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**METHOD** is published twice yearly, in April and October, by The Lonergan Institute at Boston College.

**Subscription Price 2001:** $16.00 yearly for individuals, $28.00 yearly for institutions (U.S. currency).

Subscription Orders must be prepaid in U.S. funds and should be addressed to the Business Manager, **METHOD**, Lonergan Center, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806. Changes of address and other correspondence related to subscriptions and advertising should be sent to the same address. To order on-line, visit [www.bc.edu/lonergan](http://www.bc.edu/lonergan).

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Back Issues of most numbers in volumes 1 through 9 may be ordered from **METHOD**, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90045; for later volumes, from **METHOD**, Department of Philosophy, Carney Hall 216, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806.

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Selected articles appearing in **METHOD** are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index*.

ISSN: 076-7392.
"STARE AT A TRIANGLE . . ."

A Note on How to Get an Insight, and How Not To

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Stare at a triangle as long as you please, and you will not be any nearer seeing that its three angles must equal two right angles. But through the vertex draw a line parallel to the base, and the equality of alternate angles ends the matter at once. The act of understanding leaps forth when the sensible data are in a suitable constellation.¹

IT IS A puzzle to those who have some inkling of what it is to experience an insight that there is such widespread opposition to the fact that there is such an act as insight at all. The friendly and courteous Frederick Copleston did concede to Lonergan (but it was a indeed a concession) that there appears to be such an act.² Less courteous reactions are more common.

Of course, as Fr. Copleston says, there is the Scholastic dictum, "entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate," entities are not to be multiplied without need, but "to have an insight" is not to postulate some unknown entity to account for the data at hand; it is to attend to an experience that is there to be attended to.


²Journal of Theological Studies 9 (1958): 202-204: "I suppose that some philosophers would wish to apply Ockham's razor to such 'acts'. But it appears to me that the term 'act of understanding' denotes a real psychological phenomenon."
Likewise, it is not a case of pointing to an entity that is there externally, something observable by the eye for me and my partner in discussion; it is internal to each of us, and I can do no more than invite others to attend to their internal experience. If, then, the very existence of internal experience is denied, there is little hope of fruitful dialogue. Now one can understand such a position in behaviorists, but it puzzles students of insight to find, among those who accept and attend to interiority, that so many fail to discover this act that seems to others to occur so frequently.

I just now used the phrase "attend to," and I believe it points to elements of a solution to our puzzle. What in fact do we attend to when we grope toward an insight? If we are attending to cognitional activity in the wrong place, we are not likely to lead others in a successful search. What then do we attend to? And what should we attend to? And what should we not attend to?

The last question has one blunt answer in Lonergan. We are not to attend to just any image or sensible presentation: "Stare at a triangle as long as you please, and you will not be any nearer seeing that its three angles must equal two right angles." Obviously Lonergan would not direct our attention there. But neither are we to attend to the geometric construction, namely, a line through the vertex parallel to the base. That is indeed the fertile image, the "suitable constellation" that produces the insight, but it is not yet there for us to attend to. We must find the construction before we can attend to it; and how do we find it? There has to be a step in between the mere image and the successful construction. What is it?

Is it the concept of a triangle that we should attend to? Clearly not, for that procedure labors under the same difficulty; between the concept of a triangle and the claim that its angles equal two right angles there is need of a logical intermediary; this is supplied by insight into the constructed constellation, but the question remains: How do we discover that constellation? "Stare at a concept" takes us no farther than "Stare at a triangle."
Before we continue, there is an objection to forestall. Lonergan was emphatic on the need to diagram problems, especially in geometry.\(^3\) His critique of staring at a triangle does not mean that we should do away with the diagram or image of a triangle. Quite the contrary. We are to retain the image but we must add the construction, that is, the “suitable constellation” that will issue in insight.

Let us return to the question: What happened between the blank “stare” and the “eureka,” between the mere image of a triangle and the fertile construction? That question did not concern Lonergan in the passage quoted; his point there was to show the fertile image at work, not to tell the story of its discovery, and he stated what was pertinent to and sufficient for his purpose. I do not believe it is sufficient for our purpose.

Nevertheless he has left us a clue that may help us discover what intervenes between the “stare” of incomprehension and the “eureka” of understanding. The clue is found in the Aristotelian context of his geometric solution. “Aristotle made this point [that we know a thing when it is actual] from the instance of geometrical problems; they are difficult when the construction is merely in potency; but draw in the construction, and one solves the problem almost by inspection.”\(^4\) The trick, then, is to find the right construction in potency and bring it to that construction in act. That clue, however, is remote and the puzzle remains; it has only been pushed back a step. For how do we know what construction is in potency to the desired act?

The answer, I suggest, is very simple, quite unorthodox in logic, but effective in the long run. It is very simple: How do we know? We don't know. It is unorthodox in logic: it amounts to trial and error, arriving at a conclusion without premises. But it works: trying one thing after another we eventually hit upon the right construction.

Naturally we use our intelligence in the quest. If the problem involves a triangle, there is no use studying the batting averages of a baseball team; they are in remotest potency to a problem in geometry. But

\(^3\)See *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 5th ed., Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 781, note d to ch. 1, and 783, note c to ch. 2; hereafter, *Insight*.

\(^4\) *Verbum*, 27 (14).
a triangle is composed of lines and angles; the constructions that are in proximate potency will presumably have to do with lines and angles. Let us see, then, what we can do with those two elements.

We may start with the simplest experiment: extend one side of the triangle; nothing happens in the mind. We extend two sides; still nothing. Three sides, and in both directions; a blank. So we try a different approach: we bisect an angle; another blank. We drop a median from the vertex to the opposite base; no help there. Never mind; keep trying. Then one fine day, by chance and by luck, and because we have run out of other possibilities, we happen to draw through the vertex a line parallel to the base. Voilà! Eureka! Bingo!

Our procedural question was: What do we attend to as we try to get an insight? — specifically an insight into a property of a triangle? We ruled out staring at an image: that just leaves the mind blank. We ruled out the successful image: that is the end, but what we want are the means to that end. We ruled out the concept: the concept is the fruit of an insight, not its fertile source. We were left with the potency of lines and angles to be arranged in various constructions, one of which we hope will be a "suitable constellation" for the flash of insight. What then did we attend to?

We attended to possibilities of explanation. Such possibilities are myriad. Insights, according to a perpetually quoted statement of Lonergan, are "a dime a dozen." The same may be said of ideas, for human ideas and insights are almost interchangeable terms. Of course our intelligence enabled us to narrow down the field from thousands to dozens; for example, we excluded baseball batting averages. It is somewhere in the dozens of remaining possibilities that we hope to find the solution to our problem.

We should note in passing that there are two confusions to avoid here: one with regard to the meaning of the terms "idea" and "insight," another with regard to their place in the order of cognitional process. First, with regard to meaning. "Idea" and "insight" are almost

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interchangeable terms, but "insight" orients us to the experiential source of the act, and "idea" orients us more to its content, and so we may speak of divine ideas but not of divine insights. Next, with regard to their place in cognitional process. Insights look ahead to an anticipated judgment, and it is in this sense that they are said to be a dime a dozen, for many insights are normally required if we are to make a correct judgment. But in the same cognitional process a deeper insight may look back to the lesser insights that made it possible, and those lesser insights and ideas may also, in their own context, be valued at a dime a dozen.

Thus I had the "idea" of extending the base of the triangle; it was mediocre as an idea; still it was an idea, and it required its own little insight into the nature of an extended line. Similarly it is so with the "idea" of bisecting an angle and with the other possibilities we tried. The possibilities are themselves acts of intelligence, based on previous experience; we expect them to flow more copiously in the expert, more slowly in the beginner — which, of course, is exactly what happens. Now it was only in the multiplicity of such "ideas" that the fertile image appeared. It is our good fortune that ideas come cheap, for often we need to try dozens of them before hitting on the fertile one.

It is worth pausing here for a moment to ask about the insight itself. Did something happen in that "eureka" moment? Obviously, yes. Was it just another line that happened? Obviously, no; that line parallel to the base, as a line, was no better than all the other lines we constructed. Was it an intellectual experience that happened? It would seem churlish to deny it. Is there then an internal act that we may call "insight"? At least we should be able to say with Fr. Copleston that it seems so.

The pattern is clear-cut in our geometry example. We will not expect it to be so clear in human affairs. Still, there is a class of thinking in those affairs that approaches the clarity of geometry: the whodunit crime story. An illustration may be helpful. Say the master of the house is murdered: who did it? Could it have been the visiting cousin? But what motive would she have had? What opportunity? Suppose it were the eldest son, badly in debt and needing his inheritance now. Suppose it were the housekeeper, goaded to fury by the master's insults. And so on, and so on. The difference between the bewildered gardener and the quiet detective is
that the latter actuated in thought various potential solutions and tried
them out one by one until she (Miss Marple) or he (Monsieur Poirot) hit
upon the one that explained it all.

A few general considerations are now in order. One is the absolutely
essential role of free images. In *Insight* the possibility of forming free
images is listed among the basic steps of cognitional process. Later it is a
strategic factor in the contrast between animal "intelligence" and human.
Lonergan draws on Köhler's study of apes and the quite remarkable
things apes can do, like putting together three pieces of a rod in order to
reach a banana outside the cage; but if the three pieces are scattered about
so that the ape cannot see them in one vision, it is helpless: "he isn't able to
make the free image, the freely constructed image ... bringing it all
together ...".

That creative role of free images deserves more attention. Here we
have the advice of the master himself of phenomenology, as reported by
Spiegelberg. The question regards "internal relations within one essence,"
whether, for example, "three sides, three angles, and certain shapes and
sizes ... are ... required by the essence" of what a triangle is. "The way to
settle such questions is chiefly by an operation that Husserl called free
imaginative variation [freie Variation in der Phantasie]." Spiegelberg
suggests that this "may involve two things: the attempt either (1) to leave
off certain components completely or (2) to replace them by others."

My interest is not in that particular question or in any particular
answer to that question but in the method followed: the shuffling of the
data. Lonergan himself has provided a sample of such an exercise: his
study of the emerging understanding of a circle. He imagines a cartwheel,
performs various mental experiments with the length of the spokes, the
depth of their insertion into the hub, and so on. The fruit of this juggling is

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6 *Insight*, 299 (274).

7 *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, eds. Elizabeth A.
Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 313-15; see also
p. 136: "unless we are like the animals that cannot form free images, we imagine."

the insight that a circle is the locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center.\textsuperscript{9}

I should not conclude this note without acknowledging that it simplifies too much the process to insight: there is a multiplicity of factors that a more thorough study would have to consider. I have mentioned the difference between the expert and the beginner, but experts too will find a difference between their first experience of a particular insight and its later recall: “In the first instance, phantasm has to produce the act of insight, whereas in subsequent instances, informed intellect guides the production of an appropriate phantasm; in other words, in the first instance we are at the mercy of fortune, the subconscious, or a teacher’s skill, for the emergence of an appropriate phantasm.”\textsuperscript{10} Again, that mention of the subconscious opens up a new and important area of study: “Perhaps, agent intellect is to be given the function of the subconscious effect of ordering the phantasm to bring about the right schematic image that releases the flash of understanding.”\textsuperscript{11} Similarly the mention of fortune involves Lonergan’s ideas on luck, chance, fate, fortune, destiny, ideas that he links with world order in emergent probability, with divine governance in universal instrumentality, with all of these understood as a created complement to divine providence.\textsuperscript{12}

What began as a note is threatening to grow into a treatise. Let me return to my starting point, simply to say that, instead of puzzling over the refusal of contemporaries to attend to insight, perhaps we should examine more closely what it is to which we ourselves attend and as advocates of insight are urging others to attend.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Insight}, 31-32 (7). Garrett Barden and Philip McShane have provided a number of such “shuffling” exercises in their \textit{Towards Self-Meaning} (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), Appendix 126-37, where they speak of “intelligent juggling” (128) and of “trying to manipulate the figure,” and “disposing the phantasm” (133); they have a link with Scholastic language in “illuminate the phantasm” (133).

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Verbum}, 42 (29).

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Verbum}, 93 (81). And see \textit{Verbum}, 184 (173): “the cogitativa … operates under the influence of intellect and prepares suitable phantasms.”


\textsuperscript{13} There is an area to study that I have set aside here as too complex to discuss in a short note. I have been dealing with insight into the imaginable, but more and more clearly in his later work Lonergan came to the view that the data of consciousness are not
imaginable and that therefore we have no insight into them, no insight into the operations of interiority, no insight even into insight; see F. E. Crowe, “For a Phenomenology of Rational Consciousness,” *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000): 67-90. A triangle is imaginable, a crime is imaginable, but insight into either is not imaginable. This opens a door to a new field of research in Lonergan studies. The present question then becomes: Are we staring at interiority in somewhat the same way as the helpless geometer stares at a triangle? Should we not rather find ways, as Lonergan did (Crowe, “For a Phenomenology of Rational Consciousness”), to circumvent the obstacle and bring the unimaginable into the focus of attention?
RETURNING TO THE RELIGIOUS SUBJECT
Lonergan and Eliade

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INTRODUCTION

IN HIS ARTICLE titled "The Subject," Bernard Lonergan provides a concise critique of several problematic modern-era philosophical positions that follow from what he calls "the truncation of the subject." Accordingly, one of these positions leads to the alienation of the subject illustrated, for example, in some of the existentialist literature. For Lonergan, this type of reflection can be a trap insofar as it leads to the alienation of human beings, both from the universe and from themselves.2

The renowned scholar of religion, Mircea Eliade, is also critical of this aspect of existentialist reflection in that it emphasizes the historical condition and temporality of existence and results in the subject's anxiety in the face of nothingness. For Eliade, such anxiety or dread can be an invitation to religious living. It might be said that he offers a prescription for the modern person's anxiety that includes a rediscovery of homo religiosus within oneself.3

1A major portion of this paper was presented at the Seventeenth Annual Timothy O'Fallon Memorial Symposium of the West Coast Methods Institute and Lonergan Philosophical Society 2001 held at Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. I am grateful for the feedback I received from the various participants.


This paper examines Eliade’s hypothesis that the sacred is part of the structure of human consciousness and interprets various aspects of his notion of the sacred through certain elements of Lonergan’s theory of consciousness. It proceeds with a brief summary of three topics from Eliade’s notion of the sacred that are particularly pertinent to the religious subject: (1) the transformative power of the sacred; (2) the paradigmatic figure of religious living, homo religiosus; and (3) the specialists of the sacred, the shamans. In turn, we interpret these themes in light of some select elements from Lonergan’s theory of consciousness, specifically, his notion of “transformations of consciousness” (conversion) and “differentiations of consciousness.”

By interpreting these aspects of Eliade’s theory in light of Lonergan’s theory of consciousness I hope to bring it into closer proximity with some features of the “upper blade” of Lonergan’s philosophical foundations. By doing so, I hope to further clarify these foundations for a proper recovery of the religious subject.

Eliade spent much of his life attempting to identify the patterns and structures involved in religious knowing, drawing from the vast array of data on the history of religions. His voluminous writings reflect his laborious attempt to understand the sacred, as far as the sacred can be understood. His endeavors led him to develop a comprehensive theory of the sacred that inevitably entailed questions on the relationship between the sacred and the structure of human consciousness.

In a series of lectures given at Boston College in 1968, Eliade declared: “In discussing the sacred, we always return to viewing it as a structure of the human consciousness rather than as a set of historical data.” This does not mean, however, that Eliade reduces the sacred to the structure of human consciousness; rather, more precisely, it means that the sacred is “part of the structure of human consciousness.” Nevertheless, Eliade never developed much of a theory of consciousness. So it is difficult to determine exactly what he meant by these statements.

5Eliade, “The Sacred,” 112.
In other places, he suggests that before an understanding of the relationship between the sacred and human consciousness can emerge there is a need for a comprehensive "creative hermeneutics"; he seems to suggest that this requires first the development of "a new Phenomenology of Mind." The incompleteness in Eliade's theory with respect to human consciousness might explain why in his subsequent reflections on these lectures he admitted that his hermeneutics of the sacred was incomplete. From his journal entry of June 24, 1968, we read: "In my own work, I have tried to elaborate this hermeneutics; but I have illustrated it in a practical way on the basis of documents. It now remains for me or for another to systematize this hermeneutics."8

Lonergan's interest in the history of religions developed in part from his initial encounter with the writings of Eliade. Eliade's thought would naturally appeal to him in this regard because, as Frederick Crowe has

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7Mircea Eliade, Quest: The History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 64; hereafter Quest.
9Lonergan's interest in the history of religions developed in part from his initial encounter with the writings of Eliade. He probably discovered the work of Eliade between September 1953 and May 1954 while he was completing the initial draft of Insight. Around this time he wrote to Frederick Crowe:

There is a historian of religions, Mircea Eliade, who has written a series of books [Images et Symboles (Paris: Gallimard, 1952); Le Mythe de l'Éternel Retour (Paris: Gallimard, 1949); Traité de l'Histoire des Religions (Paris: Payot, 1949)] of interest to me from the viewpoint of the significance of symbolism .... I hope in the not too distant future to get together a study of the significance of symbols as interpreting the content of the intellectual pattern of experience to the psyche (man as sensitive) as well as providing the necessary particularity and concreteness to intellectual worldviews. (Bernard F. J. Lonergan, Rome, to Frederick Crowe, Toronto, 5 May 1954, Archives, Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto, p. 2.)

Eliade's influence affected Lonergan to make editorial additions to Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. In particular, Lonergan's revisions to the 1953 manuscript of Insight reveal the addition of a footnote referring to two of Eliade's works cited above. The revisions to the original manuscript indicate that he added the following footnote: "Because of their consonance with the present analysis I would draw attention to Mircea Eliade's Images et Symboles (Paris: Gallimard, 1952) and his more ample Traité d'histoire des religions (Paris: Payot, 1948 and 1953)." Original Manuscript from the Lonergan Papers (Batch III, Archives, Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto), ch. 17, p. 904. See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, eds. F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 572, note 7; hereafter Insight.
remarked: Lonergan "saw Eliade's work as pointing to a common humanity in us all." ¹⁰

In addition, Lonergan was present at Eliade's Boston College lectures and took copious notes throughout.¹¹ There is a sense in which this "meeting of minds" sets the context for the present study. That is, Lonergan's theory of consciousness may provide philosophically adequate foundations for Eliade's notion of the sacred. Specifically, Eliade's recognition of the lack of a "new phenomenology of mind" and his call for a "creative hermeneutics" provide a context for the application of Lonergan's thought. Indeed, Lonergan's theory of consciousness fulfills both requirements. His theory provides the foundations for an epistemology and metaphysics, which in turn provide the foundations for a hermeneutic framework wherein, ideally, the theory of consciousness functions as the "upper blade" of a pair of scissors converging upon the "lower blade" of the data, yielding authentic interpretation.¹²

Hence, in keeping with Eliade's hypothesis that the sacred is part of the structure of human consciousness,¹³ one can invoke Lonergan's theory of consciousness as a hermeneutic framework in order to provide a better philosophical foundation for understanding the religious subject.


¹¹From Eliade's journal, 23 June 1968, we read: "I arrived in Boston, it was nice weather, cool, a lazy wind coming from the ocean. Rasmussen and a professor from Boston College who is a specialist in Heidegger were waiting for me. Father Lonergan, the much-discussed author of the book *Insight*, arrived from Toronto. We all had dinner with the head of the philosophy department in the restaurant on the top floor of the Prudential building, the new skyscraper" (*No Souvenirs*, 312). Lonergan was very interested in Eliade's work and attended several of his lectures. He took notes on the basic themes that Eliade presented. The theme encompassed "the structure of the sacred in consciousness as the basis for a proper hermeneutics" (*No Souvenirs*, 313).

¹²See *Insight*, 600-601.

1. ELIADE: LIVING IN THE SACRED

1.1 The Transformative Power of the Sacred

According to Eliade, a manifestation of the sacred, or *hierophany*, is always simultaneously a manifestation of power, a *kratophany*. The power present in an encounter with the sacred gives rise to feelings of ambivalence in those who experience it. On the one hand, they are attracted to this power (*mysterium fascinans*); on the other, its overwhelming presence (*mysterium tremendum*) is terrifying. However, it is not only the overwhelming presence of the sacred that terrifies a person but also the demand to surrender and live life in the sacred. This initial reluctance is natural given the imposing demands of the call to holiness and transcendence:

> in primitive man as in all human beings the desire to enter into contact with the sacred is counteracted by the fear of being obliged to renounce the simple human condition and become a more or less pliant instrument for some manifestation of the sacred (gods, spirits, ancestors, etc.).

Eliade refers to such reluctance as a *resistance* to the sacred:

> Man's ambivalent attitude towards the sacred, which at once attracts and repels him, is both beneficent and dangerous, can be explained not only by the ambivalent nature of the sacred in itself, but also by man's natural reactions to this transcendent reality which attracts and terrifies him with equal intensity. Resistance is most clearly expressed when man is faced with a total demand from the sacred, when he is called upon to make the supreme decision — either to give himself over completely and irrevocably to sacred things, or to continue in an uncertain attitude towards them.


For Eliade, the decision to resist the sacred is simultaneously a "flight from reality" (Patterns, 460); that is, in fleeing the sacred one flees reality. Conversely, the decision to live in the sacred enables one to move towards the center and "away from unreality" (Patterns, 461). Douglas Allen, elaborating on this issue in Eliade’s thinking, suggests that when human beings confront the sacred they are faced with an "existential crisis." They may either choose to flee from the demands of the sacred or accept them and be transformed.

Let us look more closely at the transformative power of the sacred. Eliade claims that every "hierophany transforms the place in which it appears, so that a profane place becomes a sacred precinct." Similarly, profane time can be transformed into sacred time. Hence, when human beings encounter the sacred they too can be transformed. Allen emphasizes the power of the sacred to transform humans in the very depths of their being:

The structure of the crisis, evaluation, and choice emphasizes the fact that religious experience is practical and soteriological, producing a transformation of human beings....in coming to know the sacred, one is transformed in one’s very being.

