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Towards a New Critical Center

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Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced; and what replaces it cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that development ... But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.1

A. The Focus on Plurality and Difference

The fact of plurality is a basic and inescapable feature of the human condition. It is not man in the singular but human beings in the plural who inhabit the earth. Hebrew scripture affirms the created unity of the human race, but it does not oppose the ideal of original union to the fact of plurality. In the memorable words of Genesis 1:27, "Male and female created he them." This vision of creative complementarity pervades the New Testament as well. As Paul assures the Christians of Corinth, there is one Lord and one Spirit, but many different gifts and ministries within the unified body of Christ.2


21 Cor 12: 4-7.
concern with combining unity and plurality, then, has been at the center of religious and philosophical reflection from the beginning.

Although the recognition of plurality is not new, our contemporary preoccupation with it may be unprecedented. The ecumenical movement in this century has focused attention on religious pluralism; the decline of classical education coincided with a strong assertion of multi-culturalism in the humanistic disciplines within the university; a recent surge in immigration from Asia and Latin America has transformed the demographic profile of the United States; the dynamic communications network of the electronic information age has dramatically extended our global consciousness and, through vivid televised and computer images, brought the far off near. These important historical changes have been ratified at the intellectual level by a new theoretical privileging of ethnicity and difference, and by a shift in philosophical orientation from the Cartesian quest for certainty to the contemporary insistence on sympathetic understanding of the other. In fact, the theoretical compass has been so redirected, that the classical commitment to transcultural universality and normativity is now greeted with suspicion and accusations of intellectual imperialism.

While the end of cultural innocence is to be welcomed, the prevailing climate of suspicion has tended towards the extreme. A warranted critique of ethnocentrism has escalated into a relentless theoretical assault on the traditional heuristic ideals of unity, identity, and invariance. As Charles Taylor has persuasively argued, pluralism, by heightening our awareness of alternatives, normally fosters uncertainty. But reflective uncertainty and indecision are not ends in themselves. They are valuable moments in a self-correcting process of personal development that should finally lead to deeper understanding and sounder judgment. Nor should they obstruct or preclude effective civic consensus, but rather promote its gradual emergence through responsible democratic debate. Confronted with the political paralysis that is currently weakening so many national governments, and with the deep existential indecision of our students and children, it is hard to avoid the

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counter suspicion that the contemporary emphasis on plurality and difference has become onesided. What has happened to their historic and essential conjunction with the aspiration to unity and commonality?

The French philosopher Blaise Pascal tersely suggested why their balanced conjunction is necessary. "Unity without multiplicity is tyranny; multiplicity without unity is confusion." I want to connect Pascal's cautionary maxim with Bernard Lonergan's consistent appeal for a critical cultural center that avoids both the classicist's predilection for restrictive unity and the relativist's surrender to pluralistic confusion. Lonergan has, I believe, provided the basic historical analysis and the set of explanatory categories around which such a unifying center might form. A brief sketch of his historical argument and a compressed account of his orienting categories constitute the central core of this paper.

B. FROM A CLASSICIST WORLD VIEW TO HISTORICAL MINDEDNESS

What are the deeper historical sources of the pronounced modern interest in cultural pluralism? In a series of important papers dating from the mid 1960s, Lonergan argued that the Western world was in the midst of a profound cultural transition. The classical culture that had originated in ancient Greece and had been transformed by medieval Christianity and actively reappropriated by the Renaissance humanists had finally broken down. In its place had emerged a comprehensive and dynamic modern culture which had not yet reached maturity. If the primary sources of classical culture were poetry, politics, philosophy, and religion the most powerful force shaping modernity was clearly empirical science. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the new science of nature radically transformed the traditional Aristotelian cosmology. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the empirical human sciences recast our understanding of human existence. They also profoundly increased our

4Pascal, Pensées #604.

5I have drawn chiefly on the following sources for this condensed account of Lonergan's thought. "Existenz and Aggiornamento" and "Dimensions of Meaning" from Collection; "The Transition From a Classicist World View to Historical Mindedness," "Theology In Its New Context," "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," and "Theology and Man's Future" from A Second Collection; "Dialectic of Authority" and "Unity and Plurality" from A Third Collection; Doctrinal Pluralism; Method in Theology.
global and historical consciousness and thereby heightened our awareness of and respect for pluralism. The new sciences of anthropology, archaeology, sociology, and history did not create cultural pluralism, but they certainly made the modern West more attentive to it. They greatly extended our knowledge of other nations and peoples, of different mentalities and social arrangements, of the extraordinary variety of linguistic and cultural patterns on which human life might be based.

The classical culture of Greece and Rome lost its normative authority in the course of this historic transition. Its canons of art, its political forms, its educational ideals, and its philosophical principles no longer served as the operative norm by which the rest of humanity should be judged. But an even deeper change in intellectual outlook was occurring which Lonergan describes as the shift from a 'classicist world-view' to 'historical mindedness.' The heuristic emphasis in classical science and philosophy had been on the eternal, the universal, and the necessary. This directive orientation is evident in both Plato's theory of intelligible forms and Aristotle's stress on immutable natural essences. These timeless forms and essences, immune from change and revision, are by definition, always and everywhere the same. But the focus of modern empirical inquiry is on contingent, temporal particulars, undergoing change and development, and inseparably joined to the natural and historical environments in which they are located. As Whitehead has argued, the most serious problem facing modern philosophy has been to comprehend the true relation between these stubborn, concrete, embedded particulars and the abstract universal principles through which we seek to explain their character and conduct. Although modern philosophy has yet to resolve this epistemological aporia, its comparative failure has not affected the new heuristic priority accorded to concreteness, temporality and becoming.

In several of his collected essays, Lonergan directed attention to four implications of this historic cultural transition:

6A Second Collection 1-9.

7"This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and passionate interest in the relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts." A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925) 10.
1) The European Enlightenment not only created new scientific theories and disciplines, but it fundamentally revised our understanding of the nature of science. The classicist conception of science, thematized in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, is modeled on the practice of deductive geometry. It envisages science as a permanent propositional achievement, expressing true, certain knowledge of causal necessity. Once the foundational principles of knowledge have been discovered, they can serve as the axiomatic base for an ordered series of rigorous inferences. The modern, empirical notion of science significantly modifies each of the defining features of classical *episteme*. Scientific inquiry is now understood as a collective and historical process whose unifying center is not a permanent set of unrevisable propositions but a common reliance on empirical method. And these propositions are no longer seen as immutable truths, but as the articulate expression of the existing state of scientific understanding. The central point is not simply that we know more about nature than our classical predecessors did, but that we understand the disciplined practice of investigating nature in a fundamentally different way.8

2) This new post-classical understanding of science has required major adaptations by both philosophy and theology. In *Insight*, Lonergan devised a new architectonic strategy for epistemology and metaphysics based on the personal appropriation of cognitional activity. His reconception of philosophy's internal structure, his insistence on the practice of intentional analysis, and his privileging of cognitional theory were deliberately designed to meet the strictures of empirical inquiry and the exigences of historical mindedness. *Method in Theology* proposed a parallel reconception of theological inquiry in the face of the same intellectual and cultural requirements. At the heart of these two creative adaptations is Lonergan's genuinely ground-breaking work in transcendental method. Lonergan has shown convincingly, I believe, that the various forms of modern empirical inquiry, scientific, philosophical, theological, and scholarly, are extensions and adaptations of a single, invariant, normative pattern. By uncovering the generalized empirical

8Collection 259-262.
method that governs human cognition and action, he has penetrated to
the deepest sources energizing modern culture and achieved a critical
position from which to appraise and connect them.

C. THE EMPIRICAL HUMAN SCIENCES

3) The shift from classical to historical consciousness has also engendered
a new philosophical anthropology, a new way of understanding human
existence and the human good. The classicist apprehension of man was
based on a metaphysical analysis of the human being. A single invariant
human nature provided the ontological ground for our essential faculties
and powers; these powers, in turn, were actualized by the acquisition of
virtues and by the exercise of basic operations. The multiple human goods
were identified with the terminal objects of these operations, and the
supreme good with the perfection and completion of human nature itself.
The sumnum bonum, eudaimonia, defined by Aristotle as activity in accord
with the best and most complete virtue, was believed to be universal and
invariant, though Aristotle recognized an unavoidable relativity at the
level of the moral virtues. The theoretical focus of classicist anthropology
was on the set of immutable features that all human beings commonly
share.

The new philosophical anthropology, by contrast, starts with
particular human beings in the concrete circumstances of their actual
lives. It is empirically rather than metaphysically based; it does not
assume an abstract and universal human nature, but investigates
incarnate developing persons in their full situatedness within nature and
history. Its heuristic emphasis is not on unity, identity, and constancy, but
on plurality, difference, and change. Most importantly, it understands the
human person as an intentional subject or agent. Through their
intentional activity, human beings generate the cognitive meaning
through which they know the universe of being and the constitutive
meaning that penetrates all aspects of their personal and communal
existence. Because intentionality is constitutive of human being and
living, the relevant empirical data of the human sciences are bearers of

9I have borrowed the term 'philosophical anthropology' from Charles Taylor.
meaning. Human reality is infused with intentional agency, and for that reason, its countless empirical expressions are infused with significance. This basic fact accounts for the essentially hermeneutical character of the human sciences and demarcates them in a fundamental way from the empirical sciences of nature. It also explains why an adequate account of intentional agency is indispensable for a critical theory of human existence.\textsuperscript{10}

Lonergan's analysis of human subjectivity reveals how our intentional operations unfold on four complementary levels: the levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. In the context of a revised philosophical anthropology, the most important level is that of existential or moral consciousness. This level with its defining operations of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action perfects and completes the normative unfolding of the human spirit. It insures that the intellectual drive for objective knowing will be complemented by an equally firm commitment to authentic living.\textsuperscript{11} While the combined operations of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness allow us to know the world as it really is, intentional operations at the existential level have a properly constitutive function. They shape the emerging moral identity of the persons who perform them, and they serve either to sustain or subvert the intentional communities within which human beings develop and mature.

4) Just as the dynamic expansion of the natural sciences led gradually to a new empirical notion of science, so the philosophical anthropology based on intentionality analysis has led to a new empirical conception of culture. The classicist notion of culture was strikingly similar to the Greek notion of science. Both science and culture were thought to be permanent normative achievements, binding on all peoples at all places and times. Cultural practices that failed to satisfy the elevated canons of classicism were considered barbaric. Its works of art were models to be imitated; its science and philosophy were perennial and abiding; its laws and institutions provided paradigms for the rest of humanity. Newcomers and

\textsuperscript{10}See Michael McCarthy, "The Risk of Psychologism," \textit{The Crisis of Philosophy} chapter 7, section E.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Collection} 238-239.
outsiders acquired the arts and virtues of this normative culture through a classical education in the languages and literatures of Greece and Rome. Given this classicist ideal, cultural pluralism was not something to be welcomed but a fact to be acknowledged and then overcome.

The new historically minded conception of culture is empirical rather than normative. To belong to a culture is to share the set of meanings and values that inform a common way of life. Because these common meanings and values are the fruit of intentional operations, because human intentionality develops cumulatively over time, because the pattern of development is different for different peoples and ages, cultural pluralism and change are only to be expected. There will be as many different cultures as there are distinct sets of shared meanings and values constituting the lives of actual historic communities.

The classicist ideal of a single, permanent culture providing a universal model for humanity has been abandoned along with the Aristotelian theory of science. But does the realistic acceptance of cultural pluralism require the loss of critical normativity? If normativity is defined by the classicist canons of permanent meanings and invariant goods, then the answer will be in the affirmative. However, Lonergan was not prepared to embrace cultural pluralism uncritically. Through his detailed analysis of the four levels of intentional subjectivity, he sought to attain a normative standpoint from which cultural diversity and historical change could be critically appraised. We will explore his dialectical strategy for responding to pluralism and conflict in the remaining sections of this paper.

D. COMMUNITY AND HISTORICITY

As we have noted the heuristic focus of the new anthropology is not on an abstract, metaphysically conceived human nature but on concrete intentional subjects. However, this close attention to human subjectivity does not imply an attachment to ontological individualism. The intentional subject is an inherently situated being whose development

12Method in Theology 11.
13Doctrinal Pluralism 6.
McCarthy: New Critical Center

...unfolds in a matrix of supra-individual relations. As human beings, we live on the earth and under the sky; we belong to humanly constructed worlds built by the collaborative arts of our ancestors and contemporaries; we develop in the company of other persons to whom we are joined through a complex web of attachments and connections. Nearly all that we know and believe we have learned through sharing in a common fund of knowledge cooperatively developed by other people. While we are capable of creative and original insights, both theoretical and practical, the necessary condition of their fruitful occurrence is a prior history of effective apprenticeship in communities of learning and teaching.

Human beings are born into historical communities and it is within that web of relatedness that their lives acquire meaning and intelligibility. Although there are important pre-intentional sources of human cooperation, the most significant personal connections are rooted in a common intentional life. Complex forms of cooperative living, working, and doing are based on shared ideas, converging judgments and beliefs, and mutual commitments and promises. Just as the moral identity of particular persons is constituted by the operations of existential consciousness, so the civic identity of a community depends on its shared commitment to a set of constitutive meanings and values.

The achievement of intentional community among free and responsible agents is always precarious. Human beings can voluntarily unite for the sake of pursuing common purposes, but they can just as easily separate when consensus on these purposes is shattered. As Lonergan has noted, existing communities vary in the level of shared intentionality they are able to achieve. These contrasting levels of associative depth can be directly correlated with the four levels of intentional consciousness. A united and effective community rests on a common field of experience, commonly accessible insights and concepts, a mutual fund of basic judgments, and a commitment to collective courses of action for the sake of deeply shared values. As existential reflection established the importance of personal responsibility, the obligation of each person to make authentic use of his or her freedom, so reflection on

14Method in Theology 79.
the ideal of community draws attention to collective responsibility. We are jointly responsible for the supra-individual patterns of cooperative order to which we belong and for the state of well being in which we bequeath them to posterity.

Lonergan's analysis of constitutive communal belonging regularly highlights the importance of social institutions, which he sometimes refers to as 'concrete goods of order.' A social institution is an intelligently devised, functionally complementary scheme of intersubjective cooperation. It is not the work of a single individual or a single generation but depends on extended human cooperation over time. Social institutions are centers of organized power through which human beings achieve together what they would be unable to do alone. But these social concentrations of power are subject to both greatness and wretchedness. Families can be united by mutual love or divided by bitterness and rancor; economic activity can be a source of shared prosperity or of prolonged depression and decline; the citizens of the same body politic can be unified by patterns of distributive justice or torn asunder by faction and civil war. Mutual cooperation deepens the level of good and evil of which human beings are capable. As individual lives take shape within the framework of social institutions, so the effective continuance of these cooperative orders depends on the underlying culture that informs and sustains them. The essential task of a public culture is to cultivate the intellectual, moral, and spiritual character of a united people. This process of shared education takes place through a great variety of cultural agencies: the home, the school, the church, the arts, the numerous media of public communication. A common culture consists in a shared inheritance of ideas and beliefs, of aspirations and values, of imaginative associations and feelings, of cultivated habits of thought, discourse and affective response. It is this shared intentional life transmitted across the generations that binds human beings together, enabling them to act in concert for the commonweal. In the absence of this commonly developed, many leveled intentional inheritance, the best designed plans for social cooperation are no better than abstract

15 *Insight* 596.
16 *A Third Collection* 5-6.
blueprints. While it is laudable to design consumer based economic and financial markets and to devise democratic parliamentary systems, without the cultivated customs and habits, without the spirit of free enterprise and republican virtue, these fragile institutions will lack an animating soul.

Wittgenstein has recognized that in learning a common language, we learn a shared form of life. One of the basic cultural tasks is the transmission of language from one generation to the next. In learning to speak the languages of an historical community, we simultaneously learn how to participate in its public institutions, in its concrete goods of order. Through the confessional rite of reconciliation we learn the meaning of 'repentance' and 'forgiveness'; through engagement as jurors in a criminal trial, we learn the meaning of 'due process'; through the procreation and raising of children we learn the meaning of 'parental love.' Public cultures, common languages, and shared social practices are so profoundly interdependent that they tend to wax and wane together. This is one reason why the distortion and devaluation of language signals the decline of cultural health and integrity. Since the effectiveness of our social institutions depends so heavily on the animating culture that sustains them, cultural confusion and linguistic decline foreshadow impending social decay.

The frank recognition that cultures both flourish and decline and that social institutions develop and decay, leads directly to the topic of human historicity. For Lonergan, historicity symbolizes an elemental truth: human living is constituted by meaning and motivated by value, and common meanings and values are the expressions of a shared intentional life. But human intentionality is never static; it changes over time and it changes in different ways and at different speeds depending on where and when it occurs. At their root, social and cultural changes are changes in a community's intentional activity. They are changes in the ideas its citizens understand, in the truths which they affirm, in the criteria by which they evaluate personal conduct and social institutions,

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18 A Second Collection 3-6; 61; A Third Collection 169-183.
19 Method in Theology 78.
and in the common goods to which they are mutually committed. But the social and cultural changes that punctuate history are themselves ambiguous. They can either express the normative unfolding of intentional cooperation or the collective failure to honor the exigencies of the human spirit. They can be instances of genuine self-transcendence or of refusals to satisfy the legitimate demands of an exacting cultural tradition. How are we to decide when cultural and institutional changes are expressions of progress to be warmly supported or forms of decline to be actively opposed? How are we to promote a critical, participatory belonging that combines both loyalty and thoughtful opposition to the evolving communities in which our lives are concretely embedded?20

E. THE SOURCES AND VARIETIES OF PLURALISM

Classicist culture with its normative canons and universal principles tended to conceal the scope and variety of human pluralism. The heuristic emphasis on intentionality and historicity has corrected this oversight. Lonergan was sensitive to the importance of pluralism both in Insight and, in the later essays written in the light of a heightened historical consciousness. In Insight the existential source of pluralism was the polymorphism of intentional consciousness.21 For Lonergan, 'polymorphism' was a term of art intended to designate the variety of ways in which human consciousness is differentiated. It was an umbrella term with a broad extension. It referred to the different patterns of conscious experience ranging from the biological and aesthetic to the dramatic and practical. Within the intellectual pattern of experience rooted in the desire to know, it referred to the differences between mathematical, scientific, commonsensical, and philosophical modes of inquiry. Each of these ways of knowing corresponded to a different intentional exigency and constituted a distinct way of apprehending and conceiving the universe of being. Within the common constraints of generalized empirical method, there was the further plurality of four

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21 Insight 385-387; 426-427.
distinct but complementary heuristic structures: classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical. And within the framework of dialectical method itself, there were the opposing patterns of action and belief, the rival positions and counterpositions, traceable either to bias or fidelity to the transcendental precepts. Insight, then, was no stranger to the sources of intentional pluralism, to the multiple differentiations of human consciousness.

After 1965, Lonergan deliberately approached the phenomenon of human plurality through the thematic of intentional meaning. Within this hermeneutical framework, the recognized sources of pluralism became even more diverse. Allow me compactly to summarize the highly nuanced taxonomy of meaning outlined in Method in Theology.22

(1) There is a plurality of carriers of meaning, both linguistic and non-linguistic.

(2) There are four distinct functions of meaning: cognitive, affective, constitutive, and communicative.

(3) There are five realms of cognitive meaning corresponding to different intentional exigences: the practical, the systematic, the scholarly, the philosophical, and the transcendent.

(4) There are three historical stages of meaning in the West, reflecting the presence or absence of effective strategies of critical intentional control: (a) the age of undifferentiated consciousness prior to the appearance and dialectical questioning of Socrates; (b) the classicist period in which systematic meaning develops, and philosophy bases its critical functions on logic and draws its systematic categories from metaphysics; (c) the age of the historically minded empirical sciences in which philosophers practice the intentional analysis of human interiority and shift their critical strategy from logic to method.

(5) There are the diverse expressions of linguistic meaning in ordinary, technical, and literary discourse.

(6) There is the staggering plurality of methods of communication in which common insights are transmitted to different audiences living within different cultures and existing at different levels of intentional development.

22This summary is chiefly based on chapter 3 in Method in Theology.
Finally, cultural pluralism has its own sources of diversity. At a basic level, these tend to coincide with the endemic pluralism of common sense meaning. In the history of culture there have been as many varieties of common sense as there have been socio-cultural differences of time and place. At a more advanced intentional level, human cultures are profoundly influenced by the development and differentiation of systematic meaning; and they undergo a profound transition when the shift occurs from an earlier stage of cognitive meaning to its critical successor. Lonergan describes the transition from the classicist worldview of the second stage of meaning to contemporary historical mindedness as the exemplary instance of this form of cultural change.

While historical scholarship does not by itself create new forms of cultural pluralism, by deliberately reconstructing the cultures of the past, it heightens our awareness of human diversity. A normatively based critical philosophy accepts this cultural diversity as a matter of course, but it carefully distinguishes among the different types of pluralism: complementary, genetic, and dialectical.

