Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

Institutional Subscription (yearly) .......... $20.00
Individual Subscription (yearly) .......... $12.00

Orders Prepaid in U.S. Funds Only

A biannual journal, Method is published in March and October. Contributors are requested to follow the University of Chicago Manual of Style in preparing manuscripts. Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor and all other correspondence to the manager, Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 90045.

Copyright Policy: All materials published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies are copyrighted by Method. Submission of an article to Method entails the author's agreement to assign the copyright to Method. Articles, Dialogues, Notes, and Book Reviews appearing in Method may be reproduced for research purposes, for personal reference, and for classroom use without special permission and without payment of a fee. This permission does not extend to copying for general distribution and for the creation of collected works or anthologies. These and all other rights are reserved.

Method is sustained by Loyola Marymount University

ISSN: 0736-7392

Cover Design by W. Hew Elcock

Copyright 1984 by METHOD
CONTENTS

QUESTIONNAIRE ON PHILOSOPHY ... Bernard Lonergan 1

Notes:
STRAWSON AND LONERGAN ON 'PERSON' ... Joseph Fitzpatrick 36

Book Reviews:
Alan Olson (Ed.), Myth, Symbol and Reality
   Reviewed by Fred Lawrence ...................... 42
Denise L. and John T. Carmody, Ways to the Center
   Reviewed by Philip Boo Riley .................. 44
Eugene Thomas Long (Ed.), Experience, Reason and God
   Reviewed by James G. Hanink .................. 47
William J. Kelly (Ed.), Theology and Discovery
   Reviewed by Michael C. O'Callaghan .......... 50

Selected articles appearing in METHOD are indexed in the PHILosopher'S INDEX
IN THIS ISSUE OF METHOD

In "Questionnaire on Philosophy" [1976] we are afforded a clear view of the nest of problems and issues with which Bernard Lonergan has struggled unremittingly over a lifetime. We encounter a series of succinct and confident expositions of the results of his efforts to reconstruct philosophy and theology to meet the radical crisis in contemporary culture occasioned by the scientific and historical revolutions. We find revealed in this document Lonergan's vision of the demands of the present age, his strategy for meeting those requirements, his suggestions of promising directions to be taken and of further strategies to be implemented if the disorientated modern mind is to regain its balance. Interwoven coherently in the responses provided are, among other things, Lonergan's own account of his unique adjustment of Hegel's dialectic -- turning it "inside out" rather than "upside down", his appraisal of the central weakness of Catholic social thought -- its apparent lack of awareness of the need for technical knowledge, his analysis of the deficiencies of both Marxian and liberal capitalist thought, his accounts of the nature of philosophy, of the minimum core of philosophic education, of the relation of theology to religion and to philosophy, and his notion of Christian praxis.

In "Strawson and Lonergan on 'Person'" J. Fitzpatrick continues to explore similarities and differences between Anglo-American and Lonerganian thought. While Lonergan and Strawson begin from philosophic standpoints commonly believed to be dialectically opposed, their views on the notion of 'person', Fitzpatrick argues, are strikingly similar.

A NOTE TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS

In Volume III of METHOD we shall continue to make available previously unpublished material from the Lonergan Centre in Toronto, in addition to scholarly articles, notes, and book reviews focusing upon issues and questions of concern to professors and students of philosophy and theology. Please renew your subscription now. A self-addressed envelope has been enclosed for your convenience.

Thank you for your support of METHOD.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON PHILOSOPHY

Responses by
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.

1. Please describe briefly the present state of philosophy and of philosophical studies in your country or region: tendencies, schools, impact, importance given to philosophical studies, etc.¹

I am not particularly competent to speak of English-speaking Canada since eleven years of my studies and over twenty or my teaching were done elsewhere. But taking the University of Toronto as a paradigm, the traditional core is the presentation of ancient and modern philosophies. This tradition has been infiltrated and, in part, overcome by the linguistic analysts. The impact of philosophy seems small and its importance little appreciated. The best students do mathematics and natural science.

2.1. Against this background describe the present state of Jesuit philosophical studies in your region, as to extent, content, and methods.

In 1930 the Jesuits of Upper Canada opened a house of philosophy in Toronto. The professors were good men, faithful to the assigned textbooks, apparently unaware of the exigences of Deus scientiarum Dominus, but very generous in spending their weekends in Toronto and neighboring parishes. After about twenty-five years it was decided to discontinue studies of philosophy in Toronto and to send our scholastics to the Oregon province for their philosophy.

2.2. In comparison with the situation before the Thirty-first General Congregation of the Society of Jesus (1965) do you notice a decline, a simple change, or even an improvement in philosophical studies? What do you think are the reasons for this phenomenon?

As studies of philosophy in English-speaking Canada were discontinued well before 1965, there has since been no change whatever. However, attitudes towards philosophy have suffered incidental losses and enjoyed incidental gains. The incidental loss is the widespread conviction that philosophy is a waste of time. The incidental gain is the breakdown of the old regimentation.

© 1984 by Bernard Lonergan
In both cases the underlying and longstanding causes are: (1) the radical shift in the notion of science in the seventeenth century; and (2) the radical shift in the notion of history in the nineteenth century.

On the scientific revolution Herbert Butterfield has said:

Since that revolution overturned the authority in science not only of the middle ages but also of the ancient world -- since it ended not only in the eclipse of scholastic philosophy but also in the destruction of Aristotelian physics -- it outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom. Since it changed the character of men's habitual mental operations even in the conduct of the non-material sciences, while transforming the whole diagram of the physical universe and the very texture of human life itself, it looms so large as the real origin of the modern world and the modern mentality that our customary periodisation of European history has become an anachronism and an encumbrance.²

Of the "historical revolution" Alan Richardson has written:

We should never forget that it was one and the same movement of critical enquiry which first culminated in the seventeenth-century scientific achievement and later in the emergence of the fully developed historical critical method of the nineteenth century. The critical faculty once awakened could not rest satisfied with the successful exploration of the realm of nature; it was bound to go on from there to the critical investigation of the more intractable realm of human nature, and, when the idea of development was fully understood, to seek to understand scientifically how, in fact, man and his institutions have come to be what they are. Since the nineteenth century it has been an axiom of Western thinking that men and their institutions cannot be understood apart from their history . . . . The historical revolution in human thinking, which was accomplished in the nineteenth century, is just as important as the scientific revolution of two centuries earlier. But they are not two separate revolutions; they are aspects of the one great transitional movement from the mediaeval to the modern way of looking at things.³

So much for the underlying and longstanding causes.

The proximate cause is to be sought, in my opinion, not in a total unawareness of the scientific and the historical revolutions, but in a failure to grasp their radical character and to acknowledge that far more than piecemeal concessions are needed to meet the issue. We have acknowledged the transformations of our knowledge of nature and of our knowledge of man, not as a single momentous event demanding an equally momentous development in philosophy, but as a series of regrettable aberrations that unfortunately are widely accepted.
3.1. In the light of what you think to be the nature of philosophy (and of theology) can you state clear reasons why philosophical studies should be a necessary part of preparation for the priesthood and/or the training of a Jesuit?

I shall attempt to answer this question in two main stages with suitable subdivisions: 3.11 - my opinion on the nature of philosophy; 3.111 - the view commonly derived from Aristotle; 3.112 - its inadequacy; 3.12 - an alternative view; 3.121 - its relevance to theology; 3.122 - its relevance to the formation of priests and of Jesuits.

3.11. In general I should say that philosophy is the basic and total science, the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft, and for this reason it fulfils an essential mediating role between theology, other sciences, human cultures and societies.

3.111. On a traditional view, commonly derived from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, science is certain knowledge of things through their causes, certa rerum per causas cognitio.

The dependence of this view on Aristotle's writings is manifest enough. For if the Posterior Analytics begin by asserting (1) an element of necessity, truth, certainty and (2) an element of causality, understanding, explanation, still these two are given immediately their technical objectification in the demonstrative syllogism, where the premises are true and certain, while the middle term assigns the necessary ground of the predicate pertaining to the subject.

Once this view of science is accepted, it is not difficult to conclude that the basic and total science must be metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science that sets forth necessary principles and conclusions about being as being. These principles and conclusions must hold for every being. And so metaphysics must be the total and basic science.

3.112. However this view of science is challenged both by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and by the historical revolution of the nineteenth century.

For the view that metaphysics is the basic and total science supposes that other sciences derive their basic concepts and principles by some further specification of the basic concepts and principles of metaphysics. But the development of modern natural science revealed that empirically established correlations yielded sets of basic terms and basic relations, and these terms and relations were far more fruitful than anything that could be derived from Aristotelian metaphysics.
Further, while the Posterior Analytics began from the view that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is, still this initial interest in reality promptly gave way to its expression in demonstrative syllogisms and in an unfolding of the numerous interesting properties of demonstrative syllogisms. Moreover, neither the fourteenth-century Scholastics nor their subsequent followers showed much concern to submit their syllogistic conclusions to empirical tests. So there arose loud complaints against Aristotelian verbalism and, at the same time, the new scientists subscribed to a rule to entertain no questions that could not be settled by an appeal to observation and/or experiment.

This rule of empirical verification had ulterior implications. For if Newton, Laplace, Maxwell, not to mention the pamphleteers, expressed no serious doubts about the necessity of natural laws, it remains that Euclid, once assumed to be unique and indubitable, has given way to Riemann's manifold of geometries, Newton has yielded to Einstein, Laplace to Darwinian probabilities of emergence and survival, Maxwell to Heisenberg's principles of uncertainty or indeterminacy. Nor is this simply the rediscovery of the Scholastic distinction between metaphysical and physical necessity. What the empirical scientist discovers is not the intelligibility of what must be but the intelligibility of what may or may not be. For that reason verification is of the essence of empirical science.

As Aristotelian science was knowledge of the necessary so also it was knowledge of the universal. But modern science, while it uses universals, conceives them not as scientific objectives but merely as tools that through successive and ever more determinate approximations bring us ever closer to knowledge and control of the concrete.

Finally, this concern with the concrete brings to light a further difference between the modern and the Aristotelian notion of science. Because Aristotelian science was to be an ordered set of demonstrative syllogisms, it could be a habit tucked into the mind of an individual. But no individual knows the whole of any modern science. Knowledge of the whole of modern mathematics, or modern physics, or modern chemistry, or any other modern field, resides not in the minds of individuals but in the aggregate resources of the respective scien-
tific communities. So Thomas Kuhn in the Postscript to the second edition of his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* began by remarking that, if he were rewriting the book, he would begin from the notion of the scientific community.

While the seventeenth-century scientific revolution was anti-Aristotelian, the nineteenth-century historical revolution was opposed to Aristotle only inasmuch as Aristotle could not conceive history as a science. Historians do not derive their basic terms and relations either from a metaphysic or from empirically validated laws; they are content to extend the ordinary language of their own place and time to include the ways of thought and feeling of the period they are investigating. They do not demonstrate their conclusions but find them confirmed by the available documentary and other evidence. They do not discover the intelligibility of what must be but uncover the intelligibility of what was, though it might not have been. They use universals but only as tools towards reaching the concrete with which they are concerned. Their knowledge, finally, has its locus not in the mind of each historian but only in aggregate resources of the ongoing community of historians.

3.12. I have been setting forth the divergence between the idea of science formulated in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and the achievement of scientific and historical investigation in recent centuries. I have now to ask, in the light of the new idea of science, what the basic and total science is to be. Essentially my answer is simple: the basic and total science is not just metaphysics but the compound of (1) cognitional theory, (2) epistemology, (3) the metaphysics of proportionate being, and (4) existential ethics. Let us say a few words on each of these.

