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CORRIGENDUM

The article by Jerome Miller published in the spring issue (METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13 [1995] 53 - 81) appeared with an incorrect title. The following is the author's original subtitle, which should be added to the main title as published:

REFLECTIONS ON LOERGAN AFTER POST-MODERNISM.

The editors regret this error.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND NORMATIVE SUBJECTIVITY: LONERGAN’S UNIQUE FOUNDATIONAL ENTERPRISE

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CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE English word derived from the Latin cum (with) and scire (to know). The Latin original meant either knowing something in the company of others or (with sibi) self-knowing.1 ‘Consciousness’ was used to mean awareness to oneself.2 In 1681 Hobbes, of all people, meant by consciousness ‘mutual knowledge.’3 Since the seventeenth century ‘consciousness’ has come generally to mean perception of the mind (Locke, 1694), or the state of being mentally aware of a thing (1746-47), or the sum total of impressions, thoughts, and feelings that make up one’s conscious being (Locke, 1695).4

The vast usages of the terms, then, provide no clear indication of its philosophical import. Indeed it should caution us to pay very careful attention to how a philosopher, such as Lonergan, might employ it. But why is it important to focus on consciousness? Why is it important for Lonergan? Indeed what is it for Lonergan? And what are some of the more pregnant

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1 See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, see under ‘scio’; Oxford English Dictionary, see under ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness.’

2 Oxford English Dictionary, see under ‘conscious,’ 3.


4 Oxford English Dictionary, see under ‘consciousness,’ 4 and 5.
implications of Lonergan’s idea of consciousness for contemporary reflection on the self and self-knowledge?

1. AGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

We live in an Age of Consciousness. For the past two decades we have been urged to ‘raise our consciousness’\textsuperscript{5} and have seen various liberation groups — racial, ethnic, national, or gender — following precisely this injunction. Phenomonologists have insisted upon studying consciousness in its purity and givenness. Psychologists have assisted us in trying to recover our repressed consciousness. Artists have explored in symbolism and surrealism the depths of our consciousness. Marxists have sought to transform the material conditions that foster our false consciousness. Gnostic poets and politicians, gurus and revolutionaries, have promised — or threatened — to liberate our consciousness. Philosophers from Descartes to Hegel to the existentialists have taken the ‘turn’ towards interiority and subjectivity — that is, towards consciousness. Ah, but here is the rub! Does not this turn to consciousness and interiority and subjectivity threaten to engulf us in the swamp of relativism, egoism, and indeed nihilism? Are there not as many consciousnesses as agents of consciousness? Would not to think otherwise be to reify consciousness and make it into an abstract something other than what we mean by consciousness with all its associations of interiority and subjectivity? Are consciousness and objectivity, in fact, contradictory, or at least contrary, notions? If so, how can we even meaningfully communicate about this obscurity?

In other words, is the contemporary concentration on consciousness itself simply one manifestation of a severe intellectual crisis? The crisis would be an \textit{intellectual crisis} in a double sense: it would be a crisis among intellectuals, and it would be a crisis about the very integrity, nature, and value of intellectual life. It would be a \textit{crisis} because grave doubts would have been sown by intellectuals about the real worth of serious intellectual endeavor, either about the virtue of radical attachment to the

\textsuperscript{5} For a survey, see Roland N. Stromberg, \textit{After Everything: Western Intellectual History since 1945} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).
desire to know or, at any rate, about the real prospect of human reason to shed light on fundamental problems of the human condition. And with an appropriate raising of consciousness why would one need, or want, to take seriously the fully intellectual life, except perhaps as a pleasurable divertissement?

I believe this is more than just a caricature of our times. While the claims on behalf of human reason have steadily shrunk among most intellectual leaders, the fascination with consciousness has correspondingly grown. That the claims of reason have suffered an eclipse in the past two centuries is obvious. The followers of the empiricists and positivists restrict reason to the gathering of facts about mere phenomena; the Kantians and neo-Kantians enclose human understanding in a cage of methodologies; conventionalists argue that even science provides only the most economical fictions; existentialists tend to consider truth as the truth we live within the bounds of practical reason or our leaps beyond reason; pragmatists look to practical reason in the most literal sense as the model for intellectual culture; such historicists as Wilhelm Dilthey proclaim the finitude of all truth and values and the emergence of an ensuing historical consciousness that will foster an 'anarchy of convictions'; such social scientists as Max Weber deny that scientific reason can pronounce on the truth of values; and linguistic philosophers reduce human meaning essentially to the function of language games.6

It is true that there have been protests against consciousness. Behaviorists, for example, consider it an occult entity. Linguistic philosophers eschew consciousness as an object of investigation because they abhor the idea of private contents of consciousness that a focus on it, in their view, necessarily entails. But these perspectives give us a clue to the source of the intellectual crisis insofar as they suggest that objective method and an emphasis on consciousness are antithetical. In brief, objectivity and subjectivity are polar opposites. Both those who glorify consciousness and those who detract from consciousness apparently accept the same ground

6 For discussion of the cultural crisis at the turn of the twentieth century, see H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930.
rules: subjectivity can only interfere with objectivity; objectivity can only mutilate subjectivity.

And behind these ground rules about subjectivity and objectivity lies a basic assumption about human knowing, the confrontation theory of truth. Objective human knowing must be analogous to an unobstructed vision of objects 'out there.' Subjectivity certainly obstructs this vision. Consciousness itself is often interpreted in this fashion. John Locke, for example, defined consciousness as the "perception of what passes in one's mind." But if this perception is not unconscious, then one must have a perception of it, and that perception must have a perception, and so on, as Leibniz suggested. Objective knowing of consciousness, so conceived, thus involves us in an infinite regress. We seem caught in dangerous quandaries and paradoxes.

Thus the problem of consciousness is, in one sense, part of a larger problem of the contemporary intellectual crisis and its operative assumption about subjectivity and objectivity.

In perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of modern culture, deconstructionism exploits these aporias regarding subjectivity and objectivity as it simultaneously assaults both objective method and the self. While deconstructionism more reveals the problem than offers a viable alternative, Lonergan would have us sweep away dominant assumptions about subjectivity and objectivity and enter into an entirely new perspective.

2. LonerGan: PhiloSOpher of ConScioussness

Interestingly enough, for Lonergan a resolution of the contemporary problem involves a return, so to speak, to consciousness. Clearly Lonergan does not mean by consciousness what most people, or even philosophers, mean. And by not meaning by consciousness what most philosophers mean, Lonergan will not take the search for foundations to

7 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 2, ch. 1, §19.

be what most philosophers from Descartes on have claimed it to be. Lonergan instead would resuscitate the now largely discredited foundational enterprise and place it within the radically different context of his distinct interpretation of consciousness. We must first turn to why he holds consciousness to be decisive in considering foundational philosophical issues, and, secondly, we must examine what he means by consciousness.

Lonergan shares the deep concern of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Dilthey that philosophical method must address itself to the incessant wars of antagonistic philosophical Weltanschauungen. This calls for a critical philosophy, one that must establish a philosophy of philosophies, accurately accounting both for the genesis of correct philosophical positions and for the birth of incorrect philosophical counter-positions along the entire gamut of conflicting philosophical worldviews. Unless a genuine philosophy of philosophies can be constructed, the philosophical horizon of relativism may win the struggle by default; the danger lurks that the civil war of philosophies may so exhaust the mettle of the participants that the excessive practicality of common sense will triumphantly proclaim itself as sovereign over its rightful masters.

Lonergan warns that the battle of philosophical horizons cannot be resolved by an appeal to the coherence of any given horizon, theory, or set of propositions within an horizon, for then every horizon would, in effect, be self-justifying. What is needed as a starting point is not metaphysics but the wisdom that generates a metaphysics. What is needed is not so much a foundational theory as a foundational reality. Or to put it another way, what is needed is not a philosophy, nor even the philosophy, but rather the philosopher: a concrete inquirer who inquires about his or her own concrete process of inquiry. Lonergan compels a higher culture worn out by centuries of irreconcilable philosophical

10 Insight 416-421 = CWL 3 441-445.
11 Notes on Existentialism 15.
12 Insight 407 = CWL 3 432.
theories and ideas to ask whether indeed the strategy of waging the foundational philosophical struggle by relying chiefly on an arsenal of theories and ideas has been the primeval fault, leading to an inevitable and exhausting dead-end. Lonergan urges that contemporary philosophical culture retrace the journey in search of foundations along the path from medieval essentialism to Descartes's thinking substance, to Kant's transcendental ego, to Hegel's subject, to Kierkegaard's this subject: from object as object, to the subject as object, to the subject as subject. Lonergan challenges us to ask whether philosophy can reasonably embark upon any other course save that of, in his unique phrase, 'self-appropriation.'

Lonergan does not prove that in the 'subject as subject' will be found the evidence for a critique of all horizons; he claims to prove that unless we find it there we will not find it at all.

What does Lonergan mean by the subject as subject? He means the subject as conscious. He means the subject not as reflecting upon his or her operations of sensing, thinking, or willing, but the subject as simply aware while sensing, thinking, or willing. Consciousness is not an operation additional to the operations of sensing, thinking, and willing. It is properly not an operation at all; it is the luminosity concomitant with operations. This is an extremely important point for Lonergan, and its radicality must be grasped and constantly be kept in mind lest our understanding of Lonergan's idea of consciousness slide into more commonplace versions fundamentally at odds with his own.

Lonergan, then, asks us to attend to our conscious activities; consciousness becomes data for our self-inquiry, self-understanding, and self-knowledge. This experiment has its uniquely personal dimensions: it is a personal philosophical reflection on our own personal activities for which we take personal responsibility. The experiment must necessarily

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13 Notes on Existentialism 15.
14 Insight xviii = CWL 3 12-13.
15 Notes on Existentialism 15.
be personal; but the results, Lonergan argues, should bear a generic resemblance.\textsuperscript{18} This is to say that conscious activities — at least for most persons — are not entirely amorphous, chaotic, and disoriented. There is a patterned interrelationship and a directional tendency in the flow of consciousness itself.\textsuperscript{19}

3. \textsc{Normative Structure of Consciousness}

Let us explore what, according to Lonergan, we shall likely find as a result of a careful scrutiny of our consciousness. We can highlight seven themes.

First, consciousness is self-presence, not self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{20} I am, for example, reading a book. While my attention is on the subject-matter of the book, I am also present to myself as reading. Only if I stop and reflect upon the fact of my reading will that self-presence (that consciousness) reach my attention and become an object of my knowledge. Consciousness is an awareness immanent in appetitive, sensitive, cognitional, and volitional operations.\textsuperscript{21} It is self-presence in acts of desiring, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, perceiving, imagining; inquiring, understanding, conceiving, formulating; reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence; judging; deliberating, evaluating, deciding; speaking, writing.\textsuperscript{22} Consciousness, then, is an \textit{experience} of the self, and, as such, it supplies data for self-knowledge, although it is not itself such self-knowledge. This means that a heightening of consciousness — consciousness-raising — is a necessary but not sufficient condition of self-knowledge. Further cognitional operations are needed beyond attending to the data of consciousness if self-knowledge is to be achieved, and various biases can short-circuit the interpretation of consciousness.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Insight} xvii-xix = CWL 3 13.

\textsuperscript{19} On cognitional structure, see Collection, CWL 4 ch. 14; \textit{Method}, ch. 1. On the directional tendency of consciousness, see \textit{Insight} 348-359 = CWL 3 372-383; A Second Collection 79-84; \textit{Method} 11-12; A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 174-175.

\textsuperscript{20} For a general discussion of consciousness, see \textit{Insight} 320-328 = CWL 3 344-352; \textit{Method} 6-10; Collection, CWL 4 226-227.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Insight} 320-321, 613-615 = CWL 3 344-346, 636-638.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Method} 7.
Secondly, consciousness is not a succession of atomic units. To consider single conscious acts entails, Lonergan insists, a 'violent abstraction.'\(^{23}\) Sensitive acts, intellectual operations, and movements of volition are all involved in multiple correlations. As I read my book, for instance, I am seeing marks on a piece of paper, and I am moving pages; I am understanding and reflecting upon the meaning conveyed by the ordered marks; and I am deciding to carry on the above activities. Attention to sensations, perceptions, images, and memories occurs within a horizon informed by the content of cognitional operations and constituted by acts of volition. Intellectual acts, however, operate with respect to sensitive stimuli and manipulation of sensitive flow.\(^{24}\) Acts of volition, in turn, regard the contents of intellectual and sensitive operations. Hence the study of consciousness is the study of flow, direction, orientation, interest, concern. Indeed distinct flows of consciousness constitute such distinct orientations as the aesthetic, scientific, and practical 'patterns of experience.' Accordingly, we can speak of the *stream of consciousness.*\(^{25}\)

Thirdly, consciousness, through various patterns of experience, flows spontaneously through *successive* and *expansive* levels, each qualitatively distinct but functionally related to the others.\(^{26}\) These are levels of

- *empirical consciousness* (operations of sensing, perceiving, imagining, feeling, and bodily motion);
- *intelligent consciousness* (operations of inquiring, understanding, expressing and formulating);
- *rational consciousness* (operations of reflecting upon formulations, assessing evidence, and judging); and
- *existential consciousness* (operations of deliberating, evaluating, deciding, and acting).

These operations in their structural cooperation constitute the self-present structure of consciousness.

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\(^{23}\) *Notes on Existentialism* 10; *Insight* 181, 324-325 = CWL 3 204, 349-350; *Method* 12-13.

\(^{24}\) *Notes on Existentialism* 10.

\(^{25}\) *Notes on Existentialism* 10; *Insight* 181-182 = CWL 3 205.

\(^{26}\) *Insight* 322-324, 600 = CWL 3 346-348, 623; *Second Collection* 79-81; *Method* 9-10.
Fourthly, according to Lonergan, spontaneously and consciously we go from the level of experiencing to inquiring about our experience; spontaneously and consciously we go from the level of understanding to judging what we understand; spontaneously and consciously we go from the level of judging to deliberating and deciding in light of what we know. The spontaneous flow of consciousness indicates that the stream is at once directional and normative. The spontaneity is rooted in the existential moods of wonder (as we inquire), doubt (as we reflect), and dread (as we deliberate). Lonergan would add to this the spiritual undertow of an unrestricted love and the 'upwardly driven' neural base charged with image and affect. The normative dimension of the flow of consciousness itself means that objectivity is the result of following these norms. Fidelity to the desire to know and to the intention of the good is the ultimate criterion of objectivity. Objectivity, as Lonergan puts it, is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.

Fifthly, we can speak of the stream of consciousness and its structure and norms because there is a unity to consciousness. And the unity is given: it is experienced. It is the experience of self-presence, which is the luminosity of self pervading the flow and operations of consciousness.

Sixthly, the normative, spontaneous flow of consciousness throughout the several levels of inquiry is expansive of selfhood. The experience of self is the experience of an expanding, opening horizon of possibility. This is the true meaning of a 'raising of consciousness.' It is the tending of consciousness beyond. Far from falling into solipsism or narcissism, a

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27 Insight 322-324, 346, 352-356, 600, 604 = CWL 3 346-348, 370, 377-380, 623, 627; Second Collection 79-81; Method 9-10, 18.
29 Method 105; Third Collection 174-175; Insight 456-457 = CWL 3 481-482.
30 Insight 380-381 = CWL 3 404-405; Method 20, 35, 37.
31 Method 265, 292.
32 Insight 324-325 = CWL 3 349-350.
33 Second Collection 80; Method 9-10.
liberation of consciousness would open up the luminous process of self-transcendence.

Seventhly, while there are such conscious emotional and conative impulses as hunger and thirst, fatigue and irritability, that have no content, most conscious operations have objects. When I am self-present as reading, I nevertheless focus attention on the content of the book through combined operations of sensation, perception, imagination, memory, understanding, judging, and evaluating. This heading of awareness toward objects is what phenomenologists call intentionality. As there are conscious acts at distinct levels, so there are objects at distinct levels. As the flow of consciousness is not a succession of atomic units, so the contents of different conscious operations will merge into profiles of particular objects and different profiles of objects will be meaningfully interrelated within a horizon.

Thus the normative pattern of conscious and intentional operations — that is, the subject as subject — provides the basis for differentiating the normative flow of consciousness from the narrow interpretations of restrictive philosophical horizons, including the prevailing views in the contemporary climate of opinion. In so doing it also raises in the most intimate and personal manner the issue of authentic selfhood.

4. Self and Self-Knowledge

If this outlines the contours of Lonergan’s philosophy of consciousness, what are some of its most fruitful implications about the conscious subject, or self, that circumvent the confrontation theory of truth? To cite some typical modern problems about the self: Is it an isolated monad? A pure Cartesian thinking thing? A completely transparent world-immanent project? Or so elusive and inexhaustive as to defy objectification and to preclude real self-knowledge?

34 Method 6-8, 30.
35 Method 5.
36 Notes on Existentialism 6-7; Method 235-237.
We must first inquire, What is the self? Clearly it is not an already preformed thing. Nor is it simply what is given in consciousness. For the spontaneity of consciousness with its directional tendency to the beyond may be blocked. Obviously the structure Lonergan talks about is not always — or perhaps is only rarely — fully present. But that does not invalidate his claims, for the normative pattern of conscious intentionality is self-validating: any meaningful attempt to criticize it (that is, to inquire attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly about it) must invoke it.37 Consciousness, then, exhibits the self as a tension of questioner and object of the question, as choosing and as chosen.38 To seek authentically one's authentic self is to exhibit this tension. To fail to seek authentically one's authentic self is to exhibit loss of selfhood. The tension of authenticity and inauthenticity becomes a theme in the recovery of selfhood. The real self is engaged in a perpetual quest for authentic existence and in a perpetual withdrawal from inauthenticity.39 But the self is not simply self-contained, even within these tensions of self-transcendence and recovery. Rather it is Lonergan's position that the self is inherently a field of tension with its own unconscious depths, with other selves, and with the transcendent beyond. This is to ask about the relation of consciousness to the unconscious, to other selves, to the divine, to being.

We must consider, then, that for Lonergan, consciousness is incarnate. Consciousness is an integrated consciousness, integrated with cosmic energy. According to Lonergan's holistic metaphysics, human reality consists of atomic, chemical, biological, psychic, and intentional levels of integration, in which higher levels are conditioned by lower ones but also sublate them.40 The chemical level systematizes what is merely

37 Insight 335-336 = CWL 3 359-360; Collection, CWL 4 190, 192-193, 199-200, 204; Method 17-21.


39 Method 110, 252.

coincidental in the underlying manifold of subatomic events; the biological is a higher integration of the underlying manifold of chemical elements and compounds; the sensitive psyche is a higher organization of the organic; and the levels of conscious intentionality sublate atomic, chemical, biological, and psychic manifolds. The laws of physics, chemistry, biology, and behaviorist psychology pertain to conscious intentionality such that sensations, images, and feelings are integral with the functioning of intellectual and moral projects without determining them.

At the same time, Lonergan argues that precisely because of this integration of nature and spirit the unconscious neural base is an 'upwardly directed dynamism' with 'anticipations and virtualities of higher activities.' Unconscious energy is a potency heading for the form of psychic energy. This arena may include what Whitehead means by 'experience.' There is a field of instinctual energy that can burst forth on the conscious level in the form of images and affects in league with the desire to know and the attraction to the good. But this integration of consciousness is a complicated and arduous process. Depth hermeneutics has both an archeological task of recovering repressed, Freudian libido and a teleological task of liberating and conscripting what Bergson calls the \textit{\'{e}lan vital}. The field of energy channeled into the neuro-physiological system of a given human organism is itself part of a field of cosmic energy; the 'personal unconscious' is related to what Robert Doran calls the 'cosmic unconscious,' or what Eric Voegelin, following Plato's interpretations in the \textit{Timaios} and the \textit{Critias}, terms the 'generic unconscious' of mankind in touch with the 'primordial forces of the cosmos.'