Complementary forms of pluralism are mutually distinct, but, as their name suggests, they are neither to be resisted nor opposed. They constitute the welcome fruit of compatible form of intentional achievement, though to establish their compatibility may require very subtle forms of intentional analysis and argument. The five realms of cognitive meaning, the four heuristic structures within the realm of theory, the different varieties of common sense, and the multiple patterns of conscious experience are good examples of pluralistic complementarity.

Genetic differences are also internally compatible; they represent successive stages in an ongoing process of sustained intentional development. Genetic pluralism is illustrated by the transition from a lower to a higher level of intentional consciousness; by the self correcting process of learning within a theoretical discipline; by the shift from the ordinary languages of practical common sense to the technical languages of scientific theory; by the historic transition from undifferentiated

23 Insight 180.
24 Method 235-237.
consciousness, through the classicist theory of science to the five distinct realms of cognitive intentionality within the third stage of meaning.

While complementary and genetic differences can be effectively integrated, the numerous instances of dialectical pluralism cannot. They represent basic and irreducible intentional oppositions that are mutually inconsistent. These oppositional conflicts are the appropriate concern of Lonergan's dialectical method whose goal is to bring fundamental disagreements to light, to exhibit their originating grounds in intentional consciousness, and to resolve their rivalry through critical judgments and authentic decisions. The positions and counter positions of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics exhibit this crucial dialectical polarity. In the field of ethics, the contrasting notions of the good, before and after moral conversion, are also dialectically opposed. In the domain of cultural conflict, dialectical method is needed to distinguish the inauthentic meanings and values rooted in the several forms of human bias from their authentic counterparts rooted in the normative eros and exigency of intentional cooperation.

Let me conclude this overly rapid survey of the varieties of pluralism with what I hope are two familiar examples from the classicist stage of meaning. In Aristotle's Physics, nature and art are distinct but complementary principles of change, while nature and violence stand in a relation of dialectical opposition. As art imitates and completes the operations of nature, so violence distorts and destroys them. In Aquinas's systematic theology, nature and grace are complementary sources of the human good, while sin, in its various modes, is a principle of violence, weakening our natural created tendencies and requiring the healing action of redemptive grace. Within Lonergan's third stage intentional analysis, Aristotle's metaphysical principle of natural form is transposed into the eros and exigency of the human spirit, while the categories of violence and sin become different sources of polarizing bias and intentional impotence.

25 Method 249-253.
F. CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO PLURALISM

What is the point and purpose of this extended effort at historical retrieval and this many leveled analysis of intentionality and meaning? The point is to deepen our understanding of the contemporary cultural situation and to promote a critical engagement with it. Most of us live today in a global culture permeated by change and diversity. The natural and human sciences continue their dynamic growth; our political and social institutions are struggling to adapt; we have lost a common moral ontology, a unifying anthropological and religious framework within which to make sense of our lives; and our cultural innocence has been shattered by an unprecedented theoretical and scholarly effort to understand ways of life that are historically remote and spatially distant. We have come gradually, and often haltingly, to a new awareness and acceptance of pluralism.

But where do these momentous changes leave the individual person, the emerging existential subject? It is irresponsible to judge prior to understanding, but there is far too much for any single person to understand; and pressing judgments and decisions will not wait upon a life of disinterested inquiry.26 When I reflect on the uncertainty and indecision of my students and my children, I am often reminded of Yeats’s cry, "The best lack all conviction and the worst are full of passionate intensity."27 In a spiritual atmosphere dominated by scepticism, distrust, and partisan fury, it is hard to find good air to breathe. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, things are scarcely better in the public realm of deliberation and argument. A clear sign that our vaunted pluralism has ceased to be fruitful is the shrill, often interminable, character of public debate.28 Because the most important human questions, the questions of distributive justice, responsible freedom, and our collective obligations to the future, have become so divisive we have tended to become silent or inarticulate about them. This is a perilous state for our moral culture as a whole, and especially for our

26Collection 266.
27William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming.
young people who are groping towards maturity within it. The alternating shrillness and inarticulacy of their elders have made them skeptical of objectivity and suspicious of nearly all moral claims and aspirations.29

In the concluding section of this paper, I would like to distinguish four contemporary responses to cultural pluralism and to comment briefly on their merits and limitations.

1) The Classicist Right

Cultural conservatives are eager to preserve what is best in our historical traditions and to protect classical works of art and thought from neglect or iconoclasm. I count myself openly among their number. But in their desire to conserve what is good, they are frequently tempted by what Pascal described as an attachment to unity without multiplicity. This temptation is strengthened by the conservative fear that the only alternative to contemporary skepticism and relativism is a retreat into classicist culture. For the sake of intellectual clarity, I want to distinguish between a ‘classic’ and a ‘classicist.’ A human work of art is a genuine classic if its revelatory power transcends its context of origin: a classical artifact remains a source of insight and depth long after the culture in which it originated has ceased to exist and command our allegiance.30 By contrast, a classicist, in cultural terms, continues to embrace a pre-modern view of science and meaning and opposes the transition to historical consciousness, fearing it will lead to the loss of objectivity and of universal standards of judgment. The strength of the classicist right is its insistence on our need for critical epistemic and moral norms. Its weakness is its failure to realize that these norms can be combined with full attention to human historicity and plurality.

The crucial philosophical point concerns the location of the invariant critical norms. Classicists insist on the need for transcultural principles in the antifoundational climate promoted by historicism. But they fail to grasp the type of foundational principles appropriate to the present

cultural context. Their philosophical allegiances lead them to search for foundations at the level of logic and metaphysics. Thus, they seek the foundations of knowledge in timeless and unrevisable truths (eternal verities) and the foundations of ethics in an abstract and universal human nature. But those static logical foundations are not adequate to the dynamism of empirical science; and while ethics requires a foundation in nature, it needs a conception of human nature that is concrete, dynamic, empirical, and rooted in intentionality. As Lonergan has written, "When the natural and the human sciences are on the move, when the social order is developing, when the every day dimensions of culture are changing, what is needed is not a dam to block the stream of change, but critical control of the riverbed through which the stream must flow."31

To use Lonergan's early terminology, classicists tend to be conceptualists whose neglect of the normative dynamics of inquiry and action prompts them to absolutize what is subject to revision and to ignore the true sources of development, objectivity and truth.32

2) The Relativist Left

I want to divide the contemporary cultural left into liberals and radicals. The liberal left is openly relativistic, partly for historical reasons connected with religious and moral toleration, and partly for philosophical reasons that are grounded in skeptical concerns. Cultural liberals tend to be relativists because they can see no rational way to adjudicate irreconcilable epistemic, moral, and cultural differences. They accept the existence of recurrent dialectical conflict but can envisage no democratic way to resolve it. The result is their strong affirmation of multiplicity and change and their deep unease about claims to unity and invariance.

The relativist embraces historical consciousness but tends to look suspiciously on all pre-Hegelian philosophy because of its universalist aspirations. Plato and Kant are particular targets of historicist scorn. Unlike their classicist cultural rivals, the relativists willingly jettison the

31 *A Second Collection* 52.
32 *A Second Collection* 73-75.
Aristotelian theory of science and the metaphysical conception of human nature. The study of human nature is freely surrendered to biology and neuroscience and the full weight of human intentionality is transferred to language and culture. In a representative cultural liberal like Richard Rorty, there is an explicit denial of natural pre-linguistic intentionality.33

On Rorty's analysis, human beings acquire intentionality by learning the various languages of their cultural tradition. In acquiring language, they internalize the norms and standards of their socio-cultural community. These standards and the basic propositional beliefs with which they are closely connected are known to be revisable and culturally specific. Although they provide the operative court of appeal for epistemic and moral conflicts within the language community, they have no transcultural or transhistorical validity. Since all intentionality is allegedly based upon language and since human languages are invariably diverse and revisable, to search for invariant intentional principles, to search for an intentional arche beyond discourse, is to search for a will-o'-the-wisp.

The relativist believes that the rejection of the classicist theory of culture entails the restriction of critical normativity to the existing language community. The only way to achieve transcultural normativity is arbitrarily to absolutize the languages, social institutions and cultural practices of a particular historical period. But to do this is to sin against pluralism and historicity. The great strength of relativism is its resistance to cultural ethnocentrism; its evident weakness is its susceptibility to shifting intellectual and cultural fashions. Cultural relativists have a strong attachment to history and historical change but inadequate critical resources for making evaluative judgments about them.

3) The Masters of Suspicion

The radical cultural left has no reservations about criticizing the history of the West. If relativism is based on an epistemological critique of cognitive and moral objectivity, the hermeneutics of suspicion is rooted in the conception of culture as an instrument of coercive power. “The Masters of

33See The Crisis of Philosophy 213-226.
Suspicion" is Paul Ricoeur's title for the hermeneutic trio of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, but Ricoeur's pointed description applies with equal justice to neo-Nietzscheans like Michel Foucault. The remote ancestry of this critical hermeneutic posture is traceable to the ancient sophists; it received early forceful articulation by Thrasymachus in the opening book of Plato's Republic. I shall sketch an outline of this influential intentional stance without highlighting significant differences among the various masters of the art; my outline clearly owes more to Marx than to Nietzsche, Freud, or the neo-Nietzscheans.

A critical theory of culture must begin with an analysis of social institutions. Historically, these institutions have been matrices of power in which human beings compete for supremacy. Within the hermeneutics of suspicion, power is the central explanatory concept. Power is not understood as the fruit of voluntary human cooperation but as the exercise of dominion by one individual or group over another. The struggle for power is as natural to humans as the struggle for survival is natural to the various biological species. To seek power is to seek rule or mastery over other persons or peoples. The most basic functional division within any social institution is between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers are the masters of the institution and the ruled are their bondsmen, even if their submission is voluntary and not coerced by physical violence. The ruler-ruled relation is inevitably based on exploitation, though the more cunning the ruler the less apparent this exploitation will be to the ruled. In principle the legal, political, and economic arrangements of society are designed to insure the rulers' advantage. Yet if this systematic injustice were apparent to the ruled, they would quickly revolt against the clear violation of their own self-interest.

At this stage in the complex power struggle, the operations of culture come directly into play. The political supremacy of the rulers also guarantees their moral and spiritual supremacy. They shape the historical narratives, the governing symbolism, and the social theories of the community as a way of concealing or justifying their exploitation.

Although the representatives of culture often claim that their works are a free expression of the human spirit, they serve, in fact, as subtle instruments of the rulers' hegemony. Bluntly stated culture serves power, understood as oppressive domination, by legitimating the existing institutional arrangements under which the society lives. To the extent that the ruled are deceived by this justification, they voluntarily comply with their own domination. Thus, they accept as just and fair a distribution of social benefits and burdens that cannot be rationally defended.

The critical theory of society is committed to unmasking the actual power dynamic that the prevailing cultural narratives serve to conceal. These cultural narratives are designated as 'ideologies' to indicate the functional role they play in justifying social domination. The purpose of the critique of ideology is to make known to the oppressed the cultural and institutional mechanisms of their oppression. When finally emancipated from the mystifications of the dominant culture, the ruled are summoned to open struggle with their oppressors. On Marx's account of the historical struggle for power, exploitation will end with the decisive emergence of a classless society. But on other versions, more indebted to Hobbes, the human struggle for organized power will continue unabated.

At the inception of modernity, both Bacon and Descartes insisted that knowledge is the basis of power, that science is the key to the lordship and mastery of nature. But according to the masters of suspicion, it is institutional power that determines knowledge or, at least, what counts as knowledge in a given society. The bearers of socially organized power determine the meanings and values through which societies understand and express their existence in history. To put it in the harshest terms, this means that the primary symbolic forms, science, art, religion, ethics, and philosophy are not expressions of the human spirit's self-transcendence, but intellectual weapons in an ongoing multi-levelled social struggle. For the masters of suspicion, every culture is a captive culture, no longer speaking truth to power but serving as a cunning apologist for it.

35Method 357-361. "...man is alienated from his true self inasmuch as he refuses self-transcendence, and the basic focus of ideology is the self-justification of alienated man."
The critique of culture as a form of ideology clearly has merit and force. It is important to acknowledge that cultural symbols and practices can, and often do, play the role that the masters of suspicion have assigned to them. But their analysis of social power, as inherently rooted in domination rather than cooperation, tends to make the condition of social alienation normative. Lacking an account of institutional and cultural authenticity, they provide no basis for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate power, between justified authority and physical or psychological coercion. As a result, they are unable to account for the numerous forms of cultural practice in which authority is exercised for the sake of the governed and in which submission to authority is a condition of effective freedom. By blurring the distinction between repressive coercion and legitimate authority, they implicitly promote an illusory ideal of individual or collective sovereignty radically at odds with the communal nature of human existence.36

The threat of performative inconsistency also hovers over the masters of suspicion. A theory of domination presupposes an underlying notion of justice; the practice of unmasking relies on an implicit account of objectivity and truth; the critique of ideology tacitly assumes the capacity for rational self-transcendence on the part of the critics who carry it out.37 If the intentional life were wholly in the service of illegitimate power, there would be no explanation for the profoundly moral resistance to injustice which cultural criticisms, when they are sound, are able to evoke.

4) The New Critical Center

In an age marked by increasing fragmentation, the human longing for wholeness and unity persists. In a culture attracted to partisan extremes, there is a growing hunger for balance and good judgment. By now, we should have shed the illusions of historical innocence. The fact of change does not invariably mean progress, the promoting of rancor and rage is

36Hannah Arendt has argued persuasively that all forms of sovereignty are inconsistent with the basic fact of human plurality. Persuasion and authority are distinct modes of plurality that respect human dignity; coercion and terror are opposing modes that do not.

not the best way to advance justice. We urgently need a political and cultural strategy that respects both pluralism and unity; we equally need a critical center from which to understand and evaluate historical change. Lonergan’s thought is of enduring cultural importance because it clearly explains why we need such a center and articulates the formidable requirements on those who would serve in its ranks.

The new cultural center must be empirical and historically minded as classicist culture was not. It must be critical, normative, and foundational as contemporary relativism is not. It must be more open to the full range of human greatness and wretchedness than the hermeneutics of radical suspicion. It must be able to distinguish the wheat of human development from the tares of bias, authenticity from alienation, legitimate power from arbitrary rule, nature and grace from the devastation of sin. It must insist on the critical appropriation of traditions rather than the systematic unmasking of our cultural inheritance.

The new center will be based on a new type of transcultural and transhistorical foundation. It will not seek its founding principles in eternal propositional truths as classicist logic did, nor in the abstract and immutable human nature of classicist metaphysics. The new transcultural foundations must be empirical not metaphysical, concrete rather than abstract, and dynamic sources of development and renewal rather than static logical axioms. The way to achieve this foundation will be ineluctably personal. It must be reached through the intentional analysis of one’s own cognitive and moral experience. As Insight has shown, at the center and core of that experience is an unrestricted desire to know and an equally unrestricted desire for the good. The normative unfolding of these desires on the four levels of intentional consciousness yields terms of meaning and proposals for action which are subject to the human being’s immanent intentional norms. Our desire for intelligibility, our insistence on truth, our demand for the truly worthwhile, these are as native to the human being as our need for love and our lifelong restlessness for God. The concrete eros and exigency of the human spirit are the transcultural universals that allow us to enter and gradually comprehend the diverse cultural worlds of our antecedents and contemporaries. They provide a normative and invariant foundation,
allowing us to connect the old and the new, the near and far off, the great and the wretched. Their discovery, acceptance, and full appropriation are essential conditions for belonging to the critical center.

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan described the personal appropriation of the *de facto* invariants of our conscious intentionality as intellectual and moral conversion. What both forms of conversion reveal is the central importance of intentional self-transcendence. To achieve objectivity, to grasp the truth, to know the real, to do the good, to achieve the common good together, to enter with sympathetic yet critical understanding into the cultures of others, these are achievements of which the human spirit is capable. They are, admittedly, difficult achievements but they are within our grasp when we are humanly at our best. The call to authenticity is the call to be and do our best as often as we can. Aristotle tells us that virtue is difficult and rare; Iris Murdoch remarks that objectivity and unselfishness do not come naturally to the fallen children of Adam. But the difficulty of virtue is a fact and not an insuperable barrier; and objectivity is within our common reach if we are regularly faithful to the *eros* and exigences of the human spirit. The belief in the human capacity for sustained self-transcendence is what separates the critical center from the liberal and radical left. For much of our lives, it is a pre-critical belief that we hold on faith. Intellectual and moral conversion provide it with a critical basis in a gradually achieved self-knowledge. Lonergan began to shape the new critical center when he embarked on his ground breaking study of Aquinas, his historical attempt *vetera novis augere et perficere.* He then proceeded to carry out his own process of self-appropriation. He shared the fruits of his foundational discoveries in *Insight* and he later extended their applications to culture, community and history. Many of us who have been inspired by his thought are the grateful beneficiaries of his remarkable achievement. We are now called, in our own, more limited ways, to carry forward the work he began. The human harvest is, indeed, great, but the laborers, sadly, are few. Come and join the vendage!

38 *Method* 237-244.
CALCULATING SUBJECTS: LONERGAN, DERRIDA, AND FOUCALU*T

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WHAT I HOPE to accomplish in this paper is relatively simple, though its subject matter is not. Perhaps the best way to express it is by means of a question. How might one view today the 'calculative' endeavors of Bernard Lonergan in the light of the decentralizing schemes of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida without falling into the trap of totalization? The question, particularly the latter part of it, reveals a torn allegiance between what I consider to be two different patterns of thinking: Lonergan's, which is based on a peculiar notion of subjectivity, and Foucault's and Derrida's, which is usually understood as a denial of subjectivity and the subject as such, even of selfhood and rationality altogether. In the first section I offer a summary of the respective understandings of Foucault and Derrida on subjectivity and calculation that will hopefully raise the discussion to its proper level of complexity. In the second section I attempt to situate this complexity in the context of Lonergan's philosophy, offering various clues and suggestions about what this might mean for someone caught in the throes of the tension inherent in the question above.

* This article is based on a paper presented to the Lonergan Philosophical Society at the 1997 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Buffalo, New York, March 22.
DESTABILIZING SUBJECTIVITY
AND DISSEMINATING SUBJECTS

"[I]t is not so easy," writes Lonergan, "to leave the subject outside one's calculations."¹ Spoken as a true mathematician. It is interesting how many interpret the contemporary critique of subjectivity as an out and out rejection of calculation. They are no doubt surprised to read the champion of their cause, Jacques Derrida, judge such views as indicative of "that condescending reticence of 'Heideggerian' haughtiness."² Needless to say the excesses of subjectivity are not overcome by ignoring or exaggerating its history. Derrida is as aware of this as Charles Taylor, who has recently condemned Derrida to the straights of a philosophical frivolity, "unfettered by anything in the nature of a correct interpretation or an irrecusable meaning of either life or text."³ While this may apply to 'postmodern' appropriations or expropriations of Derrida, I have yet to be convinced that it applies to Derrida himself. In any case the issue for Derrida is not anti-calculative, "which usually comes down to philosophizing badly,"⁴


²Derrida, "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 273.


but (if I may use the expression) 'epi-calculative': a kind of writing on — not about — the basis of calculating endeavors.\(^5\)

What, then, are Continental thinkers like Derrida and Foucault up to when they deconstruct or excavate notions of the subject? Without wanting to reduce their individual efforts to a univocal intention, I think it's safe to say, at the very least, that they do not rule out the question of 'the self.' Indeed I would echo Paul Ricoeur's sentiment, uttered originally in reference to Heidegger's *Destruktion*, that their varying critiques serve as "the condition for a justified repetition of the question ...," and self-consciously so.\(^6\) If we are to believe the reports of Derrida and Foucault on their own work, reading them as if they find the entire tradition of subjectivity to be 'utterly bankrupt,' as Robert C. Solomon clearly does in his overview of continental philosophy since 1750, is simply, though typically, inaccurate.\(^7\) Derrida — and Foucault no less — is too careful a thinker to breach the rules of his own game or, for that matter, to implicate himself in the dialectics of subjectivity. As Vincent Descombes puts it (nicely paraphrasing Derrida, who nicely paraphrases Hegel), "all negation is a superior affirmation. If I denounce this or that unreason within reason, I am denying only the negative of reason, a defect of reason within reason."\(^8\)

Is the subject rejected? Our immediate reaction, especially when our tolerance level of 'free-play' (*jeu*) is low, is to affirm that indeed it is. We might even side with Taylor, who incidentally takes Foucault more seriously than he does Derrida, by pressing their respective viewpoints to their logical conclusion, to wit, that Foucault and Derrida (but Derrida

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\(^5\) See Derrida, "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 268.

\(^6\) See Paul Ricoeur, "The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in the Philosophy of Heidegger," *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) 69, who concludes similarly with regard to Heidegger's destruction of the Cogito. See also Ricoeur, *Onself as Another* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992) 2, with reference to the comment "Michel Foucault's magnificent title" *Le souci de soi*. See also p. 188, n. 22, of the same work.


\(^8\) See Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* 150.
especially) only give license to subjectivity.\textsuperscript{9} As I indicated earlier this ignores the tendentiously 'non-dialectical' comportment of their work (in Hegel's sense), which is hardly anti-dialectical or anti-rational. Foucault, for one, "simply refuses to see reason as either our hope or our nemesis."\textsuperscript{10} He reminds us that "it was on the basis of the flamboyant rationality of social Darwinism that racism was formulated, becoming one of the most enduring and powerful ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality that was at the same time, after all, a certain form of rationality."\textsuperscript{11} What we have here is the historian's refusal to separate the life of the intellect from the ambiguities of life.

