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CONTENTS

Fred Lawrence 95 Lonergan, the Integral Postmodern?

Antonia Galdos 123 When Pragmatism and Instrumentalism Collide: Lonergan’s Resolution of the Peirce/Dewey Debate on Theory and Practice in Science

Russell J. Sawa and Hugo A. Meynell 145 On Insight, Objectivity, and the Pathology of Families

Michael Vertin 161 Interpreting the Constitution: A Response to Bruce Anderson

Robert Henman 179 Judgment, Reality, and Dissociative Consciousness
I. INTRODUCTION

It may seem odd to link Lonergan with the postmodern, since many who suppose that postmodernism is the root of all evil — the proton pseudos of our day — may well consider his thought a bulwark against postmodern pseudo-science, relativism, and nihilism. This is not an unreasonable opinion, since Lonergan does reject and resist pseudo-science, relativism, and nihilism. Naturally, many who consider themselves aligned with postmodernism would either scarcely have heard of him; or if they knew a little about him, would regard him as an opponent. There are also many ardent despisers of postmodernism who, on hearing Lonergan's name associated with postmodernism, would say with a baleful nod of the head, "I told you so!" Of course, all these opinions would usually be politically colored: liberal, progressive, conservative; politically correct vs. those opposed to political correctness.

Even so, whatever my own political leanings, and for what it's worth, I want to affirm that Christian philosophy and theology today have something important to learn from postmodernism, and that Lonergan can help us to learn it.

A. Postmodernism

When I say postmodernism, I am referring first of all to the critique of modernity. In some ways the postmodern critique has been illegitimate or exaggerated. As a translator of Jürgen Habermas's Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity, I can assure you that I do not have much sympathy for the postmodern reduction of philosophy to rhetoric and of reason to a witting or unwitting tool of power. And yet many aspects of the postmodern critique of modernity are legitimate. The gas chambers at Auschwitz have become a symbol of the end of the Enlightenment myth of progress. To recognize this does not entail any wholesale espousal of the irrationalities of imagination, language, and power. On the contrary.

The realization I owe to Lonergan (along with his students and my colleagues Patrick Byrne, Joseph Flanagan, Charles Hefling, and Matthew Lamb) that there is a normative achievement immanent in the scientific revolution has helped to keep me from confusing that normative achievement with the ideological 'cover story' of modern science propagated by the early modern followers of Machiavelli, including Descartes and Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. This cover story not only subordinates the theoretical end of knowledge of the truth for its own sake to technological expertise, but also morally reorientates modern science in the modern project of 'knowledge as power,' with its regimes of prediction, control, social engineering, and surveillance, gruesomely incarnated in the German extinction of European Jews.

When I speak of postmodernism, I am referring above all to Nietzsche's critique of modernity that was rooted in a quest for a more integral vision of


5See Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), especially chapter 15 on 'effectual truth' and the later chapters on nature as 'fortune' to be dominated by those young and strong enough.


the human. This quest was expressed in a grasp of cultural dialectics unmatched by the other 'masters of suspicion,' Marx and Freud. His criticism of the toll on humanity exacted by bourgeois capitalism, fascism, and communist socialism was exemplified in his devastating portrait of the Last Man. It is the starting point of postmodern Kulturkritik. Nietzsche's mockery of both rationalism (ancient and modern) and Romanticism turns out to be a postmodern propaedeutic for a recovery of the sacred that transcends mere nostalgic aestheticism. Most important, perhaps, is Nietzsche's unmasking of the gloomy asceticism he associates with priests and philosophers, and his linking of a genuine and hearty cheerfulness with the last and greatest of the virtues: intellectual honesty or probity. (In saying this, I am aware of the


10In Zarathustra Nietzsche speaks of bourgeois civilization as the "city of the many-colored cow" (13), and characterizes his historical age as the advent of the "last men," who "no longer shoot the arrow of ... longing beyond man, and so the "time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star" (17). Without a goal, humanity itself "will still be lacking" (60).

11Nietzsche wrote in On the Genealogy of Morals (3.10):

... The peculiar withdrawn attitude of the philosopher, world-denying, hostile to life, suspicious of the senses, freed from sensuality, which has been maintained down to the most modern times and has become virtually the philosopher’s pose par excellence ... for the longest time philosophy would not have been possible at all on earth without ascetic wraps and cloak, without an ascetic self-misunderstanding. The ascetic priest provided until the most modern times the repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in which alone the philosopher could live and creep about.

Has all this really altered? Has that many-colored and dangerous winged creature, the "spirit" which the caterpillar concealed, really been unfettered at last, and released into the light, thanks to a sunnier, warmer, brighter world? Is there sufficient pride, courage, self-confidence available today, sufficient will of the spirit, will to responsibility, freedom of will, for the "philosopher" to be henceforth—possible on earth?

12See Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 225: on 'intellectual probity,' as "the only virtue left to us," "our intellectual conscience." In Zarathustra (I.3) Nietzsche tells us that "Last
humor of linking the shy but jolly figure of Lonergan with such flamboyant figures as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. However, whatever may be the case with these remarkable French thinkers, I can tell you that Lonergan knew well the difference between true joy and its vulgarization in mere 'fun.'

B. Nietzsche mediated by Heidegger

As many of you know, Nietzsche was made palatable for the U.S. academy in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s by the sociologist, economist, legal theorist, and philosopher of religion, Max Weber.13 Weber blended the ideas of Nietzsche with Kant's moral idealism. He bestowed a strain of nobility on social thought. This nobility attracted such disciples as Karl Jaspers,14 Eric Voegelin,15 and Raymond Aron.16 This sense of nobility is manifest in Aron's deep admiration for Tocqueville,17 in contrast to his contemporary Jean-Paul Sartre, who imbued his Husserlian/Hegelian existentialism with a version of Marxism and lived out a rather less than noble relationship with Stalinism. The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the wedding of Nietzsche and/or Freud with night, at the garden wall,” Zarathustra heard in a dialogue five things that reflected a new honesty or intellectual probity. See Leo Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil,” Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 174-191.


14See Karl Jaspers, Max Weber: Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph (Munich: Piper-Bücherei, 1958), a tribute to the man who embodied intellectual integrity and comprehensiveness for him, and loyalty to whom aroused the petty jealousy of his mentor, Heinrich Rickert, and the University of Heidelberg.


Marx in a New Left movement that eliminated Kant's stringent morality from the activist equation. This relinquishing of Kant was not surprising because, as Charles Peguy noted long ago, it cannot be said that Kant has 'dirty hands' since he has no hands at all. In the context of the war in Vietnam and of Watergate, this wedding helped to establish the hermeneutics of suspicion in the American academy as the dominant climate of opinion. It also set the stage for the new Heidegger-mediated dominance of Nietzsche in the figures we now associate with the adjective 'postmodern' in the late 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s.

The important thinkers who might be regarded as postmodern and seem not to be directly influenced by Heidegger are Eric Voegelin and Alasdair MacIntyre. The other chief postmoderns are post-Heideggerians, and they fall into two orientations. There are those like Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Jean-Luc Marion, and our own Jacques Taminiaux and Richard Kearney, who go beyond Heidegger by modulating or moderating his thought — in quite different ways, to be sure. The second vast group, whose members regard themselves as more radically Heideggerian than Heidegger himself, includes Alexandre Kojève, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Gianni Vattimo, Richard Rorty, John Caputo, and our own William Richardson, to name but a few. For this talk, I want to focus on the great mediator of Nietzschean postmodernism, Martin Heidegger, because parallels between him and Lonergan help to clarify the unconventional connection between Lonergan and postmodernism I wish to address.

II. HEIDEGGER: PIONEER OF POSTMODERNISM

In the light of the controversial posthumous publication of Heidegger's works and of the valuable scholarship pioneered by Gadamer,\textsuperscript{18} Otto Pöggeler,\textsuperscript{19} and


\textsuperscript{19}Otto Pöggeler, \textit{Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking} (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 1987, ET of 1963 work).
William Richardson,²⁰ and advanced more recently with the benefit of so much more data by Thomas Sheehan,²¹ Theodore Kisiel,²² and John van Buren,²³ we are much clearer about the religious dimension of Heidegger’s thought, especially before 1927. Now we see how the path to Being and Time was marked by Heidegger’s need to break free from what in the famous 1919 letter he called “the Catholic system.”²⁴ This breakthrough was achieved chiefly through Heidegger’s reading of the works of the Western tradition outside the auspices of, and in reaction to, Roman Catholic scholasticism. It is of the utmost relevance that a great deal of the modern scholasticism called forth by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris was an embodiment of what Heidegger attacked in terms of the forgetfulness of Being and of Onto-theology.²⁵

Modern scholasticism has premodern roots in a line of scholasticism that originates with the great critic of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, passes through the leading Jesuit of Salamancan scholasticism, Francisco Suarez, to the varieties of scholastic philosophy and theology enshrined in what today is

²³John van Buren, Rumor of a Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
²⁴Letter to Fr Engelbert Krebs of 9 January 1919, cited in Kisiel, Genesis 80; see 69 ff.
known as the manual tradition. The counter-reformation bishop Melchior Cano used the system of *loci* worked out by Agricola for forensic rhetoric to reorient scholastic treatises from the *quaestio* to the thesis, and after the Council of Trent the manual tradition became *de riguer*. Here the tradition of metaphysics as the science of being *qua* being which epitomizes what Gadamer, encapsulating Heidegger’s radical critique, calls the horizon of *Vorhandenheit* played a central role.

I can only give a summary reconstruction of features that typify the syndrome of *Vorhandenheit*, which according to Heidegger had so deeply affected both the premodern metaphysics of substance and modern epistemologies of the subject.

First, there is the dominance of analogy of ocular vision for knowledge. This signals a triumph of perceptualism in the West, which both legitimates and is justified by the ontological primacy of the ‘already-out-there-now’ as the really real. I call this bias perceptualism.

Second, there is the exaggerated importance of Aristotle’s apophatic logic, whose overestimation of the significance of clear and precise concepts (whether isolated or joined together in propositions) is called conceptualism.

Third, this exclusive bias toward the products of our knowing (concepts, propositions, syllogisms) rather than toward what we actually are and do when we know is closely associated with that penchant so prevalent in the scholastic manuals, namely, the pretense of defining, dividing, and syllogizing the totality of the ‘already-out-there-now’ real, which constitutes abstract deductivism. This is the heart of logo-centrism, probably the central object of postmodernist scorn.

Fourth, the combination of perceptualism, conceptualism, and abstract deductivism results in several major flaws in scholastic philosophy and theology, the most significant and pernicious of which regards the primacy of

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28 On the horizon of *Vorhandenheit*, see Fred Lawrence, chapter 1: “The Nominalist Prejudgment,” *Believing to Understand: The Hermeneutic Circle in Gadamer and Lonergan*, to appear from the University of Toronto Press.
the subject-object split. Whether it is affirmed in terms of the metaphysics of substance or of the epistemology of the subject, this split is assumed to be primordial. Those who insist on the priority of metaphysics are preoccupied with the objective world of the ‘already-out-there-now real,’ and insist dogmatically that we can know this if we take look at what’s there instead of what’s not there, and if we follow the rules of logic. Those who give epistemology the priority say we must start from the ‘already-in-here-now’ of the res cogitans, and build a bridge over to the ‘already-out-there-now’ real by perception and logical reasoning. This primordial dichotomy between subject and object has had destructive consequences for modern thought and modern scholasticism. Let me mention a few of these consequences.

We begin with rationalism, which insisted on the old scholastic tag, nihil amatum nisi praecognitum. In modern times Christian, and especially Catholic, rationalism imported the mythology of rigor and proof into apologetics, thus mirroring its secularist opponents, who adopted Locke’s quite unAristotelian assumption that the “unerring mark of truth” is “not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant.” The difficulty here is that nothing significant can pass muster for Locke’s notion of proof — not his own state-of-nature theory, for instance.

This rationalism, oddly enough, was taken in two opposed and mistaken directions. The first direction is ahistorical orthodoxy. The utter neglect, not to say disrespect, for history cut the philosophical and theological theses off from vital contact with their sources. The thesis-method’s embarrassing status quaestionis was a blatant caricature of the doxography used by Aristotle; and its notorious ‘proof-texting’ absolved teachers and students alike from careful reading of the sources, let alone the ‘meditative exegesis’ needed to make sense of them.


30The Roman Catholic Church was heavily invested in this style of orthodoxy. No wonder that Lonergan would later say, “All my work has been introducing history into Catholic Theology.” See Frederick E. Crowe, “All my work has been introducing history into Catholic Theology’ (Lonergan, March 28, 1980),” The Legacy of Lonergan, Lonergan Workshop 10 (1994) 49-81.
The second direction, which is partially a reaction to ahistorical orthodoxy, is positivist historical-critical method, which applies the subject-object split in epistemology to history, thus creating G.E. Lessing's gaping abyss between past and present, and between the contingencies of history and the truths of faith: "the contingent truths of history can never serve as the demonstration of the eternal truths of faith."^{31}

A further modern consequence of the horizon of Vorhendenheit is the replacement of wisdom by technical expertise. This attitude is epitomized by Descartes' creation of the theory of the eternal truths as the presupposition of the technological view of the world. Heidegger's Brief über den Humanismus laments that "all being has become material for work."^{32} He was deeply upset that technology had become the ontology of the modern age.

During their lives, both Heidegger and Lonergan had to contend with the bureaucratic and managerial ethos that follows from this, not least in the guise of modern ecclesiology. Such Protestant Christians affected by Heidegger as Rudolf Bultmann and Gerhard Ebeling spoke of the Roman Church from the outside as a Heilsanstalt: an objective institution set up to dispose of or dispense salvation.^{33} This image contains the truth of caricature. Catholic theologians influenced by Lonergan, Joseph Komonchak^{34} and Hermann Josef Pottmeyer,^{35} have studied the post-1815 Roman Catholic construction of a legalistic, trium-

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philosopher, institutional mediator and guarantor of salvation, which in many ways resembled that caricature of the Roman Church.

Both Heidegger and Lonergan were confronted as young men with versions of Roman Catholicism and the dominant intellectual currents of scholasticism that may be characterized in Heidegger's language as operating in the horizon of Vorhandenheit and in Lonergan's language as counterpositional.

Heidegger's response was to ask in the most radical way what it meant to be a Christian and a philosopher. He outgrew the early tutelage under Franz Brentano and such radicalizers of transcendental logic as the neo-Kantian Emil Lask and the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Partly inspired by Dilthey and Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, he launched on a study of the classic writings from Greek and Christian antiquity. Two of the central authors of this tradition, Augustine and Aristotle, helped Heidegger break through to a hermeneutics of facticity. By this he tried to transcend classical metaphysics' question about being as being to the more radical re-origination of the question of 'to be.' The 'to be' is distinct from God, and the cost of considering God as the causa sui, the first and the highest among beings that causes itself, is atheism.

Heidegger found that the 'discoveredness' of beings in their beingness (Seiendheit) presupposes in human beings an unthematic openness and standing out (ek-stasis, 'ex-sistence') toward the 'to be,' as distinct from beings. My own opportunity to contrast Gadamer with his mentor Heidegger, whom he called "the grand master of forced interpretation," has made me think

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37 The choice to translate Heidegger's Sein as 'to be' was inspired by the late Thomas Prufer, whose masterful essay, "A Protreptic: What Is Philosophy?" has always been an inspiration ever since David Tracy gave it to me while I was a student in Basel. I am also indebted to a couple of pages of Prufer's handouts on Heidegger from 1962.


that Heidegger, despite his massive sense of breaking away and penetrating profundity, in the end read the great premodern tradition of philosophy and theology through the lens of the scholastic horizon of *Vorhandenheit*, where the 'to be' — obscured by the beings it illuminates and withdrawn into coveredness by being — was forgotten. His phenomenology would start again by questioning *Dasein* as the only manifest being concerned with 'to be,' and allow whatever shows itself in the way, as self-manifesting, to be seen. On the path of this new beginning, Heidegger found that the old idea of truth as *adequatio rei et intellectus* was not only partial and derivative, but misled its proponents to assume that in beings the 'to be' would be at its disposal. Rather, he insisted, truth (*a-letheia*) is 'un-concealment' and 'un-forgetting.' This more radical idea of truth discloses the inseparability of 'dis-closedness' and 're-collection' from hiddenness and finitude.

The analytic of *Dasein* negotiated the human being's 'being-toward' the 'to be' as distinct from beings in concern and dread. Later on, in profound acknowledgment that there is no adequate manifestation of or speech about the 'to be' in differentiation, Heidegger underwent a reversal or turn (*Kehre*) beyond the phenomenological analysis of *Dasein* to a nonphenomenological use of language which recognizes in an ongoing way the impossibility of speaking clearly what remains most hidden.

Heidegger realizes that the only *logos* of the 'to be' is the silence that is only possible for a being that can speak. And so the dis-closure of the 'to be' shatters the horizon of *Vorhandenheit*, with its congenital perceptualism, conceptualism, and abstract deductivism. It demolishes the priority of the subject-object split, because *Dasein* manifests the 'to be' by calling it into question. The force of the critique of the correspondence theory of truth dismantles both the objectivism of the 'already-out-there-now' and the subjectivism of the 'already-in-here-now.' The adoption of the notion of truth as *a-letheia*, re-vealment, dis-closure deconstructs the Cartesian subject and abolishes the priority of epistemology as the 'handmaiden of the positive sciences.' It gives some breathing room in the face of pervasive technical

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40On the meaning of the 'turn' in Heidegger, see H.-G. Gadamer, "The Way in the Turn (1979)," *Heidegger’s Ways* 121-137.
manipulation and control, and invites people to realize that, in the words of the late interview in Der Spiegel, "only a god can save us." 41

Heidegger's re-origination of philosophy in the difference and interplay between being, the 'to be,' and Dasein, inaugurates the postmodern dispensation of the ontological difference, of difference (Derrida), of the Other (Lévinas), of God without being (Marion), of discontinuity and contingency (Foucault, Derrida), of jouissance (Kristeva), of body and difference in opposition to reason as ever manipulative and exclusionary (postmodern multiculturalists). The subject is displaced in terms of the richness and poverty of the play of manifold possibilities not tethered to propositional truth, and finally not manipulable by dominative power.

These typically post-Heideggerian motifs are manifest in the overwhelmingly ethical concerns of Lévinas, Derrida, and Foucault. If postmodern thinkers hover on the cusp of Jewish and Christian religion, thus redeeming Nietzsche's renewal of serious interest in the sacred, surely the overarching thrust of postmodernism is to replace both metaphysics and epistemology with ethics as first philosophy. These three figures kept up a distanced suspicion of institutionalized Western religions' historic lack of hospitality and too frequent brutality. And so the ethical reorientation of philosophy is most prominent in their work. More recent postmodernists, such as Richard Kearney 42 and the late Gillian Rose, 43 have suggested that, for the sake of radical openness, these ethical approaches to the Other have so insisted on the abstract indeterminacy of difference and Other that they almost make concrete practical and political discrimination and deliberation impossible. I agree with their judgment.

