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VARIATIONS IN FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

Editor's Introduction

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In the fall of 1973 Lonergan gave the Larkin-Stuart Lectures at Trinity College in the University of Toronto, under the general title, "Revolution in Roman Catholic Theology?" There were four lectures: A New Pastoral Theology (November 12); Variations in Fundamental Theology (November 13); Sacralization and Secularization (November 14); and The Scope of Renewal (November 15).

The following February, under the auspices of More House in Yale University, he repeated the first three of these as the St Thomas More Lectures, February 11, 12, and 13, respectively, under the general title of "Change in Roman Catholic Theology" (a flyer made 'change' plural, somewhat altering the sense).

It is the second lecture of these two series that is reprinted here. Our Archives contain a copy of the autograph of this lecture as Lonergan prepared it for Trinity College in 1973, even to the point of including some of his ad lib remarks that were written in by a member of the audience. In preparation for the More House series, however, the lecture had been retyped professionally, and shows a number of differences.

These differences range from the trivial through the more significant to the important. Up to the concluding summary, most of the differences are trivial. A number of them are obviously typos (for example, 'not' became 'not' when a cancelation in the line below seemed to be an underlining of the word above), and our presumption is that the other
trivial changes are typos too. But three changes are more significant and must be attributed to Lonergan: "human reason cannot strictly transcend itself" became "by strict logic human reason cannot transcend itself"; "... the turn to the subject is an acceptance of modern science as cognitional fact" became "the turn to the subject is an acceptance of a cognitional fact, namely, modern science"; and "For Heidegger verstehen, understanding, was the condition of the possibility of Dasein, of being a man" became "For Heidegger verstehen, understanding, was the condition of the possibility of the project and so of Dasein, of being a man." For these three passages we follow the 1974 MS, but for the trivial differences ascribed to the typist we follow the autograph. Subdivision titles were added in 1974, presumably by Lonergan.

The concluding summary is another matter. Lonergan wrote a new one for the 1974 series, not so much making corrections as taking a different approach. This meant the omission of some remarks, brief but helpful, relating his own position to that of the theologians he had discussed in the lecture. These discarded paragraphs seemed worth saving, so while choosing the 1974 conclusion for our definitive text, we have added the original 1973 conclusion as an appendix. A passage in square brackets in the appendix was an oral interpolation Lonergan made as he read the text for his 1973 lecture; two other ad lib remarks in the 1973 delivery are similarly preserved (in footnotes 2 and 22 of the present text).

Our editing mechanics follow the policy adopted for the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: use of The Chicago Manual of Style; DS to mean Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum ...; references to 'man' left unchanged (though the frequently used 'Father' was dropped); and so on. Quotations were checked, and corrected when there was need. We retained (but with corrections) Lonergan's scriptural quotations, for which he used The New English Bible.

The notes, which Lonergan typed in the margins of the 1973 MS, became endnotes in 1974 (picking up some errors in the process), and are footnotes in the present edition. We have kept the 1974 numbering, correcting the errors, and record here some editorial remarks that, if made into new footnotes, would have disturbed the 1974 order. The first lecture, A New Pastoral Theology, had referred to the Concilium series and made
considerable use of it, so Lonergan's opening remark is to be read in that context. A quotation from Latourelle has no reference, but agrees in sense if not verbatim with a passage found in this same *Concilium* 46 (p. 29). Note 8 on Bouillard referred to *Concilium* 46, but this was the typist's misreading of Lonergan's marginal note; the reference has been corrected to volume 6 of *Concilium*.

The whole set of lectures will be included in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, volume 14, which will have the title *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965* –.
VARIATIONS IN FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

Bernard J. F. Lonergan

I have already had occasion to mention Concilium. It is a series of volumes on current theological issues in which the theological consultants at the Second Vatican Council continue the type of work they did during the Council. So far over eighty volumes have appeared. Up to 1970 they averaged about one hundred and eighty pages each. Since then the average has dropped to about one hundred and fifty.

My topic this evening comes from volume forty-six published in 1969. Its title is Fundamental Theology, and its contributors come from around the world. They are Claude Geffré at Paris, René Latourelle at Rome, Raymond Panikkar in India, Heinrich Fries at Munich, Juan Segundo at Montevideo, Jan Walgrave at Louvain, Joseph Cahill then at Notre Dame and now at Edmonton, Karl Rahner then at Münster, Langdon Gilkey in Chicago, and John Macquarrie then in New York and now at Oxford.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION

Interest in my topic lies, not in fundamental theology itself, but in the fact that the traditional conception of it was rejected by many representatives both of the thinking that went into the Second Vatican Council and of the spirit that the council fostered or at least released. This rejection marks a notable reversal of opinion. Prior to the council and during it, it was customary in most Catholic theological schools to devote to fundamental theology the whole first year of the four-year basic course. Vatican II called for an over-hauling of the teaching of theology. Four years after the council closed, René Latourelle, a brilliant French-Canadian, Dean of the
faculty of theology in the Gregorian University, Rome, reported: "Key experiments, in Europe or America, demonstrate that fundamental theology at the present time is confronted with the alternatives either of dismemberment and disappearance or of beginning a new and different life."

These alternatives are startling. What had been the staple of the first year of theological studies, now is offered the grim choice. On the one hand, it may be dismembered and disappear. On the other hand, it may be transformed into something else.

So abrupt a change may be accounted for in two ways. First, there is the general cause that accounts for so many of the seeming novelties that emerged during or after Vatican II: change was long overdue. What might have been an extended series of almost imperceptible modifications running over centuries, turned into an enormous cumulation of differences that eventually emerged as a single massive sweep.

In the second place, fundamental theology was a highly technical conception. It was concerned with presenting the reasonableness of faith. But that reasonableness may be presented in at least three different manners, and fundamental theology denoted not all three manners, but only one. That one was the most technical of the three, and the one most involved in the peculiarities of the thought and temper of an age that had passed away.

The reasonableness of the faith, then, may be shown on the basis of the faith itself. Such showing, of course, is not a logical proof. To a logician it is merely arguing in a circle, concluding to the faith by presupposing the faith. Still, logic never took anyone beyond what he already knew implicitly, for there is nothing in any strictly logical conclusion that is not already contained in the premises. What advances matters is developing understanding, coming to understand what previously one did not understand. Such is the secret of all teaching. Such too is the most effective way of coming to understand the faith. To appeal to such faith as people already have, is the most rapid and convincing way to make them begin to feel at home in what they hitherto have not grasped.

Besides those that already believe, there are those still outside the faith. To them too the reasonableness of the faith may be shown. But now
the argument will presuppose, not the tenets of faith, but the convictions of reasonable men and women. Its purpose will be, not to demonstrate, but to persuade. It will start from people as they happen to be. It will take into account their strengths and their weaknesses. It will proceed in some approximation to the artistry developed in Greece by an Isocrates and codified by an Aristotle, then developed in a new key in Rome by a Cicero and codified by a Quintilian. Its success will vary with the time and place, with the skill of the advocate and the good will of his hearers or readers.

Besides these two ways there is a third, and it is the way of a fundamental theology. It is not content with the first way, even for believers, for they can feel that the beliefs they happen to entertain are the fruit of some accident. They are believers because their parents were, or because their more inspiring and persuasive teachers were, or because their country, like Kierkegaard’s Denmark, is a Christian country. But what alone has an intrinsic claim upon them is the fact they are and/or wish to be reasonable men. Why should one, they ask, simply because he wishes to be a reasonable man, accept the tenets of the Christian religion as presented in this or that communion?

The third way, then, at once resembles and differs from both the first and the second. It resembles the first inasmuch as it speaks to believers. It resembles the second and differs from the first inasmuch as it speaks to nonbelievers. And it differs from the second inasmuch as it proposes to proceed, not by rhetoric, but by logic. It is by this concern to proceed rigorously and, in that sense, to be scientific that the way of fundamental theology differs from the other two.

It is this third way, it would seem, that Karl Rahner refers to as traditional fundamental theology. It is the way that by many today is repudiated, despite the oblique reaffirmation of its essential validity by Pius XII in his encyclical *Humani generis* (DS 3876). Its origins lie in the controversies of the Reformation period, in the triumph of rationalism in the Enlightenment, and in the cultural phenomenon of atheism. It has a threefold structure that goes back to *Les trois vérités* of Pierre Charron (1593) and to the *De veritate religionis christianae* (1622) of Hugo Grotius. This threefold structure involved demonstrations, first, of the existence of God and of religion, secondly, of the Christian religion, thirdly, of the true
church. A natural theology established the existence of God. A natural ethics established the obligation of worshiping God. The prophecies of the Old Testament and the miracles of the new established the divine origin of the Christian religion, and the Christian message settled the identity of the true church.

Now there is an obvious difficulty to this procedure. It starts from data of common experience. It advances by human reason and historical testimony. It concludes to a religion and a church that not only may acknowledge the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation but also may claim that these mysteries are not within the reach of human reason. Somewhere it would seem there must be a fallacy, for a valid argument has nothing in its conclusions that is not contained in its premises. But here the premises are presented as within the reach of human reason, while the conclusion contains what may lie beyond the reach of human reason.

To this objection there are answers, and some I think are invalid while others are valid. One may distinguish between the fact and the content of revelation, hold that the argument proves the fact, deny that it concludes or at least should conclude to the truth of the mysteries. Against such a view I would be inclined to accept Geffré's contention that the distinction is unsatisfactory. The fact of revelation becomes an abstraction. It sets aside a very notable element in the content of revelation, namely, the revelation that a revelation has occurred. Again, the distinction between the fact and content of revelation leads to a further distinction. It is one thing to establish by natural reason the possibility of believing an indeterminate revelation; it is another to establish the possibility of believing mysteries that transcend human reason. The former does not include the latter, for by strict logic human reason cannot transcend itself. And so the objection stands.

However, it is possible to give substantially the same argument a quite different interpretation. It concludes not to the truth of the Christian message but to its divine origin. It concludes that man is to harken to the message, that the message creates a situation, that the situation is one of

Lonergan: Fundamental Theology

encounter, that man is to bow and adore and in his adoration, which is unrestricted submission, he is to believe. On this interpretation, I think, the objection falls. But it falls precisely because it introduces a hiatus between the alleged objective science and the act of the believer. It is the existence of this hiatus that Jan Walgrave reported when he acknowledged a broad consensus that "... it is in no sense the function of fundamental theology to 'prove' the truth of the Christian message. All that is expected of it is that it should deal with the reasons which can justify the acceptance of the faith as a moral option for a serious conscience."²

But there remains a more radical objection. Prof. Joseph Cahill, now at Edmonton, traced current fundamental theology back to the works of John Perrone written between 1835 and 1842. He claimed that its failure sprang from its attempt to do too much. He pointed to the "... naive and uncritical treatment of Scripture ..." in the textbooks. He noted, beyond an overtly polemic tone and intent, the further weakness of parochialism quite out of place in contemporary ecumenism, a pluralistic world, and a crisis of faith. As a final seal of its obsolescence he observed that traditional fundamental theology does not provide any room for the universes of discourse set up by such sciences as history, archeology, psychology, biology, psychiatry, sociology, and philosophy.³

A similar point is made with no less vigor and greater amplitude by Karl Rahner in a paper entitled "Reflections on the Contemporary Intellectual Formation of Future Priests." Traditional fundamental theology, he would say, presupposes a view of scientific knowledge that belongs only to an earlier age. Then it was possible for a single mind on the basis of personal investigation to arrive at assured mastery in this or that field and so to be capable of a personal judgment on the issues that arose in that field. But the modern sciences are not individual but community enterprises. They are not fixed achievements but ongoing developments. They are not isolated from one another but interdependent usually in highly complex manners. The range of data to which they appeal and on which

²Concilium 46 82. [In the 1973 lecture, at the end of this quotation Lonergan interpolated the remark, "In other words, it proves that the question arises."]
³Concilium 46 94.
they rest is mastered not by the individual but by the group, and not by the group of this or that moment but by the ongoing group that critically receives and independently tests each new contribution. Finally, while the natural sciences admit secure generalizations and seriations, the fields of human studies confront the student with such vast diversity that each situation calls for a special investigation even though the results of the investigation may turn out to be matched by other instances.

It is within such a perspective that Rahner asks how a young student of theology — or for that matter an elderly professor of dogmatics such as himself — can form a personal judgment on relevant elements in the New Testament without being an expert in the Jewish theology of the time of Jesus, a Qumran specialist, a form critic, a historian of ancient religions, and many other things besides. He goes on to add that the student, if he becomes at least honestly conversant with the contemporary problems in these matters, cannot but feel that, so far from being capable of forming a personal judgment on which to base his own life and his future ministry, he is on the contrary bound to remain in all such matters a pitiful amateur.

Rahner has further pregnant remarks on the plight of candidates for the priesthood, but they are far less relevant to our present concern. We have been considering a traditional fundamental theology that characterized itself as scientific and so distinguished itself from the rhetoric of apologetics. But we have come upon serious objections to such a claim. There was a time when the procedures of traditional fundamental theology might pass for science, but the science of Newton and the scholarship of von Ranke have radically transformed what is and what is thought to be scientific. Traditional fundamental theology differs from apologetics, not by being scientific, but by being a more jejune and abstruse piece of rhetoric. Further, even if traditional fundamental theology were scientific, it would not reach its goal. At most it can set forth prolegomena. But the prolegomena are only remotely relevant to an encounter, an act of adoration, and in the adoration an act of faith.

However, my own purpose in these reflections on fundamental theology is to intimate to you some comprehension of the postconciliar breakdown and disappearance of Neoscholasticism and some brief introduction to its successor, die anthropologische Wende, the turn to the human subject. This turn is conceived differently by different Catholic theologians, and an account of these differences would call for a bulky volume. I can do no more than present my own view of the matter in the hope that it may be found helpful by those among you that wish to investigate the issues more fully.

First, then, the turn to the human subject is an acceptance of a cog-nitional fact, unknown to Aristotle, namely, modern science. This means that the ideal of science is to be conceived not in terms of deductive logic but in terms of method. The foundations on which science relies are not some set of self-evident premises or of necessary and eternal truths. What the scientist relies on ultimately is his method; and when his present method fails, then his reliance shifts to the improved method that that very failure, understood as failure, will bring forth. Similarly, the conclusions which science reaches are not the necessary consequents of necessary truths. As hypotheses, they are verifiable possibilities; as verified, they become the best available scientific opinion. Hence, science is no longer conceived as a permanent achievement but as an ongoing process; and it no longer is constituted by an acquired habit in the mind of an individual; rather it consists in the current stage in the cumulative development of a scientific community.

Already in these contrasts there may be envisaged the turn to the human subject. It is a turn from idealized objects, objects of infallible intuitions, of self-evident truths, of necessary conclusions. It is a turn to the actual reality of human subjects, to a community of men and women in a common attentiveness, in a common development of human understanding, in a common reflection on the validity of current achievement, in a common deliberation on the potentialities brought to light by that achievement.

I cannot insist too much that this turn to the subject is totally misconceived when it is thought to be a turn from the truly objective to
the merely subjective. Human subjects, their attention, their developing understanding, their reflective scrutiny, their responsible deliberations are the objective realities. Infallible intuitions, self-evident premises, necessary conclusions are the merely subjective constructions that may have served their purpose in their day but have been definitively swept aside by the science and scholarship of recent centuries.

I have been indicating the turn to the human subject — as I happen to conceive it — in its first and basic moment. But that first moment is only the thin edge of the wedge. For the shift from an ideal in terms of logic to an ideal in terms of method involves a shift not only in the ideal of scientific endeavor but also in the ideal of philosophic inquiry. As long as one’s ideal is in terms of logic, then one’s first philosophy will be, like Aristotle’s, a metaphysic. For logic operates on propositions, and it is metaphysical propositions that are presupposed by all other propositions. But method orders cognitional operations, and there are cognitional operations that are prepropositional, preverbal, prejudgmental, preconceptual; to these prior operations all propositions, including metaphysical propositions, reduce; and so from the viewpoint of method, as opposed to the viewpoint of logic, priority passes from metaphysics to cognitional theory.

It turns out, however, that the priority of cognitional theory is only relative and the priority of cognitional operations qualified. The cognitional yields to the moral, and the moral to the interpersonal. To make a sound moral judgment one has to know the relevant facts, possibilities, probabilities; but with those conditions fulfilled, the moral judgment proceeds on its own criteria and towards its own ends. Again, moral judgments and commitments underpin personal relations; but with the underpinning presupposed or even merely hoped for, interpersonal commitment takes its own initiative and runs its own course.

