Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

Institutional Subscription (yearly) ............... $20.00
Individual Subscription (yearly) ................. $12.00

Orders Prepaid in U.S. Funds Only

A biannual journal, Method, is published in March and October. Contributors are requested to follow the University of Chicago Manual of Style in preparing manuscripts. Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor and all other correspondence to the manager, Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 90045.

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Method is sustained by Loyola Marymount University
ISSN: 0736-7392

Cover Design by W. Hew Elcock
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PHILOSOPHER'S INDEX
In "Lonergan and Philosophy of Religion" David Burrell explores, from the viewpoint of a former student of Lonergan, those characteristics of Lonergan's work which render direct insertion of his ideas into contemporary debates in philosophy of religion difficult and perhaps even impossible. What one derives from an encounter with Lonergan's Insight, Burrell suggests, is not another position on topics presently being debated (for, Burrell claims, Lonergan "did not have a line on philosophy of religion as a subject") but rather a way of approaching topics, issues, problems that is grounded in a performing grasp of oneself as an inquirer. Burrell's point may have a wider application; perhaps it could be generalized to account for the difficulties encountered by anyone who would introduce a Lonerganian perspective into any current philosophic debate.

It was remarked by Lonergan himself that his use of "myth" in Insight was out of line with current usage, and on a cursory reading of Insight some have been led to conclude falsely that Lonergan's position is unsympathetic to the deeper resonances of symbolic meaning in myth. In "The Discussion of Mystery in Insight" Glenn Hughes assembles textual evidence to the contrary; the interpretive problems posed by Lonergan's usage are virtually laid to rest.

In "Lindbeck's Appropriation of Lonergan" Dennis Doyle raises serious concerns regarding the use made of Lonergan by Lindbeck in his widely-read The Nature of Doctrine. Doyle develops suggestions, found in Charles C. Hefling's recent review [Method, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1985)], that Lonergan's position not only includes but actually surpasses Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic" approach to doctrines. Ironically, Doyle points out, it is the very point Lindbeck puts forward as having the greatest ecumenical potential that distinguishes him as a Protestant from the Catholic Lonergan, viz., that no ontological reference for church doctrines is necessary.

In "Lonergan and the Husserlian Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity" Paul Kidder attempts to provide Lonerganian solutions to the fundamental Husserlian problem. Kidder's essay provides, in addition to a clear picture of the Husserlian origins of the problem, a concise defense against long-standing objections to Lonergan's apparent "immanentism" and "idealism." The solipsistic objection, Kidder shows, misunderstands Lonergan's basic position.
The most salient point about Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is that he never appeared to be very interested in it. That's somewhat paradoxical, of course, for a theologian so acutely conscious of the need for a set of keen philosophical skills that he devoted the major part of his energies to honing them -- and issued the workbook in *Insight*. But that simply underscores what he was interested in: forming thinkers who could deal responsibly with the sort of questions with which philosophy of religion occupies itself. But as a consequence it appears that Lonergan did not have a line on philosophy of religion as a subject, nor do his writings give us one. In fact, the essays in the three Collections which might be so construed are frankly disappointing.

Why? Why can we not appeal to him or to his lectures directly? The response, I believe is twofold: vocational and contextual. Vocationally, he always saw himself as a theologian: everything he did, including and especially *Insight*, is ordered to understanding the faith we have received. Contextually, that faith is one in whose development reason has long been intimately engaged, and we are part of that development. Philosophy of religion as a distinct discipline, however, seems to flourish in a setting where faith is considered to be given, and philosophy has the role either of preparing people for it (as in a post-Tridentine understanding of *preambula fidei*) or of defending it (as in some conservative Christian milieux).¹ And if anything can be said about Lonergan, it would be that he campaigned as strenuously as Wilfrid Sellars against the "myth of the given" -- epitomized in the key chapter in *Insight* entitled "Things."² So what can we say about Lonergan and philosophy of religion?

I have suggested that one would not get much help from his published essays on cognate topics. That is probably too sweeping a statement, but without defending it I can at least balance it by insisting that there is no better training for one exploring issues germane to philosophy of
religion than the discipline of **Insight** -- understood not as a competing theory of knowledge but as a performative document issuing an exciting if demanding invitation. For one so formed will be freed to take up issues as they arise, without any pre-set agenda. (Anyone who notices how readily contemporary American philosophy settles on a canonical set of topics will realize how liberating that is.) Moreover, in treating these issues, they will be encouraged to use whatever tools are available -- analytic, hermeneutic, phenomenological -- without preconceived notions regarding their appropriateness to philosophical inquiry. In this way, persons formed by **Insight** would offer fresh perspectives on current and classical topics such as the reasonableness appropriate to religious convictions, or the language uses germane to religious life and discourse. For, having undergone the discipline of **Insight**, they would have gained enough insight into themselves as inquirers to learn how to comport themselves in the face of what transcends human knowing. Grounded, that is, in a performing grasp of themselves as inquirers, in the spirit of John Henry Newman, they will be able to mediate between the going "counter-positions" like realism/anti-realism, foundationalism/contextualism, though current preoccupation with "isms" will exasperate them.

Given that current mood, the more vexing question is: how ought one teach philosophy of religion? Published anthologies are quite worthless, since the very format offers "positions" with little or no sense of inquiry. It is far better to select texts oneself, but which ones? How? I would offer the following principles of selection: (a) Choose classical as well as modern/contemporary selections which can help students learn how to appropriate a critical figure in their own tradition. That assures an actual exercise in interpretation (or hermeneutics). (b) Select modern and contemporary figures whose response to issues offers a paradigm for the way in which religious thinkers grappled with perplexities and objections facing them in their time. In this way, each offers a way of showing how an inquirer gains some purchase on that object which transcends the bounds of proportionate human inquiry.

These principles may not sound novel, and they are not. Yet they direct us to a critical assessment rather than to a preoccupation with "problems" facing belief as a project.
They presume there are believers, and that these very people struggle with that activity. In this way, the entire course becomes an exercise in religious understanding, and so highlights what I have pinpointed as Bernard Lonergan's way of structuring the activity which we call philosophy of religion -- without falling into the ready trap of pre-selected issues. (I composed a threading text for such a course in 1973, entitled Exercises in Religious Understanding, which could serve were one to choose Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and even Kierkegaard or Jung. But since it is no longer in print, a better choice, were one to select Pascal, Kierkegaard or Simone Weil, would be Diogenes Allen's Three Outsiders [Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1983].) In any case, the way of apprenticeship to cogent thinkers to discover how they deal with salient issues and so learn how to proceed oneself, is what one could learn from Bernard Lonergan in philosophy of religion.

Approaching traditions in this manner offers two distinct advantages. One is a respect for the thinkers whose work we are examining; the other is a relative freedom to proceed on our own, in the measure that we have been able to learn and to appropriate useful skills through this exercise. Again, nothing startling here, yet it clearly contrasts with a prevailing attitude of "overcoming" the past, whereby earlier positions become springboards to new ones, which establish themselves as blessed correctives to all that was wrong in the past. Lonergan's insistence that we make the effort to understand the questions to which past thinkers were responding, together with the resources at their disposal, forces one to an appreciation of the shared struggle to understand. And when such an appreciation turns critical, one has at least some assurance that one is building on what went before, and so profiting from one's participation in a tradition. Far from being "conservative," such a strategy can issue in positions as "revisionary" or as "radical" as seems called for, yet with a sense of respect for a common human enterprise. Such a student will learn to avoid slogans (like "classical theism") and assiduously avoid doing philosophy by "isms," however convenient a teaching device they may offer. For ingredient in their pursuit will be a quest for the questions others have entertained, as they monitor the signs of our times to discern the questions which preoccupy us. To appropriate the past, in the way in which Lonergan trains us to do it, is to be that much better equipped to
encounter the present. For one need be less preoccupied with making one's own mark, or with reacting against a prior position taken over as a stereotype, and so be that much more free to address what concerns our contemporaries.

A similar dynamic will govern that student's efforts to assimilate another tradition. For here again, the connection of thought with practice will emerge as we try to determine just what their questions were. At this state historical studies have a much larger place than most philosophers are accustomed to give them, as we try to determine the Sitz-im-leben of more conceptual writings. Once that effort has been made, however, the common pursuit of understanding reasserts itself. Once we have begun the work to free ourselves of our customary ways of posing the issues, we will be rewarded with enlightening trains of thought and of argument. Lonergan's studied manner of employing whatever tools are appropriate to apprentice oneself to another thinker gives one a more confident base from which to engage in a comparative study which has a chance to be corrected by the "experts," as well as to offer some illumination to other inquirers. And given the formidable obstacles to achieving any comparative understanding, this advantage, while hardly spectacular, is nevertheless a promising one. In a world which demands that we enlarge our horizons, and in which few if any of us are explicitly trained to do so, some of us must begin to explore those intercultural and interfaith regions towards which Karl Rahner has aptly pointed Christian thinkers. Yet the manner of establishing the beachheads which he called for will come most fruitfully from those who have learned the disciplines of Insight, who are willing to undergo the rigors of apprenticeship, and have thereby gained the courage to essay clear and corrigible statements which may offer a modicum of illumination for others. A modest yet exciting goal, as Lonergan himself often referred to the knowledge available in such remote regions.

NOTES


2 Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Longmans, 1958), Ch. 8; for Wilfrid Sellars, see Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities, 1963), Ch. 5, "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind."
Lonergan's clues in *Insight* are overt: "The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the experiment will be performed not publicly but privately . . . . Up to that decisive achievement, all leads. From it, all follows" (xviii). "... More than all else, the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act" (xix). But see F. E. Crowe, S.J., *The Lonergan Enterprise* (Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1980), pp. 59-62.

The celebrated Rahner lecture, "Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of Vatican II," was published in *Theological Studies* 40 (1979): 716-29.
As philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan has relatively little to say about mystery. Com...
emergence into a human being's articulate consciousness of his permanent orientation toward transcendent mystery. The analysis in Insight is more general, focusing on the human situation as such. And while the later passages about mystery, especially in Method in Theology, are very different from those in Insight, in their pointed emphasis on the affective and religious dimensions of the experience of mystery, they are not meant to be a revision of the earlier, more general discussion in Insight, but rather are considered by Lonergan to flesh out the earlier account. It will be worthwhile, then, to sketch the fundamental components of his discussion of mystery in Insight, in order to show that its few terse pages contain a more rich affirmation of the place of mystery in human self-interpretation than might be supposed.

Lonergan's notion of mystery, as presented and explained in Chapter XVII, is grounded in what he calls "the paradoxical category of the 'known unknown.'" As intelligent creatures, we are impelled by the pure desire to know, by the recurrent activity of questioning that heads toward intelligent, reasonable and responsible answers. "But, in fact, our questions outnumber our answers, so that we know of an unknown through our unanswered questions." One is always headed toward further knowledge, and so is always orientated toward the unknown that is known to be unknown in one's apprehension of the goal of as yet unanswered questions. And one's questioning is in principle unrestricted: it aims at knowledge of the totality of what is, of all being. Lonergan has indeed carefully defined "being" heuristically, as the objective of the pure desire to know. Therefore the category of the "known unknown" can reach out to embrace all reality beyond what is already known, and, categorically, is not restricted in scope by any concrete individual questioner's concrete horizon of apprehension, imagination or conscious intention.

