METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies aims, first, at furthering interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, economic, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan. Secondly, it aims at promoting original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines.

METHOD is published twice yearly, in April and October, by The Lonergan Institute at Boston College.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE 1996: $14.00 yearly for individuals, $25.00 yearly for institutions (U.S. currency).

SUBSCRIPTION ORDERS must be prepaid in U.S. funds and should be addressed to the Business Manager, METHOD, Department of Philosophy, Carney Hall 216, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806. Changes of address and other correspondence related to subscriptions and advertising should be sent to the same address.

MANUSCRIPTS should be sent to Mark Morelli, METHOD, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90045. In order to facilitate an early decision, authors should send three copies of each manuscript, double-spaced throughout, including footnotes. Submissions should be accompanied by a short biographical note. They can be returned only if adequate postage is included.

Accepted articles must follow A Manual of Style (University of Chicago Press) and should be submitted in this form. References to any of Lonergan's writings that have appeared in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan must cite that edition, but may also cite older editions.

BOOKS FOR REVIEW should be sent to Charles Hefling, METHOD, Department of Theology, Carney Hall 417, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806.

BACK ISSUES of most numbers in volumes 1 through 9 may be ordered from METHOD, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90045; for later volumes, from METHOD, Department of Philosophy, Carney Hall 216, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806.

COPYRIGHT of articles, dialogues, notes, and book reviews is retained by their respective authors. Materials published in METHOD may be reproduced for purposes of research, personal reference, and classroom use without formal permission or fee. Permission for copying in the case of general distribution, collected works, or anthologies must be obtained directly from the author.

Selected articles appearing in Method are indexed in the Philosopher's Index.

ISSN: 076-7392.
CONTENTS

Bernard J. Tyrrell 1 Affectional Conversion: A Distinct Conversion or Potential Differentiation in the Spheres of Sensitive Psychic and/or Affective Conversion?

David Oyler 37 The Operational Situation

Charles C. Hefling, Jr. 55 Newman on Apprehension, Notional and Real

NOTES AND REVIEWS

William Mathews 85 Kant's Anomolous Insights

Joseph A. Komonchak 99 Conversion and Objectivity

107 BOOK REVIEWS
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

The editors of METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies are pleased to announce that the Spring 1997 issue will be a symposium on

"MORAL THEOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,"

a 1977 essay by Bernard Lonergan that will be published for the first time in the same issue.

Articles commenting on this essay from the standpoint of any of the human sciences will be especially welcome. Articles focusing on or developing Lonergan's position in the essay, and articles engaging other thinkers in dialogue with Lonergan, will also be considered.

Those who are interested in preparing an article for submission to this symposium may request a copy of "Moral Theology and the Human Sciences" and additional instructions by writing to:

Ms. Kerry Cronin
The Lonergan Center, Bapst Library
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3801

The deadline for submitting articles to be considered for the symposium issue is December 1, 1996.
AFFECTIONAL CONVERSION: A DISTINCT CONVERSION OR POTENTIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE SPHERES OF SENSITIVE PSYCHIC AND/OR AFFECTIVE CONVERSION?

Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J.
Gonzaga University
Spokane, WA 99258

INTRODUCTION

BERNARD LONERGAN SUGGESTS that creative following of his method can lead to quite new dimensions in its development and articulation, as is the case with Robert Doran's thesis on the notion of psychic conversion.¹ My own work, related from the outset to Lonergan's reflection on conversion,² focuses largely on the healing of the wounded psyche, with frequent emphasis on love-deprivation and its healing. My aim here is to examine more deeply the origins and early stages of love deprivation in individuals, the process of healing of this psychological wounding and the question of how love deprivation and its healing might be related to 'psychic'³ and 'affective conversion.'⁴ I name

³ I wish to acknowledge here a major debt I owe to Robert Doran. In early 1974 Doran told me about his discovery of the phenomenon of 'psychic conversion' as he referred to it. Upon reflection I realized that in my work on the Christotherapy project I was also dealing with some kind of conversion(s) that touched upon the psyche and this led me to come up with terms of my own to describe the kind(s) of conversion at work in the Christotherapeutic process.
the process of healing of love deprivation 'affectional conversion.' I do so as a means of distinguishing my particular focus on conversion from others and particularly in the present study from Doran's theory of 'psychic conversion' and Lonergan's view of 'affective conversion.'

My order of exposition consists in (1) a laying out of key elements in works of certain contemporary psychological theorists which largely provide me with the research data and framework for my own particular articulation of affectional conversion; (2) the fleshing out of my hypotheses regarding early love deprivation and the process of its healing; (3) a critical reflection on possible relationships between 'affectional conversion' and 'psychic' and 'affective' conversions; (4) the posing of a few, final exploratory questions about conversions and heuristics.

4 The term 'affective conversion' is used by a number of contemporary scholars. For a discussion of diverse meanings assigned to this term see my "Affective Conversion: A New Way of Feeling," The Human Experience of Conversion: Persons and Structures in Transformation (Proceedings of the Theology Institute of Villanova University 19) ed. Francis Eigo (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1987) 109-142. In this Villanova paper I discuss the excellent work Walter Conn and Donald Gelpi have done in the area of affective conversion. I hope to carry on my dialogue with Conn and Gelpi in other articles.

5 In Christotherapy II I stated that neurosis consisted "in either or both of the following states: (1) a person's deeply felt sense of being unlovable and worthless, and (2) severe repression in a person and/or other destructive effects and expressions of miseducation which cause great psychic discomfort, and impair the ability to function well in the give and take of everyday life" (55). My present focus is on the love deprivation of the first state described in the above definition and the conversion process that is the core of its healing. As far as I know I am the first person to employ the expression 'affectional conversion,' but one can never be certain in such matters.


7 I chiefly limit myself to the consideration of certain psychologists who have a primary interest in the affective development of the infant, baby, child and are in agreement that severe psychic damage can result when this development is impaired, blocked, frustrated. These psychologists differ on a number of issues. But they all agree that the effective therapist should embody those qualities of loving care and empathic concern which the psychically wounded individual in all likelihood did not experience in her or his parenting figures.
1. HYPOTHESES ON EARLY LOVE/AFFECIONAL DEPRIVATION AND ITS HEALING OF SOME CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORISTS

1.1 Abraham Maslow

Abraham Maslow, to whom Lonergan makes reference in *Method in Theology* and subsequent writings, states that among the most basic psychic needs of the human being are the needs for love, for respect, for self-esteem. Maslow calls such needs as the need for safety, for belonging, for love, for self-esteem, and so on 'deficiency needs'; he states that these deficiency needs are 'instinctoid,' that is grounded in our animal nature. They are 'deficiency needs' because they must be filled "from without by human beings other than the subject" of the needs. Thus, for example, for proper development individuals need love poured into them; they need to be loved and valued for themselves.

Maslow contends that the lack of satisfaction of the love-need is a central element in cases of maladjustment and psychological pathologies. Unfortunately individuals are not born into a world in which their basic needs are automatically met. Maslow indicates that such needs as love-hunger and the need for self-esteem require a significant degree of satisfaction if a developing individual is to realize a basic orientation toward ego-transcendence rather than an ego-centered way of existing: "[The] ability to center upon the world rather than to be self-conscious, egocentric and gratification oriented becomes the more difficult the more

---

8 See Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton: Von Nostrand, 1968) 25. Lonergan in a passage where he is describing the dynamism of the transition in the human person from the neural to the psychic level and the ushering into consciousness of the 'demands of unconscious vitality' refers also to the obtruding of 'deficiency needs' in a context which suggests an assimilation of Maslow's notion of 'deficiency needs' (*A Third Collection* 29). Indeed, in a subsequent footnote Lonergan urges his readers to consult the writings of Maslow on 'deficiency and growth motivation,' (33 n6). Elsewhere Lonergan recommends consultation of Maslow's work concerning "growth, growth motivation and neurotic needs" (*Method in Theology* 39) and for "current corrections of earlier views" of the depth psychologists (*Method in Theology* 284).

9 Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* 164.

10 Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* 23.

11 Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* 41.

need-deficits the person has." Maslow acknowledges that in cases
where the love need is not basically met there exist degrees of pathology
and a corresponding requirement for proportionate gifts of love and
acceptance if healing of the love-deficit is to occur. The existence of the
love-need and the pathology which results to the extent that this need is
not met does not rest on the studies of Maslow alone. As Maslow
observes, "practically all theorists of psychopathology have stressed the
thwarting of the love needs as basic in the picture of maladjustment."

1.2 John Bowlby

John Bowlby has made the central focus of his career the natural pro-
pensity of human beings from the neonatal stage throughout adult life
into old age to form intimate emotional bonds with particular individuals.
During infancy and childhood the primary bonds are with parents or
parent substitutes. In infancy the most important 'affectional bond' is
generally with the mother, though ideally there is healthy affectional
bonding with the father as well. The central feature of Bowlby's idea of
parenting is "the provision by both parents of a secure base from which a
child or an adolescent can make sorties into the outside world and to
which he can return knowing for sure that he will be welcomed when he
gets there, nourished physically and emotionally, comforted if distressed,
reassured if frightened." Bowlby describes the ideal mother as quickly
attuned to the natural rhythms of her infant; she discovers what suits him
or her and behaves accordingly; she thus not only contents the infant but
enlists cooperation from the baby as well. Ideally the mother is at ease in
holding the newborn for lengthy periods and in a tender and loving
way. The mother is sensitive, accessible, and responsive and provides

13 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 37.
14 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 41-42.
15 Maslow, Motivation and Personality 44.
17 See John Bowlby, The Making and Breaking of Affectional Bonds (New York: Methuen,
1979).
18 Bowlby, A Secure Base 11.
19 Bowlby, A Secure Base 15.
the child with "a secure base from which he [she] can explore to and to which he [she] can return when upset or frightened." The child who is mothered in this fashion is able to make excursions, to develop a certain self-reliance by the time of his or her first birthday, and to enjoy a high degree of trust in the mother and "enjoyment of her company." Bowlby observes that parents tend to be unchanged in the way they treat their children, though this is by no means always the case. He states that "although the repertoire of a 6-year-old's behavior towards a parent is vastly greater than that of a one-year-old, the earlier patterns of attachment are nonetheless readily discernible to an educated eye at the older age"; thus "children who are classified as being securely attached at 6 years are those who treat their parents in a relaxed and friendly way, who enter into easy, and subtle intimacies with them, and who engage in free flowing conversation." We thus see how the "enjoyment of [the mother's] company" of the securely attached one year old described above is developmentally reflected in the friendly intimate interplay of the securely attached child of six with his or her parents.

Bowlby suggests that 'from cradle to grave' human beings have a natural desire for love and care when in distress and that "throughout adult life the availability of a responsive attachment figure remains the source of a person's feeling secure." Bowlby shows how authentic mothering fosters a sense of autonomy, boldness in exploration, and self-confidence in the developing child.

Bowlby also develops at length the various negative impacts that unhealthy parenting produces. He observes that "abused toddlers are singularly unsympathetic to age-mates in distress" whereas "infants and pre-school children who have affectionate and caring parents commonly express concern when another child is distressed and often make moves to comfort him or her"; in emphatic terms Bowlby states that "the tendency

20 Bowlby, A Secure Base 46.
21 Bowlby, A Secure Base 48.
22 Bowlby, A Secure Base 127-128.
23 Bowlby, A Secure Base 128.
24 Bowlby, A Secure Base 82.
to treat others as we have been treated is deep in human nature; and at no time is it more evident than in the earliest years. All parents please note!"\(^2\)

It is significant, I think, that Bowlby likens the role of the therapist to that of a mother who provides a sure base from which to explore.\(^2\) The therapist must strive to accept and respect her or his patient and to be reliable, attentive, empathic, sympathetically responsive. In other words, the therapist embodies precisely those qualities which the patient in all likelihood did not experience in his or her parenting figures as an infant, a child, an adolescent.

1.3 Conrad Baars and Anna Terruwe

Dutch psychiatrists Conrad Baars and Anna Terruwe were led through years of clinical practice to the discovery that besides neuroses caused by repression there exists a neurosis which results "from the frustration or deprivation of the natural sensitive need for affirmation in the infant, baby, or growing child by the mother, father or both."\(^2\) This 'frustration neurosis,' as Baars and Terruwe name it, is clearly distinct from repressive neuroses and is not just "an aggravation of a later neurosis caused by repression, or perhaps a predisposing factor in the development of such a neurosis."\(^2\) Unlike most psychiatrists, Baars and Terruwe are familiar with the faculty psychology of Aquinas and they describe the 'frustration neurosis' as the non-gratification of the natural psychic needs of the 'concupiscible' or 'pleasure appetite.' They state that "in speaking about the retarded emotional life of frustration neurotics, we have in mind the emotional life in its narrower sense; namely, the emotions of the pleasure

\(^2\) Bowlby, A Secure Base 91.

\(^2\) Bowlby, A Secure Base 152.


\(^2\) Baars and Terruwe, Healing the Unaffirmed v.
Tyrrell: Affectional Conversion

appetite, such as love, desire, and joy." Tad Dunne provides a succinct summary of Baars’s outline of what the latter calls the humane emotions of the pleasure appetite:

The humane emotions are direct responses to known objects perceived as satisfying or unsatisfying. He [Baars] lists six basic types coming in pair. Love and hate (like and dislike, fondness and displeasure). They precede desire or aversion. Desire and aversion (wanting and revulsion, seeking and loathing) are emotional movements heading towards or away from objects. They follow love or hate but precede joy or sadness. Joy and sadness (happiness and unhappiness, delight and the blues) are emotional states that depend on whether or not we have attained the loved or hated, wanted or unwanted objects.

Dunne, in my view, correctly situates these humane emotions of Baars’ pleasure appetite on the level of experiencing in the Lonerganian framework of levels of consciousness.

Although Baars and Temruwe ground primal affective deprivation in the sensitive, pleasure appetite, they stress that the person with the sensitive pleasure appetite is human and that human sensory knowing and appetite for what is good must be ultimately viewed in the broader context of the human being’s spiritual or intellectual knowledge of the universal good. They stress that emotional life evolves only gradually and that “progression from one stage to the next” can take place “only if the lower stage has reached its full development through adequate gratification of its natural needs. This gratification is absolutely necessary for

---

30 Conrad Baars and Anna Temruwe, Loving and Curing the Neurotic (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972) 138 n1. The authors list as the emotions of the pleasure appetite “love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sadness” (Healing the Unaffirmed ix n4).


32 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality 88.

33 See Dr. Elizabeth Morelli who writes: “We share empirical consciousness with the animals, but in us the higher levels of consciousness penetrate and modify this lower level, so that our perception and imagination, although empirically conscious are not merely animal” Anxiety: A Study of the Affectivity of Moral Consciousness New York: University Press of America, 1985) 77.

34 Baars and Temruwe, Loving and Curing the Neurotic 33.
entering into the next higher stage of emotional development." Thus they propose that a baby’s inborn needs for protection, belonging, tenderness, love are fulfilled developmentally, beginning with tactile, auditory, visual, and other such experiences as, for example, the baby’s response to the mother’s smile. If the developing baby/child increasingly feels itself fulfilled in its sensitive psychic desires, loved and accepted for itself, then its future rests upon a bedrock of security and psychic harmony. But if the baby or child does not have its basic psychic needs fulfilled then he or she is subject to a ‘frustration neurosis’ and “remains in a dissatisfied, frustrated psychic state which involves his [or her] entire being and pervades his [or her] emotional life with a deep-seated feeling of unrest, uncertainty, and insecurity.”

As already noted, this frustration of basic psychic needs is the source of a neurosis quite distinct from the neurosis caused by repression, though, it is important to add, that the former is often the source of repression.

Baars observes that “a very young baby is able to literally feel the difference between being loved unselfishly, for his own goodness, and being loved possessively, for the sake of satisfying his mother’s need.”

Baars, in independent research and therapeutic work, thus confirms Maslow’s view that the love-need of a person can only be filled by the unselfish love of another person. Baars writes, speaking, as it were, to an unaffirmed person: “In order to become you, you must first receive the gift of yourself. In order to receive this gift, there has to be another who gives, who gives without taking.” In Baars’s view the unaffirmed person exists in a basic feeling state of being unloved, unlovable, worthless, inferior.

35 Baars and Terruwe, Loving and Curing the Neurotic 125.
36 Baars and Terruwe, Loving and Curing the Neurotic 140.
37 Baars, Born Only Once (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1975) 72 n4. Maslow also lends strong support to the view that repressive activity often results from a lack of adequate fulfillment of basic needs: “A kind of pseudo growth takes place very commonly when the person tries (by repression, denial, reaction-formation, etc.) to convince himself that an ungratified basic need has really been gratified, or doesn’t exist. He then permits himself to grow on to higher-need-levels, which, of course, forever after, rest on a very shaky foundation. I call this ‘pseudo-growth by bypassing the ungratified need’” (Toward a Psychology of Being 58 n5).
38 Baars, Born Only Once 24.
39 Baars, Born Only Once 19.
And, "unless someone gives him — through affirmation — the feeling of being worthwhile as a be-er, he will remain unhappy for the rest of his life."  

Baars emphasizes that "affirmation is first of all affectivity, a matter of feeling."  

The gift of a second birth, of 'psychic birth' is at its core a matter of transformation from a state of feeling unlovable to a state of feeling lovable in oneself. "To be and feel accepted and approved by others constitutes man's second birth, his psychic birth." Yet, the individual in need of psychic birth must be open to receiving the gift of psychic birth. As Baars writes, again speaking to the unaffirmed person: "Without your openness the affirming person's love is frustrated. In this sense he is dependent on you, just as much as you are dependent on him for affirmation."

1.4 John Evoy

In his book The Rejected psychologist John Evoy suggests that individuals who are outright rejected or extrinsically valued, that is, valued for what they can do rather than as of worth and lovable in themselves by their parents or parent substitutes, suffer deep psychic injury. Evoy describes the reality of rejection from the viewpoint of the rejected individuals as "their emotionally toned knowledge that they were not loved and wanted, for themselves, by one or both parents." Evoy confirms the view that individuals lacking in an adequate fulfillment of their need for unconditioned love exist in a psychic state in which they feel and see themselves "as anything but admirable, worthy of respect, interesting, and acceptable

40 Baars, Born Only Once 23 n5.
41 Baars, Born only Once 24.
43 Baars, Born Only Once 99.
44 John Evoy, The Rejected (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981). See also the works of Dr. David Ausubel, for example, Ego Development and the Personality Disorders (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1952) for yet another research-based theory arguing for the origin of neurosis in early affective deprivation.
persons"; rather "feelings of personal emptiness, insufficiency, inadequacy, low evaluation of self, bankruptcy of self-esteem, or not-enoughness as persons" manifest themselves. Evoy stresses that in the light of his findings and those of other clinicians, far from being a rare occurrence, parental rejection "appears to be an experience of numerous people in our culture."46 Evoy also provides much evidence from his years of clinical experience that repression in a variety of forms often results as an effect of rejection.47

The theorists I have cited above reached their particular hypotheses largely in terms of their own research and there is little dependence of these psychological theorists on one another. Michael J. Mahoney in his magistral Human Change Processes: The Scientific Foundations of Psychotherapy48 does refer to both Bowlby and Evoy in terms of their contributions to the study of affective development and its frustration and he provides a summary of key features Evoy cites as characterizing rejected individuals.

In the final chapter of his work, Mahoney stresses that "although some definitions of psychotherapy (or specific approaches to it) have emphasized the role of 'positive regard' and affection in the helping relationship, this facet has only recently begun to emerge as a scientifically respectable focus of research"; he adds that "with the accumulating evidence on the 'working (or therapeutic) alliance' and the personal contributions of the individual psychotherapist ... there has come an increasing acknowledgment of the affective life of the counselor and, in particular, his or her capacity to invite and co-maintain a highly specialized human relationship involving mutual trust and genuine caring"; and he concludes that "the experience and expression of that caring are, of course, unique to the persons involved, but the centrality of caring has never been more widely recognized."49

46 Evoy, The Rejected 22-23.
47 Evoy, The Rejected 58; 34-37; 180-181.
49 Mahoney, Human Change Processes 355. Interestingly, Baars observed in 1979 that, although contemporary psychiatry recognized the symptoms of love-deprivation, they had not yet reached a point where they understood "the sum total of symptoms as a well-defined emotional disorder with a precisely defined cause and therapy" (Feeling and Healing
2. SOME HYPOTHESES ON AFFECTIONAL/LOVE DEPRIVATION AND ITS HEALING
BASED IN PART ON THE PRECEDING THEORIES

2.1 Introductory Cautions

It is important in the context of this article to keep in mind a caution expressed by Philip McShane in responding to a paper by Robert Doran dealing with psychic conversion and Lonergan's hermeneutics. McShane remarks that "Doran identifies a needed psychic sophistication, but the task of specifying it with implementable psychic precision calls for moves beyond present descriptive and metaphorical psychoanalysis that are not seriously supported by present middle and lower science." 50 Perhaps of equal importance is Mahoney's caution that, although attempts to specify the most basic human emotions have reached some consensus, it would be very misleading to suggest that the consensus is universal. He notes that "over five hundred different emotional terms and concepts have been identified." 51 There is a further complicating issue. Recent studies suggest that subtle cognitive and emotional development may be occurring in infants and babies much earlier than older research indicates. 52 Thus, for example, by the age of eight months "the full range of infant emotions has emerged." 53 With these cautions of McShane, Mahoney, and others in mind I would characterize my reflections in this article as one small step in the highly complex process of moving gradually from the merely descriptive phase toward the explanatory in the quest for understanding.

Your Emotions [Plainfield, New Jersey, 1979] 115. Certainly the work of Evoy and others is providing ever richer empirically based validation for the existence of this distinctive form of pathology.


51 Mahoney, Human Change Processes 187-188. Perhaps the most successful attempt to date to reach an explanatory level in dealing with one affective state, namely anxiety, in its non-pathological forms, is that of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Anxiety: A Study of the Affectivity of Moral Consciousness.

52 For a popular exposition of the latest research results in the area of infant development see Lisa Grunwald and Jeff Goldberg, "The Amazing Minds of Infants," Life 16/8, (July 1993) 47-60.

53 Grunwald and Goldberg, "The Amazing Minds of Infants" 58.
of the psychic/affective spheres of human development in their negative and positive components.

Scholars I cited above speak of a need for love in the early stages of human development, which if not fulfilled, results in varying degrees of pathology. The manner or mode in which the love-need is experienced as fulfilled or frustrated by the infant, baby, child is in accord with their particular affectional capacities and stage of development. Thus, the newborn infant is going to experience the gift of unconditioned love in a quite different fashion from the way a three year old baby is going to experience this gift.\footnote{Bowlby, for example, in his major two volume study Attachment and Loss, vol. 1: Attachment (New York: Penguin Books, 1969) and Attachment and Loss, vol. 2: Separation (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), provides ample examples of the ways in which infants and children experience and react/respond to the fulfillment/frustration of their basic needs/desires.}

There seems to be good evidence to support the view that later stages of development are greatly impacted by the early stages. There is some evidence that if affective deprivation is reversed by gifts of acceptance and love at relatively early stages of development the initial damage can be undone.\footnote{Bowlby, A Secure Base 126-129; Grunwald and Goldberg, “The Amazing Minds of Infants,” 58. For an opposing view see Freud scholar Sharon Maclsaac who affirms that “the absence of love at the outset of life inflicts the deepest wounds,” Freud and Original Sin (New York: Paulist Press, 1974) 126.} But where the pattern of affectional deprivation remains constant in infancy and early childhood healing of these love-deprived, rejected, or extrinsically valued individuals is generally effected, only with intense effort on the part of the healer and the affectively deprived individual.

2.2 Initial Grounding and Development of Theory of Affectional Deprivation

A. Primal Affectional Deprivation

Lonergan in Insight states that while neural development conditions psychic development, the latter “consists neither in neural tissues nor in neural configurations nor in neural events but in a sequence of increasingly differentiated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or
affective response, for memory ... "56 I suggest that there exist affective needs on the level of the sensitive psyche, which are conditioned by the neural level and which themselves condition in certain respects the actualizing of higher level capacities for receiving and expressing love. I further suggest that in the developing baby/child there exist ever more refined evaluative capacities for apprehending the self as desired and desirable, loved and lovable, valued and of value or as undesired and undesirable, unloved and unlovable, as disesteemed, as worthless.57

As regards the sensitive psychic level of consciousness, with Terruwe and Baars I suggest that at the most basic psychic level the frustration of the pleasure appetite in its desire for love is the primal source of affectional deprivation.58 The 'early' Lonergan discusses the nature of 'love' in terms of Aquinas's faculty psychology59 in his article dealing with finality, love and marriage.60 Like Baars and following Aquinas, Lonergan suggests that 'love' "is the pure response of appetite to the good ... while


57 See Mahoney, Human Change Processes 167 where he writes: "... the human fetus and infant are both active and interactive. The most important interactions between young children and their caregivers are emotional and communicative. But there is much more to the story than this. While they are acting and interacting, children are also developing. For the first eighteen months or so, their activities are focused on self-regulation, emotional attachment, and their own agency or competence."

