method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.
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Published by
The Institute for Integrative Studies, Inc.
In "Self-Knowledge and the Interpretation of Imaginal Expression" Robert Doran extends his argument for the foundational significance of "psychic conversion" into the domain of interpretation. Through the complementary mediations of intentionality analysis and psychic self-appropriation, he argues, one comes into possession of the "ground theme" of every story. Psychic conversion, especially, provides the interpreter a foundational familiarity with that "ground theme" as it is expressed on the imaginal level of consciousness from which narratives originate.

In "Insight and Mirrors" Garrett Barden finds in Rorty's rejection of the transcendental standpoint required by some versions of the correspondence theory of truth similarities with Lonergan's critique of confrontationalism. The problems with Rorty's position -- the grounds of his relativism -- are to be found, Barden argues, in his confusion of postulates with operations. Barden views his essay as a "development of the position" and contrasts his approach with Meynell's position-reversing analysis of Rorty.

In his "Reply to Garrett Barden" Meynell affirms the complementarity of his and Barden's analyses of Rorty, but disagrees with Barden's interpretation of Sellars's slogan "the myth of the given."

Daniel A. Dombrowski, in "Rorty and Mirror Images in St. Thomas," surveys the use of mirror metaphors by Aquinas and argues that Rorty's critique of "defenders of the glassy essence" does not really affect St. Thomas.

In "Kenny and Lonergan on Aquinas" Andrew Beards argues that Anthony Kenny distorts and oversimplifies Aquinas's position on intentionality. Kenny, Beards argues, has made poor use of Lonergan's commentary in Verbum; moreover, his interpretation of Aquinas is unduly influenced by Aristotelian physics.

A NOTE TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS

In Volume V of METHOD we shall continue to make available previously unpublished material from the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, in addition to scholarly articles, notes, and book reviews focusing upon issues and questions of concern to professors and students of philosophy and theology. Please renew your subscription now. A self-addressed envelope and subscription blank have been enclosed for your convenience.

Thank you for your support of METHOD.
My intention in this paper is to indicate the relation of psychic conversion to the interpretation of imaginal expression.

By psychic conversion I mean gaining a capacity for internal communication in the third stage of meaning, through the attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible negotiation of one's own spontaneous, elemental symbolizing, as the latter occurs in such events as one's dreams. As a conversion, psychic conversion is a transformation of the repressive censorship vis-à-vis neural demands for psychic integration and conscious representation, into a constructive censorship in their regard. As occurring in complementarity with religious, moral, and especially intellectual conversion, psychic conversion is a dimension of the foundational reality of a generalized empirical method that takes its stand on the self-appropriation of human interiority. In fact, if my previous arguments are correct, psychic conversion brings to completion the quest for the heuristic structure of foundations that achieved its first decisive systematization in the eleventh chapter of Lonergan's Insight, where there is reached the explanatory position on human knowing with which one enters the third stage of meaning.

By imaginal expression I mean all linguistic discourse, whether oral or written, that unfolds on, and is meant to be responded to on, the psychological and literary levels of expression as contrasted with the scientific and philosophic levels. The notion of levels of expression is introduced in Lonergan's discussion of interpretation in Insight. There modes of expression are classified, not in terms of language, style, or genre, but in terms of the sources of meaning both in the speaker or writer and in the hearer or reader. While scientific expression originates centrally in the sources of explanatory understanding in a speaker or writer and is meant to reproduce such cognitional sources
of meaning in a hearer or reader, and while philosophic expression originates centrally in the critical reflection of a speaker or writer and is meant to reproduce such critically reflective sources of meaning in a hearer or reader, imaginal expression originates centrally simply in the experience of the speaker or writer or in an artistically ordered set of experiential elements, and is meant to effect in the hearer or reader purely psychological conditioning at the experiential level of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses, or to elicit a more or less comprehensive and determinately ordered emotional response, or, finally, to convey insight, stimulate reflection, or prompt evaluation, but in an indirect or suggestive manner. The category of imaginal expression, then, is open enough to include several diverse literary genres. What qualifies it as a distinct level of expression is that its intended response from hearer or reader consists in an ordering of psychic sensitivity and, in some cases, in the insinuation of insights through this ordering, or in the calling forth of judgments either by the display of the field of evidence in which the judgments could be verified, or by the affective shaping or reinforcement of a moral or religious, or an amoral or anti-religious, horizon. The elicited responses would be ordered in some pattern of experience other than the intellectual: that is, in the dramatic, the practical, the aesthetic, the biological, the moral, or the religious pattern of experience. Emphasis is placed in such expression and intended response on that level of consciousness that we properly call the psyche, on the first level of awareness, on either the manipulation or the stimulation of that dimension of our intentionality whose criterion of authentic performance is attentiveness.

My paper, then, represents an attempt to advance the kind of interpretation theory that is already well underway in Lonergan's writings, and that in many ways, precisely because of the centrality of the notion of levels of expression, has advantages over the more prevalent hermeneutic theories employed in much contemporary philosophical and theological discussion. For this reason I hope that I may be excused for devoting the first two sections simply to an exposition of my interpretation of the relationship in
Lonergan's thought between foundations and interpretation. I concentrate on this relationship for two reasons. First, I believe that it is here that Lonergan's contribution to contemporary hermeneutic theory becomes most apparent. Second, only within this framework can I speak of the significance of psychic conversion for interpretation, since psychic conversion is a dimension of foundational reality. The relation of psychic conversion to interpretation will be treated in the third section. I conclude the paper with a suggestion regarding the dialectical sublation of structuralist methodology into the interpretation of narrative that is made possible by Lonergan's understanding of foundations complemented by my notion of psychic conversion.

I. Foundations and Interpretation: The Position of INSIGHT

Since psychic conversion is a matter of foundational reality, we must begin our discussion with a study of the relations between the functional specialties of foundations and interpretation. What in general is the relationship between explanatory self-knowledge and interpretation? First, we shall explore these relations as they appear in Insight, before the notion of functional specialization became explicitly differentiated; then we will study the same relations as they appear in Method in Theology, where the breakthrough has been achieved to the structure of theological operations and of the comprehensive reflection on the human condition that is grounded in theological foundations. Our specific concern in studying both of these works centers on the interpretation of what I have called imaginal expression.

A. Mystery and Myth

The functional equivalent in Insight of what was later to become the specialty, foundations, lies in the three basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity that are exposed, respectively, in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth chapters of this book. The functional equivalent of the later specialty, interpretation, is explained in the seventeenth chapter, "Metaphysics as Dialectic." What is the relationship offered there between the three basic positions and the method of interpretation?

The explicit problem of Insight's seventeenth chapter is the interpretation and dialectical negotiation of philosophical
texts. And, from the beginning, the relationship that is affirmed between the foundational positions of cognitional analysis and the objectives of interpretation is quite direct.

We propose to ask whether there exists a single base of operations from which any philosophy can be interpreted correctly and we propose to show that our cognitional analysis provides such a base.6

But before addressing himself to the interpretation of philosophical texts, Lonergan offers, from the same base, a set of suggestions that are relevant to the concerns of this paper. He presents "a genetic account of the radical meaning of mystery and myth, of their significance and function, of the grounds of their emergence, survival, and disappearance,"7 and he treats the questions of whether mystery and myth are to be regarded as cognate to earlier stages of metaphysics in its latent and problematic phases, and whether they vanish as metaphysics becomes both explicit and critically grounded.

By 'mystery' Lonergan means "symbolic expressions of positions," and by 'myth,' "symbolic expressions of counter-positions."6 By referring to positions and counter-positions, he is assuming that his cognitional-theoretic foundations are relevant to the interpretation and evaluation of prephilosophic levels of expression as well as to the philosophical level that is his central concern in this chapter. It is his notion of metaphysics that establishes the connection.

For Lonergan, explicit and adequate metaphysics consists in the intelligent grasp, reasonable affirmation, and responsible implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. Thus metaphysics is, as it were, a detailed and open-ended corollary to Insight's functional equivalent of the later specialty, foundations -- that is, to the explicit and adequate self-knowledge that is attained in the affirmation of the basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity. The implementation of this integral heuristic structure of proportionate being involves the philosopher in the reorientation of contemporary common sense and in the reorientation and integration of contemporary scientific knowledge, through advancing those assertions that are coherent with the basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity, and reversing those assertions that cannot be reconciled with these basic positions.
The affirmation of the basic positions that constitutes the functional equivalent in *Insight* of what later would become the specialty, foundations,

a) depends on the prior development of science and the prior philosophical clarification of general issues that enabled Lonergan to devote the first ten chapters of *Insight* to "a study of insight in mathematics, in classical and statistical science, in common sense and its fourfold bias, in the ambiguity of things and bodies, and in the reflective understanding that leads to judgment;"  

b) issues in the distinctions between the activities of experiencing and imagining, understanding, and judging, and so in the distinctions not only between positions and counter-positions on the basis of an accurate and universally applicable criterion of reality and of real distinctness, but also between explanation and description on the basis of the rigorous detachment of the intellectual pattern of experience that makes of the knower "an inconspicuous term in the real that is affirmed;"  

c) enables one to acknowledge the heuristic and progressive character of human intelligence, to distinguish between anticipations of insight and the actual achievement of insight, and between partial insight and mastery of a field or domain of human knowledge.

Now, such a foundational base enables one not only to understand the general significance of the symbolic expressions that Lonergan calls mystery and myth, both in themselves and in the development of the human mind and of human language, but also to distinguish between the expression of positions in mystery and the expression of counter-positions in myth, and so to discredit the latter while still paying due allegiance to the former. For, when we speak of mystery and myth, we are concerned with the intimation of unplumbed depths that accrues to our psychic feelings, emotions, and sentiments, and with the linguistic expression of such an intimation; and this intimation corresponds on the psychic level to our intellectual and rational anticipation of being, through which, because of our unanswered questions, we know of an unknown. Our orientation by the notion of being, or the desire to know, is an orientation into a known unknown, and it calls for a corresponding orientation on the psychic level to participation in some cosmic meaningfulness.
Moreover, just as being is differentiated into the variable spheres of what is already known and of what remains to be known and so is intended as to be known, so the psychic orientation is differentiated into the variable realms of "the sphere of reality that is domesticated, familiar, common" and "the sphere of the ulterior unknown, of the unexplored and strange, of the undefined surplus of significance and momentousness."  It is in the latter sphere that we find the primary field of mystery and myth, where affect-laden images and names are employed to mediate the known unknown.

Now, while mythic consciousness thinks that its images and names so mediate the known unknown as to make it known, the attitude of mystery preserves the images and names rather as expressions of the cosmic orientation of a psychic level of subjective events linked to an unrestricted notion of being. Mythic consciousness, then, is "an untutored desire to understand and formulate the nature of things," while mystery complements the unrestricted openness of our intelligence and reasonableness that is the concrete operator of our intellectual development with "a corresponding operator that deeply and powerfully holds our sensitive integrations open to transforming change." Mystery survives the development of science and metaphysics, because "even adequate self-knowledge and explicit metaphysics may contract but cannot eliminate a 'known unknown,' and . . . they cannot issue into a control of human living without being transposed into dynamic images which make sensible to human sensitivity what intelligence reaches for or grasps." And so, while mythic consciousness is the lack of self-knowledge and myth the opposite of metaphysics, mystery is the necessary and permanent imaginal counterpart and complement of the unrestricted desire to know whose concrete unfolding in history is the source, among other things, of adequate and explicit self-knowledge and of a derivative adequate and explicit metaphysics.

The images that qualify as mystery or as myth, precisely as images, are operative on the first, experiential level of consciousness. They function "within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions." But as symbols and as signs, these images stand in correspondence with intellectual dynamism. As symbols, they are simply linked with the known unknown. As signs, they are linked with some interpretation that would understand
the image. Such interpretations, moreover, are manifold, for the question of the goal of human finality "receives countless answers, pragmatic or conceptual, naturalistic, humanistic, or religious, enthusiastically positive or militantly negative." But correct interpretation of such symbolic utterances can now be based in the explicit and adequate self-knowledge that affirms the self as a unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness, and that recognizes the imaginal operator of psychic development as the sensitive correlative to an unrestricted intellectual intending of being. Such interpretation will not be a matter, then, of reconstructing in ourselves the experiences of others and of uncritically adding our own intellectual viewpoints which these others did not share. Rather, because one understands what a viewpoint is, how viewpoints develop, and what the dialectical laws are that govern their unfolding, one's interpretation of such utterances will be a matter of recovering the viewpoint of the past by approximating the insights, judgments, beliefs, and decisions that made the words and deeds, the feelings and sentiments, of another "the activities of a more or less intelligent and reasonable being."

Cognitional analysis, then, is foundational for the interpretation of the imaginal deliverances both of mythic consciousness and of the openness of mystery to human intelligence's unrestricted objective. Such interpretation will be essentially dialectical, for the interpreter knows that the sensitive field of mystery and myth is the locus of the origin, the expression, and the application of intelligent and rational contents and directives; that the integrating activities of the intellectual and rational levels stand in a dialectical unity-in-tension with the integrated activities of the sensitive level; and that, because the intellectual and rational activities are either the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know or a distorted unfolding due to the interference of other desire, the sensitive activities themselves are involved either in the mysteries of the proper unfolding or in the myths into which these mysteries are distorted because of the aberrations of intellectual and rational performance. The primary issues, then, in the interpretation of imaginal utterance have to do with the cognitional authenticity of the human spirit.
The interpretation of mystery and myth, finally, is not limited to the study of historically prescientific and prephilosophic utterance. The tense opposition of sensitive and intellectual operations is the source of a permanent challenge to the dominion of the detached and disinterested desire to know. The advance of science and philosophy may mean simply that later myths are now complemented and reinforced by corresponding philosophies and made historically effective "through the discoveries of science and the inventions of technology." Myth, then, is "the permanent alternative to mystery." 

B. The Universal Viewpoint and the Interpretation of Imaginal Expression

Within the context of Insight, what is ultimately at stake in both imaginal expression and its interpretation is the question of truth: more precisely, the sensitive psychic complement of the intellectual and rational intending through which alone truth can be attained. Consequently, the foundational appropriation of one's intelligent and reasonable intending is a constituent feature of any methodically adequate interpretation that would formulate the viewpoint, the intentionality, that corresponds to and produces the content of the original imaginal expression. Nor is such a notion of interpretation to be classified among the various romantic notions of hermeneutics, according to which interpretation is a matter of repeating in experience and expression the inner experience of the original author. What is at stake here is something quite different: the articulation, through the medium of interiorly differentiated consciousness, of the horizon that comes to expression in the original text. One need not choose between an interpretation that articulates a "world behind the text" (romantic hermeneutics) and a world disclosed "in front of the text." In understanding and articulating the horizon of the text, the interpreter captures the simultaneously world-constitutive and self-constitutive meaning of the original expression. A scientific interpretation of imaginal expression, then, would understand and formulate for a contemporary audience or readership at least the ordering of psychic sensitivity that was the response intended in the original expression, and, depending on the given instance, perhaps also the insights that were intended
to be emergent from such an ordering, or the judgments for which such an ordering was to display the sensitive or imaginal field of evidence. The particular ordering of sensitivity intended, as well as the insights and judgments insinuated, are to introduce the reader or hearer into participation in the horizon of the original expression.

