would be constituted by the dialectical unfolding of the tension of spontaneous intersubjectivity (the principle of limitation) with the technological, economic and legal-political institutions of the society."

"The infrastructure of a concrete society is constituted by the concrete realization of vital and social values in that society, whether that realization be healthy or diseased. The values that constitute culture, again whether healthy or diseased, make up the superstructure." Under the influence
of ideology, the role of cultural values is usurped by technological, economic and political institutions dominated by personal and group bias and limited in vision to the good of order.

Under the dominance of ideology, the higher values are rendered marginal. "Personal values are thus amputated, the good is rendered inefficacious in the structuring of the cultural and social order. And religious values are either explicitly denied and even forbidden in the public cultural domain, or they are twisted into perverse supports for the distorted culture and society ...."¹⁰³

Given that the higher values condition the possibility of the lower, the dialectical tension between intersubjective spontaneity and the institutions of the infrastructure can only be maintained in the direction of transcendence if there is an equivalent tension in the superstructure. This is a tension which has to exist between the cultural values of the society and personal and religious values. These latter values lie beyond the three levels of value that constitute the public formation of the superstructure and infrastructure of the society, in the realm of personal decision and orientation. As Voegelin said ... there are problems of order that extend beyond the existence of a concrete society and its institutions. But these values do not constitute a merely private realm of existence without relevance to the cultural superstructure and the social and vital infrastructure of the society. Quite to the contrary, they are the ultimate determinants of cultural integrity, or social progress, of the appropriate relation among the five elements that constitute society, and so of the equitable distribution of vital goods.¹⁰⁴

Nor can the causes of this ideological truncation of value in society be reduced to class conflict alone. In attempting to do so, Marx himself, says Doran, "has fallen victim to general bias."¹⁰⁵

As Lonergan envisions it, there are two cycles of decline in society, the shorter cycle and the longer cycle. The shorter cycle is governed precisely by the conflicts of individual and group bias. But such cycles can be reversed so long as the commitment to the transcendental precepts is operative in society. The longer cycle of decline is much harder to reverse, for it is governed by a subtler form of ideology, -- the shortsighted "general bias" of common sense which would abandon critical, self-transcending reflection in favor of getting on with the pragmatic affairs at hand, governed by "what everybody knows".¹⁰⁶
The bias of group interests will be practiced by only some groups within society, whereas general bias is practiced by virtually all groups. The latter is therefore more pervasive and problematic. Even "if the efforts at change succeed, [and] the unjust supremacy of one group at the expense of another is brought to an end,... there is no guarantee that new forms of oppression and injustice will not flow from the new political and economic arrangements," since general bias will continue to promote decline.

By now it should be clear that, for all their differences in approach, there is a remarkable affinity between Doran and Ellul. Like Doran, Ellul insists that the possibility of transcendence within social process depends finally, not even on the minority group, but on individual decision which nevertheless has political or public implications. And when he speaks of the decision for transcending freedom which emerges out of apocalyptic hope, he holds that the individual as "originating [personal] value" participates in "terminal [religious or ultimate] value" and introduces a dimension of transcendence into society and culture which is Wholly Other than any provided by the infrastructure and superstructure. And in Ellul's view also, the higher values condition the possibility of the lower values, for the eschatological openness of the infrastructure to future development (i.e., to transcendence), embodying freedom and justice, is only possible through the introduction of this transcendent dimension from without.

Moreover, given the distinction we find in Lonergan and Doran, between the longer and shorter cycles of decline, I think we can see that the difference of focus between Segundo and Ellul may be more a case of complementarity than of dialectical opposition. This is true, so long as it is recognized that the shorter cycle is subject to the vicissitudes of the longer cycle and cannot be fully resolved without addressing the latter. The difference in the assessment of the problem of ideology and the level at which one ought to respond to it, I would argue, is due to Segundo addressing the shorter cycle of decline, which is concerned with individual and group bias, whereas Ellul is really addressing the longer cycle of decline which has to do with the problem of transcendence and method or technique.
Ellul, in agreement with Doran, in essence argues that unless technique can once more be rehabilitated by being linked to the transcendence which is at the heart of intelligence all revolutions at the level of class conflict will only re-institute the social surds of a technological civilization. Segundo, in his appeal to deutero-learning, seems to be moving in the direction of that recognition also, but he remains much less clear about this.

Indeed, Doran gently criticizes some forms of liberation theology (not necessarily Segundo) for neglecting the importance of "the integrity of the individual as the measure of cultural values and of cultural values as the condition of a just social order." And in the end, Doran comes to essentially the same conclusion as Ellul about the unity of technological civilization when he argues that "an identical structural deviation occurs in both capitalism and state socialism ... one that lies in neither economic system as such but in the general bias that allows both systems to emerge."

When you have a whole civilization engaged in the longer cycle of decline, when virtually all social groups are engaged in a flight from understanding, it is hard to imagine a way out. That problem leads us to the final topic in this section on Doran, namely, the divine solution to the problem of evil as embodied in the fourfold process of conversion -- beginning in religious conversion, leading to moral and intellectual conversion, and culminating in what Doran calls psychic conversion.