Cognitional theory tells just what one is doing when one is coming to know. It includes the whole genesis of common sense, of the sciences, of exegetical and historical studies, of the philosophies. It will be radical enough to leave room for future scientific, scholarly, and philosophic developments. It insures our basic and total science against objections from the sciences of the past and leaves it open to the discoveries of the future.

Epistemology tells why performing the operations, set forth in cognitional theory, is knowing. It takes the reader or student beyond the mistaken views on knowledge and reality
METHOD

which men of common sense, scientists, scholars, and philo-

sophers so easily and frequently maintain.

From knowing what we do when we know and knowing why
doing that is really knowing there follows a corollary, namely,
a metaphysics that sets forth what in general we know when
we perform cognitional operations. Such a metaphysics will
be no more than a metaphysics of proportionate being, of
the world of our experience. But it is from that world we
must start if we are to understand the modern question of
God, since modern science has given us knowledge confined
to this world, and to go beyond that knowledge we have to
be fully and explicitly aware of what we are doing.

Of existential ethics, finally, something will be said
in our next section, for it regards man in this world, and
that falls within the traditional domain of theology.  

3.121. A Christian theology thematizes the Christian
religion on the level of the times in which the theology
is composed.

So theologies are distinguished by their time, and people
speak of biblical theology, patristic theology, medieval
theology, and modern theology, of their respective character-
istics and differences, of their relations to one another
and to their times.

In the Christian religion as lived but not yet thematized
there may be distinguished three moments. First, there is
the ontic present of God's love flooding our hearts through
the Holy Spirit he has given us. Second, there is the objec-
tive past in which God's revelation of his love to us through
Christ Jesus has been mediated down the ages by the ongoing
Christian community. Thirdly, there is the eschatological
consummation and, on the way, the command and the duty to
preach the gospel to every class in every culture.

The Christian religion as lived enters human living
both on the side of the object and on the side of the subject.
On the side of the object it enters human history and pene-
trates human cultures as the word of God in and about and
through Jesus Christ, his life and his work. On the side
of the subject it is a transformation of existential ethics.
But existential ethics I mean the ethical living that has
not yet emerged inasmuch as one just drifts through life
-- that is, just does and says and thinks what everyone else
is doing and saying and thinking, and everyone else is drifting
too. Positively I mean the ethical living that begins indeed
PHILOSOPHY

when one finds out for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to do with one's life, but that becomes established when one lives in love with those nearest one and in loyalty with one's fellow men about one. Now such existential ethics undergoes a transformation when God's love floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us: for such love is unrestricted; it is with all one's heart and all one's mind and all one's strength; further, it is comprehensive, loving God above all, and one's neighbor as oneself, and the world, in which we live with all it contains, as God's own world. It is the love described by St. Paul in the thirteenth chapter of his first letter to the Corinthians; it is the love to which Ignatius of Loyola directs those that follow his spiritual exercises.

If I may use the term, sublate, sublation, in the sense indicated in my Method in Theology, one may say that the Christian religion sublates the whole of human living. For what sublates goes beyond what is sublated; it adds an entirely new principle, sets a new goal, a new task, a new criterion, liberates what is sublated from its limitations and directs it to higher ends, yet in no way stunts it, interferes with it, robs it of its integrity. So sensitivity sublates vegetal living; intelligence sublates animal living; rational judgment concentrates the creativity of intelligence on truth and reality; deliberation, evaluation, decision, praxis integrate knowing and feeling in the pursuit of the good, of the truly worth while. The Christian religion as lived adds a further stage in this process of sublation: within the individual it is God's love flooding his heart and thereby transforming his existential subjectivity; within the ongoing human community it is the objective revelation of God's love in Christ Jesus, the mediation of that revelation through the Christian community, and the mission to preach the gospel to all nations until the consummation of all in all.

I have been speaking of the Christian religion as lived in order that I might speak of it as thematized, as the concern of theology. We have seen that the Christian religion as lived is the sublation of the whole of human living. It follows at once that to thematize the sublation of the whole of human living is a task beyond the competence of theology as a particular science or particular discipline, that theology can perform that task only by broadening its horizon by uniting itself with philosophy as the basic and total science.
To put the point in other words, one may note that particular sciences are specializations, that interdisciplinary studies build bridges between specializations to give us physical chemistry, biophysics, biochemistry, psychologies of the unconscious and social psychologies, that the ultimate ground of all interdisciplinary work is the basic and total science that results from understanding, both in their similarities and in their differences, the several methods of the particular sciences and, as well, the procedures of common sense. Only in virtue of such understanding is the theologian capable of thematizing adequately the Christian religion both in itself as a principle of sublation and in its effects upon the whole of human living.

As the reader will have noted, I am restating in the contemporary context the traditional view that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. In the medieval context logic was the norm and measure of science and by that standard metaphysics was the basic and total science. But in the contemporary context method is the norm and measure of science and so it is from an understanding of methods in their similarities and their differences that one attains the basic and total science.

There remains a final point, for in the new context the relations between theology and philosophy are particularly simple and clear. Theology is the sublation of philosophy. For philosophy is the basic and total science of human living. The Christian religion as lived is the sublation of the whole of human living. Hence the Christian religion as thematized is the sublation of the basic and total science of human living.

3.122. We have come to the end of this long answer and have now to conclude with an opinion on the relevance of philosophical study in the preparation of candidates for the priesthood and in the training of Jesuits.

First of all, then, I do not see any relevance in any antiquated philosophy, and I consider antiquated any philosophy with a cognitional theory inadequate to account clearly and accurately for the procedures of common sense, of mathematics, of the natural sciences, of the human sciences, and of human studies.

Secondly, competence in a contemporary discipline pertains not to individuals but to groups and, in like manner, competence in a set of disciplines pertains to a group of groups.
This feature of our world results from specialization, and specialization results from the fact that modern disciplines aim at knowledge, not of abstract universals, but of every closer approximations to the concrete. Moreover, as knowledge advances, specializations multiply and, as they multiply, they tend to get narrower and narrower. Eventually narrowness succumbs to decreasing returns and the need for 'generalists' as well as specialists is felt. So in West Germany at Bielefeld there has been instituted a university for interdisciplinary studies, while in America Ludwig von Bertalanffy has launched a movement with his General Systems Theory. Within this context theology as the sublation of philosophy is of supreme importance. For if one believes that the Christian religion is the sublation of the whole of human living, the theological thematization of this religion must be granted first place in significant studies.

Thirdly, as it is only in the university that all aspects of human living are under study, it is in the Christian university that theology can attain its full development and exercise its full influence. In the past indeed it claimed to be the queen of the sciences, but then its deductivist notion of science misled it into making dictatorial claims. In the present proposal its influence will be exercised, not by laying down premises and demonstrating conclusions, but by promoting interdisciplinary understanding through its philosophy and through its sublation of philosophy.

Fourthly, as I argued in my paper on "The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World," the New Testament emphasis on the function of priests is that they are to be leaders, teachers, preachers. In the measure that a diocese or a religious order wishes to provide the church with leaders, teachers, preachers, it will do all it can to make the leaders far-seeing, the teachers profound, the preachers wise. The formula for that is simple: they will themselves live the Christian life that is the sublation of the whole of human living, and they will know a theology that thematizes the sublation of the whole of human living. In this fashion they will preach what already they practise.

Fifthly, resources both human and material are limited. Doing all one can at times may be little. But even then the ideal can be maintained. What one individual lacks can be made up by another, for in modern studies what counts is not the learning in the individual mind but in the group.
Further, genuine Christian humility excludes the ressentiment that belittles the learning one does not oneself possess; and it is such ressentiment that erodes ideals.

3.2. Do you think that philosophical studies for Christians and/or especially for candidates for the priesthood should be different from philosophical studies "tout court", and if so, why?

Perhaps I should mention that I have written on this issue in my Philosophy of God and Theology and in a paper on "Philosophy and Theology." 9

Briefly I may say that the basic principle seems to me to be that human development occurs in two distinct modes. If I may use a spatial metaphor, it move (1) from below upwards and (2) from above downwards.

It moves from below upwards inasmuch as it begins from one's personal experience, advances through ever fuller understanding and more balanced judgment, and so attains the responsible exercise of personal freedom.

It moves from above downwards inasmuch as one belongs to a hierarchy of groups and so owes allegiance to one's home, to one's country, to one's religion. Through the traditions of the group one is socialized, acculturated, educated to become in time either (1) a member of the tribe or clan or (2) an inheritor of the classicism of ancient Greece and Rome or (3) a participant in the modernity that is familiar with the variety of human cultures and literatures, the achievements of modern mathematics and science, the expertise of the contemporary exegete and historian, the reflections of philosophers and theologians.

These two modes of development are interdependent. Both begin from infancy. But only through the second does the first take one beyond the earliest prehistoric stages of human development. Only through the first is there any real assimilation and appropriation of the second.

Such interdependence, as it supposes distinction, so too it opposes separation. In philosophy (and particularly in its basic phase of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics) the overwhelming emphasis is upon personal appropriation of one's own intelligent, rational, and responsible being. In theology (and particularly with regard to the mysteries of faith that Aquinas did not see his way to treating in the first three books and so relegated to a fourth in his Contra Gentiles) the major emphasis
is on the Christian tradition. But differences in emphasis are one thing. Systematic separation is another and, as it seems to me, it is less a product of Christian wisdom or prudence than of Cartesian universal doubt and of the eighteenth-century enlightenment's identification of tradition with prejudice and abuse.

Summarily, then, the theoretical shift is from philosophy as it would be worked out by men in statu naturae purae to philosophy that along with modern science is concerned not with abstract universals but with concrete realities.

Practically it would seem that the development of those not due to study theology would be enriched perhaps by some philosophical theology but more probably by an 'extension' or popular course in theology. On the other hand, those due to study theology have little to gain from an artificial abstraction from the Christian world in which they were born and brought up.

4.1. In view of the answer to question 3.1, what does the study of philosophy involve in relation to content?

4.11. Is there a necessary (minimum) content for the philosophical studies to be done by one who will be a priest and a Jesuit?

I should say that, while one may assign a minimum core requirement, still the further additions to that core have to be based on the needs and dangers of particular places and times and are best determined on the advice of people on the spot.

The minimum core I would describe as religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. By religious conversion, which is the foundation of the other two, I mean the habitual acceptance of God's gift of his love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom. 5:5). By moral conversion I mean the existential decision to guide one's decisions and one's actions not by satisfactions but by values, by what truly is worth while. By intellectual conversion I mean an adequate understanding of the difference between the world of immediacy (in which the infant lives) and the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values (into which the child, the adolescent, the adult gradually enter). Along with an understanding of this difference there would be required practical knowledge of all the symptoms of the infantile regression which confuses the real with the immediately given
and pronounces the meaningful to be unreal, or abstract, or controversial, etc.

Such conversions involve radical shifts of horizon, and horizons underpin all that is thought, said, done. Moreover, in the history of Christianity may be discerned quite different styles in which the same basic horizon finds expression, and a brief survey of these differences will serve to indicate different ways in which the core requirement may be expressed and communicated.

The universal style is symbolic. Its language is instinct with feeling. At its liveliest it is poetry. At its profoundest it is rhetoric. It lacks neither attention to detail nor keen insight nor balanced judgment nor responsible decision. But it has all these, not stripped of feeling, but permeated with feeling. The calm, the detachment, the clarity, the coherence, the rigor of the logician, the mathematician, the scientist -- these are just beyond its horizon. Such by and large is the language of the New Testament which employs parable and aphorism and apocalyptic to shift thought and meaning from man's everyday world to the world of religious meaning. Such also in the main was the language of the Church Fathers, and down the ages it has remained the straightforward simple language of mainstream Christianity.