58 I find the hypothesis of Terruwe and Baars concerning the frustration of primal love needs more satisfactory than others I have come across. Moreover, even if the Terruwe/Baars's hypothesis is found wanting I think there is an ever increasing body of evidence supporting both the hypothesis of the existence of powerful, primal affectional needs on the level of sensitive psychic consciousness and the hypothesis that the radical frustration of these needs results in a specific neurotic condition requiring healing above all through the gift of unconditioned loving.

59 A very useful study would be to attempt cleanly to disengage Aquinas's reflections on the concupiscible/irascible appetites from their embedment in faculty psychology in order to relate them with greater facility to contemporary psychological explorations of the sensitive psyche. It would likewise be helpful to subject Baars's use of faculty-psychology terminology to a similar type of study in order to relate his work more easily to the writings of the 'later' Lonergan. But I reserve these refinements in scholarship for future articles.

desire ... joy ... are consequents of the basic response." Lonergan does not dwell on the frustration of the natural spontaneity of the pleasure appetite, but he does speak, for example, of the good of natural beauty and how the human heart is "startled by a beauty that shifts the center of appetition out of self; and such a shift is effected on the level of sensitive spontaneity by eros leaping in through delighted eyes and establishing itself as unrest in absence and an imperious demand for company." I suggest, utilizing analogously Lonergan’s language, that on the level of the infant’s sensitive spontaneity there exists a desire for maternal and/or paternal affectional response that is ‘imperious,’ disquieted when not immediately fulfilled, and deeply frustrated when basically withheld. It is indeed possible that the fetus itself at a certain stage of development feelingly experiences the beginnings of the state of being affectionally undesired, not loved for itself. Lonergan in *Understanding and Being* writes of “an intersubjectivity that is basically on the sensitive level, and it

61 *Collection*, CWL 4 23-24 = *Collection* (1967) 23. Lonergan here refers in his discussion of ‘love’ to Part I of the Second Part of the *Summa theologiae* where Aquinas is discussing the passions, which are common to human beings and other animals. I put ‘love’ in quotation marks since Aquinas speaks of a ‘love’ that belongs to the sensitive appetite as well as of higher level forms of ‘love.’ Aquinas’ discussion of the passions and specifically the distinction and relationship between the passions belonging to the concupiscible and to the irascible sensitive appetites is extremely rich.

Lonergan in *Insight* is terse and minimalist in his account of the ‘feelings’ which Aquinas, in creative dependence on Aristotle and others, comments on at length in his discussions of the ‘passions.’ Lonergan is equally summary in his treatment of the ‘passions’ in *Method in Theology*.


63 Conrad Baars suggests that the mother can communicate her love through “letting her feeling of love flow into one of her hands, let us say the right one” and letting it gently rest on her abdomen; he adds that before long she will notice that the child swims “to the part of its temporary ‘home’ where ... [her] right hand ... lies”; the child nestles as it were with its back in the hollow of its mother’s loving hand, somewhat like the little child does in the beautiful carving, illustrating the prophets words, ‘See, upon the palms of my hands I have written your name’” (*Feeling and Healing your Emotions* 83). The affective [emphasis mine] symbiosis with the mother of which Lonergan writes (*Method in Theology* 121) has very early beginnings and the affective presence to the infant of the father as well throughout the pregnancy and following it is emerging as very important in the view of some psychologists. Of course, the fetus experiences ‘love’ in accord with its particular developmental stages and modes of affectional receptivity.
is perhaps most intense in mother and child." I suggest that radical failure in affectional bonding on this primal sensitive level of consciousness is the root source and core of the affective-deprivation neurosis.

B. Upper Level Affectional Deprivation

As the baby/child/youth develops in his or her capacities for responses to vital and personal values, continuing parental neglect or outright rejection in the face of the affective longings of the baby/child/youth reinforce and deepen the latter's felt state of affectional rejection, of being undesirable, unesteemed, unlovable, worthless. Here we see deprivational/affectional neurosis relentlessly reinforced at higher levels of cognitive and affective development. Thus, although primal affectional deprivation occurs on the level of sensitive consciousness, the first of Lonergan's four (some would say five) levels of consciousness, an ongoing type of affectional deprivation can occur on the higher levels of consciousness, that is, understanding, judging, deciding/loving.

As an individual develops he or she becomes capable of intentional feeling responses to values or disvalues. These intentional responses to values occur at the higher levels of consciousness. They provide data for value judgments about the self. Individuals, for example, who have experienced ongoing affectional deprivation are constantly making and remaking value judgments to the effect that 'I am worthless,' 'I am unlovable,' and so on. There can then be a dark side to Pascal's 'heart with its reasons.' These negative value judgments of the feeling heart intensify and are intensified by the felt state of feeling unlovable and unloved. In summary, my hypothesis is that just as it is possible to apprehend oneself

---


65 The topic of sensitive psychic desire and its intersubjective fulfillment on Lonergan's first level of experiential consciousness constitutes an area still in need of much study. Similarly, the phenomena of the initial and ongoing blossoming in the baby/child of value-apprehensions and responses and the integration/sublation of sensitive psychic affective desire within the sphere of these value-apprehensions/responses require much more in-depth study.

66 I do not wish to enter here into the debate about whether Lonergan did or did not hold for a distinct, fifth level of consciousness.
in feeling as loved, to express this in positive value judgments about the self, and to exist consciously in the feeling state of being loved on Lonergan's fourth level of consciousness, so it is possible to apprehend oneself in feeling as being unloved, to express this in negative value judgments about the self, and to exist consciously in the feeling state of being unlovable.

2.3 Deprivation Neurosis and Repressive Neurosis

Earlier I pointed out that Terruwe and Baars distinguish between the 'deprivation neurosis' and the 'repressive neurosis.' I think one can legitimately draw a certain analogy between the degrees of severity or pathology involved in the stages of felt unlovableness/worthlessness and the degrees of severity at work in repressive psychic disorders. Thus, in some individuals severe repression is deeply unconsciously operative and manifests itself accordingly in very unhealthy ways of daily personal functioning; in other individuals a lesser degree of repression is at work; but the repression is of a milder form and so are the symptoms through which it reveals itself in disguised fashion. I emphasize that I am using an analogy and that there are clearly significant differences between the two basic forms of psychological phenomena I am describing. It is perhaps helpful to recall that Maslow, Bowlby, Baars, and Evoy all state that repression can be an effect of some type of affective deprivation. This means that in many instances where a therapist encounters an affective deprivation neurosis he or she will at a certain point in the healing process also find it necessary to apply the therapeutic means appropriate for dealing with the healing of a repressive neurosis.

67 For a lucid exposition and creative amplification of the Terruwe and Baars theory of repression see Tad Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality 72-77.

68 As noted above, Maslow holds that our basic deficiency needs are 'instinctoid,' grounded in our animal nature (Toward a Psychology of Being 164) and that these needs may be conscious or unconscious (Motivation and Personality 54). Lonergan suggests in harmony with Maslow's theory that "the non-conscious neural basis can send up its signals that express a starved affectivity or other demands for fuller living" (Insight, CWL 3 497 = Insight [Longmans, 1961] 472). Lonergan acknowledges a strictly unconscious level and varying degrees of consciousness, for example, "feelings as felt and, on the other hand, a suprastructure of ... feelings as integrated in conscious living" ("Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," A Third Collection 58). Thus, in the case of the basic feeling state of being unlovable, this can exist in the infrastructure of consciousness as merely felt or
2.4 Affectional Deprivation, ‘Scotosis’ and Maslow’s ‘B-Love’

Maslow talks about the love for the Being of another person as an unselfish, unneeding love; he calls this ‘B-love’.\(^{69}\) he says that the “truest, most penetrating perception of the other is made possible by B-love; he further observes that “far from accepting the common platitude that love makes people blind, I become more and more inclined to think of the opposite as true, namely that non-love makes us blind.”\(^{70}\) We might then perhaps analogously speak of a ‘scotoma’ or ‘blind spot’ existing at the core of the unloved individual. Just as Lonergan speaks of a ‘scotosis’ unconsciously at work in a person that excludes insights and impacts the censor destructively, so we might speak of an affectional scotosis, at work in individuals who feel affectively undesirable and undesired at their core. This scotosis unconsciously impedes them in their capacity to be open to the offer of unconditioned love on the part of others\(^{71}\) (the unloved tend to be very mistrustful of others and of themselves) and it blocks them in their ability to perceive the goodness and lovableness of others. Instead, rejected, unaffirmed individuals feel the pull of envy, jealousy, resentment. Their resentment can actually cause them unconsciously to flee from authentic appreciation of the other, to be affectively blind to the goodness of the other. The need for affectional conversion becomes

\[\text{it can be brought into reflective awareness, named and talked about in therapy. At times what Lonergan describes as feelings existing in the infrastructure of consciousness might be described by certain psychologists as feelings existing in a ‘repressed state.’ Here a citation by Bowlby of a statement of Freud might be relevant (A Secure Base 101):}

Forgetting impressions, scenes or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting them off. When the patient talks about these ‘forgotten’ things he seldom fails to add: ‘As a matter of fact I’ve always known it; only I’ve never thought of it’ (S. Freud, “Remembering, repeating and working through,” Standard Edition 12 [London: Hogarth Press, 1914] 148).

\(^{69}\) Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 42.

\(^{70}\) Maslow, Toward A Psychology of Being 43.

\(^{71}\) Bowlby emphasizes that in the “earliest years of our lives...emotional expression and its reception are the only means of communication we have” (A Secure Base 157); yet, in individuals who have been severely deprived of authentic mothering or even rejected outright “signals, arising from both inside and outside the person that would activate their attachment behavior and that would enable them both to love and to experience being loved” [emphasis mine] are blocked off (A Secure Base 35).
poignantly urgent as we contemplate the devastating effects of the scotosis and scotoma present in the unaffirmed.

2.5 Affectional Conversion

In my hypothesis it is important to distinguish between primal affectional conversion and an upper level affectional conversion. Primal affectional conversion consists in a shift on the level of sensitive awareness from the felt sense of frustration of the pleasure/love/desire appetite to a felt sense of fulfillment of this appetite. It is a shift from a felt sense of affectional deprivation to a felt sense of affectional acceptance and fulfillment. Primal affectional conversion occurs on the first level of consciousness, which Lonergan designates as the level of experiencing. Upper level affectional conversion consists in a healing transformation of a consolidated, ongoing affective-deprivation insofar as this deprivation is at work and negatively impacting the individual on the levels of understanding, judging, deciding, loving in Lonergan's model of consciousness.

Thus, a felt sense of being undesirable, unlovable, unesteemed, worthless can exist at higher levels of consciousness where there is an apprehension in feeling of personal value and disvalue and an upper level affectional conversion takes place at these levels which consists in a shift from the felt sense of being unlovable, unesteemed, worthless to the felt state of being desirable, lovable, esteemed, worthwhile. The two affectional conversions are really distinct to the extent that they can be related to transformations on distinct levels of consciousness. Of course, concretely in the child, adolescent, or adult who is suffering from severe affective deprivation there exists a need for affectional healing on the higher as well as lower levels of consciousness. As Bowlby pointed out, the way parents treat their child in its first year is generally the way they will be treating the child in its sixth year. Thus, though it is important and valid to distinguish the primal and upper level affectional conversions as they relate to distinct levels of consciousness, there exists a constant interaction between the lower and higher levels of consciousness as the affectional healings of unmet 'love needs' on the various levels take place.
2.6 Freedom and the Process of Affectional Conversion

Affectional conversion is gradually effected through the ongoing gift of unconditioned love,\(^7^2\) of a second birthing, to the extent it is needed.\(^7^3\) In the case of the fetus or infant who is receiving the gift of primal psychic birth there is obviously no freely ratified acceptance of this immeasurable gift. But in the case of a person lacking in psychic birth, who is capable of exercising free choice, there is need for an at least implicit openness to and ratification of the gift of psychic birth. Maslow states that "no psychological health is possible unless this essential core of the person is fundamentally accepted, loved and respected by others and by himself [emphasis mine]."\(^7^4\) Baars, as I noted earlier, also insists that without the actively receptive openness of the person in need of psychic birth to the gift of affirming love the giver is necessarily frustrated. The acceptance of the gift of psychic birth is a most radical form of self-acceptance. The receiver of the gift affectively, courageously, freely acknowledges the existential truth that he or she is indeed lovable and of worth in himself or herself. To the affirming person who says, "I am glad that you are; it is good that you exist," the receiver responds by saying, "I am glad that I am; it is good that I exist; I thank you for your ongoing, persistent gracious love and existential honesty to me."

\(^7^2\) As is clear from my works on Christotherapy the healing of love-deprivation is a complex process. The core healing method (gift) is 'existential loving' (Christotherapy II 116-118); but there is also need for a healing through enlightenment (a cognitive as well as affective event) in which healings of one's body image, self-image, distorted beliefs about the self, others, and life, and so on, are gradually effected.

\(^7^3\) Psychologists differ regarding the issue of the existence of degrees of felt unlovableness and proportionate pathological effects. Evoy and Baars put emphasis on radical affective deprivation and the consequent need for radical healing or in Baars' term the basic gift of a 'psychic birth.' Maslow stresses that "intermediate stages of pathology and health follow upon intermediate states of thwarting or satiation [of the love-deficit]" (Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 41-42).

\(^7^4\) Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 196.
2.7 Affectional Conversion and Christotherapy

In my first Christotherapy book, I wrote that “Christotherapy shares with reality therapy the belief that the fulfillment of the need to love and be loved on the interhuman level is crucial for human development.” At the same time I emphasized that “although Christotherapy concurs with reality therapy on the need for loving communion with a fellow human being if basic love needs are to be fulfilled, it stresses that once Christ is mediated to an individual through another loving Christ-filled individual, then Christ can become an essential person in one’s life. Christ is indeed a ‘tremendous lover,’ and love of him and loving belief in his love can sustain one in what otherwise are most loveless situations and bring about in a person ever deepening healing.”

Further, in the paper I presented at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop in 1974 I stressed that the therapist called to bestow the gift of love on the affectively deprived individual needs to have his or her own love needs basically fulfilled, needs to be a person whose heart is flooded with the gift of God’s love and is morally converted. I stated that “the therapist must first bestow the gift of love and acceptance on the patient if he [she] is to have his [her] basic needs for love and a sense of worthwhileness fulfilled” and that the patient needs to accept freely the gift of love. Finally, I made the point that “an occurrence or transformation on one level of the psyche or human consciousness affects all the other levels.

---

75 I would like to take this occasion to acknowledge that, although I thought I was the first person to come up with the term “Christotherapy,” I have learned that this was not the case. I received a letter dated October 14, 1982 from Antoni Diller of Leeds, England in which he brought to my attention that the term “Christotherapy” appeared as a chapter heading in a book by Marcus Gregory, entitled Psychotherapy, Scientific and Religious (London: MacMillan, 1939). I have verified this reference.

76 Tyrrell, Christotherapy 36-37.
77 Tyrrell, Christotherapy 37.
[and that] concretely this means that the presence or absence of religious conversion [at least 'anonymously'] in the individual will be an existential factor in the psychological healing process."81 I cite my earliest writings on the role of human and divine love in the healing of the affectionally wounded psyche because this emphasis on the healing power of love becomes a theme for Lonergan when he writes of a healing love that "moves from above downwards"82 and a bit later of an "affective conversion."83

3. AFFECTIONAL CONVERSION AS RELATED TO PSYCHIC AND AFFECTIVE CONVERSION

3.1 Affectional Conversion and Psychic Conversion

Affective development and its aberrations have their primal rooting in the sensitive psyche, the level of empirical consciousness, of pleasure and pain, desire and fear, satisfaction/fulfillment or distress/frustration of basic sensitive desires.

I suggest that there is an essential difference between Doran's psychic conversion and primal affectional conversion. As I understand it, in the case of psychic conversion the focus is on the data of the psyche that pertain to repression as it is at work on the sensitive psychic level and to the transformation of the 'censor' from a repressive to a constructive agency in a person's development;84 on the other hand, in the case of primal affectional conversion the focus is on the data of sensitive consciousness that pertain to the frustration of the pleasure/love appetite in an individual and the transformative process that results in the fulfillment of the sensitive love-desire.

81 Tyrrell, "On the Possibility and Desirability of a Christian Psychotherapy" 167.
In my hypothesis, then, the radical frustration of the pleasure appetite in its desire/love orientation constitutes the primal form of affectional deprivation or neurosis. On the other hand, the repression of feelings which occurs on the sensitive psychic level constitutes the repressive form of neurosis. Of course, in both Baars's and Doran's hypotheses the human person is the subject of these neuroses and these latter both impact and are impacted by the higher level activities of intellect and will (in faculty psychology) or the understanding, judging, deciding, loving of intentionality analysis.

My hypothesis is then that there can be a primal affectional conversion that occurs on the level of sensitive consciousness and that this conversion is just as much a sensitive psychological conversion as is the psychic conversion that involves a transformation of Freud's censor from a repressive to a constructive agency in the ongoing development of the person. Moreover, as Maslow, Bowlby, Baars, and Evoy affirm, repression is often the effect of an affective deprivation. In these instances the occurrence of primal affectional conversion on the level of sensitive consciousness is a necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, existential condition of possibility for the occurrence of psychic conversion in an individual.  

Over the years — in Christotherapy II and in articles published both before and after Christotherapy II — I have engaged in extensive reflections on complementarities and differences between Doran's work and my own in the areas of psychic development and therapy. I refer the interested reader to these texts. There is, however, one development in Doran's thought about therapy that is especially pronounced in his later writings and is relevant to mention here.

85 Here I am also in agreement with Carl Rogers who holds that in therapy where affective deprivation is at work "the change in self precedes, rather than follows, the recovery of repressed materials" (Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965] 148).

Tyrrell: Affectional Conversion

In a paper presented at the 1977 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College I wrote that “Doran does not provide clear evidence that he regards affective deprivation and the consequent need for loving affirmation to be central elements in the healing of many neuroses. For Christotherapy, however ... the gift of love is viewed as a principal element in the healing not only of neurosis, but of addiction ... as well.”87

I had largely completed a first draft of the present article before I had the opportunity to acquire and read Doran’s masterful *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. What struck me most forcefully in reading this book was the major emphasis Doran places on the role of divine and human love in effecting psychic conversion. Doran states, for example, that “the conversion of the psychic components of a repressive censorship into constructive functioning constitutes the first and basic instance of what I have called psychic conversion” and that “only love can dissolve the psychic components of a repressive censorship, or more precisely, convert them into constructive functioning.”88 Moreover, Doran stresses that “the kind of human love that can mediate the redemptive and healing love of God” is a love that “must be informed by universal willingness” and “must itself have been healed of the consequences of its own victimization by evil to such an extent that it can submit voluntarily to being victimized again without fear of losing what it has been given in the course of the process of its own reception of love.”89 Indeed, Doran’s listing of the existential qualities required in the person who is to be an effective mediator of God’s love in effecting psychic conversion in an individual beautifully complements the list of qualities I ascribe to the Christotherapist acting as an effective instrument of God in bringing about psychological healing in both of my Christotherapy books as well as in most of the articles I have written on Christotherapy.90

87 Tyrrell, “Dynamics of Christotherapy’ and the Issue of a De Jure Psychotherapeutic Pluralism” 141.

88 Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* 251.

89 Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* 244.

90 See especially my chapter in *Christotherapy II* entitled “The Qualities of the Christotherapist” 103-115.
Doran's strikingly eloquent comments on the role of healing love in effecting psychic conversion do not eliminate the need for distinguishing clearly between an affective neurosis and a repressive neurosis. In fact, Doran's observations, in effect, reinforce the point I made above that where an affective deprivation has repression as one of its effects, the healing of the affective deprivation through the gift of love is an existential condition of possibility, though not necessarily the only one, for the healing of the repression or in Doran's terminology, for the transformation of a repressive censorship into constructive functioning.

My tentative answer to the question about whether primal affectional conversion is a distinct conversion is that insofar as affectional conversion involves a transformation on the level of sensitive consciousness from the frustration of affective desire on that level to the fulfillment of that affective desire it is a conversion on the level of sensitive consciousness that is distinct from the sensitive psychic conversion that Doran designates as 'psychic conversion.' It is thus also appropriate to describe it as a potential differentiation within the sphere of sensitive consciousness to the extent that a basic 'affective deprivation' exists in an individual and is in need of healing.

There is one important caution I should add here. Not all individuals suffer from a love-deprivation or a repressive psychic condition severe enough to be truly psychically pathological or 'neurotic' in the classical sense of the latter term. Primal affectional conversion in the strict sense refers to the healing of a truly neurotic frustration of the pleasure appetite. If Doran's psychic conversion does not constitutively involve the healing of an unhealthy, truly neurotic form of repressive activity, then it perhaps possesses a broader range of applicability than does primal affectional conversion.

3.2 Affectional Conversion and Affective Conversion

Lornergan in his explicit comments on 'affective conversion,' at least in the material available to me, has said very little. In the one explicit reference to 'affective conversion' to which I have access, Loneran states that true enlightenment and self-knowledge includes "knowledge of affectivity in its threefold manifestation of love in the family, loyalty in the community,
and faith in God”; he adds that “authentic emancipation has its roots in self-transcendence” and that this self-transcendence “includes an intellectual, a moral, and an affective conversion”; he concludes that “as affective, it [this conversion] is commitment to love in the home, loyalty in the community, faith in the destiny of man.”91 In terms of what Lonergan has explicitly written about affective conversion I remain uncertain about why Lonergan introduced in such an undeveloped fashion the term ‘affective conversion’ into his late writings, what degree of importance he attributed to the new term, and whether, most importantly, he viewed it in an explanatory fashion as a distinct conversion along with intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic conversion.

A. Reflections on Affectional and Affective Conversion

Mediated through Doran’s Interpretation of Lonergan on Affective Conversion

I think that some key reflections of Doran on Lonergan’s affective conversion prove helpful for this discussion both because Doran has access to all of Lonergan’s unpublished reflections on affective conversion and, just as importantly, because he has to my knowledge made the most explicit attempt to date to explain in the broader context of Lonergan’s overall writings what Lonergan may have meant by affective conversion and how it might be related to the other four conversions Lonergan affirmed to be truly distinct from one another.

Doran explicitly states in one text his definition of what Lonergan means by affective conversion. Before offering his definition, however, he sets up a context in remarking that the “experiential flow, the movement of sensitive consciousness, must match the self-transcendence of intentional operations if the performance of these operations is consistently to proceed with ease.” But he notes that “for whatever reasons, there can be an opposite movement of sensitive consciousness, a movement that interferes with the performance of the intentional operations. There can be a felt resistance to insight, a flight from understanding, a desire not to judge, a psychic resistance against deciding and acting, a habitual lovelessness, as well as numerous other and more complex desires and fears, 91 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection 179.
that affect to a greater or lesser extent the integrity of operations at the various levels of intentional consciousness.” Doran, then, states explicitly, in terms which most closely approximate a definition of affective conversion in his book, that “what Lonergan calls affective conversion is the movement away from this resistance toward a new way of life in which one’s sensitive desires begin to reach out towards a condition in which they will match and support the self-transcendence of the pure desire that is the spirit of inquiring intelligence itself.” Doran adds that “of this movement in its supreme moment Lonergan writes: ‘... at the summit of the ascent from the initial infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications, there are to be found the deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor of being in love with God. In the measure that summit is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are God’s expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal.’” Doran further adds that “of the opposite movement [Lonergan] says: ‘But continuous growth seems to be rare. There are the deviations occasioned by neurotic need. There are the refusals to keep on taking the plunge from settled routines to an as yet unexperienced but richer mode of living. There are the mistaken endeavors to quiet an uneasy conscience by ignoring, belittling, denying, rejecting higher values.’”

Doran’s ‘definition’ of Lonergan’s affective conversion seems to include both the crowning moment of the movement of affective conversion, which is realized to the extent that one’s affectivity is of a single piece in which one’s love for God and neighbor are most richly realized, and, at the opposite pole, an initial movement away from neurotic and other resistances to growth toward a point in which one’s sensitive desires will begin to match and support the self-transcendence of the pure desire as it unfolds as ever higher levels.