I am touching here upon a key point. I have already mentioned a hiatus between the arguments of a fundamental theology and, on the other hand, the act of faith. That hiatus frequently is referred to as a leap of faith. That affirmation of a leap I would not deny or diminish. But while acknowledging its unique aspects, I would urge that it is not unparalleled. For a distinction may be drawn between sublating and sublated
operations, where the sublating operations go beyond the sublated, add a quite new principle, give the sublated a higher organization, enormously extend their range, and bestow upon them a new and higher relevance. So inquiry and understanding stand to the data of sense, so reflection, checking, verifying stand to the formulations of understanding, so deliberating on what is truly good, really worth while, stands to experience, understanding, and factual judgment, so finally interpersonal commitments stand to cognitional and moral operations.

The successive sublations of which I speak are, not at all the mysterious surmounting of contradictions in a Hegelian dialectic, but the inner dynamic structure of our conscious living. In its natural mode, as perhaps Edmund Husserl would say, such living is just lived. It is not adverted to explicitly; its elements are not distinguished, identified, named; the patterns of their interconnections have not been studied, scrutinized, delineated. But if we hold back from the world of objects, if our whole attention is not absorbed by them, then along with the spectacle we can advert to the spectator, along with the sounds we can find ourselves aware of our hearing. So too problems let us find ourselves inquiring, solutions let us find the insights of the solver, judgments bring us to the subject critically surveying the evidence and rationally yielding to it, decisions point not only outwardly to our practical concerns but also inwardly to the existential subject aware of good and evil and concerned whether his own decisions are making him a good or evil man. But beyond all these, beyond the subject as experiencing, as intelligent, as reasonable in his judgments, as free and responsible in his decisions, there is the subject in love. On that ultimate level we can learn to say with Augustine, *amor meus pondus meum*, my being in love is the gravitational field in which I am carried along.

Our loves are many and many-sided and manifold. They are the ever fascinating theme of novelists, the pulse of poetry, the throb of music, the strength, the grace, the passion, the tumult of dance. They are the fever of youth, the steadfastness of maturity, the serenity of age. But on an endless topic, let us be brief and indicate three dimensions in which we may be in love. There is domestic love, the love that makes a home, in which parents and children, each in his or her own ever nuanced and adaptive way,
sustains and is sustained by each of the others. There is the love that is loyalty to one’s fellows: it reaches out through kinsmen, friends, acquaintances, through all the bonds — cultural, social, civil, economic, technological — of human cooperation, to unite ever more members of the human race in the acceptance of a common lot, in sharing a burden to be borne by all, in building a common future for themselves and future generations. But above all, at once most secret and most comprehensive, there is the love of God. It is twofold. On the one hand, it is God’s love for us: “God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son, that everyone who has faith in him may not die but have eternal life” (John 3:16). On the other hand, it is the love that God bestows upon us: “God’s love has flooded our inmost heart through the Holy Spirit he has given us” (Romans 5:5).

I have been indicating two distinct components in the task of apologetics or, if you will, of fundamental theology. The precise character of these components varies with the historical unfolding of the Christian religion and with the personal development of individual inquirers. In the early church the two came together in the reply: “… repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus the Messiah for the forgiveness of your sins; and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit” (Acts 2:38). For inasmuch as one was baptized in the name of Jesus the Messiah, one entered into the objective history of salvation; and inasmuch as one’s repentance became efficacious through the gift of the Spirit, one entered upon a new life. But as the centuries slipped by, both the early simplicity remained for many, and a more complex account was needed whether for the more erudite or for the more perverse. So in the First Vatican Council the two components appear: the first as the signs of divine revelation and, particularly, as the prophecies and miracles that show forth the omniscience and the omnipotence of God; the second as the help of the Holy Spirit given us within (DS 3009).

Today, the signs of divine revelation, the prophecies of the Old Testament and the miracles of the New, have been engulfed in the mountainous extent and intricate subtlety of biblical studies and critical history. God’s gift of his grace is as frequent, as powerful, but also as silent and secret as ever, while we are perturbed by the probing of depth
psychology and bewildered by the claims of linguistic analysts, by the obscurities of phenomenology, by the oddities of existentialism, by the programs of economic, social, and ecological reformers, by the beckoning of ecumenists and universalists.

NEW POSITIONS

If I have attempted an overview of the issues, I must now report, even if with more brevity than justice, on positions that have been adopted and solutions that have been proposed. Certain basic attitudes are common to Henri Bouillard, Heinrich Fries, Claude Geffré, and Jan Walgrave, and from them I shall begin. In contrast, the views of Karl Rahner and Raymond Panikkar introduce new and distinct issues that call for separate treatment.

In general, all agree that traditional fundamental theology has had its day. Juan Segundo of Montevideo succeeds in being quite amusing on the topic of a year of lectures establishing the fact of revelation without getting around to studying what was revealed. Heinrich Fries depicts the controversialists that dilated on the apostasy of opponents but failed to grasp what they prized and defended, and he contrasts such an approach with the contemporary effort not to rebut error but to open doors, to listen and ask questions, to seek seriously an answer to questions. Jan Walgrave speaks of a reversal of former positions: The old demonstrations from miracles and prophecy are often relegated to some intellectual limbo or are allowed to appear as incidental matter on the fringe of the real issues. For Henri Bouillard the real issues have their root in human experience of human life. He considers the word, unbelief, a negative name for a positive reality. The positive reality he finds stated by Paul VI in his encyclical, *Ecclesiam suam*, where it is asserted that there exist authentic human and spiritual values at the heart of non-Christian religions and at the basis of the arguments used by atheists to explain the nature of man.

5Concilium 46, 69-79.
6Concilium 46 58.
7Concilium 46 82.
8Henri Bouillard, “Human Experience as the Starting Point of Fundamental Theology,” Concilium 6 (1965): The Church and the World 82.
This appeal to common human experience evokes the memory of Maurice Blondel, once the victim of old guard attacks, but now mentioned explicitly by Geffré and Walgrave. However, the language employed seems to fit most easily into an adaptation of Heidegger. For Heidegger *Verstehen*, understanding, was the condition of the possibility of the project and so of *Dasein*, of being a man. For these writers faith is the condition of the possibility at once of being fully a man and of being a Christian. Bouillard develops the point at some length but the gist of his thought would seem contained in the sentences: "... God’s revelation would have no meaning for us if it were not at the same time the revelation of the meaning of our own existence. For the signs of revelation to be understood for what they are, the subject must grasp that there is an intrinsic relationship between the mystery which they are said to manifest and our own existence. The subject must at least glimpse what the Christian faith contributes to the fulfillment of his destiny. No apologetic will touch him if it does not in some way achieve this."

Heinrich Fries writes: "... faith is one of man’s basic possibilities and actions — insofar as it essentially means ‘I believe in you’ and not ‘I believe that.’" What is said of faith in general as a basic human possibility, is applied to Christian faith: "The tenets of faith must strike man in such a way that he is real in them and finds himself in an authentic encounter. In this encounter, man should really come to understand himself; he should find his ‘self’ and the answers to his questions. Otherwise, faith is simply ideology."

Jan Walgrave, who like Heinrich Fries is a student of John Henry Newman, feels that other approaches run into difficulties because they do not go to the heart of the matter. So we are to confront the Christian message "... with the deepened self-understanding of man and the philosophy which analyzes the motives that live in that self-understanding." This, of course, repeats in more general terms the point made by Bouillard and

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*Concilium 46, 13.

10 Concilium 46 82.

11 Concilium 6 (1965) 87.


13 Concilium 46 61-62.
Fries, to which Walgrave adds that what is to be reached in that self-understanding is existential, prereflective, already a reality before it is clarified, vécu before it can be thématique.  

Claude Geffré presents, not so much a view of his own, as a critical survey of the current situation. He finds the ultimate refinements of traditional fundamental theology in the writings of Ambrose Gardeil and Reginald Garigou-Lagrange. He observes that contemporary thought has been reacting not merely against an obsolete fundamental theology but more basically against the once pervasive intellectualist and objectivist assumptions of neo-Thomism. Accordingly, the background of more recent efforts lies in post-Kantian developments of man’s understanding.  

To the whole of theology he ascribes an anthropocentric dimension, to which fundamental theology pays special attention. For him the human subject is no longer a passive receptacle, into which supernatural truths are to be deposited; on the contrary, the meaningful activity of God’s people is accounted a constitutive element in revelation itself. So modern theology draws out the implications of Bultmann’s intuition on the preunderstanding requisite for reading the Christian message. The gift of God’s revelation is also a revelation of man to himself, so that, as Ricoeur has it, revelation as such is an opening up of existence, a possibility of existing, or as Schillebeeckx put it, understanding the faith and self-interpretation cannot be separated.

With Rahner, Geffré feels that the distinction between fundamental and dogmatic theology will tend to vanish, the more that dogmatic theology tends to be hermeneutical, that is, to find its basic terms in immediate human experience.

He feels, as Rahner suggests, there should be a far greater interpenetration of fundamental and dogmatic theology than at present exists, and thinks this will come about the more dogmatic theology becomes

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14 Concilium 46 84. [Vécu and thématique are there by sense, not verbatim.]
15 Concilium 46 9.
16 Concilium 46 15.
17 Concilium 46 15-16.
18 Concilium 46 19.
hermeneutical," that is, derives its basic terms from immediate human experience. With others, however, he finds, if not dangers, yet an excessive abstractness in Rahner’s emphasis on an anthropocentric theology, and devotes considerable space to the views of Johannes Metz and Jürgen Moltmann on eschatology as the key to the integration of theology in human historical process.

Rahner and Panikkar

While Rahner’s anthropocentrism (which goes back to the 1940s) comes up for criticism in volume forty-six of Concilium, Rahner himself is off on quite a different tack. His topic is theological pluralism. For two theologies to be contradictory, they have to share to some extent a common universe of discourse. Otherwise, the putative contradiction would be merely a misunderstanding. For propositions to be contradictory they must employ the same terms and attribute to them the same meaning. But it is just these identities that tend to be lacking in the modern world. As Rahner puts it: “We are encountering basic positions, held by alien theologians, which do not spring from a shared horizon of fundamental understanding and which do not directly contradict our own theology. The disparity is not clear-cut, so that we cannot tackle it directly. In such cases we cannot adopt a clear yes or no toward the other side.”

He does not hesitate to illustrate his point from his own Germanic world. He asks: “Who among us can say for sure whether the basic conception of Barth’s doctrine of justification is Catholic or not? If someone feels that he can, I would like to shake his hand. But where do we go, when we cannot even do that?

“Who can say for sure that the ultimate root positions of Rudolf Bultmann are really un-Catholic? Who can say that the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the postulates of the Bultmann school actually

19 Concilium 46.
20 Concilium 46 21.
21 Concilium 46 23-25.
22 Concilium 46 109. [In the 1973 lecture, on beginning this paragraph, at “Rahner’s anthropocentrism,” Lonergan interpolated the remark, “Really it is an identification of theocentrism and anthropocentrism.”]
Lonergan: Fundamental Theology

undercut his real intention and are unacceptable to Catholics, whether the Bultmann school realizes it or not? What do we do if we are not in a position to form some clear and responsible stance toward the other positions that confront us?"23

Rahner gives further examples from within Catholic thought, but what he is up to is plain enough. Any science, any academic enterprise is the work of a group, of a scientific or academic community. For the work to prosper the conditions for its possibility must be fulfilled. What Rahner is observing is that their medieval heritage had given Roman Catholic theologians a common and to some extent unambiguous language. There did exist different schools of thought, but the schools were of ancient lineage, and each had a fair notion of the ambiguities endemic in other positions. But Scholasticism and Neoscholasticism had long been inadequate to modern needs, and their influence simply evaporated with Vatican II. Thereby, the Roman Catholic theologian and, no less, the teaching office of the church, the magisterium, are confronted with basic, foundational problems that hitherto they were able to neglect. A solution will have to be ongoing, dynamic and not static, for human knowledge is a process of development. It will have to be securely anchored in history; otherwise it will be irrelevant to a historical religion. It will have to have criteria for distinguishing between genuine development and mere aberration.

Raymond Panikkar is, if anything, more radical than Rahner. He argues that if "... fundamental theology is to have any relevance at all in our time of world communication, it has to make sense to those outside the cultural area of the Western world and, incidentally, also to those within it who no longer think, imagine, and act according to the paradigms of traditional fundamental theology."24 Again, he urges: "The real challenge to Christian faith today comes from within — i.e., from its own exigency of universality ... The Christian faith will either accept this challenge or declare its particular allegiance to a single culture and thus renounce its claim of being the carrier of a universally acceptable message,

23Concilium 46 109.
24Concilium 46 46.
which does not destroy any positive value." He finds that acceptance of the Christian message is blocked, not by its religious or theological content, but by its philosophic or cultural accretions. "The Buddhist would like to believe in the whole message of Christ, and he sincerely thinks that he could accept it and even understand it better if it could be purified from what he considers to be its theistic superstructure. The Hindu will wonder why he has to join a physical and cultural community simply because of his belief in the divinity of Christ and in his resurrection. The 'death of God' theologian, or whatever name we may choose for him, will say that it is precisely because Christ is the Savior that he can dispense with any conception of a transcendent God or a physical miracle."

The solution envisaged by Panikkar is notably clear though not notably precise. It is not any set of epistemological or ontological presuppositions that once more would tie theology to some philosophic kite. Fundamental theology is to be fundamentally theology. Its immense difficulty is that it is to be an Exodus theology, a theological justification of a theological as well as a religious pluralism. It would show "... that the Christian message may become meaningful in any authentic human attitude and genuine philosophical position, of proving that the Christian kerygma is not in principle tied down to any particular philosophical system or cultural scheme, or even to any particular religious tradition. Its role is to explain, for instance, not simply that the acceptance of the existence of God is a necessary prerequisite to understand and accept the Christian faith, if this is existentially given, the Christian proclamation could look for a justification and a meaning."

The source of the solution is a pluritheological dialogue. It is not to be assumed that there must be a kind of objectifiable common ground or certain universally formulable common statements. The plea is for a really

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25 Concilium 46 46.
26 Concilium 46 49.
27 Concilium 46 47-48.
28 Concilium 46 51.
29 Concilium 46 52-53.
open dialogue, one in which its meeting ground may first have to be created, one in which the very intermingling of religious currents, ideas, and beliefs may release a more powerful stream of light, service, understanding. There are to be no rules of the game laid out in advance. Fundamental theology becomes lived religion. It becomes mystical faith because it is previous to and beyond any formulation. It is the religious quest for a ground of understanding, for a common concern, which has to be lived, delimited, verbalized.

**SUMMARY**

By way of a concluding summary one may place generically and specifically the fundamental theology that once was traditional and now is widely rejected. Generically it was a logically ordered set of propositions. Specifically it was worked out in the context of a distinction and a separation: the distinction was the medieval distinction between nature and grace; the separation was the Cartesian reinforcement of the medieval distinction between philosophy and theology.

The logical operations were in a cumulative series. A first topic was the existence and attributes of God: it was considered philosophic and named a natural theology. A second topic was ethical: it established man’s duty of worshiping God. A third topic was the true religion, and there it was argued that Jesus Christ was God’s plenipotentiary in this matter. A fourth topic was the true church: it examined the divisions within Christianity and determined which was the true church and what were its legitimate claims. With this concluded, the rest of theology had its foundation: for the true church demanded acceptance of all it believed and taught; and it was equipped to settle any further issues of moment that might arise.

In its day this procedure was well adapted to the tactic of entering through another’s door and coming out one’s own. One entered the rationalist door of abstract right reason and one came out in the all but palpable embrace of authoritarian religion. But in the course of time it

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30 *Concilium* 46:52.
31 *Concilium* 46:54.
came to pass that the rationalist door led nowhere. Authoritarian religion rode on, but it did so not as a logical conclusion but as a concrete community with a long and complicated history. There still was process but now it was, not from premises to conclusions, but from the original mustard seed to the large and conspicuously different tree. There still were cognitional operations, but now they terminated in the responsibility and freedom of total commitment.

Such has been the shift to the human subject, *die anthropologische Wende*, explored by Bouillard, Fries, Geffré, Walgrave. Such also is the historical process, that breaks the bounds of some single universe of discourse, and scatters in Rahner's manifold of disparate yet not totally dissimilar modes of speech and thought. Such, to an undisclosed extent, may be the working of the one Spirit of God in diverse cultures and traditions to ground Panikkar's metatheology.

