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Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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None of us can divine, with absolute confidence, just what in the way of inquiry and investigation is, above all else, demanded by the present, unsteady times. But we can perhaps discern, with some degree of probability, that the very least that is needed is some serious research into the foundations of our common endeavors. Nor is it a simple matter to settle, without perduing discomfort, upon that method most suited to the discovery, recovery, or critique of our common heritage. So it is that contemporary culture is punctuated, with increasing frequency, by calls back to our roots, to things themselves, to this or that new or old basis; and so it is that the many heralds of foundational reformation also prescribe methods of their own for the renewal, renovation, or rescue of a seemingly declining culture. All too frequently, however, these "returns" are to be undertaken and accomplished by the adoption and implementation of some or other technique or combination of techniques of observation and reasoning. And too often these techniques are something less than radical revisions of, or departures from, the very thought-forms which hasten the downward drift of the age. Often enough, the ease of implementation and the air of foundational relevance and urgency are sufficient enticement to new hordes of hodmen who would happily abandon open inquiry, with its modest, infrequent gains and many failures, for the illusory sense of completion typical of thinking dutifully done according to a set of positive instructions. Only occasionally do calls for exploration of the subterranean pathways of our culture evoke our deepest sense of responsibility and accountability, at once summoning us to new and energetic inquiry and alerting us to the perils attendant upon the slavish use of techniques. Heralds of this latter, cautious kind are several and significant, but among them one is to be found whose invitation to radicality has, as far as I know, no equal either in its insistence upon humility or in its unqualified rejection of the reinforcements and inhibitions of inquiry that compete for our allegiance in an ideological milieu. It is the presence of this pair of rare qualities that recommends Bernard Lonergan's labors and their fruits as a center from which to approach anew the pressing problem of foundations, and which recommends as well his notion of generalized empirical method—that deliberately self-correcting process of learning which underpins and generates all techniques—as a well-balanced guide. Those familiar with Lonergan's monumental Insight: A Study of Human Understanding and his compendious Method in Theology will not be surprised by the appearance of a journal inspired by his thought; they will know already the breadth, depth, and fertility of his labors. To these, and to any others for whom serious re-thinking is of great moment, it is my great pleasure to offer the first issue of Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, and it is my sincere hope that you will find the contents of this and future issues informative, challenging and, above all, emancipating.

February 1983

Mark D. Morelli
General Editor
CHRISTIANITY WITHIN THE POLITICAL DIALECTICS
OF COMMUNITY AND EMPIRE

Matthew L. Lamb
Marquette University

As the twentieth century draws to a close humankind faces challenges of unprecedented gravity. For the first time on this stage of world history, we can envisage the possibility (some would say the probability) of a self-inflicted abrupt and almost apocalyptic nuclear end to the human drama as we have known it till now. Since the curtain rose upon human history, the drama has been rent by wars and conflicts in which some emerged as victors and most were destroyed or enslaved as victims. The human drama has been marked by pell-mell successions of roles which could be designated as winners versus losers, victors versus victims, masters versus slaves, empires versus colonies, superpowers versus weakly underdeveloped countries. The titanic irony of the nuclear arms race is that it has the potential to end these scenarios of heroic victors and crushed victims. Physically dominative power is reaching its apotheosis. Should extensive nuclear warfare occur, there would be no victory parades. Any surviving victims would envy the dead. The pride or hubris which has fueled the massive war machines of history, which has scripted so much of the human drama in terms of power dominating and exploiting other humans, could quite literally end the planetary drama. The masks of "victory to the conquerors and woe to the conquered" have been stripped from the face of dominative power, revealing its awesome evil as death. The dialectic of master and slave, of victor and victim, ends in the universal victimhood of all human beings.¹

The world religions cherish within their traditions important resources and memories which, if incarnated in the lives and practices of religious believers, could contribute to the radical change or conversion of the human drama away from death and towards life.² Among all life-forms on this planet, humans are the only ones known to care for their dead. Burial provides the most primitive or primordial evidence of specifically human life. In diverse ways all religions grapple with the mysteries of victimhood and death as immanent in human life and yet transcending it as well. Salvific transcendence might be expressed in terms of denial, as in Buddhism, in terms of transmigration, as in Hinduism, or in terms of transformation, as in Judaism, Islam and Christianity.³ The central stories or foundational narratives of the world religions reveal paths of right conduct toward fuller life for those gifted with the call to change from the
narrowness of the ways of death to the expansion of minds and hearts through enlightenment and faith. But the gifted call can be refused; it is always more of an imperative than an indicative. Religious authenticity can shatter, twisting the symbols of life into tools of deadly animosity. The cries of the victims are drowned out by the clatter of crusades and holy wars as religion is pressed into the service of dominative power bent upon imposing its will come what may. Religion can be used—and too often has been—to extol and legitimate the victors of history and to distract the victims from their longings for freedom and dignity.

I shall address the topic of religious, and specifically Christian, convictions and public action by first outlining the ambiguous legacies of both Christianity and modernity. The urgency of our contemporary situation has not a little to do with these ambiguous legacies. I shall then discuss the political dialectics of community and empire by first analyzing what I call the radical politics of pluralism and then showing how such pluralist political dialectics relate to community, empires or superpowers, and Christianity. In this study I contrast what I term an-archy and mon-archy, on the one hand, and syn-archy, on the other. The words are hyphenated and designate respectively no (an) principle (arche), one (mon) principle (arche) or pluralist cooperative (syn) principles (arche) for creating, sustaining and changing social orders. Mon-archy tends to create, sustain and change social orders "from the top down," excusing its impositions with the belief (or defense mechanism) that the "bottom" would otherwise be an-archy. Syn-archy tends to create, sustain and change social orders "from the bottom up" by nurturing and expanding the freedoms of the "bottom."

1. The Ambiguous Legacies of Christianity and Modernity

Pluralism is both a fact and a value. Pluralism is a fact, as it always has been within nature, history and religion. Christianity is no exception. Almost all types of pluralism have and will be found within Christianity—economic, social, ethnic, political, cultural and religious pluralism. The fact of pluralism gives rise to the question of the value of pluralism. Pluralism means differences. Some differences are complementary to one another. Other differences are contradictory to, or mutually exclusive of, one another. Still others may be genetically related to one another. Leaving aside a very old problem, that of the one and the many, I would argue that pluralism is a value to be cherished and fostered insofar as it is intrinsic to the humanization and personalization of life on this planet. The whole of human history, as well as of Christianity, could be presented as an ongoing
experiment, or vast series of sets of experiments, aimed at discerning the values and disvalues of pluralism. To what extent do the differences constitutive of pluralism promote the human good? One might argue that the question is unanswerable, since there are many contradictory notions of the human good, so that pluralism is only another name for a fundamental anarchy, a fundamental lack of any universally valid principles for discerning between contradictory differences.5

Yet to argue for a fundamental anarchy is logically and ontologically an impossibility. For any argument has some principle of discerning order if it is not mere unintelligible babble. Ethical agnostics are wont to consider themselves intelligent: the better their arguments for a fundamental anarchy regarding the human good, the more their own cognitive performance subverts their intended position.6 Pluralism as a value is not anarchy. The pluralism of values so evident in the human drama does not mean a fundamental relativism of values. The crucial issue is how to mediate such a pluralism of values, with its complementary and contradictory differences, in ways that promote responsibility and freedom. If anarchy as a fundamental relativism of values is unacceptable, the fear of such anarchy has often contributed to many historical forms of what I term mon-archy. Where anarchy asserts no possible principles of discerning freely between contradictory differences in values, mon-archy attempts to settle the issue by imposing the values of particular individuals or groups upon others through various forms of domactive power. Monarchy in this sense is a fundamental inability to relate pluralism to responsible human freedom, deciding instead to impose sets of social and cultural meanings and values upon others. This would include many, probably most, of the political forms of monarchy, but it would also include many other forms of social organization where the particular interests of some are "universalized" through domactive power.7 Power is domactive to the extent that it represses the interests and questions, and the actions expressing those interests and questions, of those seeking to expand effective human freedom.8

The legacies of Christianity and of modernity in the West are profoundly ambiguous in regard to free and responsible mediations of pluralistic differences. I shall sketch some of the main components of these ambiguous legacies under the metaphor of three major betrayals: the betrayal of Christian faith, the betrayal of empirical reason, and the betrayal of dialectical reason. The metaphor of "betrayal" connotes both how these three major sets of traditions in the West could have promoted more effective human freedom and good than they de facto have, and how their
failures to do so demand of us, not a total repudiation of their ambiguous achievements, but a discerning recovery of those aspects in the sets of traditions which would, if actualized, subvert their failures.9

For Judaism Christianity inherited a revelatory intensification of the transcendent unity of the Divine immanent within the plurality of a people called out of slavery. The struggles between monarchy and the prophets were later intensified to the point of apocalyptic expectation: from the Davidic kingship to the kingship of Yahweh. Jesus both inherited and transformed this apocalyptic expectation. The unity of God is not revealed in power dominating and controlling historical chaos, but is revealed in narrative invitations to a discipleship of faith, hope and love empowering the lowly and poor to become the children of God who is Love.10 Jewish theology both stressed how God is so transcendent in unity that there can be no images of God and the Divine Name cannot be uttered, and emphasized the immanence of the Divine in the liberating identity of the Exodus narratives. Christianity likewise emphasized how the transcendent God is immanent in the preaching and life of Jesus, and also stressed how in him God became one with the poor and the powerless, with those non-identified with "the world" and called to the freedom of the Kingdom of God.11

In the first centuries both Jews and Christians suffered for their refusals to capitulate to the sacralist prejudices of the Roman Empire. Both the Lordship of Yahweh and the Lordship of Christ were recognized as prohibiting any acknowledgement, however cynical and pro forma, of the emperor as divine.12 Within Christianity, however, the temptations to sacralism were strong. Sacralism is the identification of religious values with forms of secular power: identifications of churches with the Kingdom of God, of Christ's Lordship with the mighty and powerful of this world. The Constantinian dilemma was paradigmatic. An Augustine and many monks would articulate in thought and in communal practice the need for the apocalyptic reign of God to transform radically the imperial sacralism of the Roman Empire. An Athanasius and other bishops would dogmatically break the monarchical aspirations of imperial ideology by affirming how the unity of the Godhead is community of persons.13 But Constantine had, as other monarchs after him, his court theologians. Eusebius of Caesarea would oblige, along with others, in rewriting history from the perspective of the victors, the emperors as divinely graced, if not divinely natured.14 Christianity became Christendom. Although altar and throne were separated, more often than not one would reinforce the authoritarian prejudices of the other.15
I shall not trace here the series of betrayals and recoveries in Christianity down to our own day. The monastic missionaries preached and lived the Gospel as freeing and educative empowerments of "the so-called barbarians," whereas the tactics of a Charlemagne tried to press the monasteries into his imperial designs. The efforts of the mendicants and their theologians transformed the classical Graeco-Roman heroic social virtues through evangelical faith, hope and love. Those efforts were thwarted by later scholastics who legitimated the imperial ambitions of popes and monarchs in the Holy Roman Empire. Reforming prophets and theologians rejected the inquisitorial authoritarianism of Rome for the sake of the Gospel, only to find their spiritual renewal often co-opted by the powers of the emergent nation-states. The Cross would be continually betrayed by the Sword as colonization brought new peoples and lands into the struggles for non-archical power. By the seventeenth century the West began to have its fill of the pogroms, crusades, inquisitions, wars of religion, and the other excesses and repressions of a decadent Christendom.

The first phase of the Enlightenment began to draw together the constitutive elements of a critically empirical reason. The religious convictions of faith were too divisive of public actions in their conflicting sacralisms. The successes of the emerging intellectual convictions in empirical natural sciences broke the mon-archical cosmologies of decadent scholasticism. Nature did not operate in accord with mon-archical or hierarchical orderings of the spheres. As the empirical methods of observation, hypothesis formation, experiential verification, and incipient industrial applications began to spread, proponents of empirical reason turned to the study of man and society. Freedom of religion was championed by those who, like the Deists, found a basis for belief in intelligible natural laws rather than in the contested revealed religions. Empirically oriented human and historical studies increasingly challenged the authoritarian hegemony of Christendom, as they called attention to the plurality of concrete particulars not identifiable with the cultural conceptualism and uniformity of the ancien regime.

The liberally critical thrust of empirical rationality, however, was betrayed by new forms of old alliances. The old orders of hierarchical sacralism gave way to new forms of bureaucratic secularism. As capitalist industrialization expanded, empirical reason became identified with methods of quantification and technical manipulation. Although the natural sciences would gradually uncover the wondrous unity-in-diversity of planet earth, technical industrialization would increasingly regard nature as an energy
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reservoir and dump site for its expanding megamachine. A social Darwinism would legitimate the "survival of the strongest," while a Max Weber would, despite his sad disclaimers, legitimate the fiction of value-neutral factity and the supposedly inevitable subsumption of democracy into bureaucracy. Politics became the prerogative of a social engineering trying to play off competing pressure groups. Culture capitulated to the demands of mass industry, as all aspects of modern secular life were invaded by a technical or instrumental rationality which had betrayed the critical potential of empirical reason. If the first phase of the modern Western Enlightenment put its hopes for enlightened social policies not in the churches but in the new academies, educational and research institutes, these more often than not betrayed their trust by legitimating the domimative interests of the highest bidders. The intellectual conviction of progress through a "pure" empirical reason would gradually crumble as instrumental rationality would deliver undreamed of physical power to the expanding military machines. The titanic irony of such betrayals can be seen in the possibility of nuclear annihilation. A major rationalization for these betrayals of empirical reason consisted in the belief that reality is fundamentally only matter-in-motion. A massive nuclear holocaust would indeed leave our planet with only matter-in-motion as it obliterates all higher forms of life.

A second phase of the modern Western Enlightenment began in the last century with efforts to differentiate the methods of the human sciences from those of the natural sciences (Dilthey) as well as efforts to transform personal and social living through the emancipatory imperatives of psychoanalysis (Freud) and of the socio-economic critique of ideologies (Marx). These efforts were the hesitant emergence of dialectical reason. In maintaining that the description and explanation of "facts" required only more or less mechanical conjunctions of observational techniques with techniques of theoretical measurement, empirical reason was betrayed by naive "realism." Such a naive realism was a betrayal since its empiricism and positivism were unverifiable beliefs or ideologies that did not articulate the actual praxis or performance of empirical reason. Against such betrayals of empirical reason, with their naive realist sunderings of fact and value, dialectical reason would reintegrate the fact and value in Dilthey's project of a critique of historical reason, in Marx's critique of capitalist alienation, in Freud's therapeutic critique of psychic pathologies. This hesitant emergence of dialectical reason repudiated neither the Enlightenment project nor the critical potential of empirical reason. Quite the contrary.
Analogous to the efforts of the reformers in Christianity, these efforts were an intensification of empirical reason. Just as reformers appealed to faith and the Gospels over against what they considered the incrustations of a distorted and betrayed institutionalization of Christianity in Roman Christendom, so Dilthey, Marx or Freud appealed to reason and enlightenment over against what they considered the distortions and betrayals of the meanings and values within human communication and emancipation, whether in empiricist scientism and historicism (Dilthey), or in capitalist societies (Marx), or in the repressive optimism of bourgeois consciousness (Freud).  

Such a dialectical reason contains, therefore, elements of what Jürgen Habermas refers to as the quasi-transcendental interests, as practical in the hermeneutical-historical sciences and as emancipatory in psychoanalysis and in the critique of ideologies. These elements of dialectical reason have by no means been integrated into complementary methods of reflection and action. But their hesitant emergence did introduce divergent patterns of rational reflection on value convictions. They began offering suggestions on how to resolve hermeneutically, ideologically or therapeutically fundamental value-conflicts. Whatever the differences between them, the writings of Dilthey, Marx or Freud began to establish the needs for (1) a serious intellectual and critical commitment to integrate values into reflection; (2) a reflective realization of how reason was not yet realized in history, society and psyche; (3) a growing suspicion that such a realization could not be through technical or instrumental rationality; and (4) a recognition that such projects of dialectical reason could only be achieved by attending to the victims of either cultural-historical amnesia (Dilthey), or socio-economic exploitation (Marx) or psychopathological obsessions and illusions (Freud).

But this second phase of the Enlightenment was only a hesitant emergence of dialectical reason. Its beginnings were ambiguous even in its originators. Little wonder, then, that their dialectically practical reason would be swallowed up and betrayed by the almost inexorable "progress" of scientism, technocracy, and instrumental rationality. Hermeneutics and history would betray any trace of dialectical reason as they became prerogatives of value-neutral techniques in an ivory tower scholarship, legitimating the secularist bureaucratic and cultural prejudices in dominative nations. As Arendt, Gadamer, Habermas and others have shown, they often did this in the name of a Cartesian quest for the certitude of a "fundamentum inconcussum" (unshakeable foundation), while in fact such scholarship was usually based upon the more financially and
academically remunerative "foundations" of expanding nationstates. Similarly, the dialectically transformative potential of psychoanalysis, as well as other depth psychological therapies, was betrayed by both a scientific reduction of techniques of "adjustment" to pathological social "realities," and a professionalization of analysis which, as Bettelheim, Laing and Szasz among others have argued, has contributed not a little to the commercialization and privatization of psychiatry. Finally, the series of betrayals within Marxism have successively reduced its critical and dialectical power to the platitudes and propaganda of rigid state socialisms, tightly controlled by suffocating bureaucracies and rigid party class systems. As Marcuse sadly commented, such betrayals indicate how

the means for liberation and humanization operate for preserving domination and submission, and the theory that destroyed all ideology is used for the establishment of a new ideology.

Today the innocent beliefs of the Enlightenment in progress through pure reason, whether empirical or dialectical, seem undermined by the devastations of global and local wars, by the holocaust, by increasing militarism and nuclear arms races, by widening gaps between rich and poor, by a dwindling confidence in democracy on the part of both capitalist and communist "experts." The intellectual convictions of modernity are no longer modern. Like Christianity, modernity now has a history. And that history--our history--of supposedly pure reason has brought us even more victims than did the old, impure religions. In response to the betrayals of Christianity with its competing monarchical sacralisms, modernity either proclaimed a freedom of religion (as in the primarily middle-class revolutions) or a freedom from religion (as in Marxist revolutions). Instead of religious institutions, secular educational and research institutions would collaborate with governments in forming enlightened public policies. As States divorced themselves from Churches, they wed themselves to Academies. (No wonder, you might say, reason lost its purity!) But techniques of legal separations, whether of Church and State or highly unlikely ones of State and Academy, do not address the roots of the problems. Such strategies of institutional separation are seriously infected by what Gandhi perceived as an underlying temptation in modernity: we want to create institutional systems that are so good that we don't have to be good. Academies in late capitalist and in state socialist countries have witnessed a more or less pervasive "Betriebblindheit" (yours not to question why, yours but to get good grades and jobs) with an increasing professionalization or technical rationalization of inquiry.

Pluralism has suffered an eclipse. Secularist monarchical
systems in late capitalism and state socialism now compete for global hegemony, forcing their dominative "either/or" options on Third World countries. Cultural pluralism seems faced with selling out to either a "tyranny of tolerance" (Marcuse) or totalitarianism. Genuine public discourse seems less and less effective in really establishing consensus policies. Politics seems stamped with either emotivism or decisionism. The wars and repressions amid such global rifts make the atrocities of past pogroms, crusades and wars of religion appear almost tame by comparison. Modern secular secret police (KGB, CIA, etc., etc.) have such extensive surveillance and sophisticated torture techniques that they dwarf the perversions of their predecessors who worked for the Spanish Inquisition or for other Catholic and Protestant political powers from the fifteenth century onwards.

Do the ambiguous legacies of Christianity and of modernity leave us only the options of either an enlightened cynicism or an unenlightened conviction? Does the end of innocence for both religious faith and rational inquiry lead to a condition in which, to quote Yeats, "the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity"?

2. Political Dialectics of Community and Empire

The metaphor of "betrayal" suggests two related observations. First and foremost the three betrayals suggest the seriousness of our contemporary situation. Karl Jaspers wrote: "For more than a hundred years it has been gradually realized that the history of scores of centuries is drawing to a close." Something large and ominous seems to be emerging from the subterranean depths of the human drama on this planet. We might want to brush it off by means of our convenient categories of the past such as apocalyptic rhetoric, utopian protest or millenarian fervor. But such labels have a hard time sticking to something like the nuclear arms race. Who is really expecting an abrupt apocalyptic-utopian-millenarian change in the historical drama? Very quiet and rational arguments are being made that the real dreamers are those who, despite the overwhelming empirical evidence of history and statistics, maintain that in this unique instance weapons that are mass produced will not be used! By a paradoxical twist, the betrayals of Christianity and of modernity have led, in this momentous issue, to the implausible "coincidentia oppositorum" in which those who maintain the necessity of continuing the nuclear arms race because of the realities of dominative power in an immoral and imperfect world (shades of Niebuhr), must also express a quite fantastic faith in the rational infallibility of machines, military and political
leaders (against all historical evidence) not to occasion or cause a nuclear holocaust. Such militaristic millenarianism as that evidenced in Jerry Falwell's *Listen America* finds its roots, I believe, in this paradoxical twist.40 Monarchical "realists" are forced by the realities of power to make blind and irrational leaps into anarchical utopianism and apocalypticism.

A second observation suggests that, if we are to face creatively and courageously the seriousness of our situation, we must initiate a politics of pluralism which respects the conflicting religious, moral and intellectual convictions in ways that avoid the illusory opposites of anarchy and monarchy. This is the *kairos*, in the Tillichian sense, with which the nuclear arms race confronts us. Such a politics of pluralism must be truly radical, must go to the roots of our endangered condition. Neither the rhetoric of co-existence nor the techniques of social engineering applied to competing pressure groups are adequate. Neither politics nor pluralism as they are usually understood and practiced, as Alasdair MacIntyre has so brilliantly argued, will see humankind through this dark night.41 For politics in a pluralistic world have, until now, usually relied upon techniques of separation in order to achieve some measure of tranquil co-existence. Internationally this has meant the transition from colonies (old imperialism) to "spheres of influence" (new imperialism). Within nation-states such techniques of separation have led to the bureaucratization of managing "public opinion" and conflicting pressure groups which underlies, as Jürgen Habermas has shown, the increasing de-politicization of societies.42 In such a context pluralism either succumbs to the domineering ethos of those groups mon-archically controlling and/or manipulating the nation-state, or retreats into so-called "sectarian" reservations of ritual and memory where the hope of one day becoming dominant, in league with other groups, abides. The Christian Right in our country is now making just such a move.43

A radical politics of pluralism, however, would require more genuine forms of participation in political life. I should like to outline, much too briefly, some of the constitutive elements for such a politics of pluralism. First I shall discuss Christianity within the political dialectics of pluralism, and then Christianity within a major mode of such a dialectics, namely the dialectics of community and empire.

3. A Political Dialectics of Pluralism and Christianity

The ambiguous legacies of Christianity and of modernity were presented under the metaphor of betrayal in order to indicate an analogous pattern or process in the distortions or alienations
which "betrayed" the creative originsations of the religous convictions of Christians and the intellectual convictions of modernity. That pattern or process is a dialectic, but the dialectic is not between an-archy and mon-archy. Indeed, we have seen that an-archy, which states that individual freedom ultimately means a relativism of all meanings and values and so equates pluralism with relativism, is only the other side of mon-archy, which enthrones one set of meanings and values as ultimate arbiter through a dominative power legitimated deterministically or voluntaristically. Historically, pluralism and truly responsible freedom always end up the loser when the dialectic is misunderstood in this fashion. Instead I would argue that the real dialectic is between an-archy and mon-archy on the one side, and what I term syn-archy, on the other.

An-archy claims there are no common or universal principles governing free choice. Mon-archy claims that common or universal principles must be extrinsically imposed either through a voluntaristic (or decisionistic) will to power or through elites imbued with deterministic knowledge. Syn-archy maintains that human freedom is constituted by intrinsic orientations toward principles of attentive intelligence in quest for truth and responsible love. Such principles or orientations as intrinsic to freedom can only be approximated through, or by means of, freedom.