How, then, does Doran’s interpretation of Lonergan’s affective conversion, as involving a shift in sensitive consciousness away from resisting to supporting self-transcending operations, relate to primal affectional conversion? Primal affectional conversion is limited strictly to the healing of a specific pathology, namely, the neurosis of affective deprivation. The core pathology of affective deprivation consists in the frustration of the

92 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 51-52.
pleasure-love desire on the level of sensitive consciousness. On the other hand, Doran understands affective conversion quite globally as including any factors, such as desires, fears, lovelessness, and so on, that interfere with rather than match and support the performance of self-transcending intentional operations. It thus appears that there are very likely two and perhaps more basic differences between primal affectional conversion and affective conversion as they relate to the sensitive level of consciousness.

First, primal affectional conversion is concerned only with the healing of a neurosis on the level of the sensitive psyche. Affective conversion seems to involve the healing of any form of sensitive psychic resistance to support of self-transcending intentionality. Second, primal affectional conversion on the sensitive level of consciousness is concerned as such with only one specific form of neurosis. Affective conversion, however, to the extent that it consists in the healing of neurosis, seems to include a wide variety of pathologies. Third, primal affectional conversion has as its definitional focus the shift from pleasure/love deprivation to fulfillment of this deprivation. A key effect of this healing is that the affective flow of sensitive consciousness will now tend to support rather than resist the operations of self-transcending intentionality. Affective conversion, however, would seem to have as its principal focus the movement of sensitive consciousness from a mode of resisting to supporting self-transcending intentionality. Finally, although there may be some debatable aspects regarding the distinctions I have drawn, I do not think that there are solid grounds in Lonergan's explicit statements about affective conversion or in Doran's elaborations of the nature of this conversion for the view that Lonergan's primary concern with affective conversion insofar as it relates to the level of sensitive psychic consciousness was with the fulfillment of an unmet love-need on this level.

Doran further suggests that "Lonergan's affective conversion is the fruit in part of psychic conversion, since psychic conversion makes available materials that need to be transformed if one is to be in love in an unqualified fashion." Doran adds that "the close connection of images and affects renders the dream a royal road to psychic conversion" since "the dream provides images that represent the affects that are to be

93 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 9.
negotiated, transformed, purified" and that this "negotiation, transformation, refinement, purification, conscription, help the subject to move toward what Lonergan calls affective conversion, conversion to being in love in intimacy, in the community, and with God."94

In line with Doran's suggestion that Lonergan's affective conversion is the fruit in part of psychic conversion, I suggest that Lonergan's affective conversion is the fruit in part of primal affectional conversion, to the extent that the latter is needed in an individual. Without primal affectional conversion an individual subject to radical love-deprivation possesses, in Maslow's terms, a most critical unfulfilled deficiency need. And, as long as this love-hunger remains, the individual is severely impaired in the ability to move from a self-conscious, egocentric, gratification-oriented way of being in the world toward other-oriented self-transcendence.

In my own reading of Lonergan's affective conversion, I think he is fundamentally envisaging the kind of shift that Maslow speaks of whereby a person is gradually freed from an ego-centric focus toward an other-oriented, self-transcending focus. This shift enables authentic commitment to love in the family, loyalty in the community, ongoing commitment to the realization of the authentic destiny of humankind. Of course, it is impossible without the gift of God's indwelling love for perduring, selfless love of other human beings, whether in the family, in the neighborhood, or in the community of nations, to exist.

Doran, in his first reference to Lonergan's 'affective conversion' in his introduction to Theology and the Dialectics of History, states that "what I mean by psychic conversion is not what Lonergan means by affective conversion." He affirms rather that "Lonergan's references to affective conversion appear late in his writings, but even with his recognition of affective conversion, what I am calling psychic conversion should be included as a distinct dimension of what in fact is a single and prolonged process of personal transformation."95 In line with Doran's insistence that psychic conversion is not what Lonergan means by affective conversion, I too would want to insist that affectional conversion in its primal and upper level forms is not to be simply identified with what Lonergan

94 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 85-86.
95 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 9.
means by affective conversion. Affectional conversion, to the extent that it is required, can be, to use Doran’s terms, a distinct dimension of what in fact is a single and prolonged process of personal transformation.

In his first chapter Doran again states that “psychic conversion is not the same as what Lonergan calls affective conversion. It is not the achievement of an affectivity that is of a single piece because one loves God with all one’s heart and soul and mind and strength. Such unrestricted love is the goal of a complete conversion process involving four distinct but interrelated dimensions of religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic conversion.”96 Again, in accord with Doran’s terminology I suggest that affectional conversion in its primal and upper level forms is not the same as what Lonergan calls affective conversion. It also is not the achievement of an affectivity that is of a single piece because one loves God with all one’s heart and soul and mind and strength. Rather such an unrestricted love is the goal of a complete conversion process that can include five distinct but interrelated dimensions of religious, moral, intellectual, psychic, and affectional conversion in its primal or primal and upper level form.

3.3 Summary

In the title of this paper I ask if affectional conversion is a distinct conversion or a potential differentiation in the sphere of sensitive psychic and/or affective conversion. My tentative response, as suggested in this paper, is that, insofar as an individual is subject to an affective-deprivation neurosis on the level of the sensitive consciousness, primal affectional conversion is a distinct conversion on the level of the sensitive, psychic level of consciousness, and in many instances is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for the occurrence of psychic conversion as Doran defines it. Further, insofar as a person is in need of primal and upper level affectional conversion, affectional conversion constitutes a distinct but interrelated dimension in the complete conversion process which has as its goal the unrestricted love where affectivity is of a single

96 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 59.
piece because one loves God with all one’s heart and soul and mind and strength.

4. SOME FINAL QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

4.1 Conversions as Related to Distinct Levels of Consciousness

Doran has written that “my own understanding of the varieties of conversion is such that one may speak of a distinct heuristic category for explanatory understanding, and so of a unique variety of conversion, only if the reality of which one speaks affects proximately a distinct level of consciousness.” Yet, Doran at the same time states that intellectual conversion affects the third and second levels of consciousness. I gather from this added comment that in Doran’s view a conversion may involve more than one level of consciousness as long as it ‘affects proximately’ one particular level of consciousness.

It is not immediately clear to me why one may speak of a distinct variety of conversion, only if the reality of which one speaks affects proximately a distinct level of consciousness. Basically I do not see any a priori reason for this hypothesis, but I am open to it and would like to see further discussion of it.

In any case, as far as primal affectional conversion is concerned, if Doran is correct about the need for a conversion to affect proximately a distinct level of consciousness in order to be distinct on an explanatory level, then primal affectional conversion would meet the exigency Doran suggests since it affects proximately the level of sensitive psychic awareness. It is true that upper level affectional conversion is not limited to one distinct level of consciousness. But, even if one were to conjecture that affectional conversion necessarily involves both primal and upper level conversion, as I have defined them, my response would be that affectional conversion in its primal, constitutive moment proximately relates to the first level of sensitive, psychological awareness, though it touches the upper levels of consciousness as well.


98 Doran, review of Christotherapy II 92.
As I indicated earlier Lonergan, who in *Method in Theology* and earlier writings affirmed the existence of three distinct conversions, namely religious, moral, and intellectual, later acknowledged the existence of psychic conversion as a fourth, distinct conversion and perhaps also affective conversion as a fifth distinct conversion. Philip McShane has argued for a modern-scientific theoretic conversion. Donald Gelpi argues for the existence of a socio-political conversion. The question naturally arises: Is it possible that there exist other conversions not yet formally noted and thematically developed? Thus, for example, I have often puzzled over the possibility that there might exist an aesthetic conversion, a shift from a deformed aesthetic response to the apparent, pseudo-beautiful to a reformed, aesthetic response to the truly beautiful in the realm of art. The discussion of the possibility of such an aesthetic conversion at once leads to further questions about possible differentiations within aesthetic conversion, such as aesthetic responses to music, painting, sculpture, and so on. The thorny question about beauty as a transcendental also arises once the issue of aesthetic conversion is broached and with it the question about what level or levels of consciousness are involved in the aesthetic intentional responses to merely apparent or to authentic beauty in its various manifestations.

The question of the number of possible forms of conversions is an important one to think about since there seems to be a proliferation of hypotheses regarding possible conversions since Lonergan made the topic of conversion so central to foundational theology. Thus, in this paper I have proposed the possibility of the existence of a form of conversion,

---

99 See review of *Christotherapy* II 92. I am dependent here on Doran’s reference to Philip McShane’s development of this form of conversion since I have not come across it myself in McShane’s writings.

100 Donald Gelpi, *The Turn to Experience* (New York: Paulist Press, 1994) 134.

101 I realize that, like the term ‘affective conversion,’ the term ‘aesthetic conversion’ or an equivalent has been used by a number of authors with denotative or connotative meanings. I am employing it here in my own fashion as a passing example and so I do not reference here nor make judgments about the discussions of ‘aesthetic conversion’ of other scholars.
distinct from Doran's psychic conversion, which may be proximately related to the level of sensitive consciousness.

In an earlier paper I suggested that diverse therapies might apply to diverse forms of psychic pathology. I stated that "Lonergan stands on the side of a developmental view of psychic unfolding which acknowledges diverse stages of psychic development and possible aberrations" and that "this view is ... open, at least in principle, to the possibility of varied psychotherapeutic aids to be determined in accord with the particular stage of psychic development at which the aberrations occurred." 102 I concluded my paper with a recommendation: "What is needed is the development of an integral heuristic structure of psychotherapies based equally on the rock of intentionality analysis and on an ongoing empirical testing and evaluation of the diverse psychotherapeutic theories and therapies." 103 Robert Doran in commenting on my recommendation wrote that "perhaps a heuristic of psychotherapies would point the way to a mediation of explanatory knowledge of the aesthetic and dramatic components of our being." 104

Perhaps we might also seek to develop a heuristic structure as a means of seeking determinations of conversions related proximally to each of the levels of consciousness and perhaps, if such conversions exist, to more than just one level of consciousness. 105

More specifically, in the present case it might be helpful to work out a heuristic of conversions related proximally to the level of sensitive psychic consciousness. Perhaps in implementing such a heuristic we would need to flesh out and nuance the precise significance of the distinction between a form of conversion, which though unique and not
reducible to any of the other forms of conversion, is not required in all and a conversion which all are called or at least invited to undergo. Thus, for example, though all need psychic birth, not all are initially deprived of it and hence not all are in need of the conversion process I refer to as affectional conversion. It is essential to reflect on the distinction and relationship between the two types of conversion, in particular as it relates in the present discussion to the distinction between affectional and psychic conversion. For, as I have stressed above, I think that as a neurosis love-deprivation, where it exists, is equiprimordial with repressive neurosis. Indeed, love-deprivation is perhaps more primal than repression and is often the cause of the latter. I subscribe to the hypothesis of Terruwe and Baars that love-deprivation and repression are the two basic categories of neurosis and as such, are *sui generis* in their foundational role in the development of the emotional life. Love-deprivation is thus a primal pathology, a distinct pathology, a pathology that is often at the basis of repressive pathology. Moreover, love-deprivation is a pathology that requires a distinct form of therapy and the healing of this pathology involves a true conversion, distinct from other conversions named and thematically developed up to the present.

4.3 Development or Conversion?

Kazimierz Dabrowski suggests that

there are people, though rarely met, whose initial integration [in a series of potential levels of development] belongs to the higher level, whose rich structure, constantly improved by life’s experiences and reflections, does not undergo the process of disintegration, but harmoniously and without greater shock develops into a full personality.\(^{106}\)

Lonergan in his Marquette Lecture on *Doctrinal Pluralism* states that "intellectual conversion is essentially simple" and "occurs spontaneously

when one reaches the age of reason, implicitly drops earlier criteria of reality (are you awake?, do you see it ... ?), and proceeds to operate on the criteria of sufficient reason.”107 Lonergan further remarks that “this spontaneous conversion is insecure” and that “the use of the earlier criteria can recur” and “is particularly likely to recur when one gets involved in philosophic issues.”108 Two speculative questions come to mind in the light of these comments of Lonergan about intellectual conversion: First, is it perhaps more accurate to describe the process which Lonergan says “occurs spontaneously when one reaches the age of reason ... ” as a developmental rather than a conversional process? Second, is the call to a further intellectual conversion required of all who wish to be authentic, since Lonergan acknowledges that the recourse to earlier criteria than those of sufficient reason ‘can [emphasis mine] recur’ and is even ‘likely [emphasis mine] to recur’ in certain circumstances. Lonergan does not state that the reversion to earlier criteria always recurs. But if it does not always recur, can it still be said that the call to intellectual conversion, at least as Lonergan describes it in his Marquette lecture, is universal? Is the call perhaps limited, as in the case of affectional conversion, to a particular group of individuals who lack it and hence truly need it?109

Similar questions arise in reference to psychic conversion. Thus, for example, if Dabrowski is correct in the observation I cited at the beginning of this section, then presumably in such individuals as he describes, the censor has basically operated from the beginning in a highly constructive, rather than unhealthily repressive fashion. Are then such robustly functioning, psychically and spiritually healthy individuals in need of a psychic conversion? And yet again, a similar question might be raised in regard to what I have suggested might be called an 'aesthetic conversion.' What if an individual, for example, is properly educated from the beginning in the aesthetic response to the truly beautiful in the realm of music (Plato, if I recall correctly, urged such an education)? In this case an

108 Doctrinal Pluralism 36.
109 For my more considered position on the nature and necessity of intellectual conversion as it is articulated in Lonergan’s works see my Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974) 30-39.
individual would presumably not be in need of an 'aesthetic conversion' in the area of music at least. Perhaps Dabrowski is overly sanguine in his observation about the existence of individuals who, though rarely met, move — obviously aided by God's grace — with little, if any, psychic and spiritual damage into full personalities. But, then again, perhaps there are more such healthy individuals around us than we suspect. In any case, I raise the issue of development versus conversion as a way of teasing out the true scope and limitations involved in our theorizing about conversions, their number and the relative need for them in the members of the human family.

I end this paper here with a reemphasis on the fact that I am proposing a hypothesis in my discussion of primal and upper level affectional conversion. I think that the compelling power and intellectual beauty of Lonergan's thought can too often inspire a 'rush to explanation' on the part of those who seek to follow in Lonergan's footsteps in a creative fashion. I myself have too often fallen prey to this temptation. I hope to avoid it here by stressing that in the area of feeling we are in territory still in need of much exploration and that I see my own effort here as hovering somewhere in-between pure description and explanation in the full sense.
THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION

David Oyler
314 West Cypress
Phoenix, AZ 85003

Living beings are in situations where their state is part of the state of the situation and where they condition the transition of the situation from one state to another. Their significance differs depending on the situation considered. If one considers the action of one animal within a forest, its significance is minor. However, if one considers the immediate situation of the animal, its operations and actions have a greater relative significance. There is another way to consider situations. Instead of viewing the living being as simply within a situation, situations can be understood in terms of the operations of the organism. This is the operational situation. It is defined as the complex of factors which can be organized to perform an act and the context for the organism in which this occurs. The context also is constituted in terms of the organism's operations. The purpose of this paper is to outline the model of the operational situation. It is general enough to apply to the biological and human sciences, theories of consciousness and knowing, and automation. It is specific enough to provide a framework for an integrated understanding of life and mind, and to guide research in these areas.

I will present it by first explaining what a situation in general is. As an indication of its scientific value and to build on a simpler model of situations, I will lay out the fundamentals of the physicists' notion of phase space. This is one tool for handling multiple variables in a complex situation. We will see that as phase space permits the representation of the state of a complex system, so the model of an operational situation provides the context for specifying the state of living systems. As phase space provides a means for discovering other relations by simplifying the representation of the state of a complex system, so the secondary notion of
operational situations permits the finest degree of abstraction within the full situation. A key difference between the notion of phase space and the operational situation is the constituting of the operational situation by operations. Thus, a definition of operations will be provided along with their relations to functions and acts. The value of the model of operational situations in integrating the investigation of the multi-variable situations of complex systems can then be indicated, especially in the interrelations of biology, psychology, and philosophy.

**Situations**

What is a situation? Most generally, it is a particular place and time. In pre-Einsteinian physics this was relatively easy to consider. Time and space were considered absolute. That is, in some sense they were independent of the matter that was 'in' them. The notion of being 'in' space or time was appropriate since individual spaces and times could be imagined as 'containers.' They were constants in the sense that they were the same for all observers. However, in current theory space and time are variables related to the state of matter. Particular places and time are inseparable from the state of matter which constitutes the particular space and time. Thus, space and time is different for different observers. Two events simultaneous for one observer may not be so for another. Thus, one observer's clock may not be synchronized with another's, though they may have been originally if they were once in the same place and times. Contemporary physics provides transformation equations to correlate the space and time in one situation with that in another.

For events on the scale of our daily lives, a four dimensional coordinate system can be used to represent space and time, three dimensions for space and one for time. However, in the physics of quantum mechanics, a ten dimensional system is used sometimes.

A powerful tool for representing the state of a situation on the physical level is phase space. A good popular account of phase space is found in James Gleick's *Chaos*.

Any state of [a] system at a moment frozen in time [can be] represented as a point in phase space; all the information about its position or velocity was contained in the coordinates of that point.
As the system changed in some way, the point would move to a new position in phase space. As the system changed continuously, the point would trace a trajectory.\(^1\)

Every piece of a dynamic system that can move independently is another variable, another degree of freedom. Every degree of freedom requires another dimension in phase space, to make sure that a single point contains enough information to determine the state of the system uniquely. ... Lorenz's stripped down system of fluid convection was three dimensional, not because the fluid moved through three dimensions, but because it took three distinct numbers to nail down the state of the fluid at any instant.\(^2\)

Phase space is a tool for modeling situations. Phase space makes it possible to represent a multi-variable situation with fewer variables, providing the opportunity to discover patterns that would be difficult to conceive on a more detailed level. This was a powerful aid in the discovery of strange attractors. It can provide information concerning the successive states of situations by representing the states as values of variables. If elements in the state are systematically related to one another, on the physical level they can be related mathematically and their current state can be represented by a value in phase space. If they are not related, then additional significant variables can be added. The values of the variables can be graphed, representing distributions of values for successive states.

Using phase space we can model the systematic and unsystematic elements in a situation. Unless the situation being studied is a fully systematic system in a steady state, all situations have systematic and unsystematic elements. Using phase space, the unsystematic would be represented by a set of independent variables. The systematic could be represented either by a single variable whose values represent the relations of the systematic elements, or each element could be represented singly. In the latter case, the distribution would display a strong relationship between these values, which in turn would indicate a systematic relation among them..

---


\(^2\) Gleick, *Chaos* 135.
The ground of the unsystematic is the statistical independence of events from one another. Events are independent of one another to the extent that there are no relations between them. Individual events can have determinate causes, yet be unrelated to one another. Common examples include balls on a pool table and particles in a gas. You could trace the individual history of each ball or each gas particle, but there is no overall set of relations which account for the configuration of the moment. Instead we have a set of individual histories. Similarly, if we consider a population over time, there may be no overall set of relations which account for the frequency of events of a particular type. If there were, we would expect the frequency to be fixed. However, in unsystematic situations, or sets of situations, the actual frequencies diverge from the ideal statistical frequencies, and they do so unsystematically.3

The lack of system can be of two kinds. It may concern the particular event, and then it is an accident. Or it may concern the set of events. In the latter case the events exhibit statistical independence.

However, from another viewpoint, an unsystematic situation can appear systematic. This was true of the law relating the pressure and temperature of a gas to one another. With some room for errors in measurement, this appeared to be a fixed relation. However, with the introduction of statistical mechanics, this variation was traced to the unsystematic nature of the situation. The apparent systematic relation was discovered to be a phenomenological law only. But this did not make the situation completely unsystematic, for there are still unities and relations which form the population studied. Without them, there would be no statistics since there would be nothing to which to assign frequencies.

In summary, situations are systematic and unsystematic. They are aggregates of spatial-temporal unities and relations.4 Insofar as there are relations and unities they are systematic. Insofar as there are unrelated aggregates they are unsystematic. Phase space provides a model within which to understand them which has some independence of the particular relations being studied. For example, phase space is compatible with both

4 Insight 172.
a classical and a kinetic theory of gases. However, it does not provide a non-mathematical treatment of situations.

**LEVELS OF COMPLEXITY**

We must go beyond a mathematical model to understand biological situations. Biological systems are understood in terms of functions, operations, and acts. However, to understand these, we first need a notion of levels of complexity.

The lack of system in a situation is the possibility for a higher integration, or the emergence of a new set of relations. Insofar as this new set of relations is an aggregate, the possibility exists for a higher level of organization. Since the possibility is recurrent, complex beings exhibit multiple levels of organization.\(^5\)

For example, cells are organized in organs or systems and these, in turn, are interrelated with other systems in a living thing. The behaviors of animals within a species can be organized in terms of behavioral systems. In turn, these systems can be organized in terms of the group or a society.

Considered schematically, on the lowest level of organization, A, B, C, and D are related to perform function F1. E, F, and G perform F2. H, I, and J perform F3. The repetitive performance of F1, F2, and F3 constitutes O. In this example there are three levels of organization. If we consider a set of organizations of O's, then it is easy to see that higher levels are possible through the iteration of our scheme.

The specialization of systems to perform functions which are in turn organized permits the modularization of functions. Modularization not only occurs on the same level, but exists between levels. Modularization permits generalization of function since elements can be combined in 'innovative' ways to function. Rather than having higher levels of organization tightly linked to lower level organizations, in many cases the higher level need only be linked to the function or to the results of the lower level organization. To a certain extent, any organization which performs the function or which yields the result will do. This is the basis

\(^5\) *Insight* 438 provides a much more sophisticated account of these relations.
for equifinality and equipotentiality. In equifinality we find the same purpose being achieved by multiple means. For example, in the above schema it makes no difference in the occurrence of O if F1 is achieved through A, B, C, and D or through X, Y, and Z. The important thing is that F1 occurs. Within certain limits, then, in many structures the higher level of organization is indifferent to the manner in which the lower level achieves its function.

Just as higher level organizations can exist given a variety of lower level structures, so can lower level structures be parts of more than one kind of higher level organization. Corresponding to equifinality is equipotentiality. For example, the human hand can be used for a variety of tasks, and in human action the same means can be used for multiple ends. In organisms the function of a particular system can be integrated into more than one higher level of organization.

FUNCTIONS, OPERATIONS, AND ACTS

Operators are organizations that transform themselves or other organizations or some other relata. There are two types of operations, reversible and irreversible. Reversible operations display symmetry in the sense that the initial state of the operator and the situations can be reattained. Irreversible operations are asymmetrical. The initial state is irrevocably transformed. The former are usually operative at a particular level of development, while the latter often lead to development.

Since operators are organizations, they can be hierarchically related. The notions of equipotentiality and equifinality above are two general forms of relations between higher and lower level operations.

Mathematical operations, like multiplication, transform their terms creating a product. By motor operations we can change our position or the configuration of our situation. By cognitive operations we can relate memories to one another and to key features in the present, or we can transform a mere proposition or proposal from possibly to actually true through a judgment.

Much of evolution has been the emergence of operations which have a bearing on the acts of organisms. Acts are operations performed by the highest level operator in a complex unity. This gives acts in organisms
their comprehensive quality. In ourselves this is the free, conscious operator we identify most readily with attention and decision. Lower level operations are organized in terms of the act. Given the independence of levels of organization from one another, this means that the actor does not have control over the full range of operations conditioning the act.

For example, in a therapy session, a patient may be moving his leg up and down in a nervous mannerism. If this is pointed out to him he will be surprised. As far as he was concerned, it was not an act he chose to perform. On the other hand, this same operation can be an act if it is chosen.

Acts, then, are distinct from another class of operations, expressions. Like the nervous mannerism, expressions can be chosen. Most often, though, they are not chosen for themselves, but are subsidiary to some end. When we speak, the flow of words emerges as a whole as the expression of what we mean. When the normal person expresses pain, pleasure or surprise, it is the unusual instance where that expression is chosen. There is a range of cross-cultural facial expressions and postures which evoke cross-cultural complementary behavior in people. The joyful smile, angry faces, threatening scowls are meaningful to all. However, in our daily life, like actors, we can elevate expression from mere operations to acts. We may choose our words carefully, or reinforce our message with a particular look. We can be aware of our body language and change it to match that of those with which we are interacting.

The role that operations play within higher levels of organization is their function. While operations are organized transformations, there are another set of biological functions which are more 'passive.' Examples are the function of the color of an organism as camouflage, the function of a single biochemical within a larger organization, or the function of the developed shape of the femur in standing or running. Thus, all operations are functions, but not all functions are operations. Likewise, all acts are operations, but not all operations are acts.