41 This interview took place on 31 September 1966 between Heidegger and Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolf on condition that it not be published until after his death. The famous Gespräch, in which Heidegger said, "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten," appeared in Der Spiegel in 1976 after his death, and has been republished as "'Herr Professor ...' Das SPIEGEL Interview," in Antwort: Heidegger im Gespräch, eds. G. Neske and E. Kettering (Frankfurt: Neske Verlag).


III. LONERGAN, POSTMODERN?

**A. Youthful Concern for Ethics**

Lonergan was born fifteen years after Heidegger in an English-speaking enclave of Francophone Canada. In Catholic and Jesuit schools he received an education that prepared him to study the Greek and Latin classics and mathematics at university. Like Heidegger he entered the Jesuit Order in his teens. When he studied philosophy and did his external university degree in England, the world was headed toward the Great Depression. In 1927 he wrote of himself, “I am little scholastic though as far as I know a good Catholic still.”

How unscholastic he was is manifest in his earliest papers on the form of inference (with examples stressing the role of imagination in geometry), the syllogism, and Newman’s illative sense — what Newman called the ‘true way of learning.’ It would be a grave mistake, though, to simply consider Lonergan as a person who updated Thomas Aquinas’s gnoseology and metaphysics to do justice to the seven intervening centuries of learning.

Unlike Heidegger, Lonergan’s most urgent early concerns lay in the field of social ethics. On the basis of posthumously discovered papers, we now know that Lonergan’s “interests in the 1930s were economic, political, sociological, cultural, historical, religious, rather than gnoseological and metaphysical.” As Crowe goes on to say, “The restoration of all things in Christ (Ephesians 1.10) was closer to a motto for him than ‘thoroughly understand what it is to understand.’” Besides studying Plato and Augustine’s early dialogues in Cassiciacum before going on to theology, Lonergan was challenged by Pope Pius XI’s encyclical on social order, *Quadragesimo Anno*. He began to think seriously about how Catholic social teaching could go beyond

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44 A quotation from a letter to Henry Smeaton, SJ cited by Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, *Lonergan (Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series, series editor, Brian Davies, OP; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992)* 14:

I am afraid I must lapse into philosophy. I have been stung with that monomania now and then but I am little scholastic though as far as I know a good Catholic still. The theory of knowledge is what is going to interest me most of all.

issuing ‘vague moral imperatives’ to ground precepts for social justice in concrete economic and social reality.

By the time he was sent to Rome for studies in 1933 Fascism and Bolshevism had begun to dominate Europe, and the world was careening toward its second great war. There he made firsthand contact with Thomas Aquinas’s writings. At the time he wrote that he soon realized that the then “current interpretation [of Aquinas] ... is a consistent misinterpretation” in contrast to the “luminous and unmistakeable meaning” he thought he could work out for agent and possible intellect, abstraction, intellectual apprehension of universals, illumination of the phantasm, and the Thomist metaphysic.

Though he studied Thomas, he was engaged by the thought of Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Dawson, and Toynbee. He wrote drafts of what (in a letter to a superior in his Order) he then called “a Thomistic metaphysic of history that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade. ... It takes the ‘objective and inevitable laws’ of economics, of psychology (environment, tradition) and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of a civilization) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical body.”

This concern for a theory of human solidarity inspired Lonergan to undertake two ambitious projects through the late 1930s and early 1940s. First, he developed an analysis of the elements of a theory of history and tentatively applied that analysis to the concrete course of history. Second, he embarked upon fourteen years of reading, note-taking, and writing in an attempt to understand the dynamics of production and monetary circulation in modern exchange economies, in order to discover whether and how you could have a democratic economy based on both freedom and morality. He produced a

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46 This is from a January 1935 letter to Fr. Henry Keane, cited in Crowe, Lonergan, 22.
47 Cited again from the 1/1935 letter to Keane, in Crowe, Lonergan, 22-23.
49 On the history of Lonergan’s involvement with economics, see Frederick G. Lawrence, “Editors’ Introduction,” Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation
series of texts prior to his 1944 manuscript entitled, "An Essay in Circulation Analysis." Late in his life, during his period as Distinguished Professor of Theology at Boston College from 1975-1983, he was motivated by the lack of adequate economic theory in Catholic political and liberation theologies of the 1960s and 1970s to resume the serious study of economics. The fruits of this period are now documented in this year's publication, **Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis.**

From these activities we see how much the young Lonergan agreed with Ortega y Gasset that culture sets problems which each generation must resolve either authentically or otherwise. Lonergan's reaction to his dissatisfaction with the world and the church of his youth was, in the phrase from Ortega quoted in the original preface to *Insight* "to strive to mount to the level of one's time." It is important to acknowledge that Lonergan undertook his eleven year apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas in this frame of mind.

**B. Revolution in Reading: Lonergan and Thomas Aquinas**

Charles Boyer, SJ, the supervisor of Lonergan's doctoral dissertation at the Gregorian University (written from 1938-1939 and rewritten for publication in 1940-1942), assigned the topic for his dissertation on Thomas Aquinas's theology of grace and freedom on the hunch that none of the scholastic commentators had correctly understood Aquinas in these matters. The central issue of the dissertation turned out to have less to do with

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50This series of writings has been published under the title of one of the manuscripts, *For a New Political Economy*, Collected Works, vol. 21, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).


interpretation of biblical and credal doctrine, than with Lonergan's discovery that much of the scholastic tradition had failed to see that Thomas Aquinas had undergone a Socratic reversal. Lonergan found that Aquinas's fidelity to the Dominican motto of *contemplata aliis tradere* impelled him to move out of the cave of theological opinion and controversy, and to be swept up by the centrifugal force of the quest for theoretical understanding of the theorems of the supernatural and divine transcendence, of Aristotle on operation and pre-motion, of Thomas on application and universal instrumentality, of the will's freedom, and of actual and habitual grace as both operative and cooperative. Little did Boyer know that in a matter of months Lonergan would in effect demolish the basis for the controversies on grace and freedom that had dominated Catholic theology since the days of Baroque scholasticism. [Not that many took notice.]

Just as Heidegger attempted a repetition and re-origination of philosophy, so Lonergan repeated and re-originated the highest theoretical achievement of Christian theology. He established that speculative theology is not an abstract deductivist search for certitudes concerning the propositions of Christian belief, but faith seeking explanatory understanding through philosophically grasped natural analogies, which do not exhaust the mystery, but offer "just the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look."54

Further questions compelled Lonergan in 1943 to begin studying what Aquinas understood by word and idea, leading to a series of articles published in *Theological Studies* from 1946-1949.55 Here he confirmed what he had earlier suspected, namely, that the typical modern scholastic's exclusive emphasis on sensible apprehension and universal concepts was beside the point when it


54 *Verbum*, CWL 2: 216.

came to understanding what Aquinas meant by rationality as the interior life of the human spirit. Aquinas, Lonergan understood, was interested in intelligence. Intelligence performs the 'direct' understanding proper to 'insight into phantasms,' which yields meaningful formulations of intelligibility, and also the reflective understanding similar to Aristotle's *phronesis*, which grounds concrete judgments of fact. At a stroke, he brushed aside modern scholastic perceptualism and conceptualism.

Recall that the hermeneutics of facticity in which Heidegger re-originated philosophy was made possible through his careful phenomenological reading of classical authors such as St Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Aristotle. This reading disclosed the authors' meanings by referring to our own human experience of factual existence. Lonergan, too, revolutionized the reading of Aquinas by the discovery that the basis for the metaphysical expression of his theory of the verbum was the retrieval of the experience of understanding as a power that at every stage of its enactment is aware of its own dynamisms and fertility. For Aquinas, human intelligence is a created participation in uncreated Light. So intelligence is an immanent source of transcendence that understands the distinction between subject and object in the same way that it grasps every other distinction. Hence, the primordiality of the subject/object split is also swept aside. This does not mean that the intelligent subject is the lord and master of reality who can willfully define and divide all of reality in order to dispose of it by its own will to power. Instead, the act of


57See *Verbum*, CWL 2: 98-99:

... Still, in all this progress we are but discriminating, differentiating, categorizing the details of a scheme that somehow we possessed from the start. ... And in its details the scheme is just the actuation of our capacity to conceive any essence and rationally affirm its existence and its relations. Since within that scheme both we ourselves and all our acts of conceiving and of judging are not more than particular and not too important items, the critical problem ... is not a problem of moving from within outwards, of moving from a subject to an object outside the subject. It is a problem of moving from above downwards, of moving from an infinite potentiality commensurate with the universe towards a rational apprehension that seizes the difference of subject and object in essentially the same way that it seizes any other real distinction.
understanding is an *Ereignis*, something one suffers, when, in response to questions, insights supervene on our conscious experience.\(^{58}\)

When Lonergan rediscovered what Aquinas meant by understanding, he also found that consciousness itself is not a perception, but an experience, a usually tacit presence to ourselves that is concomitant to our intentional and imaginally and linguistically mediated presence to the world.\(^{59}\) This means consciousness basically receives all that it possesses, even itself. It also means that the correct understanding of Aquinas entails the deconstruction of the truncated subject of Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, and Hume, and the dismantling, *avant la lettre*, of the immanentist subject of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel sought by postmodern philosophy. It also offers the possibility of overcoming without *ressentiment* Nietzsche’s sense of alienation brought about by the realization that the death of God yields the pusillanimous *ressentiment* of the Last Man.\(^{60}\) Living in the presence of the mystery of love and awe promotes not servility and gloomy asceticism but human responsibility for ourselves and our world.

**C. Aquinas Today: Insight**

By the end of his eleven year apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas Lonergan was convinced that “besides being a philosopher and theologian, St Thomas was a man of his time meeting the challenge of his time.” Then “Western Christendom was being flooded with the novel ideas of Greek and Arabic science and philosophy” and the challenge was “working out, and thinking through a new mold for the Catholic mind, a mold in which it could remain fully Catholic and


\(^{59}\)See *Verbum*, CWL 2: 198, note 28:

> ...[C]onsciousness is either concomitant, reflective, or rational. Concomitant consciousness is awareness of one’s act and oneself in knowing something else; this has no place in God, who knows first himself and then other things. Reflective consciousness supposes concomitant consciousness. Rational consciousness pertains to the intelligible procession of inner words, to the fact that they proceed from sufficient grounds because they are known to be sufficient.

\(^{60}\)On the truncated, immanentist, and alienated subject as deformations of the existential subject, see Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject,” *A Second Collection*, eds. William Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) 69-86.
yet be at home with all the good things that might be drawn from the cultural heritage of Greeks and Arabs."61 In 1953 Lonergan wrote that "after spending years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, I came to a twofold conclusion. ... That reaching had changed me profoundly," and "that change was the essential benefit."62 He went on to say that "it is only through a personal self-appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness that one can hope to reach the mind of Aquinas and, once that mind is reached, then it is difficult not to import his compelling genius to the problems of this day."63 From 1949 to 1953 Lonergan wrote *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* to meet the problems of his day.64 The following is one formulation of what he thought they were:

As there is a post-Cartesian affirmation of philosophy that rules theology out of court, so there is a post-Kantian affirmation of science that tosses overboard even Kant's modest claims for philosophy, and there is a still later totalitarian violence that with equal impartiality brushes aside theology and philosophy and science. But at that empty conclusion to the sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses, man still exists and man still is called upon to decide. Archaists urge him to imagine that he lives in an age of liberalism, or rationalism, or faith. Futurists paint for him a utopia that cannot disguise its own mythical features. But the plain fact is that the world lies in pieces before him and pleads to be put together again, to be put together not as it stood before on the careless foundation of assumptions that happened to be unquestioned but on the strong ground of the possibility of questioning and with full awareness of the range of possible answers.65

Some postmodernists, in the name of opposing totalitarian violence, celebrate the elimination of theology, philosophy, and science as well as any and all foundationalism. In the spirit of Nietzschean intellectual probity, however, I

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63 Insight, CWL 3: 770.
65 Insight, CWL 3: 552.
suggest that integral postmodernists criticize only ‘the careless foundation of assumptions that happen to be unquestioned’ and take their stand instead on ‘the strong ground of the possibility of questions with a full awareness of the range of possible answers.’ As Lonergan said, “If [our existential situation’s] confusion is to be replaced by intelligible order and its violence by reasonable affirmation, then the nucleus from which this process can begin must include an acknowledgment of detached inquiry and disinterested reflection, [and] a rigorous unfolding of the implications of that acknowledgment.”

Lonergan affirmed that “[d]elight and suffering, laughter and tears, wit and humor, stand not within practicality but above it. Man,” he wrote, “can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart.”66 Nietzsche’s postmodern challenge to culture is to do this with relentless intellectual honesty, and I would say that Lonergan alone inquires into the grounds of intellectual honesty. His answer was “not to set forth a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge but to assist the reader[s] in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete, dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in [their] own cognitional activities.”67 This is neither a Cartesian nor a Kantian quest, because “the question is not whether knowledge exists but what precisely is its nature.” The answer requires more than phenomenology, however, because the appropriation of rational self-consciousness moves beyond description to performance. Of Insight Lonergan wrote: “Just as in some types of therapy one learns to advert to, name, recognize, identify one’s previously submerged feelings, so in this book one is invited to discover in oneself precisely experienced operations and the dynamism that leads from one type to another. In the measure that discovery is made, one will” make one’s own “the referents” that specify “(1) basic terms, (2) basic correlations, (3) a basic orientation.”68 “My aim,” he said, “was ... to seek a common ground on which men of intelligence might meet.”69

66Insight, CWL 3: 261.
67Insight, CWL 3: 11.
Lonergan’s pedagogy in *Insight* invites the reader to venture “into mathematics and physics, into the subtleties of common sense and depth psychology, into the processes of history, the intricacies of interpretation, the dialectic of philosophies, and the possibility of transcendent knowledge.”70 He wants us “to apprehend, to appropriate, to envisage in all its consequences, the inner focus of [people’s] own intelligence and reasonableness” in insight. To gain insight into insight is “to pierce the outer verbal and conceptual exhibitions of mathematics, of science, and of common sense, and to penetrate to the inner dynamism of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection,” and “one’s own essential and restricted freedom.”71

When we realize that knowing is understanding, intellectual probity is pushed from one-sided practice of the hermeneutics of suspicion into courageous resistance to the flight from understanding and into commitment to further questions. For Lonergan “knowing is understanding, and understanding is incompatible with the obscurantism that arbitrarily brushes questions aside.”72 Because the achievement of this basic orientation “arises when the actual orientation of consciousness coincides with the exigences of the pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know,”73 reading *Insight* has to become an exercise in Socratic reversal.

However, Socratic reversal is an uncommon and arduous attainment. We distinguish professors of philosophy from philosophers because, like most professional academics, professors are acculturated into being narcissistic, self-centered animals ‘on-the-make,’ but Socratic reversal as the necessary condition for philosophy in the most serious sense entails a radical displacement of any person’s average ‘self-image’ from the self to what is highest and best. This calls for a revolution in our living, and usually, a new solution to the problem of living together.


70 “The Original Preface of Insight” 4.

71 “The Original Preface of Insight” 4.

72 *Insight*, CWL 3: 23.

In Lonergan's exploration of the structures of consciousness the dimension of reversal becomes critical in appropriating the act of judgment. Direct acts of understanding answer What/Why-questions by insights into data as presented or imagined. Such insights ground guesses or hypotheses about possibly relevant intelligibility. Guesses or hypotheses spontaneously call forth Is-questions that are answered when reflective acts of understanding grasp whether or not the evidence is sufficient. With rational necessity reflective insights ground judgments which affirm or deny that possibly relevant answers are virtually unconditioned, and so true or false.

Lonergan's position is postmodern in that he does not hold the exorbitant view of true judgments that many postmodern thinkers object to. This objectionable view of truth assumes the regular attainment of the strict conditions Aristotle set for apodictic knowledge. Accordingly, the truths affirmed by judgment are so necessary that they couldn't be otherwise. On the basis of self-appropriation, Lonergan, like the postmodernists, disagrees with this account of truth. Rather, almost everything we judge to be the case — every matter of fact — is contingent. This means it is a conditioned state of affairs, with conditions that only happen to be, yet may not have been, fulfilled. The integral postmodernist also understands that contingency is compatible with intelligibility and truth, and that to affirm truth absolutely is to assert a verified possibility, not an absolute necessity.

Note that the virtually unconditioned character of human judgment is conditioned with regard to the object known, and also with regard to the one knowing. Any reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned depends on whether or not the knower is influenced by dramatic, individual, group, or general bias. Thus, the proximate criterion of truth built into people's conscious intentionality is itself conditioned by the remote criterion of their historicity, which embraces "the concrete inevitability of a context of other acts".

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75 Insight, CWL 3: 305-306, 312, 330, 335, and passim.
76 Insight, CWL 3: 353, 355.
78 On the biases, see Insight, CWL 3: 214-231, 244-267.
79 On the proximate and remote criterion of truth, see Insight, CWL 3: 573-575.
and a context of other contents." Nietzschean postmodernism stresses that our personal horizons are mediated and constituted psychologically, socially, and historically. Not only is it a practical impossibility to reconstruct our horizons by processes of explicit analysis, but we all find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to acknowledge our complicity in social and cultural decline. This means that the judgments of fact and value at the heart of self-appropriation are also profoundly affected by the personal, social, and cultural inauthenticity of the subject.

