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APPLYING LONERGAN’S METHOD:  
THE CASE OF AN INDIAN THEOLOGY

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Lonergan’s method has been the subject of much study and discussion but attempts to use and apply the method are rare, and where such attempts have been made, they have sometimes been the subject of significant controversy and debate.1 In this paper I attempt to work out steps for applying the method toward the generation of an Indian Christian theology. The generation of such a theology is of course already in process. But I believe that Lonergan’s method offers some important and even exciting contributions to this ongoing process. This paper intends to explore some of these contributions.

I begin with some general considerations. A first consideration is that, while Lonergan has given us the broad outlines of a theological method, there is need of more detailed programming for ideas that will mediate between the great idea and its applications.2

A second consideration concerns the type of collaboration called for by the method. We certainly need what we might call “strict applications”

1Among the attempts we might list the following: Frederick E. Crowe, *Theology of the Christian Word* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), which claims to be an exercise in the functional specialty, history; Robert M. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), which claims to be an exercise in foundations; Francesco Rossi de Gasperis, *Comincianto da Gerusalemme*, which seems to be another exercise in history; and Terry J. Tekippe, ed., *Papal Infallibility: An Application of Lonergan’s Theological Method* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), which is the first and only attempt to apply Lonergan’s method as a whole.

of the method — scholars coming together for the explicit purpose of using Lonergan's method. But we also need collaboration in the broad sense, and I do not think that Lonergan ever intended excluding this. Already in *Insight* he had enunciated a canon of successive approximations and had outlined a set of critical principles that would make collaboration possible.\(^3\) In *Method* too he notes that a serious contribution to one of the eight specialties is all that can be demanded of a single piece of work, and that the distinction and division of functional specialties enables us to resist excessive demands.\(^4\) He in fact envisages an interim period until method is generally recognized. In this interim period, any single contribution will have a major part and a minor part:

The major part is to produce the type of evidence proper to the specialty. So the exegete does exegesis on exegetical principles. The historian does history on historical principles. The doctrinal theologian ascertains doctrine on doctrinal principles. The systematic theologian clarifies, reconciles, unifies on systematic principles. But there is, besides this major and principal part, also a minor part. Each of the specialties is functionally related to the others. Especially until such time as a method in theology is generally recognized, it will serve to preclude misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and misrepresentation, if the specialist draws attention to the fact of specialization and gives some indication of his awareness of what is to be added to his statements in the light of the evidence available to other, distinct specialties.\(^5\)

Method will therefore involve people working in the individual functional specialties in a broad and loose collaboration. The existence of dialectic and foundations makes it possible to (eventually) draw their contributions together. But method, as I have said, also makes place for and even demands collaboration in the strict sense, people collaborating together explicitly on commonly agreed projects. Much of even this work


\(^5\) *Method in Theology*, 137-38. It is interesting that four functional specialties are not mentioned in the above quote: research, dialectic, foundations, and communications. Is there some significance in this omission? Is it that dialectic and foundations necessarily call for teamwork?
will be done individually, but at least dialectic and foundations will involve actual interaction at some point.

1. POSSIBLE PROJECTS

One way of setting into motion an application of Lonergan’s method might be to create a new theological dictionary, on the lines of the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, or a series of theological manuals, something along the lines of the new *genus litterarium* of theological work called for by Rahner. We could then propose a method toward this end, a project that would span, say, a couple of decades.

A list of topics could easily be drawn up by a team. Existing encyclopedias, dictionaries, and manuals could provide initial models and lists of topics.

The fundamental theological issues are in the areas of Trinity, Christology, Ecclesiology, morals. Some related issues would be revelation, faith, the magisterium, the status of religious expression, truth, tolerance, dialogue, the theology of religions.

Before launching on a large-scale application of Lonergan’s method, however, it might be good to initiate smaller, more feasible projects. These could be in the individual specialties such as research, interpretation, history, or foundations. They could even be projects involving groups of specialties. Thus, for example, Crowe has suggested that the eight functional specialties might be divided into three groups: (1) research, interpretation, history; (2) dialectic, foundations, doctrines; (3) systematics, communications.

Among research projects we could think of a bibliography of Indian Christian writings and theology, from apostolic times to the present; critical editions of classical texts such as the *Khrista Purana* of Thomas Stephens, the writings of Roberto de Nobili, the *purana* of Etienne de la

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7 Crowe speaks of covering the main areas of theology over a span of 50 to 100 years, on the lines of the Bollandists (400 years) or the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (75 years).

8 Thomas Stephens was a Jesuit missionary who is reputed to be the first Englishman to step into India. He worked largely in and around Goa and was in Goa when Robert de Nobili landed there. In response to the needs and requests of new converts, he composed a *purana* (a sacred
Croix, the *Khristayan* of Narayan Vaman Tilak, the writings of Brahmobandhav Upadhyaya, the writings of Pandita Ramabai; critical editions or comparative studies of translations of the Bible into local languages; and critical editions of catechisms, hymns, and other popular literature in local languages.

Possible *interpretation projects*: particular themes in the writings mentioned above, for example, Trinity, Christology, ecclesiology, Mariology, mission and evangelization, revelation, faith, the magisterium, the status of religious expression, the status of other religions.

Possible *history projects* (but this would presuppose a great deal of already completed research and exegesis): in the areas of Trinitarian theology, Christology, ecclesiology, Mariology, mission and evangelization, revelation, faith, the magisterium, the status of religious expression, the status of other religions.

A possible *foundations project* would be to study the work of R. V. De Smet and his followers (for example, Sara Grant) to discover the categories they have recovered from Sankara, categories that might prove useful for Trinitarian and Christological theology. Part of this project might also

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10N. V. Tilak (1861-1919) was a Hindu Brahmin from Nashik who converted to Christianity. Many of the Marathi hymns that are still sung in church were composed by him. His *Khristayan* is a long prose work on the life of Christ, begun by him but completed by his wife and later by his son.

11Brahmobandhav Upadhyaya (1861-1907) was a Bengali Hindu Brahmin convert to Christianity. He desired to win over India to the Catholic church by (1) attempting to integrate the social structure of India into the Christian way of life; (2) founding an Indian Christian monastic order; (3) picking out the theistic truths in the Vedas and using them as a sort of natural platform on which to build Christian theology; and (4) using the Vedanta to express Christian theology.

12Pandita (doctor) Ramabai (1858-1922) was a Maharashtrian Hindu convert, famous for her social work as well as for her biblical learning. She learned Hebrew and Greek and translated the Bible into Marathi.

13Richard V. De Smet, SJ (1916-1997) was a Jesuit philosopher and Indologist who taught for many years at Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune (India). In his doctoral dissertation, "The Theological Method of Sankara" (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian
involve pulling together all the other attempts to recover categories from Sankara for Christian theology. Another foundations project: studying the various Christian *puranas* and other classical Indian Christian writings to discover categories recovered from the Hindu tradition.

On a little larger scale, an *immediately possible project* could be an exercise of the first six functional specialties centering around Crowe’s *Theology of the Christian Word*. Scholars could easily be contacted for papers on the topic of the Christian Word. The seminar could be envisaged in two parts. The first part would consist in complementing Crowe’s account with (1) researches and interpretations, as suggested by Crowe’s study itself, and not only of the word in Christianity but perhaps also of the word in other traditions and (2) other histories. The contributions would be patterned therefore not according to data (field specialization) but according to functional specialization. Further, we should have several contributions to each functional specialty, preferably by people with different standpoints. In the second part of the seminar, the matter generated by research, interpretation, and history could be subjected, either by the same team or else by a different team, to dialectic and foundations, resulting in doctrines. Dialectic and foundations would, among other things, take up the issue of the status and value of religious expression.

2. THE TEAM

Since Lonergan’s method is designed to be open to all-comers, the team should ideally be ecumenical, interreligious, humanist. Such openness is, I think, one of Lonergan’s key contributions to Indian theology.

Lonergan recommends as diverse a group as possible, so that dialectic becomes really significant, an interaction between radically

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University, 1953), he showed that Sankara was a *srutivadin*, a theologian who reflected on the (Hindu) Scriptures. He also proposed that Sankara, in his reflections on the relationship between Brahman and the world, taught a doctrine of *laksana* that corresponds to the so-called intrinsic analogy of the Schoolmen. De Smet engaged in a sustained dialogue with non-Christian scholars in India and was one of the founders of the Association of Christian Philosophers of India.
different horizons. In an unpublished text of 1969, he makes the following comment about dialectic:

Dialectic occurs principally, not within some one religion, but between many religions. It is the seat, not of authority, but of dialogue. It is not institutional but ecumenist. It is where the many meet, clarify their differences, eliminate misapprehensions, remove incoherences. It is where they endeavor to understand why the other fellow disagrees, to find behind what one thinks his error the truth to which he is so devoted.14

What proportion of “fully converted investigators” would be required? Lonergan says somewhere: “very many theologians must pursue the attainment of holiness if theology is to discern, appreciate, judge religious values and communicate such discernment, appreciation, judgment to others.”15 Is there any way of assuring this? — Among other things, the very incorporation of religious experience and conversion into theological method is a move in this direction. Just as we can effectively kill an issue simply by neglecting and sidelining it, so also we can promote an issue by speaking about it.

What kind of familiarity with Lonergan’s method would be required? I think we should manage with one or two scholars familiar with Lonergan’s method.

Clearly, the second and third groups of specialties would have to be done in teams that include a large proportion of Indian scholars (not necessarily all Christian!). This would ensure that the general and special theological categories that are generated are Indian in their expression though transcultural at their core.

The project could be advertised by means of papers presented in seminars and workshops and meetings of various philosophical and theological associations. Collaborators could be sought through advertisements in scholarly journals as well as in popular magazines.


An immediate task would be to compile lists of scholars in various areas: research, interpretation, history; fundamental theology, religious studies (Indology, Buddhism, Islam, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism); and systematic theology.

3. END PRODUCTS

What would be the end products of our application of method? I would certainly not envisage a division of chapters along the lines of the eight functional specialties. The functional specialties are precisely functional — a division of tasks, not of fields, not of areas of research, not of subject matter, not of results. So: while the tasks would be divided among the team of investigators, it would not follow that the results should be cast in the pattern of the eight functional specialties. But there have to be some publications. It is to be expected that these publications will emerge over a span of a number of years.

General research would produce critical apparatus. Special research in India could probably concentrate on producing critical editions. Interpretation would produce a series of monographs. History would produce narratives indicating doctrinal transition points. The results of dialectic and foundations could be published in the form of critiques and recovery, both of existing work and of the work of other team members. The exercise would also result in the generation of categories that are transcultural at their core but inculturated in their concrete expression. Dialectic and foundations would finally issue into doctrines, both doctrines that have been transposed into a new idiom, as well as "new" doctrines arising in answer to "questions of the day raised by the people of the day."

The results of systematics could of course easily be published in the form of a series of manuals. Besides systematics, however, each manual would also contain references to available research and exegesis; it would provide narratives of transition points in the history of doctrines; it would identify basic conflicts and set out the range of positions on these conflicts; and it would take a stand about these positions. The manuals would cover Trinity, Christology, ecclesiology (including Mariology and Missiology), sacramental theology, morals, and liturgy.
Communications would result in catechism texts, texts of popular theology and spirituality, and so forth. There would also be more sophisticated studies on the modes and methods of communicating reformulated and inculturated doctrines and systematics.

4. Research, Interpretation, and History

Indian theology probably needs to invest more in research, interpretation, and history. It appears to me that the current tendency is to go in for the immediately relevant and to neglect nitty gritty research and interpretation. We need more research and interpretation of the type that Nelson Falcao has demonstrated in his recent study of the Christology of Thomas Stephens's *Kristapurana.*

I note, however, that George Soares-Prabhu, a well-known Indian exegete, has pointed out that scholarship would be too technical, too time-consuming, too expensive for India. We in India, he says, will not easily be able to match, in terms of resources and expertise, the type of scholarship that Europeans and Americans are able to produce. Collaboration on a world scale is therefore imperative, and the existence of functional specialization makes it possible to take over basic research, interpretation, and history done by any scholar or group of scholars anywhere in the world. An Indian theology should have no hesitation to borrow work done in these three areas. It could then concentrate on dialectic, foundations and doctrines, and on systematics and communications. A project applying Lonergan's method will therefore make full use of existing scholarship, completing it where necessary.

An important question is whether the data of other religions should be included in a method aiming at an inculturated Christian theology, and

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at what point. The answer to this is probably yes, and right from the first functional specialty, research. If, for example, we were to choose to complement Crowe's history of the Christian word, data on the status of the word in other religious traditions would have to be taken into account. For even though explicit commitment to the special theological categories occurs only in foundations, the categories themselves are generated seminal in dialectic, and the work of dialectic is itself intimately connected to and dependent on the work done in the three prior specialties. Besides, at least the historical studies of religious interiority would involve scholarly study — research, interpretation, history, dialectic — of the texts of other religious traditions.

Another point to be thought about is the integration into theology of the present situation, the faith as lived out today. Crowe suggests that this will have to be done in systematics, for systematics involves relating doctrines not only to God but also to the world and cosmos. Doran instead seems to suggest that the situation be itself treated as a theological source. I tend to agree with Doran. There seems to be support for this from Lonergan himself, for he has pointed out that communications — or the faith as lived and theology as communicated — itself generates data for theology.

As for history, it is interesting to note that, while this specialty concentrates on special history, it cannot remain aloof from general history, because only within the full view provided by general history can there be grasped (1) differences between Christian churches and sects, (2) relations between different religions, and (3) the role of Christianity in world history. It is evident that the functional specialty history has much interesting work to do.

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18 *Method in Theology*, 292.
19 Compare with *Method in Theology*, 290.
22 *Method in Theology*, 128.
5. DIALECTIC, FOUNDATIONS, AND DOCTRINES

This middle group of specialties is perhaps Lonergan’s most significant contribution to theological method. It is also, I think, an important contribution toward an Indian theology, especially since theology in India seems to be marked by a conspicuous absence of internal dialectic, by which I mean mutual evaluation and criticism between theologians themselves. But any science has to have its internal dialectic, and, besides, *viveka* or discernment and discrimination is a cardinal principle in Vedanta. An Indian theology come of age must perforce incorporate dialectic into its fabric.

We must admit with Crowe that the instrumentalities for the middle group of specialties have not yet been worked out. Crowe says that there are no mature disciplines to which we can relate them. Lonergan has pointed out that dialectic, foundations, and doctrines are a takeoff on the old apologetics, fundamental theology and dogmatic theology; however, the differences between these are so great that the old disciplines provide very little help in the setting up of the new.

We note once again that, while a good part of the work of research, interpretation, and history can be done individually, even when individuals are collaborating on a single well-defined project, there is an absolute necessity of teamwork in the middle group of specialties.

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24There is critique in the sense of criticism of social reality and also of Western theology, colonial theology, Roman theology, the magisterium, et cetera. My point is that there does not seem to be much criticism between theologians – though perhaps there used to be a certain tension between the ashram/religions approach and the social/liberation approach.

What are the attitudes, orientations, and skills needed for dialectic and foundations?

1. An atmosphere of friendship: friendship is not only for philosophy but also for theology.

2. The arts and skills of encounter. Dialectic is encounter with the living persons of the present, who are encouraged to reveal to one another the evidence for a judgment on their personal achievement of self-transcendence. There is a need of extreme openness and sincere efforts to break down the wall between private faith and the public enterprise of theology.26

3. Ability to deal with the symbolic. This is of utmost importance both when dealing with primary religious traditions and when dealing with the situation as source.27 Method in Theology needs to be complemented with what Robert Doran has to say on psychic conversion.

4. Willingness to engage in an Augustinian confession of one's past.28

5. Willingness to question one's personal authenticity.29

6. The arts and skills of teamwork.30

7. Willingness to engage in a prayerful theology.31

8. Orientation to and engagement in praxis. Crowe speaks of a theology of the poor, a theology in dialogue with the non-person, with the atheist, the secularist, the agnostic, and, we might add, with people of

26Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 92-93.

27I am grateful to J. E. Pérez-Valera, SJ (Sofia University, Tokyo) for having pointed out the importance of psychic conversion in theological method, though I must confess that I have a long way to go before I attain a real apprehension of this importance.


29Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 90.

30J. E. Pérez-Valera writes: "As the human race and the religious communities of our century have not yet got the skills to engage in dialogue, the Lonerganian community, perhaps even in Canada and the United States, has to learn the skills of teamwork only through trial and error." (Personal e-mail correspondence, August 25, 2001.) I would only add that the self-correcting process of learning teamwork could be profitably complemented by the available expertise of psychologists, group therapists, and managers.

other faiths; a theology that knows how to use the tools of the social sciences.

9. Willingness to make a personal commitment. Lonergan speaks of bearing the burden of continuity and taking the risk of change.32 Crowe speaks of "letting Kierkegaard haunt one's theology," of forcing oneself out of a neutral stance.33

The institutions needed to foster, implement, facilitate these attitudes, orientations, and skills will be discussed below in a separate section.

5.1 Dialectic

Many complaints have been made about the wooliness, the abstractness, the impracticality of dialectic and foundations.34 Since I am writing about the practical task of applying Lonergan's method, I would like to make a few observations in this context.

First, Lonergan does not ask us to give labels to people: converted, unconverted, et cetera. He merely asks us to identify whether something is a position or a counterposition, the chief aim being the objectification of the personal horizons of investigators.

Second, I think dialectic will probably concentrate mostly on intellectual conversion. For by and large we might have to take for granted that the people we are dialoguing with are morally and religiously converted. If this is not the case, evidence will surface during the process of living together, interacting, praying, sharing, and so forth, and sometimes even from the material under study. Again, sometimes no evidence regarding moral and religious conversion might be available.

32 Method in Theology, 135.
33 Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 90.
But the method does not grind to a halt if the presence of these conver-
sions cannot be ascertained. The real problem, then, seems to be the
absence of intellectual conversion. The importance of Lonergan’s work in
clarifying intellectual conversion cannot be overstated. His remarks on
Barth and Bultmann are illuminating in this regard: “In both Barth and
Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for
intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion. Only intellectual
conversion can remedy Barth’s fideism. Only intellectual conversion can
remove the secularist notion of scientific exegesis represented by
Bultmann.” Absence of intellectual conversion is probably at the root of
many major theological disputes.

Third, dialectic unfolds on three levels. The first level contains the
eight familiar steps: (1) assembly, (2) completion, (3) comparison, (4) re-
duction, (5) classification, (6) selection, (7) identifying positions and coun-
terpositions, and (8) developing positions, reversing counterpositions. The second level consists in applying these eight steps to the results of the
first level themselves. The third level consists in dialogue, actual inter-
personal encounter.

While there may be no sudden or startling results, in an atmosphere
of friendship, much can be expected. For each person has his/her own
type of questions, and his/her own way of putting questions. Where there
is dialogue, there are as many principles for the elimination of bad
judgments operative in the discussion as there are genuine persons there.
Panikkar says that only the “others” “can help me discover my pre-
suppositions and the underlying principles of my science. In brief, das
Ungedachte, the unthought, can be disclosed only by one who does not
‘think’ like me and who helps me discover the unthought magma out of
which my thinking crystallizes. For my part, I can do him the same
service.”