This notion of function is normative only in the sense that the function is part of a biological organization's operation. Either 'X functions' within the operation or it does not. The question of teleology would be
resolved in a discussion of the emergence of functions in evolution and the organization of goal directed operations.

Not all aspects of an organism may be functional. They may not be related within a higher level operational organization and, therefore, have no further 'use.' The appendix is a commonly used example.

The unsystematic is also evident within complex systems. There are operational organizations which are not related to one another. They may be open to future integration. In some combinations they also could become dysfunctional, hampering the organism's abilities to act. This is sometimes the case with computer programs when conditions are set by one part of the program that another part cannot accommodate, causing the program to fail. The situation can be recurrent among programs within computer systems, causing the system to fail.

THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION

The operational situation is understood in terms of the organism. Most generally, it is the complex of factors which can be organized to perform an act and the context for the organism in which this occurs. The context can include elements which are not part of the organism, but to which the organism is related. Thus, the context is constituted by a set of relations in the organism or has a correlative set of relata in the organism. Examples of the former are sub-situations within a biological system, or a merely psychical reality. This notion will be discussed in more detail below. An example of the latter is the processing of the visual system.

The organism is related to every aspect of the operational situation. Thus, if there is not a correlative relata in the organism for an element, that element is not part of the situation for the organism. For example, the current price of beef may influence when cattle go to market, but the activities of the commodities markets are not part of their operational situation.

The situation is complex. Acts occur within contexts which are constituted by operations. In turn, these operations occur on multiple levels of organization and within their own context. However, to avoid an infinite regress of contexts, let me point out that operations form networks of relations, so that the contexts can be mutually self-constituting. In this
vein, the ultimate context of any operation is the organization of the organism as a whole. The notion of the operational situation implies that, to a significant extent, the organism constitutes its own context.

Additionally, there can be multiple unrelated processes occurring simultaneously. Organisms are not fully systematic. Thus, the operational situation is both systematic and unsystematic, as is any concrete situation. In the discussion of vision, we will see that this lack of structure provides the possibility for diversity of functions in constituting and operating within the situation.

While the operational situation is for the organism, it is not merely for the organism as conscious, but for the organism as a whole. On the level of consciousness, a situation exists for consciousness, or, in phenomenological terms, consciousness is 'consciousness of ...'. However, conscious operations are supported by unconscious or non-intentional operations such as the workings of individual nerve cells and neural networks in memory, or the increase in the flow of blood to areas we exercise in actualizing our decisions. On a higher level we have the embodiment of our psychic development which is retained and operative though not fully conscious.

As one would expect, operational situations differ from species to species and, to a lesser degree, by individuals within a species. It also differs by level of development and within developmental stages. Naturally, it differs too by external circumstance, and, in higher animals, by the particular stages within the individual's motivational cycles.

The operational situation is temporal. Operations can incorporate past functioning and be anticipatory. Thus, the situation can embody a range of possibilities to which the organism is attuned. Motivational cycles are an example.

As recurrent sets of operations motivational cycles tend towards their realization in acts. The recurrence of cycles can lead to development of a complex network of flexible operations. The basic cycles are motivated by drives. These usually operate through one's lifetime or for a developmental period. Drives have biological conditions, though they usually are satisfied within the higher levels of organization of behavioral
systems. Thus, in higher animals, the history of complexes includes psychic history as well as explanations on the biochemical level.

In persons drives can become values. Conversely, values can become motivators through linkage with feelings. The basic cycles, then, can be subsumed within a meaningful existence.

Though a motivational cycle achieves its apex in acts, it does not terminate in acts. The acts result in changes to the subsidiary elements supporting action. The complex of operations either assimilates them to itself, or accommodates itself to them. This changes the conditions for the next actualization of the cycle. For example long term memories, which can become operational in later cycles, may form during dreaming. The motivational cycle, then, can have an unconscious component which conditions its realization and which is self transforming after the acts are complete.

In higher animals, then, behavioral systems incorporating motivational cycles contribute to constituting the operational situation for an animal in the focusing of interest and acts in the realization of motivations. The acts can range from flight from enemies to hunting for food and nurturing behavior. In humans motivations become linked to meanings and values and can be actualized in responsible action.

**Evolurion AND OpERATIONAL SituATIons**

The ‘units’ of evolution have been conceived variously as individuals, species, or populations. Though this may be the case, it is also true that operational situations evolve. An environmental niche can be considered as a set of operational situations. As evolution proceeds, environmental niches are taken over by more highly developed organisms. With more operations available, the niche, and the types of operational situations that compose it, evolves.

There is also evolutionary pressure within the operational situation, since evolution changes not only organisms, but to what they are related. To a significant extent, it is the ability of organisms to respond to the challenges within the operational situation which drives evolution. Examples are the emergence of intentionality and intelligence.
As intentional, operations are conscious of elements correlative to the conscious operation. Consciousness is ‘consciousness of.’ If what we are conscious of is other than consciousness, but is a content of consciousness, then conscious operations make present what they are not by organizing themselves in terms of what they are not.

We can understand how this can occur by understanding the emergence of operational memory. In general, memory is based in the recurrent performance of operations, a fundamental characteristic of life. Memory is operational when it is instrumental to performing acts. It is more general than cognitive memory since it does not embody claims about reality. It is the memory of operations performed, which is used to guide future tasks of the same type. For example, in learning to speak we remember our past sounds and those of others and use them to modify our speech. In subsequent speaking, these memories become operative. There is evidence that the development of all the senses in mammals occurs by the formation of operational memories. In turn, these are correlated to neural development. This also occurs in skills.

Living systems act within unsystematic operational situations. This means that external occurrences are realized in accord with probabilities. The recurrences can be more or less similar. In dealing with recurrent events it is an effective strategy to retain successful past functioning. As noted, this is the foundation for memory. However, since it is to be operative, memory also is anticipatory. It is an organization of the organism in terms of what it is not, the recurrent external events in the operational situation. It embodies the general structure found in intentional operations.

With a memory-anticipation structure, innovative activity must emerge to make adjustments in the present situation between the operational situation as anticipated and as actual. This provides evolutionary pressure for the emergence of intelligence. This adjustment may be the emergence of different capacities, but ultimately, whatever capacities there are, they need to be tuned to the situation. This is done by combining them in different ways, timing action and so on.

Cognitive systems exploited this evolutionary gradient in moving from the extroversion of the object in sensitivity, to knowledge of the
unimaginable via the organization of symbols which refer to what they are not. If we accept that we know what actually is, then there has been a correlative evolution of intelligence from regulating systems which operate ‘analogically’ in terms of the body, to knowledge of real things and events, or knowledge by identity, with a corresponding self transcendence. Symbolic processing is the perfect mediator for such transcendence.

The notion of ‘analogical’ processing helps us to understand operations mediated by the body. For example, in building a nest certain movements of the bird are related to different placements of materials within the nest. By organizing the movements, the nest becomes organized in a particular way. By changing the possibilities for organizing the movements, different kinds of nests become possible. Thus, internal regulations can yield external regularities. In operational memory the converse can occur. External events can yield internal transformations which become analogous to the external events. In addition, the whole process can be internalized, as in the avoidance of anxiety arising in conjunction with a particular memory.

Returning to intelligence, since there are multiple elements, it is most effective if there is a central operator which has access to them. With more than one central operator, the organism could be immobilized often through conflict concerning which actions to choose. As it is, we have internal conflicts between ‘subsystems’ or operational centers, but they usually can be resolved or overridden to permit immediate action. This central operator has emerged as the irreducible (for us), free, attentive core of consciousness.

Minds vary, then, depending on the operations they have available and the operations they perform. The state of a mind, as well as the state of the operational situation, would be the particular configuration of its operations and their relata. Since that configuration is both anticipatory and unsystematic it needs to be understood in terms of probabilities for action as well as in terms of its present acts.

These are instances of the general pressure within the operational situation for the emergence of ever more complex and refined anticipatory operations. In turn these require greater complementary compensatory skills to adjust to the actual situation. As this situation becomes iterative
pressure emerges for ever more complex and varied operations. One can get a sense, then, of how evolution can be 'self-driving' in the emergence of greater complexity if the locus of evolutionary pressure is in operational situations.

A SECONDARY NOTION

Much of development and existence within developmental stages is the performance of operations on operations. As the example of the emergence of intentionality indicates, for one set of operations, the set of operations it regulates are part of its operational situation in a manner similar to that of external things and events. The internal environment can be part of the operational situation, not simply as operator, but as operand. This situation is iterative on each level of complexity. Many biological regulatory functions work this way. Operators in the cell regulate internal functions as well as relations to external elements. The immune system regulates itself to some extent as well as operating on other elements.

This indicates that there is a secondary notion of the operational situation. If we consider operations only and not acts, then we can consider the internal situation only. We also could consider operations in their relations to the external aspect of the situation. An example would be the tearing of the eye on a windy day. Though it can be considered in itself, its real significance is found in the full situation. This could affect the vision of a tennis player, for example, causing him to mis-hit the ball. Or it could clear dust from the eye of a contact lens wearer lessening their irritation and permitting them to see better.

A more complex example is the structure of the eye itself. The rods and cones of the retina fire differently for different occurrences. Some, for example, fire only for vertical movement, while others fire for lateral. The rods and cones provide a mosaic of operators which can be related to an indeterminable number of visual fields. The same is true of the possible motions of the digits on the hand. For example, the movement of one finger traces a curve, which, mathematically, has an infinity of points. Likewise with the other digits. Conceivably, then, there is an infinity of possible combinations of positions. In actuality, however, the
combinations are bounded operationally. We do not try all possible combinations, nor do we have a propensity to do so. In general, we combine movements in terms of acts we perform, where the movements, as operations, contribute to the act.

In short, the visual field is constituted by a population of neurons. The population will handle whatever is there within the range of their capacity. As a population, it is an aggregate. Its lack of organization is what makes the visual field possible. The openness of the system allows it to handle a range of visual experience. It also allows it to be in relation to the non-systematic situation. As we all know, the visual system in the eye is supplemented by other processing, memories, anticipations and so on. But there is a statistical residue here also. This permits the higher levels of organization to have a similar flexibility in handling the unsystematic. Now, one may disagree with this simple analysis of the visual system. The point, however, is not to discuss what vision is, but to understand the secondary notion of the operational situation. We have illustrated that notion by discussing the operations of the retina and their general relations to unsystematic external events and to the higher integration of their outputs by the higher visual and psychological centers.

THEORIES AND MODELS

A theory is a set of explanations. An explanation is a set of terms and relations which answer "Why?" "What?" and "How?" questions. To understand why something happened is to understand what happened or how it happened. If we focus on the key set of general terms and relations we can create a model. Models include key sets of expressions, images, and symbols which correspond to the key relations. As a set of general terms, relations, and examples, models can be varied as required to grasp particular instances.

What is a complete explanation? A complete explanation of a level of organization would tell what it is and why it is what it is. The latter would include the part of its history pertinent to its becoming what it is and an account of the present relations which maintain its current state. The account of its history would recede to the point where the conditions for its emergence became present. For example, life emerged because the
conditions X, Y, and Z were present. To ask why the conditions were present is to ask for an explanation of them. Though it does have a bearing on the explanation of life, its bearing is subsidiary to the bearing it has on the explanation of the conditions themselves. The fact that we need to ask another question about another set of organizations is indicative of this.

If the level of organization is organized within a higher level, the explanation would include an account of those parts of the higher level which organize it.

It may seem that we need to explain the whole organism to explain part of it. There is some truth to this, since the organism is a unity. But since it also is not fully systematic, the unity is partially *de facto*. The notion of animals having a 'republic of instincts' and the corresponding inability to outline an integrated theory of one motivation underlying all of a person's acts are indicative of this.

The model of the operational situation overcomes this problem by distinguishing the primary and secondary notions. The primary notion would include all operations and their correlates which have a bearing on an organism's acts at a particular place and time. The secondary focuses on some subset of operations and their correspondingly reduced range.

**The Heuristic Value of the Model**

The operational situation is caused partially by operations and partially by external events. However, the range of external circumstances which are relevant is determined by the capability of the operations to relate to them. Operations, then, play the primary role in constituting the situation. For example, just as physical space and time are determined within particular states of matter, so organic and psychological space and time are constituted by operations with some reference to physical space and time.

When operations regulate other operations, the primacy of operations is unambiguous. When operations transform 'external' circumstances, transforming the situation, their influence can be matched by 'external' transformations to which the organism must adapt. However, as noted above, the range of events which are significant is determined by the operational range of the organism.
The key to defining the operational situation, then, is to define the operations. In science this takes two general directions. The first is to focus on operations within a complex unity, such as understanding the operations of white blood cells in fighting infections by gathering data in vivo. The second is to create the experimental situation to isolate operations by simplifying the 'external' circumstances.

In either case, the results need to be integrated within the understanding of the broader situation to overcome possible deficiencies caused by abstracting. This is clearest in the second case. Discovering the operations a rat uses to navigate a maze does not give the full range of these operations within the animal's lifecycle. To do so would require observing their use in the 'natural' habitat.

One heuristic precept then, is to discover operations. A second is to acknowledge the unsystematic. To do so is to recognize that not all operations are related, nor are all the external circumstances. They need to be understood statistically.

A third is to acknowledge the relations between levels of organization. Higher and lower levels are explained to some extent in terms of each other. The notion of operations on all levels permits a multi-level explanation within a single model. For example, it is possible for emotional expression to be unconscious, to be conscious but not at the focus of attention, and to be integrated self-knowingly into our acts. Each, with respect to the emotional operators, is a different situation. But it is possible for all three to be operating at the same time with respect to different emotions at different stages of expression, constituting our emotional state. We could explain the levels of expression within the state from the level of the operations of neural transmitters through the expression in acts.

The same is true of knowing. If philosophy considers a higher level of generality than other fields, and if the generality is of operations, then it would have a biological component in the neural support for knowing, a psychological component in the cognitive operations, and a philosophical component in the focus of those operations on philosophical issues. The emergence of a philosophical model, then, would be a transformation of our state of mind with operational implications radiating throughout the
levels of organization, with the simultaneous transforming of our psychology in its basic orientations and the neural substrate supporting it. The understanding of the model of operational situations, transforms our own situation and provides a context for understanding the transformation.

The model has metaphysical implications if we consider the set of relations of cognitive operations to reality. Kantian, phenomenological, or critical realist positions, though theoretically unreconcilable, can be conceived within a single view to the extent that they are models of the cognitive operational situation, outlining which elements are relevant and which are not, where the relevance is conditioned by the cognitive operations.

It has implications also for theories of sports or skills where the relevant ‘external’ factors are selected in terms of the acts to be achieved. What is ‘external’ for a highly proficient player is different from the average player. The space of a tennis court is higher, wider, and longer for a professional tennis player since they can play more of the ‘outer’ court. Time differs also since events occur at different speeds than for the average player. In addition, different situations are created due to the skills of the players, situations at which the average player can only marvel and exclaim “How can they do that?”

The example of the tennis players is one of mutually conditioning operational situations. These occur in behavioral systems such as those conditioning attachment behavior in mother and child. The fact that operational situations evolve is seen in the evolution of behavioral systems6 and the corresponding evolution of culture in animals.7

CONCLUSION

The ability to specify operations, their range, and their current relations within a situation circumscribed by them presupposes a model for understanding life analogous to the physicists’ use of phase space. We saw that the model of an operational situation provides the context for specifying

6 See John Bowlby, Attachment (New York: Basic Books, 1969) 74-84, which provides excellent account of behavioral systems.

the state of living systems just as phase space permits the representation of the state of a complex system. Phase space also provides a means for discovering other relations by simplifying the representation of the state of a complex system. The secondary notion of operational situations provides an analogous simplification by permitting the finest degree of abstraction within the full situation. It also provides the context for integrating the results within the larger, real situation.

It should prove especially fruitful in integrating biology, psychology, and intentionality analysis in providing a model of mind. The integration of biology and psychology is a scientific task. Insofar as it has a bearing on resolving philosophical questions, intentionality analysis is a philosophical task. Otherwise it is psychology. The integration of the two is a scientific and a philosophical task. The model of the operational situation provides a common terminology and a conceptual framework where different levels of complexity can have different qualities or different manifestations. We saw the latter in the expression of feelings. The former may be the case with the mind where different neural networks perform different functions and where a threshold level of a type of neural activity is probably a condition for alertness. Finally, it provides a model for different disciplines investigating a common, complex living being. For example, neurology, psychology, and philosophy all regard conscious acts, but they do so within different contexts. These contexts are understood through the secondary notion of the operational situation. Their seamless integration and their dysfunction are understood in terms of the full situation. It is the role of the philosopher to indicate the outlines of the integrations of scientific and philosophical results. By doing so I hope I have provided a model that will prove heuristically fruitful.
NEWMAN ON APPREHENSION,
NOTIONAL AND REAL

Charles C. Hefling, Jr.
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806

ONE OF JOHN Henry Newman's most perceptive biographers wrote that "a man who has read Newman is in no hurry to speak about him." The truth of that observation did not keep Bremond himself from saying a great deal; nor should it keep those who would better understand the Newman they have read from sharing such insights as may have occurred to them. With his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, especially, they need all the help they can get. Like the Apologia pro Vita Sua, the Grammar of Assent has gained, and rightly gained, the status of a classic; there is always something more to learn from it. But it is perhaps the most difficult of Newman's writings, and one that has been interpreted in strikingly different, even contradictory ways. It stands alone, inasmuch as no immediate pastoral or controversial need prompted him to write it; none of his other books is so austere; yet, somewhat paradoxically, only the Apologia itself is more personal. For in its own way the Grammar too is autobiography: the grammar it sets out was as it were the grammar Newman followed in writing "the one and only edition of

*This paper was delivered in abridged form at "Conscience Intelligence and Faith," a conference sponsored by the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, 18-19 March 1988. It can in some ways be regarded as an extended commentary on the editorial addition provided by Frederick Crowe to a statement in Lonergan's essay on "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion"; see A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985) 223 note 25. The author would also like to thank Shirley Galla, Fred Lawrence, and William Mathews for insights they may not have known they were occasioning.

himself." Moreover, there is a sense in which even the Grammar can and ought to be understood in light of another mot from Bremond: "Would you have in one word the key ... to all his books? Take them as spiritual reading, as a devotional exercise, as an incentive to prayer." An overstatement? It may be. But much the same sentiment reappears, where one might not expect to find it, in one of the last essays of Bernard Lonergan.

Lonergan's references to the Grammar of Assent fall into two groups. In one of these he acknowledges the connection of his own 'reflective act of understanding,' the 'grasp of the virtually unconditioned,' with Newman's 'illative sense.' In the other group are references to a distinction, developed earlier in the Grammar, between those apprehensions and assents which are 'notional,' and those which are 'real.' By far the longest item in this second group appears in a discussion of what Lonergan calls barriers to Christian development. Transposing the three traditional stages, purgative, illuminative, and unitive, of ascetical theology, he speaks of barriers to purification, to enlightenment, and to loving God above all and our neighbors as ourselves. And it is in the 'campaign' against barriers to enlightenment that one does well to turn to John Henry Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent and, specifically, to the passages in which he distinguishes notional apprehension from real apprehension, and notional assent from real assent. For the barriers to enlightenment are merely notional apprehension and merely notional assent, when we are content with understanding the general idea and give no more than an esthetic response that it is indeed a fine idea. On the other hand, the attainment of enlightenment is the attainment of real apprehension, real assent, and the motivation to live out what we have learnt. It is brought about through regular and sustained meditation on what it really means to be a Christian, a real meaning to be grasped not through definitions and systems but through the living words and

3 Bremond, Mystery of Newman 102.
4 For example, Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," A Second Collection 263, 273.
5 Lonergan's changes in older terminology are usually not without significance, and his use of 'enlightenment' rather than 'illumination' could merit an essay of its own.
deeds of our Lord, our Lady, and the saints, a meaning to be brought home to me in the measure that I come to realize how much of such meaning I have overlooked, how much I have greeted with selective inattention, how much I have been unwilling to recognize as a genuine element in Christian living. So gradually we replace shallowness and superficiality, weakness and self-indulgence, with the imagination and the feelings, with the solid knowledge and heartfelt willingness of a true follower of Christ.6

Referring to the two commandments on which hang all the Law and the prophets, Lonergan continues:

A real apprehension of these commandments and a real assent to their binding force for each of us are given us by sanctifying grace, for then “God’s love has flooded our inmost heart through the Holy Spirit he has given us” (Rom.5:5). But even then we must watch and pray that we enter not into temptation, for beyond sanctifying grace we also need actual graces, even operative actual graces, that take us through the processes of purification and enlightenment towards the state of union with God.7

I do not know another passage that brings together so many of the themes that characterize Lonergan’s later work — his favorite quotation of Rom 5:5, operative grace, authenticity, the missions of the Son and of the Spirit. If there were not (as there certainly are) other reasons for those who have an interest in Lonergan to be interested in Newman as well, the lines I have quoted would be more than enough on their own.

§ 1

Before turning, however, to Newman’s distinction between notional and real apprehension, notional and real assent, some preliminary observations need to be made. The first is that this distinction, and the argument Newman builds on it, are part of a larger project. It may well be, as one critic has proposed, that the distinction itself represents “Newman’s most

original contribution to the epistemology of belief; and it may be, in the words of another, that "it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Grammar of Assent is really two books." But it would be misleading, even so, to suppose that the first of these 'books,' Part I on "Apprehension and Assent," is an independent whole. The assents in which Newman is most interested are assents to propositions that can be neither completely comprehended nor irrefutably demonstrated; in particular, propositions of Christian doctrine. Assents to such propositions are, in fact, given — people do believe — and Newman's aim is to vindicate their doing so, by examining both what is concomitant with assent and what precedes it — both apprehension, that is, in Part I, and inference, in Part II. Thus, in later editions of the Grammar, Newman characterized the first part as "refuting the fallacies of those who say that we cannot believe what we cannot understand," while the second part goes on to refute the claim that we cannot believe what we cannot absolutely prove. From one standpoint, then, the Grammar of Assent is the most sustained effort in a campaign that Newman fought all his life against what he called

the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another ... It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; ... and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy.

Since Newman's case for religious certitude as a kind of assent that is more and other than taste, opinion, or sentiment, depends on both parts of
Hefling: Newman on Apprehension

the Grammar, the fact that mounting such a case is the book’s main point is a fact that no scrutiny of other points ought to lose sight of.

A second preliminary observation concerns the nature of Newman’s argument. The Grammar of Assent, difficult though it is, cannot be called a theoretical treatise. Newman himself would be the first to acknowledge as much. For one thing, his title means what it says: the book is ‘an essay in aid,’ a first effort, and ‘an essay in aid,’ an effort with a practical purpose, which he once said was “to show that a given individual, high or low, has as much right (has as real rational grounds) to be certain, as a learned theologian who knows the scientific evidence.”12 But there is a deeper reason for the frustration that the Grammar is apt to produce in tidy minds. Newman fits his own description in the book of an “experimentalist or philosopher” as one who “makes his words distinctly subordinate” to the facts under investigation. Those who would profit from what such a thinker is saying

must throw their minds into the matters in discussion, must accompany his treatment of them with an active, personal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds, the dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects, which he has a right to presuppose, while he uses them, as images existing in their apprehension as well as in his own.13

In its context, this passage refers to psychology in particular. But the Grammar, much of it, is psychology. It is descriptive psychology, rather than explanatory; ‘commonsense’ psychology as Lonergan would use the word, rather than theoretical; but in no way does that detract from the importance of Newman’s achievement. On the contrary: he was able to achieve what he did precisely because his analysis takes its start from facts — facts about himself, in the first instance — rather than from any metaphysical theory of the soul, its potencies, habits, and so on.14 No


13 Newman, Grammar 21. This and subsequent references are to the reprint of the uniform edition of Newman’s works published by Longmans in 1870 (note 10 above), of which the page numbers are also printed in boldface type in the margin of Ker’s critical edition (note 9).

doubt his 'dim suggestions and adumbrations’ call for interpretation and commentary. Yet it is doubtful whether useful but second-rate minds, as he called those who “prove, reconcile, finish, and explain,”\textsuperscript{15} are wise in attempting to extract from Newman’s presentation a clear, precise, logically consistent, systematic account of the notional and the real — or for that matter anything else he discusses. At the same time, on the other hand, recognizing that \textit{A Grammar of Assent} is not theoretical but ‘experimental’ or empirical pulls the sting from quite a lot of Newman’s critics. Judged by the criterion of concepts precisely stated in clear definitions and related in orderly sequences — judged against a strictly logical ideal, in other words — the \textit{Grammar} does not stand up any too well. But since a big part of Newman’s argument is to the effect that logical demonstration is only a tool, not a standard to which reasoning must conform or else forfeit the name of reason, his own rejoinder to those who have faulted the \textit{Grammar of Assent} for inconsistency might be that they have had a notional but perhaps no real apprehension of what the book is about.