A hermeneutic theory that would account for and promote such interpretation must indicate a basis from which the interpreter can assign grounds for his or her interpretation that enable one to transcend the limitations and errors inherent in the biases of one's own common sense. Such a basis must be a heuristic device that accounts in principle for the development of all viewpoints and all intentionality. One needs to specify a technical instrument that puts one in possession of the constants of all subjectivity. These constants would be common to the recipients of the original expression and the recipients of the interpretation. They lie behind the genesis, the development, and the dialectical unfolding of all viewpoints. While they are always expressed in culturally, historically, and linguistically relative forms of expression, in themselves they transcend all relativity to particular audiences and readerships, since they are at the origin of all expression, and thus are universally human.

The discovery of these constants constitutes what Lonergan calls a universal viewpoint. "By a universal viewpoint will be meant a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints,"23 "a heuristic structure that contains virtually the various ranges of possible alternatives of interpretations."24 The concern of a universal viewpoint is with acts of meaning, the insights and judgments that are expressed or insinuated in texts, the intentionality that produced the original expression. One's familiarity with these acts is rooted in one's self-appropriation of one's own experience, understanding, and critical reflection.

There are the external sources of historical interpretation and, in the main, they consist in spatially ordered marks on paper or parchment, papyrus or stone. But there are also sources of interpretation immanent in the historiographer himself, in his ability to distinguish and recombine elements in his own experience, in his ability to work backwards from contemporary to earlier accumulations of insights in human development, in his ability to envisage the protean possibilities of the notion of being, the core of all meaning, which varies
in content with the experience, the insights, the judgments, and the habitual orientation of each individual.\textsuperscript{15}

The base or foundation of this ordered totality of viewpoints is self-knowledge: the positions on knowing, being, and objectivity. The viewpoints are ordered genetically, in that they are arranged as series of discoveries through which human subjectivity could advance to its present position. They are ordered dialectically, in that adequate self-knowledge enables one to compare and contrast the many formulations of discoveries on the basis of whether they are coherent or not with the basic positions. Because of such an ordered totality, "one can reach a concrete presentation of any formulation of any discovery through the identification in personal experience of the elements that, as confused or as distinguished and related, as related under this or that orientation of polymorphous consciousness, could combine to make the position or counter-position humanly convincing."\textsuperscript{26}

The universal viewpoint differs radically from universal history and from Hegelian dialectic in that the totality, the ordering, and the ordered viewpoints are all potential. The totality is not a series of known contents but a heuristic structure whose contents are sequences of unknowns whose relations are only generically determinate. The genetic ordering heads toward sequences of discoveries, but of discoveries that could be and indeed were made in a variety of manners. The dialectical ordering heads toward the furthering of positions and the reversal of counter-positions, but the oppositions are by no means as clear-cut as the antitheses of the basic positions and counter-positions. What is ordered, finally, is the sequence of viewpoints, and this sequence is itself "advancing from the generic to the specific, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, from the awkward, the global, the spontaneous to the expert, the precise, the methodical."\textsuperscript{27}

The foundations, again, of a universal viewpoint lie in a fact: the universe of meanings consists in "the full range of possible combinations

[1] of experience and lack of experience,

[2] of insights and lack of insight,

[3] of judgments and of failures to judge, and

[4] of the various orientations of the polymorphous consciousness of man."\textsuperscript{28} Thus: ". . . in the measure that one grasps the structure of this protean notion of being, one
IMAGINAL EXPRESSION

possesses the base and ground from which one can proceed to the content and context of every meaning. In the measure that one explores human experience, human insights, human reflections, and human polymorphic consciousness, one becomes capable, when provided with the appropriate data, of approximating to the content and context of the meaning of any given expression."

Now, the notion of a universal viewpoint combines with the notion of levels and sequences of expression to generate an upper blade of generalities or presuppositions for methodical and accurate interpretation of the expressions of another. That is to say, the interpreter must be familiar not only with the lower blade of techniques for dealing with the documents and monuments through which others have expressed their meanings, but also, and foundationally, with the manner in which meanings form a genetically and dialectically related sequence of unknowns, and with the manner in which expressions develop from the undifferentiated to the specialized. The scientific interpretation that emerges from such familiarity is a matter of an adequate and accurate differentiation of the protean notion of being by a set of genetically and dialectically related determinations of patterns of experience, accumulations of insights, and sets of meanings -- and "no more."

The application to imaginal expression of the universal viewpoint and of the notion of sequences of modes of expression is complicated by the fact that such expression unfolds on and is responded to on the prescientific and prephilosophic psychological and literary levels of expression. The intended response may insinuate insights or display the field of evidence for judgments, but the level of consciousness from which the expression primarily emerges and on which it must be responded to is the experiential level. Moreover, if the interpretation is to be scientific, it must do more than convey a new set of images and associations from which its recipient can reach the insights and form the judgments through which the original expression can be interpreted. A scientific interpretation must itself formulate these insights and judgments, which themselves concern in the present instance an expression whose source of meaning is experiential and whose term of meaning is, perhaps, the psychological correlative of what could be or is meant to be affirmed or denied.
Despite this added difficulty, it seems that the various canons of a methodical interpretation offered by Lonergan still obtain. Thus, the interpretation must convey the psychic correlative of some differentiation of the protean notion of being. It must do so in an explanatory fashion, taking account of the genetic sequence of such differentiations, of the dialectic of positions and counter-positions, of the symbolic expressions that psychically correspond to such alternatives, of the possibility of the differentiation and specialization of modes of expression, and of the psychic or imaginal correlates of such differentiation and specialization. Again, the interpretation will be at first hypothetical, but it will approximate probability or certainty by coming into coherence with the universal viewpoint, with the genetic sequence of modes of expression, and with the possible gaps that might exist between meaning, on the one hand, and available resources of expression, on the other. Finally, the interpretation will be, not logical, but intelligent, and so it will take into account the non-systematic component of fields of meaning, of expression in relation to meaning, of expression in relation to dynamic psychic constellations in the original author or speaker, and of documents in their origins, production, and survival.

C. Summary

Our exposition and interpretation of the theory of hermeneutics that appears in Lonergan's Insight has not covered all the details of the theory. Our intention has been to indicate the intimate connection that Lonergan posits there between the foundational positions on knowing, being, and objectivity, and the task and goal of interpretation. We have studied that relation in respect to Lonergan's genetic account of those imaginal expressions that qualify for the titles of mystery and myth, and in respect to the notion of a universal viewpoint as horizon for a scientific interpretation. We have extended the import of Lonergan's discussion to the universal viewpoint so that it includes more explicitly an account of the horizon that Insight's basic positions would constitute for the interpretation precisely of imaginal expression. Thus we may now move on to a discussion of the relations that seem to obtain between foundations and interpretation in Method in Theology, where the
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II. Foundations and Interpretation: The Position of METHOD IN THEOLOGY

The issue of the relationship between foundations and interpretation becomes more complex in Method in Theology. Four points seem to call for attention: the expansion of the foundational position on the subject, the explicit differentiation of functional specialties, the difference between the intellectual hermeneutics of the functional specialty, interpretation, and the evaluative hermeneutics of the functional specialty, dialectic, and the issue of the upper blade of the universal viewpoint as this is transposed into the context of Method in Theology.

A. The Expansion of the Foundational Position on the Subject

The central development in Lonergan's thought between Insight and Method in Theology concerns the expansion of foundations. The basic position on the subject includes but now goes beyond the position on the knower. There is affirmed a fourth level of consciousness, a level on which we apprehend potential values, evaluate, deliberate, discern, decide, and act. In Insight, this level was compacted into intelligent and reasonable consciousness; in Method in Theology, it is recognized as involving operations quite distinct from and sublating the operations of intelligent inquiry and reasonable reflection through which the real world is known. Fourth-level operations, moreover, constitute, not a notion of being, but a notion of value. Thus, as the position on being is a corollary of the position on knowing, so the position on value is a corollary of the position on deciding. And the basic position on objectivity is implicitly expanded so as to include an affirmation of the affective and existential dimensions of self-transcendence.39

The details of the expanded foundational position are familiar enough to those who have followed Lonergan's development to need no further elaboration here. It is sufficient to indicate that, while the self-affirmation of the knower...
is now equated with a philosophic conversion, foundations consist in the objectification not only of this conversion but also of moral and religious conversion. The suspicion already arises that, if previously cognitional analysis was posited as providing a base of operations from which both philosophical and imaginal texts could be interpreted, a further differentiation now appears in that base, a nuanced clarification that includes existential analysis, the objectification of the moral and religious self-transcendence of the interpreting subject.

B. The Explicit Differentiation of Functional Specialties

The suspicion is verified when one reflects on the implications of the fact that the expansion of the basic position on the subject is what made possible the breakthrough to the differentiation of functional specialties in the first place. Correlative to the fourth level of intentional consciousness are the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations. Only these functional specialties make possible the transition from the first phase of theology, which studies the past, to the second phase, which directly addresses the present and the future. The link from the critical mediation of the past into the present to the critical mediation of the present into the future is intrinsically dependent upon exposure and resolution of the issues of cognitive and existential authenticity. These issues arise as questions from the very performance of the tasks of studying the past in interpretation and history; they are explicitly confronted in dialectic; and they are resolved in foundations. The expansion of the basic position on the subject and the correlation of the cardinal functional specialties of dialectic and foundations with fourth-level objectives means that appealing to authenticity as the criterion of positions to be developed and of counter-positions to be reversed involves more than the appropriation of one's own intelligence and rationality. It entails also the appropriation of oneself as a moral and religious being. The adequate self-knowledge that can ground one's own philosophical and theological positions is a more complicated achievement than it was in Insight. It involves the self-affirmation of the moral and religious, as well as of the intellectual, subject.
Foundations, moreover, specifies directly the grounding only of the last three functional specialties: doctrines or positions, systematics, and communications. And even with regard to these three sets of tasks, the objectification of the three conversions and the consequent derivation of general and special categories to be employed in the second phase of theology is only a partial foundation. Also foundational is the work of the first four functional specialties: research, interpretation, history, and dialectic.

We are seeking the foundations, not of the whole of theology, but of the last three specialties, doctrines, systematics, and communications. We are seeking not the whole foundation of these specialties -- for they obviously will depend on research, interpretation, history, and dialectic -- but just the added foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states what is so.36

This statement raises a host of problems. In Insight, Lonergan was seeking a "single base of operations from which any philosophy can be interpreted correctly,"37 and he specifies that the equivalent of foundations in Insight is directly foundational of the task of interpretation. In Method in Theology, on the other hand, the expanded set of foundational positions, which includes the positions of Insight, is explicitly affirmed as foundational, not of interpretation, but only of the critical mediation from the present into the future. Are we to infer that there has occurred a fundamental transposition of the issue of the relation between foundations and interpretation? Have we moved from a position according to which adequate self-knowledge is foundational of interpretation, to a position in which interpretation and adequate self-knowledge are co-foundational of one's own statement of truth? Or is the relationship between foundations and interpretation more complicated, and the transposition of the issue consequently less drastic?

A study of the relevant sections of Method in Theology would indicate that the latter alternative is the correct one. Not only are the categories derived in foundations employed in all eight functional specialties,38 but also there is explicitly affirmed an interdependence, first, of foundations and dialectic, and secondly of dialectic and interpretation. In fact, all eight functional specialties are involved in at least an indirect interdependence.39 Moreover, interpretation itself is said to be related to and dependent upon
the other seven functional specialties, including foundations. What, then, is the relationship that emerges in the chapter on interpretation between adequate self-knowledge and the tasks of interpretation? And how does this relationship move into the issues of dialectic?

C. Intellectual Hermeneutics and Evaluative Hermeneutics

Interpretation, or intellectual hermeneutics, comprises three tasks: understanding the text one is studying, judging the accuracy of one's understanding of the text, and stating to one's contemporaries what one has judged to be the correct understanding of the text. The texts with which Lonergan is concerned in the chapter on interpretation in Method in Theology are a matter, not of philosophical, but of common-sense, expression.

Horizons, values, interests, intellectual development, experience may differ. Expression may have intersubjective, artistic, symbolic components that appear strange. Then there arises the question, What is meant by the sentence, the paragraph, the chapter, the book? Such in general is the problem of interpretation.

It is in regard to the first of the three tasks of interpretation, that of understanding the text, that there emerges a discussion of the relation between self-knowledge and interpretation.

Lonergan's procedure here, as in Insight, prescinds from a discussion of lower-blade techniques -- form criticism, redaction criticism, literary criticism, etc. -- and moves rather to a discussion of the levels of conditions of possibility for accurate interpretation. That is, the steps that Lonergan unfolds as intrinsic to the understanding of texts involve a move from proximate to more remote conditions of possibility of interpretation. Four steps are involved, and they become successively more remote conditions of possibility, until the final step, that of self-knowledge, is reached; and this final step is not strictly part of one's task or method as an interpreter, but is "an event of a higher order, an event in [one's] own personal development." Each of the conditions of possibility of interpretation involves one in the self-correcting process of learning, but the final condition involves a familiarity that one gains, not in learning the method of interpretation, but in learning the art of living. For the concern of interpretation is to understand "what happened to be the objects, real or imaginary, intended
by the author of the text." One's initial resources for fulfilling this task lie in one's knowledge of the language in which the text is written, and in the amplitude of one's own accumulated experience, understanding, and judgment. Even with these resources, one's assumptions regarding precisely what it is that the text intends may be mistaken. Then one must acknowledge that one's knowledge of the object is not sufficient for passing an accurate interpretation on to others; one must "note one's every failure to understand clearly and exactly and . . . sustain one's reading and rereading until one's inventiveness or good luck have eliminated one's failures in comprehension." But a third and more remote exegetical condition is also required. For one must have appropriated the common sense of the people to whom the author belongs and whom the author is addressing in his text. One has to extend one's self-correcting process of learning to the point of coming to understand "the author himself, his nation, language, time, culture, way of life, and cast of mind." In order to understand the objects intended in the text, one needs more than one's own general and potential knowledge about these objects, and more than the rereading and inventiveness that clear up lesser problems of miscomprehension. To be an interpreter, one must be a scholar.