35Method in Theology, 318.
36Method in Theology, 249-50.
37R. Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics: Cross-Cultural Studies (Bangalore: Asian
Trading Corporation, 1983), 333.
5.2 Foundations

Lonergan notes that the derivation of the special categories calls for special use of the science of religion and of studies of the spiritual life.\(^{38}\) Thus we might anticipate that studies of the Indian mystics, and of Indian spiritual traditions in general, would yield categories that are transcultural at their core but historically conditioned and therefore inculcated in their expression. Such studies would really be a question of applying the first five functional specialties to Indian texts with the explicit aim, not of selecting Christian doctrines, but of generating categories.

We have also noted above that the data of other religions should be taken into account right from the first functional specialty, research, especially when studying topics with natural openings to other religions such as revelation and the word of God. Recognition or establishment of the equivalences between different sets of categories would be the task of dialectic.

5.3 Doctrines

Crowe reminds us that the task of doctrines is not only selection but also transposition.\(^{39}\) Transposition will involve reformulation not only of doctrines in general but also of dogmas. If the general and special categories are transcultural at their core but Indian in their actual expression, we can expect to have dogmas formulated in an Indian way.\(^{40}\)

An example of transposition: if interpretation establishes that Christianity is not dualist and Sankara is not monist, then it might be possible to show that the Christian doctrine of creation is equivalent to a properly nondualist interpretation of the Upanisadic mahavakyas such as

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\(^{39}\)The Lonergan Enterprise, 89.

\(^{40}\)Transposition of dogmas is necessitated by the recognition of the historicity of their formulations as well as of the permanence of their meaning. Compare with *Method in Theology*, 320-26.
Tat tvam asi and Aham Brahmasmi. The great Indian question of the relationship between Brahman and the world, between the paramarthika Sat and the vyavaharika sat, might then be the equivalent of the Christian question about creation.41

But transposition does not consist merely in reformulation. As Lonergan points out, church doctrines are not simple reaffirmations of Scripture and of tradition. They are new insights and new expressions, because they meet the questions of the day for the people of the day, and they give rise to a new line of development within a culture.42

SYSTEMATICS AND COMMUNICATIONS

6.1 Systematics

Crowe says that systematics does not call for programming, because really it is not a question of programming but of very creative thinking; and, according to Lonergan, systematic thinkers are relatively rare. So the new systems that will replace Aquinas’s system will emerge when they emerge.43 We might add however, that while there is little we can do to


42Method in Theology, 296. Compare with Ivo Coelho, “’Et Judaeus et Graecus e methodo: The Transcultural Mediation of Christian Meanings and Values in Lonergan,” Lonergan Workshop, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston: Boston College, 2000) 16:102-104. Crowe also points out that transposition is not merely a question of reformulation, as if the whole divine contribution had been made nineteen centuries ago. “For we have to ask by what criterion we would decide what is relevant, choose new formulations, and transpose the past into the present. Here it is useful to remember the larger context. Whereas the Son of God was given once and for all in a particular place and at a particular time, the Spirit is not given once and for all, but continues to be given over and over, in every place and at every time, in an ongoing Pentecost” (Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 89).

program the emergence of systematics, we can and must work toward making such emergence probable.

Crowe goes on to note that he has spoken of systems, in the plural: this because there will be as many systems as there are cultures, and as there are ages within a culture. Still, if doctrines are cast in the language of interiority, we may expect doctrines to be related among themselves, and so also systems: thus the unity of the believing and thinking church will be maintained.

But the plurality of systems has another reason: systematics involves an intelligibility that remains at best hypothetical. We can expect therefore not merely a pluralism in expression but also in ways of understanding the mysteries.

6.2 Communications

Communications will make use of symbolic language to communicate the faith, without having to get rid of other types of language (for example, conceptual). Communications would in fact presuppose doctrines and systematics. It is systematics — understanding of the faith — that enables communication, for understanding is the key to all application. The human sciences have a role in this application: the particular audience must be understood if communication is to take place.

We might note here also that communication is mediated not only by understanding but also by love. Examples of successful communication are not lacking. Roberto de Nobili was given the name Tattuva Podagar or Teacher of Reality and was revered even by those who disagreed with him. De Smet himself carried on an amazing activity of dialogue with university professors and with Hindu gurus such as Swami Sivananda of Rishikesh. Pandita Ramabai and N. V. Tilak are held in high esteem by

45 Coelho, "Et Judaeus et Graecus e metodo," 103-104.
47 Saulièrè, 85-110. "Teacher of Reality" because de Nobili insisted on the reality of the world against the "illusionism" upheld by the followers of Sankara at that time.
contemporary Maharashtrians despite the fact that they converted to Christianity. The right combination of mind and heart makes cross-cultural and interreligious communication possible.

7. INSTITUTIONS

7.1 The Ashram Model

Crowe feels that the university as it exists today is not a suitable institution for theology as envisaged by Lonergan: it seems to have no place for prayerful discussion and self-revelation. There is also the problem of state-sponsored universities in a secular state. Further, Crowe feels that the average theological congresses are also not suitable; we need to develop institutions analogous to the monastic schools of the eleventh-century West, schools that prayed their theology. He suggests that the retreat house is a good model: we could think in terms of a theological center modeled on a retreat house: a place of prayerful and thoughtful quiet to which theologians could retire for forty days of retreat, where they could do theology — and especially dialectic, foundations, and doctrines — in a contemplative mood. In India, we have perhaps the ideal institution for all this: the ashram, which is a sort of Indian monastery, a place of rest (ashram), peace, quiet, and prayer. An ashram would provide the required atmosphere of prayer and unhurriedness. It could provide space for sensitivity sessions and growth/encounter groups, with help from institutes like Sadhana. What is needed is an aid to introspection, a help toward objectification of feelings, experiences, attitudes, thoughts. What is needed is the releasing of blocks and the enabling of personal commitment. What is needed is "Augustinian confession of one's past": laying bare the horizon that underlies one's feelings, thoughts, judgments, decisions, actions. So we might envisage the theological team in the broader sense to include psychologists and

49 Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 94-95, 91-92.

50 Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 95.

51 The Institute founded by the late Tony de Mello, SJ, presently located in Lonavla, near Pune.
counselors and therapists of various types. This would perhaps be one of the implications of recognizing the importance of psychic conversion.

For the time being we could make use of existing ashrams. Later on we could have an ashram-type theological center, with inspiration drawn perhaps from the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society, which has become, as Soares-Prabhu has pointed out, India's premier center of Christian concern.52

7.2 Centers for Personal and Spiritual Growth

Theologians will take all the help they can from centers promoting personal and spiritual growth through counseling, therapies of various kinds, spiritual direction, and guided retreats, among other avenues.

7.3 Congresses, Seminars, Workshops Integrated with Live-ins, Retreats, and Encounter

We could think of congresses, seminars, or workshops preceded by days of retreat, prayer, fellowship, sharing, encounter. Crowe reports that the International Lonergan Congress of 1970 was preceded by three days of fellowship and quiet, with no papers, meetings, seminars, discussions; the spontaneity and easy informality this generated, he says, was precious.53 With all this we are really making place for the role of friendship in philosophy and in theology, for the intricate interaction between love and truth. We are acknowledging the place of the whole person in the search for truth, and in theologizing. We are recognizing the vital interaction between volitional, sensitive, and cognitional appropriation.

52Soares-Prabhu, 347. The CISRS, as it is popularly known, was founded in 1957 by P. D. Devanandan and M. M. Thomas. Over the years, the Institute has produced literature for the guidance of both church and society in India on social policy, cultural encounter, Christian-Hindu relations, political analysis, family problems, and ecumenical affairs. This literature has usually been the product of study groups composed of some of the best minds of India. Compare with Charles C. West, The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 18.3 New Series 1997: 208-10.

53Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 95.
7.4 Solidarity and Grassroots Contact with People

To ensure the praxis orientation of theology there needs to be involvement in basic Christian and human communities, grassroots work in villages and slums, liberation movements, dialogue groups and movements, the charismatic movement. Scholars who are priests should not give up active involvement in the priestly ministry (sacramental practice, house visits, pastoral counseling, visits to the sick, et cetera). Further, there is the possibility of using the media as a pastoral tool, especially for meeting those who we might not meet in institutional settings. The possibilities offered by e-mail and the Internet are enormous.

7.5 Higher Academic Institutions

Indian universities, while they might have departments of philosophy, do not usually have departments of Christian theology. There do exist, however, "chairs of Christianity," and even some departments of Christianity in several Indian universities. Perhaps the latter might provide an opening for interdisciplinarity.

As for critical scholarship, there are a very large number of Christian institutes for the study of philosophy and theology and perhaps also some dedicated to the social sciences. Besides these, there are other institutes belonging both to the government and to nongovernmental bodies.

A database of scholars in various areas would be very useful.

7.6 A Financial Wing

Finances are needed for libraries, salaries, institutions, buildings, office space and equipment, journals, qualification of persons, travel, communication. For a limited initial project, while some finances will be needed, most of the required services could be borrowed from existing institutions.

7.7 Communications

A communications and publicity wing will be needed, as also catechetical and pastoral centers and institutes, communication institutes, missiolog-
ical institutes, liturgical institutes, associations, and movements of various types. Once again, this is not necessarily a question of founding new institutes but rather of networking with existing ones.

8. STRATEGY

8.1 Selling the Idea

Given the relatively poor reception of Lonergan in India, the idea of using his theological method needs to be packaged and sold. One way of doing this is by organizing workshops on topics such as theological methods, hermeneutics, and dialogue. Another way is to present papers on pertinent topics at meetings of existing philosophical and theological associations (Association of Christian Philosophers of India, Indian Theological Association), dialogue groups and associations. Yet another way is to write papers for philosophical and theological journals in India. Possible topics here are the need for an Indian hermeneutics and an Indian theological method; surveys of methods being proposed and used; surveys of attempts toward an Indian theology. In addition, a well-written book on a theological method for India – drawing upon Lonergan's ideas – might also serve to catch the attention of the theological public.

8.2 Interim Work

Interim work would consist of immediately possible projects, mostly work in individual functional specialties, or in groups of specialties (compare with "Possible Projects" earlier in the article). The requirements for such projects would be much more modest than those for a comprehensive project. An ad hoc team could be set up, with clear leadership and schedules. Each member could work from where he or she is, with constant communication via e-mail, coming together only for the necessary long or short meetings, live-ins, group work, et cetera.

As far as methods and attempts toward an Indian theology are concerned, a sizeable body of literature already exists. It might be interesting to classify this literature in terms of the functional specialties. I hazard the guess that the contributions will be mostly in the line of interpretation, doctrines, and systematics.
8.3 Investing in Scholarship

The seminars offered by faculties or departments of theology and religious studies provide excellent opportunities for training students in the methods pertaining to the individual functional specialties and also in functionally specialized theological method itself. Such seminars must of course do what they are meant to do: they are meant to focus not so much on content as on the methods proper to particular disciplines.\textsuperscript{55} Models for seminars on methods of research and interpretation are available.\textsuperscript{56} Seminars devoted to inculcating the functional specialties history, dialectic, foundations and doctrines need to be evolved. However, given the relative neglect of seminars in most faculties of theology in India, a concerted effort would have to be made to propagate this precious tool. A couple of articles on how to conduct such seminars would be of help, among other things.

Suggestions for research topics in the areas of Indology, philosophy, and theology could be made available to Ph.D. candidates. Other ways of encouraging scholarship also need to be found: the creation of fellowships, for example.

Institutions of higher learning (offering master’s and doctoral degrees) with resident Lonergan scholars and courses on Lonergan and on theological methods would make the emergence of Lonergan scholars more probable.

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The task of applying Lonergan’s method is huge, and the future is not completely in our hands. We must, however, allow Lonergan to


\textsuperscript{56}Peter Henrici used to guide a seminar in the Gregorian University on methods of interpreting a philosophical text. Some of the methods inculcated were the following: internal external structure, lexicology, metaphorology, internal and external sources, Redaktionsgeschichte, Wirkungsgeschichte, Deutungsgeschichte.
inspire us even here. In the context of Rahner’s pessimism about contemporary theological pluralism, Lonergan speaks with a measured optimism:

For if one understands by method ... a framework for collaborative creativity ... one will cease to work alien, alone, isolated, one will become aware of a common site with an edifice to be erected, not in accord with a static blueprint, but under the leadership of an emergent probability that yields results proportionate to human diligence and intelligence.57

There is then an emergent probability that yields results proportionate to human diligence and intelligence. So while the task of putting Lonergan’s ideas into practice is enormous, our job is to do what we can, which involves being intelligent as well as diligent, trusting in the leadership of an emergent probability that works ultimately under the guiding hand of a loving providence.

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DELIBERATIVE INSIGHTS: A SKETCH

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1. INTRODUCTION

Lonergan’s central achievement in *Insight* was his appropriation of reflective insight and judgment; the first part of *Insight* leads up to this and one could argue that self-affirmation, the notion of being and objectivity, and metaphysics follow fairly naturally. On judgments of truth, then, Lonergan is clear, detailed, systematic, and convincing. We have illustrations and applications, in concrete judgments of fact, in insights into concrete situations, in analogies and generalizations, in common sense, probable judgments, analytic propositions and principles, mathematics and, later, philosophical judgments. Those who follow the argument can see that the basic, unrevisable, three-level cognitional structure is foundational, incontrovertible, undeniable, leading on to a grasp of positions and counterpositions as they operate in common sense, science, and philosophy.

What then is missing? What is missing is a parallel, analogous treatment of the more difficult and complex question of deliberation and judgments of value. The purpose of our inquiry, scholarship, research, intellectual striving, is rarely truth for its own sake, or speculative philosophy or pure science; more often we are on the way to judgments of value, to applications of our discoveries in new ways of living, to decisions and actions. In most cases we reach judgments of fact on our

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way to judgments of value, in turn on our way to good decisions and actions. The scope of judgments of value is more extensive than that of judgments of fact. If you remember that truth is a value, then you realize that judgments of truth are a subset of the much wider judgments of value. If a judgment of truth is also a judgment of value then you realize immediately that there is no such thing as a value-free science or philosophy or sociology. You can try to exclude certain values, but if truth is a value then it is a strange kind of science or philosophy that excludes truth. When we include judgments of value we are moving to a philosophy of life, of action, a philosophy that is relevant to everybody, everywhere, even in the commonsense mode of experience.

Our contemporary culture talks freely about values — values in education, values in politics, democratic values, value-free, value clarification, religious values, and so forth. Individuals are quite happy asserting that they value this over that, that these are their value priorities. But if you look for a justification, a rationale, or defense of such a list you often find there is none beyond the bold assertion that “these are my choices.” When we look for a coherent, adequate, comprehensive account of what values are, where they come from, what are the criteria for true or false values, we do not find one. The history of a philosophy of values — axiology — is relatively short, though obviously the history of ethics, moral behavior, and the good goes back to the beginning of philosophy. We talk constantly about values, but nobody seems to know what they are or where they come from.

Contemporary theories of values seem mostly to be counterpositional; values are realities “out there now real”; values are an emotional response expressing nothing more than personal preference; values are grasped only and exclusively in “rational” judgments; values are intuited immediately, simply, directly; values are my own personal choices and don’t you dare tell me otherwise. We have “value-free” educational institutions promoting the value of neutrality, objectivity and value freedom! One notes a deplorable standard of public debate when it comes to values and moral issues; arguments that are partisan from the beginning and show gross selectivity in appealing to facts; every logical
fallacy imaginable is espoused and a few new ones are added; whoever shouts loudest and longest carries the argument.

In the light of this situation, the Lonergan project is incomplete and inadequate if it cannot or does not elaborate a coherent, comprehensive philosophy of values. The project of philosophy culminates not in speculative truth but in true values and right living. It is unfortunate that Lonergan’s treatment of judgments of value is skimpy, incomplete, and ambiguous. We have nothing like the clarity and detail of chapters 9 and 10 of *Insight*. But we do have some major statements and suggestive pointers in *Method in Theology*, and it is now up to Lonergan scholars to do the elaboration, correction, and application of these signposts in the field of values.

This article is a small contribution to this much-needed elaboration. In the first part we pose the problem and establish the background. In the second part we deal with deliberative insight in reference to the texts of Lonergan. In the third part we make a systematic presentation of deliberative insight, an extension, interpretation, and application of Lonergan. Finally, we conclude and sum up our position.

### 1.1 Posing the Problem

We are probably all familiar with Lonergan’s transition on the question of values from “value as possible object of rational choice” in *Insight*, to value as a distinct transcendental notion in *Method*, especially if you have read Fred Crowe’s excellent articles on this historic transition. Although chapter 18 of *Insight* on the “Possibility of Ethics” had some wonderful insights into good, value, freedom, decisions, rationalization, and moral impotence, and so forth, the chapter suffers the fatal flaw of deriving the good and value from speculative intellect. Moral obligation and hence moral values are derived “wholly from speculative intelligence and

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reason." \(^4\) "Willing is rational and so moral"; "the exigency of self-consistency between knowing and of doing." \(^5\) Hence value, "is the good as possible object of rational choice" \(^6\) and values are, "true in so far as the possible choice is rational." \(^7\) The good, value, and moral obligation are being identified with or derived logically from the true and the rational. This is almost inevitable in the Insight context of three levels of conscious intentionality.

Lonergan later realized that the good is a distinct notion; \(^8\) that it is a notion in the same strict sense that being is a notion; that the intentionality of fourth-level activities is toward the transcendental notion of value; that we have first-hand access to the notion of the value and the good only through the activities of evaluating, choosing, and doing the good in ourselves and others; that the notion of value is also the criterion of whether value has been reached. Hence value and the good can only be defined indirectly by using transcendental method and hence defining value as what is intended in questions for deliberation, \(^9\) what is expressed in judgments of values, what is realized in good decisions and consequent execution.

This recognition of the distinct notion of value is helped by elaborating a fourth level of consciousness and hence a four-level structure of conscious intentionality. However, the fourth level gets a little bit cluttered when you bundle together three sets of activities: (1) questions for deliberation, deliberating, and judging value, (2) deciding and carrying out decisions, and (3) religious experience, charity, and faith. When one refers to fourth-level activities, which set are you invoking?

So let me be clear about my own terms of reference in this article.

\(^4\) Insight, 624.
\(^5\) Insight, 622.
\(^6\) Insight, 624.
\(^7\) Insight, 624.
\(^8\) First public statement of this new view seems to have been in "The Subject" in 1968, published in Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection (London: Darton, Longman and Todd), 82.
\(^9\) Method in Theology, 34.
(1) Judgments of value normally come before decision and action. It is normally the case that, if we are considering buying a used car, we check the mileage, look at the engine, kick the tires, and test drive the car before we negotiate a fair price; we evaluate before we decide. If you are considering a career change, you get relevant information, seek advice, weight the pros and cons, and then decide responsibly; we don't usually choose a career at random. Good decisions follow good judgments of value. This is the normal case. There are exceptions as (a.) when action has become habitual; (b.) when we do not have time to deliberate; or (c.) perforce we have to interrupt the course of deliberation because of some emergency. (d.) We also recognize that the way “from above downwards” where love of the good or love of God take precedence. But these are not the topic of this article. In the normal basic case we make decisions, not blindly, arbitrarily, at random, but rather on the basis of a good understanding and knowledge and appreciation of facts and values involved in an action, its consequences and alternatives.

(2) Knowing values is one thing; deciding for or against values is something else. Knowing is distinct from deciding even though they interrelate closely. There is a massive illusion in our contemporary culture that you can choose your lifestyle, your values, your political policies, according to your own preference and afterward seek a “justification.” There are certainly distinct questions about deciding, willing, choosing, and acting in freedom and responsibility that deserve detailed treatment. They are not my concern here. I am just putting them aside so that we can concentrate on the judgment of value.