C. Psychic Conversion, Transcendence and Public Policy

In the longer cycle of decline, "corruption spreads from the harsh sphere of material advantage and power to the mass media, the stylish journals, the literary movements, the educational process, the reigning philosophies. A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless consistency. It cannot be argued out of its self-destructive ways ...." For intelligence becomes defined as appealing to the facts "and the facts in the situation produced by decline more and more are the absurdities that proceed from inattention, oversight, unreasonableness and irresponsibility."

How does one turn around a civilization which "cannot be argued out of its self-destructive ways"? How does one turn subjects unwilling to submit to the exigencies of the movement from below upwards (i.e., from attending to understanding,
judging and deciding) into subjects who surrender themselves to the demands for transcendence implicit in these exigencies? How can the unwilling become willing?

This is possible only because there is not only development from below but also the development promoted from above and moving downwards. For there is the transformation we call "love" in all its varieties, from love of family through love of country and humanity on to the all-inclusive love of the divine which orients humanity in the cosmos. And "where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent shortsighted common sense .... Love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope."112

As Lonergan envisions it, falling in love is a graced experience, a gift capable of transforming and expanding the horizon of one's attending, understanding, judging and deciding. "Falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise in vertical liberty in which one's world undergoes a new organization ...."113 Conversion implies a transformation of the whole personality whereby authentic or self-transcending existence is embraced successively by the religious, moral and intellectual dimensions of personality.

The core of conversion is understood as religious. It is a falling in love or total surrender of the self to the inner yet otherworldly demand for self-transcendence which drives the self beyond itself and its every finite horizon. It exemplifies itself in the unrestricted desire to know what is ultimately true and worthwhile. When this conversion penetrates the moral dimensions of personality, it manifests itself in the pursuit of genuine values, even at the sacrifice of personal satisfactions.

Finally, when conversion penetrates the intellect, one understands that knowing is not simply "taking a look," but rather is the term of a process of self-transcendence mediated by the techniques of the word. "For the word spoken and heard, proceeds from and penetrates to all four levels of intentional consciousness. Its content is not just a content of experience but a content of experience, and understanding and judging and deciding. The analogy of sight yields the cognitional myth [i.e., knowing is taking a look]. But fidelity to the word engages the whole man."114
Hence conversion is the movement from above that reorients the movement from below as a surrender of the self to Loner-gan's (now expanded) five-fold demand of the human spirit to be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love. As Doran explains it, religious conversion provides the fundamental reorientation of the self at the fifth level of intentional consciousness; moral conversion then carries this reorientation down to the fourth level of existential decision (i.e., the moral level) which in turn promotes intellectual conversion at the second and third levels of understanding and judgment; and then, he would add, the cumulative impact of these conversions seeks to come full circle in psychic conversion.

With the introduction of the term "psychic conversion", we are entering into territory pioneered by Doran himself. Doran forms his concept of psychic conversion in continuity with the evolution of differentiation in Lonergan's own thought. He points out that "in Insight, existential or deliberative consciousness is collapsed into intelligent and reasonable consciousness. As a result ... the good is identified with the intelligent and the reasonable." By the time that Lonergan wrote Method in Theology, however, he had differentiated the notion of value.

In Method there is a new appreciation of the existential level as a further distinct level of consciousness where deliberation and decision occur, beyond the level of understanding and judging. Beyond the question of what is true is the question of the good and its implementation. In addition, a fifth level emerges in Method "distinct from and sublating even the heart's concern for what is good. This is the dynamic state of being in love with God." It is on the basis of these further differentiations that Lonergan then posits the movement from above downwards to complement the movement from below upwards that is the foundation of his differentiated notion of threefold conversion.

There is, as Fred Crowe seems to suggest, a movement in Lonergan's thought between Insight and Method in Theology which could be characterized as a movement from the Thomist phase to the Augustinian phase of his work. To me, Augustine's trilogy (On the Trinity, The Confessions and The City of God) is a model of theological illumination concerning the intersection of divine, personal and social transcendence. I take
The Confessions to exemplify how theology ought to be done, namely, with autobiographical sensitivity to the affective disclosure of transcendence and its narrative expression in dialectical relation to the tradition and society. Therefore, I am drawn much more to the Lonergan of Method than to the Lonergan of Insight.

I am drawn even more to the work of Robert Doran for its ability to bring these late themes of Lonergan's "enterprise" to their full development with the differentiation of a fourth level of conversion -- psychic conversion. Equally impressive is the way Doran integrates psychic conversion with the social dimension we have been struggling with, namely, the problem of ideology and transcendence.

What was missing from Insight, as Doran points out, is a fully differentiated account of the possibility that emotions can be orienting rather than disorienting to the processes of intellectual and ethical reflection. In Insight Lonergan is still suffering from a Kantian bias against the emotions. But in Method, "instead of bypassing human feelings, the account of the good ... begins with them." Hence Method in Theology "heuristically opens the possibility of what Eric Voegelin has called a psychology of orientation, in contrast to a psychology of passional motivation."

In Method intentional consciousness is recognized as rooted in intentional feelings. Contrary to his position in Insight, Lonergan now recognizes that the affective can promote rather than retard the effective orientation of human agency in the world. Now feelings are said to give "intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive [and] power" by which we are "oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning."