The series of stages in the self-correcting process of learning involved in understanding the object intended in the text can move decisively beyond the developments intrinsic to the process of becoming an expert in exegetical methods. Even with a knowledge of the common sense of another people, even with the sustained rereading of the text, even with a knowledge of the language in which the text is written and the general and potential knowledge of the objects that necessarily is concomitant with the knowledge of the language, it may happen that one is still unable to understand the text. The self-correcting process of learning may have to be pushed to the limit of effecting a radical change in oneself before one is able to understand the objects intended in a text. One may have to come to a revolution in one's own outlook or viewpoint. "The major texts, the classics, in religion, letters, philosophy, theology, not only are beyond the initial horizon of their interpreters but also may demand an intellectual, moral, religious conversion of
the interpreter over and above the broadening of his horizon.\(^6\)

And following upon such a conversion, one may have to rethink
the entire issue from the basis of one's new and more profound
viewpoint. One may be dealing with that kind of writing that
"is never fully understood. But those that are educated and
educate themselves must always want to learn more from it."\(^7\) One
may be dealing with a writing that grounds an entire tradition,
that creates the very milieu in which it can be studied and
understood, that actually produces in the interpreter the
preunderstanding from which it can be correctly interpreted.
Or one may be dealing with a writing that departs from an
authentic tradition, that grounds a recasting of the intended
objects in such a way that it adapts them to a biased set
of assumptions and convictions grounded in a flight from con-
version. One may be pushed to the limit of determining which
is the case. But one can decide only if one has oneself faced
the issues of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion,
and come to some conclusion for oneself on these foundational
matters. One can decide only if the event of coming to under-
stand oneself has occurred in one's personal development as
a human subject.

At this point, then, we have moved away from the tasks
of scholarly or intellectual interpretation to evaluative
interpretation. We have moved from the functional specialty,
interpretation, to the functional specialty, dialectic. We
have raised the very questions that are to be resolved in
foundations. And it is clear how these questions impinge on
interpretation. For without having faced these dialectical
and foundational questions, we may not be in a position to
achieve the very purpose of scholarly interpretation. We may
simply not be able to understand the objects that are intended
in the text that we are studying. And coming to the position
of being able to understand these objects may no longer be
a matter of one's development as a scholar, but of one's growth
as a human being. We are now actually encountering the past,
where encounter is a matter of "meeting persons, appreciating
the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and
allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by
their words and by their deeds."\(^8\) Scholarly interpretation
of some texts demands that one have put one's self-understand-
ing to the test, by admitting into one's treatment of the
text this existential encounter with the text's horizon.
We can see, then, how the issues of foundations now affect the task of interpretation. These issues state the limit of the conditions of possibility of understanding a text, the limit of the self-correcting process of learning that may be required in order to understand, the limit of familiarity with intended objects that may be needed in order to understand the objects that in fact are intended in a given text.

D. The Existentially Transformed Universal Viewpoint

As we have seen, the relationships between foundations and interpretation are more complicated in Method in Theology, not only because of the explicit differentiation of the functional specialties, but also because of the greater complexity of the foundational issues themselves. In addition to the basic positions on the knower, on the real, and on objectivity, there are basic positions on the moral agent, on value, on affectivity, on the religious subject, on the divine, and on love. There is still affirmed, however, "the notion of a potential universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression." In fact, the sequences of expression are more clearly differentiated than they were in Insight. But the universal viewpoint is now reached "by advocating a distinct functional specialty named dialectic." And in dialectic the issues are raised, not only of knowing, but also of choosing and of relating to the divine. The universal viewpoint thus becomes the upper blade, not only for a series of differentiations of the protean notion of being and of the imaginal counterparts of these differentiations, but also for a series of differentiations of the notion of value and of the imaginal counterparts of these differentiations. In fact, the base from which an accurate interpretation can be given consists now, not only of a cognitional theory that contains positions on the basic philosophic issues of knowing, reality, and objectivity, but also of a transcendental analysis of the notion of value, of human subjectivity's natural desire for the knowledge and love of God, and of the heuristic structure of the soteriological satisfaction of that natural desire. But the function of the universal viewpoint remains basically the same, even if it is expressed in a more differentiated understanding of the relationship between the foundational issues and the tasks of interpretation.
III. **Psychic Conversion and Interpretation**

I have already stated that I regard psychic conversion as an aspect of foundational reality. If I am correct, then psychic self-appropriation is a constitutive feature of one's foundations. My task in the present section is to indicate, on the basis of the previous analysis of the relations of foundations and interpretation, the pertinence of psychic conversion for the interpretation of imaginal expression.

The clue that opened me upon the notion of psychic conversion lies in the expansion of the basic position on the subject that, as we have seen, represents the central development in Lonergan's thought between *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. The notion of value that is fourth-level consciousness is such that potential values are first apprehended in intentional feelings. And such feelings themselves are related intimately to symbols. "A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling." There are, then, imaginal counterparts, not only to the notion of being, as in *Insight*, but also, and most intimately, to the notion of value. In fact, it seems reasonable to argue that, if Lonergan is correct concerning the relationships between intentional feelings and values, on the one hand, and between these same feelings and symbols, on the other, then if one were to come to the point of genuine familiarity with the spontaneous elemental symbolizations of one's own psyche, one would also gain a familiarity with the affective responses through which one apprehends and initially moves toward the good. One would be discovering and appropriating the aesthetic and dramatic base of one's morals and of one's religion. One would be gaining explanatory understanding of one's own story, of the movement of one's own life precisely as that movement is experienced and symbolically reflected by the sensitively psychic level of one's consciousness. One would be in a position to appropriate both the first level of consciousness, the experiential level, and the fourth level as it sublates this experiential component and the two intellectual levels of consciousness into the affectively intentional response to the good. One would be significantly aided by such a change in oneself in the concrete self-appropriation of one's own being as an existential subject. One would be, perhaps, approximating the same explanatory understanding of the experiential and existential levels of one's consciousness as Lonergan enables
of the intellectual and rational levels. One would perhaps
even be bringing to completion the foundational quest that
reached its decisive turning point, its genuine systematization,
its first formative discovery, in the self-affirmation of
the knower, but that has already been extended by Lonergan
himself to an affirmation of higher levels of consciousness
than those through which we know what is so. One would be
providing oneself with a set of defensive circles to safe-
guard the authenticity of one's being as an intellectual,
moral, and religious subject.\textsuperscript{53}

The foundational role of psychic conversion for the task
of interpretation appears most directly in the hermeneutic
of imaginal expression. The self that one has come to know
is a self that not only inquires and understands, reflects
and judges, and so is a notion of being, but that also evalu-
ates and deliberates, decides and acts, and so is a notion
of value. By the very ontological constitution of such a self,
there inevitably will be released imaginal counterparts of
one's intentions of being and of value. Both intentions, then,
are connected with the symbols that reveal the dramatic compon-
ent, the story, of one's intentionality. To disengage that
story intelligently, rationally, responsibly is to gain a
greater depth of understanding of oneself as a cognitive inten-
tion of being and as an existential intention of value. Such
disengagement is a decisive aid in answering the questions,
What do I really want? What am I doing to achieve what I really
want? Is what I want really worth while? Is what I am doing
to achieve it in keeping with genuine self-esteem, or is it
a promotion of my own advantage at the expense of others,
or of the advantage of my group at the expense of other groups,
or of short-sighted practicality at the expense of ultimate
issues and long-term consequences? Am I an agent of the shorter
or longer cycles of decline or of their reversal? Am I part
of the problem or part of the solution?

The solution, of course, lies in self-transcendence,
and psychic conversion is a conversion of the censorship that
admits or refuses to admit those imaginal materials that are
needed for insight, reflection, and decision -- for intellec-
tual, rational, and moral self-transcendence.\textsuperscript{54} It is a conver-
sion of the preconscious collaboration of imagination and
intelligence through which the materials are presented out
of which I can make a work of art out of my own life. It is
the condition of the possibility of dramatic artistry in the third stage of meaning, i.e., in that stage in which such artistry is strictly dependent upon self-appropriation.

Much work will have to be done to relate the notion of psychic conversion to the depth-psychological systems of Freud and Jung. That work will reveal the significance and necessity of a correct position on self-transcendence if one wants to understand the human psyche. But my task at present is not to construct this elaboration, but to proceed to the question of the relation that obtains between psychic conversion as foundational and the interpretation of imaginal expression. The relationship can be succinctly stated: come to know as existential subject the contingent figures, the structure, the process, and the archetypal and anagogic spontaneity of your own psyche, and you will come into possession of an expanding base and an intelligible pattern illuminating the imaginal counterparts of spiritual desire that come to expression in those texts that originate from and are meant to be responded to on the psychological and literary levels of expression. That is:

a. appropriate the relationships that obtain among the five levels of intentional consciousness as Lonergan has delineated these levels;

b. discover the relationship between the symbolizations of your own psyche and the authentic or inauthentic orientation of your intellectual, rational, and existential intentionality;

c. distinguish the modalities of these symbols and their respective intentionalities as either personal or archetypal or anagogic;

d. and you will be able to understand imaginal expression as the psychic correlative of some differentiation of the polymorphic intellectual and existential consciousness of human subjectivity as this consciousness either remains faithful to the exigencies of intentionality or departs from the desire to know and the desire for the genuine good.

If psychic conversion is as foundational as intellectual conversion, it will stand in the same relationship to the task of interpretation as does the affirmation of the positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity. Moreover, I believe that psychic conversion will be the instrument through which moral and religious conversion are able to assume their own
foundational stance alongside intellectual conversion as the existential condition of the possibility of scientific interpretation. For it is through psychic conversion that one is enabled to appropriate the moral and religious dimensions of one's own consciousness. What one comes to through such an appropriation is not simply a further set of positions that can be set over against basic antitheses. Rather, one arrives at an explanatory unfolding of the story of one's own existence as a moral and religious agent. The story is uncovered in explanatory fashion because one has reached the standpoint from which one can fix by insight terms and relations by one another. The insight in question is an insight into the symbols that elementally and spontaneously proceed from one's own sensitive psyche. The insight grasps the relations that obtain, not only among the various dimensions of these symbols, but also between these symbols and the unfolding of one's intentionality as an intelligent and existential being-in-the-world. The insight is verified as one tries it out. And the verified insight enters the constitution of the habitual intellectual, moral, and religious orientations that one adopts as a subject. The orientations provide an expanding base for the interpretation of the imaginal expressions of others, because these others too are dynamic unities-in-tension of sensitive psychological consciousness and intentionality. Their elemental symbolizing, too, is the sensitive psychological counterpart and complement of the protean notions of being and value. One's universal viewpoint is enriched as one comes to know the relations that obtain between one's sensitive psychological symbolizations and one's intention of being and value. One is able to move more readily to that interpretation of imaginal expression that explains such expression as the psychological correlative of what could be, or is meant to be, not simply affirmed or denied, but also chosen or rejected. One understands symbolic language as complementary on the psychic level to the differentiations of the notions of being and value achieved by the subject of such language. Psychic conversion thus enters into the dialectical base of interpretation, and finds its most direct relevance to interpretation when one is treating texts that are already written in the symbolic mode, tests whose expression, then, originates from and is intended to be responded to on, the prescientific levels of human expression.
IV. The Sublation of Structuralism into Interpretation

I conclude with a few methodological suggestions regarding the dialectic of structuralism and hermeneutics and with a tentative claim that psychic conversion may perhaps be relevant to the debate.

'Structuralism,' it would seem, like 'existentialism,' is a term that is used to refer to markedly different methodologies and ideologies. For Jean Piaget, structuralism is a study of systems of transformations-under-laws, where "the structure is preserved or enriched by the interplay of its transformation laws, which never yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it. In short, the notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation." Unless I am mistaken, however, the structuralism of Piaget differs notably from that of Claude Lévi-Strauss, for whom the systems in question results not at all from the terms within the system, but solely from the differences among the terms, the differential elements; for whom, moreover, this system of differences exists only on an axis of simultaneities that is to be sharply distinguished from an axis of successions or alternations; and for whom, finally, the unconscious nature of the systems, their existence and functioning on a non-historical level of the mind, leads to the development of an anti-humanistic and anti-hermeneutical philosophy for which genetic growth is an arbitrary notion, culture is reduced to nature, and "the ultimate goal of the human sciences [is] not to constitute but to dissolve man." Piaget's notion of structure as it functions operatively in his thought corresponds quite well, it seems, to that expressed by Lonergan when he speaks of human knowing as a formally dynamic structure. The principal difference between this notion and that of Lévi-Strauss seems to be with respect to the relative priority of synchronic and diachronic relations within the totality. The conflict of Lévi-Straussian structuralism with hermeneutics seems to be rooted in the priority assigned by the former to unconscious, automatically functioning, and codified relations of simultaneity at the expense of genetically or dialectically unfolding relations that permit a semantic comprehension.

What perhaps has not been sufficiently acknowledged by the hermeneutic protagonists in the debate, however, is
the relevance to semantic understanding of the notion of structure itself as diachronic. It would seem, too, from my admittedly limited reading of efforts at structural exegesis, that the functioning notion of structure that is frequently employed is not the generalized structuralism of synchronicity that is featured, for example, in Lévi-Strauss' The Savage Mind, but is rather germane to the notion of a formally dynamic and diachronic structure that seems to be the functioning notion in Piaget's Structuralism. Variations on the conflict appear when Lévi-Strauss indicates that the differences between 'primitive' classifications and modern science are a function, not of different stages of mental development, but of different synchronic levels of knowledge; while those who hold the contrary view do not dispense with structural relations among levels of conscious performance, but rather arrange the structure in a diachronic fashion that accounts for genuine development. Lévi-Strauss' option is picked up and applauded by John Dominic Crossan, for whom what matters are "certain witnesses for change without progress and for evolution without improvement," and for whom "evolutionary progress is simply a piece of major Western arrogance." But it would seem that, if hermeneutics is to continue to dispute the claims that arise from Lévi-Straussian brands of structuralism -- claims that are not simply exegetical and so relevant to lower-blade techniques, but metamethodological and so affecting the upper blade of the universal viewpoint and of the levels and sequences of expression, hermeneutical understanding will have to incorporate into its procedures the explanatory perspective of formally dynamic and diachronic structures, and to point out to proponents of structuralism that it is in fact a diachronic notion of structure that they frequently are employing and should employ if they wish to correlate structure and meaning.