Both an-archy and mon-archy agree that pluralism and order ultimately exclude one another, while syn-archy affirms that pluralism and order ultimately include one another. For the order of syn-archy is not based upon any utopian ideal (an-archy) or any millenarian ideal (mon-archy) but upon the concrete free and pluralist efforts of countless human beings to expand their effective freedom through free and pluralist means. Syn-archy accepts human beings where they are but does not leave them there, insofar as "where they are" represses or oppresses their own orientations toward intelligent truth and responsible freedom. The transformation is not extrinsically imposed but invites change from within by appealing to self-correcting processes of learning and acting intrinsic to pluralist human freedom. An-archy excoriates universality as inimical to pluralism. Mon-archy imposes a particularistic universality and coerces all other particularities to be mediated through its dominative universality. Syn-archy affirms the manifold particularities of our pluralistic world and insists that any genuine universality will only be mediated through self-correcting processes of learning and doing immanent within those particularities.

There is evidence of movements towards such syn-archical pluralism as self-corrective toward truth and freedom within the
contemporary traditions of Christianity and of the two phases of the Enlightenment.

In Christianity we are witnessing the beginnings of a true ecumenical orientation. The old oecumen of a Constantinian or Holy Roman Empire variety was motivated by monarchical pretensions. The new ecumenism, while it occasions fears of anarchy in many, is really based upon syn-archical presuppositions. For this ecumenism—whether directed at other Christians, at other world religions, or at secular or atheistic humanism—does not rest upon any of these diverse orientations to renounce their deeply held convictions. Rather it calls upon all human beings to respond to the dynamics of dialogue with others which arise out of those convictions. It beckons Christians to appropriate more deeply and genuinely their own traditions and the Gospel of Jesus Christ. It calls for reforms and renewals in Christianity where those traditions have either been distorted, or where the circumstances out of which the diverse and conflicting traditions emerged have changed, or where those traditions are now in conflict with a genuine living of the Gospel, or are now in conflict with the deepest aspirations of human freedom.

The ecumenical movement within Christianity calls for a unity through diversity, through the imperatives of a quest for a freedom in responsibility to truth. It trusts, not in the dominative imposition of uniformity, but in the self-corrective processes of genuine dialogue. The ecumenical movements within the world religions are based upon the growing (if sometimes threatened) realization that all manifestations of the Divine within all the world religions are manifestations of compassion and solidarity with the victims of history. Ecumenism calls attention to the convictions of religious faith as convictions arising out of symbols, narratives and cognitive claims engendered by love, not by fear. Indeed, I would suggest that the ecumenical movement within Christianity arose in great part out of the experiences and dialogues of so-called mixed marriages. The dialogue in and of freedom is not mere talk; it leads to reform and renewal inasmuch as it generates self-critical reflection and action within Christianity itself. This is evident in the Jewish-Christian dialogues which are leading to Christian self-criticism of its large role in fomenting and legitimating anti-Semitism. This process is also emphasizing the foundational importance of praxis in the dialogues between secular humanist scientists and Christians, and especially in dialogues between atheists and Christians. As Hans Küng observes:

The early rationalist criticism of religion in the eighteenth century, the classical criticism of religion in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and more recent criticism have one thing in common: rejection of religion as a whole is connected with
rejection of institutionalized religion, rejection of Christianity with rejection of Christendom, rejection of God with rejection of the Church. This was true already of La Mettrie and Holbach; it was true especially of Feuerbach, Marx and Freud. And this precisely is true also of present-day criticism of religion . . . 51

The Christian churches bear a particular responsibility for the rise and spread of modern atheism. Feuerbach, Marx and Freud were not metaphysicians troubled merely by the "idea" of God; they were committed and intelligent human beings disgusted with how the authoritarian and bourgeois practices of Christian churches were both causing and legitimating oppressive and repressive projections, alienations and pathological illusions. 52

The self-criticisms within both Christianity and secular or atheistic humanism resulting from the ongoing dialogues are already beginning to bear fruit. Depth psychologies and theologies are beginning to engage in much needed cross-fertilization and collaboration. Political and liberation theologies are integrating much needed insights from economic and sociological critiques of alienation and ideologies, with dramatic political and publicly transformative effects in Easter Europe (Poland) and Latin America. Eurocommunism has abandoned, for more than just tactical reasons, its atheistic pre-judgments. 53 Syn-archical orientations are also evidenced in the dialogues and debates between empirical science and religion, as is clear both in the practical collaborations between theologians and scientists regarding the ethical ramifications and implications of science and technologies and in the theoretical development of Christian theologies which integrate scientific categories, methods and conclusions. 54 We should not underestimate the advance in political and public awareness these dialogues have made. Fundamentalist mon-archists have had to dress up, for example, their objections to evolution in pseudo-scientific garb both in Russia (Lysenko) and now in the United States (creation-science). 55

The successors of the first phase of the Enlightenment, the advocates and practitioners of empirical reason, have also, in the course of ongoing dialogues and discoveries, undergone extensive self-corrective transformations. The mon-archical illusions of a monolithic empirical science with their reductionist projects of deducing all verifiable knowledge from one set of physical laws, like the other project of reducing all languages to a unified scientific language, have been progressively criticized and abandoned. 56 The pluralisms of methods and of matrices in which the empirical sciences are done have not resulted, despite the brilliant efforts of a Feyerabend, in an-archy. 57 Rather the philosophical reflections on empirical science in, for example, Kuhn,
Lakatos, Radnitzky or Toulmin indicate an attention to the historical and social matrices of the sciences, and how the ongoing developments of methods are self-corrective even to the point of radical paradigmatic shifts. Lakatos has shown, for instance, how neither anarchy nor monarchy—what he calls the "tolerant skeptical enlightenment" and the "intolerant dogmatist enlightenment"—were able to do justice to Newtonian mechanics, let alone the Einsteinian or Quantum Mechanics paradigm-shifts of our century. The ongoing natural sciences are discovering a universe of emergent probability which syn-archically collaborates in a series of complex interdependencies within the irreducible unity-in-diversity of nature. Similarly, the empirical social sciences have begun to discover that bureaucratic rationality is somewhat illusory. What was thought to be a model of efficiency is increasingly seen as very inefficient. In fact, when bureaucracies work it is not so much due to their monarchical flow charts of authority and decision making, but rather to informal and communal interpersonal relations among the so-called bureaucrats. Philosophically the crumbling faith in instrumental rationality is leading to self-corrective reappropriations of the critical potential of pragmatism in Peirce, James and Dewey, indicating how they did not espouse the utilitarianism of much vulgar pragmatism. Politically and publicly, empirical scientists are increasingly taking responsibility for value-issues and forming unions of concern to promote dialogue and public debate on issues of vital importance regarding the impacts of sciences and technologies on nature and history. Bio-medical science and research is explicitly calling for dialogues and collaboration with bio-ethics, and a syn-archic "holism" in medicine is slowly gaining ground, often despite the opposition of pharmaceutical multinationals.

The successors of the second phase of the Enlightenment, the advocates and practitioners of dialectical reason, have also undergone extensive self-corrective transformations in the course of ongoing dialogues and debates. The ambiguities within the works of the originators of hermeneutics, depth psychology and the critique of ideologies—especially any tendencies to reduce their methods to those of the natural sciences—have been analyzed and many alternative corrections and radical paradigm-shifts suggested and argued. Depth psychologies have complemented and corrected Freudian therapies with a series of new approaches associated with Adler, Rank, Jung or Frankl. The therapeutic appropriation of the unconscious has uncovered not only what was expected by the architects of depth psychology, but also the ongoing praxis of therapy has itself uncovered many constitutive processes, and occasioned
major paradigm-shifts, as not only the archeology but also the teleology of psyche became known (Ricoeur).\textsuperscript{65} Indeed, dialectical reflection on, and appropriation of, values has led to a meta-level convergence of hermeneutics, depth psychology, and the critique of ideologies. An illustration of this would be how hermeneutics has moved from the object-oriented, empirical and structural concerns of Dilthey and Betti, through the subject-oriented, normative and existential concerns of Heidegger, Bultmann and Gadamer, to the efforts of both the critical hermeneutics of Apel and Habermas and the phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur to mediate object and subject, empirical and normative, structural and existential, elements through communication or language theories, through quasi-transcendental interests or phenomenology of texts and symbols, through praxis or poesis.\textsuperscript{66}

The differences are important and deep, the convictions are divergent among these works, but the result is not anarchy. Similarly, the convergence is impressive but it hardly resembles an orientation to mon-archy. Instead these thinkers, as well as many others (such as Arendt, Becker, Horkheimer, MacIntyre, Peukert, Tracy, Bernstein), warn against the pervasive lack of public discourse resulting from the monarchical reductions of all issues and forms of living to techniques. Genuine pluralism and political publicness demand explicit reflection upon the dialectical praxis of communication and dialogue itself. The reduction of praxis to mere "practice"-as-technique has had the disastrous consequences mentioned above in my discussions of the betrayals of empirical and dialectical reason through instrumental or technical rationality.\textsuperscript{67}

Recovering and transforming the classic distinction between praxis and technique, these authors in various and diverse ways indicate how technique, as the production or making of products or external objects, has become monarchical in industrialized societies. The resulting privatization of individuals, and mechanization of discourse and policy formation, have seriously curtailed public consensus, reduced conflict to crisis management techniques, and politics to various techniques of social engineering. Praxis is human doing, performance or conduct in which the goals are intrinsic to the performance itself as free, ongoing self-corrective processes of learning. In other words, praxis is synarchical, originating in and leading to intelligent discourse and responsible freedom.

As MacIntyre has demonstrated, only in this context of praxis—and not in the utilitarianism of techniques of rewards and punishments—does virtue as the expansion of freedom make any sense.\textsuperscript{68} Gouldner and others have shown how this distinction provides for
a Marxist analysis and critique of the ongoing developments within Marxism itself. Scientific Marxism trusts in techniques of infrastructural manipulation, while Critical Marxism seeks to reestablish praxis as the infrastructural dynamics of self-correcting relations of production interacting mutually with suprastructural developments. Marx’s own rather anarchical hope in dissolving government, combined with his ambiguities on praxis and technique, left the door open to scientific and bureaucratic monarchical political and economic regimentation.

The crises in both state socialisms and late capitalism, especially the economic crises, are demanding new and critical macroeconomic theories and praxes which would relate production processes and monetary circulation to the self-corrective heuristics of human praxis as an expansion of freedom in syn-archy. Late capitalism is a monarchical materialization of idealism and state socialism is a monarchical idealization of materialism. Neither attends to the foundations of economic activity in human performance or conduct as immanently generated activity. Instead both seek to control or manipulate that activity through techniques of regimentation or advertising. Neither, therefore, is cognizant of how sooner rather than later immoral or unethical economic practices destroy economies. Neither understands how macroeconomic processes which intensify poverty and oppression are both evil and stupid even in economic terms. Attention to the dynamics of genuinely public dialogue and debate on the part of the advocates of dialectical reason focuses reflection on the longterm significance of those movements of communal dialogue and action which are challenging the hegemony of late capitalist and state socialist "spheres of influence": movements such as Solidarity in Poland and the grassroots religious communities in Africa, Latin America and Asia, or the grassroots community organizing in Europe and North America, as well as in Russia and China.

4. Christianity, Community and Empire

There is emerging a radical political dialectics of pluralism which transcends the illusory opposites of anarchy and monarchy. Such political dialectics, with their self-corrective processes of inquiry and action, do not guarantee perfection. They do not offer new and better techniques with which to organize and control societies. They simply call attention to the value judgment that all institutions generated by humans are for the sake of humans and not the other way around. Hence, they regard as foundational what I have described as syn-archy, in order theoretically and practically to conduct themselves towards the expansion of
effective human freedom. Syn-archy seems frail and of little account over against the dominative superpowers of yesterday and today. While these latter go about trying, in Gandhi's terms, to make and sustain systems that are so good that humans don't have to be good, syn-archy claims that all their efforts are doomed to eventual failure since they ignore the human and pluralist infrastructure of any and all social organizations. They construct gigantic, dominative bureaucracies and war machines and transnational economies—but syn-archy points out that the massive idols have clay feet.

The political dialectics between anarchy and monarchy, on the one hand, and syn-archy on the other are rapidly reaching crisis proportions. As Jaspers pointed out, scores of centuries are drawing to a close. The nuclear arms race is the apotheosis of the alienating and alienated tendencies of humans to ignore their own value and project all value outwards into the monarchical systems they produce, which they then serve as values higher and greater than themselves. Nuclear weapons at the disposal of superpowers, and those who aspire to superpower status, enable them to intimidate both their own citizens and others with fears of anarchical annihilation. "Either submit to our monarchical system or be blasted back into anarchy and possible extinction" is the option offered by competing superpowers. Security through dominative power has always been an illusion—now the nuclear arms race has exposed this illusion. We have to return to basics. Superpower rhetoric and diplomacy will not get us out of this one! The centuries of empires and superpowers with their dominative power and wars to end all wars, with their pell-mell successions of a few victors and millions of victims, are drawing to a close. The illusory option between monarchy and anarchy is rapidly becoming a dead end.

Syn-archy offers a way out of this situation with its radical political dialectics of pluralism. For those dialectics call attention to the infrastructural dialectics of communities. Community, like freedom, originates and ends in human praxis. When community promotes human questing for truth and responsible love, community like freedom flourishes. When community gives way to individual or group egoism with their desires and fears, community like freedom constricts, atrophies and may die. Community, like freedom and praxis, is as radically pluralist as all the spheres of human doing and performance. It is truly the infrastructure of all economic, social, political, cultural and religious living. But this universality of community immanently transcends (i.e., mediates the universal through the particular). Community is destroyed or betrayed when it compromises with
mon-archy in order to impose its particular meanings and values uniformly upon others. When this occurs, it either instigates or legitimates empire building. No empire or superpower in history was ever the result of free choice on the part of all communities over which it extended its domineering power. The universality of community is mediated through the pluralist particularities of human communities in dialogue and debate respective of the self-corrective processes of human learning and action. When these processes are not respected, when the "easy" way out, mon-archy, is implemented, community like freedom is imperiled.

The tragedy of wars and violent conflicts is that their slaughter and maiming of human beings is the expression of the disintegration and destruction of communities and freedom within the warring groups. Wars of liberation, of insurrection against domineering mon-archical powers, are ethically justified only to the extent that they are a last resort and only through them could genuine dialogue and debate once again become actual. Militarization, like technique, focuses upon either gaining or defending external control. Like technique, the danger is that militarization would become an end in itself and succumb to mon-archy. Such an ethical justification of wars of liberation does not apply to many—if not most—of the wars in history insofar as these were military conflicts between mon-archical empires or superpowers, or those aspiring to empire building. So-called "defense" can, I believe, only be ethically justified in terms of protecting genuine communities and freedom. It loses that justification when the very techniques of defense destroy genuine community and free dialogue and action. An added tragedy of modern militarism is that the basic needs of all human communities on this planet can be fulfilled if those communities were allowed to do so. But the global rift caused by the superpowers, with the consequent displacement of capital, centralization of planning, and militarism, are not allowing the local communities to provide adequately for their basic needs. Moreover, the very forces of production themselves, with advances in contemporary technologies, are beginning to provide the technical means for vast decentralization, de-bureaucratization, and for extensive communitarian dialogue, debate, and policy formation. But those forces of production are being hampered by mon-archical relations of production bent upon control and domination.

A syn-archical understanding of community acknowledges it as the permanent infrastructure of any and all social organizations in the micro-domain (family, marriage, neighborhood), the meso-domain (cities, regions, nations), or the macro-domain (humankind). But this infra-structure does not function automatically. It is
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constituted by and in and for human freedom. Hence community can become restrictive or constrictive, it can decay and become the prey of desires and fears which alienate the self-corrective processes of learning and action. Community, when it flourishes, empowers its members toward the intelligent quest for truth, the responsibly free quest for good, the unrestrained play of symbol, ritual, and art as beautiful. But these orientations are all too easily diminished or extinguished by the tendencies to anarchy and monarchy. Yet the infrastructure seems powerfully resilient. The quest for community and freedom keeps returning with every new birth; the dynamics of instinct and psyche try time and again to enter into collaboration with consciousness in order to realize freedom and community. The challenge of our time is to overcome the monarchical alienations which try to press whatever is left of community into the service of its alienating ambitions.

A monarchically biased psychology, sociology or political theory would claim that community as Gemeinschaft can only be instinctual whereas society as Gesellschaft is voluntary and contractual. This is monarchical because it fails to take into account the teleology of human instinct toward responsibility and freedom. Freedom is then mistaken for extrinsically oriented "contracts" which can be bureaucratically controlled and manipulated. Monadic individualism and mass collectivities go hand in hand under theegis of technique.

Nuclear arms have now exposed the dead-end of such separations of community and society. As Jonathan Schell indicated recently:

By threatening life in its totality, the nuclear peril creates new connections between the elements of human existence—a new mingling of the public and the private, the political and the emotional, the spiritual and the biological.

He then recalls Hannah Arendt's notion of a "common world of word and deed" into which we are born, as it were, for a second time, and by which we are challenged to take responsibility for our physical birth. Then he continues:

Now the whole species is called on literally to take on itself the naked fact of its original physical appearance—to protect our being through an act of will. Formerly, the future was simply given to us; now it must be achieved...

This effort would constitute a counterpart in our conscious life of reason and will of our instinctual urge to procreate. And in so doing it would round out and complete the half-finished common world of pre-nuclear times, which, by the time nuclear weapons were invented, had enabled mankind to learn and to suffer but not to act as one.

What Schell overlooks is that this effort to promote intelligent and responsibly free collaboration between public and private, between the spiritual and the biological, has been more and less
successfully going on in the syn-archical praxis of trying to create and sustain communities. Admittedly, it has by and large been unsuccessful--else we would not now be in the predicament we are. But community--however fragile--is the only hope we have. Otherwise, "to act as one" would be to submit to what might be called a "Meta-Superpower" which would dominate and control the entire globe. It would be a mon-archical actualization of an Hegelian Weltgeist and, as Schell indicated himself, could not really guarantee the survival of the species since it would feed on the very fears which generated nuclear arms in the first place.80

The authority of community is not dominative authority. The authority of community does not rest on external rewards or punishments to assert itself. Authority of community rests instead upon the power of free and conscious cooperation and consensus--which is the only genuinely human form of power (power as empowering free and responsible subjects). Communal authority, then, is a praxis which originates and issues in the expansion of genuine human freedom. To the extent that authority denigrates cooperation and consensus, to that extent its power becomes increasingly dominative and dehumanizing, as it seeks to maintain and extend itself through external enticements or fear of punishment. Cooperation and consensus are not only possible among contemporaries, they also extend down the ages, and so the authority of community can continue and transform, through its own contemporary dialogues and debates, the traditions of its own or another's past.81

Such a syn-archical understanding of authority uncovers, I believe, a dialectic of authority and power in opposition to the usual distinctions between "rational bureaucratic" authority and "personal charismatic" authority. As Weber developed these "pure types" of authority, he tended to base the distinctions between them on the differences between Zweckrationalität and Werrration-
alität.82 Thus the charismatic leader or prophet tends to demand acceptance of the values he (the examples given are all male) espouses or represents by the "miracles" or wonders with which he seems endowed. Little room is left for dialogue and consensus, for when this begins, Weber maintains, the rational or bureaucratic "routinization" of the charisma has begun. Rational and bureaucratic authority tends to the Zweckrationalität where actions are primarily concerned with various external goals or ends, and the authority and value of the latter are by and large not questioned. Thus Weber, and many after him, reduce authority to either instrumentally rational or bureaucratic techniques, on the one hand, or to highly subjective and "privatized" value-charisma on the other. Indeed, it can happen, according to Weber, that the
routinization of charisma leads to anti-authoritarianism. The mon-archical presuppositions are obvious. Institutions of whatever kind roll on with their rational and bureaucratic authority and power, served by officials and members. Every once in a while a charismatic personality will come along and excite us, but if he starts a movement it too will eventually become an "iron cage." 

The trouble is that some of the iron cages have developed nuclear weapons and, if business as usual prevails, the probabilities of annihilation or anarchy are getting higher. As I mentioned before, the authorities who want business to go on as usual are forced by these circumstances to "rationalize" the arms race with what could be described as a "miracle" from the viewpoint of history and statistics, namely, that such mass produced weapons in this unique instance will not be used. As Einstein observed, since the discovery of nuclear power everything has changed but our thinking. The only way out of these iron cages is through a growing conscious and reflective appropriation of the infrastructural communities, and a concerted concern to promote those heuristics of community which nurture the quests for truth, responsible freedom and beauty. Only then will we "recover" the authority of community as genuine cooperation and consensus. Only then shall we realize how illusory mon-archical dominative power is, and how real is the human empowerment of cooperation which fosters and expands effective freedom. Each generation must enter into this process if we are to resist the temptation against which Gandhi warned.

Community is our only hope. Authority and power are within self-correcting processes of learning and doing. A student once remarked: "You mean all we humans have is ourselves!" Yes and no. Yes in the sense that all the mon-archical systems in which we project our trust are just so many expressions of our own human activity. They are our creations, and for us to allow them to turn around and control, manipulate, and destroy us is the height of foolishness and stupidity. Indeed, it would take too long to show how all creative breakthroughs in human history have always come from persons within human communities. But that is the case. Unfortunately, in the past the expressions of those creative breakthroughs have often been expropriated by mon-archical systems in order to legitimate extrinsically their power. Read Einstein's reflections on what happened to his theories. Community is not just a tragic ideal, or a regulative ideal; it is the infrastructural reality which for too long has allowed its power and its authority to be pressed into servitude and alienation by competing mon-archical systems.

No, we humans are not alone. If our present grave historical
crisis of possible nuclear annihilation is without precedent, if it calls us to engage as never before in a radical politics of pluralism and syn-archy for the sake of our very survival as a species, the dialectic itself is almost as old as humankind itself. The world religions, with their calls to conversion (in freedom and truth) away from the idols of our own making and toward the living Divine Mystery, have echoed the dialectic in many ways. If, before, religious convictions were expropriated for monarchical dominitive power, the ecumenical movement is indicating how to recover the communitarian and pluralist authority and empowerment of religious convictions arising from a faith as knowledge born of religious love. If we humans can cooperate and seek consensus on issues of eternal life and death, then why in God's name and our own must we destroy ourselves over such trifles as capitalism and communism?

Christianity began in Jesus' preaching of the coming reign of God. The basileia tou Theou, the reign, the kingdom, or empire of God reversed our all too human tendencies to identify God's empire with the dominitive monarchical systems or idols which have captured so much of the historical drama on this planet. The empire of God as proclaimed by Christ is a free gift and call to enter into communities of expectation, faith and love with the poor, the hungry, the sorrowful, the untold victims of sinful histories of domination and oppression. The empire of God would "cast down the mighty from their thrones and exalt the lowly" (Lk. 1:52). The parables of God's empire are parables of apocalyptic or revelatory empowerment, whereby the Divine Mystery beckons us to communities of faith, hope and love. As such, the parables were, as Perrin remarks, "bearers of the reality with which they were concerned." Through his own life (praxis), death and resurrection transformative religious discipleship in community was constituted and the Parable became the Parable. These communities of expectation, of incarnate hope in God's reign as Love, stand over against the monarchical empiries of world history. Toward the beginning of this article I traced some of the many betrayals and recoveries of this political dialectic between community and empire. Christian churches are complex combinations of both communities expecting the Kingdom and cultural or ritual "borrowings" from imperial and/or other monarchical symbols and organizations. Betrayals occur whenever the former are pressed into the service of, or identified with, the latter. This resulted in forms of theocratic Christendom. When this occurs, however, there arise
movements of renewal or reform in which the redemptive reversal proclaimed by Christ's Basileia tou Theou finds new expression in Christian praxis.91

This dialectic is misunderstood, I believe, when it is cast in the categories of church versus sect. Like Weber's supposedly "pure types" of authority, the distinction of church and sect tends to allow church authorities to repress within the churches the challenges for reform through redemptive reversals. In most cases it takes two to make a sect. Too often "sects" resulted from the rejection of their calls for reform on the part of church authorities.92 For example, medieval sects were largely reactions to the monarchical efforts of the so-called "Gregorian Reform" which tried to impose uniformity from the top down.93 Such "top down" strategies always seem to employ techniques of separation, as was evident in the Roman authorities' reactions to the Protestant reformers.94

The time has now passed for such strategies and techniques to be meaningful. The tensive dialectics of transformative dialogue and debate--such as those going on in the ecumenical movement--must challenge the churches to witness more vitally to the realities of redemptive community. Already this process is underway among the poorer churches of the Third World, in genuine efforts at reform and renewal "from below" in thousands of liberating grassroots communities. The times demand, as Metz indicates, a Second Reformation from below, wherein the churches would reform those monarchical residues of paternalistic conservatism and bourgeois liberalism, in order to practice church as empowering and freeing basic communities of expectation, faith and love. Within my own church, the Roman Catholic, which has, perhaps, suffered most from monarchical betrayals, such a renewal (even there!) is underway.95 We have nothing to lose in this process by our illusions and alienations.