Feelings themselves, then, can be differentiated into those that simply promote personal and group satisfactions and those that move the individual to self-transcending affirmations of the truly worthwhile. "Thus, social values call for a more self-transcending response than do vital values." And so cultural values likewise sublate social values, personal values sublate cultural, and religious values sublate personal--determining one's foundational orientation toward self-transcendence. For as religious conversion indicates, "there is in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life."
The implication which Doran draws from Lonergan's new emphasis on the importance of feeling is that there is an aesthetic base to ethical insight which makes psychic conversion itself a moral exigence. "Psychic conversion," says Doran, consists in the development of the capacity for internal communication in the subject among spirit (intellectual, rational, deliberative and religious consciousness), psyche (sensitive consciousness), and organism (the unconscious), by means of the attentive, intelligent, rational, and existentially responsible and decisive negotiation of one's imaginal, affective and intersubjective spontaneity.127

Psychic conversion follows upon Lonergan's three conversions because it requires the application of differentiated self-consciousness in the mode of interiority to the sensitive psyche so as to disengage the aesthetic images that emerge in dream and fantasy and to gain insight into them as a guide for direction in the movement of life.

Psychic conversion, in Doran's view, brings Lonergan's quest for the self-conscious self-appropriation of the knowing or intentional subject full circle. For the massive feelings embodied in the unrestricted desire to know unfold the operations of the intentional subject and shape a fully differentiated consciousness. This differentiated consciousness is then brought to bear on those feelings, as mediated through aesthetic images, in order to gain insight into them as the ultimate self-possession we call self-knowledge.

The problem, of course, as with all noetic acts, is that the flight from understanding can corrupt our quest for self-knowledge. Whether it is knowledge of the world or knowledge of the self, the problem is how to reverse the propensity for unauthenticity which is the flight from understanding. The problem is how to make "the unwilling" willing to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. It is how to persuade those who would not be persuaded.

Lonergan's differentiation of the existential mode of consciousness from the intellectual mode means a recognition that the existential sublates the intellectual pattern of experience.128 The engagement in intellectual authenticity requires the prior moral-emotive commitment to authenticity. The life of the mind cannot be removed from the existential drama of human existence, its hopes and fears. The quest for direction in the movement of life is the "cultural drama" of the third stage of meaning. Everything depends on our
capacity "to disengage the primal, elemental symbolic ciphers of [our] participation in the search for direction in the movement of life."^{129}

Doran draws here on C. G. Jung's theory that dreams and other psychic images have a teleological function.^{130} Such images try to bring to consciousness a compensating function so as to reorient the self out of a deficient or dysfunctional mode of consciousness and toward growth into the wholeness of the self. Such images, then, function to promote transcendence of the limitations of one's consciousness.

The problem is to gain access to these orienting images. For just as with our knowledge of the world, so with knowledge of self, the deformation of the existential pattern of our experience by the unauthenticity we call ideology short-circuits our capacity to attend, understand, judge and decide. "The dramatic pattern of experience penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise its own domination and control ... prior to conscious discrimination ...."^{131} And if that pattern is governed by an existential flight from understanding it will block the needed access.

The existential drama of our lives has a social and historical context. "The task of making our lives into works of art is not achieved by a solo flight of virtuosity. Dramatic artistry performs its task in the presence of others, who also are actors in life's drama."^{132} The dialectic of the self occurs within the dialectic of a community in the process of historical becoming. "What images we admit into consciousness will be a function of our antecedent willingness or unwillingness to accept the insights that are needed if we are authentically to constitute the human world and ourselves within the parameters set by the historical process."^{133} And thus when the social context of the drama of life is governed by the ideologies of the shorter or longer cycles of decline, the needed images will not be available.

But just as the existential formation of the dramatic pattern of existence, dominated by ideology, blocks access to the imagery of the psyche, so the existential reorientation of that dramatic pattern promoted by conversion also reaches down into the unconscious to release those images. Such a turning around can occur in the first and second stages of meaning. But, in the third stage of meaning, the task is to thematize it so as to be raised into explicit self-consciousness and promoted as the "capacity for internal symbolic communication."^{134}
To consciously promote the process initiated by psychic conversion "one must locate a domain of imaginal production where images are released unhindered by the guardianship of waking consciousness under the dominance of the biases" embodied in ideologies. For Doran, following Jung, this domain is the dream. It is, he says, "the key to psychic conversion." These uncensored images, "were they understood by the waking subject, would provide the materials that one needs for the ongoing structure of one's work of dramatic art," i.e., the making of one's self and one's world.

The dream is a kind of barometer for measuring the degree of one's self-transcendence. It "displays the current linkage of image and affect. If one's subterranean life has been made the unwilling victim of one's own repression of conscious insight, the dream will display the plight, the crippled condition, the anger, the violence, the perversion, the helplessness of the oppressed." Thus the dream suggests the degree to which the subject is resisting or cooperating in the promotion of self-transcendence. The bizarre and crippled images of one's psyche are meant as a compensating corrective to one's conscious orientation. It warns of the distance between one's conscious attitude and the direction of movement at work in one's life. And given that the drama of one's own life is embedded in the socio-historical drama of one's time, the dream is also of "historical and political significance .... The dreams of an existentially capable adult are a cipher precisely of one's existential participation in the promotion, obstruction, or decline of the human good."