A second style is the analytic. It is a variant on the foregoing introduced to meet emergencies in which a clarification of the basic Christian message became imperative. I call it analytic because it anticipates the discovery of the linguistic analysts that ordinary language fixes the meaning of words, not by definitions, but by showing how the word may be used appropriately. Now it would seem to be precisely this device that was employed in resolving the Trinitarian controversies of the fourth century and the Christological controversies of the fifth. Athanasius was revealing how the term, *homoousios*, was used appropriately when he stated: "omnia de Filio quae de Patre dicuntur excepto Patris nomine." Similarly, the same procedure takes a more concrete form in the Preface to the Mass of the Trinity: "Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu sancto sine differentia discretionis sentimus."

Finally, the classical *communicatio idiomatum* in Christology is speech about appropriate usage, and it appears as early as the *Formula unionis* in the spring of 433 some eighteen years before Chalcedon: "Evangelicas autem et apostolicas
de Domino voces scimus de iloguos viros aliquotiens consociantem tamquam de una persona dictas, aliquotiens autem dividents tamquam de duabus naturis et has quidem Deo condecentes secundum deitatem Christi, humiles autem secundum humanitatem tradentes" (DS 273).

A third style prolongs the second by attempting definitions. So Augustine explained heuristically that the word, person, names what there are three of in the Trinity. Boethius drew upon Aristotle's *Categories* to define a person as "individua substantia rationalis naturae." Richard of St. Victor refined on this with his "divinae naturae existentia incommunicabilis." Aquinas proposed "subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali."

But with the mention of Richard and of Aquinas we move into a new world. The speculative genius of Anselm lacked the factual material on which it might fruitfully work. The hard-headedness of Abaelard's *Sic et Non* revealed contrasts and contradictions in the Christian tradition but did not attempt to bring about their reconciliation. It was the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that brought data and intelligence together by developing the technique of the *quaestio* and by applying it to the materials assembled in collections, commentaries, books of sentences. When they discovered that the solutions to their many questions would themselves be coherent only if underpinned by a coherent conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit), theology became a science. By adopting and adapting the Aristotelian corpus it underwent a transformation that can be paralleled only by Galileo's demand that nature be mathematicized, by Newton's development of the calculus, by Darwin's introduction of evolution into biology. Unfortunately this matching of systematic intelligence with a wealth of positive information was short-lived. It was derailed by the Augustinian-Aristotelian conflict of the late thirteenth century. When the controversies subsided, a cult of the minimum took over. The rest of Aristotle was dismissed. Theologians were content with logic. The decadence of Scholasticism had begun: it left theology quite unprepared to deal both profoundly and opportunely with the already mentioned scientific and historical revolutions. Today Scholasticism is barely mentioned and Neoscholasticism a lost cause. It remains that something must be devised to be put in their place. For what they achieved in their day was to give the mysteries of faith that limited and
analogous understanding (DS 3016) that helped people find them meaningful. Today that help is not forthcoming. The bold pronounce the traditional formulations meaningless. The subtle discern in them an admixture of Christian doctrine with a Heideggerian forgetfulness of being. Nor is there any general consensus to expound and vindicate them, for the theological and philosophic basis for a consensus no longer seems to exist.

I have been indicating different ways in which the horizon of religious, moral, intellectual conversion, found expression in the past. I have done so because the question, as I understood it, desired a statement on a necessary minimum for ordination to the priesthood and, as I believe in cultural pluralism, as I have written a booklet on Doctrinal Pluralism, so I would not close the door to the priesthood on unphilosophic minds.

At the same time I must insist that thinking in terms of the minimum leads to minimal results. The minimum is dull and uninspiring. It offers no challenge. It brings no real benefit. It is regarded as drudgery and it is endured only because it is authoritatively stated to be a conditio sine qua non of ordination. Once the condition is fulfilled, it is forgotten and the only regret people have is that they had to put up with it.

Consider, on the other hand, the advantages of planning a maximum, of providing brilliant teachers, of encouraging all to make the most of their opportunity, of keeping students at the books only as long as they are making progress (or perhaps enough longer for them to discover their limitations).

4.12. Is a thorough presentation permitting an understanding of Marxism an essential element in the preparation of priests today?

The modern world has been dominated then by one and now by another theory of history. From the eighteenth century came the liberal doctrine of progress. From the nineteenth came the Marxian doctrine of dialectical materialism.

It has long been my conviction that if Catholics and in particular if Jesuits are to live and operate on the level of the times, they must not only know about theories of history but also must work out their own. The precepts of the moral law, while rich and detailed in prohibitions (malum ex quocumque defectu), are of extreme generality in their positive content (bonum ex integra causa). But what moves
men is the good; the good is concrete; but what the concrete good of Christian living is, we shall come to know only by thematizing the dynamic of Christian living in this world in itself and in its relations to liberal progress and Marxian dialectic. To put it bluntly, until we move onto the level of historical dynamics, we shall face our secularist and atheist opponents, as the Red Indians, armed with bows and arrows, faced European muskets.

Elsewhere and at some length I have indicated the main lines of this dynamic. It is dialectical in the sense that it has to do with the concrete, with action, with contradiction. It may be unfolded scientifically in terms of successive approximations, or philosophically in terms of position, its negation, and the negation of the negation. The first approximation, or the position, determines what happens when people ever are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The second approximation, or the negation, adds what happens in so far as people are inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, irresponsible. The third approximation, which negates the negation, raises the question of the conditions of recovery or redemption.

The first approximation, the position, is progress. By progress I mean a cyclic and cumulative process in which concrete situations give rise to insights, insights to new courses of action, new courses of action to changed situations, and changed situations to still further insights.

The second approximation, the negation of the position, is decline, the opposite of progress. Progress results only if people are attentive to the results of previous action, only if they are intelligent in devising remedies for previous mistakes, only if they are reasonable and responsible in their decisions to act and to cooperate. But such attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility are distorted or even blocked by the egoism of individuals and groups and by the bias of practical men of common sense who are ever prone to fancy themselves omnicompetent. Now in the measure that men are inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, irresponsible, in the same measure their actions and the consequent situations will be marked by the unintelligibility of their oversights, their mistakes, their irrationality. Further, the more that objective situations are distorted by unintelligent and irrational actions, the less are they capable of giving rise to fresh insights, since
all that intelligence can discern in the unintelligible is its lack of intelligibility. So with creativity blocked, the body social becomes the victim of warring egoisms and blundering short-sightedness. Then amoralism raises its ugly head. It sets aside the moralists and appeals to the efficient causes of modern science, for it proposes to be really practical, to be effective, to get things done. But the cult of efficiency in politics and economics easily becomes oppression, revolution, warfare. So we learnt about the liquidation of the opponents of Machiavelli's Principe, the liquidation of the feudal remnants blocking the expansion of bourgeois liberalism, the liquidation of the bourgeoisie in the peoples' republics.

There remains the third approximation, the negation of the negation. The liquidation of individuals, classes, nations does not go to the root of the matter, for the problem of warring egoisms keeps recurring as long as inattentiveness, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility keep producing and augmenting the objective social surd of the unintelligible and irrational situation. What alone goes to the root of the problem is the new man, the man converted at once intellectually, morally, religiously. Above all, religiously. For the new man will have to be a man of faith, for only faith can triumph when reason has been discredited, and reason was discredited by the ongoing process of rationalization put forward in defence of amoralism. The new man will have to be a man of hope, for only hope can release people from the hopelessness of warring egoisms and blundering short-sightedness. The new man will have to love God above all and his fellows as himself, for even-handed justice becomes merely destructive once injustice has penetrated the very fabric of a society.\(^\text{13}\)

The foregoing analysis proceeds in terms of ultimates. Attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility are the conditions of possibility of human authenticity. These conditions are excluded by inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility, and such exclusion is the root and substance of human unauthenticity, of man's alienation from his true being. Finally, man's salvation even in this life is the otherworldliness of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Now both the liberal doctrine of progress and the communist doctrine of dialectical materialism stand in explicit
disregard of otherworldliness. The liberal is a secularist who does not suspect that religion is a key vector in social dynamics. The Marxist is an avowed and militant atheist. This exclusion of religious otherworldliness is part of their thisworldly efficiency, but it has the implication that, while their doctrines may be simply progressive, they may also be some mixture of progress and decline. In the latter case their abandonment of religion leaves them without the remedy for overcoming decline.

In fact, in the capitalism of the liberals one may discern both the principle of progress and the seeds of decline. There is the principle of progress in Adam Smith's metaphor of "the invisible hand" that produces a harmonious synthesis out of the manifold and independent initiatives of capitalist enterprise. For what the metaphor refers to I have analyzed in *Insight* (chapters 4 and 8) as a conditioned series of more or less probably emerging and surviving schemes of recurrence. This process I refer to as emergent probability and I find it relevant to the genesis of atoms, molecules, crystals, solids, larger bodies; relevant again to the evolution of plant and animal species and to their ecologies; relevant finally to human history in which human ingenuity puts together natural and human resources to bring about institutional and, in particular, economic schemes of recurrence. Among such schemes are capitalist enterprises; their harmonious fitting despite their independent origins appears the work of "an invisible hand" but really results because human insight into concrete situations continues a process that runs through the whole of nature.

But if I believe that the liberal was right in speaking of human progress, I cannot but find him over-sanguine in handing over the motivation of capitalist process to enlightened self-interest. For enlightenment is given many meanings. There is the enlightenment of the mystic, of the seven sages, of the philosophers. But what the self-interest of the capitalist must have is profit, for the alternative to profit is loss, and sustained loss means bankruptcy. In such a context enlightened self-interest easily comes to mean really profitable self-interest. And when the mathematical economists draw up their design for utopia, the best of all possible worlds is seen to result from maximizing profits. In this fashion an ambiguous term betrays capitalist enterprise into complicity with the forces of decline. Profit as a criterion
encourages the egoism of individuals and of groups; individual
and especially group egoism is a bias that generates inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, and social irresponsibility; what initially appeared to be a 'scientifically' efficient and efficacious motivation, has turned out to be an engine of decline.

A similar compound of progress and decline may be discerned in Marxian thought. Basically Marx was reacting against his predecessors in philosophic, political, and economic thought. But if his reacting was sound, his implementation appears faulty. First, from Hegelian idealism he moved to world historical praxis. This was a real advance, but its benefit was compromised by Marx's arguing against idealism and concluding to materialism; today one might well prefer a realism realistic enough to have learnt much from the scientific and the historical revolutions. Secondly, it remains that these revolutions were not intrinsic to Hegelian thought. Hegel propounded a philosophy of nature that claimed to be a product of speculative reason, something far profounder than the lowly scientific understanding. But it has been scientific understanding that has survived and, in like manner, Hegel's apriorist approach to history was the position successfully negated by the German Historical School. Thirdly, Marx was right in feeling that the Hegelian dialectic needed to be adjusted, but he was content to turn it upside down. What it needed, I should say, was to be turned inside out. Instead of endeavoring to insert movement within logic, the relatively static operations of logic had to be inserted within the larger ever ongoing context of methodical operations. Fourthly, Marx has much to say about alienation. It is a topic with an undertow as deep and strong as the problem of evil. But I find it difficult to find the Marxian analysis in terms of capitalism and the Marxian remedy in "true communism" to be more than a trivialization of the issue. Sin is the irrational component in the human condition, and God's remedy is in the grace of Christ Jesus our Lord. Such is the dialectic in which all men are involved; it cannot be acknowledged by a militant atheist; and so I find it contradictory to speak of a Christian Marxism. Fifthly, Marx had a sound and, it would seem, original intuition into the nature of capitalist profit; it is this intuition that gives Marxian thought its fascination and its power. It remains that Marx expressed his intuition confusedly and emotionally in terms
of surplus value and of exploitation. But its accurate expres-
sion is in macroeconomic terms, and it is on the basis of
such accurate expression and in the context of Christian
praxis that a solution is to be sought.