As is easily seen, the category of the "known unknown" is variable: it can be constricted to refer to the symbol "x" in a simple algebraic equation, it can be expanded to refer to God in God's essence. Here, in these two examples, the phrase "known unknown" simply denotes the terms intended in two unanswered questions. But surely there is an important distinction to be made between the types of questions being asked: one aims at a "known unknown" that can be known
(given the appropriate conditions) in this life; the other is a "known unknown" that cannot. To use Marcel's capable distinction, one is merely a problem, but the other is a true, permanent because inexhaustible, mystery for the human questioner.

Human beings, according to Lonergan, are permanently orientated toward the "known unknown." But this "permanence" he speaks of may be understood in two ways. There is the general permanence that is an attribute pertaining to the presence of a range of "known unknown" in human living. And there is the specific permanence that is an attribute pertaining to the presence of true mysteries in Marcel's sense. The former, general permanence has its basis in there being always some further question to ask, answerable or not. The latter, specific permanence has its basis in the fact that some fundamental human questions are directed toward what cannot be answered under human conditions. (E.g.: Why is there something, and not nothing?). Now, Lonergan discusses mystery in Insight compactly in terms of the "known unknown," not drawing a clear distinction between "problem" and "mystery" in Marcel's senses, with the result that in some places he speaks of mystery simultaneously as the range of the "known unknown" that can be diminished through answers to questions and as the ulterior range that cannot ever be abolished in this life. For example, both of these senses are operative in the following sentence: "Though the field of mystery is contracted by the advance of knowledge, it cannot be eliminated from human living." Clearly, Lonergan is not reserving the name "mystery" for that which is intended in profoundly meaningful, but in principle unanswerable, questions.

Because he uses "mystery" compactly to refer to the objectives of humanly answerable but not yet answered questions as well as to the objectives of unanswerable ones -- both sets of objectives falling under the category of the "known unknown" -- it is possible to construe Lonergan in Insight as treating what I shall call ultimate mysteries as mere problems. Such a construal is mistaken, and it is important to show that a fair reading of the text confirms this, and also to examine the reasons that Lonergan puts forth in support of his affirmation of ineluctable mystery in human existence.
To begin, there is a pedagogical explanation for the compactness of Lonergan's use of the term "mystery" and "known unknown" where they appear in Chapter XVII. *Insight*, we are advised in its Introduction, is written from a "moving viewpoint." Now the book as far as Chapter XVII -- which continues Lonergan's account, begun in Chapter XIV, of an explicit metaphysics in the form of an "integral heuristic structure of proportionate being" -- has not yet moved on to questions concerning transcendent being. That is, Lonergan is not yet addressing those questions we may raise that specifically aim beyond the scope of being that is proportionate to human being and knowing. Such questions are broached in the book's final Chapters XIX and XX. From the moving viewpoint of Chapter XVII, then, the analysis of "the sense of the unknown" as a permanent feature of human consciousness prescinds from any distinction between the unknown as proportionate to human being and knowing, and the unknown as transcending human being and knowing. This is not to suggest that there is, for Lonergan, no knowledge whatsoever of transcendent reality. Rather he affirms the possibility of both "general" and "special" transcendent knowledge. But ultimate mystery -- mystery in Marcel's sense -- has its basis in what de facto transcends human capacities of knowing, though not human capacities of inquiry; and thus, whether an individual realizes it or not, the mystery one experiences at the core of one's being is rooted in what may be philosophically labelled "transcendence." Indeed, this is just the point that Lonergan is making: we are orientated into mystery, and experience themselves as such, long before questions that specify transcendence are raised. In Chapter XVII, such questions are carefully and explicitly set aside for later consideration, while numerous sentences -- for example, the reference to Rudolf Otto's *Idea of the Holy* -- indicate that Lonergan is concerned not to exclude religious experience, or orientation to transcendent mystery, from his analysis of our dynamic orientation into what he describes, at this point, quite generally as "the sphere of the ulterior unknown, of the unexplored and strange, of the undefined surplus of significance and momentousness." "

Lonergan's notion of mystery, then, is not restricted to, but includes, ultimate mystery. Because of this inclusion, Lonergan can make the unequivocal claim: "Man by nature is
orientated into mystery, and naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret [expel nature with a pitchfork, nevertheless it always comes back]."12 When a philosopher in the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition uses the expression "by nature," he does not do so lightly. Mystery is of our human essence.

What specifically is it about our very structure that, for Lonergan, insures our permanent orientation into mystery? His answer to this question lies in Chapter XVII's subsection "The Notion of Mystery" and in his earlier discussion of human development, part of Chapter XV's exposition of genetic method.13 In these related passages, Lonergan grounds the permanence of our experience of mystery in our nature being a "union of sensitive and intellectual activities."14 Let us examine the properties of such a union.

Human living in this view is a union of opposite activities. Sensitive activities are rooted in, and draw their reference from, the physical, the palpable, the self as a spatio-temporal center locating its feeling and perceiving, enjoying and suffering, talking and doing. Intellectual activities, on the other hand, are propelled and conditioned by the detached and disinterested desire to know. These activities are successful when they draw the self into "a quite different mode of operation" than sensitive functioning, in which the self as center is transcended through properly human knowing, and through which the self enters a universe of being (the universe of what is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed) in which it itself is an infinitesimal component subordinated to some (ultimately mysterious) destiny.15 Sensitive and intellectual activities are opposites because they hold the one, identical self in ineluctable opposition within itself as both an experienced center of being and an experienced not-center of being, as sensing animal and self-transcendent participant in the universe of being.16 This opposition is permanent, because the self is both its sensitive psyche and its intellect: "Both are I and neither is merely It. If my intelligence is mine, so is my sexuality. If my reasonableness is mine, so are my dreams."17 Now a union of opposites is a unity that is sustained in tension, as an interrelated and interdependent "unity of opposites in tension."18 And it is exactly this tension that is the home of human mystery. The tension is constituted by its poles. Eliminate the pole of intellect,
and mystery disappears along with questioning; eliminate the pole of centeredness in place and time -- that is, expand intellect to unrestricted actuality -- and the human is no longer human, but God, for Whom mysteries are not.

The two poles constituting the tension are expressed in briefest form by Lonergan as "self-centeredness" and "detachment," and the essential opposition between them as never to be transcended in human development. There is perhaps a danger in Lonergan's use of the term "self-centeredness" here, since it carries inescapable overtones of "selfishness." I don't think Lonergan is deaf to this resonance; and since he is engaged in an analysis of the very structure of human being, and self as center is a fundamental component in that structure, it is unfortunate that the physical, sensitive ground of human being should be encapsulated in a term that, taken in its normal usage, suggests something morally imperfect or in need of correction. The term conveys, however subliminally, the impression that physicality is intrinsically not the glory that the Incarnation reveals it to be. The full context of Lonergan's argument makes it abundantly clear, however, that no such dishonor is intended. On the contrary, Lonergan emphasizes the fact that denigration of the pole of sensitive activities, or exclusive valuation of the pole of intellectual activities, can only lead to disaster. The task of being human is human living; and the home of human living is most obviously the concrete world of "the feelings and emotions, the talking and the doing that form the palpable part of our living with persons and our dealing with things." Intellectual activities draw us into the universe of being, as we come to knowledge through anticipated or achieved explanation. "But explanation does not give man a home." Our home is, truly, the place of tension between the two poles: our home is neither merely the sensible, palpable environment of the brute animal, nor merely the realm of concepts in which we encounter "the bloodless ballet of metaphysical categories," but both at once and thus in-between both. The tension of human existence discovers itself as the in-between of particular and universal, of concrete and abstract, of body and what transcends the bodily, of centeredness and not-centeredness -- and of ignorance and knowledge. Human beings know, but are also finite, limited; thus do not know all; thus know of an unknown. Heretofore
we have spoken of Lonergan's "known unknown" in terms of intellectual activity. But because, as we have seen, a human being is a tension between sensitive and intellectual activities, his or her orientation into the known unknown must be both intellectual and sensitive. That is, in addition to some intellectual apprehension of mystery, a person, to be genuinely himself or herself, must be effectively open toward mystery at the level of the sensitive flow of presentations and the imaginative flow of representations, at the level of concrete images, and the feelings, emotions and sentiments that accrue to them. And on this last point Lonergan is profoundly articulate in his discussion of mystery in *Insight*, as he insists on our need for dynamic images that embody our orientation into the known unknown and so keep us open to the transforming changes that bring us, in our development, into the fuller living that is genuine attunement to the truth of our being.

Let us reiterate this position. Because a human being is a union of opposites in tension, every person is by nature orientated into mystery; in order to live the truth of one's being, then, both types of activity constituting the poles of the opposition must reflect, exhibit, embody the thrust of that orientation. The remainder of this paper will focus on Lonergan's discussion of the sensitive component in this complex, i.e., mystery apprehended in (and as) dynamic image.

A successful life does not immediately follow from accurate insights. Intellectual contents, which have their origin in images at the sensible level, must still be integrated into the full life of the individual; and this integration only takes place through the cooperation of images as carriers of the feelings and felt associations that bring mass and momentum to the project of the search for meaning.22 "Man's explanatory self-knowledge," Lonergan writes, "can become effective in his concrete living only if the content of systematic insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words."23 Applying this to our specific topic, we conclude that for us to live the truth of our natural orientation into mystery, that orientation must be embodied in affect-laden images at the level of the sensitive psyche.
Now, with regard to such images in the context of his discussion of mystery, Lonergan finds it necessary to differentiate three functions of the sensible image. First, there is the image as "image," which is the sensible content as it functions on the level of sensitive activity, "within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and action." Secondly, there is the image as "sign," where the image is connected with some interpretation of it. And thirdly, there is the image as "symbol," which is the image as "linked simply with the paradoxical 'known unknown.'" But no image remains a symbol apart from sign; for as symbol, evocative of the pure "known unknown," it invites and receives interpretation in as many ways as human ingenuity can discover when it wishes to explain or express ultimate things.