Yet, as history teaches, humans, including Christians, seem to cling to their illusions and alienations more doggedly than they do to one another and their freedom. The kairos of our times is that our illusions and alienations have backed us into a nuclear corner. Either we shall begin to accept ourselves and one another, in cooperation and dialogue, or our illusions and alienations will blast our species into a darkness where no nation, no society, no culture, no religion will grace this earth again.96 It is time we stop fearing anarchy and stop idolizing monarchy. It is time Christians and other religious communities begin in earnest to cooperate and trust the freedom with which the Divine Mystery has graced them. It is time we begin really to live together (syn) in the pluralistic dynamics of freedom (archy).
life of faith will flourish in such a genuinely pluralistic world. For then we shall be knowingly and willingly appropriating in our own lives the mystery of creation out of which we were all born. For Christians such a redemption of creation is incarnated in the life, death and resurrection of Christ Jesus.

NOTES


15 Ibid., pp. 245-275. Also Jedin, op. cit., Vol. II/1, pp. 3-93.


26 F. Capra, op. cit., pp. 53-74, 101-163.


41. MacIntyre, op. cit., pp. 103-113, 238-245.


43. Daniel Maguire, op. cit., pp. 87-140.

44. I believe that Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in After Virtue supports this observation. Both an-archy and mon-archy rest ultimately upon technique as controlling meaning and value, whereas syn-archy rests ultimately upon praxis and hence is constituted by the will to dialogue and to communicative competence in reaching truly public policy. In this regard syn-archy as I develop it here is closely related to the works of the Frankfurt School.

45. The understanding of freedom I am referring to here is dependent upon the work of Bernard Lonergan. Cf. his Insight, pp. 595-633. For a complementary understanding of freedom as expanded effectively through virtuous practice, cf. MacIntyre, op. cit., pp. 169-205.

46. Cf. Lamb, Solidarity with Victims, pp. 7-23, 28-55 and the references given there.

47. This aspect of syn-archy is equivalent to Lonergan's understanding of the self-correcting process of learning. Cf. his Insight, pp. 174-175, 286-303, 713-718.


52. Ibid., pp. 189-339.


54. Cf. Langdon Gilkey, Society and the Sacred, pp. 74-119. Process theology is a prominent exemplification of this concern to relate theology and modern science, as well as the methodological orientation of those theologies influenced by Bernard Lonergan.

55. Cf. Daniel Maguire, op. cit., pp. 57-86 and references given there to the work as yet unpublished of Dr. Dean Fowler.

28


60 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 103-139.


80 Ibid., pp. 181-231.
METHOD

81 MacIntyre, op. cit., pp. 190-209.


83 Ibid., pp. 48-65.


89 Refer to references given in notes 10 and 11 above.


93 Ibid., pp. 328-292.


96 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth.
Eleven years ago, in his *Method in Theology*, Bernard Lonergan devoted some paragraphs to the historian's use of analogy, discussing the need of understanding the past in terms of the present, as well as the pitfalls that threaten the success of such a procedure.¹ Three years later, in a paper at a Laval University colloquium, he noted the continuing importance of the psychological analogy for understanding the Trinity, and went on to assert a similar need to think analogously of consciousness if we are to construct a Christology to meet the questions of our time.²

These sample references to analogy in works that are regularly and justifiably called those of the "later Lonergan," seem quite innocent, too familiar and traditional to give pause to a busy reader. But they carry the freight of an extensive and multifaceted use of analogy in Lonergan's early writings, with a wealth of hidden meaning that might be mined to enrich our understanding of his later usage. It seemed worthwhile, therefore, as a study in itself and as a contribution to this new journal, to assemble some of the data on analogy from Lonergan's previous writings, and thus provide a better perspective for the samples noted in the *Method* and post-*Method* period of his career.

But is there more here, perhaps, than an interesting bit of history or lexicography? My own opinion is that Lonergan's use of analogy has wider implications, serving as a key to his style of thinking, and as a directive for those who labor to accept the challenge and carry out the task which his thinking has presented. My historical sketch will conclude then with a few reflections on the practical significance of this topic.

In the doctoral dissertation which Lonergan completed in 1940, two passages deal with analogy in some detail. Aquinas is shown to have used the analogy of Aristotle's physical motion (motion in the transitive sense of moving an object) to understand the divine premotion by which the sinner is converted and justified.³ And there is developed, with a more personal input, the generalized theorem of divine operation in all created activity: on the analogy of a swordsman's use of his sword, Lonergan sets forth the "proximate" analogy for the causation of the Creator and that of the creature (the "remote" analogy being the dependence on God of the principle of operation as opposed to
that of the operation itself). Such extensive interest in particular analogies is perhaps revealing, but there is no thematic discussion at this early date of analogy in general, or any special significance in Lonergan's way of using it. The content of the analogies and the particular theological questions dealt with lie, of course, outside my terms of reference.

The verbum articles that followed a few years later do show just such a thematic interest. They are especially remembered for their exposition of Thomist cognitional theory and for their recovery and revitalization of the Thomist psychological analogy for the Trinity. Under the latter heading they are obviously important for Lonergan's very personal, if substantially traditional, remarks on the relation of analogy to theology and to the understanding of divine mystery. But, far more important for present purposes, is the basis they lay for the use of analogy: the cognitional theory developed around the dynamism of intelligence as it heads for being and truth, the recognition of the proper object of intelligence in the "quiddity" of material things, and the role, in the unfolding process of dynamic consciousness, of insight into what is imagined. That theory will lead in two directions for a position on analogy.

One direction takes us to the analogy of matter and Lonergan's personal and fateful discovery of an Aristotelian position on proportion: "the ultimate subject of change . . . could be neither quid nor quantum nor quale . . . its nature could be stated only by recourse to analogy." Again, it is "what is known by intellect indirectly." And so we have, set forth here in Lonergan's own manner, a notion that will be operative throughout his career, that of proportion and "the specifically Aristotelian analogy," namely, "natural form is to natural matter . . . as the object of insight is to the object of sense." The other direction leads to the concept of being: "the concept of being is an effect of the act of understanding," and it "cannot but be analogous," expressing intelligibility whatever the particular content. Thus, "the identity of the process . . . necessitates the similarity of the proportion, and . . . the diversity of the content . . . makes the terms of the proportion different." The proportion between essence and existence is traditional enough, but the characteristic feature, giving meaning to the analogy, is the process by which human consciousness advances from experience through understanding and concept to judgment, truth and being. Also to be noted in these articles is the remark: "As there is an analogy of ens and esse, so also there is an analogy of the intelligibly proceeding est." This is of key importance in the analogy for the Trinity, since Being
is a divine attribute common to the Three, but the Father's \textit{Est},
as an act of utterance, grounds his personal relation to the Son
and, as the uttered Word, is the second person of the Trinity.
But, restricting discussion to present purposes, I merely note
how this remark, in shifting the focus from the objectified con-
cept to the objectifying act of understanding, expressing itself,
attaches analogy to its foundations in dynamic human conscious-
ness.

\textit{Insight}, except for revisions not relevant here, was written
over the course of the next four years, from 1949 to 1953. The
"notion of being," understood as the anticipation of being inher-ent in the desire to know and as set in contrast with the concept
of being, is now very much elaborated, and Lonergan's position
on the analogy of being is developed and revised accordingly. He
asks whether this notion of being is univocal, with the same
meaning in all applications, or analogous, with the meaning vary-
ing systematically from one field of application to another. One
could answer, he says, that it is univocal, for the one desire
to know underpins all other contents; or, one could say it is
analogous, for that desire penetrates all other contents; or, one
could say it is neither, "for this distinction regards concepts,
while the notion of being both underpins and goes beyond other
contents." That is, as I interpret Lonergan, one can form a
\textit{concept} of the "notion of being" (indeed, what is the whole of
chapter 12 but such a concept?), and one can say of this concept
that it is univocal or analogous, depending on whether you con-
sider it in itself as the desire to know or in its potential as
productive of all concepts; but, strictly, if one asks the ques-
tion about the notion of being as notion, then the question loses
its meaning and application.

Further material in \textit{Insight} can receive hardly more than a
mention here. First, there is little reference to analogy in our
notion of God, though it is acknowledged. But there is repeated
use in this context of the term, extrapolation, which has surely
to be related to analogous knowledge in a more searching study.
Secondly, there is a new application of analogy ("a protracted
analogy," Lonergan calls it), in which under various headings
classical heuristic structures in science are compared with sta-
tistical. It is an early instance of a pattern that will be re-
peated. Finally, there is reference to the use common sense is
prone to make of analogy, to the grounds legitimating such a use,
and to the dangers inherent in it. As always, the basic explana-
tion is given in terms of understanding: "similar are similarly
understood;" common sense exploits that fact without formulating
it but, recognizing that situations differ, adds also the
particular insights relevant to each,\textsuperscript{17} not without giving grounds for suspicion in the critical thinker.\textsuperscript{18}

We have been examining major works of Lonergan and will return shortly to more of them. But at this point there intervene three little essays, each with a wealth of detail on analogy which I will try to summarize. One is a review article on Johannes Beumer's \textit{Theologie als Glaubensverständnis}, a book that dealt at length with the position of the Vatican Council (now Vatican I) on the way we may understand the mysteries of faith, namely, through the analogies supplied by creation and by the interlocking of mystery with mystery.\textsuperscript{19} This chapter of Vatican I had been, and continues to be, programmatic for Lonergan (how familiar to his students is the phrase, "Denzinger 1796"—his shorthand reference to the passage in question), and he shows an acute interest, with generally favorable comment, in Beumer's exposition. But the focus of the article is rather on the positive value analogical understanding has and on its relation to the tasks of theology, a focus I may merely indicate in passing.\textsuperscript{20}

The second essay is the Supplement Lonergan wrote for the students in his Trinity course of 1954-1955.\textsuperscript{21} Here, under the three subtitles, "\textit{Analogia intellectus . . . Analogiae contactaria quae Deum respicient . . . Analogiae contactaria quae hominem respicient},"\textsuperscript{22} he gives what is probably his most extensive and organized account to date of the whole question. The analogy is that of divine, angelic, and human intellect, and Lonergan starts with an almost verbatim rendering of St. Thomas, adding his characteristic emphasis to relate the question to understanding. There is reference to the analogy based on Platonist thought as arriving only at subsistent universals (and then positing Intelligence to know them), there is rejection of the Platonic principle that knowledge supposes duality (with an account of the difficulty various thinkers, medieval and modern, experience when they talk of God in the context of that duality), and there is an exposition of the difference between \textit{ens quidditativum} and \textit{ens analogicum}: to apprehend God in his essence is to apprehend \textit{him quidditativum}, but to apprehend created being is to apprehend being only analogously and imperfectly.

The third essay to be noted is a paper for the Fourth International Thomist Congress, in which Lonergan draws "a protracted analogy of proportion" (an echo of a phrase we found in \textit{Insight}) between Thomist and scientific thought.\textsuperscript{23} The comparison "concentrates on a structural similarity to prescind entirely from the materials that enter into the structures." For example, "the relation of hypothesis to verification is similar to the relation of definition to judgment," though that is not to say that
scientific hypothesis is the same as Thomist definition, or scientific verification the same as Thomist judgment.\textsuperscript{24}

The academic years, 1955-1956 and 1956-1957, were productive ones for Lonergan in his bread-and-butter field of theology, resulting in something like formal "treatises" for Christology and the Trinity. We are back then at works of major importance, even if they are almost unknown to the wider academic world. These works were to undergo continuing revision till the year 1964, which marks the term of his "Latin theology" as well as of the present study. As my readers will by now expect, the nature and role of theology itself are repeatedly discussed, with considerable revision of his ideas on analogy too.

The first year then produced the smaller but important work, \textit{De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica}.\textsuperscript{25} Our first interest is in a section entitled, "De methodorum analogia." Here Lonergan sets forth an analogy between theology's path of discovery and scientific analysis, and again between theology's doctrinal order and the synthetic exposition of a science.\textsuperscript{26} Secondly, Lonergan introduces this year his very personal analogy for the unity of the divine and the human in Christ: as by one and the same infinite act of knowing, God knows both what necessarily is and what contingently came to be, so by one and the same infinite act of his being the Word can be both what he necessarily is (divine) and what he contingently became (human).\textsuperscript{27}

The following year brought up the Trinity in the academic cycle and produced a longer work, \textit{Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica}, with an extended account of the psychological analogy; indeed, the whole work centers on that analogy, as the title indicates.\textsuperscript{28} Our topic remains, however, the nature and role of analogy, which are discussed, not in the long exposition of the analogy itself, but in an introductory chapter on the nature of theology.\textsuperscript{29}

Three points come up here. One I mention, only to reserve it for a later paragraph: the recurring question of the analogy, if there be one, between the procedures of science and those of theology.\textsuperscript{30} The second is a new question: the difference between those categories which are \textit{first for us} in the natural sciences (color, sound, \textit{etc.}) and those that are \textit{first for us} in the human sciences (languages, domestic structures, \textit{etc.}), that is, in the field of the cultural. The former are said to be univocal and the latter equivocal.\textsuperscript{31} Hence there is need for these latter of a transcultural principle, and one not only on the side of the object (for example, through painstaking entry into a culture remote from ours), but one also on the side of the subject, through development of interiority.\textsuperscript{32} Here Lonergan goes on to
discuss the theological aspect of the question; it is one that necessarily arises, for revelation occurred and the gospel was preached under very particular conditions, and nevertheless the church of God is to be universal, including all peoples, of every time, of every culture. The relation of the transcultural to the analogical surely calls for further study. Finally, a third point may be mentioned: the analogy for the unity of Christ, seen already in De constitutione Christi, is now repeated, and application of the principle extended to provide an analogy for the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit in those who are justified by divine grace.

From these high matters we return the following year to philosophy and Lonergan's Halifax lectures on Insight. They contain a neat account of analogy in the context of the question, What does a metaphysician understand? "It is not any particular class of beings, not the abstract residue of all beings, and not the ens per essentiam." What, then, does he understand? Lonergan's answer is given in terms of analogy, the familiar "understanding of a proportion." The metaphysician leaves the knowledge of different types of beings to those working in the relevant areas; for him the various essences studied there function as a series of x's. But beings are a compound of essence and existence, and the metaphysician is concerned with the proportion or analogy between essence and existence. "Metaphysics is understanding and exploiting the analogy in all being." So, for metaphysics, there is understanding of analogy. But then, more fundamentally, "the analogies come from an understanding of understanding." First, there is understanding of human understanding to give a metaphysics of proportionate being (form is to potency as insight is to experience, and act is to form as the reflective ground of judgment is to insight), and then there is analogous understanding of absolute understanding to give the extended metaphysics of absolute being.

In the academic year, 1958-1959, Lonergan gave a course entitled De intellectu et metodo. It is of considerable significance for his overall development, but I note only two points for the present purpose. One is the remark that divine faith forces us to an analogy of truth. There is scientific faith (in English we would more likely use "belief"), for no scientist verifies for himself all he knows; but he could in principle verify it for himself and so no analogy of truth is involved. Divine faith, however, shows that truth is not only what we can understand, but what God understands and reveals for our acceptance. Secondly, there is brought into play to specify our understanding of mysteries, the notion (though the term is not
reported) of inverse insight: as the mathematician understands that the square root of 2 is an irrational number, and thus opens up a new field of mathematics, so the theologian, understanding that divine mysteries exceed human intelligence, can discuss them in a way analogous to the mathematics of irrational numbers, without reducing the reality itself to something irrational.  

Let us return from method to Lonergan's own work in theology. From an article of 1959, "Christ as Subject," I note only the remark, very useful it is too, that an analogy of faith obtains between ontological and psychological statements on Christ. More massively, the Christology and trinitarian theology were being reworked under various headings during the next five years, to culminate in the publications of 1964 and bring to a conclusion a particular phase in Lonergan's history. Meanwhile, of course, work on method was going forward in a complex relationship to the theology, so that one has to simplify the history of this period quite ruthlessly in any sketch of its course and development.

I note then that the De Verbo Incarnato rewrites the analogy already used for the unity of Christ, but that the changes do not affect our present topic. Also new, I think, and helpful, is a succinct table of the Platonist, Aristotelian and Thomist types of analogy: the first an analogy of form, the second of substance, and the third of being. Then the De Deo Trino of 1961 gives us a fresh exposition of analogical understanding in theology, with a strong restatement of its positive role, even though it be of the type found in science as inverse insight. And there is a new scriptural basis for the psychological analogy for the Trinity.

Work on method, I said, was going forward too, involved in the three great treatises (divine grace being the other) that served as the source for mining old ideas and the arena for testing the new, but more and more detached from them as Lonergan strove to generalize his way of doing theology. For the history of analogy, however, we need make only two remarks. In the course, De metodo theologiae, of 1961-1962, attention is given to the "worlds" of the subject (the later "realms of meaning" corresponding to the differentiations of consciousness), and we read that the analogy of these worlds is established not from the side of the object, where the greatest differences obtain, but from the side of the subject and the operations which allow us to pass from world to world. Then, there is the lecture in 1963 at the Thomas More Institute, called simply "The Analogy of Meaning." A great part of the content of the lecture we find again in chapter 3 of Method in Theology, especially in the first
part of that chapter, dealing with the various carriers or embodiments of meaning; but it is illuminating for Lonergan's thinking to find him naming the pattern of it analogical and doing so with the formality that a title bestows.  

As a final item in my historical sketch, I note that the 1964 volumes of De Deo Trino rework very thoroughly the earlier editions, both for the scriptural basis of the psychological analogy, and for its speculative elaboration. In the latter there is a new stress on systematic analogy, which permits an organization of the whole trinitarian doctrine, as opposed to a rhetorical piling up of examples which give little understanding. This revealing statement I will exploit presently for a better perspective on the overall pattern of Lonergan's usage.

I would not, on the basis of the sketchy research set down in these pages, attempt a comprehensive view of Lonergan's understanding and use of analogy, but I would maintain that we have data enough to fix certain features to be included in such a view. One such feature stands outside the particular meanings we may give the term: it is the fact that analogy itself is an analogous term with various meanings. But nowhere, so far as I know, does Lonergan offer a list of these meanings. Helpful here is his remark on Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that he is not a systematic thinker in the sense that logic requires, but uses terms and explains them with the degree of precision the occasion demands, which may not be at all the degree that another occasion demands. This is pretty much the pattern in Lonergan's use of the term, analogy, and it means that we must work to understand each occurrence in its context, and never delegate the work to logic-machines.

What then are some of the meanings we find? If we recognize the determining role of understanding, and that seems clear as day, then the strictest meaning of the analogical is that it regards what cannot be properly and directly understood: transcendent being, of course; but, in the field of proportionate being, the metaphysical elements of potency and act (form, in contrast, being the direct and proper object of insight). But, even in this strict sense, analogical understanding is truly understanding—a position that is firmly maintained in regard to such mysteries as the Trinity. Secondly, there is a broader but still technical sense in which one may speak of the analogy of classical and heuristic structures, the analogy of Thomist and scientific thought, the analogy of the various carriers of meaning, etc. There is indeed a proportion of four terms involved (A : B : : C : D), and there is indirect understanding of some, but all four
may be directly understood, which is not the case with analogy in the strict sense. Thirdly, there is the very broad and very untechnical sense in which common sense understands one situation by analogy with another; the historian's use of analogy (see my opening paragraph) would perhaps combine these second and third meanings. And I suppose the aberrations of common-sense usage would give us a fourth and illegitimate sense of analogy.

Another important division separates systematic analogies (more likely in the first two usages) from the mere piling up of metaphors (more likely in the last two). To make the point concrete, we note that Lonergan inveighs repeatedly against conceiving human knowing by taking the broad and easy path of analogy with looking. Still, he admits with Quintilian, *paenam omne quod dictimus metaphorae est*, and in fact our language for cognitive activity is full of metaphors: one could point to such terms as in-sight, grasping, catching on, understanding. What Lonergan would object to, I think, is making any metaphor behind these terms serve as a systematic analogy--and all the more so since we can understand understanding in the data of consciousness and have no need at all of analogy for the task.

Will the distinctions of the two preceding paragraphs serve to explain Lonergan's position on the relation of science and theology? For he will compare specific features in the two, while seeming to deny, recently at least, a general analogy. This is a large question. An answer would have to take account of his very considerable development in regard to both terms, but my sketchy research does turn up certain stable features. For example: the assertion that we have but one mind and must use it whatever the field or object; that the study of scientific method can lead us back to invariant structures of cognitive activity; and that there is a great difference between science and its procedures, on one side, and theology and its procedures on the other. The brief account we find in the opening pages of *Method in Theology* seems quite consistent with these continuously maintained positions. The question, however, may regard the affirmations in the Latin works of an analogy between certain procedures of science and theology. I grant that to put them into a logic-machine with recent statements would create a mess, but my advice would be not to put them into a logic-machine--try rather to understand them. To that end I would offer two clues. First, if the human mind is always the human mind one must expect it to show some similarities in its procedures wherever it be at work. Next, I suggest that it is one thing to develop theology according to its own method, noting certain similarities with scientific method, and quite another.
to take scientific method as a model and attempt to make theology conform to it. A quotation may be helpful here; Lonergan has just denied that he conceives theology on the analogy of natural science, and then continues:

However, to avoid analogy is not an easy matter. Over and above familiarity with the history of theology and with its current problems, there are two main steps. The first is an exploration of mathematics, natural science, common sense, and philosophy to uncover the basic and invariant structure of all human cognitional activity and so to reach a transcendental method ... . Such a method will be relevant to theology, for theologians always have had minds and always have used them. It will not be, however, the whole of theological method, for to it must be added the specifically theological principle that differentiates theology from other fields.

What I would call to the reader's attention here is not the two main steps that Lonergan outlines—they speak for themselves—but the context into which these two steps are to be inserted: familiarity with the history of theology and with its current problems. Lonergan, in fact, worked out his theological method in thirty-five years of wrestling with theological problems and theological history; it is a fact at once readily ascertainable and notoriously overlooked by many of his critics.

My introduction suggested that this little piece of research might be rather more significant than just another item of history or lexicography, and I wish now to expand that idea. First, I hope that my research note will illustrate the wealth of material in Lonergan still awaiting study; might it convey even the need of such investigation? This is all the more a desiderandum if my impression is correct that theologians especially tend to underestimate (perhaps even would rather like to forget?) the Lonergan of pre-1965. It is true that implementing the eight functional specialties is a fascinating task, so challenging that one is easily drawn forward in forgetfulness of the need to go back. I may be allowed then to insist, as I recently did, that research on Lonergan "is begun, and well begun, but only begun."

Secondly, analogy is somewhat more than just an instance of questions to be studied. Analogical procedures seem to enter widely and deeply into great ranges of our cognitional activity; certainly, they are essential if we would base a philosophy and theology on Lonergan's intentionality analysis and transcendental method. When I said that it is quite impossible to run his statements through a logic-machine and get anything of value emerging, I meant this, not just as a matter of fact, but as a matter of principle: if much of his thinking is not only analogous but necessarily analogous, there is no way, short of reducing an idea to some impoverished subdivision of a division, to make his insights fit the requirements of logic.
Thirdly, analogy is nevertheless an instance, and other instances can be assembled along a broad front: not just analogy, but scores of concepts are analogous. For example, the notion of the question. Lonergan lists three questions that are the operators of development, promoting us from one level of consciousness to another: questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation. Now all three can be cast in a form that uses "is": What is it? Is it so? Is it worthwhile? Then it becomes fatally easy to suppose that all three are questions in the same sense. And that is to distort the facts: the three are as different, almost exactly, as the three levels of intelligent, rational, and responsible consciousness. From this beginning one could go on to the analogy of love, of conversion, of dialectic, of system, of presence, of mediation, etc., etc., etc.