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[41] Insight \textit{457} = CWL \textit{3} 482.
\item[42] Insight \textit{531-533}, \textit{546-549} = CWL \textit{3} 555-557, 569-572.
\end{itemize}}
So Lonergan would suggest that we might add to the four levels of conscious intentionality adumbrated above a unique lower level, at the very depths of consciousness, in which a 'symbolic operator' shapes the development of sensibility. This lower level, associated with psychic integration through the coordination of neural potentialities, occupies a land between unconscious and conscious operations, including materials in the "twilight of what is conscious but not objectified." We must interpret Lonergan's suggestion in light of his notion of levels of integration. Accordingly, to posit a level of the symbolic operator is to retain fully the qualitative distinction of the higher operations of conscious intentionality (experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding) and, at the same time, to recognize that the lower, sublated level of the psyche is a bridge to cognitive and volitional activities from unconscious energy. It is not really so much to 'add' another level as simply to acknowledge the functional relation of the psyche to consciousness.

If consciousness has a participatory link with the unconscious depths, then, we may ask, does it not also open up a sharing of consciousness both horizontally and vertically? To put it another way, Lonergan's focus on consciousness is a focus on the subject as subject. Is there also a reality of subject-with-subject? We ordinarily interact with others, as incarnate beings, through varying degrees of interpretation, from body languages, to overt speech, to scientific analysis. But can we also interact subject to subject with a sharing of consciousness — a participation of consciousness? Lonergan's unique definition of consciousness pinpoints self-presence as radically different from any interpretation. Can we have a non-interpretive sharing of consciousness? Interpersonally? With the divine? Is not the latter the meaning of mystical experience? It is interesting to note that Lonergan compares mystical union with the mating of lovers.

192, 198. Lonergan, in "Reality, Myth, Symbol" 37, refers approvingly of Doran's exploration of the psyche.


46 Method 34.

47 Method 77.
Lonergan goes so far as to postulate beyond the moral operator on the level of responsible consciousness another level of consciousness, that of loving commitment, extending from interpersonal relations to embracing the whole universe in a total engagement. This loving consciousness would seem to be a subject to subject sharing of consciousness, with its most radical expression in spiritual experience. But is loving consciousness most properly another level of consciousness or another dimension of consciousness? If Lonergan’s positing of a level of symbolic consciousness legitimately strains the metaphor of level of consciousness because the psychic level of integration is precisely the link between unconscious energy and conscious intentionality, his positing of a spiritual level strains the metaphor even more, perhaps to the point where it may be counter-productive. On the one hand, Lonergan does define levels of integration with the mathematical analogue of ‘operators,’ and the existence of a spiritual operator (unrestricted loving) would, in a move reminiscent of Kierkegaard, be a distinct operator beyond that of the moral operator. This retains the old theological idea of Aquinas that the supernatural life sublates (that is, perfects) natural existence. On the other hand, the principle of this operator, for Lonergan, is not a new set of conscious and intentional operations. The principle is rather ‘conversion,’ the vertical exercise of liberty that transforms an horizon and perforce transforms (sublates) the operations within the horizon — but not by a new set of operations. The issue here would seem to be whether spiritual habits are operations or existential dispositions. We may explore this issue briefly in terms of the traditional spiritual virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Lonergan does indeed speak of faith as a judgment of value born of religious love. But the judgment of value, in this case, would seem to be an operation on the fourth level of consciousness transformed by the state of being unrestrictedly in love. Hope, Tad Dunne argues, following the pattern of Lonergan’s definition of faith, is a “confident

48 “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” 34.
49 “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” 34. On the mathematical analogy of the operator in development, see Insight 465-467 = CWL 3 490-492.
51 Method 115.
desire born of religious love"—hence an existential, affective disposition.\textsuperscript{52} Charity is itself a state of being in love. Thus just as in symbolic consciousness we reach the border of conscious intentionality 'below,' so in religious consciousness we reach the border of conscious intentionality 'above.' Both borders surround consciousness with transforming mystery. Genuine symbolic consciousness is an orientation from the unconscious to transcendence; the experience of transcendence reorients symbolic consciousness. Psychic vitality energizes the levels of conscious intentionality; spiritual luminosity alters the very horizon of experience, understanding, judging, and deciding.

We might also inquire whether the 'inner light' of the flow of consciousness anticipates in our own unrestricted questioning the horizon of being itself.\textsuperscript{53} In our consciousness do we participate in the experience of the intrinsic intelligibility of being? Is this participation the experience of the heuristic insights that ground the very process of inquiry?\textsuperscript{54} This suggests that we might consider consciousness, self-presence, as the primary meaning of intelligibility, a stance that seems in accord with Aristotle's and Thomas's emphasis on knowing as the identity in act of knower and known.\textsuperscript{55} But our human consciousness is an anticipatory illumination of what we must always incompletely and inadequately fill out with our discursive reasoning and grasp of form. So, too, no matter how profound may be a mystical experience, it remains that transcendence, for Lonergan, takes on its elementary meaning from raising the further question—\textsuperscript{56} that is, from the orientation to, and not the possession of, the beyond through the desire to know and the intention of the good. Similarly, no matter how intimate an intersubjective relation

\textsuperscript{52} Tad Dunne, \textit{Lonergan and Spirituality: Towards a Spiritual Integration} (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985) 123.


\textsuperscript{54} On 'heuristic notions,' see \textit{Insight} 392 = \textit{CWL} 3 417.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{VERBUM}, ch. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Insight} 635 = \textit{CWL} 3 658.
may be, authentic loving demands objective knowing, which, in turn, requires interpretation and judgment.\textsuperscript{57}

The very incarnate nature of our consciousness and the discursive nature of our reasoning points to the fact that selfhood is a function of a dialectic of consciousness and horizon. The orientation of consciousness itself cannot exist apart from a 'concrete synthesis of conscious living,' which Lonergan identifies as a horizon;\textsuperscript{58} while the fundamental defining principle of an horizon is the orientation of consciousness. Stated quite succinctly, conscious operations are always performed within an already constituted horizon of meaningful, significant, relevant questions and a background of previous experiences, insights, formulations, judgments, evaluations, and decisions — just as conscious operations also constitute the very horizon isle.\textsuperscript{59} Lonergan's idea of consciousness as data significantly clarifies the dialectic of performance and interpretation. Conscious performance is data for interpretation, and interpretation is a basis for future performance. One is decisively tied to one's past, which is always an interpreted past; one really never acts toward the future from a present that totally constitutes itself from a blank tablet; but one can act so as to transform one's mode of living, and the new performance can, in turn, supply new data for new interpretation.\textsuperscript{60} The circle of past performance supplying data for present interpretation that influences future performance can be a vicious circle of inhibited performance and cumulative misinterpretation, establishing the spiral of ever narrower integrations of living amid the increasing wreckage of former psychic order.\textsuperscript{61} But, on the other hand, it is possible to break out of this vicious circle and bridge the existential gap between fact and possibility, between misinterpretation and genuine insight.\textsuperscript{62} The past can become a challenge, a question, crying out for creative response, for more attentiveness,

\textsuperscript{57} Collection, CWL 4 220-221.
\textsuperscript{58} Notes on Existentialism 10.
\textsuperscript{59} Method 235-237, for a summary.
\textsuperscript{60} On human historicity, see Method 81, 237.
\textsuperscript{61} Insight 191-196 = CWL 3 214-220.
\textsuperscript{62} On 'genuineness,' see Insight 475-478 = CWL 3 499-503; on the 'existential gap,' see Notes on Existentialism 9.
greater insight, and sounder judgment to reverse the spiral and to enlarge the operational range of freedom.  

We must underscore, however, that while consciousness is not separate from interpretation, consciousness is nonetheless radically distinct from interpretation. To clarify this distinction of consciousness we can identify three levels of self-interpretation:

- **Theoretic** (a systematic, conceptual reflection on the self that aims at explanatory statements and definitions);
- **Common-sensical** (usually autobiographical reflections in ordinary language narratives and concrete observations);
- **Non-thematic** (spontaneous reflections, particularly where images and affects are wedded to experience).

As Lonergan defines consciousness, **none** of these three types of self-reflection is the same as consciousness. They are performed consciously, but awareness of the contents of these kinds of self-interpretation is not consciousness.

To illustrate in the most extreme case, that of non-thematic interpretation, which seems to bear a likeness to consciousness: Non-thematic interpretations involve what Lonergan calls ‘elemental meanings,’ where the meaning must be experienced to be understood. For elemental meanings, such experiences as those of images, feelings, gestures, and tone of voice cannot be separated from what is intended or the meaning is lost. This applies to symbolic meaning (for example, a flag), intersubjective meaning (frequently a spontaneous pattern of gesture, interpretation, and response), and incarnate meaning (deeds, for example Marathon, or words, such as the Gettysburg Address, that embody the meaning of a group or person). Regardless of how elusive, spontaneous, and compact our awareness of elemental meanings may be, there still remains the radical gap between consciousness of the act of meaning and awareness of the intended content. To highlight this radical gap we can consider the helpful distinction Michael Polanyi has made between two degrees of

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63 On the operational range of freedom, see *Insight* 619-624 = CWL 3 643-647. On Toynbee's theory of challenge and response, see *Insight* 209 = CWL 3 234; Third Collection 103-104, 214.

64 *Method* 57-69.
awareness: focal awareness and subsidiary awareness. To return to the example of reading a book, I have a subsidiary awareness of seeing ordered marks on a piece of paper, while I have focal awareness of the meaning of the words signified by those ordered marks. This is indeed a powerful analytic distinction — but, we must note, it is within the field of intended contents of conscious acts. Subsidiary awareness, then, is not consciousness. To be sure, non-thematic interpretations held in subsidiary awareness may seem so unreflective, so opaque, so subjective as to be equated with consciousness. Still they are not. Consciousness is radically other than any intended content.

We cannot stress this distinction too much, for without it we could never have access to the subject as subject. But, as Michael McCarthy has remarked, there is a perpetual temptation to define consciousness by analogies, whether they be the analogies of vision (Descartes), of technological making (pragmatism), or of socially sanctioned language (Wittgenstein). All these analogies fail miserably to do justice to the reality of the subject as subject. They obscure important operations of cognition, decision, and spiritual quest, and they contribute mightily to the intellectual crisis alluded to above. And so we have apparently come full circle.

But if there is such a radical gap between consciousness and interpretation, can we truly know consciousness, as Lonergan conceives of it? For the moment we inquire about our conscious experience, it is gone. We must remember that consciousness is not perception of mental operations. So we must rely on memory as we inquire about consciousness. Does this reliance on memory then make knowledge of consciousness, in principle, fundamentally incomplete, suspect, impossible? Lonergan’s answer would undoubtedly be that knowledge of consciousness would indeed be fundamentally incomplete, suspect, or impossible if one accepted the demand of the confrontation theory of truth that knowing

66 See Insight 554 = CWL 3 577-578.
involves some kind of direct look. As knowledge of consciousness relies on memories of conscious operations, so scientific knowledge relies on images, memories, and percepts derived from sense experience. As scientists can judge scientific theories by testing for sensible consequences, so investigators of consciousness can judge interpretations of consciousness by guiding the performance of their conscious operations to 'heighten their consciousness.'

Still, a critic might rejoin, to know consciousness is to know consciousness as an object, and to know consciousness as an object is necessarily to distort the reality of the subject as subject. Indeed, in the last analysis, it is Lonergan's insistence on the pursuit of relevant questions as the font of objectivity — and not on a perception of something 'out there' or 'in here' — that overcomes a skeptical temptation unduly to mystify consciousness. That consciousness has mystery about it surely cannot be denied. The existential tensions of selfhood and the subjective relation of self to other selves, to the cosmic unconscious, and to divine being — all alluded to above — suggest that the philosopher can never attain an exhaustive understanding of subjectivity and in these areas can more point to possibility than prove. But to posit a dynamism, a structure, and a unity to consciousness, as does Lonergan, is not to distort the subject as subject. To objectify subjectivity is not to mutilate subjectivity if by object one means simply what is intended in a question and not a Cartesian extended substance or a Kantian phenomenon defined by the stricfures of Newtonian science.

In conclusion, if Lonergan is correct about these foundational philosophical tenets, then any contemporary exploration of consciousness that does not factor in like-minded assumptions about subjectivity and objectivity will be seriously flawed. To my knowledge, no thinker has been so precise on this score as has Lonergan. His idea of the subject as subject is, I believe, the corollary to his equally precise and unique interpretation of an object as the content intended in a question and to his equally precise and penetrating notion of objectivity as fidelity to the desire to know.

68 Insight 73-74 = CWL 3 96-97.
69 Insight 283-287 = CWL 3 308-312.
70 Method 262-263, 341.
JUST HOW MANY levels of consciousness are there? Why couldn't Lonergan make up his mind? Perhaps we all would have rested more easily if Lonergan had been satisfied with the account of three levels of cognitional structure articulated in Insight. Yet within a year or two of the publication of Insight, Lonergan was already beginning to talk about a ‘fourth level.’ Then there were the multiple, albeit informal, remarks about a ‘fifth level,’ followed by a little-known mention of ‘six levels.’ Just for good measure, it seems, he threw in remarks such as “the relation between successive levels may be named sublation,” along with his...

1 See, for example, Understanding and Being, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5, edited by Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M. Doran, and Thomas V. Daly (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 16.

2 For a comprehensive survey which considers the single reference to a fifth level that was published during Lonergan’s lifetime, as well as a number of unpublished remarks he made regarding a fifth level, see Michael Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness: Is There a Fifth Level?”, METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994) 1-36.

3 Bernard Lonergan, “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994) 134. For details of its original delivery, see the “Editor’s Preface” by Frederick E. Crowe, ibid., pp. 121-124. It should be noted that Lonergan only wrote of ‘six levels,’ not ‘six levels of consciousness.’ Hence it is not clear that what I have to say about consciousness below applies to the lowest (I suppose we should call it the ‘zeroth’) level.

4 For example, “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” 130.
curious enigmatic endorsement of sublation "in Rahner's sense rather
than Hegel's."\textsuperscript{5}

Both the restless development of Lonergan's mind, and the less than
polished expositions he gave to his later thought, have led inevitably to
considerable debate. Is there really a fifth level (let alone a sixth)? If so,
what is it? Exactly how are lower activities sublated? And so on.

In this article, I would like to set forth a thesis and indicate briefly
how, if the thesis is correct, it might help resolve some of the difficulties
which have been raised by two recent articles in this journal.\textsuperscript{6}

A.1. A proposal: Consciousness is of the subject

My thesis, then, is this:

\textit{The phrase 'level of consciousness,' refers primarily and directly to the sub-
ject as subject, and only derivatively and indirectly to acts of consciousness.}

My thesis takes as its point of departure Lonergan's statement that
"it is an abstraction to speak of the acts as conscious, that, concretely,
consciousness pertains to the acting agent."\textsuperscript{7} Lonergan later amplified this
claim by means of the metaphor of a "third type of presence";\textsuperscript{8}

Moreover, there is a third meaning of 'presence': you could not be
present to me unless I were somehow present to myself. If I were

Concerning the ambiguities in the meaning of Lonergan's remark, see Frederick Crowe's
footnote 'e,' Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon" 145; for a detailed
comparison of Lonergan and Hegel on sublation, see Elizabeth A. Morelli, "Post-Hegelian
Elements in Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion," \textit{METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies} 12
(1994) especially 230-238.

\textsuperscript{6} See Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" and Robert Doran, "Consciousness and

\textsuperscript{7} Bernard Lonergan, \textit{Insight: A Study of Human Understanding} (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1957) 326; revised and augmented edition, Collected Works of Bernard

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Understanding and Being}, CWL 5 16. Given post-modern critiques of the 'privilege of
presence,' I believe it is important to stress that Lonergan's use of the term 'presence' is
merely metaphorical, as the context of this passage makes clear. There is a need to
address directly the post-modern critique as it applies to this way of articulating Lonergan's
notion of consciousness, since I am convinced that it is in no way intrinsically
dependent upon a privilege of presence, and indeed offers a solution to the conundrums
of post-modern construals of subjectivity and agency.
unconscious, you would not be present to me in the second sense ... So there is a third sense of presence: presence to oneself.9

Consciousness, then, is primarily the awareness of, or the experience of, the subject as subject as acting, as agent of certain kinds of operations.

According to this way of thinking, the term 'level of consciousness' refers primarily to different modes or qualities of 'being present to oneself.' For as Lonergan puts it:

By consciousness is meant an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts.10

Given the broader context of Lonergan’s remarks, the ‘awareness immanent in’ certain acts is the awareness of the subject as subject, the ‘third type of presence’ to oneself. The subject as subject is present to himself or herself in different ways. This is to say, when one is merely empirically conscious, one is present to oneself as merely given ('thrown' to borrow Heidegger’s term). But one can also be present to oneself as intelligent, or as reasonable.11 In addition, Lonergan makes a point of stressing in Insight, "I do not think that only cognitional acts conscious."12 While there is little evidence that when he wrote Insight Lonergan was thinking of additional levels of consciousness (and indeed good reason to doubt that he was), this way of speaking about consciousness does leave the door open to the possibility of additional levels. Consciousness is a quality of presence-to-self immanent in certain acts; the quality of that self-presence differs; hence, there may be acts that intentionality analysis would discover as disclosing modes of self-presence different from the three thematized in Insight. Therefore, the term ‘level of consciousness’ has to do primarily with the manner or mode of the subject’s self-presence. How am

9 Understanding and Being, CWL 5 15. See also Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 209-210. There Lonergan explicitly refers to the subject as 'many-leveled.'

10 Insight (1957) 322 = CWL 3 346.

11 In Lonergan’s later writings, ‘reasonable’ replaces the term ‘rational’ which is used in this context in Insight.

12 Insight (1957) 321 = CWL 3 345.
I present to myself? I am present to myself either experientially, intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, religiously (= unrestrictedly in love), or possibly in a dream-mode of self-presence.

A.2. A corollary: Some acts on several levels

If I have construed Lonergan's emphasis correctly, there follows a possibly controversial corollary, namely: Whatever act a concrete subject performs when he or she is present-to-self on a given level would truly be an act on that level. For example, if I am intelligently present to myself as inquiring and trying to understand, then the acts of imagination I employ in order to get the insight would be properly called intelligent acts. If I summon up memories while reasonably present to myself as I am reflecting and endeavoring to reach a virtually unconditioned, then my memories are third-level acts. If I am present to myself responsibly, and in that mode of self-presence I work out insights requisite to the judgment of value and decision I am striving toward, then these acts of insight themselves are responsibly conscious, because I, as subject of those acts, am responsibly present to myself as deliberating. This corollary raises a new problem regarding the meaning of 'level of consciousness'; yet the resolution of that problem provides a weighty argument in support of the corollary itself. Such considerations are the subject of the next section.

A.3. Why 'levels'?

Now, it is one thing to claim that there are distinct qualities of awareness immanent in cognitional acts. It is another to characterize these qualities as 'levels' — that is, to claim that these qualities naturally fall in to a hierarchical ordering. Why, then, should these distinct modes of self-presence be designated 'levels'? An easy answer to this question could be derived by imagining cognitional structure as a sequentially ordered series of acts: experiencing → inquiring → understanding → reflecting → judging → etc.

With this sort of image in mind, one moves progressively from act to act, and at certain key junctures, the sequential movement also effects a movement to a new level:

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reflecting → judging
inquiring → understanding
experiencing
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This would be an acceptable answer if the flow of human conscious activity actually conformed to this image. Unfortunately, at least in light of my own efforts at self-appropriation, this does not seem to be the case. Let me describe, in overly brief detail, two scenarios which raise some difficulties with the preceding image.