(3) Religious consciousness, desires, experience, conversion, faith, and love are also distinct matters that I would rather put aside for the moment, and I think that these are best dealt with in terms of a fifth level of consciousness.

(4) I am working in the context of the way from below upward, of immanently generated knowledge of truth and value, recognizing that there is a separate and distinct question of the way from above downward of handing on tradition, belief, habit, and love. But if we cannot be clear about the way up, how can we be clear about the way down?
Having made these clarifications, we can now focus on judgments of value simply as such — as immanently generated knowledge in a full integral cognitional structure represented schematically in Diagram Number 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcendental Precepts</th>
<th>Desire/Questioning</th>
<th>Proper Activity</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valuing</td>
<td>Be sensitive</td>
<td>Question for value</td>
<td>Deliberative insight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Four</td>
<td>responsible</td>
<td>Is it good? Is it worthwhile? Is it right?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judging</td>
<td>Be responsible</td>
<td>Question for reflection</td>
<td>Reflective insight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Three</td>
<td>reasonable</td>
<td>Is it true? Is it correct?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Be intelligent</td>
<td>Question for intelligence</td>
<td>Direct insight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Two</td>
<td>intelligent</td>
<td>What? Why? Where? etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td>Be attentive</td>
<td>Sense</td>
<td>Internal and external sensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level One</td>
<td>attentive</td>
<td>Appetite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram 1. Integral Cognitional Structure of Truth and Value

1.2 The Judgment of Value: Three Components

Lonergan's key statement on judgments of value would seem to be in that part of *Method in Theology* where he says: "In the judgment of value, then, three components unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself."\(^{10}\) He has given some

\(^{10}\) *Method in Theology*, 38.
background to this statement and does follow this with a few sentences on each of the components. These are by no means unambiguous or complete. Neither does he seem to indicate how these three disparate components "unite" in a judgment of value. If we are to correctly understand and elaborate the judgment of value in Lonergan, the essential task seems to be to identifying clearly these three components and then showing clearly and convincingly how they unite in a single judgment of value. This will involve a certain amount of textual criticism: interpretation and reconstruction of Lonergan's other statements about values. But it will also involve intentionality analysis to verify all this in one's own concrete experience of evaluating.

As this statement of Lonergan's is a general statement about all value judgments, I find it helpful to think of these three components as the cognitive, the affective, and the volitional, respectively. More descriptively we might think of the terms Mind, Heart, and Will as that is the way it seems to work out. Even though the focus of this article is the cognitive element, we have to give a brief explanation of the other two components to provide the context for a correct interpretation.

Let us start with the third component, "the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself."

In brief, what does this refer to? We are presuming a context of persons becoming; operating or not operating in terms of intellectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence; operating or not operating in terms of horizontal and/or vertical finality; actualizing or not actualizing human potential and talent. Positing a correct judgment of value presupposes a willingness to seek value, to change oneself as originating value and to implement values in action. Affirming a judgment of moral value is partial moral self-transcendence; it becomes complete with the further decision and implementation. In this sense a judgment of value is dependent on willingness; it is a decision.

As well as being an act of understanding and judgment, it is also a free willing cognitional act; if we don't want to make a particular judgment of value we will find a way to avoid it. This

11Method in Theology, 38.
component of willing self-transcendence is a condition *sine qua non* of the judgment of value but does not enter into the intrinsic constitution of the judgment. I think of this component as analogous to the efficient or final cause — an extrinsic, necessary condition for the occurrence of correct judgments of value.

That leaves the cognitive and affective components, and here we enter muddy waters indeed. We remember the historical struggles between the rationalist ethics of practical reason of Kant and his successors and the empiricist interpretation of good in terms of feeling or sentiment and their contemporary followers. Where does Lonergan straddle this great divide? Are we to give credence to the "rationalist" Lonergan of *Insight* and the "voluntarist" Lonergan of *Method*? How are we to understand these two components as uniting in a single judgment of value?

First, let us note that these two elements are often taken to be mutually exclusive. If you stress the importance of feeling, it is often presumed that you are thereby ipso facto downgrading the importance of understanding and judgments. And vice versa if you give a good cognitional analysis of deliberation and judgment, it is presumed that you are excluding feelings. If this were true then our project would be doomed from the start because we are trying to show how these two elements *unite* in a judgment of value. We cannot exclude either of the two components. We have to look for an understanding of these components where they are included in one another, complement one another, add to one another. They are to be take inclusively rather than exclusively, in a way that remains to be found. Fred Crowe\(^3\) has shown how the later Lonergan emphasized feelings, love, values, the way down, the heart rather than the mind. He insists that this shift in emphasis did not mean a lessening of the critical reflective aspect of his thought. However, it remains to be shown how a cognitive and affective component unite in a judgment of value.

An important clue as to how the cognitional and affective components might combine in a judgment of values comes from Lonergan's statement that, "Judgments of value differ in content but not in

\(^3\) Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value."
structure from judgments of fact.\textsuperscript{14} If we can distinguish between structure and content maybe we can identify the cognitional aspect with the structure and the intentional response to value as the content. If that turns out to be possible, then judgments of fact and of value will have the same cognitional component, namely, the structure; but these will differ in the affective component, the intentional response. If structure and content can be united in a single judgment of value then we have found a way of understanding the mutually inclusive aspect of cognition and affection in positing a judgment of value.

We might appeal to the analogy of form and matter as the intrinsic constituents or causes of any concrete existing thing in the universe of proportionate being. Matter and form are not things but components of proportionate being. They exist together; they do not exclude one another but mutually require one another. Similarly, we might think of the structural or cognitional aspect including the affective or content aspect. However, this is only an analogy but also an indication of where the analysis is heading.

1.3 Affective Component

Let us make a very brief statement about the second component, the affective aspect, the intentional response to value or to the agreeable/disagreeable. I am assuming that what Lonergan says about the three components uniting in a judgment of value is also true about judgments of truth and therefore would apply retroactively to reflective understanding and judgment in \textit{Insight}. Truth is a value, and therefore a judgment of truth is also a judgment of a value. But the three components happen to fit perfectly into the earlier terminology and detailed analysis of insights, reflective understanding, and judgment. It is easy to identify the affective component as the pure detached unrestricted desire to know the truth. It is that desire which initiates the activities of questioning, manipulating images, and so forth; it is that desire which gives mass momentum drive to the quest for understanding; it is that desire which senses that you are on the right path, somehow provokes the images, data,
and examples that are needed; it is that desire which is the criterion of truth, reached when no further pertinent questions arise; the desire is satisfied. The desire to know is a conscious, intentional feeling intrinsic to the proper unfolding of the activities of knowing. The desire to know is the intentional response to the truth, the affective component in the judgment of truth. "Heart" is already operating at the level of judgments of truth. "Unless one endeavors to understand with all one's heart and all one's mind one will not know what questions are relevant or when their limit is approached." Intentional response to truth and value is operating in Insight, although it has not yet been clearly objectified.

In extending the three-level structure to a fourth level, Lonergan is extending the scope of the desire to know into knowing the good and deciding for and doing the good. It is the same single inquiring spirit of the person, seeking for value, setting up heuristic structures to discover values, intending values and recognizing them when they are discovered. The affective component, then, at its deepest level, is the transcendental notion of value manifested in the dynamic, affective, conscious intentionality of grasping and implementing values. This desire is real, it is spiritual in the strict sense as the activities of understanding, knowing, and deciding are spiritual. It is conscious in the sense of consciousness as experience; we can identify the desire, name it, describe it, explain it by way of intentionality analysis. Just as the desire to know is a feeling, a conscious awareness, so the desire for value is a conscious feeling operating in us whether we objectify it or not. Our existential problem is distinguishing the intentional response to value from the intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable.

The discovery of the transcendental Thomists was the intrinsic dynamism of human intelligence. Marechal asserted that Kant had missed the most important a priori condition for our knowing, namely, the dynamism of intellect. Coreth finds the basis for his metaphysics in the

15Insight, 444.

preconditions for the performance of asking questions.\textsuperscript{17} In Lonergan's terminology the desire to know initiates and underpins and pushes the process to an end; we are restless until understanding and judgment have been achieved; incomplete, mistaken, partial viewpoints are overcome by constant questions, for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation. It is only when the desire is satisfied, that no further questions arise (even though they have an opportunity to arise), that we reach invulnerable insights, judgments of fact, and value. The dynamism comes from the inside not from the outside. Intelligence operates according to the rules of its own nature. It is dynamic, intentional, critical, normative, and knows when it has reached its term. In Aristotle you have active intellect taking the initiative, passive intellect receiving ideas, but it is the one intellect that has the potential to become and to make all things.

In comparison, the reason and rationality extolled by the Enlightenment thinkers seems to be the ability to follow the rules of formal logic, the moving from premises to conclusions, to put concepts together to form propositions, a kind of instrumental reason. Reason is conceived as static, as abstract, as apart from feeling and desire. Norms come from outside, from logic, or from methodology or rules of scientific method. The criterion of truth is found in sensation or in a verification principle. It is perhaps because many of us have this impoverished notion of intellect that it is hard for us to see how the cognitive and affective components of the judgment of value unite.

Unfortunately, as Girard and other contemporary writers remind us, desire is multifaceted, ambivalent, impure, multilayered.\textsuperscript{18} Our motivation is often effected by unconscious forces. Our desires are rarely pure. Our intentions are vague and complicated. Our affectivity is a complicated mess of deep purposes and superficial ephemeral loves and hates, sometimes working together, sometimes with deep contradictions. In so far as our total affectivity is in harmony with the deep-seated intention to value, then you have a process of self-transcendence taking place. But in


\textsuperscript{18}For example, Rene Girard, \textit{Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
so far as we are oriented to the agreeable or disagreeable, when pleasure, or selfish short-term ephemeral satisfaction become ends in themselves and are in conflict with the deep-seated desire for value, then we are probably on the path of downward spiral of decline.

The desire for value is spiritual, an aspect of our spiritual nature. It forms a triad with knowing and willing and is inseparable from them; it is a conscious desire, and we can make it the central desire of our lives. It can never be totally blotted out of the heart. It is capable of many perversions, twists and turns like the seed planted in various soils. This is just a brief statement to set the context for our consideration of the cognitive aspect of judgments of value. It obviously calls for greater elaboration and clarification.

2. DELIBERATIVE INSIGHT — TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Finally, we come to the subject matter proper of this article, namely, the first component of the judgment of value, "Knowledge of reality especially of human reality." Lonergan briefly indicates the need for such knowledge and understanding and, if it is lacking, the moral idealist ends up doing more harm than good. Which is fine. But as a statement of the full cognitive component of a judgment of value in general, is this an adequate statement? We are looking for the source of judgments of value, that is, knowledge of values. We are wondering where and how they emerge. And we are told that they emerge from "knowledge of human reality." If Lonergan had simply said that one of the components of a judgment of fact was knowledge of reality, would we have been satisfied? Why such a detailed account of reflective insights and judgments of fact and this enigmatic throwaway line for judgments of value? So let us devote some time to exploring the cognitive element in knowledge of values.

It is clear that Lonergan recognized a fourth level of conscious intentionality characterized by the question for deliberation, Is it worthwhile? What is it worth? Similarly, it is clear that Lonergan recognized a judgment of value, which is structurally similar to the

19 Method in Theology, 38.
judgment of fact. The somewhat unknown element as presented in our diagram is what comes in-between. It is a great help to put down the diagram, and just as Mendeleev worked out the properties of unknown chemical elements in the periodical table of the elements, we can use various analogies to specify the properties of this relatively unknown middle term. If the judgment of value is similar in structure to the judgment of fact, then surely there will be a structural similarity between the preceding cognitive elements. We are reasonably clear about the question and the judgment of value, surely it should not be too difficult to work out what happens in-between. We can also use the notion of sublation, which conditions the interrelationships and dependencies of the activities and levels.

Our procedure will be to assemble bits and pieces of text from Lonergan and secondary sources that might help solve the problem. Then in part three we will present a more systematic analysis of deliberative insight and how it works.

2.1 Knowledge of Human Reality

Let us first examine this "knowledge of human reality," which presumably is intended to cover all judgments of value and to define their essential components.

(a) It is fairly clear and uncontroversial that if you need to make a judgment of value about a social policy, about a political personality, or about the actions of a person, then you first need to understand and know as much as you can about the policy, the person, and the action respectively, about human reality. If you are making economic judgments, then know your economics; if you are changing social policy, then know about social welfare, administration, management, history, and so forth. If you are a doctor, then keep in touch with new medical developments, information, and research. Many areas of our contemporary life have become specialized, and it is to the specialists that we go, hoping that their judgments of value are based on specialized and correct information and understanding.

This is particularly true about human reality, the human sciences. To understand human behavior we need to understand the structure of the
personality, motivation, temperament, human nature, consequences of human actions, and alternatives. You expect a psychiatrist to be able to handle a neurotic patient. You expect a sociologist to understand why divorce rates are rising. You expect an economist to give good advice about investments. You expect a historian to be able to explain why certain movements arose when they did.

(b) Judgments of value presuppose correct and relevant judgments of fact. In the way from below upward, understanding depends on images, sensing, data, experience; judging depends on understanding, clear definitions, and hypotheses as well as experiencing. Judgments of value depend on previous correct judgments of truth as well as understanding and experiencing. It is clear then, that as a general rule in the case of immanently generated judgments of value, the deliberative process depends on and presupposes correct knowledge, understanding, and data from the previous three levels.

(c) It is also true that judgments of value will sublate judgments of truth and understanding and data in the sense of (1) going beyond them to something new, (2) leaving them intact in their basic structure, and (3) enhancing their overall value and importance.

2.2 Judgments of Value in Belief

Lonergan does talk about judgments of value in *Insight* in the context of the act of believing. To believe requires, "(1) a preliminary judgment on the value of belief in general ... (2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition, (3) the consequent judgment of value, (4) the consequent decision of the will, and (5) the assent that is the act of believing."²⁰

So it is clear that Lonergan recognizes and analyzes the judgment of value as distinct from the judgment of fact already in the framework of *Insight* thinking but without great elaboration. Also of great importance is the recognition that the judgment of value emerges from "a reflective act of understanding ... that grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of

²⁰*Insight*, 729-30.
deciding to believe.”21 Here we have a clear statement of the similarity between the reflective insight of judgments of truth and of value. We also note the use of the terminology of virtually unconditioned, usually referring to judgments of truth, here used in the context of value judgments.

2.3 Practical Insight and Practical Reflection in Insight

In the context of the possibility of ethics, Lonergan considers the practical insight as the answer to the question, What is to be done in this particular situation? Practical insight grasps possible courses of action, the making of being, what is to be done. Practical reflection is the actuation of rational self-consciousness, in sifting through the various possibilities, asking about consequences, alternatives, risks, motives, and value. Now there seems to be ambiguity about how practical reflection comes to an end.

On the one hand, Lonergan says clearly that “when practical insight is correct, then reflective understanding cannot grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned.”22 This is because it is a grasp of possibility, of what does not yet exist and is not an actually existent thing. He also says that “because reflection has no internal term, it can expand more or less indefinitely.”23 And he seems to conclude that “What ends the reflection is the decision” and “while there is a normal duration for the reflection, it is not reflection but decision that enforces the norm.”24

It would seem to me to be rather strange that practical reflection can expand indefinitely and be ended by a decision. Surely practical reflection would be dynamic, purposive, moving toward a conclusion or term of its own. Why should decision arbitrarily interrupt this process? What is the point of practical reflection if it is not going to achieve some contribution to a good decision. If reflection is brought to an end by decision, where does the judgment of value come in? Surely we conclude that “this is the right thing to do” before deciding to do it. It is possible that Lonergan

21Insight, 729.
22Insight, 633.
23Insight, 635.
24Insight, 635.
tried to save himself by distinguishing internal term and external term. As internal it would have a term of its own but as external it would terminate in a decision. The passage seems puzzling to me, and this ambiguity seems to carry over into the use of the term deliberation in Method.

2.4 Deliberation

"To deliberate about 'x' is to ask whether 'x' is worthwhile." To deliberate is to ask the question of the value of something, it is to raise the value question in various contexts. Unfortunately, Lonergan says very little on the content of this process of deliberation, and what he does say is not clear. It is still not clear how the process unfolds, what it is aiming at, and how it is brought to completion.

Unfortunately some of the ambiguity on "practical reflection" seems to carry over into "deliberation." He seems to take it for granted that we know what deliberation means and is still not clear on how it is ended. "Accordingly, the process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it." Is this passage to be understood as saying that decision brings the process of deliberation to an end? If that were so, then the judgment of value becomes totally irrelevant to knowledge of values.

We get some hints from the lists of activities of fourth-level operations in various places, "deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing," seem to be his basic enumeration of fourth-level activities. He also says that, "the fourth and highest level is that of deliberation, evaluation, decision." In another formulation he says that, "we deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide and carry out

25 *Insight*, 634-35.
26 *Method in Theology*, 102.
27 *Method in Theology*, 50.
Are deliberation and evaluation equivalent terms? If yes, why this redundant duplication? If no, what is the difference? Is deliberation intended to refer to the process and evaluation to the judgment of value? Does he mean by evaluate to pass judgments of value?

I find the treatment of deliberation ambiguous and skimpy. Perhaps it is because Lonergan has not sufficiently thematized the distinction between the way from below upwards from the way from above downward. *Method in Theology* naturally focuses on theological themes and hence on love and faith and their interrelationship. In the chapter on dialectics, you might have expected a treatment of judgment of value; instead he deals with the converted or unconverted historian. The role of affectivity on the way up will be different from that on the way down. So in our particular task of identifying immanently generated moral judgments of value and where they come from, we get little help from Lonergan.

2.5 Deliberative Insights—Secondary Sources

This article would not be the first to suggest the notion or at least the terminology of deliberative or evaluative insight producing the judgment of value. Most discussion on the judgment of value has centered on the meaning of intentional response, apprehension of value, and the role of feelings in producing the judgment of value. Mark Doorley,31 Pat Byrne,32 and Bob Doran33 have used terminology suggestive of something like a deliberative insight. But let me concentrate on Michael Vertin’s excellent and detailed article on “Judgments of Value in the Later Lonergan.”34 He clearly and explicitly holds for the presence of a deliberative insight


producing the judgment of value, but he does not elaborate on the form of deliberative insight beyond some vague suggestions.

It is still not clear how a cognitional and an affective component unite in a judgment of value. It is not enough to use the phrase "affective cognition" to solve the problem. I am left with some questions about "affective cognition aptly labeled deliberative," "discursive cognitional response to that ultimate content is affective." Vertin seems to suggest that the deliberative insight is the same as an apprehension of value: "the cognitional reason for every judgment of value is an apprehension of value — what in this essay I have explicated under the name deliberative insight, an act not of intellectual cognition but of affective cognition." But this would be a bit strange, given that Lonergan explicitly states that the apprehension of value is not an act of understanding but of feelings. I would tend to interpret apprehension of value as a loose descriptive term that Lonergan uses in a variety of contexts meaning something like "sensitivity to values." Intentional response, on the other hand, is a strict explanatory term defined in contrast to nonintentional and the intention to agreeable and disagreeable. Unfortunately, Vertin does not seem to refer to the text on the three components of the judgment of value, which I would consider pivotal and hence does not show how deliberative insight fits into these components and how the three components unite in one judgment of value.