I close this essay with a reference to a special case of analogy, and to the need for working it out as fully as possible: the analogy of religious interiority. At one end of the spectrum we have ourselves, religious believers with our religious interiority to be pondered and understood. At the other end we have Jesus with his human consciousness and the religious interiority of God's Son in human form. In between we have the apostles, prophets, evangelists, etc., as well as the mystics of all ages, but especially from those times when they began to describe more helpfully their experience. There is an analogy here, and I think it would greatly illuminate the relation between tradition and theology, turning a vexed question of authority and freedom into one of outer and inner word, as we meet it in Method in Theology. That is, there would be the inner word of Jesus finding expression in his spoken words and deeds, in his silence and his suffering. This expression, an outer word in a broad sense, is received, assimilated interiorly, and re-expressed by the appointed intermediaries between Jesus and the people of God. It becomes then an outer word for us, to be received in faith but given new expression in virtue of our own inner word, the gift of the Spirit, on the foundations, that is, of our interiority. A well worked out analogy of interiority would, it seems to me, be an invaluable aid toward solving a question that divides and plagues the church today.

NOTES
analogy for the Trinity here is somewhat revised from his work of 1964 (see note 28 below), but that is not relevant now.


4 Grace, pp. 84-88, under the title, "The Analogy of Operation" (see also pp. 141-143).


6 Verbum, especially pp. 208-209.

7 Chapter 1 is especially to the point, but the relevant references would take in pretty much the whole book.

8 For the quoted passages, see Verbum, pp. 143, 146, 147. The whole section (pp. 143-147) is subtitled "The Analogy of Matter."

9 Ibid., pp. 44 and 45.

10 Ibid., p. 201. A paper of 1949, "The Natural Desire to See God," continues this appropriation of analogy through understanding, but focuses on our analogous knowledge of God. The key again: "we can understand directly and properly only what first we can imagine, and so the proportionate object of our intellects in this life is said to be the quidditas rei materialis." For the mysteries of faith, then, we have to complement such understanding "by the corrections of a via affirmationis, negationis, et eminentiae." See Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. F. E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 85.


12 Insight, chap. 12, "The Notion of Being," pp. 348-374. This notion of being, I would say, is Lonergan's transposition of the Thomist light of intellect, which was itself a development of the Aristotelian agent intellect and a replacement of the Augustinian vision of eternal truth; see Verbum, pp. 79-84.

13 Insight, p. 361.

14 Ibid., p. 681. The validity of chapter 19 as a whole has been challenged, and the question raised about Lonergan's own present attitude to this approach; but it is clear to me that he still stands by what he wrote in 1953--see my article, "Bernard Lonergan's Thought on Ultimate Reality and Meaning," Ultimate Reality and Meaning 4 (1981): 58-89 (see especially pp. 80-85).
The more so, since the same term is used for interpretative procedures; see Insight, pp. 589-590. On extrapolation to God, see, ibid., pp. 636, 641-644, 670.

Ibid., pp. 63-66; the quoted phrase occurs on p. 63.

Method (see note 1 above) will speak frequently of the "brands" and "varieties" of common sense (see pp. 154, 272-273, 303), and so the question may be raised of the analogy of these.

Insight, p. 289; and see pp. 296-297.

"Theology and Understanding," Collection (see note 10 above), pp. 121-141; the original article was published in Gregorianum 35 (1954): 630-648.

For this positive value, see Collection, p. 133, the paragraph beginning: "Still, though it generates neither new certitude nor perfect understanding, the ordo doctrinae is most fruitful."

De SS. Trinitate: Supplementum quoddam composuit P. Lonergan, S.J. (Romae, in die festo S. Thomae Aquinatis, MCMLV). This is a work of three articles, the first two of which will later appear as Appendices I and II in Divinarum Personarum... (see note 28 below). The third ("Articulus Tertius: Ex Imagine in Exemplar Aeternum"), pp. 30-50, has never been published, but is available, as are many other unpublished works of Lonergan, in a chain of Lonergan Centers (on this continent, at Regis College, Toronto, Concordia University, Montreal, and the University of Santa Clara).

De SS. Trinitate, nos. 21, 22, and 23 respectively (pp. 30-36).


Collection, pp. 142 and 143. The "protracted analogy" runs through nine headings of comparison, pp. 143-151.


De constitutione Christi, p. 47; the whole section covers pp. 44-49. I need hardly mention at this point that the basis of analogy remains, not the concept, but the act of understanding that generates the concept; see pp. 47-48. On science and theology more generally, see pp. 39-40 below.

Ibid., pp. 69-71; the content of the analogy lies outside my terms of reference, but I outline it here because, unlike the psychological analogy for the Trinity, it is quite unknown. Notice, p. 73, that the explanation is said to be more than an analogy—a claim not made in later works, so far as I know.


The term, analogy, does not occur in the thesis statements that set forth the psychological analogy, but we are told that the divine processions are to be conceived "per similitudinem" (pp. 62, 69). Later sections of the book do use the term: v. g., question 15, "Quod analogice dictur persona de divinis et de creatis" (pp. 145-147), and question 21, "Quaenun sit analogia subiecti temporalis et subiecti aeterni" (pp. 176-183); this last
section is of great interest for Lonergan's wider development, but again it lies outside my terms of reference. For the nature and role of analogy, see the introductory chapter, v. g., pp. 11-12, 15-16, 21-23, 43-44, 50.

30 See pp. 39-40 below.

31 Divinarum Personarum, p. 29.

32 Ibid., pp. 29-31.

33 Ibid., p. 31. Further light on the transcultural problem is provided in the positive part of this same Trinity course, as reported by Lonergan's students, De Deo Trino: Notae ab auditoribus desumptae, 1956-7 (also available in the chain of Lonergan Centers). Here Lonergan draws a parallel between the ordinary knowledge of daily life and scientific knowledge, and then transfers it analogically to the parallel between the notion of God in the New Testament and that found, say, in Vatican I; see pp. VII-IX for the parallel and its analogical transfer, but also pp. IX-XI for the differences between scientific knowledge and theological. Hence in religious doctrine we have a double historical movement: one is transcultural, and so we have ever new adaptations in the mission field; and the other is theological, heading for the primum quod se (p. XI).


36 Understanding and Being, pp. 248-249.

37 Ibid., pp. 249-251 (quoted phrase: p. 249). I believe Lonergan uses the term, extended metaphysics, but I have lost the reference, if I ever had one.

38 De Intellectu et Methodo, Rome, 1959 (available in the chain of Lonergan Centers). A note at the end of the typescript (p. 72) describes its genesis: "Præsentes notae cursus "De Intellectu et Methodo" a R. P. Bernardo Lonergan S.J. in Pontificia Universitate Gregoriana habiti a. 1959, collectae et ordinatae sunt ab aliquibus auditoribus ex his tantum quae in scholis colligi potuerunt . . . ."

39 De Intellectu, p. 66; see also De metodo theologiae (note 48 below), p. 44, which makes the same point though the word, analogy, is not used there.

40 De Intellectu, p. 48 (and see p. 39). The notion is explained at length in Insight, pp. 19-25. Is this the first time it is applied to divine mysteries? I would not be so rash as to say so, but I have no note on its previous occurrence in that context; it is used in Insight, pp. 687, 689, with reference to the problem of evil.

41"Christ as Subject: a Reply," Collection, pp. 164-197 (see p. 196); the original article was published in Gregorianum 40 (1959): 242-270. "Analogy of faith" is a rather famous term, but I would surmise that Lonergan's use echoes, not Karl Barth, but Vatican I and the analogical understanding had through the interlocking of mysteries; at any rate that is just what is involved here, a "nexus mysteriorum."

42 De Verbo Incarnato: dicta scriptis auxit B. Lonergan, S.I., Romae, 1960. This was followed by De Verbo Incarnato, editio
altera, 1961, and *De Verbo Incarnato*, editio tertia, 1964. The pagination changes with each edition, but only the third introduces a significant revision (on Christ's human knowledge).


44 *De Verbo*, 1960, p. 308; 1964, p. 224.
45 *De Deo Trino*, 1961, pp. 277-280; see also pp. 294, 295-296, and especially pp. 300-303.
46 *Ibid.*, p. 302. This is a much fuller account of inverse insight into mysteries than we found in *De intellectu*, and it includes a very strong statement of its positive value: "non mera quaedam atque infructuosa negatio est, sed potius fundamentalis quaedam clavis in tota inquisitione theologica dirigenda atque regulanda" (p. 302). This positive value had already been underlined in *Verbum*, pp. 207-209, and *De constitutione Christi*, pp. 47-48.
47 *De Deo Trino*, 1961, pp. 304-316.
48 P. Bernardus Lonergan, S.J., *De metodo theologiae: Notae desumptae ab alumnis*—1962. But these notes do not cover all the topics treated in the course. That same summer, however, Fr. Lonergan gave 20 lectures on "The Method of Theology" at Regis College, Toronto (July 9-20, 1962), in which he treated the full list of topics, though presumably in abbreviated form. The tape-recording of these lectures has been transcribed by John Brezovec, and is available at some of the chain of Lonergan Centers.

On the analogy of the "worlds" see *De metodo*, p. 12; for some further references to analogy, see pp. 27, 32, 36, 37-38, 45, 47, 51.
49 Lecture at the Thomas More Institute for Adult Education, Montreal, Sept. 25, 1963. A transcription (by Dr. Philip McShane) of the tape-recording is available at some of the Lonergan Centers.
50 Besides the title, there are only passing references to analogy in the lecture; see pp. 1, 2, 18, 19 of the McShane transcript.
51 *De Deo Trino*, I, 1964, pp. 276-298.
52 *De Deo Trino*, II, 1964, pp. 73-92.
53 *Ibid.*, especially pp. 86, 91. See *Insight*, p. 175, for a related point: "common sense may seem to argue from analogy, but its analogies defy logical formulation."
54 *Understanding and Being*, pp. 61-62.
55 This is not to say that his usage is free of carelessness or mistakes, but merely to suggest the wisdom of examining the meaning in each case before laying charges.
56 *Insight*; see the Index, s. v., Knowing (and looking). And passim in Lonergan's writings ever since.
57 *Insight*, p. 544.

"Gratia Operans" (see note 3), p. 5; the reference is to an introductory section (pp. 1-47), unpublished but available at the Lonergan Centers. See also Divinorum Personarum, p. 41; "Bernard Lonergan Responds", p. 225; Method in Theology, p. 4.

"Gratia Operans," pp. 4, 6, 10; Insight, xx-xxii; Method in Theology, p. 4.


Method in Theology, pp. 3-4. See note 58 above.


For some years I was myself quite impatient with our delay in implementing Method in Theology. Then, in 1979 I made some attempt to organize such a work, only to find out how big a task it is, and how little prepared we still are for it.


The first two questions are found in Insight; see the Index, s.v. Questions. All three are found in A Second Collection; see the Index, s.v. Question(s). (These three are not to be confused with another trio that occur passim in A Second Collection and Method: the questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics.)

Almost exactly, but not quite, since the question for deliberation asks for a value judgment, and responsible consciousness requires more than a value judgment.

In fact, it seems to me a good exercise toward understanding Lonergan to work through a series of terms taken from an index to one of his works (from bias, context, etc., down to sublation, unity, etc.) and ask oneself: Is this term understood analogously, or univocally? One may also take up here the questions mentioned earlier: What is the relation between analogy and the various brands of common sense? and the transcultural? and extrapolation? and instances of isomorphism? On the latter, one may usefully study De notione structure, a lecture given at the Aloisianum, Gallarate (Italy), and published in the student journal Apertura 1 (May, 1964): 117-123, but available also in a 7-page typescript in the Centers; the point to notice is on p. 3 of the typescript, where there is set up an isomorphism of the structures of reality, of knowing, of objectivity, and all this is contrasted with the analogical knowledge we have of God and the angels.

This supposes that theology is not going to surrender unconditionally to the positive scholarship which tells us we can say nothing on the interiority of Jesus. Besides development from below upwards, there is development from above downwards; or, Christology is a two-way traffic, from Trinity to Christ as well as from Christ to Trinity ("Christology Today," (note 2 above, p. 50). Further, within the procedures of development, there is the scissors-action of heuristic method (Insight, pp. 312-313 and passim), which by no means relies solely on positive data.

Two major questions in evolutionary theory are "What is the origin of life?" and "What forces drive evolution?". The general structure of the origin of life is had by applying a general theory of emergence to living systems. Similarly, the forces that drive evolution are different kinds of emergence. Believing that present evolutionary theory does not adequately acknowledge the contribution of life itself to its own evolution, I shall present a model of the emergence of structure within complex living systems which rests on an analysis of the emergence of unsystematic situations in systematic structures.

The emergence of new kinds, or levels, of organization to relate the unsystematic results of the interaction of organic systems can constitute an evolutionary advance initiated within, and accomplished by, living systems alone. This kind of emergence may be contrasted with another which I identify with the emergence of life itself. In this latter case, a system comes into being from an unsystematic situation, resulting not from the interaction of systems within a being, but from the confluence of sets of unsystematic processes. To show how life can contribute to its own evolution, I shall review, first of all, some fundamental principles of hierarchy theory, which outline fundamental relationships between levels of organization. Then I shall present the most general structure of emergence of living systems, exemplified by the emergence of life. Since life was partially caused by unsystematic processes, these processes and their role as causes are discussed. Next, I shall expand on contemporary evolutionary theory's insistence that the primary source of randomness in living systems is on the level of the genotype. I point out that it can extend to higher levels of organization as well. If higher levels of organization are a rich source of variations, then it is possible that some of these variations are not systematized, though they result from the operation of systems. Drawing an analogy with computer programs, I then show how the interactions of sets of systems in a being can give rise to an unsystematic internal situation. Since the general form of emergence is for a higher level of organization to come into being organizing what is unsystematic, the stage is set for emergence within a complex system. Finally, I point out how, within current evolutionary theory, some of these instances of emergence can be evolutionarily significant. In those cases, the cause of evolutionary "innovation" would lie in life itself.
1. Hierarchical Organization

The explanation of biological, psychological, and sociological organization as hierarchical is spreading rapidly. Philosophical foundations are found in works by Lonergan, Polanyi, Simon, and Pattee. Ontogenetic development and various structures of the brain are conceived hierarchically. In his three volume work on attachment and loss, Bowlby presents a comprehensive theory of early psychic development based on the hierarchical ordering of biologically based behavioral systems. As in the emergence of many key ideas concerning the fundamental structures of nature, there is a correlative development of technological forms. Computer systems embody principles of structured programming, where higher level programs are hierarchical organizations of lower level structures. Since I am concerned with the emergence of higher levels of organization within complex biological structures, it will help to orient the discussion if I present some fundamental principles of hierarchy theory.

The abstract schema is fairly simple. Let us consider a hierarchical organization \( O \). On the lowest level of organization \( A, B, C, \) and \( D \) are related to perform function \( F_1 \). \( E, F, \) and \( G \) perform \( F_2 \). \( H, I, \) and \( J \) perform \( F_3 \). The repetitive performance of \( F_1, F_2, \) and \( F_3 \) constitute \( O \). In this schema it makes no difference in the occurrence of \( O \) if \( F_1 \) is achieved through \( A, B, C \) and \( D \), or through \( x, y, \) and \( z \). The important thing is that \( F_1 \) occurs. Within certain limits, then, in many structures the higher level of organization is indifferent to the manner in which the lower level achieves its function. This is the basis for the notion of equifinality, namely, that in nature we find the same purpose being achieved by multiple means.

Of course the higher level of organization is not completely independent of the lower level. While it may constrain the action of elements on that level, it is constrained in turn by the fundamental relations governing the lower level. Thus biological systems respect the relations of physics and chemistry while exploiting them in functional systems.

However, just as higher level organization can exist given a variety of lower level structures, so can lower level structures be parts of more than one kind of higher level organization. Corresponding to equifinality is equipotentiality. For example, in human action the same means can be used for different ends. In organisms the function of a particular system can be integrated into more than one higher level of organization.

Considering equipotentiality further, we can see that the emergence of a higher level of organization is the emergence of greater potentialities for the system in which it emerges, for it
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provides the system with new capabilities for relating to other things and systems--particularly, to those on its own level of organization. Pattee acknowledges this by adverting to the higher degrees of freedom of higher compared to lower levels of organization.6

Finally, the independence which is exhibited by higher from lower levels of organization is evidence that the higher level or organization is a different "ontological" level from the lower. Thinkers such as Simon will admit that there is a semantic difference between the two levels. That is, at the present time they must be described differently. But he will not go so far as to admit that a level of organization is in existence which cannot be explained by the same principles which explain the lower level relationships which constitute it.7 The resolution of this dispute pivots on two points. First, do distinct structural types exist on higher levels of organization? Second, can they be explained by the operations of the lower level alone?

The existence of distinct structural types is a fact. Some systems, such as feedback mechanisms, could not exist without a certain level of complexity. They permit forms of regulation or control of processes. The particular mechanisms are quite diverse, yet all exploit a fundamental structural type.

A simple scheme for feedback is the following. The system comprises, first, a receptor or "sense organ," be it a photoelectric cell, a radar screen, a thermometer, or a sense organ in the biological meaning. The message may be, in technological devices, a weak current, or, in a living organism, represented by nerve conduction, etc. Then there is a center recombining the incoming messages and transmitting them to an effector, consisting of a machine like an electromotor, a heating coil or solenoid, or of a muscle which responds to the incoming message in such a way that there is an output of high energy. Finally, the functioning of the effector is monitored back to the receptor, and this makes the system self-regulating, i.e., guarantees stabilization or direction of action.8

We also find homologous biological structures at particular levels of complexity, including homologous behavioral systems. In turn, biology explains physiological and behavioral systems in terms of their function, while physics and chemistry do not.

The existence of equifinality and equipotentiality on each level of organization points toward a degree of independence of one level from another. If different lower level configurations can lead to similar higher level structures, then the higher level must have some independence of the lower. However, this does not establish that the higher level cannot be explained completely in terms of the lower, since it is possible that similar principles are operative on the lower level, though different
types of lower level configurations contribute to similar higher level structural types. The final link in the argument establishing that higher levels of organization cannot be explained entirely through the principles which explain lower level entities and events is had by understanding the fundamental structure of emergence.

2. The Emergence of Life

By understanding what has emerged, we are at an advantage over those who wish to predict the future. We can work backward from the present structure to its cause. In the case of life, however, this has proven extremely difficult due to the gap between the types of structures which preceded life and life itself. Life exhibits self-organization, is reproductive and assembles the conditions for its own existence. Once the process of living commences, then, living beings are a primary cause of their survival and other living beings were the cause of their coming into existence. Obviously, the emergence of life could not rely upon pre-existent life as its cause. Hence, the difficulty of the problem.

What is the cause of life? The nature of the particular events in the origin of life is a scientific question. Philosophically, however, the structure of the emergence of life is similar to that of the emergence of any higher level of organization from a less complex structure or situation.

The source of emergence can be found in two places only, in the conditions preceding the emergence and in the emergent itself. In the origin of life both contribute. If life is a higher level of organization than that which preceded it, then it must relate previously unrelated structures, events or systems. Thus, it seems that an unsystematic situation alone is not sufficient to explain the coming-to-be of a system, since all the relations which organize the elements into a system are not operative in the non-systematic situation. If they were, then the non-systematic situation would in fact be a systematic situation which "causes" life, and life would not be a higher level of organization. However, we must overcome the urge to extend the reasoning that causes us to reject the unsystematic as the sole cause of life and conclude that it is not causal at all. In the emergence of life, and in emergence in general, it is either a set of unsystematic processes, or the unsystematic results of a set of systematic processes, which provide the conditions for the emergence of a higher level of organization. In the origin of life the former is the case. In the evolution of life the latter plays a key role. To understand how this is so, we must
overcome the lingering bias towards understanding causes as systematic only.

In an unsystematic process events display a statistical independence of one another. Put simply, an event is independent of another to the extent that the occurrence of event A does not influence or cause the occurrence of event B. If A and B were related systematically, then, if nothing intervened, the occurrence of A would always be followed by that of B.

There are three points we should keep in mind concerning statistical independence and non-systematic processes. First, the affirmation of randomness is compatible with the notion that events have determinate causes. This is easiest to see if we accept the Laplacian assumption that the future velocities and positions of any particles can be determined if we know the laws governing them and their present positions and velocities. Suppose that there are two different kinds of particles, A and B, which will join together if they get within a certain range of one another. Is there any non-statistical law which determines when they get within range of each other? We can find out by examining the individual histories of each of the particles which join together. Suppose that at the time of our first measurement they were in different places, they had followed different paths, and they had a series of collisions with other kinds of particles. If in ten such unions we have ten different sets of individual histories, it follows that we may not be able to discern complete similarity in the histories. Indeed, we would not expect it. But if we cannot discern complete similarity, then any law concerning their histories would not explain everything about them. This follows because laws are universal. Thus, there is an unsystematic element given even the Laplacian assumption. The lack of system can be of two kinds. It may concern the particular event, and then it is an accident. Or it may concern the set of events. In the latter case the events exhibit statistical independence.

This analysis provides for the possibility of a set of determinate collisions of gas molecules with the overall result approximating a random sample. That is, there is no law or set of laws which governs the occurrence of the set of collisions. All that can be given is a set of differing individual histories.

Second, we should not confuse unsystematic with complete disorder. Though there may be no set of laws which fully explains the existence of a situation, there are laws operating in the situation. In short, unsystematic processes have positive results. The conditions are assembled for the next situation. Because the unsystematic process is not completely disordered, it can be a cause of future processes and situations.
Third, the existence of independence in a situation is that situation's potency for the emergence of higher organizations. The lack of system on the level of physics and chemistry is the possibility for a systematization of physical and chemical entities which is not accomplished through physical and chemical laws alone. In terms of the simple model discussed above, the possibility rests on the existence of manifolds of particles, the relative positions of which are not explained by the laws governing their movement. They may be partially explicable by other relations which do not concern the mechanics of these particles. Such a relation may govern the union of $ABC$. $ABC$ may be a new thing $k$. The conjunctions of particles may give rise to a whole series of new things. Likewise, the relations governing these things may give rise to yet another unsystematic situation. The possibility of another level of things is open. Since this possibility is recurrent, there can be a series of levels of organization.

Though living beings possess some unsystematic processes, they are more remarkable for their high degree of organization. Though it lives in an environment on which it must rely for its existence, a living being exhibits an independence of the environment by assembling some of the conditions for its own existence, by exhibiting self-organization and by being reproductive. The emergence of life, then, is the emergence of a system which is largely a self-sustaining, self-organizing, reproductive system. Its self-referential nature implies that coincidental with its coming-into-being is its maintenance of itself in being. If a living being relies on itself for its own existence, it is difficult to understand how it can be explained fully by the principles which explain the events which preceded it. However, if it cannot be explained completely in terms of its antecedents, it must be partially explained by itself. This means that to some degree life must be self-causing in its origin. But how does that which does not exist bring itself into existence? Attempts to resolve the question of emergence have failed to bridge this gap. Most proponents of emergence have posited some form of alogical "leap" from one level of organization to another. In the face of an inadequate explanation of emergence, reductionists have held to the argument that a fully explanatory physics and chemistry will eventually solve the mystery.

However, the mystery can be solved if we advert to cyclic processes in nature. Lonergan has termed these schemes of recurrence. \(^9\) Unlike the independent strings of events outlined in the discussion of non-systematic processes, schemes of recurrence are recurrent cycles of events. The basic structure is that $A$
causes B which causes C which causes D which causes A. If emergence were of a scheme of recurrence of this simple, abstract structure, then, under appropriate conditions, all that would be necessary is for A to occur. If sets of unsystematic processes converged to produce A, then the scheme would unfold. Other things being equal, it would continue to operate, though the situation which gave rise to it eventually passed. Thus, self-sustaining entities do not cause themselves in the sense that they assemble the conditions for their emergence. But when those conditions are assembled, they become themselves. This possibility of becoming a self-sustaining entity is based on the type of structure which emerges, one which employs schemes of recurrence.

Naturally, not all schemes of recurrence are embodied in living systems. Nor are they as simple as this abstract model. However, we will assume that a living system employs a set of schemes operating in a hierarchical organization.

Also, since living systems are open systems, their independence of the environment is not absolute. They possess many schemes of recurrence where elements in the schemes are found in the environment and the regularity of the scheme is tied to concomitant environmental regularities. In general, though, we may conclude that an organism's dependence on itself for its survival is correlative to its degree of independence of the situation which caused it and the situation in which it continues to exist.

Finally, the independence of the organism rests on the independence of schemes of recurrence. In a system, the scheme is itself a principle of organization which must be invoked to explain its own existence. If the scheme is a higher level of organization, then the reductionist hope of fully explaining higher levels of organization in terms of the principles which organize lower levels will never be realized.