Thus all dynamic images that orientate humans into the known unknown operate as both symbol and sign, and such images, residing at the core of all human concern, guiding for each person the tendencies of his or her decisions on how, and for what purpose, to live, play a powerful role in the life of an individual. And an inevitable role; for a human remains a sensitive creature no matter how much he or she comes to know. Should one come to know all that is humanly possible to know, it would not alter the structure of one's being, and so not alter one's orientation into mystery. "The achievement, then, of full understanding and the attainment even of the totality of correct judgments would not free man from the necessity of dynamic images that partly are symbols and partly are signs." The need for dynamic images does not vary. What does vary, however, is the appropriateness of the particular dynamic images that operate partly as symbols, partly as signs for individuals and, more generally, in cultures. Appropriate images, in this context, are those that invite the proper unfolding of one's detached and disinterested desire to know; appropriate images are in harmony with what normative objectivity discovers about the universe of being, and so aid one both to reach a deeper comprehension of one's place in the cosmos and to orientate oneself affectively within the horizon thus revealed. And inappropriate images? They are images that are inadequate for, or obstruct, our dynamic orientation into the known unknown of the surplus meaning
of reality. How is one then to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate images? One touchstone remains the fact of mystery itself: the appropriate image is as inexhaustible as it is necessary and nourishing, for it directs the inquiring mind and the longing heart to the reality of mystery no less than to the mystery of reality. Appropriate images with respect to ultimate things are, in part, concrete symbols that orientate us toward our own being as a tension between sensitive and intellectual activities, a union of opposites, and so orientate us toward the genuine mystery that we are and in which we have our being. Again, inappropriate images with respect to ultimate things are those that tend to occlude, obscure, eclipse the truth of reality as it is known and loved in the proper unfolding of human development; and since one aspect of that truth is the permanence of mystery, it is not uncommon to find the inappropriate image as one prompting or serving the attempt to explain once and for all what can never be fully explained.

In Insight Lonergan names such inappropriate images "myths." Myths are efforts to grasp and formulate the ultimate nature of things, the truth of reality, but which, bound within an horizon of inadequate self-knowledge, distort that nature and that truth to a greater or lesser extent. This is not the place to examine Lonergan's view of mythic consciousness and its place in historical development, but only to point out that, in terms of this definition, myth remains a permanent temptation and reality in human affairs. For adequate self-knowledge depends upon correct understanding of the nature and criteria of the real, of the conditions and criteria of self-knowledge, and of the structure and criteria of objectivity. The correct understanding of these and attitudes and conclusions correlative to such understanding Lonergan refers to as "positions"; and their corresponding, mistaken alternatives he names "counterpositions." Since the positions are consonant with the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know, symbolic expressions solidarity with them are appropriate images. Myths, on the contrary, are solidarity with the counterpositions. Since adequate self-knowledge is not a permanent trophy won in the course of a linear march of progress through history, but a temporary victory constantly challenged by familiar enemies, myths -- whether they owe their presence to ignorance
or to less innocent origins -- remain a feature of the human world.

Appropriate images, or symbolic expressions in harmony with the positions, Lonergan calls "mysteries." They, and not myths, invite one into the truth of reality in such a way that intellectual and sensitive activities cooperate as correct judgments and decisions are reached; they prove to be endlessly fertile soil for the self-transcendent discoveries of the true order of being, affect-laden images in which, among other things, human existence becomes luminous for its own mystery, and thus images enabling one to embrace in genuineness and love the truth of one's own nature and destiny.

Lonergan further mentions that myths, because they are based on counterpositions, become discredited on occasions when a profounder self-understanding is reached; and every such occasion is an opportunity to replace less appropriate with more appropriate images, a provocation toward "a more conscious use of mystery purified of myth." An example of such a refinement of images regarding ultimate things can be seen in Plato's careful and elaborate construction of philosophers' myths in the major Dialogues, which is accompanied by the critique or denunciation (Cf. Republic) of large portions of the Greek mythological inheritance. Plato's philosophers' myths are Lonergan's "mysteries": they are symbolic expressions in which the philosopher's insights into the true order of being "blossom out into assuaging expression," as Eric Voegelin has it, to guide and orientate us into the mysterious and inexhaustible depths of being.

But mysteries can also be rejected for myths. And modernity, according to Lonergan, is guilty of just such a rejection on a massive cultural and historical scale. The advances made possible by scientific discovery and technological invention have fueled human hopes for permanent progress, and so have led to the systematic rejection of whatever might humble us before the very power over reality we have won for ourselves. And so the modern individual has tended to reject the fact of mystery itself, the humbling acknowledgement of an ultimately transcendent mystery beyond human knowing, within which human knowing is itself a gift -- and so has repeatedly chosen new, more sophisticated myths to explain the nature of things, for "myth is the permanent alternative to mystery and mystery is what his hybris rejected."
If Lonergan does not dwell on mystery in *Insight*, still his analysis is most acute. Its culmination in the paragraphs on "mysteries" as appropriate dynamic images that orientate us into the known unknown of reality is a masterpiece of concentrated understatement. His acknowledgement that the rejection of the fact of mystery itself is at the center of modernity's rejection of "mysteries" is, if not spelled out at length, still obvious. And in his insistence that it is by way of the rejection of mystery that we "are brought to the profound disillusionment of modern man and to the focal point of his horror," we recognize that Lonergan is among those thinkers for whom an integrated experiencing of the fundamental mystery of being is at the heart of healing in history.35

NOTES


5 "Insight Revisited," in A Second Collection, p. 275.

6 *Insight*, p. 531. Ch. XVII, § 1, "Metaphysics, Mystery, and Myth," provides the context for the discussion of "The Notion of Mystery," § 1.6 (pp. 546-49).


22 Cf. *Method in Theology*, pp. 31-31: "Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and
distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning."


27 Cf. *Method in Theology*, p. 341: "...no system we can construct will encompass or plumb or master the mystery by which we are held."

28 *Insight*, pp. 542-49. As Lonergan later remarked in "*Insight Revisited,"* such employment of the word "myth" is "out of line with current usage," and is misleading outside the context of *Insight; A Second Collection*, p. 275.

29 *Insight*, pp. 387-89.


LINDBECK’S APPROPRIATION OF LONERGAN

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In The Nature of Doctrine George Lindbeck engages in serious dialogue with the work of Bernard Lonergan. In the words of David Tracy, Lindbeck has written "an important and what promises to be an influential book." He is to be commended for the thought-provoking and ecumenical nature of his work. As a Protestant who is willing to engage seriously the work of Lonergan, Lindbeck is to be welcomed with open arms.

Lindbeck's appropriation of Lonergan, however, stands in need of some critical adjustments. In a recent review of The Nature of Doctrine Charles C. Hefling states that Lindbeck's treatment of Lonergan "is something less than an accurate assessment of Lonergan's views." Hefling pinpoints the root of the problem as Lindbeck's "having treated as the whole of Method in Theology's' theory of religion what is really only a part." I think Hefling is on the mark, and I wish to develop his point further.

A study of the use Lindbeck makes of Lonergan will help both to clarify what Lindbeck is about and to dispel any misunderstandings of Lonergan's position on religion and doctrine that might result from Lindbeck's book. First, some similarities between Lonergan's theory of religion and doctrine and the theory proposed by Lindbeck will be pointed out. Second, some of the advances that Lindbeck claims for his own position that can be found already in Lonergan will be noted. Finally, the real differences between Lonergan and Lindbeck concerning religion and doctrine will be discussed.

1. Lonergan and the Cultural-Linguistic View

The underlying difficulty with Lindbeck's appropriation of Lonergan lies in his inability to categorize Lonergan clearly in an argument that relies substantially on clear categorization. Lindbeck makes many of his claims against the conceptual background of a few clear approaches to doctrine: he distinguishes the cognitive-propositional approach, the experiential-expressive approach, and the cultural-linguistic approach. The cognitive-propositional is the approach
of a narrow orthodoxy that naively insists upon claims to the truth of statements. The experiential-expressive is the approach of a vacuous liberalism for which all truth is strictly relative to a cultural context. The cultural-linguistic approach, which utilizes a social scientific theory of religion, is the one that Lindbeck proposes as his own.

Lindbeck tries valiantly to describe Lonergan in terms of the first two categories. In the initial description of Lonergan's position Lindbeck depicts it as a valuable attempt to combine what is best in the two approaches. In a later description Lindbeck refers to Lonergan's position as a "two-dimensional experiential expressivism." That is, Lonergan's position is most basically an experiential-expressivism, but a highly developed one that incorporates many of the advantages of the cognitive-propositional approach. Finally, Lindbeck describes Lonergan's position as a "contemporary propositionalism." But Lonergan always manages to loom larger than the labels.

Although Lindbeck often exempts Lonergan from some of the criticisms he directs toward propositionalists and expressivists in general, there are many that he lets stand. The crux of the majority of his arguments is that the cultural-linguistic view is for various reasons superior to the previous views. What Lindbeck does not take into account sufficiently is that Lonergan's own position includes and surpasses what Lindbeck presents as the cultural-linguistic view.

Not only does Lonergan incorporate elements of what Lindbeck calls the cultural-linguistic view into his own method in theology, but this incorporation is one of Lonergan's most important achievements. Lindbeck describes the cultural-linguistic approach as one that places emphasis "on those respects in which religions resemble languages together with their correlative forms of life and are thus similar to cultures (insofar as these are understood semiotically as reality and value systems -- that is, as idioms for the construction of reality and the living of life)" [17-18]. This description sounds almost like a collage constructed from various places in Lonergan's work. For both Lonergan and Lindbeck, religions, although they are not to be confused with cultures, strongly resemble cultures in that they are, in the terms Lonergan uses to define "culture,"

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sets of meanings and values that inform ways of life. Lindbeck speaks as if Lonergan holds that the human dimension of religious doctrines can be exhaustively understood as expressions of experience. On the contrary, for Lonergan religious beliefs are constitutive of reality, they inform a way of life, and they effect the goals and visions of a community. This is what Lonergan means when he says that beliefs are not only cognitive but also communicative, constitutive, and effective [M 76-79]. Lonergan holds that religions exist within the world "mediated by meaning and motivated by value." It is this world that Lindbeck refers to in his section on the "psychosocial context"; it is this world that is studied by the social scientists.

Lindbeck at one point describes the cultural-linguistic view of religion as "a system of discursive and non-discursive symbols linking motivation and action and providing an ultimate legitimation for basic patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior uniquely characteristic of a given community or society and its members" [ND 62]. As early as 1957 in Insight Lonergan wrote of a mystery "that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, wholehearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended." In Method in Theology Lonergan speaks of the Church as a community in that it is held together by the shared meaning in Christ's message:

The message announces what Christians are to believe, what they are to become, and what they are to do. Its meaning, then, is at once cognitive, constitutive, effective. It is cognitive inasmuch as the message tells what is to be believed. It is constitutive inasmuch as it crystallizes the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian fellowship. It is effective inasmuch as it directs Christian service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God. [M 362]

In the work of Lonergan, therefore, religion is not simply the propositional expression of experience, nor is it fully explained even when it is also understood as a communication from God. For Lonergan, religion must be further understood as having a grounding in a community conceived as a socially-constituted entity. It cannot be overemphasized that for Lonergan religions are constitutive of reality, that they inform ways of living, that they effect the goals and vision of communities.
Why is Lindbeck, who uses Lonergan as his main conversa-
tion partner in a book on religion and doctrine, so unaware
of this important dimension of Lonergan's position on religion?
There are at least a couple of reasons. As Hefling points
out in his review, some of Lindbeck's most significant early
encounters with the work of Lonergan were without the bene-
fit of the "background chapters" of Method in Theology.7
Under such circumstances one could get the mistaken impres-
sion that for Lonergan religion can be understood almost
exclusively as an expression of human experience with just
a brief mention of God and without bringing in its social
dimension. A related reason why Lindbeck is unaware of such
an important dimension of Lonergan's work is that it is only
from the perspective of a highly integrated view of various
aspects of Lonergan's thought that one can come to grasp
the importance of the social nature of religion for Lonergan.