Such Christian praxis is the dynamic of human creativity
and freedom in which individually men make themselves and
collectively they make the world in which they live. In that
dynamic must be recognized (1) developing intelligence as
the principle of progress, (2) the evils of individual and
group egoism and the arrogance of omnicompetent common sense
as the principles of alienation and decline, and (3) faith,
hope, and charity as the principles of recovery from alienation
and decline. Finally, there is needed up-to-date technical
knowledge of economic and political theory and their respec-
tive histories; perhaps the great weakness of Catholic social
thought is its apparent lack of awareness of the need for
technical knowledge.

In brief, what priests need today is, not an understand-
ing of Marx, but an understanding of the dynamics of history
and of the vital role that Christians are called upon to
play.

4.13. What is the place (if any) of the human sciences,
and their relationship to the study of philosophy?

For me philosophy is the basic and total science because
it is the adequate cognitional theory. Specialists in the
particular sciences perform cognitional operations but attend
to objects. The philosopher's job is to thematize the opera-
tions that the specialists perform and, no less, to thematize
the operations performed by men of common sense.

It is well to distinguish between human sciences, engaged
in discerning universal laws, and human studies, such as
interpretation and history, engaged in understanding particu-
lar texts and particular processes.

Both human sciences and human studies are cognitional
activities that the philosopher has to thematize, but there
must be two separate thematizations. The human sciences are
analogous to the natural sciences, but human studies are
analogous to the development of common sense.

It is of considerable importance that the analogy between
natural and human science be clarified. There is identity
in so far as man is an animal. There is difference in so
far as man sublates his animality and lives in a world mediated
by meaning and motivated by values. In so far as man is an
animal, the human sciences will follow the same methods as physicists, chemists, biologists, animal psychologists. But in so far as man sublates his animality and lives in a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values, then the relevant methods are those of human studies; and it is only by postulating continuity in accepted meanings and values that the human scientist can extrapolate from the past to the future. Hence, Gibson Winter in his *Elements for a Social Ethic* was led to distinguish four styles in sociology -- the physical, the functional, the voluntarist, and the intentional -- and to assign each its area of competence. The physical style assumes that the methods of natural science are the only scientific methods: it is positivist, behaviorist, reductionist. The functional style understands social structures and processes by grasping the functions of parts in the whole: it is intellectualist. The voluntarist style stresses power, conflict, and ideology. The intentional style, finally, is phenomenological: its subjective dimensions are the constituting intentionalities of embodied consciousness; the objective dimensions are the forms in which this world appears for this consciousness.

An alternative procedure is to conceive the human sciences as instrumental: they set forth the limitations under which human freedom operates and the options among which freedom may choose. Once free choices have been made, the human scientist becomes the technician determining the steps to be followed to obtain the desired result. Something along these lines has been worked out for economics by Adolph Lowe."17

Finally, both the human sciences and human studies suffer from a flight from philosophic, moral, and religious issues. They are aware that scientific procedures cannot handle these issues. They know of no consensus on these issues. They opt for a scientific approach and endeavor to justify it by isolating areas from which the philosophic, moral, or religious issues are excluded or held in abeyance.

An exposition of Max Weber's view on value-free science and arguments against it from a traditional viewpoint may be found in Leo Strauss's *Natural Right and History*. My own position would be to follow the lines laid down in my *Method in Theology*: there exist scientific techniques to be followed in works of interpretation and in the writing of history; but these techniques do not preclude differences arising from the philosophic, ethical, and religious views.
of those that employ them; hence interpretation and history have to be regarded as functional specialties to be completed by such further specialties as dialectic and foundations in which radical differences can be dealt with not indeed automatically but at least openly and clear-headedly.

4.14. In case you would prefer different philosophical studies for those who do not have philosophical talent, or whose studies are directed to other fields than professional philosophy and theology, please indicate what should be the minimum content of such studies.

For those said not to have philosophical talent, I do not desire to prefer different philosophical studies. I would urge better teachers and simplified studies (see 4.21 below). Everyone can attain a certain measure of self-appropriation, of knowing just what happens when he is coming to know and coming to choose. Not everyone can specify the ramifications and complications, of such coming to know and to decide, through the various fields of knowledge, of moral growth, of religious development. The big block will not be a total absence of philosophical capacity but the novelty of training teachers that (1) can thematize their own conscious activities and (2) help their pupils to do likewise.

For those destined to specialize in other fields, I would have no objection to their dropping the so-called 'professional' aspects of philosophy or theology, but I would profoundly deplore any tendency to let them be satisfied with anything less than all the understanding of philosophy and of theology of which they are capable. Without that development only too easily will they tend to be not only specialists in other fields but also secularists, unable to bring their special knowledge within a Christian context and so give the Christian community (in its effort to sublate the whole of human living) the advantage of the technical knowledge they possess and the community wished them to attain. Unless Christian specialists are something of generalists, they are like the seed that does not fall into the ground to die but itself remaineth alone.

4.2. In the light of the answer to question 3.1, what does the study of philosophy involve in relation to method?

4.21. What method (of thinking rather than of teaching) should be used in the philosophical formation of our men?

The basic step is learning to give basic terms and re-
lations the meaning they possess as names of conscious events and conscious processes.

Everyone has insights. They are occurring all the time. But few people are aware of the fact. The problem is to make them aware and fully aware both of the occurrence of insights, and the series of other consciously occurring events.

The general lines of the solution has been set forth by Abraham Maslow in his *Religions, Values, and Peak Experiences.* What he says of 'peaking' and "peak experiences" also holds for the whole of intentionality analysis. I quote a few sentences:

All this implies another kind of education, i.e., experiential education . . . it also implies another kind of communication . . . What we are implying is that in the kind of experiential teaching which is being discussed here, what is necessary to do first is to change the person and to change his awareness of himself. That is, we must make him aware of the fact that peak-experiences go on inside himself. Until he has become aware of such experience and has this experience as a basis for comparison, he is a non-speaker; and it is useless to try to communicate to him the feel and the nature of peak-experience. But if we can change him, in the sense of making him aware of what is going on inside himself, then he becomes a different kind of communicatee. He now knows what you are talking about when you speak of peak-experiences; and it is possible to teach him by reference to his own weak peak-experiences how to improve them, how to enrich them, how to enlarge them, and also how to draw the proper conclusions from them . . .

. . . Part of the process here is an experiential-educational one in which we help the patient become aware of what he has been experiencing without having been aware of it . . . Until that point is reached at which he has a detached, objective, conscious awareness of the relationship between a particular name or label or word and a particular set of ineffable, subjective experiences, no communication and no teaching are possible . . . In all of these we may use the paradigm that the process of education (and of therapy) is helping the person to become aware of internal, subjective, subverbal experiences so that these experiences can be brought into the world of abstraction, of conversation, of communication, of naming, etc., with the consequence that it immediately becomes possible for a certain amount of control to be exerted over these hitherto unconscious and uncontrollable processes.

In the foregoing, while it is reasonably clear what the author is attempting to convey, it has to be admitted that he has not yet worked out a consistent vocabulary, particularly with regard to what is conscious but not thematized and, on the other hand, what is conscious but has become explicitly thematized. But there can be little doubt that this contrast and transition is what he wishes to communicate
and, I believe, it will be found that the thematization of this distinction becomes meaningful only after one has had and repeatedly had the experience of the transition itself. Experience comes first. Only afterwards does meaningful thematization arise. Indeed, in my book, Insight, it is only in chapter eleven that there is attempted an explicit account of the transition from merely being conscious to actually knowing.

Of course, I have done no more than indicate the basic rudiments of methodical philosophic thought. But further aspects of the matter will conveniently be treated in the next three questions (4.22, 4.23, 4.3).

4.22. Is there a minimum knowledge of philosophic methods necessary for a priest and a Jesuit?

Knowledge of method becomes a necessity when false notions of method are current and more or less disastrous.

For example, there have been theologians that held, perhaps innocuously enough, that the dogmas of the church were revealed not explicitly but implicitly. Many thought this to mean that the dogmas could be deduced from revealed propositions to be read in the sacred scriptures. Such an interpretation did no harm either among those not very good logicians or among those not much interested in scripture. However, with the revival of logical and scriptural studies we have been hearing that, after all, the dogmas were not revealed at all. Or again that the dogmas have been revealed, not in a revelation contained in scripture, but in an ongoing and still continuing process of revelation in the church. Or again that the dogmas express, not simply what has been revealed, but what has been revealed as apprehended and expressed within a particular culture so that, if that particular culture proves alien to us or outmoded, then the dogmas are to be revised.

Common to all of these views is the unavowed assumption that logic is ultimate and, indeed, absolutely ultimate. Now it is ultimate with regard to the clarity of terms, the coherence of propositions, the rigor of inferences. But it is not absolutely ultimate even in human discourse, for there are many actual and many more possible "universes of discourse"; and it always is possible to introduce still one more universe of discourse in which fresh distinctions are introduced, terms become clearer, different propositions are found coherent, and different conclusions are inferred.
We reach the notion of method when we ask how does one effect the transition from one universe of discourse to another or, more profoundly, how is there effected the transition from one level or stage in human culture to another later level or stage or, vice versa, from a later to an earlier level or stage. Obviously the operations involved in such transitions are not ruled by the logic of clear terms, coherent propositions, rigorous inferences. Quite different, though quite common, types of operation have to be considered and considered just as explicitly as the logical operations that from Aristotle to Hegel were thought to control legitimate mental process.

These further operations are attending to the data of outer and inner experience, precise descriptions of what is given, stumbling upon oddities, the formulation of problems, the search for solutions, the discovery of new viewpoints, the formulation of hypotheses, the deduction of their suppositions and of their implications, the planning of processes of control by observations and/or experiments, the confirmation of the hypothesis or the need for revising it and, in that case, the recurrence of the methodical process.

Still such further operations occur and combine differently in different disciplines. In each discipline one learns to perform the operations readily, easily, with satisfaction, in the lecture rooms, the laboratories, the seminars of a university. In the main such learning is much more learning what is done than why it is done. It remains that the proficient, the future leaders and successful teachers and great pioneers, will owe their superiority to the fact that they have taken the time to pause and reflect and discern just why things are done and even how they might better be done.

There is still one more step. If there is to be in the twentieth century a basic and total science, it will have to be a basic and total method. When the particular sciences were supposed to be certain knowledge of things through their causes, then the basic and total science could be certain knowledge of being through its causes. But now that the particular sciences offer no more than the best available opinion, now that they are ruled in the last resort not by their basic principles and laws but by the methods by which their current principles and laws may be revised, it becomes necessary for the basic and total science to be the basic and total method.
As any other method, the basic and total method is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations with cumulative and progressive results. But it is a method that is reached only through performing the operations of such particular disciplines as mathematics, natural science, common sense, human studies, adverting to the operations so performed and thematizing them, adverting further to the dynamism linking related operations and thematizing that dynamism, thereby arriving at a normative pattern for each of the particular methods and, through them, to the common core of all methods, namely, the dynamic structure of human coming to know and coming to decide.

In this fashion a philosophic theory of knowledge is attained and from it one moves with relative ease to an epistemology, a metaphysics of proportionate being, and an existential ethics.

The attainment may be maximal or minimal or in between these extremes. It moves towards a maximum, materially, as one advances in competence in particular disciplines and, formally, as one's increasing competence both broadens and refines one's grasp of all cognitional styles. It moves towards a minimum, materially, as one's competence in other disciplines decreases and, formally, as one's grasp of the common core narrows and coarsens.