Among the imaginal expressions for whose interpretation psychic conversion may be foundational are narratives. Narratives have also been the focus of much structuralist exegesis. If I am correct in my claim regarding the foundational role of psychic conversion, one of the elements that it provides the interpreter is the possibility of an explanatory understanding of stories. But the base that is psychic conversion is itself an explanatory understanding of one's own story; and that understanding, as it emerges from the attentive,
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible negotiation of one's own elemental symbolizing, is a matter of fixing in a diachronic manner the terms and relations of one's own spontaneous symbolic system, and the terms and relations that obtain between this system and one's intelligent, reasonable, and responsible intentionality. The symbolic system is structured; so is intentionality; and so, finally, is the interaction of symbolizing and intending. But the structuring in each case is diachronic. And the story that is told by the symbolic system is the story of one's own development or reversal, both of which are revealed precisely in the diachronic structuring of the relations that obtain among the terms of the system.

The question arises, then, whether the transposition of structuralism from the field of linguistics to that of human studies does not inevitably introduce into the very notion of structure a diachronic primacy that perhaps can be dispensed with in linguistics. Structuralism changes its own very structure when it becomes a methodological tool for the study of human relations. And surely, structuralism is changed with my proposal or tentative suggestion of a diachronic comprehension of narrative. But hermeneutics has been changed no less. The hermeneutics of narrative becomes, on the basis of psychic conversion, explanatory understanding of the diachronic structure of a story. It becomes a matter of fixing terms and relations by one another, on the basis of one's knowledge of the terms and diachronic relations that obtain in one's own story. The relations are those of emergence, of development, of conversion, of decline, of reversal, of breakdown. Perhaps through the complementary mediations of the self that are intentionality analysis and psychic self-appropriation, one comes into possession of the ground theme of every story. And perhaps what psychic conversion specifically provides the interpreter is foundational familiarity with that ground theme as it is expressed on the very imaginal level of consciousness from which the narratives one is studying have emerged.

It may be, then, that the hermeneutics of narrative is best understood as a diachronic structuralism. It is certainly true that in such an understanding our notions both of hermeneutics and of structuralism would be changed. But such change is precisely what happens in any dialectic in
which the tension of the opposites is not prematurely displaced.

A dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus, there will be a dialectic, if

1. there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character,
2. the events may be traced to either or both of two principles,
3. the principles are opposed yet bound together, and
4. they are modified by the changes that successively result from them.63

Such a notion of dialectic seems to support my still quite tentative suggestion that the hermeneutics of narrative might itself be profitably understood in terms of a diachronic application of transformed structuralist insights.

V. Conclusion

The intention and scope of this paper have been deliberately quite limited. All that I have attempted to do is to indicate what I understand to be the relation between my work on psychic conversion and Lonergan’s positions in Insight and Method in Theology on the relation of foundations to interpretation. I am quite confident that Lonergan’s hermeneutic theory is of crucial importance to contemporary debates in the fields of both literary criticism and hermeneutics. Lonergan provides, I believe, access to a quite unique reinstatement of the subject as center of the interpretative process. I do not believe that his position is subject to the critiques of Cartesian and Husserlian subjectivity that have influenced many of the most influential literary and hermeneutical theories. And I do believe that his understanding of the relation between foundations and interpretation can do much to resolve the present impasse that these disciplines seem to have reached.

Nonetheless, I do not intend this paper as an attempt to argue these beliefs. I have explicitly limited myself to indicating the complementary relation of psychic conversion to Lonergan’s foundations, as these foundations impinge on the tasks of interpretation. Moreover, before Lonergan’s position on hermeneutics can be fruitfully related to contemporary debates in literary criticism and interpretation theory, the relations between his notion of the dialectic of the subject which constitutes his explicit foundations and the
dialectics of community and culture which relate these foundations to society will have to be articulated in a manner which shows the pertinence of these relations to theories of literary criticism and hermeneutics. The present paper indicates simply and exclusively the grounds from which I believe anyone convinced of the crucial importance of Lonergan's position on the subject would enter the present discussion in these fields. And no doubt before one would be able to make any impact on these fields, one would have had to demonstrate a grasp of the issues at stake in the current debates. These are all projects yet to be undertaken. But I hope the present paper contributes to the basic positions from which further dialogue and dialectic in these areas may proceed.

NOTES


5 "...[In any philosophy, it is possible to distinguish between its cognitional theory and, on the other hand, its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues. Let us name the cognitional theory the basis, and the other pronouncements the expansion. ... The inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory, will be either a basic position or else a basic counter-position."

6 Ibid., pp. 387-88.


This distinction appears frequently in David Tracy's discussions of interpretation. See, for example, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism [New York: Crossroad, 1981], p. 120, and the texts referred to in ibid., p. 145, note 67.


Ibid., p. 566. Ibid., p. 567. Ibid.


Ibid., p. 582. Emphasis added.


On the two phases of theology, see Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 133, 140.


Emphasis added.

We should note how much closer than Insight's concern is this explicit context with regard to our question regarding the interpretation of imaginal expression.

Ibid., p. 170. Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., pp. 159-60.


Ibid., quoting Friedrich Schlegel's description of the classic.

Ibid., p. 247. Ibid., p. 288.

See the section, "Stages of Meaning," in Ibid., pp. 85-89.

Ibid., p. 153. Ibid., p. 64.

On the notion of defensive circles, see Lonergan, Insight, p. 118.

On the censorship, see ibid., pp. 189-96. On the shorter and longer cycles of decline, ibid., pp. 222-28. On the relation of the dialectic of community to the dialectic of the subject, ibid., p. 218.

For the pertinence of Paul Ricoeur's study of Freud to the project I envision, see Doran, Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations [Wash., D.C.: Univ. Press of America, 1977], Ch. 3. The basic dialectic with Jung will be over the issue of a distinction to be drawn among the orders of elemental symbols. I have found quite helpful Northrop Frye's discussion of archetypal and anagogic symbols. See his Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957], pp. 95-128. For the rudiments of my psychological use of this distinction, see my paper "Aesthetic Subjectivity and Generalized Empirical Method," The Thomist 43:2 [1979]: 257-78.


61 John Dominic Crossan, *The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology of Story* [Niles, IL: Argus Communications, 1975], p. 27.

In the Aristotelian reversal of the sceptic all that is required of the sceptic is that he assert something, even if what is asserted is that there is no truth. Professor Hugo Meynell has applied this classic move to Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.*\(^1\) In so far as Rorty does assert, or seem to assert, that there is no truth, the move succeeds. This article has another goal. I shall attempt to show that not all Rorty's suggestions are as susceptible to reversal as might first appear. In Lonergan's terms I would develop positions rather than reverse counter-positions.

Meynell considers that Rorty is committed to idealism all but explicitly,\(^2\) and he successfully reverses the idealist conclusions. Rorty explicitly repudiates idealism to embrace pragmatism,\(^3\) but my purpose is not to defend this self-description. Rather I shall concentrate on two aspects of a single issue. First, both idealists and pragmatists are generally reacting against an immediately more appealing position, namely, naive realism. Secondly, few philosophers, and Rorty is not among them, assert that there are no true assertions. The question is how to account for true assertions. In this article I shall have these two aspects of the issue in mind, but the focus of attention will be the first.

I. The Metaphor of the Mirror

Everyone knows that it is metaphorical to claim that the mind is the mirror of nature. But if we are to read Rorty's book adequately we cannot merely admit the metaphor and pass on, for it is utterly crucial in the argument that our philosophy has been "dominated by Greek ocular metaphors" and that "[t]he picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations -- some accurate, some not -- and capable of being studied by pure non-empirical methods.\(^5\)" Again and again Rorty emphasizes the part played by the image of the mirror and the image of the eye of the mind.\(^6\) He does so because he is convinced that "[i]t is pictures rather
than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions." This is to be taken seriously by the reader, and the therapeutic function of the book is to expunge some misleading images. If one underrates the importance of the attack on the mirror image, one is likely to misunderstand much of what is said about 'representation,' 'correspondence,' etc.

If the mind is imagined as a mirror, knowing will be imagined as taking a look. That knowing is modeled on seeing is Rorty's chief criticism of Locke, and that knowing is a matter of justified assertion is Rorty's chief positive contribution. If this basic position is overlooked, much of what Rorty means is liable to be distorted.

II. The Myth of the Given

The phrase "the myth of the given" is well known from a long and complex article by Wilfred Sellars. In the opening paragraph of that article Sellars distinguishes two senses of "the given." In the first sense the 'given' refers "merely to what is observed as being observed." In this sense, the existence of data is non-controversial. Sellars does not set out to deny that there are, in some sense, data which scientists, for example, try to understand and which their theories explain. Nor does Rorty. But in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Sellars does not discuss the given or data in this non-controversial sense.

In Insight Lonergan asks what sensible data are. He returns to the question in "Method: Trend and Variations." In both places he distinguishes between data and percepts and, in the latter study, remarks that the datum is an hypothetical entity. Were the reader to compare Lonergan's discussion with that of Sellars, he would be grievously misled were he to think that they were talking of the same thing.

Sellars writes:

The phrase 'the given' as a piece of professional-epistemological-shop talk carries a substantial theoretical commitment, and one can deny there are 'data' or that anything is, in this sense, 'given' without flying in the face of reason.

Sellars goes on to discuss "the given" as he thinks it has been used in epistemology. As far as I know Lonergan never uses the phrase "the given" or the term 'data' in this sense. Rorty, however, uses the term in Sellars' sense.
What, then, is "the given" in this sense? Rorty's main discussion is found in a chapter entitled "Privileged Representations." The question is not whether there are data in Lonergan's sense or in the sense that Sellars finds uncontroversial. He asks if there are privileged representations. The question is about items of knowledge. Are we given items of knowledge which are incorrigible and which can be the foundations of knowledge as a whole? It is the idea that there are given items of knowledge that Sellars and Rorty call the myth of the given.

Why should there be an effort to seek given items of knowledge? There is a theoretical and an historical answer. The theoretical answer is that if the corpus of knowledge is thought of as a deductive system within which later items are derived from earlier items, sooner or later, if infinite regress is to be avoided, the need for non-derived items or non-inferred items will appear. These non-inferred items must be given. Rationalists and empiricists and some scholastics may dispute among themselves about which items are given, but the need for given items -- whether they are called first principles, innate ideas or raw feels or whatever -- is agreed. The historical answer is that modern philosophy is influenced by the Aristotelian analysis of science as deductive in the five books of the Organon, but in particular by the two books of the Analytics and by taking Euclid as the model of science.

Very simply then, as long as human knowledge is thought of as logical system, so long will it be necessary to look for given-non-inferred-items-of-knowledge, unless one is willing to admit an element of supposition and so undermine the foundations. R. G. Collingwood was among the first to admit clearly such an element. His logic of question and answer in An Essay on Metaphysics does introduce an important dynamic element into the theory of knowing, but knowledge remains a system with expressible foundations which are now called the absolute presuppositions of the systems. Since there may be different sets of absolute presuppositions, there may be different systems; and assertions will be true or false relative to systems. In his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions T. S. Kuhn made these questions central to philosophical discussion. The point I would make here is that Collingwood and Kuhn and others such as Feyerabend and Foucault avoid the need to seek given items of knowledge,
not by denying that human knowledge is logical system but
by introducing suppositional elements in the place of the
foundational items of knowledge.

In his essay Sellars largely ignores the question as
to whether knowledge is to be conceived as static system and
concentrates on a criticism of the empiricists' candidate
for the role of "given-item-of-knowledge." I shall not attempt
here to justify Sellars' position nor even to set out Sellars' own
justification. I shall restrict myself to a very brief
indication of what I think the position is. First, Sellars
by no means denies that when I look I see something. He does
not deny that there is an experience called seeing and that
this experience has an object. Secondly, he denies that mere
seeing is knowing:

The essential point is that in characterizing an episode
or a state as that of a knowing, we are not giving an
empirical description of that episode or state; we are
placing it within the logical space of reasons, of jus-
tifying and being able to justify what one says.13

The thesis is not that nothing is given, that there are no
data, that there are no experiences, that there is nothing
about which we ask questions -- to suggest as much would be,
in Sellars' phrase, to fly in the face of reason. The thesis
is simply that there is no given knowledge. The thesis is
that if I judge I do so for reasons, and if I am asked about
my judgment I appeal to reasons.

For Rorty, as for Sellars, even the simplest judgment
rests on reasons. Since part of my purpose is to locate Rorty
with respect to Lonergan, I have to ask whether Lonergan thinks
that there are given items of knowledge, whether he thinks
that there are judgments that do not appeal to reason. A full
answer to this question would require an investigation of
Lonergan's analysis of the two diverse kinds of knowing that
exist in man without differentiation and in an ambivalent
confusion. Still, a more rapid answer may be attempted. First,
Lonergan's frequent criticism of naive realism is sufficient
indication that he does not think that our immediate relation
with being is through sense. Thus, he does not think that
seeing is properly human knowing or that smelling is properly
human knowing or that hearing, tasting or touching are properly
human knowing. Accordingly, the affirmation of a proposition
is never merely sensing, and one affirms (or denies) because
no further questions arise. Lonergan does not think that
logical inference is what leads to judgment -- he gives it as a particularly clear example of reaching a conclusion for reasons. But the entire thrust of the chapter on "Reflective Understanding" in Insight is to show judgment as reasonable and the judging subject as reasonable. Knowledge for Lonergan is reasonable because the subject becomes reasonable in judgment.

Secondly, for Lonergan the first principles are not items of knowledge. The first principles of which Aristotle and Aquinas write are considered by Lonergan to be operations. They are "naturally known" in as much as we spontaneously operate intelligently and reasonably; they are not "naturally known" as objects of knowledge. They are known "particulariter, secundum quod percipit se intelligere." But they are not "naturally known" "in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus." 

That knowledge is not given is fundamental for Rorty. It is equally fundamental for Lonergan.

III. Representation

'Representation' is not an exception to the general rule that technical terms have different meanings in different writings, and so the question as to whether knowledge represents reality cannot be approached until one knows what the questioner means by 'represents' (and, indeed, by the other terms). Lonergan distinguishes between "the heuristic and the representative functions of imagination" and by the latter he means a picture that looks like reality. Now there are verifiable pictures within the domain of common sense and so my image of a camel is verifiable; and so we might say of a statue of a puffin that it lacked the characteristic fleshy yellow circle on the cheek and for this reason was an inadequate representation. But it is a mistake to assume "that the business of science was to paint a picture of the really real." In a fully explanatory verified science there are verified assertions for which there are no verified or verifiable images; and so there is a clear sense in which knowledge does not represent reality.

When Rorty writes of 'representations' as the term has often occurred in the tradition, he, too, thinks of them as images or pictures. The mind has been imagined as a mirror of nature because in the mirror-mind are images or representations of the things in the world:
Perhaps it helps to think of the original dominating metaphor as being that of having our beliefs determined by being brought face to face with the object of belief (the geometrical figure which proves the theorem, for example). The next stage is to understand how to improve the activity of a quasi-visual faculty, the Mirror of Nature, and thus to think of knowledge as an assemblage of accurate representations. Then comes the idea that the way to have accurate representations is to find, within the mirror, a special privileged class of representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. The neo-Kantian consensus thus appears as the end-product of an original wish to substitute confrontation for conversation as the determinant of our belief.