There is a correlation between the poor and the oppressed of one's psyche and one's society. The latter are the product of the former and both demand the preferential option of one's attention. The poor and the oppressed are the victims of "social and economic systems [which] are nothing other than the intrasubjective neglect of the movement of life writ large and, as it were, "projected" into the dialectic of history."

As a third stage project, psychic conversion represents the application of the differentiated consciousness promoted by religious, moral and intellectual conversion to the level of dreaming consciousness, so as to gain insight into the direction of movement in one's life and to extend the universal willingness of conversion down to the psychoid roots of
concerned consciousness whence the drive for insight first emerged. It is to attend, understand, judge and decide upon the meaning of the narrative images of the dream in the mode of an ongoing, self-correcting dialogue analogous to the quest to know in the other realms of human experience.

Psychic conversion is a maximal differentiation of the universal willingness initiated by religious conversion, for "willingness becomes universal when it reaches into and transforms the unconscious itself ...." It is the "effective introduction into one's operative intentionality of the universal willingness that matches the unrestricted spontaneity of the desire for intelligibility, the unconditioned, and value .... [For] spontaneous psychic images function in human consciousness in a manner analogous to the role that questions play in intelligence, reflection and deliberation." The convergence of image and question renews both imagination and intellect, uniting emotion and intelligence in the promotion of a self-transcending praxis.

This fourth level of conversion, Doran argues, insures that the psychic image is released from its archetypal entrapment in the romantic agonistic rhythms of nature. For the application of the differentiated consciousness of interiority to the archetypal image transmutes it into an "anagogic" symbol which orients one heuristically toward transcendence as the "known unknown". Anagogic symbols are the "transformed and transforming symbols that correspond to the unrestricted intentionality of human intelligence, human judgment, and human deliberation." The full penetration of the personality by religious, moral, intellectual and psychic conversion transforms the archetypal symbols of the psyche into anagogic symbols which embody the supernaturally transforming power of faith, hope and love. For, as Lonergan puts it, "since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity."

The anagogic symbols produced by psychic conversion, Doran argues, promote that eschatological openness to transcendence which can ground a critical theory of society. The
fully articulated differentiation of consciousness, brought full circle by psychic conversion, can provide the theological foundations of an interdisciplinary praxis which could reorient the human sciences toward the promotion of transcendence in society. The result would be the elevation of the human sciences into the third stage of meaning. The practice of the human sciences on such a foundation would be grounded in an "evaluative cultural hermeneutic" which could guide authentic cultural and social transcendence as it conditions political and economic process.

Such an evaluative cultural hermeneutic, I would argue, represents nothing less than the practice of social ethics as a theology of culture and as the theological foundation of public policy. This evaluative hermeneutic, says Doran, would exhibit the same eightfold structure of functional specialties as Lonergan's theological method.

In the first phase, research into cultural anthropology, economic and political history and philosophic, literary, and religious texts; and, in its second phase, positions, systematic constructions, policies, planning, and execution of programs that relate directly to the orders of cultural, social and vital values as well as to those of religious and personal values.

Theology's primary contribution, then, would lie at the foundational level rather than at the systematic level. For it is at the foundational level that the mediation of meaning which constitutes the making of ourselves and our world is initiated and mediated either ideologically or methodologically.

It is at the level of foundations that the otherworldly virtues of faith, hope and love, which emerge from the conjunction of personal and religious value, must undo the ideological forces of decline by conditioning the vital, social and cultural values of the infrastructure and superstructure so as to sustain an eschatological openness to transcendence.

What Doran has in mind here seems to be what Lonergan was alluding to at the conclusion of Method in Theology when he urged that theology unite itself with other branches of human studies in pursuing the eight functional specialties which are grounded in transcendental method. The goal, he explained, would be to filter out the intrusion of ideology into social praxis.

The social historian will ferret out instances in which ideology has been at work. The social scientist will trace its effects in the social situation. The policy maker will devise procedures for the liquidation of the evil effects and for remedying the alienation that is
their source .... Corresponding to doctrines, systematics, and communications in theological method, integrated studies would distinguish policy making, planning and the execution of the plans. Policy is concerned with attitudes and ends. Planning works out the optimal use of existing resources for attaining the ends under given conditions. Execution generates feedback. This supplies scholars and scientists with the data for studies on the wisdom of policies and the efficacy of the planning. The result of such attention to feedback will be that policy making and planning become ongoing processes that are continuously revised in the light of their consequences. [51]

It is clear from these remarks that what Lonergan has in mind is an interdisciplinary collaboration which is more than a theoretical reorientation. It is a reorientation of public policy.