Foucault quite unabashedly states that the goal of his work has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. His objective, instead, has been "to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects."\textsuperscript{12} The absence of this kind of analysis, Foucault would say, is precisely what allows philosophers of subjectivity to continue presupposing the subject as a given, which is consequently used as a topic to explain 'things' other than (oddly enough) the subject. Whereas Heidegger seeks to relativize the discourse on subjectivity by appealing to 'ontological difference,' Foucault does so with an eye to the social practices that provide for the emergence of subjective awareness. Subjectivity has a history, claims Foucault, and that history is neither ancient nor mysterious. This is


\textsuperscript{11}Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader 249.

\textsuperscript{12}Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1982) 208, quoted in Rabinow, "Introduction" 7.
what underlies his rather provocative claim that "Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end."\textsuperscript{13}

Derrida's relation to the subject is more ambivalent, so much so that Jean-Luc Nancy, himself well versed in matters of subjectivity, once asked Derrida, startled by Derrida's casual reference to the term: "Are you proposing that the question be reformulated, keeping the name 'subject,' but now used in a positive sense?"\textsuperscript{14} Derrida responded that he would keep the name provisionally only as an index for discussion. But he is certainly not committed to the term as such, "especially if the context and conventions of discourse risk introducing precisely what is in question."\textsuperscript{15} What is in question, of course, is the (rational) subject as basic to discourse, so basic in fact that it remains a dominating presupposition of thought or, to use Derrida's manner of expression, the central presence that remains 'outside' centered structures. The need for a logistics (calculability) of subject Derrida does not wish to deny. "There has to be some calculation," he says.\textsuperscript{16} However, having learned much from radical critics of subjectivity (that is, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger), he is wary of reducing everything to calculating schemes — a stance that needs to be situated historically.

According to Descombes, from 1930 to 1960 the notion of a univocal subject reigned supreme in France largely due to a rediscovery of Hegel, which upset the neo-Kantian emphasis on analytical reason (\textit{Verstand}). "The Dialectic became such a lofty concept that it would have been offensive to request a definition." Descombes compares the concept's then fashionable importance to the God of negative theology who, being utterly transcendent, eludes formulation and so must be approached by means of explanations of what God is not.\textsuperscript{17} This can be gleaned from statements like the following by Jean-Paul Sartre: "The dialectic itself ... could never be the object of concepts, since its movement engenders and


\textsuperscript{14}Jean-Luc Nancy, "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 259.

\textsuperscript{15}Derrida, "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 259.

\textsuperscript{16}Derrida, "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 273.

\textsuperscript{17}See Descombes, \textit{Modern French Philosophy} 10.
dissolves them all."\textsuperscript{18} The generation that followed (after 1960) found this supreme elusiveness to be nothing more than supreme illusion, the tyranny of which required overcoming. And yet this backlash is hardly to be understood as 'anti-dialectical' in the popular or technical sense of the term. To be anti-dialectical is to substantiate dialectical thinking. Alternatives always function concentrically with what is critiqued, however radically. It is for this reason that Derrida counsels Emmanuel Levinas that it would be 'better' for him to dispute the Hegelian system in silence than to speak against it, since speaking against it only confirms it.\textsuperscript{19} Naturally Derrida, much like Lonergan, rejects the possibility of a non-thinking silence.\textsuperscript{20} Derrida's point, however, is that the negation of something only makes sense within the framework of that which is negated. "Since ... concepts are not elements or atoms and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing," whether constructive or destructive, "drags along with it the whole of metaphysics."\textsuperscript{21}

To think non-dialectically, for Derrida, is to immerse oneself in dialectical thinking without affirming or negating it, another term for which is 'deconstruction.' Grammarians used this term originally to designate a process of analysis on account of which sentence construction comes to light. Derrida's use of the term functions similarly but more specifically as a translation of, signifying an alternate form of, Heidegger's Destruktion. Although the temptation has been to interpret deconstruction as the epitome of modernist disenchantment (disengaged analysis at its worst),\textsuperscript{22} Derrida is quite confident that "it always accompanies an


\textsuperscript{20}Insight, CWL 3 353.

\textsuperscript{21}Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" 251.

\textsuperscript{22}See, for instance, Taylor, Sources of the Self 488 (emphasis added), with regard to "Derrida's supposed stance outside of any affirmation of good." In connection with this compare Derrida's comment in "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject" 273: "[I]f I
affirmative exigency," one that "never proceeds without love." However we might wish to interpret such claims, deconstruction for Derrida is clearly a serious sort of thinking, 'a thinking of affirmation,' which suspends, as part and parcel of its strategy, the affirmation and/or negation of given concepts to show how they are constructed. For many this leads to nihilism, the death of the subject; for Derrida it leads to vigilance, a requisite of critical subjectivity.

To return, then, to this tantalizing issue of the subject. I noted earlier how before 1960 in France there was an air of univocity surrounding the notion of subjectivity. After 1960 the overcoming of the sovereign subject of the Dialectic entailed not its death per se, but its fragmentation, its multiplication. "Instead of being subjected to a single ego, the world [had] now [to] manifest itself to a mass of small supposita, each one tied to a perspective" — a crucial concept to which I will return later. In Foucault the subject comes to mean that which has been constituted through certain discursive practices, through certain 'regimes of truth.' In Derrida the subject is seen as a central function without which one cannot finally get along. Enough has been said about the contemporary destabilization and dissemination of subjectivity. It remains now to see what implications this might have, if not for the thought of Lonergan, then for those who intend to follow the rhythms of his thought.

speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it's not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralize decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable." See also Boutin, "L'inouï l'indécidable selon Castelli et Derrida" 820-829.


25See Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" 271: "[Deconstruction] is simply a question of (and this is a necessity of criticism in the classical sense of the word) being alert to the implications, to the historical sedimentation of the language which we use — and that is not destruction." See also his statement in "'Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject" 272: "This deconstruction (we should once again remind those who do not want to read) is neither negative nor nihilistic; it is not even a pious nihilism, as I have heard said . . . [,] there is a duty in deconstruction. There has to be, if there is such a thing as duty. The subject, if subject there must be, is to come after this."

26Descombes, Modern French Philosophy 187.
SITUATING THE DESTABILIZATION/DISSEMINATION IN LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY: A PROPOSAL

How does all of the preceding relate to the study of Lonergan? I think that the most obvious answer is contained most succinctly in Giovanni Sala's recent characterization of Lonergan as 'the philosopher of human subjectivity.' One can be sure that pronouncements, seemingly pro or con (but especially con), are bound to elicit the attention of Lonergan scholars. Removing the subject from Lonergan's philosophy is (if you will pardon the analogy) very much like removing the resurrection of Christ from Christian faith. As the popular jingle goes, "You can't have one without the other." Lonergan's turn to the subject or, as he liked putting it, his turning of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics 'upside down,' goes to the very heart of his contribution. Remove that, I dare say, and all one is left with essentially is the genius of Aquinas, which is not a bad thing of course.

Doubtless, this is among the principal reasons why followers of Lonergan (but not only his followers) are made uneasy by expressions like the 'end of subjectivity.' Such an 'end,' however, pertains to a particular attitude of subjectivity, not to subjectivity per se. One could say that the diverse forms of 'decentralization' currently among us have engendered if not a closer analysis of subjectivity, then most certainly an unprecedented interest in the topic. The discourse on subjectivity, it seems to me, has never been more alive, nor more controversial. "In fact," if I may invoke

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28 See 1 Corinthians 15:14-18.


30 In his article, "What is Enlightenment?" based on an unpublished paper in The Foucault Reader, Foucault asks whether it is not better to envisage modernity as an attitude (an ethos) rather than an epoch: "a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task" (39).
the authority of Descombes once more, "it is not hard to detect the promotion of new subjectivities in many of the communiqués announcing the victory over the subject."31

Lonergan scholars have picked up on this. Most, if not all, have critically recruited thinkers like Derrida and Foucault to the unmasking of various 'counterpositions' in what is commonly called the narrative of modernity (from Descartes to Husserl), which Lonergan is said to have anticipated from within a different philosophical stream (Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant) and, consequently, from a different philosophical angle (insight into phantasm).32 Ronald McKinney’s ground-breaking article, "Deconstructing Lonergan" (1991), has served somewhat as a watershed in this regard — although I hesitate calling it a 'deconstruction' of Lonergan; 'critique' is more accurate. The Lonerganian tendency "to treat rival philosophies in too polemical a manner"33 has been slowly dissipating since the tempered analyses of Martin Matušťík,34 Michael McCarthy,35 James Marsh,36 Jerome Miller,37 and Fred Lawrence,38 to

31Descombes, Modern French Philosophy 77.

32See, for example, Insight, CWL 3 433-448. As Richard M. Liddy has recently reminded us, a more accurate (microscopic) chronology of 'the philosophical stream' would read something like: John Henry Newman, the Plato of John Alexander Stewart, Augustine, Peter Hoenen and Joseph Maréchal in dialogue with Aquinas and Kant. See Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1993) 16-119. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant (one might also include Hegel) serve as the major (macroscopic) dialogue partners of Lonergan in his explication of the dynamics of understanding.


name only a few who have concentrated their efforts on this topic. And yet traces of mistrust remain, for example, in commonplace appeals to the supposed relativism or potential relativism of 'rival philosophies.' Lawrence, for instance, concedes that Lonergan "shares many of the deepest concerns of postmodernism," but quickly adds that "[Lonergan] does so in a way that takes relativity seriously without being relativistic ... without capitulating to nihilism in any form."\(^{39}\) Marsh, too, recognizes certain affinities between Lonergan and his contemporary interlocutors, but complains, divining the intention of Lonergan, that "post-modernism is an unhappy, uneasy, contradictory mixture of search for understanding and flight from understanding, position and counterposition, truth and falsity."\(^{40}\) We are to decide, counsels Marsh, "[w]hich account is more faithful to the desire to understand," Derrida's or Lonergan's?\(^{41}\) In other words we are counseled to decide which account surrenders to the improprieties of relativism, assuming a strong-alternative approach to the question.

Such interpretations are made possible, I believe, by treating other viewpoints as though they were by-products — confused though they be — of the intellectual pattern, to use the terms of *Insight*. Although one may trace this proclivity back to Lonergan himself, that is, his concern for the philosophical component presupposed in cognitional theory, 'the basis' of a viewpoint rather than its 'expansion',\(^{42}\) I am of the opinion that his philosophy permits a less constricting view of the situation. The

\(^{39}\)Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness" 56. See also the parallel statement on p. 72, that is, 'the postmodern extreme,' which seems to be that of relativism and nihilism ('death of the subject').

\(^{40}\)Marsh, "Reply to McKinney on Lonergan" 103.


\(^{42}\)*Insight*, CWL 3 412-413.
Cincinnati Lectures (1959) on the Philosophy of Education provide some helpful indications of this.  

The closest Lonergan comes to the thought pattern of someone like Derrida appears in his handling of Martin Heidegger. Lonergan's thoughts on Claude Levi-Strauss, given at the International Conference on "Hermeneutics and Structuralism" in Toronto (1978), are largely descriptive and so not very helpful here. Lonergan identifies Heidegger's manner of thinking as one which is preoccupied by a 'purely experiential pattern' that is tendentiously artistic. It involves a withdrawal from the ready-made world, in which meaning is instrumentalized to serve various functions in society, to one that is "other, different, novel, strange, new, remote, intimate." While objectification is part and parcel of that pattern, its form is unlike that of the intellectual which conceptualizes, systematizes, instrumentalizes. This mode of artistic expression harbors a completely life-relational intelligibility that does not admit formulation. We might even add, for purposes of clarity, that its four-tiered consciousness is driven by a different concern than that which drives the intellectual, which need not imply that it is any less concerned with 'reality.'

43See Lonergan, Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), that is, the lectures "The Theory of Philosophic Differences" and "Art." Lonergan's remarks in Insight, CWL 3 210-212, regarding 'the dramatic pattern of experience' serve as the general horizon for the specific forms of thinking I am about to identify, that is, specific forms of thinking the ground of imagination and intelligence, the already-prior of generality that "varies with the locality, the period, the social milieu" (Insight, CWL 3 211).

44See Lonergan, "What is Claude Levi-Strauss Up To?" (paper given at the International Conference on "Hermenutics and Structuralism," York University, Toronto, November 1978) 1-25. There is, however, the 'clue' Lonergan gives at the end of the paper regarding a possible 'release' in structuralist analysis, but his unusually obscure style makes it difficult to be sure about this equation. The possible relevance of Lonergan's reading of Edmund Husserl, whose The Origin of Geometry Derrida translated into French with an important Introduction in 1962 (4th edn., 1995), is not altogether apparent with regard to the present discussion. For comparative analyses of Lonergan and Husserl see William F. Ryan, "Edmund Husserl and the 'Rätsel' of Knowledge," METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13 (1995) 187-219; and other related works by the same author noted in n. 4, p. 189, of the same article.

45Topics in Education, CWL 10 216.

46Topics in Education, CWL 10 219.
It is my contention that the Derridian-type discourse functions similarly, intending the un-presentable, the content of a purely experiential pattern, through peculiar means of expression that are deemed as appropriate as calculative inquiry, if not more fundamental. The business of such discourses, Lyotard would say, is "to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented." Derrida has been doing precisely this since 1967 by means of the inaudible 'a' of his neographism, differance, intended to curb intellectualist tendencies to reduce everything to the 'understanding' (entendement) grounded in 'hearing' (entendre) and therefore under the dominance of logos. "[T]his almost nothing of the un-presentable," he writes, "is what philosophers always try to erase. It is this trace, however, that marks and relaunches all systems." We find a similar sentiment — though Derrida is hardly surprised — in Heidegger’s rejection of the terms 'subject' and 'object,' inherently epistemological designations to describe the primordial intimacy and dissimilarity of das Seiende and Sein. Our systems of measurement are thus humbled by a forever elusive, experientially meaningful bull's-eye.

Lonergan judges this kind of thinking to be 'quite fine' and 'useful,' although he exerts little patience for its tendency to forestall 'rational affirmation' (intellectually patterned reflective understanding), the raison d'être of his own thinking. If Derrida's manner of thinking is artistic in Lonergan's sense, one could say that Derrida does indeed 'judge,' but he does so according to the demands of a peculiar pattern. One of the prerogatives of that pattern is to deconstruct judgments, in the name of the undecidable, that would contain (aufheben) the positions and dispositions of others through calculative judgment. For Derrida the undecidable is the condition of judgment, decisional judgment, beyond calculation and the programmatic as such. "C'est au moment où le calcul est impossible que quelque chose comme une décision s'impose ... et à ce moment-là la ... indécidabilité n'est pas le suspens de l'indifférence, la différence comme neutralisation interminable de la décision, au contraire, c'est la différence comme élément de la décision et de la responsabilité, du


49See Topics in Education, CWL. 10 188-190; Insight, CWL. 3 304-353. If Derrida's manner of thinking is artistic in Lonergan's sense, one could say that Derrida does indeed 'judge,' but he does so according to the demands of a peculiar pattern. One of the prerogatives of that pattern is to deconstruct judgments, in the name of the undecidable, that would contain (aufheben) the positions and dispositions of others through calculative judgment. For Derrida the undecidable is the condition of judgment, decisional judgment, beyond calculation and the programmatic as such. "C'est au moment où le calcul est impossible que quelque chose comme une décision s'impose ... et à ce moment-là la ... indécidabilité n'est pas le suspens de l'indifférence, la différence comme neutralisation interminable de la décision, au contraire, c'est la différence comme élément de la décision et de la responsabilité, du
scholastic background and his interest in mathematics are not incidental to his stance. The scope of *Insight* alone suggests influences of a thought world that puts "an extraordinary premium on logic, clarity, the mechanics of exposition, on precise division and subdivisions of material." Like Descartes before him, Lonergan is very much intrigued by the clarity and precision of mathematical-like reasoning, although for him such precision is viewed pragmatically as a means of unveiling the dynamics of 'insight.' Differences between individuals, places, and times, 'the empirical residue,' are hardly thought of as obstacles to the explanatory exigency. As we saw at the outset of this paper, Derrida would agree. In any case what separates the two are opposite ways of approaching perspectival understanding. The intellectual ('geometrical') way, which *Insight* exemplifies rather well, attempts to determine the unvarying properties of thought for all perspectives, discovering order in diversity, the invariable in change, identity in difference. The artistic way reverses matters, understanding order to be but one aspect of variety, the invariable one possible perspective among others. The latter reminds us that difference is at the basis of determination, calculation; the former that such a basis, or glimpses of it, cannot be had without the determining role of explanation. We are at the threshold of the 'logic' of ontological difference.

By understanding these admittedly logically irreconcilable approaches to be distinct patterns of experience, we might become less prone to reduce the concerns of one pattern to those of another, the artistic to the intellectual, and vice versa. Since grammatology is not cognitional

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51 See *Insight*, CWI 3 14-16, 55-56.

52 I depend here on the insightful remarks of Descombes, Modern French Philosophy 188-90.
theory, since its function has a different — some would say more modest — aim, subjecting it to the demands of cognitional theory, whoever's version that might be, deserves in my opinion the charge of inflated reasoning. However, this counter reaction is also susceptible to another charge, that of deflated reasoning, relinquishing its role as a useful corrective to intellectual truncation and thus espousing, though arguing to the contrary, an opposite triumphalism, that of the asymmetrical. Refusing to resolve such tensions has earned Derrida great notoriety: either he is praised by those who are only too eager to abandon 'the extravagances' of philosophical reflection, thereby confirming both their inability to understand Derrida and the suspicions of the opposing stream who rightly take philosophy seriously; or he is condemned by those who are unable to see beyond (or beneath) the demand that propels principles like the excluded middle, impervious to the equally important, if not more primordial, demands of the imagination. I see such a nontotalizing stance as a heuristic precondition for the emergence of insight, albeit differently patterned insights.

The philosophical dialogue between James Marsh, John Caputo, and Merold Westphal is, for me, illustrative of this entire dynamic. My sympathies, which I suspect have by this point become only too apparent, lie with Westphal, that is, his strategy. As the publisher remarks on the inside cover of the book in which the dialogue appears, "Caputo finds [Westphal] to be almost as hopeless a rationalist as Marsh, while Marsh finds him to flirt almost as shamelessly with irrationality as Caputo. Westphal seeks to argue, not for a synthesis of the two perspectives, but for a willingness to live in the tension between the two." I have tried to situate that strategy in terms of Lonergan's patterns of experience, while being sensitive to the burden of Lonergan's contribution: self-appropriation. See "A Philosophical Dialogue: James L. Marsh, John D. Caputo, and Merold Westphal," *Modernity and its Discontents*, ed. James L. Marsh, John D. Caputo, and Merold Westphal (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992) 119-161.

Lonergan does not speak this way of course. For him insight is a technical term that refers to the act of understanding that grasps the significance of data, driven by what he calls 'questions for intelligence.' In *Insight* Lonergan explicates insightful activity from a specifically intellectually patterned point of view, which does not at all mean that he restricts insight to the workings of the intellectual pattern alone. As Lawrence points out, Lonergan's thought is the philosophical equivalent of what "occurs in 'high' therapies." Instead of experiencing, identifying, and naming our emotions and feelings, Lonergan invites us — without denying the central importance of emotions and feelings — to experience, identify, and name the equally important datum of insight, which is a function of diverse patterns of experience. See Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness" 69; Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* 42-63. See also Lonergan's comments in *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal, QC: Thomas More Institute, 1982) 107.
For those of us who are appropriating the Lonergan idea — to borrow the carefully chosen title of a book by Frederick Crowe — the relevance of 'rational affirmation' is not easily left by the wayside. Indeed I refrain from making such a suggestion. Doing so, as I remarked, would only support the view that I am consciously avoiding, let us call it 'postmodern totalization through negation.' Having said that, I do mean to suggest that the counterpositional charge of relativism, when applied to thinkers like Heidegger, Derrida, or Foucault (although one is less likely to see such charges brought against Heidegger), does not really hold water. Not only does it make light of the complexity of the situation, the debate on difference and its various implications, but it may also be committing a category mistake, confusing artistic claims with intellectual ones, regardless whether Lonergan's emphasis on the knower would lead him to a different conclusion.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Calculative synthesis may be desirable, but it is not always prudent. Ambivalence toward the alleged positions and counterpositions of Foucault and Derrida is advisable, given the current state of confusion regarding the import of their thought, which may be accredited to a negligence of the central issue that guides their work: the question of the emerging subject and the conditions of its possibility, to express it in a Kantian manner. If we are forced to understand them in terms of the intellectual pattern, we should at least admit that the facts about them are not all in, and that we are still very much in the 'self-correcting process of learning' more about their manner of questioning, our understanding of which is "constantly being reviewed, enlarged, qualified, refined." We


56Lonergan wrote at a time "when neither mathematicians nor scientists nor men of common sense were notably articulate on the subject of insight" (Insight, CWL 37). Times have changed, however, to the point where intelligent men and women have become increasingly suspicious of such undertakings. In such a context caution needs to be exercised, so that intelligent men and women may not miss what Lonergan is really saying.

have to entertain the possibility, as did Lonergan with regard to Heidegger, that the content of their inquisitive impulse is intended to be and will probably forever remain elusive, which may be 'useful' to us if not intellectually, then surely experientially, artistically.\^58 As far as I can see this is not relativistic; it is a precondition of contextually differentiating consciousness.\^59


\^59I owe this latter point, that is, the connection of contextuality with a nontotalizing appreciation of different patterns of experience, to Mark D. Morelli.
CURRENT VIEWS ON LEGAL REASONING:
THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

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INTRODUCTION

For some readers 'the problem of communication' will bring to mind the eighth functional specialty that Lonergan named 'Communications.' Specifying the character and activity of that specialty in relation to law is indeed my eventual aim. But to plunge into that topic immediately would hinder present communication. The functional specialty Communications in its problematic and its potential is certainly not familiar to those working in law and it may not be an entirely familiar zone of inquiry to those interested in Lonergan's work. So I postpone reflection on that topic until I have given what can be called descriptive indications of foundational direction. I begin with what is known as 'legal reasoning.'