3. Sources of Randomness

The emergence of self-modifying complex hierarchical systems profoundly altered the world situation. In addition to beings which were at most related to their antecedents and consequents in complex causal chains, beings emerged which are related to themselves. While living beings are highly systematic and employ elaborate control mechanisms, in their internal relations it is possible for situations to emerge which are unsystematic and which in turn provide the potentiality for developmental and evolutionary advances. The emergence of, and response to, these internal situations is an evolutionary force just as the adaptiveness to environmental challenges is. However, besides environmental
forces, evolutionary theorists have concentrated on the randomness inherent in the gene pool as a primary source of evolutionary change.

George Gaylord Simpson succinctly summarizes some main points of modern evolutionary theory in the following passage from *The Meaning of Evolution*.

The evolutionary materials involved in this complex process are the genetical systems existing in the population and the mutations arising in these. The interacting forces producing evolutionary change from these materials are their shuffling in the process of reproduction, the incidence of mutations (their nature and rate) and natural selection.\(^\text{10}\)

Natural selection is defined as differential reproduction where the evolutionary changes which survive are those which confer a reproductive advantage. To be evolutionary, changes must be passed from one generation to another. This means that they must be embodied in the genetic code of individual organisms or, more generally, the gene pool of the population. Evolutionary change, then, requires changes in a population's gene pool. The source of new genes is mutation. Mutations occur randomly in all organisms, and their incidence can increase depending on environmental circumstances. The gene pool can also contract if part of a population becomes isolated from another part, or if a significant part of the population cannot adapt to environmental change, for example. Different kinds of structures emerge due to the variations in particular genotypes caused by sexual reproduction and by the type and rate of mutations. Their survival is explained through the probabilities of their surviving to the point where the organisms can reproduce and pass on the characteristic. The primary sources of randomness, then, which account for the changes in the gene pool, are variation and mutation. Both are unsystematic. As such they may provide conditions for emergence.

The potential for variety on the genetic level is far greater than its expression. Consider the case of a species with ten thousand genes. Suppose one-tenth of them are heterozygous (*i.e.*, there is a dominant and a recessive gene for the same characteristic). The number of possible combinations on this level alone is \(2^{1000}\).

Let us take this analysis beyond the level of the genotype. If we consider a complex hierarchical system the degree of potential variability is greater. Not only do we have the possibilities for combinations on the genetic level, but each of these combinations introduces variability into the structures on higher levels of organization. Variations in structure on the higher level can lead to variations in the interactions of structures. This possibility is recurrent as one ascends the hierarchy of
organizations.

If we consider the development of systems, the variability becomes still greater, since the development of higher levels of organization depends on the actions of lower levels of organization which may subsist or pass away in the course of development. Modifications of these levels can affect the organization of higher levels. This implies that genes do not function as the sole operators throughout development and the subsequent life cycle. If they do not, and if the characteristics of an organism are the relations it exhibits in its life cycle, then genes do not uniquely determine higher levels of organization. Indeed, if this analysis of emergence is correct, then a major role of genes is to provide the conditions for the emergence of higher levels of organization in development and to sustain physiological functions. However, to establish these points would require a fuller analysis of the relations between emergence and development.

Given the magnitude of possible variations, it is amazing that development proceeds in an orderly manner giving rise to similar individuals. This is evidence for a remarkably flexible system of control of the life cycle. However, despite this high level of control, evolution proceeds. Indeed, the more remarkable evolutionary feats are the emergence of higher levels of control. How does this occur?

4. A Technological Analogy

From our earlier discussion of emergence we know that the institution of a higher level of organization requires the convergence of the elements which initiate it. That discussion focused on unsystematic processes converging to provide the elements for the initiation of the scheme. Once organisms are in existence, however, we are faced with sets of systematic processes and the question of their giving rise to higher levels of organization. We know that variability is introduced into the gene pool through mutations. But we also know that the speed of much of evolution cannot be explained given the known rates of mutation. We also know that variability is introduced in the randomness of bi-sexual reproduction. Yet it is one thing to have variations in the chromosomes and another to have these variations lead to the emergence of higher levels of organization and, in the long run, to new species.

To understand the general structure of the emergence of higher levels of organization in complex systems, let us consider a fully systematic structure—a properly functioning computer program. Computer programs are written in three basic types of languages: machine, assembler and applications languages. These
languages are hierarchically ordered. Machine language is the most basic, written in the 1's and 0's of binary arithmetic. Applications languages are most like natural languages. Mathematical operations can be represented by common mathematical symbols and natural language commands may be used (e.g., PERFORM, GO TO). Assembler languages translate the applications languages into machine languages.

The possibility of automating logical and mathematical operations rests on technological advances and the existence of a logical method which can be represented and manipulated mechanically. Boolean algebra is a method for deriving logical proofs developed by George Boole in the late nineteenth century. Its salient feature is the use of 1's and 0's to represent logical truth and falsity. Since electrical switches can be either on or off, an electrical system can be used to represent logical operations in Boolean algebra and numeric operations in binary arithmetic. A computer program, then, can be understood as a logical system. Since it may branch to various routines depending on its inputs or the results of its processing, and since it may also generate complete or partial programs, it can be considered as a self-modifying logical system.

As a logical system, the computer program is completely rule-driven. This consistency is the ground of the computer's reliability. In a properly functioning program, predictable results are generated given the parameters of the input, where the results match the purpose for which the program was written. Theoretically, all the results are predictable because we are dealing with a rule-driven system. Practically, however, the situation is quite different, since we do not always foresee the ways in which the different parts of the system may interact. This is especially evident when a program has "bugs" and does not work as intended. These "bugs" may be of two general types. The first is violation of syntax or rules forbidding certain operations (e.g., trying to divide by zero or trying to multiply alphabetic characters). The second results from "logical" errors. The use of "logical" here refers to the order of processing. Hence, the processing may be logical in the sense that it is logically valid, but it may be "illogical" in the sense that it does not yield the results desired. A common error resulting from bad logic in this more general sense is the endless loop. The program branches to a set of operations which do not branch to another set and which have no instructions to stop processing. More commonly, things simply do not come out as intended. If too much is produced, then certain operations must either be eliminated or isolated from other operations. If too little is produced,
operations must be added, or logical errors which prematurely stop processing must be eliminated.

The proper development of a computer program proceeds in a direction opposite to the evolution of a higher level of organization in nature. In programming, the higher level of organization is defined in terms of the purpose of the program. That purpose is realized by using the levels of organization immanent in the machine's design, its operating system, and the programming languages. The design is "top-down." In nature, the design is "bottom-up." Evolution does not proceed in terms of purpose—though purposive behavior has evolved and proven to be advantageous. But in the development of the program, when "bugs" exist and the purpose is not being realized, we are in a situation analogous in two ways to those which I think recur in nature.

First, we have the emergence of unforeseen results from the interaction of fully systematic processes. Whereas in the discussion of the emergence of life we found unsystematic processes yielding the conditions for the emergence of system, now we have systematic processes yielding results which are unsystematic with respect to the system as a whole. In other words, there is no level of organization which integrates the results. Some of these results may be benign. Others may cause the system to stop functioning. Others may cause a radical change in the system.

Second, the emergence of results which are unsystematic presents a challenge to the programmer. The program must be altered to yield the higher organization required. The organism is faced with a similar challenge. Sometimes that challenge is met by assimilating the change into an operative level of organization. Other times that challenge must be met by the emergence of a higher level of organization.

5. The Emergence of Higher Levels of Organization from Lower Levels

A higher level of organization is a new scheme of recurrence or a new set of schemes. As noted previously, it is independent of its antecedents due to its circularity, which makes it partially self-dependent. When a higher level of organization arises from a complex structure the source of its elements may be found in the results of the interaction of the structures on the lower level. Though these structures may themselves be fully systematic, their interaction may not be, or the results of their activities may not be. Thus, the path is open for the emergence of a scheme of recurrence which integrates the results, or the activities through the integration of the results.

To be evolutionary, this new organization must be passed
from generation to generation. There are a number of ways in which this may happen according to current evolutionary theory.

First, there is a probability that the genetic combination will recur within the gene pool causing future generations to possess the organization just as the first individuals did.

Second, the new level of organization may yield an adaptive advantage. In turn this confers a reproductive advantage on the individuals, increasing the likelihood of offspring with the same level of organization.

Third, the level of organization may lead to the sexual isolation of its carriers. In this instance, a group in the population may move into a new environmental niche as in the movement of the lemurs into the trees and of aquatic life onto land. They would reproduce only with those in their own proximity.

If we extend this last point, we can see that some instances of emergence can be self-isolating. Members of a population become isolated from other members due to the level of organization which has emerged and the capabilities it confers on its members.

Finally, if we combine the three points of the diversity inherent in the gene pool with the unsystematic situations resulting from the systematic operation of complex, hierarchical systems inviting the emergence of higher levels of organization, and the self-isolating nature of some of these levels of organization, we have a model for evolutionary change where the cause of evolutionary "innovation" lies in life itself.

The problem of emergence is that of determining how the more complex or more organized can arise from the less complex or less organized. It was established that the less complex situation is insufficient to cause a higher level of organization, since the relations operative on the higher level do not exist on the lower level of organization. However, if the higher level of organization which emerges employs schemes of recurrence, then, to that extent, it can be self-causal because it becomes itself. Thus, both the lower and the higher levels of organization contribute to the emergence of the higher level.

The basic structure of emergence, then, requires a lower level of organization which has some unrelated constituents which can become related through the becoming of a set, or sets, of schemes of recurrence. In the discussion of the origin of life it was shown that this situation was constituted by the convergence of sets of unsystematic processes. However, once life has emerged, the problem of understanding the emergence of higher levels of organization becomes more difficult. It must be shown how an unsystematic situation can arise from a structure that is
highly systematic. The answer is that the results of a set of fully systematic processes can be unsystematized. As such, they are open to organization by the emergence of a higher level of organization.

Since the interaction of complex systems within an organism can give rise to the emergence of higher levels of organization, there is a "source of randomness" open to evolutionary exploitation which is not explained by mutation or by variation on the genetic level alone (although this model can also encompass both). Because the cause of the unsystematic situation is in the structure of life itself, and since the higher level of organization is living, this type of emergence can lead to an evolutionary advance caused by life itself.

NOTES


11 Francisco J. Ayala, G. L. Stebbins, T. Dobzhansky, J. W. Valentine, *Evolution* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1977). They note that "one may estimate that the amount of variation present in a population is about 5000 times greater than that acquired each generation by mutation ... It follows that rates of evolution are not likely to be closely correlated with rates of mutation."
A CRITIQUE OF "LONERGAN'S NOTION OF DIALECTIC" by RONALD MCKINNEY, S.J. by GLENN HUGHES
A REPLY TO GLENN HUGHES by RONALD MCKINNEY, S.J.
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A CRITIQUE OF "LONERGAN'S NOTION OF DIALECTIC"
BY RONALD MCKINNEY, S.J.

Glenn Hughes

In a recent issue of The Thomist (Vol. 46, No. 2 (1982): 221-241) Ronald McKinney argues that the full importance of the concept of dialectic in Lonergan's thought has not been appreciated, in part because Lonergan himself fails to acknowledge the true extent of its significance. While it is helpful in bringing many complexities and nuances in Lonergan's use of this notion to the fore, McKinney's article has far-reaching conclusions, based on his interpretations of Lonergan's key concepts and ideas, and these seem debatable. This reply seeks to question those interpretations and conclusions. Since McKinney's argument is complex, I shall begin by summarizing his article, and then I shall proceed to a critical analysis of it.

In the process of clarifying Lonergan's notion of dialectic, McKinney aims to exhibit it as constituting the "fundamental structure underlying every aspect of the content and method" of Lonergan's thought. The crux of this clarification is McKinney's distinction between three types of usage of the term "dialectic" in Lonergan's works. He names these the "dialectic of sublation," the "dialectic of complementarity" and the "dialectic of contradiction." McKinney argues that only when we have differentiated these—something Lonergan does not do—and have come to see how they are interrelated, can we see that, contrary to Lonergan's explicit assertion that the notion of dialectic is relevant only to the human sphere, in fact dialectic and dialectical method are applicable within Lonergan's dynamic world-view to the study of any process whatsoever.

McKinney's analysis begins by invoking Lonergan's description of inquiry as possessing a "scissors-like" nature. Its upper blade consists of a "heuristic structure" which provides an anticipatory outline of the nature of some phenomenon, and its lower blade consists of a method of concrete techniques. Now
each of Lonergan's three separate types of dialectic, claims McKinney, provides a heuristic structure or heuristic assumption, an upper blade, relevant to a specific range of phenomena. In each case, he hopes to show, this range of phenomena includes, in addition to cognitional and historical processes, what may be called "extramental" processes. This is an expansion of the scope of dialectic which, though denied by Lonergan, is claimed to be in accord with "the implicit thrust of his thought" (223).

The remainder of McKinney's argument may be summarized as follows:

The "dialectic of sublation" is introduced, in *Insight*, in the context of cognition's need and ability to develop a higher viewpoint when its efforts to attain logical coherence at a given stage of development have broken down. Higher viewpoints are said by Lonergan to both "retain and negate" lower viewpoints, and this achievement is "repeatedly referred to by Lonergan as 'sublation'" (224). We must advert to the parallels between this activity and those in Lonergan's description of emergence in world process, in which the principles of stability and development are analogous to those of logic and dialectic, and in which higher systems act as both "integrators" of lower systems and "operators" in emerging systems. These parallels are "too striking to ignore" (226). We can only conclude that the dialectic of sublation is relevant to extramental as well as human processes as the "heuristic structure which anticipates the general outline of the emergence of higher systems from lower systems" (226).

The second dialectic to be distinguished, the "dialectic of complementarity," is the only type for which Lonergan provides a detailed definition: it is a "concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change" (227). The paradigmatic example of this lies in cognitional process, where Lonergan stresses the "cyclic" and "cumulative" character of learning in which the levels of cognitional operation all presuppose and complement each other. This suggests that the "opposed principles" in an evolving process "mutually sublate" and thus "modify" each other, and this will hold for any number of "parts" in any dynamic, structural whole (227-228). Although these ideas are elaborated by Lonergan solely in discussions of personal and historical development, again they are relevant to extramental processes. Also, so long as the complementary parts of any dynamic system remain balanced through mutual "integration," according to Lonergan, the dynamic system is progressive. In any system, then, progress is (in Lonergan's words) "the harmonious working of the opposed principles" of change. Decline, on the other hand, is the inevitable result of either the elimination of a genuine part or the dominance of one of the principles, yielding (again in Lonergan's terms) "a distorted dialectic." Embracing these possibilities, the "dialectic of complementarity" functions as the "heuristic assumption underlying the study of dynamic systems," where the interaction of opposed principles of change is constituted by the dynamics of mutual sublation (231).

Thirdly, the "dialectic of contradiction," which most critics consider to be Lonergan's sole dialectic,
emerges in passages on aberrant historical process. This dialectic comes into play when the dynamism of a "harmonious dialectic," as a force of advance, conflicts with the dynamism of a "distorted dialectic," a force of collapse (232). The relation between these respective forces of progress and decline is not one of interdependence but of rivalry, irreducible opposition. One must give way to the other. We observe that this dialectic cannot be restricted only to human process, for harmony and distortion, progress and decline, occur at all levels of concrete world process. If the "dialectic of contradiction" applies to the tension between any and all progressive and regressive systems, then within Lonergan's world-view of emergent probability, characterized as it is by trial and error, successes and dead-ends, advance and collapse, development and breakdown, this dialectic can serve as "the most comprehensive heuristic structure for our examination of the entire world order" (234).

Having revealed and defined the three types of dialectic as heuristic structures, it is necessary to examine Lonergan's discussions of the "lower blade" of techniques, dialectical method. Again, three uses of the term are apparent. The first refers to a sub-set of mental operations by which lower viewpoints are sublated by higher viewpoints, i.e., it describes a type of cognitional process, not a method for the study of dialectical processes (235). A second refers to the dialectical method which constitutes the fourth functional specialty in *Method in Theology*: through comparison and criticism, it aims at a comprehensive interpretation of conflicting viewpoints as they come to light in historical research and as they are exhibited by the historical researchers themselves. It is a method for resolving differences. Both of these usages concern only human processes. However, there is a third use of dialectical method, in *Insight*, which renders such general applicability as to be relevant to any process within "the dialectical universe," but this range is not immediately apparent because here too Lonergan attempts to restrict its pertinence to the human sphere. He does this by insisting on an "unfortunate distinction of the genetic and the dialectical methods" (237-238). Lonergan tells us that the genetic method studies developing processes, while dialectical method supplements it as regards the phenomenon of human bias, i.e., it studies processes in decline. But clearly, "developing processes" as defined by Lonergan include both growth and decay, success and failure; while the dialectic of human history also involves both progress and decline and the interaction between them. So, whereas Lonergan argues that the genetic and dialectical methods are complementary in their anticipations, each one reveals a comprehensive relevance to both progressive and aberrant, harmonious and distorted, processes. In a consistent approach to Lonergan's ideas, then, we would do best to "regard these two methods as one and the same" (240). Indeed, the "dialectical-genetic method is the integration of the classical and statistical methods constituting Lonergan's world view of emergent probability" (240).

In conclusion, there remains the question why Lonergan insists on the "arbitrary" restriction of dialectical method to the human realm. Most probably, it is because of his mistaken identifications of the "dialectic of sublation" as the heuristic assumption of the genetic method and the "distorted dialectic" as that of the
dialectical method. Or again, perhaps Lonergan "merely
wanted to preserve the symmetry of a system in which
complementary classical and statistical methods are
flanked by equally complementary genetic and dialec-
tical methods" (239).

McKinney's article offers four principle theses. These are:

1) that Lonergan's use of dialectic is inconsistent;
2) that in each variety of its three uses the notion
is relevant, based on Lonergan's own writings, to
extramental as well as human processes;
3) that just as dialectic as heuristic structure or
assumption is a proper tool for inquiry into any
dynamic process whatsoever, so dialectical method
as a correlative set of techniques is appropriate
to any dynamic process whatsoever;
4) and that, therefore, again based on Lonergan's
writings, distinctions between the genetic and
dialectical methods are artificial, it being "pre-
cisely the task of dialectical method to examine
and survey dialectical world order in its entirety."

We might begin a reply to McKinney by asking if the first thesis
here is correct, since from it much follows.

As McKinney notes, in *Insight* Lonergan gives a succinct de-
finition of his notion of dialectic as "a concrete unfolding of
linked but opposed principles of change" (p. 217; references are
to the revised students' edition of *Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding* [New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1958]).
Later, distinguishing this notion from that of Hegel, Lonergan
adds that this "dialectical opposition is the conflict between
the pure desire to know and other human desires" (p. 422); this
makes it a "normative dialectic that discriminates between ad-
vance and aberration" (p. 422); it "does not lie within logic but
rather regards the movement from one logically formalized position
to another" (p. 422); and so it possesses "no relevance to purely
natural process" (p. 422). If Lonergan's use of the term remains
consistent with these remarks, it will be difficult to hold with
McKinney that he employs it with three separate meanings. To de-
cide this issue, we shall examine the passages cited in McKinney's
references.

To identify his "dialectic of sublation" McKinney focuses
on a passage in *Insight* where Lonergan characterizes the most
general aspects of cognitional context as being represented by
logic and dialectic. When cognitional attempts at logical coher-
ence break down, dialectic consists in bringing to birth a new
stage, a "higher viewpoint" (p. 276). McKinney's assertion that
Lonergan "repeatedly" refers to this achievement of higher view-
points as "sublation" is erroneous. In the places cited by
McKinney, the term "sublation" pertains to the relations between
the operational levels of consciousness (see *A Second Collection:
Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.*, eds. William F. J. Ryan,
S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. [London: Darton, Longman & Todd,
1974], p. 80) and to the relations between intellectual, moral
and religious conversion (see Method in Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972], p. 241) -- not, it may be noted, to the achievement of higher viewpoints. This is because Lonergan uses "sublation," not in Hegel's sense, but in Rahner's: "That which sublates goes beyond what is sublated . . . needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context" but does not destroy, negate, reject or interfere with it (see Method in Theology, p. 241). Elsewhere, however, Lonergan does remark, in a footnote, a certain parallelism between Hegel's use of Aufhebung and his own idea of the emergence of higher viewpoints, in which what is higher "both rejects and retains" what is lower (see Insight, p. 374). But there is no ambiguity in Lonergan's own use of "sublation," its range is quite narrow, and it never serves the notion of the emergence of higher viewpoints. Therefore, when McKinney stresses the parallel between this latter emergence and emergence in natural process, he has already confused two distinct concepts in the first of these notions. But this is not all. He overstates his case for the parallel itself when he presents Lonergan as arguing that world process is generated by the tension between "opposed principles" of stability and development. In fact, neither in the passage cited by McKinney (Insight, p. 123) nor elsewhere does Lonergan refer to stability and development as "opposed principles." According to Lonergan, there can be "conflict" between the two (Insight, p. 123), but conflict does not make for dialectic. Neither McKinney's identification of the dialectic which gives rise to higher viewpoints with "sublation" nor his expansion of this to natural processes is convincing.

Before examining McKinney's two other types of dialectic, we should recall a passage in Insight (p. 244) in which dialectic is described as "a pure form with general implications . . . it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles . . . it is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration . . . ." It will be noted here that dialectic always retains a bipolar character; its terms are "linked but opposed principles" which means they are two, as Lonergan clearly states in his introductory definition of dialectic in Insight (p. 217).

Now, when McKinney argues that Lonergan's formulaic definition of dialectic refers to a "dialectic of complementarity" in which a structural whole may have any number of parts all dialectically related through "mutual sublation," he has expanded
Lonergan's notion considerably. He bases the legitimacy of this expansion on Lonergan's analysis of the "cyclic" character of learning (*Insight*, pp. 174, 336, 375), and on Lonergan's description of the formally dynamic structure of human knowing as having "parts"—i.e., operational levels—which are mutually interdependent (see *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.*, ed. F. E. Crowe, S.J. [New York: Herder and Herder, 1967], p. 222). We have already seen that Lonergan does not apply "dialectic" to these relations. McKinney does so by explaining as identical these "parts" and the "opposed principles" in Lonergan's notion of dialectic. Nothing in Lonergan's writings—and certainly nothing in the passages cited by McKinney—warrants this identification. We may recall that dialectical opposition is that between the pure desire to know and other human desires. The "principle" of all cognitional activity is the unrestricted desire to know. Therefore, no "part" of cognitional operations can be considered a principle.

Secondly, when McKinney urges us to identify Lonergan's notion of progress with the "harmonious working" of all the "genuine parts" of any dynamic structure, he is then fitting together the passage, quoted above, on the implications of dialectic as pure form with his own construct of cognitional operations as a mutually dialectical interaction of "opposed principles." This allows him to apply the resulting definition of "dialectical progress" to non-human systems. Subsequently, he pulls Lonergan's phrase "distorted dialectic" (without reference) from its context in an analysis of historical aberration (*Insight*, p. 233) and applies it to any dynamic system whose "parts" are not harmoniously working together. But Lonergan's own remarks on progress and decline persistently pertain to the fruits of that bipolar dialectical opposition introduced by human knowing, human desires and human bias.

As for the "dialectic of contradiction," which McKinney sees as the conflict between a "harmonious dialectic" and a "distorted dialectic," we observe that he has concretized two highly general notions to play them off against each other and thereby produce another type of dialectic. This enables him to arrive at a dialectic which embraces extramantal processes in the form of a rivalry between a lower system and that higher system which would "sublate" it, and this rivalry is seen as underpinning the survival or demise of systems of schemes of recurrence within emergent probability. Thus this notion of dialectic would pertain to all "failures" and "successes" within the development of world process. Once more, Lonergan's own ideas fail to justify such a procedure. For, while world process is indeed characterized in
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terms of "survival" and "blind-alleys and breakdowns" (see Insight, p. 127), Lonergan's notions of success and failure, harmony and distortion, progress and decline—signifying as they do a normative dimension—are consistently restricted to human affairs. Furthermore, while the field within which development is said to take place is the "finality" of proportionate being, "development" itself does not admit breakdowns; development is a process within a field which does admit breakdowns (see Insight, pp. 454, 452). These distinctions McKinney apparently overlooks when he rests his interpretation on Lonergan's assertion in Insight (p. 448) that the "finality" of the universe of proportionate being includes failure, aberration and decline (which it does, but exclusively within its human dimensions), and on an identification of development with world process in general.