In the Introduction I spoke of the threefold emergence of the practice of management, public policy and social ethics as uniquely modern, and of the need to discover a normative foundation for the critique of empirical culture. I believe that evaluative cultural hermeneutic which Doran constructs on the basis of Lonergan's work may in fact meet that demand. It is theology of culture understood as the foundation of public policy -- a theological social ethic understood as management ethics. Such a public policy management ethics, in Lonergan's view, would place power and authority as much as possible, at the local levels [where] problems will be defined and, in so far as possible, solutions worked out. Higher levels will provide exchange centers, where information on successful and unsuccessful solutions is accumulated to be made available to inquiries and so prevent the useless duplication of investigations. They will also work on the larger and more intricate problems that have no solution at the lower levels, and they will organize the lower levels to collaborate in the application of the solutions to which they conclude. Finally, there is a general task of coordination, of working out in detail what kinds of problems are prevalent, at what level they are best studied, how all concerned on any given type of issue are to be organized for collaborative effort .... To operate on the level of our day is to apply the best available knowledge and the most efficient techniques to coordinated group action. But to meet this contemporary exigence will also set the church on a course of continual renewal .... It will bring theologians into close contact with experts in very many different fields. It will bring scientists and scholars into close contact with policy makers and planners and, through them, with clerical and lay workers engaged in applying solutions to the problems and finding ways to meet the needs both of Christians and of all mankind. [52]

Doran's evaluative hermeneutic, based on Lonergan's transcendental method, envisions nothing less than a reversal of the
cultural decline which is rooted in ideology, on the basis of an interdisciplinary collaboration which would ground public policy in the eschatological openness of transcendence.

Public Policy is the managerial art and science of making our institutions responsive and responsible. Its goal ought to be to sustain that open development of society which makes life not only possible but an eschatological adventure amidst the unpredictable and often tragic vicissitudes of history.

Management is the art of mediating transcendence so that life might be possible. Public Policy as a managerial art can be mediated either methodologically or ideologically. A methodological mediation keeps our humanly made institutions open to spontaneous development through a dialectic of limitation and transcendence. Ideology treats our social order as sacred, as if our artificially constructed social routines were given with the laws of nature. Ideology abandons transcendence in order to absolutize the limitations of social routine and to legitimize the status quo.

An ideological mediation of meaning seeks totalitarian control over all the contingencies of human existence. Such a model represents a society closed to transcendence and all further development. A methodological mediation of public policy would ground the art of management in a transcending openness to further development through the spiritual renewal of imagination and intelligence. In such a model, one aspires, not to the totalitarian fantasy of controlling all others (as well as all the contingencies of history and society as if seeking to replace God), but to the self-control we call responsibility, which occurs when individuals embrace transcendence. Its institutional analogue is the responsible management of institutional behavior which occurs when management is faithful to the scale of values revealed by a differentiated consciousness in the third stage of meaning.

5. Conclusion

All three of our authors are concerned with human liberation and the need to transform society. They agree that ideology short-circuits both individual and societal transcendence. Furthermore, each is convinced that, as Segundo puts it, "the ... only thing that can maintain the liberative character of any theology is not its content but its methodology." All three also agree that transcendence can only be introduced
through minority communities related dialectically to mass society. The decision to orient theology toward one or the other, therefore, is foundational. They all agree, furthermore, that salvation extends beyond the confines of these communities. Segundo and Ellul appeal to the Barthian theme of objective universal salvation through Christ, whereas Doran refers to the possibility of other divine initiatives witnessed to in the various traditions of a world cultural humanity. And, finally, all three suggest that the personal appropriation of transcendence ought to lead to a renewal of imagination and intelligence through which transcendence might be reintroduced into society to effect the shape of public policy.

When we turn to the specifics of each theologian's approach, however, we find some important differences. There are differences, for instance, pertaining to the level at which the problem of ideology is addressed. Segundo focuses on the conflict of group interests while Ellul and Doran focus on the longer cycle of decline related to the foundational intersection of method and transcendence. Lonergan's account of the cycles of decline allows us to understand this as a complementary difference rather than as a dialectical opposition. It is not clear, however, whether Segundo would be prepared to accept that account.

Segundo's understanding of ideology also separates him from Ellul and Doran in another way. At first he talks of ideology in the Marxist sense as a justification for the status quo, and then suddenly he does an about-face and chooses to define ideology as a neutral system of ends and means. An ideology, he says, is as good as the reasons which can be advanced for holding it. He then insists that all movements require ideologies and that Christians enjoy a freedom from ideology as the basis of a freedom for ideology.

This looks suspiciously like an attempt to solve a problem by defining it out of existence. I think Lonergan's account of the role of belief in culture would allow Segundo to make the distinctions he wants in a less confusing way. All cultures and subcultures need beliefs in order to act. But beliefs can be either authentic or unauthentic. That is, they can be based on the promotion of the transcendental precepts or on the ideological flight from understanding. What Segundo intends might be stated better by saying that all human action requires belief and that ideologically
mediated beliefs block transcendence whereas beliefs mediated by *deutero-learning* (i.e., method) promote transcendence.

Methodologically, each author has a distinct starting-point for the introduction of transcendence into the social process. For Segundo it is ideological suspicion, and for Ellul it is apocalyptic hope. From the perspective of Lonergan and Doran, we could say that ideological suspicion represents the movement from below upward (i.e., the movement of questioning). Ellul's apocalyptic hope, on the other hand, represents the movement from above downward which occurs through conversion. Doran's position could present the possibility of reconciling Segundo and Ellul through his fourfold differentiation of the conversion process as transforming and reorienting each stage of the movement upwards with a complementary movement downwards.

