Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

Institutional Subscription (yearly) ....................... $20.00
Individual Subscription (yearly) ....................... $12.00

Orders Prepaid in U.S. Funds Only

A biannual journal, Method is published in March and October. Contributors are requested to follow the University of Chicago Manual of Style in preparing manuscripts. Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor and all other correspondence to the manager, Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 90045.

Copyright Policy: All materials published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies are copyrighted by Method. Submission of an article to Method entails the author's agreement to assign the copyright to Method. Articles, Dialogues, Notes, and Book Reviews appearing in Method may be reproduced for research purposes, for personal reference, and for classroom use without special permission and without payment of a fee. This permission does not extend to copying for general distribution and for the creation of collected works or anthologies. These and all other rights are reserved.

Method is sustained by Loyola Marymount University

ISSN: 0736-7392

Cover Design by W. Hew Elcock

Copyright 1984 by METHOD
METHOD
Journal of Lonergan Studies

CONTENTS

THE MEDIATION OF CHRIST IN PRAYER . . . Bernard Lonergan 1

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION: A LONERGANIAN MEANING AND USE . . . . . . Frederick E. Crowe 21

Dialogue:
ON LEARNING FROM AN ERROR: A RESPONSE TO VERNON GREGSON . . . . . . Terry J. Tekippe 41

Book Reviews:
Lester C. Thurow, Dangerous Currents -- The State of Economics
Reviewed by Eileen de Neeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

John C. Kelly, A Philosophy of Communication
Reviewed by Garrett Barden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
IN THIS ISSUE OF METHOD

The notion of mediation holds a central position in Lonergan's Method in Theology. It pertains directly to fundamental distinctions between differentiations of consciousness, worlds, stages in cultural development, lower and higher cultures, classical and modern culture, and the two phases of theology itself. In brief, the notion of mediation is a constituent part of the nest of terms surrounding Lonergan's notion of meaning. Lonergan's interest in mediation seems to have emerged circa 1962-63, and in the previously unpublished lecture "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer" [1963] we find, worked out in detail, a realist notion of mediation with a generality comparable to that of the notion employed by Hegel.

In "Transcendental Deduction: A Lonerganian Meaning and Use" F. E. Crowe has undertaken a preparatory study of Lonergan's manner of arguing from transcendental premises on the basis afforded by the isomorphism of the knowing and the known. By means of an exploration of the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics and the derivations of the canons of empirical method and the two phases of theology, Crowe uncovers two distinguishable sorts of transcendental deduction, one pertaining to the structural side of consciousness and the other to its historical aspect or ongoing character, and asks whether, in Lonergan's view, one may conclude in greater detail, by transcendental deduction, to patterns in historical process.


My topic is the mediation of Christ in prayer. But, before turning directly to this issue, it will be necessary to introduce a number of basic terms and analogies. We shall consider (1) the general notion of mediation, (2) mutual mediation, (3) self-mediation under the three headings of (a) self-mediation by physical parts, or displacement upwards, (b) self-mediation by consciousness, or displacement inwards, and (c) self-mediation by self-consciousness, or deliberate transposition of center. We shall turn finally to a consideration of the mediation of Christ in prayer as a kind of mutual self-mediation.

1. Mediation in General

The notion of mediation was used by Aristotle within the field of logic. He distinguished first principles that are immediate and conclusions that are mediated by a middle term between the subject and the predicate. In the Posterior Analytics he states that syllogism proves an attribute of a subject through a middle term. A first principle admits no middle term because it cannot be proved. Things that are proved, are proved insofar as a middle term is inserted between the subject and the attribute. So, for example: All men are mortal. Why? Because what is composite, what is put together, can come apart. All men are composite, consisting of parts. Consequently, they can come apart, and their coming apart in a bad way is dying. The middle term 'compositeness' explains why the predicate 'mortal' is found in the subject 'man'. The middle term mediates between subject and attribute. Again, in the middle term the attribute is non-mediated, immediate, amessos. Where there is a concluded attribute predicated of the subject, the attribute is mediated in the subject.

In Hegel, an idealist philosophy immediately extends the notion of mediation to everything. Roughly: Concepts are related immediately or mediately; everything reduces to concepts; therefore, everything is related immediately
or mediately. Everything aspires to the level of the Begriffe; consequently, the relations between concepts are found in an imperfect form on an inferior level in everything else, as processes towards the concept. In Hegel the notion of mediation takes on a universal role.¹

We shall use the word 'mediation' in a universal way, as did Hegel; but we shall do so without presuppositions of an idealism. Our assumption shall be that the usage of the words 'immediate', 'mediate' and 'mediated' in Aristotle can be generalized. For example, in Aristotelian logic the first principles are necessary, evident, and true. In them necessity, evidence, and truth are immediate. While necessity, evidence, and truth are found in the conclusions, still it is a mediated necessity, a mediated evidence, a mediated truth. If we generalize the Aristotelian notion of the immediate and the mediated, then any factor, quality, property, feature, aspect, that has a source, origin, ground, basis, and consequences, effects, derivatives, a field of influence, radiation, expansion, an expression, manifestation, revelation, outcome, may be said to be immediate in the source, origin, ground, basis, and mediated in its consequences, effects, derivatives, outcome, in its field of influence, radiation, expansion, in its expression, manifestation, revelation.

Under the influence of this generalization the notion of mediation becomes an extremely vague notion, even more general than the notion of causality. But its significance arises not in that vagueness, which remains merely material, but in the patterning that the notion of mediation itself can accept. The significance lies in the distinctions we shall draw between mediation in general, mutual mediation, self-mediation in its three forms, and mutual self-mediation. Again, when we use the word 'mediation' we are not settling anything specific, or even anything determinately generic. We are using a very general expression that distinguishes between a source, an origin, a ground, a basis, and whatever results from it. The interest in settling specifics will be addressed when we proceed to the further notions of mutual mediation, self-mediation, and mutual self-mediation. To give these terms some meaning, then, we shall proceed to examples.
The examples we shall offer to illustrate mediation in general will be of four types: mechanical, organic, psychic, and logical.

**A Mechanical Example**

In a watch, movement is immediate in the mainspring. Provided the watch is wound, the mainspring keeps things moving. The movement of the other parts is mediated by the mainspring, and their movement brings to light the function of the mainspring which is to move itself and the other parts. But, besides movement, there is control. It is not enough for a watch to be going; it also has to keep time. For it to keep time there is need of a control, and this function of control is immediate in the balance wheel and mediated in the subsequent series, the wheels and levers that are controlled by the balance wheel. The balance wheel is the source of control for itself with some approximation to a simple harmonic motion with a constant period, and that constancy is transmitted from the balance wheel through the gate and escapement to the other parts of the watch.

**An Organic Example**

The supply of fresh oxygen is immediate in the respiratory system but mediated in the rest of the body. The flow of blood is immediate in the heart; the central pump is the reason for the circulation of the blood. But the flow is mediated in the arteries and veins, for the source of the flow is elsewhere. Nutrition is immediate in the digestive system, mediated in the rest of the body. Locomotion is immediate in the muscles and mediated in the rest of the body. Control is immediate in the nervous system, mediated in the rest of the body.

**A Psychic Example**

What is immediate in intelligence (or will, or senses, or imagination, or memory, or affectivity, or aggressivity) is mediated throughout the rest of consciousness and in bodily manifestations. Anger, one may say, is immediate in what moderns call aggressivity (the medieval *irascibile*). But anger is not only in aggressivity (considered as an organic part with the psychic correspondent) but is mediated in the eyes, look, voice, jutting jaw, raised arm, forward step, violent images, one-track thinking, vigor of will of the angry man. It is immediate in aggressivity, but it is mediated
in the rest of consciousness and in bodily manifestations.

A Logical Example

Finally, to revert to Aristotle, truth, evidence, and necessity are immediate in first principles. They are there not because of something else but because of the nature of first principles themselves. But truth, evidence, and necessity are mediated in all conclusions.

We have defined and illustrated the general notion of mediation. Again, the interest of the term 'mediation' does not lie in its generality but in further complications. Accordingly, we move on to the notion of mutual mediation, the notion of the functional whole.

2. Mutual Mediation: The Functional Whole

A functional whole is constituted by mutually mediating parts. Again we shall illustrate on different levels.

A Mechanical Example

A watch is both a material and a functional whole. As a material whole, it is the case and what is in the case. As a functional whole, it is what the watch does, keeping time. To keep time, the watch must be moving, and it must be moving at a constant rate. The function of movement is immediate in the mainspring and mediated in the rest of the works. The function of control, of steady movement, of constant rate, is immediate in the balance wheel and mediated in the rest of the works. The two functions mediate each other. The balance wheel controls itself and the mainspring. The mainspring moves itself and the balance wheel. This is a case of mutual mediation. The functional whole is so constructed that there are different centers of immediacy and the mediations of different immediate centers overlap. So it is that a watch doesn't merely move or merely keep time but it does both. It has a constant movement and, consequently, that is keeping time. By a mutual mediation a principle of movement and a principle of control are combined, and we have a functional whole that closes in on itself. Two immediate functions mediate each other.

An Organic Example

An organism is a material whole, the skin and what is inside it. It is a functional whole, a case of mutual mediation. And it is alive. For the moment we are concerned only with the functional whole. Accordingly, insofar as we consider
an organism not \textit{qua} alive but as a functional whole we find it to be an example of mutual mediation. The respiratory system supplies fresh oxygen not merely to the lungs but to the whole body. The digestive system supplies nutrition not merely to the digestive tract but to the whole body. The nervous system supplies control not merely to the nervous system but to the whole body. The muscles supply locomotion not merely to the muscles but to the whole body. The result is something that has fresh oxygen, is fed, is under control, and is moving, because there is a number of immediate centers and from each center there flows over the whole the consequences of that center. The whole organism (the sum of its parts, organs) has fresh oxygen from the respiratory system, nutrition from the digestive and vascular systems, local motion from the muscles, control from the nervous system. Each function of the organism is immediate in some organ or set of organs and mediated in the rest of the organs. If the immediate functions are $A$, $B$, $C$, $D$, $E$, \ldots and the mediated functions are respectively $a$, $b$, $c$, $d$, $e$, \ldots, then mutual mediation implies that $A$ is $abcde$ \ldots, $B$ is $abcde$ \ldots, $C$ is $abcde$ \ldots, $D$ is $abcde$ \ldots, and $E$ is $abcde$ \ldots.

\textbf{A Psychic Example}

We have said that anger is immediate in one's aggressivity but mediated in one's voice, look, eyes, jaw, raised arm, step forward, rancorous memories, violent images, one-track thinking, vigor of will. But the mediation is mutual, because what one sees, feels, remembers, imagines, thinks, wills, feeds one's anger. The anger grows and one tends towards an explosion. There is a mutual mediation or a feedback from the results of the anger to its causes.

\textbf{A Logical Example}

In Aristotelian logic there is one immediate and everything else is mediated. Necessity, evidence, truth are immediate in first principles and mediated in conclusions. But in empirical science there are two immediates. Empirical science is empirical through its attention to data; it is science through inquiry, insights, hypotheses, deductions from hypotheses, processes of verification, and so on. The scientific element is immediate in intellectual effort and work, in the inquiries, insights, hypotheses, and deductions.
The empirical element is immediate in data. There are two principles of immediacy, and the result is a compound as in the watch, a compound of functions, a mutual mediation. The scientific, systematic element is immediate in the hypothesis, mediated in empirical science. The empirical element is immediate in data, mediated in empirical science.

We have illustrated mediation in general and mutual mediation. We shall turn now to the notion of self-mediation.

3. Self-Mediation: Living

We may think of self-mediation as a whole that has consequences that change the whole. Both machines and organisms are functional wholes; but machines are made while organisms grow. The growth of an organism is a self-mediation. The organism originates itself by giving rise to physical parts within itself. Such growth is a process of division, from one cell to $2^n$ cells. The process of division is governed by a finality, as is illustrated by Van Driesch's experiments on sea urchins. Van Driesch placed single cells between two plates of glass such that the division could not occur in accord with the structure of the sea urchin. He discovered that if the sea urchin was allowed to grow to the sixteen or thirty-two cell stage, when the plates were removed it would correct the previous distortion and become a normal sea urchin. However, if the sea urchin was kept between the two plates for a longer time, it would never recover. These experiments were designed to show that there is no geometric pattern governing the way cells divide, that there is a certain finality within the organism itself.

At any stage of its growth the organism is alive at that stage and preparing later stages. As alive at that stage, it is a set of functional parts in a functional whole. There are different centers of immediacy, with the centers giving the whole all the properties of each of the centers. But as moving from one stage to another it will exhibit transitional developments, useful for a time but later disappearing. It is extremely useful for the infant, for example, to be able to feed at the breast, but it is just a transitional development. On the other hand, moving from one stage to another the organism will exhibit anticipatory developments that have no great utility at the given stage but are extremely useful or essential later on. For example, the size of the child's brain is out of proportion to the rest of its body,
but the brain does not increase in bulk the way the rest of the body does. In other words, there is something more than mutual mediation to the organism. There is the structuring which regards both functioning at the moment and future functioning.

The comparison of successive stages of the organism's growth reveals not only increase in size but a process of specialization or differentiation. What earlier is performed in rudimentary, global fashion by single parts, later is performed in a specialized, highly efficient fashion by different parts. This process of specialization and differentiation is not just a matter of greater complexity, as in a Rube Goldberg cartoon, but should involve mounting efficiency and mounting fragility. The process of specialization involves the creation and exploitation of entirely new possibilities. This displacement upwards is not merely the multiplication of cells from the single-cell stage to a later stage of 2n cells. Not only the initial cell but also the 2n cells are merely a substratum that may be renewed every seven years. The organism lives, it has a reality that is superior to the whole business of cells and their differentiation and specialization. This living is quite different in kind from the living of the single cells or the multitude of single cells. It is the living of the whole organism. A higher set of functions emerges on the renewable substratum and develops and sustains itself, as it were, on a higher level. In this self-mediation of the first kind -- the development of the organism -- there is a displacement upwards, a displacement from the one or 2n cells to the life of the organism, which is something different from the life of the cells. The telos is the self-developing and self-sustaining functional whole that develops through the development and functions through the functioning of its parts.