Rorty's fundamental insight shines through again: knowledge is not looking; it is justified assertion. Some Rortian themes may be set down:

1. Knowledge is not a set of representations (images).
   A corollary is that propositions are not descriptions of such representations.

2. Since there are no knowledge-representations, then a fortiori there are no privileged ones.

3. If foundations are privileged knowledge-representations (as they have been thought to be), then there are no foundations.

4. Since there are no foundations, the discipline which would discover these mirages (sc. epistemology) is mistaken.

5. One is led to consider knowledge in this way because one is misled by the image of the mirror-mind and held captive by the image of knowledge as confrontation or taking a look.

Neither Sellars nor Rorty flies in the face of all reason and denies that there are images and percepts. They deny that such data are knowledge. They assert that knowledge is propositional: "There is no such thing as a justified belief which is non-propositional." But in Insight a judgment is an affirmed or denied proposition.

IV. Correspondence

Within Anglo-American philosophy there has been much discussion of the correspondence theory of truth. A moment's reflection reveals how difficult it is even to catch up with what has been thought. I shall confine myself to the smaller task of showing the intrusion of visual imagery into some formulations of correspondence.

What Rorty has in mind when he criticizes the correspondence theory is the image of comparing one thing with another
thing, e.g., in a raffle, a ticket is drawn and the winner is the producer of the 'corresponding' ticket. One knows that the tickets correspond because one can stand outside both and compare one with the other. This is a clear if crude image but despite its crudity I think that there are residues of it in many versions of correspondence -- it is the continuing influence of this image that Rorty refers to as the residual Platonism opposed by Quine and Sellars. When Rorty rejects correspondence theory it is always a theory which includes such residual Platonism. He rejects a theory which includes a demand for some transcendental standpoint outside our present set of representations from which we can inspect the relations between those representations and their object.20

I think that Rorty is entirely correct in claiming that such a transcendental standpoint does not exist. There is simply no possibility of comparing one's judgment with reality as one might compare a photograph with its object. Where I disagree is in the assumption that every correspondence theory requires the mythical standpoint. Rorty in this respect resembles Dewart whom Lonergan criticizes in "The Dehellenization of Dogma":

Dewart urges that the correspondence view of truth supposes what is contrary both to logic and observation, "as if we could witness from a third, 'higher', viewpoint, the union of two lower things, object and subject"... But such a statement is involved in a grave confusion. The witnessing from a higher viewpoint is the nonsense of naive realism, of the super-look that looks at both the looking and the looked-at.21

Dewart and Rorty are right to reject the idea of witnessing from a higher viewpoint; where they err is in supposing that correspondence theory is committed to and confined within that image. Still, that there has been an influential naive realist theory of correspondence is undeniable.

Against correspondence understood in this manner, Rorty puts conversation, warranted assertability and justified assertion. A proposition cannot be compared with reality and so judged true; a case must be made for a proposition. We must ask what is meant by making a case.

V. On Making A Case

When the idea of reaching a conclusion by comparing propositions with reality or representations with their objects is rejected, the question as to how otherwise to reach conclusions emerges. Rorty's answer is that, at least in principle,
we affirm the conclusion for which we can make the best case, that is, in support of which we have the best arguments. He suggests that this answer is the result of thinking conversationally rather than confrontationally.22

Rorty's analysis of judgment and judging is not the same as Lonergan's but there are important resemblances. Both assert that we affirm or deny (or should do so) reasonably. This may seem very subjective but the objectivity of the world mediated by meaning is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, and this is achieved only by being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. There are differences between Rorty and Lonergan. The former maintains a pragmatism which, like idealism, lies somewhere between naive realism and critical realism. Pragmatism doesn't go far enough, but it has left naive realism behind.23

Rorty's answer to the question as to how we reach conclusions is that we affirm or deny for reasons. Another possible answer is that we affirm or deny by arbitrary decision. It is, I think, unfortunate that some passages in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature seem to proffer that answer. It is worth exploring this in some detail since it is this arbitrariness of judgment that leads to the morally horrifying conclusions and grossly implausible views that Meynell, I think rightly, criticizes.

Consider robots. Are robots conscious? Meynell thinks that Rorty's theory is that we decide whether or not they are.24 In fact, Rorty's discussion of robots is in reference to an article by Putnam in which Putnam asserts that the question calls for a decision. But in that article Putnam concludes that the question calls for a decision precisely because he claims to have shown that there are insufficient reasons to warrant coming down on either side. Were the question purely theoretical the wise thing to do would be to remain in uncertainty and to refuse to judge. But the question of robots is also practical. Robots exist in our environment and so we must treat them as either conscious or non-conscious. Since (according to Putnam) we are unable to produce convincing arguments for either an affirmative or a negative answer, we must decide. The need to decide follows the inability to judge.25 This kind of situation arises often enough in practical affairs, and the further relevant question is: Are all judgments like this?
Rorty does sometimes seem to suggest that they are. He seems to suggest that conventional or arbitrary decision is the best we can do in other cases where many -- and certainly not only philosophers -- would consider that we can judge. He writes:

We may balk at the claim that knowledge awareness, concepts, language, inference, justification, and the logical space of reasons all descend on the shoulders of the bright child somewhere about the age of four, without having existed in even the most primitive form hitherto. But we do not balk at the thought that a cluster of rights and responsibilities will descend on him on his eighteenth birthday, without having been present even in the most primitive form hitherto. The latter situation is, to be sure, more clear cut than the former, since there is no mark of the former occasion save some adult's casual remark (e.g. "the kid knows what he's talking about"). But in both cases what has happened is a shift in a person's relations with others, not a shift inside the person which now suits him to enter such new relationships. It is not as if we might be mistaken in thinking that a four-year-old has knowledge but that no one-year-old does, any more than we might be mistaken in taking the statute's word for the fact that eighteen-year-olds can marry freely whereas seventeen-year-olds cannot. It may be injudicious to take the prattle of certain four-year-olds seriously, just as it may have been injudicious to have set the age of legal responsibility so low, but no greater understanding of how knowledge (or responsibility) 'works' will decide such matters.

We may, indeed, balk. This is, I suspect, a clear instance of the kind of passage at which Professor Meynell balked. I find the claim internally incoherent (what part does "judicious/injudicious" play?) as I shall try to indicate before attempting to discover some meaning which does not render the claim merely silly.

Why would it ever be injudicious to take the prattle of a particular four-year-old seriously? There is a good conversational test: one would take it seriously if one was able to converse with him and not otherwise. Children of autocrats may not be allowed at the breakfast table, but if this child can talk, then he can talk and we know that he can because we can talk to and with him.

When we say that four-year-olds can talk, this is simply not a permission and not a stipulation. It is a common-sense generalization based on our experience of four-year-olds that it is possible to talk to them whereas, again, as a general thing, we have not found it possible to converse with one-year-olds. But whether or not this particular four-year-old can talk is a matter of particular fact and discovered by
conversational experiment. It is not a matter of giving him permission nor a matter of the crude application of the generalization.

In the legal example, it is a stipulation and a permission since marriage is -- in societies where this stipulation exists -- a social act which cannot be performed without permission. To be given permission to marry is more like being given permission to sit at the breakfast table. It is simply not like being discovered, in conversation, to be a partner. And the only way of discovering that it was injudicious to set the age of legal responsibility so low is by discovering in social practice that, as a general thing, eighteen-year-olds are not up to it. If it is solely a question of stipulation, then judicious and injudicious have no part to play.

Is it possible to assign some reason for Rorty's having adopted this view other than sheer bloody-mindedness? The position, after all, is that we made objects (in this case, talkers) by using words, and this Rorty, in another place, has called absurd.27

What Rorty wants to avoid, I suggest, is the view that we can recognize the child as a conversational partner by some other route than conversation itself. He wants to extirpate the idea that we can intuit some essence that enables us to know that the child is a talker. What is at the back of Rorty's apparently ludicrous proposition is the sound Aristotelian argument that by operations we know habits and by habits we know capacities.

Some light can now be shed from a slightly different angle on those examples in Rorty that seem to lead to horrifying conclusions. Meynell succinctly expresses the problem:

Whether the question, "Do lonely old women who keep cats feel pain when burned alive?" has an affirmative answer, is a matter we decide on Rorty's account; for them to feel pain is for us to include them in the range of our sympathies, for them not to feel pain is for us to fail to do so. I submit that this is at once a consequence of Rorty's position, and both morally horrifying and grossly implausible.28

There are passages in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature the most obvious interpretation of which is to say that Rorty does indeed hold a position leading to these conclusions. There are passages of which this seems the only plausible interpretation. And in a later essay, "The Fate of Philosophy," there is what seems an explicit admission of the charge:
The most powerful reason for thinking that no such (post-
philosophical) culture is possible is that seeing all
criteria as no more than temporary resting-places, con-
structed by a community to facilitate its enquiries, 
seems morally humiliating. Suppose that Socrates was 
wrong, that we have not once seen the Truth, and so will 
not, intuitively, recognize it when we see it again. 
This means that when the secret police come, when the 
torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to be 
said to them of the form "There is something within you 
which you are betraying. Though you embody the practices 
of a totalitarian society which will endure for ever, 
there is something beyond those practices which condemns 
you." This thought is hard to live with . . . there is 
nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there 
ourselves, no criterion that we have not created in the 
course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality 
that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigourous 
argumentation that is not obedience to our own conven-
tions.29

My purpose is not to cast doubt on Meynell's analysis nor 
to suggest that such conclusions are not morally horrifying. 
Indeed, I think that in this passage from "The Fate of Phi-
losophy" there is a clear and distilled expression of an app-
palling mistake. But this mistake is neither uncommon in con-
temporary philosophy nor simplistic. The mistake, as I suggest 
below, lies in confusing postulates with operations.

What I want to do at this stage in my analysis is to 
discover why Rorty writes as he does and, having done this, 
to suggest another aspect of this meaning. Two preliminary 
clarifications are needed. First, Rorty does not mean that 
each individual in a society can judge as he likes. The person 
lives within his society, within his language as social, and 
will not get away with (the phrase is Rorty's) certain things. 
So in contemporary Western society I won't get away with af-
firming that lonely old women with cats are witches and don't 
feel pain when burned alive. But -- and this is why Rorty's 
position is not simplistic -- there can be no guarantee that 
our society won't decline so that I would get away with this 
affirmation. Secondly, that a conclusion is horrifying or 
a saying hard is a reason for careful scrutiny but not in 
the end a sufficient reason for rejection; for if the conclu-
sion is true, it is our moral feeling that must change.

Consider the following exchange: "You should not hurt 
babies!" "Why?" "Because they possess feeling." "How do you 
know they possess feeling?" How is this last question to be 
answered? Two quite different answers suggest themselves from 
Rorty's text. The first is that we know babies feel because
we have "a sense of community (with them) based on the imagined possibility of conversation." The second -- which is more obvious from the text and which Meynell takes to be Rorty's answer -- is that we simply decide that we have a sense of community with babies or that we simply decide that they feel. These answers are not only different; they do not sit well together.

I suggest that Rorty's genuine position is that the sense of community that we have with other people and things is not in practice discovered independently of sentiment. Here again Rorty is trying to escape from a way of thinking that, in some more or less explicit way, claims a privileged representation or metaphysical intuition of "inner feelings." Thus in every human society there is some prohibition against arbitrary killing, but it is quite implausible to suggest that men intuit a "right to life" in others; it is much more plausible to suggest that the extraordinarily complex nature of our spontaneous interactions with one another excludes arbitrary killing. The prohibition against killing is not reached independently of sentiment. In his effort to break with metaphysical intuitions and privileged representations Rorty is led to what I think is an exaggerated reliance on decision which seems to carry him at times beyond the confines of warranted assertability into the wilderness of the random. Consequently, his analysis of warranted assertability includes two intertwined features that should be distinguished. The first of these features is the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. The second feature is the identification of justified true belief or warranted assertability with "what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying."

The first of these features has been discussed already. According to Rorty, knowledge is a relation between a person and a proposition. This accords with Lonergan's view that judgment, the final increment in knowing, is a relation of affirmation or negation between a person and a proposition.

The second feature calls for some discussion. It may be as well to begin with a truism. A community will affirm those propositions that it affirms and will deny those that it denies. Any person will do the same. A truth that is not known is not known.

It be less truistic to remark that, within a given community at a given time, one who affirms or seriously considers
a proposition that is not commonly affirmed or seriously considered is in some difficulty. In 1924 de Broglie postulated matter waves in the proposition $\lambda = \hbar / p$. For some years the suggestion was largely ignored until Einstein brought it to the attention of physicists generally. In 1927 some experiments were performed which produced results that tended to confirm the theory. The question is: what was the status of the de Broglie relation between 1924 and 1927? In 1924 it was certainly not a justified true belief, or a warranted assertion. Louis de Broglie himself considered it as did some but not many other physicists. In 1927 it became a warranted assertion within physics. But when in 1927 physicists judged that the experimental results tended to confirm the de Broglie relation, they did not think that the de Broglie relation began to be true in 1927, just as they did not think that the ether wind died down just when Michelson and Morley performed their experiment. Rather physicists assume that had it been possible to perform the relevant experiment in 1924 -- which it would not have been because of the absence of sufficiently discriminating gratings -- the result would have been the same as those discovered in 1927. In other words, when physicists affirm the de Broglie relation and implicitly claim that the affirmation is justified, then the mere fact that they affirm it is no part of their justification. Unless I am Humpty Dumpty, that I affirm is simply not a reason for my affirmation.

Rorty, I think, confounds the historicity of arriving at a judgment with the content of the affirmation. It is, however, still the case that the affirmations that are made in any society at any time are no more than, and can be no more than, those affirmations which the members of that society consider they have sufficient evidence for. Not only may they be mistaken but, in certain domains, they actually expect correction and development. Rorty is impressed by the provisional character of present knowledge and by the fact that tradition is fragile. What he opposes is a theory of knowledge which would affirm foundations such that whatever is discovered is already contained in the foundations and may be inferred from them.35

VI. Fundations

Rorty denies that knowledge has foundations. Before assuming that in this he differs from Lonergan, it will be
as well to determine what he means by 'foundations'. He claims that in the mirror-mind there has been thought to be

a special privileged class of representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. These privileged foundations will be the foundations of knowledge.\(^{36}\) Rorty always thinks of foundations in this way, and it is against foundations so imagined that he argues. In his elaboration of such foundations of knowledge he returns to the central opposition which runs through the entire work, viz., the opposition between knowing as confrontation and knowing as argument:

The notion of "foundations of knowledge" -- truths which are certain because of their causes rather than because of arguments given for them -- is the fruit of Greek (and specifically Platonic) analogy between perceiveing and knowing. The essential feature of the analogy is that knowing a proposition to be true is to be identified with being caused to do something by an object. The object which the proposition is about imposes the proposition's truth.\(^{17}\)

In the present context two questions arise. Are there in fact foundations in this sense? And, does Lonergan affirm foundations in this sense? I think that the answer to these questions is "No." The term 'foundations' does occur in Lonergan's writings and in association with his thought, but it must be said, roundly and unequivocally, that there is no suggestion whatsoever in Lonergan's writings that human knowledge or human knowing has foundations in this sense. Accordingly, when Rorty rejects foundations he is not at odds with Lonergan.