There is a sense in which each of these theologians emphasizes one of the three theological virtues as decisive in reorienting the human search for direction in the movement of life. Each, of course, finds a place for all three virtues, but just as clearly each gives priority to one over the others. Segundo is primarily a theologian of faith which he understands in terms of "deutero-learning" (i.e., as analogous to setting out on a journey without knowing where one is going, trusting God to lead the way. -- *Hebrews* 11:8). Ellul, on the other hand, emphasizes (apocalyptic) hope as opening up the eschatological direction of movement in life, for both the individual and society. Doran, following Lonergan, places the emphasis on love as transforming the horizon of our existence. The unity of these three virtues gives us a theological reason for seeking complementarity rather than dialectical opposition between their respective positions.

Both Doran's use of Lonergan and Ellul's use of Barth continue to find a place for a "spiritual (not necessarily ontological) dualism" in their respective theologies. That is, both utilize the symbolism of "other-worldliness" in order to speak of conversion and grace as a gift coming from without (or above) which can orient and transform self and society. For Doran, conversion is an other-worldly falling in love, and for Ellul it is an other-worldly hope. Segundo, however, seeks to avoid all such dualisms for fear of separating society into sacred and profane spheres and limiting faith to the Church, rather than understanding that faith requires social engagement with the secular world. But both Doran's and
Ellul's handling of this theme shows that this need not be the consequence of other-worldliness. In fact, both would insist that only such an "other-worldliness" can make social transformation possible.

While Doran's position is closer to Segundo than to Ellul in this instance, he has enough in common with Ellul to again offer a mediating position. Segundo is inclined to characterize faith in this-worldly terms. Ellul is inclined to a Barthian interpretation of Kierkegaard, which finds no point of contact between the human and the divine prior to the contact established through grace as an intervention from without. For Lonergan and Doran, as with Augustine, faith is already implicit in our passionate questioning, and an other-worldly love is already implicit in our desire to know. The movement from above is already implicitly present in the movement from below upward as a prevenient grace leading the self toward its own conversion as a conscious self-appropriation of transcendence. It is not a matter of either eros or agape, as the argument might make it seem, but rather of "the blossoming of eros into agape."\(^{159}\)

The appeal to other-worldliness and another scale of values affects the understanding of the role of the Church in the world. All three agree that the Church must be committed to involvement in the world. But Segundo would allow that that involvement must sometimes include violence against oppressors. Thus Segundo seems reluctant to embrace a model of the Church as the Suffering Servant whereas both Ellul and Doran are not. For them, the Church is that minority that refuses to add to the social surd created by ideology by adding violence to violence. On the contrary, the Church introduces another scale of values by returning good for evil so as to reverse the decline of society. Only a redemptive suffering on behalf of a higher scale of values can reverse the process of decline initiated by those who flee from understanding and self-transcendence. This issue may be the most intractable point of difference between Segundo, on the one hand, and Ellul and Doran on the other.

Perhaps the most important reconciling feature of Doran's work, however, is his self-authenticating notion of transcendence in which psychic conversion is the link between transcendence and the renewal of imagination and intelligence. Where Segundo and Ellul suggest that faith and hope do accomplish this renewal, neither seems able to thematize it for conscious
appropriation. For Ellul, transcendence is an arbitrary Kierkegaardian leap of hope beyond the technical system. For Segundo, transcendence, which begins in ideological suspicion, culminates in an arbitrary option for political involvement which is justified because all political options are without rational (scientific) backing. Doran, following Lonergan, presents us with a notion of transcendence as a trans-cultural and trans-religious universal of the inquiring self in its unfolding exigencies whose intelligibility is self-authenticating. And he does this in such a way as to make equally intelligible the transcending linkage of emotion, imagination and intelligence.

There is also a recovery of the linkage between faith and reason in Doran that might well heal the division between Protestant and Catholic approaches to social ethics. The Thomistic tradition posited the autonomy of unaided reason, within limits, as enabling one to gain knowledge of God and of his will. The Protestant tradition has typically regarded reason as totally corrupted by the fall and emphasized that only by a conversion of the heart through faith alone and scriptures alone can one be redeemed. But such a conversion seems to leave reason untouched. Lonergan and Doran stand closer to Augustine than to either Aquinas or Luther (or Kierkegaard) on this particular issue. With the Protestant tradition they would assert the need for a fundamental conversion of the heart. They would agree that apart from conversion reason goes astray. But they would add that through conversion reason recovers its autonomy (or, perhaps more correctly, its theonomy). Against Luther and Kierkegaard, reason can be redeemed to play the autonomous role Catholicism has been inclined to ascribe to it. And despite the fact that it seems to go counter to some of their essential presuppositions, neither Segundo nor Ellul can refrain from suggesting the possibility that faith or hope can reorient reason to be creative and transcendent. But it is Doran who thematicizes the intelligibility of this possibility by mapping the terrain that links heart and mind.