From the particular living thing one may shift to the larger whole of the concrete universal. One can apply the notion of mediation not only to the single organism but also to the species. The species may be said to mediate itself by the individuals. What lives, does not live alone; and what grows also dies. But the species mediates itself by reproduction. Within the genus, lower species mediate the emergence and the sustenance of higher species. Trees do not grow in desert sand but in soil; herbivorous animals
presuppose vegetative life; and carnivorous animals presuppose herbivorous animals.

4. Self-Mediation: Consciousness

We have been applying the notion of mediation to the self-mediation, the whole that becomes something different through its consequences, its outcome, its results. That emerging difference consists in a displacement upwards. But there is another type of self-mediation which is a displacement inwards, the displacement from the living of the tree to the living of the animal. This displacement inwards is consciousness. The organism mediates itself by developing physical parts and functioning by the functioning of the parts. The animal mediates itself not only organically but also intentionally. We shall attempt to indicate what is meant by the intentional by considering the intentional element and then the intentional summation.

The Intentional Element

The intentional element consists of three parts or aspects: the act of intending; the intended object; the intending subject. The act of intending is any act or simultaneous set of acts that occur within consciousness. It is apprehensive in hearing, smelling, moving, seeing, touching, tasting. It is integrated over time by memory and anticipative imagination. It is dynamic by affectivity or aggressivity. The intended object is made present to the subject by the act of intending, and the subject is constituted as present to itself by the same act. The word 'presence' has been used twice, but in two different senses. One can say that the table is present in the room, and that you are present to me. But for you to be present to me, I have to be present to myself. This presence of the subject to himself is not the result of some act of introspection or reflection. The subject has to be present to himself for there to be anything within consciousness upon which one could reflect or into which one could introspect. If being conscious were simply a matter of being looked at, then one would not be conscious when one wasn't looking at oneself and one would still be unconscious when one was, because what one would look at would be something unconscious; the looking does not change its object. Consciousness is a presence of the subject to himself that is distinct from, but concomitant with, the
presence of objects to the subject. This self-presence differs from the presence of an object; it is prior to any reflexive, introspective operation; it is constitutive of the subject as subject. This is the intentional element. However, more familiar to us are the intentional summations.

The Intentional Summations

Intentional acts are summated into living, the accumulation of experience, the acquisition of skills, habits, ways of doing things. Objects are summated into situations, and the summation of situations is the environment, the world, the horizon. Subjects are summated into the intersubjectivity of community, into 'we', into the family, the swarm, the flock, the herd, the group. We apprehend together the common situation, act together in the common situation, communicate about the common situation, live a common life and share a common destiny. The summation of intentional acts, then, is threefold: (1) the summation of the acts themselves, which is one's living; (2) the summation of objects into situations, into a world; and (3) the summation of subjects into a 'we' who live together and perform all the operations of life not singly, like so many isolated monads, but as a 'we'.

The animal is an organism, but it is also conscious. Just as the self-mediation that constitutes the growth of the organism involves a displacement upwards, so the intentional order involves a displacement inwards to the subject of consciousness. Moreover, the intentional order involves an extension outwards. The tree can respond only to things that act upon it; but the animal can respond to anything it apprehends. Finally, the displacement inwards gives rise to the 'we', the intersubjective community.

5. Self-Mediation: Self-Consciousness

A third form of self-mediation is self-consciousness. Though the animal mediates itself by intentionality, still in the animal intentionality does not become autonomous. The animal lives by instinct and the instincts translate into consciousness the needs and functions of the animal. The animal does not plan, think out new plans, and jettison old plans of animal living. Its mode of living is something that is settled, as we say, by instinct, by its nature. But human development is the mediation of autonomy. The child wants to do things for himself; the boy wants to decide for himself; the adolescent wants to find out for himself. Bringing
up a child, educating a boy or girl, an adolescent, a young man or woman, is a matter of gradually enlarging the field in which a person does things for himself, decides for himself, finds out for himself. This process reaches its climax, its critical and decisive phase, when one finds out for oneself what one can make of oneself, when one decides for oneself what one is to be, when one lives in fidelity to one's self-discovery and decision. It is the existential moment that the drifter never confronts. The drifter thinks as everybody thinks, says what everybody says, does what everybody does, and so do they. The mass of unauthentic humanity lacks the courage to take the risk of thinking things out for themselves. It lacks the resoluteness that decides and the fidelity that stands by its decisions. The development that reaches its goal in the existential decision and in fidelity to that decision is the emergence of the autonomous subject.

There are, from the very nature of the case, two periods in human life. In the first, one is concerned entirely with objects, with coming to do things for oneself, to decide for oneself, to find out for oneself. This process of dealing with objects makes one what one is. Habits are developed, and one becomes a kind of man or woman by one's actions. But there is that reflective moment in which one discovers that one is not merely dealing with objects but also making oneself. There arises the question of finding out for oneself what one is to make of oneself, of deciding for oneself what one is to be, and of living in fidelity to one's decisions. By such existential commitment one disposes of oneself. The disposing is not absolute within human life. My firmest resolutions today or on New Year's Eve do not predetermine my choices during the subsequent days, weeks, months, or even minutes. My choices afterwards all remain free choices, just as if I had not made the resolutions. One has to remain faithful to one's resolutions. Again, this disposing of oneself occurs within community and particularly within the three fundamental communities -- in the mutual self-commitment of marriage, in the overarching commitment to the state, in the eschatological commitment to the Church, the Body of Christ, the New Law which is the grace of the Holy Spirit. By existential commitment one disposes of oneself, and one does so in love, in loyalty, in faith.
Human community is materially an aggregate of human beings, but formally it is an intentional reality. This intentional reality is not merely a matter of knowing but of deciding, of commitment. It is what people mean it to be. Democracy in England and democracy in the United States are not 'democracy' in exactly the same sense, because the English tradition and the American tradition are not the same. There are as many kinds of wholes as there are effective ideas of the community that are lived. To change the received idea of the community is to change the reality itself. To change not merely the effective meaning but the normative meaning is to change the possible attainment of community. The community ought to be what one ought to mean, and it is what is meant de facto by the family, the state, the Church.

Just as we extended the notion of mediation in the case of organisms to the perpetuation of the species, so we can say that the community mediates itself by its history. The community is constituted by its common sense, its common meaning, its common commitment. That common apprehension of what the community is and what being a member of the community implies, may be full, vague, sketchy, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. Living that idea gives rise to situations. If the situations that arise are unsatisfactory or deplorable, either the common sense of community is corrected or it is not, and there arises the course of history of that idea of the community. The community reveals itself to itself by its living, by its meeting its problems, by its revisions of its common sense, its common meaning, its common commitment, and by the way things work out in development and breakdown, by its growth and disintegration. By their fruits you shall know them. The history that is written about is the mediation, the revelation, of the common sense of the community; the history that is written is the fully reflective product of that self-manifestation. The two are continuous. The community reveals what it is in its living; reflection on the living itself, on its problems, its successes and its failures, reveals the quality of the common sense that constitutes the community. A written history, a history that attempts to think things out, is the fullest stage in the reflection, the manifestation, of what the community is.

As a community mediates itself by its history, so the individual mediates himself (manifests himself objectively
to others and to himself) by his living. In one's living one brings to light one's possibilities and one realizes them in one's self-commitment. One discovers the inadequacies of one's self-discovery and the reservations that cripple one's self-commitment. One is true to oneself, or falls short of one's ideals, and recovers oneself in one's repentance and fresh beginnings. The person is autonomous; he is what he has made of himself. But, because his present resolutions cannot predetermine his future decisions, he is always, until death, a piece of unfinished business. Consequently, his living is the manifestation, the mediation, of his existential decisions.

The autonomy of the individual is not the whole story. From the community he has his existence, his concrete possibilities, the constraints that hem him in, the opportunities he can seize and make the most of, the psychological, social, historical achievements and aberrations that constitute his situation. Destiny is perhaps the working out of individual autonomy within community, and so the summation of destinies in a community is the history of the community.

We have conceived of history as the mediation of the community, the manifestation of the constitutive common sense of the community. We have conceived of ruling one's life as the mediation of the existential decision by which the individual constitutes himself as autonomous, and perhaps we can conceive of individual destiny as the working out of autonomy under the conditions of human community. We are brought, then, to our final complication of the notion of mediation.

6. Mutual Self-Mediation

We have considered simple mediation, mutual mediation, and self-mediation. Simple mediation is an extremely general and tenuous notion. It is mediation from the immediate to the mediated. The immediate is any principle, origin, source, ground, basis; the mediated is any effect, consequence, result, outcome, any sphere of influence, radiation, expansion. We employed this general notion to form notions of mutual mediation and self-mediation. Mutual mediation constitutes the functional whole: there are at least two principles and each mediates the other or others. Self-mediation means that a whole has consequences that transform the whole itself, and we distinguished three levels: the displacement upwards
of organic growth; the displacement inwards of animal consciousness; the deliberate shift of center of existential commitment. But we remarked of existential decision that it occurs in community, in love, in loyalty, in faith. Just as there is a self-mediation towards autonomy, so there is a mutual self-mediation and its occasion is the encounter in all its forms (meeting, regular meeting, living together). One's self-discovery and self-commitment is one's own secret. It is not a natural property that can be predicated of all the individuals in a class. It is an idea conceived, gestated, born within one. It is known by others when one chooses to reveal it, and revealing it is an act of confidence, of intimacy, of letting down one's defenses, of entrusting oneself to another. In the process from extroversion, from being poured out on objects, to existential self-commitment, to fidelity, to destiny, we are not Leibnizian monads with neither doors nor windows; we are open to the influence of others and others are open to influence by us.

Mutual self-mediation occurs in a variety of contexts and to a greater or less extent. Meeting, falling in love, getting married is a mutual self-mediation in which, it has been said, the father becomes the head and the mother the heart of the family. There is a mutual self-mediation in the education of the infant, the child, the boy or girl, the adolescent, the young man or woman. There is a mutual self-mediation in the relationships of mother and child, father and son, brothers and sisters. There is a mutual self-mediation between equals, between brothers and sisters, between husband and wife, and between superiors and inferiors, parents and children, teachers and pupils, professors and students. There are matrices of personal relations in the neighborhood, in industry and commerce, in the professions, in local, national, and international politics. The exploration of the field of mutual self-mediation is perhaps the work of the novelist. But Hegel, in his study of the master and the slave, has given us an instance of the reversal of roles, and Gaston Fessard has provided a similar dialectic of Jew and Greek. Mutual self-mediation proves the inexhaustible theme of dramatists and novelists. It is an imponderable in education that will not show up in charts and statistics. It lies in the immediate interpersonal situation that vanishes when communication becomes indirect through books, television programs, and teaching by mail.
We have considered a long series of applications of the notion of mediation, and we have done so without dependence upon Hegelian logic with its idealist presuppositions. Our treatment rests simply upon a generalization of the notion of mediation found in Aristotle. For Aristotle, the only field in which the immediate and the mediated are distinguished, is that of necessity, evidence, and truth. By considering any factor, property, aspect to be immediate in one location and mediated in other locations, I have attempted to show how the notion of mediation can be developed into a pattern of structures. Our consideration of mediation has yielded a number of terms and analogies. We generalized Aristotle's mediation of truth, evidence, and necessity to any kind of consequence, result, manifestation. We went on to consider mutual mediation on the levels of mechanics, the organism, consciousness, and mind. We conceived three levels of self-mediation, of the whole having consequences that transform the whole. We had occasion to speak of growth, consciousness, autonomy, of displacement upwards, displacement inwards, and the consequent deliberate shift of center. We made mention of evolution, encounter, community, history, and destiny, and we have considered mutual self-mediation.

I have spoken of such different instances of mediation that I may have produced mere bewilderment. The bewilderment arises perhaps because mediation is an even less determinate notion than causality. Hence, to say that A mediates B may mean any of a vast variety of things, and to know any of them is entirely a matter of studying them. The word 'mediation' does not teach us anything whatever about mechanics, biology, sensitive consciousness, rational autonomy. Still, mediation is not without significance. From simple mediation one passes to mutual mediation, an understanding of automatic devices, of organic functions, of functions within consciousness, of the difference between Aristotelian syllogistic and the method of empirical science. From mutual mediation one passes to three types of self-mediation, of the self-transforming whole. Finally, mutual mediation and self-mediation combine in mutual self-mediation. Let us turn now to an application of the notion of mediation to the mediation of Christ in prayer.
8. The Mediation of Christ in Prayer

Mediation is an open notion, an open pattern of concepts, and it can be applied in an extremely large number of ways. We must select a particular aspect of mediation in order to apply it to prayer. Our question does not regard all the ways in which mediation can be applied to Christ; it regards one particular way in which mediation is relevant to prayer. I shall proceed by first indicating the obvious way in which we spontaneously perform, in which we think of the mediation of Christ objectively. Then I shall consider what I think is significant in prayer, namely, its subjective application.

Spontaneously we think of Christ objectively, in terms of Galatians 4:4-6: "... But when the term was completed, God sent his own Son, born of a woman, born under the law, to purchase freedom for the subjects of the law, in order that we might attain the status of sons. To prove that you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son, crying 'Abba! Father!'". Christ appears to us in terms of the love of Christ: "Greater love than this no man hath, that he should lay down his life for his friends." Again, Christ appears in terms of the precept of Christ: "A new command I give unto you: Love one another as I have loved you." The example of Christ in his life, in his suffering, in his death, is set before us through all our religious teaching. The work of Christ, his redemption, his sacrifice, his church that carries on his work, are all before us. Christ mediates between us and the Father, and the Holy Spirit mediates between us and Christ: "For there is one God, and also one mediator between God and men, Christ Jesus ... [1 Timothy 2:5]; "And no one can say 'Jesus is Lord!' except under the influence of the Holy Spirit" [1 Corinthians 12:3]. This is an account of Christ as mediator in the objective field.