For Eliade the phenomenon of “ritual initiation” illustrates in a most dramatic and symbolic way the transformative power of the sacred:

In philosophical terms, initiation is equivalent to a basic change in existential condition; the novice emerges from his ordeal endowed with a totally different being from that which he possessed before his initiation; he has become another.

Ritual initiation exemplifies the power of the sacred to transform human lives from a mere “profane” existence to a fuller one of sacred living. This transformation by the sacred is inextricably connected with

19Allen, Myth and Religion, 85.
the choice to live in the sacred rather than fleeing from its demands. Again, Allen gives a helpful summary of Eliade's position:

[Through the dialectic of hierophanies, the profane is set off in sharp relief and the religious person "chooses" the sacred and evaluates the "ordinary" mode of existence negatively. At the same time, through this evaluation and choice, human beings are given possibilities for meaningful judgments and creative action and expression. The positive religious value of the negative evaluation of the profane is expressed in the intentionality toward meaningful communication with the sacred and toward religious action that now appears as a structure in consciousness of *homo religiosus.*

Allen's summary introduces the topic of *homo religiosus* – the paradigmatic person to whom living in the sacred has become a habitual way of life. Such a person seeks to live in the constant presence of the sacred.

1.2 Homo Religiosus

*homo religiosus* or the "religious person" is a fundamental theme in Eliade's theory of the sacred. The term *homo religiosus* is a generic one that "characterizes the mode of human existence prior to the advent of a modern, secular consciousness." Eliade views the task of understanding the behavior and worldview of the religious person as the ultimate aim of his discipline (*The Sacred*, 162). One could contrast Eliade's *homo religiosus*, as Gregory D. Alles does, with *homo modernus*, or the modern person:

[Eliade] contrasts two distinct modes of existing in and experiencing the world. His *homo religiosus* is driven by a desire for being; modern man lives under the dominion of becoming. *Homo religiosus* thirsts for being in the guise of the sacred. He attempts to live at the center of the world, close to the paradigmatic mythic event that makes profane duration possible. His experience of time and space is characterized by a discontinuity between the sacred and the


22Gregory D. Alles, "Homo Religiosus," in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 444; on the various uses of the term *homo religiosus* throughout the study of religion, see the same article by Alles.
profane. Modern man, however, experiences no such discontinuity. For him, neither time nor space is capable of distinctive valorization. He is determined indiscriminately by all the events of history and by the concomitant threat of nothingness, which produces his profound anxiety.23

Eliade does not explicitly invoke the term homo modernus but rather prefers to contrast homo religiosus with the generic "nonreligious person." Let us look more closely at the fundamental features of homo religiosus as expounded by Eliade.

The Desire to Live in the Sacred

For Eliade, homo religiosus is oriented toward the sacred. This is exemplified in the symbolism that comprises much of the religious person's sacred spaces, that is, temples, dwellings, and so forth. Orientation is a conscious act, that is, an act of creating sacred spaces in such a way that one is directed toward the sacred.24 However, there is a more general notion of orientation implied in Eliade's thought that refers to the natural desire of homo religiosus for the sacred. In this sense, one could say the orientation toward the sacred is characterized by an "openness to the world." That is, religious people are continually conscious of their inextricable connection with the rest of the world and the cosmos around them. "The existence of homo religiosus, especially of the primitive, is open to the world; in living, religious man is never alone, part of the world lives in him" (The Sacred, 166). Openness to the world enables homo religiosus to obtain knowledge of the world that is at once religious and meaningful because it "pertains to being" (The Sacred, 167). Similarly, Eliade asserts that homo religiosus possesses a "thirst for being."

One could say that the thirst for being is at once a "thirst for the real," or what one might call more precisely, a thirst for the "really real." Eliade characterizes it as "an unquenchable ontological thirst" (The Sacred, 64). In this way, one is reminded of the Augustinian "restless

23 Alles, "Homo Religiosus."

heart.” However, the thirst for being is manifested not only in a desire for the transcendent but also in a fear of “chaos,” that is, a chaos that corresponds to nothingness, as for example, the chaos in nonconsecrated or formless space. To quell this existential dread of chaos, *homo religiosus* attempts to create form out of chaos. Consequently, the form that religious people create is sacred, consecrated space; symbolically, it reflects themes from the sacred mythology, that is, the original revelation recounting the creation of the world.

The desire of *homo religiosus* for the sacred reflects a religious orientation that can be characterized by a “nostalgia for paradise.” The latter is “at once thirst for the *sacred* and nostalgia for *being*” (*The Sacred*, 94). Eliade explains the link between this nostalgia and sacred myths as follows:

Now, what took place “in the beginning” was this: the divine or semidivine beings were active on earth. Hence the nostalgia for origins is equivalent to a *religious* nostalgia. Man desires to recover the active presence of the gods; he also desires to live in the world as it came from the Creator’s hands, fresh, pure, and strong. It is the nostalgia for the *perfection of beginnings* that chiefly explains the periodical return *in illo tempore*. In Christian terms, it could be called a nostalgia for paradise, although on the level of primitive cultures the religious and ideological context is entirely different from that of Judaeo-Christianity. But the mythical time whose reactualization is periodically attempted is a time sanctified by the divine presence, and we may say that the desire to live in the *divine presence* and in a *perfect world* (perfect because newly born) corresponds to the nostalgia for a paradisal situation. (*The Sacred*, 92)

In addition, the nostalgia for paradise as a desire to live in the sacred is often manifested in the desire for the “center of the world.” The center of the world is the point “exactly where the cosmos came into existence and began to spread out toward four horizons, and where, too, there is the possibility of communication with the gods; in short, precisely where [*homo religiosus*] is closest to the gods” (*The Sacred*, 64-65). In other words, the desire of *homo religiosus* for the sacred, which is reflected in a longing for paradise, is also a desire for the sacred center where communication with the gods is possible.
In sum, to say that *homo religiosus* has a fundamental orientation toward the sacred is to say that the religious person has a fundamental openness to transcendence that is expressed simultaneously as a thirst for the sacred or a thirst for the real (being), a nostalgia for paradise, and a desire to live near the "center" in constant contact with the sacred.

1.3 The Sacred Life of the Shaman

The term *shaman* is a Russian articulation for the word *saman* from an indigenous tribe in Siberia. The meaning of the word has broadened considerably and become so popularized that a precise definition of shamanism is difficult. Without going into detail concerning the problem of the definition, I limit my summary to two primary themes in Eliade's *Shamanism*: the role of ecstasy and the function of the shaman.

In his classic treatise on the topic, Eliade attempts a definition of shamanism that he deems "least hazardous." The shaman is first and foremost a "master of ecstasy." That is, for Eliade, shamanism is equivalent to a "technique of ecstasy." He insists that shamans, when functioning as such, maintain an ecstatic trance in which it is believed they are able to leave their body by practicing mystical ascent and descent: "[T]he shaman specializes in a trance during which his soul is believed to leave his body and ascend to the sky or descend to the underworld." 

[T]he shaman is an individual who succeeds in having mystical experiences. In the sphere of shamanism the mystical experience is expressed in the shaman's trance, real or feigned. Shamanic ecstasy

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27Eliade, *Shamanism*, 4-5; Åke Hultkrantz broadens this definition by distinguishing between "artic shamanism," as Eliade defines it, and general shamanism wherein "ecstasy does not function as a constantly prevailing factor." See Åke Hultkrantz, Belief and Worship in Native North America (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 63-65.
signifies the soul's flight to Heaven, its wanderings about the earth, or its descent to the subterranean world, among the dead.  

In addition, shamans have control over "spirits." This means that they can communicate with the dead, demons, or other spirits without becoming helplessly possessed by them.  

Second, the principle function of the shaman, as Eliade defines it in the context of Siberia and Central Asia, is one of healing. In those communities where shamanism is present, illness is often viewed as a "soul loss." For this reason, shamans are deployed on mystical journeys, to first recover and rescue lost souls and then restore those victims to health. Hence, their mystical ecstasies are inextricably connected to their function as healers in the community. Moreover, while shamans principally function in the community as healers, one could add that they function as mediators as well, communicating with the spirits or gods on behalf of the community. Eliade includes mediation as a primary component of shamanic journeys:  

The shaman undertakes these ecstatic journeys for four reasons: first, to meet the celestial god face to face and bring him an offering from the community; second, to seek the soul of a sick man, which has supposedly wandered away from his body or been carried off by demons; third, to guide the soul of a dead man to its new abode; or fourth to add to his knowledge by frequenting higher nonhuman beings.  

In sum, one could say that the primary purpose of the shamanic ecstasy is its communal benefit. Therefore, one could call shamanism a "mystical vocation" by which one draws on the power of the sacred in order to attain mystic heights for the benefit of the community.

29 Eliade, Shamanism, 6.  
2. Living in the Sacred and Lonergan’s Theory of Consciousness

2.1 Transformations of Consciousness and the Sacred

In the previous section I highlighted that the demand to live in the sacred often flows from an existential crisis resulting from encounter with the sacred. Therefore, I suggest that it is possible to view the transformative power of the sacred in terms of Lonergan’s transformations of consciousness and specifically in terms of moral and religious conversion.

Perhaps what Eliade understands to be an orientation to the sacred, as reflected in the “nostalgia for paradise” or “thirst for being,” for example, can be understood in terms of Lonergan’s “unrestricted desire to know” insofar as this unrestricted desire ultimately intends the transcendental notions of the intelligible, the true, the real, and the good.32

Nevertheless, despite the fact that human beings possess a fundamental orientation toward transcendence, they can refuse to know and resist self-transcendence. Indeed, just as Eliade identifies the resistance to the sacred as a “flight from reality,” we can apply to this notion what Lonergan refers to as the resistance to insight, or the “flight from understanding”: “Just as insight can be desired, so too it can be unwanted. Besides the love of light, there can be a love of darkness” (Insight, 214).

The flight from understanding is reflected in human bias. According to Lonergan, bias is fourfold: dramatic, egoistic, group, and general.33 In dramatic bias, the flight from understanding is rooted in a psychic wound of the subject and results in irrational behaviors that can be attributed to the psychic wound. Egoistic bias is rooted in one’s self-centeredness; it results in one’s criteria for knowing and choosing being limited to one’s own selfish pursuits. One could call group bias a collective egoistic bias in that it favors what is best for the group at the expense of others outside of the group. General bias resists theoretical knowledge and is content to live in the concrete world; it refuses to permit questions that might lead to theory.

33 On bias see Insight, 214-15, 244-51.
From Lonergan's perspective, the transformative power of the sacred could heal these forms of bias, and this can be more precisely understood in terms of transformations of consciousness: that is, religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic conversion.34 Let us now clarify more precisely how the transformative power of the sacred might be construed through Lonergan's notion of moral and religious conversion.

**Moral Self-Transcendence**

Moral conversion “changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values” (*Method*, 240). Moral self-transcendence enables one to apprehend and choose the good. According to Eliade, for *homo religiosus* the sacred represents what is ultimately valuable or good. In this way, one could say that the choice to live in the sacred represents a consequence of moral conversion insofar as this choice is one of value over, say, the satisfactions of the profane world. This does not mean that the profane world is devoid of value. In Lonergan’s schema there is a scale of values wherein there are various values that pertain to different ends or instances of the good. There are values that pertain to a particular good, those that pertain to the good of order, terminal values such as freedom, and originating values or people who authentically choose the good over satisfactions and pleasures (see *Method*, 47-52). In addition, there is the transcendent reality that is supreme goodness, and this goodness is the ground of all value (*Method*, 109). Hence, it is important to note that when we speak of a morally transformative aspect of the sacred we mean that, for Eliade, choosing to live in the sacred is a fundamental instance of choosing supreme good.

One should also note that Eliade does not differentiate between religious and moral value. The cosmogonic myths reveal archetypes that contain the ethical code for “primitive” or archaic peoples. The myth of

34Lonergan affirmed Robert Doran's development of “psychic conversion” as a legitimate extension of his threefold notion. In a letter to a publisher, Lonergan writes: “Intellectual Moral, and Religious conversion of the theologian are foundational in my book on method in theology. To these Doran has added a psychic conversion in his book on *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations*. He has thought the matter through very thoroughly and it fits very adroitly and snugly into my own efforts.” (File 490.1, Archives, Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto.)
the cosmogony is a revelation (hierophany) recounting the primordial deeds of the gods and is likewise considered sacred — religious. Therefore, the sacred myths are not only at the root of the ethical life but are also at the root of the religious life.

**Religious Self-Transcendence**

Fundamental to Lonergan's idea of religious self-transcendence is his notion of religious conversion:

Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts. It is revealed in retrospect as an undertow of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as perhaps an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer. It is interpreted differently in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given us. *(Method, 240-41)*

I suggest that religious conversion can elucidate an understanding of the transformative power of the sacred described in our discussion of Eliade in the previous section. Indeed, for Eliade the "sacred quest for meaning is always tied in with another world of some sort or other, with the possibility for transformation." To be transformed by the sacred is to become enthralled by another world — the realm of transcendence beyond the spatial-temporal world.

The encounter with the sacred incites a profound attraction and simultaneously a fear and trembling in the subject. For Eliade, the fear and dread are connected with a fear of being overwhelmed by the sacred, of having one's profane life obliterated. However, the resistance also stems from the call to live in the sacred, which requires a complete self-surrender. "Resistance is most clearly expressed when man is faced with a

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For Lonergan, the love of God can be terrifying because “God’s thoughts and God’s ways are very different” from those of human beings (*Method*, 111). Moreover, it is not a transformation that human beings can initiate themselves, just as falling in love cannot be initiated on one’s own, it just happens—it is a gift. Religious conversion is unrestricted falling in love connected with the experience of the *gift* of God’s love. Lonergan describes this gift as the Holy Spirit flooding one’s heart, but he acknowledges that he is interpreting this experience through his own religious framework (*Method*, 241).

According to Eliade, in some cases the transformative power of the sacred can be so dramatic, as in the case of ritual initiation, that “a totally different being” emerges.  

Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom. Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the
gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of
the whole of one’s living and feeling, one’s thoughts, words, deeds,
and omissions (Method, 241).38

One could say that operative/cooperative grace is the ground for all
religious commitment: “There is, I believe, a common root to all religious
commitment. It is God’s grace that makes religion become alive, effective,
enduring, transforming.”39 Indeed, just as the encounter with the sacred
for Eliade compels one to a fundamental choice, the experience of falling
in love in an unrestricted manner compels one to a response or decision:
“Will I love him in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of his
love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw?” (Method, 116). From the
experience of God’s gift of his love there follows a “command to love
unrestrictedly, with all one’s heart and all one’s soul and all one’s mind
and all one’s strength.” This surrender to the gift of God’s love is lived out
through a life of prayer and worship, fasting and penance, and the
practice of self-sacrificing charity (Method, 119). In this respect the
experience of unrestricted being-in-love can help clarify our understand-
ing of the transformative power of the sacred.

2.2 Differentiations of Consciousness

In keeping with Eliade’s thesis that “the sacred is part of the structure in
human consciousness,” we have a context for interpreting certain themes
from Eliade’s notion of the sacred, that is, homo religiosus and
shamanism, in terms of Lonergan’s differentiations of consciousness.

Homo Religiosus

We have seen that for Eliade homo religiosus represents a paradigm of
religious living. Such a person is characterized by a desire to live near the

38Lonergan’s doctoral dissertation expounds the distinction of operative and
cooperative grace in Aquinas. See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative
Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran, Collected

39Bernard Lonergan, “Religious Commitment,” Unpublished typescript of
Lonergan’s 1969 lecture on the occasion of his receiving an honorary doctorate from the
University of St. Michael’s College. (File # 618, Archives, Lonergan Research Institute of
Regis College, Toronto), 2.
sacred at all times, and this desire finds its fulfillment in the fundamental transformative encounters with the sacred. As a result, *homo religiosus* seeks to sustain this original encounter with the sacred through a life of religious ritual and valorization, that is, the repetition of sacred mythic themes through religious ritual and the recognition of religious meaning in ordinary “profane acts.”

From Lonergan’s perspective, which begins with the structure of human consciousness, much of the sacralization or religious valorization of the universe that characterizes *homo religiosus* can be understood in terms of what he calls “religiously differentiated consciousness.” Let us reiterate Lonergan’s explanation:

Religiously differentiated consciousness is approached by the ascetic and reached by the mystic. In the latter there are two quite different modes of apprehension, of being related, of consciously existing, namely, the commonsense mode operating in the world mediated by meaning and the mystical mode withdrawing from the world mediated by meaning into a silent and all-absorbing self-surrender in response to God’s gift of his love. While this, I think, is the main component, still mystical attainment is manifold. There are many mansions within Teresa of Avila’s *Interior Castle* and, besides Christian mystics, there are the mystics of Judaism, Islam, India, and the Far East. Indeed, Mircea Eliade has a book on shamanism with the subtitle, “archaic techniques of ecstasy.” *(Method, 273)*

It is this emergence [the gift of God’s love] that is cultivated by a life of prayer and self-denial and, when it occurs, it has the twofold effect, first, of withdrawing the subject from the realm of common sense, theory, and other interiority into a “cloud of unknowing” and then of intensifying, purifying, clarifying, the objectifications referring to the transcendent whether in the realm of common sense, or of theory, or of other interiority. *(Method, 266)*

It is certainly possible with regard to religiously differentiated consciousness that some religious personalities naturally possess this differentiation of consciousness more than others. To elaborate on the above quotes, for the mystic there are two fundamental modes of being in the world, a commonsense differentiation in the concrete world of people, places, and things, and the mystical mode of “withdrawal” from the
world mediated by meaning into the world of the sacred. For Eliade, such withdrawals are a return to a primordial time made present—sacred time. Simultaneously, mystics access a center, or a sacred point, where communication with the divinities or gods is possible. In this sense, religiously differentiated consciousness represents this sustained encounter with the sacred through a commitment to a life of prayer, ritual worship, and religious valorization of every aspect of one's life. However, insofar as we can say that "primitives" or archaic peoples possess religiously differentiated consciousness, it is a consciousness that is not sharply differentiated from common sense (Method, 257).

One could say with Lonergan that the distinction between common sense and religiously differentiated consciousness grounds the modern distinction between the sacred and the profane. Keep in mind, however, that the differentiations of consciousness, such as common sense, theory, interiority, and religion, are recent developments in human history, considered as differentiations.

For Eliade, modern secularization represents a loss of the explicit sense of the sacred. The typical secular or modern person has lost much of the explicit consciousness of the sacred. In this sense, one could say that secularization is a "profanization," in the pejorative sense of the word, in that the sacred has been significantly devalued.

However, for Eliade, the sacred can never be wholly lost because it is a part of the structure of human consciousness. Again, he does not mean this in a reductionistic sense in that the sacred is reducible to human consciousness. Rather, he means that there is an implicit "religiousness" in much of the modern person's behavior, which is expressed unconsciously, for example, in modern works of architecture, art, and popular culture. During the 1960s, Eliade viewed the hippie movement as an expression of a "quasi-religious" search for absolute reality. Indeed, despite their antireligious sentiment toward dogma and institutions, Eliade saw their basic motivation as religious in spirit. For Eliade, it is impossible to be entirely nonreligious. Moreover, it could be said that he offers a

prescription for the anxiety of the modern person that includes a rediscovery of *homo religiosus* within oneself.\(^{41}\)

For Lonergan, on the other hand, there is a "secularization to be welcomed" and a "secularization to be resisted."\(^{42}\) Without going into detail, the one to be welcomed would be the secularization that emerges with the distinct differentiations in consciousness arising with the various stages of meaning that characterize such development. The advantage of this type of secularization is that it enables modern Christians to be freed from "the mental and institutional complex of Christendom."\(^{43}\) The secularization to be resisted, one could say, is akin to Eliade’s notion in that it reflects a modern view that believes itself to have grown beyond the need for religion.\(^{44}\)

In Lonergan’s terminology, I suggest that the rediscovery and religious way of living that Eliade at least implicitly prescribes for the ailment of modern anxiety can be achieved through fostering and cultivating religiously differentiated consciousness. Therefore, *homo religiosus* can be viewed as someone who has developed this religious differentiation. And, as we have said, for Lonergan this differentiation is the fruit of a sustained commitment that flows from unrestricted being in love.

### Shamanism

Throughout Lonergan’s corpus there are sufficient references to Eliade’s text *Shamanism* to indicate that he viewed it as important. Exactly why Lonergan was fond of this text is difficult to determine. However, we can make some suggestions. The majority of the references in Lonergan’s

\(^{41}\)In his essay "Religious Symbolism and the Modern Man’s Anxiety," Eliade offers a solution to the ailments of modern anxiety in his quoting of Heinrich Zimmer: "the real treasure, that which can put an end to our poverty and all our trials, is never very far; there is no need to seek it in a distant country. It lies buried in the most intimate parts of our own house; that is, of our own being" [source not cited]. Eliade, *Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries*, 245.


\(^{43}\)Lonergan, "Sacralization," 5

primary works indicate that he values this text in two respects. First, Eliade's tome on shamanism provides evidence for the possibility of authentic mystical experience within "primitive" or archaic peoples.45 Second, the function of the shaman illustrates an elementary differentiation in consciousness, that is, a movement from undifferentiated consciousness to the beginning of a specialized consciousness. For Lonergan, this corroborates Eric Voegelin's theory of "cultural development in terms of the movement away from the compactness of the symbol to differentiated consciousness."46 That is, the emergence in archaic societies of shamans and their exceptional powers indicates a rudimentary differentiation of consciousness in those societies that marks the beginnings of specialization in the division of roles.47 Similarly, Lonergan views the function of the shaman as an example of the emergence of individuality:

In the primitive community, it is not the individual but rather the community, through individuals, that thinks, deliberates, decides, acts. In the medicine man, the shaman, you have the emergence of individuality (particularly as perceived by Eliade in his fundamental work, Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase— the medicine man and his archaic techniques of mysticism).48

In general, one gains the impression that Lonergan was quite fond of Eliade's *Shamanism* but perhaps did not know where to place it within his own schema. It may be that in light of his pre-Vatican II education and formation, permeated with what he later described as classicist assumptions, Lonergan found Eliade's emphasis on "archaic" mysticism


exotic and refreshing. Perhaps the appeal of shamanism is connected with the fact that the power of the shamans is inextricably bound up with the intensity of their religious experiences. Indeed, they derive their power from this source.