3. DELIBERATIVE INSIGHT — SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION

Let us begin to specify the kind of cognitive activity involved in a deliberative insight, remembering the various analogies available to us through our diagram. This is an attempt to give a systematic, comprehensive overview of the structure of deliberative insight, and at the same time an interpretation and expansion of Lonergan's texts.
3.1 Deliberation as Insight

Deliberative insight will be an insight, an act of understanding, embodying in some way the five characteristics of direct insight. It will come as a release of the tension of inquiry; we are presuming the question, Is it worthwhile? operating consistently, deeply, driving toward a solution. It will come suddenly and unexpectedly; we cannot force such insights; we provide optimal conditions of concentration, attention to relevant data, manipulating images, data, examples in suggestive ways — and then it comes. It pivots between the abstract and the concrete; we have universal moral laws, but they have to be applied in a concrete situation. Which laws apply in this situation? Is this a situation of killing, murder, manslaughter, accidental killing, or what? Is this concrete situation an exception to the abstract definition? The emergence of the insight depends on inner conditions more than outward circumstances; the inner conditions are the questions, the habits, the feelings, the intentions, the ambitions, the desires, and so forth, moving to evaluation, decision, and action. Outer circumstances, such as poverty or riches, male or female, time and place, culture and language, may be quite irrelevant. Finally, the deliberative insight will pass into the habitual texture of the mind; if we discover that a friend is really a fraud, we are not likely to forget it; if we realize that we did the right thing in one situation, we are likely to do it again in a similar situation; we establish habitual value stances and priorities of values.

Deliberative insight, then, will not be intuitive, that is, a simple, single, direct vision of value; it will be discursive, worked out painfully and slowly, open to interference of various kinds; involving sensing, remembering, understanding, a context of facts, a context of ideas, a context of previous deliberative insights. It will involve active focusing, researching, questioning, thinking, writing, talking and will also involve passivity, waiting, listening, hoping, receiving. Many existential elements will tend to intrude for better or worse — fear of consequences, mixed motivations, selfishness struggling with altruism, am I willing to go down this route at all? Deliberative insight ushers us into the world mediated by

\[39Insight, 28-31.\]
meaning and value, not the world of immediacy of sensing of the out there now real. Deliberative insight will grasp a unity, a connection, a whole, a value, a relation, a form immanent in a multiplicity of images, situations, experiences, and events.

3.2 Structure of Deliberative Insight

But a deliberative insight will also be modeled on reflective insight because it is preparing to issue a judgment. If the structure of judgment of fact is the same as the structure of the judgment of value, then surely the form of deliberative insight will be similar to the form of reflective insight. Hence the unity we are looking for in deliberative insights is the connection between evidence and conclusion; is it sufficient, convincing, possible, probably, impossible, or improbable? The descriptive way of putting this is weighing the evidence for or against the conclusion.

All good or value is conditioned or contingent (except for God, the formally unconditioned good). There is no necessary good, and so all judgments of value will be of contingent values, values that will be true if certain conditions are fulfilled. The judgment of value will start with a conditioned, proceed to establish a link between the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions; determine if the conditions are in fact fulfilled; then proceed to enunciate the virtually unconditioned value of this person, act, policy, or thing. The deliberative insight is the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence in the premises for the conclusion. It is a single insight that unites a vast multiplicity of data, insights, facts, judgment of value, and so on. Hence deliberative insight follows the form of the hypothetical syllogism of reflective insight, that is: If A, then B. But A. Therefore B.

This analysis of the fundamental underlying structure of deliberative insight is important because it reveals the structure of the human mind as it grasps the good and knows value. We are not born knowing what is right, but we are born with the capacity to work it out for ourselves. Listen to any argument about abortion, capital punishment, just war, homosexuality, gender discrimination, for example, and underlying all the partial points, whether they are valid or not, is the structure of (1) a ques-

40Method in Theology, 37.
tion of value to be answered, (2) arguments, evidence, experience, facts, previous judgments, (3) educed in favor or against, and (4) an appropriate conclusion emerging by which we affirm or deny the value. In all cultures, at all times, this is the fundamental underlying transcendental structure of moral reasoning. This is how the human mind works, how our mind works, how your mind works, how all minds work. It is as clear as, if A, then B. But A. Therefore B. This is the fundamental form of inference that we have identified and objectified.

We usually formalize this procedure in more detailed explicit ways so as to apply to particular cases. We have the formal structure of deductive syllogistic logic; we have the rules of inference and the fallacies that occur when the rules are broken; we have inductive logic and principles of scientific method; we have many forms of modern symbolic logic; many disciplines develop their own particular forms of methodologies, procedures, rules, all to guide the process of inference from evidence to conclusions. All of these may be relevant to procedures of moral reasoning. The structure of moral reasoning is similar to the structure of scientific or philosophical reasoning. It is the content that makes the difference between reflective and deliberative insight.

3.3 Content

The difference between reflective insight and deliberative insight will be in the content rather than the structure; reflective insights intend truth; deliberative insights intend value. The transcendental notion of value motivates the intentionality of asking questions until a satisfactory solution is found; the notion of value recognizes value when it is found and provides the criterion of true value in the happy conscience of the good person. This is transcendental in the sense that it is beyond categories, applying to all human persons, making judgments of value of any kind in any time or place. This is a very high level of generality; let us try to be more specific so that we can be clear about what we are saying.

Let us consider some examples or types of value judgments.
3.4 Valuing Things

We are constantly evaluating things in a loose sense as either good or bad. We apply these judgments to cars, to dogs, to schools, to books, to paintings, to tools, to institutions, to just about anything in the universe. Let us examine how and why we do that with a few typical examples.

How do we evaluate a book, describe it as good or useless? Clearly we start with a criterion of what we hope to get from reading the book — recreational reading, escapism, help for an exam, a solution to a particular problem, general enlightenment, inspiration, et cetera, all of which are legitimate and in turn a value. We judge the book on whether it satisfies these criteria, how well it does so, with or without reservations or deficiencies or qualifications. We set the conditions to be satisfied by reading the book; if the conditions are fulfilled we judge it as good. If they are not fulfilled, we judge it as a failure, a waste of time, a useless book. If you are buying a book, you establish clearly what you are looking for — line up possibilities, judge prices, presentation, material — finally pick out what you evaluate as best and buy.

How do we evaluate a painting, describe it as good or bad? Here we are in the field of aesthetics — the appreciation of beauty, whether of painting, music, poetry, literature, sculpture, and so forth. Different people will approach a painting from varying points of view. A decorator may be looking for something to go with the curtains in the living room. A student may just be looking from a descriptive point of view, with little technical knowledge of colors, shapes, harmonies, the principles, et cetera. Some may judge only by the feeling evoked, this is sad, that feels frightening, this feels horrible. A connoisseur will judge it from a developed appreciation of harmony, shape, color, tone, mood, skill; he or she will judge it in light of its history as merely imitative, or creative, or a masterpiece. An art dealer will evaluate in terms of hard cash, publicity, auctioning, commission, among other things. Because criteria and appreciation differ so much you rarely get unanimity in art appreciation. But we can see in each case a criterion operating and the work of art fulfilling or not fulfilling the conditions set by the criterion. Art appreciation can be articulated, one can defend a painting you admire; there is deliberative
insight involved in art and art appreciation; it is not random or arbitrary activity.

We can evaluate schools, and again we will be operating according to different criteria. You will be looking for something affordable; some place within a reasonable distance; a school that offers the kind of education you are looking for; well administered and with good teachers, high academic standards, small classroom numbers, a good sports program, and so forth. As you visit the school and talk to teachers and pupils you may be lining up the information as to whether it satisfies these criteria or not. There is a constant stream of value judgments being made, leading to the final judgment of whether it is a good school overall.

The value of things will vary depending on the criterion operating in the situation. A good book for holiday reading is not the same as a good book for passing exams. Gold is very valuable but not much use if you are in a desert with nothing to eat or drink. King Richard surrounded by his enemies would willingly have given his kingdom for a horse to escape with his life. This does not mean that all values are subjective. Valuable is a very flexible notion, depending on particular criteria operating in concrete situations with individual persons evaluating. But it is a transcendental structure—a conditioned value, a link between the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions (criteria), the fulfillment of the conditions and hence the judgment of value—the virtually unconditioned of value. This can be seen in any of the above examples.

3.5 Hierarchy of Values

There are different kinds of values, and many ways of slicing the cake. Let us try a few distinctions just to become more concrete. Each level of consciousness and their proper activities have an aim, a product, and a criterion to determine whether that aim has been reached. In other words, there is a good or value proper to each level of consciousness. Let us see if we can define these values more exactly.

Vital values would be those elements necessary for life, for survival, for self-preservation as living beings. Vital values will be those proper to the first level of human consciousness. Hence, food and drink, security, clothing, shelter, health, et cetera would seem to be basic values. If these
are not satisfied in some way, it is difficult to think of higher values: *primum vivere, deinde philosophare*. Food is valuable from the point of view of survival. So we talk about good food, good housing, good clothes, et cetera or their opposite. Food is a vital value if it promotes health, life, and survival. But this food does promote health, life, and survival. Therefore it is a vital value.

Social values derive from our social nature. We cooperate as a group to survive together; we organize, specialize, complement one another so that regularly, efficiently, the needs of individuals are satisfied through a social order, a good of order. So we form institutions, companies, communication systems, economic systems, productivity, distribution, law and order, criminality, and social organizations of all kinds. The aim is order, the criterion efficiency, the value cooperation. Understanding aims at order, regularity, clarity, the good or order. So, you have a local good of order, regional, national, and international, and a global good of order to think about. "X" will be a social value if it promotes cooperation, order, and efficiency. But "X" does promote cooperation, order, and efficiency. Therefore it is a social value.

Cultural values are "the beliefs and values informing a common way of life." We include beliefs about equality, purpose of life, education, research institutions, truth telling; a political economic educational system based on truth of history, the reality of international relations, a kingdom of truth. Anything that promotes truth, understanding, and expansion and implementation of knowledge will be a cultural value. Anything that hinders correct understanding and truth will be a cultural disvalue. A communitarian arrangement should allow people to find the truth for themselves. Systems should be accountable and transparent. Media should not distort the real picture. Science, technology, medical developments, research for peace and progress are all cultural values. Here the value is truth of common beliefs, of politics and politicians, truth about human nature and human order.

Moral values recognize that the human person is free and responsible in his or her knowing and doing, as an individual within a society. You can have healthy moral individuals and also healthy moral

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41 *Method in Theology*, 301.
societies, nations, institutions, corporations, governments. If so, there is harmony rather than conflict. You can also have depraved individuals as well as corrupt societies, deformed institutions, corporations in moral decline. The human person develops in his potential as originating value producing terminal values, freely and responsibly. You can have authentic individuals in conflict with inauthentic traditions; or authentic traditions striving to convert inauthentic individuals. Justice will be a moral value if it promotes harmony between the individual and the society, promotes the development of both, recognizes the person as free and responsible. But justice does these things and therefore is a moral value. Moral values are the good proper to the fourth level of intentional consciousness.

Religious values are the most comprehensive and include the reality of human sinfulness, moral impotence, the possibility of redemption, the reality of prayer and holiness. The human person is open to the divine, aspires to a knowledge and love of God and cannot be fully satisfied by any created good. So the destiny and value of the human person is cast in a new perspective of a perhaps immortal destiny.

There is a good proper to each level of conscious intentionality; each level has its own proper value. But the higher levels depend on the lower levels; so the higher values will depend on the lower values. The higher levels of operation sublate the lower levels; so the higher values will in turn sublate the lower levels. Hence we can talk of a legitimate true hierarchy of values relating to one another as higher and lower, as mutually dependent and interrelated. In other words, some values are more basic than others, some values are more excellent than others, not all values are of equal value.

### 3.6 Value Judgments in Moral Philosophy

The moral philosopher will make judgments of value about his method, about his principles, about his criteria, about human nature, human action, and human purposes and the consequences of human action. Moral philosophy is fraught with multiple possibilities of going wrong. You can usually distinguish moral philosophies as to what they value most in human life, whether it be virtue as an end in itself as in the Stoics, or pleasure as understood by the Epicureans and Hedonists, or utility as
understood by the Utilitarians or Consequentialists. Sometimes power is elevated to the status of a final end or criterion as in the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and what is called “real politik.” Moral philosophy must make value judgments at the theoretical or methodological level but also give guidance or criteria or applications to the concrete details of everyday evaluations, choices, and actions. Many moral philosophies err by way of simplification; concentrating exclusively on one value to the exclusion of other values; concentrating on the consequences and excluding the motivations; extolling the rational universal moral imperative at the expense of human feelings, aspirations, and affects.

Let us look at some of the areas in which deliberative insights operate in order to work toward a comprehensive grasp of human moral good.

(1) Deliberative insights need to be made as to the real sphere of the moral as distinct from all other values. They will be concerned with the free and responsible development of human persons as good valuers, choosers, and doers; it pertains to persons in their relations with other persons; it pertains to the goodness of activities of the fourth level of human consciousness. We are not talking of skill, intelligence, strength, beauty, talent, personality, or temperament; we are talking of what a person has done, is doing with his life as a whole in relation to responsible choice, promoting the good, doing the right thing, being virtuous, flourishing as a human person in the fullest sense of that ambiguous term. Moral philosophy will depend on how we value the life of a human person, human nature, its development, its purpose, its proper self-realization.

We do normally distinguish between moral goodness and other kinds of goodness, but it is difficult to articulate this difference. But we do judge people as morally good or evil, and these are either true or false judgments. We judge their ability as bankers, footballers, conversationalists, teachers, but we also judge them as moral persons — “he is a good guy behind it all,” as well as that “she is a good person.” He may not be very intelligent but he is a good person. We judge the integrity of a person's motivation — we live with them over a period of time and see
how they react in various situations — we check for consistency between what they say and what they do.

(2) We deliberate about specific human actions and classify them into classes and categories. We distinguish human actions that are free and responsible from acts of the human being that are reflexes, instinctual, biologically or psychologically beyond the control of will and responsibility. We judge when actions are due to ignorance, or misunderstanding, and judge whether it is culpable or inculpable ignorance. We judge the quality of the freedom — is the act premeditated, planned, chosen deliberately or is freedom lessened by compulsions, instinct, passion, addiction, or the like? We distinguish between actions that are serious from the moral point of view, killing, stealing large sums of money, rape, et cetera, from those we consider trivial like white lies, bad language, or being impolite.

We can classify human actions into typical action situations such as adultery, abortion, murder, genocide, corruption, lying, perjury, or almsgiving, acts of kindness, visiting the sick, telling the truth. An extreme situation ethic claims that there are an infinite number of particular concrete human actions, and therefore we cannot apply any general rules. We know that human actions, although unique in their concreteness, can be understood, classified, defined, and evaluated and thus general moral imperatives can be formed about these categories.

(3) We evaluate human actions partly in terms of their consequences. Consequences are sometimes intrinsic to an action, such as killing the fetus in abortion, deceiving a friend in telling a lie. So all human action has immediate direct intrinsic consequences that condition the morality of the action. But consequences can be extrinsic; they can be either immediate or remote; foreseen and foreseeable or unforeseen and unforeseeable, direct or indirect. If you judge it right to invade another country, then the remote consequences years down the road bear on the morality of your judgment.

(4) We also evaluate moral actions in terms of intention. What was the actor intending to achieve? Moral idealism, in the sense of having high ideals but little or no competence, will probably do more harm than good. Almsgiving can sometimes cause dependency, encourage addiction, and
demean persons. Planting trees at random can do more harm than good. Good intentions by themselves are not enough.

(5) We also evaluate in terms of motive. What was the motive of the crime, what was the person trying to achieve for himself by doing this; what was a person's motivation in choosing a career or embarking on a course of action.

(6) How then does a person answer the question, What is the right thing for me to do in this situation? A person thinking in terms of moral laws will ask, What kind of an action is this? Which moral laws apply here? Which law has priority? The solution will be a deliberative insight into the application of moral laws to concrete situations. A person thinking in terms of virtue ethics might ask, Which virtue is called for here? Which virtue has priority? If I want to become a good person what do I do here? What would my role model do in this situation? The solution will be a judgment of value in terms of grasping the virtuous course of action. If the person is thinking in terms of moral values, he will understand the situation, the possibilities and alternatives, the consequences in terms of moral and other values; he will deliberate, judge, decide, and act attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly; he will be guided by conscience and answerable only to conscience.

To be unqualifiedly good human persons, our actions must be unreservedly good, the intentions benevolent, the motives wholesome, and the consequences wholly good. But all that together is rather a rarity in human affairs. But yet we must establish this as the standard of human moral judgment, and if anything is lacking the action must be judged defective. Goodness belongs to the whole, as Aristotle and Aquinas noted. Evil lies in some kind of defect, in the action, the amount, the time, the intention, the consequences, et cetera. Many moral judgments of value will be comparative rather than absolute: this is better than that, rather than this is wholly good and that is wholly bad.

In each case the value to be ascertained is a conditioned value. In each case it will be a real value if certain conditions are fulfilled. We assemble examples, distinctions, evidence, and previous evaluations and line them up as premises in relation to a conclusion. The deliberative
insight grasps the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence for the positing of the judgment of value.

3.9 From Theory to Interiority

Why have we shifted from the language of moral law, moral virtue, and vice, the moral good, to talking about moral values and valuing? I think it is because analysis of valuing comes closest to describing what we actually do when we are faced with a moral challenge. It is because we have moved beyond theoretical explanations to interiority analysis, from the second stage of meaning to the third. Theory, although it is an advance on description, still cannot account for successive theories, cannot justify its own axioms and principles, and cannot show its relation to common sense, without moving into interiority analysis. It is in the third stage of meaning that we can understand and relate and evaluate various moral philosophical systems, various methods of doing ethics, its presuppositions, principles, and axioms. Let us illustrate briefly.

Moral philosophy often thinks in terms of laws, natural law theory, the categorical imperative of Kant, civil laws, positive law, criminal law, and so forth. Perhaps the simplest way to teach children good behavior is in terms of "do this" and "don't do that." This has wide application in terms of social behavior, making clear what is acceptable or unacceptable, legal or illegal. Natural law thinking is very much a part of the Catholic and Christian tradition of teaching morality. You can work out a coherent framework for a natural law moral law philosophy as in Aquinas. But is this foundational? It suffers from the defects of all theories. In particular, we ask, Where do these moral rules come from? What function do they serve? How can they be improved? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this way of teaching? How do we distinguish just and unjust laws, good and bad laws? Are there exceptions? What law applies to this situation? What law takes precedence over another? These are the kind of questions that lead beyond natural law theory to intentionality analysis.

Aristotle based his ethics on his definitions of human happiness, the function of man, the supreme final end, pleasure; in that context he was able to define virtue and vice in an explanatory fashion and to specify the
particular virtues flanked by defect and excess. Then he could consider voluntary actions, deliberation, feelings, friendship, and other relevant matters. He set up an explanatory scheme of terms and relations covering the whole field of ethics. Virtue ethics continues to be promoted today as the best way of teaching ethics, but somehow the list of virtues and vices has changed. So the questions come again, Which virtues are ultimate? Which virtue is appropriate in this situation? Who has authority to change the rank and list of the virtues? What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a virtue ethics? How do you resolve disputes about virtues? Once you start asking these kinds of questions, you are moving from theory into intentionality analysis.