4.23. In what sense, if any, should the philosophy taught our scholastics be systematic?

Thought is systematic if all its terms are defined. Terms are basic or derived. Derived terms are defined by employing basic terms. Basic terms are defined implicitly by their relations to one another. Such relations may form a closed circle, an interlocking set, an ongoing progression, or an open analogy such as Aristotle's proportion between potency and act.

Propositions constructed out of basic terms and their defining relations are 'true' by definition and in that sense are named analytic propositions.

Analytic principles must be distinguished from analytic propositions. They are true not only by definition but also by verification. For the basic terms and relations in their defined sense have been verified.

The distinction between analytic propositions and analytic principles is of the essence of empirical science. However, verification falls short of proof: for in verification the
argument runs, not from affirming the hypothesis to affirming its implications, but from affirming the verified implications, to affirming the hypothesis. Such an argument is cogent if and only if the hypothesis in question is the only possible hypothesis; and proof of such unique possibility commonly is not available.

Hence, in general, empirical science is systematic, not in the sense that it offers a system valid for all time, but in the sense that it offers a succession of provisional systems, where each later system satisfies the known data better than its predecessors.

Besides the methods of the particular empirical sciences there is the generalized empirical method born of the reflective interplay between acting out the operations of the particular disciplines and thematizing the operations one is acting out. In this interplay the basic terms and relations of intentionality analysis both are given their meaning and are verified. They are given their meaning for what the terms mean are the operations one is consciously performing, and what the relations mean are the conscious dynamism of sensitive spontaneity, intelligent creativity, rational reflection, and responsible freedom, that promote us consciously from one operation to the next. They also are given their verification for there are actually occurring the conscious operations and unfolding the conscious dynamism to which the terms and relations refer.

Such verification has singular properties. In the ordinary case, the hypothesis is the antecedent, its implications are the consequent, and the confirming data correspond directly only to the consequent. But in generalized empirical method both antecedent and consequent are given in experience: the antecedent in the thematized operations and processes; the consequent in the publicly performed methods of particular disciplines. Again, in the ordinary case, revision involves change in a theory but not a change in the object to which the theory refers. But the revision of the central core of generalized empirical method involves a change not only in a theory about human knowledge but also in the occurrence or in the consciousness or in the thematization of conscious and thematized operations and processes.

It follows that the basic and total science is empirical yet in some sense it is not strictly hypothetical and in
some sense its central core of experiencing, understanding and judging is not open to revision.

Now the structure of knowing is isomorphic with the structure of the known: as our knowing combines elements of experience, elements of intelligence, and elements of rationality, so the objects of the particular sciences will be compounded of a potential element, corresponding to experience, of a formal element, corresponding to intelligence, and an actual element, corresponding to rational judgment.21

Similarly, the structure of our knowing and doing expresses the conditions of being an authentic person; but this structure is a matter of being attentive, being intelligent, being reasonable, being responsible; accordingly there are four basic precepts that are independent of cultural differences. Moreover, since the actuation of the structure arises under social conditions and within cultural traditions, to the four there may be added a fifth, Acknowledge your historicity.

It would seem, then, empirical science and empirically established cognitional theory are equal to the task of accounting for the invariants in human knowledge, in human conduct, and in the structure of reality proportionate to man's native powers. It remains that down the ages there have been rationalists claiming a priori knowledge independent of empirical tests and absolute idealists endeavoring in their peculiar way to vindicate the claims of speculative reason. But in the past such efforts have not succeeded in anticipating the pronouncements of empirical science and, as empirical science, from the nature of its verification, is ever open to change, at the very least we must await radical change in the methods of science before we may anticipate a successful resurgence of apriorist philosophy.

So much then for systematic knowledge. But we must not overlook the fact that not all human knowledge and not even, often enough, the majority of man's concrete certitudes are systematic. For systematic thinking defines explicitly -- or implicitly in a very technical sense of 'implicitly.' But common sense does not define, as Socrates discovered in Athens millennia ago, and the linguistic analysts at Oxford have rediscovered more recently. Moreover, the spontaneous development of understanding, which is the hallmark of common sense, recurs in the operations of exegetes and historians.22
4.3. How do we maintain intellectual coherence for philosophical studies without denying freedom to philosophical inquiry and to teachers of philosophy? What pluralism in systems and methods in any one faculty is compatible with this coherence?

The problem of freedom may be narrowed down to manageable limits by beginning from a list of the varieties of pluralism and then considering the problems that arise within each variety.

First, there is the knowledge that arises from the spontaneous development of human intelligence. In English it is apt to be called "common sense," in French "le bon sens," in German "gesunder Menschenverstand." What is common to all instances of it is not content but procedure: it always is the result of spontaneous intellectual development; but the results vary from village to village, region to region, country to country, culture to culture, and there are corresponding differences in the endless ordinary languages in which these results are expressed. Fortunately ordinary language does not express systematic thought, and so if philosophy is agreed to be systematic, the problems arising from this type of pluralism need not concern us.

Secondly, the knowledge of exegetes and of historians would seem to be an enormously learned extension of spontaneously developed intelligence, in brief, the common sense of one time and place catching on to the common sense of another. Here there arises the problem of perspectivism, for exegetical and historical techniques do not suffice to master the minutiae of variations in common sense. But from the nature of the case such differences are minor and in any case they are more or less irremediable.

There are graver difficulties that arise from philosophic, moral, and religious differences among exegetes and among historians. But such pluralism can be mitigated by the device of conceiving exegetical and historical techniques to be functional specialties and by the addition of further functional specialties, such as dialectics and foundations, to objectify these graver differences and in some fashion to deal with them equitably and not without some hope of progress.

Thirdly, there are systematic types of thought and, roughly, it will suffice to consider two types. There are the systems that are apriorist; that claim validity universally or absolutely; that take their stand on the clarity
of their ideas, the coherence of their assertions, the rigor of their inferences, and the cogency of the evidence they present.

Now as long as there is only one such system, the problem of pluralism does not immediately arise. But as soon as there are two or more of such systems, not only does a problem of pluralism exist but also it bids fair to be insoluble. Obviously an appeal to experience will offer no solution, for these systems are apriorist; they are true by the truth of their definitions, and they do not acknowledge any higher truth that rests on appeals to mere experience. Further, an appeal to logic will not solve the problem: the various types of Riemannian geometry are all perfectly coherent; and so it does seem likely that different apriorist philosophies might be equally coherent in their respective contents yet radically opposed when one is compared with another. Finally, an appeal to method has the disadvantage either of being an apriorist method, and so coherent with one philosophy but automatically rejected by another, or else of being an empirical method, and so rejected automatically by all apriorist philosophies.

It remains however that apriorist philosophies are contentious. They dispute without end but also without fruit. Eventually the age dominated by logic comes to a close, if not from the exhaustion of the opposing parties, at least from the ever decreasing size and interest of their audience. Finally, there comes the "coup de grace" when logical operations are seen to be but a minor part within the larger whole of methodical operations. With that change there arises a totally new situation and the insoluble problem of apriorist but divergent philosophies may happily be forgotten.

There remain finally the philosophies that are not only systematic but also methodical, not methodical in some apriorist sense but empirical, with their method a generalization of the methods employed in the particular sciences and, at the same time, fixing the meaning and verifying it by thematizing the operations and processes of cognitional and moral consciousness.

Now in the sciences in which an empirical method is accepted there are available and accepted empirical controls. Everyone is free to advance understanding in the field, to formulate discoveries in hypotheses, to plan and execute programs of research and/or experimentation, to publish his findings and thereby submit them to the judgment of his peers.
It remains that empirical methods in the particular sciences are not capable of resolving ultimate issues in cognitional theory, in ethics, in religion. So it is that philosophies of science are often mistaken while moral and religious issues are systematically evaded. Accordingly an empirical method in philosophy has to go to the root of this problem if it is not to be bankrupt from its inception.

Here, to my mind, the key notions are horizon and conversion. By horizon is meant the totality, the 'Ungreifendes,' within which understanding is sought, judgments of fact are made, and evaluations are accepted. Such a totality dominates our knowing and deciding from the very fact that our questions have their origin in the a priori desire to understand, to reach the truth, to know the real, to do what is worth while, that this desire of itself is both comprehensive and concrete, but its specification is attained only through specific questions and through the accumulation of specific answers. It follows that our specification of the horizon easily enough falls short of the objective at which the comprehensiveness and concreteness of our a priori desire aims. It further follows that we have to be converted from assumptions about the real and the good that suffice for the infant and have to complete the development begun as the child, the adolescent, the adult moves into a world mediated by meanings and motivated by values. Finally, it follows that teachers of cognitional theory, epistemology, the metaphysics of proportionate being, and existential ethics (1) should themselves be converted and (2) should be able to organize their courses so as to communicate their own conversion to their charges.

This may appear a tall order. But intellectual conversion is a topic that admits full objectification in terms of positions and counterpositions, while moral and religious conversions have their root in God's gift of his love, a gift that alone is a sufficient grace for salvation and so a grace granted to all by God's universal salvific will.

Perhaps we may now address ourselves to the questions raised in 4.3, and we begin by noting that inasmuch as both coherence and pluralism are desired, some sort of analogy has to be invoked.

The prime analogate, I suggest, conceives philosophy as the basic and total science, defines sciences materially by their fields and formally by their methods, and finds
the method of the basic and total science to be the generalized empirical method reached inasmuch as particular methods are explained and understood by thematizing the conscious operations and processes of the scientist.

On this conception of philosophy, inquirers and teachers are free as long as they are following the method; and as soon as they really depart from the method, then they no longer are philosophers in the defined sense.

Following the method, of course, is not a matter of deduction but of creativity: such creativity may enrich the thematization of experiencing, understanding, judgment, deliberation that already has been achieved; it may also add quite new dimensions to it, as has Robert Doran, S.J. in his doctoral dissertation.²⁴

Further, it is to be noted that accepting this or any other method rests on a judgment of value. The value in question is the value of intelligence and of collaborative and sustained advance towards truth. Such a primacy of the judgment of value (1) contradicts any rationalist primacy of reason or intellect, (2) breaks away from the ambiguities of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (VI, 2 1139b4), (3) rests on intentionality analysis in which it becomes clear that the level of deliberation is the sublation of previous levels, (4) finds itself in congenial continuity with religious faith and theology, in which the basic horizon is one of love and of value, and (5) opens the way for theology, other human disciplines, and the common sense (purged of its common nonsense) of every culture, region, and village, to inspire and direct the already described (4.12 above) Christian dynamic of history.

So much for the prime analogate. Variants may be constructed by working backwards to its less complex predecessors in which, none the less, there were expressed religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.²⁵

5. How should future professors of philosophy be prepared?

First of all they must be equipped with the essential tools: languages and mathematics. The more generous the time and effort spent on these preliminary tasks, the richer will be the future professor's cultural initiation, the profounder will be his cultural perspective across the present and into the past, and the greater will be his facility in understanding the natural sciences.
Secondly, they must gradually come to understand how arduous is their task. They are to be generalists: (1) not only knowing the objects but thematizing the operations so precisely defined in mathematics, so dynamically unfolding in physics, so dialectically involved with common nonsense in common sense, so eruditely extended to the common sense and nonsense of other places and times in interpretation and history, etc., etc.; (2) through such thematizing attaining the appropriation of their own cognitional, affective, and deliberative operations to the point where, as Aristotle put it, they no longer need a teacher but operate on their own; (3) advancing from intentionality analysis to epistemology, the metaphysics of proportionate being, and existential ethics; (4) entering into a symbiosis with theology inasmuch as theology sublates philosophy to define its special categories while it derives from philosophy its general categories; and (5) fulfilling its mediating functions by enabling theology to enter into interdisciplinary work with the sciences and with human studies as well as utilize them in its great task of communications.

