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CONTENTS

LONERGAN'S NOTION OF BELIEF . . . . . . J. Fitzpatrick 101
CONFRONTATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY . . Geoffrey Price 114
EDUCATION FOR COSMOPOLIS . . . . . . Robert M. Doran 134
THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNITY OF
LONERGAN'S NOTION OF CONVERSION . . Michael L. Rende 158
Dialogue:
FOUNDATION AND EMPIRICISM: AN EXERCISE
IN DIALECTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hugo Meynell 174
A REPLY FROM THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS . . . James G. Hanink 195
A REPLY TO JAMES G. HANINK . . . . . . Hugo Meynell 198
A WORTHY FELLOW WONDERS . . . . . . . . James G. Hanink 201
Notes:
DRAMA AMD MEANING . . . . . . William A. Stewart, S.J. 204
F. R. LEAVIS: A MEMOIR . . . . . . . . Sebastian Moore 214
Book Review:
Terry J. Tekippe, Ed.: Papal Infallibility: An Application of
Lonergan's Theological Method
ON LEARNING FROM AN ERROR . . . . . . Vernon Gregson 223
J. Fitzpatrick argues that R. Needham, in his study of belief, has failed to see that disparate understandings of belief are related essentially to disparate epistemologies. The result, Fitzpatrick concludes, is that Needham's objections to the voluntary basis of belief affirmed by Lonergan are unfounded, his readings of Hume and Kant are mistaken, and so the evidence he gathers to support his conclusion in favor of extreme relativism is insufficient.

Aristotle's departure from the Platonic position on the Ideas is regarded by some as a positive step toward concreteness and by others as a relapse from Plato's high spirituality. G. Price attributes the latter estimation to Eric Voegelin and inquires whether Voegelin has not resisted Aristotle's project of bringing into conscious reflection the psychological elements of a life which seeks to order itself in the good. For, Price suggests, Voegelin leaves unanalyzed the cycle of acts of understanding and judgment by which the soul lives out its openness toward the good.

Two opposed tendencies mark contemporary political philosophy -- liberal democratic and Marxist positions tend to collapse religious, personal and cultural values into vital and social values; whereas classically inspired positions tend to neglect vital and social values in their haste to strengthen and so preserve the higher reaches of human striving. R. Doran argues that both tendencies are marred by a common oversight of the conditioning link between the superstructure and the infrastructure of society. Doran attempts to establish the relation between cultural and social values and so to overcome this deficiency, first in theory and then by proposing a program to ground contemporary praxis. The solution, Doran argues throughout, lies in a new science of interiority.

M. Rende provides a concise and illuminating analysis of the contexts of development of Lonergan's central notion of conversion, and offers in addition an account of the meanings of religious, moral and intellectual conversion as modalities of self-transcendence.

Dialogue: H. Meynell argues, against empiricism, that the mental process to be applied to sense data for the acquisition of knowledge has been, and must not be, neglected. J. Hanink questions Meynell's view of language, his apparent suggestion that material objects are 'postulated', and his seeming reticence to show how it is that judgments 'fit' the evidence of sensation.

Notes: W. Stewart exposes the relevance of Lonergan's doctrine of meaning to the understanding of theatrical productions, and S. Moore recalls his Cambridge professor, F. R. Leavis, and the interior shift in the appreciation of literature and life that he embodied.

Book Review: V. Gregson offers a critical assessment of the recent attempt by T. Tekippe and others to put Lonergan's methodological discussions in Method in Theology to use.
LONERGAN'S NOTION OF BELIEF

J. Fitzpatrick

Human intersubjectivity, Lonergan argues, is something that occurs spontaneously in a variety of contexts. I preface an account of his notion of belief with this remark lest the misleading impression be given that Lonergan believes all intersubjective communication to be rational and premeditated. More than most modern philosophers, he is aware of community-feeling and fellow-feeling, of psychic contagion and emotional identification — of forms of interaction that are not the object simply of choice or decision. Moreover, he is aware of the irrational forces that can inhibit or block the path towards the accumulation of insights and sound judgments. Lonergan's account of belief which considers the act of belief to be based on a rational decision is normative: it is not meant to exclude a priori the possibility of irrationally induced beliefs; it is a norm that can all too easily be broken. But it is a norm and as such marks out certain uses of the word — what we might designate as 'true belief' or 'responsible belief' — against which any other use of the word can be measured. Finally, 'belief' is a word used in a wide variety of senses that are determined by context. Thus there is the notion of 'belief' in the psychological sense of opinion which falls short of certainty (e.g., "I believe it might rain later"); and of 'belief' implied by knowledge (e.g., "I know I am writing at my desk", implying that I also believe this); or there is belief in something as a desirable state of affairs which does not exist at present (e.g., "I believe in the equality of all men before the law"), implying some form of moral commitment. Lonergan's use of the word 'belief' is a somewhat specialized use intended to bring out the social character of what we call knowledge. But it is not in any way an aberrant or exceptional use. As I hope to show, it is a primary or central use of the word and other, more peripheral uses can easily be accommodated by his theory of how judgments of fact and value are arrived at.

In his acquisition of the knowledge that informs his decisions and actions it would absurd to think that the knowing subject confines his judgment to what he comes to know by and for himself. Our senses are confined to a very narrow
strip of space-time and we perforce rely on the senses of others to learn about the world. Likewise we depend on the insights of others and the formulation of these in concepts, hypotheses, theories, sayings, techniques, etc. And our judgment too of what is or is not the case is filled out by the knowledge learned from others. Further, the presuppositions upon which insights are built are taken for granted because they are commonly assumed, and even that knowledge we generate by ourselves is fused in symbiotic fashion with a far larger context of knowledge we take over from others. In other words, we exist and decide and act in a web of belief and advancement in knowledge would be impossible if this were not the case. Like Michael Polanyi, Lonergan believes that science is sustained and progresses by building on existing knowledge, which is not subject to constant revision, and by collaboration, by which is meant the contribution to a common plan or pursuit of the findings of a number of specialists. Knowledge is historical and social and without belief not only science but common sense and common living would decline. "Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession but rather a common fund, from which each may draw by believing, to which each may contribute in the measure that he performs his cognitional operations properly and reports their results accurately." We learn from others not only by repeating for ourselves the acts of understanding first performed by others, as, for example, we learn Euclidean geometry, but more commonly by taking someone's word for it. This account of belief finds inadequate a dispositional account which arises from the behaviorist's attempt to reduce inner states to observable behavior. The arguments against the dispositional account of belief need not be repeated here. Let it suffice to say that although beliefs frequently correlate with particular forms of behavior, the overt behavior is not the belief itself, and it can be said without contradiction that one occurs without the other.

The possibility of belief lies in the fact, observed earlier, that truth is not dependent on the mind of the knowing subject, that it has an essential detachable quality and as such can become a shared possession. The first step in belief is taken when someone communicates his knowledge to another. The second step is a general judgment of value, which recognizes that human beings are fallible but realizes that belief is the only means of advancement in knowledge and the alternative
is regression to primitivism. The third step is a particular judgment of value, which assesses the reliability of one's source, his intellectual acumen, his honesty, the coherence of his statements with each other and with what one knows from others, etc. The fourth step is a decision to believe based on the general and particular judgments of value. The fifth step is the act of believing, when I personally believe to be true the judgment of fact or value communicated to me.  

Lonergan's use of 'belief' is, as already noted, limited and has as its object that knowledge which is not immanently generated by the subject, but which he nevertheless accepts. Belief is distinguished from the subject's own immanently generated knowledge; it is the acceptance of another's knowledge claim which the subject is not in a position to make or to verify personally. It implies that what is believed is true or probably true, and the believing subject is willing to take someone's word for this. It is important to note that this notion of belief is not, in terms of how language is normally used, in any way odd or exceptional. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definitions of 'belief': "1. The mental action, condition, or habit of trusting to or confiding in a person or thing; trust, confidence, faith . . . . 2. Mental assent to or acceptance of a proposition, statement, or fact, as true, on the ground of authority or evidence . . . . 3. The thing believed; in early use, esp. a religion. Now often = opinion, persuasion . . . . 4. A creed . . . ." Lonergan's understanding of belief conforms, then, to some of the oldest uses of the word, conforming to the second of these definitions but embracing also the first. Other uses of the term to mean opinion or immanently generated knowledge can, moreover, be contained within Lonergan's notion of knowledge. His definition in no way violates the various uses of this highly protean word. 

Lonergan's use of 'belief' presumes the truth of what is believed and combines trust with intellectual assent. It is the element of trust that makes it the case that the act of belief is based on a decision. This element of trust can be greater or lesser, depending on the believer's competence in the area of knowledge to which the belief appertains. For example, what I decide to believe may so closely cohere with my own immanently generated knowledge or what I already believe from others that the decision is easily and swiftly
made. Or I may have little lateral backing for the belief and decide to believe my source for other reasons -- possibly circumstances may dictate a swift decision if certain consequences are to be averted. In either case, Lonergan is at pains to point out that, in the general case, belief is natural and necessary to the advancement of knowledge and, in particular cases, the decision to believe can also be founded on good reasons. This is Lonergan's position. It does not meet with universal approval and Rodney Needham in particular treats it rather roughly in his book, *Belief, Language and Experience*. Referring to Hampshire's observation that in some societies "a man's belief would be considered as much part of his responsibility as his behaviour to other men", Needham comments: "An example of this outlook is the Catholic tradition, latterly expressed by Lonergan, that belief is a free and responsible decision of the will; and European history is notoriously replete with the consequent reprobation, oppression, and burning of men because of their wilful failure, or refusal, to believe. 'A particular moral outlook, connected with particular forms of social life, will show itself in the distinctions that are stressed in the forms of common speech' (Hampshire, op. cit.). Such linguistic usages survive, however, long past their practical relevance, and despite their unsuitability for the description of experience; but so long as they are current they exert an insidious influence toward the conception of belief as a voluntary faculty."

Apart from the highly questionable insinuation that to consider belief to be founded on a free decision is to open the way for persecution and oppression, Needham's remarks amount to a rejection of the many common usages of the terms 'belief' or 'believe' which suggest that to believe is to act on a decision -- such usages as, "I refuse to believe that"; "I simply will not believe (that my wife is unfaithful)"; "After much thought and deliberation I made up my mind to believe him", and so forth. The precise argument Needham raises against these usages I shall examine shortly. His general position, which he traces to Wittgenstein and supports by referring to Hampshire, is that the theoretical positions of the past have inevitably left their residue in our language long after their 'practical relevance' has disappeared and hence no appeal to usage can settle the question of the meaning of words denoting 'human capacities' (see, for example, pp.
63 and 187). What Needham, as an anthropologist, is concerned with is the interconnection of forms of life and language. Since there are and have been many forms of life, it is not surprising that he finds any appeal to common linguistic usage in an attempt to settle philosophical disputes to be taking "for granted what is in fact radically problematical" (p. 63). Needham seeks to argue his thesis by a consideration of the notion of belief and asks if there exist criteria for the use of this word which would allow or enable us to define its meaning. Turning to European languages, he finds a great disparity of meanings attached to the word and concludes that the word 'belief' admits of no definable meaning.

As we have seen, Needham attacks the notion that belief is founded on a voluntary decision with considerable animus. Yet in dealing specifically with Lonergan's analysis of belief he in no way discriminates the precise sense in which Lonergan employs the term. Lonergan uses belief to indicate the social character of knowledge: not only do we learn from others but we also rely for our judgments and our advancement in knowledge on the immanently generated knowledge of others. Nowhere does Needham advert to this feature of Lonergan's analysis of belief: anyone reading his book could be excused for concluding that Lonergan's use of 'belief' refers to any or all of the meanings attached to that word.

Needham's precise argument against the voluntary basis of belief is as follows:

We say, for instance, that we 'cannot' believe something as though it were in our power to believe or not as we decided . . . ; but when we introspect in search of the exercise of that power we find that none of the philosophical dubiety is at all relieved -- and, of course, if it were that easy a matter the dubiety could scarcely have survived. If, after saying that I cannot believe, I suddenly assert, 'Yes, I can', I do not thereby switch from disbelief to belief, and I cannot by any firm intention alone bring myself to do so. This is a matter of common experience, testable on the spur of the moment, yet our language tends to persuade us to the opposite. (p. 83)

It is not at all clear in what sense Needham is employing the word 'belief' here. If he equates belief with immanently generated knowledge, then it is true that I cannot decide to believe or not to believe -- that would be tantamount to saying that I can decide to know or not to know. If, however, by belief is meant a truth claim for which the intrinsic evidence is not available to me (for example, when I have
not been present at an accident), or is not intelligible
to me (such as in a great deal of science) then it appears
that a certain element of decision is necessary. How otherwise
can I come to accept the truth of something for which the
evidence is external to the belief itself? -- such evidence
as, the source is honest, intelligent, his account is coherent,
it accords with what I already know, etc. All Lonergan is
claiming is that an act of responsible belief (in the sense
of that word he has designated and which the dictionary informs
us is central) is at once rational and voluntary. It is true
that so long as I remain committed to doing what is reasonable I
sometimes cannot switch from belief to disbelief: but no
more can the good man, so long as he remains committed to
what is right and good, switch from doing good and yet we
consider his actions free and voluntary (otherwise we would
not admire him). What is true of the good man in matters
of action is true of the rational man in matters of belief.
His commitment to follow the suasions of reason has to be
constantly renewed; and while it may be habitual the habit
is the product of many voluntary acts of commitment. It is
to entertain a desperately simple and distorted notion of
human freedom to consider that what is done freely is neces-
sarily done arbitrarily or 'at will': as if one could throw
a mental switch and simply do the opposite. Freedom and rational-
ity are interdependent: where reason is excluded in principle
from certain decisions (as in the case of a compulsive alco-
holic or a psychopath) we do not consider the relevant decision
to be a free one -- we say, indeed, that there was no decision,
that the action was irrational. The possibility of a free
decision presumes the possibility (though not always the
actuality) of deliberating, of marshalling the evidence,
of weighing the pros and cons -- of reasoning, in short.
Needham's argument operates on the premise that rationality
and freedom are mutually exclusive, when in fact the opposite
is the case.

But let me call attention to another serious deficiency
in Needham's argument. When he turns to philosophers to find
if they can supply any criteria for the use and understanding
of belief he at no time refers to how that notion operates
within the general system of their thought, and in particular
how it integrates with their account of knowledge. We have
already noted this in the case of Lonergan, and Needham is
guilty of a similar omission in the cases of Hume, Kant and Hampshire, each of whom he quotes at some length to demonstrate his thesis that the use of 'belief' is subject to no recognizable criteria. His technique is simply to quote the contrary philosophical opinions in isolation and conclude: "This is typical of the issue. The best of minds are at odds, the most persuasive of arguments brings no resolution . . . , and linguistic usage provides conflicting and indecisive evidences. But at least it is sure that no readily discriminable act of the will can be assumed as a criterion of belief" (pp. 85-86). But this kind of argument will not do. And the reason is that the notion of belief put forward by these philosophers is parasitic on their understanding of the nature of knowledge. As such it can be seen to have certain definite criteria defining its meaning. The meaning of 'belief' as these authors use it is not so arbitrary or wayward as Needham would have us think and he is being not a little naive when he writes: "It is an interesting feature of the major arguments, moreover, that they are not much directed against other interpretations . . . but that each is an independent sally against the ground thought to be occupied by the subject of the problem. The span of time that they cover, also, stresses the equivocal character of the topic, for there is no decisive supersession of ideas from one theory to the next: Human and Kant address us just as directly as do Wittgenstein and Hampshire" (p. 61). Furthermore, by providing us with no account of the relevant theories of knowledge or meaning, Needham gives us no grounds for making a rational assessment concerning which position might be correct. This omission, of course, tends to support the relativistic thesis he is pursuing. But let me begin by looking at the case of Hume.

Hume's Notion of Belief

Hume writes that "belief consists . . . in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters." Experience produces belief in us "by a secret operation and without being once thought of" (p. 104). If we wonder at the secrecy with which beliefs arise in us (according to Hume) we might find the clue in the gaps that exist between what, on Humean terms, we can legitimately claim to know
and what we in actuality claim to be certain of. For Hume was aware that in our practical living we assume the relative permanence and stability of material objects, we operate on the principle of cause and effect and we understand similarly, but he could provide no rational justification for any of these practices. Hence he ascribed them to belief. Belief performs a compensatory role in relation to Hume's theory of knowledge. Experience or Nature are invoked to explain what Hume thought to be the irrational beliefs by means of which we live our lives, because reason cannot provide an explanation (p. 187). Hume was simply being consistent when he thought of belief as "a certain feeling or sentiment" (p. 624), and considered it "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (p. 183, although it is questionable whether, on Humean terms, even knowledge rises above "the sensitive part of our nature"). It is surely misleading to approve Hume's understanding of belief without referring to its role within the whole Humean system, but Needham does this frequently.

**Kant's Notion of Belief**

In the same way, Kant's notion of belief follows on his understanding and description of knowledge. Strict knowledge, according to Kant, arrives at necessary and universally valid judgments by way of a priori forms and categories, but is limited to the area of sensible intuition. It is, accordingly, impossible to have knowledge of anything lying outside the sphere of sensible experience. In the area of behavior, however, the absolute character of morality is forced upon us by the way in which reason affirms moral imperatives unconditionally and regards them as universally binding. From this follows the postulate of human freedom and the further two postulates of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. It would be wrong to term these three postulates knowledge since pure reason is confined to sense experience. They are rather regulative ideas -- ideas, that is, that regulate our behavior. Their existence cannot be demonstrated (and neither can their non-existence): one does not know the objects corresponding to these regulative ideas; one can only believe in their reality. Hence Kant's saying that he limited knowledge in order to make room for faith!11
Belief is not contrary to knowledge but continuous with it: Kant speaks of the three postulates as "regulative principles only of speculative reason, which do not require it to assume a new object beyond experience, but only to bring its use in experience nearer to completeness." Kant's notion of belief falls between opinion which is neither subjectively nor objectively sufficient and knowledge which is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Belief is subjectively sufficient but not objectively; thus it gives rise to conviction but not to certainty. The conviction is not logical but moral: I cannot even say that it is morally certain that there is a God, etc., but only "that I am morally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that I am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter." What this account points up is that, like Hume's, Kant's notion of belief is not some "isolated sally against the ground ... occupied by ... the problem", but is a corollary of his theory of knowledge and forms an integral part of the whole Kantian system. As with Hume, by presenting Kant's notion of belief in isolation Needham gives the misleading impression that it is subject to no specifiable criteria. This, we can see, is wrong. The criteria governing Kant's use of belief are dictated by his theory of knowledge. Needham might respond that his comparative study of how belief is understood by major philosophers reveals a great disparity. This is undoubtedly true, and the reason why major philosophers have disparate understandings of belief is because they have disparate understandings of knowledge. Since Needham has chosen the use of the term 'belief' as a test-case in his elaboration of a general thesis leading to extreme relativism, his omission of the place of this concept in an individual philosopher's system of thought must be seen as weakening his case. The appearance of arbitrariness surrounding the notion which his presentation implies is seen to be quite false once it is recognized with what care individual philosophers have integrated the concept of belief with their epistemological investigations.

Hampshire's Notion of Belief

Stuart Hampshire, another of the four 'major philosophers'
whose notion of belief is examined by Needham, is an interesting example of a British philosopher whose philosophy approximates in certain key areas to Lonergan's. Both Hampshire and Lonergan reject the "mistake common in empiricist philosophy, to represent human consciousness in waking life mainly as a state of passive awareness, as opposed to a state of unawareness of the external world in sleep and unconsciousness."

The common rejection, which implies a rejection of Cartesian dualism, is based on the common acceptance of the role of intention in meaning and acting. Lonergan would welcome Hampshire's contention that the meaning of a statement cannot be reduced to a mere understanding of the words without reference to the variable intention of the speaker that lies behind the words. And Hampshire's unification of thought and action in the same subject by means of the notion of intention would also be welcome. But in spite of the large degree of agreement between the two philosophers there are some major discrepancies (to be discussed at the end of this section), not least in their respective notions of belief. Although he quotes Hampshire against Lonergan, Needham, as before, does little to discriminate the precise sense in which each uses the term 'belief', though he does add much later in his book that Hampshire's use is "exceedingly general and inclusive". I believe it is this highly generalized understanding of belief that explains Hampshire's disagreement with Lonergan.

Hampshire writes: "They [beliefs] constitute the generally unchanging background of his active thought and observation, and they constitute also his knowledge of his own position in the world in relation to other things." Clearly Hampshire does not distinguish between belief and immanently generated knowledge. Of a piece with this is his presentation of the process of coming to believe as one of giving one's assent to a statement where he fails to discriminate between the different conditions under which assent may be given (see pp. 159-160). It is this failure to distinguish belief from knowledge that leads Hampshire to deny that believing is founded on a decision: "But when a statement is brought to my attention and the question is whether I believe it or not, the decision that I announce in the words 'Yes, I believe it' is not a decision to do anything; nor can these words constitute an announcement that I have attempted or achieved
anything. I have not decided to believe; I have decided that the statement in question is true" (p. 158). But it is surely odd to speak of deciding that something is true. The truth of a statement is not something I decide. To claim that something is true is to claim to know and common linguistic usage does not allow me to say that I decide to know. I assess the evidence and, given my desire or intention to know the truth, I assent or withhold my assent on the strength of the evidence; provided I remain committed to knowing the truth assent follows by what Lonergan calls 'natural necessity'. There is no positive intervention of the will in the assent I give in knowledge judgments. But in cases where the evidence is not available to me or not intelligible to me -- and these are the conditions that obtain, as we have seen, in cases of what Lonergan terms 'belief' -- there can be no assent by 'natural necessity' and to subscribe to the statement in question demands the positive intervention of the will, or what is called a decision. The source of Hampshire's disagreement with Lonergan is his failure to discriminate between immanently generated knowledge and belief, or, in his terminology, between different kinds of belief.19

I shall not examine the notion of belief presented by Needham's fourth 'major philosopher', Wittgenstein, since it is so interwoven with his total philosophy and its varied stages of development as to be resistant to the brief treatment that is all I could afford to give it here.20 Let it suffice to repeat that Lonergan's notion of belief is restricted and precise and follows on his notion of knowledge; and that it is at one with the central definition presented by the Oxford Dictionary. The more massive thesis Needham builds on his lengthy examination of belief, which has vital implications for anthropology and theology and indeed for all disciplines whose object is to understand human experience and behavior -- namely, that "The solitary comprehensible fact about human experience is that it is incomprehensible" (p. 246) -- is, of course, directly opposed to Lonergan's advocacy of a method of knowing and valuing that transcends all subjects and all cultures. However, detailed criticism of this position would be out of place in this article, where I wish to confine the discussion to the notion of belief.
From the point of view of this article, my criticism of Needham has enabled me to uphold Lonergan's position on belief against contrary positions, and this kind of dialectical confrontation is, I believe, of vital importance if a concept's validity is to be truly tested. It has also forced me to draw out and elaborate certain features implicit in Lonergan's notion of belief and this, it is hoped, will help the reader to a fuller and clearer grasp of his position.

NOTES


3 See, for example, Knowing and Being, ed. M. Grene (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

4 Method in Theology, p. 43.

5 Ibid., pp. 41-47.

6 Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972. Subsequent references may be found in parentheses in the text.


8 Needham, op. cit., p. 85.

9 This argument is by no means unique to Needham. It is essentially the same as that used by Louis P. Pojman, for example, in his article "Belief and Will," Religious Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1978). Like Needham, Pojman also fails to link notions of belief with notions of knowledge in the authors in cites (including Lonergan). Lonergan's distinction between 'essential' freedom and 'effective' freedom is relevant to this discussion. See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, eds. E. A. Morelli and M. D. Morelli (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), pp. 283-285.


11 Lonergan, it is worth noting in passing, makes an important distinction between belief and faith.


14 Ibid., p. 469.
Some of the discrepancies between Hampshire and Lonergan are as follows: (1) Intention for Hampshire seems to be much closer to a self-conscious activity than is the case in Lonergan, for whom the intention to know the truth, for example, is spontaneous and irresistible and, while conscious, is not fully a self-conscious activity. There are, of course, self-conscious intentions, those namely that take place at the fourth level of consciousness, but not all intentions are formed at that level. (2) Hampshire, following Ryle and Wittgenstein, contends that mental actions are somehow shadowy and parasitic upon their expression (p. 163). While Lonergan would see mental acts as being aimed by the subject toward judgment and possibly decision and action, he would hardly describe them as shadowy or parasitic. Perhaps the metaphor of shadow reveals a vestigial relic here of a contrast between the 'private' and the 'public', that can be traced back to Descartes. Rather than describe mental acts as parasitic on their expression, Lonergan would see a heightening of consciousness as the subject moves from experience through understanding and judgment to decision and action. There is no reduction or tendency to reduce the private to the public or vice versa, but there is a recognition that I become the person I am through my meanings, values, decisions and actions. Authenticity requires a consistency between my knowing and my valuing, and my valuing and my doing. In that sense, then, there is frequently a moral requirement to act following upon a certain understanding of a situation; but at the same time I may be unauthentic and refuse to match my action with my understanding and judgment. This is a position frequently found in life, yet Hampshire cannot admit it. Because he considers the 'private' to gain its value from what actually occurs in public, so-called private intentions not endorsed by action are simply not credited. Insincerity cannot exist for Hampshire. Descartes' ghost continues to haunt modern philosophy! (3) Finally, Hampshire identifies the subject with his will which he seems to consider to be uninvolved, even in a negative capacity, with the process of coming to know (pp. 153-154). Lonergan would not identify the subject with the will merely, but at the same time he would see the will as involved in a negative capacity in the process of coming to know insofar as the intention to know frequently has to be sustained against other pressures and interests which give rise to bias. Generally speaking, I believe Hampshire's philosophy of mind to be a not quite successful attempt to shake off the effects of Cartesian dualism, and to be less systematic and less discriminating than Lonergan's analysis of the subject.

The perennial tension between the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions is a crucial issue in any inquiry into the foundations of political philosophy. As an example, we may take Charles McCoy's study *The Structure of Political Thought*, where the question is dealt with in terms of the treatment of essence and existence. The Socratic search for the essence of law and justice, and their expression in definition, is taken to contain a latent danger, overlooked by Plato, who confused the existence of things with their essences, which were necessarily immaterial. McCoy assents to Aristotle's own account:

Having in his youth become familiar first with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines [that all sensible things are in a state of flux, and that no science of them exists], he [Plato] continued to believe these even in his later years. Now Socrates was engaged in the study of ethical matters, but not at all in the study of nature as a whole, yet in ethical matters he sought the universal, and was the first to fix his thought on definitions. Plato, on the other hand, taking into account the thought of Socrates, came to the belief that, because sensible things are always in a state of flux, such inquiries were concerned with other things, and not with the sensibles; for there can be no common definition of sensible things when these are always changing. He called things of this other sort 'Ideas', and believed that sensible things exist apart from Ideas and are named according to Ideas.

This step, McCoy maintains, leads to the priority of essence over existence in Plato's political philosophy. The universal essence, 'man', is a principle of existence, and the individual men whom we know through our senses are merely weak participations in the idea 'man'. This priority of the universal concept is responsible for the extreme unity which Plato seeks to achieve for the ideal republic: the individual is absorbed in the State, much as man's own existence is itself considered a mere shadow of the archetypal concept Man. Aristotle's cognitional theory, which recognizes the embodiment of intellect, and its dependence on the senses, is for McCoy the basis on which the realms of essence and existence can be disengaged. 'Man', taken as universal, has no separate existence; human inquiry is capable of knowing John and Paul as separate individuals and thus men as existents. Only by knowing
those existent beings can that which is predicable of them --
manhood --be predicated; their actuality is distinguished
from, and not derivative from, their universal aspects. On
this view, the task of political philosophy is not to seek
a universal definition of community; rather, the general
should always be resolved through its specific parts, as
Aristotle himself proceeds to distinguish the kinds of commu-
nity that do exist, and the different kinds of character and
rule that they embody. McCoy proceeds to build on Aristotle's
metaphysics of 'differentiation' and 'organism' as the basis
for his whole subsequent argument that in the emergence of
modern political philosophy, Marxian thought represents the
point where the realms of essence and existence have once
again been conflated, albeit with the opposite consequence
that the individual man is declared to be the whole of society.