We move from law and virtue and any other theoretical moral philosophy because we wish to be foundational, to get at the source of moral imperatives. We use moral law thinking as a useful pedagogical tool at a certain stage of moral development to teach wisdom of personal moral evaluations. Applying laws to typical moral situations is a device for evaluating; it is a subset of moral value judgments. But it is the deliberative insights and value judgments that are foundational, not the systems of laws, natures, principles, and concepts. We use virtue ethics as techniques to distinguish different ways of behaving and being and distinguishing the good from the bad; we use role models to show this is what you should imitate, this is what you should avoid. But virtues and vices are also a subset of moral value judgments that are useful pedagogical tools, but they are not foundational.

What is foundational is the structure of a value judgment itself and its source in questions of value, deliberative insights, intentional response, and willing self-transcendence. These in turn reflect the very structure of the human mind and the human person as free and responsible in valuing, choosing and acting. The final mature stage of moral development is the autonomous mature individual, aware of the complexity of the value matrix in which he is operating, responding feelingly on the basis of a life well-lived, deliberating, judging, choosing, and doing in response to the promptings of a happy or unhappy conscience.
3.10 Dialectic of Moral Judgments of Value

But who is to claim such a position of perfect moral maturity? Who is to claim to have lived a life of moral goodness and made himself into a good valuer, chooser, and doer? Who has a fully happy conscience in a fully open mind? For as well as there being moral development there is also a dialectic process at work, namely, two principles linked but opposed and successively modified by their interaction. The dialectic operates in judgments of truth where it is a struggle between imagination and understanding, looking and discursive insight, the out there now real and objectivity, the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning. We talk of intellectual conversion to the extent that we successfully negotiate this dialectic.

In the moral sphere it is a dialectic of our orientation to value and our intentional response to the agreeable and disagreeable, a dialectic between value and satisfaction. The intentional response to value if followed leads to self-transcendence, to true judgments of value, good choices and actions, to a happy conscience, to being an authentic human person to doing the right thing for the right reason at the right time in the right amount and leads to happiness. If the appeal of satisfaction is in harmony with this movement, then feelings add to the mass momentum and drive of a good life. But if the response to satisfaction is in conflict with value, you have dialectical tension and disharmony. If we make the intentional response to the agreeable and disagreeable our criterion, then our judgments choices and actions will be in terms of personal preference, self-interest, the search for pleasure, doing as I like, seeking the apparent good. These will conflict with the intentional response to value, the person is at odds with himself, deep division, self-destruction, loss of freedom, unhappy conscience ensue.

Foundational disagreements between moral philosophers can be traced to the presence or absence of moral conversion. But this does not mean that these disagreements are intractable or arbitrary. One can talk about conversion, identify its elements and its consequences. One can distinguish the legitimate pluralism in the area of moral philosophy: distinguish the three stages of meaning, identify a pluralism of communication and differentiation of consciousness, divide into subject,
field, and functional specialization. All these are legitimate and complementary.

What is illegitimate is the pluralism brought about by the presence or absence of moral conversion. How is it overcome? Are we condemned to interminable useless discussion getting nowhere? Well you make conversion the topic. You distinguish the intentional response to value from the intentional response to agreeable or disagreeable. You make the deliberative insight and the judgment of value the topic; you identify the three components, you apply the analysis to examples; you do intentionality analysis. We all have the same minds, we all perform the same operations in the same sequence, but we do not all negotiate the dialectic completely or successfully in our own lives.

4. CONCLUSION

(1) We have shown that Lonergan’s statements about the three components uniting in a judgment of value are basically correct, coherent, and intelligible, if in need of some elaboration and clarification. Whatever confusion there might be probably results from not distinguishing sufficiently between the way from below upward of immanently generated knowledge, and the way from above downward of love, tradition, belief, habit, and faith.

(2) We can fully affirm the rational, responsible, and critical function of reason in searching for, grasping and affirming judgments of value. It is a fully rational process. All vital, social, cultural, and moral values are immanently generated knowledge of values. We must be able to give an account of the values we hold. There may be incommensurability between different concepts of ethics or between the ethics of different cultures or times, but all of them are the result of the one human mind performing the same fundamental operations, either well or badly, completely or incompletely, according to pure or impure desires.

(3) This affirmation does not turn us into Kantian rationalists excluding all feeling from moral values. The search for, the grasping of, and the affirmation of judgments of value are initiated by the desire to know, motivated by the intention of value, completed only when the desire is fully satisfied and no further relevant questions arise. The pure
feeling dynamic is intrinsic to the process. What distorts and destroys the search is bias, twisted motivations, impure desires that interfere with the exigency of reason.

(4) We have given an outline of how deliberative insight works in various fields. Much more elaboration and application is needed. Equally the role of intentional response to value needs to be further identified, elaborated, and appropriated. Similarly, the whole context of the fourth-level operations of decision, love, habits, tradition, belief, religious faith, in their function on the way up and on the way down, needs to be further clarified.
"A POEM SHOULD NOT MEAN / BUT BE": LONERGAN AND LITERARY AESTHETICS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Of what value is the thought of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., to literary aesthetics? Few have asked this question, in no small part because Lonergan's work devotes far less attention to literature than to philosophy or theology. Yet Lonergan's thought is claimed to possess pioneering cultural significance, because his early philosophy (culminating in *Insight*) provides "a knowledge of knowledge" that is a universal yet concretely testable epistemology and his later work, culminating in *Method in Theology*, offers a comprehensive method by which students of any discipline can gradually move toward an accurate understanding of its true value. Certainly, then, Lonergan's thought should be expected to make many key contributions to the study of literature.

Exploring the broad potential of that contribution is beyond the scope of this paper, but an important first step is to consider those moments in Lonergan's long intellectual career when he does discuss aesthetics. More specifically, I will survey Lonergan's remarks regarding the nature and value of literary art and relate these remarks both to his

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broader philosophy and to actual literary texts. In my view there are two quite distinct phases of Lonergan’s approach to aesthetics. The complementary value of these two phases can be suggested by showing the internal integrity and coherence of each phase and how each phase illuminates some very different but undeniably great poetry. In this way, I hope to begin the theoretical exploration of Lonergan’s aesthetic and its potential application to the study of literature.

2. LONERGAN’S EARLY AESTHETIC

An important introduction to the key concepts in Lonergan’s early aesthetic appears in chapter 6 of Insight, where Lonergan distinguishes common sense from scientific inquiry. In general, where “the scientist seeks the relations of things to one another, common sense is concerned with the relations of things to us.”2 Further, unlike science, common sense “never aspires to universally valid knowledge” but rather “its concern is the concrete and particular.”3 Nevertheless, insight is operative in both science and common sense, as Lonergan illustrates by discussing “patterns of experience” that are not purely intellectual. Among such is the “aesthetic pattern,” for

just as the mathematician grasps intelligible forms in schematic images, just as the scientist seeks intelligible systems that cover the data of his field, so too the artist exercises his intelligence in discovering ever novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of aesthetic experience.4

The aesthetic pattern clearly transcends a “biological pattern” that accounts for “purposeful pleasure and pain” through purely physical criteria. Humans can be unhappy well fed, happy hungry but hearing beautiful music.5 Though Lonergan here cites Langer for the example of musical composition, his own concept of “aesthetic pattern” includes many nontraditional artistic practices, each of which offers “a joy that

2Insight, 204.
3Insight, 200.
4Insight, 208.
5Insight, 207.
reveals its spontaneous authenticity”: “the untiring play of children ... the strenuous games of youth ... the exhilaration of sunlit morning air.” Such examples make clear that for Lonergan, a vital part of being human is that our “experience can occur for the sake of experiencing... and that this very liberation is a spontaneous, self-justifying joy.”

In such passages, Lonergan’s aesthetic begins to sound a bit like the “art for art’s sake” movement that so influenced artistic modernism. To equate the two views would be simplistic, but this impression does become stronger when Lonergan goes on to argue that the “self-justifying” nature of the “aesthetic pattern” distinguishes it from both the rational judgment required by the “intellectual pattern,” and the moral judgment required in the “dramatic pattern.” The “dramatic pattern” refers not to dramatic art but rather to human interpersonal action, the drama of life. Art “liberates” us not only from the “drag of biological purposiveness” but also from “the wearying constraints of mathematical proofs, scientific verifications, and commonsense factualness.” Not that such matters are absolutely excluded from art, however, for though art is “prescientific and prephilosophic, it may strain for truth and value without defining them.” While “the very obscurity of art is in a sense its most generic meaning,” this “strain” is by no means insignificant. Prior to “the neatly formulated questions of systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground,” and art can “show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep.” To fundamental moral questions, “art may offer attractive or repellent answers,” but such answers are not art’s primary purpose, nor do they determine its value; rather, in its “subtler forms,” art is “content to communicate any of the moods in which such questions arise ... the tones in which they may be answered or ignored.”

6Insight, 207.
7Insight, 208.
8Insight, 208.
9Insight, 208.
10Insight, 208.
11Insight, 209.
The implied notion here — that art offers a fundamentally different form of consciousness than that of intellectual and moral judgment — is confirmed, almost made explicit, by a section in *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan’s lectures on *Insight*. Asked to compare the artist and the phenomenologist, Lonergan replies that “what is common is the absence of attention to the reflective level of truth, reality, being; that does not come up explicitly. They both remain on the level of experience and insight.” The ensuing discussion leaves many related aesthetic questions, such as the role of historical representation in art, largely unanswered. From our later historical perspective on Lonergan’s own development, it is also striking how little discussion there is here, or in *Insight*, on the relationships between the “patterns” or “levels.” Largely absent are the notions of sublation and interdependence that are more fully developed by the period of *Method*. Still, the overlapping of concepts does suggest these relationships, as, for example, when Lonergan draws on aesthetics to explain the “dramatic pattern.” Though the freedom of the aesthetic realm is always stressed, it can be related to the moral realm, for man’s “first work of art is his own living. The fair, the beautiful, the admirable is embodied by man in his own body and actions before it is given a still freer realization in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry.” The value of each realm, or pattern, or level, Lonergan suggests, enhances and reflects that of another.

The central concepts of Lonergan’s early aesthetic, and his subtler suggestions of art’s deeper value, are given their clearest and fullest expression in the chapter entitled “Art” in *Topics in Education*. Even before this chapter, however, the same volume includes a significant discussion of aesthetics in “The Human Good as Object: Its Invariant Structure.” Lonergan again stresses that there is an aesthetic realm that

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13 *Insight*, 210-11.


has its own value, distinct from ethical or religious value, though here the aesthetic is more traditionally Thomist — its chief virtue being "the good of order" — and it is inherently moral, as it "enables people to apprehend the human good on its profoundest level or, on the contrary, to sense something wrong, in a very immediate fashion." How precisely the aesthetic realm enables such apprehension, in relation to moral and religious value, is left unclear; some connection is apparent, but here Lonergan seems midway between traditional Catholic moral aesthetics and the modernist separation of morality and art.

One might hope for the chapter "Art" to bridge this divide, and its prelude does begin with another statement of art’s broad human significance. For whereas Lonergan sees math, science, philosophy, as "a withdrawal ... for the sake of a fuller actuation when one returns," "what one returns to is the concrete functioning of the whole." Art in fact "mirrors that organic functioning of sense and feeling, of intellect not as abstract formulation but as concrete insight, of judgement that is not just judgement, but that is moving into decision, free choice, responsible action." Lonergan thus begins by suggesting the potential comprehensiveness of art, its ability to mirror each of the levels of consciousness while also showing their integrated wholeness. This statement prefigures the broad significance of art in Lonergan’s later aesthetic but explicitly formulates a systematic and rather technical definition of art that, as in Insight, places art primarily within his first two transcendental levels, experience and insight.

Lonergan borrows his definition, he says, from Suzanne Langer’s Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art, but as his later editors point out, her actual definition is that "art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling." Lonergan’s own definition is clearly influenced by Langer’s commingling of the modernist emphasis on objective form and the


16 "The Human Good as Object," 37.
17 "Art," 209.
18 "Art," 209.
19 "Art" 211.
Romantic appeal to emotion, but it is a definition more technical and precise. At this stage of his career, Lonergan defines art as "an objectification of a purely experiential pattern." He then systematically explains this definition, discussing each term of the definition in reverse order.

Lonergan’s notion of “pattern” is similar to the concept of “form” in Langer’s thought and in other aesthetics, referring to the artwork’s integral structure, its “internal relations,” which “are there whether or not the art is representative.” Again, music is Lonergan’s prime example, as “pattern” refers not primarily to the notes on a musical score, or the indentations on a “gramophone record,” but rather to the pattern that is “realized concretely only when the music is being played.” The presence of such a pattern is closely linked to what Lonergan here means by “experiential,” which refers not so much to some kind of empirical, physical reality like that on the first level, but rather to those experiences which, precisely because they are patterned, humans can “be conscious of, so to speak.” If “one hears a series of street noises,” Lonergan explains, “one cannot reproduce them”; but, if “one hears a tune or a melody, one can repeat it.” Lonergan also cites the example of poetic verse, which “makes words memorable,” and with respect to literature one might further note those plot and character patterns within a novel, or a play, which are not random, but rather selected so as to create a pattern that is essential to our consciousness of the work of art as art.

The meaning of both “pattern” and “experiential” in Lonergan’s definition is further clarified by his insistence that both terms be modified by the adjective “pure.” As with the initial meaning of these terms, Lonergan’s reasons for why art should be a “pure pattern” and “purely experiential” are closely related. A “pure pattern” refers to “the exclusion of alien patterns that instrumentalize our experience.” By “instrumentalize,” Lonergan means the use of patterns for specific utilitarian purposes, such as, in everyday life, using and patterning one’s senses to

20"Art," 211.
21"Art," 211.
22"Art," 212.
23"Art," 212.
24"Art," 213.
safely negotiate a traffic intersection or, in science, the selection of certain patterns according to "conceptual classification." There is nothing "wrong with such instrumentalization," Lonergan stresses, "but ... this is not what we want to think about when we think about art." To appreciate its pattern, art should be enjoyed for the beauty of what it is, not what we ourselves, at any given moment, can do with it.

Similarly, by the term "purely experiential," Lonergan argues that what we look for in art is an experience removed from moral or intellectual utility. Art "can be didactic," he says "but the lesson must not be imposed from outside in the manner of didacticism, moralism, or social realism." This section is much shorter than that devoted to "pure pattern," and Lonergan does not sufficiently develop the distinction between internally developed and externally imposed didacticism to explain clearly, for example, why "the Russian art that attempts to inculcate communist doctrine is not purely experiential." Nor, unfortunately, does he provide examples of other literary texts that are acceptably didactic. Lonergan's purpose here, perhaps, is not so much to propose what could be moral literature, as to preserve, in aesthetic theory and practice, the moment of artistic experience in which the meaning is primal, unrestricted by any subsequent interpretation of that experience. As he puts it:

When experience is in a purely experiential pattern, it is not curtailed, not fitted upon some Procrustean bed. It is allowed its full complement of feelings ... It is not dictated to by the world of development, organization, fulfilment. It is not dictated to by the world of science, the world of inquiry, the world of information, the world of theories about what experience should be, or by utilitarian motives. It is.

The "purely experiential" moment is also described by Lonergan as art's "elemental meaning." This "meaning," in Aristotelian terms, is the "identity of the sensible and the sense in act," a meaning normally prior to the identity "of the intellect and the intelligible in act" that properly

26"Art," 214.
constitutes knowledge, and which transforms the elemental meaning into “some ‘meant’.” In Lonergan’s epistemology, this “occurs through the pattern of true judgements,” but art, at this stage of his aesthetic, is not concerned with such judgments. Just as Insight spoke of the elemental wonder that precedes intellectual or moral questions, so here Lonergan wants to remind us that it is the elemental meaning of art that gives us this wonder, precisely because art “is opening a new horizon ... something that is other, different, novel, strange, new, remote, intimate.” While wishing, like literary modernists, to preserve this aesthetic experience for its own sake, Lonergan also argues for its moral benefits. Recalling his initial comments on the value of “withdrawal for return,” and of art as a mirror of the concrete life, Lonergan also argues that the “withdrawal” of the artist “has its significance”: “it is a withdrawal from practical living to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world.” Art, he obliquely concludes, reminds us that “the life we are living is a product of artistic creation” and “an exploration of potentiality.”

These brief suggestions of a Creator, an Artist, are then left as Lonergan returns to the final technical term of his definition, “objectification,” which in a simple sense is the outward, physical expression of the interior meaning in the mind of the artist. Lonergan cites Wordsworth’s famous account of poetic creation, “emotion recollected in tranquility,” to help explain this process and also cites an analogy familiar from Insight and Verbum, “the process” of moving from “the act of understanding to the definition.” The artwork, like the definition, is “an unfolding of what one has got hold of in the insight.” As with the definition, the work of art derived from elemental meaning is neither an illusion, nor an escape, nor an autobiography; rather,

It is grasping what is or seems significant, of moment, of concern, of import to man in the experience. In a sense, it is truer than the experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point. It grasps the central moment of the experience and unfolds ideally its proper

28“Art,” 215-16.
29“Art,” 216.
30“Art,” 217.
31“Art,” 218.
implications, apart from the distortions, the interferences, the accidental intrusions that would arise in the concrete experience itself.  

Lonergan concludes his theoretical aesthetic by discussing the "symbol," an artistic form that in many ways exemplifies his definition, and the concept of "ulterior significance," which serves to summarize the moral and religious tendencies of his evaluation of art. A symbol, he argues, reflects "an objectifying, revealing, communicating consciousness," "but it is not reflective, critical consciousness." Rather than dealing with "univocal terms" and "the principles of excluded middle and noncontradiction," the symbol presents "multiple meanings," and is "overdetermined, as are dreams." Though Lonergan's point here sometimes suffers from hyperbole and lack of specific literary example, we do "see this in a particularly striking way in Shakespeare, where images come crowding in from all sides to express the same point," and it is arguable that figures of speech generally, "such as metaphor, synecdoche, and the rest," represent "the normal flow of symbolic consciousness." Lonergan here ignores the problem of misinterpretation of symbols and the long historical links between rhetoric and logic, but he moves to much more familiar ground in concluding that, beyond his theoretical aesthetic, art is at least capable of expressing "ulterior significance." The meaning of this rather oblique term is clarified by Lonergan in a lengthy but eloquent passage which, with the help of St. Augustine, memorably evokes, without directly naming, the Supreme Artist:

33"Art," 220.
34"Art," 220.
Art, whether by an illusion or a fiction or a contrivance, presents the beauty, the splendor, the glory, the majesty, the "plus" that is in things and that drops out when you say that the moon is just earth and the clouds are just water. It draws attention to the fact that the splendor of the world is a cipher, a revelation, an unveiling, the presence of one who is not seen, touched, grasped, put in a genus, distinguished by a difference, yet is present. St. Augustine says in his Confessions that he sought in the stars, and it was not the stars; in the sun and the moon, and it was not the sun and the moon; in the earth, the trees, the shrubs, the mountains, the valleys, and it was none of these. Art can be viewing this world and looking for the something more that this world reveals, and reveals, so to speak, in silent speech, reveals by a presence that cannot be defined or got hold of.\(^{36}\)

Lonergan continues by almost lamenting that "not all art has it," and that without "this ulterior significance" art "becomes play" or "aestheticism, just the enjoyment of the pattern ... materials for exercises in one's skill of appreciation," almost seeming to forget his earlier definition of art. He does restate "the basic point that I wish to make, namely, that art is an exploration of potentialities for human living,\(^{37}\)" reminding us that part of art's elemental meaning is the possibility of any possibility. Yet there remains an unresolved tension throughout the lecture as to what art could or should be, as opposed to what it often is. Perhaps content to accept this tension, Lonergan closes the chapter by considering various art forms, showing how his aesthetic applies to the picture, the statue, architecture, and music. There is also a section on poetry, but it is not replete with memorable examples, a gap that might easily be remedied.