But there is another approach to Christ as mediator. Each of us is to himself something immediate. It is what is meant by Existenz, oneself as one is, as capable of a decision that disposes of oneself, and yet as incapable of an absolute disposition. It is all that is to be known by analysis in Insight, yet not as so known but as lived, as the vécu not the thématique, as the actus exercitus not the actus signatus. It is oneself as a prior given to oneself, all the data on one's spontaneity, one's deliberate decisions, one's living, one's loving. It is not one's thinking about
all that but each of us in his or her immediacy to himself or herself. In that immediacy there are supernatural realities, realities that do not pertain to our nature, that result from the communication to us of Christ's life. In the first part of the gospel of John 'life' is a recurrent theme which appears first in the prologue and culminates perhaps in chapter 10. "All that came to be was alive with his life, and that life was the light of men" [John 1:3-4]; "I have come that men may have life, and may have it in all its fullness" [John 10:10-11]. We are temples of the Holy Spirit; we are not our own. St. Paul expresses this in an extremely vivid, vigorous, almost vulgar passage: "Shall I then take from Christ his bodily parts and make them over to a harlot?" [1 Corinthians 6:14-19] We are not our own; we do not belong to ourselves; we are members of Christ. There is an identification of the Christians and Christ. "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" [Acts 26:14] Paul did not persecute Jesus. He persecuted the Christians. We are adoptive children of God the Father. This is the reality that we are, the higher part of our reality.

This supernatural reality is something in us that is immediate and it becomes mediated in the life of prayer. It is not immediate in the sense in which our bodies and our souls are immediate to us. Our bodies and souls are ours by nature. Being temples of the Holy Spirit, members of Christ, adoptive children of God the Father, is something that is ours essentially by a gift. Still, concretely, it is part of our reality and in that sense it proceeds, through the mediation of prayer, from being a sort of vegetative living to a conscious living. It is a merely vegetative living if one is in the state of grace, if one keeps out of sin, if one does good deeds, for one does all this only by the grace of God. But, as occurring only by the grace of God, it just occurs, and we do not stop to think. It is a life within us that is promised us by Christ, that fructifies in us, but our ideas about it can be as vague and inconsequential as Topsy's ideas about how she came into the world. On the other hand, this life of grace within us can become an habitual, conscious living. One may not think about it all the time, but one easily reverts to it. Just as when one is in love, one is distracted from everything except the beloved, so one can be distracted, as it were, from worldliness in an
easy and spontaneous manner. This is not a matter of study or analysis of oneself. It is a living, a developing, a growing in which one element is added gradually to another until a new whole emerges. This transformation is the mediation of what is immediate in us.

De facto we are temples of the Spirit, members of Christ, adoptive children of the Father, but in a vegetative sort of way. Growth in prayer is the movement of the life of grace into our conscious, spontaneous, deliberate living. Just as we are immediate to ourselves by consciousness without any self-knowledge; just as we can move to fuller knowledge of ourselves through consciousness by philosophic study and self-appropriation; so too what we are by the grace of God, by the gift of God, can have its objectification within us. The immediate can be mediated by our acts and so gradually reveal to us in ever fuller fashion, in a more conscious and pressing fashion, the fundamental fact about us which is the great gift and grace that Jesus Christ brought to us. This mediation is potentially universal, and the precept is "Pray always". In loving our neighbor we are loving Christ. In making ourselves good Christians and better Christians we are loving Christ. In this process there is complete universality, a possibility of the complete growth of every aspect of the person, for it can regard every act, thought, word, deed, and omission.

Growth in prayer is not only the mediation of the subject by his acts. As always, the acts have an object, and in that object the focal point is Christ. But it is not Christ as apprehended by the Apostles, by Paul and John, by the church, by Christ himself, by the Spirit. It is our own apprehension of him. We put on, as it were, our own view of him. We put on Christ in our own ways, in accord with our own capacities and individuality, in response to our own needs and failings. While one's view has its foundation in the tradition and revelation, it arises from what is immediate in the subject and develops in response to the capacities, the needs, and the growth of the subject. There is, then, a mediation of what is immediate in us through the grace of God by our acts. But, insofar as the object of those acts is Christ (for everything turns back to Christ in one way or another), it is not merely a self-mediation in which we develop but a self-mediation through another. One becomes oneself not merely
by experiences, insights, judgments, by choices and decisions, by conversion, not just freely and deliberately, not just deeply and strongly, but as one who is carried along. One becomes oneself not in isolation but in reference to Christ. The Father predestined us to be conformed to the image of his Son, through the merits of Christ, through the grace of Christ, through the example of Christ. Consequently, growth in prayer is not merely a personal development but a personal development in relation to another person.

This personal development in relation to another person is a mutual self-mediation. It is not merely a self-mediation through another. However, it is not the mutual self-mediation of equals, as between husband and wife, brother and sister; nor is it a matter of simultaneous mutual influence. Nonetheless, it is a very real mutual self-mediation. Christ himself, as man, developed and acquired human perfection. The perfection that Christ acquired could have been quite different from the human perfection that, as a matter of fact, he did acquire. If he sought the perfection that was suitable to him as a Divine Person, we would not expect it to be the perfection of one who lives a life of poverty and suffering, who dies in abandonment, unjustly and cruelly. Christ decided to perfect himself in the manner he did because of us. When we think of the Way of the Cross, we think primarily of the Cross of Christ. But the Way of the Cross is primarily the way in which fallen nature acquires its perfection: death and resurrection. Resurrection is attained through death because death are the wages of sin. It was because he was redeeming a fallen humanity that Christ chose to perfect himself, to become the perfect man, by his own autonomous choices. It was because of us, thinking of us, thinking of what we needed to attain our own self-mediation. Just as it is by adhering to the precepts -- for example, the love of Christ -- that we attain our own self-mediation with reference to him in the life of prayer, so also the life of Christ himself was a self-mediation with reference to others, and the others are we and all men. The mediation of Christ in the life of prayer is, I should say, a mutual self-mediation.

One may think of the human lot in terms of abstract principles: overcoming evil by good; transforming evil into good; the general theme of death and resurrection. But instead of an abstract principle we have mutual self-mediation.
We choose that way because we choose the Cross of Christ. "If any man will come after me, let him take up his cross daily and follow me." Primarily, the Cross belongs to all humanity. Christ chose it because of us, and we choose it because of him. To carry this point further is, in a sense, a matter only of private meditation and private living. The life of prayer is on the level of what is lived, and any talk about it is a thematizing of it. The notions we have developed of self-mediation and mutual self-mediation can be applied to our own subjectivity, to what is immediate within us. Initially and fundamentally, they are applied in a very obscure fashion in terms of objects, temples of the Spirit, members of Christ, adoptive children of the Father. Still, they have their subjective manifestation, their revelation in us that they are within us. They are the immediate in an ontological immediacy. Their ontological immediacy is promoted to an intentional immediacy through the life of prayer. Christ is mediator in the life of prayer insofar as that life itself is a transition from the immediacy of spontaneity through the objectification of ourselves in acts. The acts of living and the acts within praying are referred to Christ. By that process we perfect ourselves, by a self-mediation that is related to another person. But there is a similar process in the becoming of Christ as man. He became himself with reference to us. In both cases, the fundamental theorem, as it were, is the transformation of evil into good, the absorption of the evil of the world by putting up with it, by not perpetuating it as rigid justice would demand. That putting up with it acts, as it were, as a blotter, transforms the situation, and creates a situation in which good flourishes.

NOTES

1 "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer" is a lecture given by Lonergan at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal on Sept. 24, 1963 [#269 in the O'Callaghan-Tekippe Bibliography of April 30, 1983]. It seems that the only existing record is the tape-recording. However, § 1-7 of the present edition follow closely, with only occasional and minor elaborations, Lonergan's own notes on mediation prepared for "Knowledge and Learning," a two-week Institute in the Graduate School of Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington, July 15-26, 1963 [#260 in the O'Callaghan-Tekippe Bibliography]. Accordingly, in § 1-7 I have integrated the two sources for the sake of organization and clarity. § 8, where Lonergan applies his notion of mediation to prayer, is drawn entirely from the existing tape-recording [TC 369 in The Lonergan Centre, Toronto]. -- Ed.
\(^2\) Posterior Analytics II, 4.

\(^3\) On Hegel's use of the notion of mediation and its fundamental character in Hegelian philosophy, see Henri Niel, De la Médiation dans la Philosophie de Hegel [Paris: Aubier, 1945].


\(^5\) All scriptural quotations which were somewhat abbreviated by Lonergan in the lecture have been augmented and are from The New English Bible. -- Ed.

\(^6\) Insight: A Study of Human Understanding [London: Longmans, Green, 1957].
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION:
A LONERGANIAN MEANING AND USE

Frederick E. Crowe
Regis College

In chapter 11 of Bernard Lonergan's *Insight* there is a section entitled "Self-affirmation in the Possibility of Judgments of Fact," followed at once by the statement, "We have performed something similar to what a Kantian would name a transcendental deduction."¹ Those aware of Lonergan's long and strenuous wrestling with Kant's thought, and interested in the challenge-response relation of the two thinkers, will find in this statement and Lonergan's explanation of it material for rewarding study. That, however, is not my interest here.² Nor do I propose to go into the meaning that historically has been given to the phrase, transcendental deduction, or into the debated possibility or impossibility of the procedure itself. I quote the statement of *Insight* only to raise my own set of questions, which have to do entirely with Lonergan's thought and practice but find their occasion in the passage referred to. For the argument of that section is not, I think, especially characteristic of Lonergan; but the term, transcendental, and the use of transcendental method, are characteristic of him in a high degree; so one is led to ask whether there is a properly Lonerganian sense of transcendental deduction as well, what it might be, and how extensive its application is in his actual usage. My answer, to anticipate my findings, will be that there is a properly Lonerganian transcendental deduction, that it differs notably from the Kant-related form he uses in chapter 11 of *Insight*, and that it has a rather extensive application in Lonergan's writings, in the field of history as well as in that of system.

That last clause will, I fear, lead some readers to question at once the worth of my study: what can be hoped for from an investigation that goes haring off in a pursuit, long ago established as futile, of an a priori pattern in history? But even they may be curious to learn what Lonergan's views on the matter are, or at least what views are consonant with his positions. To satisfy such curiosity pertains to my personal, not at all hidden, agenda: the promotion of research in detail into Lonergan's ideas. One reads so much
now of general exposition of his thought, and no doubt that kind of writing is needed when a new thinker comes on the scene with a comprehensive view of things. But it soon loses vitality if it is not followed by very particular studies. At present, in the recurring cycle of general and particular, some of us feel keenly the need of detailed study of a hundred unresearched topics in the Lonerganian corpus. Only by this means will the multiple misunderstandings that afflict discussions of Lonergan be cleared up, and the possibility of a really grounded judgment on and evaluation of his work emerge. I hope my article may contribute something to that end. If I cannot pursue my topic in the exhaustive manner of a doctoral dissertation, I can at least introduce it and sketch some headings which a more thorough investigation might develop.

I

Our starting point is obvious enough: what is Lonergan's procedure in the passage in which he admits to having performed "something similar" to a Kantian transcendental deduction? His search, he tells us, is for "the conditions of the possible occurrence of a judgment of fact." Such a judgment answers yes or no to the question, Is it so? and supposes, if the answer is absolute, some grasp of an unconditioned. Now the 'it' that is to be affirmed in this unconditional way is not a bare 'it' but is known as linked to its conditions; that is, it supposes some act of understanding. Moreover, such an act of understanding has reference to a prior field of what can become fulfilling conditions, but in that prior state is simply given.

Thus, but in a much more schematic presentation than Lonergan's, are established the familiar three levels of his cognitional process: the given of experience, the grasp of an intelligibility in the given, the virtually unconditioned which grounds a judgment on that intelligibility. Lonergan goes on from this to a second point in his deduction, which is concerned not merely with the three levels, but with the conditions also of the inquiring subject's self-affirmation. But I need not complicate my presentation with that step. Nor need I take up the question of the objectivity of judgment, for Lonergan is not dealing here with the possibility of knowing an object but only with "what activities are involved in knowing."
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

Now the argument set forth here is not, I have said, especially typical of Lonergan's procedures. First, it deals with conditions of possibility, and his concern is regularly more with actuality and its implications than with possibility. Secondly, the argument moves backward from a judgment of fact to its conditions. That is, it starts by supposing that one knows something, and ends with the cognitional process that is required if one is to know something in the way supposed; but Lonergan's direction is regularly the opposite of that: he prefers to start with the known characteristics of cognitional process and conclude to characteristics of what is known. Thirdly, the principle on which he bases what I am going to call his transcendental deduction is that of the isomorphism of knowing and known, which principle can no doubt be related to conditions of possibility but is in itself another matter.

It would, of course, be quite legitimate to investigate the occurrence in Lonergan of the Kant-related transcendental deduction with which my article began—legitimate and perhaps rewarding. But my acquaintance with Lonergan's work leads me to expect still more rewarding results from an investigation of the transcendental deduction that pertains so much more to his way and to his system, namely, that based on the isomorphism of knowing and known. It is to be noted that the principle of isomorphism allows one to move in two directions, from the known to the knowing as well as from the knowing to the known, but the latter is the methodical procedure, in Lonergan's view; it is also his regular practice; and it will be the focus of my study. Further, these procedures have their own quite legitimate claim to the title, transcendental deduction. There is deduction of conclusions from premises. The premises are transcendental in Lonergan's sense of the term, resting on cognitional activity that is invariant no matter what the cognitional content. And the procedures are part of an integral way which is commonly called transcendental method.