The first scenario is drawn from my attempts to appropriate my own acts of insight. In attempting to solve a puzzle — in mathematics, in science, or just an ordinary recreational puzzle — I find that, sure enough, I begin with a sense experience (usually visual or auditory, either pre-linguistic or linguistic) out of which my inquiries emerge. However, what next seems to take place is a rapid-fire, complex flow of acts of consciousness, including the reactivation of habitual (previous) insights and attempts to apply them to the question at hand, acts of memory (including snippets from cinema or television), constructions of numerous new images, new but irrelevant insights, partial formulations of the new insights which go just far enough to reveal their irrelevance to the animating question, efforts to better formulate the animating question itself, and so on. In this sequence, phantasms and memories are interspersed in a seemingly random fashion amidst insights, new and old. Now, according to the schematic image above, I must be rapidly shifting back and forth between presence-to-self on the first and second levels — probably about fifty or so times a minute. This is quite possible, of course, but I must confess that it is not how I experience myself as present to myself in such episodes. I do experience myself as consistently present to myself as intelligent, as intelligent in the way an intelligent inquirer is present to self.
The second scenario is also rooted in some efforts at self-appropriative reflection, although my own observations do not differ substantially from Lonergan’s own discussion of the process of reaching a judgment of the correctness of an insight in chapter 10 of *Insight*. In Lonergan’s chapter the crucial factor is the attainment of an “invulnerable insight” which is invulnerable precisely because “there are no further, pertinent questions.” Commonly, my own initial insights are not correct because they are not invulnerable. To the extent that *I am being reasonable*, I push myself to consider numerous further pertinent questions of the what, why, how, where, etc. type. I endeavor to answer those questions with direct insights, and in doing so I engage in acts of imagining, remembering, closer sensitive attention to details, and so on. Frequently enough, these further insights modify and correct my original insight into a more nuanced, less vulnerable understanding, often significantly different from the understanding I began with. On a few occasions I have judged that I actually did finally attain an invulnerable, correct understanding of something. I do not, however, find that I have oscillated wildly between being present to myself on the first, second and third levels during such processes of reflection. Despite the fact that the process actually included acts which the schematic image would fix on each of these acts at ‘its own’ level, I would contend that in fact all those acts were performed by me consistently and continuously present to myself on the third level of reasonableness. Hence, each and every one of those acts was a third-level act, if I am correct in my thesis.

If these self-appropriative meditations, and my claim that acts of imagination, sense, insight, formulation can all be third-level conscious acts, along with obviously third-level acts of asking ‘Is it so?’, grasping of the virtually unconditioned, and judging, then we may ask, ‘What has happened to the basis for characterizing the distinct qualities of self-presence in terms of “levels”?’ That is to say, if acts are not by their very nature segregated on levels, but ‘rise’ to the level of the subject, what are we to make of the notion of ‘levels,’ let alone of Lonergan’s own persistent tendency to characterize the levels by means of certain acts? In response, I would suggest that while an act can occur on any appropriately high level

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14 *Insight* (1957) 284 = CWL 3 309.
of consciousness, there is a lowest level of consciousness below which it cannot occur. Thus, for example, acts of sensitive experiencing can occur 'in' a subject present to him or herself on any of the four (or five) levels of consciousness, but cannot occur to an unconscious ('zeroth level') subject. Acts of seeing, smelling, tasting, and so on cannot occur if a subject is completely unconscious — that is, 'out cold.' Such acts can only occur if there is a subject who is present to herself or himself at least in the first-level manner of self-presence. Likewise, acts of intelligent inquiry, direct, indirect, introspective and higher-viewpoint insights, as well as the various manners of formulation, all presuppose at least intelligent self-presence. Such acts can, however, also occur to subjects who are reasonably, responsibly, or unrestrictedly lovingly self-present. On the other hand, insights, formulations, and questions for intelligence cannot occur to a subject who is merely empirically self-present and no more. Once again, 'Is it so?' questions, as well as reflective understandings of the virtually unconditioned, and the judgments (whether of fact, probability, or correctness of insights) can occur to a subject operating at the third, fourth, or fifth levels. And so on.

Now Lonergan repeatedly asserts that the levels are determined by the 'operators' that "promote the conscious and intentional subject from one level to another." Notice the absence, when Lonergan speaks in this fashion, of either the entire catalogue of acts which in other contexts are used to characterize a particular level, and as well the absence of any mention of the paradigmatic acts ('experiencing,' 'understanding,' and 'judging') which he sometimes also uses to abbreviate the level. When Lonergan speaks in this precise way, designating the levels solely in terms of the operators, I believe he is engaging in an exercise in implicit definition, where terms are defined by relations, and relations by terms.

15 It should not be inferred that a subject first brings itself to first level consciousness without operating any act of consciousness whatever and so to speak, sits there as a passive, first-level receptacle awaiting temporally subsequent acts of seeing, smelling, and so on to later fill up. First-level consciousness, like Kant's forms of intuition, springs into being simultaneously and along with the acts of experiencing it is 'immanent in.'

16 See for example Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon" 129. See also the at least partial endorsement of this way of thinking in Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 14.
with insight into the nexus of terms and relations providing the only adequate and proper criterion of their meanings.\textsuperscript{17} The insights that ground this schema of implicit definition are the end results of a long process of self-appropriation, a process that begins far more descriptively. It begins, for example, with descriptions of certain acts as though they occupied a fixed level. To begin elsewhere would, I think, be altogether too confusing. Thus one's initial phenomenological access to the phenomenon of a level of consciousness can be in terms of a previously appropriated act of consciousness. This original way of speaking must inevitably give way to a more precise, explanatory formulation in terms of operators. Nevertheless, one can retain something of this initial way of speaking about levels in terms of acts, if one stipulates that a given level is the lowest level on which that particular type of act can occur. This would leave intact the fact that the levels themselves are determined by the subject-as-operator bringing herself or himself from a lower to a higher lever (including the process of waking up from unconsciousness to empirical consciousness).

A.4. Sublation

This brings me to the question of what Lonergan might have meant by his use of the term ‘sublation.’ A principal indication of his thinking comes from the following much-cited passage from Method in Theology:

> the fourth level of intentional consciousness — the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action — sublates the prior levels of experiencing, understanding judging. It goes beyond them, sets up a new principle and type of operation, directs them to a new goal but, so far from dwarfing them, preserves them and brings them to a far fuller fruition.\textsuperscript{18}

Notice that here Lonergan speaks of levels sublating levels. Earlier he had eschewed Hegel's manner of construing sublation. It seems clear that in doing so he meant to distance himself from the notion of concepts sublating

\textsuperscript{17} Insight (1957) 12 = CWL 3 36-37.
\textsuperscript{18} Method in Theology 316, emphasis added.
concepts in conformity with the dialectical logic Hegel devised. In its place, I believe, Lonergan primarily thought in terms of the subject sublating itself by 'operating' — that is to say, the conscious subject as the agent of the transcendental operators that transform the subject present-to-self on a lower level into the subject present-to-self on a higher level. This is most evident when a subject which had been merely empirically attentive (first level conscious) becomes puzzled about something, begins inquiring and pursuing insights in response to this inquiry. Or again, a sublation of self by self occurs when a subject present to himself or herself as understanding and formulating then begins to wonder if his or her ideas and formulations are correct. She or he thereby initiates an intricate process of reflection headed toward reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned, ultimately terminating in judgment. But the process of the subject sublating himself or herself is also illustrated in less well-rehearsed cases. Sublation of self by self is, I believe, the proper way of speaking about the process of waking up, where the subject is quite literally bringing herself or himself from non-self-presence to empirical, first-level self presence. I would also claim that sublation of self by self is what happens when a person, who is merely aesthetically soaking up sights and sounds and half day-dreaming during a day at the beach, is suddenly aroused directly to fourth-level consciousness by cries for help from the water. I would suggest that in such situations subjects do not first rise to the second level to inquire and understand, and then rise to the third level to reflect and judge, and finally to the fourth level to deliberate and act. Inquiry, insight, and factual assessment of the situation do indeed take place; but I would suggest that they take place in a consciousness that sublates itself directly from the first to the fourth level because it is immediately and thoroughly immersed in the urgency of ethical deliberation. Such a subject promotes itself to a consciousness which spontaneously begins to employ acts of understanding and judging as instruments for its own proper end: decision.

19 See Morelli, “Post-Hegelian Elements” 230-238.

20 I owe this suggestion to an unpublished essay by Mark Doorley, CSSR, “The Notion of Sublation.”
If my interpretation of Lonergan’s meaning of ‘sublation’ is correct, then once again, sublation applies primarily to the subject as subject, and only derivatively to acts of consciousness. Strictly speaking, acts do not sublate other acts; the subject sublates acts. Thus, the subject present to self intelligently enacts (or ‘sublates’) acts of imagination and memory, and indeed is highly selective in the manner in which she or he attends to data of sense under the guidance of intelligent self-presence. These acts of acts of imagination, memory, and sensitive attentiveness are no longer ‘lower-level’ acts; they are second-level, intelligent acts; they are ‘sublated’ acts precisely because the subject actually enacting them is present to self as intelligent. Likewise, the reflecting subject ‘sublates’ not only acts of experiencing, but also acts of inquiring what or why or how, as well as insights and formulations in its pursuit of the virtually unconditioned and judgment. One can speak in a metaphorical sense, for example, of an act of understanding or formulation as sublating acts of imagination or sense, or of an act of decision sublating judgments of fact. But to do so one would be merely be using the name of an act to abbreviate the mode of self-presence which is the genuine agent of sublation.

Now Lonergan himself seems to speak in this metaphorical mode when he writes, for example:

One [distinguishes] between sublated and sublating operations, and by defining the sublated operations as going beyond the sublated, introducing a radically new principle, respecting the integrity of the sublated, and bestowing upon them a higher significance and a wider relevance.21

Yet if we consider carefully Lonergan’s discussion in the passage which follows this citation, we find that the only ‘sublating’ operations actually mentioned (in that article at least) are ‘questions for intelligence,’ ‘questions for reflection,’ and ‘questions for deliberation.’ In other words, the ‘operators’ — which constitute and which serve to distinguish and define

the levels — are the primary, and perhaps sole instances of sublating operations.\textsuperscript{22}

A.5. Fifth-level acts

If these implications of my thesis are correct, they have the following additional corollary: If fifth-level consciousness is most appropriately characterized as 'being in love in an unrestricted fashion,' then fifth-level consciousness means the presence of the subject as subject to herself or himself as 'being in love in an unrestricted fashion.' Hence, any act a subject performs while present to herself or himself in the mode of 'being in love in an unrestricted fashion' would be properly called a fifth-level act. Therefore, 'fifth-level' would not be restricted merely to acts such as the 'mediated immediacy' arrived at through meditation and prayer, or the conversion-decision to commit oneself to all that is implied in unrestricted being in love. It would also pertain to all the other 'ordinary' decisions one makes insofar as they are actually performed under the sway of unrestrictedly being in love. Moreover, all the judgments of value, judgments of fact, insights, and indeed even acts of sensitive attentiveness which are brought to consciousness precisely because one is unrestrictedly in love would also be fifth-level acts. In other words, it would be perfectly consistent to view at least some of Augustine's, Aquinas's and indeed Lonergan's philosophical insights and writings as fifth-level acts. Indeed, Catherine Marshall, without having studied Lonergan's work, speaks of an experience familiar to many Christians and non-Christians alike: insights which occur in the context of contemplative prayer or meditation.\textsuperscript{23} The idea of acts which occur in the subject as unrestrictedly in love, I believe, would be the basic way of transposing the metaphysical category of 'cooperative actual grace' into the context of 'intentional correlatives.' Whatsoever one does while present-to-self as unrestrictedly in

\textsuperscript{22}I would tentatively propose that self-transcending feelings which are intentional responses to values also function as 'sublating' operations in this precise sense, but I leave my argument for another time and place.

love and precisely because of that unrestricted loving, would be an act of cooperative actual grace.24

RESPONSE TO SOME DIFFICULTIES

B.1. Vertin on the fifth level

In his recent essay "Lonergan on Consciousness: Is there a Fifth Level?" Michael Vertin argues that there is no distinct fifth level. If I understand him correctly, the basis for his argument against a fifth level is: (a) to speak of a fifth level is to invoke a meaning of 'level' which does not conform to "the meaning [level] ordinarily possesses in Lonergan's work";25 and (b) the few instances where Lonergan did speak of a fifth level can be accommodated, by means of proper reinterpretation, to the ordinary four levels of consciousness any way.26 I, on the other hand, believe (a) that it is indeed possible to speak of a distinct, fifth level, (b) that to do so is completely compatible with what I take to be Lonergan's ordinary meaning of 'level of consciousness' (as sketched in the previous sections), and (c) that there probably is a genuinely distinct fifth level of human consciousness. The basic difference between Vertin and myself, therefore, would seem to lie in what we take to be Lonergan's ordinary meaning of 'level of consciousness'.

According to Vertin, the ordinary meaning of 'level' in Lonergan's work is as follows: "In general [the word 'level'] means the place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern of increasing (or decreasing) complexity."27 Now as far as it goes, this definition is compatible with Lonergan's implicit definition of levels in terms of operators. But what exactly does Vertin have in mind when he invokes the spatial metaphor,

24 I do not mean to imply that the human subject 'does' cooperate grace by him or herself. Technically speaking, of course, God is both the efficient cause and the author of all acts of grace, which are strictly beyond the natural, unaided (non-graced) capacity of any human being. I mean only that the subject present-to-self in an unrestrictedly loving fashion is simply the human subject collaborating in those acts.


27 Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 21, emphasis added.
'place occupied'? The answer is not entirely clear solely within the context of his essay. It would seem that his modifier, 'of increasing complexity,' might illuminate the issue; unfortunately, the notion of complexity is introduced but not further developed in his essay. Some hints as to what Vertin might mean are found, however, when he goes on to elaborate what he regards as the 'elements':

'[L]evel' [in the strict sense] means the place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are (a) ordinary data, namely data of sense and of ordinary consciousness, and (b) the transcendental notions.28

Unlike Lonergan, Vertin has added 'data' to the basic terms and relations implicitly defining 'level.' I must ask, why this addition? Presumably, to give the operators something on which to operate. Now it is true that the operators operate on the contents of acts which occur on a lower level of consciousness; but more primordially, the operators operate on the subject present to herself or himself. The operators, therefore, operate on contents indirectly, by means of operating on the subject who is conscious of those contents. To be specific, the intellectual operator does indeed transform mere sense data into intellectual problems; but it does so by transforming the empirical subject into an intellectual subject, and it is because of this transformation of the subject that the mere givenness of empirical data is transformed into intellectually problematic data.

If, on the other hand, one were to follow the implications of Vertin's inclusion of 'data' to the items specifying the levels of consciousness, this would seem to provide a neat schema for identifying levels:

content → act → level of consciousness

That is to say, corresponding to empirical data, there are acts of experiencing, and as condition for the possibility of such acts, there is a first level of consciousness. When the data are promoted by operators to a higher kind of content, there follow corresponding higher acts as well as a higher level of consciousness. And in like manner, when second-level contents promoted by the next operator to the third level, and third-level contents

28 Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 21. Vertin later goes on to elaborate a 'wide' sense of level, which adds a third basic element, namely what he calls 'agapic datum.'
to fourth level, there follow acts corresponding to those operator-
transformed contents, and necessarily a level of consciousness
underpinning those acts. It seems to me that some such conception
underlies Vertin's approach to this issue. I believe that this may be related
his continuing interest in coordinating levels with metaphysical elements
which, after all, are specified as contents of acts of human knowing. In
this fashion, he would be following a method somewhat like that used by
Aristotle in the De anima:

objects (contents) → acts → potencies → souls

Yet in his introduction to Verbum, Lonergan makes two emphatic points:
(1) such an approach inevitably raises the problem of what the objects
are; and (2) however useful this method might be, a phenomenological
method which goes to the acts of consciousness directly enjoys distinct advantages:

If vegetative acts are not accessible to introspection, sensitive and
intellectual acts are among the immediate data of consciousness; they
can be reached not only by deduction from their objects, but also in
themselves as given in consciousness. Finally, when conscious acts
are studied by introspection, one discovers not only the acts and
their intentional terms, but also the intending subject ...

In this article I have endeavored to follow Lonergan's own emphasis in
stressing the priority of consciousness as experience of the subject as self-
present in treating the problem of levels.

I would like to add one last comment regarding Vertin's article. In
the argument for his reinterpretation of Lonergan's remarks regarding the
fifth level of consciousness, Vertin brings testimony from Lonergan
himself, claiming that he 'rejects' the existence of such a level. But in the

29 Insight (1957) 432 = CWL 3 457.
31 Verbum ix.
32 Verbum ix, emphasis added.
33 Verbum 17. Vertin also later asserts that Lonergan "denied a fifth level of inten-
tional consciousness," but he does qualify this remark, with "so understood as" having
implications for new functional specialties or metaphysical elements (Vertin, "Lonergan
citation Vertin is relying on, Lonergan neither rejects nor denies such a level. Rather, his actual words are "religious consciousness ... takes over the moral," that is, according to my thesis, the fourth level subject as subject is sublated into the subject as subject on the fifth level. This higher-level subjectivity takes over the fourth (and lower acts), operating them as a self-presence of unrestricted being-in-love.

B.2. Doran on 'Consciousness and Grace'

In the essay inaugurating his new work on a theological systematics of grace appropriate to the third stage of meaning, Robert Doran has found it necessary to tackle the very difficult problem (a 'disputed question' according to Lonergan) of the distinction and relation between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Since I lack training in the documents, exegesis, and history of the theology of grace, I am not qualified to comment in detail on Doran's investigation. My contribution can only be with regard to some foundational issues raised by the thesis I have proposed above, and some suggestions on how it might relate to the proposals Doran has set forth in his essay.

First, then, Doran begins his work on a systematics of grace by endeavoring to transpose the first thesis of Lonergan's *De ente supernaturali*:

> There exists a created communication of the divine nature, or a created, proportioned, and remote principle whereby there are in the...
creature operations through which the creature attains God as God is in God's own self [*uti in se est*].\(^{38}\)

Doran sets himself as his first task the transposition of the metaphysical terminology, 'created, proportioned, and remote principle whereby there are in the creature operations through which the creature attains God,' into the terminology of intentional consciousness.\(^{39}\) Doran's transposition involves the following: (a) an "uncreated grace" (equated with the "gift of God's love for us poured forth into our hearts"); (b) a "relational disposition to receive" (a), which is a "created grace" (equated with the fifth level, described as our "experience of ourselves as loved unconditionally and invited to love in return"); (c) our "consequent falling in love with God"; and (d) the "dynamic state of being in love with God" (which is equated with the scholastic notion of the infused virtue of charity); and finally (e) "operations [acts] of charity whereby God is attained" [*uti in se est*].\(^{40}\) The first three of these items are clearly intended to stand in a dependency series: (c) is conditioned by (b), which is in turn conditioned by (a). It is not entirely clear whether or not Doran holds (d) to be a fourth member in this conditioned/conditioning series; but it is clear that he takes (d) to be distinct from the other three, and to be the condition of (e). In addition, Doran also includes "our share in the inner life of God" as a consequence of (a) and (b), but possibly not distinct from (b).

There are many other details, both in Doran's basic transposition, as well as in his careful analysis, but I wish to limit my discussion to the schema just outlined and the question of how it relates to Lonergan's own metaphysical schema. My basic contention is that Doran may have drawn too many distinctions, and that the transposition is simpler in structure, though by no means simple or obvious in another sense of those terms.

The basic difficulty in effecting the transposition is making sense of the term, 'remote principle,' from the viewpoint of intentionality analysis.