By contrast, the work of Eric Voegelin to recover the
true foundations of political existence, has shown over several
decades a profound sympathy for the Platonic orientation
and its later developments. For Voegelin, the debate that
is political philosophy is not a 'given', in which we discern
and debate conceptual clarity; its very emergence rests on
the discovery of a truth in which consciousness is differen-
tiated.

The psyche itself is found as a new center in
man at which he experiences himself as open to transcen-
dental reality.

In Bergsonian language of the "opening of the soul", Voegelin
affirms that this experience of the inquirer is inseparable
from a new relation with God:

He not only discovers his own psyche as the instru-
ment for experiencing transcendence, but at the same
time discovers the divinity in its radically non-human
transcendence.

Political analysis then rests not only on the analysis of
wisdom, but in the order of the psyche of the wise man that
represents the truth about human existence on
the border of transcendence. Not an arbitrary idea
of man as world-immanent being becomes the instrument
of social critique, but the idea of a man who has found
his true nature through finding his true relation to
God.

In this his initial exposition, the Walgreen Lectures for
1951, Voegelin illustrates his point principally from Platonic
themes of the philosopher's resistance to the disorder of
society. Behind the anti-Protagorean formula, "God is the
measure", is detected Heraclitus' assertion of the over-ruling validity of the invisible harmony. The cave parable of the Republic is a description of the periangoge, the conversion, the turning around from the untruth of human existence as it prevailed in the Athenian sophistic society to the truth of the idea.

This theme of philosophy as an act of resistance to the personal and social disorders of the age, has pervaded all Voegelin's subsequent work. The recovery of the classic experience of the opening of the soul, is not the gathering of a treasure of information:

To present the classic insights as doxographic relics not only would be pointless, it would destroy their very meaning as the expression of man's resistance to the mortalizing disorder of the age . . . . The present essay obviously is an act of resistance in continuity with the classic effort.

Although Voegelin associates Aristotle with Plato as experiencing and representing the experience of discovering man's eros towards the divine ground, through his description of philosophy as the practice of immortalizing, his 1974 exposition of the life of reason once again draws mainly on Platonic symbolism. Moreover, he quite openly uses the language of reincarnation which marks the influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato's later work.

The pull [helkein] of reason, and the counterpulls [ant-helkein] of the passions are real enough, but they are movements experienced by the psyche in its state of entombment in a mortal body. The reason why man should follow one pull rather than another, is not to be found in the 'psychodynamics' of the puppetry (sc. of The Laws), nor in some standard of 'morality', but in the potential immortality offered by the divine presence in the metaxy.

The strongest evidence for Voegelin's adoption of Platonic symbolism is in the third volume of Order in History, Plato and Aristotle, of which less than a quarter is devoted to Aristotle. Voegelin follows Jaeger in emphasizing the continuity between Aristotle's early work and the Platonic-Socratic conception of philosophy as a mode of life, in the most literal sense of true life, founded in the erotic reaching out of the soul towards the Idea, rather than in the life of the passions which opens onto death. He scorns any notion of contrasting Platonic and Aristotelian 'systems', the one transcendent and idealist, the other immanentist and realist; each thinker was far too engrossed in the discovery of new
CONFRONTATION AND UNDERSTANDING

problems, to be concerned with systematic construction.\textsuperscript{13}

What then of Aristotle's critique of Plato's notion of participation in the Ideas? For Voegelin, this is no refutation of a 'doctrine' of essences; rather, what has happened is a "shift of attention" on the level of philosophizing.

By withdrawing attention from the origin of realized form into a realm of separate forms, the formal structure of reality itself came into formal view. . . . When Aristotle's attention was turned in this direction, when his inquiry concerned immanent form and the immense ramifications of its problems, the Platonic assumption of transcendental form might indeed appear as an unnecessary, and perhaps unverifiable, duplication of that immanent form that was given with such certainty in the immediate experience of the soul.\textsuperscript{14}

Such an inquiry can raise no argument against transcendental form; so what has become of the problems that had been seen by Plato when the attention of his philosophizing was directed to the form of the Good? Voegelin's answer is at once an attack on Plato's late attempt to represent the tension of existence in the demiurgic myth of the Laws, and on Aristotle for turning away from the problem raised by Plato.

Aristotle rightly criticized this part of Platonic speculation; and in eliminating this confusion, he penetrated to the clearness of his own ontology.

Thus by implication Voegelin assents to the formal argument of Metaphysics I, 6-9; but for him it is a mistaken effort:

For this magnificent achievement, however, he paid the great price of eliminating the problem of transcendental form, along with its speculative misuse.

In Aristotle, Voegelin affirms, we have

. . . a curious transformation of the experience of transcendence which can perhaps best be described as an intellectual thinning out.\textsuperscript{15}

What is this "thinning out"? Here, Voegelin's judgment once again evinces the Pythagorean perspective of the soul seeking its true home through philosophy. Not only does he find Aristotle to have reduced the fullness of Plato's noetic experience to the conception of God as prime mover, and to conceive cognitive action as a delight in itself, but

. . . no longer is the soul as a whole immortal, but only that part of it which Aristotle calls the active intellect; . . . and finally, the mystical via negativa by which the soul ascends to the vision of the Idea in the Symposium is thinned out to the rise towards the dianoetic virtues and the bios theoreitkos.\textsuperscript{16}

In short, Aristotle's work represents a 'relapse' from the high spirituality of Plato's articulation, brought about by tearing his symbolism largely out of its existential context,
and treating it as if it consisted of concepts referring to a datum of sense-experience. Accordingly, Voegelin's estimate of Aristotle's political philosophy is negative. Plato had already started the dissociation of the original complex of experiences in the *Laws* by replacing the living presence of the philosopher-king by symbolic institutions. Aristotle continued this process by developing independent disciplines of ethics and the devising of institutions.

All these centrifugal tendencies, however, were still held together by . . . the intellectual remnant of the Platonic good *polis*. The Aristotelian best *polis* was neither a *polis* ruled by the living presence of the philosopher-king, nor a symbolic play like the *polis* of the *Laws*. It became something like an intellectual puzzle that must be solved as a matter of tradition.17

II

Now it is clear that Voegelin would reject McCoy's appeal to Aristotle's metaphysics as, at best, misplaced endeavor. For a philosopher to argue that Plato's account of universal essences is mistaken because the intellect is united to a body, and is therefore capable of knowing essences existing in corporeal matter, is, from Voegelin's standpoint, to discuss the symbols of transcendent experiences as if they were simple concepts arising at the level of the senses. McCoy's exercise would be judged as a partial relapse into immanentist speculation.

The question arises, however, whether Voegelin's own representation of political existence effectively prejudices his evaluation of Aristotle. His attunement to Plato's terminology of the philosopher's search for stability of understanding has already been noted. William Barrett comments on the dualism of reason and ignorance implicit in the *Republic* myth of the cave:

> We have to see Plato's rationalism not as a cool scientific project, . . . but as a kind of passionately religious doctrine, -- a theory that promised man salvation from the things he had feared most from the earliest days, from death and time. The extraordinary impulse Plato puts upon reason is itself a religious impulse.18

The effect of this impulse is felt throughout Plato's treatment of essence and existence. As Barrett remarks again,

> Psychologically speaking, the significance of Plato's theory of ideas is to transfer the weight of emphasis from sensory reality to supersensible reality. [His] thought . . . values the eternal over the temporal, the universal over the particular, reason over the non-
rational half of man. In all these valuations it remains profoundly anti-existential, a philosophy of essence rather than existence. Yet it remains existential in its conception of the activity of philosophizing as fundamentally a means of personal salvation.19

What indications does Voegelin give of a commitment to a comparable understanding of philosophy? His exposition of the Republic in Order and History re-emphasizes the Socratic life as existential and combative. He sees Plato, as the founder of true political science, establishing the conditions for all subsequent resistance to a conflict of good and ill that is evinced in social disorder.

Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but the light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; and help is not a piece of information about truth, but the arduous battle to locate the forces of evil and identify their nature. For half the battle is won when the soul can recognize the shape of the enemy, and consequently knows that the way that it must follow leads in the opposite direction. Plato operates in the Republic therefore with pairs of concepts which point the way by casting their light on both good and evil.20

Voegelin's subsequent summary of the significance of Plato's terminology makes still clearer his sympathy with its soteriological context.

The pairs must be understood in their aggregate as the expression of a man's resistance to a social corruption which goes so deep that it affects the truth of existence under God. Philosophy, thus, has its origin in the resistance of the soul to its destruction by society. Philosophy in this sense . . . has two functions for Plato. It is first, and most importantly, an act of salvation for himself and others, in that the evocation of right order and its reconstitution in his own soul becomes the substantive center of a new community which, by its existence, relieves the pressure of the surrounding corrupt society. Under this aspect, Plato is the founder of the community of philosophers that lives through the ages. Philosophy is, second, an act of judgment . . . Under this second aspect, Plato is the founder of political science.21

In expanding on this latter aspect, Voegelin again hints at the theme of fall and rebirth:

In the philosopher who resists the sophist lives a soul which resists the destruction of Areté. The philosopher is man in the anxiety of his fall from being; and philosophy is the ascent toward salvation for Everyman . . . Plato's philosophy, therefore, is not a philosophy, but the symbolic form in which a Dionysiac soul expresses its ascent to God.22

At this point, we may recall the work of Paul Ricoeur in differentiating the symbolisms of evil as representations of human existence. In his treatment of the myth of the "exiled
soul", he insists that there is a pact between this representa-
tion and philosophy which has no parallel in any other myth. In
the Orphic schema, the soul, divine in origin, became human, en-
mixed in a body in which it forgets its true nature. Ricoeur
identifies a "myth of situation", revealing 'soul' and 'body'
as distinct magnitudes and powers, which is not a subsequent
neo-Platonic invention, but the core of that ancient discourse
of Orphism presupposed by Plato's own writings. Its central
themes can be discerned firstly as the imprisonment of the
soul in the body; then the notion of repetitive cycles of
existence, modifying the 'jail-theme', for which life ceases
to be unique, and death ceases to be its limit. Hence

life and death alternate as two states: life comes from
death and death from life, like waking and sleeping;
the one may be the dream of the other, and each borrows
its meaning from the other. Hence, the punishment is
not only incarnation, but reincarnation; and so existence,
under the sign of repetition, appears to be a perpetual
backsliding.

The third theme, that of infernal punishment, appears to con-
flict with the notion of expiation in and through the body;
but, Ricoeur affirms, they are the counterparts of each other.

It must be understood that life is a repetition of hell,
as hell is a doublet of life, . . . . Thus the 'body'
can be the place of expiation for that other life we
call death, and Hades the place of expiation for the
evil committed in this life, which, for the profane,
is the only life.24

But this interpretation of the 'body' as an instrument of
reiterated punishment itself provokes a 'puritanical' reaction
-- the soul is an exiled being, leading an occult existence
in its present body, and longing for liberation. Thus the
originality of Orphism, Ricoeur finds, is not in its teaching
of the soul's rapture by a god, which other cults taught.
It alone taught this sudden alteration to be an excursion
from the body rather than a visitation or possession. "Ecstasy
is now seen as manifesting the true nature of the soul, which
daily existence hides."25

Now the earlier Platonic dialogues display a far more
agnostic attitude towards death, as in the Apology (40c) where
Cornford considers that Plato treats the Ideas as equally
uncertain,

a secondary and unsubstantial thing, like the Atomists'
eidolon or wraith; and, like other Greeks, imagined the
soul as a shadowy phantom of the same kind.26

However, the later dialogues draw deeply on the Pythagorean
notion of the soul seeking freedom in true knowledge by release from its bodily impediments.27 What would be the attraction of this tradition to Plato? asks Cornford. If Plato made friends among his disciples after the death of Socrates, he would slowly have assimilated a quite different interpretation of his late master's thought.

He may have been converted at the moment when it flashed upon him that the 'forms' or 'meanings' which Socrates had sought, were not insubstantial wraiths, but the very living natures and indwelling souls of their groups; when he saw in them the mediators which would take the place of the Pythagorean 'numbers', and . . . fill the gap, left by Parmenides, between the immutable One and the manifold world of sense.28

Be that as it may, the repeated association in the later dialogues between the doctrine of anamnesis and the idea of transmigration from which it is deduced, always from a mathematical point of view, makes the debt to the Pythagorean perspective unavoidable.29

In this way we can locate and understand the religious impulse which lies at the heart of Plato's rationalism. For in drawing on the Pythagorean literature, he drew on a philosophy "situated at the crossroads of science and revelation," in which salvation through knowledge was the correlate of the pessimistic myth of the soul's imprisonment.30 Thus, the act in which man perceives himself as soul, and identifies with soul, is salvation; and of such,

. . . [the] purifying act par excellence is knowledge. In this awareness, in this awakening to itself of the exiled soul, all 'philosophy' of the Platonic and neo-Platonic type is contained. If the body is desire and passion, the soul is the origin and principle of any withdrawal, . . . and all knowledge of anything, every science, whatever its object, is rooted in the knowledge of the body as desire and of oneself as thought in contrast to desire.31

Enlightenment and salvation go hand in hand; for the exiled soul, the Pythagoreans find release and homecoming in the achievement of knowledge. In that literature, purification is not simply located in the ritual context of Orphism; it is simultaneously the achievement of true gnosis. Thus, as Ricoeur remarks, the very language of 'philosophy' in Plato reveals the soteriological affinity with Pythagoreanism:

. . . Rather than calling a man who meditates in pursuit of the god sophos or sophistes, the Pythagoreans preferred the rather esoteric term philosophos; it evokes the philia that is broken by 'discord', by eris, which sets man at variance with the divine and with his own
origin. Withdrawal of the soul, reunion of the soul with the divine -- there we have the philosophical intention before Plato. The idea of happiness -- eudaimonein -- is at the point where the marginal vision and the philosophical vision meet; for happiness is the 'good soul', and the 'good soul' comes to a man when he 'knows', when knowledge is the strongest and desire the weakest.32 Accordingly, in the Phaedo, Socrates becomes the mouthpiece for the Pythagorean notion of daimon: the 'lost-soul' profoundly affects the treatment of human cognition.

The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and invariable whereas body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never self-consistent.33

The results are apparent in the priority of essence over existence in Plato's treatment of participation. As Cornford shows, any view that that doctrine will not bear rational analysis is in danger of missing the point that its apparent weaknesses are, within the workings of the lost-soul myth, its strengths. For 'participation' is the consequence of the Pythagorean experience which conjoins worship and cognition in ecstatic extra-bodily experience.

The Idea is a group-soul, related to its group as a mystery-daemon like Dionysus is related to a group of worshippers . . . (for whom) the one God entered into each and all of them; each and all became entheoi; they partook of the one divine nature, which was 'communicated' to them all, and 'present' in each. It is thus we must interpret the three terms -- methexis, parousia, koinonia -- by which Plato tries to describe the relation of an Idea to its group.34

Thus the doctrine that the original 'imparts' its nature to sensible objects of beauty, gives systematic expression to the type of religious consciousness symbolized by the lost-soul myth.

III

Cassirer points out that in the aftermath of the differentiation of rational from mythic consciousness, one immediate counter-reaction is to reaffirm the identity of thought and cosmos, subject-pole and object-pole.35 The Platonic development of Pythagoreanism gives classic expression to this longing in its doctrine that the true home of the soul is in the supersensible world. Its doctrine of participation seeks to recreate the world of mythic consciousness; the function of knowledge is to awake the knower to that lost unity, by
assimilating the clues now hidden within the cosmos which will lead him to his goal.

In Aristotle, we find a determined stand against any such notion that the soul is a separate, quasi-angelic substance, and thus against any doctrine of fall and reincarnation.

The soul is in a body, and a body of a definite kind; and not as some earlier thinkers made out, who related it to a body without defining at all the nature and quality of that body; despite the fact that it is apparent that not any subject whatever can achieve any form at random.36

Far from being able to fit itself into any body, the soul is the focus of the reincarnation of the body, the principle of its existence: Plato and the Pythagoreans

... conjoin body and soul, placing the soul in the body without stating anything definite as to the cause of this, or how the body is disposed. Yet this explanation is surely necessary, for it is in virtue of something in common that one is an agent, the other acted upon, one moves and the other is moved. For each body seems to have its own proper form and species. It is like saying that carpentry enters into flutes; for each art must use its tools, and the soul its body.37

Hence the approach of Aristotle is founded not on a dialectical tension of body and soul as opposite principles, as in the controlling myth of "exile and return", but on distinguishing them as contrasting aspects of the same organism discoverable by biological and psychological analysis. Soul is no longer a self-existing entity, but a feature of all types of living matter.38

For the body is not one of the factors existing in the subject; rather it is as the subject and the matter. It is necessary, then, that the soul be a substance in the sense of the specifying principle of a physical body potentially alive. Now, substance (in this sense) is act; it will therefore be the act of a body of this sort.

If there is any one generalization to be made for any and every soul, the soul will be the primary act of a physical bodily organism.39

Soul is now viewed as the intelligible configuration of the functions and activities of each organism; it is not identical with total life, but is rather the principle and power of life. Moreover, every organism can be understood as developing between boundaries of decay and growth, generation and destruction. For Aristotle, the soul is not only the 'integrator', the principle of the structural unity of the organism, but the 'operator', -- the principle of its developmental efficiency and purposiveness.
Aristotle thus views the organism as a subject-in-process, the locus in which development takes place. As Jaeger says, in his mature view, Aristotle has discarded virtually all the psycho-physical dualism of Plato; the only part of that doctrine he retained was the belief that pure nous was independent of the body.

All other functions of the soul, such as reflection, love and hate, fear, anger and memory, involve the psycho-physical unity as their substratum, disappear together with it.  

This denial of an opposition between body and soul is an instance of Aristotle's general treatment of contrariety.  

His analysis throughout is developed in specific opposition to all those cosmological theories which, in the Presocratics and Plato, hypostatize a pair of contraries (rarefaction and condensation, love and strife, life and death) as prior to primary substance. Thus Plato's case for reincarnation in the Phaedo rests upon the universal alternation of opposites: good and evil, just and unjust. In all opposites, there is an alternation: anything which becomes greater does so after being less, and conversely: there is perennial increase and diminution. Life and death are related also as opposites: the two are generated from one another as waking is from sleeping, and the souls of the dead exist before and after their incarnation in the living. Aristotle's approach is ontological: it does not appeal to pre-existent cosmological principles, but seeks an understanding of how concrete things came to be. His 'contrariety' is not a fundamental dualism, in which opposites generate each other, but a basis for discerning the extremities between which all processes can be understood as emerging. In every fulfilment of the capacities and potentialities inherent in a substance, a variety of possibilities converge; the extremities delimit the grounds upon which understanding of that process is grounded. These extremities have no import for any implicit dualism; they are the foci of the understanding of emergence. Thus Aristotle's denial of a body-soul dichotomy affirms that both are principles of understanding, generic traits of organisms in development, and not termini between which opposition and transition occurs.

'Coming-to-know' is an instance of a process comprehensible as adjustment and development between contrary poles. Thus sensing is the adjustment of the sensing organ through which
it actualizes in itself the configuration of the sensible objects. Sensation is a coordinated and continuous process, in which the structure of an external object is inceived by the sensory organ. Equally, acts of understanding are developments within the subject: the sensed configuration of the external world constitutes the image within which universal notions can be grasped. Thus cognition is not a sudden intuition or **anamnesis**; it is one more instance of the development of oppositional functions, in the progressive actualization in sensory and intelligent consciousness of the configurations of the sensed object. Soul is naturally at home in the body, and understanding is achieved not by departure from the body, but by the capacity of sensing and understanding to intususcept the features and intelligibility of things around us. We have, in potential, a concordance between our own sensing and intelligence, and the entire world of experience.

**IV**

It is clear that, in freeing cognitional theory from the cosmological implications of the lost-soul myth, Aristotle reoriented the questions of essence and existence. The power of the human intellect that is **nous** is non-existent before it is set in operation by the configuration of the sensed world. Its capacity is not pre-structured by truths gained in previous existence. Aristotle's basic thesis of the objective reality of that which is known by sensing and understanding implies our capacity to know John and Paul as separate existents. The rejection of transmigration is essential to such realism, as Randall observes:

> If **nous** were in any way constitutive, . . . if it had a definite and determinate structure of its own, then men would not transparently 'see' and 'know' what is, without distortion.

Is the tension between the Platonic priority of essences and the Aristotelian analysis of existents to be considered as simply consequent upon their respective treatments of contrariety and thus of evil? Are we suggesting that a hermeneutic of the myths should take the place of systematic philosophy? Ricoeur is himself unable to fulfil such a project. But that is not our intention. Rather, we would affirm that that issue hangs upon the effective recognition of acts of understanding at the heart of Aristotle's cognitional theory.
Aristotle differentiates the original Socratic question, What is it? into two interlocking types of issue, the first empirical -- Is there an X? -- and the second requiring causes or reasons: What is an X? Why is X a Y? That both the latter questions are equivalent is maintained by Aristotle:

The nature of the thing [sc. What is an X?] and the reason of the fact [sc. Why is X a Y?] are identical: the question, "What is an eclipse?" and its answer, "The privation of the moon's light by the interposition of the earth" are identical with the question, "What is the reason of the eclipse?" or, "Why does the moon suffer eclipse?", and the reply, "Because of the failure of light through the earth's shutting it out."

However, as Lonergan points out, this answer only raises a further question. Is it always possible to recast "What is X?" into "Why Y is X?"? For eclipses, or the harmony of two notes, the substitution is obvious. But what is the equivalent of "What is a man?", or "What is a house?"? This is the point at which Aristotle acknowledges insights into sensed images of sensible data, at the heart of that process of coming-to-identity with the known whose structure we have already outlined. Imagine being on the moon at the moment of eclipse, he suggests. Then we should not need to ask about either the fact or the reason of the eclipse: out of the conjunction of the suitable images, we should immediately grasp the universal reason why eclipses occur. Grasping the reason is not an immediate vision or intuition: it occurs when the data are in suitable constellation: just as we see the point of a geometrical theorem when the necessary construction is inserted in the figure.

Pursuing the issue, "Is there a question equivalent to 'What is a man?' or 'What is a house?'", Lonergan finds the clue in the psychological fact of intelligent insights into sensible images. For the cause, the "why X is a Y", is itself the universal reason which is grasped in an act of insight. Such is the act of understanding in which we discern in sensed data -- limbs, face, speech, language -- a unifying meaning, expressed in the declaration that this body is human. The answer to the question, "Why is this body human?" can then be given: because its potential life is brought to actuality by soul as its specifying principle. Thus the affirmation of soul as the "intelligible configuration of the functions and activities of the organism" is not grounded in any anterior rejection of the myth of the lost soul; rather, it is made
possible through the occurrence of an act of insight in the inquirer's mind.

This view will appear circular, or worse, to the subject in whom there is no conscious acknowledgement of acts of insight. Lonergan's argument openly acknowledges this: its truth depends not on the comparison of concepts, but on the exploration of one's own mind; as with Augustine, the mind's own self-knowledge is basic.\(^3\) If this self-knowledge is made the cornerstone of interpretation, however, the issues can be concisely stated:

For the Platonist, knowing is primarily a confrontation: it supposes the duality of knower and known, . . . which appears in Plato's inference that because we know ideas, therefore ideas subsist.

For the Aristotelian, on the other hand, confrontation is secondary. Primarily and essentially knowing is perfection, act, identity. For the intellectualist, obviously, it is impossible to confuse the Aristotelian form with the Platonic idea. Form is the \textit{ousia} that is not a universal, but a cause of being.

On the cognitional side, form is known in knowing the answer to the question, Why are the sensible data to be conceived as one thing, of a man, of a house? But knowing why and knowing the cause are descriptions of the act of understanding . . . Aristotle replaced mythical Platonic \textit{anamnesis} by psychological fact, and, to describe the psychological fact, eliminated the subsistent ideas to introduce formal causes in material things.\(^2\)

\section{V}

If now we return to the contrast between the Socratic/Platonic approach to ethics and the Aristotelian, we find that the psychology of intelligence in action is central to Aristotle's reformulation. The force of Plato's concern is the need for ideal reference, in the face of the inability of traditional beliefs to meet the challenge of scepticism and relativism. It is the very urgency of this concern that underlies his treatment of knowledge of the good as primarily a confrontation.

The final thing to be perceived in the intelligible realm, and perceived only with difficulty, is the absolute form of Good; once seen, it is inferred to be responsible for everything right and good, producing in the visible realm light, and the source of light and being, in the intelligible realm itself, one source of reality and intelligence. And anyone who is going to act rationally in public or in private must perceive it.\(^3\)

It is in this consciousness of the good that man achieves
self-transcendence, and thus his distinctness from the realms of cyclical natural process and social relativism. Insofar as the bulk of the population lacks the philosophic training to discern the truth of the dialectic, Plato concerned himself increasingly with the use of myth to reorient their affections and imagination beyond their immediate horizon to the absoluteness of reason and the good.

Aristotle was as persuaded as Plato that right action needs to be grounded in universal ends. He concluded that these ends cannot be derived from empirical study of prevailing institutions and traditional mores. But Aristotle’s attention was directed to the task of locating the occurrence of rational ordering of conduct within the psychology of the person oriented to the good. As Anton comments,

Plato’s error is not in what he trusted; it lies in what he neglected to do. It was Aristotle the natural scientist, the philosopher without a speculative cosmology, and the social scientist without the sleepless zeal of the patriot and social reformer, who brought the Platonic tradition in ethics to its natural conclusion. With Plato he agreed that ethics required reason for its autonomy and society for its context of practice, but reason itself had a natural history.54

Thus, though Aristotle concurs that the life of reason is the true goal of man, nevertheless reason has a history. As intellect gradually emerges in the life of an individual, deliberation begins to establish habits of preference and action which are such as to enable the person to subordinate the appetites of the other faculties and achieve a life of reason. Thus the process of moral development can be understood as the gradual application of intellect to the task of resolving the conflict of desires:

The origin of action -- its efficient, not its final cause -- is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellec itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes makes for an end...55

Thus, whereas Aristotle concurs with Plato in ascribing to self-transcending reason the source of all true moral orientation, his attention is directed to the concrete analysis of the struggle to achieve that goal.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs
virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result ...[but] one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well.\textsuperscript{56}

His analysis is not dualistic; although virtue has to seek the mean between excess and privation, rashness and cowardice, anxiety and carelessness, yet right action is not a compromise between extremes. Rather, it is the reasoned discernment of the best response to the possibilities of action.

Virtue then is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.\textsuperscript{57}

Constant vigilance of intellect is needed to sustain pursuit of the mean; the good person's qualities are not fixed points, otherwise he would be a moral dogmatist. Rather, his decisions pay due attention to all the particular features of a situation, seeking to discern the good within an understanding of the truth of the situation, and to resist the irrational call of the appetites.

Sensitive imagination is found in other animals ... but the deliberative only in rational beings. For to deliberate whether to do this or that is the work of reason; ... and this is why the irrational animals are thought not to have opinions; they lack that which derives from reasoning; which, indeed, involves opinion. For this reason, appetite is without deliberation.

For we praise the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright, and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle.\textsuperscript{58}

We have seen how Aristotle's cognitional theory rests on the replacement of the soteriological assumptions of anamnesis with a self-attentive account of the psychology of insight; he accounts for knowledge not by contact or confrontation, but from the operations of intelligence within us. Equally, the reason why we discern the good is within us:

Practical wisdom then must be a reasoned and true state of a capacity to act with regard to human goods.\textsuperscript{59}

Newman's account is apt:

An ethical system may supply laws, general rules, guiding principles ... but who is to apply them to a particular case? Whither can we go, except to the living intellect, our own, or another's? The authoritative oracle, which
is to decide our path, is something more searching and manifold than such jejune notions as treatises can give, which are most distinct and clear when we least need them. It is seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty that are personal to him.