When, in trying to understand Thomas Aquinas, Lonergan performed the scrutinizing, naming, and reorientation involved in appropriating his own rational self-consciousness, he took his Christian and Ignatian commitment for granted. In Insight he did not properly envisage the implications of the fact that anyone attempting self-appropriation is not devoid of self-deception or free from the impact of having invested time role-playing in situations marked by the opacity of the objective surd. Insight described at length how the longer cycle of social and cultural decline pervades technological, economic, and political institutions, the educational system, the communications media, and the churches. But only after completing Insight in 1953 did Lonergan come to grips with the fact that while the human mind’s pure, detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know defines “the ultimate horizon that is to be reached only through successive enlargements of the actual

80Insight, CWL 3: 573.
81On the critique of mistaken beliefs, see Insight, CWL 3: 737-739.
82On how the appropriation of the truth involves the whole person, Insight, CWL 3: 581-585, esp. 583.
83In general, the objections Lonergan made in criticism of the concrete (in contradistinction to the logical) validity of his argument for the conception and affirmation of God hold analogously for the judgment and decision involved in self-appropriation/intellectual conversion/Socratic reversal. See Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology: The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty, Systematics (St Michael’s Lectures, Gonzaga University, Spokane, 1972; London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 11-13, 41m, 64; see also, “Natural Knowledge of God,” A Second Collection 117-133: “[N]atural knowledge of God is not attained without moral judgments and existential decisions. These do not occur without God’s grace. Therefore, the natural light of human reason does not suffice for man’s so-called natural knowledge of God” (133).
84On the longer cycle of decline, Insight, CWL 3: 251-263.
horizon," still, "such successive enlargements only too clearly lie under some law of decreasing returns. ... In the language of scripture and of a current philosophy, man is fallen." 85

D. From Insight to Method in Theology: Divine Reversal

During the almost two decades separating the completion of Insight and the publication of Method in Theology 86 Lonergan underwent his own Kehre as he gradually learned to thematize more precisely the further and prior conditions that must be fulfilled in order for intellectual conversion in its deepest sense of Socratic reversal to be achieved.

Lonergan's Kehre involved a profound shift in emphasis. Years before he had remarked, "For Augustine, our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and foremost our minds are restless until they rest in seeing him." 87 He told me that as he grew older he became more Augustinian.

As Lonergan learned how to express in terms of intentionality analysis 88 the results of his historical retrieval of Thomas Aquinas's theology of grace and

87 Verbum, CWL 2: 100.
88 Four passages from A Second Collection:

...Like recently what I've got a hold of is the fact that I've dropped faculty psychology and I'm doing intentionality analysis. And what I did in Insight mainly was intentionality analysis of experiencing, understanding, judging. Add on to that ... the different types of feeling ... (223).

...I wished to get out of the context of faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism, none of which has any serious, viable meaning and into the context of intentionality analysis that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations and reveals that together they head towards self-transcendence (170).

As before, so here too the account is not to presuppose a metaphysical framework of potencies, habits, acts, objects but basically it is to proceed from personal experience and move towards an analysis of the structures of our conscious and intentional operations. More than anywhere it is essential here to be able to speak from the heart to the heart without introducing elements that, however true in themselves, have the disadvantage of not being given in experience (204).
freedom, he had to appropriate what Augustine and later Pascal meant by 'heart.' The cognitional structure thematized in *Insight* was not enough for this task. He had to adopt the phenomenological notion of horizon. He had to investigate meaning as intersubjective, symbolic, artistic, linguistic, and incarnate. With the aid of Scheler and Hildebrand he had to thematize the transcendental notion of values, and appropriate feelings as intentional responses to values.

Joseph de Finance helped him to distinguish between

Without the explicit formulations that later were possible, metaphysics had ceased for me to be what Fr. Coreth named the Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft. The empirical sciences were allowed to work out their own basic terms and relations apart from any consideration of metaphysics. The basic inquiry was cognitional theory and, while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis.

89 *Method in Theology* 115: After speaking of faith as 'the knowledge born of love,' and paraphrasing Pascal 'that the heart has reasons that reason does not know,' Lonergan writes:

[B]y reason I would understand the compound of activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, of judging. By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values; ... Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love.


In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublated intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.

93 In *Method in Theology* chapter 2, see the sections on "Feelings," "The Notion of Value," and "Judgments of Value," 30-41.
vertical and horizontal exercises of liberty. He appealed to Pascal to apprehend the difference between faith and belief. Heightened sensitivity to the significance of the experience and dynamic state of being in love led him to rearticulate the hermeneutic circle in terms of the two vectors of human development: the way of achievement from below upwards, and the way of gift or heritage from above downwards. Gradually he was able to articulate the meaning of conversion as religious and moral as well as intellectual. Now


96 See the Index of *Method in Theology* under “Love,” 390, for the many significant references.


... [H]uman development occurs in two distinct modes. If I may use a spatial metaphor, it moves [1] from below upwards and [2] from above downwards.

It moves from above downwards inasmuch as it begins from one’s personal experience, advances through ever fuller understanding and more balanced judgment, and so attains the responsible exercise of personal freedom.

It moves from above downwards inasmuch as one belongs to a hierarchy of groups and so owes allegiance to one’s home, to one’s country, to one’s religion. Through the traditions of the group one is socialized, acculturated, educated.


For human development is of two quite different kinds. There is development from below upwards, from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of action, and from fruitful courses of action to the new situations that call forth further understanding, profounder judgment, richer courses of action.

But there also is development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one’s tribe, one’s city, one’s country, mankind; the divine love orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in his worship. Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values. At once it commands commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnipotent, short-sighted common sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of love.

98 *Method in Theology* 122, 243.
he could explain how the prior condition for people to achieve the Socratic reversal is a divine reversal.

This divine reversal is not an enlargement of the human being's actual horizon that is implicit in the structure of human consciousness. It is not something naturally possible to human beings. This divine reversal is the ultimate enlargement, beyond the resources of every finite consciousness, that alone meets humanity's highest aspiration. It is the gift of God's love, the realization of God's regard for us, by which the self enters into a personal relationship of love and regard for God. This friendly regard for God, this living out of a mysterious gratuity to which we cannot lay claim, Lonergan understood is the *hen anangkaion* if the successive enlargements of actual human horizons are to approach ever more nearly the point where the actual orientation of human consciousness coincides with the demands of the pure, detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know enough to consistently dominate conscious living. Lonergan believed that Augustine and Aquinas manifested this purity of heart when facing the crises of their epochs. Our contemporary crisis of culture, too, calls for such purity of heart.

For Lonergan, this *Besinnung*, this becoming aware, this growth in self-consciousness, this heightening of our self-appropriation in the Socratic reversal "is possible because our separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common circle of reference, the human community, and an ultimate point of reference, which is God, who is all in all, *ta panta en pasin theos.*" The divine reversal interrupts the human desire for mastery and control, and the habitual recoil of the human self into massive possessiveness. Lonergan reminded us often of Thomas Aquinas's teaching that God did not create the world to obtain something for himself, but rather overflowed from love of the infinite to loving the finite. "As the excellence of the son is the glory of the father, so too the excellence of humankind is the glory of God. To say that God created the world for his glory is to say that he created it not for his sake but

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100 "Openness and Religious Experience,“ on openness as gift, *Collection*, CWL 4: 187.
102 This paragraph follows closely the second paragraph of Lonergan's "*Existenz und Aggiornamento,*“ *Collection*, CWL 4: 222-231.
for ours."\textsuperscript{103} This divine reversal enables and calls for a human reversal so that people can decide and act in the image of God. When, and in the measure that, this happens, "the fount of our living is not eros but agape, not desire of an end that uses means but love of an end that overflows."
WHEN PRAGMATISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM COLLIDE: LONERGAN'S RESOLUTION OF THE PEIRCE/DEWEY DEBATE ON THEORY AND PRACTICE IN SCIENCE

With Historical Exemplification Drawn From Einstein's Early Work on the Special Theory of Relativity

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SUMMARY

This essay will consider the dispute between Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the nature and validity of the theory/practice distinction. Their dispute concerns whether a strong affirmation of this distinction enables scientific inquiry or disables it. Inherent in this issue are two related questions, namely whether truth can be pursued for its own sake, and, as a subset of this question, whether there is an evidence proper to the consideration of pure possibilities. I will argue that there is a common ground between the logic of inquiry which Dewey is determined will have practical effect, and the logic of inquiry which Peirce is concerned will discover the truth promised by correct investigation. This compromise is found in the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, whose critical realism includes an account of concrete judgement strikingly similar to that of John Dewey, but whose account of the normative structure of cognition, emanating from the individual's radical desire to know, also incorporates Peirce's emphasis on the pursuit of truth and on the validity of the scientist's consideration of pure logical possibilities. I will present these similarities, and will consider the structure of Einstein's 1905 paper, "On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," as a case study which supports Lonergan's (and Peirce's) account of cognitional structure, but which poses problems
for Dewey’s instrumentalism. The essay concludes that Lonergan offers a critical realism which successfully renounces the ‘spectator’ theory of knowledge without underestimating the importance of the normative element of understanding in the human desire to know.

Peirce, Dewey, and Lonergan — Common Ground

Peirce, Dewey, and Lonergan share several basic philosophical tendencies. All three share the philosophical project of articulating the structure of cognition, and, in so doing, critically exposing traditional misconceptions regarding the nature of human knowing. According to Lonergan, simplistic cognitional theories suffer from a tendency to operate according to the “myth that knowing is looking.”¹ For example, in the correspondence theory of truth, truth is defined as the “correspondence of the knowing to the known, and [in which] ... we see the correspondence of our knowing to the known.”² Thus, Lonergan observes that simplistic cognitional theories tend to adopt ocular metaphors, thereby reducing human knowledge to a simple ‘seeing,’ rather than several distinct intellectual operations related by functional complementarity.³ To illustrate this point Lonergan uses the example of holding one’s hand in front of one’s face:

The hand is really out there; it is the object. The eye, strangely, is not in the hand; it is some distance away in the head; it is the subject. The eye really sees the hand; it sees what is there to be seen; it does not see what is not there to be seen.⁴

This act of looking appears to exhibit the essence of objectivity. Consequently, one generalizes the essential objectivity apparent in this act of looking, and then deduces that “any cognitional activity that sufficiently resembles ocular vision must be objective.”⁵ Contrary to this reductionistic misconception, Lonergan’s critical realism argues that the “essence of the

²“Cognitional Structure” 216.
³“Cognitional Structure” 217.
⁴“Cognitional Structure” 215.
⁵“Cognitional Structure” 215.
objectivity of human knowing does not stand revealed in seeing or in any other single cognitional operation.” In Lonergan’s philosophy, objectivity is collectively constituted by presentation, understanding, and judgment.

Like Lonergan, Dewey and Peirce reject simplistic misconceptions about cognition and objectivity. For Dewey human inquiry passes through four stages: the pre-problematic stage, the empirical stage, the speculative stage, and the point of judgment. In many respects, this structural account of cognition corresponds to Lonergan’s stages of presentation, understanding, and judgment. Likewise, for Peirce the foundation of any logical theory is to be found in the study of the distinct methods and operations that constitute human inquiry. As a result of his Pragmatic Maxim and his consideration of it, Peirce shifts the venue of knowing, from ‘picture looking’ to ‘hands on’ inquiry. It is by inquiry into effects that our conception of an object is gained and these effects are known not by looking at something but by probing into it. Hence Dewey describes Peirce as, “the first writer on logic to make inquiry and its methods the primary and ultimate source of logical subject matter.”

Thus, for each of these thinkers, cognition is defined by functionally interrelated operations that collectively constitute cognition: none of these stages is solely constitutive of knowledge, nor can any stage be reduced to any other. All three philosophers ardently maintain that knowledge cannot be reduced to simplistic conceptions of cognition — looking ‘out’ and seeing what is ‘really there.’

C.S. Peirce and the Theory/Practice Distinction

In his essay “The Nature of Science,” Peirce defines the purpose of men of science as “to worship God in the development of ideas and of truth.” But Peirce segregates this community into three groups “distinguished by their different

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6“Cognitional Structure” 217.
7Peirce states, “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearing, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”
conceptions of the purpose of science." Peirce distinguishes between prattospudists, taxospudists, and heurospudists. Prattospudists are practical scientists — they consider themselves tutors and direct those members of lay society who are doers, the men who accomplish results: "Science to their minds tells how the world's work is to be done." Taxospudists conceive of their role as providing a "systematized account of all human knowledge." For these men, science is defined as 'organized knowledge.' Heurospudists understand themselves as endeavoring to discover truth. For Peirce, "it is true that all scientific men are engaged upon nothing else than the endeavor to discover. This is true of taxospudists and prattospudists as much as of heurospudists." The difference between the three is that the heurospudists hold in mind the very purpose of human knowing. Heurospudists are defined by their self-understanding of the essence of human inquiry: "... the heurospudists look upon discovery as making acquaintance with God and as the very purpose for which the human race was created. Indeed, as the very purpose of God in creating a world at all." In an address delivered at the celebration of Max Plank's sixtieth birthday, Albert Einstein presents a strikingly similar distinction:

In the temple of science are many mansions, and various indeed are they that dwell therein and the motives that have led them thither. Many take to science out of a joyful sense of superior intellectual power; science is their own special sport to which they look for vivid experience and the satisfaction of ambition; many others are to be found in the temple who have offered the products of their brains on this altar for purely utilitarian purposes. Were an angel of the lord to come and drive all the people belonging to these two categories out of the temple, the assemblage would be seriously depleted, but there would still be some men, of both present and past times, left inside. ... [The pure theoretician] tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best a simplified and intelligible picture of the world.  

For Peirce, the heurospudists quest for knowledge does not arise as a response to some environmental stimuli. Rather, it is the realization of the individual's desire for intelligibility. The heurospudist's desire to know is externally

10Peirce, "The Nature of Science" 47.
regulated by experience and internally regulated by the normative science of logic, which Peirce describes as "the doctrine of self-control [of the inquirer]."\textsuperscript{13} Thus, we can see that Peirce’s pragmatism, though experientially based, can accommodate a strong theory/practice distinction: it affirms the human desire to know which in turn motivates pure theory, regulated by normative logic.

**Dewey and Genetic Logic**

For John Dewey this highest flight of the *heuripsudist* is not the innate nor the highest concern of man. It is enough to say that human inquiry is motivated by the anxiety of doubt, that is, by the immediate problematic situation. Therefore, within his own study of the logic of inquiry, Dewey brought all science under the heading of practical science — oriented towards a determination of what should be done and how to do it. For Dewey this shift is imperative because it rouses the inquirer to action; inquiry is always relevant to practice. This move collapses Peirce’s three distinctions, but it further emphasizes the importance of experience, revealing the dynamism of cognitional structure within experience. Toward this end, in 1903, Dewey published four essays in a book called *Studies in Logical Theory*, which drew the same conclusions as his later works, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* and *Experience in Nature*.

The objective of these essays is to plunge into what Dewey considers the heart of the logical problem: "the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to reality."\textsuperscript{14} The answer to the problem is a revision and renunciation of the problem itself. From the practical perspective of the everyday, there is a "certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory."\textsuperscript{15} Within this rhythm, the relationship between theory and practice is not an occasion for meaningful distinction, because the reflection which generates theory arises out of a practical occasion.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13}Peirce, "The Nature of Science" 66.
\textsuperscript{15}Dewey, *Logical Theory* 2.
\textsuperscript{16}Dewey, *Logical Theory* 3. "Reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so practical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand [and] ...there is not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken up with particular questions and specific answers."
The appearance of a strong theory/practice distinction is not indicative of a lucid, progressive period in human thought. It is indicative of a period in which thought is forced outside the organic flow of its genetic paradigm. When theoretical sciences appear, like normative logic, it blocks the organic response of thought to its specific demand. Dewey states: “the generic account termed logical theory, arises at historic periods in which the situation has lost this organic character.”\(^\text{17}\) Only when we are prevented from resolving a set of very confusing practical affairs are we inclined to ask the question, “What is the relation of thought to reality?”\(^\text{18}\) Contrary to the artificial separation of theory and practice, Dewey advocates the naive viewpoint which includes everyday practice and concrete scientific research, since it “knows no fixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and control of the details of practical construction and behavior.”\(^\text{19}\) In the naive viewpoint, there is no real distinction between what are simply two different attitudes — thought and practice. These two attitudes are integrated as parts of the organic response to the experiential context in which they occur. The normative element of inquiry, for Dewey, does not come from the strict theoretical regulation of Peirce’s normative logic. Thought does not regulate itself. Instead, it is regulated by practice. Success in practice will decide whether a theory is the correct conclusion of ‘right’ thinking or ‘wrong’ thinking.

While Peirce acknowledges the rhythm of experience and the experiential demands of the specific situation, he nevertheless maintains that thought can regulate itself. It is the self-regulation thought that allows Peirce’s *heuripudist* to pursue subjects of inquiry that are not exclusively regulated by practice. This self-regulation of thought is precisely what Dewey would deny, because it implies ‘thought at large’ — that is, thought alienated from the concrete situation. For Dewey, *all* inquiry is spurred by a specific situation and it maintains its organic character by resolving the specific problem from which it originated. Consequently, the organic rhythm of thought in the concrete situation suffices to regulate thought and activity. Hence Dewey distinguishes between a pure logic “of thought as such — of thought at large or in general,” and an “applied logic,” having to do with the actual employment of concrete forms of thought with

\(^{17}\)Dewey, *Logical Theory* 3.


Since, for Dewey, the rhythm of experience suffices to regulate thought and action, there is no need for the self-regulation of thought. Pure logic (and, one might add, pure mathematics) is a superfluous philosophical construct. Logical forms are experientially generated and regulated: the history of thought is constitutive of its own evidence and is the real essence of normative logic.

According to Dewey, this discharge of pure logic in favor of applied logic follows the "nature of the reflective process" itself. It is true, Dewey notes, that "generalization of the nature of the reflective process certainly involves the elimination of much of the specific material and contents of the thought-situation of daily life and of critical science." Nevertheless, philosophical generalization seizes upon "certain specific conditions and factors" to bring them to clear consciousness. These specific conditions are not abolished in abstractions. Instead, such investigations seek "common denominators" between specific situations; philosophical generalization seizes upon "typical features" within the concrete in order to illustrate how "typical modes of thought reaction" follow.

So far from becoming independent of "specific occasions as provocative of thought," the reflective process "endeavors to define what in the various situations constitutes them as thought-provoking. The specific occasion is not eliminated, but insisted upon and brought into the foreground." These 'typical modes' of thought are then identified and from this process it becomes clear that these modes of conceiving and judging are not qualifications of thought itself, but of thought as it is engaged "in its specific, most economic, effective response to its own particular occasion." These modes of conceiving and judging are "adaptations for the control of stimuli." In other words, any distinctions and classifications of formal logic "demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents and stimuli." Hence, there is no such thing as a pure consideration of all mere possibilities (Peirce's conception of mathematics, for example). All inquiry is naturally limited by the actual. The abstract philosophical problematic concerning the validity of thought 'in general'

22Dewey, Logical Theory 8.
23Dewey, Logical Theory 8.
is thereby transformed into “a matter of the specific career of a thought-function.” Validity of thought is its own “successful fulfillment in dealing with various types of problems.” Thought is validated in the crucible of practice.