\section*{§ 2}

So much for preliminaries. The topic under consideration is one element, albeit an important one, within a larger enterprise; and to subject it to logical and conceptual analysis would be a performative self-contradiction, like talking about silence. Apprehension, especially, is better apprehended than defined. To define it, even to define it implicitly, as I shall presently try to do, by its relations with other important terms in the \textit{Grammar}, is more likely to produce a notional apprehension of apprehension than a real one. Still, to introduce a point that will return later, there is nothing wrong with notional apprehension \textit{per se}. It is at least a start.

To begin, then, by specifying what it is not, apprehending is a different activity or operation from assenting. That much is quite clear. To apprehend a proposition is to entertain it, intelligently, whereas to assent to a proposition is to hold that it is true. Apprehension regards the meaning of a proposition and thus of at least some of its component

\textsuperscript{15} Newman, \textit{Grammar} 380.
terms; assent regards its truth. Apprehension is neither the ground nor the motive for assenting, but it is always concomitant with assent and gives assent its character. In itself, assent has no 'degrees'; it is unconditional, absolute, a matter of yes or no. On the other hand, there are no 'bare' assents: we assent to propositions as apprehended, and variations in the way propositions assented-to have been apprehended accounts for what a less differentiated account than Newman's would term 'strong' and 'weak' assents. These are no different as assents; what differs, according to Newman, is the interpretation given to a proposition, the use it is put to, the sense that has been imposed on its component terms, how the idea or fact it presents has been entertained; in a word, its apprehension.

It is tempting to say that so far Newman's analysis should present no difficulties to anyone who has read much of Lonergan. Apprehension stands to assent roughly as understanding stands to judgment. Or, perhaps better, the absolute character of assent, on which Newman so firmly insists, is similar to the 'proper' content of a judgment of fact, while the proposition as apprehended resembles its 'borrowed' content. The comparison holds only up to a point, but it is worth mentioning. Any number of philosophers either have failed to notice any distinction between meaning and truth, understanding and judgment, apprehension and assent; or else have denied that such a distinction exists. Newman, by contrast, would seem to be pushing, apparently on his own and perhaps without altogether knowing it, towards something he could not, in any case, have learned from any modern thinker who preceded him—towards a significance, beyond the copulative, that is conveyed by is. Grant that is has such a further significance, correlative not with apprehension but with assent, and quite a lot of the Grammar falls into place. Otherwise, a distinction on which the rest of the book depends will very

---

17 Newman, Grammar 9, 13.
18 For one thing, Newman does not discuss 'negative' judgments, the withholding of assent, whereas for Lonergan the proper content of a judgment of fact may be no as well as yes. For another, Newman is concerned for the most part with what Lonergan would call 'commonsense' rather than 'explanatory' judging and understanding.
likely appear to be sleight-of-hand, as it does to some of the linguistic philosophers who have addressed themselves to interpreting it.¹⁹

Not that the Grammar offers no ground for interpretation from the viewpoint of a philosophy of language. Not only does it call itself a grammar, but the examples that open the section on apprehension, and also introduce the distinction between notional and real, are propositions of the standard A-is-B and cat-sat-on-the-mat kind. "Lucern is food for cattle." "The earth goes round the sun." All the more reason, then, to remember what Newman says a few pages earlier: he is writing about how we hold propositions, about psychology in one sense of the word, not about the logic of constructing sentences. Furthermore, the propositions he uses by way of example can best be regarded as first approximations or pedagogical clues. By the time he reaches the goal of his discussion in Part I, the concluding chapter on "Apprehension and Assent in the matter of Religion," the simple sentences at the beginning are far too simple to convey what he is endeavoring to communicate.

With that caveat I turn to the notional/real distinction as the Grammar introduces it. Such a proposition as "Religion is the opium of the people" Newman would call a notional one, on the ground that its terms are common nouns, "standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existing," for "certain ideas existing in our own minds, and for nothing outside of them."²⁰ By contrast, "The earth goes round the sun" is a real proposition. Its terms stand "for things simply external to us," "things in the exterior world," all of which "are unit and individual, and are nothing else."²¹ Perhaps it will be clear why some critics never get past the early chapters in which these statements appear. There is a whole literature on whether Newman was a nominalist and what he thought about the status of universals. Neither is an answerable question, for the reason already given: Newman simply did not do his thinking in the terms of any technical philosophy, and what he meant by 'individual' or 'concrete' or

¹⁹ I have in mind the painstaking analysis in Price's Belief, the limitations of which Lash in his "Introduction" to another edition of the Grammar (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) judiciously attributes to "the limitations of the philosophical tradition in which [Price] stands" (20).


'external' is a moot question which there is reason to think he could not have answered very precisely himself. In any case, having mentioned what Newman says about these examples, I propose to disregard it. For the distinction he wants to draw neither stands nor falls with the distinction between common and singular nouns.

Newman clinches this point, I think, in his observation that at least some propositions which in and of themselves are notional can nevertheless be really apprehended. Such a proposition may be notional as held by one person and real as held by another; it may be entertained by the same person as a notion at one time and as a fact at another; most importantly, it may be apprehended both notionally and really by the same person at the same time. The recurring example of this third case is a line from the Æneid where Virgil "both sets before his readers what he means to be a general truth, and at the same time applies it individually to the instance of Dido. He expresses at once a notion and a fact." Again, students in a chemistry course who watch the professor demonstrating some chemical reaction "at once enunciate it is an individual thing before their eyes, and also as generalized by their minds into a law of nature."22

Newman's most suggestive example of a notional proposition capable of real meaning is another classical tag. When Horace wrote that "To die for one's country is sweet and fitting," his proposition was notional, "a mere commonplace, a terse expression of abstractions," both as a proposition and also in Horace's own apprehension of it. But to such a patriot as William Tell, the same proposition would be "a sovereign dogma, a grand aspiration, inflaming the imagination, piercing the heart."23 Notice the four predicates, all of them, as they stand, notional. Take them in reverse order — 'heart,' 'imagination,' 'aspiration,' and 'dogma' — and you have an outline both of Newman's own pilgrimage and of the movement that structures his Grammar of Assent. That, at least, is what I shall attempt to argue in the rest of this paper.

22 Newman, Grammar 11.
§ 3

'Heart,' to begin with, is a metaphor of Newman's gauge for discriminating between the notional and the real. It is not, in the last resort, a matter of predication but of interior events. Real assent to what is really apprehended

has for its objects, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful, admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion, rouse the passions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal.24

Such objects are supplied through "informations about the concrete." They may be presented to us directly, through "bodily senses or ... mental sensations," or indirectly through narrative or memory.25 But in any case their presence is stronger, "more vivid and forcible,"26 in real than in notional apprehension.

Here is a different and more elusive distinction than the one between singular and common nouns. Inevitably a question arises: which has the force, the proposition or its apprehension? Is it that certain 'things' or 'facts,' being made present as objects, elicit or call for real apprehension and assent? Or is it rather that apprehension bestows on objects their vividness and force, in effect constituting them as vivid and forcible? Commentators do not agree,27 and their disagreement is significant. For here again the question, as posed, presumes a philosophical context that takes some stand on the seemingly perennial problem of the relation between objectivity and subjectivity. Newman, as I have said already, is not working in the context of an explicit, articulate philosophy. At times

24 Newman, Grammar 91. The subject of this sentence is "belief," but a few lines earlier Newman had spoken of "Belief, that is of Real Assent."


26 Newman, Grammar 11.

M. Jamie Ferreira takes issue with two writers, Jay Newman and James Collins, who favor the first alternative; see his Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980) 20 note 5. Ker in turn takes issue with Ferreira; see his "Introduction" (note 9 above) lvii-lviii.
his statements in the Grammar seem consistent with a somewhat naively realist position; elsewhere he appears to flirt with the idealism of which his more ultramontanist critics complained. But some of his most explicit formulations do not support either of these views, and at one point he virtually dismisses the whole question as being founded on an artificial (and thus merely notional) dichotomy. “We cannot draw the line,” he writes, “between the object and the act.” So, “as is the thing apprehended, so is the apprehension.”

In other words, the beautiful, the useful, the heroic, and so forth are not simply out there waiting to be experienced as such; nor, on the other hand, are they reducible to an internally generated aura. Instead, whether by luck or providence or sheer honesty, Newman seems to be saying that apprehensible facts as actually apprehended and apprehension as actually apprehending are the same. Really to apprehend is to be at one with what you have apprehended. Apprehension is not fundamentally confrontation but identity.

And, if so, it is a matter of personal identity. Real apprehension and real assent involve and change the person who does the apprehending and assenting. Real assents, acts of what Newman calls Belief with a capital B, affect conduct. They do it, he is careful to add, not necessarily, and not because they are assents, but because they take their character as real assents from the real apprehension concomitant with them, or (what comes down to the same thing) because of the ‘images’ in which real assent ‘lives.’

This leads to the second of the four reference points I mentioned earlier. There is no theory of imagination in the Grammar of Assent, any more wrong than there is an epistemology or a metaphysics. But it would not be far wrong to say that imagination is the pivot on which turns Newman’s whole distinction between the notional and the real. “An act of assent,” he states, “is the most perfect and highest of its kind, when it is exercised on propositions, which are apprehended as experiences and images, that is, which-stand for things.” What it is to apprehended a proposition as an

28 Newman, Grammar 37.
29 Newman, Grammar 89, 90.
30 Newman, Grammar 40.
image — that is the difficulty. It is much easier to say what Newman does not mean by 'image' than to say what he does. He sets 'images' alongside 'experiences,' as though to say that an image is present and immediate, as an experience is; indeed a past experience, made present by memory, is an image. But the experience need not have been ocular, and likewise 'image' means something more than 'picture,' despite the fact (which he notes himself) that most of Newman's examples, like his talk about 'graphic accounts,' 'field of view,' 'gazing on Tiberius,' and so on, involve sight.

Imagination, then, mediates between heart and mind, feeling and intellectual apprehension, but does not perform the creative function it did for Coleridge. The ability to construct new images, which Coleridge attributed to the 'eisemplastic imagination,' Newman prefers to call simply 'the faculty of composition.' In the Grammar of Assent, imagination only makes present, by re-presenting it, what experience presents — informations, that is, which are concrete, unit, and individual. By so doing it links real apprehension, which in itself is intellectual only, with emotion and thus with practical conduct. "Strictly speaking," Newman writes,

it is not imagination that causes action; but hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness and self-love. What imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them. ... Hence it is that the fact of a proposition being accepted with a real assent is accidentally an earnest of that proposition being carried out in conduct, and the imagination may be said in some sense to be of a practical nature, inasmuch as it leads to practice indirectly by the action of its object upon the affections.

Newman has a great deal more to say about real apprehension, and all of it warrants closer scrutiny. But in Part I of the Grammar of Assent everything I have discussed so far is preliminary to the chapter on

31 Newman, Grammar 23.
33 Newman, Grammar 27. See Ker's note in the Oxford edition (note 9 above) 349.
34 Newman, Grammar 82-83; see also 87, 89, 12.
religion. Thus, while there are no doubt any number of other topics on
which Newman's analysis might be brought to bear, his own concern in
that chapter is first with the proposition that there is a God, then with the
propositions entailed in the doctrine of the Trinity, and finally, in a some-
what more general way, with the propositions of what he calls dogmatic
theology. Here I propose to touch mainly on the first of these, belief in one
God, both because it is presumed in the discussion of the other two, and
because it exemplifies more clearly than they do a number of the points I
have tried to make so far.

§ 4

In the final chapter of Part I, and again in the final chapter of Part II,
Newman begins with what can be termed an argument from conscience,
provided that 'argument' is taken broadly. There is no logical
demonstration, no theistic proof in any strict sense. What Newman
presents instead is not unlike what Austin Farrer named 'crypto-theism.'
In this movement of thought or way of thinking, once it has been articu-
lated in prose, the overall shape and direction of classical proofs can be
discerned, even though it is not, as it occurs in itself, an inference at all but
an unreflective, even instinctual, act of real apprehension and real assent.
Something along the same lines, I think, is what Newman means when he
says at the outset of the 'argument' in Part I that conscience is the first
principle of three distinct inquiries. Where he would look if he did pro-
pose to prove the being of a God, where he would commence a proof of
God's attributes and character, and the mental act by means of which God
is apprehended, "not merely as a notion, but as a reality," are all one and
the same.35 To put it the other way round, really assenting to the proposi-
tion that God exists — believing it as if one saw36 — depends on an image
which conveys both that there is a God and what that God is. And the
image that can do this best — here the ocular connotations of 'image'
dissolve — is conscience.

35 Newman, Grammar 104.
Of the three sorts of inquiry that might be launched from the fact of conscience, Newman is concerned only with the third, and the seemingly straightforward way he goes about showing how real assent to God’s existence can happen is in fact a very subtle way indeed. To discuss conscience, as Newman uses the word, in anything like an adequate way is more than I can attempt here. But four points can be made briefly, all of them essential to conscience’s relationship with imagination and thus with apprehending that there is a God. Here it will be helpful to begin, as before, with what Newman is not arguing.

1. The Grammar of Assent does not speak of apprehending God, much less of experiencing God. Newman was too much the theist for that. By ‘God’ he means One “between whom and his creatures there is an infinite gulf,” whereas conscience is a mediation of God’s presence, a “connecting principle,” as the Grammar puts it, “between the creature and his Creator.” In themselves, the ‘phenomena’ in question are mental phenomena, found in the experience of conscience and more particularly in the ‘sense of moral obligation.’ To leave it at that, however, would be to distort Newman’s position, for these same phenomena, like thought itself, “convey to me the idea and fact of my being or existence” at the same time that they involve the idea of “an external being obliged.” Newman seldom uses the words ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent,’ but to say that in conscience God is both would be an interpretation of the Grammar that he would not, perhaps, disown. He does at least suggest, to quote the Apologia’s famous phrase, that “the thought of two and two only absolutely and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator,” is a single thought. In that thought two terms, God and self, come to light from one relation, the relation of being obliged.

2. Newman’s ‘argument’ from obligation is not abstract; it does not depend on definitions or on any deduction from the general premise that

38 Newman, Grammar 117.
39 From Newman’s Book of Sundries, preserved at the Edgbaston Oratory; entry dated 7 November 1859 and quoted in Paulin, The Way to Faith (note 11 above) 82.
obligation implies something or someone that obliges. Nor, on the other hand, is he arguing 'inductively,' as that word is usually understood, although he does allow that generalizing from particular experiences is quite possible and, in its own sphere, legitimate. The "recurring instances in which conscience acts, forcing upon us the mandate of a Superior," do provide evidence on the basis of which "we have as good a warrant for concluding the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have, from parallel experience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast world," and some such quasi-inductive proof is presumably what Newman has in mind when he says that conscience is the first principle of proving as well as of apprehending God. At present however the point is that it could compel only a notional assent, like any other proof.

3. In fact, to turn from what Newman's 'argument' is not to what it is, real assent comes, if it does, as the result of a movement of thought which is exactly the inverse of the one I have just described. There is a 'perceptive power' or 'religious instinct' by which we identify the intimations of conscience with "echoes (so to say) of an external admonition"; these identifications remain in the imagination; from them, by an exercise of intellect, we generalize to a notion of God. But, having done so, we may invert the process. Assent to this notion, as such, can become assent to a reality, if there is a return to the imagination such that in particular experiences of obligation, present or remembered, we 'image' God and his attributes. The result is thus the same, mutatis mutandis, as in the examples of Virgil's line about Dido and the chemistry professor's demonstration: a proposition is apprehended by the same mind, at the same time, really as well as notionally.

According to Newman, such an application of notions to interior 'phenomena' is within the capability of children long before they can think logically. He describes at some length an "ordinary child ... safe

---

40 Newman, Grammar 63; see also 110.
41 Newman, Grammar 104.
42 Newman, Grammar 63.
43 Newman, Grammar 104.
from influences destructive of his religious instincts,” who ‘naturally’ or ‘connaturally’ or ‘instinctively’ holds in mind

the image of an Invisible Being, who exercises a particular providence among us, who is present everywhere, who is heart-rending, heart-changing, ever-accessible, open to impetration. ... It is an image of the good God, good in Himself, good relatively to the child, with whatever incompleteness; an image, before it has been reflected on, and before it is recognized by him as a notion. Though he cannot explain or define the word “God,” when told to use it, his acts show that to him it is far more than a word.44

Notice, however, that Newman is not claiming that individually every child can or does generalize a private notion of God before applying the generalization to particulars. “How far this initial religious knowledge comes from without, and how far from within,” is beside the point, as is the question how much of the knowledge is natural and how much “implies a special divine aid above nature.”45 Not the whence but the how of belief in God is Newman’s concern. And this how is to be found in the case where the general notion of a supreme moral governor becomes the image of my moral governor; when there is brought before my ‘mental vision’ the image of “One who by implicit threat and promise commands certain things” that I myself, coincidentally and by the same act of mind, approve.46 This, in turn, harmonizes with the hypothesis that apprehension in act is one with the apprehensible in act, for here Newman evidently holds that what I image as God’s command is both what I apprehend as commanded or to-be-done, and also my approval of it.

4. A final observation can be brief, since it is implicit in all three previous ones. The God to whose existence one gives real assent is personal, inasmuch is obligation is personal. There is for Newman such a thing as a ‘moral sense,’ a sense of right and wrong, just as there is a “sense of the beautiful and graceful in nature and art”47 and likewise an

44 Newman, Grammar 113, 115.
45 Newman, Grammar 115.
46 Newman, Grammar 113.
'illative sense' of the sufficiency of evidence. But all of these 'senses' regard objects in themselves, whereas conscience "is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers, or rather with self alone and one's own actions." To the moral sense of right and wrong, conscience adds that the right is to be done, and the wrong avoided, *by me*. At the same time, however, conscience goes beyond itself; the sanction it discerns for its own decisions is 'higher than self' yet self-like. Hence the aptness of the metaphor that makes conscience a voice speaking in the imperative, and hence too the emotional quality of a good or especially a bad conscience: it is persons rather than inanimate objects that stir our affections.48

Such is the image in which the thesis 'God exists' comes to be apprehended as a reality. Its ground is inward experience; to that experience is joined some notion which, without it, would be only an abstraction; and it is interpersonal inasmuch as it relates the person I am to the Person God is.

I have stressed the fact that what I have been calling Newman's 'argument' for all this is not a proof. Neither, I would now add, has it the static quality associated with a cut-and-dried conclusion. To use the third of my index-words, the proposition that God exists, when it is really apprehended in the image conscience supplies, is an 'aspiration.' It leads on. Where it leads, Newman discusses far more fully at the end of Part II of the *Grammar* than in Part I, on which I am focusing just now; yet for nothing he says later on is the careful reader unprepared. Briefly stated, to believe in God as moral governor is to expect or anticipate, to look towards or 'aspire' to, something more than a moral governor. The very word 'apprehension' carries both meanings. To apprehend the being of a God, in the sense of imaginatively grasping and holding its truth, is at the same time to apprehend in the sense of reaching for further truth, whatever it may turn out to be. How, Newman asks, is anyone the better for Christianity who has never "felt the need of it or the desire?"49 In real apprehension, that need and desire are already operative. Or rather, they are real apprehension, in its dynamic aspect; for "belief generates belief"

---


and “the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than our present, are the very same which we already possess in connexion with” that present state.\(^{50}\)

In short, those whose ‘natural’ religion is founded on apprehension which is real and imaginative are for that reason open to, and headed for, a supernatural religion — a revelation. Newman means that word in a full-blooded sense. Those who read him as an exponent of ‘religion within the limits of experience alone’ have missed a point he never tires of making, and it is the fourth of my reference-points — dogma. The Newman who said that “if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence ... without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal ... being in my conscience” is the same Newman who, in the same book, said: “From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion. ... As well can there be filial love without the fact of a father, as devotion without the fact of a Supreme Being.”\(^{51}\)

This ‘dogmatic principle’ does not leave off when the truths of ‘natural religion’ have been stated. Notice once again, however, that Newman is not considering the logic of propositions but how they come to be held: “instead of saying that the truths of Revelation depend on those of Natural Religion, it is more pertinent to say that belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural.”\(^{52}\) Newman’s own argument that “either Christianity is from God, or a revelation has not yet been given to us”\(^{53}\) could be put into a logical shape. But his appeal throughout is, as he says along the way, “to the illative sense of those who believe in a Moral Governor.”\(^{54}\) And although the basic orientation given by such a belief is no demonstration, it does serve to counter, at the imaginative level, the two objections most often raised against the thesis that there is a God. To the objection from the presence of evil in the world, what Newman calls

---

\(^{50}\) Newman, Grammar 413.


\(^{52}\) Newman, Grammar 413.

\(^{53}\) Newman, Grammar 431.

\(^{54}\) Newman, Grammar 429.
“the theology of a religious imagination,” formed on the basis of conscience by natural instinct, “is able to pronounce by anticipation, what it takes a long argument to prove — that good is the rule and evil the exception.” Faced with the objection that the world runs mechanically according to unbreakable laws, “[i]t is able to assume that, uniform as are the laws of nature, they are consistent with a particular Providence.”

But if conscience, as the ‘connecting principle between the creature and his Creator,’ can give the creature what today might be called an existential stance, this by no means implies that there is nothing left for intelligence to do. To speak of the ‘theology of a religious imagination’ is to use ‘theology’ as a courtesy title, and Newman knows it. Properly so called, theology is a matter of notional apprehension and notional assent, not real; and of these some further discussion is now in order.

§ 5

The Grammar of Assent presents a list of five categories of notional assents, arranged in ascending order of strength. Weakest and most superficial is profession. To profess is to act as disciples do when they assert, without understanding, what the master of some philosophical school has said. Next comes credence, the assent given to finishing-school knowledge, cultured cocktail-party knowledge, the “furniture of the mind,”\footnote{Newman, Grammar 55.} assimilated though not for that reason worthless. Courses in ‘the Bible as literature’ are aimed at filling gaps in this category of assents. Third is opinion, which in Newman’s usage means assent to a proposition, “not as true, but as probably true.”\footnote{Newman, Grammar 58.} Presumption is assent to what he calls ‘first principles,’ such as the propositions that there are things existing external to ourselves, that there is a right and a wrong, that all things happen as a result of ‘causes,’\footnote{‘Causes,’ however, in a particular sense that Newman explains at length in Grammar 66-68.} and even that there is a God, in so far as this proposition is notionally but not yet really apprehended.

\footnote{55 Newman, Grammar 117.} \footnote{56 Newman, Grammar 55.} \footnote{57 Newman, Grammar 58.}
Finally there is *speculation*, a term that Newman uses in the high philosophical sense. But while he does note that the assents which belong in this category are “the most direct, explicit, and perfect of their kind, viz. those which are the firm, conscious acceptance of propositions as true,” he spends scarcely more than thirty lines on them. This is the more striking (at least to a theologian) in that along with “mathematical investigations and truths” the category of speculation includes “the principles, disputations, and doctrines of theology” properly so called.\(^59\) The contrast intended here is clear enough, both from the extended discussion of less perfect notional assents, and from Newman’s explicit statement that “[t]heology, as such, always is notional, as being scientific; religion, as being personal, should be real.”\(^60\) What is perhaps less clear is how the contrast ought, from Newman’s viewpoint, to be assessed. To put it otherwise, how is theology in the sense of speculative assent related to the ‘theology of a religious imagination’? No idle question, this. It bears on what is surely both the central theme in Newman’s thinking and the one on which it is most difficult to interpret him — faith and reason. And it bears, consequently, on the relevance of his *Grammar of Assent* to latter-day variations on that perennial theme.

A first observation with regard to notional theology and real religion is a general one. Newman does not — nor, on his own principles, could he — denigrate notional apprehension and assent *per se*. To generalize, to abstract, to conceptualize are natural activities of the mind. “We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. ... We are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the option; we can but misuse or mar its functions.”\(^61\) And again, “our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right rightly.”\(^62\) That being said, it remains, I think, that no one can read much Newman without gaining the impression that there is for him a real sense in which reasoning is dangerous, morally dangerous, in that reasoning is impersonal and somehow artificial. His well-known

\(^{59}\) Newman, *Grammar* 73.

\(^{60}\) Newman, *Grammar* 55.


suspicion of ‘paper reasoning’ and his preference for the affective and effective images of concrete persuasion invite comparison with Rousseau’s distrust of philosophizing and preference for a simple religion rooted in conscience. Like Rousseau, Newman entered a protest against the ‘Age of Reason’ in general and against deism in particular; he knew Rousseau’s Émile, and while he refers to its author as an unbeliever, he cannot help mentioning the creed of the Savoyard vicar as exemplifying arguments based on “an intimate apprehension of the personal character of our Saviour.”