\(^{38}\) *De ente supernaturali* §4. I have slightly modified Brezovec's translation of *uti in se est*. One of the benefits of the Latin phrase is it avoids attributing a gender to God, without reverting to the depersonalizing English pronoun 'it.'\(^ {39}\) Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 52.\(^ {40}\) Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 54.
What does the term mean? As articulated by Lonergan and endorsed by Doran,

Materially, substance and nature are the same; formally, nature differs from substance inasmuch as nature is substance not as substance but as proportionate and remote principle in relation to operations.41

If we prescind from questions of grace for the moment, and ask ourselves, 'How is this language of substance/nature, remote/proximate principles to be transposed when the operations are acts of consciousness?' then the following answer suggests itself. 'Substance' becomes 'the subject as subject, precisely as present-to-self in Lonergan's third sense of presence.' 'Nature,' on the other hand, is 'the self as present-to-self on one or another of the levels, and as such, the principle of acts of that level.' That is to say, a proximate principle may be the self as present-to-self empirically, and thereby principle of first-level acts of consciousness; or, the self as present-to-self intelligently, and thereby principle of second-level acts of consciousness; or, the self as present-to-self reasonably, and thereby principle of third-level acts of consciousness; or, finally, the self as present-to-self responsibly, and thereby principle of fourth-level acts of consciousness. This amounts to saying that self-as-present in one of its modes is the proximate principle of the accompanying acts; but the self present to itself just as such is the subject as subject, the subject as a self-present unity, identity, whole, and as such is the remote principle of its own acts. Admittedly, 'remote' is a pretty odd way of speaking of about selfhood; but that is inevitable if one follows the method of De anima: if one begins metaphysically with acts it takes a while to get back to the soul. Phenomenologically, of course, this priority is reversed.

If my transposition of metaphysical terms into intentionality terms is correct, then this would suggest that the 'created, proportioned, remote principle' of Lonergan's De ente supernaturali would be what Paul describes as a 'new creation' (2 Corinthians 5:17) or a 'new self' (Ephesians 4:24, Colossians 3:10). It would be a 'new self' made new by a radically

41 De ente supernaturali §14; Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 59. On 'substantial essence' as a remote principle and 'accidental essence' as a proximate principle, see also Collection: CWL 4 20.
new mode of self-transcendence. It would be a self transformed beyond all natural proportion, beyond any of its four natural levels of consciousness. It would be a unity-identity-whole with a radically new identity, transformed by an operator, not of its own, but of God’s operation. It would be a self now capable of being self-present, and therefore of operating on, a fifth-level of consciousness. As self-present to self, it would be a remote principle; but as self-present-to-self as unrestrictedly being in love, it would be proximate principle of acts of supernatural charity.

If this hypothesis is correct, then it might be that there is another ‘formal but not material’ distinction between sanctifying grace and the supernatural habit of charity. Sanctifying grace would be the experience of self-present-to-self as unrestrictedly being in love; the habit of charity would be the experience of self-present-to-self as unrestrictedly being in love as the patterning continuity to a series of acts of charity. It would deserve the denomination ‘dynamic state’ for much the same reason that intellectual inquiry also would be properly called a ‘dynamic state.’ (Of course intellectual inquiry moves from below upward, while love moves from above downward, and therein lies a world of difference.)

Now it might be objected that a habit is not properly equated with a dynamic state, and this is certainly true of the natural habits (moral and intellectual) which Aristotle thematized. However, Aristotle also saw that active (or agent) intellect resists easy categorization. It is a disposition, like the habits, yet it is not acquired; neither by practice nor through teaching. Agent intellect is according to ‘first nature,’ not according to ‘second nature’ like the intellectual and moral habits. Accordingly, Aristotle referred to it as “like a kind of habit [hos hexis tis].”42 I would suggest that the same could be said of presence-to-self as being in love in an unrestricted fashion. By virtue of the very sort of thing it is, it overflows itself, cannot keep to itself, and therefore inevitably gives rise to acts of charity. Yet it is not acquired by either practice or learning; it is a gift.

There is a virtually insurmountable problem when it comes to speaking about the reality of this experience. I happen to prefer Lonergan’s phrase, ‘being in love in an unrestricted fashion,’ and would prefer to

42 Aristotle, De anima 430a15.
conceive of Doran’s phrase, ‘experience ourselves as loved unconditionally and invited to love in return’ as derivable, modeled on the way Lonergan derives Heiler’s characteristics of world religions. That is to say, ‘being in love in an unrestricted fashion’ at least suggests to me the image of being undifferentiatedly immersed in love, like a crystal clear vessel immersed in a crystal clear sea. Only subsequently and with great effort are the subtle distinctions worked out between the self who is present to self in unrestricted loving, the unrestricted loving itself, and the One with whom one is in love. While I prefer this as the basic mode of speaking, I also fully acknowledge that, as Lonergan himself put it, the reality of this experience itself “is interpreted differently in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.” Thus, to even use ‘love’ (agape) as the word to denote this experience of unrestricted self-presence on the fifth level is speak from within a tradition but about a transcultural reality, and to do so facing outward toward other human beings and indeed other traditions. It is to speak while in search of dialogue and while seeking the increased understanding that is gained by understanding how this experience can be expressed otherwise, without however denying the wisdom of expression found in one’s own tradition.

Finally, I would simply like to pose a question, to which I myself have no clear answer. Doran phrase, ‘uncreated grace’ (a) above) does not occur in Lonergan’s De ente supernaturali. Rather, Lonergan speaks there of ‘uncreated communications’ whereby “the Father communicates the divine nature to the Son; and both the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit” (§13). By the term ‘uncreated,’ Lonergan clearly refers to God; but ‘grace’ ordinarily denotes ‘gift,’ so presumably ‘uncreated grace’ would denote some

43 Doran, “Consciousness and Grace” 54.
44 Method in Theology 109.
45 The image is adapted from Adolf Hildebrand, as quoted by Suzanne Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953) 75, using it to make a somewhat different point.
46 Method in Theology 241, emphasis added.
47 See for example “For consciousness is just experience ... Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery” (Method in Theology 106; emphasis added).
sort of gift to humans of God *uti in se est*. But if there is a gift of God in God’s own being which conditions and precedes a created grace ((b) above) which, in turn, conditions subsequent operations through which ‘the creature attains God as God is in God’s own self’ ((e) above), then these latter operations, and indeed the created grace which makes them possible, would seem superfluous. If God is already given as God is in God’s own being, what could be the point to subsequent acts ‘which attain’ that very same reality?

Whatever might be the answer to this question, I do believe that it is important to keep in mind that ‘consciousness’ is said primarily and directly of the subject as subject, and only derivatively and indirectly of acts and levels. I believe that fidelity to this principle will be of great benefit to all subsequent collaborations on this and many other topics.
REVISITING “CONSCIOUSNESS AND GRACE”

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1. THE ISSUE

In this short paper I wish to revisit briefly some of the issues that I raised in an earlier article, “Consciousness and Grace.”1 In conversation, Joseph Komonchak has pointed out that at times in that article I wrote of experience and consciousness in language that is appropriate rather to knowledge, and I hope to express my position in a way that corrects this. Moreover, an article by Michael Vertin that challenges the central thesis of “Consciousness and Grace” has served as an incentive to try to express myself more clearly.2 But this brief statement emerges as well from an attempt to relate the thesis of “Consciousness and Grace” to the following fascinating passage from Lonergan’s chapter on the divine missions in De Deo trino: Pars systematica:

... there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore four quite special modes of grounding an external imitation of the divine substance. Furthermore, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, never found unformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. Therefore, it may fittingly be said that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation


is a created participation of paternity, and so that it has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a [created] participation of active spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a [created] participation of passive spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a [created] participation of filiation, and so that it leads the children of adoption perfectly back to the Father.3

In “Consciousness and Grace,” I was concerned with the second and third of these absolutely supernatural realities, with sanctifying grace and charity. I did not there draw on Lonergan’s way of connecting them with two of the divine relations, and in fact explicitly prescinded entirely from the trinitarian question. My intent was simply to find a formulation that would express, in terms derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, the meaning of the first thesis of Lonergan’s earlier work, De ente supernaturali. That thesis states: “There exists a created communication of the divine nature, that is, a created, proportionate, and remote principle by which there are present in the creature operations by which God is attained as God is in God’s own self.”4 I asked whether Lonergan’s talk of the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified fashion, while surely naming with precision the direction in which we must turn, was sufficiently mindful of the distinction that he draws between sanctifying grace and charity in spelling out this first thesis in De ente


surnaturali (in harmony with Thomas Aquinas and against, among others, Duns Scotus). I suggested that we might speak of the language of 'the dynamic state of being in love with God' as transposing in a methodical theology what a more metaphysical theology called the habit of charity; and I asked whether we can find some distinct formulation that would transpose in a similar manner 'sanctifying grace.' In the first thesis in De ente supernaturali, charity is the proximate principle of operations by which God is reached, but there is an entitative remote principle of the same operations, a share in the very life of God, called sanctifying grace. My question was, How might we speak of this remote principle in terms of consciousness, but in such a way as to maintain its distinction from the habit of charity?

Some might wonder about the very significance of the question. After all, Lonergan says in the same first thesis (p. 7) that the disputed question of whether sanctifying grace is really distinct from the habit of charity affects not the substance of his thesis but the way of ordering ideas. Even those who identify sanctifying grace and charity admit a created communication of the divine nature, and that is the point of the thesis.

On the other hand, the task of the systematic theologian is precisely the intelligible ordering of the materials confessed in doctrines, and it was as one attempting systematic theology that I raised my question. I took seriously Lonergan's prescription in Method in Theology that "for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness," and I was asking what those elements would be if we were to try to transpose Lonergan's distinction between sanctifying grace and charity from De ente supernaturali to the context established by Method in Theology.

5 The first thesis of De ente supernaturali is not concerned only with sanctifying grace. Its thrust is generic, and includes the hypostatic union or grace of union as the principle instance of a created communication of the divine nature. My concern here is limited to the 'secondary' instance of such created communication, "the sanctifying or habitual grace, by which we are children of God, partakers of the divine nature, justified, friends of God, and so on" (gratia sanctificans seu habitualis, qua sumus filii Dei, consortes divinae naturae, iusti, amici Dei, etc.). Lonergan, De ente supernaturali 7.

A further question arises, however, and I confess that I do not have an answer to it: Did Lonergan himself continue to maintain this distinction after he came to use categories of consciousness in speaking of these realities? I raised this question in “Consciousness and Grace,” and subsequently I have noticed that in “Mission and the Spirit” there is no longer a fourfold, but a threefold, communication of divinity to humanity, “first, when in Christ the Word becomes flesh, secondly, when through Christ men become temples of the Spirit and adoptive sons of the Father, thirdly, when in a final consummation the blessed know the Father as they are known by him.” But then what becomes of the connections drawn in De Deo trino between the four divine relations as special ways of grounding an external imitation of the divine substance and the four imitations of, or created participations in, these relations?

My option remains one of attempting to preserve the distinction and to find appropriate categories for it from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. In fact, that option is only confirmed when I begin to glimpse the enormous systematic potential in the short passage that I have quoted from De Deo trino. And so I am going to try once again to formulate a thesis that would transpose the affirmation of the first thesis of De ente supernaturali into categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. This new statement is in no way a retraction of the position I was beginning to formulate in “Consciousness and Grace,” and so it probably will not satisfy Vertin’s objections, but perhaps it states the issue a bit more clearly. And I hope it meets the criticism that Komonchak offered. Finally, I have deliberately avoided here the issue of the number of levels of consciousness, especially since the discovery and publication of Lonergan’s “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” further complicates this (secondary) issue.

Given the context established by the passage from De Deo trino, we could formulate the question as follows: If the divine missions are the divine notional acts plus an external term, what, in terms of consciousness,

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is the external term of active spiration? What, in terms of consciousness, is it to "receive the Holy Spirit" (John 20:19)? The question parallels in a theological and trinitarian context the question that Lonergan was attempting to answer in "Mission and the Spirit." What in terms of human consciousness is the transition from the natural to the supernatural (where by 'the supernatural' is meant at its root divine self-communication in love)? But, I think, if one retains the distinction between sanctifying grace and charity, one's answer will not be exactly the same as that which Lonergan gave in "Mission and the Spirit," where that distinction is at least not explicit. Moreover, in "Mission and the Spirit," Lonergan is concerned, not with the end, the "threefold personal self-communication of divinity," but with "finality to it, with that finality as evolutionary, with that evolutionary finality as it enters into human consciousness."9 With his answer to that question I have no problem whatsoever. My concern is the end, when the personal self-communication of divinity is, not the incarnation or the beatific vision, but the gift of grace to us in this life. How does that gift itself enter into human consciousness? If the distinction between sanctifying grace and charity does follow the pattern of the distinction of active and passive spiration in the Trinity, if in fact it names the respective external terms of active and passive spiration, then for systematic reasons I prefer to retain it, and to try to offer a way of doing so.10

2. A REFORMULATION

In the next paragraph I will give a restatement of the entire thesis. In the next section I will try to spell out the thesis in seventeen distinct points.11

The gift of God's love poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace (the Holy spirit) that effects in us, as a consequent condition of its reception and as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of

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10 My reasons, of course, are not just systematic. That would be a form of conceptualism. I am attempting to name something that I think occurs in religious experience.

11 The seventeenth point is an addition, suggesting a possible line of further development.
a dimension or level of consciousness that is distinct from the intentional levels discussed by Lonergan in his intentionality analysis. At this distinct and nonintentional level — nonintentional because, while it has a content, it has no apprehended object — we experience what can, upon reflection, be objectified as an inchoate and abiding satisfaction of our intentional longings (and their psychic correspondences\(^{12}\)) for intelligibility, truth, and goodness. This inchoate and abiding rest from intentional striving, a secure base that sustains and carries us in our intentional operations,\(^{13}\) can be further objectified, with the help of the revelation manifest in Christ Jesus, as being loved in an unqualified fashion, and being invited and empowered to love in return. The being loved, moreover, can be understood in a Christian theology as a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word, while the love in return, to which we are invited and empowered, is a created participation of the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit. The initial and grounding nonintentional experience of rest from intentional striving is the conscious basis of our share in the inner trinitarian life of God, of our falling in love with God, and of the dynamic state of our being in love in an unqualified fashion. It is what a metaphysical theology called sanctifying grace. The dynamic state of being in love that it releases (with our assent and cooperation, which themselves are enabled by the gift itself) is what the scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, which is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained as God is in God’s own self; but the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations — what scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature — is a distinct dimension or level of consciousness: the nonintentional experience that can be objectified in Christian terms as a resting in being loved in an unqualified fashion. This experience is a real


\(^{13}\) Even “a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion ... a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give.” Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 105.
relation to the indwelling God who is term of the relation, and it is constituted by that indwelling God as a consequent condition of the indwelling itself.

3. SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE THESIS

1. There is a gift of God’s love poured forth into our hearts, and this gift is the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit and so an indwelling in us of the inner life of the triune God.

2. This gift is offered to all men and women. It is not particular to any one religious tradition. It is not a function of a tradition, but is constituted by God alone.

3. With Lonergan in *De Deo trino*, we may say that with this gift there is created an external term of this divine mission, a consequent condition of its reception, a created relational disposition to receive it, that is the created grace, the created entitative habit, that the Catholic tradition has called sanctifying grace.

4. This created communication of the divine nature is experienced, is conscious, as a nonintentional dimension or level of consciousness which, precisely as nonintentional, is distinct from the four intentional levels discussed by Lonergan in his intentionality analysis.

5. These intentional levels constitute an obediential potency for the reception of the created grace of this nonintentional experience.

6. But this grace, as experienced, is itself a nonintentional state, that is, a conscious state that has a content but no apprehended object.

7. As experienced, what I am speaking of is conscious but not known, in the sense of the full human knowing that consists in experience, understanding, and judging. Perhaps it is best known through the revelation that is manifest in Christ Jesus. We may wager at least that this articulation remains the best starting point for further discussion of just what it is.
8. The experience of which I am speaking is an inchoate and abiding satisfaction of our intentional longings for intelligibility, truth, and goodness, an inchoate and abiding rest from intentional striving and psychic restlessness.

9. It can be objectified in the terms of Christian revelation, and only because of this revelation, as an experience of being loved in an unqualified fashion. But this is not the only appropriate manner of conceiving it. In a sense, there is no really appropriate manner of conceiving and expressing it, and all human attempts to do so limp. More generically, it might be called the experience of an invitation to “Be still, and know that I am God” (Psalm 46:10), where the precise manner in which the invitation is experienced depends on the modality of the movements of mind and heart to which the invitation offers an inchoate rest. For some, it might be the assurance that there is an unfailing and absolute guarantee of meaning or intelligibility that will triumph over all absurdity and suffering. For others, it is the joy of exulting in an absolute goodness of existence that is unqualified in every respect. For still others, and in fact for all of us at one level and particularly in certain situations, it is the assurance of a mercy or forgiveness that meets us at the point of our deepest spiritual poverty.

10. In all these different forms, always it is a particular form of Ignatius Loyola’s consolation without a cause, that is, consolation with a content but with no apprehended object, a consolation that is received without being caused by anything that we have understood, affirmed, or decided.

11. However this experience is best objectified (always imperfectly) in any given instance, it can be affirmed by a Christian theology to be a created participation in the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word.

12. It releases simultaneously a freedom to love in return, and the love to which we are empowered is a created participation in the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit.
13. The nonintentional resting from intentional striving grounds our participation in the trinitarian life of God, in the divine relations constitutive of the divine life, and so is appropriately called a created communication of the divine nature. It is also, and for this same reason, appropriately called by a metaphysical theology ‘sanctifying grace.’ And the dynamic state of being in love that it releases (with our assent and cooperation, which themselves are enabled by the gift itself) is the equivalent of what the scholastic tradition called the habit of charity.

14. The created gift of a distinct, nonintentional level of consciousness is thus the remote principle, and charity the proximate principle, of acts or operations of love elicited in us whereby God is attained in God’s own being.

15. The nonintentional consciousness that is rest from intentional striving and that Christians know as (among other things) being loved in an unqualified sense, being forgiven, being assured an ultimate meaningfulness to our lives, precisely as a distinct level of consciousness and remote principle of acts of love, is a real relation to, and created by, the indwelling God who is term of this relation.

16. The relation is constituted by the indwelling God as a consequent condition of the indwelling itself. It happens because the notional act of active spiration itself is here joined with a created external term in addition to the uncreated internal term that is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Word. That created external term is the level of consciousness on which we are given rest in God.

17. Perhaps it is on the basis of our experience of what here is objectified as the created external term that a trinitarian theology might best provide some analogical understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Word.
RECENTLY IN THIS journal,¹ Michael Vertin expressed disagreement with Robert Doran on a question that has bothered many Lonergan students. In the early 1970s, when Lonergan began speaking of a 'fifth level,' did he mean to add a distinct level of conscious and intentional operations to his previous articulation of four levels of attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility?² Doran believes Lonergan was identifying a distinct fifth level of consciousness,³ while Vertin suggests that Lonergan was thinking of the fifth level as a fulfillment of fourth level yearnings, but not as an added level of consciousness.

Since Vertin and Doran both note that the data on what Lonergan meant are skimpy,⁴ I may be able to clarify things by bringing to the discussion a few pieces of evidence that have not appeared in Lonergan's major published works — evidence that will support the view that Lonergan did not intend to posit a fifth and distinct level of consciousness.

In the course of comparing the positions of Vertin and Doran, however, I was left with the impression that two assumptions had been made about Lonergan's view of love that contradict some of his explicit


³ See Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 4-6 for his account of Doran's position on five levels of consciousness. Doran himself may be expressing some reservation insofar as he often uses the expression, "fifth level or enlargement of consciousness." (Emphasis added). See, for example, Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," 62, 63, 74.

⁴ Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 2; Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," 62.
remarks. First, Doran and Vertin both seem to assume that wherever Lonergan refers to a 'fifth level,' he always means some form of religious consciousness. I would like to take this opportunity to present some texts suggesting that Lonergan often includes ordinary being in love as well. Second, Doran assumes that wherever Lonergan cites Rom 5:5 ("God's love flooding our hearts"), he means God's love for us flooding our hearts. I will offer some indications that Lonergan had something else in mind.

WHAT DID LONERGAN MEAN BY A 'FIFTH LEVEL'?