What has been said concerning *homo religiosus* as one who has developed religiously differentiated consciousness would apply as well to the religious worldview of the shaman. Lonergan indicates that he regards Eliade’s *Shamanism* as illustrating the “oldest” form of religiously differentiated consciousness.49 To this extent, the shaman possesses a heightened religiously differentiated consciousness from which the whole community benefits. As experts in the sacred, as Eliade describes them, shamans would require a heightened religiously differentiated consciousness to function properly, or one could say, a special consciousness of the spirit world of the divinities or “gods.” We suggested that shamans play an important role as healers in their societies.50 In this way, they stand out as powerful and distinctive personalities in their respective societies. They are mystagogues in the Greek sense that they lead others into mystery or the sacred. Their vocation requires a special relationship with the sacred and a sustained consciousness of mystery, which is lived out through service to the community.

**CONCLUSION**

I have been interpreting select themes from Eliade’s notion of the sacred in terms of Lonergan’s theory of consciousness, specifically as it deals with the religious subject. In this way, we have been able to begin to understand how one might claim, as Eliade does, that the sacred is a structure in human consciousness — again, not a reduction of the sacred to the structure of consciousness but rather as a way of understanding life in the sacred by taking the subject’s religious horizon as a starting point for a deeper understanding. I have suggested that the religious subject, as


50 Admittedly, my treatment of shamanism is positive. I am not considering in my discussion the possibility of shamanic powers for evil or destructive purposes.
Eliade understands it, can be interpreted within Lonergan's theory of transformations and differentiations of consciousness.

The advantage of this is twofold. On the one hand, we have brought this aspect of Eliade's theory of the sacred into closer proximity to Lonergan's philosophical foundations, which may, in turn, help clarify Eliade's position. On the other hand, we have also touched upon the theological foundations for dialogue between Christianity and the religions of traditional peoples. Lonergan's respect for Eliade's work indicates that he takes these traditional religions seriously. And his movement in this direction is in keeping with what has been called a paradigm shift in the theology of mission, which has yet to sort out precisely the evangelical-dialogue tension. Meanwhile, others have attempted to develop Lonergan's theory from this perspective.51

I hope to have contributed in some way to explicating the foundations for a more adequate recovery of the religious subject using the insights of both thinkers.

I DO HOPE hope that the title and the focus on physics does not discourage the nonscientific reader. Perhaps an immediate reassurance would be to recall the simple suggestion at the beginning of Method in Theology. Physics has been regarded as a reasonably successful science: it can help us along, so it is worthwhile for nonphysicists to get a fuller sense of that help. Oddly, this essay will reach toward showing that physics indeed can help us along the way to a richer appreciation of the strategy of functional specialization that is the main topic of Method in Theology. So I would focus your attention now on the word “paradigm.” Other zones of interest could do a parallel job, and my hope is that this effort will encourage parallel efforts that should lead to the full elevation that is my topic.

The word “elevation” requires comment, though you may have a decent initial sense of what I am talking about. You may, in fact, have tacitly substituted the word “sublate” there, a word that was one of my choices for the title. Another of my earlier choices was the neologism “uploosing,” which connects with the original Greek meaning of analysis. My final choice of elevation is complexly strategic. I would hope, first, that it would relate to Patrick Byrne’s efforts to elevate both the meaning of analysis and the meaning of Aristotle’s Analytics.¹ Second, I would note that the word “elevate” comes from Byrne’s work on the meaning of analysis. It occurs at the conclusion of that analysis in his discussion of a

somewhat parallel word, *anagein*.

Byrne goes against a solid tradition that would relate that word to reduction and makes the case for a richer Aristotelian meaning surrounding the general sense of "raising up": water by heat, an audience by rhetoric, and, significantly, potency to act.

Byrne's book posed one central question: How can one raise up the probability schedules of Byrne's eccentric view not being lost in recurrence-schemings of the standard view? My direct answer is, by the implementation of functional specialization: the spiraling of functional specialization will shift upwards, discontinuously, the probability schedules of the view's survival.

I must note immediately here the benefit of editorial advice. My previous introductory remarks became tortuous at this stage, and instead of getting into the question of physics, I ventured enthusiastically and densely to enlarge, in a first section, on my hopes for elevation. That venture is now placed in Section 3. Section 1 plunges you immediately into the problems of contemporary physics. It is worth a read, even for the nonphysicist, but please note that the main point is the one made implicitly in the previous paragraph. What will carry forward progressive views in any field is the strategy of circulating views — moving up and round through history and dialectic to foundations and so forth — that is given by functional specialization. What has emerged in physics in the past century is the need for such a division of labor.

What follows, then, is divided conveniently into three sections. The first section picks up on particular problems connected with the fifth chapter of *Insight* and moves to identify the seeds of full functional specialization. The second section was initially a more ambitious project, dealing with the manner in which functional specialization introduced precise differentiations and elevations of both *interpretation* and *implementation*, but these are topics for another day. Instead, that second section simply turns on the foundational problem of reading chapter 12 of

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3The context is *Insight* 4.2.3 (Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992]) on conditioning and the shift from product to sum of probabilities, but there are added features that enlarge the discontinuity. I note that the references to *Insight* throughout are by section, convenient for holders of different editions.
Insight, and the organism that is oneself, from a moved and moving viewpoint, in a manner that would lift us toward a postaxial reading of duration and extension, which is the topic of chapter 5. The final section picks up on the topic of elevation, sketching different senses of Insight's transposition.

1. Space-Time Structure

I take as my title that of Erwin Schroedinger's Dublin book of 1950, a book I greatly respected and labored over in the mid-fifties during graduate studies in mathematical physics. Upon completion of those studies in 1956, I moved into philosophy and by the end of 1957 I was facing Lonergan's methodological analysis of Space-Time in Insight, written about the same time as Schroedinger's book. It, too, was quite beyond me, despite my previous work on the topic: an encouragement, perhaps, to others who also found the fifth chapter of Insight difficult.

This section is not an effort to cope with that difficulty. It is, rather, a fiftieth anniversary revisiting of a doctrinal character, seeking to point to the contextualization of the chapter in the light of the fifty years since in physics. It is also an invitation to ongoing collaboration — to recall the slogan of the Florida Conference — complementing a website invitation that seeks to make that collaboration more feasible.4

I return then to Schroedinger's work, the basic assumption of which is Einstein's view that the dynamic interaction of electro-gravitational realities grounds an intrinsic geometric structure of space-time. It is worth quoting Schroedinger at some length here: later we will see how it

4The website is http:\\home.istar.ca\~axial. Some of the references I give may also help toward collaboration. In Insight Lonergan used Lindsay and Margenau's Foundations of Physics as a basic reference, and I would still recommend it. Indeed, I refrain from mentioning some of the problems that, with its help, he raises. Brevity and simplicity, indeed, require that I omit a great deal in this short article, and so I venture to recommend a single text that I find useful and that could be a basis of discussion. It is Ian D. Lawrie's A Unified Grand Tour of Theoretical Physics (Bristol and Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1998); hereafter Lawrie. He begins with geometry, builds in Emmy Noether's perspective on invariants without mentioning her, and adds useful stuff on thermodynamics. Noether is put into the context of the Calculus of Variations by Cornelius Lanczos, The Variational Principles of Mechanics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), a recommended context.
expresses compactly the central problematic. "In fact, though not always in wording, the mystic concept of force is wholly abandoned. Any 'agent' whatsoever, producing ostensible accelerations, does so qua amounting to an energy-momentum tensor and via the gravitational field connected with the latter. The case of 'pure gravitational interaction' is distinguished only by being the simplest of its kind, inasmuch as the energy-momentum- (or matter-) tensor can here be regarded as located in minute specks of matter (the particles or mass-points) and as having a particularly simple form, while, for example, an electrically charged particle is connected with a matter-tensor spread throughout the space around it and of a rather complicated form even when the particle is at rest. This has, of course, the consequence that in such a case we are in patent need of field-laws for the matter-tensor (for example, for the electromagnetic field), laws that one would also like to conceive as purely geometrical restrictions on the structure of space-time."\(^5\)

Einstein's effort in 1915 reached only to gravitation and metric geometries: a few years later Hermann Weyl opened up both the physics and the geometry of the inquiry. But let us pause over the quotation from Schrödinger; in a sense this entire section seeks to elevate the reading of the passage into a new context. Note that agent is in quotation marks, warranted perhaps by the physicist's unease at intimations of efficient causality. At all events it is immediately cloudily avoided by the introduction of particles, merely gravitation or also charged, as sources of the energy-tensor. The pause I call for is a reduplicative pause regarding pausing, the enriching character of which will emerge in Section 3. The deeper issue is the fostering of a new control of meaning to be grounded in the luminous character of writer, reader, and thinker. Putting one element very simply, Schrödinger is not in control of his use of nouns, nor indeed is our culture. As he moves into chapter 1 he immediately seeks "mathematical entities" that would ground a labeling, "a list of (grammatical) subjects without predicates."\(^6\) Already words like "individuality" and "property" haunt the text, but he pushes on to the security of identifying familiar tensors of rank 1: "the nature of the entity


may be such that there is a quadruplet of numbers attached to every point, varying from point to point.”

Immediately, then, a need is evident. Certainly, one can say that the use of the word “entity” is inconsequential: nouns are a dime a dozen. Still, “things” call in quite another coinage. Schroedinger’s book moves forward comfortably with entities called “tensors” and “densities,” “more component entities,” and his discussion is complexified by connections and derivatives yielding formulae “easily memorized in the face of a bewildering dance of indices.” Do the indices relate to a spread of properties? So one pushes on to search for curvature tensors and geodesics, which finally brings us to the recurrence — seven times — of the word “particle” on page 57. But the particles on that page are not regarded as agents or sources: “We assume that a gravitational field can be pictured as a purely geometrical property of space-time, namely as an affinity imposed upon it, and that it amounts to a geometrical constraint on particles. This affine connexion is to be regarded as an inherent property of the space-time continuum, not as something that is created only when there is a gravitational field.”

The need mentioned is now, perhaps, evident? It is the need for a redirection, and elevation, that would prevent a space-time continuum from becoming a hypothetical thing with properties. The redirection, as you might expect, lurks in the dense doctrinal expression of Insight’s chapter 5, in which the lurking recalls the particular postponed problem of thing. I am not going to attempt that redirection here: to recall the major redirection of Method in Theology and to point forward “would prove to be, not some brief appendage to the present work, but the inception of a far larger one.” A massive eightfold hodic collaboration in physics is involved. My interest here is the more modest goal of inviting a

7 Schroedinger, Space-Time Structure, 16.
8 Schroedinger, Space-Time Structure, 16.
9 Schroedinger, Space-Time Structure, 32.
10 Schroedinger, Space-Time Structure, 58.
11 Insight, epilogue, p. 1.
12 I regularly use the word “hodic” instead of the clumsy phrase “functional specialist.” The linguistic reference is to the Indo-European root of “method.” A homely
beginning of such a pastmodern collaboration, "to seek a common ground ... a new solution to the problem of living together."\textsuperscript{13} The living I refer to is the living of the life of \textit{theoria}, theoretical physics, under a norm opposed to the axial "cover story"\textsuperscript{14} hidden in Lonergan's claim that "theoretic understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view."\textsuperscript{15}

What I add here, then, are just some doctrinal suggestions to help such a collaboration and elevation. The key, I would say, is the elevation of chapter 16 of \textit{Insight}, in itself a grim undertaking, into the full foundational context. In particular there is the significance of a full thematic of the distinction between primary relations and secondary determinations focused in on residue-ridden entities and properties.\textsuperscript{16} Such a luminous control of meaning would lift clouds from modern fashions of searching. "Following a modern fashion, we will use the words particle, state, and resonance synonymously. By so doing we will neglect the difference between 'state,' which is a general word for an eigenstate with well-defined quantum numbers; 'resonance,' which suggests a state decaying by a strong interaction; and 'particle.' This last word suggests the idea of a state with a longer lifetime than that of a resonance, but there is no accepted definition for it."\textsuperscript{17} The next few chapters of that book carry one through a dense account of advances in particle physics, advances that would not have surprised Lonergan: "One

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\textsuperscript{13}I quote here the bottom line across the pages 114-15 of F. Lawrence, "Lonergan, The Integral Postmodern?," \textit{METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies} 18 (2000). While my essay would seem to be in a quite different ballpark from his, I would consider it as its complement, attending to the other face of Lonergan's achievement in \textit{Method in Theology}, solving Plato's problem and the central problem in \textit{Insight}, of implementation.

\textsuperscript{14}Lawrence, "Lonergan, The Integral Postmodern?," 96.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Insight}, 14.4.4, third paragraph.

\textsuperscript{16}How the residue "rides" is a question raised by such old Russellian chestnuts as "morning star" and "evening star" or description/designation problems generally. Again, there are the cluster of problems linked with such names as Goedel and Skolem (see the index to \textit{Phenomenology and Logic} under these names). Later, note 74 gives another slant. But we are surfing over radical problems of physics and geometry here.

\textsuperscript{17}David C. Cheng and Gerard K. O'Neill, \textit{Elementary Particle Physics} (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 268.
might note classical tendencies in the discovery of new subatomic entities over and above the more familiar electrons, protons and neutrons.\textsuperscript{18} The object of the scattering of suggestions in this short paper is to invite the collaboration that would give those classical tendencies a heuristic and humanistic luminosity significant both to physics and to general culture. That luminosity pivots on an adequate contextualization, elevation, of chapter 5 of \textit{Insight}.

A first reading of that chapter leads one to notice parallels with Schroedinger’s directions. But, while Lonergan continues to avoid the issue of \textit{things}, he shows no tendency to entativize either space-time or tensors: “science deals with objects in their spatial and temporal relations.”\textsuperscript{19} The problem, of course, is moving to an adequate heuristic of those relations, of dealing with length and duration in a subtle creative fashion that would avoid replacing Newton’s absolutes with some modified Einsteinian frame-up. Length and duration have to be “fitted into a geometrical construction”\textsuperscript{20} with a new heuristic of the problem raised on the previous page of \textit{Insight}: “how, one may ask, can one reach new laws except through measurements based on old standards?” A particle physics linguistically colonized by conceptualism and naivety has to struggle against a psychic presence of a Minkowski space-time \textit{thing} that invites one to envisage \textit{The First Three Minutes} and \textit{The Last Three Minutes} and strange multidimensional foldings in between.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, “there are windows to be opened and fresh air to be let in. It will not, I am convinced, dissolve the solid achievement of the past. It will, I hope, put

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Insight}, 4.1.2, conclusion.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Insight}, 5.3, beginning.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Insight}, 5.4.3, beginning.

\textsuperscript{21} Steven Weinberg, \textit{The First Three Minutes. A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe} (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Paul Davies, \textit{The Last Three Minutes} (London: Phoenix Paperbacks, 2000); Brian Greene, \textit{The Elegant Universe. Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory} (London: Vintage, 2000). I cite and recommend such books in this article with qualifications. Regularly they are pedagogically successful within the field, when one allows for untutored imaginings. When they venture into other regions they are regularly unreliable: for instance I highly recommend Roger Penrose’s two popular books, \textit{The Emperor’s New Mind} (Oxford University Press, 1989) and \textit{Shadows of the Mind} (Oxford University Press, 1994), as a context for the present essay, in spite of his naive and confused view of consciousness, among other things. A further perspective is given later at note 42.
this achievement on a securer base and enrich it with a fuller content." That fresh air is ancient and neglected, as Byrne’s work intimates. But that work also grounds gloom. How is one to initiate a shift in the present tradition of readers of Aristotle or of readers of the data of cyclotrons and galaxies? That is the issue of implementation that we return to presently. However, anticipating the fifth elevation of Section 3, it is metavital to cultivate an uncomfortable, and mystery-bent, awareness that the windows must be opened from within.

Before venturing into indications of directions of de-truncation in the new, it is as well to make mention of a key facet of the old. I recall conversing with Lonergan about the old cosmology — I had been brought up on Hoenan — as we walked in Dublin during Easter of 1961. I had been struggling with the beginning of chapter 16 of Insight to get beyond Hoenan’s lengthy textbook discussion of quantitas. My puzzling involved replacing Hoenan. Lonergan diverted into the perspective that one could teach a quite consistent cosmology from Aristotle. Part of that cosmology which stands the test of space-time is Aristotle’s account of time. It is mentioned in Insight but was intussuscepted by Lonergan as part of his doctoral struggle. And it remains central to the contemporary struggle: particle-motions are not from potency to act, and the measuring of those motions can only initially be mediated by a post-Minkowskian primum mobile. How, then, are they to be measured, quantized, and secondarily related within a relational context? That is the modern heuristic issue of the search for Real Geometries.

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22 Bernard Lonergan, “Christology Today,” in A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 89. I import this statement from what seems another context, but Section 2 will point toward a merging of contexts in a full eschatology of real geometry.

23 Peter Hoenan, Cosmologia (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1950). Later I was led by Lonergan’s references (“A Note on Geometrical Possibility,” Collection, note 4) to other writings. There is also his relevant reflection on geometry, De Noetica Geometriae (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1954).

24 Not, however, his account of motion. Here I am led to point to a fundamental contribution from an unpublished fragment of Lonergan. It is reproduced at note 11 of chapter 1 of volume 18 of Lonergan’s works, Phenomenology and Logic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

25 Walter Benz, Real Geometries (Mannheim: Wissenschaftsverlag, 1994). I feel that what follows here is too brief and too general to elevate you to the shocking twist involved here. Real geometry is an aggregative actualization of the forms of things. Those
The plural title of that book by Benz already points to a fundamental issue on both the macro- and the microcosmological level. There is the reaching, on lines present in contemporary work, for some single large-scale metricizable topology for the dispersedness that is the grounding and grinding character of the characters of our finiteness. A useful parallel here, certainly in the Einstein period, is with classical macrothermodynamics. The search is for a macroview that makes no effort to handle the details of included entities, arriving thus at such laws as $G_{lm} = kT_{lm}$. This is not a flawed approach, so long as the methodology remains open to classical and statistical developments, to hierarchical structures of the intended realities, and to axiomatic gaps that regard both the lower and the upper ground of loneliness.

That search is mirrored on the microlevel by searches for unification in present particle physics, for GUTS or TOES or SUSY. Before we puzzle forward toward the geometrical nature of that search, however, it is as well to recall the fuller context of that quest, pointed to in Lonergan's brief reflections on the potential, formal, and actual unity of the universe. Within the actual unity of generalized emergent probability there is the layer that is the manifold of the coincidental, that on the lowest level "becomes space-time through the interrelations of gravitational and

forms include intertwined forms of space and time. Pursuing micro and macro studies of these forms within a framework of special or general relativistic forms of space-time is a halfway house. Aristotle was pointing in the right direction: see Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), the index under time.


There is an abundant popular literature on these: Grand Unification Theories, Theories of Everything, Supersymmetry (SUSY) Theories. Despite my reservations about this literature (see note 46 and later, around note 66), I give references to such works as they are useful pedagogically or as surveys. Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (New York: Random House, 1992), illustrates the point. One has to tolerate shocking muddles when he ventures outside his field.
electromagnetic”\textsuperscript{28} and electroweak and strong force realities.\textsuperscript{29}

The struggle for unification on the microlevel has focused mainly on the potential of Lie groups and Lie algebras for the classification of various particles.\textsuperscript{30} These classifications, however, point deeper, to associated geometries, to connections on fiber bundles, to new perspectives on differential geometry, to strange multidimensionalities.\textsuperscript{31} It is in this zone that one can hope for breakthroughs, breaks from imagined entities to a stand on properties of physical things that ground the complexly bundled space-time of history, more elemental in its initial phases, still elemental but genuinely hierarchical in its early physicochemical dynamic, and fractally\textsuperscript{32} patterned over eons by the lower dispersed conditions and by the emergence of the higher topologies of living things. But the special aim of physics is to give a classical and statistical account of the quantodurational networking of geometrical relations, primary and secondary, that are the actuality of the things of physics. The center stage here has come to be occupied by gauge theory, whose “geometrical nature is not always fully understood ... partly because gauge theory is not

\textsuperscript{28}Insight, 16.4.1. The next word in Lonergan's text is “theory,” which I omit as confusing and replace above with the word “realities.”

\textsuperscript{29}The book mentioned above, at note 17, gives a good, if methodologically confused, account of these realities and the link up with group theory; see also the following note.

\textsuperscript{30}Lonergan's interest in group theory is well known (see, for example, the references in Topics in Education). It is worthwhile, in that context and in the present, to reach for a better historical view, such as one gets from I. M. Yaglom, Felix Klein, and Sophus Lie. Evolution of the Idea of Symmetry in the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Birkhauser, 1988). On applications to physics there is A. W. Joshi, Group Theory for Physicists (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1982). And for particle physics there is the delightful presentation of Howard Georgi, Lie Algebras in Particle Physics. From Isospin to Unified Theories (London: Benjamin/Cummings, 1982).

\textsuperscript{31}The popular books referred to in notes 21 and 27 can be a beginning here. Lawrie also helps. More advanced is Katsumi Nomizu's book, mentioned in note 34. For a fuller context see the two books of Lochlainn O’Raifeartaigh referred to in note 43.

\textsuperscript{32}I point here to the perspective developed by Benoit Mandlebrot: one may think of fractals as odd shapes, like a coastal map of Norway. A further relevant perspective here would be that of chaos theory. Both aspects are popularly presented in Barry Parker, Chaos in the Cosmos. The Stunning Complexity of the Universe (New York: Plenum Press, 1996). Parker's earlier (1987) book from the same press, Search for a Supertheory. From Atoms to Superstrings, is worth mentioning as a reasonable survey of the general search.
metrical." And gauge theory, through its reach into the fiber-bundle form of differential geometry, brings us full circle to the question of the geometry of physical realities in their secondary relativities.