CURRENT VIEWS ON LEGAL REASONING

Reasoning is very evidently a key activity in the legal context. In law schools, students aspire to 'think like lawyers.' In legal practice, the object of analysis is the adequacy or legitimacy of judgments and decisions. When lawyers interview a client or a witness they endeavor to assess the truth of the client's or witness's interpretation of events. In order to establish guilt or innocence in criminal cases judges and juries assess

\footnote{I have made a beginning in chapter 8 of "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) 143-170.}
whether or not an accused person was, or should have been, aware of the risks of actions that injured someone. In tort cases, judges assess the foresight and reasonableness of a defendant’s decision to act in order to establish a duty of care. And judges say they interpret the intentions of the parties in contract disputes. Perhaps the most obvious situation where the adequacy and legitimacy of the reasoning process is assessed is when a judge’s decision is appealed to a higher court.

Legal reasoning is also a focus of investigations carried out by legal philosophers and legal theorists in North and South America and Europe. Their concerns have been with how judicial decisions are ‘actually’ reached and how they are publicly justified. There is a general consensus among modern legal theorists that the manner in which a judicial decision is ‘actually’ reached is a quite distinct process from the process whereby a legal decision is publicly justified. In other words, they make a sharp distinction between what they call the process of discovery and the process of justification. They go even further by claiming that the key activity in legal reasoning is justification, not discovery. They argue that it does not matter how a judge ‘comes up’ with a decision; what really matters is that a decision satisfies certain general criteria in order for it to be said to be legally justified. In this way, the discretion of judges is constrained and controlled. Legal theorists even assert that their proper subject matter is the process of justification and that studying how judicial decisions are ‘actually’ reached should be left to psychologists. But these legal theorists, however focused on justification, do consider the process of discovery. They identify the key element in the discovery process as ‘hunches’ or ‘insights’ — a creative moment that is an unconscious, irrational, and arbitrary activity subject to bias and prejudice. Hence these hunches or insights that are part of the process of discovery must be tested by a conscious, rational, logical, objective process of legal justification.

But studies of legal reasoning have not always been dominated by analyses of justification and the sharp distinction between discovery and justification. During the 1930s in the United States, a group called the American Legal Realists examined the ‘actual’ decision-making process as part of their efforts to encourage judges to take account of practical realities and social conditions when they made decisions. Judicial
decision-making was seen as an important part of the enterprise of social reform and social advance. Also, they believed that if judges knew how they reached their decisions their values and prejudices could be identified and controlled.

The Realists claimed that novelty and creativity in judging did occur and that it should not be suppressed. They portrayed decision-making as a conscious and deliberate problem-solving process. Jerome Frank claimed that the clear thinking of judges is hampered when they are compelled to "shove their thoughts into traditional forms, thus impeding spontaneity ... tempting lazy judges to avoid creative thinking" and, instead, find "platitudes that will serve in the place of robust cerebration."2 John Dewey claimed that understanding and portraying rules as immutable, antecedent, and necessary sanctifies old rules and decisions, widens the gap between social conditions and the principles used by the court, breeds irritation and disrespect for law, and contributes to alliances between the judiciary and entrenched interests.3

Both Frank and Dewey argued that judgments are neither dictated by legal rules and principles nor reached by syllogistic reasoning. They identified five elements comprising the judging process: (1) puzzling and brooding over a problematic case, (2) having a hunch or intuition of what the just solution to the case would be, (3) checking and testing the hunch against the law, previous cases, and future implication, (4) reaching a solution to the case, and (5) expressing that solution, judgment, or decision in the accepted fashion.

Contemporary legal theorists have also written about the decision-making process. In the United States, Steven Burton analyses legal reasoning as part of "an effort to develop and defend a practicable and attractive ethic of judging in a judicious spirit."4 He offers a description of how judges weigh legal reasons. A reason for action is defined as facts plus an abstract principle or general stand which stipulates a prescriptive standard of conduct. An important characteristic of reasons is that each reason has some force. A reason with enough force can tip the balance of

pros and cons in a case. In other words, weighing reasons is the process of gauging the relative normative force of the reasons. To be more specific, the factual part of a reason provides concreteness and the standards part of a reason provides the weight — the felt normative force of a reason. A judge reaches a decision by identifying all the relevant reasons in a case and then assigning a weight to each reason. Burton stresses that the weight of each reason depends on the weight given to other reasons; “the importance of a legal reason ebbs and flows depending on the congeries of reasons in which it is embedded.”

A decision, ultimately, is reached when the ‘action threshold’ of a judge is reached, that is when a sufficient amount of normative force is present. In his own words,

The judge proceeds by gauging the weight of each legal reason in turn while standing on the ground provided by the other relevant reasons, as one might rebuild a boat plank by plank while at sea — not by a series of deductive inferences resting on an ultimate foundation ... Deliberations would continue on this basis, by successive adjustments, until total normative force is distributed at the action threshold, the judge is comfortable stopping, and judicious action ensues.

The German legal theorist Robert Alexy notes that value judgments are an essential part of legal decision-making. According to him, the application of law requires value judgments in the sense that preferring one legal solution to another involves a judgment that the chosen option is in some sense the better one. Value judgments, then, are required when legal norms, doctrines, or precedents do not dictate a unique answer. In his book, *A Theory of Legal Argumentation*, he explains the grounds of the legitimacy of value judgments. He focuses on the extent to which value judgments are rationally justifiable in the legal context. He rejects the idea that the value judgments of a group, or a community, or an individual, or legal experts are sufficient justification for a legal decision because he sees the identification of the value judgments of a group or individual

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5 *Judging in Good Faith*, 55.
6 *Judging in Good Faith*, 57-58.
as problematic. For him, the ground of the legitimacy of value judgments is to be found in the special forms in which legal reasoning takes place, the special rules that legal reasoning must follow, and the special conditions in which legal reasoning takes place. This is the rational character of legal reasoning. For example, if a decision is in accord with the canons of legal interpretation, the rules of precedent, and with argument by analogy (expressed in the form of a valid logical inference), then the decision will be 'correct'; the value judgment will be legitimate.

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory by Neil MacCormick, a Scots legal theorist, can be seen as an effort to cope with the challenges regarding the role of judges in a liberal democracy, namely how to limit the discretion and to maintain the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. MacCormick wants to describe and prescribe the features of a legally justified decision in order to control the arbitrary and irrational factors that could influence judgments and to constrain the extent of the discretion exercised by judges. What he terms first-order and second-order legal justification are seen as the methods that meet these concerns. A judge may reach an insight or possible solution to a case by whatever means, but that solution must be subject to a process of legal justification. First-order justification would be sufficient when the outcome of a case can be logically deduced from a valid rule of law plus the operative facts proved by rules of evidence. But in many cases rules of law compete for acceptance or there may be rival interpretations of a valid rule of law. In such cases, a rule of law will be legally justified if it is coherent with valid legal principles, consistent with other binding rules of law, and has acceptable consequences.

In England, Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington’s project is “to articulate a theory of ethical action upon which a practice of justice can be built ...” Their claim is that if the law is not founded on just ethical principles it is not acceptable. In this context they analyze the criteria of judgments and consider practical judgments and aesthetic judgments. A key problem they notice is that discussions of justice are raised in a

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context in which there is a proliferation of under-regulated legal authorities without the solace of universal reason or principle promised by modernity. Hence decisions are injected with a sense and urgency of ethical responsibility. The line of solution they discuss is for law to adopt principles concerned with practical wisdom from the Aristotelian tradition and reflective aesthetic judgment from the Kantian tradition. They consider borrowing Aristotle’s notion of epiekeia, the idea that when a universal law does not do justice in a particular case, justice requires practical judgment to go beyond the rules. Although Aristotelian practical judgment is focused on specific situations, with the perception, understanding, and judging of the singular as singular, Douzinas and Warrington see this as a problem. This type of practical judgment is predicated on a teleology that does not exist today and cannot be recreated, in that there is no shared universe of values to guide practical judgments. They also reject Kant’s notion of practical judgment, in which practical judgments subsume the particular under the universal law, for the same reason. It does not provide a shared universe of value — the good life. Saluting Lacan and Levinas, their view is that “the good can only be defined according to the needs and demands of the other, the person in need ...”

Douzinas and Warrington turn to Kant’s notion of reflective aesthetic judgment in their quest to revitalize justice and ethics in law. It meets their requirements because it takes account of the unique features of each case and it also considers the relation between universal and particulars. Rather than summarizing their argument it is best to quote them:

Aesthetic judgments make a claim to universality, but their law is unknown, indeed non-existent; it is active in its application and yet always still to come and be formalized. The appeal to the universal makes a promise of community, of a sensus communis, and that appeal differentiates aesthetic judgments from contingent or idiosyncratic preferences and tastes. But the community remains virtual; aesthetic judgment alludes to its existence but this republic of taste can never become actual. These strict preconditions and qualities necessarily make the aesthetic judgment a judgment of pure form, uncontaminated by considerations of need, interest, desire or use.

10Douzinas and Warrington, Justice Miscarried, 182.
While everyone should be able to experience the pleasure of the feeling of beauty in confronting the aesthetic object, the subject cannot formulate the concept or the law that her judgment implies and thus make it accessible to others. Aesthetic judgments are examples in search of their rule, subjective and individual yet in the service of the undetermined universal. As the universal law and the community they imply cannot be actualized, they are only an idea present in each judgment which carries "the promise of its universalization as a constitutive feature of its singularity." The aesthetic community is in a continuous state of formation and dissolution; it is the precondition and horizon of judgment but each judgment passed marks the community's end.11

There are, however, problems with these explanations of legal reasoning. Legal theorists offer competing accounts of legal reasoning. MacCormick's version of the 'actual' decision-making process competes with that of the American Legal Realists. Although they both recognize the crucial role of hunches or insights in legal reasoning, MacCormick portrays the activity of having insights as essentially arbitrary, irrational, and unconscious. By contrast, the realists treat hunching as a conscious and deliberate problem-solving activity.

Further, both MacCormick and the Realists state that hunches or insights must be tested and justified. However, according to the Realists, the 'actual' decision-making process includes both hunching and the activities of checking and testing them. In other words, both discovery and justification are part of the decision-making process. In fact, they identify five elements in the judging process: puzzling and brooding, hunch or insight, checking and testing the hunch, reaching a solution or judgment, presenting the solution. By contrast, MacCormick portrays the 'actual' decision-making process in terms of only two elements — puzzling and having insights, activities that are said to be quite distinct from the more important process of publicly justifying a decision.

Legal theorists' explanations of legal decision-making are vague and undeveloped. The Realists and MacCormick do little more than name activities that are part of the decision-making process. There is no comprehensive explanation of, for example, the process of hunching or having

insights. Similar limitations can be detected in Burton’s, Alexy’s, and Douzinas and Warrington’s analyses of aspects of decision-making. Although Burton recognizes the importance of judgment in legal decision-making, his discussion of ‘weighing’ in terms of congeries of reasons, normative force, and action thresholds lacks precision. Alexy’s study of the grounds of the legitimacy of value judgments in special legal forms and rules ignores the human element in decision-making. Finally, Douzinas and Warrington’s discussion of reflective aesthetic judgment is incomprehensible. In short, legal theorists’ explanations of legal decision-making are less than satisfactory.

CogNITIoNAL THEorY

My brief foray into legal reasoning reveals a massive truncatedness in accounts of legal reasoning and judicial decision-making. The challenge is to relieve this truncatedness by a full thematic of questioning, understanding, formulating, judging, and expression in the legal context. People familiar with Lonergan’s explanation of cognitional theory will likely notice that an analysis of legal decision-making in light of that explanation should fit the bill. So, instead of the five elements identified by the Realists or MacCormick’s view of insight, legal reasoning would be understood as comprising fourteen or so elements – sensible experience and imaginative representations, What-questions, direct insights, formulations, Is-questions, reflective insights, judgments of fact, What-is-to-be-done-questions, practical insights, plans, What-should-be-done-questions, practical reflective insights, judgments of value, decisions, implementations, and so on. It would be evident from cognitional theory that legal decision-making involves four types of hunch or insight, not one.

Legal decision-making would also be explained in terms of a recurring relational structure in which questions are posed, insights are experienced, judgments are made, further questions are asked, and so on until a satisfactory answer or solution is reached. The structure is relational in that a type of question or insight is defined by its place in the pattern of operations. Take Is-questions. Is-questions call for reflective insights and judgments. Further, Is-questions draw on direct insights for
their contents and they draw on sensible presentations to supply evidence for a prospective judgment of fact.

To be more specific, the unique contribution to the decision-making process of a judgment is an answer to an Is-question — ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Lonergan calls this the proper content of a judgment. An example of the proper content of a judgment in the legal context would be the judgment ‘He is guilty.’ But a judgment also has a borrowed content. The borrowed content of a judgment is comprised of two aspects — the direct borrowed content and the indirect borrowed content. Reflection draws on previous cognitional activities for these contents. The direct borrowed content can be found in the Is-question that is asked. The direct borrowed content of the judgment ‘He is guilty’ is the question ‘Is he guilty?’ The indirect borrowed content emerges in the reflective insight that links question and answer. It qualifies the judgment by claiming the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to be true, either certainly true, probably true, or only possibly true. The indirect borrowed content of the judgment ‘He is guilty’ is the implicit meaning ‘It is true beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.’ The proper content of the judgment ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ or ‘He is guilty’ completes the process of factual knowing. But the proper content of a judgment is meaningless without the question it answers. Hence the proper and borrowed contents of a judgment form an integrated whole.12

Discussions about how judges weigh reasons would quickly move beyond vague talk about congeries of reasons, normative force, action thresholds, and reflective aesthetic judgment if weighing is analyzed in terms of a judge’s performance and achievement of reflective insight and practical reflective insight. Explanations of the ground of legal judgment would be more precise if investigations were carried out in light of the operation of the thirteen elements. Legal theorists would discover that the ground of a judgment of fact is the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for that judgment and the ground of a judgment of value is the grasp of the sufficiency of the reasons for judging that one course of action is more suitable than others. But ultimately they would discover that the ground of judgment is the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible judge

operating at his or her best. In short, the ground of legal judgment would no longer be seen as special rules or forms of argumentation.

Insight would no longer be considered irrational, where rationality is taken in its fullest sense. Insight depends on both sub-rational patterning and rational patterning. Kekulé's famous daydream of the dancing snake that led to his discovery of the benzene ring illustrates sub-rational patterning. Here, the sub-rational provided a clue, an image, for insight. Memory can also provide instances that would counter a prospective judgment and imagination can devise possibilities that would run counter to a prospective judgment. These activities are not seen as being arbitrary or irrational. Rather, we might even argue that they make rational thought, in the narrow sense, possible. After all, people who are considered wise are people who are able to consider all the angles of a problem. The type of patterning that is clearly rational is illustrated by a good courtroom lawyer who, having organized all the elements of a case, takes a jury through the relevant elements with flair one step at a time in order to help them reach the desired insights and judgments.

The Problem of Communication

At this stage the reader familiar with Lonergan's work may sense that the problem of communication is minimal. It would seem that the legal theorist has only to face the task of reading Lonergan's Insight and move the relevant discourse into the legal context. Still, one might recall Lonergan's problem of getting people to read Aquinas as he described it in the Epilogue to his Verbum articles: "the task of developing one's own understanding so as to understand Aquinas' comprehension of understanding and of its intelligibly proceeding inner word."13 Again, one can recall the twist of Lonergan's statement in Method in Theology: "One has not only to read Insight, but to discover oneself in oneself."14 Even with the best of good will, the reading of Insight may not do it. A legal theorist might well become familiar with the elements of meaning as named by

14 Insight, CWL 3 260.
Lonergan — I write from a decade of experience with colleagues — yet miss the point. Witness Mary Ann Glendon, who writes "Insight, Lonergan teaches, is mysterious," in spite of her evident familiarity with Lonergan's writings. The issue here is complex. Let us take it in the easy stages of a moving viewpoint.

Even if a legal theorist arrives at some knowledge of the thirteen elements and examines them in the legal context, it has become evident to me that it is still very difficult to communicate adequately with them. (The full meaning of 'adequacy' will emerge later.) Not only do legal theorists frequently miss the implications and significance of Lonergan's work in the legal context even when they are spelled out, but they also fail to understand the nature of cognitional structure. Most people are aware that they see and hear. Yet the achievement of noticing their own direct insights and reflective insights is another matter. Understanding the operation of these activities is an even more remote achievement. The present academic culture is uncomprehending of just how much it is 'another matter,' a materia of sophisticated science. There is, then, a very real problem of communicating the results of investigations into the role of the thirteen elements in law to colleagues.

Why does an explanation of cognitional theory, such as that offered by Lonergan in Insight or an interpretation of it in the legal context by me in "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making not lead to successful communication? How can an explanation of our relational structure and its implications in law be communicated to legal theorists unfamiliar with Lonergan's work? A line of solution would seem to involve a more adequate presentation of cognitional theory which would lead the reader beyond a passing familiarity with names. But the problem does not seem to be simply a matter of providing clearer expressions. In order to indicate the complexity of the problem of communication it is useful to consider it


in terms of the elements Lonergan’s identified in a simple interpretation.17 Lonergan’s expression of cognitional theory can be found in *Insight*. That expression is governed by his practical insights F that depend on (1) the principal insight A that he wants to communicate, (2) his grasp B of his anticipated audience’s intellectual development C, and (3) his grasp D of the deficiencies in insight E that have to be overcome in order to communicate insight A. My interpretation of Lonergan’s expression involves (1) communicating my principal insights A’ regarding the thirteen elements to an audience of legal theorists. My related problems include (2) grasping B’ the legal theorists intellectual development C’ and also (3) grasping D’ their deficiencies in insight E’ that must be overcome if my principal insight A’ is to be successfully communicated. My expression is guided by my practical insight F’ that depends on my insights A’, B’, D’.

And, of course, members of the audience must read the materials, achieve insights, and reach judgments on what they understand. Communication, then, involves many activities that must be performed successfully.

Other presentations in the ‘Lonergan literature,’ however, do not seem to solve the problem of communication. They are more conventional expressions, more in the style of Lonergan’s own presentation in *Insight* but without the moving viewpoint of that work. These efforts cannot be seen as work in the eighth functional specialty Communications and they do not adequately address the deficiencies in the intellectual development of audiences outside the writers’ own horizons.

*Insight* itself even falls under Lonergan’s own criticism to the extent that it suffers from the limitations of the treatise.18 According to Lonergan, the “function of the treatise is to present clearly, exactly, and fully the content and implications of a determinate and coherent set of insights.”19 In doing so the treatise “mercilessly disregards the habitual intellectual development and the anticipated deficiencies in insight in its readers.”20 Of course, *Insight* is not a treatise in the strict sense defined by Lonergan in chapter 17, § 3.4. However, *Insight* shares the limitations of the treatise

17 *Insight*, CWL 3 585-587.
18 *Insight*, CWL 3 595-600.
19 *Insight*, CWL 3 596.
20 *Insight*, CWL 3 596.
insofar as it does not take into account the educational level of readers. The assortment of mistaken and incomplete interpretations of cognitional theory are evidence that the type of expression in *Insight* by itself is not adequate.

In terms of the limitations of the treatise identified by Lonergan the first limitation of *Insight* is that although Lonergan's goal is communication, his presentation depends on expression that is not exact and rigorous. He must use ordinary language to express his introduction and basic concepts before being able to rely on the precision of his basic concepts in subsequent chapters. The limitation of *Insight* is that Lonergan means something quite different from that which ordinary language would suggest to contemporary audiences. Perhaps this is one explanation why it is difficult to communicate the nature of cognitional theory to legal theorists.

The second limitation of the treatise identified by Lonergan is that a treatise cannot contain a whole field on inquiry. In his words, the problem is that "for every set of definitions and axioms there is also a set of further questions that arise, but cannot be answered, on the basis of the definitions and axioms." The limitation *Insight* shares with the treatise is that Lonergan's expression in *Insight* may be taken to be the whole story. Readers may fail to notice they must investigate their own fields and concerns in light of *Insight*. There is also the possibility of making the related error of dismissing Lonergan's presentation of cognitional theory as just one more theory of knowledge in the panoply.