If I have been stressing differences between the Catholic present and past, I must stress equally that the past in question is a relatively recent past. There was a late Scholasticism that took over and expanded the mistakes in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Its tendencies, which were widely influential, were extended by the controversies of the sixteenth century and by the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Such I should say were the antecedents of traditional fundamental theology. But there also was an earlier and more celebrated Scholasticism. Its aim was not to demonstrate but to understand. It brought together and classified the data of Scripture and tradition. It sought to reconcile discrepancies. It partly adopted and partly adapted a terminology, a single, coherent *Begrifflichkeit*, from the Aristotelian corpus. In this technical terminology it aimed to express a motivated clarification and orderly synthesis of the often seemingly opposed doctrines contained in its sources.

This procedure was a commonly understood and accepted if not explicitly formulated method. Its cumulative and progressive character can be seen in the succession of commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences*. If, for example, one compares the questions and articles of Aquinas with the corresponding passages in the Lombard, one can understand the manifest differences of thought and expression only
through the theological development that occurred in the intervening century.

But though it was methodical, this work had a basic defect. It was not informed by historical consciousness, and so it projected, as it were, on a flat surface without the perspectives of time and change what can properly be apprehended only as the successive strata of an ongoing process.

Contemporary Catholic theology, then, is rightly new inasmuch as it makes its own all that is to be learned from modern conceptions and techniques of science, of interpretation, of history. But I believe that all this can be achieved without any repudiation of what is valid in the Catholic past. Indeed, as my own various writings will show, it can be done in a style and with a content that has a basic isomorphism22 with the thought of Aquinas. So in this year, in which the seventh centenary of his death is celebrated, you will, I trust, permit me to end tonight’s paper with this brief tribute to his name.

APPENDIX: ORIGINAL CONCLUSION, 1973

By way of a concluding summary, one may locate the traditional fundamental theology, so widely rejected at the present time, as logically ordered operations on propositions within the context of a medieval distinction between nature and grace and a Cartesian separation of philosophy and theology.

Within this context a first task was to establish the existence and attributes of God and, as this lay within the realm of human nature, it was termed a natural theology. The second task was ethical; it established man’s duty of worshiping God, and the relevant arguments were assembled in a treatise on religion. A third task envisaged the multiplicity of religions, raised the question of the true religion, and undertook to show that Jesus the Christ was God’s plenipotentiary in this matter. A fourth task confronted the divisions within the multitude of Christians and set about determining which was the true church and what were its claims. Finally, since the true church claimed complete submission and obedience,

a foundation in principle had been found for the solution of every other theological question.

The hollowness of such a scheme became painfully obvious in an age when logic was no more than a subordinate tool within the larger framework of method, and when the biblical movement, personalism, phenomenology, and existential concern moved attention on the European continent from words to their real antecedents in operations and attitudes.

The scattering of views I have illustrated may, perhaps, be given some unity by referring to my Method in Theology. The preverbal and, indeed, preconceptual foundation of theology proposed by Panikkar [intends to be a corunon starting point. Insofar as one starts from it and moves towards Christ, it] corresponds to the foundational reality in chapter eleven of Method, a reality conceived by Christians in terms of St Paul’s statement: “God’s love has flooded our inmost hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us” (Romans 5.5).

For Rahner’s puzzlement over the swarm of disparate theologies that resist precise classification and so escape theological judgment, we may offer a set of larger containers, namely, the ordered multiplicity of differentiations of consciousness and their diversification by the presence or absence of religious, moral, or intellectual conversion. Such broad genetic differences can serve to mark off frontiers that contain conceptually disparate views.

Finally, the views of Bouillard, Fries, Geffré, Walgrave form a separate class. They do not single out some preverbal and preconceptual foundation with Panikkar, and they do not stress with Rahner the disparateness of the views they discuss. Nonetheless, their existential concern both relates them implicitly to Panikkar’s emphasis and, at the same time, enables their argument to be relevant to the disparate positions to which Rahner draws attention.
FOR THE PAST twenty years or so, some American philosophers of religion have endeavored to specify what they consider a legitimate use of words taken from sense and perception and transferred to religious knowledge. For instance, William Wainwright has recourse to a plain and simple perceptualist model and tries to justify its applicability to mysticism.1 Or William Alston offers an elaboration of his own epistemological views and argues that experiential presentations of God amount to perceiving God.2

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the young Friedrich Schleiermacher3 knew full well that the theologian he wanted to be could


not afford ignoring the decisive role of epistemology in any philosophical account of religion or mysticism. His engagement with Kant's thought had begun as early as 1785, at the Moravian seminary in Barby. In 1799 he gained notoriety thanks to his *Speeches on Religion*, couched in a Romantic language, the rhetorical style of which did not permit their author to pay much attention to their epistemological implications. But he could not remain satisfied with this achievement. He resolved to clarify his own philosophy, partly because he realized its impingement on his theology and partly in order to justify his divergences from Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Jacobi.

He did so mostly by translating and introducing Plato's dialogues, and by lecturing on what he called dialectic. Over the years 1799-1804, his work on the dialogues allowed him to appropriate Platonic thought. From 1811 until 1831, in his lectures on dialectic, completed by the Introduction he wrote in 1833, he formulated his own philosophical position, which amalgamates components drawn from disparate authors such as Plato and those mentioned above. The genre of those lectures consists of notes — his and his students' — often illuminating, yet sometimes too concise and lacking proper transitions. This sketchy eclecticism may account for the fact that by and large philosophers have not been

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4In the first edition of the *Speeches* he speaks of Religion, whereas in the second and third edition of the *Speeches* and in both editions of *The Christian Faith* he generally prefers the German word *Frömmigkeit*, 'piety.' Sometimes he mentions mysticism in a negative way, for instance in 1821, 49 (where it amounts to pseudo-science) or in D 1822, 308-309 (where the theosophy of Jakob Böhme is found lacking because it ignores the historical). But one also finds a positive usage, as in a letter where Schleiermacher talks of his schooling among the Moravian Brethren: "Here first developed that basic mystical tendency that saved me, and supported me during all the storms of doubt. Then it only germinated, now it is full grown and I have again become a Moravian, only of a higher order." This passage is quoted by Crouter, 1799, 79, n. 5.

5I am not including Hegel. To my knowledge, Schleiermacher simply ignored him, while Hegel, who was more concerned to refute Jacobi, merely alluded to his Berlin opponent in short, disparaging remarks. I therefore agree with the following assessment of their mutual suspicion: "these two great figures are like ships passing at night, never really establishing contact." This is a fair statement made by Peter C. Hodgson, editor, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) vol. I 280, n. 37.

6See Schleiermacher's *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, trans. William Dobson (New York: Arno, 1973); unfortunately a few of these introductions were lost and the project of translating Plato into German remained incomplete.
interested in his *Dialektik*, while only recently have theologians researched more than his theological writings.\(^7\)

Leaving aside his views on ethics, hermeneutics, and other branches of philosophy, I shall attempt to sort out the various epistemological elements that he incorporates in the *Speeches*, in *The Christian Faith* (also called the *Glaubenslehre*), and in the *Dialektik*. Since he seems to balance, in an uneasy manner, Platonic, Kantian, and perceptualist views, this article will successively investigate the Platonic, Kantian, and perceptualist constituents of Schleiermacher's epistemology. To conclude, the epistemology of Bernard Lonergan will serve to canvass more completely the field that Schleiermacher set out to explore.

**Is Schleiermacher a Platonist?**

Christian Berner has documented how Schleiermacher's philosophical outlook was influenced by Plato.\(^8\) For example, in his notes (*Notizheft*) on the *Dialektik*, he equates the Good of *The Republic*, Book VI with what he calls the Absolute, from which science and truth derive (D 1811, p. 66, [28.]). He also accepts Plato's suggestion that the human spirit is fitted out with innate ideas (*angeborenen Begriffen*) (D 1814, I, §176.4). Furthermore, from H.-G. Gadamer, we learn that Schleiermacher praises Plato for having pointed to the ground of all forms of knowledge.\(^9\) However, Schleiermacher qualifies this Platonic doctrine by insisting that such concepts are evolved (*entwickeln sich*) only "on the occasion of an organic affection" (*auf Veranlassung der organischen Affection*, §177). We notice here not a pure, but a Kantian Platonism. Therefore Schleiermacher is truthful when, in a letter written in 1800, he "disavows being a Platonist in the sense of taking up the entire ethos of his philosophy" (Crouter, 1799:28).

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\(^7\) A distinguished contemporary editor of the *Dialektik* remarks that philosophers have not considered this work to be original thinking and that only theologians have discussed Schleiermacher's philosophical views (mostly from the angle of the *Glaubenslehre*). See Schleiermacher, D 1814, *Einleitung von Andreas Arndt* xi-xii.


Nonetheless, in a very helpful article, basing his diagnosis on quite a few significant indications found in the *Glaubenslehre*, Charles Hefling rightly comes to the conclusion that for Schleiermacher knowing consists in a confrontation between subject and object.\(^{10}\) His standpoint is indeed traceable to Plato's view of knowledge as inner looking. More precisely, the parts of his metaphysics and epistemology that Hefling scrutinizes are sometimes Platonic and sometimes Kantian, with an admixture of perceptualism (which we can also observe in Kant himself).

Our assessment of Schleiermacher as a Platonist will depend on how we answer the following question: Is Schleiermacher in control of, or controlled by that Platonic model of knowledge? One can utilize a metaphor without accepting disastrous epistemological consequences that would follow only from unguarded projections based on some natural implications of that metaphor (for instance, the analogy from physical to spiritual contact with an object). Thus a critical realist like Thomas Aquinas, pondering Aristotle's exploration of the soul and taking account of his self-awareness as a knower, spells out the exact differences and relations between sensing, perceiving, understanding, and judging, and therefore can afford using — while not being duped by — verbs such as *sentire* (sensing), *percipere* (perceiving) and *videre* (seeing) to characterize spiritual acts. In so doing, he simply remains in the long-standing patristic tradition of the spiritual senses, which he supplements with a more systematic epistemology.\(^{11}\)

The intellectual situation of Schleiermacher's time appears to be very different. He is definitely a child of the Romantic age in his extolling imagination at the expense of intellect:

> belief in God depends on the direction of the imagination. You will know that imagination is the highest and most original element in us, and that everything besides it is merely reflection upon it; you will know that it is your imagination that creates the world for you,

\(^{10}\)See Charles C. Hefling, Jr., "The Meaning of God Incarnate according to Friedrich Schleiermacher; or, Whether Lonergan is Appropriately Regarded as 'A Schleiermacher for Our Time,' and Why Not," in *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 7, ed. Fred Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988) 105-177, esp. 99-12, 153-173.

\(^{11}\)More on this in Louis Roy, 'Wainwright, Maritain, and Aquinas on Transcendent Experiences,' 661-664 and 670.
and that you can have no God without the world (1799:138; see n. 54).

The 1821 version of the same passage calls the imagination "the highest and most original faculty in man" (98).

Along with the imagination, its act, called Anschauung, 'intuition,' is also central for Schleiermacher. We shall come back to the significance of intuition in our third section, when it will be linked with perception. Meanwhile, what must be noticed is that Schleiermacher's Anschauung consists in an intellectual seeing. Terrence Tice notes that it literally means a 'looking at.'12 After having detailed the recurrence of 'intuition' in the Speeches, Marianna Simon concludes: "l'intuition, conformément à ce qu'exprime le terme lui-même d'Anschauung, est, pour Schleiermacher, essentiellement une vision."13

Indeed, perusing Schleiermacher's and his commentators' writings suggests that he submits to the ocular metaphor as descriptive of human knowing because he operates with an epistemology that does not rest on an adequate cognitional theory.14 As Hefling points out, Schleiermacher assumes that the key to self-knowledge can readily be found in some 'introspection' (Selbstbeobachtung, 'self-observation,' CF, §4.1). Besides, he does not control another metaphor: knowing as perceiving. In our third section, we shall address this epistemological model, which is more frequent and influential in his works than the ocular one. Meanwhile, let us highlight some Kantian features of his philosophy.

IS SCHLEIERMACHER A KANTIAN?

In his Introduction to Schleiermacher's 1799 edition of the Speeches, Richard Crouter documents Schleiermacher's 'critical encounter with


Kant's moral and religious philosophy' (1799:19; see "From Kant to Romanticism," 18-39). For several years he struggled with Kant's thought and little by little developed a metaphysics of his own which deliberately incorporated idealist and realist elements. He did so in the hope that the idealist and the realist elements would correct and reinforce each other. We shall see, however, that he did not decisively challenge the Kantian assumptions that he endeavored to attenuate.

In his effort at transforming Kant's idealism Schleiermacher adopts a Neoplatonic scheme, mediated to him through Schelling. It consists of the duality Being/manifestation (Wesen/Erscheinung), in which we observe a descending movement, proceeding from Being, which is the One that necessarily manifests itself in the multifaceted world. The similar overall scheme of Schleiermacher's Dialektik, which John Thiel unfolds with great clarity, presents us with a spectrum, the two poles of which are the 'ideal' and the 'real.' This polarity is posited as a starting-point. The ideal is on the side of reason and the real on the side of the senses. Dialectic grounds and encompasses both ethics, which relies more on reason, and physics, which relies more on the senses. Nevertheless, the transcendental and the empirical always stand in need of each other.

A definite epistemological-metaphysical agenda propels the whole quest of the Dialektik. Its "fundamental problem," as Thiel remarks, is "the determination of what thinking may be considered knowing." Part I, entitled 'transcendental,' attempts to justify the "presupposition of a transcendent ground of agreement between thinking and being." Part II, alternately called 'formal' or 'technical,' establishes the rules governing the philosophical process.

We find in Schleiermacher two positions of which Kant would have disapproved. First, because it has to do not only with knowing but also with being, the 'ideal' pole is not only transcendental, but also trans-

15According to Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), between 1806 and 1811 his thought stood very close to Schelling's philosophy of identity (102); however, from 1811 to 1814, his thinking changed and he saw the source of truth "not in us but above us" (153).

16John E. Thiel, God and World in Schleiermacher's 'Dialektik' and 'Glaubenslehre' (Bern: Lang, 1981) chs. 1 & 3. See also Berner, La philosophie de Schleiermacher ch. 3.

17Thiel, God and World 19.
cendent since it amounts to the divine ground of human knowledge. He writes: "the deity as transcendent being is the principle of all being and as transcendent idea is the formal principle of all knowing" (D 1811, §23.3; see §15.3).

Second, Schleiermacher wants to correct Kant concerning regulative and constitutive principles. The principles of his dialectic are at once regulative and constitutive (D 1811, §2 and §43). On the one hand, as regulative they guide our knowing processes. On the other hand, the idea of God or of the Absolute is constitutive, albeit only in the weak sense that it underpins our striving toward being (D 1811, §44, and D 1814, §229.1).

Notwithstanding these departures from the metaphysics of the Königsberg master, Schleiermacher's outline does not deviate that much from Kantian epistemology. As Hefling correctly remarks, "he follows Kant in regarding concepts as prior to understanding, understanding as a matter of combining concepts with percepts, and perception as the basic and confrontational relation between the subject as knower and objects as to be known." To address the problem created by this confrontational relation, the Dialektik proposes to ground the correspondence between knowing and being, first in an intersubjective agreement among thinkers based on the 'ideal' side, and second in an objective agreement based on the 'real' side. The ideal side deploys a rational activity (Vernunftthätigkeit) that must work in tandem with the real side, the activity that organizes the materials of sense (Thätigkeit der Organisation, D 1814, I, §108-109).

Truth is conceived as the result of an interpenetration (Durchdringung) between the speculative and the empirical knowing— an interpenetration that, if perfect, would be the pure intuition (die reine

18See D 1814, index, 'Transzendentales,' for evidence that transzendentales and transzendentes characterize the same ideal pole. For this observation, I am indebted to Berner, La philosophie de Schleiermacher 109-110.

19Hefling, "The Meaning of God Incarnate" 172. In The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self (Albany: SUNY, 1995), Thandeka accepts Kant's and Schleiermacher's assumption that at the outset a wedge must be driven between human thought and the real (on p. 68, she mistakenly writes that being (Sein) is "[t]he chaotic totality of sensible impressions"; this is Schleiermacher's definition of the real, not of being, which encompasses both the ideal and the real; see D 1811, §27 & D 1814, I, §132). She thinks that in order to solve the problem Schleiermacher has recourse to the embodiment of the self in the organic world. But this 'solution' is irremediably flawed, since it in no way questions the initial assumption.
Anschauung, D 1822, §47). The ‘real’ is somehow apprehended and given ontological status before human insights and judgments take place. This extroversive picturing of reality may explain his remark that “it [Knowing] only becomes real by a passing-beyond-self of the subject, and in this sense it is a Doing” (CF, §3.3). Since the ‘real’ is assumed to lie at the empirical pole, Schleiermacher construes the epistemological problem as “the overcoming of the opposition between speculation and empirical knowing” (die Aufhebung des Gegensazes zwischen Speculation und empirischem Wissen). For him, however, this goal is never reached. The hiatus must be narrowed and yet it can never be closed: “real knowing is also something that is never to be brought fully into place” (D 1811, §40).