Lonergan himself, however, does help the reader to make
the necessary connections. He emphasized the social nature
of belief in Insight.8 For him, belief is inherently a social
process in that it takes place within the context of "the
 collaborated of mankind in the advancement and dissemination
of knowledge" [I 703]. Beliefs make up a large percentage
of the common fund of human knowledge that constitutes the
very world in which human beings live. Lonergan explained:

 Ninety-eight percent of what a genius knows, he believes.
It isn't personally independently acquired knowledge.
Human knowledge is an acquisition that goes on over
centuries and centuries, and if we want to accept no-
thing, that we don't find out for ourselves, we revert
to the paleozoic age. At that period they found out
for themselves everything they knew.9

In Method in Theology Lonergan moved from the social
nature of belief in general to the social nature of religion
and doctrine. He first established a social science perspec-
tive with his chapters on the Human Good and Meaning. It
is in these chapters that Lonergan set up a grounding for
religion and doctrine in the world mediated by meaning and
in what today is commonly called "praxis."10 Lonergan made the
connection himself: "Before we can speak about religion,
we first must say something about the human good and about
human meaning" [M 25]. In his chapter on Doctrines, Lonergan
clearly rooted his theory of doctrines in the groundwork
of the earlier chapters:
In the third chapter on meaning we distinguished the communicative, the effective, the constitutive, and the cognitive functions of meaning. Next, in the fourth chapter on religion we spoke both of an inner grace and of the outer word that comes to us from Christ Jesus. Because of its authoritative source, that word is doctrine. Because that source is one, that doctrine will be a common doctrine. Finally, such common doctrine will fulfill the communicative, effective, constitutive, and cognitive functions proper to meaning.

It is effective inasmuch as it counsels and dissuades, commands and prohibits. It is cognitive inasmuch as it tells whence we come, whither we go, how we get there. It is constitutive of the individual inasmuch as the doctrine is a set of meanings and values that inform his living, his knowing, his doing. It is constitutive of the community, for community exists inasmuch as there is a commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another. Finally, it is communicative for it has passed from Christ to the apostles and from the apostles to their successors and from these in each age to the flocks of which they were the pastors. [M 298]

Lindbeck speaks as if Lonergan's theory of doctrine is built directly atop his chapter on Religion without any other foundation. What is clear from the passage above, however, is that Lonergan's theory of doctrine is based as much on what might be called his "cultural-linguistic" perspective as on his experiential view of religion.

2. Lindbeck Beyond Lonergan?

Several advances that Lindbeck claims for his own position can already be found in Lonergan. First, Lindbeck puts forth the claim that his cultural-linguistic approach is able to bridge the gap between the non-theological and the theological study of religion because of its compatibility with the approaches currently reigning in academic circles [ND 25]. One of the major strengths, however, of the theological method Lonergan has developed is its bridging of this gap. The entire first four of the eight functional specialties of Lonergan's method deal precisely with the study of religion from the linguistic-historical-social-psychic-cultural perspective of the religiously disinterested observer. That is, one of Lonergan's great achievements has been the incorporation of what might be called the "social science perspective" into the theological enterprise. Lonergan is even seen by some as having laid the foundations for the unification of all sciences.11

Lindbeck expresses another of the advances of his own approach over the approach he attributes to Lonergan as being
that "the former reverses the relation of the inner and the outer. Instead of deriving the external features of a religion from inner experience, it is the inner experiences which are viewed as derivative" [ND 34]. This point, though, is debatable. As Lindbeck himself mentions, Lonergan holds that at least in the case of Judaism and Christianity, "not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but also the outer word of the religious tradition come from God" [M 118]. For Lonergan, religious beliefs proposed by a religion that involves God's personal entrance into history do not simply objectify religious experience but simultaneously concern the word of God in itself. Such beliefs emerge not simply from within the collaboration of human beings among themselves, but from within a higher collaboration of human beings with God [I 698-703; 719-23]. Certain events take place in history in which there can be discerned a personal entrance of God that marks the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression. Lonergan maintains that "faith is not in man's word but in God. It is admitting the possibility and acknowledging the fact that God could and did enter into the division of labor by which men come to know, that his contribution was one that could not be replaced by human effort, that in accepting the truths of faith we are believing not just man but ultimately God" [SC 96-7]. Thus it can be seen that Lonergan does not neglect the external dimensions of religion in favor of the internal, but rather strikes a fine balance between human experience and the social mediation of the communication of God.

Yet another advance that Lindbeck attributes to his own approach can already be found in Lonergan. Lindbeck contends that "religious change or innovation must be understood not as proceeding from new experiences, but as resulting from the interactions of a cultural-linguistic system with changing situations" [ND 39]. In the context of the chapter in which this statement appears, it is clear that Lindbeck attributes to Lonergan the view that religious change comes most basically from new experiences. On the contrary, although Lonergan would be slow to deny the role of new experiences in religious change, he nonetheless argues that the most basic impetus for change in the contemporary world is the emergence of cultural pluralism. In Lonergan's view, theology finds itself in a new context as that which "mediates between
a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix" [M xi]. Theology must be done in a new context in which one culture that used to be considered normative is now conceived as one among many cultures, and in which cultures are conceived as historical, developing phenomena. Lonergan calls this the empirical notion of culture and argues that theology in this new context should be conceived along the lines of an empirical science [SC 58-9]. This is hardly, to borrow Lindbeck's terms, the theological program of a two-dimensional experiential-expressivist and contemporary propositionalist who does not sufficiently emphasize a cultural-linguistic perspective.

A final advance that Lindbeck claims for his own approach is the following:

Religion cannot be pictured in the cognitivist (and voluntarist) manner as primarily a matter of deliberately choosing to believe or follow explicitly known propositions or directives. Rather, to become religious -- no less than to become culturally or linguistically competent -- is to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training. One learns how to feel, act, and think in conformity with a religious tradition that is, in its inner structure, far richer and more subtle than can be explicitly articulated. [ND 35]

Lindbeck implies that Lonergan's emphasis on the internal does not allow him a full range of reference for describing the role of external tradition in the process of religious conversion. But, on the contrary, Lonergan stresses that the changes in feeling, acting, and thinking that correspond roughly with religious, moral, and intellectual conversion involve the attainment of a new horizon. Lonergan does not picture the religious believer as one who wrestles with the question of the truth of various propositions simply on a one by one basis. It is true that for Lonergan there is a subjective dimension to the existential process of verifying one's religious beliefs. What is being verified, however, is not primarily the beliefs themselves but rather the horizon that they in part constitute. What is being evaluatively reflected upon in religious belief are the meanings proposed, the way of life they inform, the institutions they support, the visions they inspire, the good they bring about, the human relationships they engender, and the world that they constitute. In Lonergan's view, when theologians state doctrines and explore their meanings they are appropriating the truth of what has already in principle been accepted
as true with the acceptance of the worldview that they in
part constitute.

3. Substantial Differences

Even though much of Lindbeck's approach can already
be found in Lonergan, he does differ from Lonergan on two
substantial points.

First, Lindbeck criticizes Lonergan's transcendentalist
assumptions regarding interreligious dialogue. Is there a
commonality in religious experience that can ground inter-
religious dialogue? Lonergan assumed that there is; although,
as Lindbeck points out, Lonergan was well aware that he as-
sumed this [ND 37]. Lindbeck argues that such an assumption
is highly debatable, and in this he is correct. Lindbeck's
criticism on this point, however, stands in need of two quali-
fications.

It is not clear, first of all, that Lonergan's meaning
of the word "experience" is the one Lindbeck attributes to
it. Lindbeck seems to suggest that by "experience" Lonergan
means "an experience" such as a significant occurrence that
takes place in someone's life. Lindbeck builds much of what
he says about Lonergan's theory of religion on his analysis
that for Lonergan there can be found at the basis of differ-
ent religions "a common core experience" [ND 31]. Although
Lonergan may at times use the term ambiguously, he virtually
never uses "experience" to mean "an experience." As Philip
J. Mueller expresses it, for Lonergan "experience ... usually
designates the empirical level of intentional consciousness....
Experience can also mean consciousness, as in 'experiencing
one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.'" Mueller
goes on to say that "religious experience is not an unexpected and momentary occurrence.... Religious experi-
ence constitutes a new principle of life, a fresh horizon for living." In the second place, Lindbeck argues as if Lonergan's
total theory of religion and doctrine is based solely upon
his assumptions concerning universal religious experience.
As I have shown, this is not the case. Lonergan made his
assumption concerning the universality of religious experi-
ence in the interest of interreligious dialogue. It flows
naturally from his analysis of human intentionality and his
method in theology, but it is not necessary to either.
A second point on which Lindbeck raises a substantial criticism of Lonergan concerns the ontological reference of church doctrines. Lindbeck points out that for Lonergan some church doctrines, such as Nicea's doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, were in their initial development rules for talking whose metaphysical import was only incipient and the fuller understanding of which would only come later [ND 94]. In contrast, Lindbeck argues that in the case of such doctrines there is no need to insist on any ontological reference whatsoever [ND 106].

Again a qualification must be made concerning Lindbeck's criticism. The example Lindbeck uses to demonstrate the problem of the ontological reference of doctrines involves conflicting interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity by Lonergan and Rahner. Lindbeck refers to Lonergan's appropriation of the medieval psychological analogy to describe trinitarian procession and to Rahner's insistence on the correspondence of the immanent trinity and the economic trinity. He then argues that at least one of these positions must be judged implicitly heretical because they cannot both be true. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. Rahner's position boils down to the claim that an ontological correspondence exists; Lonergan's position is a contemporary appropriation of one traditional way of understanding that correspondence. For both Lonergan and Rahner the requirement for a theologian is to accept the doctrine as true; but how that truth is to be understood, allows for a great deal of diversity. It is precisely on this point that Lindbeck disagrees with Lonergan. Lindbeck insists that once a church doctrine is accepted as a rule, then not only should the degree of allowable diversity concerning its ontological reference be great, but also the question arises whether it has properly an ontological referent at all.

This is Lindbeck's major difference from Lonergan and perhaps the single most important claim of the book. It is sadly ironic that the point Lindbeck puts forth as having the greatest ecumenic potential is also a point that tends to distinguish Lonergan as a Catholic and Lindbeck as a Protestant. The question at root is whether or not ecclesiastical mediation is in some way intimately bound up with revelation. If it is not, then church doctrines can be understood adequately from a cultural-linguistic perspective. If it
is, then while the social nature of church doctrine should always receive proper emphasis, such doctrines must also be apprehended simultaneously from an explicitly theological perspective.