Finally, it should be said that there is an amazing convergence of agreement (at least in principle) between Segundo, Ellul and Doran regarding Christian commitment to the Third World. Segundo, of course, argues for a preferential option on behalf of the poor. But, as we have seen, so does Ellul
who argues that only by reorienting our technology and economics to aid the Third World can we find a sense of meaning and direction in the modern world. And, finally, Doran too calls for a new techno-economic and cultural order that will enable the poor and oppressed victims of an ideologically distorted society to participate equitably in the tasks and rewards of a new global world order.

Not surprisingly, it is Doran who is able to remove the appearance of arbitrariness and bias from this option. For once one has recognized the link between the poor and oppressed of one's psyche and of one's society, it becomes clear that only by giving these victims preferential attention can transcendence be restored first to the psyche and then to society. Thus Doran concludes: "My argument in effect constitutes a defense, perhaps even a grounding, from the standpoint of a transcendental anthropology, for the insight of liberation theologians regarding the hermeneutically privileged position for theology of the most grievously oppressed peoples of our globe, and regarding the preferential option for the poor that must govern the Church's exercise of all her ministry."\160

The present world order, says Doran, is dominated by an ideological bias which has allowed the techno-economic order to result in a "massive oppression of the disadvantaged that has become global."\161 A global economic imperialism, we are told, is finally responsible for the poverty of the Third World nations. Here I think Doran overstates the case. It would be a fundamental failure of insight not to recognize, after Doran's extended argument about the influence of the cultural superstructure, that the difference between the rich and poor societies of the world cannot be accounted for entirely in terms of imperialism and exploitation. Surely, as Max Weber recognized, religion and culture profoundly influence the kinds of personal and social creativity that individuals, groups and societies engage in. And although there is plenty of blame to go around concerning exploitation, it would be tragic if we jettisoned all the creativity and ingenuity that certain religions and cultures have unleashed in the technological and economic spheres.

As Doran himself recognizes, a new world order must integrate the concerns of spirit and body. And this dialectic of transcendence and limitation must apply to the tasks of production as well as distribution if there are to be enough goods to meet the demands of distributive justice. Doran's
own vision of an integral society governed by the scale of values revealed by the emergence of the third stage of meaning would insure such a balance, even if that balance is not fully acknowledged in his conclusions. A managerial public policy grounded in the theological foundations of interdisciplinary praxis would in fact be guided by a vision of the human good humbled by the task of promoting the realizable within the constraints of finitude. It would in fact be an ethic of efficiency, liberated from the constraints of ideology, in order to do more with less. It would maximize the productivity of human effort in order to transform the global ecology of the earth into a land of promise for all the communities of a world-cultural humanity.

As with the work of a sculptor, so with the "artisans of a new humanity," to use Segundo's phrase, one must have not only vision but skill (techne). Skill without vision produces the trivial. Vision without skill produces nothing at all. When the two are conjoined, one is productively engaged in the eschatological or utopian task of new creation. That task, as Doran puts it, is one of "dramatic artistry" whereby one is engaged in the making of one's self and one's world -- in the making of humanity. We are faced with a task never before engaged in by human beings prior to the modern period. For, as Ellul argues, in a technological civilization we are required to consciously choose our selves and our institutions together -- at the same time. We are asked to engage simultaneously in the existential and managerial tasks of shaping public policy as the implementation of a methodologically grounded social ethic whose foundations are theological.

Poetically we dwell upon the earth, says Holderlin. And the poet, as the Greeks well knew, engages in the arete and techne of making and doing. As linguistic, and hence technological, creatures, we dwell in a world of our own making. Our choice is to dwell either unauthentically or authentically, to engage in either an ideological refusal of transcendence or to methodologically embrace transcendence. We can either be confined to the world as given or we can engage in that techno-poesis which is the making of ourselves and our world through an eschatological openness to a transcendence which makes all things new.
NOTES


4 In the ancient world, social change is accounted for through natural archetypes. For instance, for Aristotle the state is the natural outgrowth of the family. The telos of the family is the state, just as the telos of an acorn is an oak tree. See Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History [NY: Oxford U. Press, 1969], pp. 24 & 25.


7 In doing this I shall focus primarily on Segundo's book The Liberation of Theology [1976] and on Doran's book Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences [1981]. Both of these represent recent and concise efforts to relate transcendence, social process and theological method. With Ellul things are a little more problematic; his views on these issues are scattered throughout his works. He has not as yet drawn together his views on these themes in one concise statement. Fortunately (for me) I have done this in The Thought of Jacques Ellul [1981]. I am painfully aware that I do not have an equal command of the work of each of these authors, especially in the case of Segundo whose work I have only recently begun to explore. I have tested my account of Segundo's position, however, against Alfred Hennelly's comprehensive interpretation (endorsed by Segundo) entitled Theologies in Conflict: The Challenge of Juan Luis Segundo [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1981], and I believe it is substantially accurate.

8 Minimally, I mean by transcendence the capacity to "go beyond" what is given. The further implications of that mysterious capacity I leave open for additional amplification and development. By common sense I mean those pragmatic categories through which we interpret that world as it appears to us. It describes the real world that we all have to live in. Common sense is what everybody knows, but what everybody knows is as diverse as the times and places in which it is known. Common sense is always concrete and particular in its references and specific to time and place. And it is shaped by past tradition. Today's ideas and ideologies are likely to be the common sense of tomorrow.