On a number of occasions Lonergan made references that suggest that he did not intend to identify a fifth level of conscious and intentional operations.

1. Both Vertin and Doran speak of a 'fifth level of consciousness.' But nowhere does Lonergan seem to use that four-word term. The first recorded occurrence of 'fifth level' appears in 1972, when a questioner had asked Lonergan to explain a statement in Method in Theology regarding Rahner's reference to a 'consolation without a cause.' Lonergan replied that the initial experience may be conscious but not yet known. The questioner pushed on: "There would be no insight, no concept, no judgment?" Lonergan: "Not of itself, no. You can say it's on the fifth level. It's self-transcendence reaching its summit, and that summit can be developed and enriched, and so on. But of itself it is permanent." Notice Lonergan just says 'level,' not 'level of consciousness.'

Even when, ten years later, questioners refer to a 'fifth level of consciousness,' Lonergan doesn't use 'of consciousness' in his reply. Further research using text-processors may prove me wrong, but the absence of 'fifth level of consciousness' in the texts cited by Vertin and Doran, and in some additional ones I will refer to below, might make a person curious.

2. Lonergan's typescript entitled "Karl Rahner's Method in Theology" compares interestingly with its published version, "A Response to

Fr. Dych"7 (1980). I have put in italics what is found in the typescript but not in the published version.

with the questions on the three levels of questions for intelligence, questions for sufficient reason for factual judgments, and questions for evaluation and decision, not what's in it for me or what's in it for us — that's egoism, but is it really worth while, is it truly good? The transition from the earlier type of morality listed by Kohlberg into the fourth and fifth level. Questions for evaluation. ... this makes the precedence of intellect on will like the precedence of sense on intellect. It makes it just what normally happens. It does not exclude divine operations directly on the fourth level, or if you wish to call it the fifth. As St. Paul instructed the Romans, "God's love has flooded our inmost hearts by the Holy Spirit he has given us."

It may be relevant that Lonergan uses the singular, 'fourth and fifth level.' Also, he uses the expression, 'if you wish' — which mirrors his original mention of it in 1972, 'you can say it's on the fifth level.' It seems that he has some reservations about saying 'fifth level of consciousness.'

3. In 1981, during an interview in which he was talking about vertical finality working in human consciousness, Lonergan clearly refers to the fourth level as the top level of consciousness. "When you are making a judgment you get contrary instances tossed up, and your conscience (that top level of consciousness) is a peaceful or troubled or uneasy conscience ..."8

4. Vertin notes several ways in which Lonergan uses 'level' to support his view that Lonergan was using the term in a wide sense when he mentioned a 'fifth level' and therefore that Lonergan was not thinking of a distinct level of consciousness in a strict sense.9 However, there is another strict sense in which Lonergan uses 'level,' a usage that actually supports Vertin's position more strongly. We find it in Lonergan's two articles, "Finality, Love, Marriage" (1943) and "Mission and the Spirit" (1976). There, Lonergan's perspective is not the structure of consciousness


9 Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 21-23.
but the entire evolving universe of being. In “Finality, Love, Marriage,”
the word ‘level’ occurs dozens of times, usually with the phrase, ‘of
operations.’ These operations can include conscious and intentional
operations of the individual, but they also include activities done in
common with fellow human beings and the operations of divine grace as
they affect consciousness.

“Mission and the Spirit” picks up on this evolutionary perspective
and terminology. There Lonergan addresses the question, “What, in
terms of human consciousness is the transition from the natural to the
supernatural?” He finds the link in a “passionateness of being” that
“overarches conscious intentionality. There it is the topmost quasi-
operator that by intersubjectivity prepares, by solidarity entices, by falling
in love establishes us as members of community.”10 Although Lonergan
does not say so explicitly, there clearly is some kind of level beyond the
fourth level of individual conscious intentionality, a level that participates
in the overarching ‘passionateness of being.’

Lonergan sees something beyond the fourth level of consciousness
because he is discussing not merely the conscious and intentional
operations of the individual subject. The context here is vertical finality —
the spindle on which Lonergan stacks all the schemes of recurrence whose
circling and self-stacking make up an evolving world process. He
apparently conceives that being in love constitutes a fifth level in the
ascent of vertical finality, counting human attentiveness as level one. This
fifth level is both conscious and intentional.11 But its operator is not a
question. Unlike the previous three levels, it does not depend on an indi-
vidual’s wonder alone to come to its proper term. Also, it constitutes the
subject as a term of an interpersonal relation, which the four lower levels
do not. That is, when we cooperate with being in love, our consciousness
becomes also a common consciousness with friend, family, country, or

11 I am using these terms as they appear in Method in Theology 7. That is, the
operations are conscious in the sense that they mediate a self-presence in the subject;
they are intentional in the sense that they are transitive, they intend objects, the
operations of loving make the beloved present. While those who are in love with God
without yet realizing it do not intend a known object, it is the intentional character of
their love that moves them to come to know God.
God. The first four levels may be active without also giving that common consciousness.\footnote{For more on what Lonergan meant by ‘common consciousness,’ see his “Finality, Love, Marriage,” Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 34-35. I have some reflections on this idea in “Consciousness in Christian Community,” M. Lamb, ed., Creativity and Method: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980) 291-303.} Given these differences, it makes sense that Lonergan would hesitate to use the expression ‘level of consciousness’ lest his listeners take it to mean a level defined by operator questions in the same manner as the previous levels.

Still, we could ask why Lonergan doesn’t mention a ‘fifth level’ in “Mission and the Spirit.” He may have used the more technical term ‘topmost quasi-operator’ to avoid the very ambiguity of ‘level’ that Vertin, Doran, and I have tried to sort out. He seems to recognize that our families, friends and communities exercise an enticement on consciousness that performs an operator function similar to the draw of God’s own self-communication in Word and Spirit. But this operator is unlike the operators that the other questions are, for the reasons mentioned above. Hence, a ‘quasi-operator.’\footnote{I do not know if Lonergan has explained ‘quasi-operator’ more fully anywhere. Perhaps he’s borrowing the use of ‘quasi’ from Rahner’s ‘quasi-formal causality’ and inserting it onto his nest of genetic-method categories. This would be consistent with his preference for explaining the link between God and us as a term of a relation — a kind of operator relation — not merely a kind of formal cause.}

5. A late-arriving piece of evidence surfaced in 1994, just as Vertin was finishing his article. In a closing footnote, he refers to an unpublished paper Lonergan wrote sometime between June, 1977 and October, 1978 — “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” which was promptly published.\footnote{Lonergan, “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994) 125-146. Frederick Crowe dates its composition between June, 1977 and October 1978 (122-123). Given its appearance after Doran’s article appeared, Doran may have changed his views more in line with Vertin’s, particularly since Lonergan credits Doran for the very insight into a ‘level’ that stands outside the four levels of a subject’s conscious and intentional operations.} In the course of a familiar discussion of the structure of conscious intentionality, Lonergan surprisingly makes reference not only to a fifth but even a sixth level:
We must now advert to the fact that this structure [of conscious intentionality] may prove open at both ends. The intellectual operator ... may well be preceded by a symbolic operator that coordinates neural potentialities and needs with higher goals through its control over the emergence of images and affects. Again, beyond the moral operator ... there is a further realm of interpersonal relations and total commitment in which human beings tend to find the immanent goal of their being and with it their fullest joy and deepest peace. So from an intentionality analysis distinguishing four levels one moves to an analysis that distinguishes six levels.\footnote{May I point out (1) an absence, again, of the term 'levels of consciousness,' (2) an absence of the modifier 'intentionality' in 'an analysis that distinguishes six levels,' and (3) Lonergan's clear reference to the fact that these additional levels differ from the others insofar as they render the structure of our conscious intentionality 'open' at both ends.}

May I point out (1) an absence, again, of the term 'levels of consciousness,' (2) an absence of the modifier 'intentionality' in 'an analysis that distinguishes six levels,' and (3) Lonergan's clear reference to the fact that these additional levels differ from the others insofar as they render the structure of our conscious intentionality 'open' at both ends.

To sum up, it appears that what Lonergan meant by his occasional references to a 'fifth level' is a level of operations that are intrinsically cooperation — acts we share with one another and acts we share with God. The level at which such operations occur may be numbered 'five' or 'six' from the point of view of vertical finality. However, from the point of view of intentionality analysis, the top level of consciousness is better numbered 'four.'

**DOES THE FIFTH LEVEL INCLUDE LOVE AMONG HUMANS?**

Despite their differences on the structural status of the 'fifth level' in consciousness, Doran and, to a lesser extent, Vertin seem to think of that level as exclusively concerned with religious experience and holiness.\footnote{For example, Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 63: "We identify this level of consciousness with the created communication of the divine nature ... that is, with sanctifying grace." And Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 34: "There is a fifth level, a level correlative at root with my experience of unrestrictedly being in love, ..." I italicize 'at root' to suggest that Vertin may be aware of the operations of human love on the fifth level.}

Granted, the focus of their discussion is God's love, not human love. Granted, too, it is at the fifth level that divine operations make their essential contact and integration with otherwise merely human operations.

\footnote{"Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon" 134.}
And granted, finally, they may be presuming that any real love among humans is also divine, and, whether or not it is also known by its subjects as divine, they may be investigating that love simply as conscious. But lest readers draw a false conclusion about the kind of operations Lonergan identified at this fifth level, I would like to present data indicating that he meant to include human love as well as divine.

1. In 1975, I had occasion to ask Lonergan what he meant by 'personal relations' both in his 'structure of the human good' and in his provocative remark in *Insight* that personal relations need to be studied only in a larger and more concrete context. In particular, I asked him whether these 'personal relations' are also on this 'fifth level.' He said it was indeed so. He added (according to my notes scribbled during the interview): "5th level is being an agent in society, being in history, in society, in a family."

I have no doubt from this discussion that Lonergan’s reference to a fifth level included all fulfilling relationships of love, not only loving relationships with God. No doubt, Lonergan understood the fifth level as the locus where a person would experience rest in God; but seems also true that Lonergan included some restless care-giving for one another as well.

2. Another reference supports this view of the fifth level as including our efforts to love one another. In a 1973 address to faculty and students of the Toronto School of Theology, Lonergan refers to a further level beyond the usual four:

But beyond all these, beyond the subject as experiencing, as intelligent, as reasonable in his judgments, as free and responsible in his decisions, there is the subject in love. On that ultimate level we can learn to say with Augustine, *amor meus pondus meum*, my being in love is the gravitational field in which I am carried along.

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18 Doran often emphasizes the 'rest' character of this love: "We have here identified this created, proportionate, and remote principle with a fifth level or enlargement of consciousness, where we rest in the experience of God's unconditional love for us." "Consciousness and Grace" 64. See also 54, 75, and passages cited in Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 7, 8).
Our loves are many and many-sided and manifold. They are the everlasting theme of novelists, the pulse of poetry, the throb of music, the strength, the grace, the passion, the tumult of dance. ... 19

Later in the same address he says, "We adverted to a topmost level of interpersonal relations and total commitments, a level that can be specifically religious." If he was choosing his words with care, then where he says interpersonal relations ‘can be’ specifically religious, he likely intends to make room for our ‘many and many-sided and manifold’ human loves.

So I suggest that where Lonergan mentions the ‘fifth level,’ he often had in mind not only the love of God but also the love of friendship, loyalty, and family. This would be consistent with the view that this level pertains to vertical finality in the universe, not merely in the individual subject.

This interpretation also clarifies an unusual reference that Lonergan made to a type of conversion other than his usual intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. In 1977, during an address to the American Catholic Philosophic Association entitled “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” he spoke of an ‘affective conversion,’ defined as ‘commitment to love in the home, loyalty in the community, faith in the destiny of man.’ It is unlikely that he meant ‘affective conversion’ to replace ‘religious conversion,’ since he later spoke of ‘religious conversion’ in “Unity and Plurality” (1982).20 It seems more plausible that he recognized a dialectical difference between people who let their heart take the lead and people who do not (affective conversion). And among those whose heart leads, some let their love of God take priority over everything else (religious conversion).

My concern here is that by focusing too exclusively on individual holiness, we would lose some very familiar and common experiences of ‘fifth-level’ operations that connect us to one another as well as to God. We’d lose a verifiable foundational reality for ecclesiology, for example, and for marriage, friendship, the social dimensions of grace, and the soli-

19 “Variations in Fundamental Theology” (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute Library, File 773) 10. Italics on the English are mine.

20 See A Third Collection 176, 179, 180; compare 247.
darity of the human community in history. This would be an unfortunate loss. Vertical finality is a gold mine for the functional specialty, systematics. It is rich lode too for doctrines because it posits an objective process by which the universe has an evolutionary dynamism whose achievements far exceed the effects of the commonly accepted principle of natural selection. Philosophers with any respect for empirical data can acknowledge this transcendent dynamism and the questions of God which it raises without feeling forced to embrace a particular religion. Believers can rest in a conviction that the work of God’s Holy Spirit as well as God’s Incarnate Word both operate in conjunction with vertical finality at this fifth level in human shared consciousness without feeling that God somehow must break the laws of evolution or physics in effecting salvation.

WHAT DID LONERGAN MEAN BY ‘GOD’S LOVE FLOODING OUR HEARTS’?

Doran’s article aims to identify the kind of experience that grounds the habit of charity, and he suggests that it is the experience of being loved unconditionally by God, something we experience ‘as such.’ Where Lonergan quotes Romans 5:5 as “God’s love flooding our hearts,” Doran reads, “God’s love for us poured forth into our hearts.” He says, “It is a different experience from our being in love with God.” For this interpretation Doran relies on current opinions of scriptural exegetes, and upon it builds an imposing foundation for a distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Vertin challenges Doran’s interpretation, holding that it is practically impossible to distinguish between the experience of being loved by God and the experience of loving God. I find Vertin’s position convincing and would extend it by an intentionality analysis of the event of knowing one is loved by God.

21 Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 60.
22 Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 61, 75. In the Greek, ‘for us’ does not occur. Also, Doran translates the passage as God’s love flooding over into our hearts. However, the Greek has ‘in’ (en), not ‘into’ (eis), which suggests that Paul means to convey not a flooding over of love from God for us flowing down into our hearts but rather a ‘love of God’ already in our hearts flooding over in love for God and neighbor.
23 Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 62; see also 57-58, 60, 61, 63.
24 Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness” 30-34.
1. One of the delicate points associated with interpreting Lonergan on how the heart works is that sometimes you have to lay the evidence of your own heart on the table. So, I venture to say that I have never experienced God's love for me flooding my heart 'as such.' What I have experienced is that I grew up enjoying the company of my family and friends. It was an experience of common consciousness, the experience of acting together as a 'we.' It would take many stories to convey how that compact experience differentiated into the knowledge that I had also been loved by my family and friends. Yet all the stories would have one thing in common: I had to believe the people who told me they love me. It was not an experience of being loved 'as such.' I had to realize, in a real assent, the truth of the proposition that they loved me. This realization is a judgment.

I propose that the same is true of God's love for us. We hear the word about God's love from our parents and the church, and we believe it. Believing that God loves us is a judgment worth embracing with all one's heart. It is an act of faith, a judgment of value born of religious love.

As it happened, it was Lonergan who helped me understand the remarkable character of the evidence on God's love for me. The word of love from God is everything that the word of a friend is, plus a very different kind of word. A friend uses words, gestures, gifts; a friend shows up in time of need. God too, in Christ Jesus, uses words, gestures, gifts; Jesus showed up in our time of need. But God also takes up residence in the heart and loves from there. Lonergan calls this the 'inner word' in hearts matched by the 'outer word' of Jesus in history. Most poignantly, I realized that my love for God is the quintessential evidence that God must love me too.

I am not doubting people who claim they have experienced God's love for them; this can be a genuine and relatively common religious experience. I am only suggesting that what they 'experience' is a

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25 Method in Theology 119.

26 They may understandably be influenced by the great wave of interest in religious experience generated by William James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). It is a paradox that, for some believers, the proof that God loves them unconditionally has to be the condition that they experience this in some unmediated illumination rather than in the more risky judgment of value born of religious love.
judgment, a third-level operation. They realize a truth; they make a real assent. They experience a poignant drying up of relevant questions about their worth (a judgment of value) and a subsequent realization that God loves them without condition (a judgment of fact). Whether or not such judgments knock them down on their way to some Damascus or just quietly undermine their self-centeredness, they remain convictions. For all of us, I believe, the source of questions which these faith judgments resolve lies in the prior experience of loving.

2. Is this not Lonergan’s understanding too? In Method in Theology he says “Since he [God] chooses to come to me by a gift of love for him, he himself must be love.” Lonergan’s point here is that God is not revealing divine love for us so that we might return that love. God is not waiting for our response before coming to us. God is the love with which we love.

3. Moreover, in the address mentioned above, “Variations in Fundamental Theology” (1973), Lonergan draws a clean distinction between God’s love for us and the love described by the Rom 5:5 text:

But above all, at once most secret and most comprehensive, there is the love of God. It is twofold. On the one hand, it is God’s love for us: ‘God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son, that everyone who has faith in him may not die but have eternal life’ (Jn 3, 16). On the other hand, it is the love that God bestows upon us: ‘... God’s love has flooded our inmost heart through the Holy Spirit he has given us’ (Rom 5:5).

4. We should also note that Lonergan identifies the gift of God’s love flooding our hearts with religious conversion, not with God’s invitation to such a conversion: “Religious conversion is ... other-worldly falling in love ... it is God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit.”

27 Method in Theology 108. Also, in “Mission and the Spirit,” Lonergan cites Romans 5:5 as evidence to support the fact that we can love God without yet knowing God. It would make no sense if ‘love of God’ there meant God’s love for us, since God knows us thoroughly (A Third Collection 31). Also, in “Pope John’s Intention,” Lonergan cites Romans 5:5 as evidence that God gives us the grace to observe the double commandment to love God and neighbor (A Third Collection 237).

28 “Variations in Fundamental Theology” 11.
flood of love is not simply God's offer of love; it is "total and permanent self-surrender."  

5. In 1974, Lonergan made reference to Rom 5:5 in order to clarify what it means for us to love God, not vice versa: "'Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength' (Mark 12: 29-30). Of such love, St. Paul spoke as God's love flooding our inmost heart through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom 5:5)." In a similar passage in Method in Theology, he notes that Paul's experience of God's love flooding his heart provided the evidence supporting his subsequent conviction that God loves us: "It grounds the conviction of St. Paul that 'there is nothing in death or life, ... that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord' (Rom 8:38f.)."  

6. Further evidence on what Lonergan understands by Rom 5:5 can be found by looking up all the texts that cite the passage. None of the texts I am aware of contradict the interpretation I am suggesting. A more convincing account of Lonergan's understanding, however, lies not in the text but in the metaphor. Of all the ways God's love can be described, the image of an overflowing fountain seems particularly apt. For example:

The fount of our living is not eros but agape, not desire of an end that uses means but love of an end that overflows. As God did not create the world to obtain something for himself, but rather overflowed from love of the infinite to loving even the finite ... so too those in Christ participate in the charity of Christ: they love God super omnia and so can love their neighbors as themselves.  

The metaphor of an overflowing fountain carries ancient and revered credentials in the Church. In his first homily after Pentecost, Peter says, "In the days to come — it is the Lord who speaks — I will pour out my spirit on all. ... Now raised to the heights by God's right hand; Jesus has received from the Father the Holy Spirit who was promised, and what you see and hear is the outpouring of that Spirit" (Acts 2:18, 33). The outpouring of the Spirit that they saw and heard was the disciples

29 Method in Theology 240-241.
31 Method in Theology 105.
32 "Existenz and Aggiornamento" (1964), Collection, CWL 4 230.
pouring out loving words to all nations, represented by the cosmopolitan crowd gathered there in Jerusalem.