3. LITERATURE AND THE APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF LONERGAN'S EARLY AESTHETIC

Lonergan's early aesthetic does apply more easily, in my opinion, to visual art or music than to literature, but many of its insights can illuminate, and be illuminated by, concrete literary examples. Though it is a poem about poetry, and thus not precisely what Lonergan means by a "purely experiential pattern" of elemental meaning, the ideas of Archibald

\(^{36}\) "Art," 222.

\(^{37}\) "Art," 222.
MacLeish’s “Ars Poetica” are highly suggestive of aspects of Lonergan’s early aesthetic theory. Of this poem’s twelve couplets, at least six bear repeating here:

A poem should be wordless
As the flight of birds...

A poem should be motionless in time
As the moon climbs.

A poem should be equal to:
Not true.

For all the history of grief
An empty doorway and a maple leaf.

For love
The leaning grasses and two lights above the sea —

A poem should not mean
But be. (7-8, 15-24)

Even in this fragmented form, the pattern of “Ars Poetica,” objectified simply as both rhyming and unrhymed couplets, helps the reader first to experience how poetry works through figures of speech such as verbal irony, simile, and metonymy, while also suggesting subtly a philosophical account of what poetry is. Poems are not literally “wordless,” and words must be spoken in time, but with these paradoxes MacLeish suggests the “pure experiential” reality of the poem, before its objectification, in which it exists independently of definite time or space. The metonymies for grief and love are a flow of symbolic consciousness that allow “the full complement of feelings” to these primal experiences. Each of them is suggestive of multiple meanings, each offering images that could appear in the overdetermined dreams of those experiencing these emotions. Finally, and most obviously, MacLeish’s assertion that poetry “should be equal to: / Not true” (17-18) reminds one of Lonergan’s claim that art

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39 For this suggestion, I am indebted to comments made by Professor Charles Hefling at the Lonergan Summer Workshop, held in June 2001, at Boston College.
presents elemental meaning, prior to the pattern of true judgments that allow us to know truth. That understood, Lonergan might translate Macleish’s most famous line, that “a poem should not mean / But be” (23-24), as meaning that “a poem is not a ‘meant’, but is.”

Countless other poems could be cited to illustrate the individual concepts of Lonergan’s early aesthetic, but a work that most exemplifies this aesthetic is “Kubla Khan,” by Samuel Taylor Coleridge.40 This poem seems to be written from precisely that “purely experiential” realm that Lonergan stresses is unrelated to any instrumental theory, whether practical or intellectual.41 Rather this poem evokes the mystery of how a dream prompted by a brief, insignificant prose commentary on a historical figure, “the Khan Kubla,” could lead to a three-hour dream that gave to Coleridge “Two to three hundred lines,” of which only 54 were written down.42

This “Xanadu” itself is “a miracle of rare device” (1,35), symbol after symbol that have no instrumental value whatsoever, yet who can deny the wonder evoked by this “savage place, “ “holy and enchanted” (14), or fail to want to hear the “Abyssinian maid,” who “on her dulcimer she played,” until she would “revive within” our own delight at “symphony and song” (39-43). There are hints of the Romantic poetic persona, “his flashing eyes, his floating hair!” (50) in the speaker’s concluding lines, but broader “ulterior significance” dominates the poem’s conclusion, where the reader is exhorted to “close your eyes with holy dread,” for the builder of this “miracle,” this “rare device,” “on honeydew hath fed / And drunk the milk of Paradise” (35, 52-54). The nourishing paradise here is poetry, however, and as in Lonergan’s early aesthetic, “Kubla Khan” primarily evokes elemental wonder, not theological judgment.


41The creativity of “Kubla Khan” seems unrelated to the opium use commonly associated with the poem, since clearly Coleridge went on to use opium many times during his tragic and nearly fatal addiction to that then misunderstood drug; however, such activity did not regularly produce other poems of this character.

This does not make “Kubla Khan” any less valuable as a religious poem on the principles of Lonergan’s early aesthetic. In general, art is “content to communicate any of the moods in which such questions arise,”43 for “art is a fundamental element in the freedom of consciousness itself.”44 Thinking about a poem like “Kubla Khan,” because it raises far more questions than we can possibly answer, reawakens our sense of wonder, our need to exercise our hearts and minds in a way that never ceases to “explore[e] the full freedom of our ways of feeling and perceiving.”45 In that way, art is much like nature, as both remind us that we are made in the image of a free, intelligent, Artist. Coleridge explains this beautifully, in my opinion, in the more historical yet also wonderful poem, “Frost at Midnight,”46 in which he tells his infant son Hartley that, because he, the child, will grow up close to nature,

... so shalt thou see and hear
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
Of that eternal language, which thy God
Utters, who from eternity doth teach
Himself in all, and all things in himself.
Great universal teacher! he shall mold
Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask. (58-64)

4. BROADENING THE MEANING OF MEANING: LONERGAN’S LATER AESTHETIC

Though elements of the aesthetic presented in Topics in Education reappear throughout the remainder of Lonergan’s career, I do not believe they represent the fullness of his thought on the subject. Not that these ideas are ever clearly repudiated, but rather there are additional ideas, sufficient enough in scope that they might be termed Lonergan’s “later aesthetic.” To borrow a term that figures so importantly in how Lonergan eventually links his four “levels” of consciousness, and their accompanying forms of

43Insight, 209.
44“Art,” 232.
45“Art,” 232.
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, we could say that this later aesthetic "sublates" the early one, in that it:

introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.47

Perhaps the key for appreciating the "richer context" of Lonergan's later aesthetic is to trace the development of his thought on a crucial question: what is the meaning of meaning? Lonergan implicitly poses this question as early as the preface of Insight, in which he reasons that since insight is in part "an apprehension of relations," and because "meaning seems to be a relation between sign and signified," insight thus "includes the apprehension of meaning, and insight into insight includes the apprehension of the meaning of meaning."48 Further insight into the accurate intellectual judgement of meaning dominates the extensive discussion of hermeneutics that ensues in Insight but, as with some other elements of this text, the value of meaning, in its broader significance for ethical and religious issues, is only partially developed. The early 1960s, however, brought three essays that Fr. Eric O'Connor once remarked "form a series" on the meaning of meaning: "Time and Meaning,"49 "The Analogy of Meaning,"50 and "Dimensions of Meaning."51 Each expands Lonergan's conception of the meaning of meaning and suggests how that broadened concept might revalue the significance of art, including literature.

48Insight, 4-5.
"Time and Meaning" opens by making clear the impact upon Lonergan of the German “human sciences” in which, by contrast to American “behavioral sciences,” meaning is “the fundamental category.” This notion was in accord with Lonergan’s fight against “naïve realism,” the notion that reality is simply “taking a look” at empirical things. Similarly, this essay laments how some say that “there are things that are real and on the other hand there is “mere meaning” — as though meaning were not a reality.” Rather, he stresses that the “esse reale” “divides into the ‘natural’ and the ‘intentional’; the intentional order is the order of meaning.” Far from being of secondary importance, the intentional realm concerns most of what is crucial to distinctively human life. Fundamentally opposed to “nihilism, the negation of any meaning to human life,” Lonergan argues that “meaning is constituent of human living” and that “the development of man is principally the development of meaning.” Thus Lonergan rhetorically asks, “If we eliminated meaning from human life, would there be any family?”; “would there by any society if there were not any meaning?” There “might be a herd or a drove,” he answers, but “hardly a society,” for there would be “no education, no morals,” no “human institutions.” Further, and very significantly for my topic, Lonergan writes:

to eliminate meaning would be to eliminate interpersonal relations, symbols, art, language, literature, religion, science, history, philosophy, theology. There would still be human beings in the sense of the definition “rational animal”; but it would always be the rational animal that had not yet reached the point where it had learned any language or been able to signify anything.

Lonergan here includes art and literature among the crucial subjects of human life, and rejects the term “rational animal” as sufficient to describe

52 "Time and Meaning," 95.
54 "Time and Meaning," 105.
55 "Time and Meaning," 106.
57 "Time and Meaning," 104.
58 "Time and Meaning," 104.
the human being. "To signify," in this passage, is not just to express meaning, but further, perhaps, to express the significance, the value, of that meaning.

The value of art and literature in expressing value-laden meaning is also expressed elsewhere in "Time and Meaning." Distinguishing five varieties of meaning — intersubjective, symbolic, incarnate, artistic, and linguistic — Lonergan does repeat some of the concepts of *Topics*, but we also hear him "broaden the meaning of meaning" in several ways significant to his aesthetic theory. Intersubjective and incarnate meaning both develop the ways in which individuals express meaning through their very person — ways long utilized, of course, by dramatists. Lonergan now defines a symbol as "an image that either induces an affect, causes the affect to arise, or on the other hand expresses an affect." By "affects," a word linked to 'affections,' Lonergan associates symbols with the feelings stressed by Langer. But he also includes something broader: "our orientation in life ... the direction of our living, our attitudes to the world, to other persons, to things." This developed sense of the symbol, in turn, leads Lonergan to reflect on the seemingly irrational claim that art enthusiasts make of some artworks: "It's alive!" While reaffirming the nonutilitarian emphasis of *Topics*, Lonergan also here affirms the broad use of art as "a transformation of one's world ... a transformation of the subject."

As for the role of linguistic meaning in this transformation, Lonergan admits that language is "of course the most precise and the most varied form in which human meanings are expressed." Again, he does not provide many literary examples, but in addition to noting the "overdetermination," the "conjoined opposites" of meaning in a text like *Macbeth*, he also sees in "a great deal of human literature" the laws of

59 "Time and Meaning," 103.
60 "Time and Meaning," 98.
62 "Time and Meaning," 103.
63 "Time and Meaning," 103.
64 "Time and Meaning," 103.
Maillet: "A Poem Should Not Mean/But Be"

affect."\textsuperscript{65} In symbolic literature there is even "commonly attached to such processes a profound religious feeling."\textsuperscript{66} Though Lonergan critiques the potential "distortion" of "a secularism that excludes religion" and, "on the other hand," a "religion founded on sentiment" that can occur in misreading the "undifferentiated" symbolic consciousness of a poem like Wordsworth's "Intimations of Immortality,"\textsuperscript{67} it is the misreading rather than the poem itself that is to blame. Literature can and should offer a place for what another essay from this same period, "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," calls "self-mediation."\textsuperscript{68} This is Lonergan's term for what happens when we allow others to know our own "self-discovery and self-commitment," the transformed self, one might say, which reveals our fundamental orientation to life.\textsuperscript{69} "Mutual self-mediation," Lonergan recognizes, "provides the inexhaustible theme of dramatists and novelists."\textsuperscript{70}

Lonergan's second key article on meaning, "The Analogy of Meaning," reaffirms many of the main ideas of "Time and Meaning," particularly the constitutive role meaning plays in "art and symbol, literature and history, natural and human science, families, states, religions, philosophies, and theologies."\textsuperscript{71} In some ways, he also extends them further. The potential of art to effect self-transformation in its audience even becomes, through reference to C. S. Lewis's \textit{An Experiment in Criticism}, an essential element of reading: "Unless the reader is, as it were, reenacting in himself what is intended to be communicated by the literary language, nothing happens; the books remain on the shelves."\textsuperscript{72}

The various forms of meaning are all here, but for the first time Lonergan

\textsuperscript{65} "Time and Meaning," 117-18.
\textsuperscript{66} "Time and Meaning," 119.
\textsuperscript{67} "Time and Meaning," 119.
\textsuperscript{69} "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," 174.
\textsuperscript{70} "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," 176.
\textsuperscript{71} "The Analogy of Meaning," 185.
\textsuperscript{72} "The Analogy of Meaning," 186.
states clearly that "literary meaning also exploits" each of these areas: "intersubjective, incarnate, symbolic, and artistic meaning." Perhaps most importantly, Lonergan affirms in even more detail how important meaning is to the development of each level of consciousness: intellectual, moral, and spiritual. Meaning, Lonergan insists,

is constitutive of our endless questions, our acts and growing habits of understanding, our explorations of possibility — mere possibility — in mathematics, in logic, and in fiction, in the novel and in the movies too. It is constitutive of our doubts, our affirmations and negations, our beliefs and opinions, our convictions and our certitudes. It is constitutive of our loving, our loyalties, our allegiance, our faith, our resolutions and fidelity, our deliberations and decisions. Not only is it constitutive of what we could say, could do, could make, either on our own or with the help of others, but also, Deo volente, it is the ground of all that is distinctively human, the potentiality for the region or realm or field in which arise good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error, grace and sin, saving one's soul and being damned.74

Amazingly, Lonergan then extends even further the relevance of this fundamental category, arguing that meaning is constitutive not only of individuals, but communities as well. Again, central here is the family, which "becomes a different thing when divorce becomes a common possibility. You have changed the meaning, and changing the meaning changes the reality because the meaning is constitutive of the reality."75

Particularly from the viewpoint of a Catholic theology of sacramental marriage, which follows from Jesus' denial that the women at the well actually did have five husbands (John 4:17-18), Lonergan's use of the word "reality" here raises the question of the relationship between "meaning" and "being." This question actually did arise in a question period following this lecture, and Lonergan distinguished the two by agreeing that, in a sense, meaning can be a field "more inclusive than that of being," because "a false statement has a meaning," and thus meaning "can be

occupied with everything that isn’t and not just with what is!”76 This answer raises further questions, particularly ultimate questions about the relationship of falsehood and evil to the truth and goodness that religion associates with eternal Being. Perhaps, however, what Lonergan means to stress here is both the potential for individual and collective “good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error”77 that exists both in realms of meaning and in the material realities that such meanings constitute. In the world of time, where choices are yet to be made and destinies unfold, the meanings that will eventually be “meant” in the eternal world of Being can only be known as “through a glass darkly.” Interpretative disagreement over even scriptural revelation, sadly, makes clear that meaning in our world may not be what is meant in God’s kingdom.

For the scholar of literature, Lonergan’s key point is that which dominates the third in his series on meaning, an article in Collection called “Dimensions of Meaning.” There he again meets head on the objection that meaning is “a very secondary affair” and that “what counts is reality.”78 By contrast, Lonergan stresses the essential, “constitutive” role of language in exploring and developing human potential:

For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent, not only what is near but also what is far, not only the past but also the future, not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal, the ought-to-be for which we keep on striving though we never attain. So we come to live, not as the infant in a world of immediate experience, but in a far vaster world that is brought to us through the memories of other men, through the common sense of the community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.79

In such comments, Lonergan seems quite distant from the thinker who would confine art solely to the realm of elemental experience and insight,
distinct from any relevance to judgment or decision. Rather, he is closer to
Aristotle, whose Poetics argues that, through language, a poet can
represent "things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to
be, or things as they ought to be" (XXV.1).\textsuperscript{80} Literary language, and "the
pages of literature," are only a small part of how Lonergan's three articles
manage to "broaden the meaning of meaning,"\textsuperscript{81} but meaning itself has
been shown to be so crucial to human life that the significance of literary
art, too, must mean significantly more than in Lonergan's early aesthetic.

5. SUMMA: LONERGAN'S AESTHETIC IN \textit{METHOD IN THEOLOGY}

The importance of Lonergan's series of three articles on meaning is
confirmed by \textit{Method in Theology}, which devotes one of its foundational
chapters to this concept. Many of the ideas of these articles are restated in
\textit{Method} but also present are most of the ideas on art in \textit{Topics in Education}.
The sublation of the early aesthetic by the later is not as clear as one might
wish, but it can be inferred. Indeed, awareness of the issues with which
Lonergan wrestled in the earlier work makes \textit{Method} seem an admirable
attempt to balance the "purely experiential" aesthetic of \textit{Topics} with the
moral and spiritual exigencies stressed in the later articles on meaning.

Lonergan begins the \textit{Method} chapter on meaning by again presenting
the major carriers of meaning described in the three articles: inter-
subjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic, and incarnate. The discussion
of art also draws directly from \textit{Topics}, citing Langer and repeating the
definition of art "as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern."\textsuperscript{82}
The antiutilitarian view of art is restated, but the role of art as potentially
moral and self-transformative is refined and strengthened. Lonergan
writes that art may "accrue" a

retinue of associations, affects, emotions, incipient tendencies. Out of
them may rise a lesson, but into them a lesson may not be intruded
in the manner of didacticism, moralism, or social realism. To them


\textsuperscript{81}"Time and Meaning," 103.

\textsuperscript{82}\textit{Method in Theology}, 61.
also there accrues the experiencing subject with his capacity for wonder, for awe and fascination, with his openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, majesty.83

The sense in which art may give truth is also clearly affirmed, for it "may be regarded as illusion, but it also may be regarded as more true and more real," for "it is grasping what is or seems significant, of moment, concern, import, to man... truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point."84 Yet while Lonergan could again be read as rejecting the separation of art from judgment, the third level of consciousness normally required to affirm truth, he also wants to preserve art as a place of "elemental meaning" in which one can cease "to be a responsible inquirer":

It is possible to set within the conceptual field this elemental meaning of the transformed subject in his transformed world. But this procedure reflects without reproducing the elemental meaning. Art criticism and history are like the thermodynamic equations, which guide our control of heat but, of themselves, cannot make us feel warmer or cooler.85

Is Lonergan's scientific analogy here compelling? Can great literary art itself be conceptual, philosophical, even theological? Can literary criticism accurately convey, perhaps even enhance, our elemental experience of literature? To further clarify his answer to such questions, Lonergan again quotes, though here without reference, Wordsworth's famous notion that "artistic composition recollects emotion in tranquility."86 Yet Wordsworth himself went on to qualify this comment, immediately adding that "though this be true, poems to which any value can be attached" are always, also, the product of a poet who "had also thought long and deep."87 Though the discussion of art in Method does not express the necessity of intellectual understanding stressed by Wordsworth, Lonergan

83 Method in Theology, 62.
84 Method in Theology, 63-64.
85 Method in Theology, 63.
86 Method in Theology, 63.
does conclude by again affirming the ethical import of art, which "invites one to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world." 88

An expanded view of the communicative and constitutive possibilities of the meaning found in literature does appear elsewhere in Method. Symbol, for example, is defined so as to include both fictional and historical objects, "a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling." 89 Lonergan's standard stress on feelings is somewhat expanded here, as well, by a greater stress on the symbol offering not just "a wealth of multiple meanings," but also "that coincidentia oppositorum, of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on." In so doing, symbol provides "a dialectical or methodical viewpoint" that can include "what is concrete, contradictory, and dynamic," a key intellectual function that the symbol performed "before either logic or dialectic were conceived." 90 The intellectual capacities of symbols might be stressed even more, except that Lonergan seems to have in mind primarily nonlinguistic symbols, for he further recognizes that the "conventional signs" of language "can be multiplied almost indefinitely." 91 Hence it is that "literary language," in particular, "would have the listener or reader not only understand but also feel." 92 Rather than confining literary art exclusively to the realm of feeling, Lonergan here seems rather to commend literature for adding the "plus" of feeling to the understanding it obviously conveys.