Certainly the previous paragraph has lost my ordinary reader, even perhaps the reader who has a first degree in physics. What to do? Obviously it is time to compact my sketchings.

I see the need for moving in two directions in the contemplation of the physical universe. The more remote is the direction taken up in the second section: what I might call a patient Dogenesque stance regarding dispersed reality, merged with a fuller reading of Lonergan's short section on the unity of the proportionate universe. The second direction, taken up sketchily here, is to invite a struggle with present notions of geometry, dimensions, and space-time.

That struggle, as you may suspect by now, involves the set of elevations of Insight to be introduced in Section 3. So, for instance, just as the paragraph beginning on line 18 of page 288 of Method in Theology invites us to shift the early chapters of the book into a full explanatory context, so the discussion of metaphysical equivalence in Insight involves a massive lifting of the considerations of, say, chapter 10 of the book. What is real geometry? One has to bring into conjunction, in the manner of generalized empirical method, the feebleness of our grasp of that sketch of heuristic control in Insight, and the mesh and mess of the best of present description and explanation of the nature of geometry and of the incipient geometrization — in a sense of that word that lifts it quite


34 Coming to grips with the notion of fiber bundle is a stretch of the imagination for anyone familiar only with standard geometries. A simple illustration gives food for thought. Galilean space-time can be split into a time line to every point of which there is attached a fiber. The fiber at each point is, of course, the three-dimensional Euclidean space. The structure, base manifold and fibers, is called a fiber bundle. I give this not only to give a lead on the topic but also to give a lead on complexity. To help get a sense of the complexity of concrete real geometry, imagine the bundle of determinate relations of a "point" particle: geometries within points of geometries. A compact presentation of this approach to differential geometry is Katsumi Nomizu, Lie Groups and Differential Geometry (The Mathematical Society of Japan, 1956).

35 One might merge and sublate both Dogen and Lonergan in a kataphatic sophistication of the final contemplation of St. Ignatius's Exercises.
beyond metric geometry — of the classification of physical realities. Only such a symbiosis can lift us into heuristic precision regarding the centers of predication that are neither points nor strings — for these are elements, primarily or secondarily determined, within particular geometries — but things that have both descriptive attributes, bubbling especially out of present large-scale research, and explanatory attributes, sought dialectically in the present push towards primary and secondary determinations within complex topological structures.

What then is space-time? First we must be clear that in its purity as a geometry of physical things — as nonchemical and so forth — it had a shockingly compressed history, which nonetheless is a present presence. That presence in the universe is a massively complex network of multiply indeterminate secondary determinations of the set of primary relations. It is toward a classification of these relations that the standard model reaches an uneasy truce with gravitational relations. That reach has to be cleansed from within of a plague of pathologies. Three myths are worth nontechnical mention: the myth of unification, the myth of reductionism, and the myth on popularizability. Regarding unification, I will only say that efforts toward unity, described broadly in the previous footnote, are no more toward a Theory of Everything than the periodic table leads to an account of all or any aggregation of chemical reactions. The illusion, of course, meshes with the other myth, that of reductionism, which is an insidious present ethos. Even an elder of physics can nod in both these

36The immediate reference is to background radiation. However, the fuller context would be an analysis of dispersed presence on all levels of material finitude.

37Summarily there is "the idea of unification. Perhaps the three-component phenomenological group SU(3) . SU(2) . U(1) can be fit into a simple unifying group with just one component. We are led directly to the unified SU(5) theory or to one of its elaborations. It seems that weak, strong, and electromagnetic interactions must first be put together before we may implement Einstein's dream of marriage with gravity." S. Glashow, "Old and New Directions in Particle Physics," in To Fulfill a Vision: Jerusalem Einstein Centennial Symposium on Gauge Theories and Unification of Physical Forces, ed. Yuval Ne'eman (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1981), 165. This volume adds a worthwhile context to our reflections.

38Essential here is the cultivation, along the lines indicated in Section 2, of the sense of mystery pointed to by chapter 17 of Insight. The emergent characters would both resonate with preaxial compact humanity and incarnate a little of the tone of postaxial living. Axial humanity, in which we live and move and hurry past being, is primarily schizothymic.
directions: "With the discovery of quantum mechanics, a theory of atomic structure was established for all time. Why is the sky blue and copper red? How do rabbits multiply and cells divide? All this, and more, follows (with some hard work) from the rules."\(^{39}\)

Finally, there is the mythology of *haute vulgarization*. There is an evident surge in publication in this area, pivoting on an untutored hunger in the laity and in an untutored desire in some of the physics community.\(^{40}\) The disorientation of *tutoring* is a massive axial question raised by Lonergan’s discussion of mystery.\(^{41}\) There is nothing wrong with the desire, a desire of our hearts restless to speak and to listen. But what is becoming increasingly evident is the need for a shift in the meaning of meaning, of speaking and listening.\(^{42}\)

We are on the edge here of my fundamental pointing to functional specialization as a patent need in the successful development of the full set of schemes that are identifiable within physics in its cultivation and its communication, its mediation of complex technology and common talk. The pointing requires another essay: I focus here only on a narrow illustration from theoretical physics. The movement of that physics has been not only historical but dialectical. In his book, *The Dawning of Gauge Theory*, Lochlainn O’Raifeartaigh gives an account, among others, of the twists and turns of Weyl’s suggestions, the tarnished seed of the presently dominant gauge theory, early rejection by Einstein and others,

\(^{39}\)Glashow, "Old and New Directions," note 37, 161.

\(^{40}\)The position is plainly taken by Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* (New York: Bantham Press, 1988), 6: "The basic ideas about the origin and fate of the universe can be stated without mathematics in a form that people without scientific education can understand."

\(^{41}\)See note 38. The tutoring of humanity out of axial dysfunction is a central task of the hodic turn of mind and molecules to the Idea.

\(^{42}\)A paragraph on this deep topic is a snowball in the fire. To notes 38 and 41 I can only add the message of the artists, the poets, and perhaps the cry of an Africa under siege. "The contemporary type-European is an ex-human who, by overshooting his mark, has regressed into sub-humanity. Having squandered his civilized inheritance, he has lost both motive and aptitude for conducting Africans on to the higher ground he has himself deserted"(Leonard Barnes, *Africa in Eclipse* [London: Victor Gallancz, 1971], 19). One of the lost aptitudes is a teaching and story-telling capacity, role, task, institution, that would be vibrant with the mysteries of frail and feeble human communication.
and later openness. Food there for the delicate strategy of *Method in Theology*, page 250, which would reveal, through the fifth process of *Classification*, what parts of the dialectic are predominantly methodological, what parts predominantly undeveloped physics. One would then have a fuller context for discerning the drive, for example, in present string theory. "The next step in creating a more unified theory of the basic interactions will probably be much more difficult. All the major theoretical developments of the last twenty years, such as grand unification, supergravity, and supersymmetric string theory, are almost completely separated from experience. There is a great danger that theoreticians may get lost in pure speculations."45

Such dialectic work, in a full specialist context, would take its accurate place in the spiral of specializations that begins and ends with *Communications*, grounding a lift in the probabilities of, for example, good teaching, good popularization, and good technology. I cannot go beyond these few hints in this short article. I must hope that the reader would be able to develop the points, perhaps from the perspective of another field familiar to him or her, drawing on my previous efforts to make the same point.46 Most recently47 I have sketched more adequately how the process toward and through dialectic calls forth a convergence of disciplines, so that the dialectitian of physics is discomfortingly in dialogue with, say, the biologist, as he or she moves through the operations described on page 250 of *Method*. Thus, as Lonergan claims: "it will make conversion a topic, and thereby promote it. Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of


46See the notes at the beginning of Section 2.

maturation. But I would lay emphasis here on the maturing of theoria and the conversion, against the distortion of specialization, to the stance described in Insight, already quoted but now in a new elevated context: "theoretical understanding seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view." So there can develop, in this millennium, "a perhaps not numerous center ... strong enough to refuse half-measures" taking a hodic stand against the disharmonious and dysfunctional subjectivity of specialization that has become acceptable in this modern period.

I must cut short this section, replacing dense doctrinal presentation with brief historical mention. How is the intertwined mess of methodology and twentieth-century physics to turn, be turned, toward fuller progress? Through the turning of the wheel, the spiral, of hodic method. The mess became explicit a century ago in the Einstein period and has twisted and turned through the developments and interpretations of quantum mechanics and its related statistics, the infinities of quantum electrodynamics, paradoxes of dispersion, the accumulation of an abundance of data on both the micro and the macro level, the search for

49*Insight*, 14.4.4. See note 15 earlier.
51In the first lecture of Lonergan I attended, the lost first lecture of Easter 1961, Lonergan spoke of Thor Herydahl, the author of *The Kontiki Expedition*, taking a stand against specialization, building a boat. I am only now beginning to sense the revolutionary perspective on theoretic maturity lurking in his suggestions. A fuller perspective would sublate into the full hodic context the discussions in *Insight* of authenticity and mystery.
large-scale and small-scale geometries, the sequence of theoretical developments of both these levels in the past fifty years, and the intertwining of macro and micro theories, especially in the study of the early cosmos. More evidently than in the period of Lonergan's writing of *Insight and Method in Theology* there is the manifestation of the need for the slow evolution of nine genera of both communications and implementations isomorphic with the inner eight functional specialties and their external relating.55

Perhaps I may risk concluding this section by anticipating the high point of the full challenge of the sevenfold elevation of *Insight* that is the topic of the final section. That full challenge is to global culture, in its personal longing and its human responsibility, to reach differentiatively for a canonic "a priori whence can be understood....destiny."56 We certainly need and deserve better than *The Last Three Minutes*, better than the mood Euripides foisted on European drama, better than the piffle peddled by professional religions. It is way beyond time for a dialectic and foundational tackling of the problem of our destiny that would match the courageous effort of Aquinas at the end of *Contra Gentiles*. Perhaps no area of inquiry manifests better the vulgarity of the last seven centuries of theology than the almost invincible ignorance of the need to have a serious contemporarily informed shot at the heuristics of the real geometry of eternal life. But this is a deep axial matter.

2. SEARCHING FOR FOUNDATIONS, FOR SHOBOGENZO

It is history that is searching for Shobogenzo, *truth-law-eye-treasure, "The Fullness of the Vision of Truth."*57 The searching, in our time, spirals stumblingly toward a humble globalization that is both hodic and integral. "As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon

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55 This is obviously a massively complex topic. I hope to handle it more fully in *Linguistic Loneliness and the Cosmos of Modern Physics* (Halifax: Axial Press, forthcoming 2003).


57 This is simply an attempt to communicate the meaning of the four-character title of Dogen's major work, *Shobogenzo*. See Heinrich Dumoulin, *Zen Buddhism: A History*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 74, 112.
Hegel’s insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, and that there is mediated, set before us as a mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and human failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is the prior need of method.58 That method, as Lonergan puts it in that powerful unpublished beginning to the unwritten book promised in the epilogue of Insight, involves a third order of consciousness beyond method. It would be to method what zoology is to animals. It would involve inner and outer talk of method and so merit the title Methodology.

Might I be optimistic here and assume that my main point is now clear? Contemporary physics cries out for that division of labor that Adam Smith wrote of in the first chapter of The Wealth of Nations. “The division of labour, in so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase in the productive power of labour.” Lonergan’s discovery is, in a sense, a discovery of the obvious like the problem that amused him as a parallel, finding out how to stand an egg on its end. But it lifts the problem of the implementation of desire — raised by Plato, decentered by Aquinas, degraded by Machiavelli — to a new humility of functional metapragmatics. Am I being silly to rise to optimism regarding a slow global shift to this academic division of labor? Shift happens.

It was pretty evident to me, when I faced the problems of musicology in the late sixties, that that field of inquiry was gasping for functional specialization of effort.59 Later I ventured into literary studies, and more


59 The result, “Metamusik and Self-Meaning,” was presented at the Florida Lonergan Conference of 1970, later published as chapter 2 of P. McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1974). I take the opportunity to note that this book, together with Lonergan’s Challenge mentioned in the next note, are now available free on the website mentioned earlier in note 4. Also
recently into linguistics and economics, each zone a vast and relatively isolated panorama in which was verified Lonergan's claim that "if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is the prior need for method." The method is the global academic-monastic method that I have, of recent years, strategically called hodic method. It is the crowning achievement of history's ferment and history's search fulfilled in the evolutionary sport, Bernard Lonergan. His tired sketching of it is surely worth taking to heart as a pastmachievelian, pastmodern cultivation of kanons, of characters. "The treatment of character then is, as it seems, a branch and starting point of statecraft." Hodic method is the global treatment of character, within its Hinayana and without, in a Mahayana of common meaning, constituting a higher emergent probability of the ongoing genesis of "horizon, assimilative powers, knowledge, values, character."

Lonergan's "larger work" did not emerge, but within his and history's achievement of actual differentiations there is the clearly identifiable hodic component of the hope of the thirty-first place: "The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference with intellect's finality." The crowning element is the strategy of retrieval that he laboriously conceived and succinctly expressed on page 250 of Method in Theology. Only through that precisely described structure can the aspirations of both


Aristotle, at the beginning of the Magna Moralia.

Lonergan, Method in Theology, 14.1. Earlier I hint at a loose parallel between the first two sections of the chapter and the Lesser and Greater Vehicles of Hinduism.

Insight, 20.5, in the thirty-first place.
Aquinas and, for instance, his Japanese contemporary, Dogen, be carried forward as history toward integration into a genetic pragmatics of *tokuzui*, “attaining the marrow.” Our culture requires not some simple comparison of Dogen and Heidegger, or some simple splicing of *Tao* and physics, but a massive global centuries-long collaboration that would turn us gracefully, millenially, from the long axial cycle of decline. That turning pivots, of course, on a Yes-openness to the cruxiform patterns of history, to the prodigal possibilities of repentance. Lonergan, like “Dogen was able to transcend the common differentiations. His higher viewpoint helped him affirm all the holy scriptures and rites, even though he sometimes judged them negatively and took issue with them. His last word, spoken from the perspective of true Dharma, is a transcendental Yes.”

Lonergan brings a Zen-like focus to the absolute value of the “flower in the crannied wall” of Tennyson’s little poem:

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand.
Little flower — but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all and all,
I should know what God and man is.

I suspect that he could have equally cherished and focused on the late poem of Dogen:

64 I refer to Dogen’s book, *Raihai tokuzui* (Attaining the Marrow through Worship) of 1240, a significant document for feminist studies in Zen Buddhism.

65 “Self-sacrificing love of one’s neighbour is repentant.” The context in *Insight* is the thirteenth place of chapter 20. The context here is axial repentance from the state of sin incarnated in schizothymia.


68 Quoted from Dumoulin, *Zen Buddhism*, 72.
To read either of these poems with any adequacy one must have read chapter 12 of *Insight*, with a viewpoint that is moved and moving, within some habitual zazen-poise, perhaps within the fuller “what, then, is being?” poise, or perhaps even as the fullest character of the question, “what, then is hodic being?,” seeking thus within one’s organic loneliness, according to the nomos of one’s talent and time, “the notion of being,” *shobogenzo*.

3. ELEVATING *INSIGHT*

I return to the point made in my introductory remarks. Here I am going to ramble through seven aspects of the elevation of *Insight* or its analysis, or its “reduction of potency to act,” to recall a fine point of Byrne’s discussion. The ramble is descriptive, suggestive. I would claim a certain parallel with Lonergan’s first presentation, probably in 1967, of a version of chapter 3 of *Method in Theology*. When I asked him whether there was a systematic structure to that presentation of meaning, he replied that he was just making some suggestive points. My rambles here are somewhat similar, and the parallel merits exploitation. I am writing outside the functional specialties, perhaps even in a manner that could be classed as

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*Yo no naka wa*  
To what indeed shall I liken  
*nani ni tatoen*  
The world and human life?  
*mizutori no*  
Ah, the shadow of the moon,  
*hashi furu tsuyu ni*  
When it touches in a dew drop  
*yadoru tsukikage*  
The beak of the waterfowl.

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69 *Insight*, 19.4.

70 It is also worth recalling that Fr. Crowe and I sat together and left together on that occasion, both puzzled at the “simplicity” of the presentation. We had, over the previous years, come to expect some big explanatory shift intimated on the first page of the epilogue of *Insight*.

71 There is a sense in which this essay is simply a drawing attention to the shocking paragraph of *Method in Theology* beginning at line 18 of page 287. It suggests an elevation of the early descriptive chapters to full explanatory heuristic form. If I were to pick a page symbolic of the challenge it would be p. 464 (489 in the new edition) of *Insight*. One has to replace the phrase study of the organism with self-study of the organism to get a feel for the drive of the Zen-Ken search.
haute vulgarization.\textsuperscript{72} I am describing aspects of a climb to be slowly undertaken within the context of functional specialization. Why, for instance, are there seven aspects? Simply because I have an apocalyptic fondness for the number.\textsuperscript{73}

Perhaps the most evident need is the elevation of Insight from the moving viewpoint. This will not be an easy task. For one thing there is a duality about the question of moving viewpoint. Certainly there is the moving viewpoint promised and noted by the author here and there, a pedagogical device. But there is also the moving viewpoint of the author in this work that was never subjected by him to major revision. I recall asking him, in one of our Dublin conversations of the summer of 1971, when he reached precision about the meaning of “is”: his reply: “when I got that far in Insight.”

While I merely draw attention to the problem of moving viewpoint here, as it happens a key instance of the pedagogical strategy relates to a central problem of physics that is at the heart of Section 1. The reader has perhaps adverted to it already. It is the problem of having an explanatory heuristic notion of the notion of thing. The invitation to that heuristic comes in chapter 8; its axiomatic presence prior to the discussion of space-time would have given that discussion a significant lift.

That problem of an axiomatic presence of a conception of res, res particularis, res particularis existens, pulls in a second aspect of

\textsuperscript{72}On haute vulgarization see Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 121, 155.

\textsuperscript{73}My article “Features of Generalized Empirical Method and the Actual Context of Economics” in Creativity and Method, ed. Mathew Lamb (Marquette University Press, 1980), mentions seven bridges. Section 2 here may be seen as a deepening of the problem of “the bridge of size.” I am, of course, not alone in my attraction to the number. The work of Deepak Chopra, How to Know God: The Soul’s Journey into the Mystery of Mystery (New York: Harmony Books, 2000), pivots on seven. But I mention it here not only because of this, but because the success of the book is symptomatic of a contemporary longing. I do not think that that longing is sufficiently met by a reach for an enlightenment that is in fact mainly anaphatic and regularly confusing: “The insight came to Gautama under the Bodhi tree, just as it came to Jesus in the desert” (Chopra, How to Know God, 229-30). First, I would suspect that Gautama’s enlightenment was primarily an elevation of ising. Second, while I have no doubt about the ongoing enlightenment of Jesus, the primary enlightenment, a what-project within a what, was initial and of a quite different character, indeed of Infinitely Different Characters. See further, notes 82 and 83, and the text around note 41.
recontextualizing *Insight*: the lift that would be mediated by Lonergan's previous work on Aquinas, most evidently the work of the *Verbum* articles. And here again I note the added complication of the author's incomplete and moving viewpoint: in particular, there is no axiomatics of the *position* that nonetheless is more fully present in *Verbum* than in *Insight*.74

A third elevation of *Insight* is from a doctrinal presentation to a systematic presence. I recall, from a Boston Workshop of a decade ago, Charles Hefling drawing a parallel between reading *Insight* and reading a cello tutor. It catches the point magnificently. Tutorial doctrines ground a grim array of climbing exercises. The point is of much broader significance in this longer cycle of decline: there is a centuries-old deep *character*-flaw in the presentation of *theoria* that maims our move to the third stage of meaning. One must look to the eventual implementation of functional specialization to bring forth globally *characters* of humane communication. But the general point is obvious enough: the excitement of reading such a book as *Heroic Climbs*75 does not leave one comfortably breathing thin air. The general point, however, takes on a further depth when placed in the context of the two previously mentioned elevations. Then there can emerge a group aspiration for a full genetic and axiomatic thematic of the phylogenetic moving viewpoint within any and all fields of inquiry. It is an aspiration that sublates the humility of Schumpeter's claim for economics as "an incessant struggle with creations of our own and our

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74 The issue is extremely complex. The *Verbum* articles of the late 1940s (republished as *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 2d ed., Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) are richer in self-attentive exercises than is *Insight* but do not push for a positional axiomatics such as is suggested at the end of chapter 5 of *Phenomenology and Logic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). Might someone do for these two books what Hilbert did for Euclidean geometry? Note some key deficiencies of *Insight*’s presentation of the position, partly due to the moving viewpoint. First, there is no axiom of intentionality. Second, an axiom of particularity is needed. I touch on the latter in *Phenomenology and Logic* in commenting on the missing axiom lurking behind the Russell and Whitehead axiom (in readable form): [x and x] implies x. (See the index under *Russell*) The three xs are, both empirically and conceptually, different. Recall the ABC exercise in *Insight*: Obviously, this has relevance to geometry and physics.

predecessor's minds." It is an aspiration that pushes forward Lonergan's post-*Insight* struggles with history's relation to system. It is an aspiration that should lift the two sets of canons of inquiry of *Insight* into a new post-Kuhnian synthesis. It is an aspiration that requires a global functional specialist collaboration bringing forth the ongoing freshening of the genetic pragmatics that will be the seventh functional specialty.

But the aspiration is locked into the emergent probability of what I list as the fourth elevation of *Insight*. It is the pragmatic elevation of *Insight*, and of general culture, into the incarnation, the character, of the later definition of generalized empirical method. "Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects." While this is a definition that goes beyond the more elementary mention of generalized empirical method in *Insight*, the point nevertheless is made regularly in the book: forms are known through science, and modern science has made possible the advances in heuristics sketched in *Insight*. It is a discomforting explicitation: if one is pushing the heuristics of feelings or dreams one had best be up-to-date on their biochemistry. This discomfort is more easily recognized, and its cruxiform burden more Zen-patiently assumed through a pondering on the fifth elevation of *Insight* into the new control of meaning that is offered by the fullest possible heuristic. But before focusing on that height it is as well to pause optimistically on immediate implementables, caught in the popularization of the late definition of generalized empirical method contained in the slogan, "when teaching children geometry, one is

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77 The problem is being tackled by Robert Doran: see "The first chapter of *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica. The Issues,*" *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000): 27-48 and the references there to recent volumes of *Theological Studies*.