To say so much is not, on the other hand, to claim that Rorty's and Lonergan's analyses are identical. They are not. Rorty contrasts confrontation and conversation. But in his analysis of conversation he strikes a snag. He thinks of warranted assertions as those assertions for which we can give reasons but -- and here is the snag -- if the sequence of conversational argument is envisaged after the model of formal inference, sooner or later one will hit the issue of primitive elements for which there is no argument, e.g., postulates. Rorty gets over the snag in two ways. First, he asserts that we need not worry about "the potentially infinite regress of propositions-brought-forward-in-defence-of-other-propositions."\(^{38}\) Secondly, he says that "it would be foolish to keep conversation on the subject going once everyone, or the majority, or the wise, are satisfied, but of course we can."\(^{39}\)

As far as I can judge, the first assertion is merely that. He provides no argument to show that we need not be
worried about infinite regress, and there is a long standing tradition to the contrary. His basic oversight is that although he has shifted correctly from confrontation to conversation, he still sees conversation as logical system.

The second assertion is considerably more fruitful and is the beginnings of a discussion of personal responsibility in judgment. I should prefer to say that it is foolish to keep the conversation going once one is oneself satisfied (except, of course, to convince one's partner or for one or several of the vast variety of other reasons why we converse). Still, if the majority or the wise are satisfied it may well be silly not to wonder why one is not. In the end, however, it is personal satisfaction that is the criterion.⁴⁰

Rorty's second suggestion is fruitful, but his first assertion leaves us with a problem. The problem is to be resolved in two moves. The first move is to admit that in any systematized body of knowledge there are elements of supposition. These are not foundations in Rorty's sense precisely because they are supposed ultimates and not given ultimates.⁴¹ There is no suggestion that present system is final. The second move is to recognize that the elimination of the visual metaphor and its privileged representations is insufficiently radical. There are, indeed, ultimate propositions in any system but what is ultimate in knowledge is neither a set of propositions nor a set of privileged representations. What is ultimate is a set of operations: the "real presuppositions are not a set of propositions but the dynamic structure of the human mind."⁴²

The real presuppositions are operations, not propositions about operations. The first principles of knowing are the dynamic structure of the mind, not a set of statements purporting to express such first principles. Thus, the foundations which Lonergan affirms are not at all like those sought by Descartes, Russell or Husserl. They were correct to look for ultimates, but they looked in the wrong place and for the wrong kind of thing. Rorty is right to reject foundations of this kind. He goes clearly beyond representations. He wants to go beyond propositions, but he cannot do so clearly and decisively because he overlooks the dynamic structure of the mind, of knowing, of conversation, as lived, as in exercise, not as known.
The foundations are intelligence, rationality, reasonableness and responsibility in exercise. When intelligence, rationality, reasonableness and responsibility are correctly understood, then the foundations are correctly understood. But intelligence, rationality, reasonableness and responsibility do not become foundations by being known; they are foundations by being exercised. But this is what Rorty is obscurely pointing to when he thinks of conversation as ultimate.

VII. What, If Anything, Are We Talking About?

Because Rorty, in distinguished contemporary company,eschews a correspondence theory of truth the reader may be inclined to exclaim that Rorty does not think that we ever speak truly about the world, does not think that we ever know what is the case, does not think that we even try to say what is the case. The reader may be tempted to go on to claim that what Rorty writes in his book is not -- and is not supposed to be -- a set of assertions about anything. This interpretation will not do.

Rorty does think that we try, and are more or less successful in our attempt, to talk about the world:

Now in one obvious sense we know perfectly well -- prior to any theory -- that we (our ancestors and ourselves) have been referring to the same things. They were trying to cope with the same universe and they referred to it, although doubtless often under unfruitful and foolish descriptions . . . .

When he writes that we do not have privileged representations, that we do not know by opening the eye of the mind and so on, he asserts these propositions as true of us.

Admittedly, when he comes to write directly of truth, he produces passages which seem to suggest that conversations are a series of arbitrary claims that are hardly about anything at all. Still, when a writer seems to be flying in the face of reason and to be asserting something which seems manifestly foolish, it is best to think again about one's reading. The core of Rorty's position is this: we affirm propositions, not because we have some vision of the essence of the object which impresses itself on our mind, but because we have reasons.

Are these propositions, for which we have reasons, true? A clarification is needed. What Rorty means by 'true' is 'warranted'. He means this because he can discover no other way of arriving at judgments. Now we all know from experience that our judgments have a way of falling before the onslaught
of further relevant data, further relevant questions, further relevant insights. And yet when we make judgments we do so for reasons which seem to us sufficient. The corrigibility of judgment drives a wedge between 'warranted' and "stating what is the case" because, of course, an earlier 'warranted' judgment now discredited never stated what was the case, never corresponded to or conformed with what is. Thus, if 'warranted' means 'true' and vice-versa, then 'true' does not mean ipso facto "stating what is the case". True judgments, in the sense of warranted judgments, do not ipso facto conform with what is.

The needed clarification is the idea of probable judgments. The judgments of empirical science and many common-sense judgments are not true but probable and "probable judgments are probably true in the non-statistical sense of converging upon true judgments, of approaching them as a limit." In common usage, both everyday and philosophical, the term 'true' is used in both senses but the senses are intertwined confusedly. First, a "true judgment" is a judgment which states what is the case, which has reached the limit. Secondly, a "true judgment" is a judgment for which I now consider I have sufficient evidence.

It is sometimes said that we affirm a proposition because it states what is the case, but the 'because' is odd here. We affirm a proposition because we think that we have sufficient evidence. The truth of the proposition depends on what is the case, but what is the case is not known by any other route than by affirming reasonably a proposition. Thus, what is the case is not known before it is affirmed and so what is the case cannot be a reason leading to affirmation.

VIII. Addendum on an Argument

I have several times referred to Meynell's reversal of Rorty and indicated where I agree. There is one place in Meynell where I think he misunderstands both Rorty and Sellars. Meynell constructs a valid argument which leads to idealism, in the premises of which the term "experiential given" occurs. In his commentary on the argument Meynell writes that "Sellars appears to assert the second premise," namely, "But there is no experiential given." I have tried to make it clear that neither Rorty nor Sellars denies that there is an experiential given: they deny that knowledge is given. Thus I think that Meynell's argument applied neither to Rorty nor to Sellars.
What I am more concerned about is the impression that Meynell's first premise might give. It reads as follows:

If there were no experiential given, we could attain no knowledge of any world of things and events existing prior to and independently of ourselves.

There is some danger that this premise, which Meynell affirms, would give the impression that we know things existing prior to and independently of ourselves by the sheer fact of experiencing them. The premise need not be understood thus; indeed, it does not strictly suggest this, but it is none the less true that formulations of this kind have been understood in a naively realist fashion.

In the wake of, and constant temptation to, naive realism it is worth stating clearly that Lonergan, Rorty and Sellars agree on this: that we are not given in experience knowledge that things exist independently of ourselves. Nor, indeed, are we given in experience knowledge of ourselves. It is the case that human knowing as a matter of fact includes an experiential element, but neither Rorty nor Sellars denies this. There is, then, an experiential element in the pattern of acts that culminates in the knowledge that the cat is other than me, but that the cat is other than me is known in a set of judgments, sc. the cat is; I am; I am not the cat; the cat is not me." None of these judgments is given in experience.

Meynell writes of experientially basic experiences grounding belief:

Now my experiences as of a black cat . . . are . . . experientially basic; that is to say, there is nothing to ground them in the same way in which they ground my belief that there is a black cat in my vicinity.8

The difficulty is with the term 'grounds', for 'grounds', like 'foundations' comes trailing clouds of theory from its philosophic home. I should prefer to say that my experience of the cat, the felt presence of the cat, is evidence for the judgment. But it is not the experience, not the felt presence, which is decisive and basic; what is decisive and basic is the rational judgment that follows upon an investigation of the felt presence.9 What grounds my judgment is my grasp of the virtually unconditioned, my grasp in reflective insight of the sufficiency of the evidence. The problem with saying that one's experience of the cat grounds a judgment about the cat is that this may be taken to mean that the judgment is not more than a description of the given as given and that
knowledge is to be equated with the grounding experience. It is this that Rorty and Sellars and Lonergan deny.

It is all too easy to understand the contention that experience grounds judgment as being identical, as Lonergan puts it, with "the naive realist and empiricist opinion, which thinks of verification simply as a matter of attending to data and not as a matter of finding data that fit in with an hypothesis." It would be a pity if the reversal of Rorty were read as criticizing him for going beyond naive realism rather than for not going sufficiently far along the road towards critical realism.

Rorty has said that Dewey and James are waiting at the end of the road down which others are trudging. This article is dedicated to the memory of a thinker who is, I think, further along the road but, so to speak, in the same direction.

NOTES

I should like to record my thanks to my friend and colleague Frank Dorr for reading and commenting helpfully on this article in progress.


2 Ibid., p. 42.


5 Ibid., p. 12. 6 Ibid., pp. 12, 38-9, 43, 45, 126, 142, 146 etc.

7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 46 and cf. 144.


10 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 324.


13 Quoted by Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 185.

14 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.Q.87 art. 1.

15 Lonergan, Insight, p. 99, and see index under "verification and image."

16 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 163.

Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 179.
Ibid., p. 293.
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 163.
Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 144.
Ibid. p. 276. Perhaps this is the reference of Meynell's third footnote. Of course, we do some things with words, and notice also Aristotle's remark at Nicomachean Ethics 1161a that a free man cannot be friends with a slave qua slave but qua man he can.
Ibid., p. 45.
Rorty, "The Fate of Philosophy," p. 33.
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 190.
Ibid., p. 191. Ibid., p. 176. Ibid., pp. 141-142.
Lonergan, Insight, p. 127.
Ibid., p. 163. Ibid., p. 157. Ibid., p. 159.
Ibid., p. 159.
Cf. Lonergan, A Third Collection, pp. 129-44 and passim in his writings on being responsible for one's judgments.
Ibid., p. 508.
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 286.
Lonergan, Insight, p. 552. Ibid., p. 300.
Meynell, "Reversing Rorty," pp. 41-42.
Cf. A Third Collection, p. 144; Insight, p. 375.
Lonergan, A Second Collection, p. 28.
Lonergan, A Second Collection, p. 273.
REPLY TO GARRETT BARDEN

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In general, Professor Barden's account of Rorty's work should be taken as complementary rather than as opposed to my own. He agrees with me in regarding some of the statements actually made by Rorty as absurd or frightful; I with him in acknowledging the great merit of Rorty's work in helping to dismantle the naive realist view of knowledge. One may sum the matter up, in Lonerganian terms, by saying that Barden is charitably concerned to develop the positions in Rorty; I, more polemically, with pointing out the counterpositions in his work and trying to reverse them. I hope that my deep admiration and respect for Rorty came out in what I wrote. To take a counterposition significantly further towards its own reversal -- as Rorty seems to me to have done in relation not only to Wittgenstein, Sellars and Quine, but to Heidegger and Gadamer as well -- is among the most worthwhile of philosophical achievements. The more paradoxical or terrifying passages in Rorty should be seen, in my view, as valid workings-out of the basic counterposition, and not as the mere rhetorical flourishes which Barden supposes. If you get rid of the given element in knowledge, or of foundations for knowledge in general, and are fully serious about it, this is where you arrive.

Apart from this, I disagree somewhat with Barden on a point of exegesis. I do not think that Sellars's slogan "the myth of the given" was directed only against the view that knowledge is given, as Barden maintains. I believe it is directed, if not quite consistently, against the beliefs that there is a given element in knowledge, and that this element is empirical. But whatever be the case with Sellars, Rorty is radically and on the whole consistently opposed to any given element in knowledge, rightly seeing this as a virtually necessary component of the view that he is above all out to attack, that there are philosophical (as opposed to psychological or sociological) foundations to knowledge.

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Barden's argument tends to conceal the extreme divergence between Lonergan's principles and Rorty's. Lonergan and Rorty, to be sure, are at one in rejecting the most obvious application of the mirror analogy to knowledge; that knowledge is a matter of just exposing oneself passively to the already-out-there-now-real. I believe that it is the special merit of Barden's article to have brought this out so clearly. But it is not too much to say that Lonergan's special claim to fame as a philosopher is successfully to have carried out that very enterprise which it is Rorty's main object to show is misguided in principle; the providing of foundations for knowledge. On Lonergan's view, the human mind, by following the right method, may indeed approach towards "mirroring" nature; that is to say, it may progressively come to make true judgments about a reality which exists prior to and independently of its making such judgments. Jupiter is larger than the earth, whether anyone knows it or not; by following the right method, we may come to know that Jupiter is larger than the earth. But it is quite fundamental to Rorty's view that no such "right method" can be set out or justified.

It seems to me that Sellars's slogan would have been pointless, if merely directed against the view that knowledge as such is given; no philosopher in recent times, so far as I can see, has ever maintained such a thesis. What he was criticizing was the characteristic empiricist notion that there is a given component in knowledge, against which knowledge-claims are to be checked. I believe that Lonergan was also, and quite rightly, committed to this view. If there is no such given element, there seems no way of checking which among rival sets of mutually-consistent propositions about the world is likely to be true, and the gap must be filled by sheer prejudice or social consensus. Reasonable judgment is not merely a matter of appeal to empirical data or 'givens' (Barden seems to like data and to dislike 'givens', though it appears to me that the terms are merely Latin and English for the same thing); but it does characteristically include it. That such data arise in a context of inquiry and of theory, I would admit, but do not regard it as germane to the issue. I cannot just wish away the evidence which goes against my cherished theory about deep-sea crustaceans or Thutmosis III; it is there, 'given', for all that it might never have been noticed, and its significance never attended to, apart from
human theoretical interests. And short of some 'given', which is presumably a matter of experience in some sense (it is difficult to think of any other candidate), how can we rationally determine whether the oxygen or the phlogiston theory of combustion is true, whether electrons or pulsars exist, or whether an animal or pre-verbal infant is in pain?