**THE POSSIBILITY OF PURE THEORY — PEIRCE’S RESPONSE**

In 1904, Peirce wrote a review of Dewey’s *Studies in Logical Theory* in a journal called the *Nation*. Privately, he wrote letters to Dewey in 1904 and 1905 criticizing the 1903 *Logic*. Peirce’s criticism is twofold. First, Peirce writes that Dewey’s logic is a “natural history of thought” and as such it is vulnerable to the accusation of subjectivism, because it has forfeited the guidance of a normative logic by expressing itself in “the trivial language of practical life.” Second, Peirce objects to “Dewey’s treatment of genetic logic as a complete theory of inquiry.” According to Peirce, Dewey’s genetic theory of logic is incomplete because it posits an artificial dichotomy: either logic derives its entire evidence from an idealistic correspondence theory or logical forms are derived exclusively from the history of the rhythm of experience. Peirce rejects this dichotomy, arguing that thought must admit of the pure evidence of self-regulative norms, in addition to the dynamic evidence of practice. Therefore, although he is “strongly in favor” of Dewey’s Pragmatistic views, Peirce is compelled to reject the *Studies in Logical Theory* as a volume “penetrated with this spirit of intellectual licentiousness, that does not see that anything is so very false.” Thus, Dewey’s thought never considers ‘right’ reasoning versus ‘wrong’ reasoning as such.

This consideration is necessary to all scientific inquiry, insofar as it retains a purity of method and motive, but it is particularly imperative to certain sciences because it allows them to consider “mere possibilities,” for example “pure mathematics,” “dynamics and general physics,” “chemistry,” and “physiology proper.” In fact, were it not possible for these sciences to consider the mere

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possibilities of reason independently of their concerns with the actual, then certain scientific conclusions would not be reached. But to claim that certain scientific conclusions depend, at some point, upon reason's consideration of mere possibility is not to say that certain scientific conclusions within these sciences, pure mathematics notwithstanding, are not reached by way of the genetic logic which Dewey proposes; it is simply to say that Dewey's genetic paradigm does not hold true for all inquiry. Peirce makes this point in a double-layered analogy which distinguishes the anatomy [structure] from the physiology [function] of thought. He writes:

Though you use the expression 'Natural History,' yet of the two branches of Natural History you seem to be alluding only to the latter, since you speak of its being revolutionized by the conception of evolution. Now the doctrine of evolution has not affected physiology either much or little, unless by lending a competing interest to anatomy and thus weakening physiology. It has certainly neither directly, nor indirectly, strengthened it. So, using the word anatomy without reference to its etymological suggestions, but simply as a designation of the sort of business that Comparative Anatomists are engaged in, you seem to conceive your occupation to be the studying out of the Anatomy of Thought. Thereupon, I remark that the 'thought' of which you speak cannot be the 'thought' of normative logic. For it is one of the characteristics of all normative science that it does not concern itself the least with what actually takes place in the universe, barring always its assumption that what is before the mind always has those characteristics that are found there and which Phänomenologie is assumed to have made out. But as to particular and variable facts, no normative science has any concern with them further than to remark that they form a constant constituent of the phenomenon.30

Here, Peirce observes that anatomy has always been concerned with the description of the structure of the actual. Insofar as it has a function of its own, a process of thought proper to it, this process is always limited to the actual. Physiology proper is more than just a matter of description of the actual; it makes hypothetical suppositions regarding the merely possible — along the lines of deduction and a broader sense of abduction — within a freer field of speculation which is not strictly bound to consider only the actual. This contrast is one

30Peirce, Collected Papers 8.239.
element of the anatomy/physiology analogy: anatomy is limited to the actual, while physiology may consider the merely possible.

The second layering of the analogy regards physiology as a thing’s proper function, whereas anatomy is a thing’s proper description (which may include its function). The physiology [or function] of thought is to seek truth. This search for truth may certainly include description, as it includes phenomenology, but it is not limited to description of the actual because it also concerns the description of the possible. Physiology may roam through the merely possible in a way that descriptive anatomy cannot, if anatomy is to succeed in merely describing actuality. Thus, Peirce argues that within the ‘Natural History of Thought’ there is an anatomy of thought which is descriptive of the actual reflective process relative to actuality (which is indeed the function of its branch); but there is also the physiology of thought, the function of thought as thought, and this is to seek truth. Since it is the proper function of thought to seek truth, it is also the proper function of thought to seek coherence. This is achieved through logic. Within the general aspect of the cognitional context, this effort is the driving force behind the progress of inquiry. Lonergan makes a similar point, stating:

The pursuit of the logical ideal, so far from favoring a static immobility, serves to reveal the inadequacy of any intermediate stage in the development of knowledge. The more deeply it probes, the more effectively it forces cognitional process to undergo a radical revision of its terms and postulates and so to pursue the logical ideal from a new base of operations.\(^{31}\)

But to say that it is the proper function of thought to seek coherence, through logic, is to require reflection or critical thought. Reflection, then, is the effort of the inquirer to seek internal coherence as the result of thought’s proper function. This seeking and finding takes place not only by describing the realm of the actual but also by reasoning to the point of coherence within the realm of the possible, where the number of variations is innumerable — which they cannot be in a descriptive anatomy in which the variations must be limited in order to be described. In this process one uses and further develops logic, which is then applied to inquiry, and becomes the applied logic of inquiry. This development and application of logic is the proper normative element of science.

By contrast, Dewey's Comparative Anatomy requires "a rich experimental field" of experience. But this is precisely what limits one from having an anatomy of "Higher Plane Curves." Such an anatomy would be entirely artificial because "one can say in advance how pure possibilities vary and diverge from one another. Namely, they do so in every possible way. What renders a Comparative Anatomy possible is that certain conceivable forms do not occur." Hence, there can be a comparative anatomy of chemical elements, because the elements only differ from one another in a limited number of ways. But there cannot be a comparative anatomy of higher plane curves, inasmuch as the science of higher plane curves is not exclusively regulated by the 'history' or 'career' of previous thought on the subject. Nor is the mathematician interested in selecting, from among an inventory of alternatives, the most 'economical modes' of thought for considering higher plane curves. Instead, the mathematician is interested in demonstrating, by necessity, their properties. As such, this inquiry departs from the evidence of actuality and relies on the logical self-regulation of thought. This logical self-regulation is not a subordinate moment within an overarching orientation towards practical exigencies precisely because the evidence of actuality contributes nothing to the proper evidence of the investigation.

Peirce's distinction between physiology and anatomy explains why the inquirer, the scientist as Peirce defines him, is accountable to the correct application of his purely motivated method. The scientist is not limited to the practical concerns of actuality and 'environmental stimuli.' Instead, the scientist exhibits the proper function of thought, namely to render coherence. This requires a combination of the genetic and the non-genetic methods. The descriptive cannot prosper without the analytic, nor the analytic without the descriptive: "There are some sciences which can be and ought to be studied genetically, while others cannot be so studied without rendering them perfectly futile." The choice is not

32Peirce, Collected Papers 8.239.
33Peirce, Collected Papers 8.239.
34See Einstein, Ideas and Opinions 274: "I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics."
35Peirce, Collected Papers 8.243
either pure or applied logic, as Dewey concluded, but an emphatic need for both. Peirce concludes, “if it were not for this uncalled for intolerance of your logical theory, I should have no serious objection to it; and there are parts of it that seem admirable and of great value.”

LONERGAN AND DEWEY — CONVERGENCES

A possible bridge between Peirce’s Pragmaticism and Dewey’s Instrumentalism appears in the cognitional theory of Bernard Lonergan, which has elements of Dewey’s experiential emphasis and Peirce’s normative ethics. Lonergan’s philosophy displays remarkable similarities to that of Dewey on the topic of the dynamic nature of human experience and judgment. Where he differs from Dewey, Lonergan’s view is aligned with the intentionality and normative element of Peirce. Lonergan successfully integrates both of these divergent strains of thought into a single, coherent philosophy.

Dewey and Lonergan display a manifest convergence on the subject of judgment in concrete situations. For Dewey, all thought is conducted from within the context of a ‘situation’ or ‘environment.’ The logical force of objects and their relations is explicable only in reference to this context: “the situation controls the terms of thought: for they are its distinctions.” In Dewey’s cognitional theory, then, the process of thought progresses naturally from the anxiety of an unsettled situation (an anxiety directly experienced) to the comfort of the settled situation by the transformation of a situation which provides “the background, the thread and the directive clue” of our thought. With the anxiety of the problematic situation, one has simultaneously some “feeling, or impression, or ‘hunch’ that things are thus and so.” With this hunch, thought:

is not yet resolved into determinate terms and relations; it marks a conclusion without a statement of the reason for it, the grounds upon which

36Peirce, Collected Papers 8.244.

37John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903) 3-

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it rests. It is the first stage in the development of explicit distinctions. All thought in every subject begins with just such an unanalyzed whole.\textsuperscript{39}

For Dewey, the next step is an explicit statement of the problem — the recognition of "what the problem is." This statement is the point at which the problem points to its own solution: "For statement of the nature of a problem signifies that the underlying quality is being transformed into determinate distinctions of terms and relations."\textsuperscript{40} Thought is the operation which transforms the indeterminate situation into a determinate one; it transforms the cognitive experience into a cognized one. The termination of this progression is marked by some organic response to the settled situation. This may be the ejaculation 'Yes', 'No', 'Oh,' each of which symbolizes "an integrated attitude toward the quality of a situation as a whole."\textsuperscript{41} The inquirer's judgment establishes a situation that is a settled, coherent, cognized whole. Dewey is careful to point out that this thought process is not a response that occurs in the subject as subject, abstracted from the situation to which the assent is given, but is an integrated response to the situation. In broad terms, this is Dewey's genetic description of concrete judgment.

Like Dewey, Lonergan observes that inquiry begins with an experiential puzzle or problem. Guided by a 'hunch' or 'notion,' the inquirer proceeds to an explicit formulation of the problem and explicit definition of its related concepts. Ultimately, the inquirer grasps an 'insight' or idea which appears to solve the original puzzle:

> what is grasped in understanding, is not some further datum added on the data of sense and of consciousness; on the contrary, it is quite unlike all data; it consists in an intelligible unity or pattern that is, not perceived, but understood.\textsuperscript{42}

At the point of insight, a new question emerges: "Is it really so?" The inquirer proceeds to ask questions which reflect on the 'bright idea,' in order to confirm or to refute it. This inquiry ends with an act of reflective understanding which pronounces 'Yes' or 'No,' in accordance with whether or not an insight is grasped.

\textsuperscript{39}Dewey, "Qualitative Thought" 183.

\textsuperscript{40}Dewey, "Qualitative Thought" 183.

\textsuperscript{41}Dewey, "Qualitative Thought" 184.

\textsuperscript{42}Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject" from The Aquinas Lecture, The National Honor Society for Philosophy, Marquette University, 3 March 1968, p. 15.
as 'virtually unconditioned.' When we grasp that an insight is 'virtually unconditioned,' we at once understand: (i) an idea's conditions; (ii) the link between the conditioned and its conditions; and (iii) the fulfillment of the conditions. A prospective judgment already incorporates the experiential element which Dewey considers 'immediately had.' It also already displays the intelligible order grasped by the understanding. Yet it is grasped as conditioned because "it stands in need of evidence sufficient for reasonable pronouncement." After this further evidence is grasped in an act of reflective understanding, the inquirer affirms or rejects the insight in an act of judgment. Hence, Lonergan's account of human inquiry has three stages: (i) the level of experience, where we are given data that provokes questions (Dewey's 'situation'); (ii) the level of understanding, where we achieve insights and refine them (in Dewey, the translation of a situation into a system of definite terms); and (iii) the level of judgment, where we reflect on our ideas and judge them.

In comparing these two accounts, a number of similarities are evident. Both thinkers emphasize the dynamic character of inquiry. For both thinkers, human intelligence is not defined by static contemplation; instead, inquiry progresses dynamically through multiple stages and operations, culminating in judgment. Inquiry finds its initial impetus by the experience of a puzzle, disruption, or problem. The knower explicitly formulates the problem and defines concepts, guided by a 'hunch' or 'notion.' In both cases, the process of verification culminates in a moment where no further problems or questions are evident. When the problematic situation is resolved in a settled unity, the inquirer judges by affirming 'Yes' or 'No.' This judgment does not issue from a detached observer but involves personal commitment. With the judgment, we commit to what were previously 'mere ideas.'

However, despite these similarities, Lonergan and Dewey part ways on matters of fundamental importance. While they offer seemingly parallel accounts of the stages of inquiry, their entire philosophical trajectory is ultimately defined by differences in their conception of the origin of inquiry. For Dewey, the

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43 For Lonergan's discussion of "The General Form of Reflective Insight" see Insight 305-306.
44 Insight 305.
45 Insight 297: "A third determination of the notion of judgment is that it involves a personal commitment."
‘situational problem’ is a sufficient stimulus to explain the genesis of inquiry. The concrete problem is resolved precisely when thought/activity establishes a settled situation. Hence, the intermediary acts, by which we progress from puzzle to resolution, demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents and stimuli. Hickman observes:

Dewey’s logic is instrumental, that is, technological, because for its purposes a hammer is not different than a therefore. As a means of appropriate control of the environment, inquiry uses tools and instruments of all kinds: some are conceptual, some physical, some the hardware that extends our limbs and senses.  

Ultimately, with this conception of human inquiry, Dewey endeavors to soften any strong distinction between the inquirer and the environmental situation. Human beings are classified as “organic centers of experience.” Dewey defines experience as “just certain modes of interaction, or correlation, of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say, to be one.” Hence, from his initial stipulation that inquiry arises in response to stimuli, Dewey transforms his phenomenology of inquiry into an argument against strong distinctions between knower and known. Without this distinction between knower and known, Dewey rejects any concept of the subject which would account for the self-regulation of thought required to validate theoretical knowledge (as distinct from practical instrumentality). Dewey observes that this entire trajectory follows from the position “that every reflective problem arises with reference to some specific situation, and has to subserve a specific purpose dependent upon its occasion.”

While Lonergan acknowledges that the situational problem plays an important role in the genesis of inquiry, he does not agree that an environmental disruption suffices to motivate or to explain human inquiry: human thought is not sufficiently explained through the history of its stimuli (anatomy of thought). While inquiry is always occasioned by a concrete problem, it is not necessarily the case that this concrete problem is practical, nor is it necessarily the case that

inquiry is exclusively *motivated* by the original problem, nor is it the case that inquiry is always exclusively ordered towards the practical resolution of the same concrete problem from whence it arose. Instead, Lonergan argues that human inquiry is driven by a 'pure desire to know.' This desire prevents the individual "from being content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience." The desire to know thereby orders human cognition beyond the demands of environmental stimuli. He states:

[The desire to know] pulls man out of the solid routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, doing and enjoying. It holds him with the fascination of problems. It engages him in the quest of solution. It makes him aloof to what is not established. It compels assent to the unconditioned.

For Lonergan, the desire to know is distinctive from other human desires, by ordering human cognition beyond instinctive biological adaptation. It moves human beings beyond experiential immediacy towards the critical affirmation of the actual.

Lonergan's account of the pure desire to know is commensurate with Peirce's point that thought must operate with more than one type of evidence—including the evidence of thought's self-regulation by logical norms and the evidence of the merely possible (there is no instrumental validation of the necessities governing higher plane curves). Lonergan, states:

Upon the normative exigences of the pure desire rests the validity of all logics and all methods. A logic or method is not an ultimate that can be established only by a hullabaloo of starry-eyed praise for Medieval Philosophy or for Modern Science, along with an insecure resentment of everything else. Logic and method are intelligent and rational; their grounds are not belief nor propaganda nor the pragmatic utility of atom bombs and nylon stockings; their grounds are the inner exigence of the pure desire to know. They are to be accepted insofar as they succeed in formulating that dynamic exigence; and they are to be revised insofar as they fail.

Here, Lonergan identifies the 'grounds' of logic in the "inner exigence of the pure desire to know." Contrary to Dewey, Lonergan argues that the validity of logic

49Insight372.
50Insight373.
51Insight405.
should be identified with the desire for knowledge — not the desire for instrumental control. With this identification, Lonergan concurs with Peirce to the effect that, in the pursuit of knowledge, the knower frequently must conduct inquiry relying upon the internal self-regulation of thought. Moreover, Lonergan observes that it is frequently necessary to prescind from considerations of actuality precisely because the inductive consideration of actuality would impede understanding.\(^{52}\)

Lonergan's argument for the existence of this 'desire to know' is both phenomenological and historical. On the one hand, he relies on the reader to be capable of detecting its operation within herself. On the other hand, he argues that some such account of human desire for inquiry is necessary to explain concrete historical scientific achievements. Lonergan exemplifies his case with the example of Archimedes,\(^{53}\) but his case is equally well expressed in the example of Einstein's development of the special theory of relativity. Lonergan's 'pure desire to know' offers perhaps the very plausible explanation of the structure of Einstein's 1905 paper "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies."\(^{54}\) While a full consideration of EMB is beyond the scope of this paper, a few observations are especially salient. Einstein begins the paper with a consideration of a formal asymmetry\(^{55}\) in electrodynamics: in the case of a magnet and conductor in relative motion, the scientific law which explains the phenomena differs depending upon whether the magnet or conductor is considered to be 'at rest' (this asymmetry, although well-known in the scientific community, was not generally considered to be a problem since it was of no practical import). Following upon this statement of a problematic formal asymmetry, Einstein almost immediately announces his two postulates of the relativity theory: the principle of relativity and the constancy of the speed of light. He thereby transforms a limited, electromagnetic inquiry into an examination of the universal foundations of kinematics. Einstein does not pause to explain the relevance of these two

\(^{52}\)Insight31-32. Also see Insight379, where Lonergan states: "...as intelligence abstracts, so reflection prescinds."

\(^{53}\)Insight27.


\(^{55}\)For a more complete consideration of this aspect of Einstein's thought, see Patrick Byrne, "The Origins of Einstein's Use of Formal Asymmetries" *Annals of Science* 37 (1981).
principles to his original problem. Instead, in a series of steps, he provides a
definition of simultaneity, derives the relativistic transformation equations, and
the relativistic field transformations for electromagnetics and optics. Hence, the
architecture of *EMB* reveals that Einstein's primary goal is to use a limited
problem as an occasion for an inquiry into the first principles of nature. With this
rapid development into an inquiry about fundamental principles, Einstein's *EMB*
demonstrates that Einstein's interest is not circumscribed by the initial problematic
situation. Einstein's inquiry is not intended to provide an instrumental resolution
to an environmental disruption; rather, it is intended to achieve knowledge of the
universal structures of nature. This presentation exemplifies Lonergan's concept of
the pure desire to know (as well as Peirce's concept of the *heuristics*).