All these texts suggest that the 'love of God' to which Lonergan refers is quite unlike romantic love. Young adults may be inclined to compare it to an I-Thou love between lovers, where the appropriate metaphor is an exchange of gifts. Indeed, Lonergan's penchant for the expression, 'falling in love,' reinforces this impression. But only as they grow old together do they realize the full dynamic of love, as the love between them floods over in a love that raises children, cares for neighbors, and labors for the commonweal. To understand the Christian agape, we do better to compare it to the mature versions of human love than to its wondrous beginnings. It is not simply a mutual love; it is an overflowing. It is the logic of love found in 1 John: "Beloved, if God so loved us, we too should love one another."33

I offer these observations not to discount the opinion that Paul's intention in the Rom 5:5 text was to speak of God's love for us. It would be unlike Lonergan to have been unaware that exegetes today favor the 'for us' interpretation; the context makes that plain even to the non-professional. However, it seems to me that the point is to present Lonergan's intention, not Paul's. For Lonergan's intention, in turn, we should consider that it may well be within the third stage of meaning. On this consideration, Paul wrote Rom 5:5 in the stage of common sense, where terms are descriptive and compact, not precisely defined within a theoretical framework, and therefore able to represent both our love for God and God's love for us simultaneously. Joseph Fitzmeyer, the exegete on whom Doran relies, reads Paul's text within the second stage of meaning — a linguistic and logical differentiation of consciousness that neatly slices experiences between God loving us and us loving God. Lonergan, then, pursues an understanding of the text within the third stage of meaning by attempting to make known what was conscious but not known to Paul — that Paul first experienced loving God and neighbor and only subsequently realized that this experience is, and always was, identical to being loved by God.

33 1 Jn 4:11. See also Jn 4:14: "The water that I shall give will turn into a fountain inside you, welling up to eternal life."
A PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO FOUNDATIONS

This has been an exercise in interpretation and dialectics. Yet, because the topic is Lonergan's understanding of being in love, it has also been an exercise in foundations. Foundational elements have innumerable implications for theology, but I would not like to leave off this discussion without giving two brief illustrations of what can happen to the person who makes a foundational commitment to this understanding of love.

My first illustration regards making a good decision. The criterion for judging good and bad is, like any judgment, the absence of further relevant questions. Many pious believers try with all their might to discover what God wants of them, as if the outcome has to be a judgment of fact on the state of God's mind. Because this is a below upwards effort, made from the perspective of the fourth level of consciousness, it is easily undermined by the covert mischief of bias suppressing crucial questions. Its results do not stand the test of Christ's peace umpiring the heart (Col 3:15). What Lonergan's work has demonstrated is how affective conversion leads a person to take seriously the horizon of the fifth level as it uncovers questions from the lower levels kept in the dark by bias. Augustine said as much in his famous remark, 'Love, and do what you will.' The outcome of this kind of discernment is a judgment of value born of love. It gives a conviction rooted in trusting love, not a certitude rooted in analysis of data.

When it comes to a serious decision, some people rely on a spiritual mentor to help them clarify alternatives. The mentor, however, should do more than clarify alternatives. People also need to clarify the criteria of their choices. The most fundamental criterion is the belief that God actually loves them — loves them without even the condition that they make a perfect choice. If the above interpretation of God's love is correct, that we first experience the gift of loving before realizing that we are loved (or before 'experiencing being loved as such'), then the mentor's job becomes clear: In order to help people realize that God loves them without condition, start with the evidence of their loving. Help them talk about their families and friends, about what they would 'love' to accomplish in life,

34 The Greek for 'rule' here is brabeuētô. The Pauline author borrowed it from sports, not politics. It means rule like an umpire, not like a king.
and so on. Eventually lead them to face the question of where this loving comes from. No one ever claims to have decided to love; deep down one knows it's a gift. Left in solitude with this question, many are drawn by their own love to realize that God loves them. They will have moved from their affective conversion to their religious conversion. When they consider what they would love to accomplish in life side-by-side with the realization that God may just be flooding their hearts with this love, and if they experience no relevant questions in that context, then the decision flows with a conviction built on faith.

For a final illustration, I would like to suggest what Lonergan's view of love may have done to Lonergan's theological interests. In the mid-1940s, Lonergan developed the position that there are operations in us by which we attain God as God really is.35 The question of the relationship between experience and grace marked the opening of a thirty-year dialog between the old theology of grace and a newer theology that takes experience seriously. Lonergan's interest shifted from the question of how we 'attain God' (attingitur Deus) toward how we are in love with God. At the same time, questions of historicity had enriched the dialog by asking what being in love means for history as well as for consciousness. It is this awareness of history that led Lonergan to write, "doctrines are not just doctrines. ... They can strengthen or burden the individual's allegiance. They can unite or disrupt. They can confer authority and power."36 That is, the concern of doctrines is just as much concerned with the policies and values that ought to shape our common future as its parallel specialty, history, is concerned with the policies and values that have shaped our common past. Lonergan's mature doctrine is that God's love is double. It is the outer word in our history and the inner word in our hearts. It concerns how thoroughly the faithful might let God's love be their love and how totally Christ's incarnation might incarnate in them God's love for this world. This transformation represents, it seems to me, God flooding Lonergan's heart with the divine love for this world as well as for God.

35 De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum (notes for students, Collège de l'Immaculée Conception, Montreal, 1946), cited by Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 52.

36 Method in Theology 319.
THE TERM CONSCIOUSNESS probably derives from the Latin *cum scire*, which literally means 'to know along with.' It is helpful, in trying to uncover the phenomenon more adequately, to retain the original order and render the Latin 'accompanying-knowing,' introducing a hyphen to emphasize the compact nature of what is intended. Moreover the word *knowing* here is to be understood in a loose or generic sense and not in any developed or technical sense.² It simply means an awareness of some kind. Etymologically, then, we may conclude that the term consciousness means 'accompanying-awareness.' It is an awareness that accompanies many human processes and activities.

To be conscious, in this light, is to think, to feel, to act, and in doing so, to be aware that one is thinking, feeling, and acting. Aquinas writes in the *De veritate*:

One is aware that he ... lives, and that he exists, because he is aware that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort.³

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2 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologicae* I q87 a1 c; *Summa contra gentiles* III 46 §6.

3 Aquinas, *De veritate* q10 a8 c. Taurini: Marietti, 1964. I translate *percipere* as 'to be aware.'
I interpret this as a reference to consciousness understood as the awareness immanent in acts of sensing, understanding, thinking, feeling, acting, and so on.\footnote{Insight, CWL 3 344. See also Georges Van Riet, "Idéalisme et Christianisme: A propos de la 'Philosophie de la Religion' de M. Henry Duméry," Revue philosophique de Louvain 56 (1958) 403-404.}

Consciousness, one may say then, is the internal experience of the subject's cognitive and appetitive activities. If it be objected that internal is a spatial term, and that the phenomenon of consciousness is not a spatial reality, I concede that the use of the adjective internal is metaphorical. "Metaphor," as Aristotle explains, "consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."\footnote{Poetics 21 1457b6-7, trans. I. Bywater in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) II 2332.} It is inappropriate naming. In cases of such inappropriate naming, one may legitimately ask what the original datum is that the metaphor expresses. The best answer in the case we are examining is in terms of the idea of presence. It may be said that consciousness is the presence of the subject to himself or herself in and through those very cognitive and appetitive activities which at their object pole make the world present to the subject.\footnote{Lonergan, Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 209-210.} Consciousness is thus the constitutive presencing which establishes the human subject within the world.

Moreover, through consciousness the subject is compelled to take up a stance with respect to the world. For human beings as conscious are not in the world merely as things of nature are in the world. They are not just inanimate entities, inert, immediate to themselves, and single, like stones in an abandoned quarry.\footnote{G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) I 31.} Nor are they simply brute animals confined to limited instinctual patterns of behavior, like the wild horses of the Camargue. Central to human consciousness is a desire which Bernard Lonergan describes as "the drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain."\footnote{Insight, CWL 3 28.} Being itself conscious, this desire is familiar to us all in the form of wondering, questioning, and inquiring. All efforts to understand and to get at the truth of things are born from this
desire. While Lonergan's initial focus is on this dynamism as quest for knowledge, he also understands it as desire for order and for the good. It is the source of all striving to transform and transfigure the world, and to render it more appropriate for human habitation and community.\(^9\) Moreover, Lonergan shows — though we have not space to elaborate the point here — that this primordial desire at the heart of human subjectivity is in a sense unlimited. It is a striving for complete knowledge, for perfect order, and for the infinite good.\(^10\) Hence it must be said — as indeed many traditions in European philosophy have maintained — that human beings through their conscious self-awareness, their reflexivity, their activities, and above all through their unlimited desire, transcend the order of nature and show themselves to be spirit in the world.

Human beings, then, as Hegel points out, are not merely inert, immediate to themselves, and single, like natural objects. They are capable of 'duplicating' themselves, as he puts it. They think, represent themselves to themselves, and place themselves before themselves. They alter their 'environing' world by impressing the seal of their own being upon it, thus reducing its unfamiliarity and 'otherness.' Hegel draws upon what must be an almost universal human experience to illustrate this 'doubleness' by which human beings differ from the 'single' things of the natural order:

A boy throws stones into the river and now marvels at the circles drawn in the water as an effect in which he gains an intuition of something that is his own doing.\(^11\)

The child's impulse here involves the practical alteration of external things, and at least part of what is going on is an imposition of his own mark upon them, so that he is enabled to recognize characteristics of his own in them. This is only possible, of course, because he is a conscious subject. It is thus clear that human beings, through consciousness, find themselves in a world which presents itself to them as that which is to be understood, to be known, and to be altered through human action.

\(^9\) *Insight*, CWL 3 619-621.


It has become customary in certain philosophical quarters to express this aspect of consciousness by speaking of a certain distance between the human being and the world, so that human thoughts and actions are conceived of as emerging from the awareness of separation between self and world established by consciousness. For Sartre, to mention one example, the human subject (pour-soi) emerges by separating itself from the in-itself (en-soi) of inert being.12 Thus for Sartre it could be said that consciousness and being stand in inverse ratio to each other, and that the human subject is intrinsically in exile from being. Without pretending in any way to rebut Sartre’s vast and, in many senses, ‘awe-ful’ metaphysical vision, it seems clear that the terminology of distance and separation in the context of consciousness must, like the adjective internal already encountered, be understood as metaphorical. Through metaphor, as we have already learned from Aristotle, one refers to a thing by means of words which are also used to speak of something different. To take a nice example from Brian Davies, “one can speak of the ‘ship of State’ without implying that the government floats on water.”13 Note, however, as Davies also points out, it is characteristic of metaphorical language that one can always raise a question about literal truth.14 If it be denied that distance and separation in the context of consciousness are to be understood metaphorically, one may simply raise the question: ‘Do you mean that there is literally spatial distance and spatial separation within consciousness?’ This question must surely be answered negatively. Hence, it it is clear that we are dealing with metaphorical rather than literal language here. Consequently, we must be careful not to be misled by our imaginations. Consciousness is best understood, as I have been suggesting, not as a form of absence but rather as a form of presence, a form of presencing or making present.

Nevertheless, these metaphors of distance and separation undoubtedly have some point to them, and it would be unwise to dismiss them outright. It makes sense to ask, as we did regarding the adjective internal,

14 Davies, Thinking about God 136-137.
what is the original datum being expressed by them. Perhaps part of their suggestiveness and resonance lies in their application to the questions of the self-knowledge and the self-coincidence of the human subject. The proximity of the human being to himself or herself in both these senses is very problematic.\footnote{15 Elizabeth Clément and Chantal Demonque, \textit{Philosophie}, vol. 1 (Paris: Hatier, 1989) 12.}

Regarding the first of these aspects, it should be noted that the consciousness which human beings have of themselves through their thoughts, feelings and actions does not lead automatically to understanding or knowledge of themselves. Consciousness on the one hand, and self-knowledge on the other, are to be clearly distinguished. \textit{"For the concurrence of two elements, understanding and judgement about the thing understood, is necessary for knowledge."}\footnote{16 Aquinas, \textit{De veritate} q10 a8 c. I translate \textit{apprehensio} as 'understanding.'} Consciousness, then, is the mere experiencing of one’s thoughts, feelings and actions, whereas knowledge of oneself involves the understanding and sound judgment of one’s experiencing of one’s thoughts, feelings, and actions as these are given in consciousness.\footnote{17 \textit{Collection}, CWL 4208.} Self-knowledge, it may be said, is the fruit of a diligent, subtle, and prolonged form of interrogative introspection.\footnote{18 Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I q87 a1 c.} Consciousness, on the other hand, is simply the transcendental condition of the possibility of this kind of interrogation. To express this last point in simpler language, one may say that consciousness supplies the data for interrogative introspection.\footnote{19 \textit{Collection}, CWL 4 166, especially n. 14.} Thus while it is obvious that all human beings are, at least to some degree, conscious some of the time, self-knowledge is a notable achievement attained only by very few, and that after long efforts, and usually perhaps with some admixture of error.\footnote{20 Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I q1 a1 c.} In this sense, then, drawing upon the metaphor in question, it may be concluded that for most of us there is a certain distance between ourselves and what we are.
The second way in which the metaphors of distance and separation find appropriate application to the context of consciousness is even more striking. For not only is there in most cases a certain distance between ourselves and what we are, but there is also in most cases a certain distance between ourselves and what we do. Putting this in other terms, not only do we not, in most cases, know what we are, but also in most cases, we do not coincide with what we are. This requires further elucidation.

The same desire to know which is central to human consciousness, and which is the source of all our understanding and knowledge of the truth of things, also grasps practical possibilities in the domain of the real. In other words, as has been intimated earlier in this piece, the desire of which we have been speaking is not merely confined to the field of knowing but extends also into the realm of action. "Man is not only a knower but also a doer." The desire to know grasps practical possibilities in the universe of being. These options may be intelligent modifications or orderings envisioned in the environing world, but they may equally be discovered in the human subject's own way of living. As Lonergan writes:

That living exhibits an otherwise coincidental manifold into which man can introduce a higher system by his own understanding of himself and his own deliberate choices.

While Lonergan speaks of both of these, at least in this place, as if they were separate and separable, it seems to me that both must occur simultaneously: that is, the grasping of a possible intelligible reordering of the 'environing' world is also, and at the same time, a grasping of a possible higher ordering of one's own living. And the converse is also true. The two are in this sense mutually correlative and mutually co-implicatory. Lonergan expresses this elsewhere when he says: "On this level subjects both constitute themselves and make their world."

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21 Insight, CWL 3 622. Lonergan's magnum opus was originally published in 1957, hence the author's regular use of man for the whole human race.

22 Insight, CWL 3 622.

23 Collection, CWL 4 220.
Readers who have persevered this far will doubtless be aware that there is considerable debate in modern philosophy regarding the proper and adequate interpretation of that seemingly innocent, yet apparently contentious little word ought. Now, our brief remarks on the conscious process from knowing to doing — drawn as they are from the work of Bernard Lonergan — provide us with the basis for understanding the real meaning of ought. For it is one and the same desiring consciousness that underpins the subject’s knowing and the subject’s doing. Indeed, this identity at source elicits an operative and dynamic needfulness for self-coincidence in thought and action. Drawing on Lonergan again: “From that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.”24 This operative exigence within consciousness is that to which the term ought points. Putting this in another way, moral imperatives spring from intelligence and reason.25

It remains of course that this dynamic needfulness is not necessitous or necessitating, so to speak. There is scope for escape. Human beings are free, and not uncommonly we are adept at avoiding the requirements of intelligent moral living. This fact provides our second context for applying the metaphors of distance and separation to consciousness. Every escape from the moral exigences of consciousness establishes distance and separation between one’s knowing and one’s doing, and in this sense brings about non-coincidence of oneself with oneself.

The most common form of such distance is simply to flee from self-consciousness as far as possible. Moral attention to one’s thoughts, words and deeds may for example be swamped by a total immersion in external activities that eludes or excludes reflective self-awareness, and apportions praise and blame not to oneself but to others. The second common form of distance within consciousness occurs when the subject transposes “inconsistency between knowing and doing into inconsistency within knowing itself.”26 Writers on morality usually term this

24 *Insight*, CWL 3 622.

25 Thus what Kant had in mind in speaking of the categorical imperative is shown to be more accurately understood as grounded in conscious intelligence and reason, and the speculative-practical dichotomy in the critical philosophy, and indeed in much modern thought, is critically overcome.

26 *Insight*, CWL 3 623.
'rationalization.' It is a matter of revising one's knowing into harmony with the doing that has been non-intelligently chosen. One introduces half-truths, lies, or excuses in terms of alleged extenuating circumstances; or, in the extreme case, one persuades oneself, and others, that vice is virtue. Thus is a false self-coincidence won at the price of negating the full dynamism of the desire to know. The third common form of distantiation is the moral renunciation of which Ovid spoke: "I see and approve of what is better, but I follow what is worse." 27 It is a form of merely speculative complacency which, while it acknowledges the aspiration towards intelligent and reasonable living, has given up any hope of actually making this incarnate in one's own way of life. 28

These failures — failures to allow the full range of its intrinsic dynamism and freedom to the primordial desire — thus set up within consciousness negative elements, even in a certain sense negations, that may appropriately be referred to by means of the metaphors of distance and separation. Our discussion has shown, however, that in the context of moral living or self-coincidence, these metaphors point rather to what are contradictions within consciousness than simply distances or separations. Moreover, these contradictions are extremely difficult to suppress, consciousness being what is, conscious. Sooner or later they give rise to regret, to suffering, and even to the remorse of having to acknowledge as one's own thoughts, feelings and actions in which, as Hegel might put it, one does not recognize oneself. 29

We may conclude our rather disjointed reflections, then, by suggesting that these spatial metaphors, especially perhaps that of distance, remind us that to be a conscious subject is to be on a journey. Our journey is one of self-constitution through free choices, in which the conscious chooser chooses what he or she is.

28 These three forms of what I metaphorically term 'distantiation' are adopted from *Insight*, CWL 3 622-624.
29 Clément and Demonque, as cited in note 15.
Freely the subject makes himself what he is; never in this life is the making finished; always it is still in process, always it is a precarious achievement that can slip and fall and shatter.\textsuperscript{30}

To be a conscious self is not to be in reassuring and assured possession of a fixed and already established identity. It is rather to be engaged on a continuous and unending task which is to be indefinitely, perhaps infinitely, realized.

\textsuperscript{30} Collection, CWL 4 220.
From his earliest important writings in the Logical Investigations of 1900/01 and the 1907 lectures published as The Idea of Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl interrelates the notions of the epoche, intentionality, and wonder. But in these same writings, he often speaks of the antecedent, pre-given correlation of the conscious, intending

1 The terms ‘epoche’ and ‘transcendental reduction’ are taken as equivalent in this paper. Grounds exist for this identification. See Elisabeth Ströker, Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. Lee Hardy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) 60, n. 34. This work is an outstanding study of Husserl.


For the locus classicus of Husserl’s thematic (for the meaning of this term, see n. 3 below) examination of the notion of wonder, see the late Vienna lecture (1935) “Phenomenology and the Crisis of European Man,” in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965) 171-192.

See also the article of Eugen Fink, “Was will die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,” in Fink’s Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930-1931 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) 157-178.

In the citation of Husserl’s works, the numbers in parentheses refer to the German pagination.

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ego (subject) to a transcendent, objective world. This primordial correlation is not the product of either any individual intuition or complex intentional acts of the intending subject, whether these complex intentional acts are called intuition or constitution. Rather this primal correlation stands as the foundation for the wonder, the epoche, and the intentionality of the conscious subject. Such a correlation is comprehensive: all other correlations in knowing rest, founded upon it. Husserl calls it the ‘riddle’ (Rätsel) of human knowing. For their part, the concepts of wonder, epoche, and intentionality are ‘thematic,’ since Husserl explicitly identifies them and interrelates them. The notion of the riddle of knowledge, however, may be called ‘operative,’ since Husserl does not give it the same explicit examination which he gives the other concepts mentioned above.