With those clarifications I turn to the more substantive question of the cognitional process and the conclusions about the known that may be deducible from its characteristics. But rather than set forth Lonergan's cognitional theory in general, I propose to look for examples of transcendental deduction as I described it, and in those examples to discover
features of cognitional process as well as our justification for using it to conclude to features of the known. We will find cases, I believe, of what we may call pure transcendental deduction, along with others in which to the pure core is added a further element derived not from the process but from the materials submitted to the process. Again, we will find this deduction applied most clearly in the area of the structural and invariable, but also, though less clearly, in the area of the historical, of the changing and developing content of our knowing. Finally, the investigation will provide material for reflections that will help delimit the role of transcendental deduction and determine its locus in the wider context of human knowing.

II

The first question, then, is whether and in what form and to what extent there occur instances of the procedure that I am calling transcendental deduction. A full answer is not possible here, but it will be a helpful beginning if we take one instance in which what seems to be such a deduction is carried out in some detail and with some logical rigor. An obvious candidate for the role of such an example is "the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics" that we find in chapter 14 of Insight. For, first, there is Lonergan's well known position that methodical metaphysics derives from cognitional theory; then add that he refers to the present transition as a deduction, and that he asserts his explicit metaphysics to be "implicit in the pure desire to know." We do seem to have antecedent grounds for expecting this transition to be an instance of transcendental deduction, in which the premises will be found in cognitional process, and the conclusion will be what Lonergan understands by metaphysics: "the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being."

Let us turn from expectations to actual performance. The major premise is the isomorphism that Lonergan affirms between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known.

If the knowing consists of a related set of acts, and the known is the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts. This premise is analytic.

To this major are joined two sets of minor premises: a primary
set which, on the basis of experience, affirms recurring structures in the process of knowing, and a secondary set supplied by reoriented science and common sense. The secondary minor gives the materials to be integrated, but the primary minor gives the integrating structure itself. Thus, every instance of knowing proportionate being is a unification of experiencing, understanding, and judging, from which minor premise joined to the major, it follows "that every instance of known proportionate being is a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judgment." Here we have the structure of the known derived from cognitional process alone, a pure case of transcendental deduction in the sense defined.

I add three notes in further clarification. First, though the primary minor (joined to the major) yields a pure case of transcendental deduction, the secondary minor does not, but takes us into materials known by science and common sense. Secondly, though the deduction is a priori with respect to every possible future case of knowing proportionate being, it is not independent of past experience: the primary minor is itself the product of repeated experience. (I shall return to this point later.) And, thirdly, the metaphysics to which this chapter concludes does not as yet contain statements on the nature of reality but only on the structure of the known. We can, if we wish, already refer to the known elements as potency, form, and act, corresponding to experience, understanding, and judgment; but it is only in chapter 16 that Lonergan takes up the question whether these metaphysical elements are merely cognitional or also ontological: "Are they merely the structure in which proportionate being is known? Or are they the structure immanent in the reality of proportionate being?" (This point too will occupy us later.)

The foregoing clear-cut instance of transcendental deduction will perhaps enable us to discover other instances that show the same pattern but do so less clearly. I do not intend to make an exhaustive list but I do wish, for a special reason, to set forth one other instance, that of "The Canons of Empirical Method," in chapter 3 of Insight. To simplify discussion let us lay down as premise the familiar cognitional structure in which we observe data with a question, form a possible explanation to account for them, and then seek to verify or falsify the explanation. Such a structure determines at
once three procedural rules: turn to data, ask for their immanent intelligibility, and submit the resulting hypotheses to the test of reflective insight. But those rules give us already the core elements of the canons of selection, of relevance, and of parsimony -- the first, third, and fourth of Lonergan's list of six.\(^\text{19}\)

Once again we are dealing in effect with an instance of transcendental deduction. This is not made explicit in chapter 3 itself, so far as I have noticed, but it becomes quite clear at the beginning of chapter 4, where the canons are said to be an anticipation of empirical method, one based on the nature of cognitional process. Thus, heuristic structures "anticipate a form that is to be filled. Now just as the form can be anticipated in its general properties, so also can the process of filling be anticipated in its general properties." Further, the source of the anticipation is the nature of cognitional process: "If insight is to be into data, there is a canon of selection . . . ."\(^\text{20}\) Etc., etc.

We now have before us two instances of a deduction from cognitional process, one that concludes to the structure of the known, another that concludes to the procedures of investigation. They are remarkably alike in premises and form. There is clearly a pattern here, and I believe that, once alerted to this pattern in Lonergan's thought and procedures, we can skim through the pages of *Insight* and his later works to find further instances of the pattern. Nor should this be surprising in view of the famous 'slogan' which he formulated in the Introduction to *Insight*. If I quote once more this somewhat over-quoted passage, it is in the hope that the exposition I have given of transcendental deduction may endow it with new meaning:

> Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.\(^\text{21}\)

III

I wish to turn now to the historical aspect of consciousness and ask whether anything resembling Lonergan's style of transcendental deduction can be applied there, and whether he himself supplies any instance of it. Since the fact will prove the possibility -- *ab esse ad posse valet illatio* -- it will be enough to deal with the second question if it
turns out to have an affirmative answer, that is, if we can provide instances of grounded transcendental deduction in this area. But let me preface my search with some clarification of the sense in which I am using the word, historical.

Readers of Lonergan are familiar with the recurring feature of consciousness which he regularly names its 'levels': experience, understanding, judgment, and responsibility. So prominent is this feature, and so simple is it for us to form a schematic picture of this four-leveled structure, that we too easily overlook the equally prominent feature of what happens when the structure is put to use, a feature that stands to the structure itself as a variable content to an invariable framework, and is best described, if we must be brief, as the historical aspect of consciousness. It is a matter, if we allow ourselves a few more words, of the ongoing exercise of our intentional dynamism and of the cumulative results of the exercise, a matter then of the 'wheel' of progress as well as of the shorter and longer cycles of decline, a matter of diverse brands of common sense, of differentiation of patterns of experience and of realms of meaning, a matter too of the developing stages of meaning, of the conflicting horizons that result from the absence or presence of the various conversions, and finally of the interaction of the upward way of achievement (from experience through understanding and judgment to responsibility) with the downward path of tradition received (from level to level in the opposite direction).

With that preface let us go back to chapter 3 of *Insight* and the canons of empirical method. I said that I had a special reason for listing this example of transcendental deduction. The reason, however, did not lie in the three canons I then discussed but in the three I omitted. The three already discussed (selection, relevance, parsimony) pertain to the invariant structural features of knowing (experience, understanding, judgment), but the other three pertain to the ongoing use of the structure, that is, to the historical aspect of consciousness. Thus, "If insights into data accumulate in a circuit of presentations, insights, formulations, experiments, new presentations, there is a canon of operations." Again, "If some data are to be understood, then all are to be understood," and so there is a canon of complete explanation. Still, "one must not jump to the conclusion that all
will be explained by laws of the classical type; there exist statistical residues," and so there is a canon of statistical residues.\(^\text{23}\)

Clearly these three canons form a different group from those that correspond to the levels of cognitional structure. Just as clearly two of the three relate directly to the 'historical' use of the structure: one (operations) to the ongoing and cumulative character of inquiry, the other (complete explanation) to the extension of inquiry to all data without limit. If the last canon (statistical residues -- third of this group, and sixth in Lonergan's full list) seems to relate directly to data and so to an element in the structure, nevertheless it does so only by differentiating a new type of inquiry into the data from the classical type; but with such differentiation we are once again dealing with variables, and thus entering into the historical field by another route.\(^\text{24}\)

Is this second group of canons derived, or can it be derived, by way of transcendental deduction, as I said the first group was or could be? As far as Lonergan himself is concerned, there does not seem to be, under this heading, any distinction whatever between the two groups. "If insight is to be into data, there is a canon of selection. If insights into data accumulate in a circuit of presentations, insights, formulations, experiments, new presentations, there is a canon of operations." Here two canons that belong to different groups are derived in exactly the same fashion; so are the other four in the sentences that follow those quoted. There is even a generalizing statement about the set: "Whether one likes it or not, heuristic structures and canons of method constitute an a priori."\(^\text{25}\)

And why -- to take the question on its own merits -- why should there be any distinction under this heading between the two groups? That a human person lives in time is as much a fixed feature of his life on earth as that he lives at all. That new questions arise on the basis of answers to the old is as recurring a phenomenon as the questions that arose out of the dynamism of consciousness in the first place. That an open consciousness, and especially a polymorphic one, can be differentiated into a variety of patterns is as characteristic of our way of being as is the open and polymorphic consciousness itself. There does not seem to be any antecedent reason for denying transcendental deduction
to the historical side of consciousness while granting it to the structural side, if and insofar as that deduction is based, as it is here, on cognitional process.

The two questions (on the structural, on the historical) come easily together in chapter 5 of *Method in Theology*, where Lonergan sets forth the eight functional specialties that constitute the integral work of theologians. That is, the levels of consciousness, the structural invariant, give the four specialties of mediating theology (research, interpretation, history, dialectic) as well as the companion four of mediated theology (foundations, doctrines, systematics, communications). But the distinction between the two phases of mediating and mediated theology is not at all a structural one in the way the levels are; it belongs rather to what I am calling the historical aspect of consciousness. So the question arises whether the distinction relates to some pattern of history from which it could be derived transcendentally, in a way that is at least analogous to what we saw in the canons of empirical method. Of course, we have special materials once more, theological instead of those of natural science, so we will not expect a pure instance; but the question remains whether there is a core element amenable to transcendental deduction, in the historical area as well as in the structural.

Lonergan's views on the matter come closest to formulation in the third section of the chapter, entitled "Grounds of the Division." Here the division of theology into two phases is based on simple relations, like that of receiving tradition from the past and then handing it on, or that of harkening to the word and then bearing witness to it; or, put a little more eruditely, it is a matter of theology first in *oratio obliqua* and then in *oratio recta*. Now this seems to involve a pure element of invariant pattern analogous to the one we found in the canon of operations: that is, we live in time, and our use of the structure of consciousness is ongoing; moreover, it is ongoing from generation to generation. Thus, while the circuit of empirical method might be repeated several times in the lifetime of an investigator, the two phases of theology and of the slow-moving cultural field in general are more likely to involve a heritage received from a perhaps distant past and handed on responsibly to the next and many future generations. The element of
responsibility is, in fact, very prominent in the cultural field (though who would deny that it pertains also to empirical science?) and modifies the pattern of ongoing operations. We have, then, a fourth level added to the three levels of cognitional process, so for that latter term we had best substitute something more inclusive, such as the process of dynamic intentionality. The main point, however, is that the core element of the historical, the two phases, is as readily deducible from the process as are the specialties themselves.

Again I add some clarifying notes. The first: though it is deducible that there will be four specialties in each phase of theology, what is not deducible is the content of any specialty, not even from that of its immediate predecessor. This, I would say, is what Lonergan means in his remark, "This descent [of the second phase] is, not properly a deduction, but rather a succession of transpositions to ever more determinate contexts." A second: though transcendental method is set forth in chapter 1 of Method according to the upward movement from experience through understanding and judgment to responsibility, chapter 5 shows us that this is but half the story: the method also applies, at least analogously, in the reverse direction of the downward movement; further, it seems to me a good question whether the transcendental precepts (be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible) do not need new modalities of application in this downward movement.

I have been laboring one point only of the historical aspect of consciousness: its ongoing character, and the consequent possibility in theology of deducing from that character two phases that regard the procedures if not the products of the theological specialties. But that is really a very simple matter, and the question naturally arises whether transcendental deduction can go beyond this elementary beginning and conclude in greater detail to patterns in historical process. This turns out to be a question of some complexity in Lonergan’s work, and all I can do here is introduce it, advert to a few key passages, and show some of the implications.

Now there is one extremely interesting and directly relevant argument in the very early Lonergan, actually in the introductory pages of his doctoral dissertation. This
47-page essay, to which his students are continually drawn back as to a magnet, sets up the problem of achieving objective results in historical inquiry, and proposes as means "a theory of the history of theological speculation . . . an a priori scheme that is capable of synthetizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time . . . In the present work this generic scheme is attained by an analysis of the idea of a development in speculative theology." Further, the basis for this construction is transcendental: "It is possible to construct a priori a general scheme of the historical process because the human mind is always the human mind."32 Still, Lonergan is not so carried away by his idea as to suppose that he can in this way determine the concrete details, the materials, of history. When he comes to the generic scheme itself, he calls it "The Form of the Development," where the accent is surely on the word, form, as opposed to the material content. And he states categorically that "there is no more a possibility of filling in the details of that scheme a priori than there is of predicting the future."33

What, then, is the form of development that Lonergan works out? I cannot give it in detail, but neither should I leave my readers entirely in the dark, so here in rapid sequence are the seven stages of his general scheme. From the principle that the mind moves from the particular to the general, it follows that a speculative explanation will first center on a specific reason; this will then be generalized and given a significance beyond its worth. The insufficiency of the specific theorem will eventually appear and lead to the discovery of the generic explanation; and this too will be generalized and given for a time the status of the sole solution. The insufficiency of the generic theorem alone will, however, in due course become apparent; and there will follow the rediscovery of the specific theorem in a new setting, with a synthesis finally of generic and specific theorems in an adequate explanation.34

The material question in which this scheme is illustrated is that of the human need for divine grace. The specific theorem first offered in explanation is that of the different states of man: fallen man cannot without grace avoid sin. The generic theorem is that of the supernatural: eternal life is beyond the reach of man himself in any state.35 The
sequence of the seven stages determined by the general form of development is then illustrated in the theology of grace from Augustine's De Correptione et Gratia to the Prima Secundae of Thomas Aquinas.36

Readers may wish to challenge this argument at many points: in itself, in its premises, in its application to the theology of grace. It is not my purpose to defend it, but only to show that, already at this early date, Lonergan was thinking in terms of our definition of transcendental deduction, and this in the field of history. I would especially note his deliberate recourse to cognitional theory for its premises. He is going to analyze the idea of a speculative development and will do so, he says, "solely from a consideration of the nature of human speculation."37 His a priori scheme "is not an hypothesis but a demonstrable conclusion."38 He will correlate statements from the fifth to the thirteenth century "without making any hypotheses on the nature of grace... [but] merely in virtue of the assumption that the people in question were all men, all thinking, and historically inter-dependent in their thought."39

With this example, which occurs at a highly intellectualist point in Lonergan's personal development, we are at the other end of the spectrum from the simple ongoing character of human intentional process. Are there also instances of transcendental deduction that we might call middle-of-the-road? I believe there are, and I offer as one of them Lonergan's analysis of human history, which he carries out on a broader scale by far than his analysis of speculative development, though not on the very broad scale of the general ongoing character of human inquiry. According to his own account his thinking on this question began around 1937-1938. His analysis took the form of successive approximations, illustrated by analogy with three approximations to formulations of the planetary laws. A first approximation, then, to the form of history is given by "the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its implication was an ever increasing progress." The second occurs with "the radical inverse insight that men can be biased" with resultant decline. But, thirdly, there is "the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus."40

It is especially useful to have this 'form' of history,
because what we may call its three moments are not moments in a temporal sense but in the sense of forces at work. The human race does not first progress, then decline and finally enjoy redemption: the three processes are going on simultaneously. So we are dealing with 'form' in a rather special sense of history, not attempting an impossible prediction of events in chronological order.