Judgment requires this interaction between a molding conceptualizing activity and the raw, irrational manifold provided and organized by the senses. Rather than being a matter of reflective understanding (in Lonergan’s sense), reason’s role amounts to nothing more than a slight enhancement of conceptualization. A judgment is an assertion that completes the otherwise empty, general concept by filling it with organic, individual materials (D 1814, I, §118) and thus rendering the concept determined as a form of knowing (als Wissen fixirt werden, §142). On the one hand, judgment makes concept more concrete by showing how it is exemplified in various instances: we obtain difference while maintaining identity. On the other hand, concept enriches judgment by subsuming the experiential content under categories (§141 and 143). To perform its reduced function, judgment employs the Kantian ‘Schema,’ which brings together a concept and an image ‘in an oscillating process’ (im oscillirenden Verfahren, D 1814, II, §31).

Given this weak account of judgment, Schleiermacher’s attempt at being a realist remains hampered by the shackles of idealism. As Thiel explains,


21Berner (La philosophie de Schleiermacher 112, n. 3) points out that Schleiermacher’s distinction between understanding and reason is less clear than Kant’s (see also the section ‘Le schématisme,’ 139-150). On concept and judgment, see Thandeka, The Embodied Self 73-76.
Schleiermacher constantly emphasizes the relativity of all thinking and knowing. Both are radically subject to the limitations of the finite. Even though knowing, as opposed to thinking, is founded on agreement between thinking and being, this agreement does not elevate knowing to the level of the unconditioned. In other words, knowing itself cannot furnish the ground of agreement between thinking and being, and is not, therefore, self-validating. Only the presupposed absolute, transcendent unity of thinking and being can serve as such a ground.22

The pole of unity, which is asymptotically presupposed, cannot enable human knowers to reach finite truth as unconditioned. The word 'relativity,' used by Thiel, would be perfectly acceptable if it meant simply that one's perspective can be improved, for instance in a dialogue with texts. Schleiermacher describes such a dialogue in his Hermeneutik, which discusses the difficulties and rules of a self-correcting process of reading.23

In the Dialektik, however, the relativity amounts to 'the polar relationship between the ideal and the real.'24 For Schleiermacher finite thinking must try to keep the two poles in some kind of equilibrium. Yet relative thinking will never manage to overcome the asymptotic character of the polarity. Short of 'absolute' or 'infinite judgment,' which ought to embrace 'the totality of what is finite' (D 1811, §46), one remains unable to grasp and assert any form of truth as virtually unconditioned. We can only approximate to correct judgment because, as a commentator puts it, "the truth claim of a judgment cannot be satisfactorily substantiated until the whole system of thought is completely set up."25

Typically Kantian also is his premise that, at each end of the graduated scale, both the 'ideal' and the 'real' are unknowable (since nothing is known except what comes from perception and has been shaped by

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22Thiel, God and World 26; the author's italics.

23Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, ed. Heinz Kimmerle and trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986) esp. 149 and 164, where it is correctly said that the goal of perfect interpretation can only be approximated.

24Thiel, God and World 27.

25Richard B. Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge (New York: Harper, 1941) 204. The author also perspicuously notes that Schleiermacher pays lip service to the correspondence theory of truth, but that his criteria stem from a coherence theory of truth (203): further evidence that he wants to be a realist as well as an idealist.
conceptualization). They are the two basic constituents of a logical construction, in which God is situated on the side of the 'ideal.' What is called 'God' (the absolute unity) amounts to the uppermost limit of the continuum, while 'matter' (the chaotic manifold) amounts to the lowermost. Thus Schleiermacher can state:

There is no such thing as an isolated perception of deity. Rather, we perceive the deity only in and with the collective system of perception. The deity is just as surely incomprehensible as the knowledge of it is the basis of all knowledge. Exactly the same is true also on the side of feeling (D 1811, §17).

Here in the Dialektik the divine plays a transcendent role, whereas in the Glaubenslehre it plays an experiential role as the source of religious feeling. To a certain extent Kant could accommodate the transcendent role, but never the experiential role of the deity.

Accordingly, regarding our knowledge of God The Christian Faith offers us two contradictory assertions. The first is staunchly Kantian:

any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely excluded, because anything that is outwardly given must be given as an object exposed to our counter-influence, however slight this may be. The transference of the idea of God to any perceptible object, unless one is all the time conscious that it is a piece of purely arbitrary symbolism, is always a corruption, whether it be a temporary transference, i.e. a theophany, or a constitutive transference, in which God is represented as permanently a particular perceptible existence (§4.4).

In the same paragraph, Schleiermacher’s second assertion departs from Kant:

God is given to us in feeling in an original (ursprüngliche) way; and if we speak of an original revelation of God to man or in man, the meaning will always be just this, that, along with the absolute dependence which characterizes not only man but all temporal existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God.

On the one hand, then, the author accepts Kant’s stricture against reducing God to a particular object that could be perceived. On the other hand, when he speaks of a 'consciousness of God,' he trespasses the
bounds that Kant assigns to human knowledge. In the first sense, God cannot be given; in the second, God can be given. Schleiermacher uses the word ‘given’ in two different senses: the first sense is the strict, univocal one attached to sensory perception; the second is based on the analogy of perception, which he does not handle properly, as we shall find out in our next two sections.

IS SCHLEIERMACHER A PERCEPTUALIST?

We have seen some elements that Schleiermacher takes from Plato and Kant, as he develops his epistemology. What remains to be factored into the rounded picture is what he draws from the perceptualism that readily becomes normative for many philosophers, even though it actually is a counterposition. This section will undertake to show that in his Speeches Scheliermacher frequently uses a perceptual-tactual model, but that in the 1820s he distances himself from it and yet never quite replaces it with an adequate cognitional theory. We shall examine his vocabulary, particularly his use of ‘feeling,’ ‘intuition,’ ‘perception,’ ‘determination,’ and ‘influence.’

In the Speeches feeling is inseparable from intuition, whereas in The Christian Faith it stands by itself as the sole defining characteristic of piety.26 Before asking ourselves what is the significance of this change, let us scrutinize the relationship between feeling and intuition as the first edition of the Speeches presents it. Schleiermacher writes: “Religion’s essence is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling” (1799:102). In ‘intuition’ (Anschauung), there is an element of receptivity, which is suggested by the alternative phrasing, “religion is the sensibility (Sinn) and taste for the infinite” (103). What Schleiermacher claims to be “the highest and most universal formula of religion,” namely, “intuition of the universe” (104), carries an implication of directness which he will drop in his later works. Here the universe as an immeasurable whole — “the infinite nature of totality, the one and all” (102) — is the object of a global intuition.

Fortunately, even at this early phase a qualification is introduced: by being situated within a movement of desire, the range of the intuition is projected further ahead and thus the intuited object seems to become less directly attained. Schleiermacher speaks of "the desire to intuit the infinite" (103); he writes that "religion wishes to see the infinite." Or again, in a sentence that also asserts its receptive side, he states: "It wishes to intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe's own manifestations and actions, longs to be grasped and filled by the universe's immediate influences in childlike passivity" (102).

If we notice this connotation of 'immediate influences' on the part of the universe, we shall not be surprised to find out that 'intuition' takes on the same meaning as 'perception' (Wahrnehmung). As he mentions the fact that phenomena affect our senses, Schleiermacher casually employs the verbs 'to intuit' and 'to perceive' (anschauen, wahrnehmen) as synonyms: "what you thus intuit and perceive is not the nature of things, but their action upon you" (104-105). The same identification recurs a couple of paragraphs later, where 'intuition' equals 'immediate perception' (105). This meaning is transposed into religion: "The same is true of religion. The universe exists in uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us every moment." But how does our receiving of this activity become a religious experience? By seeing every element as belonging in the infinite universe. "Thus to accept everything individual as a part of the whole and everything limited as a representation of the infinite is religion" (105).

A few pages further down in the same Speech (112-114), Schleiermacher sorts out two stages of human consciousness in which perception and feeling are present. In the first stage, they are one, because they are undifferentiated. He finds an instance of that unity in the Aristotelian doctrine (Aristotle, however, is not mentioned) of the identity between sense and the sensed: "That first mysterious moment that occurs in every sensory perception, before intuition and feeling have separated, where sense and its objects have, as it were, flowed into one another and become one ..." (112). In the second stage, which is reflection, a distinction can be made between 'an image of an object' and 'a transient feeling' (112), or between 'intuitions of the world and formulas that are supposed to express them' and 'feelings and inner experiences' (114). But here, in this
first edition, there is little phenomenological analysis, although its rhetorical description helpfully evokes a unitary experience.

The third edition offers more precision. In the reflecting stage, where the object and sense are separate, the duality is expressed in the following way: On the one hand, “the object rent from sense is a perception”; on the other hand, “you — rent from the object — are for yourselves a feeling” (1821:43; for the sake of clarity I have modified the punctuation of the English translation). The two basic terms are ‘perception’ (with ‘intuition’ as a synonym), which designates the apprehension of what comes from outside, and ‘feeling,’ which becomes more clearly a matter of self-consciousness. Immediately afterward, in the tripartite schema of knowledge, morality, and religion, ‘perception’ characterizes knowledge, ‘activity’ characterizes morality, and ‘feeling’ characterizes religion (44-45). Their respective operations are: ‘perceptions,’ ‘works,’ and ‘sensations’ (46).

In this third edition also, Schleiermacher slightly alters a key phrase, one which we have already quoted, which he now renders, “true religion is sense and taste for the Infinite” (39). In his Explanations, he calls attention to the change: “In the former editions, sensibility and taste stood not quite correctly for sense and taste for the Infinite.” He wants to distance himself from the metaphor of perception: “Sense may be capacity of perception (Wahrnehmungsvermögen) or capacity of sensibility (Empfindungsvermögen). There it is the latter” (103, n. 2). For him, strictly speaking we cannot perceive the Infinite, but we perceive finite things, and such a perception is a stepping stone required by the religious sense.

Thus we can mark a recasting of ‘intuition-perception,’ which no longer stands at the center of religious experience, but merely exercises a function in worldly experience. Crouter notes that this reconsideration begins with the second edition: “The 1806 formulation aligns intuition (Anschauung) with science rather than with religion as in 1799” (1799:103, n. 9). This realignment is confirmed in the 1821 edition, where Schleiermacher writes: “True science is complete intuition” (quoted from Crouter’s Introduction, 1799:61-62, in which Crouter makes the realignment clearer by substituting ‘intuition’ for Oman’s ‘vision’ as the English rendering of Anschauung; see 1799:62, n. 99, and 1821:39).
Equally interesting is the presence, in 1806, of the definition of religion as "immediate perception of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite" (see Crouter, 1799:62), which becomes, in 1821, "the immediate consciousness (Bewusstsein) of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite" (1821:36). Indeed, by restricting perception to the realm of ordinary knowledge, Schleiermacher is hinting at a richer apprehension of human consciousness. In The Christian Faith, where such a richer apprehension is fully expounded, 'perception' is finally disavowed: it has been demoted from the status of religious 'feeling,' since it merely belongs to the realm of objective consciousness (§3.2, Note).

Another important word is Bestimmtheit. It is usually translated as 'determination' or 'modification,' but it might be better rendered as 'determinedness' or 'distinctness.' Already in the first edition of the Speeches, such a determination is adumbrated. To explain the fact that "every intuition is, by its very nature, connected with a feeling," Schleiermacher adds:

> Your senses mediate the connection between the object and yourselves; the same influence of the object, which reveals its existence to you, must stimulate them in various ways and produce a change in your inner consciousness (1799:109).

Thanks to sensory perception, the object brings about a change of consciousness which is a modification of feeling. Analogically, §3 of The Christian Faith blocks out a definition of piety as "a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness."

Bestimmtheit goes along with the pair perception/feeling. In the 1821 edition of the Speeches, for example, Schleiermacher speaks of "perceptions and feelings belonging to other modifications of religion" (54). The change called 'determination' requires a cause, namely, 'a determinant' (ein

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28 Bestimmtheit des Gefühls is translated as 'distinctness of feeling' by Thandeka, The Embodied Self 119, n. 1.
Bestimmendes). Such a determinant can be mundane and finite, when limited to sensible perception: “any such sensible determination of the self-consciousness points back to a determinant outside of the self-consciousness” (CF, §30.1). Or it can be nonmundane and infinite, as in the feeling of absolute dependence: “God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant (das Mitbestimmende) in this feeling and to which we trace our being in such a state” (§4.4).

The last word that must be highlighted is ‘influence,’ or ‘action.’ In The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher distinguishes between the content of the object and its ‘influence’ (Einwirkung), between the object as known and the object as affecting us (§4.3). Obviously he wants to concentrate on the latter. The directness of the Einwirkung is stressed even in the case of the divine influence, as Schleiermacher states that “the expression of that feeling [of absolute dependence] posits the action (das darin wirksame) of the very same thing which is expressed in their original idea [of the Supreme Being]” (§5, Postscript). In §46.1, the verb einwirken is repeatedly matched with erregen, ‘to stimulate’ as a synonym. And §59.1 speaks of “the stimulating influences (die reizenden Einwirkungen) of the world upon the spirit.”

We find the same vocabulary in the third edition of the Speeches. “What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is not the nature of things, but their operation upon us” (1821:48). Or again: “Your feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you” (45). One must allow oneself “to be affected by the Infinite” (86). Although On Religion mentions ‘dependence’ (Abhängigkeit) only once (in the first edition, 1799:129, see n. 42; we do not have the equivalent of this passage in the third edition), the Speeches already link up the theme of an external influence with our fundamental receptivity, as is made clear by the following remark: “every living, original movement in your life is first received” (43-44).

Those excerpts display Schleiermacher’s uneasy utilization of a perceptual-tactual model. For all his efforts at correcting and refining this model, he does not succeed to break loose out of it. So let us ask ourselves how a better cognitional theory might have helped him uncover neglected aspects of human knowing.
TOWARD A MORE ADEQUATE EPISTEMOLOGY

A twentieth-century disciple of Schleiermacher's, Georg Wobbermin, who has attempted to develop his master's theology, writes:

Schleiermacher conceives of the objective consciousness in the sense of perceptual objectivity. The discovery that there is also a non-perceptual comprehension of objects was made later. Schleiermacher does not reckon at all with any such process. He thought only of perceptual objectivity, more precisely, of the reflective processes of the mind in which it results.

It is from the model of perceptual objectivity that Schleiermacher wanted to characterize, by contrast, the kind of consciousness typical of religious feeling: "Hence he added the qualification 'immediate,' lest anyone be led to think of a self-consciousness which is more like an objective consciousness ..."²⁹

Schleiermacher's use of the perceptual metaphor is consistent with his modified Kantianism. For him, knowledge is obtained in accord with the two Kantian stages: first, the direct contact or impression that occurs in perceiving or intuiting; and second, objectification or conceptualization. However, realizing that religious experience is different from ordinary knowledge, he decides to characterize it not as objectification, since this stage is obviously at one remove from religious experience, but as perception. Not as sense perception, of course, but as another kind of perceiving, intuiting, being impressed, or being determined.

The weakness of this strategy resides the fact that his analogy — as well as Wobbermin's — is perceptual. Perception has the limitations of what Lonergan calls the first level of intentionality. Being the lowest component of human knowing, it cannot be fruitfully employed as the principal paradigm for religious analogy (although, as was pointed out in our first section, it can serve as a suggestive metaphor).

A careful reading of Schleiermacher's Dialektik and of his Glaubenslehre signals that three layers are present in his archeology of consciousness: first, reflective knowledge; second, consciousness

accompanying all our acts; and third, religious experience. Except in a few passages, he clearly distinguishes only the first layer from the two others, which he lumps together. Let us now present these layers and their elements, and recast them into the more adequate framework of Lonergan's intentionality analysis.

First, in our object-oriented knowledge, more is involved than perception and conceptualization. When the human mind intends the world, the results that it achieves are not, pace Kant and Schleiermacher, mere constructs like percepts and concepts; intentionality also reaches out to reality by inquiring, getting insights, verifying the status of its partial discoveries. Thanks to the understanding that triggers objectification, the series of interrelated concepts that ensue are much more than pale representations of things which would stand out in front of us. Through the operations of the second and third levels, we move beyond imaginative spatialization and we become reflectively one with what we grasp and affirm. In the attainment of truth, there is no dichotomy between subject and object, but rather a relation of both intentional identity and ontological distinction between them.