Thirdly, as already has been noted (3.112 above), the carrier of a modern science is not the individual but the ongoing scientific community, and similarly the carrier of interdisciplinary studies is the relevant set of scientific communities. Now what holds for specialists, mutatis mutandis also holds for generalists.

Their proper domain is thematizing, intentionality analysis, epistemology, metaphysics of proportionate being, and existential ethics. In that proper domain individually they have to be masters according to the level of their times. Again, individually, each must have sufficient knowledge of other fields to derive from them what is essential to his own proper domain. On the other hand, it will be not the individual generalist but the group that through different members attains expertise in the various departments of interdisciplinary work; in other words, the group of generalists includes some experts in theology, others in mathematics, others in natural science, others in human science, others in human studies, others in communications.

Fourthly, it cannot be stressed too strongly that the mediation of the generalists is intelligent rather than logical: by logical mediation I understand the process from universal concepts to particular instances as just instances;
by intelligent mediation I understand the process from understanding the universal to understanding the particular. The difference between the two is a difference in understanding: in logical mediation one understands no more in the instance than one did in the universal; in intelligent mediation one adds to the understanding of the universal a fuller and more determinate understanding of the particular case. The generalist that is just a logical mediator turns out to be an obtuse intruder; the generalist that is an intelligent mediator speaks not only his own mind but also the language of his interlocutor.

Fifthly, there is an ambiguity to the term, theme, thematic, thematize. It can be given a naive realist interpretation, and then to thematize is to observe carefully and to describe accurately. But it also can be given a critical realist interpretation: then from the experience of operations one advances to the bestowal of names; from the experience of process (sensitive spontaneity, intelligent inquiry and formulation, rational reflection, responsible deliberation and freedom, where each later mode sublates those that go before) to the understanding of the structure within which the operations occur; from such experience and understanding to judgment on the difference between such self-appropriation and the formation and verification of hypotheses about subatomic particles.

When thematizing follows the naive realist model, it is an unending task. When it is a matter of experiencing, naming, understanding, judging, it quickly reaches the building blocks that can be recombined in a great variety of manners to reveal the diverse structures of diverse procedures and methods.

Sixthly, any attempt to introduce a new program of studies will find itself involved in the dialectic of progress, decline, and redemption. For if the new program is worth while, it will attempt progress. If it runs into undue opposition, there will be some failure to attend, to understand, to be reasonable, or to be responsible. And so there will be need of charity, of hope, and of faith.

NOTES

1 The questionnaire to which Lonergan responded was distributed to various Jesuit professors around the world, in preparation for a Symposium on Philosophy that was eventually held at Villa Cavalletti near Rome, Sept. 8-18, 1977. Lonergan did not attend the symposium. [Ed.]


6 See Method in Theology, pp. 253-61; 332-37; 358-62.


10 The minimal results have been described by Konstanty Michalski, La philosophie au xivème siècle: six études, long difficult to obtain but reedited in 1969 by Kurt Flasch [Frankfurt: Minerva].


16 Elements for a Social Ethic. The Role of Social Science in Public Policy [New York, 1966; paperback 1968].


22 See Insight, chapters six and eleven; and Method in Theology, chapters seven, eight, and nine.

23 See Insight, Index s. vv.


25 See above, 4.11, on a minimum core; or Method in Theology, chapter twelve, § 5 & 7, on the "Ongoing Development of the Mind"; or Eric Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History," in Eternità e Storia [Firenze: Vallecchi, 1970], pp. 215-234.

26 Method in Theology, chapter eleven, § 6 & 7.

27 Method in Theology, chapter fourteen.
A useful comparison can be drawn, I believe, between what Lonergan means by 'person' and the position developed by the Oxford philosopher, P. F. Strawson, in his well-known essay on "Persons". To understand the point of this comparison, a preliminary historical note about the topic Strawson is engaged with may help. He is working within a philosophical climate in which certain problems about the self, the subject or 'I' of some propositions, and indeed about persons generally, have arisen. The source of these problems lies in the notion, widely held, that what is real, or at least what is verifiably real, is the observable. Once this notion is entertained, where we stand (literally) in relation to an object that is to be known becomes significant. If the object is within my field of vision over there, well and good. But what if the object is not "over there"? What if I am ascribing actions or qualities not to an object over there, but to myself? Can I be said to observe myself? If I do not observe myself, can there truthfully be said to be a self at all? Moreover, if the meaning of propositions is determined by the method of their verification, can two such propositions as "I am in pain", said by Jones, and "He is in pain", said by Smith of Jones, be accepted as saying the same thing? Does the word 'pain', for example, mean the same in the selfascriptive proposition as it does in the other-ascriptive proposition? Other-ascriptive propositions, after all, can be translated out into observable characteristics like grimaces, pallor, sweating, heavy breathing, etc., whereas it is difficult to see self-ascriptive propositions as so translatable. Quite distinct meanings might be attached to the
respective propositions, "I am in pain" (said by Jones) and "He is in pain" (said of Jones), if indeed the former can be said to have any meaning. Further, when we observe others all we actually observe are their physical movements, their bodily behavior. Yet we normally ascribe intentions, feelings and thoughts to others; we assume a world of conscious states similar to those we claim for ourselves. Are we right to do this if the real is the observable? The notion that the verifiably real is what can, at least in principle, be observed creates some pretty philosophical problems -- it can drive a wedge between consciousness and bodily behavior, it can call in question the very notion of a self, it can give rise to scepticism about "other minds".

I hope this brief sketch allows the reader an entrée into the kind of questions Strawson is addressing in his essay.

Strawson begins by examining self-ascriptive propositions and other-ascriptive propositions. He asks the question, "Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.?" [378]. Two erroneous responses to this question are provided by the Cartesian view and what Strawson calls the "no-ownership" theory, held by some behaviorists. Both consider the question to be founded on an illusion. The former divides the subject into two distinct substances, to one of which states of consciousness are ascribed and to the other of which corporeal characteristics are ascribed. The no-ownership theorist, on the other hand, denies the ego or the subject altogether and claims the dependence of experiences on a unique body as the only legitimate grounds for ascription. The no-ownership theorist is, accordingly, obliged to claim as a contingent fact, "All my experiences are had by (are uniquely dependent on the state of) body B" [383]. But, Strawson asks, what is 'my' doing in this claim? It is impossible to eliminate 'my' without making the sentence analytic ("All experiences dependent on body B are experiences dependent on body B") in a way which would deny the alleged contingent fact. In other words, the word 'my' must be understood in such a way as to introduce the notion of ownership the no-ownership theorist seeks to avoid. Particular states of consciousness can only be identified as the states of some identified person. The Cartesian
view meets with a parallel objection. For if states of consciousness are wholly private, there is no way in which they can be ascribed to anyone else. But if this is the case, there is no way of identifying states of consciousness and so no way even of ascribing them to oneself. What this leads up to is what Strawson calls "the primitiveness of the concept of a person" [388]: the concept of person cannot be thought of as a secondary entity deriving from two primary entities, one of which is that to which states of consciousness are ascribed and the other of which is that to which bodily characteristics are ascribed. The structure of our language will not tolerate such dualism, since this structure transcends both the sceptic's self-ascriptive use of person-predicates and the behaviorist's other-ascriptive use of person-predicates. The same meaning of 'pain' applies whether I say "I have a pain" or "He has a pain" and to take either the self-ascriptive or the other-ascriptive use of the word as self-sufficient is to violate the structure of our language.

In the penultimate section of his article Strawson goes on to ask "what it is in the natural facts that make it intelligible that we should have this concept" of a person [398]. His own reply is, as he admits, somewhat tentative, perhaps owing to his own chosen linguistic method of philosophizing. (In Individuals he writes, "Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy"). This may make him reluctant to seek an extralinguistic explanation of the features of language he so brilliantly uncovers. But he does say this: "What I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how we can see each other (and ourselves) as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature. 'To see each other as persons' is a lot of things; but not a lot of separate and unconnected things. The class of P-predicates that I have moved into the center of the picture are not unconnectedly there, detached from others irrelevant to them. On the contrary, they are inextricably bound up with the others, interwoven with them. The topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected subjects" [399]. There is in this quotation a definite echo of Aquinas's definition of a person ("subsistens distinctum in natura intellec-
tuali") as well as reference to the relational character of person reminiscent of his commentary on the trinity.
Lonergan considers the traditional Scholastic view of person to be enriched by modern genetic biology and psychology, and here, I suggest, he takes up Strawson's proposal of finding an explanation of our basic conceptual scheme in "the natural facts". The following is Lonergan's own summary: "From the 'we' of the parents comes the symbiosis of mother and child. From the 'we' of the parents and the symbiosis of mother and child comes the 'we' of the family. Within the 'we' of the family emerges the 'I' of the child. In other words the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community through the intersubjective relations that are the life of community that there arises the differentiation of the individual person."

It follows that 'person' is never a general term. It always denotes this or that person with all of his or her individual characteristics resulting from the communities in which he has lived and through which he has been formed and has formed himself. The person is the resultant of the relationships he has had with others and of the capacities that have developed in him to relate to others."

Perhaps more should be said. When he asked the question, "what it is in the natural facts that make it intelligible that we should have this concept" (of a person), Strawson added, "and to ask this question in the hope of a non-trivial answer", adding in a footnote, "I mean, in the hope of an answer which does not merely say: Well, there are people in the world" [398]. The Lonergan 'answer' I have quoted gains greatly in depth by standing foursquare with Lonergan's theory of knowing. For Lonergan's division of the process of coming to know into three component stages or moments smashes the notion of the subject-world relationship that has dominated Western philosophy since Descartes. In doing so, it destroys the problem of different meanings having to be attached to selfascriptive and other-ascriptive propositions. If Jones says, "I am in pain", and Smith says, "Jones is in pain", they can be understood as meaning the same thing; the location of the speaker with reference to the object to which pain is ascribed is no longer so significant. If knowing were simply experiencing then the location of the speaker would make a great deal of difference; this is not so when knowing is understood as experiencing, understanding and judging. In so far as Jones is correct in saying, "I am in pain", he is simply affirming his understanding of
the data of which he has immediate experience. Smith's judgment, "Jones is in pain", is also the affirmation of an understanding founded on the data of which he has immediate experience. It does not matter whether the data anyone has immediate experience of is relevant to his own state or someone else's.

The shift from knowing-as-observing to knowing as experiencing-understanding-judging also breaks down the isolation of the knower. Man the knower is no longer seen as standing in glorious isolation over against a world of reality "out there" in space and time, as he is conceived by Descartes and Hume (albeit Hume failed to find such a subject of consciousness when he looked inside himself. It was because he continued to work within this scheme that Russell too had difficulties in locating the ego.). Man is an experiencing, understanding and judging subject. As experiencing he is already in the world, a body among bodies, umbilically linked through his senses to what is going on both horizontally -- across contemporary society -- and vertically -- down through the ages that have passed. He is there, inserted into the flux of events, being acted upon by his environment. In the field of knowledge he takes over the concepts and ways of thinking embedded in his language and the intellectual tradition and folk wisdom he inherits. But he is not merely formed by his society; he has the pleasure, occasionally, of contributing to the stock of knowledge, of adding to the conceptual scheme of things, perhaps, in some rare cases, of challenging it and transforming it radically in some particular area. There is then a reciprocity of consciousness between the individual and society without which neither could exist. It is impossible to define society without reference to the individual and impossible to define the individual without reference to society: the two are fused in a relation of symbiosis.