The third limitation of the treatise Lonergan identifies is that it cannot adequately capture the contemporary state of a question. In Lonergan's opinion, more or less definitive knowledge can be expressed usefully in the form of a treatise, but tentative solutions, tendencies, and unsolved problems that point to future lines of inquiry would be misrepresented if expressed in the form of the treatise. The reader of *Insight* can be forgiven for thinking that Lonergan has sorted out many problems. However, the reader may fail to appreciate the fuller context of the presentation and the lines of inquiry it opens in his or her own field such as law.

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21 *Insight*, CWL 3 596-597.
The fourth limitation of the treatise is that the treatise cannot adequately capture the dynamic and incomplete nature of commonsense insights. Common sense is without precise terms and definitions. In the legal context the problem is how to adequately present a theoretic account of a common sense activity to legal 'theorists' who have no appreciation of the horizon of theory. Further, the links between Lonergan's explanation of cognitional theory and the practice of law have not been worked out in detail so it would seem easy for legal theorists to consider explanations of legal reasoning guided by an understanding of cognitional theory to be unimportant.

Insight is also particularly vulnerable to haute vulgarisation. The current careerism of the academic community calls for summarizers, simplifiers, glossators, and consumer-friendly forms of presentation. The novel and complex analyses and arguments in Insight make excellent raw materials for such projects. Unfortunately, these new forms of expression are more likely to be incomplete and mistaken than educational.

A brief discussion of distinction between axiomatic and rhetorical expression highlights one broad difficulty of communicating. The role of expression (oral, written, or actions) is to invite or facilitate insight, judgment, evaluation. Yet axiomatic expression, the type of expression used predominately in Insight and in my "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making, does not seem to facilitate understanding of the elements in law. The primary purpose of axiomatic expression is to set forth clearly and exactly the terms, relations, and implications of what is understood and judged. It disregards what a reader already knows and the elements that would lead a reader to understanding. Although axiomatic expression, like any type of expression, represents the possibility of a reader's understanding, judging, evaluating, the elements are portrayed as static and permanent objects rather than as a recurring pattern of mental activities. The adequacy of this type of expression depends on the competence of the reader to grasp the relevant insights. The problem associated with axiomatic expression is that the reader could miss crucial insights, but still judge that they understand the materials. Axiomatic expression, then, is inadequate because the reader must be invited by the writer to notice and understand the operation of the thirteen elements.
Adequate communication of the nature of cognitional structure calls for rhetorical expression. Such expression, of course, has been an object of discussion since what Jaspers would call the beginning of the axial period in the various cultures of China and the Middle East. The Western tradition can find its beginning in Socrates. That tradition, and others, will eventually be caught up into a full functional specialist retrieval. Here, however, we are gathering hints. Relevant hints are given by Philip McShane in some of his writings, for example, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations* and *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*. The expression is rhetorical in that both books are invitations to readers to ‘detect detecting,’ to grasp insight into insight. He provides problems for readers to solve as an aid to encourage readers to attend to their procedures of problem solving. In his opinion, “The two questions, ‘What is mass?’ and ‘What is mind?’ have to be tackled by attending to the relevant data and doing lots of exercises.” This is a difficult task. Legal theorists may be, as McShane notes concerning Gabriel Betteridge in *The Moonstone*, “too full of domestic responsibilities to feel the ‘detective fever’ as he might have felt it under other circumstances.” Or, they may be straightjacketed by some mistaken theory of knowledge.

Rhetorical expression illustrates the writer’s direct concern with the reader’s questions and insights. The primary aim of this type of expression is to provoke insight, judgment, decision. The writer must discover or anticipate what the reader does know and does not know and then identify and organize the elements that would lead the reader to the desired insight, judgment, decision. Communication is adequate insofar as the writer correctly estimates the education and attitude of the reader and selects elements that have some meaning to the reader. Yet rhetorical expression is not common in academic writing.

McShane regularly refers to Lonergan’s suggestions regarding linguistic feedback somehow turning the meaning of words towards

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ourselves, and he occasionally uses explicit neologistic devices such as the Bridge of Oxen\(^{26}\) to initiate what he anticipates will eventually be a massive third-stage meaning shift. According to Lonergan, such a future development of language would increase “the possibility of insight ... by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective.”\(^{27}\) In the legal context, law would not simply be understood as written or unwritten rules, as an object, but instead law primarily would be understood as an activity. Law would be understood as a creative problem-solving process demanding intelligence and reasonableness. The word lawing would become as acceptable as the word cooking. And the legal syllogism would be understood through a renewal of expression in terms of four different types of insight. Such pointers are scarcely beginnings. One has to anticipate an eventual shift from the ritualized discourse of legal theory and practice to a discourse that retains a theoretic and metatheoretic complexity yet brings Jack and Jill, Judge and Jury into a new resonance, consonance, of subjectivity.

At this stage it is worth recalling the humble place of humor and satire in such a transition. In Insight Lonergan recognizes their potential for transformation. According to Lonergan, the possible function of satire “would depict the counterpositions in their current concrete features, and by that serene act of cool objectification it would hurry them to their destiny of bringing about their own reversal.”\(^{28}\) Satire challenges by laughter, not argument. “Purposeless laughter can dissolve honored pretense, it can disrupt conventional humbug; it can disillusion man of his most cherished illusions.”\(^{29}\) Regarding humor, the possible function of humor is to keep “the positions in contact with human limitation and


\(^{28}\) Insight, CWL 3 649.

\(^{29}\) Insight, CWL 3 649.
infirmity. It listens with sincere respect to the Stoic description of the Wise Man, and then requests an introduction."\textsuperscript{30}

Akin to such comedic elements is the shift of context from the academic to the social which may lift the conversation from anti-dialogue to dialogue, "meeting as subjects."\textsuperscript{31} Ivan Illich notes that "most learning happens casually, and even most intentional learning is not the result of teaching"\textsuperscript{32} and there is the admission of Alfred Eichner that "Late in the day, after they have had two or three drinks, many economics professors will begin to admit to their own reservations about the theory which forms the core of the economics curriculum."\textsuperscript{33} But here I would note a shift of intention in this very paragraph. I have given random and peripheral references regarding the topic. I could extend these, moving into the different worlds of the American Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and postmodern legal analyses. The randomness and the references, however, serve to draw attention to the desperate need for order in our search for a transposition of communication. So, I am led back to my introductory remarks regarding the foundations of such a transposition.

CONCLUSION

Where would these random references, these possible contributions to the transformation of legal thinking, living, communication, find their new academic place? It seems evident that debates, comparisons, contrasts, and so on, of perspectives on and in law are clearly to be placed with the fourth functional specialty Dialectics. Most precisely, page 250 of Method in Theology gives an account of the strategy of the massive and efficient labor involved in this. This effort represents a huge discontinuity in discourse about law. The transition may be aided by the implementation

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Insight}, CWL 3 649.

\textsuperscript{31}The references here are to Paulo Freire. On dialogue, see \textit{Education for Critical Consciousness} (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 45ff. On 'meeting as subjects' and liberation of dialogue in general, see \textit{The Politics of Education} (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1982) 100 and passim.


of the principles of criticism within Lonergan’s canons of hermeneutics, but even these are discomforting. For example, the first principle of criticism allows that the demand for the universal viewpoint can be expressed in reviewing what I might call random writing in the legal context. The transition to Dialectics and subjectivity, however, is strangely helped by the type of broad objectivity that the canon of explanation introduces. One moves from direct criticism, or from comparing X and Y (even when Y is Lonergan) to the beginnings of the larger metahistoric task.

Obviously, the conclusion of an article introducing the problem is not the place to view such a task, even descriptively. But perhaps what I have written can help towards a new rhetoric, a fuller humility, a broader humor, in facing the struggle out of the web of ways and words that constitute our present legal lives.

\[34^{\text{Insight, CWL 3} 610-612}\]
COMMON SENSE, SPACE, AND THE PROBLEM OF TROUBLED CONSCIOUSNESS

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Human intelligence operates within the temporal context of the serial unfolding of experience. The serial unfolding of experience extrinsically conditions the questions which subjects ask and thus the insights they achieve, since insights are into images. The extrinsic conditioning of intelligence by the sensible and the imaginal can limit the full operation of intelligence by arbitrarily restricting the contexts of meaning in which the subject can operate.

Our consideration will focus upon the relationship between the level of presentations and the level of intelligence. In particular we will consider the relations between experience and intelligence in two contexts: (1) common sense and the problem of 'troubled consciousness'; and (2) the comparatively long time which proved necessary to the development of a theoretical justification for the obviously successful procedures of the calculus. In both instances, we will argue, the 'problem' resides in the difficulty which intelligence has in freeing itself from the arbitrary limitations imposed upon the insight by the tendency of the subject to continue to 'see' or 'understand' the insight in terms of the data in which it was first grasped. One key way in which these limits are imposed is through the subject's spatialization of the world.
Common Sense and Spatiality

Common sense is a specialization of intelligence. Intelligence is specialized when it is dominated by a set of interrelated questions and the answers which they engender. Common sense is the specialization of intelligence in the practical questions of living and securing one’s well-being within the world. It is the spontaneous and primal development of intelligence. Within the common sense patterning of experience, intelligence tends to restrict the questions it poses to those which have some plausible relevance to its practical projects. To understand the reason for this restriction requires an understanding of the relationship between the common sense specialization of intelligence and what Lonergan terms ‘biological extroversion.’

Lonergan argues that there are two characteristic modes of human knowing: ‘extroversion’ whose object is the ‘already-out-there-now-real’ or ‘body,’ and ‘intentionality’ whose object is the ‘thing.’ The difference between these two modes is grounded in different but related vital concerns: (1) self- and species-preservation; and (2) the pure and unrestricted desire to know. Both of these vital concerns orient subjectivity. Self-preservation orients subjectivity towards an ‘environment’ or a ‘habitat’ in which one’s well-being is secured. The pure and unrestricted desire to know orients subjectivity towards a ‘world’ which is in part mediated by meaning and in part constituted by meaning. Both of these concerns separately and in concert can direct or effect the ‘flow’ of sensation and can result in characteristic patternings of experience. The biological patterning of experience, for example, is an intelligible unity discernible within the flow of sensations whose unity derives from the dominance of biological drives or purposiveness within sensible consciousness. The intellectual patterning of experience, by contrast, derives from the domination of sensible consciousness by intelligence. The difference between the two patternings of experience is marked.


2*Insight*, CWL 3 293.

3*Insight*, CWL 3 206.
Lonergan notes the difference between the intellectual pattern of experience and the biological pattern of experience:

The aesthetic liberation and the free artistic control of the flow of sensations and images, of emotions and bodily movements, not merely break the bonds of biological drive but also generate in experience a flexibility that makes it a ready tool for the spirit of inquiry ... So deep is the penetration, so firm the dominance, so strange the transformation of sensitive spontaneity [by the pure and unrestricted desire to know], that memories and anticipations rise above the threshold of consciousness only if they possess at least a plausible relevance to the decision to be made. For the stream of consciousness is a chameleon; and as its pattern can be biological or artistic, so too can it become the automatic instrument, or rather the vitally adaptive collaborator, of the spirit of inquiry.4

The mutual inherence of both of these characteristic ways of knowing (and the characteristic patternings of experience which underpin them) constitutes a dialectical tension within the commonsense subject. This dialectic of commonsense subjectivity creates an ever-present tendency for the commonsense knower to misunderstand the nature of his or her objects of knowledge. Within the context of theory, the subject operates as if verified insights were the criterion of the true and the real. However, it is impossible for subjects to operate exclusively within this pattern of experience. When they return to the dramatic or practical patterns of experience, the pressure to think of objects in terms of the already-out-there-now-real is very strong. The distinction between 'bodies' and 'things' can only be made by subjects operating within the intellectual pattern of experience who are attending to the dynamics of their own process of inquiry.

The extroversion of consciousness toward its environment is a quality which human persons share with the lower animals. The function of the extroversion of consciousness is to secure the biological-organismic well-being of the animal within its environment. Lonergan comments:

As in the plant, so in the animal there go forward immanent vital processes without the benefit of any conscious control. The formation and nutrition of organic structures and their supports, the

4Insight, CWL 3 209.
distribution and neural control of muscles, the physics of the vascular system ... fit into intelligible patterns of biological significance. Yet it is only when their functioning is disturbed that they enter into consciousness. Indeed, not only is a large part of animal living nonconscious, but the conscious part itself is intermittent. Animals sleep. It is as though the full-time business of living called forth consciousness as a part-time employee, occasionally to meet problems of malfunctioning, but regularly to deal rapidly, effectively, and economically with the external situations in which sustenance is to be won and into which offspring are to be born. ... Thus extroversion is a basic characteristic of the biological pattern of experience ... It is this extroversion of function that underpins the confrontational element of consciousness itself.\(^5\)

Commonsense intelligence emerges within a consciousness which is divided among many concerns. It is vitally concerned with securing the well-being of its body and its panoply of needs within a complex and sometimes hostile environment. As biology calls forth consciousness, so consciousness calls forth intelligence. Common sense, however, transforms human biology and endows the body and its needs with broader meaning and significance. Lonergan comments:

human desires are not simply the biological impulses of hunger for eating and of sex for mating. Indeed, man is an animal for whom mere animality is indecent. It is true enough that eating and drinking are biological performances. But in man they are dignified by their spatial and psychological separation from the farm, the abattoir, the kitchen; they are ornamented by the elaborate equipment of the dining room, by the table manners imposed upon children, by the deportment of adult convention. Again, clothes are not a simple-minded matter of keeping warm. They are the colored plumes of birds as well as the furs of animals. They disguise as well as cover and adorn, for man's sensible and sensing body must not appear to be merely a biological unit.\(^6\)

However, transformation of the biological is not necessarily transcendence of the biological. Common sense never escapes its foundations in biological need. It remains wedded to vital needs even as it transforms them, adorns them, re-orient them. The questions which it

\(^5\) *Insight*, CWL 3 206-207.

\(^6\) *Insight*, CWL 3 210.
poses must always have some relation to the life-world which is bounded by birth and death and vitally concerned with the fragility of existence. While human living is not limited to operating exclusively within the life-world and can constitute for itself other worlds, it always returns there.

The emergence of new worlds out of the commonsense world can create another kind of tension within consciousness. In particular the emergence of the world of theory and the theoretical differentiation of consciousness gives rise to the 'problem of troubled consciousness.' Commonsense consciousness as undifferentiated insists upon homogeneity. If the procedures of common sense are correct, then theory must be mistaken. Only the emergence of the interiority which the self-appropriation of consciousness makes possible resolves this apparent conflict. Self-appropriation, if it is to be thorough-going, is difficult, for the tendency of common sense to strive for homogeneity between the commonsense and theoretical worlds is strong. We shall argue that one fundamental way in which common sense strives to enforce homogeneity between the life-world and the theoretical world is through the extension of its characteristic 'spatialization' of the world into the world of theory. Commonsense spatiality (or what we shall call 'existential spatiality') intrudes upon the world of theory in subtle ways. One must understand, then, the character of commonsense spatiality in order better to detect its unwarranted protrusion into the theoretical world.


8 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979) 84ff. Lonergan comments, "[t]roubled consciousness emerges when an Eddington contrasts his two tables: the bulky, sold, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless 'wavicles' so minute that the desk was mostly empty space."

9 Lonergan, Method in Theology 84.

10 There are characteristic ways in which theoretical consciousness when it is troubled tends to misunderstand the role and function of commonsense intelligence. For a fuller treatment of this problem, see John Haught, Religion and Self-Acceptance (Washington, DC: The University of America Press, 1980) 41ff.
Existential Spatiality

Common sense is spontaneously self-referential. This is not to contend that commonsense subjects are selfish or self-centered in a morally reprehensible way. (While they may be, such selfishness has nothing to do with the self-referential character of commonsense consciousness.) Rather, to contend that common sense is self-referential is merely to elaborate upon the 'practical' character of common sense. The self-referential character of the commonsense world is clearly carried by the subject's spontaneous spatialization of the world as is shown by Jean Piaget's account of the child's development of a system of spatial organization.

Piaget's account of the child's system of spatial organization serves to reinforce the account we have given of the spontaneously self-referential character of commonsense spatiality. In Piaget's account, the child moves from the sensorimotor stage through the preoperational substage and the concrete operational stage, to the stage of formal operations. In the sensorimotor stage, the 'object' is keyed to the sensorimotor operations which the child performs: turning the head, focusing the eyes, moving towards or away. This unified set of operations determines the nature and meaning of any given 'object' for the child. At this stage, the objects which populate the child's world have no permanence or stability beyond the transitory acts by which he or she perceives them. If you offer an infant at this stage of development her rattle, she may reach for it. Her eyes will follow the movement of the object. However, if in her seeing you should hide the rattle under her blanket, she will not look for the object under the blanket (as she will do later in her development). The 'meaning' of the 'object' at this stage is simply the unified set of sensorimotor operations which allows her to perceive the object while it is visible. Once it passes beyond the point where it can be made present by this unified set of bodily motions, it no longer 'exists' (to speak anachronistically) for the child. Toward the end of the sensorimotor period of development, the object will attain a sense of permanence beyond these motions: when you hide the object behind your back or under the blanket, she will look to find it.
The child’s experience of space also moves through the same set of permutations in the process of sensorimotor development. Space for the sensorimotor child is a function of the sensorimotor operations which she performs. Near and far, open and closed, inside and outside, order and disorder, and other such spatial qualities are understood by the sensorimotor child in terms of her body-as-center and its movements. The key to understanding Piaget’s insights resides in understanding that the ‘meaning’ of objects for children (up to adolescence) derives from the child’s own concrete operations with the object. Meaning emerges from the operations of the child and its success or failure in manipulating the objects to do what the child wants them to do. Meaning in these early stages of formation is ‘concrete’ rather than ‘formal’, that is, derives from the thought that follows action, rather than from the thought which precedes action. The later, ‘formal’ meaning, is characteristic of the later and higher stages of cognitive development.

In Piaget’s account of cognitive development, formal operational behavior emerges when the adolescent shifts his or her approach to objects in the world from concrete and kinesthetic operations to formal or mental operations. At this stage of development, the ‘object’ ceases to primarily identified with that which can be concrete manipulated in various ways and becomes a subset of what can be formally manipulated. For the formal operational adolescent, the real becomes a subset of the possible. He or she no longer thinks first in terms of what is, but rather in terms of what could be. For example, in an experiment designed to uncover cognitive differences between concrete operational children and formal operational children, Piaget presented children with five vessels of clear liquids which, when combined correctly, yielded the color yellow. The concrete operational child proceeded to produce the desired effect by trial and error, with no preformed plan of procedure. The formal operational child, however, spontaneously considered all of the possibilities prior to beginning and proceeded to experimentally exhaust all of the possibilities.11

Piaget discusses the cognitive development of the child through its various stages in terms of what he calls 'egocentrism.' In the sensorimotor, pre-operational, and concrete operational stages of cognitive development, the child is unable to transcend the limitation of his or her own place, time, and point of view. For example, in his work with concrete operational children, Piaget experimented with this egocentrism by telling a child a story and asking him to repeat the story to another just as it had been told to him. Consistently the concrete operational child would omit vital elements of the story which would have been required to communicate the storyline to another. When questioned about his memory of the story as it had been related to him, it was clear that he remembered all the requisite elements. The problem resided in the inability of the child to adopt the point of view of the other in order to see what the other needed to know in order to understand the story. This type of egocentrism is transcended in the formal operational development. The formal operational adolescent is capable of envisioning the point of view of the other and of seeing what the other lacked in order to understand the story. However, what is not transcended is the sense of a privileged center. The formal operational child can coordinate a variety of centers, but each center is understood in terms of the primal center which is one's own subjectivity. The subjective center is merely formally transposed from the concrete center of 'here and now' to any number of other possible centers 'there and then.' While the formal operational child is freed from the spontaneous egocentrism of the earlier stages, a yet more profound (because more difficult to focus upon) self-referentiality remains.

The essentially self-referential nature of the commonsense subject's spontaneous spatialization of the world is further suggested by the work of the Danish theorist of architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz, in his attempts to develop an adequate and phenomenologically sophisticated theory of space. Norberg-Schulz develops a notion of spatiality which he terms 'existential spatiality,' by which he understands the 'intelligence which interconnects ... sensations.' In Norberg-Schulz's view, the

topological relations of enclosure, proximity, order, and continuity dominate spontaneous perception. Such relations are incorporated into the spatial order imposed by a Euclidean geometrical organization of spatial relations which emerges within the process of cognitive development. The topological relations require a point of reference, a center in terms of which near is near, order is established, or 'something' is enclosed, and so on. The prime referent is the subject. Lived space draws its meaning from its reference to the space of the subjective center. Norberg-Schulz argues that one spontaneously orders one's world in terms of oneself as center and projects that order into a variety of other spaces. He comments, 'Man's space is subjectively centered. The development of the [spatial] schemata does not only mean that the center is established as a means of general organization, but that certain centers are 'externalized' as points of reference in the environment.' Norberg-Schulz utilizes this account of the subject's spontaneous spatialization of the lived world to give an account of the architectural organization of lived space. In this account, the central concept is the relation of 'inside' to 'outside.' The lived world is arranged, like Chinese boxes, in terms of a series of spaces within spaces, from the self 'inside' the body, to the cosmos as the 'container' of all.