With respect to the second layer, Schleiermacher rightly asserts that we are capable of more than knowing what lies outside of us. He points to a consciousness that accompanies all our acts of knowing and doing and that is in itself prereflective and unobjectified. About it, he asks a very Aristotelian question:

Through our search for supreme principles, do we want first to posit ourselves as being in possession of something? We rather presuppose it as existing already and want simply to attain the consciousness of it; it exists in all our knowing but previously in an unconscious way and only under the form of activity; it is indeed something actually at work, but it is not also taken up into consciousness (D 1811, §5).

And in the following lecture, Schleiermacher avers: "in order to come to know one must nonetheless have some prior knowing of that knowing" (§6).

In the *Glaubenslehre* Schleiermacher returns to the importance of the prerellective 'I,' in which the transition between thinking and willing takes place and which constitutes the living unity of human consciousness (§3.4). He underlines the significance of this unobjectified self-consciousness which lies at the source of all our operations. It is not unlike what Aristotle writes about the ever abiding human wonder and about the desire for happiness (in both cases a permanent 'feeling' indeed, in Schleiermacher's sense of the word *Gefühl*). It could be compared to Thomas Aquinas's principles of understanding and of practical reason.

Schleiermacher does distinguish self-consciousness and self-knowledge. The former is prerellective, whereas the latter is a case of reflective knowledge. However, his account of self-knowledge does not take into consideration some indispensable acts of which we are conscious. These conscious acts are questioning, acquiring insights, making grounded judgments, loving in a way that is permeated with meaning and truth. Furthermore, as we saw in our examination of the first layer, his construal of objectification — which applies both to our knowledge of others and to our self-knowledge — leaves much to be desired. By contrast, in Lonergan's view, instead of being objectified by the mere imposition of concepts, such acts become known precisely as we find out how their various aspects are interconnected — a matter of insights followed by judgments.

Obviously important components are missing in Schleiermacher's cognitional theory. First, in terms of contents, his list of the items of which we are conscious is too brief; second, regarding the passage from self-consciousness to self-knowledge, the objectification is unwittingly shortchanged. We shall spell out presently the consequences of this incompleteness for his objectification of religious experience.

As far as the third layer is concerned, Schleiermacher correctly explains why immediate self-consciousness is not the outcome of finite causality and therefore is directly received in absolute dependence (CF, §4). But even so he fails to elaborate the critical-realistic epistemology in which this religious experience acquires its full significance. Far from totally escaping the realm of knowledge, absolute dependence and its 'whence' can be meaningfully and truly referred to in insights, judgments,
and propositions that, for all their purely analogical and negative character, are nevertheless intellectually more valid than he imagined.

Despite the richness of his observations on immediate self-consciousness and absolute dependence, Schleiermacher merely detects and hazily adumbrates what has been presented here as the second layer, namely, the kind of consciousness that accompanies all our acts and states on the four levels of intentionality. Because it stands half-way between the other two layers (reflective knowledge and religious experience), this consciousness is the key to a right assessment of the other two. It is not an awareness of — typical of perception — but a consciousness in — present in all our intentional activities. Schleiermacher realizes that this form of consciousness (so central for Lonergan) is not an awareness of. But failing a successful explication of the consciousness in, he cannot show all its import for a theology that would systematically relate its various aspects and apply them to issues such as the Trinity, the filial consciousness of Christ, the graced consciousness that believers can have.

Not having clarified the fourfold consciousness that accompanies our intentional states and activities, Schleiermacher must rest content with the Kantian representation of reflective knowledge in terms of perception completed by conceptualization, to which he adds prereflective consciousness. What he lacks is the broader sweep of a human intentionality asking questions for meaning, truth, and value. Apparently unaware of this larger context in which he should have situated religious experience, he contrasts the latter with reflective knowledge wrongly construed as perception-conceptualization. Furthermore, he interprets religious experience as another kind of perception, pronounced different from ordinary perception and yet too similar, in my estimation, since it is seen as an intuition.

Thus his analogy for our experience of God draws upon the lowest level of human intentionality, instead of being based on the highest level, where the paramount reality of intelligent loving can be elucidated. Undoubtedly Schleiermacher is convinced that religious consciousness amounts to much more than perception. He asserts that “the highest

degree of feeling is the religious one."32 Noteworthy also is the fact that he locates this religious feeling at the origin of both knowing and doing, that is to say, in the very ground of the soul. And yet he talks of that consciousness in terms that are typical of the first level of intentionality.

By contrast, when he ascribes religious consciousness to the fourth level, Lonergan makes it more distinctive. Far from being determined in the sense of being influenced or impressed in a quasi-tactile fashion, religious consciousness consists in a being-in-love whose specificity has been clarified by its having been preceded by the three levels that it sublates. Thus the basic religious feeling is not a special kind of perceptual-tactual experience, but a state of being-in-love that makes sense on the fourth level of intentionality because it fulfills it.

Is such consciousness of one’s immanent life also a religious consciousness? Both Schleiermacher and Lonergan answer yes to this question. However, the former too narrowly focuses on the transcendental unity of knowing and doing that is found in feeling, whereas the latter sets himself the arduous task of differentiating the consciousness that traverses all our states and activities, whether profane or religious. Moreover, Lonergan would agree, I think, with the twofold fact of our absolute dependence and the existence of a ‘Whence.’ But he would add that this ontological fact is not intuited in feeling, but asserted in a judgment, on the third level of intentionality.33 Only after having shown the truth of this fact can one relate our basic Gefühl with the metaphysical assertion itself. On the one hand, this feeling is in itself a particular kind of self-consciousness, a state of being unrestrictedly in love; on the other hand, it can be called ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ at the stage of reflection, where religious experience is mediated by thinking.

This position of Lonergan opens the way to a better assessment of the relations that obtain between prereflective experience and its objectification. Lonergan’s account of objectification allows us to realize not only its limitations — which are overstated by Schleiermacher — but also its validity. The reason is that objectification can be better appreciated within


33See Insight, CWL 3 ch. 19, “General Transcendent Knowledge.”
the complex process of asking questions regarding the prereflective, of coming to understand it, and of making true judgments about it. Thus absolute dependence is comprised of several aspects which are present in Schleiermacher's writings and yet hardly explicit and therefore uneasily related (when related at all): our collective dependence, as members of the universe, upon a first Cause; the dependence of all our knowing and doing upon feeling; the dependence of feeling upon a 'Whence'; our dependence upon a Savior for our basic feeling to be restored and harmoniously maintained.

An article by Lonergan enables us to make sense of that absolute dependence by way of metaphysical categories that are better suited than Schleiermacher's perceptual and tactual metaphors such as intuition, perception, determination, and influence, which were introduced in our preceding section. For Lonergary the fundamental relation of dependence on the part of a human person or of the world does not amount to the receiving of an influx that would be exerted by the Creator. Rather, it consists in the receiving of finite being, imparted by the Creator. Once in existence, secondary causes serve as his instruments in applying them to their respective operations. In the case of free agents, each of these operations is 'a vital, immanent, voluntary act' and not a transitive, physical movement (as suggested by Schleiermacher's perceptual-tactual model). An actuation by the One who is Pure Act has little to do with being touched or pushed, or with registering a determination construed as an influx.34

This metaphysics of causality is the context in which Lonergan's understanding of religious experience must be construed. He disposes of analogies that outwork those taken from perception. He writes:

The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence. That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love.35

34See Collection, CWL 4 ch. 3: "On God and Secondary Causes," esp. 54-57 and 63.
35Method in Theology 105.
Lonergan's integrative intentionality analysis allows him to highlight the link between religious experience and all forms of human intending.

To conclude, what comes clearly into view is that Schleiermacher's epistemology welds disparate pieces borrowed from Platonism, Kantianism, and perceptualism. Since it does not stem from a fully differentiated account of conscious intentionality, his philosophical eclecticism stands in need of significant corrections. All the same, he has the merit of having been the first modern theologian to highlight the subjective side of religion and to link it with a general epistemology. For this reason, integrating his investigations into the better cognitional theory and epistemology that Lonergan offers may very well be an indispensable way of furthering his intentions.
BERNARD LONERGAN is widely recognized for his important contribution to cognitional theory. Rejecting the Kantian paradigm of cognition as the imposition of categories on a manifold of sensible intuition, he explicates a dynamic process of cognition in which subject and object are transcendentally unified in questions raised in the process of rational inquiry. He claims that a normative account of the unrevisable basis of all human speculation can be reached through the self-correcting process of learning. His critical realism synthesizes the Thomist ideal of detached judgments about real objects with an account of moral development.

A crucial problem for any cognitional theory is to determine the scope and limits of its application to the realm of human action, and most specifically to the determination of normative or moral actions. Like most cognitive theorists, Lonergan maintains that cognition carries out similar heuristic and verificational functions in both its empirical and moral applications. However, he acknowledges that while the object of an empirical inquiry is a factual existent, the object of ethical inquiry is only a

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possible state of affairs to be ‘made’ by the subject. On the basis of this difference, he distinguishes judgments of truth in the epistemic realm from judgments of value in the moral realm.

The purpose of this paper is to examine critically some of the meta-ethical grounds of Lonergan’s theory of moral cognition. The cogency of his theory of moral cognition, like any cognitive theory, depends in part upon its explication of the role of cognitive reflection in determining how human actions are judged to be good, and thus normative. Thus my analysis here shall first define and describe cognitive reflection, particularly how it sets limits on how an object or act can be judged as true or good. Next I will lay out how Lonergan applies cognitive reflection to the moral realm, particularly to judgments of value. However, drawing from some recent accounts of moral reflection, a critic could argue that Lonergan’s theory of moral reflection requires, but does not adequately account for, a crucial mediating component of proper ethical judgments. The mediating factor is the moral point of view. The critic would argue that a plausible account of the justification of normative claims requires the inclusion of limits determined by the moral point of view. I shall conclude by showing how a broader account of Lonergan’s theory of moral reflection does in fact account for the fundamental worry raised by such a criticism. But I maintain that Lonergan still would have serious misgivings about certain essential features of the moral point of view.

I. COGNITIVE REFLECTION

Reflection is a term commonly used in philosophical analysis. Yet it has a multitude of references, such as to the mirroring or duplication of an idea or concept (“his proposal reflects a commitment to freedom”), an introspective activity (“she was absorbed in a moment of self-reflection”), or to think deeply about something (“further reflection reveals a different conclusion”). However, specifically philosophical, or cognitive, reflection (hereafter, simply ‘reflection’) actually has a fairly specific lineage, from which most of these usages eventually can be shown to arise. Here I wish

only to extract from this lineage what is considered to be the foundational property of reflection and then indicate how it illuminates Lonergan's specific usage of the term.

Reflection is a cognitive act that explicates the limits, either subjective or social, under which we determine concepts about the world. Reflection aids in comparing certain concepts, since it determines their specific source. As Kant pointed out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, these sources are either sensory or intellectual. Reflection is needed in order to make proper determination of concepts of comparison, such as identity and difference, agreement and opposition, the inner and the outer, and most importantly, the determinable (matter) and the determination (form).

Reflection has manifold applications. To illustrate, it is first and foremost used to explicate the opposition that lies at the core of a subject's phenomenological awareness of the sensible world. The subject through an act of reflection differentiates a sense object from itself through a determination of the limit of subjectivity or self-consciousness. Lonergan refers to the same limit when he distinguishes between a subject's 'actual' performance and its 'abbreviated objectification' of that performance.

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6 G.H. Mead, for example, explicates this limit of consciousness pragmatically as the result of a reflection that ceases at the point an action, either epistemic or actual, that is carried out relative to an object. See George Herbert Mead, *Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) 26.

Moreover, he holds to the Kantian rule that the subject can never exceed the limit of self-consciousness such that it can know itself completely in an act of introspection.\(^8\)

Another act of reflection, which is closely allied to its explication of self-consciousness, determines the limit of verification or judgment of the contingent truth of a proposition about an object or state of affairs. Verification assumes that the subject has not only perceptual access to a specific object of sense, but critical grounds for determination of the verification of the object that are independent of, and thus not identical with, the object as perceived.\(^9\) An act of reflection determines that the subject, conditioned by the fallibility of its capacities of perception (sensing) and inductive inference (understanding), is nonetheless able to consider these as matter upon which it imposes a formal procedure of verification to determine a state of affairs as contingently — not absolutely — true. Lonergan understands verification to be a procedure by which the subject grasps a virtually unconditioned by means of a reflective insight.

Reflection has a verificatory function also in the moral realm.\(^10\) An act of moral reflection verifies that a possible action is a reasonable act for the agent to perform, and thus is a good act. The reflection explicates a subjective desire or interest as matter and a moral conception of a good act as form.\(^11\) The moral conception can take various guises, such as the

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\(^9\) These epistemological functions, explicated by reflection, have been formulated and combined in various ways: as that which relates the intelligible species back to the particular phantasm (Aquinas), as that which grasps consciousness as a self-verificational act (Descartes), as a conscious act of the subject that determines an epistemically impermeable border between conditioned (sensible) and unconditioned (intelligible) that serves as a ground for judgment (Kant), as a socially constituted historically conditioned absolute knowing (Hegel), or as what is presupposed in the intersubjective structures of communication (Habermas).

\(^10\) First, and most broadly, it determines for moral reasoning a limit of determinant possibility (limit) from the way the world is and an indeterminant way, or set of ways, the world is not. The cognition of one or more possibilities which the world could be but is not provides the matter for the moral judgment; the fact that one and only one possibility is determined to become the way the world is to be is the form actualized through the agent’s subsequent act.

\(^11\) The reflection that determines the verification must occur before, not after, the act is carried out. Lonergan himself argues that well-made decisions are conditioned by the
common good, maximal utility, the idea of the good, the categorical imperative, and so on. To illustrate, consider the case of an individual who is trying to decide how to respond to the needs of several hundred people in his local community displaced by a flood. The individual can choose from several possible ‘good’ acts, some compatible and some mutually exclusive. He could send a donation to a local Red Cross agency, volunteer to house some of the displaced persons in his own home, or even do nothing. The moral ideal presumably would be to take the necessary actions needed to restore all of the flood victims to some ideal of human well-being, but this must be balanced with the subjective conditions of the actor (how large is his home, what financial resources does he have available to give right now, what is the ultimate limit of his beneficence: the point after which he places himself below some level of marginal utility, and so on). The act verified as good is dependent on the intersection of both of the reflective moral concept and the specific circumstances of the actor. On this reflective reading, a verified moral norm is, by nature, both true and contingent.

The principle of impartiality is another such conception that moral reflection can employ. Kant understood impartiality in a monological sense, determinable from the reason of the autonomous agent alone. Each subject tests what hypothetical or generalized others would agree to without having to appeal to real, concrete argumentation processes. But some moralists since Kant use the principle of universalization to formulate actual dialogical or intersubjective procedures by which moral norms are constituted. The impartiality involved in this intersubjective procedure is called the "moral point of view." It bestows on agents the capacity to give convincing reasons for their actions in conflict situations by first limiting their own desires and interests. First, it requires that agents consider


12For a good example of such reasoning about limits, see Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Spring 1972).

others’ conceptions of particular goods. Then each moral agent, utilizing a reflective analysis regarding a proposed or actual moral norm, articulates its own reasons for or against the norm and takes account of those reasons offered by others. Such an impartial procedure can, in principle, yield universally valid norms. On this view, disagreements prompt us either to accept reasons others can provide for their conflicting judgments or to come up with reasons to convince them of ours. This version of universalization is not a deductive rule of inference, but a ‘bridge principle’ by which we can formulate generalized needs or wants. Agents verify norms of action as good on the basis not of individual or aggregate interests, but of socially accepted reasons. Moral verification is thus reducible to subjects judging, on the basis of criticizable reasons, a possible recurrent state of affairs to be good because each subject impartially assents to it.

The moral point of view does not, however, function as a utopic ideal. Rather it is understood to be immanent to practical reason and able to be posited as an object of an intentional, reflective act of an inquiring ethical agent. It can be instantiated in various loci: families, communities, institutions, and even nation states. These moralists demand that each person possibly affected by a norm has, on the one hand, the right to give reasons for or against the norm in public debate and, on the other hand, the obligation to assent to the best reasons offered. The moral point of view thus reconstructs a reflective dimension implicit in moral thinking. It provides for agents freedom both from dogmatic authority and from some of the epistemic burdens of their moral deliberation. Moreover, the moral point of view can be readily applied beyond ethics to political deliberation.