78 I give a fuller account of the genetic structure of systematics in *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics*, chapters 2 and 3.

teaching children children." For geometry one can substitute any topic. For children one can substitute any age. And the teacher is also being taught the teacher. All this is immediately, though badly, implementable, where I must recall another relevant slogan, "if something is worth doing, it is worth doing badly."

The fifth elevation points toward the effort to read the book in the full heuristic context, whether one accepts Lonergan's Christian viewpoint or not. The problem is neatly captured by attending to a single sentence: "The universe can bring forth its own unity in the concentrated form of a single intelligent view." Within Lonergan's Christian perspective the universe brought forth the mind of Jesus, and the form of his view was the Trinitarian practical vision of history. Our universe dances on the needle of His desire. This, obviously, is a huge topic, a mindfilling kneeful of awe. Existentially it places the book Insight in the context of Lonergan's special categorial reality, and it is an invitation to Christians to do the same. Here lies a vocation to an Imitatio Christi that steps clearheadedly away from the brothers of the common life, and indeed from present Christian Zen: it is better to feel compunction and to understand it, in a reach for the mind of Christ.

Sixth, there is the elevation of Insight to a new level of linguistic subjectivity. This shift cuts deeply toward a new horizon Of Grammatology and also gives a new richness to the pragmatics of moving

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80 Insight, 16.4.4.

81 Lonergan's last published Latin effort was an enlargement of thesis 12 of De Verbo Incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), 332-415. This was central to his life and the mediation of his prayer. See further his De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), 107-109, 182, 196, on Jesus' self-understanding as Creator.

82 The ontology of this is complex. See De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, 232-35. I treat some aspects of this elevation of the universe in "Grace: the Final Frontier," chapter 7 of The Redress of Poise (Halifax: Axial Press, 2001).

83 Recall 1 Cor. 2:7 and Phil. 2:5. Here, surely, one finds Christian motivation both toward self-appropriation — reaching a mind "like to ours" through ours — and toward the fruitful dark glimpse of the content of that mind. My emphasis here on our kataphatic orientation by no means excludes anaphatic reaching. But it seems to me that this next millennium needs a focus on what-enlightenment (in both its modes) rather than on is-enlightenment.

84 I recall here the title of Jacques Derrida's work (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997). I hope to tackle the transposition of that work in a sequel to Phenomenology
viewpoint. There is the key pointing of Lonergan. "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feed-back, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective." Of course, the book *Insight* was written as an invitation to a new level of subjectivity, but the writing style does not give it a serious twist in that direction. So, to take an example of key relevance to our present point, the title of chapter 12, "The Notion of Being," does not immediately turn the casual reader to the reader's deepest desires, much less to a self-study of the organism that lives, not in a habitat but in the universe. Certainly, then, there is a lower level of linguistic turning to which every teacher of *Insight* adverts. But the elevation I write of must go deeper, cut into grammar, and reorient the evolution of language. Grammar, whether from Panini or from Alexandria or from medieval England, grounds an alienating colonization of expression that already warped Sanskrit and Greek expression and left English open to conceptualism's further colonization. What are the real parts of speech? Are they not to be discovered in a manner that echoes the schooling slogan, "when teaching children grammar, one is teaching children children, one is self-teaching the teacher"? Indeed, the barely articulate child may yet redeem grammar. And, to shift from the ontogenetic to the phylogenetic, barely articulate Vedic desire may yet refresh chapter 12 of *Insight*. Here I am turning again, somewhat off course, into high Oriental seas, but it may help some of my Oriental or Zen readers.

I began my list of elevations by noting the moving viewpoint of *Insight* intended by Lonergan. Chapter 12, within that viewpoint, says nothing about objectivity and indeed the title of the chapter might well have mentioned, as I once suggested, not being but omra. Or? Pick any

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85 *Lonergan, Method in Theology*, 88, note 34.


Oriental, Aboriginal or ancient African "total-reached-for." Chapter 12, in this new lightsome and linguistic turn, becomes of deep anthropological importance, a phenomenology of desire seeking to retrieve our global best. The instance touched on in the previous section may help: there is Dogen (1200-1253), Aquinas's contemporary, and perhaps indeed the Aquinas of medieval Zen. His language is already a colonized language, but his desire resents colonialism in his search for the integrity of the organism that is Dogen. Indeed, his self-search has the character of a broadness that reached beyond and behind various Zen sects — Soto, Rinzai, Obaku, whatever — beyond the wider vaguer Hinayana and Mahayana reachings. He was slowly writing his Shobogenzo during the first quarter century of Thomas's life, with one section focusing on the topic "being-time." Is he not trekking the same Mount Fuji as Thomas when he writes, colonized-crippled: "You must cease to concern yourself with the dialectics of Buddhism and instead learn how to look into your own mind in seclusion"88? And there is the discovery of the puzzling onenesses that the incarnate notion that is the human organism gives to the content of the "duration" that Lonergan writes of in Insight, chapter 5: "One has to accept that in this world there are millions of objects and that each one is, respectively, the entire world — that is where the study of Buddhism commences. When one comes to realize this fact, [one perceives that] every object, every living thing, is the whole even though it itself does not realize it. As there is no other time than this, every being-time is the whole of time: one blade of grass, every single object is time."89 So, Zen Mastery might elevate our Western search into a more organistic sensability of Ken Mystery.90


89Kapleau, The Three Pillars of Zen, 310.

90You are with me, I hope, in not viewing the above paragraph as anything more than broad suggestions. What of my comparison of Lonergan and Dogen? It is quite superficial: within the full Lonergan heuristic Comparison is the challenge expressed by lines 6-7 of page 250 of Method in Theology. What type of realist was Dogen? (The question behind Hee-Jin Kim's book, Dogen Kigen — Mystical Realist [University of Arizona Press, 1975]. Such a question eventually gains precision and semi-invariant tentative answering through the spiraling of functional specialization. In passing I would note a useful account of Dogen's and Buddhist thought on existence and time in Hee-Jin Kim, Dogen Kigen, 184-213.
Finally, there is the analysis of *Insight* that comes from the demand of efficient unity for metaphysics.\(^{91}\) It is the book's central *problem* where my italics recall for the reader Lonergan's meaning of *problem* in chapter 20 and so the issue both of special categories already mentioned and the missing book mentioned at the start of *Insight*’s epilogue. The *problem* is the feebleness of the *capacity, need*\(^{92}\) that is the dynamic of material finitude's “destiny,”\(^{93}\) but here I must be brief, pointing my reader toward the intussusception of a single word, *implementation*. The word occurs significantly a dozen times in *Insight* but it is not indexed.\(^{94}\) It is the problem word in the definition of metaphysics. It is the problem fact of the cultural failure of *Insight* that parallels the failure of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* and Thomas's *Summae*. It preoccupied Lonergan for a dozen years before he found the core of the missing book. So I conclude with the same claim that I made on the first page: The efficient survival of this eccentric view on human intelligence and progress depends, with precise statistics, on the gradual implementation in the academy of the division of labor suggested in *Method in Theology*.

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\(^{91}\)See Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 160.


\(^{94}\)Fr. Crowe and I have had humorous exchanges over the years about the flaws in our indexing efforts in *Insight* and *Method*. Most recently he smilingly remarked "there are a lot more references on feelings in the new index!" Implementation presents a challenge for the next edition.
CLEARING THE GROUND

How to Think about Realism and Antirealism

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REALISTS AND ANTIREALISTS disagree either about what knowing is or about what we can know; usually they disagree about both without clearly distinguishing between the two questions. I argue that the dispute about the nature of knowledge is the result of confusion on both sides. Once that confusion is cleared away it becomes evident that the only issues properly in dispute are those concerning what we can know and that, as a rule, such issues are best settled by attempting to acquire the knowledge in question. I offer brief critiques of Kant, Putnam, and Dummett, which show that at least the first two conflate, or come perilously close to conflating, two quite different things: the construction of something that can be known and knowing what one has constructed. In the course of these critiques I argue (1) that the denial of bivalence results partly from the confusion about knowledge just mentioned and partly from erroneous views about language; (2) that truth, in any sense in which knowing it would be informative, is, roughly, correspondence; (3) that thinking of the realism-antirealism problem in terms of what is or is not “inside” or “outside” the head or mind is misleading and that the crucial distinction is between what is and what is not placed beyond hypothesis by evidence and cogent reasoning. Finally, (4) I propose that Bernard Lonergan’s theory of what knowing is should be acceptable to both sides and, in addition, has the advantage of being demonstrably correct.
I. PROTAGORAS REVISITED

The minimum commitment of a realist is this: there is at least something which we can know as in itself it really is quite independently of our knowing it. Of course realists hold different views about what we can know in this way and how we can know it, just as antirealists differ about what we cannot know in this way and why we cannot know it. Attempts to clarify issues founder for want of common ground: What counts as "knowing," as being "mind-independent," as "objective," as "real"? But I think we can begin to make some progress by reflecting that if the minimum commitment just stated were all there was to realism, it is hardly credible that there would be any antirealists.

After all, the antirealist is committed to the truth of antirealism, that is, to a fact about human knowing. Surely, he does not mean to assert that he has "constructed" human knowing in the process of understanding it or that his theory is uninformative about what knowing really is because such knowing has somehow been altered or masked by his coming to know it. Nor is he asserting that the statements in which his theory is set out are neither true nor false. The antirealist is not claiming that he has failed to grasp what is really the case about what we can know and what knowing is; he is claiming that he has succeeded in doing this. If that is not what he means, then the antirealist has made no intellectual commitment at all.

The argument just given may be termed the "anti-Protagorean" argument: Man may be the measure of all things else, but he is not the measure of that fact about himself — not if he wishes to inform himself or anyone else about the matter. The point of the anti-Protagorean argument is that realists and antirealists do and must share the minimal commitment mentioned earlier and that to correctly understand that commitment is to resolve the issue about the nature of knowing.

1This argument should not be confused with Putnam's version of one of Plato's anti-Protagorean arguments. (Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 120). Plato also gives what is essentially my argument. Putnam's counterargument does not apply to the present argument and is not a cogent objection to Plato's second argument.
The antirealist will concede that the truth of antirealism is in some sense mind-independent, that is, he will concede the point about the nature of his own knowledge claim, for he cannot coherently do otherwise. But he will insist that it is trivially true that antirealism is the case independently of his knowing that it is; it is mind-independently true in somewhat the same sense that statements about the present contents of his consciousness are mind-independently true. If this is to count as mind-independent, then it is not this part of the mind-independent that both he and the realist would like to know but that he thinks we cannot know.

The realist of the sort I have in mind — the realist who is impressed by the anti-Protagorean argument — will concede that at first blush it does not seem particularly relevant to the issues that divide realists from antirealists. (A fuller exposition of this position is given in Section II.) But he will insist that there is an important lesson to be learned from it. In puzzling over the problem of what we can know and, hence, over the problem of mind-independence and objectivity, outside the mind and public must not be confused with verified and therefore beyond hypothesis. The point is not trivial; for it is the latter, not the former, which gives the epistemically crucial sense of "what is the case" and, therefore, of "mind-independent" and "objective," as we shall see. It is our ability to achieve epistemic objectivity, that is, epistemic mind-independence, which determines what we can or cannot know about items that are ontologically mind-independent. Once all parties get clear about this, the issue will no longer be what knowing is, but what we can know. Section II makes the case for this claim.

A look at three antirealists will prepare the way.

1.1. Kant

My problem with Kant is not about whether we can know "things-in-themselves," "noumena"; it is about what Kant thinks knowing is. When Kant says that we can know geometry and arithmetic because we construct space and time out of some non-informative "stuff" by imposing upon it the a priori forms and the a priori categories of the understanding, he is not saying that he knows that fact about cognition by imposing still other a priori forms and concepts on a first level cognitional "stuff," so
that the *First Critique* only tells us about that higher level construction and not about how we are able to know arithmetic and geometry. It is not difficult to discover how Kant did come to know the nature of human knowing (if he did come to know it), for he tells us. He had experience with knowing or thinking he knew various things, read Hume, became puzzled ("awoke from" his "dogmatic slumber"), invented a hypothesis — transcendental idealism — and proceeded to demonstrate its truth. And when he had succeeded in doing this (if he did succeed) he did not limit himself to the modest assertion that transcendental idealism must *appear* to be true. No, he insists that it *is* true, that there are no two (or three) ways about it, and that those who think otherwise are just wrong.

Kant tells us, famously, that "we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves have put into them."\(^2\) But of course he does not mean that we consciously generate and impose the a priori forms of space and time or the a priori categories, nor is Kant claiming that those who do not understand the *First Critique* cannot do mathematics. In fact, we also know how these sciences have developed. They were achieved by the same process Kant used to acquire his epistemological knowledge: by wondering about certain experiences — in this case mathematically relevant experiences (of whatever sort) — formulating the puzzle as a sufficiently well-defined problem, inventing a hypothesis, and showing (by constructive proofs or otherwise) that one of them is correct. If the intuitionists are right about mathematics, they arrived at that knowledge by the operations just described, not by "constructing" mathematics in the process of working out the correct theory of mathematics.

So the a priori forms of space and time described by Kant are to be understood as accounting for why space and time have the properties that we subsequently learn they do have. Thus we have two operations going on, both of which are often lumped together as "knowing": constructing something knowable and knowing what we have constructed.\(^3\) And if we


\(^3\)Of course we do sometimes consciously "construct" mathematical objects, but this is not the process that Kant thinks makes experience itself possible and intelligible. It is not clear how the notion of consciously constructed mathematical objects (the nth ordinal
know, in the second sense, that that is how a priori synthetic knowledge is possible, then we know that transcendental idealism correctly describes, characterizes, "corresponds" to that epistemic fact.

1.2. Putnam

It will suffice to list the salient features of Putnam's "internal realism."

1. The attack on "metaphysical realism," that is, on the view that there is some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. [That] there is exactly one true and complete description of "how the world is."\(^4\)

2. The claim that there is no "God's-eye view" that we can know or usefully imagine: there are only the actual points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.\(^5\) There are psychological, conceptual, linguistic, and logico-semantic versions of (2), as we shall see.

3. The attack on the correspondence theory of truth, that is, on the view that truth involves some sort correspondence between word or thought signs and external things and sets of things,"\(^6\) and the advocacy, instead, of truth as "verifiability under ideal epistemic conditions."\(^7\)

It is not difficult to see how the anti-Protagorean argument applies to each of these claims.

1. However successful Putnam's attack on "metaphysical realism" may be, surely he is not arguing that the account he gives of how our cognitive

\(^7\)Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History*, 55.
powers are related to the world is not "the one true description" of that fact. No, he is asserting that his account of reference and cognition is simply true, that it correctly characterizes its subject matter, and that there are no two ways about it. Perhaps the "out there" presents itself to us as a blank screen upon which we project our interests and conceptual structures; but once one sorts the world "internally" in a certain way, surely that is the way he has sorted it, at least for the time being; and one's statements about this "internal reality" will either "correspond" to the "internal reality" or they will not. Crucially, that "reality" will be correctly characterized as just the sort of item it is.

Again there are two quite different things going on: verifying a hypothesis about something and creating something about which a hypothesis may be entertained. Muddle results from calling both "knowing." I suspect that, if pressed, Putnam might agree. He does, at one point, refer to "internal reality," not as the result of acts of knowing, but as "makers true, makers verified" of claims about them. If this is an endorsement of the distinction I have been making, then I propose that we should all follow his example, which some of us do not.8

2. If there is no God's-eye view at all, then obviously, there is no God's-eye view about whether there is a God's-eye view; and if there is such a view, it will, to quote Aristotle, "say of what is, that it is, and of what is not that it is not." Again Putnam might agree. But the point is not trivial. For even if what is known is only "internally real" (and not also some sort of relation to an "outer reality," albeit otherwise unknowable), nevertheless, that fact and the fact that we know it are absolute facts about a rather special and limited reality. For what could "reality" mean if not what is the case? And what would knowing what is really the case be, if not knowing something as in itself it really is? To know an illusion as an illusion or an appearance as an appearance is, therefore, to know it as it

8If the "world" is not a "fixed totality of objects," in some broad sense of that phrase, what is it? What would count as a world if not some sort of totality (perhaps the "totality" limited by nothing at all), some sort of item or items or features of items or relations among these? Is Putnam suggesting that the mind-independent world, however amorphous it may be, and however ambiguous our references to it are, isn't just the way it is and not otherwise? And why should our notion of the "world" exclude "inner realities" or anything at all? Whatever the distinction between "mind-independent" and "mind-dependent" "worlds," it is not a distinction between something and nothing at all.
really is, however ontologically odd it may be. Similarly, to know of an "internal reality" that it is (at least in part) internal is to know it as it really is. To "know an unreality" is simply to have judged wrongly, and to discover one's mistake is to learn what is really the case. None of this involves any defect in, or puzzle about, the nature of knowledge.

The appearance-reality dichotomy at play here can be misleading ontologically as well as epistemologically. It suggests an ultimate ontological division between the "not real in here" and the "real out there," instead of a distinction between a knower (or the content of her mental life) and objects other than herself that she would like to know, both of which are quite real.9

The psychological version of (2) is to the effect that the world can only be "our world" and so is constructed out of our interests and values and the "mind-independent world" in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish any of these elements from the others.10

But, again, Putnam cannot be saying that his theory of internal realism is a pudding mix of the real nature of human cognition and his particular values and interests in which it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other.

One gets the conceptual version of (2) and its corresponding deconstruction by substituting "conceptual schemes" for "interest and values" in the previous paragraph. The linguistic version is that "to talk of facts without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing."11 But either the language in which internal realism is stated is one which "says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not," or it is merely some language that talks of "something," in this case internal realism, which might nevertheless turn out to be a quite different "something" if expressed in another language. (And must we specify the language by

9In the First Critique Kant speaks of knowledge of one's self as a knower as though it were knowledge of the appearance of one's self as a knower. But the appearance of a knower cannot know anything (although it can appear to know something); appearances are objects of knowledge, not knowing subjects. If the knowing subject is not cognitionally present "to" herself without anything mediating that knowledge, nothing can be cognitionally present to her.


which we specify the language to be used, and so on ad infinitum, to talk of something? The theory of types as applied to languages is commonly abused to avoid facing up to viciously circular and regressive reasoning. It is to be hoped that the theory of linguistic types is not that type of linguistic theory.

(3) I am not competent to evaluate Putnam’s formal argument that “no view which only fixes the truth value of whole sentences can fix reference,” but at the risk of being tedious, I must note — what, again, Putnam might not deny — that if successful reference is needed to acquire knowledge of the mind-independent world, then it would seem to be necessary for making knowledge claims about the internal realist “world.” The terms Putnam employs in his argument, however their meaning is fixed, must be sufficiently free from ambiguity for him to talk about what he is talking about — at least to himself — and their referents must be unambiguously “in his head,” if he knows what he says he knows and unambiguously “in our heads,” when we come to know what he knows.

There are, of course, difficulties with the correspondence theory of justification, but, as we shall see, nothing is gained by pretending to make the problem go away through tinkering with the notion of truth — a notion which we all hold when we are not in a state of philosophical desperation and without which we could not say or think that there is another theory of truth.

12Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 33, 217-18. Putnam holds that his proof that reference must be ambiguous does not apply to “internal realism,” apparently because such reference occurs within a common “conceptual scheme” and is therefore somehow internal to each subject in a group of subjects. (Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 43 ff.) But can it be shown that Putnam’s proof would not, as a formal matter, also apply to internalist reference? It may be argued that his proof presupposes a third person perspective and therefore is inapplicable to reference considered from a first person perspective. The difficulty with this move is that the very possibility of a third person, “objective” perspective seems to imply the very God’s-eyesview rejected by Putnam. For Putnam, the first person, “internalist” perspective is the only one available to us for cognition, including our knowledge of his proof: there is ambiguity between conceptual frameworks but not within them. Unfortunately, Putnam’s proof (and all proofs in mathematics and logic) is supposed to hold for all these incommensurable conceptual reference frames.

If, as has been suggested, Putnam holds that referring constructs the referent in an "internal reality," there will be a conflation of referring and constructing referents which parallels that between knowing and constructing something to be known.

(4) If we don't conflate knowing and constructing, the difficulty with any attack on the correspondence theory of truth becomes patent. As Donald Davidson puts it, "What else could 'truth' mean" in any sense in which knowing it informs us about something? For each of the internal realism claims just discussed, either Putnam's claim "corresponds to," correctly characterizes, the nature of knowing or it does not, or it constructs a picture of something else which, whatever its merits may be, leaves us none the wiser about what we can know and how we can know it.

(5) Putnam's verification theory of truth is most conveniently discussed together with Dummett's verificationism.

1.3 Dummett

The salient features of Dummett's antirealism are his rejection of excluded middle, his verificationism, and his insistence on the fundamental role of language in resolving the realism-antirealism issue.

I must confess that I have been unable to understand how a well-formed proposition can be neither true nor false or how, if this were true in one case, it would not be true in every case. Surely, anything whatever is what it is and not what it is not, and so is either what we claim it is or is not what we claim it is. The condition "well-formed" is not a convenient escape hatch; it just refers to propositions expressed by sentences that require reconstrual. And notice that I am talking about propositions — about conscious events that consciously characterize (or about their

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15Whatever role reference plays in cognition, reference by itself is not knowledge of anything either "inner" or "outer," although verifying the hypothesis that one has succeeded in referring is knowledge of that fact and, perhaps, by implication, of the fact that there is a referent.

idealization) — not about sentences or sentence types, whose attendant propositions, if any, we may or may not understand and may or may not be able to verify.