The primary content of this paper pertains directly to Edmund Husserl’s notion of the riddle of knowing. The examination of this notion, though necessarily condensed — given Husserl’s comprehensive treatment of this conception about the primordial correlation of knowing throughout his major works — will be undertaken by relating the riddle essentially to these central concepts of Husserl: wonder, epoche, and intentionality. This paper will not attempt merely a ‘scissors and paste’ accumulation of relevant texts from Husserl. Rather, it will proceed, using the major stages in the development of Husserl’s thinking as benchmarks for a method to map out the study of the riddle of knowing clarified by germane texts. Thus the three central concepts of wonder, epoche, and intentionality, then, can serve as the main themes that pin Husserl’s method down.

When one speaks of philosophical method, however, then one should immediately think of Bernard Lonergan’s work, especially Insight and Method in Theology. The stated goal of the symposium in this issue of METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies is to engage other thinkers in dialogue with Lonergan, in an “important area of inquiry,” namely the investigation of “the structures of human consciousness.” This paper attempts,

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then, in addition to an exposition of Husserl, to align three of his main concepts and Lonergan's equivalent notions. Lonergan is not a disciple of Husserl, nor did he read much Husserl. But the climate of opinion in which both philosophers' works on foundational problems in the theory of knowledge and method in philosophy luxuriantly flowered reveals similar features of the most remarkable similarity in their enterprises. This paper is written in total agreement with the aims of this symposium issue, according to which a "critical examination of similarities and differences between his [Lonergan's] position and others can be expected to promote clarity." This paper, then, may be taken as a Rosetta Stone for one to read off some of the basic themes of Husserl and of Lonergan together.4

I. THE RIDDLE OF KNOWING

The 1907 lectures *The Idea of Phenomenology*5 are the watershed in the thinking of Edmund Husserl on phenomenology. Here he explicitly declares that there is a riddle in human knowing, and he identifies it. Further, he invokes the epoche to elucidate the three themes of the riddle, of the correlation of the knower and the known, and of the nature of intentionality. But in Foreword I to the first edition of *Logical Investigations*


of 1900/01, already anticipating the problems of *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl states:

In this manner my whole method, which I had taken over from the convictions of the reigning logic, that sought to illuminate the given science through psychological analyses, became shaken [in Schwanken geriet], and I felt myself more and more pushed towards general critical reflections on the essence of logic, and on the relationship [Verhältnis], in particular between the subjectivity of knowing and the content of the object known.6

Then, in Foreword II (to the second edition of *Logical Investigations*, 1913), as he specifies the concepts of structure, intentionality, and consciousness, Husserl adds:

Understandably, as the horizon of my research widened, and as I became better acquainted with the intentional 'modifications' so perplexingly [verwirrend] built on one another, with the multiply interlacing structures of consciousness, there came a shift in many of the conceptions formed in my first penetration of the new territory.7

In his own *Introduction to the Logical Investigations* (only published later in 1913), Husserl states that the “Platonism” of R. H. Lotze had “perplexed” (in Velegenheit gesetzt hatte . . . ) him “as a mathematical logician.”8 This Introduction, appearing as it does after his 1907 lectures (*The Idea of Phenomenology*), not surprisingly is laden with references of the conceptions formed in my first penetration of the new territory, to the riddle of human knowing. The term *Rätsel* appears at the beginning of this Introduction where Husserl is initiating the discussion of the relation between consciousness and the sphere of ideal reality:

Only such a one [the person who understands the difference between psychologism and ideal realities] can realize fully that the

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'being-in-itself' [Ansichsein] of the ideal sphere in its relation to consciousness brings with it a dimension of puzzles [Rätseln] which remain untouched by all such argumentation and hence must be solved through special investigations, and in the opinion of the author, through phenomenological ones.9

Further in the Introduction, Husserl pursues on the one hand the notions of the riddle of knowledge, and on the other the correlation between transcendent reality and immanent, conscious subjectivity. Thus, "pure logic" (mathesis universalis), says Husserl,

if it also assumes the problem of philosophical 'elucidation' in the sense of the 'Prolegomena' [of the Logical Investigations] and the second volume [of the Logical Investigations], if as a consequence of this it learns from the sources of phenomenology what the solution is to the great riddles [Rätsel] which here as everywhere arise from the correlation between being and consciousness ... 10

then pure logic will become a "philosophical discipline."

The riddle of knowing, Husserl avers, is the enigmatic status of human knowledge which consists in the fact that immanent operations of the subject are correlated to transcendent objects. But, as he makes clear, the fact and the status of this riddle of itself alone is not the foundational explanation of itself. A riddle is not the explanation of the riddle itself. "Positing of a factual existent [Setzung eines Daseins] that is not given itself in the absolute sense," states Husserl, "is enigmatic [rätselhaft] just because it is not given itself."11 To name something a riddle is not to elucidate it. To make such a claim for the self-founding of the status of something factual and contingent would be to make a claim for a case of

9 Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations 22 [114-115].
10 Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations 29 [122].
circular reasoning. For the status of this correlation cannot be accounted for just through an understanding of the very performance of the correlating acts of knowing that are occurring either randomly or systematically. Both the correlation itself and then these individual correlations of intentional operations are in need of some rational account that offers a basic set of necessary conditions, as far as Husserl is considered. The correlation is not an ultimate statement or an ultimate set of such statements. The human mind in its consciously operating structure is the foundation of the correlate.

Bernard Lonergan, in his early work Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, while discussing the notion of the agent intellect, states that human intelligence is a type of scheme, or knowing structure:12

in its details the scheme is just the actuation of our capacity to conceive any essence and rationally affirm its existence and its relations. ... It is a problem of moving ... from an infinite potentiality commensurate with the universe towards a rational apprehension that seizes the difference of subject and object in essentially the same way that it seizes the any other real distinction.13

Without doing violence to Lonergan's thought, one could say this scheme is a pre-given structure, or an invariant pattern of conscious operations. The scheme is not immobile. It advances through conscious levels of sensation, understanding, and judging, analogously to an operator. Like an operator in logic or mathematics, this scheme transforms its levels of conscious intending such that the subject operates on different levels of intending. These levels, in their turn, are always correlated to corresponding transcendent objects. And then one might point out that among such conscious levels, of secondary and derivative importance, some true or


false statements might be found. But all of these statements presuppose their grounding in this scheme. In sum, the scheme is correlated with its conscious levels to the levels of transcendence. These levels may include insights and their contents, and statements with their contents.

In the Introduction to *Insight*, Lonergan takes up again the question of what is the foundational element in the structure of human knowing. It is not, of course, a set of axioms or postulates. Invoking the theorem of Kurt Gödel, Lonergan agrees with him that "any set of mathematical definitions and postulates gives rise to further questions that cannot be answered on the basis of the definitions and postulates."¹⁴ Lonergan points out that there is an upper context that answers the questions that the definitions and postulates raise, and that they themselves cannot answer. This upper context is "the immanent and recurrently operative structure"¹⁵ of human conscious intelligence. This upper context is the human mind. The human mind, or human intelligence, is an invariant structure that recurrently activates all the levels of conscious intending with their correlative transcendent objects.

While discussing the foundational structure of human intelligence in Husserl and Lonergan, one should recall, or in the language of contemporary hermeneutics, 'retrieve' Aristotle's examination of the problem of primordial knowledge at the very end of *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁶ There Aristotle likens the primordial knowledge to one man who stands his position, and then to the others who stand theirs, and thus an army's rout is prevented. Primordial knowledge, or primal intending, cuts short the infinite regress to reveal the foundational element of knowing. These retrievals for describing the ground of knowledge, expressed as 'primitive' knowledge in the *Posterior Analytics* and in Lonergan as the scheme and structure that are the human mind, clarify what Husserl means in stating that the correlation existing in knowing is just a fact that is the starting point of for any further acts of human knowing. In 'retrieval' language:

¹⁴ *Insight*, CWL 3 20.
¹⁵ *Insight*, CWL 3 20.
¹⁶ 100a10 to the end. See *Insight*, CWL 3 18-22.
Indeed, reminiscent of Heidegger’s hermeneutic of facticity, the starting points of Husserl’s philosophy now appear to be the primordial fact of the ‘I’ and the fact of its historical world as such.17

The primordial knowledge of Aristotle and of Lonergan’s scheme and structure are what Husserl would call the wondrous fact of the foundational correlation of ego and transcendence.

Now the correlation that underpins and defines human knowing, as already emphasized, is a contingent fact.18 This correlation is not in need of something like a ‘linkage’ to constitute the relation of the intending subject and the intended transcendence. One could say that “The problem is to characterize the tie between thoughts and cognitive activities: between thoughts, considered as objective, immutable entities — ‘ideal unities’, in Husserl’s term — and those of our mental acts whose contents they are.”19 But the requirement of an explanation of the ‘tie’ between the intending subject and the intended object is not the same as the necessary existence of an added ‘linkage.’ If an added ‘linkage’ is required to relate subject and object, then a ‘linkage’ is needed for relating the ‘linkage’ in turn to each of the two poles of intentionality. And if a ‘linkage’ of some sort is required, then an infinite number of them is required. For every ‘linkage’ will need its own ‘linkage,’ since it is correlated to something, and so on without any possible limit. In brief, if a ‘linkage’ is sought, an infinite regress is introduced. And this is the point: the correlation is the ‘linkage.’ The correlation is based upon intentionality. When the subject intends, the transcendent object is intended. Acts of intending are diverse and thus so are their objects. There is no need for a third independent

17 Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993) 10. This work is among the finest introductions to Husserl’s thought by three renowned experts.


entity to bring about the correlation which would loom up like the Third Man problem of Plato.

The fact is contingent because it is dependent upon and conditioned by something else. It is contingent even epistemologically, since when one knows through the e poche about the structure of intending, inner time-consciousness, and knowing, the correlation is grasped as a relational state that just happens to exist in a certain mode or manner, and this mode or manner is determined by imposed conditions that antecede the e poche. Simply put, the correlation of the knower and the known just happens to be the case. But just as simply put for Husserl, this correlation is a marvelous correlation, *diese wunderbare Korrelation*,\(^{20}\) that keeps awake his abiding astonishment. And so he wonders why knowledge is the way it is, and not some other, and he wonders how he might go about elucidating the correlation. “The wonder of all wonders is the pure ego and pure consciousness ... ”\(^{21}\)

Openly and clearly, Husserl has advanced beyond the ‘phenomenological ego,’ the stream of consciousness of the *Logical Investigations* to a pure ego, untainted by any traces of his earlier empiricist or psychologistic ego.\(^{22}\) With his grasp and subsequent acknowledgment of the ‘marvelous correlation’ given between subject and object, Husserl joins other philosophers who have been moved by the existence of, and the enduring subsistence of, this correlation. Husserl’s astonishment is analogous to the central problem of philosophy, as Noam Chomsky puts it, which Plato announces in *Meno*, 80d: Plato wonders how a person can

\(^{20}\) Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology* 10 [12].


\(^{22}\) See Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Invest. 5, #4 541-542 [353-354]. Husserl remarks in n. 1, p. 541 [353]: “In the First Edition the name ‘phenomenological ego’ was given to the stream of consciousness as such.” In n. 1, p. 542 [354], he explicitly points out his advance to a non-empiricist ego, a pure ego: “The opposition to the doctrine of a ‘pure ego’, already expressed in this paragraph, is one that the author no longer approves of, as is plain from his *Ideas* cited above.”
go from not knowing an object to knowing and recognizing it when he comes upon it, and then to know that the knowledge attained of that object is true. Chomsky identifies this as 'Plato's problem'; it is basic to all philosophy. Chomsky wonders why people can speak meaningfully at all in the first place, and then, why they like to speak to one another. Chomsky's wonder at Plato's problem can be said to underpin his linguistic investigations.\textsuperscript{23} Again, Husserl's astonishment is analogous to Leibniz's wonder why there is something rather than nothing at all.\textsuperscript{24} Eric Voegelin presents 'anamnetic experiments' to recall that the 'consciousness' of the person "in its intentional function ... in its finite experience, transcends into the world."\textsuperscript{25} Finally, Lonergan explicitly relates his notion of the dynamic structure, immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity, to Plato's problem in Meno in his Introduction to \textit{Insight},\textsuperscript{26} stating that Plato's problem is an element in his attempt "to cast into the unity of a single perspective" the method of human knowing.\textsuperscript{27} Throughout \textit{Insight} Plato's problem is always present in the background, though it appears only fleetingly.\textsuperscript{28}


See W. Ryan, "The Incompatibility of Intuition and Constitution in Husserl's \textit{The Idea of Phenomenology} (1907)," \textit{METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies} \textbf{10} (1992) 154 and 165, for a discussion of the riddle of knowledge in another context of Husserl's. But for a comprehensive work on such topics as the riddle of knowing, wonder, astonishment, the contingency of human knowing and the human knower, and the correlation to objective reality (Husserl's transcendence), one must turn to Lonergan's \textit{Insight}.


\textsuperscript{26} See \textit{Insight}, CWL 3 16. See also the 'paradox' of human knowing that Lonergan speaks of on p. 325. He is again, it would seem, acknowledging Plato.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Insight}, CWL 3 16.

\textsuperscript{28} See, for example, \textit{Insight}, CWL 3 325. See also Ernan McMullin, "\textit{Insight} and The Meno," \textit{Spirit as Inquiry: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan}, Continuum 2/3 (1964) 69-73.
Around 1905 Husserl begins to use the term *Rätsel* (riddle) to describe the factual situation of the overarching correlation of the knower to the known, of the immanently acting subject to the transcendent object.²⁹ He declares that the subject and the object are the two poles of the human knowledge. Most importantly for this paper, in his search for the ultimate ground (*Boden*) of human knowing, Husserl, before undertaking any eidetic studies, or any other individual phenomenological project or task, clearly points out the relation of each pole of the correlation to the other. This permanent, abiding riddle of the bipolarity of knowing that can awaken any person’s wonder³⁰ is the source of the transcendental reduction, or epoche. It is, then, the source of Husserl’s method inasmuch as the epoche is the instrument for uncovering the intentional structure of the ego.³¹ On the other hand, Husserl likewise uses the term ‘riddle’ when he writes of the problems and difficulties that he encounters in his phenomenology, and that he believes he resolves. But he also uses the term to designate the insoluble problems and difficulties that arise when one does not employ his phenomenology, as for example, an empiricist like Hume.³² To the empiricists Locke, Hume, and Mill, Husserl gives detailed inspections, finally dismissing their empiricistic opinions, throughout his Prolegomena of the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl directly attacks their incoherent positions with their inherent self-contradictions and the subsequent skepticism flowing from their empiricism. Nonetheless, Husserl is cognizant of the influence of Hume for Hume’s radical question how an objective world can exist at all,³³ and of Locke for Locke’s notion of ‘inner


³⁰ After *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl uses the term *erstaunen* and other related terms, as in his Vienna lecture of 1935.


³² See, for example, *The Idea*, Lecture I.

perception' of psychical acts to find the origin of certain logical categories and universal ideas, such as unity and number. In a way, Hume appears again when Husserl points out the necessity of the epoche, since in showing definitively the relation of intentional immanence and intended transcendence, the epoche dispels the dualism of Hume and its clumsy 'linkage' through association. And Locke appears again when Husserl states the necessity of the self-reflection of the ego to perform the epoche.

But Hume's radical skepticism, on the one hand, deeply disturbed Husserl in his quest for a clarification of the immanent subject and the transcendent object; on the other, it clearly defined for him the dimensions of the aporia of intentional constitution. In 1906, Husserl wrote in his notebook:

I have had my share of the torments of confusion, of doubt swinging back and forth. I must reach an inner unassailable stability. I know that what is at stake is of the very greatest importance.

Later in the Crisis, Husserl interprets Hume in a second manner. In Husserl's judgment, philosophers like Hume relentlessly haul their incoherent thinking directly into the box canyon philosophy of skepticism. Hume, however, can be evaluated according to Husserl as a person who, though he does not ever ride out of his box canyon, on the way into it has stated a profound problem for philosophy:

But how is this most radical subjectivism, which subjectivizes the world itself, comprehensible? The world-enigma [Welträtsel] in the deepest and most ultimate sense, the enigma [Rätsel] whose being is being through subjective accomplishment [Leistung], and this with

\[34\] See Husserl, Logical Investigation, Investigation II, #10; The Crisis, #22.

the self-evidence that another world cannot be at all conceivable — that, and nothing else, is *Hume’s problem*.36

This riddle or enigma is not a mysterious state of affairs attained — and rarely at that — by the intentional acts of the subject which might be designated as either acts of constitution or of intuition. Nor is this riddle in some way produced, least of all, metaphysically created out of nothing by the subject. For Husserl, the individual subject and, as well, the transcendental subject are a riddle, not because to understand them through the self-reflective epoche demands immense labor, but because the human subject with its built-in structure of knowing is a contingent fact. As contingent, it does not necessarily have to exist. It just happens to exist in a certain manner according to certain conditions. Its existence as a specific, identifiable reality of any type whatsoever cannot be predicted. The built-in structure of knowing is prior to, and a necessary condition for, even knowing that precisely because of its own pre-given correlation this structure itself is a riddle. As already discussed, this contingent fact comprises two poles of a relation: the subject with its pre-established correlation to transcendence, or put another way, the correlated subject and object. The subject, then, is not free to be either correlated or not correlated to transcendent objectivity. The subject really has no idea at all why it is existing as it actually is with its own specific and individual identity. And the subject really has no say at all about being correlated to transcendence. Finally, even the wonder at the riddle that awakens the epoche is just a fact that may or may not occur:

- reality is relative to and constituted by subjectivity ... [this] is the meaning of this relativity; it does not signify that consciousness causes or makes objective meanings, but only that consciousness is a necessary condition for the emergence of the world as real, as possessing a sense.37

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36 Husserl, *The Crisis* 96-97 [99-100].

37 Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) 164. This work is still one of the finest studies ever done on Husserl. Sokolowski does not hesitate to identify the ‘profound knowledge’ of Rudolf Boehm upon which he drew in writing this work.
Since, as Husserl abundantly declares, most people live out their lives in a ‘natural attitude’ in which things just happen,\textsuperscript{38} for such people some sort of topic and discussion about the meaning of the world and subjectivity as the necessary condition of its emergence as real is senseless. As for the notion of an epoche, it does not even glimmer on the horizon of any single one of the endless particular intending acts that go on throughout the whole time span and scope of the natural attitude. As far as the natural attitude is concerned, the epoche, then, does not appear at all in its sweeping power that enlightens the nature of intentionality which is incessantly manifesting itself unreflectively in the numberless acts of any individual subject at any time and any place.

Although the epoche does not automatically spring forth simultaneously with the appearance of wonder at the correlation of immanent subject and transcendent object, as soon as a person can thematize wonder as \textit{erstaunlich} and \textit{wunderbar}, that person is already taking a ‘way’ (\textit{Weg}) to performing the epoche. This way taken, whether under the influence of Descartes’ comprehensive doubting, or from the abundant classes and instances of constituted realities existing in the \textit{Lebenswelt}, opens upon the epoche. The riddle of knowing, therefore, leads Husserl to wonder, to wonder precisely at the riddle of human knowledge and the dimensions of the riddle, rousing him to follow these diverse ways to the epoche. The riddle of human knowledge, therefore, and the wonder of it all is for Husserl the motive for performing the epoche.

Some overview, then, of the immense and permanent effect of the riddle upon Husserl with the accompanying permanent astonishment, and consequently upon his own transition to initiate the epoche in his work, can serve as a transition to the next part of this paper. Husserl’s own way, then, can be a clue (\textit{Leitfaden}) for those who wish to grasp his method and his analyses. The sequence, roughly speaking, of Husserl’s procedure may put in this manner: first, the riddle of knowing, and then following upon this, wonder at the riddle, wonder as the motive for the epoche (Husserl’s method), and the uncovering of immanent and tran-

\textsuperscript{38} In the colorful language of J. H. Hexter in his book \textit{Doing History} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), reality is just “one damn thing after another” (46) for the ‘dull’ historian. In Husserl’s language, such dull history never leaves the natural attitude.
scendent dimensions in intentionality. In sum, the clarification of Husserl’s motives for the epoche reveals his quest for a clarification of the effects of the riddle of human knowing.