Some moralists, however, reject appeals to the reflective capacities of agents altogether. They argue that moral claims are verified not by reference to cognitive limits and constraints on the actors, but only by whether or not the claims instantiate fixed rules. As such, there is no contingency to norms. But such a rule-bounded position runs into a number of incoherencies. First, it runs into the endless regress of

14 For a good treatment of a discursive approach to universalization see William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), especially 38-43, 76.
determining meta-rules that determine when and how a rule applies to a specific situation. Second, the claim that all moral acts are justifiable by reduction to a set of rules is itself a rule, causing a certain logical circularity. Third, these moralists appeal to a certain intuition an actor has into rules and their application to specific situations, running the risk of undercutting any kind of reflective, philosophical analysis of the rules themselves. Rejecting the reflective analysis of the subjective limits of moral norms, these moralists fail to account for the individual’s situational perspective in ethical matters.

II. LONERGAN’S ACCOUNT OF MORAL REFLECTION.

Kant argued that since the understanding is inexorably linked to free, specifically unconditioned, practice, it is also linked to ethics. Lonergan also claims that the praxis of asking questions for intelligence and reflection has an implicit ethical reference. The knower’s act of questioning is motivated by a comprehensive and unrestricted desire to know. Borrowing from St Thomas, he notes that this questioning reveals an unrestricted intentionality with a practical element: “we do not know the answer yet, but already we want the answer.” This heuristic function of the intellect thus also forms the basis of the determination of acts as good. But Lonergan maintains that though reflection extends beyond knowing to doing, it consists fundamentally in knowing.

Lonergan claims that in an ethical inquiry the intellect inquires into the ‘invariant structure of the human good,’ which has three distinct

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15Roberts, The Logic of Reflection 30. Similarly, discourse ethicists like Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas have claimed that all argumentation utilized to determine the validity of cognitive claims has an implicit ethical reference: the argumentation, as it aims for normative verification, refers to the normative ideal of a idealized communication community. See Karl-Otto Apel, “‘Discourse Ethics and ‘Liberation Philosophy’,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism 22:2 (1996) 5-6. For Apel the communication community is a transcendental pragmatic given, for Habermas it is an unavoidable presupposition. For a good treatment of this problem, see Marianna Papastephanou, “Communicative Action and Philosophical Presuppositions: Comments on the Apel-Habermas Debate,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism 23:4 (1997) 41-69.

16Insight CWL 3 619.

17Second Collection 123.

18Insight CWL 3 624.
levels. The first level is that of particular goods, which are the objects of appetites. Practical insight begins from the unities and relations of possible courses of action to satisfy the goods that emerge from the 'sensitive flow' of our percepts and images, feelings, and conations. The second level is the good of order. If something is a particular good, it will recur when there is a good of order. Schemes of recurrence are aggregates of similar events or, in the case of practical affairs, habitual actions. At this level, moral inquiry aims to produce a stable and systematic set of good acts for human living.

Lonergan calls the inquiry into the systematization and regularization of a set of goods common sense. Common sense thinking manifests itself in many aspects of life. Every occupation, for example, has its own regularized ways of doing things. Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of 'prehuman attainment,' such as familial and tribal bonds. Common sense emerges spontaneously from an intersubjective learning that goes on 'unconsciously and implicitly.'

Prior to the 'we' that result from the mutual love of an 'I' and a 'thou,' there is the earlier 'we' that precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its oblivion. This prior 'we' is vital and functional.

Lonergan claims that this intersubjectivity "radiates from the self as from a center, and its efficacy diminishes rapidly with distance in place or time." Thus at a certain point these spontaneous intersubjective bonds are replaced by convention. Convention derives from detached questioning about the good of intersubjective order. It establishes the reflective order that implicit intersubjectivity alone cannot.

19Insight CWL 3 643.
21Insight CWL 3 237.
22Insight CWL 3 198.
23Method in Theology 57. But he does not maintain, as some phenomenologists do, that we know others only intersubjectively. See Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, "The Spectrum of 'Communication' in Lonergan," Communication and Lonergan 67-86.
24Insight CWL 3 238.
The determination of the good of order through conventions thus protects each member of the society "from the object of his fears in the measure he contributes to warding off the objects feared by others." Though initially this is an almost Hobbesian way of determining order, Lonergan conceives it as an intelligible pattern of relations that condition the fulfillment of each person's desires. As concrete, though, it is an order realized in acts produced by actual good persons, not by impartial agreement. Common sense attains to its highest object when it grasps the developing object of historical consciousness: the point at which the entire fabric of human existence appears as a historical result of actual human apprehension, judgment, choice, and action. But common sense can never determine ideal frequencies for the following of practical rules and the occurrence of rational choices or decisions. Its generalizations are not meant as premises for deductions, and it never aspires to justified knowledge. It has no theoretical inclinations, but remains completely in the familiar world of things for us.

Lonergan claims that a perennial dialectic remains between the good of order and what he terms the individual, group, and general biases of common sense. First, common sense is continually in conflict with egoistic interest and desires. Lonergan defines egoism not as a spontaneous, self-regarding appetite, but as the failure to allow for the complete free play of intelligent inquiry. Second, common sense insights remain attached to their origin in spontaneous and narrow intersubjectivity. This bias can never be fully eliminated, since common sense cannot determine itself as an invariant ground for practical action. Third, general bias, the lag in the development of our intelligence and reasonableness, only compounds the group bias in common sense. Thus the dialectical and dynamic nature of common sense thinking, in its search for conventional order, cannot alone secure order in society. But the good of order, a new (second) notion of the good, develops in societies as an intelligible patterns of relationships that condition the fulfillment of each person's desires by his contribution to the

25 Insight CWL 3 238.
26 Second Collection 83.
27 Topics in Education CWL 10 76.
28 Insight CWL 3 246.
fulfillment of the desires of others. However, the good of order remains under emergent probability and thus must be continually re-developed in one’s culture. Moreover, the good of order remains in permanent tension with the intersubjective spontaneity of common sense, since they are both grounded in a duality inherent in the human person as such. Thus normative truth cannot emerge from these two modes of social ordering.

Lonergan posits practical judgment as the third level that determines the good of value as such. Value consists in the good of self-consistency in knowing and doing. Most broadly this entails that the moral agent avoids rationalization and ‘moral renunciation.’ There are, however, three types of value: aesthetic, ethical, and religious. The aesthetic is the realization of the intelligible in the sensible, whether in things made, actions performed, or in habits or institutions. Religious value occurs when the autonomous subject stands before God, “with his neighbor, in the world of history, when he realizes within himself the internal order, the metaphorical justice of justification, that inner hierarchy in which reason is subordinate to good, and sense to reason.” Ethical inquiry culminates in the rational choice of terminal values. The object of every deliberative choice of a value is a transcendental good of intelligible universal order that is not constructed, but discovered through a process of mediation. Effectively, then, judgments of value become the non-deductive reasons on the basis of which acts are determined as good.

Judgments of value determine either what is good or better among more than one possible action. They determine the least conditioned, least partial, and the least antecedent of a set of possible goods. Lonergan does not explicate the specific inference procedures involved in these

29Insight CWL 3 238.
30Insight CWL 3 252. Cosmopolis remains the ideal towards which human practical intelligence strives in order to overcome bias (Insight 263-267).
31Insight CWL 3 622-623.
32Topics in Education CWL 10 38.
33Insight CWL 3 628.
34Method in Theology 37.
35Insight CWL 3 625, 629.
judgments. But by setting forth within his analysis of the ontology of the
good how judgments of value relate to the recurring schemes of goods of
order, he does specify the basic terms and inferences involved in practical
judgments.

Lonergan first maintains that the terms of practical judgment exclude
feeling and sentiments. Thus practical judgments involve no calculus of
pleasure or pain. Rather, they refer directly to the good as such. They not
only presuppose explanatory knowledge derived from a formal compo-
nent of the good, but they also are understood as affirmations of the actual
component of the good.36 How is this actual good affirmed in a particular
practical judgment? Agents begin with their subjective desires, restrict
them on the basis of the good of order, but ultimately subject them to the
whole domain of proportionate being: the "total manifold of the uni-
verse."37 A dialectic is instantiated in which subjective desires, limited by a
reflective grasp of this totality, form an essential part of the determination
of the good:

Insofar as the intelligibility of this universe is dialectical, its goodness
consists potentially in the failures and refusals of autonomous self-
consciousness to be consistently reasonable, formally in the inner
and outer tensions through which such failures and refusals bring
about either the choice of their own reversal or the elimination of
those that obstinately refuse the reversal, and actually in the
consequent removal of disorders and false values.38

Lonergan’s notion of the good thus is not static, but dynamically
connected to the developing intelligibility of the universe.

Giovanni Sala claims that Lonergan develops this transcendental
term — the intelligibility of the universe — on the basis of his rejection of
Kant’s claim that the primary link of knowledge to what is known is

36Insight CWL 3 630.
37Insight CWL 3 629.
38Insight CWL 3 630. Dialectical oppositions are a special type. They cannot be
overcome simply by new data or new perspectives: they require intellectual, moral, and
religious conversion. The absence of conversion gives rise to opposed horizons (Method in
Theology 253).
(passive) sense intuition. In affirming the conditioned status of what is sensed, Kant denied that the senses could provide us with the absolute totality of a series of conditions. But Lonergan claims that what is known can also emerge from a non-sensible source, namely the subject’s intentionality. While the objects of some intentional acts are sensible, such as the acts of perceiving or desiring a physical object, the objects of other intentional acts are transcendent, such as acts of apprehending value and loving. Thus he sees the empty object of Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself as the transcendent object of a broader intentional act: the dynamic knowable object of the totality of being.

Being is the unknown that questioning intends to know, that answers partially reveal, that further questioning presses on to know more fully. The notion of being, then, is essentially dynamic, proleptic, an anticipation of the entirety, the concreteness, the totality, that we ever intend and since our knowledge is finite never reach. Since Lonergan identifies the good with being as such, the good of specific objects or acts is also determined relative to this same dynamic process of inquiry into being.

Lonergan claims that Kant fails to grasp this notion of being because his ultimate is not truth, but experience. Since Kant does not determine the unconditioned itself as a systematic structural element, his doctrine remains immanentist. But for Lonergan, agents can determine a non-intuitive virtually unconditioned proposition about a particular contingent object as a result of their inquiry into it. It is reached when no further relevant questions can be asked. The virtual unconditionality of a judgment of fact is determined by three ‘rudimentary’ acts of the inquiring subject that are not themselves judgments but are immanent in

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39 Giovanni Sala, Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge, trans. J. Spoe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) xv, 9, 50, 78. This thesis of Sala’s can be challenged, but it does find support in much of The Critique of Pure Reason.

40 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A417 footnote.

41 Second Collection 75.

42 Insight CWL 3 630.

43 Topics in Education CWL 10 185.
the act of reflective understanding leading to judgment. These acts determine

(§1) what is understood as the conditioned as conditioned

(§2) the conditions that must be fulfilled for it to be a virtually unconditioned,

(§3) that these conditions have been fulfilled.44

The asserted judgment that emerges as the mental word that follows is grounded by, and expresses, the reflective insight. Michael Vertin calls the transcendental notions that propel and orient questioning on this level ‘supra-intelligibilities.’45 Lonergan stipulates, however, that ethical reflection requires another act of reflection distinct from those employed in judgments of fact. Both judgments of fact and judgments of value select one member of a pair of reflectively grasped contradictories by either affirming or denying, or by consenting or refusing. But in the moral realm reflective understanding cannot grasp a similar kind of virtually unconditioned; if it could, the content of the insight already would be a fact, not a possible course of action. Since moral reflection thus has no internal term, reflection should be able to continue indefinitely. But a ‘reflection on the reflection,’ or decision to decide, concludes the reflective process.46 Obviously Lonergan means this not in a circular sense, but in the sense that the agent finds reasons to cease deliberation and thus decide.

In both the epistemological and ethical realms the dynamism of judgment reflects back on the subject, resulting in a ‘self-transcendence of the subject.’47 Particularly in his later works, Lonergan emphasizes that the subject emerges as rationally self-conscious, autonomous, responsible, and free. In Topics in Education, Lonergan parses this autonomy and self-consciousness in existential terms. He claims that consciousness is

45Vertin, “Judgments of Value” 228.
46Insight CWL 3 635.
47Method in Theology 37.
intentional: he uses Heidegger's term *Sorge* to describe it. One's world is the horizon of horizons, the totality of one's concern.

One's own horizon is the limit, the boundary, where one's concern or interest vanishes. As one approaches the horizon, one's interest, attention, concern is falling off to the vanishing point. At the horizon it has ceased altogether.

Lonergan stresses that moral development occurs by means of the expansion both of one's horizon generally and of the various modes of organization of oneself as a moral subject.

Lonergan also describes the determination of values and human goods from the point of view of the supernatural order. For example, one can analyze human decisions by starting from the will of God as the orderer of both the universe and the human soul, proceeding to the good of social order, and finally ending in the choice of a particular good. One can also invert the order, beginning from a particular good, referring it to the good of order, and culminating in the divine will. For example, agents can will a particular good (such as to own a house) and in so doing implicitly will the good of order into which that good fits (that of the good of the owner's community), and then affirm it as part of God's willing of order. This supernatural view of moral development describes good human acts as acts of charity or love, which cooperate with grace. Vertical finality understands the supernatural order as an orientation or rational actions to an end higher than that of our own essence. Moreover, vertical finality emerges "not from the isolated instance but from the conjoined plurality; and it is in the field not of natural but of statistical law, not of the abstract *per se* but of the concrete *per accidens*.

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48 *Method in Theology* 84.

49 *Topics in Education* CWL 1090.


51 *Collection* CWL 4 22. Lonergan concludes that although nature functions in the repetitive maintenance of life and reason supervenes to set up conditions for the good life, grace "takes over both nature and reason" (*Collection* CWL 4 39-40). In terms of the three human ends — life, the good life, and eternal life — in this paper we have restricted our analysis to the good life.
In early works, Lonergan emphasized that feelings and sentiments are by-passed in this process of judgments of value. He wanted to set his analysis apart from the hedonist and sentimentalist approaches that find the good in experience alone. But in later works he refers to 'apprehensions of value' that are intermediate between judgments of fact and judgment of value, and precede the latter. They are not feelings per se, but are in feelings. They are intentional responses neither to the agreeable or disagreeable, nor the pleasant or painful, but to either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, and trust. They involve the 'stirring of our being' that occurs when we glimpse the "sheer possibility of moral self-transcendence." Here Lonergan comes very close to Kant's view that a close link exists between moral reasoning and intuitions of the sublime. Vertin concludes that "for the later Lonergan a value judgment is epistemically-objective exactly in so far as the affectivity of the value apprehension whence it proceeds is correlative with the transcendental affectivity of the transcendental notion of value."

III. LONERGAN’S ACCOUNT AND THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW

Having examined the inferential, reflective, self-transcendent, supernatural, and affective aspects of Lonergan’s account of moral reflection, we are now ready to return to our original meta-ethical question: whether his account explicates conditions or limits adequate for moral verification. We will focus in particular on the act of reflection presupposed in judgments of value.

On Lonergan’s account, moral verification clearly cannot operate from the level of particular goods alone, since they belie adequate conceptual analysis. Without an independent ground of justification, no particular good as such can be determined to be better than another. The good of order functions as an independent term in judgments regarding

52 Insight CWL 3 629.
53 Method in Theology 37-38; 115-116.
54 Method in Theology 38.
the relative values of particular goods. However, Lonergan denies that the good of order is constitutive of judgments of value. He does acknowledge that common sense insights — mediated through one's social milieu — are the ground of, and indeed the fulfilling conditions for, practical judgments of value. But while intersubjective norms can be starting points for a judgment of value, they cannot be its terminus ad quo. Lonergan thus assumes that a principle of impartiality is at best a necessary, but indeed not a sufficient condition for a judgment of value. Instead he explicates the two terms in a judgment of value as the agents' affective desires and the transcendent ground of value that is the constitutive term in the agent's judgment of value. The good of order is included in, but not determinative of, judgments of value.

But it might be alleged that Lonergan avoids such universalizing or generalizing processes on the grounds that intersubjective agreement and consent cannot completely free agents of bias. He does urge 'collaboration' among inquirers, though not for ethical but for scientific inquiry. Although he grants that the good of order possesses its own 'normative line' of development that results from explicit or tacit agreements, he claims that such agreement is only a 'first approximation' to the actual course of social development. In response, a proponent of the moral point of view might argue that the fact that intersubjective agreements are prone to bias does not entail that all intersubjective procedures are. The moral point of view purports to eliminate bias, while effectively securing the balance between individual desires and the good of all.