Once the activity of reflective intelligence is distinguished, the task of political philosophy follows as the analysis of the very environment that allows man to engage his intelligence as a determinate activity. The political life is the proper context for all his ethical activities; each citizen, by bringing his intelligence into play, discerns opportunities for cooperation and initiative for the good of all.

Why does Voegelin so resist this project of bringing into conscious reflection and assigning symbols to the psychological elements of the life which seeks to order itself to the good? Why does he accuse Aristotle of reducing the Platonic eros towards the agathon to "delight in cognitive action for its own sake?" Why does he believe that Aristotle's whole orientation is a relapse in the generation after Plato, treating his symbols as if they were concepts referring to a datum of sense-experience? Could it be that, in sharing Plato's primary concern to explicate the truth of man's order to the transcendent, Voegelin has erred similarly, not in what he trusts, but in what he leaves unanalyzed -- the recurring cycle of acts of understanding and right judgment in which the soul exercises its vigilance, thus living out its openness towards the good?

At its root, this is a question of whether the experience of participation in transcendent reality can be understood without treating its elements as if they were identifiable entities within immanent experience. The publication of Voegelin's autobiographical manuscript reveals the depth of his attraction to the thought of William James, and the extent to which he shares James's disdain for 'systems' in philosophy, the disparagement of the 'thinness' of 'vicious intellectualism', and the correlative preference for the 'thickness' of the whole of experience as the indispensable foundation of philosophizing. Perhaps then we should detect Jamesian overtones in Voegelin's estimate that the fullness of experience which Plato expressed in his myth is in Aristotle reduced to the conception of God as the unmoved mover, as the noesis noeseos, the thinker on thinking.
If on the other hand we take the psychology of Aristotle to be, not a representative of participation which is deformed by hypostatizing one of its poles, but as a fuller differentiation of participating consciousness, then we are able to affirm knowing to be, not confrontation, but identity in act. The way is then open to extrapolate as Lonergan does from insights into images, to posit not a thinking thinker but a pure understanding in whom essence and existence are identical. The way is also open for the political philosopher to grasp the distinctness of existence of persons and communities, and to understand the extent to which they are achieving, through intellectual deliberation, their true goal in acknowledging the sovereignty of the good.

NOTES


3 Aristotle, Politics I, 1252a. 23; III, 1-13 (1274b.1-1284b.34).


7 Plato, Laws, 716e.

8 Heraclitus, B.54.

9 Eric Voegelin, New Science of Politics, p. 69.


11 Ibid., pp. 55 ff.; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b. 33.

12 Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, p. 105.

1. Ibid., p. 275.

2. Ibid., p. 276.

3. Ibid., p. 276, citing Aristotle, *De Anima* III.5; *Politics* VII, 2, 1324a.

4. Ibid., p. 356.


6. Ibid., pp. 75-76.


8. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

9. Ibid., p. 70.


12. Ibid., p. 287.


18. Ibid., pp. 300-301.


20. Phaedo 80b.


CONFRONTATION AND UNDERSTANDING


42 Ibid., pp. 125, 133, 165.

43 Aristotle, De Anima 429a 22-31; 431b 20 - 432a 14.


48 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 2, 90a 27-30; Metaphysics 1051a 22 ff.


50 Aristotle, De Anima II, 1, 412a 20.

51 Lonergan, Verbum, p. 184.


53 Plato, Republic 517c.


55 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1098b 30 - 1099a 3; 1139a 32 - 1139b 2.

56 Ibid., 1098b 30 - 1099a 3.

57 Ibid., 1106b 36 - 1107a 3.

58 Aristotle, De Anima 434a 2-10; Nicomachean Ethics 1102b 13-18.

59 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1140b 19.


61 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1099b 30-33, 1102a 12-15.


63 Ibid., p. 277.

64 Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p. 172.

65 Voegelin, OH III, p. 276.

66 Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 182, 184.
This paper is a greatly revised version of a lecture that I delivered first at Loyola University in New Orleans in 1978 and then at the 1979 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College. The revision derives from subsequent and fuller reflection on the situations addressed and evoked by a contemporary Christian systematic theology. A summary of the results of this reflection is given in the first part of the paper. It is followed by a description of the development of intelligent, rational, and existential consciousness that would be required to meet this situation. Then the plausibility crisis of the contemporary academy is discussed in the light of the educational ideals proposed in the preceding section. The paper concludes with a proposal for a four-year liberal curriculum oriented to the development needed to meet the situation. This final section may serve more either as a regulative ideal or as the starting-point for a discussion than as a set of practical prescriptions that could readily be implemented just as they stand.

The Situation

In the second chapter of Method in Theology, Lonergan offers us a hierarchy of values whose ascending order, it seems, is determined by the degree of self-transcendence to which we are carried at each level.

"... We may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world."
The situation that would be addressed by a contemporary Christian systematic theology, as well as the anticipated situation which such a theology would evoke, can be understood best by disengaging some of the relations that obtain among the levels of value, and by employing this disengagement to understand both the breakdown of the integrity of human valuation that characterizes the present situation and the integrity itself that would constitute the situation to be evoked.

Among the relations that obtain in the hierarchy of values we may specify a relation from below upwards of differentiation and creativity and a relation from above downwards of conditioning and enablement. Thus a problem in the recurrent realization or effective distribution of vital values may give rise to the questions that, if pursued, would lead to new technological, economic, and political institutions at the level of social values. For these institutions to be promotive of a good of order that is truly worth while, they must respect the two principles of change that constitute the integral dialectic of community: the spontaneity of human intersubjectivity and the practical agency that is responsible for the maintenance and transformation of the organization of human affairs. If Method in Theology states the function of culture to be one of discovering, expressing, validating, criticizing, correcting, developing, and improving the meanings and values that inform a given way of life, Insight makes it clear that the ulterior purpose of such refinements lies in the integrity of the dialectic of community. More concretely, the development and implementation of new technological, economic, and political institutions may prove to be impossible short of a transformation of the cultural values informing a society's way of life. Culture functions at the two levels of everyday transactions and reflexive, superstructural objectification. But for it to function with integrity at either level there is required the integrity of self-transcending persons originating values in themselves and their milieu, and inspiring and inviting others to do likewise. And sustained personal integrity is impossible without a living relationship of partnership and love with the absolutely transcendent source and goal of the human exigence for true meaning and real goodness, and so without the effective realization of religious values.

This relationship of differentiation and creativity
from below upwards in the scale of values obviously implies a relationship of conditioning and enablement from above downwards. Religious values condition the possibility of personal integrity. Personal integrity conditions the possibility of the integrity of culture at both the superstructural and the infrastructural levels. The integrity of culture conditions the possibility of a social order that exists and functions in accord with the integral dialectic of community. And only such a social order renders possible the effectively recurrent distribution of vital values to the whole community.

The situation that a contemporary systematic theology would address, which in the present paper is considered also as the situation within which liberal education takes place, must be thought of in global terms. For the problem of the effective distribution of vital values is a global one, to be solved only by the creation and development of political, economic, and technological structures constructed from within such a global perspective. Such a solution is impossible without the crosscultural generation of such cultural values as could initiate, promote, and maintain the integral dialectic of community, and this in a global network of communities that would provide a genuine alternative to globally pervasive distortions of the scale of values. Such crosscultural communication will break down without the discovery and implementation of the crosscultural constituents of personal integrity that lie in the transcendental imperatives constituting the levels of human consciousness and in the refined affectivity necessary to be faithful to these imperatives. Finally, the implementation of these imperatives by truly attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving subjects in community demands their cooperation with God in working out not our solution, but his, to our problem of evil: a cooperation that, given the global context of the present situation, would be furthered by the dialogue of world religions.5

The principal agents of the global distortions of the scale of values are the various representatives of centralized state socialism that take their inspiration from one or other interpretation of Marx, and the network of disintegration spawned by multinational corporational capitalism. The structure of the distortions operative in Marxist states parallels that found in capitalist societies.6 And the conflict between
these two imperialistic networks is as productive of disintegra-

tion as are the distortions themselves that constitute
each system of imperial ambition taken singly. The situation
within which a liberal education today would take place,
then, may be characterized largely in terms of global distor-
tions of the integral hierarchy of values, due in great mea-
sure to the exploits of competing and escalating imperial
ambitions. A liberal education would be oriented to mediating
the cultural values constitutive of an anticipated alternative
situation in which the integrity of the scale of values would
be the effectively operative norm of procedure.

Cosmopolis

1. The Problem

There is at least one problem in our articulation of
the relations among the various levels of value that needs
further treatment. Its contours become clear if we reflect
on two opposed tendencies in contemporary political philosophy.
Liberal democratic and Marxist political philosophies may
be considered together, in so far as they reveal either a
neglect of or a scepticism regarding the autonomy of religious,
personal, and cultural values, and a tendency to collapse
at least the effectively operative scale into the two more
basic levels of vital and social values. Political philosophies
which draw their inspiration from the classical tradition,
on the other hand, emphasize the upper reaches of the scale
of values but tend to neglect the more basic everyday-cultural
and especially the social and vital values. In either case
what is missed is the conditioning link between the superstruc-
ture and the infrastructure of society. Thus classically
inspired political philosophies maintain a conversion position
regarding praxis, whereas liberal and especially Marxist
orientations stress social-structural transformation; and
each praxis position is suspicious of the other. The relations
among religious, personal, and cultural values and the rela-
tions between social and vital values are easier to grasp
and assent to than is the relation of the three higher levels
to the two more basic levels. If our position on the scale
of values is to be accepted, then, we must establish that
the relation that obtains between authentic cultural values and
justice in the social order is every bit as firm as those
that hold between other levels of value.
Our position regarding the levels of value and their relations is a component in a philosophy of world-constitutive praxis. From this perspective we may discern a blind spot in classically inspired political philosophies. Correcting this inadequacy may enable us to solve the larger problem of grasping the firm relation of conditioning and enablement that must obtain between the superstructure and the infrastructure of a healthy society. For, while classically inspired political philosophies do affirm correctly that the social order is a derivative of cultural values, they neglect to ascertain that breakdowns in the social order may signal a demand for more than simply a reaffirmation and reappropriation of the cultural values of the classical tradition. The latter values, while by and large valid, especially when retrieved by such a sensitive thinker as Eric Voegelin, may have to be sublated into an entirely new horizon that institutes a quite novel set of cultural values commensurate with the dimensions of the social problem. This becomes particularly the challenge when the social order is a global network of "if-then" relationships. The global nature of our contemporary social order calls for the development of a new set of cultural values as the condition of the possibility of a just global social order. This new set of cultural values must be crossculturally generated and must consist in a higher synthesis of the various regionally delimited cultural traditions participating in the institution of a crosscultural community. Moreover, applying the same principle of creativity and differentiation from below upwards among the levels of value, a major transformation at the level of personal value, a transformation measured by the proportions set by the task of the crosscultural generation of cultural values, will be required, in the form of the self-appropriation of the invariant and so crosscultural constituents of human integrity. And this personal transformation will call for a reconstitution of religious experience itself in the form of a willingness that is not only universal, in the sense in which Lonergan employs this term, but explicitly and thematically ecumenic in its orientation toward the emergence, promotion, and survival of a world-cultural communitarian alternative to the distortions of the dialectic of community emergent from the agents of imperialism. These creative differentiations at the levels of cultural, personal,
and religious values set the context for a concrete discussion and application of the higher viewpoint that Lonergan calls cosmopolis, and this higher viewpoint defines the objective of an adequate contemporary liberal education.

Lonergan speaks of a divinely originated solution to the mystery of evil, a solution informed by the following three components:

a) "a renovation of will that matches intellectual detachment and aspiration;"

b) "a new and higher collaboration of intellects through faith in God;"

c) "a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended." Our concern at present is primarily with the new and higher collaboration of intellects through faith in God, that is, with a religiously and theologically transformed cosmopolis. The mystery of evil confronts us today in part in the spectre of a post-historic humanity as the limit or end result of the series of ever less comprehensive syntheses in the understanding and organization of human affairs: a series that is rooted in the exclusively instrumentalized rationality emergent from the general bias of common sense. Cosmopolis provides the corrective to general bias; but, as a higher viewpoint in the mind, it is dependent upon an actual higher integration in the being of those informed by it, upon a universal willingness that renders possible the effective freedom to collaborate in the institution of a world-cultural humanity.

We must analyze the general characteristics of this cosmopolitan collaboration before applying our understanding of cosmopolis to the current situation with its invitation to, and indeed exigence for, the crosscultural generation of the cultural values of a global communitarian alternative to imperialism.

2. The General Features of Cosmopolis

Cosmopolis is a development of intelligence that grounds a collaborative enterprise of subjects committed to understanding, affirming, and implementing the integral dialectic
of community. We can perhaps best move to an understanding of the dialectic of community if we begin by differentiating the several components of society.

I follow David Tracy in employing the term, society, as a broad generic term encompassing several more specific dimensions. But while Tracy differentiates society into the three components of the technoeconomic order, the polity, and culture, I find it more exact, first, to accept from Karl Marx a distinction of technological institutions (Marx's "forces of production") from the economic system (Marx's "relations of production"), to add with Lonergan yet another dimension, that of intersubjective spontaneity or primordial human intersubjectivity, and to distinguish two dimensions to culture: the everyday and the reflexive. Society, then, consists of the five dimensions of spontaneous intersubjectivity, technological institutions, the economic system, the legal and political domain, and culture, where culture is a matter of both everyday meanings and values and reflexive objectifications of everyday transactions. The actually functioning dialectic of community is constituted by the relations that obtain among these components of society. The dialectic is integral when the relations are sound, and distorted when they are awry. The issue, then, is one of determining the constitution of sound relations among these dimensions of society.

Now, the progress or decline of a society is to be understood in relation to the development or maldevelopment of the person as a dramatic artist. We may interpret the relations in the following way: first, the desire to make of one's life, one's relations with others, and one's world a work of art, by discovering and following in freedom the direction to be found in the movement of life, is more readily fulfilled to the extent that the social conditions that stimulate personal change allow for and foster the use and development of intelligence and the exercise of freedom, and is subject to frustration to the extent that the factors of understanding and freedom are restricted by the mechanisms of psychological conditioning, social absurdity, and in the limit totalitarian control; second, a society will transcend the grip of chance or fate or destiny, of conditioning, bias, and control, to the extent that the persons who compose it are exercising intelligence and freedom in genuinely forging
a work of art as they constitute their world, their relations with others, and concomitantly themselves; third, this is not a vicious circle, for the process of society has a certain dominance over that of the individual, who is born into, raised in, and stimulated by the already given social situation: the culture, the polity, the economic realities, the technological institutions, and the habits of sensitive spontaneity that prevail in the person's society; and fourth, conditions of cultural, political, and general social decline pose a special problem: how is the decline to be reversed if the development of the individuals who might initiate and promote the reversal is so intimately conditioned by social realities? Only the formation of a creative minority that grasps what is going forward, understands its roots, anticipates its consequences, and decides to resist it and to offer an alternative, seems to be adequate to the realities of major decline. And the roots of such decline lie in the perversion of intelligence, the neglect of the sensitive psyche, and the misuse of freedom that all are involved in what Lonergan calls general bias.

Effective resistance, then, demands the development of the intellectual, psychic, and moral capacities that can meet the decline at its roots. Lonergan's project of the self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness is in the interests of precisely such a development. Cosmopolis is Lonergan's term for the relevant development especially of intelligence. Its commitment is to the understanding and implementation of the integral dialectic of community.

The integral dialectic of community is a function of a taut balance between two linked but opposed principles of change: spontaneous intersubjectivity and the practical intelligence that institutes a good of social order. Practical intelligence is responsible for three of the dimensions of society: technology, the economic system, and the political order. The relation of these dimensions with spontaneous intersubjectivity is a function proximately of the everyday, and remotely of the reflexive, level of culture. The infra-structure of a healthy society is constituted by the dimensions of intersubjectivity, practicality, and the everyday level of culture. The reflexive level of culture constitutes the society's superstructure. The condition of the possibility of the integrity of the dialectic between spontaneous inter-
subjectivity and the technological, economic, and political arrangements instituted by practical intelligence is culture, in both its everyday and its reflexive components. A cosmopolitan intelligence thus assumes as its responsibility the integrity of culture in both of its dimensions. Its principal task lies in the transformation and integration of the sciences and scholarly disciplines that constitute the reflexive level of culture. But it must envision as well a transformation and integration of the myriad instances of common sense. Cosmopolitan intelligence, then, will inform an intellectual collaboration that assumes the integrity of culture as its principal responsibility and that implements this responsibility through a reorientation especially of the human sciences and of common-sense practicality, so as to promote in society and history an integral dialectic between spontaneous intersubjectivity and the practical constitution of technological, economic, and political institutions.

The reorientation of the sciences will be grounded in a new science that disengages the constitutive features of integral intelligence, rationality, and responsibility, and that reorients, I believe, first of all the science of the sensitive psyche and of the unconscious on the basis of its appropriation of intellectual, rational, and moral genuineness. The reorientation of common sense would emerge as a post-interiority mentality influenced by the reorientation of culture promoted by the science of interiority. Cosmopolis, then, assumes responsibility for the integrity of culture by devoting itself to three interrelated functions: the elaboration of a science of human interiority; the consequent reorientation of the human sciences; and the reorientation of the everyday level of culture through the promotion and development of a post-interiority mentality at the level of common sense. The central notion in the reorientation of human science will be, I believe, the tension of limitation and transcendence, which at the level of the dialectic of the subject obtains in the relations between neural demand functions and the censorship, and at the level of the dialectic of community in the relations between spontaneous intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. Every instance of an integral dialectic of limitation and transcendence depends on a synthesis that stands above either pole. Thus the dialectic of intersubjectivity and practicality depends on culture,
and that of psychic spontaneity and dramatic intelligence on universal willingness; and so the grounds of reorienting human science in accord with that tension lie in an appropriation of that tension itself in the psychic and intellectual conversions constitutive of the science of interiority. The intellectual collaboration instituted by cosmopolitan intelligence thus

... stands on a basic analysis of the compound-intensity that is man; it confronts problem of which men are aware; it invites the vast potentialities and pent-up energies of our time to contribute to their solution by developing an art and a literature, a theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and help they need and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense.¹⁰

3. Cosmopolis Today

We remarked earlier that the dialectic of political philosophies -- at least of liberal and Marxist philosophies, on the one hand, and classically inspired positions on the other -- could be resolved by strengthening the link between cultural and social values; for this is the point at which all of these philosophies depart from a position consistent with the integral dialectic of community. And we suggested that this link can be strengthened by correcting a blind spot in the classically inspired political philosophies. These philosophies correctly maintain that the social order is a derivative of cultural values. But they do not grasp the isomorphism that is demanded between the proportions of the social problem and the differentiated inclusiveness demanded of the cultural values that would meet it. The global nature of the contemporary problem of social order calls for a crossculturally generated set of cultural values that consists in a higher synthesis of various regionally defined cultural traditions. This ecumenic set of cultural values will depend on the self-appropriation of the transcultural intentional and psychic constituents of human integrity, and thus on as thorough a retrieval as possible of

1) the prehistoric rhythms of psychic process,

2) the history-constituting operations of autonomous intentionality,

and 3) the tension of limitation and transcendence, of psyche and intentionality, that constitutes the integral dialectic
of the subject, and that is the core of authentic personal values.

The regionally defined cultural traditions that would constitute the heritage of a world-cultural humanity may, for purposes of clarity, be differentiated into cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological variants. The task of cosmopolis today is to generate a set of cultural values that is a function of the integration of these three distinct disclosures regarding the direction to be found in the movement of life. More precisely, it seems that the basic dialectic here is between cosmological and anthropological truth, and the integrity of the dialectic is a function of the soteriological vector that moves from above downwards in human consciousness.

The cosmological societies regarded the recurrent events of nature, often linked with intracosmic divinities, as what from a more differentiated perspective may be called the prime analogate of order. The order of reality moves from nature to society, and from society to the individual. Thus a society is invested with integrity to the extent that its order is a participation in and reenactment or embodiment of the cosmic order; and the individual is invested with integrity if he or she takes one's allotted place in a society whose order is dictated by cosmic process.

In the anthropological symbolizations the order of being undergoes a dramatic shift, so dramatic that it is spoken of by Karl Jaspers and others as axial. The measure of order now becomes a world-transcendent divine reality, and order in society arises from that divine reality's attracting force within the minds and hearts of individuals. The society then takes on integrity to the extent that it is composed of persons of integrity, where personal integrity is a matter of responding to those inclinations that draw one to attunement with the world-transcendent ground of order, and of rejecting those inclinations that draw one away from such attunement. The relationship between individual and society is shifted from what it was in the cosmological societies. There the society was patterned after the cosmos, and the individual after the society. The cosmos was the measure of integrity for the society, and the society the measure of integrity for the individual. In the anthropological societies the divinity is the measure of the integrity of the individual,
and the attuned individual the measure of the integrity of the society.

An integral world-cultural community would be informed by the dialectic of cosmological and anthropological truth. Not only is each mode of symbolization an expression of insights attained in humanity's search for direction in the movement of life. The cosmological mode is not simply superseded by the anthropological. It retains its validity in areas not covered by the anthropological differentiation: a validity that once again is being acknowledged in the development of an ecological sensitivity to the limits imposed by nature on human exploitation, domination, and control.

Human individuals and cultures share an irreplaceable partnership in being with nonhuman nature, a partnership expressed in cosmological modes of symbolization, a partnership, finally, whose loss generates falsehood in human self-understanding and alienation in world- and self-constitution. The truth of this partnership is still available in the spontaneous psychic symbols that Jung calls archetypal: symbols taken from nature and imitating nature and so expressing our intimate participation in the schemes of recurrence of the material cosmos. The anthropological differentiation, on the other hand, is a recognition of certain dimensions of the truth about humanity that the cosmological or archetypal horizon is too compact to encompass. Our native capacity for transcendence is world-transcendent. As such it is differentiated in Greece by philosophy and in the Orient by the praxis of affective detachment. Voegelin conjectures that it takes a cultural crisis to awaken this recognition, which can arise when cosmologically ordered societies break down and so lose trust in cosmic order as a measure of integrity. Then the human soul ordered by attunement to the unseen measure becomes the criterion, sometimes even the model, of a social order rightly attuned to the sacred order of being. The integrity of the soul measures the integrity of the society, and God measures the integrity of the soul. Our participation in the rhythms and processes of nonhuman nature remains intact, but it is no longer the ultimate source of the integrity of our partnership in being and so the measure of the rightness of our search for direction in the movement of life.

The integral dialectic of cosmological and anthropological truth joins the dialectic of the subject between neural
demands and the censorship and the dialectic of community between spontaneous intersubjectivity and practicality as an instance of the tension of limitation and transcendence that characterizes all genuine development in the concrete universe of being. The source of the integrity of the dialectic of the subject lies in neither of its two poles taken singly but in universal willingness. The source of the integrity of the dialectic of community lies not in intersubjectivity nor in practicality but in culture. So too, the source of the integrity of the dialectic of cosmological and anthropological truth -- let us call it the dialectic of culture -- lies in neither of its two poles taken singly and in independence of the other, but in the transformative soteriological vector in consciousness whose differentiation constitutes in part the disclosive element in the events of divine revelation in Israel and Christianity.

Anthropological differentiation displays the emergence of the individual ego, its dissociation from the collective identifications of the cosmologically ordered societies. These collective identifications are twofold: the identification of the individual with the people and the identification of the people with the cosmos. These two forms of nonindividuation can be understood in an interiorly differentiated mode in terms of Jung's notions, respectively, of collective consciousness and the collective unconscious. They still threaten the individuation of the person, but that threat is now acknowledged as an impediment to order rather than as the source of order. The individual is expected to differentiate between self and group and to assume personal responsibility for his or her own insights, judgments, and decisions. We are further expected to differentiate the agency of these intentional operations from the cosmic energetic connections that link the human body to the nonhuman universe and that make archetypal symbolism such a perennial human phenomenon. Archetypal symbols are hindrances to individuation, however, only if one identifies with them or regards them as ultimate. They facilitate individuation if negotiated by an intelligence, rationality, and existential freedom that is distinct from the energetic sources out of which these symbols arise. Anthropological truth is the source of the differentiation of such intelligence, rationality, and freedom. But cosmological truth preserves a place in the unfolding of integral development,
due to the abiding validity of the archetypal. An analysis of the soteriological vector would show its therapeutic efficacy vis-à-vis a displacement in either direction of the tension between cosmological rootedness and anthropological emancipation. A displacement toward the cosmological dehistorizes our participation in being by linking us too compactly with the schemes of recurrence of nonhuman nature. A displacement toward the anthropological results in a loss of the myth as a constitutive feature of human self-understanding, and so in a sacrifice of consciousness as participatory luminosity to consciousness as world-constitutive intentionality. At its extreme, this displacement immanentizes the world-transcendent measure. It usurps the prerogatives of divinity. Ultimately it sacrifices the agency of the individual responsible for his or her own questions, insights, judgments, and decisions to the instruments of a potentially totalitarian power. Such a power absorbs personal responsibility into a new form of collectivism, one modelled now not on the cosmos but on the efficiently functioning machine, and objectifies its aspiration in social structures that invade the total fabric of human life like a creeping cancer.

In my most recent work, I have been attempting to develop an argument that it will be the role of a constructive contemporary systematic theology to disclose the therapeutic function of the soteriological vector vis-à-vis cosmological and anthropological displacements, and so the conditioning function of religious values on the integral dialectic of culture. Such a theology would function as a constitutive element in a cosmopolitan education. But our subject at the moment is not theology but education itself: the education that would mediate the integrity of culture to a situation that calls for a world-cultural integration of the dialectic of cosmological and anthropological truth as the condition of the possibility of a global order that is in harmony with the integral dialectic of community, and thus promotive of the equitable distribution of vital values to the whole human community.

The Academy: A Crisis of Plausibility

In Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations I called attention to the way in which the potential plateau of intellectual synthesis achieved particularly in the work
of Aquinas never became a consolidated basis for the further differentiating advances effected through the discoveries and methods of modern science, modern historical scholarship, and the two phases of the philosophic Enlightenment regarding, first, cognitive interiority and then world-constitutive praxis. The breakdown of the medieval synthesis was due largely to its employment of the Aristotelian notion of science as true and certain knowledge of the universal and necessary and to the intellectual disasters consequent upon Scotistic conceptualism. These inherent weaknesses at the heart of scholasticism prevented it from grounding a higher existential synthesis from which the speculative synthesis of Aquinas could be both integrated into a base of world-constitutive agency and internally criticized in dialectic with modern advances in science, history, and philosophy. The result of the conceptualistic derailment of the medieval achievement is the series of ever less comprehensive syntheses in cognitive and existential praxis that Lonergan calls the longer cycle of decline. The scale of values has been operatively reduced to the objects of sensitive desires and to the social order whose purpose it is to assure the recurrent satisfaction of such desires. The surrender of our orientation to religious, personal, and cultural values in the face of the demands of shortsighted practicality results as well in a disharmonious and nonsequential, incongruous and nonrhythmic distortion of the flow of our sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses, in a dissociation of the complexes of our psychic energy, and so in a sequence of less comprehensive syntheses in personal living.