Unfortunately, Method has little space for examples of literary works that do balance thought and feeling, but Lonergan's clearly growing respect for the intellectual, moral, and spiritual complexity of literature is expressed in a later passage related to interpretation and conversion:

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88Method in Theology, 64.
89Method in Theology, 64.
90Method in Theology, 66.
91Method in Theology, 70.
92Method in Theology, 72.
The major texts, the classics, in religion, letters, philosophy, theology, not only are beyond the initial horizon of their interpreters but also may demand an intellectual, moral, religious conversion of the interpreter over and above the broadening of his horizon.93

Lonergan's hermeneutic focuses upon scripture or theology, however, and does not directly address a possible method for achieving such conversion in literary criticism. Nor does Lonergan clearly address the complex question of whether there exists a kind of conversion particular to art, or literature, an "aesthetic conversion." Still, that a literary classic might require an interpreter's conversion on each of the key levels that Lonergan does explore — the intellectual, moral, and religious — does reflect Lonergan's broadened sense of the meaning of meaning.

The possibility of transcendental method being applied to sources of meaning had been suggested, as well, in Method's foundational chapter on meaning. For there Lonergan augments his discussion of common forms of meaning by somewhat incoherently launching into an extraordinary discussion of "elements of meaning," of which he distinguishes "(1) sources, (2) acts, and (3) terms of meaning."94 "Sources of meaning" are very broadly defined as "all conscious acts and all intended contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four levels of consciousness."95 Sources may be the questions raised by transcendental method, "a capacity that consciously and unceasingly heads for and recognizes data, intelligibility, truth, reality, and value," or the answers found in "categorial" sources of meaning, "the determinations reached through experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding."96 Given Lonergan's consistent inclusion of literature among the crucial sources of human meaning, we might well expect literary art to offer both transcendental questions and categorial answers.

The concept of "acts of meaning," however, goes on to preserve some of the distinctions of Lonergan's early aesthetic, noting that there are "potential" acts of "elemental" meaning in which "there has not yet been

93Method in Theology, 161.
94Method in Theology, 73.
95Method in Theology, 73.
96Method in Theology, 73-74.
reached the distinction between meaning and meant,” an example of which is “the meaning of the work of art prior to its interpretation by a critic” (74). The existence and value of elemental works of art is indisputable, but the general example, the implied notion that all works of art are preconceptual, all critical interpretation postelemental, must be qualified. If the plot, characters, or themes of a literary work affirm an intellectual, moral, or religious “meant,” then the horizons of an interpreter might also require conversion, or at least the “full act of meaning,” through “an act of judging,” that culminates in “active meanings,” “judgements of value, decisions, actions.”

In Lonergan’s terms, the full, active meanings thus express “what is meant,” the “what” which he calls “a term of meaning.” “Term of meaning” requires one to distinguish, as Lonergan notes in comparing physical nature to scientific descriptions of that nature, “different spheres of being.” Though a distinction “has to be drawn between a sphere of real being and other restricted spheres such as the mathematical,” “they are not simply disparate,” and both can be “rationally affirmed.” Might not the same be said for the “sphere of being” of either literary art or literary criticism which, to recall “The Analogy of Meaning,” presents both “good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error”? Certainly, an affirmative answer to this question would help to justify Lonergan’s inclusion, later in Method, of “languages and literatures” among the “intrinsic components” that are constitutive of “social institutions and human cultures.”

In sum, while Method clearly preserves art as a place that welcomes the person who “has ceased to be a responsible inquirer” and is simply hoping to be refreshed by the wonder of a new horizon, it also incorporates Lonergan’s developed view of the foundational importance of meaning in human culture and, however indirectly, accepts literature as an important constitutive source of that culture. As with the early

97 Method in Theology, 74.
98 Method in Theology, 75.
99 Method in Theology, 75.
100 “The Analogy of Meaning,” 197.
101 Method in Theology, 78.
102 Method in Theology, 63.
aesthetic, it largely remains for others to show how Lonergan's later, more balanced aesthetic can illuminate, and be illuminated by, actual works of literary art.

6. APPLYING LONERGAN'S LATER AESTHETIC: AN EXAMPLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL LITERARY CRITICISM

Lonergan does not personally cite any such examples, but there are many works of literary art that do reward a transcendental inquiry into the truth and value, the "meant," that is either clearly expressed or subtly evoked by that text's linguistic data. As Method recognizes, any such "classic" allows extensive interpretation and endless evaluation, but here I wish to suggest briefly the possibility of transcendental criticism of one well known text: "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." Coleridge is again chosen not because of Lonergan's obvious affection for the Romantic period, but rather because, in accord with the proposed relation of sublation, both Lonergan's early and later aesthetic can be exemplified by the same multidimensional poet.

Coleridge's "Rime" exemplifies the later aesthetic, first, because it so clearly, or so mysteriously, presents an elemental world strikingly different than our own, a world of imaginative fantasy or "myth" commonly associated with literature. Yet it is also a conversion narrative in which the unfolding plot presents characters whose hearts undergo moral change and even, to varying degrees, experience the love of God, which Lonergan sees as the heart of religious conversion. Readers of this old tale are never required to accept doctrines familiar from external sources in order to enjoy the story, yet from out of the elemental, symbolic story can be heard an invitation not unlike that given by Jesus after his parables: "who hath ears to hear, let him hear" (Matt. 13:9). Further, the "conceptual language" that presents the moral and religious transcendence of Coleridge's characters is affirmed not only by abstract

103 Method in Theology, 161.
105 Method in Theology, 105-07
literary criticism but is actually suggested, either directly or mysteriously, in the literary text itself. Not unlike MacLeish’s “Ars Poetica,” such conceptual language does not detract from the aesthetic value of this literary work but rather evidences the infinite versatility of the linguistic signs employed by literature.

“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” begins with an epigraph from a late seventeenth-century but prescientific philosopher, Thomas Burnet, who posits, with wonder, the notion that “there are more invisible than visible Natures in the universe.” Coleridge’s poem continues the speculation, as an old Mariner journeys to the South Pole and there kills an albatross whom his sailors had regarded as an omen of good luck. Then appears a hideous figure, “the Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH,” who mockingly announces, “The game is done! I’ve won! I’ve won,” before the Mariner watches in horror as all of his shipmates are struck dead (193, 197). Later, the men begin to row again, but the Mariner explains then that “Twas not those souls that fled in pain . . . But a troop of spirits blest” (347, 349), and after the ship is returned to the Mariner’s “own countree” (467), “a seraph man / On every corse there stood” (490-91). Other “polar spirits” are also seen, and heard, moving the ship, returning the Mariner to dry land where a “holy Hermit” serves to “shrieve [his] soul” and “wash away / The Albatross’s blood” (512-13).

Lonergan, for good reason, would regard much of “The Rime” as “undifferentiated,” primitive religious consciousness. But though Coleridge certainly loves his ancient Mariner and the old, spiritual England whom he represents, it is quite unlikely that Coleridge himself intends the poem as primarily naturalistic. In his Biographia Literaria, Coleridge states that his own “supernatural poems,” in contrast to Wordsworth’s poems on “things of every day,” mean to “transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.”106 On the other hand, while Coleridge is like Lonergan in seeing the symbolic imagination as allowing “the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant

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qualities," his conception of the symbol is more explicitly theological; for him, a symbol

is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative. As Robert Barth, S.J., argues, "the Unity he is speaking of is God," a point also made clear in Coleridge's famous definition of the primary, creative imagination, which he holds "to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." Even without being aware of Coleridge's theological aesthetic, however, most readers easily find in the "Rime" not an attempt to realistically represent the supernatural, despite both the poem's and Christianity's assertion of the existence of "seraph" beings, but rather a poem that does interest our "inward [human] nature" while symbolically presenting the "translucence of the Eternal" throughout the living unity of nature in which our own natures abide.

This is not to say that the poem is allegorical, for Coleridge sharply contrasts the stable one-to-one meanings posited by some allegories with the mysterious, infinite meaning suggested by symbols. Neither literal nor allegorical, the "Rime" instead raises, first, many existential questions of, if not universal, then certainly widespread human interest: Have you ever willfully exiled yourself from your own home, turning prodigal? Have you ever damaged or even destroyed innocent life? If so, have you

107 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 174.
110 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 167.
ever felt the anger, perhaps even the curse, of those you have damaged? Thus the biology of the shipmates’ sudden death is less significant than how “horrible” is “the curse in a dead man’s eye!” (259-60), and one polar spirit’s most significant comment is to tell how another “loved the bird that loved the man / Who shot him with his bow” (404-05). Do we not also, at times, directly or indirectly hurt those who love us? How often, too, is there no material remedy to personally repair the damage we have done? These questions are hardly trivial but rather precisely those that led another great Jesuit theologian, Karl Rahner, to argue that all of humanity is “threatened radically by guilt.” Like Shakespeare’s Claudius and Macbeth, Coleridge’s guilty Mariner becomes unable to pray, as he memorably describes:

I looked to Heaven, and tried to pray;  
But or ever a prayer had gushed,  
A wicked whisper came, and made  
My heart as dry as dust. (244-47)

Even when one is as personally sorrowful as the Mariner, there may remain many injured “third parties,” and others, like the “pilot’s boy,” who “welcomes” the Mariner back to his “home countree” by jeering, “full plain I see, / The Devil knows how to row” (568-69).

Though there is debate about the eventually Anglican Coleridge’s beliefs at this stage of his life, many symbols in the “Rime” do present the Mariner’s crime, and subsequent guilt, in not only a moral but also an ultimately religious, even Christian context. The prodigal journey is a fall “below the kirk” (23) (or “church”), and the “Sun,” a pun for the Son of God whose initial use in Scripture (Mark 16:2) prompts countless further uses, here becomes one of the poem’s many images of the crucifixion:

The Sun came up upon the left,  
Out of the sea came he!  
And he shone bright, and on the right  
Went down into the sea.  
Higher and higher every day,  
Till over the mast at noon – (25-30)

Traditionally, Christ went atop his mast, the Cross, at noon, dying three hours later, though in the first section of the poem it is not initially clear why “the Wedding-Guest here beat his breast” (31). Subsequently, though, Coleridge more explicitly evokes the meaning of the Crucifixion by having the Mariner slay the innocent albatross with a crossbow, after which, he laments, “Instead of the cross, the Albatross / About my neck was hung” (141-42). Later, when his shipmates die, the Mariner links their deaths to his initial crime, as “every soul, it passed me by, / Like the whizz of my cross-bow!” (222-23) and sees his potential redemption in terms of blood atonement, the need to “wash away / The Albatross’s blood” (512-13). Clearly, as many critics have noted, the “Rime” is not about the death of a bird, but rather representative of the countless sins of irrational violence that Christ bore in dying upon the Cross.

Christianity itself, however, has traditionally had multiple explanations for how it is that the death of Christ on the cross effects the at-one-ment of God and humanity, so it is perhaps unsurprising that Coleridge himself positst several different stages in the redemption of his Ancient Mariner. The initial, most mysterious stage perhaps relates to the redemption of creation effected by Christ, even those elements of creation that we still experience, “naturally,” as ugly. Early in his journey, the Mariner is repulsed by “slimy things … upon the slimy sea” (125-26), but later he looks upon water snakes and declares:

O happy living things! no tongue
Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gushed from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware: (282-85)

However unconscious and elemental the meaning of this moment, it has immediate positive consequences: the albatross falls from his neck, and that “self-same moment,” he declares, “I could pray” (288). Then ancient English religion, and art, further combine as “Mary Queen” sends (again recalling, now by contrast, Macbeth or his Queen) “gentle sleep from Heaven” (294-95). This does seem to be a moment of “aesthetic conver-

113 See Luke 24:44.
sion," in which the Mariner's experience of the objective beauty of God's world overcomes the internal harshness of his human soul.

The poet Coleridge understandably stresses this aesthetic moment but then also portrays the Mariner going through the longer, harder, and still necessary process of moral conversion. He "hath penance done," the Polar Spirit tells us, even before we might call it such, and, he promises, "penance more will do" (408-09). This penance primarily occurs before the "holy hermit" in his own country, whom the Mariner urgently addresses: "'O shrieve me, shrieve me, holy man!'" (574). The Hermit first shows the source of his spiritual authority as he "crossed his brow," and then calls, simply, for honest self-revelation: "'Say quick,' quoth he, 'I bid thee say — / What manner of man art thou?'" (576-77). In a fascinating statement that suggests the ethical rather than purely aesthetic character of his own narrative art, Coleridge's Mariner then reports that

Forthwith this frame of mine was wrenched
With a woeful agony,
Which forced me to begin my tale;
And then it left me free. (578-81)

Recalling Christ's famous promise — "know the truth, and the truth shall set you free" (John 8:32) — the truth of his tale, however painful, unpleasurable, undelightful it might be for him to tell, finally gives the Mariner spiritual freedom.

It is this free state that allows the Mariner to close the poem with a clear statement of religious conversion, in the Lonerganian sense of God "flooding our hearts with his love."114 This profound experience is always difficult to portray authentically, and perhaps that is why the Mariner begins by reminding us that on the "wide, wide sea," so "lonely 'twas, that God himself / Scarce seem'd there to be" (598-600). Awareness of the possibility, and pain, of separation from God is what now causes the Mariner to know that "sweeter than the marriage-feast" is "To walk together to the kirk" and "all together pray, / While each to his great Father bends" (601-07). For the Mariner, church and prayer are no longer

114Method in Theology, 112.
empty rituals, but expressions of the universal love of God that, in Lonergan’s thought, grounds religion:

He prayeth well, who loveth well
Both man and bird and beast.
He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all. (614-17)

Famously, Coleridge once responded to the critique that his poem lacked a moral by saying that “it had too much.”\(^\text{115}\) These comments on prayer are probably the explicit lines that Coleridge had in mind, but it is also important to note that he never took the opportunity of several subsequent editions to remove this passage from his poem. Like many great literary lines, these have become so familiar as to sound almost cliched, but even excessive fame ought not to diminish our appreciation of the vital religious truths that they convey.

Indeed, it is our evaluation of this conversion narrative, its potential effect on us, with which the poem finally concludes. For convenience I have described the Mariner as addressing “us,” the readers, throughout his narrative, but the poem is actually framed, beginning and ending, by his pausing a “wedding guest,” before a marriage, and telling him the tale. My convention is not entirely inappropriate, however, for like us, the guest often listens to the tale “like a three years’ child” (15), and then at other times exclaims: “I fear thee, ancient Mariner!” (224, 345). Symbolically, the “wedding guest” perhaps suggests “universal humanity” in two very different senses: first, as the commonplace, sensual-driven human who attends wedding feasts for hedonistic reasons, unaware of their deeper spiritual significance; hence the Mariner’s final speech tells him that “sweeter than the marriage-feast, / ‘Tis sweeter far to me, / To walk together to the kirk” (601-03). At the same time, given the poem’s other symbols, and the Mariner’s final reminder of God’s universal love, the “wedding guest” also recalls Christ’s parable warning

us not to delay accepting God's invitation to his banquet (Matt. 22:1-14), and Christ's ultimate role as the bridegroom who comes to marry us, the Church, as His bride (Rev. 21: 2-9). The guest's response to the Mariner's tale is thus of crucial importance, and it is perhaps to his dual character, and suggested conversion from the old to the new Adam, that the poem's final lines refer; rather than going into the original wedding service he

Turned from the bridegroom's door.
He went like one that hath been stunned,
And is of sense forlorn:
A sadder and a wiser man,
He rose the morrow morn. (621-25)

If the wedding guest is our representative in the poem, several questions transcend the poem's conclusion, waiting to be answered by our own lives: has the "Gume" awakened us from our sensual, hedonistic slumbers? Have we reflected on the perhaps unknown, unseen damage done by our own thoughtless acts of violence? Do we understand our own inability to atone for this violence? Are we aware of how lonely is the life in which God scarce seems to be? Perhaps most importantly, are our eyes and ears yet open to seeing and hearing the abundant goodness and grace with which God, through Christ on the cross, has infused creation and His kirk? If thus converted aesthetically, morally, and religiously, do we feel both the Mariner's freedom, peace, and joy? Are we also, like the wedding guest, "sadder" ("more serious," but also more aware of the world's suffering) and "wiser," able to "[rise] the morrow morn" with the morning Son, the risen Christ? Via such implied questions, Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient Mariner" challenges readers of any age to a transcendental conversion that alters not only their aesthetic, intellectual, moral, and religious beliefs, but also — as Lonergan's philosophy requires — the conscious actions of our very lives.

7. CONCLUSION

Among other critiques, transcendental literary criticism of the kind just offered inevitably provokes at least one of two opposed rebukes. Those hostile to traditional religion will argue that a moral or religious
"message" has been imposed from the outside, telling us more about the interpreter than the literary work. Lonergan, we recall, made a similar objection to Marxist art, and with his early aesthetic we must affirm our rejection of any such external imposition, and also be careful not to equate the moral or religious "meants" of a work with the broader, elemental, often mysterious world of meaning from out of which it emerges. At the same time, basic to Lonergan's "critical realism" is the rejection of the Kantian claim that we cannot know the noumena of phenomena, and the corollary Nietzschean claim that all interpreters are equally biased, speaking more of themselves than what they are interpreting. Lonergan's heuristic of testing insights before affirming judgments can be applied to many areas of literary criticism, and when moral and religious meanings are clearly expressed, as in Coleridge's "Rime," they must be affirmed. Even, perhaps especially, when we know in part, we must affirm that part of what we know.

By contrast, those sympathetic to traditional religion, especially a dogmatic religion like Christianity, will object to any perceived attempt to continue the tradition of Matthew Arnold and others in which art, especially poetry, is perceived as a potential replacement for "superstitious" faith. With Jaques Maritain, one should maintain that "it is a deadly error to expect poetry to provide the supersubstantial nourishment of men,"116 and with C. S. Lewis, that every Christian should know that "the salvation of a single soul is more important than the production and preservation of all the epics and tragedies in the world."117 That clear, one can also affirm, with the current Catechism of the Catholic Church, that there is a category of "sacred art," which "is true and beautiful when its form corresponds to its particular vocation: evoking and glorifying, in faith and adoration, the transcendent mystery of God."118 Both sacred art and works that, like Coleridge's "Rime," combine elements of secular and sacred art can yet be valued for their individual role in the economy of


118Catechism of the Catholic Church (Ottawa: Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1994), 505.
grace, that being their own unique capacity to refer one toward, rather than replace, a sacramental life in which one encounters "the dear God who loveth us" ("Rime" 616).

The challenge, as suggested earlier in this paper, is perhaps to distinguish the "spheres of being"119 into which any particular literary work falls and, moreover, to clarify how its "meaning" relates to what religion affirms to be "Being." Lonergan's early aesthetic, and MacLeish's "Ars Poetica," see great art as becoming part of Being in an elemental sense, a sense that stipulates no relationship to moral or religious truth. Though many great literary works do fall into this metaphysical category, others must also possess infinite meaning if the moral and religious Being that they express is itself eternal. But what, it will be asked, of evil, the lies that are familiar both in literature and our world, the profane that surely will not exist in the sacred world of eternal Being? St. Augustine's doctrine of evil as "the absence of Being," clearly addresses this problem, but in an abstract way difficult for many to appreciate. J. R. R. Tolkien, another transcendent literary author, poetically applies Augustine's acute perception of this problem in "Mythopoeia," his defense of mythical writing.120 "Of Evil," this World War I veteran well knew, "this alone is dreadly certain: Evil is" (79-80). Yet in "Paradise," this faithful Catholic also knew, we will "see / that all is as it is / and yet made free" (131-36). There evil we "will not see," for evil never dwelt "in God's picture but in crooked eyes, / not in the source but in malicious choice" (140-41). Those choices will still have been made, those lies once told, but in the "everlasting Day" of Truth, all such darkness will be illuminated, understood, and therefore no longer dangerous or even significant. Our reaction may well be like that of Sam Gamgee after the sudden obliteration of Mordor:

"How do I feel?" he cried. "Well, I don't know how to say it. I feel, I feel" — he waved his arms in the air — "I feel like spring after

119 Method in Theology, 75.

winter, and sun on the leaves; and like trumpets and harps and all
the songs I have ever heard!"121

Tolkien's point, surely, is not that all of Sam and Frodo's trials and
tribulations have been insignificant but rather that their suffering has now
been replaced by a far greater joy.