Apparently, Dummett holds that in some cases (for example, counter-factuals and generalizations over infinite extensions) we can very well understand the meaning of a sentence (via the meaning of its subsentential parts\(^{17}\)) but that, nevertheless, it may be neither true nor false because we do not know how to recognize the evidence for its truth.\(^{18}\) But I think it is important to distinguish the evidence for the truth of a proposition from its truth conditions. The truth conditions are just that things are the way the proposition says they are; evidence may be anything that is capable of giving grounds for the belief that things are indeed that way.

Now, we would not know where to look for evidence if we did not already know, via our understanding of the proposition, for what possible state of affairs it was to be evidence. Again, it seems to me that that state of affairs must either obtain or not obtain and, hence, that the proposition

\(^{17}\)In contrast, Donald Davidson’s theory of how we come to understand language makes our grasp of the truth conditions of sentences epistemically primitive without exception. The senses of the subsentential expressions must be worked out by analysis of the true sentences in which they occur. This makes the link between truth and meaning too close. Because Davidson’s theory binds what we are capable of thinking to language and binds our understanding of language in turn to our ability to know when sentences (as part of a holistic system of sentences) are held true, it follows that we could not learn what sentences mean if they were not generally used correctly “by our lights.” The meaning of an expression, the expression itself, and its observed truth conditions become essentially linked to each other and to knowledge. One result is Davidson’s “omniscient translator” antiskeptical argument. Understanding sentences through their subsentential parts — a view with which Dummett, in spite of his verificationism, seems somewhat more sympathetic — leaves space between the meaning of a sentence and its truth; for one can learn how the speaker uses words and phrases without requiring that he put them together correctly to express true propositions. One can (and small children obviously do) use words and phrases without making judgments even though the words have the sorts of meanings they have because of their ultimate role in judgments. What may be required in the beginning is consistent use, not true judgments. Parallel considerations apply to the priority, in coming to understand a language, of grasping individual sentences over grasping a holistic system of sentences.

\(^{18}\)Hale, “Realism and its oppositions,” 279-80. So far as I can discover, construction of a “world” to fill the gap created by the world we cannot know because statements about it are neither true nor false does not play a role in Dummett’s antirealism, but one cannot help wondering if it may not be just offstage.
that affirms or denies that it obtains must be either true or false. Similarly, we could not know that evidence was needed or that no "conceivable candidate for evidence could be recognizably relevant" if we did not already know that a claim was being advanced and what that claim was. Our radical inability to know what sort of evidence could verify an assertion does not alter the relation of that assertion to the world, and it is that relation that constitutes the assertion as true or false.

Dummett's views about bivalence are closely connected to his verificationism, which in turn is implicit in his theory of meaning. Where the meaning of a sentence is not acquired, as discussed earlier, by first learning the meanings of its constituent expressions and then by applying general syntactical rules for their combination, it is acquired by observing the instances in which the sentence is held to be true, that is, by observing its truth conditions. Thus, if we cannot identify the cases in which the sentence is held to be true, that is, the case in which it is verified, we cannot grasp its meaning. Where such observable truth conditions are unavailable in principle, so also will be the sentence's meaning. Hence the classic verificationist claim that the meaning of a sentence is its method of its verification. Hence, also, the claim that a sentence cannot have a truth value absent any possibility, even in principle, of our knowing whether it is in fact true.

As already discussed, part of the problem with verificationism is its failure to distinguish between truth conditions and evidence for truth. But the view of truth and meaning just set out is also encouraged by talking about learning a language as though it consisted quite literally of learning under what circumstances sentences are true or subsentential parts are held to have certain meanings. This way of talking conceals what is really going on.

If an utterance is made under suitable circumstances, I learn, not that someone holds the utterance to be true or false or to have such-and-such a sense or referent; what I establish as true or false is my hypothesis about what proposition or subpropositional part the speaker understands the utterance to express. If our hypotheses about the meaning associated with an utterance are neither true nor false, there will be no possibility of confirming or disconfirming those hypotheses and, hence, no possibility
of coming to know the meaning of the utterance. And neither the hypothesis nor the proposition nor the subpropositional sense nor the judgment that the hypothesis is verified is an utterance.

One might not know what an utterance means, but one cannot fail to know the meaning of his own judgment that he doesn’t know what the utterance means. Similarly, one cannot fail to know what hypothesized meanings he could or could not verify as belonging to the utterance. Utterances whose meaning cannot be ascertained are not exceptions to bivalence; they are utterances whose attendant bivalent assertions, if any, cannot be ascertained. Relative to our state of knowledge, they are simply meaningless utterances.

One learns a language (in the sense of “learn” that applies to a normal adult), I suggest, just as one learns anything else: by wondering about one’s experiences, formulating questions, proposing answers, and finding out which answers are justified by the evidence. Nor is there any reason why, in learning a language in this way, we should be bound head, hand, and foot like Plato’s cave dwellers by a literal mapping — holistic or otherwise — of observed utterances onto observed events.

There are, for example, no observable circumstances which by themselves could enable us to acquire or adequately manifest knowledge of a general term. Everything we can observe is a particular or particulars, and every utterance anyone makes could be interpreted as a proper name of a particular or group of observed particulars provided the interpreters are sufficiently unimaginative or otherwise cognitively limited. Does that mean that we do not have or cannot communicate universal concepts? Does it mean that we construct an “internal reality” in which there are such concepts but that they can have no application to the “external world”? Or does it not rather mean that one judges reasonably that language users who are very like her in other relevant respects are also like her in having concepts that cannot be adequately manifested empirically but which we all do, somehow, have, apply, and communicate, and without which we could not think that we do not have these abilities?

What began as an effort by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead to craft a language adequate for a rigorously thought-out logic and mathematics
has, in my view, become an obsessive attempt to bind thought to language — in some cases, to a behaviorist theory of language; hence, the major role of philosophy of language in the realism-antirealism debate and generally. For the later Wittgenstein, to take an extreme case, whatever natural language happens to be in use will set the limits of our philosophical aspirations. But are we capable of meaning and cognition because we share a linguistic practice, or do we share a linguistic practice because we are capable of meaning and cognition? To opt for the former seems wrongheaded, if for no other reason than that learning a language is itself an act of cognition. The evident fact is that we routinely adopt, adapt, or invent whatever linguistic practices serve our purposes, as, indeed, Wittgenstein himself repeatedly does in the Investigations.

But if we can invent hypotheses with essential freedom from de facto public discourse conceived along rigidly empiricist lines, then we are free to subject the world, language, and ourselves to unrestricted inquiry. Perhaps we would not find the answers we most want, but we would at least know that the correct answers, if we could find them, would tell us what is the case. And if we can invent propositions that an utterance might mean, we can hardly have acquired our knowledge of the candidate propositions from the utterance, and those propositions can hardly fail to be true or false merely because we do not know how to verify them.

Putnam, like Dummett, holds a verificationist theory of truth. For Putnam, a statement can be true (or false) only if it (or its negation) is verifiable at least under "ideal epistemic conditions." If this view results from the identification of propositions with sentences, it is subject to the objections just given. If, on the other hand, Putnam is speaking of propositions, we face another difficulty already dealt with. How does one set about determining the verifiability (under either ideal or less than ideal epistemic conditions) of a proposition that he must treat as having no truth value until that verifiability is established, and that he must, therefore, treat as making no claim whose verifiability or nonverifiability can be examined? Let us look more closely at why making a truth claim implies having a truth value and vice versa.

19Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 55 ff.
It is obvious (1) that a proposition's having a truth value implies that it makes a truth claim — it asserts or denies something. But, as I argued above and am about to argue further, (2) a proposition's making a truth claim implies that it has a truth value. Hence, a proposition has a truth value if and only if it makes a truth claim. Of course, (2) is a large part of what the realist-antirealist controversy is about, so more needs to be said about why I think (2) is true and how it applies to making truth value depend upon verifiability.

We must treat every (well-formed) proposition as making a truth claim, as asserting or denying that something is the case, because that is what propositions do, that is what constitutes their having any meaning at all as propositions. For a proposition to make no assertion or to "assert" that something is neither the case nor not the case is not for it to acquire some mysterious non-value or some inscrutable third value but to render itself useless to our cognitional project: it would be neither actually or potentially informative. This is exemplified by the fact that the hypothesis that a proposition does not make a truth claim (or does not have a truth value) must itself make such a claim (or have a truth value) if it is to advance one's cognitional project.

But if a (well-formed) proposition must make a truth claim, must assert or deny that something is the case, then it must have a truth value; for the world is as it is (and not as it is not) and thus must satisfy or not satisfy the proposition's claim. In a word, the reason propositions must be bivalent is that the world is "bivalent," and the point of propositions is to be informative about the world.20

20The most plausible candidates for propositions that are neither true nor false, it seems to me, are (1) those about not-yet-constructed mathematical items, (2) those about future contingents (There will be a sea battle tomorrow or The number that will be constructed for the first time tomorrow will be prime), (3) those about certain quantum events, and (4) "vague" propositions. But (1) If claims about not-yet-existing mathematical items (if there are any such items) are not treated as claims about future contingents, it seems to me that they are amenable to the usual methods for dealing with apparently nonreferring terms. (2) The problem with future contingents is better viewed as a problem with the nature of time and contingence, not as a problem with bivalence. (3) It is to be emphasized that statements that certain quantum events are indeterminate are not themselves indeterminate with respect to their truth values. At the very least, claims of indeterminacy must always be embedded in claims that are determinate if either claim is to be informative. Finally, (4) a vague proposition is nevertheless a proposition: if it excludes anything at all (and is not about everything about everything),
As we have seen, determining the verifiability of what does not already have a truth value will seem plausible if one thinks that truth and falsity are (relational) properties of sentences (ink, sound waves, gestures); for sentences indeed make no truth claims and have no truth values. But in fact "verifying a sentence" will either be found to consist in verifying a hypothesis about what proposition is to be assigned to the sentence, as explained above, or it will amount to implicitly assigning a proposition to the sentence and then showing that that proposition cannot be verified by some approved sort of evidence.

Verification in the absence of truth value will also seem plausible if one conflates finding grounds for judging that the truth condition obtains with constructing the item to which the characterization will apply after we have created that item. It will be argued that the sentence or proposition could not be true or false unless there was something for it to be true or false of. But I think such statements can formulated so as to avoid this difficulty. The important point to make here is that, as we have seen, the "maker true" (truth condition) is not necessarily the same as the "maker verified" (evidence), as Putnam seems to imply, and that when they are the same, say, when one can directly inspect a system of concepts one has rationally constructed and about which one is making an assertion, there is a "maker verified" because there is a "maker true," not a "maker true" because there is a "maker verified."

To give Aristotle's example, the same objects that sparkle in the heavens are planets, but they are not planets because they sparkle; they to that extent it characterizes. The fact that we cannot determine its truth value in some cases tells us that there are, perhaps, vague items in the world or that the proposition is not a very good one. It does not tell us that the proposition has no truth value, for in that case it could not even be vague. A completely vague proposition is no proposition at all.

21 The truth value of a proposition allegedly about a nonexistent item is, I suggest, false. The sentence must, of course, be reconstrued, as in Russell's account of nonreferring descriptions, as expressing several propositions, one of which is existential. After the item and, hence, the proposition's truth conditions, come into existence (by our constructing them or otherwise) the proposition will have, for example, the value true, not only for the person who constructed the item in question, and who therefore also happens to be in a position to know what the proposition's truth value is, but as an absolute relation between the proposition, by whomever entertained, and the item. If this were not so, the proposition would both have and not have a truth value or would have contradictory truth values.
are only known to be planets because they sparkle. In the same senses, respectively, of "because," statements about an item are not true or false because they are verifiable; they are verifiable, in part, because they are true or false. And this remains true even when the same item discharges both epistemic functions. Truth is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for verification; verification is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for truth. The illusion to the contrary in the case of constructed epistemic entities results from the fact that the person who does the constructing is the person whose hypothesis is verified by the item constructed; but these two relations between the person and the object are quite different.

II.

We have seen what knowing commits one to if one sees the point of the anti-Protagorean argument. I must now make good on my promise to expand this insight into an account of knowing, that of Bernard Lonergan, which should be acceptable to both parties. I have noted that Kant, Putnam, and Dummett arrived at their theories by the quite ordinary process of having experiences with knowing, wondering about the nature,

An editor of this journal suggested that Lonergan may have held that verification is a necessary condition for truth in the case of omniscience "for the same reason that the intrinsic intelligibility of being implies an act of unrestricted intelligence." This is an interesting suggestion, but I confess I am unable to see how the notion of verification could have more than a very remote, analogical application to divine intelligence. Obviously, God would know, not merely believe or hypothesize, every truth; so in that sense, and for God, "verification" would be a necessary condition for truth. (Actually something not unlike this does occur in human knowing, but a discussion of it lies beyond the scope of this paper and would furnish no comfort to the antirealist.) Perhaps the thought is that an unrestricted act of understanding would ground, that is, "verify," each of its "beliefs" because the being and the intelligibility of the content of the belief are grounded in the exhaustive self-knowledge of the primary intelligible. This self-knowledge would somehow also constitute, by identity, the primary intelligible's existential ground. Thus the divine existence would "verify," be conclusive "evidence" for, the truth of divine "beliefs" or "hypothesis" about itself, and this "verification" would also, by identity, be a necessary condition for the truth of divine "beliefs about" itself and everything else. In the usual senses of the terms, however, verification, that is, epistemic grounding, is not a necessary condition for truth in the case of finite subjects, as the editor observes. If it were, we would ipso facto both be able to believe and be justified in believing every proposition we could invent that in fact happened to be true, even though we had no clue as to which of the propositions are true and which are false.
scope, and limitations of that knowing, formulating their puzzlement in a question, proposing an answer, and consulting the evidence to determine whether the proposed solution is correct. This motive and these operations are the common currency of science and philosophy, and yet they contain the solution to our problem. Further, it turns out that any attempt to reject this quite ordinary account of knowing is self-refuting in a way to be described in a moment. First the notions of "hypothesis," "experience," and "wonder" need explication.

A "hypothesis" is consciously invented and entertained, so in that sense, it is mental; but its content is entertained - well, only hypothetically. It may propose a characterization of something mental or something physical; but if the evidence shows the hypothesis to be correct, then what it asserts is the case and is real, whether what is the case is "in here" or "out there." This is the epistemic sense of mind-independent and is to be distinguished from the ontological sense of that expression, as explained earlier. The fact that I am now thinking about philosophy is ontologically dependent upon my mind; but the hypothesis that that is what I am doing is mind-independent in the epistemic sense, provided I am not so preternaturally dull-witted as to fail to relate the evidence to the hypothesis. In the same way, the influence of gravity on photons is a mind-independent fact in the ontological sense; but to learn this fact it is necessary that one's hypothesis to that effect be promoted to mind-independence in the epistemic sense by one's grasp of the evidence.

We come to know what is or is not ontologically mind-independent by making our hypothesis to that effect epistemically mind-independent. In the second sense, mind-independence is just justified true belief (justified hypothesis), knowledge — it is a God's-eye view. As previously noted, if mortals are not capable of such a view, then they are not capable of knowing that they are not.

The notion of "experience" is rather technical. We shall say that experience is anything of which one is conscious prior, epistemically, to intellectual inquiry into it. It may be the content of any act of sensing or imagining, or it may be the act of sensing or imagining itself as something about which we might become curious. It may be any intellectual act (including an act of inquiring) or content of an intellectual act whose
intelligibility or further intelligibility we may wish to explore. Experience is consciousness of data, of whatever kind. Is the data of sense ontologically mind-independent or capable of informing us about something that is ontologically mind-independent? That is a question to be answered, if at all, by inquiring intelligently and reasonably into these and other data.

"Wonder" is just the disinterested desire to know, the intellectual curiosity given top billing by Aristotle in the Metaphysics. The desire to know is not yet knowing, but its satisfaction is. If you think it is not, isn't that because you are intellectually dissatisfied with the claim that it is? Is that intellectual dissatisfaction functioning as a norm for what is to count as knowledge? If it is not, what warns you off accepting the claim that it is? If it is such a norm, will it provide no guidance in finding a better theory?

Disinterested curiosity is about how things really are. If your inquiries lead you to believe that it isn't, nevertheless, I'm sure they lead you to believe it really isn't. Could you have gotten such an objectively correct conviction if you had not intended to get it — hankered after it — and been guided by that intention from the beginning? Do you know that your cognitional hankering is a disinterested desire for objective truth because you already know what "disinterested" and "objective" mean, or do you know what these expressions mean because you already have such a desire?

No doubt you have a better theory of knowledge. Did you acquire that theory by virtue of never having had any experience with knowing or trying to know anything? By remaining utterly without curiosity about what constituted such efforts as knowing or trying to know? If you became curious, did you seek no insights and propose no intelligent hypotheses? Did you take no interest at all in whether that hypothesis was

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23 This could not be the case unless the intellectual curiosity, the inquiry itself quite apart from its object or content, was already intelligent and rational. We do not become conscious by becoming conscious of the concept of consciousness, nor do we think intelligently and reasonably when we are conscious by understanding the concepts intelligence and reasonableness and then by applying those concepts to our thinking. The subject's conscious epistemic operations, from inquiring through verifying, are not objects of consciousness (although may be made such); they are constituted by consciousness. They are not self-conscious; they are consciousness itself.
correct? If you did, did you make no judgment that it was indeed verified by the evidence? If you omitted any of these operations, how credible is your theory even in your own eyes? But if carrying out these operations of experiencing, inquiring, hypothesizing, and judging to satisfy the need to be intelligent and reasonable is the root of cognitive credibility, doesn't that mean that the result constitutes justified true belief? And if your belief is justified, doesn't it inform you about what is really the case?

So, also, any attempt to refute the theory of cognition I have sketched would necessarily rely for its plausibility on the very intellectual operations, needs, and norms it is rejecting; hence, the theory is transcendentally secure. In particular, the antirealist objection that to transcend the knowing subject would be to achieve a God's-eye view, a "view from nowhere," is convincing to the antirealist himself only if it, too, is the outcome of just such operations and serves his cognitive purposes only if these operations succeed in transcending his own and every other subject's "viewpoint." If the products of these operations of experiencing, inquiring, hypothesizing, and verifying are "subjective" in the epistemologically pejorative sense, and therefore incapable of accessing the real, then so is the product of the operations by which that impotence is purportedly known; for they are the same operations. That was the point of the anti-Protagorean argument.

On this theory, the "objective" is the content or object of the various cognitional operations just described and will vary in kind with the level of the operation. When the operation is the grounding of a judgment, the objective is simply the real; when it is the content of sensation, it is a sensum. A sense datum is objective, not because it is public, but because it is given as a potential object of inquiry and a potential constraint upon hypotheses. The epistemically objective cannot be what is "out there" or what is expressible in a public language; for we learn what is "out there" and public by formulating hypotheses that achieve epistemic mind-independence, which are verified, by experiences that we have prior to knowing whether they are "in here" or "out there." If we cannot know what is "out there" and public in this way, we cannot know it at all.

But if the operations described are what one does to learn what is really the case about his knowing or about anything else, and if the motive
mentioned is why one performs them and how one knows one is doing them correctly, is there no clue to the general nature of the real in the general nature of the kinds of questions one asks and the kinds of content that these operations produce?

The foregoing aimed to convince that what we acquire by these operations is the case, the real, being. Is there anything that cannot be known by these operations? The answer, obviously, is yes. Of course, in a trivial sense it is not possible for me to know, for example, what Caesar had for breakfast on the day he crossed the Rubicon, although it is possible for Caesar to have known it. However, for reasons rooted in nature it does seems to be impossible for anyone to know both the momentum and the location of an electron. Here, three points require making.

First, what in principle lies absolutely beyond the reach of the cognitional operations described can make no conscious difference to us, that is, it cannot affect us in any way of which we can be conscious; for we can inquire into anything of which we are in any way conscious, thus bringing it within the scope of the cognitional operations and motives.

Second, absent further showing, it does not follow that what we cannot in principle know is somehow more or less real, more or less important than what we do or can know. Moreover to show that this is the case would be to exhibit important knowledge about that of which we claim to know nothing.

Third, it does not follow that what we cannot in principle know, because we cannot in principle bring our cognitional operations to a successful conclusion regarding it, lies outside our disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. If it be proposed that there may be something that lies absolutely outside our power to inquire, nevertheless, we can, as noted above, wonder about whether this is really the case, and so in some sense bring the alleged item within the scope of our inquiry. Nor would this unsatisfied wonder be entirely useless cognitionally. For just as it carries within itself the norms of intelligence and judgment that lead us to what is really the case about what we can know (and that may require us to acknowledge that there is something we cannot know), so it contains
the norms which, if only we could apply them, would enable us to know the unknowable.

But let us be specific. Can we know, say, whether there is an external world, whether there are moral facts, whether there are universals, whether Schrödinger's cat is dead or alive? Let us formulate the problem as clearly as we can, apply our best intelligence and judgment to the relevant data, and see what we come up with. Perhaps it can be shown that there is no problem, only a deep misunderstanding. Perhaps it can be demonstrated that the answers to these puzzles cannot be known—perhaps some sort of incompleteness theorem might apply to them. Either of these results may well prove more interesting than the solutions to the original puzzles might have been. But no matter what the outcome of our efforts, it would not be a victory for either party in the realism-antirealism debate; for the most fundamental difference in that dispute would have been resolved. If there is no disagreement about what counts as knowing and, hence, about what counts as real, then there can be no deeply divisive debate about what we do or do not, can or cannot, know.

So the operations and motives described define the real, define "being," at two levels. First, just as the laws of nature may be "operationally" defined as what is or could be achieved by the successful employment of scientific method, so, quite generally, what there is that we do or can know is what results or might result from the successful implementation of the operations described. Second, the real is, quite generally, the object of the disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.