The real question, however, is whether we have here something like a transcendental deduction. I would answer yes, at least for the first two moments. My reason is mainly the close link between this analysis and that of progress-decline in Insight, where the premise, as we saw, was indeed transcendental. Let us return to that book for a fuller account of the 'wheel' of progress.

Thus, insight into insight brings to light the cumulative process of progress. For concrete situations give rise to insights which issue into policies and courses of action. Action transforms the existing situation to give rise to further insights, better policies, more effective courses of action. It follows that if insight occurs, it keeps recurring; and at each recurrence knowledge develops, action increases its scope, and situations improve.41

The idea of progress is thus attributed directly to insight into insight. But the idea of decline has a parallel basis, as the immediately following paragraph indicates: "Similarly, insight into oversight reveals the cumulative process of decline . . . ."42 Later in the book Lonergan will develop his concept of the shorter and longer cycles of decline,43 though the image of a wheel is perhaps less applicable when the dynamic of progress is replaced "by sluggishness and . . . stagnation."44 As for the redemptive moment, this too could perhaps be added on the basis of intentionality analysis, but only by those who have identified their religious experience and are able to see it as a third 'moment' in the unfolding drama of their personal history.

With this account of the pattern of history I skirt but do not explore a whole great continent of discourse. Even that part of the continent which belongs to research into Lonergan's thought awaits exploration in many areas, though much has been done already.45 For the particular question which has occupied me in this article, I would recommend attention to the stages of meaning that Lonergan describes in Method and elsewhere; they seem to form a pattern closely dependent on the natural differentiation of consciousness,
and so to be amenable to transcendental deduction. And, of course, those differentiations themselves, insofar as they are 'natural', should be amenable to the same treatment, though I suspect that, with their multiplication, we might have to distinguish between the more fundamental forms and the less.

V

My purpose has been expository and even within that limitation directed more to opening up a field of inquiry than to exploring it. But, aware of the strong views and perhaps even stronger feelings that are sometimes manifested against the a priori and especially against its introduction into history, I wish to conclude my essay with a few notes that might in some measure disarm the critics and should, in any case, help them view Lonergan's thinking in better perspective.

A simple but very helpful observation is that, except perhaps in the introductory pages of his doctoral dissertation, the term, a priori, is not by any means a favorite of Lonergan. Already, by the time Insight was written, it had yielded to the much more characteristic term, heuristic -- as readers who trust the Index to that work may easily verify for themselves. There does remain a role for the a priori, but its limits are clearly indicated in a somewhat later article, in which Lonergan discusses the dynamism of human intentionality.

In its broad lines this dynamism rests on operators that promote activity from one level to the next. The operators are a priori, and they alone are a priori. Their content is ever an anticipation of the next level of operations and thereby is not to be found in the contents of the previous level. Such anticipation is, of course, the business of Lonergan's heuristic structures and methods.

A second point can be introduced by a quotation from the same article. The discussion now is of the analogy between evolutionary process and the development resulting from what Lonergan calls vertical finality. He explains: "By the analogy of that process is meant, not some basis for a priori prediction, but only a basis for a posteriori interpretation." Of course, we will be wary of applying this remark beyond the specific area that Lonergan has in mind. All the same I see a close analogy between this a posteriori interpretation and the synthetic order in which for
several years Lonergan set forth his trinitarian theology. As students of that theology will remember, it begins with the analytic order, in which there is development from what is first for us (the sending of Son and Spirit) to what is first in itself (the divine nature understood in a new way as a dynamism issuing in eternal processions); but it is followed by the synthetic ordering of that development in exactly the reverse direction (from the new insight into the divine nature to the missions in time of the second and third Persons). This in turn has a formal resemblance to Lonergan's use of transcendental deduction. I would like to be clear on that point: I am not saying that there can be transcendental deduction of trinitarian theology, but only that the synthetic ordering of that theology illuminates Lonergan's way of thinking and may help us understand and see in better perspective the data collected in my present study.

Perhaps that will be clearer if I add at once a third point: just as the synthetic order depends for its materials on the results of the analytic, so transcendental deduction, though it is valid a priori for every logical exercise of conscious intentionality, is nevertheless valid only in virtue of a premise which was itself formed a posteriori. Thus, in the transition for latent to explicit metaphysics, the primary minor premise "consists of a series of affirmations of concrete and recurring structures in the knowing of the self-affirming subject." Again, the method of metaphysics is "dictated by the self-affirming subject in the light of his pedagogically acquired self-knowledge." And yet again, the method begins from people as they are and the conclusion is known "through the known structures of one's cognitional activities." And yet once more, "cognitional theory is determined by an appeal to the data of consciousness and to the historical development of human knowledge." I will stop hammering, but it is worth noting that the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics starts with an analytic premise, which may be merely an analytic proposition but becomes an analytic principle with the introduction of existence: "Analytic propositions become analytic principles when their terms are existential; and terms are existential when they occur in definitive, factual judgments."}

This brings me to my final point. No amount of exercise
in the ideal order is by itself constitutive of knowing; or, there is no way that transcendental deduction can by itself introduce existence. That is clear enough if we think backward from deduced conclusions to premises, to the formation of the premises, to the scattered affirmations from which premises are formed. But the relevant point for me is made by going forward from transcendental deduction. We have seen that this procedure allows us to conclude, on the basis of self-knowledge, to the structure of the known and likewise to the structured activities by which we inquire into the to-be-known. But what is the forward relation of transcendental deduction to the existence and nature of the philosopher's world? This is a distinct question, for Lonergan defines his notions of being and objectivity, in the first instance, in such a way as to leave them compatible with any philosophy. It remains, then, to be determined whether the philosopher's world is limited or unlimited, one or many, material or ideal, phenomenal or real, immanent or transcendent, a realm of experience, of thought, of essences, or of existents.\(^5^8\) In particular, to put the question as I did earlier in this article, are the metaphysical elements merely cognitional or also ontological? Or, to put it now another way, how can one grasp and affirm the evidence for a metaphysics? In Lonergan's view the affirmation has to be made in dynamic terms, and he makes it with the help of a three-part metaphor: a breakthrough ("one's affirmation of oneself as empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious"), envelopment ("the protean notion of being as whatever one intelligently grasps and reasonably affirms"), and confinement ("effected through the dialectical opposition" of positions and counter-positions).\(^5^9\) Whatever name we give this argument it is to be clearly distinguished from the transcendental deduction that has occupied us throughout this article: the introduction of dialectic by itself is a guarantee of the difference. Or, to return to our topic sentence, if the existence of the philosopher's world was not contained in the premises of the argument, then transcendental deduction cannot introduce it in the conclusion.\(^6^0\)

NOTES


2 Kant and Lonergan have been compared under various
relevant headings in a good number of publications by Giovanni B. Sala; his basic work is Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis. Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight [Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971].


One simple index of this is his continued opposition to the discussions of late medieval Scholasticism on the absolute power of God; for example, in Philosophy of God and Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973], pp. 6, 30-31.


8 Insight, Index, s.v., Isomorphism. See Appendix to Note 60, below.

9 One passage I would like to see studied is Method in Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972], p. 109, where Lonergan deduces, from the experience of being in love in an unrestricted manner, the seven features Heiler found in all world religions; what sort of deduction, or what sorts, are employed here? The same work, p. 14, relates his use of the word, transcendental, to the conditions of the possibility of knowing an object. See note 4 on that page.

10 There is also the intermediate step: moving from the structures of the knowing to the structured procedures involved in seeking the to-be-known. We will have an example of this in the canons of empirical method.

11 Insight, p. 399. 12 Ibid., pp. xi, 400-401.

13 Ibid., p. 399. But see his critique of deductive methods later in the same chapter, pp. 402-408.

14 Ibid., p. 401. 15 Ibid., p. 391.

16 Ibid., p. 399. The point is made repeatedly: pp. 104-105, 115, 117, 361; see, for example, p. 115: "For knowing and known, if they are not an identity, at least stand in some correspondence and, as the known is reached only through knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other."

17 Ibid., p. 400. 18 Ibid., p. 499.

19 Ibid., pp. 71-74, 76-78, 78-83. Only the core elements of the canons are due to transcendental deduction, for they are canons, not of all and every cognitional activity, but only of that of the empirical scientist. Thus, the core of a canon of selection would apply both to empirical science and to a philosopher thinking out his Utopia, but the canon for empirical method limits inquiry to ideas that involve sensible consequences. The core of a canon of parsimony might
apply to guesswork, insofar as that could be called a cogni-
tional activity, but the canon of parsimony in empirical
science "forbids the empirical scientist to affirm what .
. . he does not know" (ibid., pp. 78-79). Etc., etc.

20 Ibid., pp. 103-104. See also p. 41: ". . . a general
anticipation based on cognitional theory."

21 Ibid., p. xxvii (the original is in italics).

22 Ibid., p. 104.

23 Ibid., p. 70.

24 The "Canons for a Methodical Hermeneutics" of chapter
17 are even more involved in the historical aspect of con-
sciousness; see especially the "canon of successive approxi-
mations" (pp. 588-590). But so also do they show a greater
mix of adventitious elements with the core of transcendental
deduction, and need more careful study than I can give them
in this sketch.

Throughout this article, of course, I am speaking of
the history that is written about, not of the history that
is written (Method, p. 175), and within that limited area
primarily of the history that pertains to the development
of one's conscious intentionality: there is some reference
to wider aspects in such topics as the three moments of human
history.

25 Insight, pp. 103-104.

26 It may help to observe how chapter 1 of Method prepares
the structural aspect, and chapters 2 and 3 the historical.
But that is only an approximation: there is much of the his-
torical in chapter 1 and of the structural in chapters 2
and 3. -- It is worth insisting: 'historical' means simply
that we are in the field of meaningful events, which includes
the events that happen in human consciousness.

27 I am adopting as mere convention the use of 'structure'
for the levels of consciousness and of 'pattern' for the
form of history; one could reverse the usage without disas-
trous consequences.


29 Loner
gan does not limit to theology the use of his
eight functional specialties; they "would be relevant to
any human studies that investigated a cultural past to guide
its future." See "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in Philip Mc-
Shane, ed., Foundations of Theology [Dublin: Gill and Macmil-
lan, 1971], p. 233.

30 Method, p. 142.

31 "Gratia Operans: A Study of the Speculative Development
in the Writings of St. Thomas of Aquin" [S.T.D. dissertation,
Gregorian University, Rome, 1940]. This introductory essay
has never been published, but is available in various Loner-
gan Centers of research.

32 "Gratia Operans . . .," pp. 3, 4, 5.

33 Ibid., p. 5. See also p. 18: ". . . what we hope to
establish is not any a priori form of history but mere sets
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

of abstract categories that have a special reference to the historical process." There seems to be a slip in word usage here; it is in some sense a 'form' of history that he is trying to establish, so I suggest the emendation, "not any a priori chronicle of history."

39 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

36 Ibid., pp. 34, 34-36. 37 Ibid., p. 4.

39 Ibid., p. 6. Lonergan makes his case, however, for a compound theorem, such as we find here in the specific and generic explanations of the human need for grace. Evidently he allows for the possibility of a simple theorem, so we have to ask whether the assumption of a compound theorem adds an adventitious element to the pure core of transcendental deduction.


41 Insight, p. xiv. This is referred to as a 'circle' (p. 35), a 'circuit' (pp. 35, 76, 104, 166, and passim), a 'wheel' (pp. 223, 226); it is found in the self-correcting process of learning (p. 174) as well as in a developing social order (pp. 223, 226). In Method (p. 366) and later works (V.g., "Mission and the Spirit," p. 74 -- see note 49, below), the term 'feedback' occurs.

42 Insight, p. xiv. See also Method, p. 55: "As self-transcendence promotes progress, so the refusal of self-transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline."


44 Ibid., p. 229.

45 Without taking time and space to list studies of Lonergan's notion of history, I can put readers in touch with a partial bibliography by referring to recent volumes of Dissertation Abstracts International; see especially the key words: Lonergan, History, in the subject index.