Yet in the long run such a comparison is not very helpful. Newman was anything but a cosmopolitan thinker. His Englishness is patent and universally acknowledged, and in England the Age of Reason had a flavor of its own, discernably different from its French cachet. If Alan Bloom is right, everyone in France is a follower either of Descartes or of Pascal; but the same simply cannot be said of everyone in England, least of all Newman. It is true that the Grammar of Assent belongs unmistakably to the nineteenth century as contrasted with the eighteenth; true also that the Oxford movement of which Newman’s was the leading intellect ran parallel to the Romantic movement in English literature. Yet to regard Newman as Romantic in the sense that Rousseau was, or to equate the conscience he toasted with Pascal’s ‘reasons of the heart’ or Schleiermacher’s ‘sense and taste for the infinite,’ does little to illuminate his position and not a little to obscure it. The intellectual and religious milieu in which he took that position is too different from the Continental one. Newman as existentialist is undoubtedly Newman: Newman as irrationalist is not. He would be appalled at the gibes which are now thrown at the

63 Newman, “An Internal Argument for Christianity,” originally published in Discussions and Arguments (1872); reprinted in Essays and Sketches, vol. 3, ed. Charles Frederick Harrold (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948) 343-373, at 346. The passage from Émile, which Newman quotes in French without citation, is the famous one where the vicar says that “if Socrates’ life and death are those of a sage, Jesus’s life and death are those of a God” and goes on to argue that they could not have been invented; see The Essential Rousseau, trans. Matthew Josephson (New York: The New American Library, Inc., Mentor pb, 1974) 286.

'ruse of reason,' as he would have been appalled to read, ten years after his death, the placid claim that "the will that moves us is dogmatic; that our brain is only the very imperfect instrument by which we devise practical means for fulfilling that will; ... and that the man who gives to reason and logic the attributes and authority of the will ... is the most hopeless of fools."\textsuperscript{65}

Still, to say that Newman is no irrationalist is a long way from saying there is not a tension between the rational and the imaginative in his \textit{Grammar of Assent}. There is. When he contrasts the two, at the end of the chapter on notional and real assent, Newman inserts, as having "a freshness and force" that he could no longer command, some five pages quoted from an article he had written almost thirty years earlier, on the Tamworth Reading Room. This long quotation contains some of his most memorable aphorisms, all of them illustrative of one side of his thinking:

I have no confidence ... in philosophers who cannot help being religious, and are Christians by implication. They ... hit without grasping ...

Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism.

After all, man is \textit{not} a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.

Knowledge of premisses, and inferences upon them, — this is not to \textit{live}.

[I]f we commence with scientific knowledge and argumentative proof, ... or attempt to make man moral and religious by libraries and museums, let us in consistency take chemists for our cooks, and mineralogists for our masons.\textsuperscript{66}

About these admittedly rhetorical statements, there are two points to be made.

\textsuperscript{65}George Bernard Shaw, review of \textit{George Bernard Shaw} by G. K. Chesterton, \textit{The Nation}, 25 August 1909; reprinted in \textit{Pen Portraits and Reviews} (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1932) 88. It is perhaps significant that Shaw, that \textit{epigone} of Nietzsche, is criticizing Chesterton, that latter-day Newman.

\textsuperscript{66}Newman, \textit{Grammar} 93-96.
It is clear, first of all, that Newman is talking about ordinary folk, 'the multitude,' people of what Lonergan calls undifferentiated consciousness. And he is talking about them as potential citizens of heaven. A deep pastoral concern is never very far from the focus of his attention, and here as elsewhere what is most important is the salvation of souls. The advocates of the reading room for workers at Tamworth supposed that "[f]irst comes knowledge," the material phenomena explored by science, "then a view, then reasoning, then belief" — a very neat summary of the path 'from below upwards' that Lonergan follows in Insight. Yes, Newman replies, but things seldom happen that way. Why not? "Quarry the granite rock with razors," he writes in The Idea of a University, in an obvious attempt to capture the force and freshness of his earlier challenge about shooting round corners — "quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and pride of man." Not only is 'religion within the limits of reason alone' no religion at all, but to start within those limits is to run the grave risk of never getting beyond them. Human passion and pride can rule human thinking as well as they can any other human activity. Newman knew that at first hand. "The truth is," he writes in the Apologia, recalling his twenties, "I was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence to moral; I was drifting" — the apposition is significant — "in the direction of the Liberalism of the day."

The second point to be made, then, is that tension between faith and intelligence results from getting their relative priorities in the wrong order. For most people, if not all, believing comes first, as Lonergan too acknowledges in later writings; and believing is a matter of real apprehension and assent. Religion "never has been a deduction from what we know; it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe," ever a revelation, which in Christian religion has come into the world incarnate in personal deeds, as a story, apprehensible by imagination, and only

67 Newman, Grammar 92.
69 Newman, Apologia 34.
70 Newman, Grammar 96.
imagination can touch 'the passion and pride of man.' That is one side of the Grammar of Assent. But there is another, for Newman is under no illusion that imagination is infallible, that there is no such thing as superstition, that a revealed religion can be a do-it-yourself project. Not only does he hold that "real apprehension has the precedence, as being the scope and end and test of notional," but also that

theological science, being ... the exercise of the intellect upon the credenda of revelation, is, though not directly devotional, at once natural, excellent, and necessary. It is natural, because the intellect is one of our highest faculties; excellent, because it is our duty to use our faculties to the full; necessary, because unless we apply our intellect to revealed truth rightly, others will exercise their minds upon it wrongly.

That is as much as Newman chooses to say in the Grammar about what 'speculative' or 'scientific' theology does, and why what it does should be done. The point to be emphasized is that theology is an exercise of intellect upon propositions that are to be believed — not, presumably, in order to believe them but, as I shall point out presently, in order to investigate their credibility as believed. Since belief itself is an act of assent, it admits of no degrees; nevertheless the apprehension that accompanies it can change, and the 'others' who wrongly exercise their minds on revealed truth may very well be ourselves.

On this interpretation, there is no inconsistency between Newman's praise of imagination and his taking for granted, as a truism, "that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason" and that "religion cannot maintain its ground at all without theology." It remains that how imagination comes under the control of reason, and so how theology functions in relation to religious belief, is a question Newman answers by implication, in Part II of the Grammar. But since it pertains only indirectly to his chief concern, that answer can best be understood in light of other writings. And for that a brief excursus will be necessary.

71 Newman, Grammar 34.
72 Newman, Grammar 147.
73 Newman, Grammar 121.
§ 6

It was noted earlier that the first part of *A Grammar of Assent* is aimed at countering those who hold it impossible to believe until one has understood what is proposed for one’s belief. Such was the teaching of two authors whom Newman took to task in one of the *Tracts for the Times*, and along the way he gives a very clear account of the distinction hinted at in the *Grammar* between proper and improper applications of reasoning to revealed religion.

On the one hand Newman declares that it is right, after recognizing a revelation to be divine, “to investigate the meaning of its declarations, and to interpret its language,” right “to use its doctrines, as far as they can be fairly used, in inquiring into its divinity,” and right “to compare and connect them with our previous knowledge, with a view of making them parts of a whole; ... to bring them into dependence on each other, to trace their mutual relations, and to pursue them to their legitimate issues.”

This is somewhat the sort of exercise Lonergan has in mind when he discusses the functional specialty ‘systematics,’ and particularly interesting as an anticipation of how the theologian’s task was set out at the first Vatican council in the year the *Grammar of Assent* was published. Such an exercise, on the other hand, is sharply contrasted in the tract with what Newman there calls ‘rationalism’:

it is Rationalism to accept the Revelation, and then to explain it away; to speak of it as the word of God, and to treat it as the word of man; to refuse to let it speak for itself; to claim to be told the why and the how of God’s dealings with us, as therein described, and to assign to Him a motive and a scope of our own; to stumble at the partial knowledge which He may give us of them; to put aside what is obscure, as if it had not been said at all; to accept one half of what has been told us, and not the other half; to assume that the contents of Revelation are also its proof; to frame some gratuitous hypothesis about them, and then to garble, gloss, and colour them, to trim, clip,

---

pare away, and twist them, in order to bring them into conformity with the idea to which we have subjected them.\textsuperscript{75}

Clearly Newman does not approve. But where, exactly, lies the difference between the 'scientific' assents of theology, itself 'natural, excellent, and necessary,' and on the other hand the kind of intellectual exercise this passage describes? Both work with the same materials, principally the Bible. Both make use of the same faculty, the intellect. How then do they differ?

Newman's answer is characteristic, and it comes down to this. The difference lies, in the first instance, not in the reasoning that is exercised, nor in the way it is exercised, nor even to what it is exercised on. It lies in the persons who do the exercising. Rationalists, he continues, make themselves their own center, not their Maker; they do not go to God, but imply that God must come to them (185). And this difference, in turn, rests on the one I have been discussing all along. "Rationalism takes the words of Scripture as signs of Ideas; Faith, of Things or Realities."\textsuperscript{76} Those who stipulate understanding as a condition for their belief start \textit{ipso facto} with a merely notional apprehension and go on, almost inevitably, to explain away what they have so apprehended. By contrast, those whose apprehension of what they go on to reason about is a real apprehension, and whose assent to it is a real assent, perform much the same intellectual activities, but perform them within another horizon and so with another outcome entirely.

This is not to say that Newman is offering to separate the sheep from the goats in advance. As he says in another connection, he is speaking, necessarily, in generalities and hence "without allowing for the manifold inconsistencies of individuals, as they are found in the world, who attempt to unite incompatibilities."\textsuperscript{77} Still, he makes clear enough what is at stake: "Comparison, calculation, cataloguing, arranging, classifying, are intellectual acts subsequent upon, and not necessary for, a real apprehension of the things on which they are exercised."\textsuperscript{78} Rationalism errs in

\textsuperscript{75} Newman, "Tempers Contrasted," 184.
\textsuperscript{76} Newman, "Tempers Contrasted," 186.
\textsuperscript{77} Newman, \textit{Grammar} 191.
\textsuperscript{78} Newman, \textit{Grammar} 129.
making them, instead, prior and necessary. And this contrast is the substance of what I mentioned in the last section as Newman’s implicit answer in the *Grammar* to the question of ‘scientific’ theology’s role in controlling the imagination. The distinction he draws there is between ‘investigation,’ which is quite compatible with assent, and ‘inquiry,’ which is not: “those who assent to a doctrine ... may without inconsistency investigate its credibility, though they cannot literally inquire about its truth”; indeed, such an investigation, in the case of educated minds, is “an obligation, or rather a necessity.” Whether Newman ever refers directly to the Anselmian program of *fides quærens intellectum* I am not expert enough to say. But it would not be reading too much into his own explicit statements to find implicit in them something like the same program for ‘speculative’ or ‘scientific’ theology.

Not that Newman himself ever attempted to realize such a program. Far from it. He never claimed to be a theologian, in the specialized sense, any more than a philosopher, and anyhow the only model of ‘scientific’ theology available to him was less a matter of ‘aspiration’ than of logical deduction. Not surprisingly, the authors of the Christian intellectual tradition he most admired and felt most at home with were those who preceded Anselm — the fathers, whose writings, like most of his own, were seldom if ever ‘speculative’ in the sense of being written for their own sake, and seldom if ever ‘scientific’ in the sense that medieval theology would later be, but for the most part practical, pastoral, and apologetical. This may be one aspect of Newman’s ‘Englishness’; patristic thought has been the special love of English divines since the sixteenth century. Yet it is also true that while Newman could acknowledge and respect ‘scientific’ reasoning as he used the term, his was no more a speculative than a mystical temperament. When all is said, the theology he preferred — and wrote incomparably well — is the ‘theology of a religious imagination.’

What I have been endeavoring to show is that for Newman the relationship between theology as a notional science, and religion as rooted in real apprehension and assent, is in many respects is the same relationship, writ large, as the more fundamental one, within the

individual mind, between generalizing and imagination. It was I pointed out earlier that the notion of God as moral governor arises from particular experiences of obligation; as reapplied to such experiences, that notion comes to be apprehended really as well as notionally. In similar fashion theology, as contrasted with rationalism, presumes real apprehension and moves towards notional comparison, system, definition, analysis, and orderly presentation.

If the analogy were complete, there ought also to be a parallel movement in the other direction, that is, from speculative theological assent to religious devotion. And in one sense there is. Newman waxes even more eloquent than is his wont when he describes the 'Athanasyian' creed as "a hymn of praise, of confession, and of profound, self-prostrating homage, parallel to the canticles of the elect in the Apocalypse ... the war-song of faith ... the most simple and sublime, the most devotional formulary to which Christianity has given birth, more so even than the Veni Creator and the Te Deum." He admits that in itself the doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery and as such apprehensible only as a notion, but insists that each of the propositions which the doctrine comprises can be apprehended vividly and imaginatively. Thus, presumably, does the Trinity come to be not just a dogma but a 'sovereign' dogma. But in that regard it is an exceptional dogma too, for Newman has to acknowledge that for the most part the propositions of dogmatic theology do not lend themselves to direct translation into the language of devotion. Theological 'speculation' regulates real apprehension at one remove, "ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest," and leaving to liturgy especially (though not only) the direct appeal to religious imagination.

80 Newman, Grammar 133.
81 Newman, Grammar 148.
82 Newman, Grammar 120.
83 See Newman, Grammar 139-140.
I have been dwelling on what may be called the positive aspect of notional apprehension and assent, and more particularly of ‘scientific’ theology,’ in relation to religion. So to underscore the fact that for Newman there is a positive aspect has seemed to me appropriate, if only for the sake of a context in which to understand his rather more numerous references to the ‘merely’ notional. Much of what I have said comes down to saying that ‘merely’ must be taken at face value. It means ‘and nothing more’ — and nothing more. Even though there is little in the Grammar of Assent from which to infer either that notional assent cannot, as such, be real as well as notional or that it has not, as such, any role to play with respect to religious living, Newman is all too easily drafted into the service of an anti-intellectualistic or anti-scientific religiosity, and so it is well to remember that when he was faced with the momentous decision whether to leave one church for another he “determined to be guided, not by my imagination, but by my reason.”

Yet when all this is granted there remains a sense in which, so far as religion is concerned, notionally apprehended truth can be a snare and a delusion, a ‘barrier to enlightenment.’ It was C. S. Lewis who remarked that the trouble with being a theologian is that it can lead you to suppose you are therefore a good Christian, and who said too that no doctrine seemed less real to him than the one he had just successfully defended. It would be interesting to know Newman’s views in this regard, but on theology as a vocation he has nothing to say in the Grammar and very little elsewhere. The Grammar is about religion, and religious assent is, or ought to be, real rather than notional; but in Newman’s judgment “except within a small range of subjects it commonly is not real in England.” For the “genius of modern England,” objects are scarcely necessary, rites and creeds are not essential constituents, and doctrines are “not so much facts as stereotypes of facts.” The “national religion of England in its length and breadth ... professes to be little more than ... reading the Bible and living

---

84 Newman, Apologia 126.
85 Newman, Grammar 55.
a correct life. It is not a religion of persons and things, of acts of faith and of direct devotion; but of sacred scenes and pious sentiments." 86

Newman is careful to add that there are exceptions, among them the party he himself had helped to found. But, as a general statement, his rather withering portrait of Victorian religion would probably be confirmed by historians today. And one cannot help wondering whether much that he says about 'national religion' in the England of 1870 would have to be changed in order to substitute 'American civil religion in the 1980s.' It is not hard to think of reasons why such a comparison would only go so far, and this is not the place to settle how far that would be. What does seem true in any case is that through the Grammar of Assent Newman in his gentle way is calling attention to a fact that may raise for anyone a possibly relevant question. The fact is simple: there is such a thing as real apprehension and real assent. The question is difficult: how much of my apprehension and my assent is real, and how much 'merely' notional?

That is the sense, or one of the senses, in which Bremond is correct in saying that all Newman's books — even, I would add, the Grammar — can be taken as 'spiritual reading' and an 'inducement to prayer.' My own reading of that remark is not that the 'philosophy of religion' Newman offers is of no intellectual importance, but that because it is intellectually important — because what Newman says is true — his Grammar of Assent is also spiritually important. If, as Lonergan says in the long quotation with which I began, 'enlightenment' consists in real rather than in notional meaning; if, as he says elsewhere, Gadamer is making 'a straight-forward application of Newman's distinction between notional and real apprehension' by contending that "one really grasps the meaning of a text only when one brings its implications to bear on contemporary living," then, it seems to me, the process of understanding a text that begins with the black marks on paper within the covers of A Grammar of Assent has not reached its term until Newman has changed one's life: cor ad cor loquitur.

86 Newman, Grammar 56-57.
87 Lonergan, Method in Theology 169.
KANT'S ANOMALOUS INSIGHTS

A Note on Kant and Lonergan

William Mathews, s.j.

The Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy

Dublin 6

GIOVANNI SALA's LETTER together with his book, Lonergan and Kant,1 hopefully will stimulate anew the question of the Kantian influence on Lonergan and, equally, the potential contribution of Lonergan to Kant studies. For it is becoming clear that Lonergan's roots in Kant run deeper than was previously suspected. Sala has drawn our attention to the well known comment about the judge in the B-Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason.2 Reason must approach the study of nature in order to be taught by it, not like a pupil listening to his teacher but more like a judge "who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated"(B xiii). The role of the judge will be to evaluate critically the evidence supporting the truth or falsehood of the theory. There seems to be involved in this something more than Kant's analysis of judgment in terms of applying rules to situations. This poses the question, does the actual performance of a judge or jury sit within Kant's analysis of understanding, judgment, or reason? Or in certain respects is it an anomaly? Is it drawing our attention to a dimension of the performance of mind that is outside of the scope of the analysis in the actual text?3


2 Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London, Macmillan 1964). All references are to this version which will be abbreviated as CPR.

3 More specifically, is Kant's analysis of judgment, A68, B 93 ff. consistent with what a judge or jury member actually does when they perform their work? See Sala, Lonergan and Kant note 1, xii, 6-8, 34. On the other hand the article on judgment in Howard Caygill,
In the present note I would like to draw attention to a possible second anomaly in the same B-Preface. There, and elsewhere in his works, we find a number of uses of the word Einsicht, insight, which I believe deserve attention. There is a certain shyness among philosophers of mind when it comes to using the word 'insight,' or even related words such as 'discovery.' Granted that it is interesting to find as eminent a philosopher as Kant actually using the word in what seems a significant place, his second Preface to the work. The uses pose the question, To what extent did Kant acknowledge, or not, the event of insight? When he was writing the final Preface to his work had the event of insight clicked for him? If so, might his recognition of the event of insight have resulted in a further anomaly, in that it too might in some sense stand outside the horizon of the work? For the commonly accepted meaning of the word 'insight' is that it is a mental sightedness that penetrates a person's character, the nuances of a situation, a hidden secret. Insights are into something. But for Kant a mental act such as an insight can never be into anything in the world. Accordingly there is something anomalous in his use of the

\[ \text{A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 267, asserts that for Kant "the theoretical judgment contains an is and an is not," suggesting the need for a careful study of the focal differences between Lonergan and Kant on judgment.} \]

\[ \text{4 In his book Sala frequently refers to passages from the B-Preface and elsewhere in the CPR. To my knowledge none of his references draw our attention to the occurrence in the Preface or elsewhere of the word Einsicht. Nor is that word listed in the index of the book. This in part is the reason for the present note. The word insight does occur in a quote on page 104 from Cassirer, Kants Leben und Lehre (Berlin: 1918) 139. The sentence reads: "However, one can hardly defend the view that 'all the fundamental insights that constitute the KRV are already expressed here.'" Only one reference to the word is to be found in Register to Kant, Werke in Zwölf Bänden (Wiesbaden: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1958). No references to insight are to be found in A Kant Dictionary referred to in n 3.} \]

\[ \text{5 There is a parallel question for Lonergan, namely, When did the philosophical significance of the word 'insight' begin to click for him? His first recorded use of the word occurred on page 2 of an essay he wrote in 1928 entitled "The Syllogism." There he quotes from page 307 of Joseph's An Introduction to Logic as follows: "The subsumption in syllogism belongs to thinking which has not full insight into all its premises at once." At this point I do not think that the importance of the word had clicked for Lonergan. It occurs twice in section II of his essay, "The Form of Inference," published in Thought 18 (1943), reprinted in Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 6-7. Again the word does not seem significant to the argument. The phrase 'intellectual insight,' which occurs on 6 also occurs in Kant. It seems that it was in the Verbum articles, 1943-1949, that the word began to come into its own.} \]
term. Even if this should prove to be the case there is still the further question, Is insight a philosophically interesting or important word? Is the quality of mind it refers to humanly significant? The series of instances in which Kant actually uses the word will provide us with an opportunity to assess and evaluate its importance.

I

The word *Einsicht*, which Norman Kemp Smith translated as ‘insight,’ occurs to my knowledge six times in the B Preface to the CPR, B xiii; B xiv; B xxx (twice); B xliii and B xliv. The question arises, on the basis of his usage of the word, what is he actually talking about?

Kant’s first use of the term ‘insight’ occurs in the context of descriptions of mathematical and scientific discoveries. After describing those discoveries he refers to them as the insights of reason. Early Egyptian mathematics was at a groping stage. This groping stage was transformed due to a revolution in the mind of a man. A new light flashed upon the mind of man when Thales or whoever demonstrated the properties of an isosceles triangle for the first time in human history (B xi). What exactly does he mean by ‘a new light,’ the light of insight? This should be read in conjunction with the later discussion of the rule or law of the triangle (B 744-745), which was presumably written before the Preface. A philosopher left with a triangle will not produce anything new. The geometer on the other hand draws a triangle. He extends the base line beyond the boundary knowing that the sum of angles at the point of extension along the line is two right angles. Through the point of extension he draws a line parallel to the opposite side. In the disposed image he comes to understand that the sum of the internal angles is two right angles. In his lectures on *Understanding and Being*6 Lonergan uses similar geometrical examples, constructing an equilateral triangle or proving that the external angle in a triangle is greater than the opposite internal angle, to illustrate the phenomenon of insight into phantasm. Unlike Kant he does not freeze in front of

the image but goes so far as to say that the insight is caused by a combination of our questioning and the image.7

In describing scientific discoveries Kant again talks about how a new light broke on the students of nature when Galileo caused the balls to roll down an inclined plane, when Torricelli made the air carry a weight of mercury, and when Stahl changed metals into oxides and oxides back into metals. Galileo's experiment rests on the insight that the measured distance moved might stand in a fixed correlation with the measured time taken to move that distance down the plane. The experiment is concerned with filling out the expectations of that insight. Torricelli's barometer is based on the insight that the measured weight of the atmosphere can be related to the measured weight of a column of mercury. Stahl is trying to understand combustion. He proposes that phlogiston is the property of matter that makes it combustible. It is lost in the process but may be regained through contact with coal, for instance. His insight was revised by Lavoisier and Priestley, who showed that when a chemical burns it absorbs oxygen and increases in weight.

Kant's first usage of the term 'insight' refers back to these accounts of a new light dawning on the human mind, accounts of new mathematical and scientific discoveries. He states that "reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, as it were, and must not allow itself to be kept in nature's leading-strings" (B xiv). Although in need of clarification this suggests that for him the new light of insight determines nature a priori, puts an interpretation into nature. Lonergan, with Aquinas and Aristotle, holds that the image causes the insight, that our understanding in the learning or discovery process is acted upon and receives its content from what we experience.8 So although Kant and Lonergan

7 He recognizes that in the problem-solving process our wonder in its pursuit of understanding has to dispose or rearrange suitably the image, a basic tactic of Euclid in his proofs. When our wonder about the spatial properties of the geometrical shape has suitably lit up the disposed or rearranged image Lonergan now goes so far as to say that the image causes the insight into the definition of the triangle or the point to be discovered or proved. The product of the insight is the definition, made up of its constituent concepts. In this sense insight into phantasm is the cause in us of language formation. For Lonergan concepts and definitions do not reside innately in our minds but are formed through insight into phantasm.

8 In his essay "Insight Revisited," (A Second Collection [London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974] 267) Lonergan sums up his position stating that Aristotle and Aquinas held
Mathews: Kant's Anomalous Insights

seem to be talking about the same kind of event when they use the word, insight, in this instance they explain what it does quite differently.