CONCLUSION

No doubt you are wondering how all this gets us any nearer to the truth about realism and antirealism. In an important sense it doesn't. Knowing what knowing is does not in itself constitute knowing, say, whether reference to ontologically mind-independent items is ambiguous or what the fate of Schrödinger's cat is. As we have just seen, a theory of cognition is an account of a method of methods (is itself a product of that method), and a method is only potentially its results. But it does tell us that there is no other way of knowing, tells us what we ought to mean by "knowing," "mind-independent," "real," "objective," and distinguishes knowing from
constructing something to be known. It informs us that any informative proposition about anything is and can only be bivalent, suggests that making language foundational was wrong from the start, and invites us to set about inquiring into what is and is not ontologically mind-independent by establishing that the relevant hypotheses are epistemically mind-independent.
TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

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INTRODUCTION

LET ME BEGIN with a few words about the overall orientation of my paper.¹ The original theme on which Father Gilbert suggested that I speak was Transcendental Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy. The first term of that theme, “transcendental philosophy,” is familiar to everyone here. Let us characterize philosophy in general as the effort to discover what in some important sense is most basic and to give a global account of everything in terms of it. A philosophy is transcendental, then, if it pursues that goal by the pathway of investigating the elements of human consciousness and seeking to elucidate their apriori structure. If one thinks generically of transcendental philosophy as an approach that historically is associated with Immanuel Kant and his successors, it remains that our particular interest is in the species associated with Joseph Maréchal and those influenced by him.

¹The original version of this paper was presented at a symposium held in Brussels, Belgium, on 7-8 April 2000. The symposium, entitled “Après Maréchal: Pensée chrétienne aujourd’hui,” was convened to mark the appearance of a volume of twenty-one essays on the work of Joseph Maréchal. The volume, Au point de départ: Joseph Maréchal entre la critique kantienne et l’ontologie thomiste (Bruxelles: L’Editions Lessius, 2000), was edited by Paul Gilbert, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome. Father Gilbert was also the principal organizer of the symposium.

On 12 October 2000, I presented the paper to the Graduate Seminar of the Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto, Canada. I am grateful to the other participants for their comments, some of which I have been able to address in this final version.
I have changed the second term of Father Gilbert's suggestion from "analytic philosophy" to "linguistic philosophy." A philosophy is linguistic if it pursues the goal of philosophy by the pathway of investigating human language, whether ordinary or logically ideal. On this characterization, "linguistic" philosophy includes the "analytic" philosophy of such thinkers as G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and their followers, in which the analysis of physical and mental realities goes hand in hand with the elaboration of an ideal language. But it also includes the "ordinary language" philosophy that stems from the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

My task this afternoon is to offer some reflections on the relationship of transcendental philosophy and linguistic philosophy. To do better justice to that task, however, I would like to situate it in a broader context. For it seems to me that, historically speaking, the relationship of transcendental philosophy and linguistic philosophy is part of a more complicated relationship, one that includes two further elements, namely "metaphysical philosophy" and "phenomenological philosophy." A philosophy is metaphysical if it pursues the goal of philosophy by the pathway of investigating concrete beings, particular existents, real things. And a philosophy is phenomenological if it pursues the goal of philosophy by the pathway of investigating the elements of human consciousness. (Thus phenomenological philosophy is more general than transcendental philosophy, focusing on the elements of human consciousness but without necessarily seeking their apriori structure.)

The remainder of my paper, then, has two main parts. In the first I will sketch what I suggest are three successive stages in the recent history of relations between metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophies. Second, speaking in my own name, but influenced by both Joseph Mérédit and Bernard Lonergan, I will argue that transcendental philosophy grounds, integrates, and critiques the respective contributions

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2Norman Kretzmann draws a useful distinction between philosophy of language, the philosophical study of language for its own sake, and linguistic philosophy, the philosophical study of language as a way of approaching the traditional questions of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and so forth. (See Kretzmann, "Semantics, History of," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7 [New York: Macmillan, 1967], 401.) It is linguistic philosophy in this sense that is our interest in this paper.
of metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophies. And I will concretely illustrate this account of transcendental philosophy by employing it to highlight what I take to be a key strength and a key weakness in the later work of the aforementioned Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most important and influential linguistic philosophers.

1. **Metaphysical, Phenomenological, and Linguistic Philosophies**

I suggest that twentieth-century metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophers' assessments of each other's philosophical approaches fall into three historical periods. The periods correspond very roughly to the three successive thirds of the century, but in some contexts the views characteristic of a given period may emerge only later and/or last longer. In the first period, the three approaches are viewed as *radically opposed*. The efforts of one's own group are deemed philosophically valid and those of the other groups are deemed philosophically invalid — not just mistaken, but fundamentally defective precisely as philosophy. In the second period, the approaches are viewed as *potentially complementary*. The efforts of the three groups are deemed to be mutually supportive but just how they fit together is not very clear. In the third period, the approaches begin to be viewed as *parts of a basically transcendental* study.¹ I shall elaborate this suggestion by speaking briefly about each period in turn.

1.1. **As Radically Opposed**

A prominent feature of academic philosophy during the first part of the twentieth century is the diversity in its conceptions of the philosophical enterprise. Debates about philosophical conclusions, of course, are as old as philosophy itself. And differences over the character of philosophy as such are not absent from its larger history. But perhaps in no other period have there been such profound and pointed disagreements about

¹The views that characterize the three successive historical periods illustrate three successive stages in the elimination of the kinds of differences that Lonergan terms *dialectical*. (See his *Method in Theology* [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972], ch. 10.)
philosophy's starting point and goal. Apologizing in advance for the inevitable oversimplifications, I would summarize these disagreements as follows.

First, in the view of those philosophers who, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, proceed *metaphysically*, philosophy begins by considering concrete beings, particular existents, real things. What particulars exist is deemed evident; what things are real is deemed obvious. Why? Because human knowing is deemed fundamentally reliable: for the most part, what we know is identical with what is. And the goal of philosophy is to discover the *basic nature* of those real things precisely insofar as they are real, including what they presuppose and imply, and then to give a global account of everything in terms of that basic nature. Situating themselves in the tradition of such thinkers as Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine, Duns Scotus and Aquinas, these metaphysical philosophers regard their own approach as subsuming whatever is valid in the approaches of phenomenological and linguistic philosophers and as implementing it in a more basic way. Thus, in their view, it may well be useful to explore conscious structures and linguistic meanings, but the philosophically most fundamental way of characterizing them is in terms of entitative natures. A book that clearly exemplifies this outlook is Etienne Gilson's *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (1939).

Second, in the view of those philosophers who, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, proceed *phenomenologically*, philosophy begins by attending to the elements of human consciousness - sensing and the sensed, conceiving and the conceived, judging and the judged, and so forth. The goal of philosophy is to discover the *basic structure* of the elements of human consciousness precisely insofar as they are phenomenal, including what they presuppose and imply, and then to give a global account of everything in terms of that basic structure. Locating themselves in the tradition of such thinkers as

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4In every period of history, of course, disagreements about the character of philosophy are apt to be closely intertwined with disagreements about other matters, some specifically scholarly and others more widely social and cultural.

5Paris: Vrin, 1939 [*Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco: Ignatius Institute, 1986)].
Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza, Locke and Hume, Kant and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, these phenomenological philosophers regard their own approach as subsuming whatever is valid in the approaches of metaphysical and linguistic philosophers and as executing it in a more basic way. Thus, in their view, it may well be worthwhile to investigate entitative natures and linguistic meanings, but the philosophically most fundamental way of characterizing them is in terms of conscious structures. A book that nicely illustrates this outlook is Jean-Paul Sartre's *L' Etre et le néant* (1943).6

Third, in the view of those philosophers who, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, proceed linguistically, philosophy begins by considering human language. And its goal involves treating the *basic meaning* of such language, including what it presupposes and implies. But there are two stages in how they conceive that meaning. Initially, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and such followers as C. D. Broad, John Wisdom, and Gilbert Ryle envision the fundamental organization of reality as logical in form. Linguistic meaning is essentially a relation by which words directly picture, denote, refer to physical or mental realities; consequently, if a language were perfectly logical in form, it would picture reality perfectly. Hence the goal of the philosopher is twofold: (1) to elaborate a language that is both logically flawless and comprehensive and (2) to show that our various actual linguistic expressions either can be translated into that ideal language and thus are genuinely meaningful, or else cannot be translated into it and thus are ultimately meaningless.

Subsequently, however, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle, and their successors adopt a different view of linguistic meaning. Earlier they envisioned language as picturing realities, they sought a logically ideal language to perform that task best, and they identified its meaning with the *realities pictured*. Now what they take as basic is our actual, everyday language. They envision it simply as serving practical purposes — naming, classifying, describing, prescribing, joking, cursing, and so forth — within the diverse concrete situations in which we live out our lives. And they identify its meaning entirely with the *uses* to which it is

6Paris: Gallimard, 1943 [Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953)].
put, uses that are governed completely by the rules, regulations, conventions, and habits that are operative in this or that particular concrete situation. Hence the goal of the philosopher no longer is analysis, developing an ideal language, and then testing whether our everyday expressions can be translated into it. Rather, it is just description, elucidating the tasks that in fact our everyday language already performs.

In both the first and second stages of twentieth-century linguistic philosophy, its proponents draw on various ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers’ writings on grammar and logic; but they regard their own approach as relatively novel. Moreover, they regard it as subsuming whatever is valid in the approaches of metaphysical and phenomenological philosophers and as accomplishing it in a more basic way. A book aptly representing the first stage is Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922); the second, his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).7

During this first period of twentieth-century philosophy, when metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophers deem their respective approaches to be the uniquely valid ways of philosophizing, scholarly relations between the philosophers themselves are apt to be marked by mutual disinterest and even dismissiveness. They esteem different major authors, belong to different associations, attend different conventions, publish in different journals, and periodically disparage the acumen of persons who take the other approaches.

I suspect that the situation during this period at the institution where I work, the University of Toronto, offers certain parallels to situations with which many of you are familiar in your own institutional contexts. The professors engaged in philosophical research and teaching at my school during the first several decades of the twentieth century could be grouped along a continuum.8 At one end were those who favored the *metaphysical* approach. They were predominantly and quite publicly Catholic. They had strong backgrounds and interests in the humanities. They revered


8With a current total enrollment of about 40,000 students on three campuses, the University of Toronto is the largest institution of higher learning in Canada. For historical reasons, the Department of Philosophy has long been one of the University’s larger departments. At its peak size, in the early 1970s, it included about fifty full-time faculty members.
medieval philosophers in general and Thomas Aquinas in particular. And they were not averse to treating philosophy as the handmaid of (Catholic) theology. At the other end of the continuum were the professors who favored the \textit{linguistic} approach. Although they included religious believers, they also included some quite public nonbelievers. They had strong backgrounds and interests in mathematics and the natural sciences. They revered recent English-speaking philosophers in general and Bertrand Russell in particular. And they maintained strongly that a philosopher's religious beliefs, if any, ought to have no influence whatsoever on her philosophical conclusions. In the middle of the continuum were the professors who favored the \textit{phenomenological} approach. They included Protestant Christian and Jewish religious believers who sometimes were quite public about their beliefs but often were not. Frequently they had strong backgrounds and interests in the human sciences. They revered modern Continental philosophers in general and Immanuel Kant in particular. And they tended to think that religious beliefs could contribute positively to the emergence of supra-religious philosophical truths.

Insofar as scholarly relations between the three groups of philosophers existed at all, they were commonly cordial but sometimes hostile. Indeed, the difference of fundamental perspectives was such that as late as 1975 the University of Toronto at the undergraduate level had not one Department of Philosophy but two! The St. Michael's College Department of Philosophy included most of the metaphysical philosophers, while the Department of Philosophy for the remainder of the University consisted mainly of linguistic and phenomenological philosophers.

\subsection*{1.2. As Potentially Complementary}

A salient characteristic of academic philosophy during the middle years of the twentieth century is the decreased negativity of metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophers' assessments of each other's approaches. Although there are holdouts in each group, there is a widespread conviction that the different approaches, far from being radically opposed, are potentially complementary, notwithstanding
fundamental unclarity about precisely how they might fit together. The emergence of this changed perspective is contemporaneous with an expansion of the context within which academic philosophy is pursued. The original context is that of the departments, associations, conventions, and journals traditionally labeled “philosophical,” where from the outset the characteristic goal of researchers is to discover what in some important sense is most basic and to give a global account of everything in terms of it. That original context now is augmented insofar as researchers affiliated with departments, associations, conventions, and journals not traditionally labeled “philosophical” nonetheless concern themselves with questions about radically basic factors and global explanations. The latter researchers, however, in contrast with their colleagues, do not begin with such questions. Instead, they arrive at them by prolonging their initial investigations of particular issues in the natural sciences, the human sciences, the humanities, or theology. It remains that both “philosophical” and “nonphilosophical” researchers in the expanded context of academic philosophy are typically eager to profit from the insights provided by all three philosophical approaches — metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic. A book that nicely reflects this perspective is Ian Barbour’s Issues in Science and Religion (1966).9

During this second period of twentieth-century philosophy, when metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophers come to view their respective approaches as mutually supportive, scholarly relations between the philosophers themselves are apt to be more collaborative than in the earlier period. Signs of such collaboration within the expanded context of academic philosophy include the frequent presence of philosophers from all three groups among supporters of the many new interdisciplinary programs, associations, meetings, and journals that are devoted to philosophy and one or more “nonphilosophical” disciplines.

I would highlight three indications of increased scholarly cooperation during the middle years of the twentieth century between researchers at the University of Toronto who favored metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic approaches, respectively. First, in 1975 a merger occurred between the two undergraduate Departments of Philosophy: the St. Michael's College Department of Philosophy, with its large complement of metaphysical philosophers, and the Department of Philosophy for the remainder of the University, comprising mainly linguistic and phenomenological philosophers. Significantly, however, the unitary department introduced two distinctive sets of course designators (PHI and PHL) to reflect and thus somehow extend the earlier history. Second, within the expanded context of academic philosophy, issues that were philosophical in fact, if not always in name, came regularly to be addressed via one, two, or even all three philosophical approaches in such disparate departments as Physics, Sociology, Political Science, Architecture, Comparative Literature, and Theology. Third, without differentiating the approaches favored by its various members, the Department of Philosophy became a participant (sometimes even to the extent of sharing faculty positions) in such diverse interdisciplinary programs as Environmental Studies, Medieval Studies, Bioethics, Criminology, Women’s Studies, and Religious Studies.¹⁰

1.3. As Parts of a Basically Transcendental Study

What characterizes the second of my three periods in the history of twentieth-century philosophy is that metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic philosophers come to view their respective approaches as reciprocally supportive but without yet envisaging very clearly just how they fit together. More exactly, what remains unclear is whether the framework within which the three approaches complement one another is itself an articulation (1) of the nature of real things, and thus is fundamentally metaphysical, or (2) of the structure of human consciousness, and thus is fundamentally phenomenological, or (3) of the meaning

¹⁰Indeed, my own academic appointment, dating from 1972, is shared two-thirds by the Department of Philosophy and one-third by the Department for the Study of Religion. I am also cross-appointed to the Toronto School of Theology.
of human language, and thus is fundamentally linguistic, or (4) of something else. What marks the start of my third historical period is the embryonic emergence of the view that the three approaches are parts of a single philosophical study that articulates the specifically apriori structural features of human consciousness, including what they presuppose and imply — hence a study that is fundamentally transcendental. That is to say, this view illuminates the distinction between a broad phenomenological study, which regards all the structural features of human consciousness but without very sharply differentiating apriori features from others, and a narrower phenomenological — or transcendental — study, which focuses precisely on the apriori features. In a way that I will amplify in the next main part of my paper, the transcendental study underpins, unifies, and regulates the studies that heretofore have been labeled "metaphysical," "phenomenological," and "linguistic."

The historical antecedents of the specific notion of transcendental philosophy whose appearance I am highlighting go back at least as far as Kant.\[^{11}\] Moreover, one of its distinctive traits is elaborated in some detail by Maréchal, namely, its procedure of characterizing apriori features of human consciousness concretely as the features one can never deny without operational self-contradiction. However, another of its distinctive traits is that it expressly relates itself not just to metaphysical philosophy and phenomenological philosophy but also to linguistic philosophy. As marked by both traits, this notion of transcendental philosophy is proximately foreshadowed, on my reading, in the work of such thinkers as Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas.\[^{12}\] And it appears explicitly in the Maréchalian

\[^{11}\]In Le point de départ de la métagypsiqne, Cahier I (pp. 25-30 of the third edition [Bruxelles: L'Édition Universelle, 1944]), Maréchal puts these antecedents as early as Aristotle (Metaphysics 4.4).

\[^{12}\] I should make clear that my assertion of an historical period in which the metaphysical, phenomenological, and linguistic approaches begin to be seen as parts of a fundamentally transcendental study is an assertion that emerges from my reading of the history of explicit philosophy in light of my own antecedent conviction that the transcendental approach does indeed underpin, unify, and regulate the other three. (That antecedent conviction is based upon my own appropriation of myself as a knower: see the second main part of this essay.) This is but one illustration of the fact that while all historical interpretation requires careful attention to the data to be interpreted, it also
trajectory, in the work of such thinkers as Emerich Coreth and Bernard Lonergan. As a book that plainly exemplifies it, I propose Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* (London, 1972).\(^{13}\)

Let me note three small signs of the appearance of a third-period perspective at the University of Toronto. First, beginning with the year 2000, the two distinctive sets of course designators (PHI and PHL) for undergraduate courses within the Department of Philosophy will be reduced to one (PHL), a development that may be interpreted as expressing an incipient collective recognition of a fundamentally common philosophical enterprise. Second, since its establishment in 1980, the Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College within the University of Toronto has hosted a monthly seminar during the academic year for graduate students doing research on some facet of Bernard Lonergan’s work. During the past two decades this well-attended seminar has drawn participants from a variety of departments and programs, including Philosophy, Education, Science and Technology, Sociology, English, and Theology. Third, in 1986 the University of Toronto Press committed itself to publishing Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, a projected twenty-five volume assemblage of materials from Lonergan’s published and unpublished writings, lectures, and notes. (Eight volumes have appeared thus far.) At the same time, the Press announced a subsidiary series that would study various aspects of Lonergan’s thought and its implications. Several works have been published to date in this series, under such titles as *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (1990), *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan* (1991), *Lonergan and Feminism* (1994),

2. TRANSCENDENTAL METHODOLOGY

Speaking in my own name, but drawing remotely on Maréchal and proximately on Lonergan, I now offer a brief systematic account of the version of transcendental philosophy whose historical emergence I have just sketched. Adapting an expression that has come to be used by some writers influenced by Maréchal, I designate this version not broadly as transcendental "philosophy" but more narrowly as transcendental "methodology."  

2.1. The Findings of Transcendental Methodology: The Four Levels

My total horizon comprises (1) my basic horizon, the fundamental field within which every determinate element of my consciousness stands, plus (2) every determinate element of my consciousness. Let us consider the basic horizon and its determinations in turn.

First, then, my basic horizon has a subjective pole and an objective pole (see Chart 1). The subjective pole is my transcendental intending: my apriori, strictly heuristic, transcategorial, cognitional and decisional striving. As cognitional and decisional striving, this intending is both radically self-present and intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly self-
constituting. As transcategorial striving, this intending is unrestricted in its goal, unlimited in the fulfillment it seeks. It is a yearning to know and choose the totality of whatever is inherently knowable and choosable. As strictly heuristic striving, this intending merely anticipates its goal indeterminately, thus far in no way actually achieving it determinately. And as apriori striving, this intending is both given and natural. It is the very dynamism of my intentional consciousness, anteceding all my choices and all my cognitional acquisitions.

The objective pole of my basic horizon is what the subjective pole prefigures or foreshadows or implies, exactly insofar as it prefigures or foreshadows or implies it. Hence, just as my transcendental intending is my apriori strictly heuristic transcategorial cognitional and decisional striving, so the transcendental intended is the totality of whatever is inherently knowable and choosable but simply as prefigured apriori and thus as wholly indeterminate. It is the foreshadowed plenitude of what, if I were to grasp it exhaustively, would completely satisfy my essentially unbounded yearning to know and choose. It is the naturally given but merely implied and thus entirely unspecified integral content that in fact is what I mean, at least operationally, whenever I employ such words as "is," "being," "reality," "is good," "real goodness," and "genuine value."

16 In characterizing transcendental intending as self-constituting and as strictly heuristic, I am following Lonergan on points in which I judge him to have gone beyond Maréchal. These subtle but important differences are key themes of "La finalité intellectuelle: Maréchal et Lonergan," my contribution to *Au point de départ* (pp. 447-65).

17 For Maréchal, my naturally given basic horizon is inevitably the one within which all my particular acts of knowing and choosing proceed. Lonergan, by contrast, argues that although my naturally given basic horizon ought to be the one within which I operate, my existential basic horizon — the one within which I actually do operate — may be different. For my existential basic horizon is a matter of radical choice, a matter of radical intellectual (and ultimately moral and even religious) conversion or unconversion. Though I ought to choose the naturally given horizon as my existential horizon, I remain free to reject it in favor of something less. (See, for example, *Method in Theology*, pp. 235-44.) Like the points in the prior note, I judge this point as one in which Lonergan is not directly disagreeing with Maréchal but rather going beyond him.
Second, determinate elements of consciousness emerge within my basic horizon insofar as I engage in actual knowing and choosing (see Chart 2). These determinations are not fully correlative with my transcendental intending and intended, whose scope is unlimited. Rather, they are the cognitional and decisional acts and contents that, as a human subject, I am actually able to perform and achieve, acts and contents whose scope is limited.\textsuperscript{18} That is to say, the determinate elements of my consciousness are merely proportionate, not transcendental. These proportionate determinations may be considered in two ways. First, they may be considered simply in terms of their apriori features: the pure-structural, invariant, relatively indeterminate dimensions of the acts and contents of my knowing and choosing. Second, the determinations may be considered in terms of the totality of their features — not just apriori, but also empirical: the structure-complementing, variable, at least relatively determinate dimensions of those acts and contents. My primary concern here and in the remainder of this paper is with the determinations considered in the first way, namely, simply in terms of their apriori features.