46 Method, pp. 85-99. True, Lonergan has in mind mainly the Western tradition (p. 85).

47 Ibid., pp. 303-305, and passim.

48 That is not the whole story. Lonergan found support in Piaget's work: "It enables one to distinguish stages in cultural development" (Method, pp. 29-30). And Kohlberg's stages of moral development are well known; see Elizabeth A. Morelli, "The Sixth Stage of Moral Development," Journal of Moral Education 7 (1977-78): 97-108, for a critique of Kohlberg based on Lonergan; the critique, however, recognizes the validity in principle of such stages.


50 Ibid., p. 72.
The data on the analytic and synthetic orders have also been collected; see Craig Boly, "The Development of the Twofold Way of Ordering Ideas in the Early Theology of Bernard Lonergan" [Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto School of Theology, 1982]. -- On the eight functional specialties as reorganizing existing branches of theology, see Method, p. 136.

53 Insight, pp. 399-400.
54 Ibid., p. 398.
55 Ibid., p. 401. 56 Ibid., p. 387.
57 Ibid., p. 316.
58 Ibid., p. 349. See also p. 362 and, on objectivity as an open notion, p. 384.
59 Ibid., p. 484.

60 It is my pleasant duty, at the conclusion of this study, to thank Fr. Thomas Daly, of the Melbourne College of Divinity, for a careful reading and thoughtful critique of the manuscript.

Appendix. -- I have just noticed an unpublished paragraph which is very illuminating for this whole question. It occurs as note 8 in "Religious Knowledge, the second of three lectures Lonergan gave at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, in 1976, under the general heading of Religious Studies and/or Theology. This second lecture itself was published as "Religious Knowledge," pp. 309-327 in ed. Fred Lawrence, Lonergan Workshop, Vol. I [Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978], but without any notes. Here is the paragraph as it appears in the typescript.

Distinguish three meanings of the term, transcendental: the most general and all-pervasive concepts, namely, ens, unum, verum, bonum, of the Scholastics; the Kantian conditions of the possibility of knowing an object a priori; Husserl's intentionality analysis in which noesis and noema, act and object, are correlative. [Originally attached to the paragraph, "Generalized empirical method envisages . . .", p. 323 in Lonergan Workshop. -- Compare the two meanings of the term, transcendental method, in the 1970 paper, "Philosophy and Theology," A Second Collection, p. 207.]

The third of these meanings clearly corresponds to what I called, in the introduction to my article, "a properly Lonerganian transcendental deduction" and the second to "the Kant-related form he uses in chapter 11 of Insight."
Vernon Gregson's review of *Papal Infallibility: An Application of Lonergan's Theological Method* [Method, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall, 1983): 223-232] provides two signal services. It presents a searching critique of the work done within the various functional specialties; and it offers a severe criticism of the methodological principles the work was based on. As I find the methodological issues more fascinating, I will concentrate on those.

When I initiated the undertaking which eventually resulted in the publication of *Papal Infallibility*, I envisioned that a concrete application of Lonergan's theological method would raise many questions about the meaning of Lonergan's project. I must admit I did not anticipate a challenge as radical as Gregson's. I saw the issues as being those of *quid sit*: What is the method? I expected that there would be disagreements on that; others would think Lonergan has intended this procedure rather than that. Gregson brings the question back to *an sit*: Is there a method? Indeed, he pronounces on that in the negative: "There is no specific Lonerganian Method in Theology." "A wrong turn was made in the project by trying to apply 'Lonergan's Method' as if he had a distinctive method." To put it another way, I proceeded on the assumption that Lonergan was calling us to do *something*, and the questions would be over exactly what it was. But Gregson holds that Lonergan is not asking us...
to do anything. He and I share a ground of agreement that this is indeed a radical critique; it could hardly be more so. However, I feel quite as strongly that he is involved in the most basic misapprehension of what Lonergan is about in Method in Theology.

What, in Gregson's view, does Lonergan's work in theological method invite the theologian to do? Clearest is what it does not intend: it does not call for a work like that in Papal Infallibility, it does not envision "a theological meal in eight courses"; it is not a "New Method Laundry"; it calls for the implementation of no recipe, not even Lonergan's own. Positively, Lonergan's work calls theologians to become aware of "the dynamic structure of their own cognitive and moral being," "to take reflective and active possession of our minds," to allow "the release of 'the eros of the human spirit'." The most definite statement Gregson is able to make is that the method "simply but eloquently brings theology to fuller reflective consciousness and therefore helps in the distinguishing of good theology from bad and in the studied encouragement of the former." In other words, Lonergan's work in method makes no contribution to the actual doing of theology; at most, it may serve as a criterion of discernment between good and bad theology, once the theological project is completed.

What evidence does Gregson give for this radical interpretation of what Lonergan is about? One would expect that such a profound revision of "what Lonergan intended" would be based on some textual evidence. In fact, I see Gregson making no serious attempt to quote Lonergan to support his viewpoint. In the book [pp. 332-334] I had already dealt with some of these issues, trying to show that Lonergan's project was open to an implementation like that in Papal Infallibility, and cited texts from Method in Theology to support this view. I note that Gregson made no attempt to answer those arguments, or to cite other texts to support his thesis. His whole position, as an interpretation of Lonergan, is based on sheer assertion.

The appeal Gregson does make is to the parallel case of scientific method.

There is in fact a very clear analogy and it is in terms of scientific method. There is a natural sequence of questions which leads one from the gathering of data to the forming of hypotheses to the process of verification. Individual scientists make specific contributions
in formulating and clarifying the stages of the mind's natural sequence but the method can't properly be called by the name of the clarifier.

The analogy is valid; but I believe that Gregson is simply inaccurate in his grasp of the development of science. Human beings always asked questions, gathered clues, made hypotheses, decided questions on evidence. But scientific method arose at a specific time, as a magnificent achievement of intelligence. On this subject Lonergan often quotes H. Butterfield, _The Origins of Modern Science_. Nor is this methodological step anonymous or unheralded; it is forever associated with the illustrious names of Bacon, Galileo and Newton; and perhaps those of Albert Einstein, Neils Bohr, and P. A. M. Dirac.

"Surely what Lonergan is concerned with is not recipes but with the mind . . .," Gregson points out. This, I believe, is a half truth. Of course Lonergan is concerned with the mind; but that is not all he is concerned with. Specifically, Gregson misses here the distinction between transcendental method and "the more special method proper to theology" [Method in Theology, pp. 4, 14, 20, 22, 23, 25]. Transcendental method is the mind itself, which Lonergan examined exhaustively in _Verbum_ and _Insight_. But Lonergan is also interested in applied method; he is in _Method in Theology_ precisely proposing to elaborate a method for theology, based on the remote analogy of method in science [pp. 3-4, 125]. To say that Lonergan has no method, then, is to imply that he failed in the very project he set for himself.

Some third way, then, must be found and, even though it is difficult and laborious, that price must be paid if the less successful subject is not to remain a mediocrity or slip into decadence and desuetude.

To work out the basis for such a third way is the purpose of the present chapter. First, we shall appeal to the successful sciences to form a preliminary notion of method. Secondly, we shall go behind the procedures of the natural sciences to something both more general and more fundamental, namely, the procedures of the human mind. Thirdly, in the procedures of the human mind we shall discern a transcendental method, that is, a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise. Fourthly, we shall indicate the relevance of transcendental method in the formulation of other, more special methods appropriate to particular fields [p. 4].

In sum, I find Gregson's extremely minimalistic interpretation of the meaning and import of Lonergan's contribution to theological method to be completely unpersuasive.
Lonergan reveals in a retrospective interview that he saw theological method as the culmination of his life's work ([A Second Collection, p. 213]. I am not sure if I know exactly what Lonergan intended by his method, but I feel certain it promises more than Gregson makes of it. As to the question whether there are specific theological methods, and whether something is to be done with them, I believe Lonergan has pronounced quite clearly.

Theologians are to be responsible for keeping their own house in order, for the influence they may exert on the faithful, and for the influence theological doctrine may have on Church doctrine. They will fulfill this responsibility the more effectively, I believe, if they turn their thoughts to the topic of method and if, instead of waiting for the perfect method to be provided them, they adopt the best available and, in pursuing it, come to discern its shortcomings and remedy its defects (p. 332).

Other methodological questions Gregson raises are less radical, but not without interest. Not surprisingly, as it is virgin territory, Dialectic is the focus of many of these questions. Gregson suggests, for example, that in the chapter I should have made my own values more explicit. I believe here he overlooks the "methodological neutrality" that Lonergan assigns to the first four specialties. The researcher, exegete, historian and dialectician are "listening to the past," dealing with the materials presented by others. It is only in Foundations that the theologian is asked to explicate his own subjectivity [Papal Infallibility, pp. 197-199].

Gregson also says, "It is sufficient and in fact all that can actually be affirmed to judge that a statement or an act is lacking or is apparently lacking moral, or religious value, prescinding from a judgment of character." In other words, Dialectic is to judge statements and acts, not persons. I find no basis in Lonergan's writings for such a restriction; quite the opposite. Dialectical oppositions are grounded in the presence or lack of intellectual, moral and religious conversion. But clearly it is persons who are converted, not statements or acts. "Our fourth functional specialty moves beyond the realm of ordinary empirical science. It meets persons. It acknowledges the values they represent. It deprecates their shortcomings. It scrutinizes their intellectual, moral and religious assumptions" [Method in Theology, p. 252].
Finally, I think Gregson misunderstands my own method in the chapter. "The author admits that he . . . is quite unsure that a judgment on a person's character need be made on the basis of his position on infallibility." Again, Gregson says, "But he never grounds that moral conversion demands the acceptance of papal infallibility." I never intended to ground such an affirmation. My procedure is first to set forth the criteria for discerning the presence or absence of conversion [Papal Infallibility, pp. 202-204]. Those criteria have nothing to do with papal infallibility as such. Then I ask the question of conversion in regard to each of the authors, based on those criteria [pp. 217-231]. This task I propose precisely as a 'deductive' rather than an 'inductive' moment [pp. 201-202]. Only then do I confront this data with the data on the authors' theological position on infallibility [pp. 231-234].

Gregson's treatment of the chapter on Foundations also raises two methodological points. He criticizes the chapter because "... it is only partially based on the specific history and dialectics of infallibility which precede it." Here I think Gregson fails to grasp the extent to which Foundations is a new beginning in the progress of the method. It is not explicitly based on what precedes it; it is rather an explicitation of the author's own conversion. (Of course, conversion does not take place in a vacuum, so the past is always present and active.) Ultimately, the appeal in Foundations is only to one's own experience, one's own subjectivity, and not to anyone else's, no matter how exalted, in the past. It is only Doctrines, in fact, which "stand within the horizon of foundations," but "have their precise definition from dialectic, their positive wealth of clarification and development from history, their grounds in the interpretation of the data proper to theology" [Method in Theology, p. 132].

Gregson further holds that Fagin does not produce (or even intend to produce), in Lonergan's words, "the type of evidence proper to that specialty." This in turn calls into question the following specialties, because they are based on the foundations. I am not sure what Gregson conceives as "the type of evidence" proper to Foundations. To my mind, it is the reality of one's own conversion, objectified in theological discourse. This Fagin intended: "The task in
this section will be to attempt to articulate the categories of Christian conversion" [Papal Infallibility, p. 242]. I believe he also succeeded to some extent in this endeavor, though he chooses to proceed in terms of Scriptural and traditional language rather than by direct autobiography.

Of Gregson's remaining criticisms, many take the form of suggesting an expansion of the project: a dialectic based on psychic conversion, a witness from Eastern Orthodoxy, a fuller treatment of subsidiary issues. I cheerfully admit that many of these additions, in greater or less degree, would be desirable. However, any human project has to have some limits; otherwise, like the process of reflection preceding judgment, it could go on forever. The Greeks recognized that the better could also be the enemy of the good. But one of the suggestions catches my fancy: that the chapter on Dialectic should have included another exercise of the method done by someone "who did not accept papal infallibility but held an alternate view of truth and authority in the church." Taking that together with the admission, "I realize I am calling for an entire book on the dialectic of infallibility," may I suggest that Gregson might be in a perfect position to write such a book? In it he could explore his suggestion, "Why might intellectual conversion not ground the opposite, namely, that the formal criterion of definition by the Pope does not in itself indicate that a statement is to be accepted as true?" I would be curious to see what evidence might be brought forward, for example, to show that Augustine, Aquinas and Bellarmine are intellectually unconverted, while Luther, Febronius and Hans Kueng are intellectually converted. The attempt might even produce what Lonergan ultimately calls for, a dialectic of dialecticians.

Of Gregson's remaining points I single out only the creative effort he makes in adding two theses to Fagin's original five. The second one I see as unproblematic, as it only makes explicit a negative implication of Fagin's fifth thesis. But the first additional thesis appears to me gravely questionable. "In so far as the pope does not reflect and express the faith and consensus of the believing church in his solemn definitions or in so far as his solemn definitions are not confirmed by the faith of the community, they are not to be considered infallible." Perhaps I am
missing something, but I find it hard to distinguish this from precisely that Gallican understanding the Fathers of Vatican I were intending to exclude by their *ex sese et non ex consensu ecclesiae*.

To conclude, I am grateful to Gregson for focusing these methodological issues so sharply; and I hope that a vigorous discussion will ensue on these questions.
Thurow has written this book so that laymen may understand the "convulsions now affecting the discipline of Economics". In his view such understanding is essential because prevailing economic theories create the climate for public debate in which economic choices are made. The book recounts the history of U.S. economic policies since the 1960's, and explains in an uncomplicated way why the remedies for inflation and unemployment proposed by economists to politicians in power at the time were apparently ineffective. The failure of mainstream economics to provide a theory that would be adequate when choosing economic goals, or the policies to achieve them, is explained via a discussion of how markets, particularly labor and capital markets, have failed to operate as the equilibrium theory indicated they should.