If Lonergan and Strawson can be seen to be saying the same or very similar things about what it means to speak about 'persons', it is interesting to note that they do so from two distinct philosophical standpoints. If my introductory remarks are to the point, Strawson can be seen, in conjunction with many other British and Anglo-Saxon philosophers, to have found in the close attention to how language actually is used a way round many of the puzzles and epistemological oddities generated within the dominant tradition by the
conception of knowing as perceiving or observing or the like. By turning to language many of the puzzles and oddities can be resolved. Lonergan does not depend on language in this way. He would claim to go beyond language to that which language mediates. That being so, it is not surprising that his position is in basic agreement on many points with those philosophers, like Strawson, who actually attend to how language is used as opposed to those others who smuggle the old tenets of the classical European philosophies into contemporary discourse under the guise of something called 'language'.

NOTES


3 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27 ff.

One of the distinct pleasures of living in the Boston area is the possibility of hearing so many of the great and near-great lecture at the seemingly numberless colleges and universities in the vicinity. One of the most distinguished lecture series is Boston University's on philosophy and religion. Fortunately, these lectures are being published, somewhat belatedly it is true; but for the most part, the calibre of the talks and the speakers is such that the contents of the volumes are not dated. This is especially the case perhaps with this inaugural volume of the series.

Lonergan's little talk, "Reality, Myth, Symbol," was delivered at a delightful afternoon session where he was featured along with the amiable and idiosyncratic sage, John Findlay. Lonergan's six-page essay -- not the shortest contribution, mind you (Mason took the honors for brevity with four pages!) -- is one of those gems that anyone can appreciate, but Lonergan scholars will treasure. It is packed. Two pages on the problem of reality feature the role played by the immanent criteria of the knowing subject in determining what is meant by the term, reality. Next, two pages on the place of myth in which L. begins by elucidating the meaning of story (myth) in the actuation of conscious intentionality and then considers symbol in that context as "a more elementary type of story." Finally, two pages under the heading "Toward Fourfold Conversion" where, instead of trying to 'prove' his views on the topic, L. simply tells "something of the story by which I arrived at my views."

This third section, however, is not just a summary of "Insight Revisited," for in each instance where L. does retail
what he said in that earlier rendition of the story, he tells us something new, whether he is talking about J. A. Stewart on Plato or Peter Hoenen on the Moebius strip. Even the condensed account of the way from Insight to Method in Theology, with its contrast between what de Grandmaison and Lebreton had accomplished in terms of apologetics and the need for critical history both on the level of performance and of a methodical account, is illuminating indeed. Then the recapitulation of what Method in Theology is on about leads into L.'s clearest published comments on what he so appreciates about the work of Robert Doran in terms of a fourth conversion—left unnamed—in the domain of the imaginal. This latter includes a quite neat summary of at least some of what L. finds suggestive in the work of Ira Progoff.

Progoff was also helpful to L. in the middle section as well. L. uses him to elaborate the dynamism of human being as being-in-the-world and of Bergson's élan vital, yet another expression of what he has spoken of elsewhere in terms of vertical finality and the 'quasi-operator'. (This language, incidentally, is quite typical of L.'s speech in the mid- and late seventies.) Not the least important of L.'s apercus in this section is his distinction between story and cover story. Together with Method's notion of ideology, I find this a significant contribution to foundational categories.

This last-mentioned distinction brings us back to the section on reality, where we note L.'s utter lack of reluctance to talk yet again about his own first philosophical principles rooted in the reality of our own nature: our ability to raise questions. Relentless fidelity to these principles, I believe, is manifest in L.'s own retracing of the path by which he, like Aristotle before him, has become "more a friend of myths," without any trace of naïveté about their "basic ambiguity": a foundational need in philosophy and theology today.

Besides the brief meditations of Herbert Mason and Elie Wiesel, the other essays in the volume are out of the solidly scholarly mold. Jacques Waardenburg gives an account of interdisciplinary approaches to myth and symbol; while Alan Olson provides a synoptic overview of the approach of hermeneutic phenomenology: Cassirer, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Jaspers, et al. Harold Oliver, also sympathetic with hermeneutic phenomenology, shows what an extremely intelligent person who is not a critical realist might do with the volume's theme by
moving into a relational ontology. Three of the pieces are more specialized: Dennis Tedlock on Indian religion, a field in which he is an expert; Howard Kee, who is a New Testament scholar in control not only of philological tools but those of the sociology of knowledge, takes up Egyptian, Hellenistic, and Johannine views on myth and miracle; and John Findlay, author of a rather unorthodox book on Plato, on the myths of Plato.

Hans-Georg Gadamer's talk on "Religious and Poetic Speaking" is neither a specially composed contribution nor a meditation; but it is a product of Gadamer's years-long and painstaking attempt to specify the bearing of his hermeneutic phenomenology by applying it to the diverse kinds of linguistic performance, especially in what he calls eminent texts. Religious and poetic speech are two major divisions within the overall linguistic field. As the volume, Poetica, the second volume of his Kleine Schriften, and the outstanding Celan interpretation, Wer bin Ich, Wer bist Du? attest to, Gadamer, is a sensitive and genial construer of poetry; and we get a taste of this in this article. But I found most fascinating his erudite comparisons of the hermeneutic significance of the relative unimportance of religious texts in Greek religion and the importance of texts in Christianity.

The volume as a whole is ably edited by Alan Olson, who has provided an introduction and indices.

Fred Lawrence
Boston College


My first response to a new introductory text in world religions is a question -- Why yet another? What makes a particular text unique in a field inundated with such introductions, many of which have proven over time to be quite effective? And if a text is written by scholars familiar with Lonergan's thought, as is the case with Ways to the Center -- both authors have completed dissertations on Lonergan, and their recent work betrays an awareness of, if not a reliance on, Lonergan's methodological perspective -- the question may be posed in this way: does Lonergan's thought inform the authors' orientation to the material and the categories by which they organize the vast data on world
religions in a way that sets this text off from more standard approaches like, e.g., the historical survey used by Noss, the thematic approach of Streng, et al., or the comparative study developed by W. C. Smith? Well, yes and no.

Although Lonergan's name is mentioned only once in the text (269, in reference to trinitarian developments) and his work is cited only four times in the notes, 'Lonerganian' language -- e.g., "incarnate spirit", "natural desire to know", 'interiority', etc. -- is found throughout. The most conspicuous use of Lonergan is found in the Introduction. Readers are invited to follow the transcendental imperatives and to be attentive, intelligent, reflective and decisive in their study. But more significantly, the authors base the formal organization of the individual chapters (with the exception of those in the first part on the ancient mind) on Lonergan's account of cognitional structure. Each chapter begins with a section entitled 'Appearance', usually a two page contemporary vignette of the tradition to be discussed; corresponding to experience animated by wonder, this section is designed to solicit the reader's attention. There follows a lengthy section on 'History', a comprehensive interpretation of the origins and development of a religion, which is said to correspond to understanding and judgment wherein the mind "works to grasp and affirm reality" [10]. Each chapter concludes with a consideration of how a religion forms its worldview; entitled "Structural Analysis", it directs the reader to decision or response by analyzing each tradition in terms of the 'fundamentals' [91] or categories (apparently derived from Voegelin [77, 91]) of Nature, Society, Self, and the one from which the others 'emanate' [131], Divinity.

The text proper contains three parts: Ancient Religions (three chapters), Asian Religions (four chapters), and Near Eastern Religions (three chapters). The content of these chapters and the sources cited are relatively standard. One facet of the Carmodys' presentation, however, deserves mention -- their use of a notion derived from Eric Voegelin's work, that of breaking with "the cosmological myth" [64, 67, and elsewhere]. Although they do so somewhat inconsistently, and only sparingly in the third part, this use is a feature that makes the text unique and akin to Lonergan themes, particularly those of interiority and the ongoing discovery of mind.
The text suggests that the cosmological myth is broken to the extent that nature and divinity are sufficiently differentiated in a tradition. Thus, in their account of the ancient mind, the Carmody's refer to Zoroastrianism's shift from nature to interiority, from cosmos to the "inner light of human conscience" [73] as a new religious development and the first step toward breaking the myth; and to Greece's concentration on logos over mythos as a "quantum leap in the search for divinity" [87] and as the "climax of ancient efforts to discern how human spirit is consubstantial ('of the same stuff') with God" [78]. In the discussion of the East in Part II the authors contend that the emphasis in these traditions on psychology, interiority, and the "soul-cleansing" powers of the divine [108] constitutes a partial break with the cosmological myth, but that the break is never finally managed because of an equal emphasis on harmony, the subordination of divinity to nature, and the failure to develop an extra-cosmological authority. The traditions discussed in Part II, the "ethical monotheistic" religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, seem to break more comprehensively with the myth; important here are the doctrines of creatio ex nihilo, the transcendent yet interactive and revealing deity, and the affirmation of the possibility of individual participation in the divine.

The use of Vögelin's notion regarding the cosmological myth at times seems to impose criteria on which non-Western thought can only come up short; the authors thus sometimes unduly stress negative features of the tradition as, e.g., with the absence of the notion of creation from nothing in Hinduism [123] or with the failure of Chinese religion to develop a 'sophisticated' (equals Western?) sense of history or philosophy [197]. For the most part, however, this approach is helpful. I have drawn attention to its place in the text because it illustrates what I detect as the Carmody's concern to thematize religious interiority and to an extent the foundations for an intra-religious dialogue. Significant here, e.g., is their definition of religion as "mystery working" [6], "mystery held meaning", and 'ultimacy' [10], and their view that the "dialectic of unity and difference" [341] perceived in world religions stems from the fact that individual religions are "but ways to the Center" [10] corresponding to the mysterious center of oneself where "authentic religion offers all of us our best names" [xiii]. Unfortunately, this
feature is not significantly developed by the authors. In this regard, their chapter organization along the lines of Lonergan's cognitional analysis and functional specialization remains more of a formal structure; their discussion in the final analysis is not significantly different from that of other texts that consist of anecdotal examples (Appearance), historical surveys (History) and limited comparisons (Structural Analysis). It is not surprising, therefore, that faith and the religious person, the focus suggested by the Carmody's emphasis on the personalist dimensions of religious studies and Lonergan's method, is lost in what emerges as the delineation of the religious system, the 'ism' of a faith's cumulative tradition (W. C. Smith).

Ways to the Center more than lives up to what the Carmody's present it as: a text suited for an introductory level course in religious studies. The text is well-designed, readable and well documented, and their discussion raises contemporary and methodological issues. (Be advised that Wadsworth has recently issued this text in two separate paper editions, one on eastern, the other on western "ways to the center"). Readers seeking a distinctively methodical introduction to religious studies, however, will have to continue to look elsewhere.

Philip Boo Riley
University of Santa Clara


Professor Long introduces this collection of essays with a problem and a plausible solution. The problem is the impasse between a rationalist approach to religion and an experiential one. This antagonism between reason and experience has prompted Basil Mitchell to observe that supposedly "Either God is at best an inferred entity and faith in God is no more than acceptance of an hypothesis; or God is an experienced reality about which rational doubt is, at least for the one who experiences, impossible" [2]. Long's remedy for this impasse is to see experience not as the subjective reception of sense data but as an intentional relatedness to other persons and things. We are immersed in a tradition and history which afford us
METHOD

rational standards for assessing experience. Thus, the gap between reason and experience is not insurmountable.

How well do Long's dozen essayists contribute to this solution?Surprisingly well, it seems, given their widely varying starting points.

John Smith directly advances Long's agenda. Religion is in disarray, in part, because the 'firmament' of religious life, that is, its medium of expression, is no longer provided by classical metaphysics. After cataloguing inadequate efforts to provide a new 'logos' for religion, Smith proposes the category of experience. He means neither the narrow experience of 'empiricism' nor the select experiences of the mystic. Rather he has in mind, and usefully illustrates, a notion of experience as "a distinct level of reality which emerges at the interface of ... what there is to be met and an intelligent, sign-using creature" [18].