The second use of the word insight occurs in the context of metaphysics (B xiv). For Kant it is a speculative science of reason which soars above experience. Unlike mathematics, which applies concepts to intuition, metaphysics for him rests on conceptual analysis alone. It is still at the stage of random groping that mathematics and science were at before Thales, Galileo, Toricelli, and Stahl. Why has it not become a science? He explicitly asks, Is such a discovery possible? It is in this context that he talks about metaphysics seeking to have an a priori insight. As with mathematics and science, metaphysics needs a single and sudden revolution, a changed point of view. He then goes on to propose his well known Copernican revolution for metaphysics. By assuming that the stars rotate around us as spectators Copernicus could not explain their movements. By adopting the new viewpoint that the spectator rather than the stars is revolving progress was made. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics as regards the intuition of objects. Rather than assuming that intuition must conform to the constitution of objects why not assume that objects must conform to the constitution of intuition. This is Kant's basic metaphysical insight, his discovery. Although its content is distinctively metaphysical, as an insight or discovery it is quite similar to the discoveries of mathematics and science. In the first two occurrences Kant clearly acknowledges a discovery process that is intellectual and so unlike sensible intuition. The question arises, how does this fit in with his analysis of understanding, judgment, and reason?

The third and fourth uses of the term (B xxx), dealing with the problem of God, freedom, and immortality, talk about depriving reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight: "For in order to arrive at such insight it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to objects

that "intellect abstracted from phantasm a preconceptual form or species of quod quid erat esse, whence both terms and nexus (of the definition) were inwardly spoken." A very detailed treatment of the topic is given in the fourth of the Verbum articles, "Verbum and Abstraction" 162-163, in particular notes 113 and 114. The implication is that insight finds something, the point of the geometrical shape, in the phantasm. The finding of the quod quid est in the phantasm is for Aquinas infallible, suggesting that errors in understanding have their source in the wrong image, a point discussed in Verbum, 175-176.
of possible experience." There follows his famous remark about denying reason in order to make way for faith. Here Kant is probing the question, are there mysteries which are beyond the power of our natural insights? Are there limits to our insights? The discussion also draws to our minds the possibility of mistaken or pretentious insights such as those of Stahl. Insights are a dime a dozen. Many are false, partial, incomplete, open to revision, and need to come before the judgment of rationality. Lonergan will revise Kant's metaphysical insight. He will hold that objects must conform, not to the constitution of intuition but rather the constitution of a cognitional structure comprised of a level of experience, a level of intelligence and of judgment.

Kant's fifth and sixth uses (B xliii, xliv) clearly designate insight as the quality of the enlightened and critical person. Critical philosophy is addressed to those persons who combine "thoroughness of insight with a talent for lucid expression," which he adds he does not possess. Finally, he talks about "men of impartiality, insight and true popularity" as necessary for the establishment of his philosophy. These are interesting uses in that they invite us to open up the human image of the person of insight, they have an anthropological ring. What must be clear is that however he interprets what an insight is, in all six instances what Kant is writing about when he writes about insight is very close to what Lonergan means by an insight.

Two further occurrences of the term, insight, within the body of the CPR itself are worth noting. Towards the end of A 132, B 171 Kant starts an analysis of judgment. Understanding is a faculty of rules. Judgment for him is the faculty which distinguishes whether or not something stands under a given rule. Kant has in mind a physician, judge, or ruler who has at hand many rules but who may nonetheless stumble in their application. Although understanding is capable of being instructed in rules, even though examples are the go-cart of judgment, the application of rules to situations can only be practiced and cannot be taught. No school can make good the lack of mother-wit it requires. He then goes on at A 133, B 172: "For although an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others may indeed be proffered to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, the power of rightly employing them must belong to the learner
himself." In the next paragraph, suggesting that too great a study of illustrations of applying rules to situations might dull one's intellect, he adds: "Correctness and precision of intellectual insight, on the other hand, they more usually somewhat impair." The phrase 'intellectual insight' makes clear that for Kant insight is nothing like intuition. What Kant is clearly saying here is that between the rules and the situation there is a chasm and that chasm can only be crossed by insights. John McDowell, in his "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," comes to the same conclusion. No explanation of the use of an expression is proof against misunderstanding because of the inexhaustible variety of applications. Understanding the use of an expression involves a cottoning on, a leap or an inspired guess at the pattern of applications which a teacher is trying to get across. In order to apply a rule to a situation there is needed the leap of insight. This seems to me an illustration of the event of insight clicking in the tradition of analytical philosophy.

Our final illustrations of Einsicht, of insight in Kant, will be taken from the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Part II addresses the question, How is a pure science of nature possible? Nature for Kant is related to rules. His answer runs:

It is only possible by means of the constitution of our understanding, according to which all the above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar way in which we think (namely, by rules) and hence experience also are possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects themselves.

---


10 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1950). The term 'insight' does not occur in the index. I am indebted to Jeanne Belair for pointing out occurrences of Einsicht, insight, in this text. She has located some 14 occurrences in the Lewis White Beck translation on 6, 7 (three occurrences), 23, 37, 65, 70, 72 (two occurrences), 79, 125, 126, and 127. I am also indebted to Paul Lennon and Patrick Riordan, both of the Milltown Institute, for help with the German texts of Kant.

11 See also Prolegomena 65.
His clear denial here that our understanding of nature is like an insight into the objects themselves illustrates the tension between his use of the word ‘insight’ and the commonly accepted meaning of the word in terms of mental penetration of character or the secrets of nature. Yet in his very use of the phrase ‘insight into’ he seems to accept that insights are into something, have some object. Discussing the meaning of the categories he goes on:

Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them at the same time to use merely in experience, never occurred either to their first author or to any of his successors; but without this insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names, without explanation or rule for their use.12

Kant is drawing attention to the distinction between an insightful use of the categories and a blind or parrot-like use. Clearly in the insightful use the insights are into something, into the meaning and use of the categories. So the question of the object of insight is on the agenda.

In the appendix to the Prologemenon Kant discusses a reviewer’s judgment on the CPR. It is an extremely interesting case study of a philosophical judgment on a philosophical theory of mind. He describes an enlightened and critical reviewer whose understanding has gone to the heart of the argument of a text and critiqued it, possibly harshly. The author might be displeased with what is written about the work but cannot fault the understanding and criticism of the reviewer. The contrary is the case where a reviewer reviews a text which he clearly does not understand. This could be because of his narrow mindedness, impatience at the demands made by the text on his understanding, his inability to appreciate that one cannot review Euclid (or its philosophical equivalent) unless one understands geometry, or his sense of personal superiority as a result of which he keeps his superior insights or discoveries hidden from the world.13 The problem as Kant sees it is that the standard for judgment on matters metaphysical has yet to be found. By this I interpret him to mean that the relevant significant questions involved in such judgments

12 See also Prolegomena 72.

13 See also Prolegomena 126.
Mathews: Kant's Anomalous Insights

are not known by individual reviewers or by a community of philosophers. What is to be done until the standard is found in the matter of judgment on works of metaphysics? In this context there is the final use of the term 'insight' in the Prologomena:

If, however, they are critical in character, not indeed with reference to other works but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable, since the need is common to us all and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of the judge unwarranted.\(^\text{14}\)

Philosophers, it seems, cannot avoid the activity of making philosophical judgments with respect to their own works and the works of others. What Kant did not seem to realize is that it is in this unavoidable process that at least an element of the sought-for standard of judgment in matters metaphysical resides. It is through the process of true judgment that we come to know what is, what exists, what is so. Overlook this fact and you are lost when it comes to the standards for judgment in metaphysics.

It is one thing for the solution to a crossword puzzle or problem situation suddenly to click for us, suddenly to fall into place. It is quite another for it to click with us that we have insights and what, in some primitive way, they do and are like. Lonergan has clearly stated on a number of occasions that unless the event of insight has clicked with us we will get nowhere with his work.\(^\text{15}\) But he does not go out of his way to

\(^{14}\) See also Prolegomena 127.

\(^{15}\) Lonergan ended a long and illuminating response to a question on his own intellectual development at the Lonergan Workshop in Boston on June 19, 1979 with the remark that his cognitional theory requires something to click inside you: "But it has to click because if you haven't had the click you are not going to get anywhere with Insight." On a number of occasions he has stated that Kant with Aristotle and Aquinas knew all about insight. One of those occasions occurs in his lecture notes, "Intelligence and Reality," notes made for his course at Thomas More Institute, Montreal 1950-1951. These notes are available at the Lonergan Centre, Toronto. The lectures were given when he was composing Insight. The references to Kant in those notes are numerous and significant, the Norman Kemp Smith edition being directly referred to. On page 12, paragraph 7 his headings suggest that analytic and synthetic \textit{a priori} (judgments) presuppose insights and that "analytic seems to be covert insights." In Understanding and Being he says something similar: "Kant's synthetic \textit{a priori} presupposes that the insight already exists and that the concepts are already formed" (30). When using the word in the B-Preface and
bring about that click in his readers. In his writings he tends to presume that it has happened. The previous analysis suggests that a study of Kant's usage of the term Einsicht, insight, could facilitate the clicking of the insight event in students of Lonergan. Add to this the fact that for Kant insights can never be into anything whereas for Lonergan, following the common usage of the term, they are always into some property of the world and there results the basis for an interesting discussion of mind.

When the event of insight has clicked, the further question of its importance as a human quality arises. Is it an attribute philosophers and anthropologists ought to take seriously? For Richard Dawkins the dominant human quality is our DNA, for Francis Crick it is our neurons. I have no doubt that our DNA and our neural networks are significant human attributes. But there is much more to us than our DNA or neurons. Insight, the mental sightedness by means of which we understand our DNA and our neural processes, is an irreducible conscious human quality. The range and variety of illustrations of insights which Kant offers, limited though they are, provide evidence to support the suggestion that what the word insight refers to is an important human quality. If Aquinas and Lonergan are to be believed, it is a key element in language formation. To rule it out of the human equation as unimportant is to do

elsewhere, was Kant adverting to what Lonergan suggests he had presupposed? For an illustration of the event of insight clicking in the scientific community see W.I. B Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Inquiry (London: Heinemann, 1974) chapter VI. In that chapter there is given one of the best accounts that I have come across of how insights are experienced in the scientific community. Unfortunately the chapter is entitled “Intuition.”

16 On the third page of his book The Astonishing Hypothesis (London: Touchstone Books, 1995) Francis Crick states that the human being is “nothing but a pack of neurons.” On page 261 he acknowledges that it is through insight into the marvelous complexities of our brains that we will master creativity and aesthetic pleasure. Crick acknowledges insights but does not take them seriously. On page 62 of his essay “God’s Utility Function,” in Scientific American 273/5 (November 1995) Richard Dawkins states in the sub-heading that “life has no higher purpose than to perpetuate the survival of DNA.” DNA and neural networks are profound elements in the human mystery. This does not mean that they should so fascinate us that other important elements of that mystery such as the power of insight or the desire to be loving and loved are deemed unimportant and uninteresting.
ourselves a radical violence. But to take it seriously and explore and analyze it is a momentous and even hazardous philosophical option.\(^{17}\)

II

Sala has stated that "there is no doubt that the Critique of Pure Reason was in Lonergan's mind when he wrote Insight."\(^{18}\) This I believe to be true. But it challenges us to discover as precisely as is possible the details of how Kant positively influenced Lonergan's thought.\(^{19}\) For what has become clear to me in recent years is a profound and positive influence of Kant on Lonergan. A key factor in arriving at this conclusion was a study of the notes he made for his lectures, "Intelligence and Reality," given at the mid-point of the process of composing the book, Insight. Those notes, I believe, are a sort of proto-Insight, a primary vision of the book. After dealing with the notion of being and objectivity he goes on on page 23 to discuss the categories of proportionate being, to address directly the metaphysical question. His definition of a proportionate object as the range of beings with a structure that corresponds to our knowing is followed immediately by the comment: "Cf. Kant: object of possible experience." Further investigation resulted in the discovery that this phrase occurs in paragraph xxx of the B-Preface to the CPR in a sentence that also includes the word 'insight.' The conclusion is that when Lonergan began to compose his chapter on the elements of metaphysics for the first time he was reading or had in mind the B-Preface to the CPR. That Preface contains the account of the Copernican Revolution needed for a future scientific metaphysics. On page 27 of his notes Lonergan discusses the question of the scientific status of philosophy and by implication, metaphysics. Add to this the fact that in the B-Preface there can be found references to empirical and intellectual consciousness (B xl), and the unconditioned. In the A-Preface (xi-xii) there is a clear invitation to reason

\(^{17}\) See Richard Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegville: The Liturgical Press, 1993) 145 for comments from Lonergan to the effect that the analysis of insight and its implied realism is a difficult and momentous philosophical option.

\(^{18}\) See also Sala, Lonergan and Kant xiv.

\(^{19}\) See comments in n 15 on "Intelligence and Reality."
to undertake the most difficult of all its tasks, namely self-knowledge. This
seems quite similar to Lonergan’s invitation to self-affirmation. The
opening pages of that same Preface refer to the endless controversies of
metaphysics, a passage that is clearly echoed in Insight.20

More specifically there is a need to explore how Kant might have
helped Lonergan to frame, not so much his answers as his questions.
Lonergan was educated in the scholastic tradition which, despite its neo-
Kantians, was on the whole critical of Kant who was seen as an adversary.
Whiteside introduced Lonergan to Kant in Heythrop in 1926/7, comment-
ing that his critical remarks were only pin pricks and not to be taken as a
critical refutation.21 In the scholastic tradition a main criticism seems to
have been that if one takes Kant’s turn one gets lost in subjectivity at the
expense of objectivity. A bridge is opened up between our mental pro-
cesses in here and the world out there (CPR, A 89/90, B 122/3). Liddy still
remembers quite vividly being told that the only answer to the bridge was
dogmatically to assert that our knowledge does cross from in here to out
there.22 Whether this was the basis of Whiteside’s criticisms is almost
impossible to know. But it is highly likely that Lonergan was educated in
an environment in which Kant would have posed the difficult question of
uniting the subject and object of knowledge. This, I believe, influenced his
second or epistemological question, which deals with the manner in which
mental acts get beyond themselves to knowledge of objects in the world.23

20 Insight, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992) 410f. In an earlier draft of the opening passages of chapter 14 which I
have discovered the suggestion of a Kantian influence is even stronger.

21 Caring About Meaning, Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert,
For other remarks on Kant see 15f.

22 Liddy, Transforming Light 102-3, 175. It is reported that at the Florida Conference
on his thought at the end of March 1970, Lonergan stated that a central problem for mod-
ern philosophy had been posed by Kant, a problem which he then claimed he had gone
some distance towards resolving. In his notes, “Intelligence and Reality,” on page 18
when discussing the notion of objectivity Lonergan claims that his solution to the prob-
lem of the subject and object of knowledge leaves no possibility of immanence because
there is “nothing left over from which to cross.” Taken with Liddy’s comment on the
problem of the bridge this establishes a strong Kantian connection.

23 Verbum, 66f.; Insight, chapters 12 and 13. From the passages in Verbum it is clear
that Lonergan was exploring possible contributions of Aquinas to the modern problem.
In the light of the movement of Lonergan's thought it is my belief that during his philosophy studies and after, Kant, among others, posed for him the question of the relation between sensibility and understanding in human knowing. His very first essay in 1927 entitled "The Forms of Mathematical Inference" was concerned with the movement from particular sense data and diagrams to some inferred understanding. He clearly disapproved of Kant's proposed answer in terms of sensible intuition and the categories of the understanding. During his philosophy studies he did not take to Aquinas. This changed when he read Hoenen's essays on the origin of the first principles of mathematics. For Hoenen those first principles are not a priori, but are worked out, following Aquinas, by insight into phantasm through which a nexus between terms is apprehended in the phantasm, in the image. This encouraged him to think that Aquinas might have something different to offer than Kant on the relation between the sensible and the intellectual in human knowing. It is within the movement of his thought on this problem that the Verbum articles can in part be located. He also found confirmation in Aquinas for Newman's position on assent.

A further influence of Kant on Lonergan is to be discerned in the structure of Kant's Copernican revolution for metaphysics. This I believe positively influenced the structure of the composition of both the Verbum articles and Insight. There are direct references to the Copernican revolution in Insight (413) and in Method in Theology (96, 264). There is also a covert reference to it in the Verbum articles (45-46), where Lonergan explains why he began from the psychological content of Thomist theory of the intellect rather than from the metaphysics. It is a thesis that is repeated in great detail in the conclusion to the third article where he insists that an interpretation of Aquinas on mental acts must be able to

---

24 For Lonergan's reading of Kant in the early thirties, see Liddy, Transforming Light 76-84. Central at this time was his explorations of the object of understanding. On the problem of the relation between the sensible and the intellectual components in knowing see CPR, A 15, B 29.

25 P. Hoenen, "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae" (On the origins of the first principles of science), Gregorianum 14 (1933) 153-184; "De Philosophia scholastica cognitionis geometricae" (On the scholastic philosophy of geometrical knowledge), Gregorianum 19 (1938) 498-514; "De problemae necessitatis geometricae" (On the problem of necessity in geometry), Gregorianum 20 (1939) 19-54.
reconcile his psychological and metaphysical statements. Because of the scholastic environment which those essays were addressing, Lonergan could not directly state his Kantian sympathies. But they are nonetheless there and guiding him. From Kant Lonergan learned that our knowledge of the world must be consistent with our knowledge of ourselves as knowers, with knowledge of the processes by means of which we know the world. But unlike Kant he considers that the manner in which our minds connect with the world is through cognitional structure as a whole rather than through sensible intuition. The universe corresponds to our mental desires and powers. Our mental desires and powers correspond to the universe. Any attempt to articulate a vision of the universe that neglects the correlation of subject and object or that simply ignores or truncates the subject will result in error. The Kantian insight is almost totally neglected at the end of our century by the whole new breed of scientific metaphysicians. Dennett, Dawkins, and Hawking conjure up world views in total disregard of their own cognitional powers and their relation to the structure of the world.

To conclude, the present study is of the form of notes towards a critical study of Kant’s uses of the word **Einsicht**, insight, and of the manner in which Kant influenced Lonergan’s questions and project. Inevitably it has posed the question, how important a human attribute, a human quality, is insight?
NOTE
CONVERSION AND OBJECTIVITY

Joseph A. Komonchak
The Catholic University of America
Washington, DC 20064

This note is not a scholarly exegetical article on the notions in the title and their relationship in Lonergan’s writings, nor is it a theoretical exploration of the theme itself. It is rather a report on an experience in trying to communicate what Lonergan had to say about objectivity and to help students to grasp the issues and to get the point. I offer it for whatever help it may supply to other teachers and also in the hope that it might encourage others to report on successful teaching moments.

In a course designed to introduce new graduate students to the joys and rigors of theology, after we had made a rapid tour through the major periods in the history of theology, we turned to Method in Theology as a text by which to wrestle with the problem of how to become a good critical and constructive theologian. We very quickly had to confront two major questions. On the one hand, how to defend the transcendental, universal claims Lonergan made for his ‘generalized empirical method,’ particularly in a cultural age whose new respect for pluralism sometimes becomes the claim that there are distinct epistemologies corresponding to different cultures, ethnic or racial groups, and even to what is often now called ‘gender’? On the other hand, is Lonergan’s definition of objectivity as ‘self-transcending subjectivity,’ easy enough to parrot back, anything more than a clever slogan, with the adjective not by itself enough to overcome the cultural assumption that the noun implies relativism? Are we not told that all knowledge is perspectival?
I trust that these two difficulties are not unfamiliar to others who have tried to introduce students into Lonergan’s thought. Our students’ difficulty in understanding his position should not be underestimated. While his transcendental claims are now easily recognized as counter-cultural, the appeal to subjectivity is often taken to be just another invocation of more or less arbitrary particularity and so to contradict the universal claim. These, at least, are often first impressions.

My students were genuinely puzzled and their questions real. While they wanted to affirm the value of pluralism, instinctively they also wanted to maintain that there are some transcendental values, for example, concern for ‘universal’ human rights or structures and practices that oppress women and which no cultural context can justify. But, initially at least, they wanted something more solid than appeals to intellectual, moral, and religious authenticity.

“Aren’t there any objective criteria?” a student asked one day. “What do you mean by ‘objective?’” I replied. (To give her credit, she was challenged enough by my question to go back to Lonergan’s text and next class she showed that she had got the point.) The question was back on the table when we got to the text in which, in reference to a criterion for the work of purifying categories, Lonergan wrote: “Nor may one expect the discovery of some ‘objective’ criterion or test or control. For that meaning of the ‘objective’ is mere delusion. Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. It is to be attained only by attaining authentic subjectivity.”1 Then there is the place where Lonergan asks for “the criterion that is to guide the theologian in the exercise of his autonomy” and finds it in “the touchstone of his own authenticity.”2 “Why,” I asked the students, “is this not pure subjectivism? And how do you put this claim together with his self-description as ‘a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines.’3 How can he say both things at once?”

2 Method 331.
3 Method 332.
Every teacher longs for the day when he can see the light of insight go on in students' eyes; and if I eventually had this joy, I hasten to attribute it to the example and pedagogy of the master mediator of conversion, Jesus of Nazareth. In the middle of yet another discussion of the issue, I suddenly remembered the parable of the lost and found son (Lk 15:11-32). This is a better name to give it than 'prodigal son': it relates it more closely to the two parables with which Luke linked it and which describe the lost and found sheep and coin; and it directs attention to the real point of the longer parable, the dialogue between the forgiving father and the elder son. Here Jesus drives home the point of all three parables: a response to those who were grumbling that he should receive sinners and eat with them (Lk 15:1-2). The chapter is a masterpiece; and I sometimes think that if everything else that Jesus taught and embodied were lost to us but this chapter, we would have the essence of his message still; and we would also know the only way into the world he inhabited.

The elder son, on learning of the feast being celebrated at his brother’s return, becomes angry and refuses to go in (v. 28). His father, who had not waited for the younger son to reach his house but had rushed out to greet him (v. 20), once again goes out, now to the older son, and begs him to come in. There ensues the dialogue that reveals the inner selves of the two men and the worlds they inhabit. The elder son speaks first, in protest: “Lo, these many years I have served you, and I never disobeyed your command; yet you never gave me a kid, that I may make merry with my friends. But when this son of yours came, who devoured your living with harlots, for him you killed the fatted calf!” The elder son does not address the man as his father and cannot bear to describe the returned sinner as his brother (“this son of yours”). His world is a world in which his father is a master who issues commands, which he must obey as a servant, in the hope of a reward. To such a self in such a world the father’s actions are incomprehensible.

How does the father respond? “My son,” he says, “you are always with me, and all that is mine is yours. But we have to make merry and be glad, for this your brother was dead and is alive; he was lost and is found!” He urges the familial relations: he is speaking to his son and about his son’s brother. The essence of the father’s relationship with the
elder son is one of communion: of presence to one another and communion of life and goods. But in the father’s world, there is an ought: “We have to rejoice.” The Greek word (edei) is a word of duty, obligation, an “ought”-word. The father senses an “ought” where the elder son sees only folly and injustice. And where does this ‘ought’ come from? We have been told earlier: “While [the younger son] was yet at a distance, his father saw him and had compassion and ran and embraced him and kissed him” (v. 20). “His bowels were moved,” says the Greek, meaning the seat of his emotions, his inmost heart. That is, the father loved, and because he loved, he had to celebrate his son’s return.

Two worlds and two selves. Two worlds because of two selves. The genius of the parable, its power still today, is that we are not told whether the older son goes in or not, because that is a question that can only be answered by those who hear the parable.4

“Now, which of the two, the father or the older son,” I asked my students, “lives in the ‘real,’ the ‘objective’ world?” Most of them, despite honestly acknowledging a certain sympathy for the older son, admitted that the father’s is the ‘real,’ ‘objective’ world. “Well,” I said, “what has to happen for the older son to enter that real world, to experience its real ‘oughts’ and its real joys? He has to love as his father loves. He has to be converted. He has to become a new self. That is what Lonergan means by moral conversion. Objectivity — attaining the ‘real’ world, experiencing its joys, acknowledging its duties, living in it — is self-transcending subjectivity.” Finally, the light seems to have gone on.

But why, one can ask, ought one love? One parable recalled another. The parable of the ungrateful and unmerciful servant (Mt 18:23-35) turns on a similar ‘ought’ (edei). The servant who has been forgiven an immense debt walks out into freedom only to exact from a fellow-servant full payment for a trivial debt. The master rebukes the first servant: “You

4 The power of the parable remains. When a colleague asked her students to reflect on it, one of them left the room upset. The next day she explained that she had received a scholarship to a prestigious university, which she had given up when her sister ran away from home, sending her parents into a dull despair. One day the student came home to find a crowd at her house where her parents were celebrating her sister’s return. “I walked over to my sister,” she explained to my colleague, “and slapped her across the face. I haven’t been home since. I hate this parable!”
wicked servant! I forgave you all that debt because you pleaded with me. *Ought you not* to have had mercy on your fellow servant, as I had mercy on you?” Again, an unrecognized ‘ought.’ But where does this ‘ought’ come from? It cannot be derived by any logical process from the indicative. Try the experiment: From the premise: “I have been forgiven an immense debt” there is no logic, no syllogism, that can derive the moral imperative: “I ought to forgive this trivial debt.” And yet people, my students included, recognize that ‘ought,’ they know (or at least sense) that the master is right, speaks truly, says what ‘really,’ ‘objectively,’ *ought to be done*.