A genuine liberal education must be concerned with reversing this decline in the dialectics of the subject and of community. The distorted dialectics today manifest principally a displacement of the tension of limitation and transcendence in the direction of transcendence. Ironically, the neglect of limitation unduly limits the genuine transcendence of the human spirit, thus reducing the operative scale of values to a practical conspiracy between the levels of vital and social values. A contemporary liberal education would include an interpretative reconstruction of the historical constructions of the human spirit, of the intentional and psychic orientations out of which these constructions arose, and
of the world opened up in front of these constructions. But it would engage its participants as well in the cumulative construction of a critical and normative human science that enables us to mediate not only from the past into the present but more radically and foundationally from the present into the future, on the basis of a thoroughgoing appropriation of the psychic and intentional roots of the tension of limitation and transcendence. Both mediations must occur in the context of a fundamental critique of the present situation as a resultant of the distorted dialectics of the subject, community, and culture. And both must be grounded in an explanatory self-appropriation of the tension of limitation and transcendence through the psychic and intellectual conversions that constitute the science of interiority. The appropriation of cultural acquisitions must not be merely a fusion of conversational horizons, much less a function of common-sense eclecticism, but an evaluative or dialectical hermeneutic that, while allowing no past achievements to be forgotten, pushes them relentlessly to the transformations through which they can assume their appropriate place in the integral constitution of a global network of communities capable of providing an alternative to the distortions of the dialectic of community. The mediation from the present into the future, which is partly grounded in the appropriation, integration, and transformation of cultural acquisitions, is an implementation of the exigencies generated by what, following others, we will call the second phase of the Enlightenment: exigencies not only to clarify but also to effect the integrity of our cognitive and existential praxis.

The question of academic integrity is a question of fidelity to the normative scale of values as the source of an intellectual focus. An academy not so focussed is guilty on a massive institutional scale of the major surrender of intelligence that is the principal agent of the longer cycle of decline. Such an academy capitulates to one of two aberrations: either the ideological ruse that defines excellence in terms of proficiency within a distorted dialectic of community, or the escape of culture into the ivory tower of ever more dilletantish conceptualistic glass-bead games. In either case the academy is contributing only to the perpetuation of schemes of recurrence that are victimizing history. Authentic intellectual praxis in the contemporary situation
METHOD

involves the reorientation of common sense and science.\textsuperscript{29} That reorientation today involves not only the liberation of dramatic intersubjectivity and of the practical organization of human affairs from the biases that have generated distortions in the dialectics of subjects, community, and culture; not only the purging from science of confused notions regarding reality, objectivity, knowledge, and value; not only a methodical integration of science derived from and grounded in an affirmation of the structure and implications of normative intentionality; but also the global perspective that would promote a human science and a common sense capable of informing the way of life of a crosscultural network of communities devoted to the integral dialectics of subjects, community, and culture. Structural conditions currently affecting the academy both internally and in its external relations with the economic and governmental institutions of the wider society, however, severely frustrate such an intellectual vocation.

My articulation of an internal critique of the academy has been aided by recent papers by Frederick Lawrence. The modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness has advanced to the recognition of the primacy of authentic praxis -- both cognitive and existential -- over theory. Lawrence finds a turning point from a first to a second phase of the Enlightenment in Kant's second Critique, where the emphasis of modern philosophy shifts from the cognitional activities and claims that preoccupied philosophers from Descartes to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and begins to center around "faith, will, conscience, decision, action."\textsuperscript{33} With this shift there arises a question about the normative significance and limits of the first phase of the Enlightenment. This question emerges as the modern philosophic differentiation moves from interiority as cognitive and technical to interiority as constitutive and practical, as rationally and humanely constituting human history. The second phase of the Enlightenment is related to the concerns of what Lonergan calls dialectic and foundations, where the issues of cognitive, moral, religious, and psychological integrity are the matter under investigation, and where, as Lawrence puts it elsewhere, there ensues a painstaking elaboration and refinement of the assumptions which shape and frame our view of the main issues of living, the ultimate grounds for preferring one
way of life to another, and so the basic alternative standards of political judgment. Lawrence draws on Leo Strauss to argue that "the trajectory of political thought stretching in one wave from Machiavelli through Hobbes, Locke, Smith, and in a second wave from Rousseau through Kant, Hegel, and Marx is rooted in the Machiavellian option to, in Lonergan's formulation, 'develop "realist" views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done.'" But from the standpoint of the concern of the second phase of the Enlightenment to mediate theory and praxis, science's concern for utility so championed by the first phase, its demand for autonomy from philosophy, and its exclusion of questions that cannot be resolved by appeal to observation and experiment simply lend plausibility to "the Machiavellian argument that true answers to the questions how we ought to live are so far removed from how we do in fact live as to be practically or politically irrelevant." On the grounds of the first phase of the Enlightenment alone, as Lawrence shows, politics and morality are completely separated from one another, human ends are privatized, and the common good gives way as the raison d'être of the political order to the purely private vital values of the protection and security of the individual; science itself is manipulatively derailed to serve what Bacon called "the relief of man's estate;" and so knowledge is placed at the service of power; and even Marx, who criticized the bourgeois politics of the first phase of the Enlightenment, never suggested a motivation for revolution other than the maximization of satisfactions, and so failed to transcend the primacy of "economic man" characteristic of the first wave of modern political thought and of bourgeois politics in general. The result, says Lawrence, is that "in both liberal and communist political thought, the classical political orientation which judged the desire for wealth, glory, and freedom to do what one pleased utterly subordinate to the requirements of the good life is turned upside down. The political order is governed strictly in the light of the standards of security, comfort, and disoriented freedom." For our purposes here, this means that to the extent that the academy remains an institution after the mold of the first phase of the Enlightenment, it operates on the assumption that education can proceed without a governing
concern for a series of profound transformations in the presuppositions that shape and frame our view of the main issues of life, in the ultimate grounds for preferring one way of life to another, and so in the basic alternative standards of political judgment and choice; knowledge remains in the service of the relief of the human estate in the realms of security, comfort, and disoriented freedom; and curricula and methodologies neglect the normative exigencies of inquiry and rather treat as normative the facts as they are. To that extent the academy is little more than a finishing school for agents of the longer cycle of decline.

The academy's neglect of the transformative issues of the second phase of the Enlightenment is due not only to its acceptance of an outmoded scientistic methodology, however, but also and perhaps more radically to the wider society's interest in preserving such an epistemology intact. The economic and governmental agencies that support the academy's existence either reject the concerns of the second phase of the Enlightenment or at least do not encourage that they be brought to bear on the unfolding and constitution of the public domain. The academy is not a promising environment for the intellectual vocation of cosmopolitan inquiry, when that inquiry is oriented to reversing the very distortions that keep the academy functioning. The task of developing within the academy the grounds for a cosmopolitan cognitive and existential synthesis that meets the surd of contemporary history at its roots will be a formidable one.

**A Proposed Liberal Curriculum**

Nonetheless, we must dream. I conclude, then, by proposing a liberal curriculum to serve as a point of departure for a discussion that would promote the agency required for cosmopolitan collaboration in the face of the longer cycle of decline. There are two aspects to this curriculum: a hermeneutic and a foundational aspect. The hermeneutic aspect would be guided by an approach somewhat along the lines of the Great Books tradition; but the core of the total educational experience would be found in the foundational aspect. For the cosmopolitan vocation espouses more than an exclusively disclosive notion of truth. Its retrieval of the great constructions of the human spirit is done from the basis of a developing foundational, and so transformative, position
on the integral dialectics of the subject, community, and culture.

The general characteristics of my proposal are as follows. One year of the curriculum here suggested is devoted to the exploration of the current situation in these three dialectics; two years are devoted to a retrieval of how we got to this point; and a final year focusses on the question of where we go from here. The first year centers on awakening the question through the study and dialectical appropriation of the thought-forms of modernity and of their reciprocal relationship with the organization of human affairs at the level of social values. The second and third years would emphasize the study of cosmological and anthropological thought-forms in antiquity and in the development of the major civilizations of the world. The final year would focus on the critical mediation of cognitive and existential praxis from the present into the future, through the articulation and/or exercise of the scientific and philosophic, literary and artistic, political and economic, religious and theological positions and orientations that would evoke the world-cultural alternative to the longer cycle of decline.

Under the semester system, the usual undergraduate curriculum totals something in the neighborhood of 128 hours. I suggest that sixty-four of these hours, or sixteen each year, be devoted to the core curriculum, with support courses being added in accord with the needs of individual students. Eight hours would be devoted each semester to the core curriculum. In the first three years, six of these hours each semester would be concerned with the hermeneutic aspect of the program, and two with the foundational dimension. In the final year, all sixteen hours would be foundational in intent.

In the first year of the program, then, two six-hour hermeneutic courses -- one each semester -- would be taught by an interdisciplinary team of scholars whose expertise enables them to help students not only to study some of the representative primary sources of the modern period in science and philosophy, art and literature, economic and political theory, religion and theology, but also to exercise themselves critically in the intentionality that produced these sources and to grasp the objective correlative of such intentionality at the level of the social order. These two hermeneutic courses
would be divided as follows: in the first semester the course would be devoted to primary sources from the late medieval period (Machiavelli) through the first phase of the Enlightenment; in the second six-hour course, the same approach would cover the period from Kant's second *Critique* to the present. The two foundational courses during the first year -- two hours each semester -- would be devoted to a basic introduction to the self-appropriation of the modern scientific, scholarly, and modern philosophic differentiations of consciousness.

The second and third years of the curriculum are concerned with the course of civilizational history that led humanity into the modern period. In their second year, students would be exercised in retrieving the various differentiations that resulted in what Jaspers and others regard as the axial period in the major civilizations of the world. Four traditions would be studied: the Chinese, the Indian, the Israelite, and the Hellenic. The emphasis would be placed on testing the hypothesis of independently originating axial breakthroughs from cosmological to some form and degree of anthropological and soteriological truth. Students would read in translation primary sources in these traditions, with the explicit intention of disengaging the differentiations among cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological mentalities.

The foundational aspect of the curriculum in the second year, and again in the third, would focus upon furthering students' self-appropriation of intentional consciousness, and upon introducing them to the self-appropriation of symbolic consciousness. An effort would be made to enable them to contrast and relate to one another their symbolic and theoretic procedures. Within the realm of theory, they would be called upon to contrast the modern praxis of scientific intelligence with which they became familiar in their first year with the classical ideals of science expressed in the works of Plato and Aristotle, whom they will study in the second year. Thus their appreciation will be heightened of the characteristic difference between modern and classical thought-forms. An effort would be made, too, to enable the students to discover their own mythopoetic imaginations and to integrate this discovery with their ongoing appropriation of intelligence and rationality. Thus the notions of intellectual and psychic
conversion become central to the foundational dimension of the second and third years.

The hermeneutic theme of the third year of the curriculum would be religion and culture. The axial religions would be studied in greater depth precisely as religions, and attention would be directed to the question of religious dialectic both within the religious traditions taken singly and among them. Presuming that most of the students would come from a Christian background, specific attention would be devoted to the intentionality behind and worlds opened in front of New Testament texts. The relationship of religious to personal and cultural values would be studied. The process of mediating the Christian differentiation in contemporary terms would also be begun, and students would thus be invited to experience what it is to do theology. The question, too, of the development of religious doctrine in the various traditions would be studied, and an effort made to understand the respective manners in which the task of mediating religion and culture eventually had to give rise, at least in some of these religions, to a technical theology distinct but not separate from living religion. The continuing foundational aspect of the third year would include an introduction to the self-appropriation of one's dialectical capacities and of one's religious orientations.

Finally, in the fourth year of the curriculum, emphasis shifts to the predominance of the foundational aspect. The theme of the fourth year is the integration of theory and praxis. The intention is, first, to arrive at an understanding of the options regarding foundational issues that lie behind current methods being employed in various fields; and, second, to move to a resolution of these dialectical conflicts by coming to one's own position on foundational issues. The accent is on being able to give an account of one's own foundational stance. The emphasis shifts from an intellectual life in oratione obliqua, understanding and reporting on what others have said and done, to an intellectual life in oratione recta, saying and doing oneself, mediating the movement from the present into the future.

Obviously, the entire thrust of the curriculum and the intellectual and emotional demands it imposes make it probable that only a small number of students might be able to participate in it. Selecting these students will be difficult. Moreover,
because of the demands upon faculty for individual contact with students, most of the faculty engaged in such a program would have to be freed from other responsibilities. To adopt this kind of curriculum as an alternative option involves, then, at least a rearrangement of financial priorities, if not downright financial sacrifice, on the part of an academic institution. Let me conclude, then, with the persuasion that such sacrifices are called for on the part of educational institutions genuinely devoted to the continuing transformative influence of a humanistic and religious heritage. For the goal of this program is to arrive at the foundations of a new style of interdisciplinary collaboration in the understanding and making of humanity. The hope is that the students would graduate from the program with a commitment to precisely this kind of ongoing collaboration with one another and with their professors -- a commitment, I might add, that is strong enough to enable them to endure the sacrifices that are entailed when one decides to commit one's life and one's intellectual and psychic energies to the reversal of the longer cycle of decline before it reaches the point of no return.

NOTES


3 Ibid., pp. 236-238.


8 Lonergan, Insight, pp. 623-624.

9 Ibid., pp. 238-242.

10 Ibid., pp. 723-724.

11 Ibid., pp. 238-242, 633.
15 Lonergan, Insight, p. 212.
16 Ibid., p. 218.
18 Lonergan, Insight, pp. 472-475.
19 Ibid., pp. 187-196.
20 Ibid., p. 241.
26 Doran, Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, pp. 94-95.
29 Ibid., pp. 398-401.
33 Lawrence, "Political Theology . . .," p. 240.
34 Ibid., p. 242.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNITY
OF LONERGAN'S NOTION OF CONVERSION

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1. The Development of the Notion

I would like to propose a general view of Lonergan's development of the notion of conversion. In such a general view I distinguish three periods. The first or early period is dominated by the works Grace and Freedom and Verbum. In this period, Lonergan was chiefly laboring at the task of "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas." It is in this period that we meet his first reflections on the notion of religious conversion and his first thought on the notion of intellectual conversion. The second or middle period is predominantly influenced by the work Insight. Lonergan moved out of the exclusively Thomist context and addressed the contexts of modern science and philosophy with the question, What do we do when we know? It is in this period that his reflection on the notion of intellectual conversion reached maturity. The third or later period is defined by the work Method in Theology. In this period, Lonergan investigated the notions of meaning, of historicity, and of method. He distinguished intellectual, moral, and religious conversions and related them in terms of various modalities of self-transcendence. These three periods constitute the background against which I propose to trace Lonergan's development of the notion of conversion. Let us now consider each of these periods in some detail.

The first period is dominated by the works Grace and Freedom and Verbum. In Grace and Freedom Lonergan investigated the development of Aquinas' thought on operative grace. The investigation was based on a theory of speculative development. Lonergan contended that speculative theology had developed through generating technical terms from earlier common words and through generating theological theorems from prior common notions. Lonergan maintained that Aquinas' theological procedure was scientific; it was a matter of ordering these terms and theorems into intelligible syntheses.

Centuries earlier Augustine had distinguished between operative and cooperative grace. However, he had made this distinction, not in order to create speculative theology,
but rather in order to meet the immediate challenge of controversies. Augustine did not employ technical terms and theorems; he employed terms which were the common possession of all. Lonergan locates Augustine's reflections, therefore, within a world of common sense apprehension. Nevertheless, he points out that Augustine reveals "such a penetration of thought and understanding that one must affirm the development of speculative theology already to have begun."

Aquinas retained Augustine's distinction between operative and cooperative grace. He further distinguished between habitual and actual grace. Moreover, such distinctions were not drawn to meet an immediate controversy, but rather they emerged from and were defined in terms of a theology oriented towards speculative coherence and comprehensiveness. In the specific case of conversion, Aquinas met the difficulties involved in reconciling God's grace and human liberty with a precise theological tool -- the scientific theorem. He subordinated specific theorems to more general ones. Thus, Aquinas fixed the meaning of religious conversion through the integration of two theorems. First, according to the theorem of universal instrumentality, God applies all agents to their activities. Secondly, according to a more specific theorem, human volitional activity unfolds in two phases: initially God alone operates on the human will to make it good, and subsequently He cooperates with a good will to give it good performance. Consequently, in the Thomist context, Lonergan first began to conceive the notion of religious conversion in terms of the relation between technical theorems.

In Verbum, Lonergan sought to establish the intellectualism of Aquinas. It was the act of understanding which was central for Aquinas. In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan had focused on Aquinas' scientific procedure of ordering theorems. Still, even in this earlier analysis, Lonergan had pointed out that the principle which synthesized the theorems, which held them together in an intelligible unity, was the act of understanding. In Verbum, Lonergan investigated Aquinas' account of the procedures of the rational soul. It was in the rational soul that Aquinas located the natural analogy for the trinitarian processions. However, while Aquinas' account relied on Aristotle's metaphysical psychology, Lonergan insisted that it relied more profoundly on Augustine's interior "speech of spirit within spirit." For Aquinas, the central factor
was the soul's self-knowledge through its act of understanding.

What did Aquinas mean by the act of understanding and by an intelligibly proceeding inner word? Lonergan proposed a method to approach this question which was both simple and profound. He wrote: "a method tinged with positivism would not undertake, a method effected by conceptualist illusion could not conceive, the task of developing one's own understanding so as to understand Aquinas' comprehension of understanding and its intelligibly proceeding inner word."

In Lonergan's view, one can develop one's understanding to the point of (1) grasping what Aquinas meant by \textit{intelligere}, (2) grasping what Lonergan meant by understanding, and (3) grasping what occurs in one's own mind when one understands. This was a reaffirmation of Aquinas' principle that the human soul understands itself through its acts of understanding.

In this context, I believe, we can discern the seeds of intellectual conversion in "the act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand itself and pronounce its universal validity."

Consequently, although Aquinas relied upon Aristotle's metaphysical psychology, his account of the inner word of human intelligence most directly rested on the fact that the human soul can reflectively understand itself.

In this first period, we can trace Lonergan's developing appreciation of Aquinas. In \textit{Grace and Freedom}, he approached Aquinas in terms of a theory of speculative development; in \textit{Verbum} he approached Aquinas in terms of the process of developing one's understanding. The latter approach was more dynamic. Again, in \textit{Grace and Freedom}, Lonergan analyzed successively more general theological theorems whose structured synthesis fixed an act of understanding; on the other hand, in \textit{Verbum} he relies on the self-possessive and reflective nature of the human act of understanding to fix the basic features of successive hermeneutical circles. In the former, the relations between theorems fix the act of understanding; in the latter the act of understanding fixes the terms and relations. The development from \textit{Grace and Freedom} to \textit{Verbum} is a movement from the generation of theological theorems to the generating intellect, from theory to inferiority. In \textit{Grace and Freedom}, the notion of conversion is an element within a theological system; in \textit{Verbum} it is the reflective self-possession of the human act of understanding.
The middle period is dominated by *Insight*. Lonergan continued his efforts to clarify the dimensions of cognitional interiority. However, he moved away from the intricacies of Thomist interpretation and into the problem of modern cognitional theory. The advance of the modern sciences represented both a new problem and a new resource. First, modern science heightened the contrast between common sense and theory, between what is prior for us and what is prior in itself. Secondly, modern scientists have provided us with many more acts of understanding and have formulated them within rigorously structured contexts. Aquinas had maintained that we can understand ourselves through our acts of understanding and Lonergan applied that principle to the realm of modern scientific theory. Consequently, in *Insight*, he used modern science as the scaffolding for entry into the realm of cognitional interiority.

The key factor in *Insight* is the self-appropriation of the cognitional subject. Self-appropriation is a matter of one's own rational self-consciousness clearly and distinctly taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness. Up to that decisive achievement, all leads. From it, all follows.\(^8\)

Self-affirmation is the central factor in *Insight*. From the understanding of understanding and from the reflective grasp of one's cognitional activity, one proceeds to a knowledge of the broad lines of all that can be known, and thence to a critically based metaphysics. In this context, intellectual conversion is a realization that the sufficient development of understanding is a criterion for the real. In the act of reflective understanding one finds not only the immanent perfection of the cognitional subject, but also the sufficient basis from which to affirm knowledge of being. In summary, the intellectually converted subject realizes that it is in the act of judgment that being is known.

The later period is defined by *Method in Theology*. The key notions which determine the context of this period are meaning, historicity, and method. While *Insight*'s analysis of the natural sciences was sufficient to provide a preliminary notion of method, theological method demands more. Natural scientists seek insights into ranges of data; on the other hand, theologians seek insights into the communities and traditions which have formed their own minds. For the natural
scientist, the object of investigation is constituted initially by experiential conjugates and the investigating subject is an incarnation of scientific disinterestedness -- the pure desire to know. For the theologian, the object of investigation is not purely experiential, but already constituted by human acts of meaning, e.g., texts, historical movements, and theological controversies. The investigating subject is, not simply an incarnation of the pure desire to know, but a subject caught up within an historical, communal, and personal process of development. Lonergan writes: "Indeed, historicity and history are related as object to be known and investigating subject." Accordingly, to introduce method into this situation is to enable the historical subject to fruitfully reflect upon its constituting historicity in order to reflectively guide its making of history.

Besides the conditions of one's historicity, there is the unrestrictedness of one's intentionality. This is a factor which transcends diverse cultures and various historical epochs. In every culture there are good men and women. In each historical epoch there are those who search for the truth and seek to live in its light. Further, most significant is the gift of God's love. It is a transcultural factor offered to everyone in all places and at all times. Lonergan writes: "It is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather is the principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness to any culture." Consequently, Lonergan grounds theological method in the unrestricted intending of the transcendental notions.

In this later period the notion of conversion is conceived in terms of the norms of theological procedure. Conversion transforms the person, moving him or her into the realms set up by the intentionality of the transcendental notions. Theologians are historical subjects and so they need to reflect upon their pasts in order to understand themselves. However, that self-understanding can transcend history when they awaken to their transcendental intentionality. Indeed, religiously converted subjects are subjects in an unrestricted state of love and that state both constitutes their inmost being and provides a norm for their historical activity. Consequently, in the later period conversion is conceived in terms of the concrete norms which guide historical subjects.

In summary, conversion has been formulated in several
different manners. In *Grace and Freedom*, it was conceived in terms of technical theorems. In *Verbum*, it was discussed in terms of intellectual light. In *Insight*, it was a matter of the reflective self-appropriation of the subject. In *Method in Theology*, it was a movement into the horizon of the transcendental notions. As a basic statement I would say that Lonergan initially thought of the notion of conversion within the realm of theory (*Grace and Freedom*). He gradually came to conceive it in terms of the realm of interiority (*Verbum* and *Insight*). Finally, he conceived the notion of conversion within the realm of method and the orientation of human subjects to the realm of the transcendent (*Method in Theology*).

2. The Unity of the Notion

While it is important to know about the succession of contexts through which the notion of conversion has been developed, it is also important to understand the notion in its unity. Consequently, I would like to propose a general account of the unity present in the distinct notions of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.

**Religious Conversion**

Religious conversion is the gift of God's love flooding our hearts. In our inmost being, we experience the indwelling of God's unrestricted acceptance and favor. Such an event occurs, not on the empirical level of the flow of sensible data, nor on the intellectual level of thinking and supposing, nor again on the rational level of criticizing and judging. Instead, God's grace is poured into that part of our consciousness which is concerned with personal existence. Indeed, the indwelling of God's love occurs concurrently with our discovery of our true selves. The true self which we discover is worthwhile and significant. Consequently, I would say that religious conversion is the discovery of ourselves as worthwhile and significant because we exist in God's love.  

The discovery of God's love dwelling at the very heart of our existence is a gift. We feel immeasurably blessed because God has chosen to love us. We realize that our lives are important because God has entered them. Yet, God's love is unmerited. We are important and valuable because God loves us; God does not love us because we are important and valuable. God's love does not depend on our achievements or on our virtues. God's love is not given because of anything we
have said or done. Rather, like the parents beholding their sleeping child, love is focused upon the very being. Similarly, God's love is focused upon our being. However, God's love is more than the ground of our meaning and value; it is the ground of our being. Accordingly, in a special sense, God's love is our very being.

God's love floods our hearts and grounds our existence in a dynamic state of being in love. That dynamic state is the principle of subsequent and proceeding acts of love. "We are to love, then, because He loved us first" (I John 4:19). We are to love our neighbors out of God's love overflowing in our hearts. Our particular acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal. 5:22) flow from that deeper dynamic state. Since God's unrestricted love has convinced us of our worth and significance, there is no felt need to establish our value by diminishing others. Indeed, our inner peace and freedom permit us to more clearly perceive the true and mysterious value of other persons. Consequently, we can actually do the good with ease because we are in love.

Inversely, death is the final and chief fact for the unconverted subject. Most people simply pass from this life and are forgotten. Nor is there comfort in the fact that this lot is shared in common. Nor, again, does the facticity of death confine its significance to the end of one's life. What is the point of pursuing knowledge and what is the meaning of one's pure desire to know, if death cuts short one's existence after a few decades? Again, what is the point of working so hard and what is the good of one's pure desire for value, if one's life is no more than a worthless statistic? Finally, why love and why surrender to the dynamic eros of human living, if the cosmos is a silent and empty tomb? Consequently, for the unconverted subject, the brute fact of death not only stands waiting at the end of life but also subverts even partial and interim pretenses of meaning and value.

Death is a fact for both the religiously converted and the religiously unconverted person. For the religiously converted person, however, flooded with God's love, death has been overcome. With St. Paul, we can be certain that nothing, not even death, can come between us and God's love (Rom. 8:38). The religiously converted person is operating within
an horizon which subverts the facticity of death; death no longer has an ultimate significance. One can fully surrender to one's desire for unrestricted love. However, if love subverts the ultimacy of death, nevertheless the relevance of death remains. To love one's neighbor means to die to life on the basis of competing egoism. To be open to the inner movements of the Holy Spirit means to die to one's childish fears and wishes. Finally, the religiously converted subject will always need to pray along with Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane: "Nevertheless Father, not my will but Yours" (Lk. 22:42).

The unrestricted state of being in love is the ultimate principle of the converted person's life. It underpins, penetrates, and promotes forward operations on the successive levels of consciousness. It is a principle which originates prior to consciousness and terminates in a reality beyond consciousness. Thus, when the subject surrenders to God's unrestricted love, it is surrendering to a reality which precedes and transcends conscious control. The individual can perceive such a surrender of conscious control as a kind of death. For example, the physical development of the individual had been a matter of gradually gaining control over physical operations. Again, the psychic development of the individual had been a matter of gaining some familiarity with and mastery over feelings. Consequently, when the individual is invited to surrender to a principle over which there is no conscious control, this is perceived as an invitation to death.

Religious conversion turns ordinary life upside down. The fearful individual's perception of death is transformed into the loving person's acceptance of the way to new life. Thus Jesus says: "Unless a grain of wheat falls on the ground and dies, it yields a rich harvest" (John 12:24). The religiously converted person discovers its true self in God's love; consequently, the person can live out that discovery by surrendering ever more fully to that love. On the other hand, the religiously unconverted person is dominated by death and has no reason to surrender to the dynamism of self-transcendence.

Moral Conversion

Moral conversion is the free response of the moral subject
to the transcendental notion of value. The transcendental notion of value is not the notion of any particular good, nor the notions informing the concrete structures which insure the recurrence of particular goods, that is, the good of order.

I would identify the transcendental notion of value with a dynamic state of freedom. It is such a dynamic state, not as a private possession, but rather as a possibility in which all persons are invited to share. Consequently, in moral conversion, the subject freely responds to the dynamic thrust towards freedom for itself and for others.

The thrust of the moral subject towards the transcendental notion of value is concretely actuated in the decision. As transcendental, it is oriented beyond all particular goods and all concrete social and cultural orders. As the immanent thrust of a concrete subject, however, it is realized in the choice of particular goods and in the building and support of some good of order. The act of decision, then, is the realization in the concrete of the person's orientation towards a goodness beyond all criticism and towards an unrestricted freedom. In the act of decision, the moral knowledge and feelings, the deliberation and evaluation, of the person come to fruition. The person operates neither arbitrarily nor compulsively, but within the context of responsible freedom. The act of decision is more, however, than the immanent perfection of the responsible person. With the act of decision begins the real self-transcendence of the person -- the transformation of moral intentionality into moral performance. The person transforms the world in the light of its responsible decisions. Consequently, through the act of decision, the moral person both constitutes itself as more proximately capable of free activity and constitutes the world as a freer place.