Nowhere, then, in those passages cited by McKinney, nor indeed anywhere else, do we find a discussion of dialectic which contradicts Lonergan's central definition. Therefore we reject McKinney's thesis of inconsistency, and therewith his thesis of dialectic's applicability to extramental processes. But McKinney's conclusions about the three types of dialectic, although misconceived, do point out a weakness in Lonergan's formulaic definition of dialectic as the "concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change." On the surface, this phrasing does not appear to exclude non-human process. But in light of other passages it becomes clear that there is not genuine "opposition" in this sense except that created by human bias (see Insight, pp. 217 ff.), and that therefore "linked but opposed principles of change" cannot occur beyond its range, a range determined by the conflict between "the pure desire to know and other human desires" (see Insight, p. 422). "Emergent probability" in the natural order is not characterized by such opposition; and the emergence of a higher system does not result from the dialectical transcendence of an opposed state of logical incoherence as does the emergence of a higher viewpoint, but from the fulfillment of conditions for its probable emergence among underlying schemes of recurrence followed by the actualization of that probability.

Finally, if dialectic in Lonergan's use is consistently restricted to the human realm, we will not expect to find dialectical method applied to non-human processes. And in fact we do not. McKinney's thesis that genetic method and dialectical method are identical in their effective range is built upon his case that each is relevant to the study of both "progressive and regressive systems," human or non-human. As we have seen, for Lonergan progress and decline are exclusively characteristics of human activity, and so dialectical method is pertinent only within
the human sphere. But McKinney seems to misunderstand both dialectical method and genetic method when he asserts (without reference) that in Lonergan's work "the genetic method is said to examine progressive systems while the dialectical method is said to be responsible for examining systems in decline." We find Lonergan's distinction, instead, to be that genetic method is concerned with intelligibly related sequences of systems, while dialectical method is concerned with the relations between successive stages in a changing system, which are not directly intelligible (see Insight, pp. 461, 485). These latter relations are not directly intelligible because of the introduction of human bias, which brings with it opposed viewpoints in their concrete, dynamic contradictions. Neither of these methods is to be confused with classical and statistical methods, which are concerned respectively with "constant system" and "data that do not conform to system" (see Insight, p. 485). Thus there is but one dialectical method, discussed at length in Method in Theology, chapter 10. In this light, in fact, it is doubtful whether a radical distinction between 'dialectical process and dialectical method is even appropriate. For dialectical method is itself a process of intelligence correcting its own bias, a methodological entering-into dialectical process to make conversion more likely and to promote positive outcome. Still, McKinney's research leads him to look for another type of dialectical method in Lonergan's writings, one that could apply to all developmental processes in a universe conceived as dialectical. And since genetic method, according to Lonergan, studies developing process within the total field of emergent probability (see Insight, p. 462), the two methods should be equated. But this equation collapses both from the invalidity of McKinney's preliminary theses and from the unambiguity of the texts themselves.

Somewhat more curious than McKinney's presentation of a second, universalized dialectical method is his discovery of yet a third dialectical method in a "set of techniques directing the inquirer to the achievement" of higher viewpoints. This concept of "dialectical method," if separable from that discussed in Method in Theology, has no foundation whatsoever in Lonergan's writings. Perhaps McKinney wished to preserve the symmetry of an argument that had begun with the distinction of three types of dialectic.
I am grateful for Glenn Hughes' clear and accurate summary of my "complex" argument as well as for his very able presentation of the more orthodox and restrictive interpretation of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. Nevertheless, if I have erred in overstressing the inconsistency in Lonergan's thought, Hughes has completely ignored the relevant evidence indicating such inconsistency.

First of all, Hughes is correct that I am mistaken in distinguishing a dialectical method for achieving higher viewpoints (see Insight, pp. 275-277) from the dialectical method for analyzing conflicting points of view in history. They are, indeed, one and the same. What he has failed to see, however, is that such a method is identical to what Lonergan refers to as "sublation." Hughes admits that Lonergan contrasts the operations of logic and dialectic. Indeed, in Insight this dialectical grasp of a comprehensive viewpoint which eludes logic is called "metalogical" (zzvi); in Method in Theology this dialectical viewpoint is identified with "method" itself (pp. 66, 129, 305). Dialectic, then, achieves a higher viewpoint by radically revising terms and postulates (see Insight, p. 276). Lonergan, moreover, identifies this higher viewpoint with the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung (see Insight, p. 374). Hughes passes over this point too quickly. Indeed, Lonergan further establishes this identification when he equates his notion of sublation, i.e., development, with "the accumulation of insights moving to higher viewpoints" and the reversal of counter-positions (see Insight, p. 422). His adoption of Rahner's notion of sublation (see Method in Theology, p. 241) only differs from the Hegelian concept in Lonergan's refusal to regard sublation as the reconciliation of conceptual contradictions which would violate the principle of identity (see A Second Collection, p. 80).

Even if Hughes were correct that there is no identification in Lonergan's thought between sublation and the emergence of higher viewpoints, he has still failed to refute my claim that Lonergan uses the term dialectic to refer to the attainment of a higher viewpoint which logic cannot achieve. Finally, it should be noted that Lonergan's fundamental principle of isomorphism results in his repeated assertions regarding the common structure of developing higher viewpoints in the mental order and evolving higher integrations in objective processes (see Insight, pp. 257, 440-444, 465, 633). Consequently, despite Lonergan's
claim to the contrary (see Insight, p. 422), dialectical sublation is as relevant to purely natural processes as it is to human affairs.

Hughes, moreover, is simply mistaken when he argues that for Lonergan dialectic is always bipolar in character, for Lonergan himself admits a tripolar opposition and conjunction (see Insight, p. 728). Indeed, his claim that Lonergan never refers to the mutual interdependence of cognitional levels as dialectical is simply not true, for Lonergan in Verbum speaks of the "dialectical interplay" of these elements (see Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell, C.S.C. [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967], p. 58). Hughes' fundamental error, however, is his failure to recognize the complementarity which is clearly intended in Lonergan's definition of dialectic as the concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change (see Insight, p. 217). For throughout his writings, Lonergan repeatedly argues that the human person is the dialectical unity of the two principles of intelligence and sensibility, neither of which can be eliminated.

Yet such a dialectic of interdependence is clearly differentiated from Lonergan's reference to the "dialectical opposition between positions and counter-positions" (see Insight, p. 691) or the dialectic between authenticity and unauthenticity or between the self as transcending and the false self as transcended (see Method in Theology, p. 111). For there can be no integration or creative tension of opposites existing between such contradictions. It is precisely when the harmonious dialectic of opposed but linked principles becomes distorted that the latter dialectic of contradiction arises.

The failure to distinguish these two dialectics has led to the charge of Lonergan's intellectualist bias. For if we regard the pure desire to know as being in contradiction to the other desires of the human person, then, of course, the latter must be suppressed. But, on the contrary, they are complementary and both have a role to play. The intellect orders but it does not eliminate that which is ordered. The fact that Lonergan only speaks of the bias of egoism or the bias of common sense and never of the other possibility (the bias of theoretical intelligence) has led many to believe that the pure desire to know is in a war to suppress the other patterns of experience.

Finally, Hughes himself admits that Lonergan's definitions of dialectic are generic in formulation. Therefore, it seems inconsistent that there is a need for dialectical method "only when one turns to the human level" (see Insight, p. 575). For elsewhere Lonergan acknowledges that dialectic is relevant "to
any field of data" (see Insight, p. 485). Moreover, Hughes' claim that, for Lonergan, unintelligibility enters into the world process only with human bias is contradicted by other passages. Lonergan himself had admitted that the world process in general admits breakdowns and blind-alleys (see Insight, p. 127). Hughes' argument that such "breakdowns" only become normative when the human realm of freedom arises does not take away the fundamental isomorphism of "breakdowns" at all levels of the world process. Lonergan even admits that the genetic method is forced to distinguish between "normal" and "abnormal" successions in the stages of natural organisms (see Insight, p. 466). This is certainly inconsistent with his later assertion that the abnormal arises only with the onset of human affairs in the world. Therefore, if dialectic is also said to anticipate both progress and decline as a heuristic structure (see Insight, p. 738), then my question is certainly reasonable as to why Lonergan distinguishes the genetic and dialectical methods at all.

All the above evidence suggests to me that there are certainly questions which Hughes ought to consider more carefully before concluding that Lonergan's notion of dialectic is perfectly consistent throughout his thought.

A REPLY TO RONALD MCKINNEY, S.J.

Glenn Hughes

In his reply McKinney has adroitly pinpointed the key issues in his original argument and clarified his approach to them. In so doing, he again underlines both the importance of an accurate interpretation of Lonergan's notion of dialectic and the value of scholarly efforts, such as his own, to bring to our attention that importance. Still, in the final analysis, I do not find convincing the three points McKinney here chooses to defend.

First, the identification of Lonergan's dialectic, or dialectical method, with what he elsewhere calls "sublation" seems to me unfounded, particularly since McKinney fails to cite a single passage where Lonergan uses "sublation" to describe a process which accords with his notion of dialectic as presented in Insight. Contrary to what McKinney asserts in his reply, Lonergan does not identify his own notion of sublation with his own notion of "development," but rather contrasts the latter with Hegel's notion of sublation (see Insight, p. 422). Furthermore, he never "identifies" his notion of the emergence of higher viewpoints with Hegel's Aufhebung, but merely mentions a "parallel"--again,
with Hegel's notion, not his own (see *Insight*, p. 374n.). Lonergan's own use of "sublation," drawn from Rahner, does not even appear in *Insight*. "Sublation" in Lonergan's later work specifically does not involve "radical revision of basic terms and postulates," which, according to McKinney, is the function of dialectic as a process yielding higher viewpoints.

It is, I believe, important to note that the sole text cited by McKinney in support of his analysis of dialectic as a process for achieving higher viewpoints (see *Insight*, pp. 276-277) is part of Lonergan's introductory analysis of the notion of judgment. Here Lonergan speaks of logic and dialectic as the most general aspects of "the contextual aspect of judgment (see *Insight*, p. 276). The issue is relations between judgments, logic's efforts to systematize judgments, the discovery of logical conflict due to unreasonable judgments, and the subsequent "release" of the dialectical process (p. 277). Thus, in these passages, as elsewhere, dialectic arises from conflict. This is not to say that dialectical process cannot lead to "higher viewpoints"—a possibility I see no need to refute—but that dialectical process is essentially concerned with both human unintelligence and unreasonableness.

Second, McKinney illuminates a serious and intricate problem when he distinguishes sharply between the dialectic of the human person (more accurately, the "dialectic of community;" see *Insight*, pp. 217-218) involving the two principles of intelligence and sensibility (or spontaneous subjectivity), on the one hand, and the dialectical opposition between positions and counterpositions on the other. It would seem, as McKinney indicates, that the former dialectic is one of "interdependence" where integration, or a "creative tension," is the norm and goal, whereas the latter is a dialectic of "opposition" or "contradiction" in which elimination of one of the elements is sought. It could further be conceived that if the former dialectic were working "harmoniously" the latter would not arise, since only positions and not counter-positions would result. Lonergan's definition of dialectic as the concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change would refer only to the former dialectic of "complementarity," and with the latter he would be introducing a new dialectic. But is this an exhaustive view of the case?

Closer inspection reveals that the radical distinction between these dialectics breaks down. The dialectic between intelligence and spontaneous subjectivity aims at their integration through the subsumption of "other human desires" under the ordering guidance of the "pure desire to know" (see *Insight*, pp. 215, 422). It aims, in other words, not at eliminating what is
ordered (as McKinney points out) but at resisting the tendency to absolutize sensitive and intersubjective desires and interests. Now, the counter-positions derive from the absolutizing of that elementary knowledge of ours which is grounded in biological extraversion, from establishing it as the sole criterion of reality. However, this knowledge remains a valid knowledge and is not to be eliminated (see Insight, p. 253). It is to be integrated through subsumption under the ordering guidance of that fully human knowing which derives from inquiring intelligence and reflective judgment, and employs the latter as its criterion of reality. In short, positions and counter-positions arise from the linked but opposed principles of change which constitute the duality in man's knowing. We find it helpful and incisive to distinguish, as McKinney has done, between a dialectic at the level of personal integration and a dialectic at the theoretical level of opposition between positions and counter-positions. But, in our view, both remain defined by the scope of Lonergan's general description of dialectic, just as both aim at intelligent activity through appropriate integration of contradictory elements. For the fact remains that the pure desire to know is in contradictory opposition to other human desires insofar as they are unintelligent. This does not mean, however, that they "must be suppressed," but only that they must be correctly integrated with the ordering of intelligence.

Third, I must continue to dispute McKinney's assertion that dialectic, as Lonergan conceives it, is "as relevant to purely natural processes as it is to human affairs." In the first place, McKinney states that "Lonergan acknowledges that dialectic is relevant 'to any field of data' (see Insight, p. 485)." In fact, the text of this passage reads: "... taken together, the four methods [classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical] are relevant to any field of data ...." This, clearly, does not imply that dialectic, or any one of these methods alone, is applicable to any field of data. In the second place, while McKinney is correct in identifying the issue of unintelligibility as central to the possibility of non-human dialectical processes, his notion of the unintelligible is at variance with Lonergan's own. McKinney contends that breakdowns and blind-alleys in world process as described by Lonergan are examples of unintelligibility (see Insight, p. 127). But, as Lonergan remarks, these are properties of world process; emergent probability is explanatory of world process, including these properties; they thus "reveal an order, a design, an intelligibility" (see Insight, pp. 127-128). Breakdowns and blind-alleys are intelligible in terms of statistical laws, of emergent probability. Radical unintelligibility
enters reality only with human actions which contravene human intelligence, with human bias, where intelligibility is directly opposed by human freedom.

Along the same line, I believe McKinney has misinterpreted my use of the term "normative" (see Insight, p. 422) to describe Lonergan's dialectic. "Normative" does not mean "normal." Development in natural organisms can be "normal" or "abnormal" (see Insight, p. 466) in the sense that successions in stages of development depend on a "relevant pattern of a diverging series of conditions" referred to in the phrase "other things being equal" (see Insight, p. 108). Further, "abnormality" in this case is intelligible, precisely after the manner of breakdowns described above. The term "normative," with its moral resonances, is descriptive of human affairs because of the obligatory character of the unrestricted desire to know and love. Opposition to this desire is genuinely unintelligible because it is in radical opposition to what is intelligent. Progress and decline remain bound to this opposition, and so dialectical method remains relevant only to human processes.

On other points, McKinney is correct to show that I am mistaken in arguing that Lonergan has never referred to the mutual interdependence of cognitional levels as "dialectical." He does so in Verbum (p. 58). However, I submit the hypothesis that in these articles, written years before Insight, Lonergan hadn't yet worked out the precise use of the term defined and adhered to in Insight and thereafter. To mount a charge of inconsistency on this single citation does not seem sound. McKinney is again correct when he refutes my claim that Lonergan always speaks in Insight of dialectic as bipolar. The exception occurs in a passage where dialectic is said to become a "tripolar conjunction and opposition" through the intervention of a supernatural solution to the human problem of evil (see Insight, p. 728). I am compelled to point out, however, that McKinney's initial thesis was that, since Lonergan admits that dialectic can be tripolar, then theoretically the process "could be composed of an indefinite number of interacting principles." I cannot affirm that the deduction follows from the premises. Supernatural intervention constitutes something of a special case, and scarcely discredits the characterization of dialectic as a bipolar opposition within human dimensions.
It is not implausible to claim that one main use of philosophy is to provide a comprehensive critique of culture. The tools which might be a means to such a critique have been improved to a striking degree by analytical philosophy during the last fifty years or so; but unfortunately, for reasons that I will go into, they on the whole are not being and cannot be used for this purpose. In fact, the reputation for triviality which analytical philosophy enjoys in many circles is largely deserved; but I think that it need not be so. I believe that a way of doing philosophy has emerged in the last few years, with the work of Bernard Lonergan, which should enable analytical philosophers to cultivate their virtues without indulging their vices, to avoid triviality and irrelevance while preserving precision of statement and rigor of argument. In accordance with a convenient fashion inaugurated by Thomas Kuhn, I shall in what follows call this way of doing philosophy "the new paradigm." To deal with analytical philosophy within the space available, I shall make a distinction within it between a "first phase" and a "second phase." These "phases" will certainly be what Max Weber would have called "ideal types," but they will be sufficiently representative of actual instances, as I shall try to bring out, for providing an adequate basis for the making of my case.

Briefly, I would contend that, to provide a critique of culture, a philosophy needs foundations, and in particular foundations for a rational ethics. The reasons for this, for all that it is fashionable in some circles to overlook them, are obvious to a degree. To provide a critique of a culture, or of aspects of a culture, is to show where and why it or they are really worse than they might be, and how they might really be improved. But it is evident that the notions of "really worse" and "real improvement" depend on some conception of a real good, which is not simply a matter of what the culture or a majority in it happen to think is good. And to articulate what is a real good, and why, is the business of a rational ethics. However, the first phase of analytical philosophy sought to provide foundations
for science and for factual judgments, at the cost of destroying the foundations of rational ethics. The second phase has attacked the very belief that there could be foundations for knowledge at all, concentrating their attack particularly on the foundations allegedly discovered by the first phase. I believe the plight in which they have thus left philosophy to be somewhat appalling, for reasons which will appear. The new paradigm provides foundations for the making of true factual judgments and true value-judgments, and hence is in principle capable of providing an effective critique of culture.

Among the most usual characteristics of the first phase, which is typified by Bertrand Russell and the Logical Positivists, is the attempt to discover and clearly to articulate the foundations of knowledge. Their philosophy was empiricist; it was experience which was supposed to supply the justification or falsification of knowledge-claims. An impressive logical apparatus provided, or rather was hoped to provide, the means by which one could make the deductions required from statements about ordinary physical objects, and from scientific statements, to statements corresponding directly to items of experience. But no such basis could be provided for ethics, or for value-judgments in general. There was no way, it was argued, in which one could make valid deductions from any ethical statement to any body of statements referring directly to the course of experience. Since, then, there was no conceivable means of showing ethical statements to be true or false by reference to the course of experience, it appeared to follow that ethical statements could be neither true nor false. For example, that Hitler was a bad man, or that he was a worse man than Gandhi, or that murder or wanton cruelty are wrong, is neither true nor false. What are they, then? Some said that they were expressions of emotion. In saying "Stealing is wrong," for example, I am not strictly speaking saying anything about stealing, but am evincing a negative attitude towards it. Others emphasized rather the action-guiding nature of ethical expressions, their function as instruments of social control. On this view, if I say "Stealing is wrong," I am undertaking to refrain from stealing myself, and also discouraging those within my range of influence from doing so.

That it is hopeless to undertake any sort of critique of culture on such a philosophical basis is rather like the emperor's clothes; it is so obvious that it is commonly overlooked, if not elsewhere, at least within the circle of professional analytical philosophers. Not that argument on moral topics is absolutely ruled out on this view; one may, for example, try to show that one's opponent is being inconsistent in his principles—-that his
determination to torture all Ruritanians as much as possible is mitigated by occasional acts of kindness towards such people. But the consistent Nazi, who displays no unregenerate hankering after the music of Mendelssohn, is safe.

Perhaps the most salient feature of the second phase of analytical philosophy is criticism of alleged foundations of knowledge, in particular of the type of foundations typically proposed by philosophers of the first phase. Thus (at least on a common and plausible interpretation) the late Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* attacked the attempt of the early Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to show how "elementary" propositions might "picture" real states of affairs, and thus provide a secure basis for more complex kinds of knowledge of the world. In parts of the master's last work, *On Certainty*, rejection of the idea that there could be an absolutely right or wrong way of coming to talk about the world, such as might be articulated by an account of foundations, seems to have been taken very far. One would gather from that work that different views of how things are in the world prevail in different societies, and in the long run depend on the different ways in which members of the societies behave and do things; there is no way in which one can compare these different views to find out which is right.

In the context of the philosophy of science, Kuhn, Feyerabend and others have argued that any idea that we have or could have a direct contact with "reality," undetermined by the interest or social background of the person or persons concerned, is more or less superstitious. Even the moments of experience, those "sense-data" or "sense-contents" on which philosophers of the first phase used to lay such stress, if they could be referred to at all, which was itself highly dubious, could only be referred to by a highly-complicated and *a fortiori* socially-determined language. And it was difficult to see how language, as an essentially "public" activity, could do other than refer to "public" objects in a shared physical reality, whereas "sense-data" were irreducibly private. The common-sense apprehension of reality, and the "ordinary language" in which it was enshrined, which were extolled by some philosophers, differed vastly from place to place and from time to time. If the foundations of our knowledge of reality were to be provided by common sense and ordinary language, which of the myriad versions of common sense and ordinary language was this to be? And in any case, was it not at least arguable that common sense led to science, and that science showed that common sense was wrong?

The ultimate issue of these second-phase views is the
contention forcibly expressed by David Bloor, that a "true" proposition is simply a proposition accepted by the most influential members of a social group, a "valid" argument the sort of argument which it finds binding. This, of course, is a self-destructive view, which is probably why few philosophers, whatever the actual implications of the premises which they hold, directly assert it. (Sociologists are apt to be bolder and less scrupulous.) Consider the actual proposition, "a true proposition is one which is accepted by the majority of one's group." Is this supposed to be true, and if so in what sense? If it is true of all propositions, whoever may state them, then this is inconsistent with what is stated by the proposition itself, for all that it is its prima facie implication. If it is true merely for the members of some group, then it is trivial; since other groups may with equal propriety take the contradictory view.

It looks as though, while the first phase of analytical philosophy seemed to destroy the basis for a critique of culture along with the basis for ethics, the second phase appeared to destroy the basis of all objective knowledge whatever. The arguments of the philosophers of the second phase against those of the first phase seem convincing; and yet the position which appears to be the issue of the second phase is self-destructive. Is some third approach possible, which would agree with the first phase in articulating foundations for knowledge, but would not be prone to the objections to which the foundations proposed by the first phase were liable? It seems to me that it is, in what I have called the new paradigm.

Let us attend for the moment to the manner in which philosophers of the first phase thought that they could establish foundations for knowledge. The essence of their position was that it was the evidence of sensation which must be appealed to, in order that the truth or falsity of a (non-analytic) proposition might be established. Now it seems that it is one thing just to have a sensation or an experience of some other kind, and another to accept it as supplying grounds for the truth or falsity of a proposition. It is one thing to see a streak on a photographic plate, or a shape outlined by a recording pencil in a radio-laboratory; it is another to grasp that the streak or shape may be evidence that a previously-unknown type of fundamental particle or celestial body exists. Again, it is one thing to perceive a series of noises or gestures made by one's neighbor; it is another to see in these evidence that the fellow is thinking of his wife's disapproval or his daughter's performance in an immanent school examination. Yet again, it is one thing to see marks on a printed page or an ancient monument, another
to suppose that these constitute evidence that some previously unsuspected event occurred or action was performed in the remote past.

Finding out about the real world, as is brought out by these examples, is not just a matter of (a) having experiences. It is also a matter of (b) envisaging possibilities of what might be the case if these experiences are to be accounted for, and (c) judging that some one of these possibilities probably or certainly is the case in the light of the experiences. We cannot directly perceive the fundamental particles of physics, or the thoughts and feelings of other persons, or the things and events of the remote past; but we can get to know about them in the kind of way that I have just described. It is advertence to these basic mental operations involved in coming to know which lies at the very basis of the new paradigm.\(^\text{13}\)

Now it is rather characteristic of second-phase philosophers (due particularly to the influence of the later Wittgenstein and of Gilbert Ryle\(^\text{14}\)) to reject appeal to such inner mental operations, at least as relevant to fundamental philosophical issues. Yet to deny their existence is self-destructive, and their relevance to fundamental philosophical questions is not difficult to bring out. Suppose someone does deny their existence, as positivists and behaviorists are wont to do. Has he attended to the evidence relevant to the topic? Has he thought of possible ways in which that evidence might be accounted for? Does he advance his conclusion as the best way of accounting for it? If he has not done or does not do any of these things, he is not to be taken seriously. Why pay heed to an opinion which is admittedly put forward without regard to evidence, and for no good reason? If, on the other hand, he does or has done all these things, and propounds his conclusion accordingly, he is using in order to get at the truth the very mental processes whose relevance for getting at the truth he is denying. Let us call the three mental activities involved experience, understanding, and judgment, and the dispositions to exercise them attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness. In the mature sciences, these three mental activities are taken very far by generations of specialists in order to arrive at knowledge of what is the case about the world; it is by means of them that we have come to know about what is very remote from us in space and time, like dinosaurs, the big bang, quasars and black holes.