As a way of developing economic theory, Thurow suggests that one look behind the facade of supply and demand curves to study the determinants of economic behavior. This approach is complementary to Bernard Lonergan's analysis of economic dynamics in his essay *Circulation Analysis*. Where Thurow considers the psychological and sociological bases for economic behavior, Lonergan studies the effects of unavoidable lags in the productive process on the same behavior.

Because the style of *Dangerous Currents* is episodic, parts of it can be read independently or referred to as needed. The references for each chapter at the end of the book are a helpful guide to some of the literature on the economic theories and policies of monetarism, supply-side economics and the rational-expectationist view, as well as the various areas of controversy in econometrics and labor market analysis.

**The Price-Auction Model of an Economy**

As his framework of analysis Thurow uses the price-auction
However, following discussion of that model, he presents a devastating criticism of it -- not only as an explanation of the way in which the economy works over time, of how the labor market works, and of how people in fact behave in buying and selling but, in general, as a paradigm for a social science and a guide to policy. Although Thurow does not clearly outline an alternative model, the reader can discern suggestions as to how he might modify the analytical scaffolding of economics. One change would be the introduction of a more nuanced conception of human behavior than the profit or utility maximization assumption that has traditionally been accepted by most economists as being dominant in the behavior of economic man. Another would be the acceptance of a large degree of randomness in events -- a factor which would account for the failure of economic predictions and point to the difficulties in the path of the development of economics as a science. Because the future is radically uncertain, its determination cannot be accomplished through the use of such tools as risk analysis and the calculation of probabilities. Thurow also draws attention to the role of institutions in channeling economic behavior. He mentions, too, the relationship between flows of income, such as profits and wages, and market disequilibrium -- an aspect not usually considered in the price-auction model, in which wages always equal marginal productivity in a timeless equilibrium.

Chapter 1 describes the lack of agreement between Keynesian macroeconomics, which assumes that wages are not flexible but does not prove it, and the price-auction model which assumes that all prices including wages (the price of labor) are flexible. Although Thurow believes that it is impossible to prove the correctness of either viewpoint -- because the tools of measurement are only approximate, the choice of key variables from the many that are interacting in a given situation is frequently debatable, and random events can dominate results -- his judgment, based on econometric evidence of low price elasticities, is that price is not a key variable in market clearing particularly in labor markets. In chapter 7 he discusses at length the variables that appear to be more important in labor markets.

Chapter 3 focuses on the reasons why the price-auction model fails to deal with inflation. The principal reason
is that it is a timeless explanation — one in which money, in fact, does not matter although relative prices do. In the static price-auction model, money becomes a good whose price relative to itself is equal to one. Thus, in terms of this model, no clear argument can be offered for a policy to deal with inflation. When time is introduced into the analysis, the question becomes whether markets clear rapidly because prices are flexible, or whether they are in major disequilibrium because prices change very slowly. Thurow concludes that an active anti-inflation policy implies a belief in rigid prices and wages.

In his essay, Circulation Analysis, Lonergan also views the price-auction model as inadequate in a dynamic analysis. He reasons that price is not the sole primary variable in such cases. The variables that had traditionally been assumed to be unchanging — such as capital equipment, people’s preferences, income distribution and prices of other goods — do in fact change and must be part of the analysis.

Economic Dynamics

Thurow reiterates that economists do not argue about whether markets clear, as the price-auction model says, while noting their disagreement about the speed with which adjustment occurs or the size of the imbalance. Such discussion, however, is the concern of economic dynamics and, for this reason alone, Thurow claims that the price-auction model is not a suitable tool. Set against his belief that economic models are static and the economy dynamic is his realization of the difficulty of modeling dynamics formally. The direction of his interest in the development of dynamic theory presented in Dangerous Currents lies principally in the area of behavioral constraints, that is, in determining the forces affecting behavior, the ways in which preferences are formed, the effects of income distribution, and the role of institutions such as large corporations, labor unions, and financial bodies.

A different but complementary approach to economic dynamics is taken by Lonergan in his essay which focuses on the productive process itself as the source of disequilibrium in a time-analysis of markets. The productive process can be more or less taken for granted when it is assumed that the equipment will not change, as happens in the logical price-auction model. But gestation lags in production must
be taken into account when new equipment is introduced, just as behavioral constraints must be taken into account when tastes or institutions change or new goods are introduced. Lonergan's cycle of the productive process considers such a technical constraint.

The source of the technical constraint for Lonergan is the lag in the growth of the standard of living, that is, consumer goods, while new plants and machinery, which normally increase productivity, are developed and put into place. The eventual acceleration in the production of consumer goods and services will create problems of absorption if the changes in production are not reflected in changes in the functional distribution of income. Increased production of plants and machinery implies the need for increased savings and investment, while acceleration in output for consumption requires an income distribution which increases consumption. Further, and in tandem with the shift in emphasis of the productive process from increasing equipment production to increasing production for consumers, a disequilibrium in financial markets can occur as business investment credit grows less rapidly. There will also be disequilibrium in labor markets as workers with different skills are needed and money wages, which once rose rapidly in certain industries, tend to stabilize or decline. In product markets, new goods and services will displace the old, causing shifts there as well.

Lonergan believes that this technical source of disequilibrium can be better dealt with if its basis is understood and the economic agents modify their behavior accordingly. The transition from one phase to another could also be eased if governments, large corporations, and labor unions were each to help in the transfer of human resources, equipment, and procedures, through planning and training.

From a systems viewpoint, Lonergan's analysis is restricted to economic phenomena and takes as given an economy's political, cultural, and technical development as well as its natural resources and population. In Dangerous Currents, on the other hand, Thurow is concerned with how the economy relates to political and social systems, in such areas as consumer preferences and labor market behavior.

Economics as Science

In his chapter dealing with econometrics, Thurow discusses the effectiveness of empirical work in economics. Referring
to the 'mushiness' of the data available, he notes that different empirical tests can be done that do not invalidate opposite explanations of what is going on in an economy. He also speaks of the inconclusiveness of empirical work and, while attributing it to the size of the random component in events, he says that "too often what first seem like random events are shown to be deterministic, if understood properly." A further source of difficulty, in Thurow's eyes, is that empirical work is based on the static price-auction model. Indeed, he comments that the dynamic properties that are added to models have a "disturbingly ad hoc character."

Thurow discusses the interest today among economists vis-à-vis reducing the stochastic element in economic processes to calculations of probabilities of the occurrence of different outcomes. He distinguishes risk from uncertainty however, identifying the latter not as being reducible to such calculations as the expected value of variables but rather as a phenomenon which needs to be included in economic analysis. "The problem with uncertainty," according to Thurow, "is that someone has to bear it. We need to know who does and how the damage can be minimized if a market economy is to work successfully." But Thurow sees economic research as being restricted by the fact that experiments are not repeatable, which means that statistical laws are hard to validate. Furthermore, he notes that in human affairs man can change the probability of events occurring through his own actions. In summary then, Thurow finds the element of randomness in economic data to be large, relative to what is systematic. Statistical analysis cannot reject the view that economic processes are random. Nor can it prove that the economy is not systematic.

We can turn to Lonergan's analysis of classical and statistical laws presented in Insight for additional understanding of the failure of the price-auction model. Viewed in that context, the model can be seen as being based on the classical economic laws of supply and demand which hold if other variables in the system are assumed not to change. The variables taken traditionally as given or parametric—the tastes of consumers, the stock of equipment or tools, the actual income distribution, and the prices of other goods—mean that the classical laws may apply only in a very short time frame. As a result, the laws of supply and demand
fail to deal with major economic questions concerning investment, employment and income and must be extended by a new dynamic analysis.

In a dynamic model dealing with investment, employment and income, new variables enter the calculations and other classical laws to explain their relations must be determined. The process by which economic agents from their expectations about the future is one key concern. The rational-expectationists, whose views are discussed by Thurow in chapter 6, find that if one assumes that businessmen and consumers immediately discount anticipated changes in the economic environment (such as increases in government budget deficits, or droughts, or oil price shocks) better econometric results will be achieved than if one assumes behavior adapts slowly. Thurow remains 'agnostic' on this issue, saying that economic experiments cannot conclusively 'prove' one theory or another; he does, however, acknowledge the importance of including expectations in dynamic models of economic behavior.

In Circulation Analysis, Lonergan presents the cycle of the productive process as a new concept that will account for dynamic disequilibrium in markets. He categorizes relative prices, income distribution, and capital equipment as endogenous variables changing in relation to one another, but holds as exogenous or unchanging for the period of the analysis the political and social contexts and techniques. He does, however, see in technical change, as Schumpeter did, a source of the dynamism of his pure cycle.

For Lonergan, classical laws do not hold in the concrete because of the haziness of data. He believes, moreover, that these laws need to be complemented by statistical laws which measure probabilities of the occurrence of events, given the relationships defined in classical laws. To his mind, uncertainty is the irreducible indeterminacy in any particular outcome which cannot be assigned a probability. In his discussion of classical and statistical laws, Lonergan does not raise the issue of how to deal with the victims when an actual outcome in human affairs is unacceptable. That omission, however, does not imply that society need not give thought to helping persons who bear the costs of uncertainty; for example, those who lose their bets while undertaking a normal business risk might be compensated in some way. This issue is mentioned by Thurow more than once in his book.
Approaches to Policy

Particularly in his chapters dealing with inflation, as well as in chapters 6 and 7, Thurow explains the link between the mainstream economics of the price-auction model and the current policy stances recommended by proponents of monetarism, supply-side economics, and the rational-expectations view. To his eyes, monetarists would find the cause of economic variability to lie in the unstable growth of the money supply; their recommendations would involve the stabilization of money management. Supply-side policy advocates would add, to a policy of stabilizing monetary growth, measures that would stimulate investment by reducing regulations and taxes. The advocates of a rational-expectations view of the economy would find economic policies unimportant, for they believe that markets adjust immediately to any changes. In other words, markets "behave as well as they can," given "deficiencies in information, unavoidable and often substantial transaction costs, and large stochastic shocks," and macroeconomic policies are not helpful.

Thurow argues that all these policies are inadequate because they are based on a price-auction view of how the economy works. While limiting himself mainly to a description and criticism of the policies based on that model, Thurow restricts his positive proposals to longer term policies of institutional change which would improve the economic environment in which markets operate. These include such ideas as skill training through apprenticeship, compensation for loss due to uncertainty in economic events, and the counteraction of constraints in capital markets.

If we are to take Lonergan's cycle of the productive process as a perspective in policy planning, it would appear that a more nuanced money-supply management is required, one advocating increased money growth rates in periods of growing investment and more stable growth rates in periods of rising consumption. Supply-side policies could encourage the initiation of a period of increasing investment -- Lonergan's "surplus expansion" -- provided the simple monetarist views on policy were elaborated and the savings behavior of governments, business, unions and households were informed by some understanding of and consensus concerning the benefits and costs of economic growth. Thus, if the cycle of the productive process were commonly understood as the way
things work in an economy, economic agents could behave accordingly. The rational-expectationists' assumption might then be a better simplifying behavioral assumption than adaptive behavior in a theory of economic dynamics.

Conclusions

The book concludes with suggestions as to the various areas in economic theory where development is needed in order to explain economic disequilibrium not dealt with in the price-auction model. Concerned with behavioral constraints, Thurow recommends interdisciplinary study of the ways in which people form their preferences, which after all determine in turn their economic behavior. Thurow tells us that preference formation is largely a social process with "intensive individual-social interaction." He explains that although social preferences are a total of individual preferences, they also include a normative view of what would be in Thurow's terms a "fair economic game." He argues that institutions such as governments, corporations and unions, as well as minimum wage laws and new forms of money and credit also constrain economic behavior and must be considered in economic analysis. In effect, he finds that institutions are not all determined by the market, as the price-auction model assumes. They are also created or changed by communities deliberately choosing their goals. Thurow stresses, as well, the importance of integrating uncertainty into economic calculations by some form of a sharing of the costs related to "losing one's bets," a situation he terms as inevitable in a market economy.

Larner in his essay on Circulation Analysis, focuses on essential economic phenomena; his cycle of the productive process deals with technical rather than behavioral constraints. The cycle is related to lags in production and provides a fundamental explanation of disequilibrium in markets. In Insight, however, his discussion of the complementarity of classical and statistical laws and of the emergent probabilities of a world process provides a structure for understanding economics as a science. There, too, he explores the basis of behavioral assumptions, for in his discussion of the structure of human knowing he determines a normative process of preference formation. His notions of the concrete human good as an object of desire, of the good of order as understood and known, and of value as a good that can be chosen, thereby provide a framework for understanding individual and social
preference formation. This process might also parallel Thurow's "fair economic game" within the technical constraints of the cycle of the productive process.

Thurow's book does help the layman gain an understanding of the present stage in the development of economics as a science. The consequent difficulties facing economists in advisory positions who are expected to give constructive advice about something that is uncertain are also quite clear. Although recommendations containing such phrases as "on the one hand" and "on the other hand" are not popular with people who must make decisions within brief time periods, it is difficult to eliminate such caveats when economic science has so little to say about dynamic processes, when the future will always remain uncertain and when, in Thurow's view, economic events depend to such a large extent on stochastic processes or chance. In Dangerous Currents, faced with these dilemmas, Thurow proposes policies with which to achieve politically chosen goals. Lonergan, however, would argue that policy makers must first consider the technical constraints of the cycle of the productive process which, to his eyes, constitutes the fundamental dynamic process in an economy.

Eileen de Neeve

NOTES

1 The price-auction model is based on a logical understanding of the process of buying and selling in a market: that is, while other things remain unchanged, price is determined by the tentative offers to buy and sell that occur until a price is set at which the total supply of the goods or services brought to market for sale at that price (or less) will be sold, and all buyers willing to buy at that price (or more) will be able to buy. See p. 4 of Dangerous Currents for further discussion.

2 The proportional change in quantity supplied or demanded in response to a given change in price. For example, if price increases 10%, does the quantity demanded increase exactly, more than, or less than 10%?