For the morally converted person, the ultimate criterion of moral living is the pure detached desire for freedom. Particular goods can be judged to be truly or only apparently good inasmuch as they promote or fail to promote freedom. Similarly, the good of order must be judged in terms of its promotion of freedom. However, the morally converted person is not yet a morally perfect person. It has yet to apprehend the fullness of human authenticity and freedom; it has yet to achieve the spontaneous and "sustained self-transcendence of the virtuous man." The morally converted person has to
develop in knowledge and in moral feelings. However, even while learning, the morally converted person already possesses the needed criterion for discernment, namely, the pure detached desire for freedom.

Inversely, satisfaction is the final criterion for the morally unconverted person. From experience, it knows the good of particular objects. It knows the satisfaction of meeting particular needs, e.g., a good meal or a sound night's sleep. From the development of understanding and feeling, it knows the value of the good of order. It knows the efficacy and the security of a social and economic order that works. On these levels, the morally unconverted person feels secure in identifying the good with that which satisfies.

However, in time the satisfaction of the morally unconverted person can turn to despair. Whether acknowledged or not, the pure and detached desire for freedom underlies, penetrates, and transforms the hierarchy of satisfactions and goods. Freedom cannot be found on the level of particular goods, nor on the level of the good of order. Freedom is to be found only in surrender to the pure and detached desire. The glamour and attractiveness of particular goods can quickly vanish. The feelings of excitement and opportunity at the outset of a marriage, a career, or any new venture can sour. One seeks new opportunities, new challenges, and new stimulation. Yet, because they are on the same level, they are subject to the same unsatisfactoriness. That unsatisfactoriness is grounded in the real yet unacknowledged frustration of the pure and unrestricted desire for freedom.

Liberation lies in surrender to the pure detached desire for freedom. This desire includes the desire for meaning and value because there is no freedom without these dimensions. Both the morally converted person and the morally unconverted person experience this desire. However, only the former has decided to make it normative. The morally unconverted person is dominated by insistent cravings and by contracting fears. For example, to give free rein to one's pure desire to know means withdrawing from the race to accumulate as many consumer goods as possible; it means forsaking one's anxieties about making a mark in the world, or rising in the esteem of one's social group. Again, to exercise one's pure desire for freedom means dying to one's fears concerning the unknown and to one's cravings for security; it means breaking away from
one's settled routines. For the morally unconverted person, the potential rewards of such exercises are too distant to outweigh the satisfaction of meeting immediate desires and of calming nagging fears.

Moral conversion reverses the dominance of satisfaction over desire. The morally unconverted person correctly apprehends that goods satisfy. In fact, particular goods and a smoothly operating good of order can be satisfying. However, the criterion for the good is not satisfaction but desire. Unless one surrenders to one's pure desire for value and to one's unrestricted desire for freedom, one ultimately faces despair. By making de facto satisfactions normative, the unconverted subject frustrates and degrades the pure desire for freedom. Eventually, even the satisfaction provided by categorical goods is spoiled. In the gospel of St. Luke, Jesus says: "That is why I am telling you not to worry about your life and what you are to eat, nor about your body and how you are to clothe it... No, set your hearts on His kingdom, and these other things will be given you as well" (Luke 12:22, 31). Similarly, moral conversion is a matter of setting one's heart on the pursuit of value and of surrendering to the pure detached desire for freedom.

**Intellectual Conversion**

Intellectual conversion is the discovery of the significance of the pure desire to know. The pure desire to know is the principle which underpins, penetrates and promotes forward all of our cognitional operations. It is the principle which awakens questioning. It draws the objects, events and characteristics of ordinary living out of their initial contexts and into the context of elemental wonder. It frees the subject's memory and anticipation, conation and imagination, from the routines of practical living and enlists them in the service of intelligent questioning. Again, it is the pure desire to know which poses and sustains the questions which lead to insights. It is the principle which guides the intelligent formulation of insights into definitions, theorems, and systems. Again, it is the pure desire to know which promotes the subject from the level of intelligent formulation to the level of rational judgment. It is the principle which raises and sustains the critical question -- Is it so? -- and guides reflective understanding, the marshalling and weighing of evidence, and the rationally
proceeding judgment. Finally, it is the pure desire to know which orients us beyond all present cognitional achievements towards the distant goal of the totality of being.

The pure desire to know is an unrestricted intention of being. Aquinas affirmed that man is a potency in the realm of intellectual substances; Lonergan affirms that the pure desire to know is only a desire. If we are to fulfill that unrestricted intention, to actuate that infinite potency, to satisfy that pure desire, we must first turn towards the sensible world. Consequently, the pure desire to know is more than an immanent principle guiding cognitional operations to perfection; it is a principle that leads us from ignorance to knowledge. It is the intention of being.

The intellectually converted subject recognizes in the object of sensation, not what it wants to know, but the material basis for what it wants to know. It regards the sensible object, neither as real nor unreal, neither as a being nor as a non-being. The sensible object is data for understanding, the material for insight. Again, the intellectually converted subject recognizes in a single insight, in the clustering of insights, and in the discoveries of science, not what it intends to know, but the intelligibility that might be relevant to what it intends to know. It regards the idea, the theorem, and the system, neither as true nor false, neither as facts nor as errors. All formulations of direct understanding are merely hypotheses which stand in need of verification. The intellectually converted subject recognizes in the products of understanding, in its conditioned formulations, the material basis for the reflective question -- Is it so?

The unrestricted intention of being reaches a partial but actual fulfillment in the act of judgment. In this life, our acts of understanding are always conditioned. They are always acts with respect to some determinate content. We do not purely and simply understand; we understand something. Thus, one aspect of our rational nature is the fact that we must proceed piecemeal, one step at a time, accumulating and combining individual insights. We understand first one thing, then another, until both insights are integrated in a higher viewpoint. The unrestricted intention of being can provide a criterion or standard for our developing understanding because, although the unrestricted intention is not itself knowledge, it is an anticipation of the act through
which knowledge is achieved. It is an anticipation of the act of cognitional self-transcendence. In the act of reflective understanding, the intellectually converted subject actuates that anticipation, whets its appetite. In the act of judgment, the intellectually converted subject partially but actually satisfies that unrestricted intention of being.

Intellectual conversion reverses the dominance of the object over intentionality. Initially, the subject is ignorant. It knows neither about elementary objects nor about itself. Still, the first order of business is to learn about its immediate environment. The self-knowledge of the subject is a later development. The subject masters elementary objects and it is through the understanding of elementary objects that the subject can begin to understand itself, its acts of understanding, and its intentionality. Chronologically speaking, however, knowledge of objects precedes and is the condition for the self-knowledge of subjects.

As intellectual development goes forward, there occurs a reversal or shift in priorities. For example, the interests of the beginning student and the interests of the scholarly exegete are different. "The student reads a text to learn about the objects that as yet he does not know . . . . On the other hand, the exegete may already know all about the objects treated in the text, yet his whole task remains to be performed." The exegete reads the text to learn about the intentions that informed the context within which the text as a whole is to be understood. Thus, the student reads Aquinas to learn about grace; the exegete reads Aquinas to understand his struggle to order scriptural and traditional data in terms of general and specific theological theorems. The former is interested in the objects Aquinas expounded. The latter is interested in the intentions behind Aquinas' manner of proceeding.

Again, critical historical investigation offers a powerful example of the reversal in the dominance of object over intentionality. First, the historian takes as an object "the remains of the past perceptible in the present." The task is to understand these objects. However, the reconstruction of the meaning of scraps of historical data leads, not to historical knowledge, but to historical experience. Secondly, the historian reconstructs from any number of imaginatively reconstructed experiences the contexts of historical understanding and knowledge. The second historical procedure —
from historical experience to historical knowledge -- is not guided by a mere second look at the remains of the past. It is primarily guided by the intentionality of the historian. It is guided by the historian's previously acquired historical knowledge, by the cumulative work of other historians bearing on the same topic, and most significantly, by the intelligent and reflective questions which the historian can ask. Indeed, once the historian has understood the right questions to ask, the perceptible objects can be shifted to a broader and richer context. More and more, historical inquiry is dominated by the historian's intentionality, as expressed in questioning, rather than by the initial perceptible objects.

Hermeneutical and historical investigations reveal how human intentionality becomes ascendant over the object. However, exegetes and historians are not cognitional theorists and what is implied by actual scholarly performance need not be explicitly reflected upon. More generally, intellectual conversion is a discovery of the significance of the pure desire to know, that is, the unrestricted intention of being. It is that intention which ultimately determines the contexts within which objects have meaning. Certainly, we must first learn about the objects. Only after some knowledge of the objects has been achieved, can we proceed through the act of understanding to the knowledge of the subject. However, intellectual conversion reverses this priority. It liberates the subject from an infantile fixation on the object, the merely given, and already-out-there-now-real. Intellectual conversion awakens the subject to the pure desire to know. It actuates the unrestricted intention of being. The intellectually converted subject still seeks to understand data and to reach results by appeal to the data; but the contexts within which data are apprehended, understood, and verified are contexts created by a subject who understands precisely what it is doing when it is knowing.19

In summary, the pure desire to know is the unrestricted intention of being. Intellectual conversion grasps the significance of this identity. It is a psychological fact that we desire to know; it is an epistemological fact that what we desire to know is being. Thus, to desire to know is to intend being. The intention of being provides the criterion or standard to which our judgments must measure up. Although the intention of being is not a knowledge of what
being must be, it is an anticipation of the act through which knowledge of being is achieved -- the act of cognitional self-transcendence. Again, the pure desire to know determines what any particular judgment means; it guides the development of understanding. Through the process of question and answer, it constructs the contexts within which data are understood. Accordingly, intellectual conversion is a grasp of our potential to understand what an object means and to judge whether or not that understanding is correct.

NOTES


2 Lonergan writes: "Augustine's penetrating reflections on knowledge and consciousness, Descartes' Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Pascal's Pensées, Newman's Grammar of Assent all remain within the world of commonsense apprehension and speech yet contribute enormously to our understanding of ourselves. Moreover, they reveal the possibility of coming to know the conscious subject and his conscious operations without presupposing a prior metaphysical structure." See his Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), p. 261.


5 Ibid., p. 217. 6 Sum. theol., I, q. 88, a.2, ad 3m.
7 Verbum, p. 87. 8 Insight, xviii.

10 Method in Theology, p. 283.

11 While my formulation of the notion of religious conversion obviously reveals my dependence on Lonergan's own account, I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to the reflections of Dom Sebastian Moore. See his The Fire and the Rose Are One (New York: Seabury Press, 1980).

12 St. Paul points out: "We were still helpless when at his appointed moment Christ died for sinful men. It is not easy to die even for a good man -- though of course for someone really worthy, a man might be prepared to die -- but what proves that God loves us is that Christ died for us while we were still sinners" (Rom. 5: 7, 8).
This account of moral conversion presupposes Lonergan's model of the structure of the human good as presented in Ch. 2 of Method in Theology. The phrase "dynamic state of freedom", however, is my own terminology. I use it to emphasize the close connection between moral conversion and religious conversion as a dynamic state of love.

Method in Theology, p. 35.

I use the term 'object' in this context in the same sense as the term 'body' is used in Insight, that is, as "a focal point of extroverted biological anticipation and attention. It is an 'already out there now real', where these terms have their meaning fixed solely by elements within sensitive experience and so without any use of intelligent and reasonable questions and answers" (Insight, p. 254). More generally, however, I want to emphasize the dominant role of the subject's intentionality over any merely given datum.

Method in Theology, p. 156.

Ibid., p. 206.

There is of course a material determination to our acts of understanding. We seek to understand some determinate data. Yet, properly speaking, we seek to understand, not simply the givenness of the data, but something in addition to the givenness of the data. We seek to know the intelligibility of the data, a factor which transcends its mere givenness. For the discovery of this further factor, the pure desire to know becomes increasingly influential. The pure desire to know provides both a criterion and the meaning of what we seek to know. Cf. Verbum, p. 7.
Roughly and summarily, I wish to argue, in common with many traditional philosophers, but in opposition to a numerous and vocal group within contemporary philosophy,\(^1\) that there are two aspects to the foundations of knowledge: the data for knowledge, out of which knowledge is to be acquired; and the mental process to be applied to the data if knowledge is thus to be acquired. On the first aspect, I believe philosophers within the empiricist tradition (represented, for example, by David Hume, Bertrand Russell, and A. J. Ayer) to be largely correct; though on the second, I believe them to have been erroneous or neglectful (in spite of the promising start provided, perhaps surprisingly, by John Locke).

If the topic of the foundations of knowledge is to be treated at all adequately, a good deal of ground has to be covered. In what follows, I shall deal with the following topics in order: (i) the empiricist account of foundations; (ii) objections to that account; (iii) the view that knowledge has and needs no foundations; (iv) objections to the no-foundations view; (v) a proposal as to the foundations of knowledge; (vi) a consideration of objections to this proposal.
The Empiricist Account of Foundations

The empiricist account of foundations, or, rather, of what I would prefer to regard as just one aspect of foundations, is well known; as are the objections to it which have been brought forward in the last few decades. However, it is necessary for what follows briefly to rehearse this account and the objections made to it. The ultimate given, on the basis of which all human knowledge of matters of fact was supposed to be possible, was 'sense-data' or 'sense-contents'. Example of such data would be the contents of my visual field at any moment, the sounds in my ears, the sensations in the parts of my body, and so on. It may be asked why these philosophers did not say roundly that we perceive physical objects, and that it is such perceptions which are at the basis of our knowledge. The answer is, that much more is implied by "There is a physical object of such-and-such a description over there", than "I am enjoying such-and-such a sensation or cluster of sensations". For example, for me to be aware of a purple and approximately oval sensation at the center of my visual field is one thing; for there to be a plum a short distance in front of me is another. If a plum is there, this sensation will be liable to be succeeded by other similar ones, given that I keep my eyes turned in roughly the same direction, and the light remains fairly good; other people will seem to report or react to the plum when they appear close to it, and I myself will enjoy certain sorts of tactile sensation if I reach out in that direction, certain sorts of gustatory sensation if I grasp the apparent object and go through kinaesthetic sensations as of bringing it to and putting it into my mouth, and so on and so on. On the other hand, I may momentarily have a purple visual datum as though of a plum, or a smell or taste or tactile sensation of this sort; but not occurring as a member of the complex, in the usual relations to other members of that complex, that would be to be expected if there were actually a plum before me. The apparently seen, felt, smelled or tasted plum might disappear; or not seem to be confirmed as present by other persons. In such cases, I am liable to conclude that my experiences are illustory or hallucinatory. In the long run, on the classical empiricist account, all of our knowledge is founded on such sense-experiences.
But how is our knowledge of physical objects supposed to be founded on such a basis? (At a later stage, I shall argue that empiricists are in general correct that knowledge of this kind is founded in a certain sense on sense-experience; but that they erred on the manner in which it is thus founded.) A once commonly-held view is that talk about physical objects in space is simply an enormously simplified way of talking about actual and possible sense-experiences; that every statement about a physical object logically implies a very complicated disjunction of statements about sense-experiences, and nothing more. The great advances in logic achieved at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, notably by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, seemed to make the actual execution of the task, of analyzing any statement about a physical object in terms of statements about sense-contents, one which was feasible at least in principle.

A true empirical statement is one for which the implied disjunction of statements about sense-experiences turns out to be true; a false empirical statement, one for which it turns out to be false. Now empiricists have traditionally been inclined to pride themselves that their way of thinking both vindicates and exemplifies the scientific attitude. What are the grounds for this? It seems to be characteristic of the sciences that their practitioners conscientiously test their hypotheses against the available evidence in observation and experiment. It is easy to infer that a genuinely scientific statement is one in the case of which the implied disjunction of statements about sense-contents has been investigated with special care, and has turned out to be (probably) true. A theory constitutive of a mature science, for all that its terms are likely not to correspond directly with anything observable, enables a range of anticipations of possible sense-experiences to be made which is far beyond that licensed by ordinary statements made about material objects. For instance, "There is a yellowish heavenly body over there", stated at night and accompanied by a pointing gesture, might imply merely that, if there were no apparent clouds in the way, a small disc or point of light would enter the visual field of any normally-sighted person who looked as directed. On the other hand, "There is a giant planet, of such-and-such a size and mass, at such-and-such a distance
from the sun, travelling at such-and-such a velocity", would be capable, in conjunction with other assumptions, of licensing a true prediction that, given once again an apparently clear sky, experiences of a similar kind would be enjoyed by an observer who looked in the same direction in the sky six or six-hundred years hence. A scientific statement, then, on the standard empiricist view, differs from a statement of ordinary language, in that its foundations in sense-experience will have been more thoroughly scrutinized and tested, and its support by sense-experiences in consequence more confirmed.

Objections to the Empiricist Account of Foundations

The difficulties in the empiricist account of foundations may be distinguished as of two basic types -- those arising from attempts to articulate those foundations themselves, and those which appear in attempts to show just how knowledge is supposed to be based on such foundations.

Sense-impressions, as generally conceived at least, seem ineluctably private to the individual who enjoys them. The fact that I have a pattern of blue markings on white at the center of my visual field has no strictly logical implications for what other people in my environment may be enjoying in their experience. But language is a public affair, and there are solid grounds for the belief that it is only possible for individuals who share a public world to which their language has primary reference. We could not learn, from our parents and peers, to use terms like 'red' or 'hot' in the way we do, except in relation to publicly-perceivable objects which are really red or hot. If it were really private sensations of redness or hotness which were primarily at issue, how could I ever know that the sensation which I called 'red' or 'hot' was anything remotely resembling the sensations so called by anyone else? Even if it were proper, as indeed might be doubted, to refer to sensations as opposed to objects as 'red' or 'hot' at all, at least the very facts about how we learn language strongly militate against the view that it is awareness of the private entities which provides the basis for our knowledge of the public. On the contrary, it is only by virtue of a language learned primarily in interaction with publicly-observable physical objects that we can talk, even granted that we can properly thus talk, of any
private sense-experiences which we may enjoy in relation to them.

One fairly obvious solution to this difficulty is to replace statements about sense-contents with statements about physical objects at the basis of the whole edifice of empirical knowledge. The trouble with this is that talk about physical objects, as has already been pointed out, seems laden with expectations and assumptions which prevent its being basic in quite the required sense. If the object of the exercise is to ground knowledge in experience, then it has to be admitted that talk of physical objects involves a great deal more than a mere record of what is given in experience.

In any case, whether we regard the given in terms of observed physical objects, or of sense-experiences, we have need of an apparatus of concepts to describe and to articulate it. But the whole point of empiricism is that our experience is sufficiently independent of our concepts and judgments to be a means of testing whether the concepts are liable to be instantiated, the judgments to be true. However, since we apparently cannot get at this 'given' apart from this apparatus of concepts on which it is supposed to provide a check, it begins to look as if the notion of any 'given' independent of that apparatus were a mere chimera.

Not only have difficulties arisen about the nature of the supposed 'given'; but the manner in which knowledge of whatever is not 'given' is supposed to be based on it has also proved puzzling. How, for example, do we come to know about physical objects in the external world, when we have only sense-experiences to go on? Apparently not by deductive argument; since however profuse or detailed a description I and others provide of our actual or potential sense-experiences, we can make no sound deduction to the effect that any physical object exists or is present. Just the same thing, at a further remove from experience, applies to the theoretical entities postulated by scientists in relation to their observable effects; and to the thoughts and feelings of other persons in relation to their visible and audible behavior. And even if one sets aside gnawing doubts about the propriety of inductive inference in general, there seems no properly inductive inference from any set of statements about actual or possible experiences to one about physical objects. Thus I might make such an inference from the fact that a certain
complex of sense-experiences A had previously always occurred together with sense-experience B, that it would do so on some future occasion; but it would be quite a different matter arguing from such a complex of experiences to the existence of presence of a physical object. If the inferences cannot be justified deductively or inductively, it may well be concluded, they cannot be justified at all.7

One way out of the problem is to deny that we have only sense-experiences to go on, and to maintain that we have direct acquaintance through our senses with material objects in our immediate environment. Another is to insist that talk of physical objects is in the last analysis nothing but talk of sense-experiences that we do enjoy, or would or might enjoy in certain circumstances.8 The first way out seems to fall foul, as I have already said, of the fact that much more seems to be claimed by the statement "There is an object of such-and-such a nature in my vicinity" than what is directly entailed by any report of my experience here and now. As to the second, it was indeed quite widely held a few decades ago that talk about ordinary physical objects in space, and, more remotely, all other meaningful discourse which is not simply concerned with the formal systems of logic and mathematics, is a simple way of talking about sense-experiences; that every such statement amounts to a very complicated disjunction of statements about sense-experiences. The great advances in logic made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seemed to make the project of actual analysis in such terms, which was obviously enormously complicated in detailed execution (think of the actual and hypothetical implications for experience of the statement about the presence of the plum in my initial example), feasible in principle. But, as a matter of fact, no-one ever produced a satisfactory logical analysis of even the most simple statement about physical objects, let alone the more recondite declarations of the practitioners of the sciences, in terms of sense-experiences.

Even if it were conceded, in face of the difficulties, that we have direct experience of physical objects in space, as opposed to sense-experiences, it may be doubted whether we would be much further forward on the road towards the solution of the problem of knowledge. For just the same difficulties arise about the relation of knowledge of other kinds to knowledge of or acquaintance with objects in our immediate
environment, as about the relation between our knowledge of physical objects and our knowledge of or acquaintance with sense-experiences. In the ordinary sense of 'know' at least, where the use of the word is not more or less arbitrarily restricted by philosophical dogma, assumption, or fashion, I can 'know' facts about the remote historical past, about what other persons are thinking and feeling, and about electrons and neutrons. But it is apparently one thing to set out the evidence publicly available on these matters -- for example, in documents and on monuments, in gestures and noises made by human organisms, and in tracks in cloud chambers and streaks on photographic plates; and another to claim that the facts for which such things are claimed to be evidence actually are so. Once again, the difficulties in showing that the logical path from the evidence to the allegedly known facts is deductive or 'inductive' (if indeed the latter demonstration, whatever it amounted to, would provide any consolation) seem insurmountable. And those who cleave to the faith that talk about thoughts and feelings is really after all merely talk about actual or possible vocalizations and gestures (behaviorism), or that talk about nuclear particles is nothing but a convenient way of speaking about actual or possible observations or practices (operationism), are apt to overlook the generality of the problem. To say that talk about your agonizing pain is really nothing but a compendious way of talking about your actual or hypothetical screams and contortions may merely shock or seem rather odd; but to say that talk about George Washington or Edmontosaurus is abbreviated talk about marks on paper or noises liable to be emitted in certain contingencies by historians or palaeontologists is to stretch credulity indeed.

Another possibility is to acknowledge that while physical objects (or whatever) are not directly knowable, they are indirectly knowable as causes of our sense-experiences. But, it may reasonably be asked, what is the path from the direct to the indirect kind of knowledge? How, if at all, are we justified in traversing it? If we say that the existence of physical objects is the simplest explanation for our experiences, as Russell suggested at one stage of his career, what justification do we have, if any, for claiming that what is postulated in such explanations, however successful these are in practice, really exists or is as we say it is? It
has been suggested that it is enough merely to describe the procedures which we actually follow in attributing feelings to others, in validating or invalidating a historical claim, and so on, on the basis of our experience; and that such description ought to satisfy the sceptic. But the sceptic may quite reasonably retort that merely to describe such a procedure is a very different thing from justifying it. Someone who believed in goblins and leprechauns rather than in fundamental particles, and in what we would call myth and legend rather than what we would call history, could do as much. Admittedly the scientific community have procedures by which they purport to test in experience the claim that such-and-such an alleged historical event actually occurred, or that someone other than oneself has these feelings or thoughts rather than those; but it is another thing to justify the claim that the procedures in question actually do tend to establish the real occurrence of the historical fact, or the real existence of the thoughts or feelings.

As A. J. Ayer sees it, "It does not greatly matter whether we regard the need for analysis as supersedng the demand for justification, or whether we make the justification consist in the analysis." But it is one thing to analyze in detail the grounds for making a statement; it is another thing to show how they do ground the statement, at least in those cases where there is good reason to suppose that the fact stated by the statement is one thing, the ground on which one has the right to state it another. Suppose I ask a haruspex how he knows that a certain state of the entrails of the birds he disembowels indicates that his gods are angry, another that they are in beneficent mood. I cannot see how an accumulation of information, however detailed, as to how he relates the one actual state of affairs to the other putative state of affairs, will give me an adequate answer to my question. It would only do so if he admitted that all that was meant by "the gods are angry" was that the entrails of the birds were in one observable state rather than another.

The View that Knowledge Has and Needs No Foundations

It is due to these and other similar difficulties that some philosophers have concluded that knowledge has and needs no foundations, no 'given' element, whatever. Empiricists
have of course supposed that there is some such element in knowledge, on the basis of which we can arrive at it or test it as such. But why, it may be asked, should such an assumption be made? Wilfrid Sellars has put into currency the phrase "the myth of the given".\textsuperscript{14} Certainly, our society is not normally given to question reports made by individuals in certain circumstances. But that such reports are not questioned is no more than a matter of social convention. It is not that the statements treated as 'basic' -- those which we accept as reasons for modifying or abandoning or confirming other statements, but which we do not regard as themselves liable to such modification, abandonment or confirmation -- are somehow of themselves 'certain' or 'incorrigible'; it is only that we do not bother, since we have no inclination, to question them. And some reports which might be felt to be incorrigible are thus questioned, when they run counter to assumptions which are socially acceptable. A dentist may well conclude, when he has taken all the usual steps to anaesthetize a patient's tooth, that the patient's statement that his tooth is still hurting is to be rejected. And that famous respect for the evidence of one's senses, on which the more sentimental chroniclers of the scientific movement have laid such emphasis, looks dubious indeed when one takes a more objective look at the history of science.\textsuperscript{15} Theorists have shamelessly brushed aside evidence which did not conform with the hypothesis which they were advocating; nor has posterity invariably rejected their views when they have done so.

The fact is that scientists can get on with their job, of investigating phenomena, theorizing, and carrying out experiments, each in the manner appropriate to his discipline, without being dictated to by philosophers. Every now and then, sciences go through a fundamental and revolutionary change in theory. But it is mistaken in principle to look for some overall criterion in accordance with which the later cluster of theories in the science concerned is 'truer', "more in accordance with reality", or whatever, than the earlier. Such changes in the activities and ways of speaking of scientists are just the same in principle as similar changes in other social groups; they are the proper concern of the sociologist rather than the epistemologist.
It is the actual consensus of the sciences which determines what is true about the world, not their supposed deference to an overall method of investigation which vanishes into thin air the moment one takes serious steps to find out what it is. The ancient problem of epistemology, of how we can attain knowledge and understanding of the real world, is a pseudo-problem. The zoologist is our authority on elephants, the chemist on hydrochloric acid; there is no encyclopaedic professional lady or gentleman who can be our authority on knowledge in all its departments. How people acquire and pass on those thoughts, skills, and ways of speaking and writing, which society dignifies by the name of 'knowledge', is a matter of empirical psychology, which is itself just another branch of natural science.