Can these principles provide a basis for ethics as well as for scientific knowledge, and thus for a critique of culture? In the case of ethics, a fourth mental activity has to be taken into account, that of decision. Let us say that a person exercises
responsibility so far as he decides to act according to what he judges reasonably to be good, where what is good has the same kind of relation to the needs and feelings of persons as the truth in science has to the data available to the senses by means of observation and experiment. In ethics, there is another important phenomenon to be taken into account which is strongly emphasized by the new paradigm. Where what is good is concerned, our own desires and fears make us indulge in a half-conscious avoidance of the relevant experience, and of envisagement of the relevant possibilities. Both one's individual situation, and the place of one's class or group within society at large, are likely to motivate one in such avoidance. A selfish husband may not attend to evidence, for all that it is as clear as day to the whole of his acquaintance, that he is causing his wife and children acute suffering; a privileged class may take for granted a view of its contribution to the common good which is more consonant with its self-esteem than with what would be arrived at by intelligent and reasonable investigation of the relevant data. In the matter of individual self-deception, the new paradigm largely confirms the insights of Freud and his followers; in that of group and class "ideology," those of Marx.

In a fine recent article which expounded a typical second-phase approach, Richard Rorty suggested that philosophers should not be envisaged on the analogy of scientists (as on the first-phase view); but on that of lawyers, expert in the general business of arguing for or against a case. Elsewhere in his article, he cited the epigram of W. V. Quine, to the effect that one may be interested either in philosophy, or in the history of philosophy. Taken together, these reflections seem somewhat disquieting. Plato's main ground of complaint against the sophists was that they were adept at making the better cause appear the worse, and the worse the better. But short of foundations, one has no basis even in principle reliable by means of which one can find out what is really true or really good or, by implication, what is really the better or the worse cause. But in the tragic dissensions and the terrifying difficulties which characterize our times, we desperately need to know the truth about our situation, and to know and do what is for the best. We need persons who can argue equally well for any case whatever (presumably, like lawyers and the sophists, according to who is paying them), whether it be genocide or the flatness of the earth, like one needs a hole in the head. But according to the new paradigm, as on Plato's view, argument is valuable precisely because it is the sovereign means of finding out what is true and what is good; since to argue well is to ensure that evidence is attended to,
that possibilities are canvassed, and logical consequences pressed, in order that error and deception may be avoided. ¹⁷

According to the new paradigm, then, the function of philosophy as the critique of culture is to foster the attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility which are the essence of what is best in human civilization; and to conduct a sustained battle against the irresponsible inattentiveness, and the flight from intelligence and reason, which damage a culture, and ultimately may lead to its breakdown. If, through cowardice or sloth, we cannot take the trouble to understand our opponents' point of view (by attending to the evidence on the subject, and applying our intelligence and reason to it), what alternative have we but to tyrannize over them or destroy them, or to be tyrannized over or destroyed ourselves? Socrates said that an uncriticized human life is not worth living. The enormous dangers which now threaten humanity suggest that an uncriticized human life may soon not only be not worth living, but be altogether impossible. We need to exert the utmost attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to avoid destroying ourselves. If analytical philosophers would adopt the new paradigm, they would not only lose their widespread reputation for sterility and triviality, but might even be capable of doing something for the future of mankind.

It is important that these remarks should not be taken as an attack on analytical philosophy as such; they amount to a suggestion not that it be supplanted, but rather that it be supplemented. I do not insist that everything which may reasonably be called analytical philosophy falls at all comfortably into either of the two phases which I have distinguished; and plainly, so far as anything does not do so, my arguments are not applicable to it. But even if they only apply to a substantial proportion of analytical philosophy, given that they are sound, they still retain some point. It may further be objected that the logical positivism which I said was typical of the first phase is now dead. But even if logical positivism is entirely defunct, which I doubt, empiricism is certainly not; and I know of no version of empiricism which, when fully worked out, is not subject to all the objections to which logical positivism is notoriously liable. I would admit that, if there is a type of analytical philosophy which acknowledges the need for foundations, provides foundations which are not self-destructive or arbitrary, and is applicable to the construction of a rational ethics, then nothing that I have said impugns it in the least. ¹⁸

NOTES

¹ See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding (London: Longmans, Green, 1957).


3It should be admitted that I use the phrase "the new paradigm" more as an expression of hope than of confidence. This is as much as to say that I do not strongly expect analytical philosophers to adopt this way of following their craft; I merely think it desirable that they should.

4See especially Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (London, 1956); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936). Men like R. Carnap and H. Reichenbach represented the tradition in America. Russell, of course, was actively engaged with moral and social issues. But he was always clear that this had nothing to do with his work on the foundations of knowledge.

5Such statements were called "basic statements" or Protokollsätze.

6One might suppose that human happiness or misery provided the requisite grounds for ethical judgment. But these philosophers argued that this could not be the case, since however much happiness was admitted to be caused by an action, it still apparently made sense to deny that the action was good.


11This epigram is due to Russell; I cannot now find a reference.

12The truth of an analytic proposition was established by the fact that its contradictory made no sense. For the view ascribed to David Bloor, see "Popper's Mystification of Objective Knowledge," Science Studies (1974): 75-76.

13See Insight, Introduction and chapters XI and XII.


15See Insight, chapters VI, VII and XVIII.


17The technical reasons why the objections to first-phase foundations pressed by the second phase do not apply to the new paradigm would take too long to develop in this short paper. See H. Meynell, Freud, Marx and Morals (London, 1981), chapter 5. Roughly, the first-phase conception of foundations depended on the assumption that one could make logical deductions from statements supposed to be true about the world to groups of statements about actual or possible human sense-experience. The second phase showed that this was impossible. The new paradigm maintains that one may arrive at true statements, both of fact and of value, by the application of intelligence and reason, in the senses already given, to the data of experience. Though deductive logic plays an essential role in this process, it is not as all-important as it is in the first phase.

18I am grateful to Mark D. Morelli for pointing out to me the objections to what I have said which are alluded to here.
THE USEFULNESS OF PHILOSOPHY

Mark D. Morelli

What is philosophy's usefulness? I hope in what follows to shed some light on this question, and I shall offer a very general answer. The question can be viewed in at least two ways. First, as an expression of the preoccupation of a particular historical period and a particular cultural setting. Second, as an expression of an interest, concern, tendency which is transhistorical and transcultural.

Two cultural critics--Julien Benda and Thomas Molnar--have bemoaned "the decline of the intellectual" which is expressed in his capitulation to political, social, economic concerns; they view the collapse of the conception of disciplines of reason as contemplative, unpractical, pursued for their own sakes as the intellectual's betrayal of his calling, his vocation. Seen from this perspective, the question of philosophy's usefulness is an expression of the ills of an age, a function of our forgetfulness of a conception of reason which some call Greek.¹

Again, we are, many of us, Americans, and Americans, as Robert Bellah has observed, are perhaps "too deeply committed to the active life in its pathological hypostatization." Bellah's sympathies here are obvious; he shares the outlook of the aforementioned cultural critics, we might say, while directing its critical thrust to a particular cultural setting, the one in which we happen to find ourselves. From this perspective, then, the question of usefulness is an expression of a people's mentality, the "pragmatism" of the American mind.²

The question under consideration may be viewed in a second manner, as an expression of an interest, concern, tendency which is transhistorical and transcultural. The interest to which I allude is the concern with the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical--the dominant "pragmatic" motive of men and women of common sense. This is an interest above all in successful survival and smooth social performance; and the means to the "pragmatic" and dramatic ends are respectively getting the daily tasks of life done and sizing up and interpreting co-workers who partially constitute the situation-at-hand.

This common-sense interest is transhistorical, for we find its implications recorded by Plato in the story of Thales and the milkmaid; and we find its expression in the questions the sophists posed to Socrates: Does the philosophic life lead to wealth, to power, to honor? This interest and its self-defense may very well have had something to do with Socrates' trial and death--ignorant is just what the man of common sense does not

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believe himself to be; and *aporia*, that befuddlement to which the Socratic dialectic leads, is, from the common-sense standpoint, simply an impediment to action.

This interest, moreover, is transcultural; for, in every culture the need exists for one to deal with the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. Such dealings are a necessary condition for the survival of a culture.

Finally, it may be noted that in our day this transhistorical and transcultural interest seems to have achieved its most thorough realization so far, having been confirmed and thereby strengthened, first of all, by the empirical scientific thrust of Bacon's dictum "Knowledge is power," worthwhile knowledge is applicable knowledge; second, it has its confirmation and a source of strength in the socio-economic situation that has directly or indirectly resulted from the Baconian insistence upon the usefulness of knowledge. That is to say, common-sense practicality is more *obviously* indispensable today than it was in ancient Athens, for example. The continued functioning of the industrial and bureaucratic superstructures depends upon the virtually continuous actuation of a common-sense capability.

The question of philosophy's usefulness, then, may be understood in at least two ways. But the first manner is reducible to the second; our historical period and American culture in particular have given virtually free rein to the concrete and practical interest of the common man. The question, therefore, may legitimately be raised by the man of common sense; he has the right, pre-ordained by the very nature of his "specialty," to ask philosophers, What concrete and practical implications for my survival, physical and social, does philosophy have? And the student of philosophy, being at the very least a man or woman of common sense, has the right to ask, Is a degree in philosophy going to get me a steady job?

The philosopher, for his part, has the right to distinguish, as I have distinguished incipiently here between the properly common-sense standpoint and other standpoints over which it may gain supremacy not only in practical but also in intellectual circles. And the philosopher may exercise that right again by distinguishing further between common sense as *such* and common sense as *transformed*, so to speak, by additional philosophical development. In each case, the question of philosophy's usefulness takes on a different meaning: it has a shortterm practical and somewhat self-centered meaning when raised by the man or woman of common sense as *such*; on the other hand, it takes on a longterm practical, more universal meaning when raised by the man or woman whose common sense has been *transformed* by additional
philosophical development. Whereas the question, in its common-
sense purity, emerges from a concern, one might say, with the
good-for-me; the question as having been transformed emerges
from a concern, equally practical, with the common good. Let us
consider the question raised from a standpoint of philosophically-
transformed common sense, the question in its "higher" rather
than "lower" practicality.

The question undergoes a transformation or transposition.
It remains practical, for it still concerns action, getting
things done. But the things transformed common sense is concerned
to get done are different from those common sense as such pur-
sues. Whereas common sense as such is concerned with physical
and social survival, transformed common sense is concerned, I
suggest, with the survival and successful co-existence of all of
the endeavors of humankind. This suggestion is excessively pro-
leptic; the question of philosophy's usefulness, as formulated
by transformed common sense, cannot be answered clearly before
we answer the question of philosophy's nature. Once it has been
determined just what, broadly speaking, the philosopher is, we
may fruitfully ask what it is that he is peculiarly suited to
provide his fellow humans, what human needs he is peculiarly
suited to satisfy through his practical involvement in human
affairs.

What is philosophy? Conceived as an intellectual discipline,
philosophy is, very generally, the pursuit of an intellectual
integration of the standpoints, methods or modes of operation,
and corresponding "worlds" of the full range of human endeavors.
That is to say, as an actual achievement philosophy is a cogni-
tional theory which provides accounts of knowledge in the realms
of common sense, natural and human science, historical study and
writing, classical studies, artistic creation and aesthetic apprecia-
tion, religious reflection, and philosophy itself; it is,
moreover, an epistemology which provides an account of objecti-
vity which "saves" the objectivities of all of these endeavors;
still more, it is a metaphysics which "saves" the realities of
the distinguishable "worlds" of these various pursuits; and fi-
nally, it is an ethics which provides an account of the human
good. Philosophy is not concerned primarily with the conditions
of the possibility of knowledge; rather, it begins from the fact
of knowledge, or better knowing. That is, philosophy is not
conceived here as logical analyst and "lawgiver" but as meta-
logical objectifier of polymorphic consciousness and "integrator."
Its attention is focused on conscious and intentional activities
rather than on behavior and behavioral systems. The philosopher,
then, is not an observer of culture but an "appropriator" of cul-
ture, exploiting a given access to "data of consciousness."
Naturally, this notion of philosophy's nature may be challenged on a variety of grounds, and such challenges would be not only enlightening but also welcome; but my illustrative goal may be reached without that lengthy digression, however illuminating and however much it may be demanded by philosophy's present, deplorable state.

Now, in order to fruitfully raise the question of philosophy's usefulness, we must assume the end of this complex pursuit to have been accomplished already; for, to raise the question without this assumption is to invite accounts of philosophy's usefulness such as the following: philosophy's usefulness lies in its function as a clarifier, an eliminator of linguistic confusions; or, philosophy is basically wonder, a wonder which is never quite satisfied—thus philosophy, while perhaps individually rewarding and edifying, really is not useful, for wonder's applications are found in its satisfaction; or, from Maritain for example, philosophy's usefulness lies in its role as an exemplar, warning of errors and reminding of truth by its mistakes and its disinterestedness. I would be willing to admit that all of these accounts specify characteristics of philosophy as activity; but all fail to notice that the link between philosophy and one's own common sense must be reconstituted more completely if one is not to be philosophical only when in the "tower" and shortsightedly commonsensical when in the "street." To shun practicality altogether, rather than to reintegrate it in some way with the philosophic self one has become, is to generate a serious problem of one's own identity. On the one hand, this problem may be addressed inadequately—as it has been repeatedly in the past—by denying the realm of common sense any true reality and the man of common sense any real knowledge of the world and the good. On the other hand, the exigence to maintain one's identity may take the inadequate form of a denial of reality to the realm of philosophy and a denial of knowledge to the philosopher; one may abolish metaphysics and retain a philosophic semblance by hovering spectatingly over the realm of common sense as a representative of disembodied logical mind.

If we assume the philosopher to be in possession of a relatively adequate intellectual integration of human endeavors, we may ask, Given this specifically philosophic knowledge, what use is philosophy? Again, what is the philosopher, who possesses this intellectual integration, peculiarly suited to do? What application does philosophic understanding have?

First, we may note the fact that possession of this intellectual integration is not equivalent to being a man or woman of common sense, an artist, a scholar, a philosopher, a religious
person, and a scientist of both nature and humankind. It follows that the philosophic practicality we are asking about is not that of an interloper, one who jumps from specialty to specialty, doing everyone's job and offending everyone as he does so. The integration alluded to is a heuristic integration, an integration grounded upon a grasp of a variety of ways of seeking; similarly, it is a heuristic integration of the "worlds" of the various endeavors, not a conceptual integration of the results obtained by the various endeavors. The Renaissance ideal of the polymath is today nothing more than an ideal.

Second, we may note that the thrust of philosophic activity seems to be a thrust toward unification; and we may suppose that this unifying motive will characterize transformed common sense as well.

Finally, we should note that as common sense as such is a specialization of intelligence which is situational, that is, it is exercised in the concrete situations that actually exist; so philosophically-transformed common sense must meet the situation that actually exists. The philosopher as practical must meet the demands of the age.

With these remarks and our account of philosophy's nature in mind, we can conclude that the transformed common sense of the philosopher is best exercised, first, in relation to the actually existing situation of the disciplines and endeavors whose standpoints, methods, and "worlds" he understands; second, its overall aim will be the concrete unification, rather than the intellectual integration, of the people engaged in these various pursuits; finally, its procedure will not be to take over the functions of the various disciplines and endeavors, but to bring out the manner in which these functions complement one another.

What, then, is the usefulness of philosophy? The philosopher is peculiarly suited to operate in some manner between and among the representatives of the various endeavors. Employing the analogy of international relations, I would name this intermediary function "diplomacy." Now, this diplomatic function is especially called for today: specialization has reached a peak, and interdisciplinary conflict is a fact of cultural life; common sense as such, in a practical response to cultural disorder and fragmentation, is claiming hegemony, and the liberal arts are capitulating. Consequently, the philosopher, were he in possession of a relatively adequate intellectual integration, would function today as a diplomat functions in wartime or in times of high international tensions, drawing upon his empathic abilities and his talents pertinent to transdisciplinary communication. He
would differ from the international diplomat, however, in this very important respect: his allegiance would lie with his ideal of a collaborative unity in human endeavor, an actual complementarity of human pursuits, rather than with one pursuit in particular.

NOTES


3 This notion of philosophy may be gleaned from Bernard Lonergan's Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958) and from his Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).


6 On the nature of the integration, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 390-396.
Cochran's title gives us his three basic elements right away. "Character," he says, requires interior solitude, a faith commitment, and some concrete responsibility-taking. "Community" comes in two forms: a communion among members and a hospitality towards others. From here, after discussing the subsidiary notions of authority and freedom, he articulates the role a "politics" must take in the maintenance of character and community. It is a fine, sustained discussion at a rather even pace, with ample footnotes that lead off into many interesting-looking side trails. His aim is to counter the liberal ideologies of individualism and politics-by-interest group, and he achieves this by letting the individual and social dimensions--character and community--define one another. He acknowledges his debt in this to Eric Voegelin's call for a view of social reality rooted in the personal quest for order. Besides citing Carl Friedrich, Robert Nisbet, Peter Berger and other value-oriented social theorists, he also cites Henri Nouwen, Jacques Maritain, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Bernard Cooke. As one might guess, he is a Catholic and, as it happens, a married deacon, thirty-seven, and a teacher of political science at Texas Tech.

Cochran's patently normative model of person-in-community is not a sheer utopian ideal; he does raise some relevant questions for policy-making. He suggests that the excessive influence of interest groups over American policy--particularly in areas of national energy, welfare, health care, and transportation regulation--is responsible for major social injustices. He warns against the ideal that the body politic ought to be a community (because of the danger of a nationalism). Nor should politics have as its chief aim the development of character; character ought to arise from within solitude and faith rather than merely in response to political forces. Politics ought to aim at maintaining and facilitating a pluralistic approach to the common good, both because diversity is a bulwark against ideologies and because the principle of subsidiarity (he calls it "communal autonomy") keeps power in local hands. Against this background, he gives reasons for a reduction of paternalism in welfare programs, for the initiation of income maintenance programs, for moving away from a prison policy based on rehabilitation and moving towards retribution as the justification of punishment, for educational vouchers in public and private schools, and for large-scale participation by citizens in government and by workers in management.

Yet when we arrive at the final page, we are still left with a normative view of person-in-community without any effective mechanisms for countering the reigning ideologies. "Normative principles should be seen as ordering concepts; that is, they should be viewed as goals which, if pursued, will impart a proper order to the society pursuing them." This is a big "if." Influential interest groups have never been known to bother about conceptual models as long as they hold the reins of power. Besides, even among people with Cochran's requisite faith commitments there will remain basic differences on religious commitment,
on the norms for ethical positions, and on political philosophy itself. Fundamental commitments themselves can be diametrically opposed, and unless a normative model articulates ways of revealing and resolving them, we cannot get from point A to point B no matter how orderly point B looks. To be effectively normative we also have to be dialectical.

Like many other hopeful thinkers, Cochran looks upon social ills chiefly as the product of ideas. Therefore, he reasons, if we want things better, we need better ideas. Having the right concepts is what counts. The reason this does not work is that concepts are not the basic normative principles. Behind concepts lie more fundamental dynamics of character and community which Bernard Lonergan has articulated as the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible, Be in love. An effective dialectical political theory will look at social ills not as a result of ideas but precisely as the failure of ideas to be forthcoming or implemented. This failure, in turn, can be analyzed as simultaneously a distortion of character and a breakdown of community. With this heuristic, a political theory can fashion not only a fine normative model but also a dialectical method for pinpointing exactly where good ideas are suppressed or diverted. Thus Lonergan expects some combination of four possible ways of suppressing ideas: neurosis, egotism, group bias, and the short-range thinking in which common sense prides itself. In a similar vein, Eric Voegelin himself expects that underneath social disorder lay not a set of ideas but a gnostic suppression of the intelligible link between social policies and their roots in the soul's search for order. Likewise, Roberto Mangabiera Unger (Knowledge and Politics) expects that liberals will either emphasize reason and rules and suppress the dynamics of desire and values or vice versa. In other words, to be effectively dialectical we must also be epistemologically critical.

I must confess, however, that my copy is now full of underlinings, stars, and exclamation points. There is a good deal of wisdom and coherence in this work. Those committed to dialectical and critical political theory will find that Cochran keeps the relevant questions alive.

Tad Dunne, S.J.
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William Johnston, an Irish Jesuit, is Professor of Religious Studies at Sophia University in Tokyo and a former Director of the Institute of Oriental Religions. Students of mysticism likely know him for such previous good works as The Inner Eye of Love and The Still Point. Students of Lonergan perhaps first met him at their teacher's invitation: "I have found extremely helpful William Johnston's The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing . . . Readers wishing to fill out my remarks will find in his book a position largely coherent with my own" (Method in Theology, p. 342).

In The Mirror Mind, Johnston returns the compliment, making explicit use of Lonergan's view of objectivity, conviction that one only comes to moderate realism through a conversion, program to understand understanding in "his great book Insight," and distinction between knowing and knowing one's knowing. Implicitly, Johnston derives from Lonergan the transcendental precepts (Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible, Be
committed) that he uses to structure his discussions of interreligious dialogue, biblical interpretation, and inner healing.

The Mirror Mind therefore represents some of the fruit that the interaction between Lonergan and Johnston has produced, and one might validly consider it an offspring of the "Lonergan School," although Johnston is not a disciple, in the pejorative sense, and apparently is not a member of the Lonerganian inner circle. Rather he is a spiritual theologian aware enough of the cognitive problems that mysticism and interreligious dialogue entail to want a profound view of consciousness such as Loner-gan's and have the good sense to put it to work. In the present volume Lonergan is more in the background than the foreground, but students of Lonergan will find many resonances throughout.

Johnston's chapters in The Mirror Mind are: "Interreligious Dialogue," "Self-Realization," "Body and Breathing," "Words and Silence," "The Holy Books," "Transformation of Feeling," "Healing and Redemption," and "Love: Human and Divine." In most of these chapters he moves back and forth between Christian and Buddhist teachings. On interreligious dialogue he is hopeful, stressing the common ground that the transcendental precepts offer and the union that sincere religionists such as Christians and Buddhists may find in their living, mystical faith: "Already Christians who dialogue with Buddhists are discovering that levels of consciousness previously dormant are opening up to the presence of God. Already it becomes apparent that Christian mysticism is in its infancy and that the mysticism of the future will outshine in splendor anything that has existed in the past" (23). Self-realization takes Johnston to the centrality of Buddhist enlightenment, where one finds one's true name, and to Christian divinization, where God is the self's inmost substance. The middle chapters on body and breathing, words and silence, and the holy books deal with the riches of both Eastern and Western religious experience with these themes: how the body is to be enlightened and spiritualized; how words and silence are contrapuntal in deep contemplative experience; how the holy books reveal more and more as one is oneself filled with bodhi-light or the Spirit.

My favorite chapter was "Transformation of Feeling." Here Johnston rounded out a Lonerganian program for the appropriation and authentication of consciousness by stressing the mystical use and purification of the affections. These themes continued in the next chapter, "Healing and Redemption," where the stress lay on letting the divine darkness or cloud draw off one's poisonous memories, guide one's life-cycle passage, purify one's soul of its deep disorders. The final chapter, on love, was in the spirit of The Inner Eye of Love, making the case that the blind stirring of affection or living flame of love is the key to one's transformation by God, as well as the soul of a sacramental view of other people and a rich appreciation of friendship. The unity of The Mirror Mind emerged in this final stress on love, so much so that I wish it had been more clearly proposed from the beginning as the various topics' binding motif.

The Mirror Mind began as the D'Arcy Lectures given at Campion Hall, Oxford, in the Fall of 1980 on the topic "Christianity in Dialogue with Eastern Mysticism." Perhaps that topic would have made a better sub-title than "Spirituality and Transformation." For, to my mind, "transformation" has to include more than one's personal relations with God and other individuals. Nature and societal structures also cry out to us to regard them in transformation. We must interact with them so that we bring them under the warming influence of divine love. In a brief Epilogue Johnston does allude to the claims the poor have on our love and compassion. Throughout the book he does mention the mystic's
sensitivity to such natural phenomena as the sound of water. But the wholeness one might think mystical love should embrace and encourage is surprisingly curtailed. The economics, politics, oppression, warfare, and culture at large that shape spirituality in any age, and distort it greatly in our own, are present to The Mirror Mind only tangentially. True enough, their transformation ultimately depends on the agape that Johnston's mystical interests spotlight. Lonergan's more general labors suggest, however, that a fully adequate spirituality would put agape in close contact with economic and general cultural analyses, so as to be able to show quite precisely what contemplation can do to succor the wretched of the earth.