Norberg-Schulz utilizes Piaget's account of cognitive development to understand existential spatiality (which we are taking as the spatiality of the commonsense subject). The point to be emphasized in Piaget's work is the manner in which the development of formal operational capacities within intelligence continues to be related to the prior stages of development. We suggested that one ground of similarity is an egocentricism which characterizes both the formal operational stage and the prior developmental stages. The formal operational subject continues to understand and operate with space in terms of a privileged center. While the formal operational subject can transpose that center into any number of other centers, the fundamental context from which the formal operational subject continues to organize space is in terms of the 'body-as-center.'

—Norberg-Schulz, Existence, Space, and Architecture 18.
From the body-as-center all other topological relations are derived: near and far, in and out, open and closed, ordered and disordered, and so on.

Norberg-Schulz’s work on existential spatiality and Piaget’s on the meaning of ‘objects’ and the ‘space’ which they occupy suggest some important insights which assist in our understanding of common sense. In some important ways, Piaget’s work on cognitive development and Norberg-Schulz’s characterization of existential spatiality adumbrates the meaning of the ‘practical’ orientation of common sense. Lonergan characterizes the relations which the practical orientation of the common sense intelligence grasps as ‘descriptive.’ He comments upon the meaning of descriptive relations:

There exists, then, a determinate field or domain of ordinary description. Its defining or formal viewpoint is the thing as related to us, as it enters into the concerns of man. Its object is what is to be known by concrete judgments of fact, by judgments on the correctness of insights into concrete situations, by concrete analogies and generalizations, and by the collaboration of common sense.\(^{14}\)

In commonsense insights and judgments, one term of the relation grasped in insight and verified in judgment is always, in one way or another, the self. The self and its life-world is always, in a fashion, ‘at the center’ of the world of common sense. Norberg-Schulz’s work, building upon Piaget’s account of cognitive development, argues a similar point with respect to existential spatiality. As the formal operational subject’s utilization of existential spatiality allows for the projection of the center into other times and places and so escapes the narrow egocentricism of the earlier stages of cognitive development, so the commonsense subject can ‘see things from the point of view of another’ but in a manner which presupposes the centrality of the self.

We have argued that the development of existential spatiality manifests a key way in which the body-as-center exerts a subtle primacy. We have suggested that within this spontaneous organization of lived space we see manifest the biological foundations of the common sense specialization of intelligence. We will now argue that a similar phenomenon is evidenced even within the theoretical differentiation of

\(^{14}\textit{Insight, CWL 3 317.}\)
consciousness in even more subtle fashion, again through the influence of
spatiality. We will further argue that such phenomena contribute to the
problem of troubled consciousness. We will consider these issues
particularly in the context of the development of the theoretical
justification for the procedures of the calculus.

THEORETICALLY DIFFERENTIATED CONSCIOUSNESS

Differentiated Consciousness

The emergence of the theoretical differentiation of consciousness, and
particularly in the development of modern science, marks a shift away
from the centrality of the self. With the emergence of theory, intelligence
focuses upon the interrelationship of things among themselves rather than
upon things as they are related to oneself. This movement is nicely
illustrated in the emergence of modern science as championed by Galileo
and Descartes. Galileo and Descartes promoted the 'mathematization' of
phenomena as the most promising avenue for the new science to pursue.
Most simply, this means that phenomena are to be correlated with one
another in terms of their common relation to an independent measuring
standard. The measuring standard allows all relevant phenomena to be
assigned a number. These numbers, then, can be related to one another
mathematically. The data derived from this process are for the most part
the same, regardless of who measures.

Galileo, in his discovery of the principle of inertia, succeeded in
grasping the requisite insights by virtue of his ability to divorce his
consideration of objects in motion from his commonsense experience of
the motion. Up to this point, it was assumed that constant motion
required a cause for its continuation, because the common experience had
always been that motion decays. Galileo was able to abstract from
common experience by 'geometrizing' the data within the laboratory of
his imagination. Picturing the movement of objects in pure, Euclidean
space was one of the key sensible conditions that allowed the occurrence
of the insight that rest and constant motion are identical, and that only
change in motion required a cause. Galileo's method and its further
refinement in the ‘mathematization’ of phenomena marked a sea-change in science.

Some important assumptions and presuppositions, however, were overlooked by the tradition of modern science that emerged from these insights. Milič Čapek, in his important work, *The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics*, comments upon one important assumption that was overlooked by classical modern science from Galileo to Newton and beyond:

Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics are both based on deeply ingrained habits of imagination and thought whose strength is far greater than we are generally willing to concede ... Kant was so much impressed by this strength that he regarded it as a manifestation of the unchangeable *a priori* structure of the human mind. Herbert Spencer, in spite of his radically different epistemology, eventually agreed with Kant, at least as far as the immutability of the Newtonian-Euclidean form of intellect was concerned. This form of intellect is, according to Spencer, the final and definitive outcome of the long process of adjustment; in this process the external world created, so to speak, its accurate replica in the human mind in the form of the Newtonian-Euclidean picture of nature. No change in this picture was to be expected according to Spencer and the positivists and naturalists of the last century. In this respect they shared the general belief of their time in the irrevocably final character of classical science. This belief was justified not only by what then seemed overwhelming evidence in favor of the classical view of nature, but also by the evolutionary argument referred to above: classical physical science was regarded as the final and complete adjustment of human cognitive faculties to the objective order of things. Thus the idea of the absence of evolution in Kant led to the same conclusion as the idea of already completed evolution in Spencer’s evolutionary empiricism.\(^{15}\)

Čapek’s argument reveals how pervasive was the assumption of the identification of Euclidean space and reality: both rationalists and empiricists/positivists share the belief. The point of Čapek’s book is to show how this assumption is shattered by the emergence of relativity physics and quantum mechanics.

Joseph Flanagan, S.J. argues in his article “Body to Thing” that Galileo and Newton tacitly assumed that as the laws of physical motion were verified, a certain kind of spatio-temporality was also verified. Flanagan argues that this assumption by Galileo and Newton illustrates a general tendency: the assumption that as one verifies a set of intelligible relations in the process of judging, one also verifies a certain set of images from which the insight emerged and which have formed the context of verification of the insight.¹⁶

These reflections serve to alert us to the existence of a set of problems deriving from the relationship between even theoretical insights and the level of presentation. A preliminary understanding of these issues provides a clue to understanding the difficulties which attended upon formulating an adequate theoretical justification for the calculus.

*Imagination and the Development of the Calculus*

The history of mathematics reveals that mathematicians had a difficult time in theoretically justifying the obviously successful procedures of the calculus. The problem lay in the difficulty that they had in rigorously formulating the concept of the ‘limit.’ The concept of the limit in calculus tended to be linked with the concept of the ‘infinitely small,’ or the infinitesimal. The school of atomists under Democritus conceived a notion of the ‘mathematical atom’ at the same time as holding for the infinite divisibility of lines. If lines are infinitely divisible, then the smallest mathematical atom must be infinitely small. The same line of thought was adopted by the Pythagoreans. However, with the rise of the Eleatic school, this line of thought encountered severe criticism. The most famous set of criticisms from the Eleatic perspective are contained in Zeno’s paradoxes. Zeno reasoned that if line segments are conceived as constituted by an infinite number of elements, and if these elements are conceived as having any magnitude whatsoever, then the segment must be of infinite length. Or, if these infinitely small atoms are conceived as having no magnitude, then an infinite number of them constitutes no

length whatsoever.\textsuperscript{17} The criticisms of Zeno and the Eleatics proved problematic for Greek geometers and also for Newton and Leibniz (who developed the modern procedures for the calculus), for both the 'ancients' and the 'moderns' conceived methods of calculating the area under a curved surface which seemed implicitly to operate with the infinitesimal.

While both ancient and modern techniques for calculating the area under curved surfaces are accurate, there seemed to be no rigorous justification which answers problems like those posed by the Eleatics. The problem, as we suggested above, resided in the lack of a rigorous arithmetic definition of a 'limit.' However, as we shall see, the remote source of the problems resides in the prevalent tendency to utilize geometrico-imaginatively oriented explanations (principally utilizing the idea of the mathematical or geometrical 'atom') in order to explain and justify theoretically the obviously practically successful procedures for taking the integral and the derivative.

"The development of the concepts of the calculus," Carl Boyer notes in his work on the history of the calculus, "may be considered to have begun with the Pythagorean effort to compare — through the superposition of geometrical magnitude — length, areas, and volumes, in the hope of thus associating with each configuration a number."\textsuperscript{18} The procedures for determining the area under a curve (that is, taking the integral) can be conceived in the following fashion. On a Cartesian


\textsuperscript{18}Boyer, The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development 96.
coordinate system, draw a curved line which extends from the origin to point \((x, y)\). (See Figure 1.) The area which one wishes to determine is the area under the curve which extends from \((0, 0)\) to \((x, y)\). Construct upon the figure a series of rectangles under the curve. (See Figure 2.) The area of each rectangle is known \([y(x_{n+1} - x_n)]\). The area under the curve consists in the sum of areas of all of the rectangles plus the portion of the area under the curve which is not included in any of the rectangles. As the size of the rectangles becomes smaller, the difference between the sum of the areas of the rectangles and the total area under the curve decreases. As the differential approaches zero, the area of each of the rectangles approaches zero as well. The sum of the areas of all of the rectangles approaches the total area under the curve. When the difference between the sum of the areas of the rectangles and the total area under the curve equals zero, the number of the rectangles must be infinite and, in order to calculate the area under the curve, one must be able to take the sum of the area of this infinite number of infinitely small rectangles. One is faced with Zeno’s paradox. Either the actual area of each of the rectangles is zero and therefore the sum of the infinite series is zero, or the rectangles have some area and the sum of an infinite number of them constitutes an infinite amount.

The problem facing the mathematical theorist attempting to justify the procedures of the calculus was historically formulated as the problem of infinitesimals, that is, the problem of taking the sum of an infinite number of infinitely small geometrical atoms, which sum constitutes the area under the curve. Procedurally, in the method for determining the derivative, the calculus disregards terms containing elements which, when taken to their limit, approach zero. In the method for calculating the integral, the calculus takes the sum of an infinite number of infinitely small areas. The practice is doubly strange, for in the one case, one disregards some terms in the equation (for the magnitudes are so slight as to negligible); and in the other, one takes the sum of these same quantities.

The problem can be helpfully formulated in terms of the difficulty of operating mathematically with infinities. In attempting to formulate a justification for the procedures by which ancient and medieval mathema-
ticians were calculating the area under a curve, Galileo proposed a third type of possible aggregation between the finite and the infinite:

[Galileo] maintained ... that continuous magnitudes are made up of indivisibles. However, inasmuch as the number of parts is infinite, the aggregation of these is not one resembling a very fine powder, but rather a sort of merging of parts into unity, as in the case of fluids.\(^1\)

Boyer comments that "this analogy is a beautiful illustration of the effort to picture in some way the transition from the finite to the infinite."\(^2\) Galileo's account illustrates the geometrico-imaginative context in which mathematicians had been thinking theoretically about what they were doing as they did calculus.

Isaac Newton's attempts to formulate a defense of the procedures of the calculus were bound up in a similar manner with thinking in terms of geometrical images. He proposed in his *Principia Mathematica* three different ways of interpreting what one was doing in the new methods of calculus (for whose development he was, in part, responsible). He proposed understanding these methods in terms of (1) the notion of the infinitesimal; (2) the notion of the derivative as the ultimate ratio of the change in the relations of the \(x\) variable to the \(y\) variable; (3) the method of fluxions. While the most fruitful of the three approaches for formulating the conceptual basis of the calculus is the notion of the derivative as the limit of an ultimate ratio between the range and the domain, Boyer comments that "the fact that Newton could thus present all three views as essentially equivalent shows us how far he was from viewing his method as quite distinct from the somewhat equivalent methods of his predecessors and contemporaries."\(^3\) Further, while Newton's presentation of a theoretical justification for the calculus in the *De quadratura* and the *Principia Mathematica* proved most fruitful and most resembles the contemporary formulation of the conceptual basis of the calculus, its


\(^3\)Boyer, *The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development* 201.
problematic nature resides yet in its all too geometrical character. Boyer comments:

Newton’s view of a limit, like that of ... earlier workers [Gregory of St. Vincent, Lacquet, Wallis, Steven Valerio], was bound up with geometric intuitions which led him to make vague and ambiguous statements ... These remarks imply that Newton was not thinking arithmetically, as we do now, of the limit of the sequence of numbers representing the ratio of the (arithmetical) lengths of the geometrical quantities involved, as these become indefinitely small, but he was also influenced by the infinitesimal views of the seventeenth century to think of ultimate geometrical indivisibles.22

The fact that Newton continued to swing back and forth between an arithmetically oriented presentation and a geometrically oriented one precluded him from adequately justifying the procedures of the calculus.

The rigorous formulation of the conceptual justification of the procedures of the calculus had to await several developments in mathematics. Upon the formulation of an adequate concept of a ‘number,’ a ‘function,’ and a ‘variable,’ the way was opened for a rigorous defense. Further, the advent of these concepts marks the liberation of mathematics in general and the calculus in particular from its over-dependence upon the intuitive, geometrically oriented context of its prior development. For the ancient Greeks, particularly the Pythagoreans, numbers were identified with magnitudes, that is, were considered as the ultimate abstractions of geometrical forms.23 Even with the development of analytic geometry in which geometrical forms were converted to algebraic equations “in which are implied all of the properties of the curve” or figure,24 mathematicians still failed to develop an adequate concept of ‘number.’ In contemporary thought concerning the meaning of ‘number’ and ‘variable,’ the variable in an algebraic equation stands in place of a number, and the number is unspecified. The key to the variables in the equation, though, is not number conceived as an ‘indeterminate constant,’ unknown but sought, but rather is the operations within the equation

which specify a set of relations which, when understood, specify the number. The heuristic symbols in an equation stand for a continuous variable whose meaning is determined by a function of the operations specified in the equation. For Fermat and Descartes, by contrast, the variables in an algebraic equation represented "indeterminate constants to which line segments could be associated, the tacit assumption being made that to every segment there corresponded some number." 

In general, the shift in mathematical theory which proved most fruitful in the development of the calculus was the shift away from numbers as specified magnitudes, known or unknown, to numbers as that which result from mathematical operations. Mathematical operations became more the focus. In contemporary mathematics, the meaning of 'variables' (and therefore 'numbers') has come to be seen as dependent upon the relations specified by the operations defined by an equation.

The shift in mathematical theory from numbers as magnitudes to numbers as the resultants of mathematical operations is coupled with the development of the concept of the 'function.' A function is defined as "a set of ordered pairs of objects such that no two ordered pairs of the set have the same first object but different second ones." The concept of a function allows one to define the set of second objects in an ordered pair (the 'range') in terms of the first set of objects in the pair (the 'domain'), since to each member of the domain there corresponds one and only one member of the range. The specification of the nature of a function allows for the maximum liberation of the variable from identification with any one number or magnitude and specifically focuses attention upon the operations which define the interrelationship between the range and the domain. The function allows the mathematician to operate without having to specify any particular ordered pair. The concept of the function precludes understanding numbers in a geometric way (that is, as corresponding to some magnitude) and requires that 'number' be understood as that which results from mathematical operations.

The development of the concept of 'number' and 'function' marks the liberation of mathematics proximally from its primal geometrical context of meaning and remotely from its identification with the world as perceived or imagined. From the perspective of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, these developments mark the emergence of mathematics as purely 'intellectual.' We indicated above that there operates within the commonsense subject a dialectic between extroversion and inquiry. This dialectical tension often results in common sense misunderstanding what it is doing when it is knowing. Common sense is likely to think that 'knowing is taking a good look' and the known is 'the already out there now real.' The intellectualist perspective grasps that the criterion of truth is the verified insight and that the real is that which is verified in judgment. In general, the intellectualist perspective understands that the key to knowing is not experiencing but inquiring, not sensing alone but a complex set of operations, ordered by inquiry, of which sensing is but a part. In the line of development in mathematical theory that we have briefly been tracing, we mark the significance of the emergence of primacy of the mathematical operation. The mathematical operation is essentially an insight. For example, when Lonergan discusses the concept of the arithmetic series $1, 2, 3 \ldots$, the key to the series lies in the ellipsis, \ldots, for to understand what the ellipsis means is to have had the insight into the relation which obtains between the numbers in the series. In that insight, one is liberated from the particulars ('1, 2, 3') and has grasped in one moment the infinite sequence of possible particulars which can be generated by the arithmetic operation of 'adding one' to the preceding number. In this process of grasping the relation between the particulars, one is de facto liberated from the particular, from the image as presented in imagination or sensation.

With respect to the calculus, these developments allowed mathematicians to define the concept of 'limit' as a function. Mathematically, the "limit of the infinite sequence $P_1, P_2, \ldots P_n \ldots$ [is defined] to be the number $C$, such that, for any given positive number $E$, we can find a positive integer $N$, such that for $n>N$, it can be shown that

\[^{28}\text{Insight, CWL 3 13-14.}\]
This explanation of a limit is based, as Boyer notes, on "words and symbols — such as number, infinite sequence, less than, greater than — with regard not to any mental visualization, but only to their definition in terms of the primary undefined element." This definition of limit "simply makes no appeal to intuition or sensory perception." The limit, $C$, is not conceived of as the last number in the sequence, but rather as a number defined by the operations specified in the definition. Such a definition is possible only when one's thought is liberated from the primal geometrical context in which mathematical theorists wrestled so long with justifying the procedures of the calculus in terms of infinitesimals.

CONCLUSION

Commonsense intelligence develops from a biological substratum that calls forth first consciousness and then intelligence as part and parcel of its strategy for survival. The emergence of intelligence, however, sets a new and unprecedented way of being for animal organisms. While it may have emerged as the servant of vital need, once on the scene it sets a new context for living and developing.

The differentiation of consciousness into theory or artistry (to name but two) are developments of intelligence according to its own intrinsic principles and exigencies. In principle, these differentiations do not rely upon nor are they directly connected to the primal, biologically-based context out of which commonsense intelligence first emerged. We have argued, however, that the primal context continues to exert an influence into the realm of theory through the characteristic way in which subjects operate with spatial relations. Both Čapek and Flanagan indicate ways in which the Euclidean spatial organization resident within imagination and tied ultimately to existential spatiality affected the thinking of classical modern physicists. We have attempted to illustrate this problem at greater

length by considering some of the issues which troubled mathematicians in the process of their development of an adequate theoretical justification for the procedures of the calculus. The principal problem turned out to be their tendency to conceive what they were doing in the terms of Euclidean geometry: to consider that when taking the limit one was implicitly operating with geometrical atoms, infinitesimals. Only with the development of purely mathematical (or arithmetic) definitions of number, variable, function, and limit was an adequate theoretical justification forthcoming. These developments mark the liberation of mathematics from its dependence upon the geometrical context out of which it emerged and by extension from its relationship to existential spatiality, the spatiality of the commonsense subject.

Our consideration of the emergence of existential spatiality and its residual effects even in the world of theory are manifestations of the problem which Lonergan has termed 'troubled consciousness.' Troubled consciousness derives from the mutual inherence within differentiated consciousness of two characteristic ways of knowing: extroversion and intelligent inquiry. Each way of knowing implies distinct and mutually incompatible ways of knowing and generates contradictory accounts of the process of knowing and of the object known. Extroversion conceives knowing as taking a look and the known as a subset of the 'already out there now real.' Intelligent inquiry conceives knowing as asking and answering questions for intelligence and reflection and the known as the object of judgment. The tendency to confuse and conflate the two ways of knowing and the two types of objects of knowledge is strong. Only intellectual conversion, that is, a theoretical grasp of what one is doing in intelligence and a decision to make intelligence the criterion of what counts for knowing and for the real, can resolve the confusions which result from troubled consciousness. Our reflections upon the characteristic manner in which one spatializes the world, and upon the ways in which this spatialization is residual even in the operations of theoretical intelligence, serve but to adumbrate the meaning of troubled consciousness and the scope of the issues which intellectual conversion must embrace.
FAITH DEVELOPMENT: FOWLER AND LONERGAN REVISITED

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In 1988 Brendan Carmody published an insightful article, “Faith Development: Fowler and Lonergan,” which attempted to draw parallels between the work of James Fowler, in his groundbreaking study, *Stages of Faith*, and the theological method of Bernard Lonergan. Carmody’s aims in the article were threefold: to identify the overarching concerns of these two thinkers; to substantiate a claim that Lonergan’s treatment of religious experience is more satisfactory than Fowler’s; and to combine fruitfully Lonergan’s transcendental method with Fowler’s developmental perspective on faith. These are indeed laudable aims, for they would bring the empirically based research of Fowler into dialogue with the transcendental approach of Lonergan in a way which could illuminate both. Indeed it might help settle one of the nagging questions about Fowler’s research, that of normativity. In what sense does Fowler’s construct of ‘stages of faith’ represent a normative understanding of faith development?