Dewey expected that a scientific theory like Einstein's must arise from a
problematic empirical situation, for example, from the Michelson-Morley
experiment. For, as he wrote:

Thus when the Michelson-Morley [sic] experiment disclosed, as a matter of
gross experience, facts which did not agree with the results of accepted
physical laws, physicists did not think for a moment of denying the validity
of what was found in that experience, even though it rendered questionable
an elaborate intellectual apparatus and system. The coincidence of the
bands of the interferometer was accepted at its face value in spite of its
incompatibility with Newtonian physics. Because scientific inquirers
accepted it at its face value they at once set to work to reconstruct their
theories: they questioned their reflective premises, not the full 'reality' of
what they saw. This task of re-adjustment compelled not only new
reasonings and calculations in the development of a more comprehensive
theory, but opened up new ways of inquiry into experienced subject matter.
Not for a moment did they think of explaining away the features of an
object in gross experience because it was not in logical harmony with
theory....

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56 Dewey, *The Philosophy of John Dewey* 274. Einstein consistently maintained that the
Michelson-Morley experiment exercised a negligible influence on his thought. In an interview
with Robert S. Shankland, Einstein stated that greatest experimental influence was Fizeau's
experiment of 1851. See Robert S. Shankland, "Conversations with Albert Einstein," *American
Journal of Physics* 31 (1963) 47-57. Abraham Pais argues that this remark to Shankland:

"...is the most crucial statement Einstein ever made on the origins of the special theory of
relativity. It shows that the principal argument which ultimately led him to the special
theory was not so much the need to resolve the conflict between the Michelson-Morley
result and the version of aether theory prevalent in the late nineteenth century but
Dewey would likewise expect Einstein's inquiry to be almost exclusively ordered towards the practical resolution of this empirical problem. Finally, he would expect the verification or refutation of Einstein's theory to depend largely on its ability to predict and control empirical situations.

Yet Einstein does not proceed according to this model. While his inquiry is occasioned by a specific problem, it is primarily motivated by an interest in the "unification and simplification of the premises of [physical] theory as a whole." To achieve this unification Einstein constructs a thought experiment. This thought experiment consists in the simplification of a hypothetical situation into its conceptual essentials: in this case, two reference frames in inertial motion relative to one another. Einstein's goal here is a set of equations which will provide the coordinates $\xi, \eta, \zeta, \tau$ of the moving reference frame $k$ in terms of the coordinates $x, y, z, t$ of the stationary reference frame $K$. Notably, Einstein does not operate by means of an inductive method. Rather, he constructs a theoretical situation with rather, independent of the Michelson-Morley experiment, the rejection of this nineteenth century edifice as inherently unconvincing and artificial."}


From Dewey's interpretation of the Michelson-Morley experiment it is evident that instrumentalism emphasizes the role of gross experience as the decisive factor in theory formation. Consequently, it is all the more notable that Einstein did not abandon the theory of relativity, despite the immediate emergence of contradictory experimental data. From an instrumentalist framework, Kaufmann's data and analysis of 1905 would have threatened Einstein's theory. Kaufmann used radium to emit $\beta$-rays into parallel electric and magnetic fields. His data differed substantially from the anticipations of Einstein's and Lorentz's theories (-10.4% for Lorentz/Einstein vs. -2.5% and -3.5% for the theories of Bucherer and Abraham respectively). Lorentz was prepared to abandon his relativity theory in view of Kaufmann's data. Furthermore, Kaufmann's results caused Poincaré to temper his support for Lorentz/Einstein. By contrast, Einstein's particular conception of verification and his commitment to the aesthetic integrity of his theory allowed him to detect "an unnoticed source of error" in Kaufmann's experiment. For a complete discussion of Kaufmann's experiment see Arthur I. Miller, "An Example of the Delicate Interplay Between Theory and Experiment," Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity: Emergence (1905) and Early Interpretation (1905-1911) (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1981) 334-352.

57Einstein, Ideas and Opinions 342.
only as much material detail as is necessary to express the essence of the physical situation which interests him.

Einstein’s next step is to introduce a ‘Galilean co-ordinate’ \( x' \) in the stationary system, where \( x' = x - vt \).\(^{58}\) Einstein intends to arrive at transformation equations for distance and time in the moving system. He does so by applying the criterion for synchronicity which he has derived earlier in the paper. At this point, however, it is essential to notice that the criterion for synchronicity requires an intermediary, by which Einstein can relate \( \xi = ct \) and \( x = ct \). The Galilean coordinate provides the required intermediary, since the relation between \( x \) and \( x' \) is known, and since Einstein can choose the \( x' \) which is identical to \( \xi \). Thus, even while Einstein intends to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Galilean transformation, he must begin here with a mathematical intermediary similar to the Galilean transformation, with which to relate \( x \) and \( x' \). Otherwise, he would not have a provisional situation to which his criterion for synchronicity could be applied. If he could not apply his criterion of synchronicity, he would have no basis for defining the time of the moving system. The Galilean co-ordinate, then, provides an essential starting point which will be transcended by the successful derivation of the full transformation equations. Einstein proceeds from this starting point to apply his criterion for synchronicity (light signals between \( k \) and \( K \)) in order to establish the transformation equations for distance and time in the two systems.

This derivation of the transformation equations is logically coherent, once one stipulates the hyper-idealized situation with which Einstein begins. However, the situation is no more accessible through induction than Peirce’s “Higher Plane Curves.” While Einstein’s derivation always retains physical meaning, its depends for its evidence not on the immediate data of experience but on the theoretical self-regulation of thought.

Ultimately, the theory of relativity finds its primary verification in its simplification and unification of the theoretical foundations of science. That is, an important part of its corroborative value is to be found in the creation of the

\(^{58}\)Isaac Newton utilizes a similar pattern of inquiry in the \textit{Principia}, by utilizing Kepler’s harmonic law to demonstrate universal gravity, and by subsequently using universal gravity to specify the limited conditions under which Kepler’s harmonic law holds. For a complete discussion of this aspect of the \textit{Principia}, see I. Bernard Cohen’s “Newton’s Theory vs. Kepler’s Theory and Galileo’s Theory,” in \textit{The Interaction Between Science and Philosophy}, ed. Yehuda Elkana (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1974) 299-338.
relativistic transformation equations, and the simple and elegant derivation of relativistic electrodynamic field transformations. Only at the end of the paper does Einstein derive three consequences which are ‘accessible to experiment.’\textsuperscript{59} Einstein’s project would not be plausible, nor would it be generally accepted, if the only motive and criterion of scientific achievement were instrumentalist. Any instrumental significance of the theory is oblique and is not explicitly emphasized at any point in the paper itself. Rather, the mark of superiority which distinguishes the theory of relativity from competing theories (for example, Lorentz), is not its proximate practical effects but its simplicity, elegance, unity, and universality.

Lonergan maintains that all inquiry is ultimately ordered towards knowledge of the actual, but he also affirms the possibility of scientific inquiry into pure possibilities developed in accordance with the evidence of pure cognitive norms. However, Dewey’s genetic paradigm cannot account for any distinctive evidence proper to the self-regulation of thought. Contrary to Dewey’s genetic paradigm, Einstein’s derivation of the transformation equations is not exclusively regulated by the history of his thought on the subject of magnets and conductors: instead, Einstein’s formulation of the problem and his derivation of its resolution is, in an essential way, governed by pure theoretical norms. Lonergan can explain both Einstein’s overall goal of knowing reality and Einstein’s shift, for a time, to the consideration of pure possibilities in accordance with the evidence of logical coherence.

CONCLUSION

Lonergan demonstrates the unity between the two aspects of Peirce that we have highlighted above: (i) Peirce’s insistence on the importance of \textit{heurospudists}; and (ii) his criticism of Dewey for failing to account for the science of pure possibilities, by limiting all thought to the genetic paradigm. Similarly to Peirce’s \textit{heurospudist}, Lonergan’s concept of the pure desire to know accounts for the scientist’s motive in considering pure possibilities independently of the practical concerns of actuality. The pure desire to know makes possible a suitably complex account of the subject which includes biological sensitivity, instrumental practicality, and pure theoretical inquiry. Without a positive affirmation of an internal desire to

\textsuperscript{59}Einstein, \textit{EMB} 64.
know Dewey's position is theoretically unavoidable. While this position affords an apt description of concrete judgment, its reductionistic instrumentalism prevents it from providing an adequate account of theorists like Einstein: the aim and structure of physical theory can only be explained by means of a positive account of cognitional structure, which explains the internal exigencies that generate pure theoretical norms.
ON INSIGHT, OBJECTIVITY, AND THE PATHOLOGY OF FAMILIES

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The nature of family therapy, as it is practiced at the present day, has intrigued the authors. This is due to our impression that its epistemology is in disarray, and that this disarray may affect both the ethics and the clinical practice of therapists all over the world. It is our conviction that Lonergan's transcendental method, and the clear articulation of the relation between the natural and human sciences which issues from it, together provide an interdisciplinary epistemology which can solve these problems. It can clear away the debris of limited philosophical thinking on the part of systems theorists and those who cleave to the biomedical model, while at the same time providing an antidote to the extreme subjectivism which has arisen in opposition to them. We will try to show this in what follows.

Let us give some background to our discussion. The discipline of family therapy initially arose from a recognition that the family is important in the genesis of disease in individuals and in their healing, and that much can be gained from having family members present at interviews between patient and therapist. It was also affected by a realization of the limited applicability of psychoanalysis. Under the influence of systems theory, it reacted against the exclusively biomedical model characteristic of traditional medicine. Now systems theory was determinist and thoroughly 'objective'; it reduced individual persons to patterns of interaction.

1Given the crucial ambiguity of the term 'objectivity' on Lonergan's account, the inverted commas seem in order; in this context it means, 'eliminating all reference to
between them, which could then be envisaged in terms of the systemic laws that were held to be crucial in understanding families. Its neglect of subjects led to the same difficulties as biomedical science had done through its reduction of family relationships in terms of a model based on physics and chemistry. In reaction to systems theory, family therapy has recently adopted a radically subjective 'narrative' approach, which views each family member's version of any event as of equal validity, thereby ruling out all notions of objectivity and truth. There is a 'multiverse' of individual viewpoints, as opposed to a single universe about which one might be either right or wrong.

There is by now an abundant literature describing the normal family, pathology in families, and indeed the complete lack of norms in the thinking of some family therapists. It is not our purpose here to survey this literature or to criticize it in detail. Rather our aims are (1) to outline and account for that very subjective approach to knowledge and belief that is implicit in family therapy as generally practised at present; (2) to sketch Lonergan's 'critical realist' epistemology; (3) to bring out how this epistemology might be used at once to corroborate the insights in the view of family therapy now fashionable, and to correct its oversights; and (4) to hint at the wider implications of what we have said.

1. THE SUBJECTIVISM OF CONTEMPORARY FAMILY THERAPY

The discipline of family therapy, rather than striving to build theoretical models which come more closely over time to represent the truth about families, produces model after model, each of which has some practical advantages, some defects. When a model first comes into vogue,
members of the profession are wont to overlook its defects and exalt its merits. Once the novelty of the theory wears off, the defects become more conspicuous; and a new theory takes over, probably no better and no worse than the one before, but often with opposite merits and defects, and the same cycle is repeated.

It will be useful if we distinguish, no less briefly and informally than is strictly necessary for our purposes, between a number of conceptions of knowledge and reality which seem to underlie these changes. First, there is naive realism. What is real is what you can see, hear, and touch; it may be very different from people’s ideas about it. We need not spend bng on this view of things, but it is worth remarking that it leads to the conclusion not only that thoughts and values are unreal, but also that the theoretical entities of science are so — since you cannot see electrons or neutrinos, or for that matter feel or smell them. (They may be part of the best explanation of what can in some circumstances be seen; but that is a different matter.)

‘Scientism’ is the view that all that is real in the world is ultimately to be understood in terms of physics and chemistry. This, of course, also entails that minds and values are unreal, since one cannot reduce talk of minds or values to number, weight, and measure. Physics and chemistry enjoy a high prestige, and rightly so, among the sciences, since their progress over the last few centuries has been spectacular. They have accordingly dominated what is sometimes called ‘the medical model’ of human beings, which treats them as machines, or at best as organisms, that function as they do for reasons which are in the last analysis entirely physical or chemical. It must be acknowledged that to envisage people in accordance with the medical model has proved to be by far the most effective means of dealing with a very large number of illnesses.

Yet scientism does appear, at least at first sight, to have certain limitations. We have said that it seems to imply that in the last analysis minds and values are unreal. And yet, as Hilary Putnam has pointed out, science itself appears to be ineluctably dependent on the reality of both minds and values; since its achievements are entirely due to people

thinking, and thinking well. In addition, the very concept of illness or dysfunction apparently includes an evaluative component; what could it be to be sick, if one would not in general be better off well? And when matters go wrong in human relations, it is often mostly the way in which people think, rather than how they are merely as organisms or machines, which is at fault.

It is largely dissatisfaction with the restrictive kind of 'objectivism' implied by scientism and the medical model, which seems to have driven many therapists, by way of protest, to a subjectivism so extreme as to imply that there is no reality at all, only different conceptions of 'reality' maintained by different human subjects. One might say that a truncated conception of objectivity finds its nemesis in the conclusion that there is no objectivity at all. But this seems inconsistent both with common sense and with science, implying as it appears to do that there is no matter of fact about whether cows eat grass, or common salt is soluble in water, or there is more than one cubic mile of water in the Atlantic Ocean.

Also, quite apart from the paradoxical implications to which we have just referred, such subjectivism appears actually to be self-destructive. Are not even the different views of reality held by different human subjects supposed to be real? Is there not only no matter of fact about common salt, but not even any matter of fact about what we or the reader or the President of the United States think about salt? Is it not important for family therapy, in particular, that the daughter of a family may really think and feel in one way rather than another, perhaps in a very different way from what her mother can bear to believe that she thinks and feels? Also it is doubtful, to say the least, how far anyone could survive (outside a mental hospital) who actually tried consistently to live by such a conception of things.

Furthermore, if some member of a family under a therapist's care gets murdered by another, are the courts going to wear the view that, say, the younger son was only murdered by the elder in the 'reality' of the court, but was not murdered at all in the father's 'reality,' or was

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murdered by someone else in the mother’s? And if courts were to take this line, would we really consider them the more enlightened for doing so? Fortunately, common sense and a talent for inconsistency rescue most family therapists, both in handling patients and in other aspects of their daily lives, from the more bizarre consequences of their own theories.

2. LONERGAN’S INTERDISCIPLINARY METHOD

In order to establish an interdisciplinary method of inquiry which does justice both to objects and to subjects, two major points have to be clarified. The first is the nature of knowledge; this requires an adequate epistemology, which will explain to each of us what we are doing when we are knowing, and how we know that what we are doing is knowing. The second is the nature of what is to be known by the human intellect, or the universe of beings in its most basic elements. At first sight at least, we seem to be faced with two rather different types of entity; those which do not appear to be subject to thoughts and feelings like ourselves, and those which do.

First of all, it seems worthwhile to attend to two very different possible meanings of the term ‘objectivity.’ According to one, to be objective is to look at what is out there to be looked at, and not to get distracted by such subjective irrelevances as thoughts and feelings, whether one’s own or those of others. But in accordance with the other meaning, to be ‘objective’ about thoughts and feelings, whether those of others or one’s own, is to attend carefully to the evidence available on the matter, to envisage the possible explanations for it, and to judge accordingly; especially when the evidence tends to go against the assumptions and prejudices which one previously held. It is this sort of objectivity that Lonergan had in mind, when he wrote that “genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic

7 It is said that the late Professor Gilbert Ryle, the famous philosopher of mind, was once asked what he thought were the ultimate constituents of the universe; and he replied, “Things and chaps.” One might say that both physical science and systems theory are at least at first sight objectionable, so far as they try to reduce chaps to mere things.

subjectivity.” Such authentic subjectivity certainly includes looking at what is there to be looked at; but it has other crucial aspects as well. If you want to get to know about the thoughts and feelings of another person, you have not only to attend to the evidence available to you on the subject in the noises she emits and the gestures she performs. You also have to be alive to a range of possibilities as to what she may be thinking or feeling; and judge how she is probably thinking and feeling on the basis of this evidence, rather than according to your ingrained prejudices or your wishes or fears about the matter. Such judgment had usually better be tentative; there is always more evidence available, a wider range of possibilities to be envisaged.

It is worth noting at this point that, just as the thoughts and feelings of others go beyond what we can directly perceive, so do the particles of the atomic nucleus, and the events of the past. One does not apprehend these by just staring at the available data; one has to theorize about what may explain those data, and judge that the theory best supported by the data is most likely correct. It is a central doctrine of Lonergan’s critical realism that three types of mental activity are involved in getting to know what is the case: one has to (1) attend to the relevant evidence, (2) envisage a number of possibilities, and (3) judge to be the case the possibility which is best supported by the evidence. If one is to go on from knowing what is true to acting well, one must make a decision in accordance with one’s best judgment — rather than out of sloth, fear, self-interest or whatever. In Lonergan’s words, to be authentically subjective, and so to be objective in the sense which is desirable, is to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.10

Critical realism, in common with idealism and the fashionable family therapy view, but in opposition to naive realism, acknowledges that a great deal of creativity goes into the conception of the world that each one of us has. It is the Achilles heel of ‘scientism’ that every scientific theory requires mental creativity on the part of itsdiscoverer; the notion of science as nothing but the sheer observation of facts is superstition. But it does not do to infer from this, in the manner of idealism and many schools

9Lonergan, Method in Theology 265, 292.
10Lonergan, Method in Theology chapter 1.
of therapy, that there is no objective world of things and states of affairs that exists, and largely is as it is, prior to and independently of ourselves and our beliefs. It took many decades of intensive theorizing to discover that there were inert gases, and to distinguish them from one another; but the fact remains that inert gases, though not discovered till towards the end of the nineteenth century, had existed for billions of years, and in no way depended for their existence on their discoverers. Again, to know what another person is thinking involves some mental creativity, as we cannot see or hear other people's thoughts; but it is a matter about which one can be right or wrong.

A person's beliefs about what is real, and the feelings that she has due to these beliefs, are themselves a part of what is real; and they are to be known in the same very general way as the rest of what is real, by attending to the relevant data in experience, by envisaging a range of possibilities, and by provisionally judging that possibility to be so that best accounts for the experience. It is very important that this applies to our knowledge of ourselves as well as of other people, as has become notorious due to the work of Sigmund Freud and his followers (both orthodox and unorthodox). There is a huge gap, which some people never seem to bridge, between feeling angry or full of hatred, and putting it to oneself, 'I am angry,' 'I really hate so-and-so.' But only if one makes the judgment, is one in a position to do anything effective about it. A vast amount of harm done by people to others and themselves is due to the fact that they cannot acknowledge or own their real feelings.