Difficulties in the 'No Foundations' View

The view just outlined, for all that it is now rather popular among philosophers, can easily be shown to have some pretty implausible consequences. One is the social relativity of knowledge. Each human society has been inclined, on a variety of grounds and for a variety of motives, to accept a set of statements as true, or even as unquestionable, which is considerably different from the set so accepted by other societies. Short of some 'given', in relation to which such statements can at least in principle be tested for their truth or falsity, are we not left with a collection of mutually incompatible and mutually impregnable views on how the world is, between which the choice cannot be anything but arbitrary? Members of one society will be much more inclined to question the prima facie implications of the deliverances of their senses than what is logically entailed by, for example, the statements of the Bible or the Koran; members of another society will take just the opposite view; and there seems, ex hypothesi, no means of adjudicating between them which is not in the last analysis, however one dresses it up, a mere preference for one's own opinion. Any fair comparison between views of how the world is, where their relative truth or falsity is at issue, seems to require an independent criterion; and it is hard to see what other criterion there could be than rational methods, in principle acceptable to all parties, applied to what is given in experience. If disputes about what is the case are to be settled at all, there
must either be some foundations on the basis of which this
can be done properly; or resort can only be had to social
pressure, bribery, torture or whatever.

The claim is sometimes made that 'truth' is an intra-
thoretical matter; that there is no sense to the question
of whether any very general theory is true 'of' the real
world. If anything like the usual notion of 'truth' is at
issue here, this view would seem to have the remarkable conse-
quence that there is no real external world about which our
theories can make a claim. For in the ordinary sense of 'true',
my claim that there are apples on your living-room table
is true, not when the most influential people are prepared
to agree with it, but when there really are apples on your
living-room table. Any view of 'truth', in fact, which does
not make it a matter of correspondence between our beliefs
and statements and what actually obtains in the real world,
is rather a travesty of our ordinary notion of truth than
an analysis of it. The occurrence of the big bang, and the
presence of detectable quantities of sodium chloride in the
earth's oceans, are facts or not, prior to and independently
of the social groups which may assert them or deny them.
If there is a real external world at all, truth is a matter
of whether our beliefs or statements rightly hit off what
obtains in it, and not merely of the agreements of our state-
ments among themselves, or with those of other impressive
and well-regarded persons.

It is one agreeable corollary of the no-foundations
view, as I have said, that scientists should be left to pursue
their calling just as they do, rather than being invited
or even constrained to follow some overall method. But it
may reasonably be asked, for what is it that society values
scientists? It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the answer
is at least partly because they employ a method or methods
by which they tend to find out what is true, what is the
case, about the world. (Most scientists, I understand, do
not regard themselves as merely in the business of producing
technological goodies; nor do most other people so regard
them.) Let us suppose, in common with the generality of man-
kind, that "the real world" is something which at least might
conceivably be distinct from the aggregate of things and
states of affairs that the scientific community happen to
believe to exist and to obtain at any one time. In that case,
how are we to know that the beliefs of scientists are more likely at least to approximate to the truth about those aspects of the real world with which they are concerned than those of anyone else? The moment one gives a reason for supposing that they are -- by pointing out the exceptionally careful and methodical scrutiny to which scientists subject the relevant data, or the scrupulous rationality with which they subject their theories to testing -- one is back with foundations for knowledge.

The foundations once proposed for knowledge proved, or at any rate were alleged, to be inadequate. But the thesis advanced as a consequence of this, that there are no foundations for knowledge, and in particular that there is no 'given' in relation to which we can test the truth of our claims (where 'truth' is a matter of correspondence by our statements with states of affairs in a world which exists prior to and independently of our statements about it) leads to conclusions which seem at least equally impossible to accept. Is there any way, it may be asked, of revising or repairing the older doctrine of foundations, or of substituting a new one, in such a way as to meet the difficulties?

A Modest Proposal

Any proposal about the foundations of knowledge must have two steps: (i) a description of whatever it is that is supposed to be 'given'; (ii) an account of the procedures which are to be applied to this 'given' if knowledge is actually to be obtained. To deal with the 'given' first -- are perceptions of material objects 'basic', or are sense-experience? As I have already tried to show, both claims are subject to difficulties, which have led not a few to deny that there is any 'given' element in knowledge. However, it seems to me that the difficulties can be resolved if each is taken to be basic in a different manner, the latter in respect to experience, the former in respect to language. To put the matter roughly and succinctly, we could not speak of a real public world unless we had experiences which are in an important sense private to us; however, we could not speak of these experiences unless we could in the first place speak of material objects in a public world. Qua givenness to sensation, experiences are basic; qua language and judgment, material objects are so. We could never say truly that we perceived
a material object unless we had the requisite sense-experiences; on the other hand, we could not speak of sense-experiences unless we could speak of material objects. So much, by way of a preliminary sketch, for the first step; it will be the more easily extended and justified by attention to the second.

The first point to be made about the second step is that the procedures for arriving at knowledge on the basis of experience cannot be reduced to logic in the strict sense; and I believe the widespread contemporary despair of the possibility of finding foundations for knowledge is due largely to the misapprehension that, if there were such foundations, they could be so reduced. Each human being, however primitive or sophisticated his cultural milieu, learns in the course of growing up an ordinary language which consists quite largely in judgments framed in terms of conceptions which have been tested through a wide range of experience; and our instinct is usually to move directly from the enjoyment of the complex of experience to the making of the apparently appropriate judgment -- that is, to the effect that things really are as they seem to be in our experience. It does not usually prove worth our while, when there seems to be a dagger before us -- when our visual or other experiences are appropriate to this -- to delay our instinctive propensity to judge that there actually is a dagger before us. Now no single one of the vast array of ordinary languages can be mainly erroneous in the normal judgments of observable physical fact which it makes or presupposes; otherwise its users would not have survived. One needs to be able to talk about poison berries and tigers, and indeed to be able to make rather a large number of true statements about them, given that one is able to think and talk at all, if one is going to survive in a jungle full of poison berries and tigers.

Mentally to divide the experience which is at the basis of the judgment from the judgment itself requires some pains and some sophistication; but it can quite readily be done, as has been demonstrated ad nauseam by those philosophers who have written of 'impressions', 'sense-data', 'sense-contents', and so on. Any occasion on which we recognize a difference between what is and what seems to be so involves some kind of exercise of this capacity. The fact is that a person may honestly report his experiences, without, however tentatively,
making any judgment about states of affairs external to those experiences themselves. 19 (Presumably he could not do so, unless he could also make judgments about observable physical states of affairs; but that is another matter.) It is therefore misleading to assimilate all *prima facie* reports of sensation to more or less mistaken or tentative statements about objects in the reporter's immediate physical environment, as one may be tempted to do in an effort to show that there need be no such entities as 'sense-experiences' at all. Now one may quarrel with the terminology; but it does seem pretty odd to deny what is at first sight the obvious fact that we may enjoy sense-experiences, but withhold judgment altogether about the public state of affairs which accounts for them. I think that what motivates some philosophers to engage in this curious maneuver is the fear that, if such entities as 'sense-experiences' are allowed to gain any footing in our ontology, we will find ourselves altogether cut off from the public world of physical objects and events. But this fear is groundless. The real world, including physical objects and whatever else there may be, consists in what is to be known by *judgments* for which our sense-experiences provide the basic *evidence*. One is in danger of losing the real world not as a result of admitting that there are sense-experiences, but as a result of confusing the real things which are the potential *objects* of adequately-grounded judgments with the experiences which ultimately provide the *grounds* for these.20

What is the relation of sense-experiences to the judgments in virtue of which we come to know the real world? It seems that, in order to know a world consisting of real things and events which exist largely prior to and independently of ourselves, we have not only (1) to enjoy sense-experiences, but also (2) to conceive possibilities, and (3) to judge that some of the possibilities are realized.21 For example, to know that a horse and cart have just passed by my window, I characteristically have (1) to have had visual and aural sensations *as though of* a horse and cart passing my window, (2) to have conceived the possibility of its having done so, and (3) to have judged that this possibility is the one that best fits the evidence. It is worth noting, for later attention and discussion, that not only the conscious *contents* of experience, but also the conscious *acts* of conceiving and judging, appear to be items of which I am directly aware,
and can, by appropriate attention, make myself more aware. (Locke made this point when he maintained that 'reflection', as well as 'sensation', was the source of the 'ideas' which were the basis of human knowledge.\textsuperscript{22}) This is perhaps most obvious in cases where I am puzzled for a while as to what to make of my experience -- say, when it is dusk, or my impression is a very fleeting one. In such a case, rather than moving directly from the impression as though of a horse and cart to the judgment that there is a horse and cart in my vicinity, I may wonder for some time, "What was it?", and only later hit on the possibility, let alone establish the fact, that it was a horse and cart. It is also worthy of remark, that the two kinds of questioning which are apt to underlie respectively the conceiving of possibilities and the making of judgments ("What might this be?", or "Why might this be so?"; and "Does that exist?", or "Is that so?"), are also activities of which we are directly conscious, and to which we can attend. However, it is one thing to exercise these types of mental capacity, and to be in some sense aware of doing so; it is another to spell out our awareness to ourselves. David Hume, for example, was an enormously intelligent man (good at framing conceptions and concocting hypotheses, at asking and answering questions of the 'What?' and 'Why?' kinds); and a highly reasonable one as well (good at affirming what he had conceived as so in accordance with the available evidence), but for all that he conceived and affirmed in effect he was no conceiver or affirmer, but a mere bundle of sensations and memory-traces.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Possible Objections to the Proposal}

It may be objected that these acts of conceiving and judging to which I have alluded, and the acts of questioning which characteristically underlie them, are subjective mental events which could only be referred to by the kind of "private language" which was pilloried by Wittgenstein; and hence that to postulate them at all is inadmissible. But the answer is that no such conclusions can validly be drawn from what Wittgenstein actually says about private languages, even if one accepts this as correct. A private language, on Wittgenstein's account, is one which refers to some inner or private event for which there are no customary public criteria -- in the manner, for example, that writhing, groaning, and
a constrained manner of speaking are characteristic of pain. But there are plenty of public behavioral criteria by means of which we can recognize that someone is wondering or inquiring, or has conceived a possibility, or judges that it is so.

If this is the correct account of the manner in which our experience is related to our knowledge of the real world, none of the puzzles mentioned in the second section of this article remain to plague us. For at this rate, it is neither the case that to talk about material objects is in the last analysis just to talk about sense-experiences, nor that material objects are what are directly given in our experience -- with the difficulties that each position entails. Russell's one-time view, that the existence of a world of material objects commends itself as the best explanation of our sense-experience, is in a manner vindicated; as is the thesis that material objects are rightly to be postulated as causes of our experience. For to conceive that a state of affairs in the physical world may be so, and to judge that it is so, on the basis of experience, is indeed to provide an explanation of that experience. And to say that such-and-such material objects are within our environment is often to explain why we have the experience we do, and thus to assign a cause for that experience.

The claim that there are two aspects of the given, each basic in its own way, has further to be elaborated and justified. The ultimate foundations of knowledge in experience do not, at least normally, consist of propositions which, in any useful sense, can be said to be known. I can articulate the foundations of my knowledge in my experience by the use of certain expressions, full of phrases like 'sense-data', 'sense-contents', and so on, in which analytical philosophers of the generation of Russell and Moore used to be very proficient; but I need not do so, and I do not characteristically do so, and only in so far as I did so would my apprehension of them at all plausibly be worth calling 'knowledge'. While a red patch at the corner of my visual field may be the grounds of my knowledge that my wife's dressing gown is in the living room of my house, it is an abuse of words to claim that I know that I have such a patch at the corner of my visual field, except perhaps in the case that I give my attention to the matter. Usually, for practical purposes, the justification of knowledge-claims by appeal to experience stops short
with some reference to perceived physical objects and events. "How do you know that your aunt is arriving here tomorrow?"
"Well, here is a letter in her handwriting informing me of her intentions to that effect, and she is usually a reliable person, who sticks to her plans." Theoretically, the question could still be pressed, "How do you know that there is a letter before you of the kind that you say?" The reply could be made, "I have visual and tactile sense-impressions appropriate to this being so, and I have no reason to believe that I am habitually or temporarily subject to hallucinations regarding such matters."

In principle, it seems that our statements about material objects in our immediate vicinity can characteristically be justified in this kind of way, for all that we very seldom find it worth while so to justify them. However, that the theoretical term of such "How do you know that . . . ?" questions is appeal to sense-impressions, does not imply that it is doubtful whether we can really perceive or come to know about a publicly-shared world of physical objects, or that we might in the last analysis have no knowledge of anything but sense-impressions; one could only reach such a conclusion by dint of confusing the content of a judgment (that such-and-such a state of affairs actually is the case) with the ultimate grounds in experience by which such a judgment may be supported. Still, we could not talk about such experiences if we could not talk about the physical objects and states of affairs which characteristically occasion them. This is the real lesson to be learned from Wittgenstein's disparaging remarks about private languages.

What is apt to go wrong in discussion of this matter is well illustrated by Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars attacks the notion of 'foundations' of knowledge, and of what he calls "the myth of the given", as "misleading, in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observational reports, there is another dimension in which the latter rest on the former." This, of course, is precisely the position for which I myself have been arguing. Sellars himself protests that he by no means wishes to claim that human knowledge has no foundation at all, in a sense that would suggest that it was on the same level as rumors and hoaxes. He also remarks that "empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension,
science, is rational, not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy though not all at once." But either he can spell out what it is to have reasonable grounds for putting a claim in jeopardy, or he cannot. If he cannot, he is forced into that radically anti-foundationalist position (maintained, for example, by Feyerabend) according to which one might as well change one's beliefs as a result of a threat or a bribe as because of adequate empirical evidence. If he can, then the spelling-out of what counts as such "adequate empirical evidence" amounts to nothing less than an articulation of foundations. The latter, it seems clear, is closest to Sellar's actual position; which would much less misleadingly have been expressed as a revised positive account of foundations and of what, and in what sense, is given, than as a rejection of foundations and of any given element in human knowledge. And as a matter of fact, his misleading terminology has encouraged some philosophers to adopt the view that there are no foundations of knowledge whatever, and no element in knowledge which is in any sense given. And at that rate, the only difference between knowledge on the one hand, and rumors and hoaxes on the other, is social acceptability.

To cite conscious mental activities as relevant to the theory of knowledge is to invite the charge, much feared by analytical philosophers, of 'psychologism'. However, it is one thing for the forming of concepts and hypotheses and the propounding of judgments to be mental acts; it is another thing for the qualities attributed to things and the distinctions drawn between them by the judgments to be merely a matter of psychology. It is by an act of understanding which may fairly be thought of as mental (how else would one think of it?) that I grasp that the square root of two cannot be the quotient of any two integers, however large; but it by no means follows that what is grasped through the act of understanding is a matter of psychology. And it is only this last view which can be called 'psychologism' in any sense which is very obviously vicious.

How empiricist is the account of foundations which I have outlined? It is certainly empiricist in that it attempts to articulate foundations of knowledge in experience -- even finding some use for that notion of raw sense-experience, so characteristic of earlier twentieth-century empiricism,
and now so widely believed to be discredited. It is not empiricist, however, in the sense that it by no means obviously follows from it that every object of knowledge is an actual or even a potential object of experience. For it is one thing for judgment to be confirmed by experience, for it to have grounds in experience; it is another thing for what the judgment is about to be an actual or potential object of experience. The existence of 'mass' in Newton's sense may be verified in countless instances in a scientist's experience, but it does not correspond directly to anything which can become the direct object of his experiencing; and the same applies to the thoughts and feelings of other persons in relation to the observable evidence which you or I may have for them. There is another way in which the account is empiricist according to one criterion, not another -- in a sense which applies to Locke, but not quite to Hume or to most subsequent empiricists. Like Locke's view, it does not entail that any of our 'ideas' are innate. But it does admit what Locke would call 'reflection', as well as 'sensation', as a source of 'ideas'. That is to say, it acknowledges that we not only undergo sense-experience, but also employ our minds with respect to it, asking questions, forming hypotheses, envisaging possible explanations, marshalling evidence for or against our hypotheses or possible explanations, making judgments as to what is so on the basis of our experience and our hypotheses, and so on. This conscious activity of our minds with respect to sensation may also come to our attention (for all that it has been excluded by and large from attention by modern empiricists, as well as by their successors in the analytical movement), and itself become the basis for further questions, hypotheses, and judgments. What do seem to be innate are predispositions to perform the mental acts which will enable us to acquire knowledge when applied to the contents of experience; we acquire concepts or 'ideas' in the course of such performances, but it is quite unnecessary to suppose that the concepts or 'ideas' are themselves innate.

But whatever the rights and wrongs of introspection as a method of investigating human mental operations, the matter most importantly at issue here, the articulation and defense of foundations for knowledge, does not depend on it. That human beings attend to experience, frame hypotheses,
and judge, as a means of getting at the truth about things, is certainly true, as is demonstrated by the following argument. Suppose someone denies that this is so. Has he attended to the relevant evidence? Has he envisaged possible explanations for this evidence? Does he make his denial as the best way of accounting for the evidence? If he does not do each of these things, his denial is not to be taken seriously, lacking as it does any vestige of justification. But if he does do each of them in justification of what he says, he has performed in order to get at the truth the very mental actions whose relevance for getting at the truth he is actually denying.31

In effect, this article has brought out how the adoption of Bernard Lonergan's "generalized empirical method" is essential if analytical philosophy is to get out of the corners into which it has so sedulously varnished itself. Such a conclusion can only increase one's indignation and astonishment at the fact that analytical philosophers have paid so little attention to Lonergan's work.

NOTES


3 'Probable' in that future experience may give reasons for overturning even a very well-established scientific theory.

4 See Wittgenstein's aspersions on "private languages" (Philosophical Investigations, I, §§ 243-315).

5 That "basic statements" should be reports of observed physical states of affairs is the view of Karl Popper (Objective Knowledge [London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972] and Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973]).

6 For a useful summary of such attitudes, see G. J. Warnock's 'Introduction' to The Philosophy of Perception, ed. Warnock (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967).

METHOD

8 Williams, op. cit., p. 15; Ayer, op. cit., p. 79.
9 Williams, op. cit., p. 16; Ayer, loc. cit.
11 Williams, op. cit., pp. 16-17; Ayer, op. cit., p. 80. I am greatly indebted to Williams for these formulations of the attack on empiricist accounts of foundations.
12 Williams, op. cit., p. 17; Ayer, op. cit., p. 83.


16 On this and related topics, see Rorty, op. cit., pp. 295-305.
17 On the idea that knowledge has two components, see Rorty, op. cit., p. 169.
18 Sellars has a similar point to make (op. cit., p. 170).
19 Sellars' discussion of this matter in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" seems at first sight to advance this view (op. cit., p. 144). But elsewhere (e.g., op. cit., p. 47) he appears to take a position more consistent with the one I am defending.

20 Cf. Hugo Meynell, The Intelligible Universe (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1982), Ch. 3.

21 See P. F. Strawson, 'Introduction' to Philosophy of Logic, ed. Strawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 3: "If we are to be able to say how things are in the world, we must have at our disposal the means of doing two complementary things, of performing two complementary functions: we must be able to specify general types of situation, thing, event, etc., and we must be able to attach these general specifications to particular cases, to indicate their particular incidence in the world." Evidently, Strawson's "two complementary functions" correspond closely to (2) and (3).

22 See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chs. I, VI, VII.
23 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Part IV, § VI.
24 See note 4 above.
25 See note 10 above.
26 Sellars, op. cit., p. 170.
27 Ibid.
28 Feyerabend, op. cit.
29 See the many citations of Sellars' work in Rorty, op. cit.
30 For some shrewd comments about this charge, see Stanley Rosen, The Limits of Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1980), xiv, pp. 11-12, 109, 176, 218, 253.
31 See B. J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), pp. 16-17, for a witty application of this argument.
A REPLY FROM THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS

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Professor Hugo Meynell's paper merits a due measure of appreciation. He gracefully summarizes for us certain insurmountable problems of classical "sense-data empiricism." To his credit he goes beyond criticism and, resisting the temptation to change the subject altogether, offers us an alternative account of how we have knowledge of a public world.

The core of Meynell's proposal is roughly as follows. In laying bare the foundations of our knowledge of the public world, we should take raw sense-impressions as the 'given' with respect to experience and material objects as the 'given' with respect to language and judgment. And how is it that we move from the given, so understood, to the knowledge based upon it? The transition "cannot be reduced to logic in the strict sense" but rather, it seems, turns on the content of language. Thus

Each human being, however primitive or sophisticated his cultural milieu, learns in the course of growing up an ordinary language which consists quite largely in judgments framed in terms of conceptions which have been tested through a wide range of experience; and our instinct is usually to move directly from the enjoyment of the complex of experience to the making of the apparently appropriate judgment -- that is, to the effect that things really are as they seem to be in our experience.

Upon asking the sharp question of how private sense-experience is related to judgments about the shared world of which our language speaks, Meynell schematically remarks that "we have not only (1) to enjoy sense-experiences, but also (2) to conceive possibilities, and (3) to judge that some of the possibilities are realized."

To what extent is such a proposal empiricist? For Meynell it is healthily empiricist in affording a foundational role to raw sense-experience. At the same time it has graduated from rigid empiricism chiefly in discerning that the object of a judgment confirmed by experience need not itself be an object of experience.

What is one to make of this model? As a non-dogmatic empiricist and a friend of the plain man -- was it J. L. Austin who found him riding the Clapham omnibus? -- I find it puzzling in three major respects: (1) its view of language, (2) its sympathy with the claim that material objects, even in ordinary contexts, are 'postulated', and (3) its reticence
to spell out just how judgments 'fit' the evidence of sensation. I will consider these problems in turn.

Language, Meynell suggests, is the critical factor in bridging the gap from raw private experience to shared public world. How does language so serve? Meynell's claim that each human being learns a natural language is, of course, too strong. Moreover, the behavior of a feral child would give no reason to suppose an incapacity to distinguish between, say, afterimages and material objects. Far more central, though, is the assertion that an ordinary language "consists quite largely in judgments." Thus, I take it, in learning a language we pass from experience to judgment; goal is incorporated in medium. But this solution is too easy. Judgments are typically expressed in a language, to be sure; although sometimes even non-verbal actions express judgments -- and with greater eloquence. Indeed, if a language 'largely' consists in judgments, then most ordinary languages, e.g., Korean and Polish, are largely the same, unless their speakers make radically different judgments. But surely most ordinary languages are not largely the same. They differ greatly in both syntax and semantics. Even if we take sentences rather than individual words to be the units of meaning in a language, a sentence is not, in itself, a judgment.

Having maintained that language is largely constituted by judgments, Meynell also intimates that it is somehow the language that judges. He remarks that "no single one of the vast array of ordinary languages can be mainly erroneous in the normal judgments of observable physical fact which it makes or presupposes; otherwise its users would not have survived." But languages, since they judge nothing at all, do not make errors -- although the poverty of their language may lead people to make especially dangerous errors. (A separate point: Meynell's appeal to survival value is a surprise. His remarks are for the most part anti-pragmatist.)

But if the plain man is suspicious about personifying language, he is notoriously wary of claims that we must postulate, in accord with elusive canons of simplicity, the existence of material objects. Such simplicity, after all, leads him quite as directly to Berkeley's God! Meynell does make a certain effort to differentiate his stance from a view with which we are all familiar.

Russell's one-time view, that the existence of a world
of material objects commends itself as the best explanation of our sense-experiences, is in a manner vindicated [italics added]; as is the thesis that material objects are rightly to be postulated as causes of our experience. But his hesitations are ultimately minor. For he rejects the claim that, in ordinary circumstances, the plain man simply sees, let us say, the cat on the mat. Of course, Meynell cannot put his opposition so baldly: what is denied is "direct acquaintance" or 'givenness'. For the given in experience has been reduced to sense-impressions. If we have the 'appropriate' or 'requisite' sense-impressions, then -- other things being equal -- we can make knowledge-claims about the cat on the mat.

The plain man, though, remains puzzled. In ordinary circumstances "material object reports" do not result from even reconstructed justifications via sense-impressions. To be sure, one is sometimes mistaken about, for example, one's vision or the lighting or trick mirrors. But when one is not mistaken, it is not that one has somehow made a proper inference or quasi-inference any more than one has made a proper inference when one judges that one's spouse is a person rather than an android.

But might the plain man be given an inducement to countenance some sort of justificatory inference from sense-impressions? Meynell assures us that such a process would "not imply that it is doubtful whether we can really perceive or come to know about a publicly-shared world of physical objects . . ." That worry could only result from "confusing the content of a judgment" with its "ultimate grounds in experience." His point might prove consoling if ever the link between (putative) grounds and content had been clearly stated. But Meynell has not done so.

That he has not is ironic; he is keen to the failure of the sense-data empiricists to work out the connection between (1) sense-data reports and (2) material object claims. They cannot licitly derive (2) from (1), either deductively or inductively, he says. Yet Meynell in parallel fashion denies any strict logical connection between the given of experience and our judgments of public reality. There is reference to testing and evidence, but neither a logic of testing nor of evidence is entertained. We are to conceive of possibilities which account for our "as though of" sense-impressions and judge which possibility "best fits the evidence."
All of this strikes the plain man, who sees cats rather than experiences sensations "as though of" a cat, as a verbal solution to a dilemma of the philosopher's own making.

With three central misgivings about Meynell's epistemology now before us, two other worries might simply be noted. First, there is a tendency to suppose that the problem of "the foundations of knowledge" is simply the problem of the foundation of empirical knowledge. Second, there is the awesome assumption, evidently defended elsewhere, that the real world just is that which is intelligible to us on the basis of sense experience.

A postscript. Meynell is indignant about and shocked by the scant attention analytical philosophers afford to Bernard Lonergan. About the wars between the schools the plain man has little to say. But a sociologist of knowledge might offer the following hypothesis. The diversity of thought among analytical philosophers is so great and the literature they have produced is so broad that there is little appetite to travel elsewhere, especially when -- shall it be acknowledged? -- anti-Catholic bias gives a distant land a doubtful reputation.

A REPLY TO JAMES G. HANINK

Hugo Meynell

Professor Hanink's criticism of my article is a model of what such things should be. He is invariably good-tempered, is generously appreciative where he can be, and makes fundamental criticisms clearly and fairly.

In my opinion, the man on the Clapham omnibus is a worthy fellow; Lonergan's philosophy, as opposed to (say) the philosophies of Russell or Hegel, vindicates him as being so. A thoroughgoing exercise of what Lonergan would call "attentiveness, intelligence and reasonableness" (attending to experience, envisaging possibilities, and checking out the possibilities in the light of further experience) will confirm his conviction that he is travelling on a real omnibus to or from a real place called Clapham -- rather than being a moment in an ever-evolving Absolute harboring crude fantasies.
to that effect, or a bundle of sense-data from which both Clapham and the omnibus are abstracted as logical fictions. But the excellent man does have his limitations. He cannot say why this conviction of his is right. He will probably defer to the Cavendish Professor of Physics and to the Astronomer Royal so far as to believe that there are positrons and black holes; but he will have no coherent idea of why he believes these authorities, in preference (say) to Tibetan lamas or Navajo witch-doctors. He may or may not believe in astrology or homoeopathy. Possibly he does not believe that there is a God, though his wife does; and they cannot both be right. And what is common sense to persons far from Clapham is liable to be something rather different. It is likely to be a matter of common sense to the man on the Bombay rickshaw, for example, that the souls of human beings are re-incarnated after their bodily death; but I am sure that the man on the Clapham omnibus would laugh this off as contrary to common sense. Which of them is right? To conclude on this matter -- common sense is an excellent thing, but bits of common nonsense are apt to get mixed up with it, and common sense is of itself quite incapable of disentangling them. How do we adjudicate between the myriad varieties of common sense? And how do we reconcile the deliverances of common sense with those of science, when they conflict, as they quite often do? And what are we to do about religious questions, on which persons of common sense are notoriously liable to disagree?

So much for the limitations of the man on the Clapham omnibus. A "non-dogmatic empiricist" sounds a fine thing to be; but I wonder whether this is not a polite term for someone who is not disposed to work out a consistent position?