The situation is, however, far from hopeless. Lindbeck has raised a point around which much ecumenical dialogue must center and concerning which many distinctions need to be made. Although many Catholics will not agree with Lindbeck that no ontological reference whatsoever for church doctrine is necessary, still the nature of such reference and its status as binding call for further reflection.

Lindbeck has written a good book. He is to be commended for the depth of his thought and for the ecumenical nature of his work. It is my wish, however, that Lindbeck would not have presented his position as a categorical advance over two earlier positions of which Lonergan's is a good hybrid. Rather, I think it would have been better for Lindbeck to argue along with Lonergan for the need to realize the inherently social nature of religion and doctrine, and then to distinguish his own position from that of Lonergan concerning a transcendental basis for interreligious dialogue and the question of binding ontological reference for second-order church doctrines.

NOTES

1 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster press, 1984), pp. 7-8; cited as ND throughout the remainder of the text.

2 David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology," The Thomist 49 (July 1985): 460-72.


5 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), xi; cited as M throughout the remainder of the text.


7 Hefling, 56.


Mueller, 243.

LONERGAN AND THE HUSSERLIAN PROBLEM
OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY

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Lonergan's philosophy is a critical philosophy. It derives its critical powers from a decision to analyze metaphysical, social, historical, and theological convictions and disputes in light of their cognitional-theoretical assumptions. By virtue of the same decision, Lonergan's philosophy is a transcendentental philosophy. It identifies a whole range and a whole pattern of invariant operations that form both the basis for human experience and the basis for all theoretical interpretation of human experience. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan identifies the operations as

seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing.

To analyze these operations in their patterning and their concrete conditions is to perform what Lonergan, in *Method*, calls "intentionality analysis." To go beyond analysis in an effort to appropriate the patterns in one's own living and thinking is to undertake the central task to which all of Lonergan's writings chiefly direct their readers.

One may observe that certain of the operations named seem to have a private aspect to them. What is meant by "private" here is something quite simple. A mundane example will give a first approximation to its meaning: suppose that I am going out to dinner with my friend Howard. To go out to dinner means that my friend and I intend to spend the evening sharing, not only a meal, but memories, stories, ideas, beliefs, fantasies, and so on, which would otherwise have remained private. Were our memories, ideas, beliefs, and so on essentially and completely public phenomena, there would be little need to spend so much time communicating them to one another. Furthermore, in the course of having dinner and visiting, there are sure to be some number of thoughts and feelings that my friend and I choose not to share with one another, but rather suppress because they are inappropriate, or rash, or doubtful. We have the power not only to make public, but to keep private as well.
The present essay will address a particular problem that arises in relating the transcendental role of intentionality analysis to this privacy inherent in the basic operations. The problem may in fact be posed in any one of the three following ways. In the first place, one may ask, how does a cognitional theory that makes transcendental use of private acts of intelligence explain the public aspects of human life? Can the theory achieve an explanation of the public aspects of life in a way that strengthens rather than weakens the overall cognitional theory, but does not merely reduce the public to the private? Secondly, one may develop the foregoing questions into a sceptical challenge resting on a solipsistic assumption: how can a cognitional theory that pivots on the private acts of my own intelligence even account for the very existence of minds other than my own? If truth-giving operations occur in the privacy of my mind, how do I know that my dinner companion is not just an automaton, but is indeed a human being with private intelligent operations of his own? Thirdly, one may ask, what is the nature of the community of subjects whose cognitional operations are being sought by the given cognitional theory? Implicit in this question is the problem of social ontology: is the ontological ground of community to be found in individuals or in the relations that exist among individuals? Should the community be understood, for philosophical purposes, as a collection of individuals, or should each individual be understood as being fundamentally a participant in a greater social reality?

The whole of the problem that is subject to this tripartition will be what is meant here by "the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity."

The central purpose guiding the investigation in the following pages will be to answer, for Lonergan's philosophy, all three formulations of the problem: it will be shown that Lonergan's cognitional theory incorporates the public aspects of human life in a way that strengthens his overall theory; it will be shown that to raise a solipsistic objection to Lonergan's position is to misunderstand that position; and it will be shown that Lonergan finds utter ontological priority in neither the individual nor the community, but rather makes an ontological commitment to their dynamic interrelationship.
The philosophy of Edmund Husserl will serve as a background to this treatment of Lonergan. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity as it is discussed in contemporary philosophy is rightfully called a Husserlian problem, for Husserl's philosophy makes use of subjectivity in such a manner and to such a radical degree that a decisive address to the problem is not only called for, but is pursued by Husserl explicitly, at length, and in painstaking detail. Lonergan's treatment of the problem, on the other hand, is largely implicit. Remarks relevant to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity are woven into Lonergan's discussion of other philosophical issues. Taking advantage, then, of a host of general similarities that exist between the philosophies of Husserl and Lonergan, one may use Husserl's work to indicate where the problem connects with Lonergan's thought.

The following order of discussion suggests itself. The writings, both of Husserl and Lonergan, contain sections where intersubjectivity is considered in a non-transcendental (and therefore transcendally non-problematic) way. These sections will be dealt with first, so as not to confuse them with those sections treating specifically transcendental intersubjectivity. Next, an exposition of some of the main features of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy will be given, leading into a discussion of his address to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. After considering some of the criticisms that Husserl's treatment of the problem has received, an interpretation of Lonergan's position on the matter will be developed, an interpretation which necessarily extrapolates to a small degree from Lonergan's implicit statements in his writings.

1. Intersubjectivity in the Non-Transcendental Sense

Both Lonergan and Husserl hold that human life is in some sense fundamentally intersubjective, and that there is some sense in which intersubjectivity has autonomy and priority over the individuality of the person. Yet intersubjectivity has limitations as an explanatory principle.

According to Lonergan, the world is always mediated, and in some measure constituted, by meaning; and meaning "is embodied or carried in human intersubjectivity, in art, in symbols, in language, and in the lives and deeds of
While art, symbol, language, and deeds all move through the medium of intersubjectivity, there are also ways of examining the qualities of the medium itself. The nature of the medium is seen in fellow-feeling, psychic contagion, emotional identification. These phenomena are spontaneous and affective: feeling spreads without reflection." The source of these spontaneous feelings runs deep. Its "we" is "prior to the 'we' that results from the mutual love of an 'I' and a 'thou';" its "we" "precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its oblivion." 

Intersubjectivity has its own kind of meaning. Intersubjective meaning arises spontaneously and indicates feelings rather than thoughts. A smile, for example, does this. "Inter-subjective meaning does not regard objects; "rather it reveals or even betrays the subject, and the revelation is immediate." 

There is, however, a limitation: "A smile may be simulated and so it may be true as opposed to mendacious, but it cannot be true as opposed to false." Purely intersubjective meaning does not make the kinds of truth claims that linguistic meaning does. But human life generally, and philosophy in particular, constantly involves claims to the kind of truth that is opposed to falsity. Because reality cannot be discerned without verification of such claims, purely intersubjective meaning can only be a part of the full meaning of the real. But to acknowledge the reality of linguistic meaning requires advertence to acts that have a private aspect to them.

Husserl's writings, too, bear witness to a spontaneous and immediate kind of intersubjectivity operative in human life. In particular, passages in Book II of Husserl's Ideas describe an attitude, called the "personalistic attitude" (die personalistische Einstellung), wherein human subjects have an immediate presence for one another. When one is in the personalistic attitude, everything about the other person, no matter how material or mechanical it may otherwise seem, is perceived as an immediate revelation of a distinct personality, or spirit (Geist). When enjoying a dinner out with my friend Howard, there is nothing about Howard that I perceive as a mere object the way I perceive the coat rack or the salt shaker as mere objects. Rather I enjoy Howard's person in every aspect -- in his hands and hair and clothing as much
as in his words and facial gestures. In relating to Howard personally, I find his body and spirit thoroughly united.\textsuperscript{12}

In these same Ideas II passages (as well as in other texts), Husserl draws special attention to the intersubjective origins of the motivations and purposes of human action. My activities are constantly being motivated by the promptings of others, and my actions seek to prompt them.\textsuperscript{13} Even if I am at home alone, my house is full of cultural objects in which the ideas, the skills, the purposes of other people are instantiated.\textsuperscript{14}

But neither this intersubjectivity of motivation nor the intersubjectivity of the personalistic attitude provides an adequate foundation, in Husserl's eyes, for a rigorous and comprehensive philosophy, a philosophy that would give an adequate account of the whole range of one's involvements with plants, animals, people, tools, social and cultural institutions -- all of the mundane engagements that Husserl indicates with the term "life-world."\textsuperscript{15} A rigorous philosophy of the whole range of elements within the life-world would need to consider all the ways in which the life-world is normally interpreted. In fact, human experience of the world is interpreted less commonly in terms of the personalistic attitude than in terms of what Husserl calls the "natural attitude" (die natürliche Einstellung). Husserl's foundational philosophical ideas, which he calls "phenomenology," are developed, not through a deeper exploration of the personalistic attitude, but through an opposition to the natural attitude. The transcendental philosophy occasioned by this opposition requires a theory of intersubjectivity that differs from the personalism of Ideas II.

2. Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl's Phenomenology

A. The Program of Husserl's Phenomenology

The negative aim of phenomenology is to overcome the natural attitude. The natural attitude consists in a set of objectivist assumptions occurring quite naturally, but with highly limiting effect, in common sense, in science, and in philosophy. In philosophy, for example, the natural attitude operates in the development of objectivist epistemologies. Objectivist interpretations of scientific knowing begin where concrete scientific activity ends: science establishes various facts about existing objects; objectivist epistemologies explain how the scientists were able to overcome the barriers
METHOD

of their own subjectivity enough to get at the true objects that were there to be gotten at. In so doing, these epistemologies assume that to verify the true existence of things is the same as to enter into an ordered world, the order of which is, as it always and ever shall be, utterly independent from, and indifferent to, its interrogation by human subjects.16

As objectivism guides an epistemology, so it can influence the formulation of problems and approaches in the sciences themselves, and the common assumptions operative in common sense. But in all variations on the natural attitude, whether common-sensical, scientific, or philosophical, it is the unquestioned, presuppositional character of the basic natural-attitude tenets that Husserl most opposes. In its enthusiasm for the independence of facts, the natural attitude simply overlooks the obvious truth that every fact is parasitic on meaning, and that all meaning is intrinsically dependent upon the constituting activity of subjectivity.

The full program of Husserl's phenomenology includes the several tasks of setting aside the natural attitude, of developing an alternative context for philosophical analysis of life and science, of setting out phenomenologically the general procedures whereby judgments are made and truths are established, and of relating these general procedures to the specific problems native to particular sciences. Such a vast program resists brief summary. But some sense of the overall purposes and tactics of phenomenology is necessary for forming a clear idea of how it conceives subjectivity and intersubjectivity transcendentally.