Also, in spite of the bogus objectivity of scientism, and the self-destructive subjectivism which has arisen in opposition to it, the thoughts and feelings, the opinions and attitudes, of other people are themselves matters about which one can be more or less right or wrong. One tends to get at the truth so far as one judges that possibilities are so in the light of the relevant evidence, rather than following one's preconceptions or prejudices. A father of a family has always assumed that his daughter enjoys their family outings; but has he really listened to his daughter on the subject? Is she perhaps frightened of telling him the truth, for fear of the fuss that he or her mother would make? What it all comes to is that one can have, paradoxical though it may seem, objective knowledge of the
subjective, in the sense of well-founded and true belief both about one's own thoughts and feelings and about those of others.

There is a similarity, which is frequently overlooked, between the method of science on the one hand, and the way by which we inquire effectively into the thoughts and feelings of persons on the other. For all their great differences, both forms of inquiry have the following three things in common: (1) one must attend to the evidence given to one's senses; (2) one must envisage a range of possibilities as to what may account for the evidence (Might the sample contain barium? Might she be angry that one hasn't brought her flowers?); (3) one must (in most cases provisionally) judge that possibility to be the case which is best supported by the evidence (it turns out that probably it doesn't contain barium, that she very likely is angry about one's lapse of etiquette). Just as you can attend to relevant evidence, envisage a range of possibilities, and come to the reasonable conclusion that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, or that the hydrogen atom contains one proton and one electron, so you can come to the reasonable conclusion that another person is feeling hurt or angry, or that she often wishes that you were dead. The one pair of states of affairs is as real as the other; though neither is perceivable. The judgments involved, at their best, are apt to be provisional, as there is usually more relevant evidence to be attended to, more possibilities to be envisaged.

Now a critical realism such as Lonergan's agrees with naive realism and scientism that there is a reality which exists prior to and independently of ourselves, by correspondence with which our judgments are true, by failure to correspond with which they are false. But it takes the point emphasized by more 'subjectivist' views, that we can only get to know about the real world by a creative use of our minds in envisaging possibilities. And one of the things that we find out about by the creative use of our minds is the minds, in other words the thoughts and feelings, of other human beings. And it is knowledge of this aspect of reality, and the taking account of it in one's action, which is above all things necessary for the health of families and other human groups. On the other hand ignorance, whether quite innocent or more or less wilful, is a prime contributory factor to group distress and dysfunction.
The late Sir Karl Popper used to stress that the good scientist will be particularly on the lookout for evidence against the position that she at present holds: contrasted with this attitude is that of the ‘self-reinforcing dogmatist’ who attends only to the evidence that confirms his own opinions, and overlooks or brushes aside the evidence that fails to do so. Similarly, in good human relationships, people really listen to one another; which crucially involves being ready to modify or give up one’s assumptions about how one thinks and feels when the evidence dictates that one should do so. Bad human relations are largely a matter of not attending to such evidence, not being open to such possibilities; of putting other people on the ‘Procrustean bed’ of one’s ingrained assumptions and prejudices. (‘Well, she’s such a fool she couldn’t have anything worth saying.’ ‘He’s such a knave he couldn’t be hinting at something which would make my own moral stance look a bit shabby.’ ‘If she doesn’t see things Daddy’s way, she’s wicked or insane, bad or mad.’)

On the critical realist view of Lonergan, just as there are three components of coming to know, so there are correspondingly three typical sources of error, or of semi-deliberate avoidance of knowledge. One may fail to attend to relevant available evidence, or to envisage relevant possibilities, or to judge that some possibility is probably or certainly so in the light of the evidence. You just don’t happen to hear the sound of your daughter weeping at night; or the hypothesis that your own behaviour might be the cause does not occur to you; or you dismiss the hypothesis with indignation or ridicule, and perhaps make life difficult for those who inconveniently remind you that it might be true. Those who have power over others are apt to have special motives for such avoidance, such ‘selective inattention’ or ‘flight from insight’ as Lonergan puts it. It is a sad fact about humanity that persons may be willing to subject their nearest and ‘dearest’ to an indefinite amount of suffering, in order to avoid acknowledging their own insensitivity, stupidity, or cruelty.

13Insight chapter 6.
The thought of Humberto Maturana has influenced some health professionals in the direction of subjectivism. Maturana's basic idea seems to be, that the physiology of perception shows that reality is constructed rather than apprehended; and so, if different family members construct different 'realities,' there is nothing to choose between them. Thus any privileged view of 'how things really are' in the family, whether on the part of the therapist or any family member, is ruled out from the start. It is consequently the business of the therapist to make 'paradoxical interventions' which may induce the family to react in such a way that they no longer seem to themselves or others to require the services of the therapist, and in that sense become 'better.'

But there seems to be a significant internal inconsistency about this view. If all of what anyone calls 'reality' is merely subjective construction by some people rather than others, then is not the scientific physiology on which Maturana bases his argument itself invalidated? However, it is wise, as well as charitable, to look for what is right, what Lonergan would call the 'position' in Maturana's account. It is at least a corrective to the scientific reductionist view that the only thing there is to be 'objective' about in the family is the members as organisms, and that their own views should be left out of account. Also, it usefully undermines the view that the father or mother in a family always has the right view of things; if there is no right view, then at least this vicious assumption is ruled out from the start. Again, reality is not to be got at by just staring at what is out there; a great deal of construction has gone on in anyone's apprehension of the world. But understanding has to to cooperate with judgment; some constructions are more open to correction by the evidence than others, and so are more liable to apprehend reality, or at least come ever closer to doing so. The more powerful members of families, as of other structured groups, tend to impose views of things


15This sentence summarizes the practice of the 'Milan school' of family therapy. For information on this topic, we are very grateful to Dr. Karl Tomm.

16In Lonergan's terms, it is ensnared in a 'counterposition.' See Insight 413-415, 513, 523-524.

17See previous note.
upon the less powerful which are due rather to self-image or self-interest than to the relevant evidence.

3. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE THEORY OF FAMILY THERAPY

What is the bearing of all this on the pathology of families, on the amelioration of such pathology, and on the knowledge and expertise necessary for those who do professional work in this area? The golden thread running through a Lonerganian theory of family therapy is that genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity,\(^\text{18}\) that is, of subjectivity as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Healthy families are characterized by such authentic subjectivity in the relating of members to themselves and to one another; sick families by a lack of it.

We suggest that there are features common to all family therapies which actually promote health, whether acknowledged by their practitioners or not. We believe such therapies enable members of families to become more attentive, more intelligent, more reasonable, and more responsible in relation to their own thoughts and motives, while lack of the same tends to be the basis of interpersonal problems. We recognize that unconscious influences and personal biases decrease the awareness that family members have of their own circumstances. The ideal state of affairs is that every family member, especially the more powerful, should have a fairly accurate notion of the overall thoughts, feelings and opinions of each of the others; and that she or he should have the disposition to revise this in the light of the relevant evidence, and have the good will to strive for the overall good of the family accordingly. Thus truth can lead to justice and foster love.

With this as a basis, parents can use their power and authority to lead children towards self-knowledge, and towards a self-expression which takes into account the need of others for self-knowledge and self-expression. In this way each child may be helped to find their own meaning based in their own context, and this meaning will contribute an essential element to their understanding of the truth about the world which they experience.

\(^{18}\)Recall note 9 above.
Contrariwise, inattentiveness, stupidity, silliness, and irresponsibility are root causes of the pathology of families and other groups. One potent source of such restriction of consciousness is that we are often motivated, both as individuals and groups, not to know certain truths. For example, unfaithful spouses often fail to realize the destructiveness to their marriage of their infidelity. Again, people who present to counselling are seldom aware of the significance of their childhood experiences in the patterns of conflict they are experiencing in their marriages; and parents who have unruly children often do not know the importance of the parental coalition in imposing the clear and reasonable limits which are necessary for the child’s development.

It is important to realise that abuse of power is primarily its exercise in such a way as to harm or frustrate others, rather than to help them towards liberation and fulfilment in the long term; and that such abuse is proportional in nearly every case to ignorance, of oneself or of others. Many a vindictive sadist who has inflicted a great deal of corporal punishment in schools, has deceived himself and others with the reassuring falsehood that he is beating his charges for their own ultimate good. And it is rather unusual, say, for a husband or father to put it dearly to himself, ‘My treatment of Griselda is spoiling her life, wrecking her chances of happiness and fulfilment, both now and for the future; but I am just too lazy, or the status quo suits me too well, for me to do anything about it.’ He will be more likely to pretend, both to others and to himself, that it is all for her own good. The fact, for fact it is, that children are happier and more fulfilled in the long run for certain constraints and disciplines, is a fruitful source of self-deception of this kind for parents with a repressed appetite for tyranny.

The training of the therapist should render her particularly adept at observing behavior, at envisaging possibilities as to what the persons concerned may be thinking or feeling, and at judging what they are thinking and feeling in accordance with this evidence. A great deal of the trouble in disturbed families comes from people not being able to express, or not daring to express, what they are thinking or feeling, due to fear of invalidation or reprisal by more powerful others (‘Of course you don’t think your mother doesn’t really love you!’ ‘How wicked of you to think for a moment that your father had had too much to drink!’), or even to put it to
themselves what their real thoughts and feelings are. The therapist should thus be particularly good at picking up non-verbal clues. And it is the therapist's job to pass on some of her skills to those whom she is helping, so that they may learn to be more attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible with respect both to their own needs and feelings and to those of other members of the group.

As Michel Foucault used to bring out, even if he did not employ his insights as consistently as one could have wished, the views of the less powerful ought especially to be heard, as they are liable to have attended to evidence, and envisaged possibilities, which the more powerful have been motivated to neglect or brush aside. When a spouse or child is constantly interrupted by other family members, this is surely a sign to a good therapist that that family member must especially be listened to, if one is to get near the truth of the situation, and so be in a position to do something useful about it.

Sometimes what seem obviously to be physical symptoms can turn out to have psychological causes, as happens in the case of what is called 'somatizing.' Suppose (to take a real and not untypical example) a young male patient suffers from acute stomach pains, but the most exhaustive and expensive examinations in terms of classical medicine fail to find anything amiss. However, when the family are interviewed together, the therapist notices that the pains markedly increase and decrease in intensity with changes in the behaviour of the patient’s mother. Treated in accordance with the hypothesis that they are due to his thoughts and feelings about his mother and his reactions to her perceived attitudes towards him, the patient’s symptoms are soon ameliorated and in time disappear. Of course, it is very important indeed that the therapist should be alive to the possibility that the cause of such symptoms is after all organic; but surely she should at least entertain other options before inordinate expense has been incurred, and before the patient and her family have undergone too much avoidable suffering.

Something should be said about the authority of the therapist. At one extreme, the doctor is God. At the other, which is affected by some family therapists, he is no authority at all, and just adds to the family

conversation. But he usually expects to be paid, and is supposed to be in some way responsible if a family member commits suicide or murders another while under his care. On a more reasonable view, the doctor is less than God, but her training does give her some kind of authority, which justifies her in drawing her salary so far as on the whole she exercises it well. What does she know, and what can she do, that the rest of the family probably do not or cannot? Everyone has at least an inchoate idea of the difference between a relatively happy, healthy, and functional family on the one hand; and an unhealthy, unhappy, and dysfunctional one on the other. The therapist has a more detailed and informed conception of this, and of what tends to move families, or encourage them to move themselves, from the latter kind of state towards the former. This may be backed up by more or less adequate theories. Some therapists, again, insist that they presuppose no norms as to what a healthy family should be. We believe this to be absurd as it stands, but it does express an important insight. This is, that it is up to the family itself, to a large extent at least, autonomously to determine what the relationships comprising it should be like.

4. WIDER APPLICATIONS

What relevance does the theory of family therapy have to the pathology of groups in general? The answer is that it applies across the board with scarcely any modification. In general, the greater the knowledge, in all members of a group, of what other members actually think and feel, and the greater their disposition to take this into account, the more happy and functional that group will tend to be. In all groups, some are more powerful than others, and the greater the power, the greater the benefit of their knowing and acting in this way, and the greater the harm, in terms of the unhappiness and dysfunctionality of the group and its members, of their


21We take it that this will be so as long as there are human beings on earth; though we realize that some postmodernists believe that things might some day be otherwise. See Roy Boyne, *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 4, 124.
failure to do so. We believe virtually every therapist, certainly every good therapist, assumes that any techniques she uses in relation to the group that she is assisting are such as to increase knowledge and action of these kinds. This is one reason why one of the main functions of the therapist is to provide a milieu where it is safe for group members, particularly the less powerful, to make known their own beliefs and feelings, and where other group members are expected to listen to them.

The petty tyrannies, self-deceptions, and codependencies of the family are at once a microcosm of, and a fertile breeding-ground for, the repressions, obfuscations, downright mendacities, and vicious cruelties of such institutions as the Mafia and the Third Reich. Robert Subby’s rules for dysfunctional families — no acknowledgment of feeling, no playfulness, no rocking of the boat, and the rest — are all characteristic of such organizations, and have the function of stopping people being conscious of what others, or even they themselves, think and feel, or of what they are really up to. People often have a substantial investment in remaining unconscious; as a patient of Carl Jung’s remarked, on Jung making a suggestion to him: ‘That couldn’t possibly be true, doctor; or I would have been wasting my time for the last twenty years.’ When truth does break through, its entrance is often bloody. There is a story about a young staff-officer who went to the field of Passchendaele just after the famous battle in the First World War; ‘Did we really send them through this?’ he exclaimed, and burst into tears.

Alas, the church frequently sets a bad example in these matters; as Owen Chadwick used to say in his lectures at Cambridge, it is no wonder that the Fathers so often compared the church with Noah’s Ark, since the tempest without is only exceeded by the stench within. When the church is operating as it should, of course, the fact that our lives are hid with Christ in God will give us the heart to fight all these evils in ourselves and

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22 Codependence is a matter of covering-up, due to one’s own weaknesses and compulsions, for others so that they never have to face the consequences of their own actions.


24 Schae and Fassel remark pertinently that they “have found an inverse correlation between the loftiness of the mission” in an organization “and the congruence between stated and unstated goals” (*Organization* 123).
in others, in accordance with that tremendous passage in chapter 4 of Method; so that we can foster true progress in society, undo decline, and resist the vast pressures of social decay.\textsuperscript{25}
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION:
A RESPONSE
TO BRUCE ANDERSON

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INTRODUCTION

IN AN ESSAY that appeared in the previous number of this journal,1 Bruce Anderson has undertaken to summarize and comment on a paper that I presented at the 1999 Lonergan Workshop.2 I am grateful for his attention to my paper, and for his judgment that it was clearly written and is potentially useful to legal philosophers. It remains that some of his remarks call for my response. More importantly, the goal the paper pursued merits clarification, whatever its success in achieving that goal. Consequently, the following reflections fall into two main sections. First, I will review the features of what I would label 'special pre-empirical horizonal analysis' and recount my paper's intentions in this regard. Then I will address some of Anderson's remarks.


1. HOW JUDGMENTS ARE GROUNDED

1.1. General Positional and Counterpositional Accounts

A reflective insight or an apprehension of value, the respective cognitional ground of a fact-judgment or a value-judgment that I make, is a matter of my grasping a concrete rational or responsible unity — the virtually unconditioned of fact or value — within a diversity of factors. Those diverse factors can be distinguished in various ways. One way is to divide the totality of factors into two groups: those I experience in the particular concrete situation that my judgment regards, and those I bring to that particular concrete situation. The first group may be labeled ‘immediate empirical.’ At root, immediate empirical factors are the data of sense that characterize the particular concrete situation, and correlative data of consciousness insofar as they are conditioned intrinsically by those data of sense. The second group of factors may be labeled ‘presuppositional’ or ‘horizonal.’

Horizonal factors in turn may be subdivided into ‘empirical’ and ‘pre-empirical.’ Empirical horizonal factors are learned. They are what I bring to my investigation today from what I learned in my investigations yesterday, or last week, or last year. If someone challenges them, the proper way to address that challenge is by appealing ultimately to the empirical data of yesterday, or last week, or last year, upon which they are based. Pre-empirical horizonal factors, by contrast, are structural. They are my stances on certain methodological issues, stances that I may well not have spelled out for anyone, including myself, but that nonetheless (insofar as I am proceeding consistently) are conceptual or operational antecedents of what I do spell out. If someone challenges them, the proper way to address that challenge is by attempting to show that any effort to falsify them verbally cannot avoid invoking them operationally.

Finally, the pre-empirical horizonal factors may be subdivided into ‘special’ and ‘general.’ Special pre-empirical horizonal factors are the characteristic procedures and criteria I employ when conducting investigations within one particular range of empirical academic disciplines rather than

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another — within scholarly studies rather than the natural sciences or the human sciences, for example. General pre-empirical horizontal factors, on the other hand, are the procedures and criteria I employ when conducting investigations within or beyond every particular range of empirical academic disciplines. Proportionate general pre-empirical horizontal factors include the four-level structure of proportionate knowing (namely, experiencing, understanding, fact-judging, and value-judging). The ultimate general pre-empirical horizontal factors are my transcendental intentions of intelligibility, reality, and value.

I propose the foregoing as a Lonerganian sketch of the general positional account of how a fact-judgment or value-judgment is cognitively grounded. That is to say, the cognitonal ground is a reflective insight or an apprehension of value, not something else. The diversity within which that concrete unity emerges includes both immediate empirical factors and horizontal factors, not just the former and not just the latter. The immediate empirical factors at root are mere data, not something more. And whatever the empirical horizontal factors and the special pre-empirical horizontal factors may be, the general pre-empirical horizontal factors include a structure of proportionate knowing that (a) extends to no fewer than four levels and (b) stands within the ultimate framework of no fewer than three successive transcendental intentions.

Besides the general positional account, however, there are general counterpositional accounts of how judgments are grounded. Various such accounts are manifest directly in the history of explicit philosophizing right down to the present day. They also are manifest indirectly in the history of implicit philosophizing (namely, the history of all other human enterprises — for everyone is at least an implicit philosopher). In effect, some of them deny one or more of the transcendental notions. Some of them deny one or more of the four levels of proportionate knowing, perhaps even completely rejecting

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4Hence data of sense and the transcendental intentions are the ultimate respective 'lower and upper blades' of Lonergan's well-known 'scissors' of methodical seeking and finding.