Rorty grasps the point that, if there were anything 'given' in knowledge, it would have to be something in the last analysis irreducibly private to the individual; but to acknowledge anything thus private to the individual would be incompatible with the behaviorism which he has inherited from Wittgenstein and Quine, and which is of course one of the most immediate and obvious corollaries of the basic counterposition. The experiences of persons are not as such objects for the naively extroverted consciousness; all that is so which has a bearing on their experience is observable behavior, so experience must really, so far as it is not mere illusion, be simply a matter of behavior. Just the same applies to pain. Pain is not an external or public reality; but, on behaviorist criteria, it is not a private or internal reality either, because there is no such thing (apart from physiological states which again, in spite of strenuous philosophical activity to this end, cannot at all plausibly be identified with pain. So, whether those who cannot talk about their pain, like babies and non-human animals, really feel pain or not, becomes a matter of social consensus. "Of course", says Rorty, this does not imply that we might just as well cut limbs off babies who are not anaesthetized. (The uses of phrases like "of course", to insulate with specious justification a train of reasoning from its obvious upshot, deserves an article, perhaps a book.) The application of all this to alien forms of life which we might meet, or to species or races on our own planet to whom we might happen to take a dislike or merely find inconvenient, scarcely bears thinking about.
One of the most important works by an American philosopher in the last decade has been Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Rorty attempts many things in his book; one important task before him is the effort to argue against (or better, deconstruct) the view which holds that human beings have a "glassy essence" which, when properly polished, can mirror the essential structure of the world. That is, he argues against the correspondence theory of truth. Sweeping judgments are made concerning various figures in the history of philosophy, not the least of which is St. Thomas Aquinas. As far as I know, however, no one has yet examined the relationship between Rorty and St. Thomas, which is what I will do in this article. I will show that an analysis of St. Thomas' use of mirror metaphors has surprising ramifications not only for our understanding of Rorty, but also for the way we should view some largely neglected texts of St. Thomas.

That Rorty's own view of philosophy as merely edifying conversation is opposed to that of St. Thomas is made explicit when Rorty identifies St. Thomas' active intellect with the glassy essence; it is precisely this mirror of nature (the active intellect) which is "distinctively human" for St. Thomas. This "intellectual essence" makes mirror imagery possible by cognitively penetrating the nature of the real. Hence, for Rorty, St. Thomas' assimilation of Aristotle so as to conciliate the Church Fathers was actually an attempt to re-fashion the rest of culture because St. Thomas believed he had the truth, as so many other philosophers have also believed. As Rorty has it concerning St. Thomas and others:

A "mainstream" Western philosopher typically says: Now that such-and-such a line of inquiry has had such a stunning success, let us reshape all inquiry, and all of culture, on its model, thereby permitting objectivity and rationality to prevail in areas previously obscured by convention, superstition, and the lack of a proper epistemological understanding of man's ability to represent nature.

The success alluded to is St. Thomas' assimilation of Aristotle.
Such an exalted conception of philosophy leads Rorty to call into question his previous contention that the glassy essence is what is distinctively human; rather it is divine:

The notion of a human being whose mind is such an unclouded mirror, and who knows this, is the image, as Sartre says, of God. Such a being does not confront something alien which makes it necessary for him to choose an attitude toward, or a description of, it. He would have no need and no ability to choose actions or descriptions. He can be called "God" if we think of the advantages of this situation. . . .

Rorty is more correct than he realizes in associating St. Thomas with mirror imagery in that St. Thomas often uses the image of a mirror (speculum) or mirror-like properties (specularis). But does he use these mirror metaphors in the ways Rorty alleges? Does St. Thomas believe either that mirror imagery is distinctively human, or that mirror imagery is ultimately divine? Does St. Thomas believe that a human being's glassy essence can reach a final determination regarding "Truth and Reality and Goodness," and that such a determination provides a carte blanche to remake culture? Given certain qualifications, I think all of these questions must be answered in the negative, but as before, in analyzing St. Thomas' use of mirror metaphors we may make discoveries surprising not only from a Rorty-like perspective, but also from the various perspectives of those philosophers who are usually called Thomists.

Now to St. Thomas. He is quite clear that a human being's cognitive power is a type of mirror:

Judgment is correct when the cognitive faculty perceives a thing as it really is, and this comes from a healthily disposed power of perception; a well-made mirror (speculum) reflects the images of bodies as they really are, whereas in one poorly-made they appear distorted and crooked. That a cognitive power is well-disposed to receive things as they really are at root is from nature, but its flowering is from practice and from the gift of grace.

A superficial reading of this quotation could play right into Rorty's hands. But notice the last sentence. We human beings naturally have the cognitive power to mirror nature, but in order to do a good job of it we either have to work hard or have God's help. As James Collins notices, we have to work hard to know, according to St. Thomas, because initially we are not (like the angels, to be treated later) tabula depicta, but tabula rasa upon which "nothing has yet been written." The gradual and successive discovery of truth
by human beings is an advance into an unknown field; many
discursive acts and walks up blind alleys are required before
even a limited amount of knowledge is acquired. For these
and other reasons, human minds for St. Thomas are not the
highly polished glassy essences that Rorty alleges.

The inadequacy of human beings as mirrors is put in sharp
relief when compared to God as a mirror. St. Thomas carefully
considers the position which suggests that whoever sees a
mirror sees what is reflected in it. God knows all things,
hence the one who sees God sees all because God acts as a
mirror. Or again: The Word of God (Verbo Dei) is a mirror
of all things. St. Thomas' replies to these positions are
informative. He claims that one who sees a mirror does not
necessarily see everything in it unless the mirror is seen
perfectly. St. Thomas does not deny that God is a mirror (in-
deed he believes God is an intelligible mirror -- speculo
intelligibili -- for all intellectual substances), but he
doubts our ability to even vicariously develop a view of the
world sub specie aeternitatis by looking into the divine mirror.
Because our approach to God is at best analogical we just
do not see the divine mirror (speculum aeternitatis) with
perfect clarity.

Material mirrors do not have the power to be seen or
not seen, whereas God as a mirror has this ability. The divine
speculum is only shown to those beings that God chooses. Fur-
ther, in the uncreated mirror (speculo increato -- God) a
thing is seen through the form of the mirror itself, as an
effect is seen through the cause. Unless we see perfectly
the essence of the cause we do not see well (or see at all)
what is reflected there. And in the case of God we do not
see the essence of the cause. Once more, St. Thomas does
not indicate what Rorty implies he should indicate, that human
mirror imagery could aspire to be divine mirror imagery.

Not even the vision of the prophets is a vision of the
divine essence itself. The prophet only sees things lighted
up by God, hence these things are, in a way, mirrors. But
God cannot be a mirror in this sense, because mirror images
in creatures are formed by other realities, and God for St.
Thomas cannot be passive with respect to these realities.
Some (e.g., William of Auxerre) erroneously think that it
is the divine essence itself that the prophet sees. Rather,
the prophet's mind (mentis propheticae) is a mirror image
of divine foreknowledge largely through the mediation of those things, themselves mirrors, lighted up by God. The other mirrored glasses which human beings can use to know the truth -- faith and the sacraments -- are, in Pauline fashion, dark ones (in speculo et in aenigmate).\textsuperscript{13}

Natural things, human cognitive powers, the vision of the prophets, faith, and the sacraments are all mirrors, and they are all mirrors that are accurate enough to enable us to avoid Rorty-like (or Kuhn-like) scepticism; truth, for St. Thomas, is the correspondence between our thoughts and reality, it is the degree to which our thoughts mirror reality. But the effort to use the well-made mirrors provided by natural things, human cognitive powers, the vision of the prophets, faith, and the sacraments to escape scepticism (and, I daresay, Rorty-like relativism) does not, as Rorty implies, place us in the land of milk and honey, where our confidence in our glassy essences provides us either with the boldness of totalitarian power or with the luxury of complacency. Because the divine mirror is also, at least from our perspective, a cloudy one, the inadequacy of human mirrors is perhaps made most apparent when compared to the mirroring abilities of angels. Mortimer Adler is certainly correct that even if we do not have conclusive philosophic proofs for the existence of angels, we can nonetheless use their possible existence to learn something about ourselves.\textsuperscript{14}

St. Thomas thinks it important to consider the following interpretation of St. Paul: because we see God as in a mirror (albeit a dark one) we can infer that we have natural knowledge of God, but the angels cannot have such knowledge because it comes from the sensible world which angels do not inhabit.\textsuperscript{15} St. Thomas' reply delineates three ways in which knowing a thing is possible, and in particular we are concerned here with knowing God: (A) God can be known when the divine essence is present in the knower, as if light itself were in the eye; (B) God can be known when an image of God is immediately present in the knowing faculty; or (C) God can be known when an image of God is known through mediation, like seeing a man in a mirror, or in this case, like seeing God through the mirror image provided by the things God has made.\textsuperscript{16} Only God has (A), and (C) is applicable in the case of human beings, not only with respect to their knowledge of God, but also with respect to their other knowledge, if only because human
knowledge is acquired through the mediation of the senses. Angels, not human beings, have (B). Angels do not really have mirroring abilities, they are mirrors: "the mirror being the angelic nature itself." 17

The superiority of angelic mirroring to human mirroring, however, should not lead us to suppose that even their most clear mirroring enables them to have (A) of God, as the pseudo-Dionysus implied. 18 To know God through a created likeness, even an angelic mirror, is not to know God's essence. 19 This seems to be due to the facts that the knowledge of angels is not itself the cause of things, as is God's knowledge; and that although angels have an immediate insight into the principle of being and its consequences, or into the essence of the known object, which human beings do not have, their own angelic essence does not entail existence, as does God's essence. But it is only knowledge of God that is defective in angels in that angelic intellect, which does not need to abstract form from matter, is, as Collins puts it, an "imago Dei, a pure uncontaminated mirror without defect, since it possesses the full perfection of created intellectual light." 20

As mirrors of nature angels are precisely the highly polished glassy essences Rorty is concerned with. But angelic knowledge of God, although more certain and clear than ours (because, among other reasons, their knowledge is not mediated by abstraction from matter), is nonetheless analogical.

In sum, Rorty should be criticized on four points: (1) He completely ignores the distinction in St. Thomas between speculum aeternitatis and speculum temporale, and between speculum spirituale seu mentis and speculum materiale. (2) He is incorrect in putting St. Thomas among those philosophers who see the human mind (specifically the active intellect in St. Thomas) as an unclouded mirror of nature. (3) He is also incorrect in assuming that if the human mind were an unclouded mirror it could take on the powers of the divine mirror, because even if human beings turned into angels they still would not have an essence that entailed existence, and they would still be creatures who thought analogically. 21 (4) Rorty gives no indication that his highly glassy essence is found in St. Thomas among the angels, but even here only with respect to knowledge other than knowledge of God.

It has obviously not been my purpose in this short article to defend St. Thomas' epistemology, but to show that Rorty's
criticisms of defenders of the glassy essence do not really affect St. Thomas. I also suspect, although I am by no means certain, that Thomists may be surprised at the diversity of St. Thomas' use of mirror metaphors. For this much, at least, we have Rorty to thank. There is one final surprise, but I will not elaborate on it here. Leibniz's impenetrable, windowless monads acting as a system of reflecting mirrors owes more to St. Thomas than many have realized.

NOTES

2 See my "Rorty on Plato as an Edifier," forthcoming in Philosophia.
4 Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars edition [NY: McGraw-Hill], (hereafter: ST); 2a2ae, 51, 3. It should also be noticed that St. Thomas was not the only medieval thinker to use mirror imagery. See Vincent of Beauvais (1190-c.1260), Speculum Maius [Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck, 1964]. The first part of this work is titled Speculum Naturale. Other relevant passages from St. Thomas dealing with the idea of a mirror of nature are 2 Scriptum in 4 Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi 11, 2, 2 (hereafter: Sent.); Questiones Disputatae de Veritatae 8, 8 (hereafter: Verit.); and Expositio in Isaialem Prophetam 21.
6 ST 1a, 12, 8. Also see 4 Sent. 49, 2, 5.
7 3a Supplementum 92, 3. For the Supplementum see Summa Theologica, trans. by English Dominican Fathers [NY: Benziger, 1922]; and Summa Theologiae [Rome: Marietti, 1956].
8 ST 1a, 12, 9. "Again see 31 Supplementum 92, 3.
9 ST 2a2ae, 173, 1. Also see Questiones Disputatae de Potentia 4, 2. Finally, in ST 2a2ae, 123, 9, St. Thomas, relying on St. Ambrose, uses a mirror image to describe those aids available to us in facing the future.
10 ST 3a, 80, 2. The famous phrase from St. Paul describing our vision of God, a favorite of St. Thomas, "through a glass darkly," at 1 Corinthians 13, is not often noticed to be a reference to a looking glass, a mirror (blepomen gar arti di esoptron en ainigmati; aisoptron = mirror).
12 ST 1a, 56, 3. ST. Thomas relies here again on St. Paul, Romans 1:20.
13 Again, see ST 1a, 56, 3. Also see Verit. 12, 6; and Expositio in 4 Libros Meteorologicorum Aristotelis 8b and 12b, where mirrors are used to explain sight at a distance, and 9d, where a fiery mirror is mentioned. It should be noted that although angels do not have knowledge (A) of God, angelic knowledge of itself is of this sort.
See De Divinis Nominibus 4 (PG, 3, 724).

ST 1a, 12, 4. The emphasis is mine.

Again, see Collins, p. 214; also see pp. 179, 184, 219.

Collins, p. 182, rightly alerts us to the fact that human intelligence in its highest reaches makes contact with angelic cognition in its lowest degree, but this is different from suggesting that human beings can think like angels. But the fact that St. Thomas believes human beings can in their highest reaches approach angelic cognition reawakens us as to why he is often called the angelic doctor. Also see Verit. 15, 1.
In a recent essay, "Aquinas: Intentionality," Anthony Kenny has presented a view of the way in which mind and world harmonize that attempts to reconcile insights in Aquinas's account of human knowing with those of Wittgenstein. Kenny argues that the resulting theory is a more successful account of mind and reality than Plato's realist idealism or the conceptualist idealism of anti-realists, past and present.

In developing his argument Kenny draws upon expositions of Aquinas's theory of intentionality given by Peter Geach and Bernard Lonergan. Both writers, according to Kenny, give interpretations of Aquinas's thought which are in some ways helpful, but in other respects misleading. After examining their contributions, Kenny goes on to outline his own account of what he believes to be a more faithful interpretation, not only of Aquinas's thought, but of the nature of intentionality in knowledge.