Phenomenology begins with a fundamental change of attitude. Inasmuch as that change abandons the natural attitude, Husserl names it with the term "epoché;" insofar as it struggles towards a genuinely phenomenological attitude, Husserl calls it "transcendental reduction."17 The epoché is achieved by putting out of play, suspending, bracketing, all at once, all the validities assumed in the natural attitude. Only by thus refusing to take any fact whatsoever as simply given does the question genuinely and fully arise as to the manner in which givenness as such occurs.18 By denying its philosophical reflection any pregiven validities, epoché makes the pregivenness of the life-world itself thematic for the first time.19 The epoché, then, initiates a "reduction," in the sense of a return to origins.20 The reduction is "transcendental"
because the origin sought is the subjective condition for the possibility of truth.

To prescind from the objectivity of objects and the independence of truths is not to eliminate objects as appearances and truths as ideas and propositions. The bracketing of assumed validity retains the sense and the appearance of that which is bracketed: in epoché the world, "my world, our world, humanity's world" does not disappear, but is recovered as "phenomenon."21 Phenomenal appearances are tied to a particular subject; the appearance of objects occurs only in sequences of profiles relative to a particular point of view. In the natural attitude, one sees this relativity as subjective distortion of objective existence; in the transcendental reduction one considers it essential.22 The phenomenologist operates on the conviction that a sufficiently rigorous and thorough articulation of the concatenation of all profiles, along with the concepts that guide their coherence, provides a better account of how truths are established and maintained than the view that simply posits, by fiat, independence from the subject as the guiding criterion for truth.

Although the transcendental reduction confines its consideration to the resources of the thinking subject, it is able within that sphere to determine how objects are known to exist and propositions are known to be true. Material objects are always experienced in a multiplicity of profiles. Yet one is aware that some profiles or series of profiles offer a better indication of the whole than do others.23 It is of the very nature of consciousness always to be intending objects; but because of an implicit awareness of degrees of quality in one's access to objects, consciousness intends its objects with corresponding degrees of potential for truth. An intention, the object of which is absent, is an "empty" intention, and a judgment regarding such an object demands that the intention be filled by the collecting of evidences.24 If, for example, I recommend to my dinner companion the chef's special truite meunière, I only emptily intend a dish that has not yet even been prepared. I take a risk in recommending it. By inviting myself into the kitchen to watch the chef prepare it, or, ultimately, by tasting the prepared dish, I would gather the evidences that would support or undermine my estimation of the quality of the dish. There is, moreover, an optimum point at which nothing that pertains to the given judgment is emptily intended, but rather all of the pertinent
features co-intended with the intention of a given object may be said to be filled. By this state of affairs the thinking subject recognizes a certainty.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus from a restriction to mere phenomena in the epoché, Husserl has developed an explanation of the affirmation of actually existing material objects. However, reality is more than material objects. Contingent experience of material objects engenders generalizations. Looking at my dinner plate, I see that it is round; looking at my companion's plate, I notice that it too is round. Thus I associate the two; they are the same type of thing; both are round. "Roundness" in this case, though general, is tied to concrete intuitions.\textsuperscript{26} But there is a sense in which the possibility of discovering a common roundness in objects is provided by something not tied to concrete intuitions, something perfectly general and \textit{a priori}: the circle, or circularity itself.\textsuperscript{27} Such pure generalities, or "eide," are frequently employed in judgments. Judgments of this sort assert, not contingent experiential facts, but necessary \textit{a priori} limits to experience. To verify the eidetic component of one of these judgments, therefore, requires not a test of empirical givenness, but a test of the unchangeability and \textit{a priori} constitutive power of the proposed eidos in all relevant cases -- a test as to whether one's judgment invokes a genuine eidos.\textsuperscript{28} The process by which an eidos is adequately intuited is a process of imaginative free variation of examples. One begins with the proposed eidos and, by running through a whole range of varying imagined instantiations, the genuineness of the chosen eidos (if it \textit{is} genuine) is allowed to announce itself by the persistence of the eidos through all possible variations.\textsuperscript{29}

The phenomenological explanation of the verification of material objects and eide constitutes Husserl's positive alternative to the naive objectivism of the natural attitude; but the movement from epoché to verification also establishes a basis upon which to raise, and to raise with a great deal of force, the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.

B. The Transcendental Ego and Intersubjectivity

By prescinding from the objectivity of objects as presumed in the natural attitude, the phenomenological epoché prescinds also from all of those features whereby a subject can be experienced as an entity in the world. It prescinds from aspects such as spatial extension, natural behaviors,
personality, and personal relationships. All of these qualities, some of them clearly intersubjective, are, of course, retrievable through phenomenological analysis: phenomenology uncovers the process whereby I constitute a spatial, temporal, intersubjective world to which I may add myself as a member. But when the epoché first takes place, all of the empirical and intersubjective qualities that make a subject a "human person" are considered mere phenomena displayed before the single ego that performs the epoché. The ego, the 'I', that performs the epoché, then, is not in the world, but is rather the extramundane transcendental ground for the world, hence "the transcendental ego." Since only the ego that performs the epoché persists through the epoché as something more than mere phenomenon, that ego is the unique and ultimate source for all meaning; everything worldly has an essential dependence upon it. And because the ordinary intersubjective life of human beings is something worldly, "a unique sort of philosophical solitude," says Husserl, characterizes the transcendental ego:

I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of cosubjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of personal pronouns has become a phenomenon with my epoché; and so has the privilege of I-the-man among other men.

With these assertions there emerges a conflict between the transcendental starting-point of phenomenology and the meaning of intersubjectivity. The goal of phenomenology is to explain how subjectively-grounded constitution of the world can also be true. However, part of what it means to be "true" is to be "there for everyone" -- always and ever to persist in the same manner no matter who does the interrogating, or when, or where. But a problem arises here, for the phrase "there for everyone" surely has a hollow ring if by "everyone" is meant all of those human persons who are mere phenomena displayed before a single, unique transcendental ego. Thus the personalist treatment of intersubjectivity in Ideas II is of no assistance here. However immediate one's ordinary relationships with others may be in the non-reduced life-world, those relationships cannot but become mere phenomena in the epoché. So in order for the phrase "there for everyone" really to be normative, there must exist a multiplicity of transcendental egos. Hence the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.
In his "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" Husserl undertook a very dramatic solution to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. There he raised and addressed an objection claiming that the absolute foundation for his philosophy is entirely solipsistic. In the course of replying to this objection, Husserl attempted a consistently phenomenological discovery and verification of the existence of "other" transcendental egos.

His argument runs as follows. Beginning with a bold move, Husserl emphasizes the uniqueness of the one transcendental ego that performs the phenomenological epoché by demanding a further phenomenological reduction: the "primordial" reduction, or reduction to "ownness." One excludes, in this reduction, all sense that phenomena have, or might have, "alien" origins or foundations: phenomena are considered only insofar as they are fully present and complete within the transcendental ego's sphere of immanence.34

Now, if one performs this reduction on the phenomenon of "myself as a man," one obtains "'my animate organism' (meinen Leib) and 'my psyche' (meine Seele), or myself as a psycho-physical unity."35 However, performing this same reduction on another person yields something quite different. The other is, in my ownness, merely a body (Körper), a physical unity.36

Although the bodies of "I" and "other" are thus radically different within the primordial reduction, they nevertheless exhibit innumerable perceptible similarities, which similarities impel one spontaneously to group the two bodies within the same type, "human body." This grouping, in turn, provides the basis for phenomenological discovery of the other as other transcendental ego. Because the significance of my own body is a psycho-physical unity, any other recognizably human body can take on the same significance -- but in a roundabout manner required by the reduction to ownness:

Since, in this nature and this world, my animate organism (mein Leib) is the only body (Körper) that is or can be constituted originally as an animate organism, ... the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism, and done so in a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism ... only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the "analogizing" apprehension (analogisierende Auffassung) of that body as another animate organism.37
Adding to the spontaneity of this "analogizing apprehension" is its fundamental connection with the psychological tendency to "pair" the objects of perception: if there are two wine glasses on the table, I do not see them first as two things and then proceed to reason that they are both wine glasses; I seem them as "wine glasses" just as soon as I see them as "two." In pairing, then, there is an "overlapping of objective sense," which applies, within certain limits, to the perception of my own body and that of another.

Analogizing apprehension and pairing do not reveal, of course, any actual qualities or contents of the psychic life of the other ego. As in the case of material objects, one must gradually become familiar with another person through the various profiles that he or she offers for inspection over time, i.e., through the ideas that are uttered, the feelings and images that are described, expressions, behaviors, habits and the like. But more importantly, the other is constantly re-affirmed as other ego by an inexhaustibility that no material object has. The other ego is, like my own ego, a fundamental source for the constant, dynamic creation of profiles, such that efforts at a definitive circumscription of another person's character are repeatedly frustrated by new surprises.

With intersubjectivity thus phenomenologically confirmed, the path is prepared for phenomenological confirmation of the intersubjectively-shared world:

The intrinsically first other (the first "non-Ego") is the other Ego. And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is "other:" an Objective Nature and a whole objective world, to which all other Egos and I myself belong.

Thus objectivity is reintroduced, but now as phenomenologically discerned through the treatment of transcendental ego and other ego.

C. Difficulties and Developments

Some of Husserl's best interpreters have expressed strong reservations regarding Husserl's working-out of transcendental intersubjectivity and the role of transcendental intersubjectivity in phenomenology generally. Many critics have expressed suspicion regarding the possibility of performing all of the phenomenological reductions and still being able to constitute the other as a truly alien transcendental ego. In particular, Alfred Schutz has argued (amid his many detailed
objections to Husserl's theory) that it is impossible to verify the other as anything more than a behaving animal unless one either oversteps the restriction to ownness of the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" or else "slides into" that sphere of ownness a pre-understood conviction that words like "you," "her," and "everyone" refer to genuine realities. The latter move is what Schutz claims Husserl implicitly does in his "Fifth Cartesian Meditation." Eugen Fink and others have concurred in this assessment. Michael Theunissen's The Other includes the equally and similarly threatening criticism that any meaningful interpretation of the notion of "body" employed in the primordial reduction's analogizing apprehension inevitably renders the transcendental sphere dependent upon the empirical. For the only way that the transcendence of the other ego is confirmed is through analogizing apprehension, which is to say, through the mediation of a body presented to the senses. Therefore, although in principle phenomenology insists upon the dependence of all empirical phenomena on the transcendental ego, here the ego of the other is subordinated to the empirical manifestation of his or her body.