5For my present purpose, I find it convenient to point toward the matter of positional and counterpositional accounts of knowing by focussing on the matter of positional and counterpositional accounts of judgment, rather than beginning with the first matter in its full generality.
judgments in the technical sense. Some of them deny horizontal factors altogether; some, immediate empirical factors.6

Now, in the context of Lonergan’s later writings, the task of methodically elucidating all the extant general accounts of how judgments are grounded, whether those accounts are explicitly affirmed by someone or merely implicit in what she says or does, is assigned to Dialectic, the fourth of the eight functional specialties. The subsequent task of highlighting the general positional account, as distinct from the counterpositional ones, falls to Foundations, the fifth of the eight functional specialties.

A clear and interesting example of how these dialectical and foundational tasks are related to preceding and succeeding investigative responsibilities and to one another may be found in one of Lonergan’s own writings. In “The Origins of Christian Realism,”7 he first retrieves the Christian theological portrayals of the relationship of God the Father and God the Son that are offered by Tertullian, Origen, and Athanasius respectively. Next, he shows that those portrayals respectively presuppose three dialectically different general accounts of reality, stemming from three dialectically different general accounts of knowing.8 Third, he argues that the general account of knowing (and, at core, judging) and the corresponding general account of reality presupposed by Athanasius are positional, whereas those presupposed by Tertullian and Athanasius are counterpositional. Fourth, he concludes that at least in this respect the portrayal of God offered by Athanasius is positional, whereas the portrayals offered by Tertullian and Origen are counterpositional.


8In this particular example, of course, the general accounts regard human knowing of not just proportionate reality but transcendent reality.
1.2. Special Positional and Counterpositional Accounts

There is yet a further dimension to the matter of giving accounts of judgments. For besides the general positional account there are *special positional* accounts, delineations of the procedures and criteria proper to this or that particular range of empirical investigations — the natural sciences, for example, or scholarly studies, or the human sciences. These special positional accounts presuppose the general positional account but illuminate the additional methodical determinations that characterize, say, the making of natural scientific judgments, or scholarly judgments, or human scientific judgments. Similarly, each general counterpositional account has its corresponding *special counterpositional* accounts.

As with the general accounts, the task of methodically elucidating all the special accounts of how judgments are grounded, whether those accounts are explicitly asserted by someone or just implicit in her words and deeds, is part of Dialectic. And the subsequent task of highlighting within that group the special accounts that are positional, by contrast with those that are counterpositional, belongs to Foundations. That is to say, both Dialectic and Foundations have general part and a special part.

At the moment I do not recall any place in his writing where Lonergan illustrates the interplay of the *special* dialectical and foundational tasks with preceding and succeeding investigative responsibilities in the degree of methodical detail that he does for the *general* tasks with his aforementioned discussion of Tertullian, Origen, and Athanasius on God. Nonetheless, conclusions offered by Lonergan that might be expanded into comparable illustrations are hardly lacking. Let me note but three. In the special disciplines of exegesis and historiography, some investigators maintain that securely grasping the meaning of this particular text or that particular historical event requires excluding one’s own presuppositions. By contrast, the positional stance on the matter implies rejecting this counterpositional “Principle of the Empty Head.” Again, in the special discipline of human psychology, mechanist deterministic readings of Freud’s discoveries would have them dismiss in advance the possibility that growth in self-understanding may have a central role in psychotherapy. But the positional renunciation of mechanist

determinism as an adequate framework for investigating human psychic and intentional functioning keeps that possibility open, thus leaving the issue to be settled by empirical psychotherapeutic findings. (Those findings, in turn, suggest that growth in self-understanding does indeed have a central role.)

Again, in the special discipline of ethics, investigators' determination of the moral goodness of this or that particular human act is bound to be flawed insofar as those investigators proceed from counterpositional accounts that, in effect, identify the criterion of responsible choice with individual bias, or group bias, or general bias, rather than self-transcending value.

1.3. The Goal of My 1999 Lonergan Workshop Paper

The theme of the 1999 Lonergan Workshop was specified partly as “Lonergan and the Human Sciences.” I envisioned my paper as addressing that theme indirectly, by virtue of directly addressing a theme that I argued was methodologically prior, namely, “Lonergan and Scholarly Studies.” More exactly, my central goal was to sketch an original and rounded example of what I have just now reviewed, namely, the interplay of special dialectical and foundational tasks with certain prior and subsequent investigative tasks, precisely in the special disciplinary area that Lonergan calls ‘scholarly studies.’ In other words, my goal was one of ‘special pre-empirical horizontal analysis,’ first dialectical and then foundational, within scholarly studies — with my particular example drawn from U.S. Constitutional law.

In the paper itself, I set forth this goal and my intended steps for pursuing it as follows:

I can ... characterize my paper ... as a Lonergan-inspired effort to illuminate the inevitable influence of special pre-empirical presuppositions on the conclusions reached by any investigator who engages in scholarly studies. Using a concrete example, I will pursue this effort in three main steps. First, I will briefly recount a current dispute about a prominent legally normative text, the Constitution of the United States. Second, I


11 Insight, CWL 3: 244-267 [1957: 218-242]; see also Method 47-52.
will propose how this dispute reflects important underlying but often overlooked differences between the disputants regarding the procedures and criteria of textual interpretation in general. Third, I will sketch the character and basis of what I take to be the correct stance on textual interpretation, and what that stance implies for a correct resolution of the dispute about the Constitution.\textsuperscript{12}

In a corresponding footnote, I added that in (the bulk of) the paper I would be “engaged in the fourth functional specialty, dialectic. My dialectical focus here, however, is special rather than general, interpretative rather than positive, and scholarly rather than scientific.”\textsuperscript{13}

Next, after indicating how controversies about a right of privacy were sparked by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the mid-1960s onward, and after distinguishing several related issues within the area of controversy, I delimited the disputed question at the core of my example.

Let me be clear about the question this dispute regards. ... It is the interpretational question of whether the Constitution implicitly asserts a civil right of privacy. Granted that the Supreme Court has decided that the Constitution does implicitly assert a right of privacy, and that these decisions possess supreme legal authority as long as they remain in place, are the decisions themselves examples of accurate constitutional interpretation? Or are they examples of judicial invention, instances of judges doing what they are legally authorized to do but not textually justified in doing?\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, I made clear that for the purposes of my example I would restrict myself to providing "some samples of the arguments" of just three (of the many) persons who have addressed this question: Justice William O. Douglas, Judge Robert Bork, and Professor Laurence Tribe.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Vertin, “Right of Privacy” (original) 3-4; (published) 4. In the published version, this paragraph makes explicit an additional step that in fact both versions take, namely, indicating how the interpretational differences in turn reflect still more basic but usually neglected differences regarding the nature of knowing in general.

\textsuperscript{13}Vertin, “Right of Privacy” (original) note 6; (published) note 9.

\textsuperscript{14}Vertin, “Right of Privacy” (original) 5; (published) 5.

\textsuperscript{15}Vertin, “Right of Privacy” (original) 5-6; (published) 5-6.
2. ANDERSON’S REMARKS

After offering a three-page summary of my 1999 Lonergan Workshop paper, Anderson follows with two pages of general comments, two pages of comments “in light of debates in contemporary legal philosophy,” and ten pages of comments “in light of Lonergan’s writings on Interpretation and Dialectic.” His remarks manifest the understandable enthusiasm of one who is well versed in a specialty not unrelated to my paper’s topic; and they highlight a wealth of interesting, important, and timely issues. At the same time, however, in many respects they strike me as regarding a different paper than the one I thought I had produced. This seeming absence of proper focus often characterizes not only Anderson’s critical remarks but even his occasional laudatory ones.

I recognize that some of the confusions I find may stem from infelicities of thought or expression in my own paper, or from the fact that Anderson had access only to the original rather than the published version at the time he prepared his remarks. Nonetheless, I must confess that in general I do not find either his reading or his reasoning to be very careful. While some of the imprecisions are of little consequence, others are sufficiently germane to my paper’s central thrust that they merit at least brief attention and correction. And one in particular deserves more extended discussion. Handling these tasks will occupy the remainder of this essay.

2.1. Some Matters of Middling Importance

Let me briefly report and respond to five passages from Anderson regarding certain matters of middling importance in my paper. (I treat the passages in the order of their appearance.)

In a first passage, Anderson indicates his disagreement with my endorsement of what I suggest is Tribe’s account of interpretation.


17The published paper is almost three times as long as the original one. It has many more nuances, plus many more samples from the three disputants’ writings.
Vertin: Interpreting the Constitution

I find it difficult to accept Vertin's assessment that Tribe's version of interpretation is correct. His argument is (1) that Tribe's and Lonergan's stances coincide — they use similar terms such as understanding and intelligence. (2) Vertin's own experience of interpretation coincides with Lonergan's explanation of cognitional theory. (3) Therefore, Tribe's view is correct. The use of similar words by Lonergan and Tribe is not enough to persuade me to accept Tribe's version of what counts as a successful interpretation over the others.\(^{18}\)

In response, I would point out that my comparison of Tribe to Lonergan was based not on a similarity in the *words* they use but rather on something far more fundamental: a similarity in their portrayals of *cognitional procedures*. Lonergan maintains that knowing in general is neither simply passive nor simply creative, and I find Tribe's view of interpretative knowing remarkably similar.\(^{19}\)

In a *second* passage, Anderson takes issue with my negative assessment of what I suggest is Bork's account of interpretation.

Bork's stance on interpretation cannot be easily dismissed. A right of privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution. Many members of the legal profession believe that [the] role of judges is to apply the law, not to create it. On the other hand, many people in the legal profession recognize that judges have made novel decisions and have created new laws. Bork's view simply represents one side of a long running debate concerning the limits of judicial power. Douglas and Tribe represent the other side. Vertin, however, does not handle this conflict.\(^{20}\)

In response, I would draw a distinction. The question of judicial power’s limits may be considered either in its totality or simply insofar as it embodies and illustrates a prior and more general question. Considered in its totality, it belongs to the domain that is the responsibility of comprehensive legal scholarship; and in this regard I deliberately prescinded from it, since my paper did not aspire to be an exercise in comprehensive legal scholarship. Considered simply insofar as it embodies and illustrates the prior and more general

\(^{18}\)Anderson, "Pointing" 54.

\(^{19}\)While the published version of my paper sets forth the basis of the comparison in much greater detail, an account focussed on cognitional procedures is far from absent in the original version. See Vertin, "Right of Privacy" (original) 20-24; (published) 35-44.

\(^{20}\)Anderson, "Pointing" 54.
question of textual interpretation, however, the question of judicial power's limits stands squarely at the center of what my paper focused on. For where one locates the limits of judicial power depends in part upon how one conceives of textual interpretation. On the account of interpretation I attributed to Douglas, for example, judicial invention does not necessarily overstep the bounds of judges' power to interpret laws, since successful interpretation in general can include invention. By contrast, on the account of interpretation I attributed to Bork, judicial invention always oversteps the bounds of judges' power to interpret laws, since successful interpretation in general always excludes invention.

In a third passage, Anderson opines that "the writings of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe," as well as my paper, are flawed by egregious reductionism.

Two legal theorists, Peter Goodrich and Ngire Naffine, argue that a serious problem with legal analysis is that, by translating complex social problems into legal issues, our understanding of concrete problematic situations becomes trivialized and over-simplified. In my opinion, the writings of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe do just that — they translate difficult problems concerning birth control and abortion into a debate over whether or not a right to privacy exists. In light of the educational, political, economic, medical, social, and religious contexts relevant to an adequate discussion of these issues, Vertin's discussion of presuppositions in legal interpretation also ignores relevant areas of inquiry. In other words, Vertin's paper is consistent with the deficient perspective that separates law from other disciplines and lines of inquiry in an attempt to solve complex problems by legal analysis.  

I do not judge that this astonishing passage deserves an extensive reply. Hence I offer just two observations. First, it is not necessarily illegitimate or unproductive to write about something without attempting to write about everything. The basic standard for assessing a writing is not how many worthwhile topics it addresses, but rather how successful it is in addressing the specific (and often appropriately limited) topics the author set out to address. Second, in the version of my paper on which Anderson is commenting, all my citations of Douglas save one were excerpts from judicial opinions he rendered in his role as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The works of Bork and Tribe

21Anderson, "Pointing" 56.
that I cited were confined to those whose primary concern was how the Constitution ought to be interpreted. And the restricted goal of my paper itself was articulated clearly in its introduction.

In a fourth group of comments, Anderson contends that the arguments of Douglas, Bork, Tribe, and Vertin are also reductionistic from another standpoint, as well as confused — the standpoint of Lonergan's writings on interpretation and Dialectic.

The arguments by Douglas, Bork, and Tribe about the existence or non-existence of a right to privacy indicate a concern with facticity — whether or not a right to privacy, in fact, exists. They frame the debate in terms of an argument that can be settled by making a judgment of fact. Questions about whether or not a right to privacy should exist are not explicitly raised. ... Vertin also portrays interpretation as an exercise in establishing facts — the issue is either a right to privacy exists or it does not. Insofar as Vertin ignores questions of value in his analysis of Douglas's, Bork's, and Tribe's writings, he does not break from this tradition of truncated subjectivity.

... Vertin's selection of excerpts by Douglas, Bork, and Tribe indicates that they do not separate interpretation from other activities. They treat diverse problems as if they are interpretational problems insofar as problems related to birth control, abortion, and privacy depend on one's interpretation of the Constitution. Hence the stances of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe/Vertin can be seen as very muddled musings on interpretation.

While I agree with Anderson about the presence here of some "very muddled musings," I view them as having a different mental location than what he envisages. I would also propose that they can be largely eliminated insofar as one draws and is guided by disciplined distinctions between such items as the following: (1) an actual or just possible reality (such as the right of privacy); (2) John's writing about that reality; (3) written interpretations of John's text by William, Byron, and Harry; (4) written evaluations of John's text by William, Byron, and Harry; (5) Mary's interpretative account of the texts of William, Byron, and Harry respectively, as regards both (a) their perhaps

23Anderson, "Pointing" 59-60. (I have corrected the spelling and grammar.)
differing interpretative and evaluative conclusions about John's text, and (b) their perhaps differing interpretative and evaluative procedures for reaching those conclusions; (6) Mary's evaluative account of the same; (7) the additional complications that emerge if John was a Framer of the Constitution and William, Byron, and Harry are Supreme Court justices; and (8) Lonergan's account of what he eventually distinguishes as eight specialties in a functionally differentiated approach to human studies.

Finally, in a fifth passage, Anderson opines that the magnitude of my inattention to the six steps Lonergan lays out for preparing the materials of Dialectic (namely, assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, and selection) puts my approach to Douglas, Bork, and Tribe beyond the pale of proper Lonerganian interpretative and dialectical procedures.

In my opinion, Vertin's presentation of the views of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe on interpretation and the comparison to Lonergan's use of language lies outside the procedures of scientific interpretation and Dialectic demanded by Lonergan in Insight and Method in Theology.

In light of what I have already said by way of response, I make no comment on this opinion.

2.2. A Matter of Greater Importance

Beyond the matters of middling importance on which I have just now responded to Anderson, there stands a matter whose importance I count much greater. It is that of the difference between (special) pre-empirical presuppositions and empirical findings, the distinction that stands at the heart of the enterprise my paper undertook. Anderson certainly grasps the significance of the distinction, and he praises my paper for addressing it:

[Q]uestions about how judges' views on interpretation affect their decisions have not been raised by legal scholars. In this context, Vertin's paper is a worthwhile contribution to legal philosophy in that he raises a

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24 Method 249-250.
neglected question: How do views on interpretation influence judicial decision-making?²⁶

Nonetheless, as I read on and between the lines of Anderson's essay, it appears to me that he remains somewhat unclear about the distinction's exact contours.

In one passage, for example, Anderson identifies my distinction with the distinction between reaching a judgment and justifying it.

Let us begin with Vertin's claim that a judge's view on interpretation prefigures her judgment. There are a number of legal scholars who hold a complementary [sic] view. Legal theorists such as Richard Wasserstrom, Neil MacCormick, Jerzy Wroblewski, and Steven Burton argue that how a judgment is reached is one thing and how it is supported or defended is another, separate matter. ... According to Vertin, presuppositions about interpretation prefigure a judge's decision, but do not determine the empirical findings (that is, the outcome of legal analysis) which he presents as a subsequent activity. In this way, Vertin's view is consistent with the legal scholars' sharp distinction between the process of reaching a decision by whatever means and the process of legally justifying it.²⁷

In the next paragraph, continuing his identification of my distinction with the distinction between discovery and justification, Anderson points out that in his own book²⁸ he has rejected the latter. He goes on to reprove me for not having addressed his argument.

By contrast, in "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making, I offer a competing explanation of judicial decision-making. ... I use Lonergan's explanation of cognitional theory to reject the view that we can sharply distinguish between how a decision is reached and whether or not it is legally justified. The problem is that Vertin, who sharply distinguishes between a zone of presuppositions and a separate zone of empirical legal activity that may or may not be affected by presuppositions, should explain the extent to which my analysis of cognitional theory in judicial decision-making is inadequate.²⁹

²⁶Anderson, "Pointing" 53; see also 66.
²⁷Anderson, "Pointing" 54-55.
²⁸See above, note 16.
²⁹Anderson, "Pointing" 55.
In commenting on these two passages, I would begin by observing that the relation between pre-empirical presuppositions and empirical findings is the relation between one’s antecedently structured seeking and the result at which one arrives. What a person knows is bound to be prefigured, though not completely determined, by what she is antecedently oriented to do when she knows — that is to say, by her antecedent (if perhaps just operational) answer to the question, “What at best am I doing whenever I am knowing?” In the present context, the primary meaning that an interpreter grasps in the text of a law is bound to be prefigured, though not completely determined, by her antecedent (if perhaps just operational) answer to the question, “What at best am I doing whenever I am grasping the primary meaning of a text?”

The relation between pre-empirical interpretational presuppositions and empirical interpretational findings may be illuminated more amply by the following example, which is based upon a syllogism I used in the original version of my 1999 Workshop paper to explicate the stance I was imputing to Douglas.30

Major Premise: If as an authentically inventive interpreter I attribute meaning X to text Y, then the primary meaning of text Y includes meaning X.

Minor Premise: But as an authentically inventive interpreter I attribute the assertion of a right of privacy to the U.S. Constitution.

Conclusion: Therefore, the primary meaning of the U.S. Constitution includes the assertion of a right of privacy.

In this example, the major premise expresses the pre-empirical interpretational presupposition maintained by this particular interpreter; the minor premise expresses the actual performance in which he engages in interpreting the Constitution; and the conclusion expresses the interpretational result at which he arrives. Now, the major premise prefigures the conclusion by spelling out three things: (a) the conclusion (at least in general) that is being considered (“the primary meaning of text Y includes meaning X”); (b) the fact

30(a) For purposes of illustrating the present point, examples based upon the explicative syllogisms I used regarding Bork or Tribe would be equally effective. (b) The explicative syllogisms that appear in the published version of my paper are considerably more developed than those in the original version.
that conditions must be fulfilled if that conclusion is to be asserted ("If ... , then ..."); and (c) what those conditions are ("as an authentically inventive interpreter I attribute meaning X to text Y"). The minor premise, however, is what establishes that those conditions in fact are fulfilled. And the major and minor premises together determine the conclusion.