Professor Hanink finds my position puzzling in a number of respects. I should remark that my preoccupation with language is not with it as observable noises or marks on paper; but as expressive of conception and judgment. The world is a great deal more than we perceive; but I believe that it cannot be other than what we tend to find out by envisaging possible explanations of what we perceive, and judging to be true the possibilities which best fit the evidence. To be is to be perceived, said Berkeley; a Lonerganian might say that to be is to be potentially conceived intelligently and judged reasonably of on the basis of perception. Logic,
notoriously, while it greatly facilitates the process, cannot
be a replacement for it. It is self-destructive to deny that
we can make true judgments for good reason; we tend to make
true judgments so far as we are careful to support our judg-
ments with good reason; and the world is nothing other than
what true judgments are about. And this includes entities
which we cannot perceive; including the thoughts and feelings
of other persons, the things and events of the past, and
the sub-atomic particles discussed by physicists. It is as
carrier of conception and judgment, I believe, but not other-
wise, that language gives us the crucial clue as to how experi-
ence is related to reality.

As to how judgments 'fit' the evidence of sensation,
I believe Lonergan's view to be correct, that the right way
of dealing with the problem is to attend to one's own making
of judgments on the basis of sensation -- this would be gener-
ally rejected, I think, by most philosophers in the tradition
of Wittgenstein or Ryle. But the fact is that, every day,
each of us is liable to go through such a procedure as the
following. I observe something which puzzles me; I think
up various explanations which may account for it; and I choose
the explanation which is best corroborated by the original
observation perhaps in conjunction with further ones. A judg-
ment likely to be true, and so about the real world, is one
which is corroborated by observation when it might have been
falsified by it. This procedure, as I say, is followed by
practically everyone practically every day; it is followed
in a more thoroughgoing way by the natural scientist in the
course of his professional work. The man on the Clapham omnibus
uses the process; but he can by no means describe or justify
it. Lonergan's followers feel that their master has described
and justified this process more satisfactorily than any other
recent philosopher; and this is one of the reasons why they
feel that more attention ought to be paid to his work. And
they feel that attention to the mental processes underlying
justified judgment is not merely significant for professional
philosophers; but may be useful in beginning to resolve some
of the ideological disputes which tear communities apart.

Professor Hanink is distressed at my apparent sympathy
with the view that ordinary physical objects are somehow
'postulated'. (Whether I hold it or not, it is the view of
W. V. O. Quine, who has described the physical object theory
of reality as on a level with the gods of Homer.) Perhaps it would be more aseptic to say that their reality is 'assumed'. In one sense, after all, it is palpably false to claim that I laboriously build up my wife from sensory cues each time I perceive her. And yet it is surely hard to deny that we attribute to ordinary physical objects much more than we directly perceive of them -- we assume that an apparent dollar bill will not dissolve into steam, or change abruptly and inexplicably into a twenty-dollar bill (worse luck). Common sense, as I have said, makes such assumptions, and in a manner leaps to such judgments, but does not spell out the fact that it is doing so. And I think it a merit in the older empiricism, pace philosophers like the late J. L. Austin, to have drawn attention to this fact.

There remain some small points. I agree that languages do not judge, but that people make judgments by means of language. But I think that language as it actually exists consists quite largely in the expression of judgments (e.g., "George, the cat has got at the anchovies again"). One assumes that one's spouse is a person rather than a droid, and all one's experience confirms this (though occasions might arise, for our less or more fortunate descendants, when it might do otherwise). I agree that the problem of knowledge is not only the foundation of empirical knowledge, but I believe that the correct solution found to the particular problem will turn out to have application to the more general one. Awesome assumptions, if I make them, can hardly be defended except at awesome length, and so I will not defend them here. But could the real world, in the last analysis, be anything but some intelligible possibility confirmed by the evidence of experience? If it were not, in what sense would it be 'real' or "the world"?

A WORTHY FELLOW WONDERS

James G. Hanink

Following the doctrine that one kind word merits another, let me note straightway that I welcome Professor Meynell's witty and probing remarks. Still, I do not think that he quite sees how things are on the Clapham omnibus. Perhaps, though, he can yet be induced to come aboard.
A beginning might be made (again) with humble things and familiar people. Meynell, easing himself out of the clutches of W. V. Quine, allows that it would be "more aseptic" to say of physical objects, e.g., the journal now before the reader, that "their reality is assumed" rather than postulated. Indeed, he advises us that one "assumes that one's spouse is a person" rather than an android. But this just won't do. No reader of Method, at any rate in practice, merely assumes its existence. We all of us know that the journal before us is real. Moreover, let us both speak and think with the vulgar, if we only assume that our spouse is a person we are in a bad way.

Now the fact that we all know certain truths about physical objects and persons, too, tells us something important about the plain man's philosophical significance. The plain man is not a proxy for the merely conventional. Meynell, thus, is mistaken in supposing that the plain man defers to titled academics or is undecided about astrology or, one might add -- Meynell does not, is a fan of Lawrence Welk. It is wrongheaded to think of the plain man in sociological terms. For talk of the plain man is properly taken as a kind of shorthand for a set of core propositions that function for thinkers like Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore as an embryonic "metaphilosophy of commonsense."

Certainly this set includes but is not limited to

(1) Physical objects exist.

and

(2) Persons exist.

and

(3) We know that (1) and (2).

Admittedly such a metaphilosophy is not a complete philosophy of perception or other minds or anything else. But without some such core, constructive philosophy is impossible. How we determine the core of commonsense propositions is, of course, a question of the first importance. It seems to me that the chief among its distinguishing marks are (i) the widespread disposition to accept them as evident and (ii) the absence of any good reason to reject them. Given (i) and (ii) and the premise that a truth need not be necessary in order to be known, (1) and (2) and (3) are indeed rightly treated as basic beliefs which we know to be true. Whether or not
(4) God exists.

shar... their status seems to me to be the first question
of the philosophy of religion.²

Two other points, not directly touching upon who rides
the Clapham omnibus, deserve a final mention.

Meynell now speaks of language as consisting largely
in the expression of judgments. But the original problem
was how to justify judgments about a public world while some-
how basing them on private sensations. Perhaps this hurdle
is to be overcome by more assiduous attention to just how
one does this in practice. Yet the objection remains: we
don't in practice build up to physical object reports from
the contents (are they objects?) of our private sensations.
Rather we see the world around us, from this or that perspec-
tive, just as we should expect to.

As for the closing question, could the real world fail
to be an intelligible possibility confirmed by the evidence
of experience? . . . Well, what is actual is possible. But
why should we suppose that everything actual is intelligible
to us? And why not acknowledge that much of what is actual
is evident -- rather than based on evidence?

NOTES

¹ For recent and illuminating discussions of such ap-
proaches, see David O'Connor's The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore
(D. Reidel, 1982), Edward H. Madden's "The Metaphilosophy
of Commonsense," American Philosophical Quarterly (Jan. 1983),
and Jonathan L. Kvanvig's "The Evidentialist Objection,"

² For one assessment see Alvin Plantinga's "Is Belief
in God Rational?" in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed.
C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1979).
As far as I know, no one has developed Lonergan's thought on art in general to apply it to drama in particular. Such an application I shall attempt in this article. At the outset, however, I should warn the reader that my approach to the topic is epistemological rather than aesthetic. That emphasis is evident especially in the first part which deals with meaning. A review of some relevant parts of Lonergan's treatment of meaning is needed in order to clarify and situate the position of drama in the field of meaning. I should add a further caution that this review presents his highly nuanced thought in vastly over-simplified form.

The obvious question, then, is, What is meant by meaning? Most people, I'm sure, would answer that question in purely conceptual terms, that is, meaning considered solely in relation to language. Simply put, meaning is what you understand by a given word. When you use the word 'democracy', what you mean is what you understand democracy to be. It is your concept or idea of democracy. When uncertain of a word's meaning, you consult a dictionary. The spoken or written word is an arbitrary or conventional sign of your internal 'word' or concept, idea, meaning. Directly the external word refers to a meaning; only indirectly does it refer to an object.

By itself, of course, a word may have several possible meanings. Take, for example, the word, 'tot'. It may mean what I understand by a young child or moppet. It may refer to a tot of rum; or it may be the German word meaning 'dead' as in the sentence, Der König ist tot, The King is dead. This consideration leads us to a preliminary distinction which, in Lonergan's words, is between partial terms of meaning, i.e., a word or term (group of words) not in a complete sentence and full terms of meaning, i.e., a proposition, whether
an affirmation or denial; a declarative sentence as in the above, "The King is dead."1

The point I am making here is not an attempt to outline Lonergan's much more complete discussion of meaning but to show that the ordinary interpretation of meaning is of some conceptual content, either as a partial or full term, that can be expressed linguistically, and also to show that, while language may be the most obvious conveyer of meaning, it is not the only one. Indeed, there are several other "carriers of meaning." In passing, I should note that "carriers of meaning" is the first of five headings listed by Lonergan, the other four being Elements, Functions, Realms, and Stages.2 Here our concern is with "carriers of meaning" under which five subdivisions appear in the following order: intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic, and incarnate meaning. As you would suspect, our interest lies in artistic meaning. But before we examine this subdivision there are some preliminary remarks which should help to prepare the way and provide better ground for our consideration.

Linguistic meaning, I have suggested, is the meaning that comes most readily to mind when people think of meaning. It is true, of course, that in language meaning comes to full flower and finds its freest and fullest expression. Language, however, is embodied in conventional written or spoken signs whose meanings have to be learned. The writer or speaker may be very articulate, but if he is writing or speaking in a language I do not know, his meaning is lost to me. I cannot come up with the proper concepts if I do not understand the words, the language he is using. But linguistic meaning is not the only meaning. Prior to conceptual meaning there is meaning that occurs almost spontaneously and to which we advert only in its happening. This is the meaning conveyed through human intersubjectivity. It arises naturally out of the community of feeling and fellow-feeling that are the spontaneous intentional responses of one human being to another in situations that arouse human feeling. It is akin to the electrical charge that can arc between opposite poles. It is as palpable. Thus, at the funeral of a loved parent, the children share a common sorrow while friends are moved by fellow-feeling aroused by the children's grief. We as strangers can be moved to sadness by the spectacle on our television screen of mourners weeping for the victims of some terrorist attack. The meaning in such intersubjective
responses is perhaps minimal and certainly not conceptualized, for the intersubjectivity is more a matter of action and feeling.

There is nevertheless an intersubjective communication of meaning which Lonergan illustrates by a phenomenology of a smile. In his exposition, a smile is indeed a prime example of an intersubjective carrier of meaning. Is there not a song to the effect that "There are smiles that make you happy; there are smiles that may you gay?" A smile involves more than a mere external combination of certain facial movements together with those of the lips and eyes. These movements form a pattern with a meaning. A smile differs from other intersubjective communications and this difference serves to highlight the fact that a smile does convey meaning. It differs quite evidently from the meaning to be drawn from a frown, a snicker, a scowl or a stare. Indeed, because a smile has meaning you have to be careful not to go about smiling at everyone you meet. You could be misunderstood!

Further, while we have to learn the meaning of words by being taught, by education, we learn the meaning of a smile rather on our own. That meaning, too, would seem to be common to all peoples. Whether the smiler be Canadian, French, German, Russian, Chinese, African, the meaning of a smile remains very much the same. National, racial, cultural differences do not change its meaning. On the other hand, a gesture such as a clenched fist can be open (?) to different interpretations in different contexts: an expression of victory, a communist salute, a physical threat.

Smiles themselves, of course, can express a considerable variety of meanings. There are smiles of welcome, of friendship, of love, of encouragement, of sympathy, of joy, of shyness, of contempt. We speak of a glad smile or a sad smile, of a fresh and eager smile, or a weary and resigned smile. Somehow a smile's meaning is elemental, global. A smile tends to reveal one subject immediately to another. It is intersubjective, interpersonal. It lets a person know what another person means to him. That is not to say that a smile cannot be simulated, for "one can smile and smile and be a villain."

Obviously enough a smile is something we readily perceive. But our perceiving is not just a matter of the sum of impressions made on our senses. Our perceiving is selective. That is, out of all the manifold of the presentations of our senses, our perceiving picks only those which can be constructed into a pattern with a meaning. In the general hubbub of a
cocktail party, for example, you can pick out a particular set of sound waves that has a meaning. You can focus your attention, as it were, and listen to one person out of all the general babble. Similarly, out of the vast complex of possible facial movements, you can easily pick out the patterned set of movements we call a smile, and you can do this precisely because the pattern has a meaning. It is a Gestalt, "a patterned set of variable movements, and it is recognized as a whole." I believe it was Cardinal Marty of Paris who remarked of Pope John Paul I, "He gave us the smile of God."

Now at this point in your reading you may be wondering what all this has to do with drama. Intersubjective meaning does have considerable relevance to what I have to say about drama, as I hope to make clear in my subsequent remarks. That relevance may be obvious to a confirmed theater-goer. At any rate, the time has come to move on to the consideration of artistic carriers of meaning and of drama as a particular and potent example of them.

I can best begin, perhaps, by quoting Lonergan's definition of art for which he acknowledges his indebtedness to Susanne Langer's Feeling and Form. "Art," he says, "is defined as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern, and each term in this definition is carefully explained." Following Lonergan's lead, I shall try to do the same, though I should warn the reader that my account is little more than a paraphrase of Lonergan's own explanation.

What is perceived is a pattern and that pattern may be either abstract or concrete. An abstract pattern, for example, is formed by the notes on the page of a musical score or in the indented grooves of a phonograph record. There is not simply an accidental juxtaposition or jumble. A brick wall has a pattern and differs from the mere jumble of a pile of bricks. A concrete pattern is perceived in the given movements, volumes, tones, colors of a particular work of art. These are related internally in such a way as to form a whole and again are not merely accidentally juxtaposed. The finished painting exemplifies this internal relationship while the unrelated colors on the artist's palette do not. People streaming from the theater at the close of a performance do not form a pattern whereas the dancers' movements in a ballet do. A skillful director does not leave the movements of his actors to chance.
A pattern naturally requires a perceiver and so in turn there is a pattern to the perceiving drawn from the pattern of the perceived. As we saw in the example of the smile, the perceiving is an experiential pattern that involves some selection and organization on the part of the perceiver. Precisely because the smile is a patterned set of movements, it is easily perceived and readily distinguished from a frown or scowl. You may be able to hum a tune or melody which you heard as background music at the cocktail party, but you cannot repeat the incidental babble of voices or successive noises. Because it is patterned a few lines of rhyming verse can be remembered where the same statement in prose form is soon lost to recall. "So verse makes information memorable." This is why the advertising on radio and television makes such common use of the sung verse jingle. The successful jingle can stay with you and haunt you!

Besides being an experiential pattern, the pattern of the perceiving should be purely experiential. That is to say, a pure pattern does not permit the inroad of any preconditioned pattern that is at odds with pure experience. Somewhat like Pavlov's dogs, our senses can be conditioned or trained to respond more or less automatically to various signals. Military training aims at producing this sort of automatic response in the recruit who learns to obey commands without having to mull things over. After a number of performances of a play, veteran actors can run through their lines and stage movements while their minds are occupied with other concerns. Further, instead of the purely experiential pattern, sense experience can be reshaped much in the manner of the Procrustean bed by an alien, a priori theory of interpretation drawn from some field of science at the expense of experienced psychological fact. Instead of paying attention to what happens when the senses are allowed to function on their own, one's interpretation is predetermined by an epistemology which holds that, while sense impressions are objective, their pattern is merely subjective.

Another word, perhaps, for "purely experiential" could be 'existential'. The pattern must be of colors, shapes, sounds as they actually occur in a given context, in the existential situation. All of us are aware how easy it is to react according to ready-made stereotypes. We tend to see and hear and interpret in line with what current fashion decrees or the local critic dictates. This does not mean
to say that, in approaching a work of art, we should somehow try to divest ourselves of our own personalities. Such an exercise obviously would be futile, and rather like divesting oneself of clothing so that one would not appear prejudiced at a fashion show. When we attend a work of art we are accompanied by our likes and dislikes, our memories, our desires and aversions, our moral and social judgments. Still, rather than being prisoners solely of the past, we must try to be open to the present actual experience. Briefly, the point is that our experiencing has to be our own, not someone else's. We object to having our reactions imposed upon us. We object at a performance to a card being held up with "APPLAUSE" printed on it! To be genuine, the applause has to be spontaneous. Unless the cast is playing to an empty house, the audience consists of conscious subjects, each of whom experiences his own existential pattern. Each subject brings to the theater "his capacity for wonder, for awe and fascination, his openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, majesty." That capacity, that openness must be given free rein. Lonergan says it well.

The required purity of the existential pattern aims not at impoverishment but at enrichment. It curtails what is alien to let experiencing find its full complement of feeling. It lets experiencing fall into its own proper patterns and take its own line of expansion, development, organization, fulfilment.

Another point to be noted is that, as the pattern draws to completion or is finally grasped as a whole, a lesson may emerge from it, but the lesson should not be imposed upon it by way of heavy-handed teaching or preaching, or of social realism. To illustrate the point, we note that lessons emerge from Shakespeare's plays but one is never conscious of feeling one is in a classroom or before a pulpit. George Bernard Shaw, on the other hand, has been criticized for making the lesson too obvious. Blatant moralism can make one feel one is being beaten on the head with a baseball bat. The moralism is more evident, perhaps, in Shaw's Doctor's Dilemma than in his Arms and the Man.

We must not forget that, like the meaning of a smile, the meaning of the existential pattern is elemental. It is not developed meaning. The pattern in a drama may not be fully grasped until the final curtain. Until that curtain falls, the pattern, the Gestalt, the form remains a form in suspense. This suspense of form is not to be identified
with suspense of plot which is merely accidental to a particular play, but rather with the suspense of the pattern which, like that of the smile, is grasped as a whole. It refers to what Charles Morgan terms "the incompleteness of a known completion." There has to be some prior awareness of the whole, some anticipation of what is to come, a grasp of a pattern that is being fulfilled. By way of illustrative contrast, consider the experience of watching a cage full of monkeys at the zoo. There is plenty of action but no pattern emerges. One soon tires of the "monkey business" and moves on to the next cage. On the other hand, by way of parallel to form in suspense, one does not fully grasp Euclid's geometry until one has finished the entire book.

The work of art itself is the proper expression of this elemental meaning. In drama the work of art is the play, and the play not merely as a written work (which may qualify as a piece of literature) but as a staged production. The script of a play obviously conveys conceptual, developed meaning. But a play is much more than its script, however important that may be. Though the script is the governing or commanding form, it is only a part of the total pattern. The experience of reading a play is not that of witnessing its production. While a play may not impress in its reading, it may prove captivating in its production. Only in its actual production do all the elements of the play come together. The scenery, lighting, costumes, properties, colors, make-up, perhaps as well music and dance, -- a whole gamut of art forms unite with the actors to present the total experiential pattern. The actors communicate, too, through more than the spoken word. Through intersubjectivity with their audience they convey meaning by facial expression, use of eyes, tones of voice, friendly or threatening gestures, bodily movement, or what in general can be called "body-language". A good actor will be commended, for example, for his "commanding presence" on stage. So it is that without saying a word a good actor can establish community of feeling and fellow-feeling between his audience and himself. Sometimes, indeed, a silence can be as expressive as an dialogue. In fact, a mistake amateur or inexperienced actors often make is to feel they must keep on talking without a break instead of allowing actions to speak for themselves.

Now it goes without saying that the world of the theater is a world of illusion, a transformed world. Yet that world
and its characters can sometimes seem more real, more true than the everyday world. More books have been written about Hamlet than about most famous real persons. Almost paradoxically there are people who know more about Hamlet's problems and mental processes than about their own. A character like Archie Bunker becomes the prototype of the prejudiced person whom we see mirrored in a good many people we know -- but never of course in ourselves! Still, the drama gives us the chance to live however briefly a vicarious existence. So it is that the dramatic pattern involves "the conscious performing of a transformed subject in his transformed world."10

While the subject, however, may be transformed, he nevertheless does not cease to be human. And because he is human the experiential pattern must not descend to mere animality and so become offensive. As Lonergan remarks, "Indeed, man is an animal for whom mere animality is indecent."11 Man, in effect, has to maintain a "psychical distance" from merely biological performances. Thus nudity, obscenity, explicit sex, when presented solely at the biological level, tend not to attract but to repel, to offend one's sensibilities, or at least to prove tiresome. Whatever their appeal to prurient interest and box office coffers, they cannot claim to be either good drama or legitimate art.

Here I should point out that drama as a work of art is not to be identified with entertainment. That is not to deny that drama entertains. It does, but it must not be looked upon as "show business". That is the attitude of the commercial theater which tries to satisfy the demand for amusement. Susanne Langer supports our viewpoint. She says, "Drama is neither ritual nor show business, though it may occur in the frame of either one; it is poetry, which is neither a kind of circus nor a kind of church."12 If drama, then, is to be a true work of art, it must rise above mere entertainment, the circus, variety show, commercial comedy. Drama as a work of art should be capable of transforming the audience and of elevating it to a new world. Because Lonergan expresses this characteristic of a true work of art so well, allow me to quote him at some length.

We are transported from the space in which we move to the space within the picture, from the time of sleeping and waking, working and resting, to the time of the music, from the pressures and determinisms of home and office, of economics and politics to the powers depicted in the dance, from conversational and media use of language
to the vocal tools that focus, mould, grow with consciousness. As his world, so too the subject is transformed. He has been liberated from being a replaceable part adjusted to a ready-made world and integrated within it. He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself, emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom.\(^{13}\)

By way of conclusion I should add some brief remarks about the objectification of the experiential pattern. There are two distinct aspects to this objectification. First, there is the objectification which the artist himself must achieve if he is to give visible, audible, or tangible expression to his experience, to the elemental meaning or insight he wishes to convey. The unshaped block of marble must give way to hammer and chisel; the haunting theme must be recorded in a musical score; the paint must be transferred from palette to canvas; the characters and plot of the play must be transported from the author's consciousness to come alive in his script. Secondly, there is the objectification which the theater- or art-goer may wish to achieve. The experiential pattern, as I have noted, is not developed meaning. The experience is the emotion, the feeling as it is felt. To give expression to the elemental meaning the work of art has had for us is a matter of insight, of grasping the form or pattern which governs the work, and of subsequently working out, developing, correcting our initial insight. We revisit the art gallery, we listen again to the music, we return to the theater to see the play a second, a third, a fourth time. Recently I heard of a youngster who had seen the movie Star Wars seventeen times. I should like to have heard him attempt an objectification of his experience!

Objectification, whether on the part of the artist who creates or of the subject who experiences it, requires a separation from the existential experience, a measure of detachment. It calls for calm recollection of the experience and insight, conceptualization, reflection, judgment, and the expression of the results of this process. While each one of us no doubt indulges in some sort of post mortem analysis after leaving the theater, the further work of a more explicit clarification and judgment is the work rather of the drama critic. Add, of course, the literary critic, the music critic, the art critic whose reviews may mean the success or failure of the work of art. Because conscious subjects
differ rather notably in taste and temperament, in intellectual capacity and sound judgment, their objectifications of the experiential pattern often enough will also differ. In fact, you can read reviews of a play witnessed by two critics and wonder whether both saw the same play. It was a distinguished American drama critic, as I recall, who remarked that dramatic criticism to many people must seem like an attempt to tattoo soap bubbles!

While dramatic criticism, or for that matter art criticism in general, may help one reflect upon an experiential pattern's elemental meaning and assist in one's understanding and appreciation of it, it cannot reproduce the experience. Just as knowledge of the laws of thermodynamics does not make one feel any warmer or colder, so reading the learned critic's review, however perceptive it may be, does not recreate one's own experience nor replace it if one has not seen the play. Only the work of art itself can manage that.

In the final analysis, then, one must visit the art gallery oneself, one must listen to the symphony, one must attend the theater. The work of art, as it were, issues an invitation for one to experience for oneself. In Lonergan's words, "The work of art invites one to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world."¹

NOTES


²Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 57.

³Ibid., p. 59. ⁴Ibid., p. 59. ⁵Ibid., p. 61.


¹⁰Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 63.


¹²Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 320.

¹³Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 63.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 64.
It is a rare and awesome thing to have had one's life touched by a genius. The chances against it are astronomical. Yet this luck, or grace, has been mine.

It is only much later in life that it becomes possible to establish a scale to measure the different depths in oneself to which various influential persons have penetrated. Towards one end of that scale, there is that region of the spirit where one can be profoundly and forever changed. For me, Leavis alone of all my teachers penetrated that region. And because I know that his impression was not what they call subjective, but on the contrary was the unifying of so many elements in experience that hardly ever come together, I feel confident in calling it the influence that only genius exerts. To study under him at Cambridge in those early days was the kind of educational experience the possibility of which now seems more and more remote.

It was an integral part of this unusual depth of influence, of course, that one was not alone in it. There were disciples -- a term that nowadays is not used without mockery, except in New Testament studies, where appreciation has been driven out by technique. There was that special friendship which grows among a few people undergoing the same kind of awakening and enlightenment.

What was it that he was doing for us? What was he bringing together that the whole modern educational system seemed to put asunder? He associated literature with the hunger for ultimate meaning without which we would not be human. He came upon a world where the enjoyment of literature was confined to an 'aesthetic' sphere, while the human quest for meaning was thought to be taken care of by theologians and, in a more innocent time, by philosophers. He came into that world and said a resounding 'No' to its division of labor and consequent emasculation of the spirit. Really to hear Shakespeare's words is to be troubled and excited in those deepest reaches of the spirit where damnation, purgation, and salvation are appropriate concepts. And the test of great writing is, precisely, that it echoes in those forgotten reaches. I remember Leavis once referring to "that almost indecent way Shakespeare has of telling you things about yourself that you
didn't know you knew." No one else was speaking like this. I met a younger Englishman at a theological conference at Boston two summers ago who, when I mentioned Leavis, said, "He was the last prophet we had in England." And immediately we understood each other. We had both felt that oneness between some word-orderings and "the word" which, once felt, sends shockwaves of change right through the system.

I came to Leavis as a Christian and a monk. Thus I had some familiarity with a tradition that had for two millennia cultivated the soul's deepest desire, mapped out in various ways the "itinerarium mentis in Deum". It had done this far more creatively in earlier than in modern times, so that the spiritual tradition had perforce become "fugitive and cloistered". Yet here was a teacher who, while remaining staunchly agnostic, allowed one's spiritual life to breathe in that world of great literature so long claimed for itself by a modernity impatient of the monkish. Yes, he really made us monks and priests feel we belonged, with all our priestliness, to the world we lived in. If this is called education, then another word will have to be found for what generally goes by that name.

I refer to "us monks and priests", because Leavis had a large Roman clerical following. He used to say impishly that this was only because he had put Hopkins on the map, thus promoting "one of ours" to the top rank of English poets. There was more to it than that. The soul craves for a unified vision of the world: and people like monks and priests, for whom that unified world exists in principle, experience a certain frustration at the failure of this believed-in unity to flesh itself out in the world we live in. Thus we perhaps more easily "smell out" someone who offers a remedy to this spiritual schizophrenia. That was his appeal for us. And he exercised this appeal very properly in being the first critic of any note to discover that an obscure Victorian Jesuit had, in his attempt to spell out his dialogue with the infinite, achieved that combination of emotional honesty with technical sophistication that is the mark of high poetry. Who else paid attention to Hopkins in the early thirties? And Leavis pointed to the very thing that was most remarkable in a religious poet: the presence of a single integrity that dictated the confession of feelings and the ordering of words. Anyone conversant with religious writing as I am -- and I
include my own of course -- knows with what fatal ease the
hallowed phrase imposes itself to the obfuscation of any
real communication of feeling. As Eliot says, "The religious
poet says what he believes. The devotional poet says what
he wants to believe."