Iso Kern too has recognized the great difficulties Husserl encounters in attempting to overcome the solipsism introduced in Cartesian Meditations, but Kern claims that such difficulties are peculiar to the Cartesian way into phenomenology, the Cartesian way of developing arguments in favor of performing the epoché and transcendental reduction. The Cartesian way presupposes the need for a philosophy that has an absolute ground in indubitable evidence. The natural attitude cannot provide such a grounding because it merely assumes the objectivity of its objects. Only the cogito, the thinking "I", because the whole of its nature unfolds within consciousness, is capable of being indubitably affirmed. But because the cogito is also intentional, one can explain, through transcendental reduction, the constitution of all reality out of the resources of the cogito, treating them merely as appearances, but ultimately providing a more compelling account of the constitution of the world than was possible through objectivism. This Cartesian way of motivating the transcendental reduction was not used in Formal and Transcendental Logic, and was even attacked by Husserl himself in The Crisis. These two works pursue, not a Cartesian
way, but an ontological way. The ontological way begins by acknowledging accepted ways of dividing up and relating the various aspects of the structure of reality. Formal logic represents such a division. The term "life-world" suggests a broader ontology, one that embraces all of the specific ontologies of logic, common sense, physical science, and so on. But none of these ontologies is complete, for in the course of differentiating its objects, each ignores the subjective origin of all of its differentiating activity. In this case, then, a change of attitude from the natural attitude to the phenomenological means widening one's ontological analysis so as to include its proper subjective a priori component. The transcendental reduction alone allows such an inclusion. This ontological way into phenomenology, claims Kern, does not have the problem with solipsism that the Cartesian way has.

Such a distinction between the methods of the earlier Husserl and those of the later Husserl is not unfamiliar to Schutz and Theunissen. Both readily observe that The Crisis projects a new way of exploring the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, but they note also that Husserl was prevented by his final illness from fully undertaking that exploration, and from indicating its direction with anything like the explicitness of Cartesian Meditations. At the same time, the transcendental ego in the text of The Crisis (as has been noted earlier) is characterized by a "solitude" that is not significantly different from the kind of solitude and uniqueness attributed to the transcendental ego in earlier works.

It should be clear from these examples of the scholarly debate why Gadamer has called transcendental intersubjectivity a "constantly smoldering" problem within the phenomenological movement. The idea of transcendental intersubjectivity lies at the core of phenomenological philosophy, but its nature is a controversial question among the authorities. It is not the business of the present inquiry to enter further into this debate, nor to assess what damage might be done to phenomenology by the existence of such a debate. For the purposes of providing a frame of reference for Lonergan's relation to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, it has been enough to identify the transcendental interest that lies behind Husserl's attempt to deal with
the problem, to describe some of his strategies for doing so, and to indicate that a debate over the problem continues even within the phenomenological movement.

3. Lonergan and Transcendental Intersubjectivity
   A. From Non-Transcendental Intersubjectivity To the Intellectual Pattern

Intersubjective meaning, according to Lonergan, reveals, not what one knows, but who one is.

To say what one knows presupposes the labor of coming to know. But to show what one is, it is enough to be it; showing will follow; every movement, every word, every deed, reveals what the subject is.49

The difficulties raised by the sceptical philosopher are commonly set aside when one's purpose is to make an acquaintance, to form a friendship, to become intimate. The main concern in such cases is not what one knows, or how one interprets one's knowing, but who one is.50 It is in this personal context that the questions arise as to whether one is doing what is necessary to be an authentic and a good human being.

But if the question regarding authenticity moves beyond objective knowing to personal living, still, claims Lonergan, without objective knowing there is no authentic living; for one knows objectively just in so far as one is neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly; and one does not live authentically inasmuch as one is unperceptive or stupid or silly.51

Furthermore, a community cannot exclude objective knowing without becoming an inauthentic community, for friendships cannot last where unperceptiveness, stupidity, and silliness predominate, and a community without friendship is a manipulative community.52

Lonergan's distinguishing and relating of the operations in knowing emphasizes direct and reflective insight. Knowing obviously involves sensations and concepts. But insight is something far more subtle, and when it is not ignored by cognitive theorists, it is generally explained by them in terms of the more obvious operations.53 Direct insight is the act whereby one understands something in data. The data may be data of sense or data of consciousness; what one understands may be an intelligible relation among data or a unity, identity, whole in data that is named by the word "thing." Insight takes one beyond sensation and imagination, but to formulate an insight requires the further process of conceptualization, and conceptualization makes new use of images, putting together with the content of the insight only as much of the image as is essential to the occurrence of the insight.54
Direct insight responds to the question for intelligence: "What is it?" Reflective insight responds to the further question: "Is that really so?" A person has many bright ideas, but only some of them regard actual occurrences and existing things. So the question for reflection is distinct from the question for intelligence. To answer yes or no to a reflective question is to make a judgment. A reflective question establishes a "conditioned," something that would indeed be so if its conditions were fulfilled. A judgment announces that the conditioned is in fact a "virtually unconditioned": it has conditions but the conditions are fulfilled. By what process is it determined that the conditions are fulfilled? One can say in general terms that the determination is made by a process of marshalling and weighing the evidence. An answer in more specific terms cannot be put briefly, for there is a great variety in the kinds of conditions that different reflective questions intend. One question may require evidences in the form of other judgments, another question may require observation with the senses or attention to data of consciousness. Yet one can indicate, again in general terms, at what point the process of marshalling and weighing evidence comes to term. Just as there is a natural exigency by which the mind is promoted from questions for intelligence to questions for reflection, so there is a natural exigency that urges one on through a progressive consideration of conditions: the determination of the fulfillment of one condition leaves a person who is operating in the intellectual pattern spontaneously curious regarding the status of another condition, and from that question one is led to another, and so on, until no further pertinent questions arise to challenge the evidences gathered. At such a point, the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled.

The dynamism present in the process of marshalling and weighing evidence is natural, but the process is not automatic. Eagerness can interfere, causing one's judgments to be rash; one may habitually refuse to recognize a fulfillment of conditions, making one indecisive. If one cannot overcome such limitations entirely, still one can improve, and a good education is one that develops, not just sharp wits, but also good judgment.

Lonergan's cognitional theory, then, emphasizes the distinctness of the activities of sensing, imagining, understanding, marshalling and weighing evidence, and judging. And beyond
judging there is deliberating, evaluating, deciding -- oper-
ations wherein the operator is implicated in a personal way: "Is it worthwhile?" "Should I do it?" and so on. Though dis-

tinct, none of the operations Lonergan discusses, taken se-
parately, constitutes knowing. Only the whole is knowing. The whole is a dynamic whole -- constantly developing, con-
stantly driven forward by a pure, overarching, unrestricted desire to know truth for its own sake.

The reader perhaps notices similarities between Lonergan's cognitional theory and Husserl's. Differences in terminology between the thinkers should not deter one from pursuing such comparisons. For example, though the terms are different, there are many similarities to be discovered between what Lonergan calls "reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evi-
dence, judging" and what Husserl calls "positing, seeking originary evidences, verifying." There are, of course, substan-
tive differences to be noted as well. For explicit discussion of substantive similarities and differences in cognitional theory, one is referred to William Ryan's work. The present discussion will add to the project of comparison and contrast only by showing (in section D below) how differences in the ways that the two thinkers take up cognitional theory make for differences in the ways that they conceive the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.

B. The Notion of Privacy and the Question of Solipsism in Regard to Lonergan's Cognitional Theory

The word "privacy" can carry with it assumptions about the nature of human knowing. Lonergan claims that knowing implies self-transcendence: one transcends the world of dream and fantasy to enter the real world. But one must know one's knowing if one is to know that one's knowing achieves self-
transcendence. If one ignores certain of the operations in-
volved in knowing, one is likely to become convinced that those operations do not exist. If one does not accept the existence of the operations necessary to achieve self-transcendence, then there results an immanentism. Such an immanentism can be reflected in one's use of the word "privacy."

The problem entertained by immanentism is the problem of getting from "in here" to "out there." The difficulty of solution is assured by the formulation of the problem. Once one has posed the problem in terms of spatial relations of internal and external, one naturally looks for the spatial
barrier between the internal and the external. Since one is concerned with human beings, one focuses on the senses, for the senses bring what is outside the body into the inside. Knowing, then, is explained on analogy with sensation, and above all on analogy with the sense of sight. But in fact seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting are only parts of knowing. The other parts, moreover, do not bear an analogous relationship to sensation, but a complementary relationship.64

One must be careful, therefore, in using the term "privacy" in connection with Lonergan's cognitional theory. While avoiding naive-realist assumptions about "privacy," one must examine how Lonergan himself uses the term.

One of Lonergan's uses of the term regards experience. There is an "ineluctable privacy of each one's experience." To each man his own desires, precisely because they are his own, possess an insistence that the desires of others can never have for him. To each man his own labours, because they are his own, have a dimension of reality that is lacking in his apprehension of the labours of others. To each man his own joys and sorrows have an expansive or contracting immediacy that others can know only through their own experience of joy and sorrow.65

What Lonergan calls "consciousness" exists also at the level of experience. Consciousness is an awareness immanent in cognitive acts. It is the experiencing of one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.66 Hence one could say that Lonergan recognizes a privacy in consciousness.

Secondly, ideas have a kind of privacy.

Most men get ideas, but the ideas reside in different minds, and the different minds do not quite agree.67 Insights are not shared simply by having them. One must formulate the insight in a way that occasions it in others. The formulation itself requires insight, and so there is an art of teaching.

Now, if experience alone, or insight alone were what Lonergan meant by "human subjectivity," then the privacy of these two might be the basis for a solipsistic objection to his views on intersubjectivity. But each is only part of what he means. The solipsistic objection would assume that one can know human subjectivity only by having a direct awareness of it; but Lonergan's position is that one only knows anything by reaching a virtually unconditioned. Such is the way one must affirm oneself as an intelligent and rational subject; such is the way one would make that affirmation about someone.
else. The evidences in the two cases of affirmation would differ in certain respects, but the ultimate judgment regarding the other would not thereby be less certain than the judgment regarding oneself.

To affirm with certainty the other's performance of the whole broad range of conscious operations is to affirm that the dynamism among the operations is at work in his or her activity. I cannot see through the eyes of my friend Howard; I cannot think his private thoughts. So I must learn the content of his gaze and the significance of his meditative expression by asking "What do you see?" and "What do you think?" This assumes that a dynamism is present whereby the other's intelligent-sounding speech communicates intelligent acts like seeing, tasting, inquiring, understanding, and so on. That such an affirmation can be made with relative certainty is proven by the absurdity of the alternatives. To doubt the dynamism would be to imply that the other's speech, which sounds so intelligent and reasonable, is actually senseless. Now, this would be the case if the other were not really speaking intelligently but only faking it. But to do a good fake, let alone a seamless fake, would require intelligence, reasonableness, deliberation, and so, that which one was doubting would be confirmed.

One could multiply arguments demonstrating that the solipsistic objection misunderstands Lonergan's basic position. What is perhaps more pressing, however, is the need to consider how Lonergan actually integrates the private and public aspects of human subjectivity that he acknowledges.