In light of the three preceding paragraphs, I would note that it is incorrect to speak of "a zone of presuppositions and a separate zone of empirical legal activity that may or may not be affected by presuppositions." Pre-empirical presuppositions always affect empirical findings.

Moreover, I would note that the relation between pre-empirical presuppositions and empirical findings is a wholly different matter from the relation between reaching an interpretation and justifying it. Consequently, whatever the value of Anderson's argument in his book that discovery and justification cannot be sharply distinguished, consideration of that argument was not relevant to the carefully limited aim of my paper.

There is additional evidence that Anderson is somewhat fuzzy about the relationship of (special) pre-empirical presuppositions and empirical findings. At one point, for example, he seems to have me reaching a conclusion simply from a pre-empirical presupposition.

... Vertin writes that he is "inclined to agree" with Tribe's judgment that the U.S. Constitution asserts a right of privacy insofar as Vertin himself approaches the constitutional question with the same pre-empirical presuppositions as those of Tribe.  

As is pretty clear in the passage that Anderson immediately cites from my paper, however, my inclination to agree with Tribe's conclusion does not stem simply from my concurrence with what I take to be his pre-empirical interpretational presupposition, a concurrence whose firmness reflects my familiarity with pre-empirical issues. Rather, it stems crucially as well from my

31Anderson, "Pointing" 55; my emphasis.

32Anderson, "Pointing" 52; my emphasis. On the previous and following pages, however, he expresses the relationship correctly: "... Douglas, Bork, and Tribe have prior convictions (not necessarily objectified) that influence their textual interpretations" (51; my emphasis; see also 53).

33Anderson, "Pointing" 53.
concurrence with his interpretation of the Constitution when he reads it in light of that presupposition, a concurrence whose tentativeness reflects my relative lack of expertise on specifically constitutional issues.

In another passage, Anderson suggests that the ‘key function’ of one’s pre-empirical interpretational presupposition might be rhetorical.

Legal scholars interested in rhetoric ... might claim that Douglas, Bork, and Tribe use their views on interpretation as rhetorical devices, as part of their strategies to persuade the reader to agree with their decisions. The key function of a particular stance on interpretation is its use to bolster an argument or outcome. The argument would go something like this: If I can convince you that my stance on interpretation is correct, then I can convince you that my judgment is correct, if it is evident to you that my view of interpretation coincides with my judgment. In fact, Vertin uses this line of argument to justify his acceptance of Tribe’s judgment that a right to privacy exists.34

If indeed my 1999 Workshop paper was unclear on this point, I hope that at least my preceding remarks in the present essay have made my view plain. I think that the ‘key function’ of one’s pre-empirical stance on interpretation is epistemological, not rhetorical — though of course a person may appeal to many sorts of commonalities, including epistemological ones, when attempting to convince others to agree with her. More specifically, I think that the ‘key function’ of the respective interpretational presuppositions in the writings of Douglas and Bork and Tribe is not rhetorical but epistemological. Finally, at no point did I intend to argue otherwise in my paper.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly there are claims I make in my 1999 Workshop paper, whether the original or the published version, that can profit from the scrutiny of other scholars. Some obvious candidates are the distinctions I draw between general and special positions and counterpositions, the respective interpretational presuppositions I attribute to Douglas, Bork, and Tribe, and my comparative assessments of those presuppositions. Perhaps some of my claims require fuller elaboration; others, perhaps revision or even wholesale rejection.

34Anderson, “Pointing” 55-56.
It remains that other scholars’ efforts to improve my treatment of the topics I have addressed are likely to be worthwhile precisely in the proportion that they put a premium on beginning with accurate interpretation of the paper in which I have addressed them. What was the principal goal I envisioned myself as pursuing in that paper, and what were its limits? Exactly how did I think the particular steps I took could help me achieve that goal? Insofar as I considered the writings of others, what were the original contexts and the specific aims of those writings, and precisely what role did I conceive them as serving in my own project?

In a way that I have attempted to document in some detail, I deem that Anderson’s attention to these elementary interpretational questions is seriously deficient; and I view that deficiency in turn as vitiating the relevance of the many otherwise valuable insights he obviously has had. Despite these reservations, on the other hand, I find that my effort of responding to him has solidified my grasp of what I was attempting in my Workshop paper. For providing the occasion of that advance, as well as for clearly affirming the value of my spotlighting the influence of interpretational presuppositions on judicial findings, I thank him.
JUDGMENT, REALITY, AND DISSOCIATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

A Practical Application

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This paper draws upon Lonergan’s exposition of genetic development and cognitional theory. According to Lonergan the movement upwards from lower manifolds to higher is the manner in which the human subject develops, and any form of dissociation or childhood trauma can and will inhibit that movement on many fronts. Because there is such a wide range of association paths, some form of development can take place, but it will suffer the aberrations of blocked pathways. My exposition in this article is a purely descriptive application in which I have attempted to express how Lonergan’s notion of the real can be very helpful in understanding the dynamics of dissociative consciousness. In brief, dissociative consciousness inhibits the natural integral dynamic of the human subject. In doing so physical ailments abound as the body and consciousness fight for integration. Although I have focused on dissociative consciousness, this understanding has ramifications for any therapeutic action or diagnosis. Others in those fields will be able to work out further implications and applications.

As a Pastoral Associate in a parish I am often involved in counseling that is sometimes spiritual direction and at other times therapeutic. Over the past ten years I have worked with women who had been sexually abused as children by their fathers. A common factor began to emerge in terms of their previous treatment by professional psychologists, psychiatrists, and therapists. Symptoms

were being treated with coping skills or medication but none seemed to be dealing with the central issue which appeared, in every case, to be repressed feelings and memories. The dissociated parts of consciousness were the cause of most of their physical ailments and the anxieties experienced in living.

I developed a methodology for assisting these people in recalling the repressed memories and feelings, eventually releasing the hold that such repression has over integral development. In developing that methodology I drew on Bernard Lonergan's notion of reality and the integral structure of the human subject. The feelings and memories are integrated by moving them 'upwards' from the unconscious to consciousness. It is a matter of integrating lower levels of activities that could not or cannot be resolved on a lower level. In researching and reading for assistance I found there to be a basic problem which leaves the contemporary analyst quite unequipped to properly deal with the integration of repression. The following article is an effort to outline one particular experience and at the same time attempt to express how Lonergan's notion of the 'real' can assist in the field of therapy as well as provide an exposition of how Lonergan's notion of the integral subject can provide a foundation for therapy.

The theoretical literature on dissociative consciousness reveals a prevailing problem all therapists have to deal with in their effort to orient their patients (consumers) towards better health. That prevailing problem is the accepted notion of the 'real' world. This is not discussed as a problem in the various journals because there is an unquestioned and accepted premise that what is 'seen' is what is 'real.' Lonergan's work directly challenges this unquestioned assumption regarding the 'real.'

2 Outlining this methodology would require a lengthy work that is outside the scope of this present paper.

3 Insight, CWL 3: 488-503, on development.

4 Insight, CWL 3. See the chapters on Metaphysics regarding the integration of the different levels of the human subject.

5 "To move feelings" is a metaphorical phrase. It is a matter of making conscious what is not conscious.

6 The process of integration would be obvious to many analysts. The lack of a systematic understanding of the dynamic of integral subjectivity leaves a wide range for error and experimentation remains rooted in positivism.

7 A perusal of a variety of texts reveals that the 'real' is widely held to be identical with the 'seen.' Readers of METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies will be familiar with Lonergan's notion of the 'real' and his notion of the integral subject.
Bearing these issues in mind, let me return to a specific instance of dissociative consciousness. I spent three and a half years helping a person diagnosed with dissociative consciousness, of which the fragmentation varied widely in personality expression. There were many different personalities present ranging from aggressive women manifesting sexual comfortability to young girls terrified of speaking. This person had been in and out of various mental health facilities for almost three decades. She had many therapists and psychiatrists, and had taken a multiplicity of medications. Her disorder revealed sexual abuse and ritualistic abuse by the father over a period of almost twenty years. The fear associated with these events causes the dissociative event in consciousness. Dissociative consciousness produces a distortion and break in the natural extroversion of consciousness leading to a fixation of inner imaging.

I originally encouraged this person to seek specific professional help. She informed me that having gone that route for the time mentioned above, she was not prepared to try that again. In my earlier work on childhood development, I explored the notion of an 'inner world.' She was indeed 'familiar' with what might be meant by 'inner world,' but her earlier therapy had avoided the topic. We assume that if a person sees an inner world or hears inner voices or sounds, that he or she is 'crazy.' We assume that images and sounds must be 'out there' in the 'real' world. This person explained to me after a few months of therapy that the dissociative portions of consciousness were letting me into their world and that this inner world was their 'real' world. I was told that the world out there was not 'real' to 'them.' Notice how the words express the real in terms of a judgment. Why does a person who has been traumatized develop these inner elaborate schemes?

Colin Ross touches on this issue in his discussion of how often and easily people dissociate in everyday living. Different degrees of fear will bring on some degree of dissociation. Childhood abuse can be so brutal, so engaging of the element of fear, that one can withdraw completely from the world of outer sensibility to the inner world of imagination. Such fear can be so great, that the images brought forward become fixed in the imagination. The person I had been working with developed a tunnel-like image that we later learned to be the child's 'view' of the crib. This crib image had been there as long as she could recall. The

correlation of various statements led me to the hypothesis that she may have been abused, in some manner, at an age of less than one year. One portion of consciousness experienced the abuse and the remainder of consciousness ‘remained’ in the ‘crib’ while the abuse was taking place. It was an extremely sophisticated manner of avoiding the abuse which began when mobility was an impossibility or unknown. Unfortunately, the inability to ‘get away’ physically later translated into the inability to decide on one’s own how to survive later abuse even as an adult. As Colin Ross puts it, “fragmentation represents a creative strategy for coping with and surviving this assault.” Unfortunately, such fragmentation leaves the subject living with repressed unintegrated feelings that severely affect one’s emotional development.

There is usually one personality functioning in day-to-day activities. This personality usually has the greatest degree of development or ability to integrate while other personalities are focused on one issue from the past. The person I had been working with exhibited fragmented portions of consciousness that had not worn glasses for some years, while the ‘adult’ (that is, day-to-day) expression of consciousness required glasses since early youth. She also described how medications that had been administered while at hospitals, were distributed to portions of consciousness so that the intended effect would not occur.

The withdrawal to develop elaborate images and personalities manifests a psychological control of neural chemistry somewhat similar to the manner in which dream images are created or even in the manner that anyone can imagine an image in their sensitive integration area.

After about three months of work together, this person informed me that things ‘out there’ began to have color. She informed me that the outer world of sensibility had always been gray and dark. Most of the abuse did take place at

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10The accuracy of these statements is questionable. Just as memories can be repressed into the unconscious, it may well be possible to restrict chemical effects to portions of the unconscious leaving other portions of awareness unaffected by the medication. The restriction is brought on simply by shifting awareness or focussing awareness. Extreme introversion over time allows the subject to split awareness.

night, but it would appear that this was not the cause of this grayness. It seems more accurate to understand this as her inner conscious creation attempting to block out the outer world of sensibility completely. Her conscious attention to experience had withdrawn to a fixed state of introversion. Certain portions of extroverted consciousness had been, for the most part, overcome.

As more repressed feelings and dissociated areas of consciousness were integrated, colors changed from pastels to brighter shades. She did inform me that when this first began, the colors emerged with physical pain. She expressed that feelings had colors and it would seem that the symbolic nature of her psychology had become overly sensitive due to her excessive fear of the outer world.

Returning to our earlier discussion of the foundations of psychology, the positivistic position claims that what is 'real' is what is seen — or we might use the term 'experienced' — through the senses. The inner world of a person with dissociative consciousness is judged to be the real world just as the positivist 'judges' the outer world of sensibility to be the real world. The point here is that reality is known by correctly understanding experiences, by judging one's understanding of inner or outer experience. The dissociative consciousness creates an inner world of sensorium where all five senses appear to be active and all experiences appear to originate within consciousness, therefore not requiring an explanation. The patient becomes like a creator.

This issue of judgment raises also the issue of objectivity. If there is no fixed 'thing' outside of me, beyond me, how can science be certain of any thing; including hypothesis, theories, or conclusions?

If objectivity is a matter of elementary extroversion then the objective interpreter has to have more to look at than spatially ordered marks on paper; not only the marks but also the meanings have to be 'out there'; and the difference between an objective interpreter and one that is merely subjective is that the objective interpreter observes simply the meanings that are obviously 'out there,' while the merely subjective interpreter 'reads' his own ideas 'into' statements that obviously possess quite a different meaning. But the plain fact is that there is nothing 'out there' except spatially ordered marks; to appeal to dictionaries and to grammars, to linguistic and stylistic studies, is to appeal to more marks. The proximate source of the whole experiential component in the meaning of both objective and subjective interpreters lies in their own experience; the proximate source of the whole

\[12\text{Insight, CWL 3, see also ch. 8.}\]
The intellectual component lies in their own insights; the proximate source of the whole reflective component lies in their own critical reflection. If the criterion of objectivity is the 'obviously out there,' then there is no objective interpretation whatever; there is only gaping at ordered marks, and the only order is spatial. For example, Lonergan's judgment on objectivity is not present to us in the words above, for those are just marks. The reader must read, add meaning, and then judge one's own meaning. But the meaning judged is not, in the first instance at least, Lonergan's meaning. It is the reader's meaning. There is no meaning in the words provided. They are just letters arranged in a specific order.

These distinctions are relevant to the issue of dissociative consciousness. If judgment of one's understanding, one's meaning of one's experience, is how we know reality, how we objectify our understanding, then, to a certain extent at least, that is also what the person with dissociative consciousness is doing. The person judges her own creation to be the 'real' through her understanding of her experience. Unfortunately for dissociative consciousness, fear blocks the insights that would over time release the introverted state. As the feelings are integrated, the fear lessens and an integrated extroverted state can gradually emerge. If this is how the subject knows reality, reflection on moving out of one 'world' to another might reveal the struggle of introverted consciousness to reorient itself. When we begin to treat persons with dissociative consciousness we 'call' the repressed feelings out from their world into ours.

Our world is judged by the patient to be hostile, so these feelings do not come out easily and are often unpleasant when they do so. My patient explained later that her other personalities ('alters') were seldom abusive in the crib. Yet I found some to be self-abusive when they came out. Self-mutilation is often the result and is treated as a problem in itself. Such activity is a symptom that the person usually has no control over. This is completely different from attempted suicide. Self-mutilation usually occurs as a way of stopping the inner psychological pain, memory, chaos, or headaches associated with emerging memories that need to be integrated into consciousness. These memories are resisted and the resistance creates a change in chemistry, experienced as a headache or some other sensation due to rapid chemical change. Such a person usually discovers, by accident, that physical pain stops the inner pain. Once a

\[13\] \textit{Insight, CWL 3, see also 605.}
child discovers that this activity will help, she will often utilize it whenever the inner pain becomes unbearable. It would require some work on the part of biochemistry and neural chemistry to explain the relations and how consciousness focuses on the physical pain enabling consciousness to repress the anxiety that it is trying to integrate.

This activity will eventually become habitual because it ‘works.’ The fact that it is only a temporary solution is irrelevant when the situation is extreme and the personality is usually not immediately educable about the inadequacy of such a solution. Self-mutilation for a dissociative consciousness is a survival technique. Self-mutilation keeps the person ‘safe’ in their world. It is best treated by shifting the feelings and memories from the personality that is performing such acts to the personality that is normative in daily living. In other words, integrate the repressed feelings into consciousness. It is counter-productive to dispute whose reality is more ‘real.’ What is needed, instead, is a realization of how similar are the structures by means of which healthy and dissociative persons form their senses of the ‘real’ and the ‘world.’ This realization will assist therapists in appreciating how a dissociative person’s understanding of the situation fixes their psychological stability. In their judgment of what is ‘real,’ some semblance of inner order is maintained. Medication and unfamiliar surroundings can and often do challenge a person’s understanding and they can become extremely agitated, confused, or afraid, and they will react to these experiences in ways that too often clinicians denote as ‘sick.’

It took a few weeks for the person I was working with to metaphorically invite me into the ‘crib.’ She did so when she knew the other personalities trusted me. The personalities when present to me actually experienced me as ‘in the crib.’ I later informed her that in fact I was not and could not see what she was seeing so she would then describe everything to me. She was surprised at first. Later she would apologize and say, “Oh, I keep forgetting you’re not in here.” We might ask ourselves, how difficult would it be to let a stranger in our house when there are news reports of numerous killers lurking in our area? The dissociative person is hiding from abusers and when the abuse is severe enough, everyone, the entire outer world of sensibility, becomes the abuser. By entering into the meanings of the creative consciousness of the patient and healing the fears, one slowly reorients the understanding of that person to judging the outer world of sensibility as the world we move about in and make decisions in every day, in order to keep
consciousness extroverted and to survive. It also slowly heals the fear so that it becomes more intelligently selective and not generalized to the entire outer world of sensibility.

Before concluding, I wish to add one further point, suggested by a quotation from Lonergan.

Let us now return to such sciences as psychology and sociology. Two cases arise. These sciences may be modeled on the procedures of the natural sciences. In so far as this approach is carried out rigorously, the meaning in human speech and action is ignored, and the science regards only the unconscious side of human process.¹⁴

The therapist must work with the conscious side of human process if he or she is to be successful. Observation of a person and their behavior as the major determinant in assessing their disorder is doing bad zoology. One must seek meanings of the things done and the words spoken, backed up by an understanding of the inner dynamics that constitute the integral subjectivity of a person. These meanings then become the data of the therapy. Once these meanings are understood as a whole, one moves to a judgment of the problem and then a decision of what form therapy will take. Treating the physical symptoms is a requirement but it must be kept in mind that the actual cause is not being healed by the process. Positivism and behaviorism lead to such errors.

In conclusion, Lonergan’s thought on the hierarchy of being would be most beneficial to both teachers of psychology and counselors in practice. The more efficient complement to those activities of course is the implementation of schemes of recurrence that would over a prolonged period reduce the neurotic schemes inherent in contemporary culture. This brief article points to that complement through the challenge to educators to initiate their own manner of communicating their own self-discovery.

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