At the core of religious experience, Hywel Lewis next argues, is the cognitive insight into the being of God. This experience, in turn, provides an evaluational referent for our broader experience, thus permeating our lives at both the individual and cultural levels. Unfortunately, Lewis's diffuse discussion does not take us much farther.

The careful description of religious experience is, John Macquarrie contends, critical. Phenomenologically, religious experience takes the person beyond self, thus bypassing empiricism's egocentric predicament, and shows an ultimacy that resists reduction. Moreover, it is theism, he urges, that best accounts for such experience. But atheists, too, sometimes appeal to the living experience of Godlessness; and theistic experience is possibly deceptive. So reflective experience itself drives us to "the way of argument." Yet once we become immersed in "theistic proofs" we find, in turn, that the real accessibility of their premisses depends on religious experience.

Thomas Langan's welcome focus is on experience as tradition. It is, he points out, the nature of tradition to unite theoretical and practical knowledge. It is a web of the rational and the experiential which more or less successfully supports the individual process of 'appropriation' in biblical religion.

The interplay of faith and reason in Aquinas is Frederick Crosson's starting point. Must faith have rationally demon-
strated 'preambles'? Yes, if we speak of the logical preconditions of its articles; no, if we speak of existential acts of belief. Indeed, reason typically follows faith. 'Proof' is retrospective, relative to a context of experience, as even the history of science shows. Crosson's concluding definition of faith, "an act of rational assent to what is heard," is, however, dubious. For it leaves open the question of why one supposes that one has, indeed, heard anything.

Bowman Clarke takes his lead from Kant and Peirce. Classical theistic arguments are not distinct arguments reaching a single conclusion. So far Kant is correct. But what, then, is their role? The argument from design serves as an heuristic model which provides us with an hypothesis. The ontological argument, in turn, explicates 'God' in a theoretical context. Then, following Peirce's intriguing suggestion, the cosmological argument can be seen as offering a general theory of reality from which the existence of God is deducible. Clarke's discussion is thematically supplemented by Frank Dilley's useful contrast between cosmological arguments that start from the bare existence of a world and those starting from the existence of a world exhibiting -- and so the believer experiences it -- purposive motion. Science's experience of the cosmos and how justification in science compares with justification in theology is Frederick Ferre's subject. His inquiry, however, is shaped by a problematic treatment of knowledge as an ideal limit of warranted assurance.

James Ross, in the spirit of Augustine, next explores Isaiah's text "Unless you believe you will not understand." Ross's chief interest is in "ego-situated religious knowledge," i.e., a knowing that results from one's "religious conceptual sets." The claim: unless you have certain dispositions (pre-theoretic beliefs), you will not understand (gain theoretical knowledge). Thus, if we see these pre-theoretic dispositions as the product of experience, reason is again linked with, rather than played off against, experience.

William Alston's graceful contribution is an argument against irreducible metaphor in theology. Particularly cogent is his case that if "pan-metaphoricism" is accepted, theology collapses, since any piece of "God-talk" has as good credentials as any other. What Alston's impressive argument contributes, however, to the larger theme of these essays is unclear. The import of experience re-emerges, though, in Louis Dupre's piece on negative theology, a re-emergence hampered by his
yen for paradox. The thesis, roughly, is that we best approach God not by looking for that which 'images' God but rather by openness to His presence. The experience of mystics as well as modernity's divorce from natural symbols of the sacred are enlisted in support of this thesis. Kenneth Schmitz, however, is more optimistic about the role of "natural imagery" that permeates the experience of biblical religion. Nature is not sterile. Indeed, Schmitz sees both natural and conventional signs as grounded in transcendent reality. Still, with Dupre, he argues that the natural order is 'like' the Creator not as image but by a "presencing of cause to effect."

A final note: Experience, Reason and God would be suitable for use in courses for advanced undergraduates and graduate students.

James G. Hanink
Loyola Marymount University

Theology and Discovery: Essays in honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.

In March 1979 Marquette University awarded Karl Rahner its Pere Marquette Discovery Medal and sponsored a three-day symposium in his honor. This book contains Rahner's brief acceptance speech, the eleven symposium papers, and two responses to each paper. Six of the main presentations are on topics not directly related to Rahner's thought, while the remaining five are studies of some aspect of Rahner's philosophy or theology. In his Preface the editor claims to have arranged the papers in an overall theological order. I failed to understand just what that order might be, and so I am providing a different arrangement for purposes of this review. Accordingly, I will discuss briefly the six papers not directly related to Rahner's thought, four papers touching Rahnerian themes, and finally the one paper on Rahner's method in theology. Space limitations prevent me from dealing with the twenty-two responses to the papers, except to note that the respondents include Bernard Lonergan, Matthew Lamb, David Tracy, and Joseph Komonchak.

Both George Muschalek and Jon Sobrino offer reflections on the conditions for the possibility of experiencing God in the world of today. Muschalek argues for the possibility of experiencing God as God in our immediate experience of world and community. Sobrino goes a step further by insisting
that it is the community of the poor that carries the reality of Godly Mystery in history.

Thomas Ommen and Leo O'Donovan discuss aspects of theological understanding. Omnen defends the thesis that faith is not a prerequisite to theological understanding. O'Donovan insists that theological understanding, if it is to take seriously historical change, must first come to grips with natural change: it is possible to reach a deeper understanding of both nature and history by considering both from the scientific standpoint of evolution, complemented by such philosophical considerations as Lonergan's notion of finality.

John Sheehan's concern is with historical judgment as crucial to determining the shape and value of the scriptural Canon. He argues that it is the living faith community that is the judge or canon of scriptural content, for genuine authority resides only in the community of believers who recognize in the Bible a fundamentally religious message to be interpreted differently in different historical contexts.

Bruno Schüller enters the debate on whether or not there is a specifically Christian ethics, a distinctive manner of responsible decision-making flowing from life in Christ. He makes a distinction: there is a specifically Christian paraklesis (moral admonition and moral rebuke) that stands or falls with belief in Christ -- for belief always is rooted in historical events; but there is no such thing as a specifically Christian normative ethics, inasmuch as normative ethics is concerned with finding out whether and why a contemplated course of action is morally good or bad, right or wrong: and normative ethics flows, not from some revelation from God, but rather from the constitution of the human subject as human -- it is to be objectified and clarified by a philosophical ethics rooted in the truth of human existence.

Of the foregoing papers, I found Thomas Omnen's to be of most interest simply because of my own concern with method in theology. Each of the six essays is important in itself, but Omnen raises the foundational issue of theological pre-understanding and invokes the work of Pannenberg and Tracy, among others, to justify his stand that faith is not prerequisite to theological reflection. He defends a basically Kantian position and as well seems to confuse 'faith' and 'belief', leaving him with a notion of theology rooted in theory rather than in method.
Turning now to four authors reflecting on aspects of Rahner's thought, I suggest that the reader begin with Gerald McCool's essay about Rahner's place in the Thomist tradition. The link with that tradition is placed in Rahner's foundational theology that begins with the mystery of human life grounded in the Mystery we call God. The break with that tradition is occasioned by the new cultural context of modern philosophy, modern science, and modern historical scholarship -- a context largely ignored by the neo-scholastic revival of the nineteenth century. McCool notes Rahner's pessimism about the possibility of unity in contemporary theology, given the pluralism of philosophical horizons -- a pessimism, I might add, that underpins Rahner's scepticism about Lonergan's hope for a unifying method in theology. An otherwise good historical essay by McCool is somewhat marred by his conclusion that a main value of Rahner's theology is that it "directs the believer's attention away from the vast amount of objective knowledge about which no agreement is possible and focuses it on his own fundamental experience of himself and God. This, after all, is where the action is in human life" [91]. Such solipsism and cultural insensitivity does not do justice to Rahner's intentions, as I have elsewhere argued in setting forth the complementarity of the notion of foundational theology in Rahner and Lonergan.

Johannes Metz offers an essay in dialectic, contrasting Rahner's transcendental theology with universal-historical theology (Pannenberg, etc.) and with political theology (Metz, etc.). The dialectic succeeds inasmuch as Metz clearly summarizes the three key hermeneutical components of any theology worth its salt: critical historical consciousness, rootedness in Godly Mystery, and sensitivity to concrete practical issues in the human community. But the dialectic breaks down in Metz' option for a theology that would interpret both history and faith in the light of current societal/cultural conditions. I believe it is precisely those conditions, historically evolved, that are in need of foundational critique from within a religious horizon. In a word, Metz' hermeneutic concern is quite valid, but he insists on bypassing the methodical turn to the religious subject in history. The question here is whether 'foundations' is foundational (Rahner, Lonergan), or 'communications' is foundational (Metz).

Harvey Egan offers a splendid essay on the precise meaning of Rahner's foundational theology. He adequately locates
the mysticism demanded of the theologian involved in foundational theology, though he leaves unanswered the crucial question of the language articulating foundational categories. A clue to such articulation is offered by Avery Dulles, who sets forth the genesis of authentic insight whereby religious conviction goes public in history. Dulles's essay would be quite useful to anyone concerned with bridging the gap between foundational and doctrinal theology, for insight is the crucial operation here, just as it is in all of the theological specialties.

There is a fifth essay on Rahner's work -- by William Dych, who discusses Rahner's method in theology. I found this paper to be the most inadequate in this otherwise provocative volume. Perhaps the central problem in Dych's paper is his equation of 'consciousness' and 'knowledge', leading him to set up an opposition between the theological methods of Rahner and Lonergan. Rahner's appeal to the conscious, purely experiential subject grounded in Mystery is, for Dych, an appeal to the fullness of human subjectivity: any conceptualization or objectification of this subject is inevitably partial, incomplete, and quite secondary to this experiential immediacy. In contrast, says Dych, is Lonergan's focus on the explicit and thematic experience of God. Fr. Dych goes to great pains to show how these two approaches to theologizing are complementary, rather than dialectically opposed; but in doing so he ignores both the conceptualization involved in Rahner's "first level of reflection" as well as Lonergan's insistence on the priority of the conscious, purely experiential subject grounded in Mystery.

Dych's essay is profoundly accurate in drawing attention to Rahner's concern with the pre-conceptual religious subject and to Lonergan's concern with the process of conceptualization to this subject. But the "missing link" between Rahner and Lonergan is not adequately identified by Dych. I would suggest that Rahner's hermeneutic needs a grounding in a thematized method, while Lonergan's methodical grounding needs a thematized hermeneutic. It is not that Rahner has ignored method, but rather that he has not adequately articulated it; it is not that Lonergan has ignored hermeneutics, but rather that he has not adequately articulated it. And such is the possibility of future dialogue between the two thinkers.
Taken as a whole, Theology and Discovery is an eloquent witness to the foundational issues confronting philosophy and theology at the present time. The contributors to this volume attack these foundational issues, both philosophically (the meaning of religious experience, religious understanding, religious responsibility), and, drawing especially on Rahner, theologically (the questions of canonicity, dialectic, faith/revelation, and doctrines). When read in the order here reviewed, the many essays take the reader from passionate involvement with a world in need of God towards a world passionately needing to know its already experienced involvement with God, thanks to the genius of Karl Rahner and of the participants in the Marquette symposium.

But perhaps the best commentary on the book should come from Lonergan. He concluded his remarks after Dych’s paper by observing, "Besides the inner gift of the spirit, there is the sensible spectacle of Christ on the cross. With those steps we are already into Christian Theology" [57]. Rahner's work is a living testament of what it means to be united with the crucified Jesus in the spirit; Lonergan's work is a living testament to what it means to inquire about the conditions of the possibility of being united with the crucified Lord in the spirit. With Rahner we are already into Christian Theology; with Lonergan we are already into just what that Christian theologizing can and should become.

Michael C. O'Callaghan
Marist College