4 Output per person in paid employment.

5 Lonergan uses the more general term "surplus production" for the production of plant and equipment. The word 'surplus' also indicates the fact that such production implies delaying consumption, which can only be done if some sort of surplus exists. Lonergan uses the term "basic production" with reference to what is consumed in the standard of living.
6 Lonergan, op. cit., 1982 typescript, section about the Surplus Stage of the Productive Process.

7 Dangerous Currents, pp. 109, 117.

8 Ibid., p. 123.  9 Ibid., p. 108.  10 Ibid., p. 236.


12 Classical laws are essentially unverifiable.


15 Eileen de Neeve, Economic Growth and Investment Cycles in Eastern European Socialist Economies [Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Concordia University, Montreal, 1979].

16 Lonergan, op. cit., Chapter IV.  17 Ibid., Chapter XVIII.

18 Lonergan also discusses the human good as "at once individual and social" and relates it to social progress and decline. See Method in Theology [New York: Seabury Press, 1979], pp. 52 ff.
Communication, like many things, is not thought difficult until it fails, but the difficulties revealed through misunderstandings, while at first practical and to be practically solved, sometimes indicate theoretical questions which themselves can lead to the discovery that what seems easy and what, in practice, is and remains easy, is or may be difficult to understand. Communication may founder because the syntax of the message is too complicated; recent studies on the success of instructions on packages show that some syntactical arrangements can obscure quite simple messages. Some messages fail because the phonemic ranges of speaker and listener are too different and so in Cork a child from Tennessee on asking for 'bearfruit' is astonished to be offered an apple when he had hoped to be shown the lavatory. Finally, some messages fail because the partners live in different semantic worlds, because they are on different wavelengths. To talk of semantic worlds or of wavelengths is to talk in metaphors and a major part of \textit{A Philosophy of Communication} is devoted to an unpacking of these metaphors.

Communication is often thought of as the passing on of information or as the attempt to persuade. Fr. Kelly defines it as the sharing of meaning [p. 6]. This definition fits the everyday view but Kelly upsets the applecart when he writes a few lines further on that communication is also sharing what he calls 'non-meaning' -- and by non-meaning he means non-sense or error. In what follows I shall concentrate on this oddity because it is here in my opinion that Kelly makes his most penetrating contribution and one which runs throughout the book, but it is here too that there is an opaque use of language that could mislead readers.

Consider a very commonplace example of everyday meaning: A asks B for his telephone number and B replies that it is 796243; A goes away satisfied but there is a snag: 796243 is not B's telephone number. Let us suppose that B made a mistake rather than that he lied. Error has been communicated but I find it obscure to call this 'non-meaning'. The example is commonplace but it is obvious that among the many messages
transmitted daily some are errors in this sense -- messages that could be true but as a matter of fact are not -- and there are points of view from which the truth or falsity of the message is irrelevant. To continue the example, one might ask whether it is better to communicate one's telephone number in speech as "seventy nine - sixty two - thirty four" or as "seven-nine-six-two-three-four or as "seven hundred and ninety six thousand two hundred and thirty four" etc.

Nonetheless, the communication is flawed when the wrong number is given. Why? Because the intention of the original question was to get the correct one. I would, therefore, suggest another definition or description of communication: co-operation in the pursuit of truth. I suggest, too, that something like this definition is the energy behind K.'s work.

K. arrived at his definition of communication after reading Bernard Lonergan's definition of community in Method in Theology: "A community . . . is an achievement of common meaning." It is easy to overlook the fact that the common meaning that a community achieves is not necessarily a true or noble meaning -- a moment's reflection will bring to mind communities whose common meaning the reader not only does not share but whose meaning the reader abhors. Perhaps it is opportune to say that terms like 'community' and 'meaning' are more neutral than contemporary enthusiastic use often allows. Lonergan writes of the adult world being mediated by meaning and K. takes up this theme in his seventh chapter; we should not forget that this mediating meaning may well be evil.

K. is well aware of this and quite deliberately and openly takes his stand on the fundamental intention of communication which is truth, and it is this which makes the book stand out. But his language is sometimes misleading. He writes [p. 175] of the possibility of only a travesty of meaning being passed on and that the ideology of a group may be largely a collection of myths. There are two ways in which a contemporary meaning can be a travesty. First, a contemporary meaning can be a travesty of an earlier meaning the real import of which it has utterly failed to grasp. Secondly, a contemporary meaning may be wholly faithful to an earlier meaning and both may be travesties of the reality which they purport to express. In the first case an earlier
and more adequate meaning no longer exists although perhaps the original expressions of that meaning remain and can assist in the arduous efforts to rediscover that meaning. In the second case the meaning adequate to the reality does not and never did exist. But in both cases, and K. constantly comes back to this, in communication the goal is adequate meaning.

A Philosophy of Communication is about the conditions which make adequate meaning possible and those which prevent or distort it. The fundamental epistemological condition is the dynamism of intellect which has been variously named and which Lonergan calls the pure desire to know. The corresponding epistemological condition is the possibility of truth. The corresponding metaphysical condition is being. In most contemporary philosophical schools, however different they seem, there is a common rejection of the second and third conditions. Truth, for example, is thought not to be possible because propositions are within contexts or paradigms or presuppositional sets or epistemic frames and these are not verifiable. Being, then, is not what is to be known but what is defined (i.e., limited) by the context adopted. Nor are these contemporary attitudes new, any more than the realism which opposes them is new.

A less fundamental but none the less important condition for adequate meaning is the conviction that one may be wrong. One cannot ultimately escape the pure desire to know, however distorted one's practice and however wrongheaded one's theory. Neither can one avoid being wrong, but it is easy enough to dodge the conviction that one may be. The conviction that one may be wrong is difficult to achieve for the very obvious reason that in debate one often finds oneself preferring to have the upper hand rather than seeing truth prevail. But there is another reason: whenever one states something one holds it to be true (I exclude lies) because if one did not hold it to be true one would state something else. Nor in practice is one or can one be open to correction by everyone -- there are people with whom it is not worth arguing because one has already considered their position. (One may, of course, want to convert them to one's own position, but this is another issue.) Again one is in practice convinced that he is wrong about everything. What is meant by the rule of thumb that one should be convinced that one may be wrong
is that one should assume that many of one's positions are
much more a matter of personal tradition than personal inquiry,
that many positions have been adopted in small or large mea-
sure because one happened to be a certain age and in a cer-
tain place at a certain time, that many positions are fashions,
that many are half-formed. Communication is cooperation in
learning -- which is not supposed to mean that there are
to be no masters and no students, for this contemporary myth
of the equality of inquirers is a negation of human learning
and human time.

We are by now a far cry from communication as simply
the passing on of information. Still this remains one aspect
of communication and an immensely important one. By informa-
tion here is generally meant the "already accepted" -- thus,
in our society children are told that the earth is spherical,
etc. Such information is in principle within the dialectic
of inquiry but in practice it is not doubted. Such informa-
tion can be ill received: how many small children have hap-
pily believed that the world is a spear? The more basic prob-
lem is not that some inaccurate information will be trans-
mitted, nor that information will be garbled, but that every-
thing will be received as information.

This is not a new problem. Plato opposed the Sophists
on this point. For the Sophists considered that human communi-
cation was the inculcation of opinion. Plato considered that
human communication was a dialectic and Aristotle developed
this idea. However, it would be ludicrous and unbearably
tedious if everything was always the subject of debate, and
so it will be a perennial social and political question to
determine what should now be debated.

The mass media do not, then, produce the problem of
the transmission of information and the critical dialectic.
They do, however, produce a particular version of the problem.
Consider the difference between reading a newspaper report
and listening to the reporter -- of a report one cannot ask
questions. This was true as soon as there was writing, but
while the audience for writing was small the writer was often
known to his readers and his writing was to a much greater
extent the continuation of the dialectic of speech. The en-
largement of the audience necessarily brought with it a
diminution of dialectic.

As techniques of communication developed, more and more
messages were transmitted and once again within a system where response is neither desired nor possible. Response in the sense of buying something advertised is of course desired, possible and, one supposes, given, but there is another question to be asked about advertising concerning the level of the imagery. For many people in our society almost the only graphic art they see in their lives is in advertisements; for most people -- I suspect for all -- most of the graphic art they see is in advertisements. What is the effect of this? I don't know and I don't know how to go about answering the question, but it is a legitimate question and one which, I think, would arise within the context of K.'s book. What is the effect of getting so much information but necessarily so unsystematically in daily newspapers? In his eleventh chapter K. discusses the mass media, but I found that the discussion fell below the standard of the rest of the book inasmuch as he seems to accept uncritically the point of view and context of those scientists who have studied the media. K. does once or twice analyze the inquiries but I think insufficiently, and I would disagree with his analysis of cause on p. 151. What does it mean to say that mass media do not have a direct causal effect on the psychology and personality of readers, listeners, viewers? These terms are too large to be useful.

What does it mean to talk of television? There is an obvious sense, as when someone says that he watched television last night, but even there he may mean that he watched the news or a discussion program or an old film of one kind or another or a new television film of one kind or another or a comedy or an informational film of some kind. At this level it makes as much sense to talk about watching television as to talk about reading books. It is, of course, possible to be addicted to television, as it is possible to be addicted to books, but it seems possible that the addict either of tele-images or of print is addicted to those images and that print which make the least demand on him. It is also possible to raise the question of the specific effect of a particular medium -- Plato's discussion of the different effects of speech and writing is a precursor of McLuhan's, and whatever one may think of the answer the question is important.

The question of the effect of television is too gross
to be answered. And even when it is in practice made more specific the answer is sometimes overlooked. Consider the following passage:

Lazarfeld and Merton . . . insist that television is not a direct cause of psychological change. . . watching telecasts of the war in Vietnam night after night apparently bored many American people to the extent that they were no longer concerned.

In this passage the example disproves the hypothesis. Attitudes were changed by watching television although the attitudes reached (boredom and lack of concern) were not, perhaps, those attitudes envisaged by the presenters. But is this television or is it boring television? In any medium an interesting topic introduced in and out of season becomes boring. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine what is involved in being concerned.

'Passivity' is a common contemporary complaint. K. discusses the role of television in inducing passivity [pp. 160-162]. This discussion is valuable inasmuch as he shows, by bringing together several studies, that those who are said to be made passive by television may already have been so. A difficulty is that only very indirectly do we learn what passivity involves and then not very exactly. Sometimes passivity seems to mean the choice of the lesser effort even when the rewards of more effort are in some sense perceived to be greater; sometimes it seems to be the reception of entertainment rather than its production; sometimes it is being satisfied with the trivial. Since these senses are not, perhaps, totally disparate, it is possible to have some notion of what is being spoken of; but the idea that television (and no doubt other media and other experiences) can have a reinforcement effect is acceptable but incomplete, for television does not impinge for the first time on an already formed person but is rather part of his formation. The contrast between the serious and the light, between the artistic and the trivial etc. are moral contrasts of the basic form: X is better than Y. The matter can be complicated by saying that what is really important is the range of programs watched, books read, music heard, etc., but the structure is the same: range X is better than range Y. As in all moral contrasts the better is more difficult than the worse, at least at first, until a good habit is formed. What is really at issue in this chapter is a contemporary morality.
The rest of the book could serve as the context for such an effort but, in my opinion, K. is too confined within the context of the authors he considers and fails to recognize that the title "human scientist" confers nothing but that.

It is worth pointing out that in ordinary everyday speech these words have a range of meanings which the speakers more or less adequately specify between themselves whenever they use them, but the more formal a discourse becomes the more technical words must become and the more they are asked to bear. It will not do to import the particularity of everyday speech into the universality of science, and what often happens is that a spurious clarity is achieved.

In his twelfth and final chapter K. suggests "An Overall Plan for Communication". If bias of whatever kind blocks communication, then the elimination of bias will assist communication. Bias, of course, is, like the mote, easy to see in one's brother's eye. K. is careful to stress [e.g., pp. 180-181] that everyone is prone to bias, but even with this insistence this is a dangerous chapter. We all have a utopian streak and when we come to the peroration may read it utopically, so it is worth saying crudely that those who expect unbiased groups are like the early Christians who expected heaven on earth or like those south sea islanders who wait confidently for the cargo to arrive. There will be no cargo. There are no unbiased people. Cosmopolis does not and will not exist.

Are we, then, confined within our biases? The answer is both yes and no. The elimination of bias is a lifetime's job because, among other reasons, the roots of bias are constant and uneradicable.

The liberation of mind from bias is not performed once and for all but is a constant effort which occurs within dialectic or argument -- dialectic, for Aristotle, is the emergence of truth from the dispute between partial opinions.

My effort here is not to contradict K.'s final chapter but to suggest a way of reading it. Sometimes he writes as if there were a group -- an actual collection of people called cosmopolis -- which, being unbiased and lucid, would on occasion seek to frustrate and nullify the efforts of other biased groups: "Cosmopolis . . . will take a strong line when dominant groups seek to rationalize their error and set it up as a universally valid principle . . ." [p. 190]. The
danger is that cosmopolis is or may become a name that a particular group gives itself. He writes that "cosmopolis . . . could itself become infected by bias," and while it is important to say something like this, the manner of saying it reinforces the impression that cosmopolis is a particular group. Gnosticism is an ever recurrent temptation.

The Gnostic is already certain of everything about which he has an opinion; what K. means by cosmopolis is rather the constant effort to investigate the presuppositions of what at any time is taken for granted not only by others but by oneself, a willingness to be uncertain, a disposition to distinguish between what one believes and what one knows, between what one is reasonably sure of and what one is less sure of, between initial idea and considered conclusion. One should dispute, wrote Ignatius of Loyola, in order that truth might appear rather than that one would have the upper hand. A Philosophy of Communication is an extended comment on that simple admonition.

Garrett Barden