Such is the wonder that enraptures those living the "aesthetic
pattern" of life and experiencing either the elemental or transcendental
meaning of works of art, the meanings described, respectively, by
Lonergan's early and later aesthetic. But since both Lonergan and I "hold
for the priority of poetry,"122 perhaps we may sum up the value both of
poems that do "not mean, but be," and poems that, because in Being, have
infinite meaning, with the single line response of Gerard Manley Hopkins
to the fundamental aesthetic question that served as the title for one of his
many elemental and transcendental poems and as the guiding question of
Lonergan's aesthetic, "To what serves Mortal Beauty?": "See: it does this:
keeps warm / Men's wit to the things that are;" (3-4).123

122Method in Theology, 73.
123Gerard Manley Hopkins, Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Oxford Authors. Ed. Catherine
Phillips. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 167. I am indebted for this reference to
the J. Robert Barth article cited earlier in this essay, "Mortal Beauty: Ignatius Loyola,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and the Role of Imagination in Religious Experience." Barth
cites this Hopkins poem as an epigraph.
THE UNITY OF THE SELF AS GIVEN

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The focus of this paper is the subject in the specific sense of the subject of conscious acts. Such a subject has ontological and existential significance, but I am not going to explore the ontological structures of the subject, and I am not addressing specifically the subject of moral consciousness. It remains, nevertheless, that the subject of conscious acts is both real and self-constituting.

In the first footnote to The Subject, Lonergan recommends a work by the Protestant theologian James Brown entitled Subject and Object in Modern Theology. Brown traces the historical emergence of "subject" as a technical philosophic term. The terms "subject" and "object" rose to technical significance first in the writings of Scotus, but for him they had meanings opposite in connotation to their currently accepted meanings. "Subjective" referred to the subject-matter of judgment, and hence what transcends the knower, which we would call "objective." While "objective" for Scotus referred to the objects of thought as mere presentations, and hence was applied to whatever remained in the mind of the thinker, which we would consider "subjective." The terminology in its modern usage derives from Kantian epistemology in which the subject is a transcendental necessity, an epistemological point that has position but no magnitude: "the needle's eye through which all relations pass." In

3 Brown, Subject and Object, 23, 168.
fairness to Kant, it should be noted that Brown is only considering here Kant's epistemological subject, not his moral and religious subject. The movement of philosophy subsequent to Kant has been "a series of attempts to win for the subject acknowledgement of its full reality and its functions."4 I am using the term subject in a post-Kantian sense, not in the sense of a transcendental "I" posited as necessarily attached to every act. The subject in question here is the concrete subject, the subject given in conscious experience.

In The Subject Lonergan writes: "The study of the subject is quite different [from the metaphysical account of the soul], for it is the study of oneself as one is conscious. It prescinds from the soul, its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these are given in consciousness. It attends to operations and to their center and source which is the self."5 Lonergan in this passage uses three terms to be differentiated and related—"subject," "soul," and "self." "Self" is used as another term for "subject" and is defined as the center and source of conscious operations. Conscious operations are given in consciousness, but is the center and source of these acts given in consciousness? Is the self or subject given in consciousness or must we not also prescind from the subject as we do from the classically deduced soul?

In his account of the self-affirmation of the knower in chapter 11 of Insight, Lonergan would have us advert not only to conscious operations but to the identity involved when I see, hear, imagine, inquire, and so forth. There is an identity on the side of the object, which makes the perceiving, inquiring, and understanding pertain to the same ultimate known. But, there is as well, according to Lonergan, a unity on the side of the subject of the conscious operations. And, this unity is neither posited on the basis of our experience of operations nor transcendentally deduced, but it is given in consciousness. "Indeed," Lonergan adds, "consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of

4The Subject, 34, note 1.
5The Subject, 7.
The subject of the operations is the unity, and this unity is not an isolated monad found within consciousness. On the contrary, it is within the unity of a single field that distinct conscious acts or contents are to be found.

Is the subject as center, source, and unity of operations given in consciousness? When I first studied Insight as an undergraduate, I was struck by a line in the section on Human Development: "First, then, at any stage of his development a man is an individual existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates." I was perplexed by the idea that the self is an individual, existing, unity. I recalled experiences of not being aware of myself in an experience. I had had a number of experiences of no self being there, and I have had similar experiences since. The idea that the self is an existing unity, therefore, did not seem to be supported by the data of consciousness. It should be noted that Lonergan in this particular passage is not describing the unity as given. He is working out the metaphysical elements of development. Nevertheless, it was this passage which raised the problem for me. Sartre notes that Titchener in his Textbook of Psychology commented that "the me was very often absent from his consciousness." Sartre does not consider such phenomena to be the function of psychological aberration, although in schizoid conditions the presence of the self can be elusive. On the contrary, such testimony supports Sartre's argument that there is no I in unreflected consciousness, that indeed there is no I given in consciousness.

Sartre develops his argument as a corrective to Husserl's phenomenology, which otherwise he largely embraces. In The Transcendence of the Ego, he critiques Husserl's phenomenological account of the factuality of the pure Ego, that is, its givenness in immanence. Does Sartre's eradication of the phenomenological pure Ego pose a threat to Lonergan's subject?


7Insight, 495.

First of all, Husserl’s pure Ego is not Kant’s transcendental ego. Sartre explains the difference this way. When Kant concludes that “the I think must be able to accompany all our representations,” he is not asserting that in fact it does accompany all of them. Regarding this transcendental necessity, Sartre poses a question of fact: “Is the I that we encounter in our consciousness made possible by the synthetic unity of our representations, or is it the I which in fact unites the representations to each other?” To develop his position that the former is closer to the truth, Sartre considers Husserl’s account of the I’s relation to consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre explains, is a science of fact; it is existential rather than critical in the Kantian sense. “Problems concerning the relations of the I to consciousness [for Husserl] are therefore existential problems.”

Husserl’s phenomenological method involves suspension of all that is not directly given in consciousness — all noumenal objects and events as well as the commonsense and scientific propositions concerning them. He calls the objects not directly apprehended as evidence in consciousness “transcendents.” All transcendents are to be assigned the epistemological value of nil — neither positive nor negative. There is only one thing purely given in consciousness prior to constitution, the pure Ego. This I is a transcendent in immanence. Husserl writes:

If an intentional experience is actual, carried out, that is, after the manner of the cogito, the subject “directs” itself within it towards the intentional object. To the cogito itself belongs an immanent “glancing towards” the object, a directedness which from another side springs forth from the “Ego,” which can therefore never be absent.

The Ego is the source, for Husserl, of an attention within the already intentional act. This directedness toward the object from the Ego is a permanent feature of conscious acts.

The Ego appears to be permanently, even necessarily, there, and this permanence is obviously not that of a stolid unshifting experience, of

9Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 34.
10Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 35.
a "fixed idea." On the contrary, it belongs to every experience that comes and streams past, its "glance" goes "through" every actual cogito, and towards the object. This visual ray changes with every cogito ... But the Ego remains self-identical.\(^\text{12}\)

Thus, the Ego is both the source of the directedness shot through every intentional act and it is self-identical. Further, it is described as individual:

as residuum of the phenomenological suspension of the world and the empirical subjectivity that belongs to it there remains a pure Ego (a fundamentally different one, then, for each separate stream of experiences).\(^\text{13}\)

Finally, Husserl's pure Ego is neither posited as a transcendental necessity nor constituted by intentional acts. To adhere rigorously to the central phenomenological cannon, Husserl counts the pure Ego as a phenomenological datum, only insofar as "it is given together with pure consciousness."\(^\text{14}\)

So far, although Husserl employs different terms, his pure Ego sounds not unlike Lonergan's subject. Husserl's Ego is the self-identical, individual, permanent, source of the glance in every intentional act, which is given together with consciousness. Lonergan's subject is the center, source, and unity of conscious operations, and it is given in consciousness as a unity.

Sartre does not deny that an I, as attached to intentional acts and as in a sense the source of acts, appears in consciousness, but he insists that it is only in reflective consciousness that the I appears. The I is constituted through reflection. As constituted it is just as much a transcendent, that is, an object not given in immanence, as any other object. If Husserl had been thoroughly rigorous in his methodical procedure, the transcendent I would have fallen before the stroke of phenomenological reduction. Strictly speaking, for Sartre, it is not correct to say, for example, "I have consciousness of this chair" but rather, "There is consciousness of this chair."\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{12}\)Husserl, Ideas, 156.
\(^\text{13}\)Husserl, Ideas, 157.
\(^\text{14}\)Husserl, Ideas, 157.
\(^\text{15}\)Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 53.
To adopt the pure Ego as a necessary yet given transcendence in immanence is to introduce a superfluity. Sartre accounts for the unity and individuality of consciousness without this fabrication. The I is not the unity or the unifying principle of conscious acts and states. In fact, it appears on the foundation of a unity that it did not create — the given unity of consciousness itself. Sartre explains that consciousness unifies itself:

It is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I. Indeed, consciousness is defined by intentionality. By [this] intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It unifies itself by escaping from itself ... Whoever says "a consciousness" says "the whole of consciousness" ... 16

Further, what differentiates one conscious whole from another conscious whole is not the attached I, but consciousness itself. The individuality of consciousness stems from the very nature of consciousness — it can be limited only by itself: "This singular property belongs to consciousness itself, aside from whatever relations it may have to the I.17 Finally, for Sartre the I is not distinct from the me. If there were an I of the type Husserl describes, "it would be to the concrete and psycho-physical me what a point is to three dimensions: it would be an infinitely contracted me." And its factual existence as actually given in consciousness, would introduce an ontological problem of multiple selves. But, for Sartre there is only one concrete existing self (me or I depending on the context).

Can Sartre's argument against the I as the unity of conscious acts given in consciousness be leveled against Lonergan's account of the subject? Sartre would be in agreement with Lonergan that there is one concrete existing self, but he clearly would disagree that this self as subject of conscious acts is given in consciousness as the unity of those acts. Has Lonergan been as phenomenologically lax in his account of conscious intentionality as Husserl? Or, to put it another way, is Sartre's philosophy of conscious intentionality simply more subtle than Lonergan's? Lonergan's work escapes both critical assessments through a distinction

17Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 39.
regarding the meaning of consciousness itself, which was apparently overlooked by both Husserl and Sartre.

The straightforward account Lonergan gives in *Insight* of the notion of consciousness and the unity as given appears to be rather simple and plain. He states without elaboration points which find lengthy and detailed analysis in his treatment of consciousness in his *De constitutione Christi* (On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ). To give just one example, in *De constitutione* Lonergan provides a four-page section on the meaning of the word *I*, which he examines by combining a pair of threefold distinctions. By the way, he finds the greatest divergence in opinions on the meaning of the word *I* among philosophers, not only because of the variety of basic schools of philosophy, but also because of the different levels of *Existenz* achieved by the followers of such schools.

Lonergan makes a distinction at the start of Part V on “Human Consciousness” between two senses of consciousness — consciousness as experience and consciousness as perception. Lonergan is not describing two kinds of consciousness, but two competing conceptions of consciousness. He employs this distinction throughout Part V, and in the conclusion he exposes the radical ground of this distinction. There is a dialectical opposition between two gnoseological theories: “One which bases knowledge upon an identity, and another which maintains that knowledge is rooted in a duality of some kind.”

The view that knowing involves an identity of the knower and the known is Aristotelian; the view that knowing is a form of intuition or a confrontation of the knower and the object known is Platonic. Lonergan only mentions three contemporaries who hold either view, one of those mentioned is Sartre: “Likewise also Jean-Paul Sartre by his separation between the *en soi* and the *pour soi* considered that for a real and simple God to know himself would be a contradiction.” He proceeds to name schools of thought that maintain the dualist, confrontational view of knowing: “So, also, generally speaking, empiricists, sensists, phenomenologists, and naïve realists.”

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Lonergan considers both Husserl and Sartre to be in the camp that treats knowledge as rooted in some kind of duality.

The two divergent opinions on the nature of consciousness — consciousness as experience and consciousness as perception — are rooted in this radical opposition. Lonergan summarizes the two:

If knowledge is rooted in identity, so also is consciousness. Hence it is not too difficult to conceive consciousness as experience strictly so called which is in the operating subject on the side of the subject and through which the operating subject is rendered present to himself under the aspect of experienced.

If knowledge is grounded upon duality, then consciousness, like all other knowledge, is a kind of intuition or perception or confrontation through which an object is known; and consciousness is distinguished from all other intuitions, perceptions, or confrontations in that the object that is known is precisely that which is intuiting, perceiving, and being made conscious.²⁰

Both Husserl and Sartre assume that knowing is a kind of intuition. Sartre insists that there is no knowing without an object over against, outside of, consciousness. (It should be noted that knowing is being used here in a general sense, to stand for the apprehension involved in any conscious act, not in the precise sense of the knowing which finds its term in judgment.) Consequently, both Husserl and Sartre mean by consciousness, consciousness as perception. Because this notion of consciousness is assumed, they are not able to make the distinction Lonergan makes between the two notions of consciousness.

While the distinction is not made explicitly, Husserl exploits the ambiguity implicitly. In describing the “glance” of the pure Ego, Husserl writes:

This glancing of the Ego towards something is in harmony with the act involved ... This means, therefore, that this having in one’s glance, in one’s mental eye, which belongs to the essence of the cogito, to the act as such, is not in itself in turn a proper act, and in particular should not be confused with a perceiving (in however

²⁰"On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ."
wide a sense this term be used), or with any other types of act related to perceptions.\textsuperscript{21}

Sartre apparently did not notice Husserl's strong proviso and instead expected Husserl to be consistent in his account of consciousness as a kind of intuition. Inasmuch as consciousness is conceived as perception, Husserl's account of the pure Ego is inconsistent with his overall account of conscious intentionality. Sartre masterfully picked up on this inconsistency and insisted on a thorough and coherent treatment of consciousness from which ultimately the transcendent I must be excised.

Lonergan, on the other hand, conceives of consciousness as experience. Consciousness is not a kind of perception, in fact, consciousness is not an act or an intentionality at all. It qualifies the intentional acts, more precisely, consciousness qualifies the subject. Lonergan distinguished two senses of experience: a broad sense in which we would speak of a "man of experience," and a strict sense, in which it means a "preliminary and unstructured knowledge that is presupposed by intellectual inquiry and completed by it."\textsuperscript{22} In addition, there are two senses of experience in this strict sense - exterior and interior. Lonergan points out, however, that this distinction of exterior and interior comes later with intellectual operations. Experience, in the strict sense, forms a sort of undifferentiated whole. By consciousness as experience, Lonergan means interior experience in the strict sense as a kind of preliminary and unstructured knowledge or apprehension.

We must adhere to the point that this interior preliminary apprehension is not a kind of perception. Lonergan explains:

What we experience interiorly, however, is not known to us either by any specific act or as an object. [Note that Lonergan is in complete agreement with Husserl on this point.] In the very act of seeing color, I become aware not only of that color on the side of the object but also, on the side of the subject, I become aware of the one who sees and the act of seeing.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21}Husserl, \textit{Ideas}, 109.

\textsuperscript{22}"On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ," section 75.

\textsuperscript{23}"On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ," section 75.
This brief account presents the heart of the problem. It is problematic to assert that in preliminary undifferentiated experience not only the content and the act are given, but also the one who performs the act (the subject) is given. One may ask, is the subject given in experience as preliminary or is it only differentiated through subsequent acts, as Sartre claims with his insistence that the I only appears in reflection? Lonergan continues: "Now this awareness of oneself as seeing and the act of seeing ... is presupposed and completed, first, by asking what is seeing ... [and so forth]." The interior, undifferentiated experience of the act or of oneself is completed by subsequent intellectual and rational operations, but note that it is presupposed by this further cognitive activity. When one does come to understand and to judge the nature and the existence of the subject of conscious acts, one does not need to perform a transcendental deduction in order to conclude that there must be an I attached to and unifying all conscious activity. The subject is already given in the experience subsequently presupposed.

Lonergan appears to agree with Sartre, when he addresses the issue of the unity of conscious acts in De constitutione. He states: "Experience in itself forms a sort of continuous ... whole." Does this imply that the unity of conscious experience does not involve a subject as unifying principle? Recall that in Insight Lonergan characterizes the unity which is the subject as that to which we allude "when we talk of a single field of consciousness." Experience forms a whole in itself which we may refer to as the field of consciousness, but insofar as it is conscious it consists of a preliminary knowledge of the subject as well as any acts or contents. Lonergan’s unifying subject of conscious acts is not a point with no magnitude, but the whole within which acts, states, and contents are experienced.

A neat summation of the implications of Lonergan’s basic distinction is offered in his "Christ as Subject: A Reply":

26Insight, 349.
If consciousness is conceived as an experience there is a psychological subject, while if consciousness is conceived as the perception of an object there is no psychological subject.27

Lonergan's precise distinctions may not be enough to convince anyone that he is correct in holding that consciousness is indeed experience, and experience in the sense he defines. Lord knows Father Perego was not convinced. So, in reply to Perego's objections, Lonergan provides an argument to support his conception of consciousness as experience.

If consciousness is perception, that is, if it is taken to be knowledge of an object, then it can have no constitutive effect upon its object. It can only reveal its object as it was in its proper reality prior to the occurrence of the cognitive act or function named consciousness. However, consciousness is not only cognitive, it is also constitutive. We do want to speak of the consciously intelligent subject of intelligent acts and the consciously rational subject of rational acts. Therefore, consciousness must not be knowledge of an object. Lonergan recapitulates: "The subject in act and his act are constituted and, as well, they are known simultaneously and concomitantly with knowledge of the object."28 The knowledge of the subject alluded to here is not knowledge of an object; it is knowledge of the subject as subject. This preliminary knowledge is not the result of any reflection; it is mere apprehension of oneself in the act.

Lonergan's distinction of consciousness as experience and consciousness as perception allows the resurrection of the subject from one of its postmodern graves. In addition, it rescues the heart of Husserl's descriptions of the experience of the pure Ego. Perhaps surprisingly, it also allows for an account of the conscious subject, which incorporates many of Sartre's insights. The influence of Sartre on Lonergan can be discerned throughout his account of the nature of human consciousness. For example, in the course of his reply to Perego, Lonergan quotes Van Reit at length to clarify how consciousness as experience is not consciousness of an object.29 But the passage from Van Reit, which Lonergan finds helpful,

28 "Christ as Subject: A Reply," 165.
29 "Christ as Subject: A Reply," 172.
is a summary of Sartre’s account of nonthetic consciousness in *Being and Nothingness*.

Finally, does Lonergan’s account of consciousness as experience enable us to make sense of those experiences mentioned earlier, experiences of there not being any self or *me* present? In order for the psychologist Titchener or me to report such experiences there must have been a subject aware in a preliminary fashion of itself as subject in the conscious acts and states experienced. The subsequent reporting does not constitute the subject of the original experience, rather consciousness as experience is presupposed by the subsequent reporting.
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