Now, just as within my basic horizon the features of the transcendental intended are specified by the features of my transcendental intending, so within my total horizon the apriori features of the

\textsuperscript{18}Throughout this paper, I prescind from religious believing and loving, acts whose basic focus is not proportionate but rather transcendent reality and goodness.
proportionate contents of my consciousness are specified by the apriori features of my proportionate acts. That is to say, the pure structural features of the proportionate realities I know and choose are prefigured, foreshadowed, implied by the pure structural features of my proportionate knowing and choosing. Although no reality I know or choose emerges for me in its empirical fullness apart from my actual concrete knowledge or choice of it, the pure structural features that any such reality would possess are determined in advance by the pure structural features of the cognitional and decisional acts by which I would know or choose it.

![Chart 2: My TOTAL Horizon, with Its Determinate Elements Distinguished into ACTS and CONTENTS](image)

What are those apriori features? My answer must be brief and merely schematic. My acts of proportionate knowing and choosing constitute a composite process whose pure structure properly\(^\text{19}\) comprises four levels of conscious-intentional elements: (1) my *attentive experiencing* of data of

\(^{19}\)In other words, *at best* I remain free to understand before experiencing, to judge before understanding, and so forth — but only on pain of violating the given dynamic structure of my concrete subjectivity, the structure that is the fundamental norm of all my operations and thus the radical conscious-intentional basis of every other norm I know as such.
experience;²⁰ (2) my *intelligent understanding* of the concrete intelligible unity of those data; (3) my *rational affirming* of the reality of the intelligibly unified data; and (4) my *responsible affirming* and *choosing* of the goodness of the intelligibly unified data. Correlatively, each proportionate reality is a composite term whose pure structure comprises four levels of metaphysical elements: (1) what attentively I experience, or *potency*; (2) what intelligently I understand, or *form*; (3) what rationally I affirm, or *act as real*; and (4) what responsibly I affirm and choose, or *act as good*.²¹

### 2.2. The Findings of Transcendental Methodology: The Two Phases

Next, I suggest that the determinate elements of consciousness emerge within my basic horizon not only as acts and contents on four levels, but also in two phases (see Chart 3). Let me designate the first phase "acceptive" and the second "originative." The *acceptive* phase includes both acts and correlative contents. The contents are the proportionate realities *given to me*, the already actual things that I encounter, whether they be objects of the natural physical world or concrete embodiments of human meaning. The acts are the proportionate cognitional operations by which I know those things as actual realities and actual goods, and the proportionate decisional operations by which I consent to them as actual goods.²² The *originative* phase follows on the acceptive phase, and

²⁰In Section 2.2, with Lonergan we will distinguish data of *experience* into data of *sense* and data of *consciousness* (plus data of *imagination*).

²¹I maintain that the distinctions between potency, form (or first act), and act (or second act) are real distinctions, whereas the distinction between act as real and act as good is merely notional. See Michael Vertin, “Lonergan’s Metaphysics of Value and Love: Some Proposed Clarifications and Implications,” *Lonergan Workshop* 13 (1997): 189-219, at 197-205.

²²For (1) the basic distinction between what I am labeling the “acceptive” and “originative” phases, (2) the argument that the former concludes with an act of consent or “complacent willing,” and (3) the contention that even evil things merit acceptance (not insofar as they are evil, but simply insofar as they exist), I am drawing on a well-known study by Lonergan’s most extensive and respected interpreter. See Frederick Crowe, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” *Theological Studies* 20 (1959): 1-39, 198-230, 343-82, 383-95 [Three Thomist Studies, ed. Michael Vertin (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Institute of Boston College, 2000), ch. 3-6], especially 9-19, 203-211, 346-49 [pp. 81-91, 118-26, 152-55].
likewise it includes both acts and correlative contents. (To avoid introducing an additional level of complexity into this account, let us presume that my intentions always are good, never evil.) The acts are the proportionate cognitional operations by which I know certain things as both possible realities and possible goods, and the proportionate decisional operations by which I choose to actualize those things and then (insofar as I have the requisite freedom, skill, materials, and tools) execute the choices. The contents are the proportionate possible realities (identically the possible real goods) I intend to originate, the things that become actual realities (and actual real goods) insofar as I succeed in actualizing them. I should add that the acts of the originative phase can include the particular cognitional and decisional operations by which I know linguistic expressions as possible, choose to actualize them, and attempt to carry out those choices; and the contents can include the particular intended realities that are my intended linguistic expressions.

**including my intended linguistic expressions

*including my intending of linguistic expressions

Chart 3: My TOTAL Horizon, with Its Determinate Elements
FURTHER Distinguished into TWO PHASES
I must underscore that, on the account I am elaborating, the realities given to me include both natural objects and objects embodying human meaning; and both of these stand in contrast to the realities I intend to originate. Moreover, the realities embodying human meaning may embody a meaning that is my own or someone else’s. More amply, the humanly meaningful things I encounter may be the more or less successful results of an originative process on my own part, a process of knowing certain deeds or products as both possible realities and possible goods, deciding to actualize them, and more or less successfully implementing those decisions. Or, again, they may be the more or less successful results of originative processes on the part of one or more other persons. But a deed or product simply as intended remains in the order of possible reality, and one’s effort to actualize it culminates an originative process; whereas a deed or product as actualized stands in the order of actual reality and one’s encountering it initiates an acceptive process.23

Earlier I claimed that when the determinate elements of my consciousness are distinguished into contents and acts, transcendental investigation manifests that the apriori features of the contents are specified by the apriori features of the acts. I now claim that when the contents and acts are further distinguished into two phases, transcendental investigation manifests additional details of the aforementioned relationship. That is to say, it manifests that the pure structural features of the proportionate realities I encounter are prefigured, foreshadowed, implied by the pure structural features of my proportionate acceptive knowing and choosing. Similarly, the pure

23 I would add three points. First, the extent to which the deed or product as actualized embodies the deed or product as intended is a reflection of the originator’s freedom and skill, along with the materials and tools available to her; and determining the degree of that embodiment is a key part of the enterprise of interpretation. Second, since realities embodying human meaning result from processes of origination, apt interpretation of any such reality (whether originated by another or by oneself) methodically presupposes some familiarity with the process of origination — and, at root, with oneself as originator. Third, the distinction between the realities I encounter and those I intend to originate is methodically more basic than the distinction between natural objects and objects embodying human meaning. In my judgment, making the latter distinction more basic than the former (as often happens in global contrasts between “philosophy of nature” and “philosophy of history”) obscures the process of concrete, personal self-reflection by which the fundamental meaning of the latter distinction becomes explicit in the first place.
structural features of the proportionate realities I intend to originate are prefigured, foreshadowed, implied by the pure structural features of my proportionate originative knowing and choosing. Although no reality I encounter or intend to originate emerges for me in its empirical fullness apart from my actual concrete encounter with or originating intention of it, the pure structural features that any such reality possesses are specified in advance by the pure structural features of the cognitional and decisional acts by which I encounter or intend to originate it. And, as a particular case of this general relationship, the pure structural features of any linguistic expression I intend to originate are determined in advance by the pure structural features of the acts of linguistic intending by which I intend to originate it.

What are those apriori features? Not surprisingly, they are more differentiated versions of the general apriori features that earlier I attributed to the determinate elements of my consciousness. In the acceptive phase, my acts of proportionate knowing and choosing constitute a composite process whose pure structure properly comprises four levels of conscious-intentional elements: (1) my attentive experiencing of data of sense or consciousness; (2) my intelligent understanding of the concrete intelligible unity of those data; (3) my rational affirming of the actual reality of the intelligibly unified data; and (4) my responsible affirming of and consenting to the actual goodness of the intelligibly unified data. Correlatively, each proportionate reality I encounter is a composite term whose pure structure comprises four levels of metaphysical elements: (1) what attentively I experience, or potency; (2) what intelligently I understand, or form; (3) what rationally I affirm, or encountered act as real; and (4) what responsibly I affirm and consent to, or encountered act as good.

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24See note 19.
25For the somewhat surprising discovery that Lonergan eventually rejected his own initial indication that data of consciousness can be understood directly, plus an astute suggestion about how to surmount this difficulty without compromising the main lines of Lonergan's philosophical stance, see Frederick Crowe, "For a Phenomenology of Rational Consciousness," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000): 67-90.
26Recall note 21.
In the originative phase, my acts of knowing and choosing constitute a composite process whose pure structure properly comprises four levels of conscious-intentional elements: (1) my attentive experiencing of data of sense, consciousness, or imagination; (2) my intelligent understanding of the concrete intelligible unity of those data; (3) my rational affirming of the possible reality of the intelligibly unified data; and (4) my responsible affirming of the possible goodness of the intelligibly unified data, plus my responsible choosing to actualize the possible reality and goodness and (insofar as I possess the requisite freedom, skill, materials, and tools) executing that choice. Correlatively, each proportionate reality (identically each real good) I intend to originate is a composite term whose pure structure comprises four levels of metaphysical elements: (1) what attentively I experience, or potency; (2) what intelligently I understand, or form; (3) what rationally I affirm, or intended act as real; and (4) what responsibly I affirm, choose, and attempt to actualize, or intended act as good.

2.3. The Evidence for Transcendental Methodology’s Findings

I have contended that my total horizon comprises my basic horizon plus proportionate determinations of my consciousness. Within my basic horizon, which is wholly apriori, the features of the objective pole, the transcendental intended, are prefigured entirely by the features of the subjective pole, my transcendental intending. And in both the acceptive and originative phases in the emergence of the determinations, the four-level apriori structure of the proportionate realities is prefigured entirely by the four-level apriori structure of my proportionate cognitionial and decisional acts.

Where do these claims come from, and how are they justified? A quick answer might be that the claims come from Maréchal and Lonergan.

27See note 19.

28Data of sense and data of consciousness are simply given, whereas data of imagination are creative variations and combinations of these. While perhaps most obvious in the originative processes of artists, data of imagination play at least some role in the originative processes of everyone.

29Recall note 21.
and are justified by their eminent reputations! Such an answer would not be entirely incorrect, since I cannot deny for an instant that I have learned much from these two. By their very nature, however, the claims are fundamentally personal. They are claims about my total horizon, my basic horizon, and the determinations of my consciousness, claims whose basic meaning and justification are directly accessible to me alone. Consequently, although they certainly have guided my reading, the genesis and validation of the foregoing claims ultimately derive not from reading the books of Maréchal and Lonergan but from reading the book of myself. The same self-referential admission would have to be made by any other person asserting (or, for that matter, rejecting) such claims.

Let me put the point more precisely. Like anyone else, I am able to undertake philosophical reflection on my engaged living. Insofar as my reflection is specifically transcendental, it is an effort to elucidate the given normative pattern, at once utterly general and utterly concrete, of my engaged living. Now, that concrete normative pattern (or “apriori conditions of the possibility”) of my engaged living is what is meant by the expression “transcendental method” in its primary sense. And “transcendental methodology” is the technical name of the philosophical reflection that aims to make the concrete normative pattern explicit.30 It follows that my claims about my total horizon, my basic horizon, and the proportionate determinations of my consciousness are claims that result from my transcendental methodology. They are claims that begin to elucidate my concrete transcendental cognitional and decisional method. They are claims that incipiently express the apriori features of my concrete cognitional and decisional subjectivity and what those features prefigure, where the features’ apriori or pure structural character is both manifested and vindicated by the fact they are operationally incontrovertible: I can never explicitly deny them without implicitly invoking them in the very process of attempting to assert the denial.

It is important to notice that, on the foregoing account, my engaged living is first and my transcendental methodology is but second. That is to say, transcendental methodology is an effort that moves not from

30“Transcendental method” in its secondary sense denotes the abstract procedural scheme that results from successfully elucidating the concrete normative pattern.
possibility to actuality but rather from actuality to its preconditions. More exactly, it moves from particular instances of my knowing and choosing, to their given concrete normative pattern, the apriori conditions of their possibility. It moves from my concrete cognitional and decisional engagement to the operational presuppositions of that engagement. Hence the results of transcendental methodology are far from disengaged, nor are they "apriori" in some fundamentally abstract sense.

It is also important to notice the hallmark of apriority: operational incontrovertiblity. A feature of a conscious operation or content is apriori or pure structural if (1) I can never deny the feature without employing it in the very action of denying it, or (2) it is implied by such a feature. (A simple example: the apriority of consciousness as a feature of my cognitional operations is shown by the impossibility of denying it without self-contradiction. If I were to assert, "I am utterly unconscious," the content of my assertion would always be falsified by the consciousness that would inevitably characterize my act of asserting that content.) Thus I am contending that what I have labeled "apriori" features of both my basic horizon and the proportionate determinations of my consciousness ultimately are operationally incontrovertible. This does not mean that such operational incontrovertibility necessarily is readily apparent to me as a student of self. Nor does it mean that my expressions of it cannot change and develop. But it does mean that, whether or not I have explicitly grasped the fact, what I assert would always be undercut by my act of assertion if (employing the words in their usual senses) I were to make such assertions as the following: "My concrete subjectivity is not intrinsically characterized by cognitional and volitional yearning"; "Reality and real goodness are fundamentally different from what I yearn to know and choose"; or "My cognitional process does not include acts of intelligent understanding and reasonable judging."

It remains that although transcendental methodology is radically and inescapably personal, it is not strictly private. For persons can discuss, thereby indirectly compare, and if necessary expand and even correct the conclusions that each has reached regarding her own concrete transcendental cognitional and decisional method. Indeed, the enterprise that historically has been called "philosophy" may now be envisioned
concretely as a conversation between you and me in which we consider the results of our respective transcendental reflections.

2.4. The Main Parts of Transcendental Methodology

If the picture I have sketched above is at least roughly accurate, it seems that transcendental methodology as a personal and communal investigation subdivides into four successive studies (see Chart 4). First, *transcendental acceptive phenomenology* aims to elucidate the basic horizontal context and pure structural features of the acts by which one knows and consents to proportionate already-actual realities. Second (and substituting "noumenology" for "metaphysics," for the sake of terminological elegance), *transcendental acceptive noumenology* aims to articulate the basic horizontal context and pure structural features of proportionate realities that are already actual, features prefigured by the pure structural features of the acts by which one knows and consents to them. Third, *transcendental originative phenomenology* aims to illuminate the basic horizontal context and pure structural features of the acts by which one knows certain things as proportionate possible realities and goods, chooses to actualize them, and executes the choices. Included among the cognitional and decisional acts that this study treats are one's acts of intending linguistic expressions. Fourth, *transcendental originative noumenology* aims to express the basic horizontal context and pure structural features of the proportionate possible realities (identically the proportionate possible goods) that one intends to actualize, features foreshadowed by the pure structural features of the cognitional and decisional acts by which one intends them.\(^{31}\) Included among the

\(^{31}\)Let me add two points. First, since for transcendental methodology the functionally most basic features of the content labeled "being" are prefigured by the functionally most basic features of my transcendental intending, and since my transcendental intending is my unrestricted striving not just to *know what is* but, more radically, to *know and choose what is good*, transcendental noumenology (both acceptive and originative) is not just a *factual* enterprise but, more radically, a *valuative* one. Second, readers familiar with Lonergan may find it of interest that I envision the distinction between the acceptive and originative phases of transcendental methodology to be presupposed by Lonergan's distinction between the first and second phases of a functionally differentiated theology or other scholarly or scientific human study. (See *Method in Theology*, ch. 5.)
actualized realities (and goods) that this study treats are one’s intended linguistic expressions.

An added comment in line with what I have underscored above in Section 2.2 may be useful. The acts and contents addressed by transcendental originative phenomenology and noumenology respectively are one’s own intending acts and one’s own intended contents. But in focusing on one’s own intended contents, contents that one intends to actualize, transcendental originative noumenology focuses on deeds and products that remain in the order of possible reality. By contrast, insofar as an investigation focuses on deeds and products that have been actualized, whether by oneself or by someone else, that investigation regards deeds and products that stand in the order of actual reality; and the transcendental investigation that regards actual realities is not originative noumenology but rather acceptive noumenology. By inclusion, the transcendental investigation not of one’s intended linguistic expressions but rather of actual linguistic expressions, expressions actualized by oneself or by someone else, is a part not of transcendental
originative noumenology but rather of transcendental acceptive noumenology.

2.5. "Transcendental Philosophy and Linguistic Philosophy"

After this lengthy preparation, I am now in position to offer, if only in cursory fashion, my account of the relationship of transcendental philosophy and linguistic philosophy. That relationship, I have argued, is part of a more complicated relationship that also includes metaphysical philosophy and phenomenological philosophy. Hence I will address the simpler relationship by addressing the more complex one. Let me begin with a four-step synopsis and follow with an example.

First, I maintain that transcendental philosophy — or, more exactly, transcendental methodology — constitutes the fundamental dimension of what throughout this paper I have called "metaphysical," "phenomenological," and "linguistic" philosophies. Any philosophical approach, whether it begins by considering real things, or human consciousness, or human language, or anything else, at least implicitly regards the apriori or pure structural features that underlie these starting points in their empirical fullness. By making explicit the pure structural features of my total horizon, transcendental methodology provides a basic framework in which the respective pure structural features regarded by more specific philosophical approaches may be situated; and this in turn provides a way of distinguishing, relating, and critiquing those more specific approaches.

Second, "phenomenological" philosophy has three progressively narrower senses. Taken broadly, it regards all the structural features of all the elements of my consciousness, acts and contents alike. Taken somewhat less broadly, it regards both the acts and the contents of my consciousness but only in their pure structural features. Taken narrowly, its scope is limited to the pure structural features of my conscious acts. In this narrow sense it corresponds to my transcendental phenomenology, both acceptive and originative. "Metaphysical" philosophy in its fundamental dimension regards the pure structural features of real things — both those I encounter and, presumably, those I intend to
It originates. Hence it corresponds to my *transcendental noumenology*, both acceptive and originative. And "linguistic" philosophy in its fundamental dimension regards the pure structural features of both (1) a subset of my conscious acts, namely, my acts of intending linguistic expressions, and (2) a subset of the realities I intend to originate, namely, my intended linguistic expressions. Hence it comprises correlative subdivisions of my *transcendental originative phenomenology* and my *transcendental originative noumenology*.

Third, by making explicit the pure structural features of my total horizon, transcendental methodology highlights the basic criterion of sound philosophizing. It points up that the ultimate test of any philosophical conclusion is its fidelity to the pure structural features of my own concrete cognitional and decisional subjectivity.

Fourth, by displaying diverse philosophical approaches as related contributions to a common enterprise, transcendental methodology restrains exaggerated ambitions and encourages appropriate exertions. It makes clear that no approach that is actually just part of the total enterprise can expect to satisfy the requirements of the whole. But it makes equally clear that the flourishing of the total enterprise requires the contribution of every part. More specifically, transcendental methodology suggests that scholars who associate themselves with the tradition of Joseph Maréchal and his followers are thoroughly justified in resisting the totalitarian philosophical claims that even now occasionally emanate from the ranks of scholars who take the linguistic approach. On the other hand, it also suggests that Maréchaliens who aim to be more than mere specialists, scholars who aspire to be faithful to the integral philosophical concern that is so obvious in *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, must take account of the rich and valuable discoveries made by linguistic philosophers and profit from them.

An example may be useful in concretizing these general considerations. Thus I propose that transcendental methodology spotlights an important basic strength and an even more important basic

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32 While metaphysicians study my acts of knowing and choosing, they do so from the standpoint of metaphysics — that is, as factors of the real thing that is me — and not from the methodically prior standpoint of phenomenology.
weakness in the later linguistic philosophical stance of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a stance sketched above in Section 1.1.33

The early Wittgenstein, as we have noted, maintains that the meaning of my linguistic expressions is identical with the realities they picture: my words name the objects that I understand, where my understanding is my direct intellectual seeing of those objects. But in intellectual seeing, as in sensory seeing, the content I see — precisely as I see it — is fundamentally just private, just like the act. The consequence is that the meaning of my linguistic expressions is fundamentally just private.

The later Wittgenstein rejects this consequence. He argues that the meaning of my linguistic expressions, far from being fundamentally just private, is fundamentally just public. And his changed stance on the consequence goes hand in hand with a changed stance on the antecedents. Although he still identifies the meaning of my linguistic expressions with the content of my understanding, Wittgenstein now denies that my understanding is an act of intellectual seeing or, indeed, any other kind of mental act. For all mental acts and contents are hopelessly and irretrievably inner, hidden, private. Instead, both my acts of understanding and their contents are aspects of my outer, manifest, public behavior. They are features of my participation in the concrete life of the community. And thus the meaning of the linguistic expressions I employ is fundamentally just public precisely because that meaning is nothing other than the uses to which I put those expressions in my behavior as a member of the community.34

In light of the transcendental method I have articulated, Wittgenstein's later account improves on his earlier insofar as the later account rejects the view that my understanding is a matter of intellectual seeing and that, in consequence, the meaning of my linguistic expressions


34 In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein not only elaborates his later stance: at many points he also presents elements of his initial stance, which he now rejects. Passages cited by Fitzpatrick in one or the other of these respects include the following: 6, 96, 139, 154, 206, 258, 272, 323, 339, 362, 380, 436.
is fundamentally just private. On the other hand, the later account regresses insofar as it affirms that my understanding is not a mental act of any kind and that, in consequence, the meaning of my linguistic expressions is fundamentally just public. My transcendental methodology suggests that the radical weakness of both accounts is their inadequate articulation of the pure structural features of my acts of understanding. Positively, it contends that my intelligent understanding is indeed a mental act, though not an act of intellectual seeing. As indicated above in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, it is an act of intelligent unification, an act of grasping the concrete intelligible unity in attentively experienced data of sense, consciousness, or imagination. Within that intelligible composite, the experienced data are intrinsically particular, incommunicable, private, while the intelligible form is potentially universal, communicable, public. Insofar as I successfully conceptualize that composite and externalize it in language, the result is a linguistic expression whose meaning is fundamentally partly private and partly public.35

35For a detailed elaboration of the contention that both the meaning I intend to express and the meaning I manage to express are intelligible composites, plus an extended example and two extended counter-examples, see Michael Vertin, "Is There a Constitutional Right of Privacy?" Lonergan Workshop 16 (2000): 1-47.