Lonergan could defend his version of moral reflection against this criticism on several grounds. He does account for many of demands of the

57 Although Lonergan fails to posit an intrinsic relation between intersubjectivity and moral truth, he does see an integral relation between intersubjectivity and meaning. Intersubjective actions, like smiles, are natural and spontaneous. An intersubjective meaning is not about some object, rather it "reveals or even betrays the subject, and the revelation is immediate. It is not the basis of some inference, but rather in the smile one incarnate subject is transparent or, again, hidden to another, and that transparency or hiddenness antedates all subsequent analysis that speaks of body and soul, or of sign and signified" (Method in Theology 60-61).

58 Insight CWL 3 726-728.

59 Insight CWL 3 620.
Swindal: Cognitive Reflection

moral point of view, while at the same time criticizing some of its entailments.

First, Lonergan could argue that the invariant structure underlying his notion of judgments of value, when viewed more broadly, is in fact coextensive with the moral point of view. Lonergan claims that the invariant structure of the good is not only open and interlocking, but also synthetic. It is "large enough a structure to include both subject and object, to unite the subjective and the objective, the individual and the social." In other words, the ontology of the good as such confirms that whatever is critically judged as good is a good for society. Moreover, the good affirmed in judgments of value extends beyond the confines of the individual and social good to include to the good of the physical, chemical, biological, and cosmic orders as well.

Second, Lonergan gives not a phenomenological description, but also a conceptual analysis of intersubjectivity. The conceptual analysis reveals both a reciprocity and an objectivity embedded within intersubjectivity:

we pass from intersubjectivity to the objectification of intersubjectivity. ... We speak about ourselves; we act on one another; and inasmuch as we are spoken of or acted on, we are not just subjects, not subjects as subjects, but subjects as objects. This capacity to see oneself from another's point of view — as an object — is a necessary component of the moral point of view. It works towards mitigating the biases to which intersubjectivity is prone.

Third, William Rehg has proposed a reading of Lonergan's ethics that makes it to a large extent compatible with the moral point of view. Rehg claims that the procedure of moral inquiry that Lonergan endorses is in fact intrinsically intersubjective. The further pertinent questions involved in the reflective understanding about the justifiability of adopting a norm are understood to arise not from the individual agent alone, but from anyone. The interaction of several subjects constitutes an 'intersubjective insight.' Thus all self-correcting learning unfolds in a community of inquirers. The claims of each essentially are in need of

60 Topics in Education CWL 10 40.
61 Second Collection 131.
correction by other inquirers who appeal to hitherto neglected facts. Rehg argues that too much remains unthematised among the moral inquirers for their own convictions to yield immediately to universalization: "such conviction comes only with the others' 'yes.'" Thus an individual's judgment of value implicitly entails a reference to acceptance by the other. Thus a Lonerganian could argue that answering all further relevant questions raised by others constitutes an argumentation-theoretic equivalent of the moral point of view.

But despite these strong similarities between Lonergan's judgments of value and the moral point of view, significant differences remain. Lonergan holds that moral truth is constituted neither by a communal agreement, nor by aggregation of the acts of consent of each member about a norm, nor by each actor's particular assent to the communal decision. The moral point of view, as I construe it, posits a mediate level of verification that does not employ a transcendental concept of the good, but relies solely on the reciprocity of participant perspectives to determine impartiality. It employs not a unitary transcendent, as Lonergan does, but a unified set of binary transcendences (each agent transgresses its own perspective relative to that of another agent, and vice versa). Each moral actor, operating under the constraint of the moral point of view, realizes that the verification of a moral judgment carries with it the ambivalent circumstances of its birth from the union of the limitations of its own subjective perspective and the limitations of the perspectives of others. This double limitation is understood to cancel out bias. But Lonergan

62 Rehg, Insight and Solidarity 86.

63 Moreover, Rehg himself even questions the ability of an intersubjective inquiry to secure the kind of social solidarity needed for ethical life. He notes that "reflective insight cannot rest on even the 'summation' of individual insights or acts of mutual convincing" (Rehg, Insight and Solidarity 236). "Even if the individual's conviction is indissolubly linked to that of other individuals, and even if this conviction must be confirmed across the various languages and conceptual frameworks appropriate to each other individual's need interpretation," a principle of universalizability posits a counterfactual end (237).

64 What this further entails, though it lies beyond the scope of this paper, is how the judgments of one agent in a moral discourse can become reasons that another agent can use in the inferences involved in its own moral judgments. For a good treatment of this issues, see Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) 496ff. Inference concerns relations not only among propositional contents, but also among interlocutors.
would remain skeptical of such a move. He claims that only an intentional totality can set the proper limits needed to eliminate bias.

Lonergan would also dispute the claim that intersubjective agreement alone could constitute judgments of value. Instead he argues that each agent must still be held responsible for validating each norm as good. In the epistemological realm Lonergan distinguishes between the intersubjective acts of determining ordinary meaning and the subjective acts of discovering originary meaning. The same distinction is applicable to the moral realm: the agent's judgments of value in concrete situations originate what is understood as good, while the good of order is the subsequent determination of recurrent goods as norms for the ordinary function of society. He thus avoids the problem of assimilating the ethical good of the individual to the prevailing standards of order in the community of which it is a member. He also obviates the need for a 'mythological conception' of community which certain features of the moral point of view tend to promote. In fairness to moralists who defend the moral point of view, however, the onus of the self-actualization that Lonergan places in judgments of value, they place in the actors' application of norms to specific contexts.

The most serious question that one defending Lonergan's ethics could pose to critics would be whether the universalization of one's moral perspective encapsulates the proper end of ethical reflection. A critic of universalization could claim that a discursive generalization of interests is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a good society. One could have a communal order that suppressed some concrete human and non-human goods. Lonergan takes the Aristotelian position that a good society is reached not simply through generalized interests, but through the development or perfection of each member. Lonergan remains strongly committed to the contribution ethics makes to the developmental process of individuals: ethics is not simply a matter of properly applying universalizable norms, but of becoming a more authentic and free person. Lonergan is more concerned with self-transcendence and personal authenticity than with autonomy and toleration in the Kantian sense. At best universalization is

65See Brandom, Making it Explicit 594.
for him a moment in the broader quest for conversion, self-transcendence, and loving.

In sum, significant questions remain regarding the procedures by which norms can be socially adjudicated and applied by moral agents to concrete situations. My aim has been only to explicate how moral reflection — setting proper subjective and social limits in ethical reasoning — is a sine qua non for determining a coherent ethical position. Moral reflection helps us appreciate not just the invariant structure of each ethical judgment, but it also specifies the ordinariness of the communal task of working out ethical norms in a world that continually meets new exigencies. Our actions have consequences that are extending both to more people and farther in the future than ever before. Lonergan’s unique contribution to this discourse on moral reflection has been to make it adequate to a comprehensive account of authentic self-transcendence.
BOOK REVIEWS


I

At the conclusion of the introduction to Insight Bernard Lonergan gives a quasi-apology for not including many references. “This is not an erudite book,” he says, and then goes on:

If I my be sanguine enough to believe that I have hit upon a set of ideas of fundamental importance, I cannot but acknowledge that I do not possess the resources to give a faultless display of their implications in the wide variety of fields in which they are relevant. I can but make the contribution of a single man and then hope that others, sensitive to the same problems, will find that my efforts shorten their own labor and that my conclusions provide a base for further development. (CWL 3, 24)

Joseph Flanagan’s book Quest for Self Knowledge: An Essay on Lonergan’s Philosophy is, it seems to me, just that: a development and filling out of some of the lines initiated by Lonergan’s Insight as well as his Method in Theology. That process is undertaken by a person sensitive to the same issues tackled in Lonergan’s writings.

In particular, Flanagan’s work is an excellent companion to Insight. Now that Lonergan’s Collected Works are being published by the University of Toronto Press and ‘Lonergan Centers’ exist in virtually every part of the world, Flanagan’s volume makes a significant contribution to that movement. I say the work is a ‘companion’ to Lonergan’s writings, because it is definitely not an ‘introduction.’ It is much more sophisticated than that. It is more a ‘reading guide’ or ‘translation’ that can accompany
some of the more difficult sections in Lonergan’s writings. Many of those sections regard Lonergan’s analyses of modern science and mathematics.

The work is written clearly with many illustrations. A section that struck me early in the book was Flanagan’s analysis of the insight into the definition of a circle. This, of course, was one of Lonergan’s favorite examples. Flanagan analyzes four definitions of a circle:

1) A circle is a line that goes around and meets itself.
2) A circle is a set of coplanar points equidistant from a center.
3) \(x^2 + y^2 = r^2\)
4) \(x^2 + y^2 + Dx + Ey + F = 0\)

Flanagan shows how these definitions, in ascending order, illustrate the progressive transcendence of insight beyond imaginative constraints. Flanagan’s familiarity with coordinate geometry and the possibility of more general and comprehensive definitions enriches our understanding of Lonergan’s example.

Similarly, Flanagan enriches Insight’s sections on heuristic structures by historical accounts of the origins of modern mathematics and modern physics. In all of this a well chosen simile or expression highlights a basic notion from Insight. Take the following on the world of theory:

To enter the world of theory, human knowers have to learn how to decenter themselves and recenter themselves within strictly explanatory patterns of knowing that correlate things to one another. (119)

Similarly, a line on dialectical method succinctly captures its intent:

Dialectical method, then, anticipates discovering, not light and reason, but darkness and unreasonableness. The dialectician realizes that the only way to correct such radical disorientations and distortions is to attempt to reorient the way people wonder through a basic reversal of the desires and fears that govern their knowings and doings. (106)

Or, as he captures the meaning of the general bias:

Put in its broadest context, common-sense knowers have to become long-term historical knowers if they are to understand how and why their own social order is operating the way it is. (85)
Flanagan brings a wide life-time's erudition to his task: Carl Boyer's histories of mathematics, Piaget's developmental psychology, Jane Jacobs' writings on cities, Northrop Frye's literary criticism, Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Eric Voegelin and Abraham Maslow on religious experience, and so on — all contribute to the richness of this book.

Though all it, these developments of the natural and the human sciences provide the matter to be transformed, reoriented and unified by an integrating metaphysics.

Metaphysicians are dependent on common-sense and scientific knowers to provide them with the data that they will transform, reorient, and unify into an ever expanding explanation of the entire universe of being. (154)

Central to a contemporary metaphysics is the integration of the sciences freed from imagination's 'pictures.'

The history of mathematical science could be summed up as a liberation from imaginative thinking, or as a series of successful breakthroughs from imaginable worlds into strictly non-imaginable but highly intelligible worlds which are able to mediate in comprehensive and systematic ways vast amounts of sensible data. It was from such advances in liberating thinkers from images and replacing them with heuristic symbols that resulted in the art of implicit definitions and the discovery of a series of higher viewpoints. These nineteenth-century achievements in higher mathematics have been central in developing the present approach to metaphysics as an integral heuristic structure for explaining the universe of being. (175-176)

Flanagan's last two chapters on ethics and religion are both heavily influenced by Lonergan's *Method in Theology*. After eminently illustrating the transcendence of intellect over imagination, slowly he returns to allowing imagination its due, to the need for an aesthetic liberation of imagination so that it can cooperate with and embody the deepest springs of spirituality. Writing about love, Flanagan notes:

One of the most obvious effects of love is the new spontaneities it gives us to do things for the person we love. (227)
The only questioned that occurred to me while reading *Quest for Self Knowledge* was whether or not the point of *Insight* is not something simpler than *Insight*. After all, Lonergan’s own interpretation of *Insight* can be found in such works as *Understanding and Being*, *Topics in Education*, and the article, “Cognitional Structure.” He said that anyone of ‘a sufficiently cultured consciousness’ should be capable of grasping its point. On the other hand, erudite commentaries like Flanagan’s are extremely important for setting Lonergan’s work within the context of wider mathematical and scientific perspectives that are, in cultural fact, what a metaphysics on the level of our times must penetrate, transform and integrate. Flanagan is to be heartily congratulated for tackling, within the pages of one book, the interpretation of *Insight* and *Method in Theology* — an awesome challenge.

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II

1. Overview

Flanagan’s book provides an introduction to Lonergan’s philosophy suitable for graduate students and post-graduates. It will prove engaging for those already familiar with Lonergan’s philosophical thought and an excellent resource for those looking for an introduction that is both detailed and broad in its scope. However, unlike Terry Tekippe’s recent publication, *What is Lonergan Up to in Insight? A Primer* (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1996), this book does not seem intended for undergraduates. It is in parts a faithful digest of Lonergan’s *Insight* in a more accessible form; in others an insightful interpretation of that same book, and in still others a revision that incorporates some of the insights, innovations and developments in Lonergan’s thought that came after he published *Insight*. Flanagan’s own stated objective in writing this book is to communicate Lonergan’s foundational approach to philosophers who are at home in either the analytic or phenomenological traditions (12). However, Lonerganians will read the book as a synthesis, based on years
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of study, that tries to capture the core substance of Lonergan's methodological approach to philosophy and articulate its importance for human history.

The book follows the broad outline of Lonergan's *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, but insightfully summarizes and reorganizes the material into eight rather than twenty chapters. It also is less than half the length. Those familiar with *Insight* will recognize that many sections of Flanagan's *Quest* correlate directly with parallel sections in Lonergan's book. When this is the case, Flanagan references the relevant sections of *Insight* in his notes. However, there are two notable exceptions to this procedure. One is Flanagan's chapter 2. In comparing the organization of the two books, chapters 1 and 2 of *Quest* are intended to cover the same ground as chapters 1 through 5 of *Insight*. In those chapters, Lonergan introduces the reader to the immanent, conscious event of insight that stands at the core of what his book is about and carefully explains how insight and human intelligence develop into the specialized studies of mathematics and the classical and statistical scientific methods. Flanagan covers this same ground, but to do so provides his readers in chapter 2 with an engaging history of the development of mathematics, physics, and other sciences. This historical approach substitutes for Lonergan's more systematic approach to those disciplines and assumes less prior knowledge on the part of the reader in those areas than Lonergan did. The chapter may still intimidate some readers, but Flanagan's account of the arduous overcoming of the basic counter-positions in these areas will prove rewarding for those who make the effort.

The second exception constitutes a more significant departure from *Insight*. Flanagan's chapters 7 and 8 treat of ethics and religion respectively. These topics also come last in *Insight* (chapters 18 - 20), but beyond the common order of presentation much has changed. Flanagan has attempted to rewrite these chapters to incorporate developments in Lonergan's thinking that came after the publication of *Insight* (1957) and culminated in his publication of *Method in Theology* in 1972. A glance at the notes for these chapters indicates the change. There is only one reference to *Insight* in chapter 7 and none in chapter 8. These chapters are no longer a summary or interpretation, but a 'reconstruction,' if you will. They seem
to constitute Flanagan’s answer to the question, How would the later Lonergan write an ethics and a philosophy of religion? To that end, they make a notable contribution to Lonergan studies, and, especially in the case of chapter 8, draw a sharp contrast with what one finds in Insight.

2. Critical Review

Flanagan has written an elegant introduction to Lonergan’s philosophy. Compared to Insight, it is concise, but still substantive and rigorous. This has been achieved through (1) careful selection of which topics and terminology to retain from Insight and which to omit, and (2) interesting innovations that present sometimes familiar Lonerganian themes in a fresh way. There is, for example, an elegant simplicity as well as succinct accuracy in the definition of culture given in the introduction. In just a few lines Flanagan distinguishes the social order from the values that move people to live cooperatively in that order and identifies culture with those sets of values: “Culture is why a people behave the way that they do. If institutional, cooperative schemes are what people do, culture is why they do it” (10). His clarification of his meaning of method in the introduction has this same succinct and insightful presentation. Readers will also find his treatment of authenticity in chapter 6 worthwhile reading. There he does an excellent job of working out Lonergan’s distinction between minor and major authenticity (178). The former refers to one’s authentic cooperation with the prescribed expectations of one’s culture, and the latter to one’s authentic overcoming of the biases and oversights that are intermixed with the good of one’s culture. Working with this distinction, Flanagan is able to relate the authentic subject to the world process driven by vertical finality and emerging possibilities. Indeed, this is one of the major unifying themes of the book: that the dynamism in the authentic subject orients us toward the unrestricted possibilities for knowing and doing good that transcend the limits of any given social and cultural context.

Still, this polished text sometimes leaves the reader wishing to know more about the author’s thought process in deciding to approach things as he did. Why, for instance, did he retain the important discussion of dialectical method, but do away with the language of ‘positions’ and ‘counter-
positions' which Lonergan employs in *Insight* to explain this method? Similarly, one may wonder why he has done away with Lonergan's term 'already-out-there-now-real' when the theme of contrasting extroverted consciousness from authentic knowing remains so central to *Quest*. Since this book is intended as an introduction that will appeal to readers with different backgrounds, a more self-conscious discussion of these interpretive issues would be inappropriate. Still, questions of this sort arise, especially with respect to Flanagan's last two chapters that are so different from what one finds in *Insight*. For Lonerganians a multitude of questions will likely arise having to do with the implications of what Flanagan has written for understanding in detail how Lonergan's thought developed after *Insight*.