As Carmody notes, Fowler understands his approach as embodying both a structural and a content-based normativity. It is structurally normative in that the proposed developmental structure is universal and

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3Carmody, “Fowler and Lonergan” 95-96.
cross-cultural. But it also has a content-based normativity in that the highest stage of faith, universalizing faith, has a normative content. Critics have suggested that the particular content Fowler ascribes to this stage reveals a bias in his work towards a Jewish-Christian understanding of faith. One critic, Sharon Parks, speaks of "an awkward division between the descriptive and the normative" in Fowler's work. Carmody himself is of the opinion that Fowler's approach has "resulted in an unsatisfactory division between structure and content as well as an unambiguous and perhaps imperialistic normativity."\(^4\)

This same tension between the descriptive and the normative is also present, and explicit, in the work of Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan himself draws attention to it in describing his transcendental approach as a generalized empirical method.\(^6\) The normative structures of human conscious activity are to be found in an empirical analysis of that very consciousness:

The argument is: that the prior is not object as object or subject as object; there only remains subject as subject, and this subject as subject is both reality and discoverable through consciousness. The argument does not prove that in the subject as subject we shall find the evidence, norms, invariants and principles for a critique of horizons; it proves that unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all.\(^7\)

If Lonergan's claims here are correct, if an empirical investigation of consciousness reveals the norms operative within consciousness, then a conjunction of Lonergan's and Fowler's work could provide some hope for sustaining the normative claims made by Fowler, or at least shed some new light on them.

\(^4\)Quoted by Carmody, "Fowler and Lonergan" 94.

\(^5\)Carmody, "Fowler and Lonergan" 95.


In this way Carmody’s project could represent an important transcendental grounding for the type of developmental approach Fowler gives to faith. However, for reasons which I shall indicate below, I feel that Carmody’s approach does not do justice to the project he sets himself. He seeks to correlate Fowler’s stages of faith with Lonergan’s notions of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. In doing so I think that Carmody misreads Lonergan on these conversions. On the other hand I would suggest that there is another element of Lonergan’s method which much more readily lends itself to the type of project Carmody is proposing, one which provides a more coherent correlation with Fowler’s stages of faith. The required element is Lonergan’s notion of ‘stages of meaning.’

**FOWLER’S STAGES OF FAITH**

It would perhaps be a good idea briefly to remind ourselves of the description of Fowler’s stages of faith.

**STAGE 1: Intuitive-Projective Faith**

This is a fantasy-filled, imitative stage. The child is powerfully and permanently influenced by examples of visible faith of parents. There is a fluidity of thought patterns, no stable operations of knowing. Imagination is unrestrained, with little constraint by logic. This stage is productive of long lasting symbols. The strengths of this stage are the birth of imagination and the creation of imaginative synthesis. Powerful symbols form through imaginative stories. Dangers arise from being ‘possessed’ by images of terror and fear which may be exploited by others. The main factor in the transition to the next stage is emergence of concrete operational thinking and the ability to distinguish between truth and falsity.

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9This is my own brief, and I hope accurate, summary of part IV of Fowler, *Stages* 117-211.
STAGE 2: Mythic-Literal Faith

At this stage the individual takes on stories, beliefs, and observances that symbolize belonging to a particular community. Beliefs, rules, and attitudes are appropriated with literal interpretations. Faith symbols are one-dimensional and literal. Meaning is both carried and trapped in narrative with little or no reflective conceptual meanings. The new strengths of this stage are the rise of narrative, drama, and myth as ways of finding and giving coherence to personal experience. The weaknesses involve the limitations of literalness and a reliance on reciprocity which can lead to 'works righteousness' or to the opposite — a self-abasement in an environment of mistreatment. The transition to stage 3 is initiated by clashes or contradictions in stories and authorities. This leads to reflections on meanings allowing for a breakdown in literalism and the emergence of mutual interpersonal perspective taking.

STAGE 3: Synthetic-Conventional Faith

At this stage personal horizons begin to extend beyond the family to include school, peers, media. Faith must now provide a coherent orientation within this complexity. It must synthesize values and information. It does this by adopting a 'conformist' stance, highly attuned to others' expectations. Beliefs are now deeply felt and consistently clustered but they are not objectified or examined systematically. Authority tends to find its focus in the community either through incumbents or in consensus. Significantly, symbols cannot be conceptually separated from the symbolized. The emergent strength of this stage is the forming of a personal myth or story which incorporates identity, faith, past, and future. The dangers are excessive internalization of others' expectations with loss of personal autonomy and a possible nihilism through a personal betrayal of authority figure. There may be a compensatory intimacy with God unrelated to real life. The factors leading to transition are serious clashes between valued authorities or marked changes in group practices, sanctioned by authorities or encounters with other perspectives and beliefs.
STAGE 4: Individuative-Reflective Faith

Now a person begins to take seriously the burden of responsibility for his or her own beliefs, lifestyles, and commitments. He or she begins to face unavoidable tensions, for example, between the individual and the group, between subjectivity and the demands for objectivity, between self-fulfillment and service, or between relativity and the absolute. One may begin to define one's own identity, not by reference to group membership but to an explicit, reflective value system. Symbols are now translated into conceptual meanings. The process of demythologization begins. The strengths of this stage are a capacity for critical reflection on identity and outlook. The dangers are an excessive confidence in its strengths, a lack of attention to 'unconscious' factors influencing judgments and an overassimilation of reality to one's own world view. The transition to stage 5 is initiated by a gnawing sense of sterility. This may be coupled with an inbreaking of symbols and myths from the past, from one's own or other traditions. These symbols and myths unsettle the neatness of one's system, leaving one disillusioned with the logic of clear distinctions and abstract concepts.

STAGE 5: Conjunctive Faith

This involves a reintegration of previously suppressed or unrecognized aspects of self and reality. One develops what Paul Ricoeur calls a 'second naïveté,' a post-critical remythologization where symbolic power is reunited with conceptual meaning. The boundaries established in the previous stage become porous and permeable. The person becomes alive to paradox and truth in contradictions. One strives to unify opposites in mind and experience. One may envisage a universal justice but one is caught by one's own need to preserve well-being. The strength of this stage is the capacity to be immersed in meanings while grasping their relativity. The danger lies in a paralyzing passivity or inaction which can lead to cynicism and a withdrawal from action. The movement to stage 6 is then initiated by a call for radical actualization of universal vision.
STAGE 6: Universalizing Faith

This stage overcomes the paradoxes of stage 5 through a moral and ascetic actualization of universalizing apprehensions present in the previous stage. The model, for Fowler, is the disciplined activist incarnate, captured by a willingness to be spent for the sake of justice. Such faith is contagious. It creates 'zones of liberation' for others and is often seen as subversive of social and political structures in the radicalness of its demands for justice. Fowler notes,

it is my conviction that persons who come to embody Universalizing Faith are drawn into the patterns of commitment and leadership by the providence of God and the exigencies of history.\(^{10}\)

It is within this framework that Carmody seeks to make connections with the work of Lonergan.

CARMODY ON LONERGAN AND FOWLER

Carmody begins with the assertion that "Lonergan's equivalent to Fowler's 'faith' is religious conversion." He justifies his stance by noting Fowler's references of Tillich's 'ultimate concern' and Niebuhr's 'search for an overarching, integrating and growing trust' as being similar to Lonergan's notion of 'being in love in an ultimate and unrestricted manner.' He seeks to make a distinction, following the work of Walter Conn, between a fully developed, critical religious conversion, which involves cognitive, affective and moral domains, with a less critical, less thorough religious conversion. He concludes that one may identify 'Lonergan's uncritical religious conversion' with Fowler's understanding of faith and the more critical conversion with stage 6 in Fowler's developmental schema.\(^{11}\)

Carmody also seeks to draw parallels between other conversions identified by Lonergan and Fowler's stages of faith. He describes Lonergan's notion of intellectual conversion in terms of being faithful to the innate thrust of the dynamism that is the core of all our search for

\(^{10}\)Fowler, Stages 202.

\(^{11}\)Carmody, "Fowler and Lonergan" 96-97.
meaning, enabling a self-affirmation that is not open to radical revision. He then makes a connection between this conversion and Fowler’s third and fourth stages, which involve a greater personal responsibility for one’s judgments, as opposed to those of external sources of authority. He also correlates Lonergan’s notion of moral conversion, which involves a change in one’s criteria for decision from satisfactions to values, and Fowler’s stage 4, where one thinks in terms of law, rules, and governing standards. Finally he postulates a connection between a notion of psychic conversion, though he does not identify the source of this notion, and Fowler’s stage 5.

DIFFICULTIES WITH CARMODY’S ACCOUNT

Though Carmody’s suggestions are not without merit there are several difficulties which can be readily identified.

The first is Carmody’s identification of Fowler’s notion of faith with Lonergan’s notion of (uncritical) religious conversion. While it is true that Fowler recalls the contributions of Tillich, Niebuhr, and other religious thinkers, it is also clear that his notion of faith is not restricted to the religious. Rather, faith is concerned with “the dynamic, patterned process by which we find life meaningful.” As such “faith is not always religious in its content or context.” Indeed, the examples Fowler gives in his book make it clear that a broader, anthropological notion of faith is operative, not a theological one (though, of course, a theological notion is not thereby excluded).

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12 Given Carmody’s references it is likely that the source is Walter Conn, “Conscience and Self-Transcendence” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia university, 1973). However, Conn’s notion of psychic conversion is quite different from, say, that of Robert Doran, *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Towards a Reorientation of the Human Sciences* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). Lonergan does refer at times to affective conversion, which is different again; see also Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990) 9.


14 Fowler, *Stages* 3-4.

15 See, in particular, the case of ‘Mr D’ which has little or no religious content, *Stages* 164ff.
This makes Carmody's identification between Fowler's notion of faith and Lonergan's notion of religious conversion problematic. While the religious significance of religious conversion may be implicit, Lonergan's notion of religious conversion is more restricted than the notion of a general anthropological process by which we find life meaningful. People can construct meaning on a smaller basis than being in love in an unrestricted manner.

Carmody seeks to overcome this difficulty by making a distinction, following Conn, between critical and uncritical conversion. It is important to note that this distinction is not Lonergan's. Lonergan does make a distinction between moral conversion and moral development, and presumably one could make a similar distinction between religious conversion and religious development. Further, Lonergan sees religious conversion as containing, in some sense, the seeds of both moral and intellectual conversion, though the full explication of this is difficult and rare. Indeed Lonergan claims that the rarest of these conversions is intellectual conversion, not 'critical religious conversion,' as Carmody claims.

In making this claim Carmody states in a footnote that:

Religious experience [conversion?] in the full, critical sense must be rare since it presupposes intellectual and moral conversions. See: Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p.39.

The reference to Method, however, does not bear out the claim being made. Lonergan makes no mention of intellectual conversion in the text cited, not even implicitly. The material is referring to religious development in a horizon constituted by religious conversion. The claim is made

16Indeed Lonergan does refers to the social function of beliefs in much the same way Fowler refers to faith; see also Method 41ff.

17See also Method 240: "Such conversion, of course falls far short of moral perfection. Deciding is one thing, doing is another.”


19Carmody, “Fowler and Lonergan” 96: “In its fully developed state, Lonergan’s critical religious conversion is rare.”

by Lonergan that 'continuous growth seems to be rare' but it is the growth of religious development which is the concern. Indeed it is not difficult to imagine persons of profound religious development who would not have the slightest idea what intellectual conversion is, would not have achieved it, and would not need to. Certainly Lonergan makes no reference to any type of religious conversion that would presuppose intellectual and moral conversion. It is, rather, the opposite:

First there is God's gift of his love [i.e. religious conversion]. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion.21

On this view, religious conversion leads to moral conversion and eventually in the tradition and beliefs of the Church are to be found, for those who seek them, 'the seeds of intellectual conversion.'

This view of the causal relationship between religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, then, makes Carmody's correlations between intellectual conversion and the third and fourth stages of faith development, and between moral conversion and the fourth stage of faith development, somewhat problematic. Lonergan would understand the development as being, in general, from religious to moral to intellectual conversion. Carmody's proposal would seem to reverse the order. Given Lonergan's assessment that intellectual conversion is very rare, it would follow that few ever go beyond stage 4 in their faith development.

Finally, I have some difficulty in Carmody's description of intellectual conversion. He speaks of intellectual conversion in terms of a discovery of 'a dynamism that is at the core of all human search for meaning,' of being 'faithful to that innate thrust' so that one may 'reach a self-affirmation that is not open to radical revision.' To support this he refers to Method 238. Again the reference does not support the claim, as far as I can see. There Lonergan defines intellectual conversion in the following terms:

21Method 243.
Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at.\textsuperscript{22}

Carmody's description falls short of the philosophical precision which Lonergan is here demanding. This is not to say that the elements Carmody identifies are not significant in Lonergan's overall vision. However, the imprecise and weaker sense he has given to Lonergan's notion of intellectual conversion has misled him in seeking to correlate it with elements of the third and fourth stages of faith development. It could be that Carmody is appealing to a distinction between a critical and an uncritical intellectual conversion, as he did before concerning religious conversion. But if this is the case he would be so far departing from Lonergan's terminology as to make the comparison between Lonergan and Fowler invalid.

**AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: FAITH AND MEANING**

Given this negative assessment, is there any way of restoring Carmody's project of finding common ground between Lonergan and Fowler? I believe there is, and that it is to be found in Fowler's understanding of faith in terms of 'the dynamic, patterned process by which we find life meaningful.' It is the correlation of faith and meaning-making which is important here. Indeed meaning is a fundamental category in Lonergan's work and he has much to say about meaning which is helpful in understanding Fowler's developmental stages.

In *Method in Theology* Lonergan introduces a number of categories for the analysis of meaning — carriers of meaning, elements of meaning, functions of meaning, realms of meaning, and finally stages of meaning.\textsuperscript{23} It is the category of 'stages of meaning' which is of interest in the present

\textsuperscript{22}Method 238.

\textsuperscript{23}See, in particular, chapter 3 of *Method*. 
context. "The stages in question are ideal constructs and the key to the constructing is undifferentiation or differentiation of consciousness."\(^{24}\):

In the first stage conscious and intentional operation follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where theory is controlled by logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority.\(^ {25}\)

In Western history, as Lonergan sees it, the breakthrough into the second stage was initiated by 'the Greek discovery of mind.' This enabled people to distinguish myth from history and magic from science. But with the rise of modern science, an ever greater tension between the realms of common sense and theory became apparent. For that tension to be diagnosed and resolved, the modern 'turn to the subject,' a movement into the realm on interiority, is necessary. What was already initiated by Descartes, furthered by Kant, and accelerated by existentialists and phenomenologists is now systematically exploited by Lonergan himself.\(^ {26}\)

While conceding that these stages are ideal types, Lonergan obviously understands them as having explanatory power in terms of the movements of history. They are 'progressive' and, in that sense, normative, in that they arise from the exigencies within consciousness itself. Lonergan clearly understands his own work as a contribution to the emergence of the third stage of meaning.

Now Lonergan has in mind stages that emerge over historical epochs. However, one may argue, with Robert Doran, that these same stages are "ontogenetically reproduced in the individual story of contemporary men and women."\(^ {27}\) If this is the case, then Lonergan's stages of meaning could well relate to Fowler's stages of faith. Indeed it is not difficult to identify parallels.

\(^{24}\)Method 85.  
\(^{25}\)Method 85.  
\(^{26}\)Method 90-96.  
\(^{27}\)Doran, Subject and Psyche: Riceour, Jung and the Search for Theological Foundations (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980) 269.
The first three of Fowler's stages of faith arise within a relatively undifferentiated, commonsense grasp of meaning characteristic of Lonergan's first stage of meaning. Significant in establishing this correlation are the inability of subjects in the first three of Fowler's stages to distinguish effectively between the symbol and the symbolized, and the location of the source of meaning in the group's apprehensions. Meaning is common to the group. It is the local variant of 'common sense,' but it is not articulated systematically. Rather it is apprehended symbolically, imaginatively, affectively. These symbols and affects may be relatively coherent, the values of the groups may be carried by a common narrative, but there is little by way of rational reflection on the content of faith. The movement through these first three stages is largely the result of a normal process of the cognitive and affective development that will occur in most children.

Fowler identifies certain dangers inherent in these levels. One may be 'possessed' by powerful images and affects; one may be unable to break free from the literalness of the story which carries the group's values; one may be trapped in a religious delusional world. Lonergan too sees similar dangers inherent in the first stage of meaning. There is an inability to distinguish myth from history, magic from science. People of enormous common sense can still be captured by myths and magic rituals which "penetrate the whole fabric of primitive living."[28]

I think the comparison of these stages of faith with Lonergan's first stage of meaning is enough to indicate that a correlation can be drawn between them. In Lonergan's terms the issue is the control of meaning. The commonsense horizon of the first three stages of faith and the first stage of meaning does not contain any systematic procedure for controlling meaning beyond the resources of common sense. This stage is adequate for most people, most of the time. However, it is inadequate once one begins to ask systematic questions which cannot be addressed within a commonsense framework.

Thus the movement from stage three to four is largely a matter of a specific cognitive development, which, in light of my comments on Carmody's approach, should not be confused with intellectual conversion.

Rather it is the cognitive development whereby one begins to separate the symbol from the symbolized, to reflect systematically on the meaning and values of one’s life, to translate symbolic meanings into conceptual frameworks. As Fowler notes, it is a stage of ‘demythologization.’

This is clearly parallel to Lonergan’s description of the second stage of meaning. It does not leave behind the earlier stage of common sense. However, it adds a new mode for the control of meaning, a mode of theory. It is a stage where one has “to sort out and somehow detach from one another feeling and doing, knowing and deciding.” At this stage, linguistic argument emerges “as an independent power that could dare to challenge the evidence of the senses” as well as the opinions of common sense. These achievements allow for a control of meaning which goes far beyond that offered by the commonsense horizon of the first stage of meaning. In particular they lead to the development of technical, theoretic languages, which reflect a degree of precision not found in commonsense horizons.

For Lonergan an outstanding example of a breakthrough into such a second stage of meaning can be found in the achievement of Thomas Aquinas. Using the theoretic language of a modified Aristotelian metaphysics, he translated the prior, relatively unsystematic, and often commonsense language of Christianity into a systematic edifice of enormous explanatory power. On a more mundane level, in Fowler’s terms, it can be seen in the beginnings of a critical awareness of the meaning of faith as disclosed in theology, or, in a non-Christian setting, in being grasped by the apparent explanatory power of an ideology, such as communism. In both cases explicit reflective meanings and values become determinative of one’s life choices.

Both Lonergan and Fowler recognize the limitations of this stage of development. Lonergan identifies the growing tension between common-sense horizons and theoretic apprehensions. He recalls Pascal’s pensée which contrasts the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with the God of philosophers and theologians, and Eddington’s two tables, one solid

29Method 90.
30Method 91-92.
31Method 115.
(commonsense), the other largely intra-atomic void (theoretic). Fowler speaks of the dangers of a totalizing over-confidence in the theoretic framework, an overassimilation of reality to the worldview. He notes the danger of a growing sterility and a lack of attention of various 'unconscious' factors which are covertly influencing one's stance.

I would like to add here the difficulty that a theoretic stance has with the problem of evil. An overconfidence in one's theoretic stance can create the illusion that one can produce a theoretical solution to the problem of evil; that evil can be solved by just getting one's ideas straight. (I would argue that Scholasticism avoids this problem by saying that evil has no substance, that it is a privation.) The sterility that stage 4 can lead to is the sterility of impotence, the inability to move beyond the realm of ideas into the realm of a praxis which can overcome the problem of evil. This difficulty will arise again when we move to stage 5.

This growing sense of sterility initiates the transition to stage 5 and its resolution determines whether the person can successfully make the further transition to stage 6. Fowler describes the transition to stage 5 in terms of the inbreaking of symbols and myths from one's past. This process unsettles the neatness of one's theoretic framework, leading to a breakdown in the logic of clear distinctions and abstract concepts. Stage 5 then involves a reintegration of previously suppressed or 'unconscious' aspects of oneself. One begins to reconnect with the power of symbols, though not in the uncritical manner of stage 3. Lonergan would describe this same process, I believe, in terms of a shift to interiority. Such a shift requires a radical relocation of the source of authority, away from the common sense of the group, away from the power of conceptual argument, and towards oneself, one's own interiority. Lonergan clearly envisages such a movement in terms of a philosophy of interiority, such as his own transcendental method, which can overcome the tensions between the worlds of common sense and theory. However, a similar turn

32 Method 84.

to interiority may be occasioned by other means, such as psychotherapy or profound religious experience.

Fowler claims that the strengths of this stage 5 are found in its capacity to be immersed in meanings while grasping their relativity. Lonergan would concur that a shift to interiority gives the subject a freedom with regard to meaning because one is in touch with the source of all meanings. Concepts are relativized as they are grounded in interior acts which are prior and more fundamental. However, Fowler also notes a particular danger to this stage, one to which Lonergan does not refer.