In this article I wish to treat of three areas touched upon in Kenny's discussion. First, I believe that Kenny's presentation of Lonergan's position, as expressed in Lonergan's *Verbum*, is somewhat truncated and misleading. Further, in the development of his own account of Aquinas's doctrine of intentionality, Kenny touches upon elements of Aquinas's thought which, in fact, are given lengthy and detailed treatment in sections of Lonergan's *Verbum* to which Kenny does not refer. What emerges from a comparison of these two accounts is, I think, that Kenny has oversimplified and distorted Aquinas's position. The second thesis I wish to advance is that Kenny's selection of what needs to be dropped and what retained in Aquinas's position often goes the wrong way. It appears that Kenny's presentation of Aquinas's thought retains aspects influenced by an Aristotelian physics hardly acceptable to those concerned with epistemological issues arising from modern science. Thirdly, I believe that we may find clues in Lonergan's work, subsequent to *Verbum*, as to how to give a more satisfactory answer than that given by Kenny to his own question: "What makes my thought of X my thought?"
In the first part of his essay Kenny presents the differing accounts of Lonergan and Geach of the way in which Aquinas came to grips with the problem: what makes my thought of X a thought of X? Kenny points out that for Aquinas human knowing involves the more or less immaterial and intentional reception of forms. Sensible forms are received by the senses and intellectual, intelligible forms are received by the mind. But the reception of sensible form is not completely free of matter since it occurs in material organs. With regard to the intellect, however, the form received is said to be wholly immaterial. It is the form of X, just as X's form is that form. But what is the status of that form in mind, rather than in the world? According to Geach, Aquinas held that the form of a horse in the field and the form of that horse in my mind are identical; just as what I sense and the thing which I sense are identical.

Kenny's main argument, in the first part of his essay, is with Geach as to the status of the form in the mind as esse intentionale rather than esse naturale. However, Kenny also contrasts Geach's view of identity of forms with a passage he quotes from Lonergan's Verbum to show that, on Lonergan's account, Aquinas talked of a similarity of forms. The form in the mind and the form in the thing are similar in form but different in mode; the form of the horse exists naturally in the horse but intentionally and immaterially in the mind. Kenny writes:

The substance of Lonergan's account of intentionality, then, is as follows. If A is to know X then the form of A's knowing must be similar to the form of X which is known; but it must be different in mode.2

However, the quotation which Kenny gives from Verbum, to back up the statement quoted above, should not be taken out of context. One of Lonergan's main contentions throughout Verbum is that, for Aquinas, knowing is a matter of identity of knower and known.3 It is also one of his main contentions that there is abundant evidence to show that, for Aquinas, this identity of knower and known in the act of knowing is not simply a matter of the reception of sensible form, nor simply a matter of the grasping of intelligible form, but of judging that the form understood, together with its matter, exists in reality.4

Thus, for Kenny to characterize "Lonergan's position" as being that the "form of A's knowing must be similar to the form
of the known" is misleading. Rather, we might say that, for Lonergan, the form in A's knowing must be similar, in all respects, to the form of the known. This is because, on this position, knowing involves more than reception of form; it also involves judging as to the actual existence of that form in matter.

After dealing with the accounts of Lonergan and Geach, Kenny goes on to give his own position. This position stresses that, for Aquinas, the intellect only grasps the intelligible form of a thing, not its matter. Further, the intelligible form which the intellect grasps is a universal form. A universal form, abstracted by the intellect, such as 'humanity' (rational animal), can only be applied to, say, Socrates, Kenny avers, by its being placed in the context of sensible imagery of, pictures of, Socrates. This imagery was termed the phantasmata by Aquinas.5

Kenny writes that Aquinas rejected . . . the idea that our knowledge of material objects could be something which was purely intellectual.6 Thus, on this account, for the universal form in my mind to have reference to the world there must supervene activity in which I physically point out or show where my idea has reference. According to Kenny we can put Aquinas's doctrine in modern terms by saying that

our thoughts have the sense they have because of the universal forms in which we think; they have the reference they have to individuals because of the sensory context in which they occur.7

However, for Kenny, it is in this area that Aquinas's account is deficient and needs to be supplemented by Wittgenstein's analyses of the way this reference to individuals and sensory contexts occurs. Kenny praises Aquinas's doctrine that the mental imagery is needed for the mind to grasp the universal form, but adds that when Aquinas believed that this mental imagery (phantasmata) was all that was required to distinguish between particulars -- between Socrates as opposed to Plato -- then he was surely wide of the mark. Kenny asks, with Wittgenstein, what makes my mental picture of X a picture of X? That is to say, what makes Aquinas's mental images, which are needed to individuate the universal 'humanity' in the particular Socrates, images of Socrates?

If we turn to Lonergan's lengthy treatment of some of the issues mentioned here, I think it can be seen that Kenny
has distorted Aquinas's treatment of knowledge of the particular. It is evident that Aquinas explicitly treats of the way the mental images have reference to that of which they are images.

To begin with, Kenny omits mention of the fact that for Aquinas there are three kinds of abstraction: the objective, the apprehensive and the formative. Here we will be concerned with the latter two. Formative abstraction is the activity of the mind which grasps a universal common to any instance; but apprehensive abstraction is a grasp of the universal in the particular. Formative abstraction follows from apprehensive abstraction. Beyond these there is a reflection on formative abstraction which sees the universal precisely as universal. The relation between the formative and apprehensive types of abstraction, and their relation to sense, is summed up by Lonergan:

One can mean "circle" without meaning any particular instance of circle; but one cannot grasp, intuit, know by inspection the necessary and sufficient conditions of circularity except in a diagram. 

Kenny quotes from Aquinas to show that since what we know by intellect is the universal, so our intellect is not directly capable of knowing anything which is not universal. However, when taken together with a broader sample of Aquinas's texts, as given in Verbum, it can be seen that the key word in the passage Kenny quotes is 'directly'. That the intellect is capable of knowing the particular, material thing is evident in Aquinas's position; but this knowing will be 'indirect'. Kenny writes that

It is by linking universal intellectual ideas with sensory experience that we know individuals. But the precise status of this 'know' in Kenny's account is difficult to determine. As we have noted, Kenny believes that pointing to, or seeing, a particular person at a certain time and place are necessary in order that our universal ideas have reference, and pointing and vision go beyond pure intellectual thought.

Now it is clear that for Aquinas no human thoughts are "pure intellectual thoughts", if we mean by this that they are thoughts free of physically derived mental images; whether these thoughts be of metaphysical principles or bars of chocolate. Therefore knowledge of individual people and things
does not cease to be 'intellectual' for Aquinas. If I point out to you that this is the person about whom I was speaking, you have to understand what this pointing means; and anything to do with understanding is, on Aquinas's account, to do with intellect.

I have pointed out above the way in which Lonergan demonstrates Aquinas's view that there are various levels of abstraction which intellectually relate a universal to a singular. If we relate this structure to the way in which Aquinas accounted for knowledge of the particular, then it can be seen that his own account of 'reference' is quite intelligible. The process entailing "reflection on the mental imagery" (reflexio supra phantasmata), which Aquinas describes as necessary for knowledge of the material particular, is not so mysterious as Kenny avers.

Aquinas believed that we could have indirect but intellectual knowledge of the material particular because our inquiries are with regard to finding out 'what' this particular is, and we are aware of beginning our inquiry with this particular. Therefore the mind is capable of a 'to and fro' movement between the particular material thing and the universal idea grasped in the data on that thing.

Let us take an example to illustrate these points. After having tinkered about with the engine of my car to try to find out why it makes a nasty 'knocking', I come indoors to think about the problem. My thinking will be with regard to images (phantasmata) derived from physical contact with the engine in the car outside. Thus, images such as 'piston rod', 'pressure', 'gasket', and memories such as "the noise occurred when I accelerated", will be involved. Any grasp of what might be wrong will be born out of reflection on this data derived from contact with my car's engine and experience of its functioning. But if, perhaps, I have a strange philosophical bent, I may reflect that what I have grasped, in grasping what the 'knocking' is, is a universal -- an idea relevant to understanding any such other instance of 'knocking' in any engine of the same type. After my attention has been directed towards the universal ("the knocking in an engine of this type"), it can shift back to "the engine in my car outside", from which the mental imagery was initially derived, to affirm, "so that's what's wrong with my car". Such a shift of attention, from the mental images as providing the matrix for a
universal insight to that from which the mental images were derived, is all that need be grasped in order to make sense of Aquinas’s position that knowledge of the material particular involves reflexio supra phantasmata. Indeed, it is only such a shift of attention, or 'intention', which renders such acts as 'pointing' and 'showing', of which Kenny writes, meaningful; rather than the pointing of my finger being due, merely, to cramp, or my 'seeing' being an instance of dumb, alcoholic gazing.

Further, it would appear from evidence provided by the Prima Pars that Aquinas thought of the intellect as being able to grasp not only the species qua, but also the species quae. This, clearly, contradicts Kenny's contention that Aquinas thought of the mind as only able to grasp the universal form 'humanity' and then apply this to sensible imagery in order to know the particular man, Socrates. For the species qua is the metaphysical abstraction, 'humanity' (rational animal), but the species quae is the item of knowledge known to anyone when they know that Socrates lived at Athens.

Aquinas is quite explicit, then, on why this mental picture is a picture of X. It is because in attempting to know X the intellect is aware, does not forget, that the mental picture formed from the sensible data on X, refers to this particular, material X which it is trying to understand via 'universal' insights.

Turning to my second thesis, the question can be raised as to how well Kenny’s presentation of Aquinas’s ideas on mind would recommend itself to those interested in problems arising out of the philosophy of science?

I think that suspicions might be aroused when Kenny attempts to correct, or modify, Aquinas’s view that "sensation in act is identical with the sensed in act" in terms of primary and secondary qualities. This may well have been the correction which the Galilean position would have wanted to make to Aquinas’s doctrine, but I think that contemporary scientific objections might be a little different. Kenny writes:

The theorem that the activity of a sensible property is identical with the activity of a sense faculty seems to be true only of secondary qualities like taste and colour. It is only of these that we can say that their only actualization, the only exercise of their powers, is the actualization of sense-faculties. A primary quality, like heaviness, can be actualized not only by causing a feeling of heaviness in a lifter, but in other ways such as by falling and exerting pressure on inanimate objects.
One may wonder how a contemporary physicist would react to talk of 'heaviness', 'falling' and 'exerting pressure', but the real issue which Keny brings to our attention here requires a more far-reaching solution than he has to offer.

In *Insight* Lonergan attempts to situate many of Aquinas's ideas in the context of contemporary debates on the epistemology of the sciences. With regard to the doctrine Aquinas inherits from Aristotle on the status of such 'forms' as colours, sounds and sensations like 'hard', 'soft', 'hot', 'cold', Lonergan argues that greater clarity results if we drop this use of 'form' which results from Aristotelian physics. 'Form', rather, should be reserved to express the sense it has for Aristotle and Aquinas when they write of it as that which is grasped by intellect in an insight into sensible data. Such 'forms' would be the intelligible unities, relations, systems, operations, etc., which the scientist discovers on the basis of sensible experience. On Lonergan's account, sensibilia, like colours and tastes, are "things as related to us"; whereas the intelligible 'forms', understood by the scientist, are "things as related to one another".

From the point of view of contemporary science, then, sensibilia like colours and tastes can, according to Lonergan, be regarded in the following way:

In the object they are sensible in potency; in sensation they are sensible in act; as named they are associated with any sufficiently similar quality through an insight that grasps how to employ the name; as objects of inquiry they enter into a heuristic structure that seeks what is to be known when they will be understood; finally, as explained, they are related to laws that implicitly define conjugate terms.17

Kenny's own discussion of the status of 'red' manifests the undertow of a naive Aristotelian physics. He writes:

Redness, as such, is something which has no existence outside thought.18

The reason for this, Kenny argues, is that redness is always the redness of a particular thing; and it is the particular thing which has existence in the world. I can think of redness without the thought of a red bus, but redness has no extramental reality without the bus attached. This account is related to the Aristotelian notion that redness is an 'accidental form' which, as Kenny states in his essay, is "perceived by the senses."19

However, redness is certainly something which modern scientific theory treats as a reality apart from thought.
Contemporary theory on colour involves such elements as the relative intensities of electro-magnetic wavelengths, pigment absorption and, in more recent work, the organizing capacities of the brain. If contemporary scientific theory is correct then, at least in its own estimation, it has said what colours, like red, are in reality.

Coming to the final topic of this article, I should like to discuss briefly the question which Kenny raises towards the end of his essay: "What makes a thought of X my thought?" If both you and I can have a correct idea of what happened on the last day of the Test match, or of the formation of the Solar system, what makes these ideas mine rather than yours?

Kenny notes that Aquinas was concerned with this problem in his debate with the Averroists, whose position was that there are no individual souls, only a world soul. In attempting to refute this Aquinas argued that my thoughts are mine because they are connected with the mental imagery which is produced by my body. Kenny finds this unsatisfactory and favours, rather, Wittgenstein's emphasis on the expression of a thought as that which provides criteria for showing its possessor.²⁰

We may ask, however, whether such criteria are completely adequate in explaining what makes a thought of X my thought. We could think of the case of someone under the influence of hypnosis who expresses judgments about things and people which he has been ordered to express by his hypnotist. When such a person 'came to' we would hardly hold him responsible for these judgments. For as Aquinas also argued against the Averroists, if this man does not understand then this man should not be listened to. Perhaps, then, the concept of responsibility is helpful in understanding what makes my thought of X my thought.

We can develop this idea a little if we turn to some of Lonergan's more recent work.²¹ Lonergan maintains that our attempts to come to a correct idea about things involves such requirements as being attentive to experience, being as intelligent as we can in asking questions, hitting off ideas, formulating concepts and working out implications, and being as reasonable as possible in judging as to the veracity, probability or doubtfulness of our ideas. Such a list of requirements may appear banal, and I cannot go into the many and varied ways in which Lonergan develops these notions here,
but the point I wish to make is simply that, "my (correct) idea of X" is the fruit of my attempts to be attentive rather than inattentive, intelligent rather than silly, and reasonable in judgment rather than rash or stupid. Of course, it may be objected that "my thought of X" could simply be an instance of day-dreaming or reverie; but such fantasizing normally takes place within the context of a life in which we occasionally, at least, want to get things straight.

As the 'producer' of an idea about X, then, I am responsible for that idea. Admittedly this linking of philosophy of mind with the concerns of moral philosophy may seem strange to some, but for Aquinas it was far from unfamiliar. For Aquinas believed that, in some fashion, the will is 'in' the intellect.22

NOTES

22. ST, q. 82, a.4,c and ad.1.

I should like to thank Fr. Anthony O'Sullivan for discussing with me some of the issues treated in this article.