This was an important part of Leavis' unity of vision:
emotional honesty showing itself in the way a phrase is turned.
I remember him saying in a lecture, à propos of a sonnet
of Christina Rosetti, "She thinks she feels like that; but
she doesn't feel like that." (When a colleague to whom I
quoted this commented "What a sexist remark!" I groaned in-
wardly -- what a long way we have come from that precision
of thought and feeling.) He always would quote with approval
Eliot's statement about Blake:

Blake's poetry has the unpleasantness of great poetry.
Nothing that can be called morbid or abnormal or perverse,
one of the things which exemplify the sickness of an
epoch or a fashion, have this quality; only those things
which, by some extraordinary labour of simplification,
exhibit the essential sickness or strength of the human
soul. And this honesty never exists without great techni-
cal accomplishment.² [Emphasis mine -- and Leavis's]

Another poetic giant received at Leavis's hands his first
serious critical appraisal: T. S. Eliot. Only recently I
was rereading the chapter on "The Waste Land" in New Bearings,
alongside the contemptuous sallies with which the accredited
critics greeted that poem. Leavis was the only voice calling
us to become conscious of living in this time and then, and
thus, to read "The Waste Land". It was the poetry of an age
"too conscious of too much", he said. Again, as a theologian,
I am amazed at how early Eliot and his interpreter were grasp-
ing that new relationship of the psyche to its myths which
is the most challenging and work-demanding problem for theology
in our time.

I have to report another very recent experience that
has brought home to me Leavis's prophetic character. Teaching
the theology of salvation to American college students --
not "theological students", for we have a "theology require-
ment" -- I have come to realize that one of the most important
signs of our 'fallen' condition is the underdevelopment,
in each sex, of a latent capacity to feel as the other sex
feels. I am getting so used now to finding that "Eliot was
already there", that I thought of Tiresias. Leavis's comment
on Eliot's note to this part of the poem is worth quoting.
The note runs, it will be remembered:

Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a "character", is yet the most important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-eyed merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not wholly distinct from Ferdinand, Prince of Naples, so all the women are one woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias. What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of the poem.

Leavis comments:

If Mr. Eliot's readers have a right to a grievance, it is that he has not given this note more salience; for it provides the clue to "The Waste Land". It indicates plainly enough what the poem is: an effort to focus an inclusive human consciousness. The effort, in ways suggested above, is characteristic of the age; and in an age of psychoanalysis, an age that has produced the last section of "Ulysses", Tiresias -- "venus huic erat utraque nota" -- presents himself as the appropriate impersonation. A cultivated modern is (or feels himself to be) intimately aware of the experience of the opposite sex.3

Whatever one thinks of the notes to "The Waste Land", or of the above comment, the whole point is Leavis's realization that it is the quality of consciousness, and the capacity to be more conscious, that matters today; that the great poet is one who can make us much more conscious; and that the great critic is one who finds 'salient' in the poet's work this transformative power. It is with a religious awe, a sense of making anamnesis, that I recall that Leavis did this to me and my religious contemporaries. Quite simply, he made life itself more exciting than it would otherwise have been. I love him for that.

It was he who gave me Eliot, whose poetry has stayed with me these forty-odd years, always reappearing in new places uncovered by a continuous theological probing of human experience. Without an interpreter of the calibre and charisma of Leavis, I do not think I would have been able to open my mind to the revolution in feeling that Eliot achieves and calls for. I mean that an altogether new willingness to listen to a poem with unremitting patience was required to experience what Eliot was doing with language and therefore with consciousness itself. Leavis instilled that contemplative stance, and made it seem obviously the only way to listen to real poetry. His repeated axiom, that "there is only one right reading" for a poem, is easily dismissed as dogmatism: but it envisages -- what its critics showed little care for -- a consensus, among hearers, in the poem, and thus a real
fruitfulness of the word in the community. Nor did he believe that the "one right reading" could ever be arrived at without much dialogue, which he used to describe as "saying to someone 'this is what I seem to hear. What do you think about that?'' It's the same thing that runs through all of his work among us: he cared. He was the educator, the nurturing one, the pastor par excellence.

It was in this stance of initiator to a fuller consciousness through the word, that he gave -- 'tradidit'! -- Eliot to us. I remember how at my first supervision he handed to me the Selected Essays. That was something of an act of 'tradition' -- a word as dear to him as it was to Eliot. I am not ashamed to compare what is still by far the most exciting educational experience I remember to something very much older, simpler, and shaped by a functional reverence -- the experience, in fact, of discipleship. We are too clever and distracted for it these days. We can only take it in the phony aura of the guru.

Shortly after the appearance of "Little Gidding", Leavis said to me, "The only poetic development comparable to that of Eliot from "The Waste Land" to "Little Gidding" is Shakespeare's." I know that later he was to become sharply opposed to Eliot's poetic statement. He said to me, about fifteen years ago, "I say 'No' to Eliot, 'No' to his alternatives of "pyre or pyre"." I have to say something about this change in attitude, which is fully expressed in the long chapter on Eliot in his last book, The Living Principle.

That essay begins with a strong reaffirmation of Eliot's greatness as a poet. But he finds in the Quartets many places where Eliot's wonderful creativity -- a word that appears very frequently in the essay -- lapses, and the verse goes limp. These are the places where the transcendent mystery is directly affirmed as a loving presence. Briefly, every so often Eliot chuck's up the sponge and surrenders to the God of his daily Christian worship. There is no real feeling in these passages -- indeed, religious surrender is made to do duty precisely for a certain inability to feel that is Eliot's sickness, evidenced in his notorious attitude to women and to sexuality. Yes! Eliot is very vulnerable just there. It has often been observed, however, that there are two types of mystic: one whose sense for the transcendent is born of emotional wounding and deprivation (Auden finds
this in Dag Hammarskjold), another for whom it is born of emotional fulfilment. Eliot himself has noted both ways:

This is the one way, and the other
Is the same, not in movement
But in abstention from movement; while the world moves
In appetency, on its metalled ways
Of time past and time future."

Also, in Leavis's text a powerful assumption is at work. It is a dual assumption: that a vigorous civilization always has a religious dimension, and that our civilization is altogether lacking in vigor. It follows that our civilization is incapable of producing significant religious poetry -- and this is shown by the fact that even Eliot fails to do so -- a backhanded recognition of Eliot's poetic stature! But the assumption is itself so charged with Leavis's highly individual attitude to religion that one must wonder whether it is not the basis for saying that Eliot's religious poetry is a failure, as well as being corroborated by this failure taken as independently ascertained fact. There seems to be an argumentum in circulo here.

This may be accountable for as follows. Leavis's religious attitude is avowedly indebted to Blake. Religiousness is the full expression of our creativity; and creativity, he believes, has no place in it for surrender to another and altogether higher power. But is this so? One might ask what religiousness, so esteemed by Leavis as an essential dimension of civilization, is if not the confession of dependence on another and higher power, to which 'surrender' is appropriate and indeed enjoined by all the world-religions. I don't think Leavis ever really asked that question. And he may just be projecting his own failure to face its implications onto Eliot at precisely those points where Eliot is saying 'Yes' to that very question. Where Eliot said 'Yes' -- at, I believe, deep personal cost; it did cost him "not less than everything" -- Leavis said an emphatic 'No' to Eliot.

Of course this is speculation. I would prefer to emphasize that Leavis does raise the vital religious question of our time: that of a real synthesis, in feeling and image, of creativity with religious surrender, such that the latter would appear as the consummation of creativity rather than its relinquishing in favor of a higher power. It was, in fact, only recently that I realized that I had always operated out of two centers: a monk, the creature of God, and a modern, self-creating; and that now these two centers coalesce, and
there is only one center. It is, of course, to the great mystical tradition that we must look for this identity between creative self-constitution and surrender. As Bernard Lonergan -- my other teacher -- puts it: The infinite is mediated to the mystic through the immediacy with which he knows his or her own movement to the unknown. (I find myself wondering: Why is the top-level stuff so marvellous today, the lower levels so distracted and dreary?) And this "movement to the unknown" is the most creative and self-constituting thing we ever do:

We must be still and still moving
Into another intensity
For a further union, a deeper communion
Through the dark cold and the empty desolation,
The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters
Of the petrel and the porpoise. In my end is my beginning.\(^5\)

The point I am making is that it has taken me much labor to get within feeling distance of this unity, and that Leavis it was who gave the essential program for this labor, as it was he who stumbled on its essential problematic, the issue of creativity and worship.

The problematic lurks, of course, at the heart of Leavis's crucial insight into the inseparability of great diction from the essential movement of the soul. I shall never forget the abysmal disappointment, not to say sense of bathos, that awaited me in Rome whither I repaired for theological studies immediately after my years at Cambridge. In my naivete I somehow assumed that I would there meet people who would do with a psalm or the "Vexilla Regis" what Leavis did with "Put up your bright swords, for the dew will rust them". Nor was I entirely off the beam in my complaint, as I subsequently learned when I read Northrop Frye's statement that the most devastating failure in scripture study today is the total lack of aesthetic, evaluative response. I recall an incident at, I think, M.I.T. in the States. An honorary doctorate was to be awarded to some eminent scripture scholar, and the President -- whose specialty may have been computers -- asked for some representative works in that field, so that he could make an appropriate speech. When the time came, he opened by describing this preparatory activity and said, of the scriptures, "Surely these books deserve better treatment. They are good books!" What Leavis called "the higher navvy-ing" flourishes especially in the field of scripture scholarship. The Word of God, which, for the believer, is
the word, lacks that breathing-room in the spirit which Leavis, with a lone voice, claimed for the word. "Our last prophet" -- yes, perhaps: our last believer in the word.

There were, of course, serious weaknesses in the Leavis 'movement', especially at the undergraduate level. The stringent demands made of literature by Leavis involved the exclusion, from the 'canon', of whole tracts of poetry, prose, and criticism traditionally hallowed in the English School. Shelley, Tennyson -- and, for heavens' sake, Milton! -- most of Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope . . . the list continued. Bradley (with his footnote "How many children had Lady Macbeth?") was the Aunt Sally of Shakespeare criticism. As a powerful strategy for giving more time and concentration to certain areas and thus facilitating a revolution in consciousness, the purge was justified. But for our young minds, the combination of being let-off an immense amount of reading with expressing lofty disdain for the neglected authors, was too much. However, those who outgrew this dogmatic exclusivism were able subsequently to get more out of the neglected authors than if they had encountered them as the classics of an Establishment. I well remember my dear friend Hilary Steuert, who was responsible for my reading English under Leavis, saying to me on one of our many walks: "You know, I've been reading Bradley (a slight lowering of the voice for this terrible confession), and he's damned good!"

Leavis was one of those very rare "men who opened my eyes". There has been one other such teacher in my life: the Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan. I have long felt that there must be a profound connection between these two crucial influences. Apart from the fact that Leavis, towards the end of his life, was becoming increasingly enthusiastic about Michael Polanyi, whose thought is very close to Lonergan's, I suggest the following. One of Lonergan's most transformative ideas was, that there are other conversions besides the religious. There is an intellectual conversion, which he described as follows: "The appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness is not an end in itself but rather a beginning, for unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that
dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism. Then there is moral conversion, the feeling drawn to a good that is not simply the advantageous. Now some of us whom Lonergan has taught and changed have become convinced -- and Lonergan has strongly agreed -- that there is still another conversion: of feeling perhaps, of imagination, of psyche, of our mythic or symbolizing consciousness. To such a conversion, surely Leavis was pointing: and he was alone in this. To hear Shakespeare or Yeats or Eliot in the 'conscious' way that he demanded is to be reborn. The old, the customary, Heidegger's 'Altäglichkeit', dies in one, and new life springs up in its place.

God knows we need this conversion today, when a murderous defense policy is insinuating itself through a systematic murder of the language, in phrases such as "acceptable losses", "surgical strikes", 'fratricide' (for the collision of two warheads causing boundless devastation). The spirit of F. R. Leavis is not absent from E. P. Thompson's admirable opening chapter of Protest and Survive.

I cannot doubt the part played by Leavis in whatever life-renewal I may have experienced, or in my hope of an ultimate salvation for humankind.

NOTES

1 The present essay is to be included in a volume about Leavis to be published in 1983 by Cambridge University Press.

2 Selected Essays (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. ), p.275.


4 Burnt Norton III.

5 East Coker V.

BOOK REVIEW


ON LEARNING FROM AN ERROR

This study of papal infallibility is intended by its editor, Terry Tekippe, to be "a first of its kind," namely, "a full-scale effort to implement Lonergan's method." It is divided into eight chapters, each devoted to one of the functional specialties. The chapters are of uneven lengths, ranging from six pages (Research) to one hundred-and-ten pages (Interpretation). There are seven authors. The work is published by University Press of America.

Regretably this well-intentioned and in many ways diligent study is seriously and, I believe, fatally flawed by a radical misunderstanding of Lonergan's contribution to theological method. Tekippe writes in the Introduction, "In a sense, what the present effort does is almost to construct a 'recipe book'." He adds, of course, that the rules which would apply Lonergan's "methodological principles" "are not to be followed blindly, but creatively, as Lonergan warns about his own principles." But the power of the 'recipe' analogy, although never explicitly referred to again, remains obvious in the entire structure of the study and in some specific chapters. Surely what Lonergan is concerned with is not recipes but the mind which makes recipes and also does theology. And what he invites us to is to take reflective and active possession of our minds and not to implement his own recipe (as if he had one) or anyone else's. This misunderstanding leads to a preoccupation with Lonergan's articulation of method rather than with the dynamics of the issue itself. It also leads to the logical but unwarranted conclusion that "Lonergan's theological method" has never been tried before. If it is a recipe for an eight course meal, that is no doubt true. If it is the subjectivity operative in theology, then what Lonergan writes about has been done over and over again.
whenever good theology has been done. He simply but elegantly brings theology to fuller reflective consciousness and therefore helps in the distinguishing of good theology from bad and in the studied encouragement of the former. But taking the untried recipe approach, the editor writes, "This book attempts to meet that need [for actual examples of the method in operation] by providing at least one example of the method, as applied to a concrete problem." This misunderstanding is quite regrettable since it placed impossible demands on the authors.

There is no specific Lonerganian Method in Theology. Rather, there is simply method in theology, and Lonergan makes specific contribution to it. I consider this point to be essential. There is in fact a very clear analogy and it is in terms of scientific method. There is a natural sequence of questions which leads one from the gathering of data to the forming of hypotheses to the process of verification. Individual scientists make specific contributions in formulating and clarifying the stages of the mind's natural sequence; but the method can't properly be called by the name of the clarifier. The same is true of Lonergan's contribution to method in theology. He is surely adding new dimensions of understanding and in many instances important concrete suggestions, but at base he is formulating the natural sequence of questions that lead one, with regard to religious questions, from data to interpretation to history to dialectics to foundations to doctrines to systematics to communications. He might have been the first to formulate the stages so precisely, but he is basically naming a process which has been operative in most instances with considerable sophistication for a very long time. Lonergan is appreciative of past theological excellence and yet makes a genuine contribution to the field by unpacking the subjectivity (and hence objectivity) of those doing theology.

The misunderstanding of Lonergan's contribution to theological method leads to a concomitant misunderstanding of theological collaboration. Rather than relying on already extant interpretive and historical studies of infallibility and engaging in a dialectics of these studies, the authors did their own studies of the Biblical, Patristic, Medieval, Reformation, and Modern periods, and this even when they were not themselves necessarily historians or scholars of
those particular periods. They often correctly rely on others' studies, but one doesn't have the confidence that one is in contact with the best sources of scholarship.

Functional specialization, in Lonergan's sense, does not necessarily involve personally working with others on the same specific project, though surely that is desirable when possible. Primarily it is recognizing the unique contribution of specific experts and precisely not having to redo their work. It is doing one's own specialization well, acknowledging and appreciating that others are engaged in complementary facets of the same theological and human enterprise. The false understanding that Lonergan's "specific method" had not been tried, led the authors to the mistaken conclusion that they had to do everything over again, even if in some instances in summary fashion. These comments should not be taken to imply that some of the studies, as will be seen later, are not substantial contributions to scholarship. Rather, it is to again question the authors' understanding of Lonergan's views on theological collaboration.

The chapter on Research, by Sean Freyne, is not meant to be critical. It simply lists with a brief explanation the research decision taken by the authors of the chapters on Interpretation and History. In Interpretation the following will be treated: various books on the New Testament, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Augustine, Aquinas, William of Ockham, Luther, Bellarmine, Febronius, Vatican I, Vatican II, Hans Küng. In History: The Biblical period; The Patristic period (100-650); The Medieval period: Interventions and Claims of the Popes (650-1100), Canonical Formulation (1100-1250), Theological Development (1250-1500); The Reformation period (1500-1800): Reformation and Counter-reformation (1500-1600), Later Movements (1600-1800); The Modern period: Catholicism confronts Liberalism: The Syllabus, The Controversy concerning theological method, A Dying Gallicanism and a Triumphant Ultramontanism, Taking the measure of Pius IX, Vatican I to Vatican II. One would like to see the justification for not including the views of Eastern Orthodoxy on the truth of tradition and on the passing on of the tradition. A full treatment of the question of infallibility today must take the alternative views of Eastern traditions into account. Needless to say, the authors will rightly plead that they can't do everything. That is certainly true. But one is not asking for original research
on Orthodoxy -- that would be to deny functional specialization -- but only awareness of that research and the inclusion of an evaluation of its significance in Dialectic, Foundations, and Doctrines. One of the specific suggestions that Lonergan does make is that dialectics should be done "in an ecumenical spirit." Not to include the data on Eastern Orthodoxy is to perform a theological experiment without all the relevant data. The results are bound to be askew.

I trust my point is clear. It is not a criticism of the data that are included in research, interpretation, and history; it is a criticism that other data essential to a contemporary ecumenical dialectics were not. This point is important because, whereas Lonergan's contribution to research, interpretation, and history is basically the articulation of the role of subjectivity in those specialties, his contribution to dialectics is more substantial. And it is here in particular that I find much too narrow a base in the work under consideration. I realize I am calling for an entire book on the dialectics of infallibility, but I think that is necessary -- nothing less would do justice to the question.

The author of the Dialectic chapter acknowledges as much, I believe, when he speaks of the question of "the salvific impact of truth, Church authority, the structure of the believing community, the role of Peter, the principle of apostolic succession" as "intimately related" to the topic of infallibility and then doesn't consider them with any fullness.

A partial dialectics of infallibility is inadequate today. A consequence of this lack is that the later specialties must build on an inadequate base. For a good scientific or scholarly experiment one must deal with all the relevant data, the best hypotheses and undertake the most thorough verification. With less than that, one doesn't have a good experiment. And the same holds true for theology.

Before moving to a more detailed analysis of the chapter on Dialectic, let me single out for special mention the nuanced study of the texts of Vatican I and Vatican II by Stephen Duffy and his treatment of the changing theological contexts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They are informative and judicious.

I have three methodological reflections on the chapter on Dialectic by Terry Tekippe. The first is that, whereas Lonergan in Method in Theology focuses on the presence or
absence of intellectual, moral and religious conversion, after *Method in Theology* he also includes psychic or affective conversion. I think that addition is particularly important for a subject like infallibility since it involves, in significant fashion, the question of authority which is an affect-laden matter with deep psychic roots. I think that psychic dimension of infallibility is also important in the light of Lonergan's specific suggestion with regard to the two most recent examples of a solemn definition by a Pope: the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption. "... I might suggest that human psychology and specifically the refinement of human feelings is the area to be explored in coming to understand the development of Marian doctrine" (*Method in Theology*, p. 320). Not to consider the psychic dimensions of papal infallibility and of the two latest examples of it is to omit an essential element of the subjectivity which should be involved in the treatment of this question. I would suggest, then, that the chapter on Dialectic ignores some of the most recent developments in Lonergan's thought on the subject.

Another point on dialectics regards the check list that is made of theologians' conversions: religious, moral, and intellectual. Aquinas is intellectually, morally, and religiously converted. Luther is religiously converted but questionably morally and intellectually converted. No judgment is made on Künng's religious conversion. "Judging the Christian conversion of a living author seems excessively arrogant, whatever Lonergan's method calls for. Hans Künng claims to be both a Christian and a Catholic, and it is perhaps better to take him at his word, unless explicit evidence to the contrary can be produced." Künng's moral and intellectual conversions are called into question, however. Vatican I and Vatican II have all three conversions, although "the notion of conversion can be applied to a council only in an accommodated sense." The author admits that he does not supply sufficient data for those judgments and is quite unsure that a judgment on a person's character need be made on the basis of his position on infallibility. He is correct. Tekippe points out that Lonergan himself has never in print questioned the religious or moral conversion of anyone. But Tekippe wonders, "What good is a method which no one will dare to use? Our forefathers of the Reformation and Counter-reformation,
it is true, were less loath to brand their opponents as totally lacking in all moral and religious qualities. But one may doubt whether such candor really helped to solve any human problems." Would that Tekippe had acted on his own wise intuition.

To judge that a statement does not indicate an author's reflective awareness of the levels of consciousness is one thing. Even to judge that the person habitually lacks that reflective awareness is a matter of the same type. But to judge that an individual personally and habitually prefers satisfactions to values or is ignorant of or denies the Ultimate is quite another. It is sufficient, and in fact all that can actually be affirmed, to judge that a statement or an act is lacking or is apparently lacking moral or religious value, prescinding from a judgment of character.

My third point is that what one has in the chapter on Dialectic is not Bernard Lonergan's dialectics of infallibility but Tekippe's. That is as it should be, but that should be made more abundantly clear. In other words, the author would have done well to make his own values more explicit. He is convinced that papal infallibility is the intellectually converted position, and he finds that all those who hold to papal infallibility are intellectually converted. He is convinced of the great value of what he calls "institutional virtue: respect for the contemporary church and its leadership, docility, obedience." And those who have these values he considers to be morally converted; those who don't are only questionably so. But he never grounds the assertion that moral conversion demands the acceptance of papal infallibility. Why might not intellectual conversion ground the opposite, namely, that the formal criterion of definition by the Pope does not in itself indicate that a statement is to be accepted as true. Only the evidence for the statement or the evidence that the statement is held by the living tradition can ground that. If the evidence is not forthcoming, the statement need not be considered true, let alone infallible.

In any case, I hope my point is clear. What one has here is dialectics by someone who accepts papal infallibility and therefore it is not surprising that he finds those who also accept it to be intellectually, morally and religiously converted. It would have been fascinating, and very helpful to the reader, if an alternative chapter on dialectics, by someone
who did not accept papal infallibility but held an alternative view of truth and authority in the church, had been included.

The chapter on Foundations is particularly insightful and particularly brief -- not quite thirteen pages. I found it particularly insightful, since I consider that it really does name categories of immense significance for Christian living and Christian theology: the love of God, the fidelity of God, revelation, truth as saving, sacramentality, and authority as service. But an adequate rationale for the choice of categories is not developed. Why is faith as active, for instance, not included? With regard to the functional specialties Lonergan has written that "a serious contribution to one of the eight is as much as can be demanded of a single piece of work." What one has here -- and what the author, I believe, knows he has here -- are some elements for foundations. They do not represent what Lonergan considers to be the major contribution to be made by work in any of the eight functional specialties. "The major part is to produce the type of evidence proper to the specialty." The author does not do that; nor does he intend, in the limited space, to do that. This constitutes a serious flaw in the whole project; for the whole project rests upon these foundations. If they are inadequately drawn or inadequately justified, what is built on them will be shaky.

A final comment on the chapter on Foundations is a paradoxical one. As brief as this chapter is, I believe it is based only partially on the specific history and dialectics of infallibility which precede it. It is based rather on the history of Christian understanding of the love of God, of the fidelity of God, of revelation, of truth as saving, of sacramentality, and of authority as service; and these were not the specific subjects of the prior investigations that make up the first four chapters of the book. The chapter has a much broader base than is explicitly acknowledged.

My point here, then, differs from the one I made about the chapter on Dialectic. There I thought the data base and the conclusion were both too narrow. Here I find the conclusions broad but the data base too sketchily presented.

In the chapter on Doctrines, by Fagin, again the formulations are insightful, but a contemporary doctrinal treatment of infallibility must deal more fully with ecumenical problems related to infallibility. Let me suggest a sixth and seventh
thesis to follow the author's own which would be concerned with possible abuses of infallibility. I believe these are implied in the author's first five theses but that they need to be made explicit.

The sixth: "In so far as the Pope does not reflect and express the faith and consensus of the believing church in his solemn definitions, or in so far as his solemn definitions are not confirmed by the faith of the community, they are not to be considered infallible;" and the seventh: "In so far as the Pope would make a solemn definition that did not concern a truth necessary for salvation, the definition is not to be considered infallible."

These two theses would seem to express the author's implied view on the matter. If they do express his view, then a further question needs to be asked. Is belief in papal infallibility a truth necessary for salvation? If it is not, then it ought not to be considered to fall under the gift of infallibility to the church.

The chapter on Systematics contains helpful reflections on infallibility as analogy and as sacrament. The position on infallibility which is defended, is considered by the author, Robert Kress, to be a moderate infallibilism. The author's attitude toward infallibility seems to me to be ambivalent. We read: "Infallibility is . . . a public quality of the faith of the Church whereby it searches for ever greater understanding of its saving faith, secure that it can never become simply erroneous, and, we might say, secure that it will never be less in the service of the truth it witnesses and proclaims than more." But we also read: "Although the word may not be the best, other suggestions have not been so overwhelmingly persuasive as to be irresistible. It may well have become such a part of our history that it cannot be simply dismissed. In any case the basic intention of the doctrine of infallibility, if not the word itself, has been present in the Church from the beginning, at least in regard to the Church as a whole, if not the papacy. So, since we have to explain the thing, we may as well content ourselves with the word, especially since there is certainly a surfeit of warnings about its limitation."

Kress is quite polemical in his attack on Küng and defines the problematic of the question too much in Küng's terms. It seems to me that they do, in fact, share common ground. Again the
dialogue with Orthodoxy is not considered, and very little reference is made to the Roman Catholic dialogue with the Reformation Churches. Also, it is not clear how the 'systematics' follows from Fagin's Doctrines and the qualification he places on infallibility.

The chapter on Communications, by Lucille Sarrat, is a simple retelling of some of the points made earlier in the book. Its audience is said to be adult education or college level, but it is really not nuanced enough to meet the questions that are raised today. And it is ecumenically years behind the times. "The Reformation, as we know, brought about much turmoil in the church. Indeed, the need for reform of the church at this time was quite real; but, as often happens, some of the reformers went too far. It remained for wise and scholarly men to stem the tide of extremism. Among these learned theologians was a man named Robert Bellarmine . . . ."

My concluding reflections are direct. A wrong turn was made in the project by trying to apply "Lonergan's Method" as if he had a distinctive method. The question of infallibility itself, once it was decided on, should have been the focus, and Lonergan's methodological insights and those of others used in so far as they helped to lead one to a resolution of the question. The double focus, on the infallibility question and on the implementation of Lonergan's explicit methodological analysis, allowed too many compromises throughout the work as a whole, despite specific positive features, to do the subject of infallibility sufficient justice. In other words, the control for the book should have been the question of infallibility as it stimulated the desire for truth and the recognition of value. It should not have been the implementation of a method. Paradoxically, that would have been the real implementation of method which I believe Lonergan actually calls for -- the release of "the eros of the human spirit". Anything less smacks of New Method Laundry.

I entitled this review "On Learning from an Error". The self-correcting process of learning works both individually and communally. It was perhaps inevitable that this erroneous understanding of Lonergan would at some point be implemented. Lonergan himself calls his work a model; so it is certainly understandable that it would be taken by some to be such. But he insists that he is not only offering models. He hopes his "readers will find more than mere models in what I shall
say." That 'more' is "the dynamic structure of [the reader's] own cognitive and moral being." That is the real "framework for creativity". The editor, in the Epilogue, expresses the fear that Lonergan's work might be reduced to a private therapy. But there is no danger of that if the dynamic structure of our knowing and doing is really affirmed; for that dynamic structure is precisely intentional. It might be private, but "it is not so private as to be solitary," and effective collaboration has proceeded, and will continue to proceed, from this base.

The editor and the authors of Papal Infallibility will have done a real service if, in addition to providing us with insights in their study, they have helped others to realize that their study is not the way to go in understanding Lonergan's contribution to theological method.

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