With this parable, we are brought to the world that can only be entered by religious conversion and in which alone can this ‘ought’ be experienced. This is the world and the self created by God’s immense generosity, to which one owes one’s very freedom. How can one who to such generosity owes his very freedom to encounter another not be generous in turn? The mercilessness of the servant contradicts the freedom he enjoys only because of God’s mercy. God’s love has created an ‘objective’ world that has a new logic of ‘oughts’ all its own. The wicked servant *ought* to have acted mercifully, because mercy made possible the world in which he now walked freely. Not to recognize that ought was to be a stranger, an alien, in this world. But again, how to recognize this world except by participating in the love that created it? And how can one participate in it except by receiving it: “the love of God has been poured out into our hearts”: the love of God for us, yes; the love of us for God, yes; but also the love of God that is generosity itself becoming one’s own love, making one love as God loves and, to paraphrase Pascal, enabling one’s heart to discover reasons, a logic of ‘oughts,’ which unloving reason cannot know.

A third and last parable: the generous owner of the vineyard who gives the same reward to all, no matter how briefly they have worked (Mt 20:1-16). Those who bore the heat of the day complained, grumbled (a verb cognate to that used of the Scribes and Pharisees in Lk 15:2). And the master’s response: “I choose to give to this last as I gave to you. Am I not

5 Chrysostom recognized it long ago: “He wickedly abused the gift, the very freedom bestowed on him by his master” (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 10:379).
allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to me? Or do you resent my generosity?" The last question reads literally: "Or is your eye evil because I am good?" An evil eye, the eye of one who does not love, cannot recognize goodness. But the modern translation catches something too: to sum up the abyss that separates two worlds, two hearts, two logics, could there be a better phrase than "resentment at generosity"? One heart loves where the other doesn’t and creates a world, a reality, an intelligibility, an "objectivity," that is unrecognizable and unlovable in the other. The worlds cannot communicate by a common logic, for logic requires a first principle, and what is first in one world is last in the other, what is last in one is first in the other (Mt 20:16). There are no common first principles, for one world’s first principle is love and the other’s is resentment.6

Who lives in the real, objective world: the reconciling father, the forgiving master, the generous owner, or the angry son, the ungrateful servant, the resentful laborers? Jesus said that the world he described and exemplified is the real world, and he also described the only passage from one world to the other: metanoia, conversion. Not to hear his word and do it is to build upon sand; to hear his word and do it is to build upon rock (Mt 7:24-27). Rock-solid ‘objectivity’ is the fruit of the self-transcending subjectivity that is faith.

The love of God has created the ‘real’ world, that is, the only world that exists, and the same love has reconstituted that world after its destruction by sin. The real world and all the selves within it are the creatures of a creative and reconciling generosity. The world, in all its objectivity, is the free creation of God’s subjectivity, his wisdom and love. As the world exists only because of that loving wisdom, so also is it only wisely known by those who love as the one who made it loves. Self-transcending love is the only way to know, to enter, to live in the world created by self-transcending love.

Perhaps this all has further implications. Can a third party adjudicate between father and older son, say a devotee of ‘religious studies’ engaged in comparative ethics? He might uncover the formal structure of ethics, analyze and compare the two ethical logics and the worlds they yield.

6 Note Lonergan’s citation of Newman: “First shoot round corners and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism” (Method 338 n3).
This is the work of dialectics. But will not the abyss remain? And how can it be bridged except by conversion? Between 'dialectics' and 'foundations' the older son, and any observer, has to decide whether to join the celebration.

My example illustrates what Lonergan refers to as 'moral conversion.' But there are formal analogues with intellectual and religious conversion, and it is perhaps not surprising to find some anticipations in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who noted that one person might witness a miracle or hear the same preaching and not believe while another person does. "We must, therefore, posit another, an inner cause, which inwardly moves a man to assent to the things of faith. ... Faith, with respect to the assent which is the principal act of faith, comes from God inwardly moving a person by grace."  

And if that refers to religious conversion, there is another text in Aquinas where all three conversions are invoked:

As by the natural light of intellect a man assents to principles, so a virtuous man by the habit of virtue judges rightly about the things appropriate to that virtue. And in this way also by the divinely infused light of faith a man assents to the things of faith but not to their contraries.

Here we have the natural light of intellect, the virtuous man's ability to discern rightly, and the divinely infused light of faith, all placed in parallel, differently grounding in subjectivity the concrete possibility of knowing the real, the 'objective,' world in its several dimensions. What, on any of the three levels, could substitute for converted subjectivity?

7 *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 6, a. 1

8 *Summa theologiae* q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; see also q. 1, a 4, ad 3m; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, 154.
LONERGAN WORKSHOP
EDITED BY FRED LAWRENCE

VOLUME 11: "LANGUAGE OF THE HEART: LONERGAN, IMAGES AND FEELINGS"
PAPERS FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL LONERGAN WORKSHOP

"FOUNDATIONS IN ECCLESIOLOGY"
BY JOSEPH KOMPONCHAK
SUPPLEMENTARY ISSUE TO VOLUME 11

IN JUNE:
VOLUME 12: "IN TUNE WITH THE DIVINE GROUND:
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL ORDER"
PAPERS FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL LONERGAN WORKSHOP

$14 PER ISSUE

To order send check or money order (US funds), payable to "The Lonergan Institute," to:

Lonergan Workshop
Orders
Lonergan Center,
Bapst Library
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA
02167
BOOK REVIEWS


In his foreword to Lonergan and Feminism, William P. Loewe notes: “a common concern for freedom, authenticity, and genuine personhood constitutes a point at which the intellectual project of Bernard Lonergan and the burgeoning of contemporary feminist thought converge.” He adds: “The fact of that convergence will only make a difference, however, if it becomes concrete and actual through dialogue, a dialogue that will involve hard and critical questions.” Thanks to Cynthia Crysdale, the invitation to such a dialogue has been issued, prompted at least in part, no doubt, by the conviction she expresses in the introduction to this volume, that “to be a theologian or philosopher today and fail to be aware of the radical challenge of feminism is to render oneself anachronistic or irrelevant, or both.” Given the burgeoning of material in the application of Lonergan’s thought in so many areas, the virtual absence in that material of women’s voices and of feminism as a topic for discussion, are startlingly obvious. In editing this volume, Crysdale hopes to redress this imbalance, “to begin a conversation, to initiate a dialogue among scholars interested in both Lonergan and feminist questions.”

The way we have gone about knowing is at the core of the challenge of feminism. Method (beginning with the way we know) is of the essence of Lonergan’s work. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that most of the contributors to this volume — all the contributors are Lonergan scholars — have homed in on the relevance of the transcendental notions and precepts to a dialogue between those influenced by Lonergan’s thought and those concerned with feminist issues. ‘Transcendental precepts’ is the term Lonergan uses to describe the five distinct
imperatives — be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love — that sum up the a priori dynamism of the human spirit, impelling the human subject to transcendence by genuine humanness. While all the contributors see the transcendental notions as normative and so integral to the way we know, the way they see this dynamism contributing to the present conversation varies.

In the first essay, Frederick Crowe, S.J., begins by making the necessary distinction between "Lonergan and ..." and "Lonergan on ..."; one might validly 'apply' a generalist thinker to a specific area in the first case, but certainly not — at least not per se — in the second. This essay actually serves as something of a second introduction to the book, setting out so clearly as it does one of the tasks being undertaken by the contributors, namely that of considering the possible relevance of a generalist thinker, such as Lonergan, to a particular set of concerns, such as those of feminists. Such a task involves the transition from general to particular, specifically the move from transcendental to categorial, and Crowe clarifies the way in which it is through the application of the universal but indeterminate dynamism (that is, the transcendental notions) that the content of feminist concerns (as of any other category) is authentically determined. Crowe also proposes that the kind of dialogue that could bring about effective understanding and co-operation between men and women could well be facilitated by Lonergan's little-known idea of mutual self-mediation.

Gender and epistemology are the focus of the next three essays, all written by philosophers. In each case, Lonergan's transcendental or heuristic methodology of human knowing is seen as critical to the feminist-Lonergan dialogue. Paulette Kidder notes that feminists such as Sandra Harding and Lorraine Code have rejected the objectivism associated with the philosophic tradition, because of its disregard for the particular, and yet they see the danger in the way that postmodern relativism is unable to account for the differences between valid and invalid claims to possess knowledge. Feminists seek to articulate an alternative epistemology, and in this task Kidder sees Lonergan as a feminist resource: while the work of feminists such as Harding and Code "adds to that of Lonergan a concern to identify the way bias has worked
to suppress women and feminine experiences,” the work of Lonergan can add to that of Code and Harding “a greater precision concerning the way bias works (by inhibiting experience, understanding, judgment, and decision) and the way it may be overcome (through fidelity to the transcendental precepts). Rather than speaking simply of ‘women’s experience,’ feminists could use Lonergan’s terminology in order to distinguish a whole range of feminine contributions to knowledge (that is, not only our experience but our images, questions, insights, and judgments).” Hence, Kidder sees more potential for the empowerment of feminists in Lonergan’s epistemology than in the relativism of the ‘postmodern epistemology’ currently predominant in feminist circles.

The way in which Evelyn Fox Keller, “a biophysicist by training and a feminist by recent conviction” considers the relationship between gender and scientific knowing is the focus of Michael Vertin’s attention. He concludes that Lonergan’s account of cognitional conversion can complement Keller’s work by clarifying and generalizing the heuristic aspect of her critique: cognitional conversion is in line with her specification of the ‘dynamic objectivity’ characteristic of the correct account of scientific knowing and its absence is evident in the ‘static objectivity’ characteristic of incorrect accounts. Vertin also concludes that Keller’s work can complement that of Lonergan: her rejection of gender-bias as intrinsic to scientific knowing can highlight the way in which gender-neutrality is part of cognitional conversion.

Elizabeth Morelli, after giving an account of the tradition in Western thought which attributes rationality specifically to men, and also noting the relativism of contemporary feminist epistemological theory, deals with the question of whether any cognitive acts constituting the process of knowing are gender-specific. In that context, she uses the distinctions made possible by Lonergan’s intentionality analysis to give a delightfully engaging and convincing phenomenological analysis of the notion of ‘women’s intuition.’

Cynthia Crysdale, by examining Lonergan’s understanding of community, belief, and the existential nature of self-appropriation, demonstrates that his heuristic method does account for the social location of knowers, for the ‘situatedness’ of their knowing. Drawing on Lorraine
Code’s analysis of the traditional designation of women as non-knowers or, at best, receivers rather than discoverers of knowledge, and on the empirical work of Belenky and her colleagues who, in *Women’s Ways of Knowing*, give some analysis of the social structures that block women’s understanding of how they know, Crysdale attempts to delineate the social and cultural conditions needed for women to engage in the self-appropriation that is central to Lonergan’s method.

The multiplicity of conflicting ‘feminist’ doctrines is well known. Tad Dunne claims that Lonergan’s analysis of authenticity in its relation to power, authority, conversion, and historical change, gives clear and concrete guidelines that would enable one to ascertain which among these doctrines can be of benefit to women. Dunne makes no attempt to bring Lonergan and feminism into dialogue, but deals only with the way in which he considers feminism could benefit from what Lonergan has to offer.

Denise Lardner Carmody explicates the transcendental precepts which Lonergan specified because she sees in them a corrective to the lack of foundational clarity, and to the perhaps too-ready adopting and abandoning of theoretical positions that some feminists see now characterizes many allegedly feminist works. “A ‘transcendental precept,’” she says, “is a rule, a bit of advice, an admonition, a directive that a wise person follows because it applies always and everywhere. The ‘transcendental’ aspect of the precept is this constant applicability, its status as a simple expression of what we simply are as human beings, how we simply are constituted to perform. The force of the precept depends on its perspicuity, its credibility.” She stresses that it is the transcendental nature of human consciousness itself that provides the ongoing challenge to authenticity for both feminists and those influenced by Lonergan, a challenge that if met together could result in a most fruitful dialogue.

In response to the ecofeminist critique of patriarchal hierarchies, the acknowledged prime source of the concrete and systematic subordination of women, Michael Shute proposes that Lonergan’s notion of world process (that is, emergent probability), which retains a hierarchical worldview — but without the distortions of patriarchy — provides an explanatory key for establishing a notion of world order that pertains to
both the processes of nature and the dynamics of human history. Shute proposes that the self-transcendence of human consciousness equips human subjects to be active participants in the intelligent transformation and integration of nature, while acknowledging that, because human desire far exceeds attainment, human history is ultimately 'material for divine artistry.'

Mary Frohlich examines the truncating effects of what Lonergan calls 'scotosis' — the distortion of understanding resulting from a given insight being systematically excluded from entrance to consciousness — in relation to the meaning of sexual difference, and cites as an example the mystification of the problem of gender in some arguments against the ordination of women. Her ultimate conclusion is that sexuality finds its true meaning in the orientation of the human person towards communion with other human persons and with God, and that insistence on a worldview of sexual hierarchy is "a mystification that not only blocks the unfolding of sexuality in its true role as mystery, but also blocks true insight into the ultimate Mystery — the radical transcendence of God."

In contrast to the other contributors to this volume, Charles Hefling focuses specifically on Lonergan's own explication of doctrine, specifically Christology, rather than on the relevance of his heuristic methodology. Hefling does, however, intentionally operate out of Lonergan's worldview as he attempts to ascertain whether his work in Christology can (a) answer the legitimate questions raised by feminists, summed up in Ruether's question 'can a male saviour save women?' or, as Hefling would probably put it: "is Christ's maleness intrinsic to his work as redeemer?"; and (b) meet their concern about the way in which Christ's passion and death have been used to legitimate structures that support destructive gender roles for women. In response, drawing on the work of Daphne Hampson, who has articulated most clearly both sides of the above problems, Hefling concludes that, according to Lonergan's position, Christ's maleness is not intrinsically related to his taking on of human nature, but that the 'Law of the Cross,' as understood and accepted by Lonergan, might need to be better explicated and understood if it is to prove salvific rather than a stumbling block to feminism.
The aim of the editor, to initiate a conversation, has been initially fulfilled by the dialogue undertaken by most of the contributors to this volume. Almost without exception they have brought feminism and Lonergan into searching dialogue, and have done so with a trenchancy that has highlighted not just the fact but also the ways in which such a convergence holds the promise of a dual benefit: a verifiably sound foundation for the promotion-towards-solution of the vital issues with which feminism is concerned. Clearly the reaping of that benefit depends on the conversation continuing and moving well beyond the initial participants. Will this volume help to achieve this? Despite the occasional slip into esoteric language, and one or two forays into areas less directly concerned with contemporary feminist questions, it should do so. The obvious and informed commitment of most of the writers to both Lonergan and feminist questions, and the diversity and depth of scholarship brought to bear on the conversation extend an invitation that I expect many will be eager to accept.

Kathleen Williams, R.S.M.


Like Bernard Lonergan’s *Grace and Freedom*, to which it refers so extensively, J. Michael Stebbins’s *The Divine Initiative* is a rewritten doctoral dissertation. (Stebbins wrote the original in the Joint Doctoral Program of Boston College and Andover Newton Theological School, defending it successfully in 1990.) Perhaps its most fundamental category, introduced in the preface and employed throughout the book’s eight chapters and afterword, is that of intellectual synthesis. “A synthesis is not just a network of concepts; it is primarily an act of understanding, a master insight that, when it emerges, integrates some set, large or small, of insights whose precise interrelation had not previously been apparent” (xix). One goal of
theology is the elaboration of just such syntheses. Like other disciplines, theology "aims at a grasp of intelligibility that, over time, develops in synthetic fashion as increasingly higher viewpoints unify increasingly broader ranges of what at previous stages resisted assimilation in a single perspective" (292). The distinguishing feature of theology is that what it aspires to synthesize is nothing less than the entire range of Christian beliefs and natural knowledge, in order "to shed as much light as it can on the universe of being as a whole" (292). Such was the enterprise of Aquinas. And such was the enterprise undertaken by Lonergan when, in an effort that began seriously in the late 1930s with his doctoral dissertation on Aquinas's notion of operative grace, he attempted "to articulate certain crucial aspects of the remarkable synthesis that was the fruit of Aquinas's project of 'thinking out the Christian universe'" (294). By the late 1940s Lonergan had completed what in retrospect was an initial, theoretical, phase of his own synthetic effort; and the result of that initial phase is what constitutes Stebbins's focus in the present volume. "The chief purpose of this book is to make available as a resource for Christian theology the synthesis that permeates Lonergan's early writings on grace" (xix).

Stebbins judges that Lonergan's early theological synthesis finds its fullest expression in De ente supernaturali (1946), a supplementary Latin textbook that Lonergan wrote for the course on grace he taught from time to time. Hence Stebbins makes this work his primary object of investigation and uses its scheme for organizing his consideration of the other materials from Lonergan's early period. Moreover, he identifies his investigation as proceeding in the functional specialty interpretation. That is to say, his primary goal is simply to elucidate the distinctive features of the comprehensive theological understanding at which Lonergan had arrived by the late 1940s, not to trace its development, or defend its accuracy, or show its implications for today (xxi).

Stebbins distinguishes a general philosophical component and a properly theological component in Lonergan's early synthesis. The general philosophical component is a metaphysics whose fundamental categories are (a) strictly explanatory, free of any intrinsic linkage to experiential data or images, and (b) critically based, performatively (if not yet
explicitly) grounded in the recurrent features of concrete cognitional process. This explanatory and critically based metaphysics provides a highly nuanced general account of the relationship of God and the world. On that account, God is the principal cause of whatever exists or occurs. But this universal divine efficacy is utterly transcendent: only hypothetical necessity can be deduced from it, and the latter is compatible with contingency. Moreover, although the human will is indeed self-determining, its self-determination is not independent of other aspects of its activity that are directly or indirectly controlled by God. Consequently, there is no conflict between the universality of divine providence and the reality of human freedom. Among other things, this conclusion provides a framework within which the controversy over the character of actual grace (de auxilis) is resolved by being dissolved (293).

The properly theological component of Lonergan’s early synthesis is “the theorem of the supernatural,” an understanding of the supernatural order as totally transcending the natural order but nonetheless subsuming, extending, and completing it. This theorem allows Lonergan to extend natural analogies in controlled and fruitful fashion to the supernatural, thus genuinely (though always far from exhaustively) advancing our grasp of the latter. Specifically, it allows him to present grace as a created communication of the divine nature, a notion that “expresses a remarkably comprehensive synthesis: it suggests a link between the grace of union in Christ and sanctifying grace in us; it provides a way of relating the latter to the theological and moral virtues and to all salutary acts, whether these occur before or after justification; it accounts for the supernaturality, and hence the gratuity, of grace; and it suggests that through grace we share in the life of God precisely as triune, since the interrelations of the divine Persons are grounded in the uncreated communication of the divine nature from Father to Word, and from Father and Word to Spirit” (292).

In Stebbins’s view, the value of Lonergan’s early theological synthesis is permanent. “Lonergan’s recovery, adaptation, and development of Aquinas’s thought stand as an enduring achievement of theological understanding; any future theology of grace must find a way of embracing it, or give up any claim to comprehensiveness” (xix). Specifi-
cally, Lonergan’s early achievement is not eliminated by the disciplinary advance beyond theoretical to *methodical* theology. “[W]hat survives of the speculative synthesis outlined in this book when theology becomes fully methodical? The answer: practically all of it” (298).

It remains that the advance to fully methodical theology is not yet complete, and in his afterword Stebbins briefly recalls Lonergan’s contribution to that advance and sketches what still needs to be done. Following the initial, theoretical phase of his work, Lonergan devoted great efforts to elaborating the general philosophical component of methodical theology — and this in two stages. From about 1950 to 1964, and especially in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957), he showed explicitly and in great detail just how the threefold structure of explanatory metaphysics is grounded in the threefold structure of concrete intentional consciousness. From about 1964 onward, and especially in *Method in Theology* (1972), he elucidated an additional level of intentional consciousness, but without providing nearly the degree of detail about that level and its metaphysical correlates that he had provided earlier about the first three. Moreover, in this later period Lonergan claimed that at least sometimes we experience ourselves as being in love without restriction, that this experience is the basic theological component of a methodical theology, and that it is really identical with what theoretical theology calls sanctifying grace (albeit notionally different from the latter). As with his account of the fourth level, however, he did not develop these claims in much detail. Consequently, the requirements for completing the transition to a fully methodical theology in general and a methodical systematic theology of grace in particular are two: (a) to develop a more detailed analysis of the fourth level of intentional consciousness; and then, within the framework of the latter, (b) to elucidate the systematic implications of the dynamic state of being unrestrictedly in love.

In my judgment, this book is wonderfully accurate as an account of Lonergan. Stebbins analyzes and synthesizes with great skill. In his treatment of the operations of intellect (in chapter 1), right through to his concluding remarks about Lonergan on actual grace (in the latter half of chapter 8), he is extremely sensitive to details and distinctions that others often overlook or misunderstand. Moreover, he not only explains
accurately, he clarifies. He understands the material so thoroughly that he is able to link Lonergan’s claims in fresh ways, offer original examples, and thus teach the reader what Lonergan really is getting at. Given the challenging technical character of the material, this is a stellar achievement.

In particular, I was especially struck by Stebbins’ fine discussions of the role of understanding in theological speculation (chapter 1) and of the natural desire to see God (pp. 149-82). I found his focusing of the crucial points at issue in the Molinist/Bannezian controversy (chapter 6) quite helpful. His various charts (enumerated on p. x) are fruitful visual clarifications of complex relations and distinctions. These and similar contributions importantly augmented my own understanding of Lonergan, and not merely on the topic of grace.

Although his focal topic is limited to the theological synthesis present in Lonergan’s early writings on grace, the broad historical, philosophical, and theological perspectives Stebbins elaborates on his way to treating that focal topic make his work potentially valuable to a larger audience than theologians specializing in grace. I deem the book to include features of interest to systematic theologians in general, historians of theology, philosophers of religion, metaphysicians generally, persons interested specifically in Lonergan, and persons interested specifically in Aquinas. I commend it to them all.

MICHAEL VERTIN
St. Michael’s College
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1J4
CALL FOR PAPERS

THE LONERGAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

INVITES SUBMISSIONS FOR ITS NEXT MEETING.

The 1997 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association will be held March 21-23, in Buffalo, New York. Papers for the Lonergan Philosophical Society Meeting should be submitted no later than October 15, 1996. Papers, approximately 12-15 pages long, on any topic related to Lonergan studies are welcome. Please send submissions to Dr. Elizabeth Morelli, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, 7900 Loyola Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90045.

Twenty-third Annual JUNE 17-21, 1996
Lonergan Workshop BOSTON COLLEGE

The Structure and Rhythms of Love:
In Honor of Frederick E. Crowe, SJ

SPEAKERS, WORKSHOP LEADERS, AND PANELISTS:

R. Avillez P. Drilling J. Madrid S. Moore, OSB
F. Braio M.A. Glendon P. Marcoux E. Morelli
D.B. Burrell, CSC C.C. Heffing M. McCarthy W.E. Murnion
P. Caringella G. Hughes T. McPartland D. Oyler
F.E. Crowe, SJ M.L. Lamb P. McShane L. Roy, OP
M. Doorley D.J. Levy K. Melchin D.W. Tracy
J. Flanagan, SJ R.P. Lewis H. Meynell M. Vertin

For information write, call, or FAX Fred Lawrence, Director, LONERGAN WORKSHOP, Carney 405, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. 617 782 7319 (H), 617 552 8095 (O), FAX 617 552 0794.
To: Business Manager,

*METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies*

THE LONERGAN CENTER
Bapst Library
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3801

Please enter the following subscription(s) to *METHOD*:

☐ ___ individual subscription(s) @ $14 per year

☐ ___ institutional subscription(s) @ $25 per year

☐ This is a renewal of subscription(s) to *METHOD*.

☐ This is a new address.

Name ____________________________________________

Address _______________________________________

______________________________________________

______________________________________________

Subscription orders must be prepaid in U.S. funds. Please make checks payable to *METHOD*.
Subscriptions ordered on this form will begin with the first (Spring) number of the 1996 volume.