John Carmody
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The effort at constructing a coherent synthesis of modern psychological insight with religious and spiritual wisdom has been greatly aided by the comprehensive heuristic structure of the study of the human subject by Bernard Lonergan. Walter E. Conn has done important studies correlating Lonergan's observations on conversion with various developmental theories. Sebastian Moore is in the process of elaborating an existential soteriology informed by his own creative reorientation of psychological theorists. My own efforts have been to ground a redirection of depth psychology in Lonergan's intentionality analysis and then to complement intentionality analysis with the reoriented psychology. And Bernard Tyrrell has been at work articulating the principles and process of a concrete therapeutic praxis that integrates particularly his Ignatian tradition with the insights he has gained in the course of his own passages and ongoing conversions and in his practice as a counselor and therapist. The book under review is the second of Tyrrell's major works along these lines, and it draws more extensively and explicitly on the Ignatian heritage than did his earlier Christotherapy: Healing through Enlightenment (New York: Seabury, 1975). Tyrrell tells us at the beginning that his book is addressed to readers "sympathetic both to religion and to the legitimate insights of science." His aim is "to bring together these two spheres which have often been subject to rigid separation and compartmentalization." He intends "an integration in theory and practice of the principles of healing and growth present in Christian revelation, the Ignatian exercises, and the secular fields of psychology and psychotherapy" (5).

The book consists of an introduction on "passages and conversions" and of two major parts, each of which has two sections. The two parts concern, respectively, the foundations and the process of Tyrrell's Christotherapeutic project. "Foundations" treats the development and deformation of the human subject (section 1) and methodological principles governing both the theory and practice of Christotherapy (section 2). "The Process" deals with the healing of sin, neurosis, and addiction (section 1) and the healing and education of such feelings as anxiety, fear, anger, sadness, and depression (section 2). The book closes with an appendix on guilt.

Dr. David Fleiger of Edmonton, Alberta, whose judgment is based on the experience of implementing Tyrrell's synthesis, formulates quite well the success with which Tyrrell achieves his goal. Christotherapy II, Fleiger says in the Foreword, achieves "a holistic system of healing and growth of inestimable
benefit to counselors and spiritual directors and to lay men and women of good will who seek to realize higher levels of psychological integrity and spiritual maturity" (xi).

In a short review, and especially given the nature of this journal, I have chosen to concentrate on points of dialogue, rather than to expatiate on the merits of some of Tyrrell's key notions: mind-fasting, spirit-feasting, existential diagnosis and discernment, and the turning-from and turning-to stages of ongoing conversion. I would like to suggest a way of understanding the relations of Tyrrell's work to Conn's, Moore's, and my own. Then I would like to raise two methodological questions, and to conclude with a suggestion regarding Tyrrell's manner of relating his own position to those of other therapeutic practitioners.

If one were to locate Tyrrell's work in terms of a functional-specialization understanding of the psychology-spirituality problematic, it would be considered by and large a work of communications. The real foundations of Tyrrell's thought lie in the self-knowledge he has gained from long exposure to Lonergan's invitation to self-appropriation and from an ongoing and complementary psychological self-understanding and transformation begun a number of years ago with the assistance of Dr. Thomas Hora and continued since through the self-correcting process of learning. Much genuine dialectic has been involved in the process of arriving at the judgments offered of others' positions on given issues, but the actual dialectical process (assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, selection--Method in Theology, p. 250) is not repeated in the text. Christotherapeutic formulations of positions (corresponding to doctrines) obviously occur, and the resulting work does emerge from a systematic synthesis, yet the aim of the book guides Tyrrell's articulation primarily in the direction of the fruit of such labor for the concrete praxis of a new therapeutic synthesis. Perhaps the relations among Conn, Moore, Tyrrell, and myself can best be understood in terms of functional specializations. Conn's work to date as well as my own have been largely dialectical-foundationaL in that the actual discourse that we have employed reflects a concern with the sifting of positions from counter-positions in an effort to contribute to an integral heuristic structure of the developing organic-psychological-spiritual subject. Moore's work is doctrinal-systematic, since it "uses foundations as a guide in selecting from the alternatives presented by dialectic" and "seeks an ultimate clarification of the meaning of doctrine" (Method in Theology, p. 355). And Tyrrell's direct discourse aims primarily at revealing the meaning of his own and others' dialectical, foundational, doctrinal, and systematic reflection for the concrete practice of an integrated psychological-spiritual therapy.

My first methodological question has to do with the categories of psychological conversion and conversion from addiction. Conversion and its varieties provide those working to implement Lonergan's method with foundational categories constituting a heuristic structure for explanatory and normative understanding of the subject. My own understanding of the varieties of conversion is such that one may speak of a distinct heuristic category for explanatory understanding, and so of a unique variety of conversion, only if the reality of which one speaks affects proximately a distinct level of consciousness. Thus religious conversion affects proximately the fifth level, moral conversion the fourth, intellectual conversion the third and second--and Philip McShane has argued recently for a modern-scientific theoretic conversion as the distinct transformative event at the second level--and what I have spoken of as psychic conversion affects the first level, transforming the repressive censorship into a constructive one regulating the emergence of imaginal materials into conscious-
ness. Tyrrell uses the term "psychological conversion" in a way different from my use of "psychic conversion." Psychological conversion is "a shift from a basically neurotic way of existing and functioning to a dominantly healthy state" (17). This and "conversion from addiction," it seems to me, represent two of the fruits of some combination or other of the foundational conversions, and not distinct foundational categories for an explanatory understanding of the person. The discussion may appear purely academic, but if what we are about is the cumulative articulation of interiorly differentiated consciousness, it seems pertinent to raise such a question.

My second question has to do with the relation of special and general categories. Frederick Lawrence has argued persuasively against the cogency of the currently prevalent methods of correlation. But at times Tyrrell conveys the contrary impression of extrinsicism or revelational positivism. The transcendental field "is unrestricted, and so outside it there is nothing at all" (Method in Theology, p. 23). There is but one "primary process," but one "pulsing flow of life," but one search for direction in the movement of life. Positivism of a theological variety is a temptation for one who acknowledges that the categories of psychological science are too restrictive and compact to do justice to the process. But what we must learn is a discourse in oratione recta that confidently articulates in a truly synthetic manner all of the dimensions of the process in their intrinsic relations with one another. I have no doubt that this is Tyrrell's intention, and I suspect that it is largely his concern to relate himself to and qualify psychologies not grounded in theological foundations that leads him to express himself at times in a manner that seems religiously defensive and theologically positivistic.

And so let me conclude by encouraging Tyrrell to be more confident about the integral heuristic grounding of what he is about. Theological foundations provide the grounds for a higher and dialectically achieved synthesis of the various psychological theories. That synthesis can be stated in direct discourse. Points of agreement and disagreement with other theorists and/or practitioners can be relegated to footnotes. The result would be a more unified and straightforward presentation of one synthetic achievement. What Tyrrell is about is on the mark. Writers in the area of spirituality not equipped with Tyrrell's philosophical and psychological sophistication, as well as psychologists not familiar with religious discernment, are all lacking something that Tyrrell offers. My concluding word, then, is one of encouragement that, except where he chooses to engage in dialectic in the strictest sense, Tyrrell limit his text to a straightforward presentation of his own immanently generated position, and display the rightful confidence to relegate debate with others to a less prominent position.

Robert M. Doran, S.J.
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Tellers of the Word is for John Navone the latest and most comprehensive in a series of books which he has dedicated to the basic topic of the theology of story. Among his most recent books are: Towards a Theology of Story (Slough, U.K.: St. Paul Publications, 1977) and The Jesus Story: Our Life as Story in Christ (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1979). Thomas Cooper joins Navone as coauthor of Tellers of the Word and the result
of their collaborative effort is a major contribution in the area of the systematization of the theology of story.

The book consists of a brief introductory section entitled Part I: A Threefold Propaedeutic to the Theology of Story, a central section entitled Part II: Nine Moments in the Theology of Story and a final section consisting of three Appendices. The first part is authored by Navone alone and it suggests in three brief chapters a historiographical, literary and philosophical context in which to situate the second part. The core of the book, the second part, is coauthored by Navone and Cooper and divides into a section entitled A Phenomenology of Storytelling (Moments One through Three) and The Universal Story of God Told in the Life Story of Jesus (Moments Four through Nine). Within the nine moments of the theology of story the authors develop a series of 123 theses arranged in clusters.

Moments One through Three of the theology of story focus respectively on human persons as the subjects of their stories, on the craft of telling stories and on the meaning of human stories. Moments Four through Nine deal in turn with God as revealed through human stories, with the gift of God's love through the Spirit of Jesus as grounding the story of Christian conversion, with Jesus Christ as the Sacrament who transforms human life stories, with the Jesus story as the foundation for the story of His community, the Church, with the Jesus story as the revelation that human beings are ever to be "surprised by joy" and, finally, with the Blessed Trinity as the beginning, the middle and the end of all our storytelling.

The authors of Tellers of the Word have clearly done their homework in acquainting themselves with the major books and articles relevant in some fashion to the theology of story. The bibliography of works cited in the text itself runs well over 100 entries and there are 200 or more books and articles suggested for further reading. Although Tellers of the Word is principally a theological work, it is profoundly interdisciplinary in its interests and incorporates materials from a wide variety of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, history, sociology.

Navone and Cooper state that their aim in writing Tellers of the Word was to create "the first systematic . . . theology of story"(340). As far as I know, Tellers of the Word is the first attempt at a major systematization of the theology of story and I believe that it basically achieves what it sets out to accomplish. As a first effort, it is, of course, a beginning, not an end; but theologians in the future who seek to develop yet more nuanced and rigorous systematics of the theology of story will of necessity be required to take account of this richly creative, seminal work of Navone and Cooper.

The authors acknowledge the influence of the work of Bernard Lonergan in Tellers of the Word and I think some reflections on this Lonerganian influence are appropriate, if not, indeed, obligatory, given the nature of this journal.

First, Lonergan's articulation of the foundational reality of conversion in its diverse forms plays an important role in Tellers of the Word, especially in chapter eight which is the longest and one of the richest chapters in the book. Navone and Cooper attempt to show how elements of religious, psychic, intellectual and moral conversion manifest themselves in ever richer degrees of intensity and self-transcendence as one moves from the Gospel of Mark through the Gospels of Matthew and Luke (with Acts included) to the Gospel of John. In the Gospel of Mark, for example, the authors discern the beginnings of a religious-psychic conversion where God's power is portrayed as freeing the new
convert from the servitude of encapsulation in the self and opening him or her to trust "in another" (168); further, the authors discern the first fruits of a moral conversion in the convert's submission to Jesus' rule and kingdom; finally, Navone and Cooper see the beginnings of an intellectual conversion in the interior movement of the convert from a notional to a real assent to the Lordship of Jesus. After analyzing the Gospel of Mark in the light of Lonergan's conversions the authors attempt to show how conversion in its diverse dimensions is manifested in successively more intense degrees of self-transcendence in the Gospels of Matthew, Luke and John.

Of particular interest to me is the authors' reference to a "psychic" form of conversion. In the major context in which the term appears (168 ff.), they do not appear to use the expression according to the technical, partly Jungian-inspired sense which Robert Doran (originator of the term) gives it in his writings. Rather, psychic conversion seems to mean for the authors of *Tellers of the Word* a shift from encapsulation in the self to trust in another and an ever growing sense of being beloved children of God. If this is Navone and Cooper's understanding of the conversion of the psyche, it would correspond rather closely to my own understanding of what a conversion on the psychic level involves. In *Christotherapy II* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982) I consider one of the most fundamental forms of a conversion of the psyche—i.e., the expression "psychological conversion"—to involve a shift from a sense of being unloved to a felt sense of being lovable and from a state of basic mistrust to a trusting mode of being in the world. Interestingly, Navone and Cooper make significant use of the writings of psychiatrist Dr. Frank Lake who stresses in his writings the primal need for basic acceptance by significant others if authentic psychological development is to occur.

A second reflection I would like to make regarding the Lonergan-Navone-Cooper relationship concerns the issue of systematics. Now, although the authors of *Tellers of the Word* describe their book as a systematic enterprise I believe it would be an error to consider it to be a strict, pure exemplification of Lonergan's seventh functional specialty, systematics. Frederick Crowe, for example, in his brilliant *Theology of the Christian Word* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978) attempts to work rigorously according to the methodical exigencies of a single functional specialty, namely, history, and he succeeds optimally in his enterprise. But *Tellers of the Word* is a wide ranging, richly multidimensional work which makes no claim to operate exclusively within the functional specialty systematics. As I have already shown, *Tellers of the Word* involves lengthy considerations involving the reality of conversion in its diverse dimensions. There is also a profound pastoral dimension at work through the book. In fact, one of the factors which makes the work most readable is the authors' frequent recourse to the telling of various stories in order to give flesh and blood reality to their more abstract considerations.

It is important, I believe, to note that there is nothing rigorous in Navone and Cooper's delineation of "nine moments" in the theology of story or in their elaboration of 123 theses. There is no insistence that there are of necessity nine and only nine moments in the theology of story. In fact, the authors make no attempt to offer a systematic definition of the term "moment." Moreover, in Appendix III the authors humbly include a section entitled *The Theses the Authors Missed.* In my judgment it is precisely the fluid, non-definitive, open-ended character of the work which is one of its most inviting and attractive qualities.

In a third, very brief reflection I would like to commend the authors for their use of the language of "persons" in refer-
ence to the Trinity. Due to the influence of Karl Barth and to some extent Karl Rahner a hesitancy has arisen on the part of some theologians to speak of the Father, Word and Spirit as "persons." This hesitancy is due, I believe, in part to a fear of lapsing into tritheism. And so certain theologians prefer to speak of three "modes of being" in God rather than of three persons. I think that this tendency is misguided, opposed to the clearly personalist language of Holy Scripture and of the Creeds and Councils and offensive to ordinary believers. Here I can only assert--due to lack of space--but not demonstrate that Lonergan in his Christological and Trinitarian writings clearly shows that a proper understanding of the metaphysics and psychology of person as analogously applied to the Trinity removes any danger of a lapse into tritheism and, in fact, makes it most appropriate to speak of the Three who are the One God as persons, as conscious subjects of the one divine nature.

In a fourth brief reflection I would like to note an important change which Navone and Cooper introduced in the second printing of their book. In the first print of Tellers of the Word the authors wrote in one of their few negative comments on Lonergan's work: "Lonergan's proper appreciation of the precariousness of human intellectual and moral development . . . seems to have blinded him to the essential role that the community plays in the concrete experience of falling in love with God" (279). In the second print of Tellers of the Word the text is changed to read: "In Method in Theology, Lonergan's proper appreciation of the precariousness of human intellectual and moral development . . . may give to the reader unacquainted with Lonergan's other and less accessible writings the impression that he is blind to the essential role that community plays in the concrete experience of falling in love with God" (279). I simply wished to note this change and I leave it to readers of the work to explore the context in which these statements occur and possible reasons for the textual modification.

In conclusion, I recommend Tellers of the Word with great enthusiasm and I look forward eagerly to further collaborative publication efforts on the part of John Navone and Thomas Cooper.

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A significant number of introductions and reassessments of Christianity as a religion in the modern world exist today (e.g., Rahner's Foundations of the Christian Faith, Kung's On Being a Christian, etc.). As monumental as these approaches may be, their sheer size—if not theological bias—may dissuade the potential reader. Thus, it is with considerable pleasure that we can welcome an Englishman's contribution. It is unique in the sense that Butler aims to write an apologia for Christianity that speaks "to intelligent people who may feel an obscure need for fundamental meaning, but who recoil from the refinements of professional theology" (7). In this he is largely successful, although one must say in the same breath that this is no watered-down catechism. The thought is rigorous, and there are some theological favorites (Lonergan, Rahner), as well as those who will strike some Christians as strange bedfellows (von Hugel, Popper). But so be it. With a deftness that bespeaks wisdom, Butler brings forth their truth. It all comes out as utterly convincing and thoroughly humane.

The tone is contextually set in the initial two chapters:
"The Question," focusing on a practical appropriation of man the questioner, and "On Being Reasonable," in which Butler wrestles with determinism, the contemporary enemy of the human person (in its most recent version I would imagine something like "it's all in the genes"); the alternative is the responsibly free person. An introduction to Christianity might consider these preliminaries superfluous, but they really do set the proper conditions for an appreciation of the Christian religion. In fact, it can be argued that authentic Christianity will not have a chance, unless there is the requisite vision of what a human being is; our religion requires a proper mindset. There then follow two chapters on the use of Scripture today. These too are more than impressionistic jottings: without an appreciation of the workings of the historical-critical method, it is virtually impossible to formulate the *depositum fidei*. Even though Butler might be numbered among the more conservative users of this technique (in this reviewer's opinion!), still he recognizes that our eyes of faith need it. It is our way of separating myth and magic from the truth of religious reality.

The core of the book is found in chapters five and six: "The Point of Reference" and "The Point of Ultimate Reference." I would wager that this is where Butler will lose many of his readers, for he demands nothing less than an appropriation of the self as subject. There is the easily recognizable phenomenon of human biological growth and perhaps even a recognition of authentic human freedom in its moral expression, but there is also the inadequacy of penetrating the self. Where does it all point to?

We can now introduce the word "God." It is a dangerous word ... it has to be admitted that, left to ourselves, what we can say with certainty about him is rather abstract ... but [nevertheless] a reality which we have to affirm, although he is beyond everything that we can grasp by immediate knowledge. He is the ultimate satisfaction of the unrestricted questioning that makes us human; but he is a satisfaction that we can already affirm without having actually attained. He is indeed the absolute Mystery (114-115).

The influence should be apparent to all Lonergan readers, but I would also add that it is an excellent hermeneutical appropriation of Vatican I on God.

Subsequent chapters take up such problems as God speaking and the Christian message centering on the resurrection event. Both are handled with a dexterity marked by the best of post-Enlightenment theological categories. But it is Butler the ecclesiologist that shines through the final chapters. Beginning with a reflecting Church (appropriate models for which are Paul, "John," and the author of Hebrews), Butler poses the hard questions and offers some lapidary answers. Christianity as an objective, ecclesial phenomenon begins with the still valid question: "what think you of Christ?"(292). This is the two-edged sword, and any form of Christianity which looks to itself more as a cultural inheritance than as authentic personal engagement must face the problematical fact of an unauthentic tradition. What is the Church really? It should be obvious that ideal Christianity is to be found in that Church which represents a unity and communion of the faithful witnessing to Christ's message. For Roman Catholics this means a witness from Pope to us ordinary folk; it means getting comfortable with that untidy notion of an "invisible" Church; and in it all note well the hierarchy of values. Yet Butler is also realistic, for he knows that the Church has an imperfect strain (semper reformanda, harboring sinners, etc.). Such a distinction between the Church as it ought
to be and the Church as it historically is does not render us immobile. We cannot afford to sit on our haunches waiting for a purified Church to occur. To act thus would be tantamount to admitting that Christ's message cannot already be effective; such a notion of Church is always doomed to failure. Furthermore, fresh hope for the confused or disenchanted should be witnessed in the official Church's efforts at Vatican II. Rather than the brief emotional outburst, we need the long hard look of spiritual maturity. And if one is still not convinced of the value of institutional religion? Recall that "apart from the Church and the authors who belonged to the Church we should know virtually nothing of Jesus" (215). "Melior conditio possidentis" (217).

More profoundly, the question of church membership is not an ecclesiological problem at all: what we ought to abandon is that notion of certainty which pertains to God alone. In the spirit of generalized empirical method: "Our life . . . is lived by probabilities. And it is astonishing to note the extent to which life, so lived, succeeds" (282). By and large taking risks in life is justified; it is good to trust reality. In a sense it is like a detective story. Or, to put it another way, Pascal's wager is right. "For scepticism has nothing to offer you except the grave and extinction" (288). In a word, we are getting a thoroughly modern grammar of faith.

Overall, the book is a masterpiece of critical aggiornamento and authentic Existenz. It is packed with practical insights that successfully push Christianity to a higher viewpoint beyond mere ideologies. Admittedly, there are some distracting points about which one might quibble: e.g., a somewhat forced argument for miracles (164), a short corollary on the shroud of Turin (178-179), but these do not effectively detract from the whole. If I were pressed to point out the one thing that impressed me, it would be Butler's continual insistence that being correctly human is a criterion of being a Christian. For the already religious, for those who have problems with Christian religious identity, or for the simply curious, Butler's book is not just another resource of erudition. It can provide an education for a wide audience. Tolle et lege.

Jerome M. Dittberner
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The general drift of Professor Rosen's book is certainly one with which readers of this journal are likely to be sympathetic; they will especially applaud his "imperative addressed to analytical philosophers; become self-conscious" (12). For all his sympathy with the aims of many philosophers of this school, he argues that they can be charged with making and depending on assumptions which they fail to spell out, and which indeed cannot in principle be expounded or justified with the technical rigor which these philosophers affect. A large part of his book, accordingly, is devoted to exposure of these assumptions. He complains that, for all that they frequently commend rigor and lucidity, they are not as a rule notable for self-criticism. The real virtues of the movement, and the fact that it has somehow got the name of being uniquely "scientific" among schools of philosophy, have deflected attention from the fact that its self-justification is largely rhetorical. Typical practitioners are inclined to confuse irony in the presentation of opposed views with a refutation of them. Moreover, translation into the jargon approved by analytical philosophers has not on the whole clarified or resolved the traditional problems of philosophy, as it
has so widely been believed that it would; on the contrary, it has led to their being ignored or distorted.

Very characteristic of analytical philosophy has been the attack on "psychologism." Professor Rosen admits that this, when properly and carefully formulated, is quite justified; you cannot, for example, purport to reduce logic or the theory of meaning to psychology with impunity. But this should not be taken as a pretext for ignoring the importance of the conscious subject as a topic for philosophical reflection. However much analytical philosophers may have attempted to obscure or to get round the fact, a structure does not just "mean" of itself; an intelligence has to perceive it, or at least be capable of perceiving it, as "pointing-to" such-and-such a meaning. One might regard the book as quite largely an attack on the superstition that we can do philosophy adequately under the pretence that we are not conscious and intelligent subjects. "The distinction between sense and nonsense, and even the force of logical principles like that of non-contradiction, does not reside within linguistic axioms and symbols but in the intelligence that poses the axioms as 'worthy of being believed' (the literal sense of the term). The intrinsic absurdity of attempts to show that the mind is a machine is that such a performance would have neither actors nor an audience"(11).

What is Professor Rosen's proposed antidote to these evils? Philosophy should frankly abandon its attempt totally to conceptualize the world; it should realize that all analysis presupposes a prior synthesis, and that both activities need conscious subjects to perform them. What we have need of now, he says, is not new systems, let alone new solutions to conceptual puzzles, but a more comprehensive grasp of the basic and perennial problems of philosophy. To set aside these problems may flatter our illusions of enlightenment or our sense of technical mastery, but inevitably promotes a vulgarization of the human spirit. Not, of course, that we ought to abolish science in the name of a reactionary aestheticism; it is not science, but an abuse of it based on an underlying complex of theoretical errors, to which we should be opposed. The philosopher best follows his vocation by trying to preserve a delicate balance between man and the cosmos; this is certainly a rational activity, none more so, but Professor Rosen disclaims the ambition of performing the impossible task of reducing this rationality to rules and regulations. "The positive task of the philosopher is to fecundate his analytical skills with dreams, and to discipline his dreams with analysis"(260).

I conclude that this is a rather important book, and hope rather than expect that it will be widely read and taken to heart by professional philosophers. It seems to me rather more satisfactory in its diagnosis of the plight of contemporary analytical philosophy, than in its account of where a remedy is to be found. The reader will find a good many parallels to the fundamental argument of Lonergan's *Insight*; but it is a remarkable index of the variety and insularity of contemporary philosophical cultures that such a well-informed and independent-minded writer should show no signs of either having read that book, or heard of its author. The style of the work is curious. On the whole it is rather turgid and difficult to read; but the overall muddiness is quite frequently relieved by brilliant epigrams and shafts of wit.

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