C. Subjectivity as Public and Private

Lonergan's articulation of the pattern of human knowing employs the metaphor of "levels." But Lonergan also insists that actual knowing is cumulative and progressive. No judgment occurs in a vacuum. New judgments involve presuppositions established by previous judgments, and each new judgment adds, as a single increment, to a body of habitual knowledge. The wheel of human knowing not only turns, but rolls along.

Actual knowing is not all of one's own making. One's presuppositions include what one has already verified, but also many things that one has not oneself verified. One accepts a great deal on the word of people one trusts. And those people have believed other people. There is, then, a heritage of
common assumptions that establishes a horizon for one's knowing. The heritage includes more than judgments. From one's family and one's culture one receives a whole stock of concepts, notions, images, symbols, and habits.

Furthermore, the intelligent activity of humans not only inherits a world; it seeks to change the world.

The practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics and culture, that not only separate man from nature but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships.

If intelligence engendering and maintaining such structures is faithful to the pure desire to know, there is the possibility of cumulative progress in a community; if the intelligence is inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, and irresponsible, then there is likely to result cumulative decline.

The various features of knowing mentioned thus far in this section may be illustrated with the example of a language. Normally one does not invent the words one speaks; the meanings in a language and its grammar are taken over from tradition and shared in common. But language is not perpetuated unless individuals understand the meanings of words through their own personal acts of insight. At the same time, by their use of words, individuals contribute to the richness or the poverty of a language.

The example illustrates the ongoing cycle in which, according to Lonergan, the private and individual aspects of knowing combine with the public and communal aspects. The individual is constantly dependent upon a public sphere for a cultural horizon and for an arena for practical activity; the community is constantly dependent upon the individual for the intelligence and reasonableness needed in order to maintain its institutions. The interrelation of the individual and the community is cyclic, dynamic, ongoing, developing.

D. An Objection and Reply

Husserl was well accustomed to thinking of intellectual life in terms of horizons. Every dealing a person has with objects in ordinary life, says Husserl in The Crisis, is surrounded by a "vital horizon" of pre-established validities.

Because of this constantly flowing horizontal character ... every straightforwardly performed validity in natural world-life always presupposes validities extending back, immediately or mediatelly, into a necessary subsoil of obscure but occasionally available reactivatable validities.
Husserl describes here the same process of judgments adding to judgments that Lonergan considers an ineradicable feature of knowing. But to Husserl's way of thinking, the epoché overcomes this horizontal phenomenon. In the epoché, an attitude is arrived at which is above the pregivenness of the validity of the world (der Geltungsvorgegebenheit der Welt), above the infinite complex whereby, in concealment, the world’s validities are always founded on other validities, above the whole manifold but synthetically unified flow in which the world has and forever attains anew its content of meaning and its ontic validity.

For Husserl, to fail to overcome reflectively the horizontal phenomenon is to fail at ridding one's philosophical foundations of naively-accepted assumptions. One cannot overcome the natural attitude, according to Husserl, without recognizing a transcendental ego that is clearly distinguished from that worldly individual who must learn everything in a cumulative fashion. This position directly challenges Lonergan's view.

In reply, one could argue, first of all, that Lonergan's emphasis on insight takes the place, in his philosophy, of a transcendental ego. The transcendental ego, in Husserl's thought, is an ego that is beyond any mundane horizon. Insight, in Lonergan's thought, is that act whereby a concrete, mundane ego moves beyond its horizon: every direct insight goes beyond its horizon by contributing the understanding that is the only means of appropriating the horizon as horizon; reflective insight overcomes the contingency of mundane learning, not by eliminating the conditions discerned by reflective questions, not by determining a formally unconditioned, but by reaching a virtually unconditioned -- a conditioned the conditions for which are in fact fulfilled. Hence instead of thinking in terms of Husserl's extramundane entity, the transcendental ego, Lonergan identifies an extramundane, transcendental moment in the dynamic process of knowing, a moment that is distinct, but not separate from the process as a whole.

Secondly, how does Lonergan overcome the natural attitude? For Lonergan, the problem of the natural attitude is less a problem of horizon as such than a problem of a particular horizon: the objectivist, naturalist horizon born in the eighteenth century. A person firmly entrenched in the natural attitude has great difficulty accepting the idea that insight is an utterly supervening event. For such a person, insight, like any other mental act, is a purely natural phenomenon. In Lonergan's view, this naturalism results from a failure
to recognize that higher integrations in nature make no sense in the terms of the lower elements that they integrate. If chemical processes, for example, are analyzed purely in terms of physical laws, one has no way of explaining certain given aggregations of data; the aggregation can only be explained by laws of chemical process. What for the chemist is coincidental may be intelligible for the botanist. And there are higher integrations at the levels of animal psyche and human psyche. The lower-integration parts of a higher-integration thing are not autonomous entities. To assert the autonomy of the chemical parts of a plant is to deny that the integration at the vegetable level, called "plant," has actually occurred. A naturalist or reductionist conception of human being considers the rational or existential aspects of human being to be an appendage to a more real entity of a lower integration, such as the animal or vegetable. Lonergan's theory of integrations recognizes material, vegetable, and animal dimensions of the human psyche, but shows that the unity of the dimensions is explicable only in terms of a higher integration that precludes treating them as autonomous, let alone "more real," entities.76

These remarks may suffice to show that Lonergan does have fully-developed arguments in opposition to the naiveté and naturalism which, the Husserlian objection suggests, might threaten his position. Further replies to the objection would need to examine in more detail the differences between Husserl's phenomenology and Lonergan's cognitional theory that occasion the objection.

E. The Question of Social Ontology

If it is granted that, functionally, knowing is both social and individual, one may yet be bothered by the question as to which, the social or the individual, is ontologically prior. The answer is that the question is mistaken. The question does not entertain the possibility that reality might be too complex to admit of resolution into a single set of priorities.

The question of priority can be raised in regard to the operations in the intellectual pattern, and there Lonergan answers that while "lower levels of operation are prior as presupposed by the higher, as preparing materials for them," it is also true that

the higher levels have a priority of their own; they
sublate the lower, preserving them indeed in their proper perfection and significance, but also using them, endowing them with a new and fuller and higher significance, and so promoting them to ends beyond their proper scope.\textsuperscript{77}

The question of priority can be raised in regard to subjectivity and objectivity, and there Lonergan answers that intentionally [the objectivity of truth] goes completely beyond the subject, yet it does so only because ontologically the subject is capable of an intentional self-transcendence, of going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so.\textsuperscript{78}

In these answers, Lonergan refuses to settle the given controversy by identifying an ultimately autonomous, ultimately prior term. Instead he challenges his readers to affirm the reality of the more complex interrelation of the two. Such would be his answer as well to the question regarding the social and the individual. The reality is the functional interrelationship of the two. A person is attracted to belief in utter priority of one over the other only by ignoring details of that functional interrelationship.

\textbf{4. Limitations of the Present Inquiry}

The present inquiry has treated the problem of intersubjectivity in general philosophical terms; it has not treated explicitly Lonergan's understanding of the role of intersubjectivity in concrete and historical moral and religious life. It is relatively easy to indicate how the matter of transcendental intersubjectivity relates to Lonergan's work on the structure of the human good. Lonergan says that "the human good is at once individual and social."\textsuperscript{79} This essay has attempted to understand Lonergan's general theoretical grounds for believing that statement to be true.

The religious issue is more complicated. Human relatedness to God differs from human relatedness to human beings because God's subjectivity has important differences from human subjectivity. Limitations on human intersubjectivity are limitations of being human. God is capable of an infinitely greater degree of intimacy. One discovers this intimacy in religious life by recognizing God in the love that embraces and carries forward all of one's thinking and doing, and by identifying the grace of God as that which brings about one's otherwise private acts of understanding.\textsuperscript{80} Through such discovery, one may find God to be even more intimate to one than one is to oneself.
The question of divine-human relations, in going beyond the scope of the Husserlian problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, indicates an important limitation of this essay. It is hoped, however, that while postponing the religious question, the inquiry conducted here could yet serve as one prelude or overture to that question, to be set among the other varieties of preludes and overtures that already exist.

NOTES

The author wishes to thank Patrick Byrne, Richard Cobb-Stevens, Timothy Lynch, and Method's reader for comments and criticisms of this essay in its earlier drafts.


4 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 58. 5Ibid., p. 57.

6 Ibid. 7Ibid., pp. 57-8; cf. Lonergan, "Philosophy of Education; Lectures given at Xavier College, Cincinatti, Ohio, 1959," unpublished manuscript, pp. 154-55.


13 Husserl, Ideen II, p. 192; Theunissen, The Other, p. 126.


In many of his texts, Husserl is not entirely consistent in his use of the terms "epoché" and "transcendental reduction." The meanings given here follow his use of the terms in Die Krisis (see p. 154; The Crisis, p. 151), and Theunissen's interpretation in The Other (see pp. 24-5).

Husserl, Krisis, p. 153; Crisis, p. 150.

Husserl, Krisis, p. 151; Crisis, p. 148.

Theunissen, The Other, p. 24.

Husserl, Krisis, p. 155; Crisis, p. 152; Theunissen, The Other, p. 26.


Husserl, Ideen I, pp. 338-9; Ideas I, p. 331.


Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 426-8; Experience and Judgment, pp. 352-4; Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, pp. 66-7.


Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 188; *Crisis*, p. 184.


See the "Discussion" of Schutz's article in Schutz, Collected Papers III, pp. 84-91.

42 Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 146. Schutz and Theunissen raise many other objections to Husserl's solution to the question of transcendental intersubjectivity, objections which cannot be gone into here, but which claim, for example, to find problems with Husserl's use of the notion of "pairing" in the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" (Schutz, "Transcendental Intersubjectivity," pp. 63-4; Theunissen, *The Other*, pp. 62-5), problems with specifying how particular subjective qualities are analogically transferred (Schutz, as above, p. 68), and problems with the role and the plausibility of the "personalistic" attitude (Schutz, as above, p. 69; Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 134).


Schutz, "Transcendental Intersubjectivity," pp. 74-5; Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 34.


Ibid., p. 238. 52 Ibid., pp. 238-9.


Ibid., p. 76. Lonergan accuses Husserl's phenomenology of immanentism in Insigh, p. 415.


Lonergan, Insight, p. 322; Method in Theology, p. 15.


Lonergan's image, here, applies more directly to "method." See Method in Theology, p. 5.

Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 41-7.

Lonergan, Insight, p. 207.

Lonergan, Insight, pp. 225-42; Method in Theology, pp. 52-5.

Husserl, Krisis, p. 152; Crisis, p. 149.

Husserl, Krisis, p. 153; Crisis, p. 150.

Cf. Lonergan, "Existentialism," p. 54: "Husserl's transcendental reduction to the subject is not ultimate; the ultimate reduction is of subject and object, scientific world and world of common sense, to being. The subject is, and if he is, he is among the being."


Lonergan, "The Subject," p. 70.

Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 47.