Fowler states that at this fifth stage there is the danger of a paralyzing passivity leading to cynicism and a withdrawal from action. One can be caught by the need to preserve one’s own well-being. I would argue that the key factor here is the negotiation of the problem of evil. One feature of stage 5 that Fowler notes is its proclivity for paradox and contradictions. Lonergan would speak of this in terms of the dialectic character of human living, caught between the poles of transcendence and limitation. Such a dialectic must be held in constant but creative tension. However, the question arises whether the fact of evil is another instance of such a dialectic, whether good and evil must also be held in 'creative tension.' One’s answer to this question is determinative of whether one can make the transition to stage 6.

In a number of his writings, Robert Doran has argued persuasively that the work of Carl Jung represents a failure to deal adequately with the problem of evil. Jung's work clearly represents a turn to interiority. Yet Doran argues that Jung misconceives the dialectic between good and evil as another instance of the dialectic between transcendence and limitation. Jung goes so far as to speculatively place the source of evil in God's own being. He also strongly rejected the Scholastic doctrine that evil is a privation. Doran warns of a therapeutic treadmill, where constant analysis robs the subject of the power to act. Jung's favorite symbol of the

34See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," A Third Collection 58.

35Particularly, Doran, Subject and Psyche 251ff, and Theology and the Dialectics of History 332-349.

mandala then becomes a symbol of self-enclosure, self-protective against the risk of the self-transcendence needed to overcome evil.37

The proper resolution of the problem of evil is not to be found in psychological or metaphysical speculation. It is to be found in the self-transcending power of a love which allows itself to be spent for the sake of the kingdom. This is the stage that Fowler describes as universalizing faith. Similarly Lonergan envisages:

a religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, [which] will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress.38

Now it is clear that Lonergan would argue that such a stage is reached through a profound religious experience (and conversion). However, the problem is not simply one of religious conversion but also religious development, wherein "religious effort towards authenticity through prayer and penance and religious love of all men shown in good deeds becomes an apostolate."39 Such religious development and growth in authenticity would undoubtedly require a profound moral conversion, but only in few cases would there be an accompanying intellectual conversion. In Fowler's terms this would only occur where persons "are drawn into the patterns of commitment and leadership by the providence of God and the exigencies of history."

Thus I would not accept Carmody's position that Fowler's stage 6 correlates with a religiously, morally, and intellectually converted subject. It would require, I believe, a person of profound interiority, grounded in religious experience, and committed to authenticity (moral conversion). However, it would only demand intellectual conversion in order to meet the exigencies of a particular situation.

37Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 345-6: "To cling to the mandala ... is to refuse the self-transcendence through which we continue to find authentic direction in the movement of life."

38Lonergan, Method 55.

39Lonergan, Method 119. Lonergan describes this 'highly complex business of authenticity' on 121.
Perhaps we are now in a better position to evaluate Fowler’s claims that his developmental account of faith is normative and transcultural. In correlating Fowler’s stages of faith with Lonergan’s stages of meaning we can infer the same degree of normativity as that attained by Lonergan’s account. Lonergan’s account of the stages of meaning is grounded in his transcendental method, which claims also to be normative and transcultural. However, we should recall that Lonergan’s account of the stages of meaning is dealing with cultures, while Fowler’s account of stages of faith is dealing with individuals. What are the implications of this?

The first implication that we should note is that Fowler’s account of the stages of faith is one which draws on the resources of a culture that has entered into the third stage of meaning. The key features of his account deal with cognitive and affective developments in the subject and with religious experience, conceptualized as universalizing faith. These are all matters of the interiority of the subject and hence pertain to the third stage of meaning.

The second implication concerns the claim that Fowler’s stages of faith are transcultural. Suppose a culture has not entered into the second stage of meaning, where common sense is distinguished from theory. It may then be quite difficult in such a culture for an individual to enter into Fowler’s fourth stage of faith. There simply may not be the cultural resources to do so. Should we then conclude that such a person would also not be able to move into the fifth and sixth stages of faith? It seems to me that this is most unlikely, though these later stages may need to be reconceptualized. The overall process of faith development may be more compressed in such a culture, but it is quite conceivable that the final goal (stage 6) would be much the same. On the other hand, in a culture such as ours, where a large number of people have the resources of the second stage of meaning and a growing number of people have the resources of the third stage of meaning, Fowler’s six stages of faith could represent a normative developmental process.

In this sense we could say that Fowler’s account of stages of faith is both normative and culturally conditioned. It is culturally conditioned in two senses: (1) as explicated it depends on our culture having entered into
the third stage of meaning, and (2) the full developmental process as explicated may only occur in such a culture. On the other hand it is also normative, in that the third stage of meaning is itself a normative direction of development for any culture.

CONCLUSION

In his article, Carmody sought, among other things, to combine Lonergan's transcendental method with Fowler's developmental perspective on faith. Though I have been critical of the way in which he attempted to do this, I hope that this article has shown that such a fruitful combination can be achieved. The key to such a combination is, I claim, not Lonergan's notion of conversion, as Carmody would have it, but rather his notion of stages of meaning. Such an approach allows us to identify both culturally conditioned and normative elements in claims made about Fowler's developmental schema.
BOOK REVIEWS


In 1969, Garrett Barden and Philip McShane published Towards Self-Meaning, an introduction to the philosophy of what we now label 'the early Lonergan.' Envisioning an audience of interested beginners, people without extensive academic backgrounds in philosophy but willing to learn and especially to learn about themselves, the two Irish colleagues proceeded not by expounding Lonergan's writings but by inviting the reader to test Lonergan's ideas in the laboratory of her own concrete subjectivity. Their book was short, simply written, and loaded with astutely selected (and entertaining) examples.

The present book stands in the same genre. Terry Tekippe, professor at Notre Dame Seminary in New Orleans and long-time Lonergan scholar, proffers it as 'a primer' on Lonergan's Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.1 Like Barden and McShane, however, Tekippe does not devote his efforts to examining texts. (Indeed, the book contains not a single quotation from Insight.) Instead, drawing heavily on Lonergan but keeping him in the background, he makes up a guidebook for the reader's own journey inward, a journey of personal self-study. At every step of the journey he encourages the reader to compare her findings with findings that are Lonergan's in fact but not in name. The guidebook consists of thirty chapters that average about five pages each. The first twenty-five chapters, corresponding roughly to chapters 1-17 of Insight, regard cognitive structure and proportionate being. The last five, corresponding

roughly to chapters 18-20 of *Insight*, regard morality, God, and what Tekippe calls ‘Christian wisdom.’

I find the book to be rich in substance, cleverly organized, filled with an impressively wide range of examples, and appealingly written. Tekippe manages to touch on a surprisingly large number of *Insight’s* distinctive themes without being the least bit tedious. Highlighting the event of direct insight in eight of his first ten chapters, he unfolds those themes in a sequence likely to capture and hold the attention even of novices in philosophy. He illustrates those themes with examples drawn from such areas as common speech, sports, detective stories, jokes, natural science, Greek philosophy, and the Bible. And his writing is lean and lucid in style, engaging and modest in tone.

I do have three quibbles — one small, and two slightly larger. (Though I devote more space to quibbles than to compliments, my overall evaluation of Tekippe’s volume is far more positive than negative.) The first quibble would hardly be worth mentioning except that it bears on what Lonergan means by ‘consciousness,’ something that turns out to be extremely important in his overall philosophical perspective. At least on Lonergan’s own terminology, consciousness is sharply and importantly distinguished from awareness of objects (including reflexive awareness, awareness of oneself as an object). Consciousness is nothing other than one’s primitive, non-reflexive awareness of one’s acts and, more fundamentally, of oneself as actor. Hence, in a Lonerganian context it strikes me as confusing to portray consciousness as “awareness of an object, an act, and the self” (84, my emphasis; see also 84, 93, 101).

Second, by the end of his chapter 22, Tekippe has excellently articulated many features of what he variously terms ‘interior science,’ ‘the inner science,’ ‘the science of consciousness,’ and ‘cognitional science’ — which I interpret as equivalent to what Lonergan in *Insight* terms the correct or positional ‘cognitional theory,’ the basic component of the correct or positional philosophy. Later, however, in his chapter 30, Tekippe asks whether there is any knowledge that mediates the tensions between the various specific kinds of knowing, any ‘final form’ of human

\(^2\)See, for example, *Insight* 274-275, 320-328, 333-335 = *CWL* 3 298-299, 344-352, 358-359.
knowing, any 'final wisdom'; and he disqualifies interior science from that mediating role for at least two reasons. The first reason is that, as science, interior science abstracts from particulars in order to arrive at the universals with which it characteristically deals; whereas the 'final form' of human knowing must take account of particulars — most notably, concrete moral choices. The second reason is that, as science, interior science is fundamentally just logical; whereas the 'final form' of human knowing must be intuitive, reaching beyond syllogisms and their premises to self-evident principles that alone can ultimately ground knowledge and a wisdom that alone can ultimately integrate it.

Now, it seems to me that, in making these objections to the mediating role of interior science, the Tekippe of chapter 30 overlooks the lessons taught so well by the Tekippe of chapters 1-22 and what those lessons imply. For Lonergan's cognitional theory and the metaphysics derived from it are characteristically concerned not with abstract, abstractive, historical universals ('woman,' 'cyclotron,' or 'joke,' for example), the universals that arise through prescinding from particulars, but rather with concrete, heuristic, structural universals ('judging,' 'thing,' or 'being,' for example), the universals that arise through anticipating a totality of relatively indeterminate particulars. Again, Lonergan's cognitional theory and the metaphysics derived from it, though inescapably logical in their formulation, are certainly not just logical in their foundation; for that foundation is one's concrete dynamic cognitional structure itself and what that structure foreshadows. Hence, while it is true that Lonergan's cognitional theory and the metaphysics derived from it do not necessarily constitute the 'final form' of human knowing in their formulation, the reason for this is not that they are abstractly universal (for their universality is concrete, not abstract). Rather, it is that in principle their formulation is subject to refinement (albeit not radical) and augmentation. And, on the other hand, they do constitute the 'final form' of human knowing in their foundation. For that foundation, the dynamic and self-vindicating structure of human cognitional activity, provides the ultimate pattern within which all

3See, for example, Insight 396-401, 497-509 = CWL 3 421-426, 521-533.
4See, for example, Insight 385-390, 567-568 = CWL 3 410-415, 591.
possible human knowledge unfolds; and, as such, it is uniquely capable of grounding a concretely universal reconciling and integrating viewpoint.

Tekippe's rejection of his 'interior science' (equivalent to Lonergan's 'cognitional theory' and its implied metaphysics) as the 'final form' of human knowing is followed by his proposal of an alternative; and his stance on this matter occasions my third quibble. He suggests, in his chapter 30, that the best candidate for what he now begins regularly labeling 'final wisdom' is an amalgam of 'all that is good and positive' in "the Greek breakthrough to science, the Christian experience of the Light of the world, and the modern Enlightenment" (154). A distinctive Greek contribution is an emphasis on reason, where 'reason' indicates definitory logic, and science that is understood in terms of necessity. A distinctive Christian contribution is "that the ultimate knowing is placed not in reason, but in faith. Beyond the knowledge of reason is the enlightenment of God's own wisdom" (154). Christian faith complements the abstract, remote, intellectual universality of Greek logos with the concrete, personal, loving particularity of the Christian Logos. A distinctive Enlightenment contribution is a renewed emphasis on reason, where 'reason' continues to indicate definition, logic, and science, but with science now understood in terms not of necessity but of mere verified possibility.

Whatever else may be said about it, Tekippe's proposal regarding 'final wisdom' is, in my judgment, decidedly non-Lonerganian. His correlation of 'reason' with 'logic' leads him in turn to maintain that whatever is beyond logic is also beyond reason; but in some respects 'final wisdom' surely is beyond logic; therefore, in some respects 'final wisdom' surely is beyond reason. That is to say, in some respects 'final wisdom' is a matter of 'faith.' I contend that Lonergan differs here from Tekippe in at least three important ways. First, Lonergan clearly and forcefully rejects the reduction of reason to logic. In his view, although the products of human reasoning may find expression in the abstract concepts and propositions and syllogisms of logic, the process of human reasoning is the eminently concrete procedure of reflection, reflective insight, and affirmation. Second, while certainly not denying that what Christians affirm as matters of faith infinitely transcend what they affirm as matters

5See, for example, Insight 279-316 = CWL 3 304-340.
of reason, Lonergan envisions that difference in terms of the distinction not between concrete content and abstract content but rather between supernatural gift and natural achievement.6 Third, it does not mesh with Lonergan's outlook to claim that there is any respect in which the 'final form' of human knowing includes matters of faith. For as I have already indicated, Lonergan maintains that in their concrete structural foundation (though not necessarily in their formulation), his cognitional theory and its implied metaphysics are what constitute the 'final form' of human knowing. Matters of faith, by contrast, are more than just structural in character: like all other determinations of one's concrete cognitional structure and what it foreshadows, they are historical.7

Having spelled out my three quibbles, I would conclude by noting that the two larger ones regard difficulties limited to Tekippe's final chapter, by suggesting that these difficulties do not detract much from the preceding chapters' value, and by reiterating my fundamentally quite positive assessment of the book as a whole. I am especially enthusiastic about its prospective usefulness to beginners in philosophy, its intended audience. Though deliberately prescinding from the later Lonergan, and thus from such topics as the realm of interiority and the character and function of religious conversion (topics not unrelated to my larger two quibbles), this work neatly complements Barden and McShane's introduction to the early Lonergan; and I could easily imagine adding it to the set of required readings in some of my future undergraduate courses. On balance, therefore, I commend the book as a valuable contribution to the Lonergan enterprise; and I salute Tekippe for his fine achievement.

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6See, for example, Insight 696-703, 718-729, 732-734 = CWL 3 718-725, 740-750, 754-756.

7See, for example, Insight 497-502, 718-729 = CWL 3 521-526, 740-750.

In a paper delivered at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop in 1992, David Tracy suggested that the time had come for a second reception of Lonergan's work. The first reception happened for the most part within Roman Catholic philosophical and theological circles. Given that Lonergan taught Catholic theology, this comes as no surprise. A review of the exhaustive list of secondary sources compiled by Terry Tekippe confirms a concentrated effort by Lonergan scholars in these areas. Implicit in Tracy's remarks is the judgment that this abundant effort has not yet produced the hoped-for sea change. At times movement in the academy is painstakingly slow. In Insight Lonergan cites Max Planck's comment that "a new scientific position gains general acceptance, not by making their opponents change their minds, but by holding its own until old age has retired them from their professorial chairs." Nonetheless, reference to Lonergan in Copleston's nine volume History of Philosophy consists of a single footnote. The quotation is in the context of a discussion of the influence of Heidegger in contemporary Thomism. The full quote is as follows: "The writings of B. Lonergan, the Canadian Thomist seem to be free of Heideggerian influence. As for Coreth, the influence of Heidegger is clear enough, but so is that of Fichte, by whom Marachal himself was influenced." Copleston, it will be remembered, read the typescript of Insight prior to its publication. It would be quite an oversight if Lonergan's work were to be but a marginal note in the history of Western

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12Insight, CWL 39.
thought. Therefore, we must ask the question: How are we to enable this second reception of Lonergan's work?

Two areas for advance suggest themselves. Firstly, generalized empirical method has a relevance in any field. Thus, to the task of re-communicating to Catholic theology and philosophy can be added efforts to extend Lonergan's method to new fields. Indeed, it is especially with questions of methodology that the confusion in contemporary disciplines is manifest and Lonergan's approach may help "cut like a knife through disputes on the nature of the real, of the objective, of development, of distinctions, of relations, of metaphysical elements, of matter and spirit."13 Quietly there emerged within the Lonergan enterprise serious efforts to extend generalized empirical method to non-theological sciences and disciplines. They are an important factor in preparing the way for a second reception of Lonergan's work.

A second potential area for advance is the implementation of functional specialization within theology and in secular fields of study. The timing of Lonergan's discovery of functional specialization is relevant here. The first reception of Lonergan's work occurred largely among his students in Canada and at the Gregorian in Rome from 1940-1965. Lonergan arrived at the notion of functional specialization in 1965. Consequently, the first reception of Lonergan to which Tracy refers did not include functional specialization. It is not that Method in Theology has not been read. I expect that it has been read more often and more widely than Insight. However, the topic of functional specialization has not taken hold of the conversation. This is true in theology as well as in other fields. Again a review of secondary literature confirms this suspicion. Why this is the case it a matter for speculation. Nonetheless, functional specialization is particularly well suited for transfer to secular disciplines. Its aptness for an efficient division of academic labor can be communicated without a lengthy detour into Lonergan's philosophical work. As functional specialization is Lonergan's crowning achievement, its integration into the effort of a second reception is vitally important.

In her introduction to Lonergan and Feminism, Cynthia Crysdale identifies the emergence of a third generation of Lonergan scholars, more

13*Insight*, CWL 3524.
It is this group that will shepherd a second reception. Among this new group of scholars is Bruce Anderson. In his new book "Discovery in Legal Decision-Making," both of the elements mentioned above make their appearance. "Discovery in Legal Decision-Making" is a substantially rewritten dissertation for the Doctor of Law degree at the University of Edinburgh. That original context is important in understanding the book’s final form. The author’s challenge is to communicate to an audience unaware of Lonergan’s work. His strategy is to tackle a central and contentious issue in the field of legal theory, legal discovery, and demonstrate how Lonergan’s cognitional theory is relevant to the issue. The result is a exemplary instance of reversing the counterpositions.

There are two keys to Anderson’s success. The first is his firm grasp of the issue of legal discovery as it occurs in the law literature. The second is the way he handles the Lonergan material. The book divided neatly to treat each in turn: the first four chapters are devoted to a discussion of the relevant legal questions while the second four introduce the core of Lonergan’s method. The strategy of the first part of the book is dialectical. Anderson investigates the dispute between ‘realists’ and ‘legal formalists’ about the nature of the legal decision-making process. Those familiar with Lonergan’s work will recognize that Anderson is teasing out the cognitional data relevant for understanding this dispute. Those not familiar with Lonergan’s work will be drawn in by his deft handling of the debate. Anderson proceeds by making a preliminary distinction between the ‘process of legal discovery’ and ‘the process of legal justification of decision.’ This allows him to suggest the different methodological basis for each pattern of activity. His aim is twofold: first, to flush out the shortcomings of the deductive approach of legal formalism and, second, to establish a beachhead for making explicit the relevant cognitional data implicit in the realists’ discomfort with the formalists. The second chapter expands on this initial division by pointing to a very fruitful analogy between scientific method and legal discovery. Of interest to many will be Anderson’s critical discussion of the Popperian approach to this question.

The introduction of the scientific analogy places the dispute in legal theory within a wider context. It also provides an initial justification for an ultimate defense of Lonergan's approach.

Anderson now turns to two specific cases to indicate how 'discovery' functions in legal cases. The first case concerns a well known landmark judgment in the Morgenthaler abortion clinic case by Canadian Supreme Court Justice Madame Wilson. This is a well chosen example. It raises many of the 'hot button' issues that a discussion of the hermeneutics of legal judgment would engender. In this particular judgment there is the added feature of Justice Wilson's explicit appeal to the women's point of view. The discussion is expertly handled. The second case concerns arbitration in an insurance case. Anderson uses this case to draw out further the problem-solving nature of the discovery process. I found Anderson's efforts in these first four chapters a model of lucidity. He avoids obscuring technical expression and legal jargon. Although I am not a lawyer, I found the discussion to be accessible, interesting, and relevant. Anderson's fine grasp of cognitional process is evident in the well thought out strategy of these chapters and in an apt choice of examples. He skillfully sets the stage for the introduction of the Lonergan material.

The second half of the book introduces Lonergan's cognitional theory and functional specialization. These chapters stand quite well on their own. There have been any number of introductions to cognitional process in recent years. The three chapters Anderson devotes to it are as good as any I have read. Consistent with the first four chapters they are a model in clarity of presentation. The reader will appreciate Anderson's use of diagrams to augment his presentation. The focus remains introductory and concrete throughout. In the final chapter, "Legal Reasoning in a New Context," Anderson sets the discussion of the previous seven chapters in the context of functional specialization. As we have now come to expect, this introduction is well handled. I would point especially to his explication of the modes of expression relevant to each of the four levels of human consciousness (150-158). This section exploits material implicit in Lonergan but not generally discussed. It is relevant to the problem raised at the outset of the book concerning the status of legal justification and it precisely establishes the appropriate cognitional activity explicit in
various forms of legal expression. This is an especially insightful few pages whose relevance goes well beyond a strictly legal context.

For legal philosophers and theorists "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making is a clear presentation of an alternative approach to a particularly difficult problem in legal theory, one with clear practical manifestations. The book has the potential to be ground-breaking in this field. It is also an excellent introduction to cognitional theory. Lonergan scholars will appreciate Anderson’s dialectic skill. Especially to be commended are the author’s efforts to introduce functional specialization. This book is an exemplary instance of how Lonergan’s discoveries can be successfully communicated to a new audience. Efforts such as this will improve the probabilities that there will be a successful second reception of Lonergan’s work.

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