Chapter 7 is on Ethics. Flanagan begins the chapter by acknowledging that metaphysics has been dethroned from first philosophy. Now ethics will play the mediating role between philosophy and the sciences that metaphysics was once envisioned to play. Moreover, ethics, we are told, will prove to be the higher viewpoint that sublates and transforms what is achieved in metaphysics. While this theme of the reversal in the importance of theoretical and practical may be familiar to readers — and is certainly one that interested Lonergan since he takes the practice of method to be foundational — it does not seem to be fully developed in the chapter. The moderating role that ethics can play for the sciences is not spelled out; nor is the new relationship between ethics and metaphysics. Still, it is clear that this chapter builds on what has already been achieved in chapter 6 on metaphysics. More explicitly, it seems that for Flanagan the central contribution of metaphysics to ethics is to provide the ultimate horizon within which the meaning of our choices ought to be understood.

A central innovation in this chapter is that it is structured by three pivotal questions: What am I doing when I am choosing? Why do I choose it? and What do I choose when I make a choice? The first question opens up a rich discussion of the deliberative process and the important contributions of feelings, symbols, beliefs and love to that process. The second question leads to an exploration of the tension between cultural and transcultural values. This tension unfolds within the authentic subject as she grapples with the need to make value judgments. The values that
make one an authentic participant in one's culture may need to be transposed if one is to be an authentic subject who remains true to her or his own unrestricted drive toward the good. Flanagan argues that the authentic chooser must appropriate this conscious tension and work responsibly with it.

The answer to the third question is the highpoint of the chapter and brings us back to the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. Flanagan argues that in any act of choosing we are in fact choosing to participate in the "cultural and historical world-order in which we are living" (224). When even an egoist makes a simple decision, such as to purchase a sweater, that choice in fact links him or her to this broad context of social order, cultural values and historical process. Choices always put one in participation with the emerging world-order and have meaning in relation to this universal horizon. Thus the real horizon within which the meaning and value of our choices ought to be understood is the horizon that we come to understand through a metaphysics of the dynamic, emerging world-order and world history. However, if this is ethics on a grand scale, the chapter also returns periodically to the theme that all choices and cultural values must be judged by whether they help or hinder persons in becoming authentic in their relationships with themselves and others. We are told, that is, that the value of the person is paramount (210).

In his final chapter, Flanagan offers us a philosophy of religion. I think its contrast with Insight can be suggested succinctly by drawing a distinction between a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of God. If Quest offers the former, Insight offers the latter. The philosophy of God in Insight is one respect traditionally Thomistic because it develops an a posteriori argument for the existence of God. In another respect it has a strong continuity with the major themes and developments that go forward in Insight. Indeed, it is the culmination and completion of the intellectualism that is central to Insight, and the full implications and importance of two of Insight's most central themes emerge only in Lonergan's philosophy of God.

The first theme is the spontaneous and unrestricted desire to know. Lonergan saw it as a powerful force in human history that compels us
eventually to raise every intelligent question in anticipation of knowing the full intelligibility of being. It finally leads us to conceive of the possibility of a transcendent Source that renders the universe fully intelligible. The second theme is the intellectual conversion that Lonergan hoped to evoke in his readers (though he never uses the term in *Insight*). Lonergan thought that an attentive reading of *Insight* could reorient readers so that they would recognize that the real is not the perceived of extroverted consciousness, but the reasonably affirmed understanding of intelligent and rational consciousness. Once readers appropriate that knowing the real is not a matter of taking a look, but of grasping that what one understands is a virtually unconditioned (a conditioned judgment that in fact has had its conditions met), then one may grasp the reasonableness of affirming this conceived possibility of a transcendent Source. Thus, the intellectualism of *Insight* and the intended intellectual conversion of its readers have their *telos* in chapter 19. Accordingly, the objective in his chapter 19 seems to be found in his statement that God “is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation” (*Insight*, Collected Works 3:680; in the older editions, 657).

Chapter 8 of Flanagan’s *Quest* offers a philosophy of religion. It does not construct arguments designed to evoke the intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation of God from the reader. It is interested in the emergence of religious experience in human consciousness and the history of human attempts to articulate and symbolize the meaning of those experiences. Its central foundation is not intellectual conversion, but religious conversion and the experience of falling in love with the transcendent and totally other that is traditionally called God. While the chapter does not cite or mention *Insight* once, it does periodically point us toward *Method in Theology* and discusses authors like Rudolf Otto, Abraham Maslow, Mircea Eliade, and Eric Voeglin at length. Though the chapter offers a great deal, the unmistakable difference between it and its counterpart in *Insight* calls the status of the original work into question. There can be no doubt that Flanagan’s work reflects developments in Lonergan’s own thought, but does the later philosophy of religion imply the rejection of the earlier philosophy of God? If not, how do the two become integrated into one unified philosophical system?
These questions are important for understanding Lonergan's philosophy. Since Lonergan's earlier philosophy of God stood as the denouement and completion of the intellectualism of Insight, its absence here suggests the need to rethink what constitutes the completion of that project. If the later Lonergan were to rewrite the last chapters of Insight, how would he do it? Flanagan's last chapter invites us to focus on these questions because he has specifically set out to write an 'essay in Lonergan's philosophy.' In doing so, he turns primarily to Insight as his resource. Moreover, he continues to stress the theme of intellectual conversion that was so central to Insight. Hence Flanagan several times takes the opportunity to remind his readers that his chapter 2 on the history of mathematics and the sciences is crucial for his strategy of helping the reader to overcome the basic bias of confusing knowledge with the contents of extroverted consciousness (see, for instance, 264-265).

We find then both a continuity and discontinuity with Insight, but the discontinuity is most centralized in chapter 8. Chapter 19 in Insight is the further working out of the implications of the intellectualism that was developed in the rest of the book, pushing that project to its fullest potential in the affirmation of the God who renders the universe fully intelligible. This approach neither examines nor evokes the dramatic and existential pattern of experience in which men and woman discover and work out their response to the allure of the transcendent other. It remains through and through explanatory and theoretical, arguing that the affirmation of God is the intelligent and reasonable conclusion to the explanatory, philosophical endeavor. Whereas, Flanagan, like the later Lonergan, is interested in understanding the history of religion as the arduous process of working out the meaning of religious conversion and the experience of being in love with the fully transcendent other. This work too may be explanatory, but it is something else — indeed something of more significance — that is being explained. Yet if this philosophy of religion articulates the transformed horizon within which questions of God's existence and nature arise, there remains, nonetheless, to raise and meet intelligently and reasonably those questions that do arise. Does doing so require a philosophy of God? That would seem to be the case. Moreover, we perhaps should not too quickly dismiss the possibility that
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metaphysical arguments, such as those Lonergan offers in *Insight*, have an allure of their own and a power to evoke in the reader a more open heart.

We ought to applaud Flanagan for this book. He has given an excellent introduction to Lonergan’s thought. He has also made an important and original contribution to philosophy and Lonergan studies. Yet Lonerganians should also find in his book the impetus for a dialogue about how to understand Lonergan’s work in the last chapters of *Insight* in light of both their continuity with the overarching project of *Insight* and their uncertain relationship to the later developments that Flanagan so capably presents to us.

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Have you ever wondered why Economics is such a mess — why economies do not function properly, why economists cannot adequately cope with inflation, recessions, bankrupt countries, government deficits, and trade imbalances? According to Philip McShane we need a radical shift in economic thinking. His new book, *Economics for Everyone*, envisages such a breakthrough. His method is to home in on what actually happens in the economy in order to generate the missing idea. He proceeds by “meshing hints, concrete allusions and quotations in a manner that will encourage slivers of insight, a sluicing of orientation …” (79). *Economics for Everyone*, then, is an invitation to get to grips with, a pointing towards, an explanatory perspective that includes the fundamentals of properly running the economy. The book is an elementary introduction to economic science. It is introductory in that it offers a perspective that will be unfamiliar to both common readers and professional economists. It is elementary in the sense that McShane
presents the basic elements, the essentials of this novel perspective. His aim is not to provide a complete and comprehensive viewpoint but a starting point for everyone interested in economics. This book is for beginners. I see *Economics for Everyone* as the textbook for a new half-year course in Economics, the basis of a future B.A. in Economics.

McShane's perspective is neither a new mathematical model, nor an endorsement of a vague ethic of giving to the poor, nor a polemic for or against capitalism or communism, nor a critique of the economic policies of political elites. And he does not provide quick fixes. The view on offer here is much more sophisticated. We are invited to identify and understand the relevant economic variables and their interconnections that economists have neglected. In short, *Economics for Everyone* is part of an effort to communicate the essential elements of the economy.

McShane draws extensively on two manuscripts written by Bernard Lonergan during the periods 1942-1944 and 1978-1982. (These manuscripts will be published as Volumes 21 and 15 of Lonergan's Collected Works.) In fact, McShane writes that *Economics for Everyone* is entirely derivative; he is "merely trying to make available the achievement of Bernard Lonergan" (11). While this may be the case, *Economics for Everyone* certainly is a significant book in its own right. It is an excellent presentation to beginners of some very complex ideas. Not only does McShane create a carefully controlled step by step build up of fundamental economic variables and their relations, but he interlaces it with a critique of ruling economic opinions. To be more specific, the book is concerned with the discovery of two financial circuits and the proper balancing, nationally and internationally, of their surges. Diagrams from Robert Gordon's textbook and quotations from Joan Robinson and Robert Eatwell and others are used to illustrate the extent to which economists have neglected essential economic variables and hence lack the basis for serious criticism and construction. McShane's own caricatures succinctly capture the essence of the current economic scene: "...compare the economist to a driver who, stupidly, ignorant of standard driving, pushes along in a single gear, and when the engine overheats, decides to get the car painted" or "...envisage economists as people on a beach trying to make the tide come in flat or in a steady slope" (10).
What, then, is *Economics for Everyone* about? It is important to say that this book is not an axiomatic presentation of economic truths. On the contrary, the reader is lead from basic to more complicated issues, each successive chapter builds on insights grasped by reading and puzzling about previous chapters. Chapter one, "Baskets and Handfills," teases out the crucial functional distinction between two types of economic activity — a basic level of economic activity and a surplus level — and their relation to invention and innovation. The basic level of economic activity is concerned with what we would recognize as consumer goods and services such as supplying fruit, potatoes, berries. By contrast, the surplus level includes goods and services that make basic activities possible such as supplying baskets, building ploughs and machines, research and development. McShane's aim is to get you to try to identify, in a preliminary fashion, the basic and surplus flows in economic process and to indicate how this differs from popular views. Chapter two, "Flows and Surges," builds on the previous chapter by focusing on the dynamic nature of basic activities and surplus activities in the productive process, particularly short-term and long-term accelerations or surges in output. Here, the aim is for you to at least have an impression of 'natural' economic surges.

Chapter three, "Beyond the Casinos," is the pivotal chapter of the book. It brings together elements discussed in the two previous chapters and it provides the foundation for the topics raised in subsequent chapters. McShane tackles the problem of what rhythms of financial flows are required to carry the surges in basic and surplus production forward successfully. The focus is on the circulations of 'money.' The idea is that rates of payment correspond to rates of basic production and to rates of surplus production. In other words, a financial flow meets the flow of basic production and a distinct financial flow meets the flow of surplus production. These monetary flows are presented by a diagram, their relations are explained in terms of a flow called a cross-over (distinct flows linking the basic and surplus circuits), and you are introduced to an elementary view of what happens, and what should happen, to the circuits during a surge in surplus production and basic production.
This chapter leads to chapter four, "Government and Globe." Financial circuits that correspond to the operations of international trade and national government are added or superposed and discussed in relation to basic, surplus and cross-over circuits, surges, and the dynamic equilibrium of the circuits during different phases of economic process. McShane’s hope is that by the end of some serious work on this chapter "you will have an angle, the beginnings of a perspective, on missing components of contemporary searchings in the economics of international trade and government operations." McShane’s quotation from Lonergan simply and bluntly summarize this chapter,

There exist two distinct circuits, each with its own final market. The equilibrium of the economic process is conditioned by the balance of the two circuits: each must be allowed the possibility of continuity, of basic outlay yielding an equal basic income and surplus outlay yielding an equal surplus income, of basic and surplus income yielding equal basic and surplus expenditure, and of these grounding equivalent basic and surplus outlay. But what cannot be tolerated, much less sustained, is for one circuit to be drained by the other. That is the essence of dynamic disequilibrium (107).1

At this point two examples in McShane’s book are worth singling out as outstanding aids to enlightenment. One, on page 73 he fine-tunes Lonergan’s diamond shaped diagram of the monetary circulation, laying it out as a box with the basic and surplus circuits on horizontal axes. I found the circuits much easier to grasp with this modification. Two, McShane’s image on page 85 of the links between national economies as stacks of vinyl records on a turntable, with each monetary circulation linked with others through a central funnel, is an example of teaching at its best.

Economics for Everyone complements Lonergan’s own treatment of economics in that it highlights the fundamental elements of Lonergan’s explanatory perspective. I have greatly benefited from reading Economics for Everyone (EFE) in tandem with Lonergan’s 1944 Version of An Essay on Circulation Analysis (1944 CA). In fact, I recommend working through the leads offered in Economics for Everyone before tackling Lonergan’s terse

1Quoted from B. Lonergan For A New Political Economy, sections 29-31.
prose. You may find the following links between chapters and sections helpful: EFE Chapters 1, 2 & 1944 CA Sections: Outline of the Argument, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7 bis; EFE Chapter 3 & 1944 CA Sections: 7 ter, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; EFE Chapter 4 & 1944 CA Sections: 16, 17, 18.

But *Economics for Everyone* is not 'merely' derivative. In chapter five, "A Rolling Stone Gathers Nomos," McShane places economics in a larger cultural context that includes both mindless trouble-shooting and the lack of an appreciation that we do not appreciate what we are doing when we are trouble-shooting, that is, truncated subjectivity. He points to the need for global collaboration in economics and sketches the requisite division of labour that would transform economic inquiry, that is, functional specialization. Also, he points to issues in economic science worth following up. Finally McShane invites us to appreciate the extent of the challenge of dealing constructively with economic problems: "...what is at issue is a triple paradigm shift in economic thinking. There is, firstly, the paradigm shift of a theory of economic dynamics that definitely 'crosses the Rubican' that has been our main topic. There is the paradigm of the eightfold structure of economic inquiry that you have glimpsed in these past few pages. But there is the more fundamental third paradigm shift, underlying the previous two and grounding the probability of their occurrences. It is a shift, against modern and post-modern truncation, towards a deep and precise plumbing of the depths and heights of human desire and imagination, the discomforting entry into one's own black box of which Lonergan writes." (125) McShane rounds off his book with an epilogue in which he reflects on economic methodology and the horizon of theory before stressing the importance of theoretical economics to Lonergan students.

This remarkable little book is a skilfully crafted tapestry of hints, diagrams, explanations, quotes, critiques, questions, and pointings that you will find well worth puzzling and brooding over. *Economics for Everyone* is essential reading for anyone — common readers and professional economists — interested in economic matters.

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THE LONERGAN
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
will meet in conjunction with the American Catholic Philosophical Association in St. Paul/Minneapolis, Minnesota, in November, 1999. Beginning in 1999, the ACPA will shift its meeting dates from Spring to Fall. The ACPA will not meet in Fall, 1998. The specific dates and the theme of the 1999 conference have not yet been determined. Consult the ACPA Website and the Los Angeles Lonergan Center Website for further information. Abstracts of proposed papers should be sent, by June 1, 1999, to Dr. Elizabeth Murray Morelli, Dept. of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA, USA 90045-8415. Papers should be no more than 15-20 pages in length.

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MEMORIAL LONERGAN SYMPOSIUM
jointly sponsored by the West Coast Methods Institute and the Lonergan Philosophical Society, will be held November 6-8, 1998, at Santa Clara University. The theme of the symposium is "Healing/Creating/History." The 1998 symposium will include a videoconference with the Australian Lonergan Society and a presentation by Lonergan biographer, William Mathews SJ. 1-2 page presentation proposals, bearing some relationship to the issues raised in Lonergan's article "Healing and Creating in History," should be sent by May 1, 1998, to Dr. Mark D. Morelli, Dept. of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA, USA 90045-8415, or delivered by email to Mmorelli@popmail.lmu.edu. Regularly updated information may be found on the Los Angeles Lonergan Center Website.
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