13 Ibid., p. 209. 14 Ibid., p. 208. 15 Ibid., p. 228.
16 Ibid., p. 213. 17 Ibid., p. 228. 18 Ibid., p. 225.
19 Ibid., pp. 224-225. 20 Ibid., p. 226. 21 Ibid., p. 47.
22 Ibid., p. 25. 23 Ibid., p. 69. 24 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
28 Ibid., p. 102. This sudden definitional reversal seems to me to be unwarranted and confusing. I shall discuss it further in the conclusion to this paper.

29 Ibid., p. 110. 30 Ibid., p. 108. 31 Ibid., p. 150.

32 Ibid., p. 167. 33 Ibid., p. 110. 34 Ibid., p. 178.


41 The Ethics of Freedom, p. 420.


44 The New Demons, p. 65.


46 The New Demons, p. 203.


48 Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, pp. 162ff, and Ellul, Violence [NY: Seabury, 1969], p. 133. While Ellul says violence can never be justified by appeal to the Gospel, he is willing to admit it is sometimes a tragic necessity. "As a Christian I ... cannot call violence good, legitimate, and just, [but] I find its use condonable (1) when a man is in despair and sees no way out, or (2) when a hypocritically just and peaceful situation must be exposed for what it is in order to end it. But ... it is contradictory to the Christian life, whose root is freedom." As such it is never a virtue but always an expression of the condition of sin.


51 The New Demons, pp. 207 & 208.


54 Ibid., p. 272.


56 The Technological Society, xxxii.


59 Ethique de la liberté, p. 55.
60 Ethics of Freedom, p. 233.
61 Ellul, Perspectives on Our Age [NY: Seabury, 1981], pp. 5-7.
63 Ellul, Ethics of Freedom, p. 19. 64 Perspectives on Our Age, p. 18.
65 Ethics of Freedom, p. 457.
68 Nevertheless, like Ellul, Segundo argues that the Gospel must be addressed to each individual and not to the masses. See The Liberation of Theology, pp. 128, 158.
69 Ellul, Ethics of Freedom, pp. 210, 211, esp. n. 10.
70 Ibid., p. 339.
71 Jacques Ellul, To Will and To Do [Phila.: Pilgrim Press, 1969], see Ch. 14, esp. p. 253.
72 Ethics of Freedom, pp. 382-383.
75 The Presence of the Kingdom, p. 127. 76 Ibid., p. 109.
77 Ibid., p. 112. 78 Ibid., p. 132. 79 Ibid., p. 124.
80 Ibid., p. 133.
83 Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, p. 55.
84 Doran, Psychic Conversion, pp. 14 & 11.
85 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics [Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1952], p. 78. Doran seems to treat this differentiation as two (historical and soteriological) but Voegelin, at least in his later work, treats these as components of one differentiation. History, as a symbolic mode of existence, begins with the soteriological event of the Exodus. "History is not a merely human but a divine-human process." See The Ecumenic Age [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1974], p. 304.
86 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 7. 87 Ibid., p. 13.
90 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 16.
91 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 6.
92 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 102, quoting Lonergan, Insight [NY: Philosophical Conversion, 1957], Ch. 12.
93 I shall return to the topic of bias to discuss a second form of ideology which Lonergan calls "general bias."


97 Ibid., pp. 41-67. 98 Psychic Conversion, p. 64. 99 Ibid., p. 64.


102 Ibid., p. 58. 103 Ibid., p. 61. 104 Ibid., pp. 58-59.


107 Doran, Psychic Conversion, pp. 96-97.


110 Psychic Conversion, p. 102, quoting Lonergan, Method, p. 55.

111 Lonergan, Method, p. 55.


121 Doran, Psychic Conversion, pp. 20, 68. 122 Ibid., p. 67.

123 Ibid., p. 68. 124 Ibid., p. 69, quoting Lonergan, Method, 31.

125 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 72. 126 Ibid., p. 74.

127 Ibid., p. 29. Doran defines psyche as the "sensitive sequence of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses. These constitute what we call the psyche." [p. 182]

128 Ibid., pp. 144-45. 129 Ibid., p. 146.

130 See Doran's Subject and Psyche.

131 Psychic Conversion, p. 176, quoting Lonergan, Insight, 190.

132 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 176. 133 Ibid., pp. 176-77.

134 Ibid., p. 178. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., p. 179.


141 C. G. Jung's term for the biological level where instinct makes the transition to the psychological or archetypal image.

142 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 192. 143 Ibid., p. 200.

144 Ibid., pp. 152-53. 145 Ibid., p. 201.

146 Ibid., quoting Lonergan, Insight, p. 723.

147 Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 127. 148 Ibid.

149 Ibid., pp. 61-63. 150 Lonergan, Method, p. 364.


154 Ibid., p. 102. 155 Ibid., p. 106.

156 157
Ibid., p. 150. Lonergna, Method, pp. 41-47.


Doran, Psychic Conversion, p. 121, Quoting Lonergan.

Doran, "Suffering Servanthood," p. 64. Ibid.