II. WONDER AND INTENTIONALITY

Wonder is a fact incessantly manifesting itself in the intentional life of people. That intentional life comprises the immediate correlation of the immanent ego to any transcendence, but also the mediate, particular acts of knowing, feeling, and valuing whose interrelationships make up the most conspicuous aspects of human living. The ego is immediately correlated to transcendence insofar as it can intend any instance of something transcendent, and it is mediate correlated insofar as any individual or set of its intentional acts intend individuals or sets of individual transcendent objects. After all, people are puzzled all the time in their lives, whether in trivial or in momentous situations, whether about the pain of toothaches, or why there is pain in the universe in the first place; whether about forgotten names of a lost friend, or why there is friendship in the first place. But even if this wonder at the riddle of being an intending subject is merely some kind of fact itself it is not a whimsy or an atomistic instance in the flow of life to be brushed aside or ignored as some trivial fact, as ‘nothing but’ one more fact of living.

In the Introduction to Insight, Lonergan states that his program is to take place “in the difficult realm of matters of fact.” Thus in this difficult realm of fact, a central issue for Lonergan’s interest is the reality of wonder and curiosity in human living. He asks, “Where does the ‘Why’ come from?” Then he goes on to state that the “desire to understand … constitutes the primordial ‘Why?’”39 The essential difference between Husserl and Lonergan in their treatments of wonder can be noted here. First of all, both Husserl and Lonergan are in agreement about the overall characteristics of wonder. They both thematize the general character of wonder. Thus Husserl thinks that wonder is the source of the epoche by which he uncovers the eidos of the transcendental ego; Lonergan thinks that wonder is the source of the self-appropriation of the conscious subject

39 Insight, CWL 311.
who thus uncovers his or her intentional structure of knowing, feeling, deciding, and loving. But Husserl does not thematically develop the concept of wonder as the intentional operator in his concept of the advance through the levels of intentional constitution from passive genesis to the active constitution of the judgment. Yet Husserl is most aware of the drive of intentionality from a passive level to an active level. In discussing this drive of intentionality, he introduces his key notions of association (his notion, not Hume's) and striving.40 Lonergan, however, thematically identifies wonder in the questioning by which the conscious subject advances through the diverse levels of intending. Husserl could be said to treat wonder thematically once and operatively once; Lonergan treats wonder thematically twice. In other words, for Lonergan there is one, comprehensive wonder.

In rejecting the existence of wonder as 'nothing but' one more fact of living that meaninglessly appears for the Natural Attitude, Husserl constantly recalls that the existence of the correlation always evokes wonder, and this wonder is always an immense, unexpected, and perduring astonishment. To show how inclusive this wonder is, Husserl does not hesitate to compare it to a religious conversion. "Perhaps," he says, "it will even become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion."41 There are, of course, antecedents for such a position. For Plato himself does not hesitate to compare wonder to a type of conversion when he defines education in book 7 of the Republic (518d) as a conversion of the soul to the transcendent Good.

Crudely, one can describe the correlation of intentionality in this manner: the riddle is in the transcendent object whereas wonder is in the subject. As crudely dualistic as the correlation is thus described, and as certainly as Husserl would reject the dualistic myth of a subjectivity in here and an objectivity out there, still the insistence upon the existing correlation is authentic Husserl doctrine, from the early Logical Investigations V-VI to the late Crisis. The main thematic issue, however, to

40 Husserl's notion of constitution will be treated further in this paper.
41 Husserl, The Crisis 137. See also 100 and 189.
be inspected is the question: how is this wonder related to the epoche? is it the source of the epoche? is it the ground of the epoche? how is it related to intentionality? how does it involve immanent acts and transcendent objects? One can condense — and thereby oversimplify — Husserl’s detailed exposition in this manner: the subject wonders about its correlation through knowledge to transcendent reality. The correlation is a riddle. The riddle of knowledge awakens wonder.42

The riddle of human knowing could be judged in a reductionist manner to be ‘nothing but’ some sort of inaccessible personal state or private feeling.43 Yet, to judge wonder in such a reductionist manner has grave problems both as an interpretation of what really is as plain as a pikestaff in the actions of humans, and equally as a total misinterpretation of Husserl’s notion of intentionality. Husserl has two approaches to treating the notion of the riddle of human knowing that must be distinguished. First, he points out that wonder at the correlation of human knowing and transcendence does occur in people. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Edmund Husserl; he writes books about it. Further, wonder perdures in the background of the subject’s intentionality, but emerges frequently when one is engaged in certain studies, such as those of the works of the Greek philosophers and of Husserl’s own phenomenology. Secondly, wonder is the source of the epoche. Husserl declares that he abandons the Cartesian approach to the epoche of The Ideas (1913) because it is too sudden, appearing like an unjustified ‘leap’44 into the dogmatic assertion of certain realities, such as the structure of intentionality in the subject. It is not enough to say, ‘Let us perform the epoche … ’ Husserl remarks in both The Idea of Phenomenology45 and Ideas.46

42 See Bernet, Kern, and Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, ch. 1, #3 for a concise presentation of the notion of the riddle of knowledge in Husserl, especially in relation to the epoche.

43 45. One may see John Searle’s critique of such reductionist opining in his book The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), for example, the first chapter. One may further see the many works of Viktor Frankl, for example, The Doctor and the Soul and Man’s Search for Meaning, with his longstanding critique of reductionism, the ‘nothing but’ mentality, that prospers in Freudian and behavioristic psychology.

44 See Husserl, The Crisis 186 [190].

In the 1920s, specifically in the lectures entitled Erste Philosophie, Husserl develops the notion of the actual concrete life (Lebens) of people as the unique starting point for initiating the epoche. “By life-world is meant the world as we encounter it in everyday experience, in the world in which we pursue our goals and objectives, the world as the scene of all our human activities.” One could, however, as a point of historical fact, make the claim that Husserl has in The Idea already recognized some of the basic structural elements of the intentional correlation of any world, and therefore the life-world. At the very beginning of The Idea, he states:

Our judgments pertain to this world. We make (sometimes singular, sometimes universal) judgments about things, their relations, their changes, about the conditions which functionally determine their changes and about the laws of their variations. We find an expression for what immediate experience presents. ... Isolated cognitions do not simply follow each other in the manner of mere succession.

In his later works, Husserl advances to the level of what he calls ‘genetic constitution’ that goes beyond the ‘static’ identification of structural elements in his early phenomenology. Because of the development of his studies on inner time-consciousness, and the appearance of his notion of genetic constitution in such works as Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Experience and Judgment, Husserl is able to identify thematically and name the life-world. His studies of time culminate in his understanding that inner time-consciousness is the necessary and sufficient condition for intentionality. For “it is not time, but the originary time-consciousness that is the necessary form of each

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46 See Husserl, Ideas, #32.
49 Husserl, The Idea 13 [17].
originarily intuition of an Objectivity."\(^{50}\) In his vocabulary, inner time-consciousness is the absolute upon which intentionality rests. Thus, Husserl grasps that, if the ego is performing acts of intentionality, it will constitute correlated objective realities. Then, with the distinction of passive genesis and active genesis to define the two kinds of 'genetic constitution,' Husserl has established the method of the epoche in order to further clarify the correlation of knowing subject and known object. The epoche is Husserl's method.\(^{51}\)

Whatever the life-world may exactly be according to Husserl, it is certainly not something out there already constituted as known. In Husserl's words, known objects in the world of logic or in the life-world are not "simply in consciousness in the sense in which things are in a box."\(^{52}\) Or, as Lonergan would say, the life-world is not the already out there now real that we intuit. Such an oversimplification of the status of the life-world is a reductionism. In actuality, the life-world is a set of all objects that have been actually constituted, and can be constituted by the transcendental ego. The ego can be considered as constituting intellectual, aesthetic, and ethical objects all by itself, but more in the spirit of Erste Philosophie, as constituting such objects as intended realities by reason of tradition and together with the members in a certain community with a certain tradition and with a certain telos. The problem of the life-world for Husserl is the degree to which it is constituted by the ego. Thus, in his vocabulary of Formal and Transcendental Logic, Experience and Judgment, and The Crisis,\(^{53}\) the life-world either could be a case of just passive genesis or of just active genesis, or it could be a unity of these two kinds


\(^{51}\) See Rudolf Boehm, "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction," 201-203.

\(^{52}\) Husserl, The Idea 56 [71].

\(^{53}\) See Part III, A.
of constitution. It does not seem that Husserl has clearly or not identified the exact constitution, whether passive or active, of the life-world. The identification of the exact constitution of the life-world, however, is not essential to the main issue of this paper, namely the riddle of human knowing. In any case, one must always keep in mind that according to Husserl any type of constitution is an intentional performance, not a mere empty box-like receptacle in which objects are 'simply lying.' Thus, one may point out that the intending, constituting, and objects that ceaselessly occur in the life-world are clues (Leitfaden) to the existence of the transcendental ego. No matter precisely how the life-world is constituted as known, it is as a unity that it is the objective pole to which the intending ego is correlated. The vast richness and diversity of the life-world never mask the fact that the ego is correlated to it. The life-world, then, with this richness as clues for discovering the ego is a fact. The life-world with its clues is another source for understanding the correlation of subjectivity and transcendence that is the riddle of knowing. It evokes the epoche in a way different from the Cartesian Way of The Idea and Ideas. By the time of Erste Philosophie, Husserl has decided that the life-world is the unique starting point for performing the epoche.

The basis of Husserl’s introduction and analysis of the epoche at the time of The Idea, as already stated, rests upon the understanding of the relation of Rätsel and wonder. His ability to understand this relation was befogged at that time in his near despair in his skepticism. The epoche is not only Husserl’s liberation from skepticism and the presentation of the

54 See David Carr’s discussion of the life-world and its elements of passive and active genesis in his Introduction to The Crisis xxxviii-xliii. See also the “Kritische Bermerkungen” of Roman Ingarden in Cartesiansche Meditationen, heursgeben und eingeleitet, S. Strasser, 2. Aufl. (The Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) 214-215. Here Ingarden points out the ambiguity of the concept of a ‘purely passive Nature’ in Husserl’s discussion of passive genesis in contrast to active genesis. This ambiguity in Husserl’s attempt to precisely distinguish the point of difference between his notion of passive and active genesis is closely implicated with his attempts to define the essence of the life-world. Ingarden does, however, agree with Husserl that the one intending goes through stages or levels from passive to active constitution. Ingarden says that Husserl’s opinion that constitution “die Schritt für Schritt die Bildung der Gegenstandes durchfuhr, ist unwiefalsrhaft ganz richtig” (215). See Ryan, “Active and Passive Elements in Husserl’s Notion of Intentionality,” 44.

55 Husserl, The Idea 56 [72].
epoche, it is also the starting point for establishing his phenomenological method. Thus, in *The Idea*, as well as *The Crisis*, Husserl speaks of the riddle of knowledge, and then in his Vienna Lecture he speaks explicitly of wonder. The two notions are closely related. The first notion of wonder is closely associated with the term Rätsel which he uses in Lecture I of *The Idea* for the first time in these lectures, and then, which Husserl himself frequently expresses by name throughout these same lectures. The second and more comprehensive notion of wonder he thematically introduces and describes in his late Vienna lecture “Phenomenology and the Crisis of European Man” (1935). There he cites Plato’s and Aristotle’s identification of wonder as the beginning of philosophizing, and he cites as well the spirit of science introduced by the Greeks. This approach is not conjoined explicitly and thematically, but rather operatively (see above) with intentionality, inasmuch as it is identified with the a priori correlation of the subject to transcendence through intentionality.

But of capital importance for the understanding of wonder and intending, Husserl introduces as a theme the telos of the human spirit that was discovered by the Greeks, and that he claims his phenomenology has more abundantly described than the Greeks. In surpassing the Greeks, Husserl has joined two essential elements in his method: the epoche and the life-world. They clarify what the telos of the human spirit is. This telos, grounded in the community of Western Europe, according to Husserl, is correlated to the wondering subject who has carried out the epoche. The subject pursues this telos constantly, as an individual and as a member of a community, through the intentional constitution of an objective reality — such as Western Europe — by its knowing and valuing, by the achievements of religions and by ethical investigations. This human reality is the set of intellectual, aesthetic, ethical, and religious achievements of a community. This human reality is part of the life-world of Europeans. The telos of Europeans is not randomly discovered and casually chosen by Europeans. For Europeans, the telos is not freely chosen; its existence is a fact. As for the tradition of Europe, its

56 Husserl, *The Idea* 15 [20].
57 For the meaning of ‘thematic,’ see above n. 3.
set of intellectual, artistic, ethical, and religious achievements, are not freely picked out as a casual possibility for the people in Western Europe. The correlation, however, of human subjects to the telos through intentionality is also a fact. Further, then, the telos does not exist because human subjects have decided that it should; the correlation is not something chosen. Finally, wonder at the correlation and the telos is not freely decided upon and selected by either the individual or the community.

Two other important concepts of Husserl should be introduced here because they help to clarify the interrelationship of the principal topics of this paper: subject and object, wonder, intentionality, and the epoche. These concepts are (1) that of the eidos, and (2) that of 'primordial' or 'proto-' expressed in the German prefix Ur-. These major concepts on their own can be considered auxiliary notions that help to elucidate the principal topics of the paper. For they pertain to the nest of basic notions that Husserl constantly uses to engage his phenomenological method. Thus, these two concepts have their own individual and specific identity, and yet they are in addition related to the central topics of this paper. To understand their identity is to gain a further understanding and elucidation of Husserl’s comprehensive topic of the intending ego and its known object.

The first of these ‘auxiliary’ concepts is the eidos, specifically, the eidos of the ego. Husserl usually assigns the term ‘eidos’ to an essential structure of something understood in the eidetic moment of the epoche. Such are the eidos of the ego, the eidos of the essential features of any color, or the eidos of any object whatsoever. Husserl thus most often emphasizes the eidos as an ‘object’ intended by a special type of intentional act. “The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence.” This presentation of the eidos could be

59 For the notion of the eidos itself, one may see The Ideas, part 3, ch. 1; Cartesian Meditations, Fourth Meditation. For the notion of moments in the epoche, or transcendental reduction, see Rudolf Boehm, “La phénoménologie de l’histoire,” Revue internationale de Philosophie 71 (1965) 55-73.

60 See Husserl, Ideas, #3-4.

61 Husserl, Ideas 9 [10-11]. Italics are in Husserl’s text.
called a noematic account. There is, however, correlatively a noetic account of the eidos in which Husserl, it seems, openly states that the eidos is an act of understanding prior to concepts. The eidos is a set of insights, through which the ego grasps something, even itself. “It [the eidos] is,” he says, “prior to all ‘concepts’, in the sense of their verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos.” Since Husserl rarely speaks of the eidos as an intentional act except when considering the epoche, it is difficult to find him directly addressing the eidos as an intentional act. But given the context of his inspection of the eidos in the early part of Ideas, and his comprehensive exposition of the eidos in Cartesian Meditations and his explicit remarks cited above, it seems clear that the eidos is a noetic event in the ego that grounds an infinity of concepts and linguistic expressions. The eidos of the ego, then, could be said to be attained in an insight — or set of insights — that grasps the interlinking elements of the knowing and valuing ego. Consequently, for Husserl the eidos is either of the act of grasping the structure of something in its essential features — as the act of the ego grasping itself and writing books like Ideas and Cartesian Meditations — or, as it is usually considered by Husserl, the essential structure of something known in a special moment of the epoche. So, there are eide of color and objects in general, but there is also an eidos of the ego and of Western Civilization whose principal characteristic is its telos. Finally, Husserl’s designation of intentionality as the eidos of the transcendental ego sums up precisely the essence of the ego. The ego’s essential characteristic, revealed after Husserl’s discussion of the epoche in #32 of Ideas, is identified in #37 as ‘directedness-to’ objectivity. Husserl’s emphasis upon the essential features of the ego underline his position that the ego is the primordial and grounding source of all human intending. According to Husserl, then, upon this ground rest all axioms and laws of logic and the sciences, and any other kind or instance of human knowing. When one thus considers the eidos as possessing both noematic and noetic dimensions, one immediately sees the remarkable similarity of the positions of Husserl and of Lonergan with respect to the

ground of human knowing. Husserl would say that all intuition and constitution are grounded in the essential intending of the ego. And Lonergan would say, almost echoing the very words of Husserl, "a single insight is expressed in many concepts. ... a single insight grounds an infinity of concepts." But Lonergan would add that ultimately insights as well as all other acts of knowing are grounded in the "overarching intention of being."

The second of Husserl's 'auxiliary' concepts is found expressed in the German prefix Ur- which occurs abundantly in his writings. It may be translated as 'proto-' or 'primal.' It is found in terms such as the well-known expression Urdoxa in Ideas. Other Ur- terms that might be cited are Urbedingung, Urzeitigung, Urstiftung and Urkonstituion. Husserl's frequent use of this prefix when he is investigating the correlation of the ego to transcendence reveals that he considers this correlation the primal reality of the ego's knowing. The prefix, conjoined with an understanding of the eidos of the ego, helps to stress that this correlation is the very ground of human knowing. This ground is ontologically prior to anything else in the manifold human acts of intending, knowing, and valuing that are occurring and will occur. This ground is the foundational operator — in the language of mathematics and logic — of all human intending, transforming the ego from one conscious level to another in its intentional performance. The eidetic moment, for its part, of the epoche uncovers the transformational characteristics of this operator. This eidetic moment Husserl names the 'Detached Observer.' It is the ego as performing the epoche.
The eidos of the ego and the usage of 'proto-', at first seemingly unrelated notions in Husserl, are essential to clarifying the interlinking levels of intentional activity occurring in the ego. Why? Because these two notions aid in understanding Husserl's central concept of the transforming capability of intentional constitution. As already pointed out, when Husserl speaks of the eidos of the ego, he is not speaking of a conceptualized listing of innumerable but inert features. Nor is he speaking of the eidos as if it were merely a taxonomy of concepts and propositions to be mastered in order to identify the levels of intentionality with their correlative objects. Finally, the eidos is not an image or 'picture' — although it does possess the powers of an heuristic image — of the intending ego, in spite of the etymology of the word 'eidos.' To sum up the remarks on the eidos and the Ur- prefix: for Husserl the eidos is revealed in one of the moments of the epoche as the invariant structure of the ego. That is to say, the eidos is the invariant pattern grasped through one moment of the epoche. This structure operates through levels of intending to constitute transcendent objects. Through this pattern of interlinking acts of intending, the ego works consciously to constitute known reality.

After this condensed presentation of these two auxiliary concepts of Husserl, one can return to the central notion of wonder, and thus round off Husserl's examination of the riddle of human knowing. Evidently, to round off his examination of the riddle in no sense means to pretend a comprehensive treatment of such a vast topic. But one can go back to the nest of central thematic and operative notions which Husserl constantly uses, and thereby achieve some elucidation of these central notions. One can thus best bring this study to an end by last of all analyzing Husserl's rich concept of constitution. The notion of constitution encompasses these two auxiliary concepts. But then, his notion of wonder encompasses the concept of constitution since as wonder it is the primordial conscious response of the ego to its factual correlation to transcendence. Upon the basis of this wonder, the ego can and does constitute known realities. Not only is wonder the source of the epoche; it is furthermore the source as an
operative concept of the intentional constitution that the epoche inspects. And as for the epoche, it must start from the life-world which is constituted by the ego. By examining, then, some features of constitution here, one rounds off the study of wonder and the Rätsel by rounding back to them and their implications for Husserl's notion of the riddle of knowing, and thus for his phenomenology.

For Husserl, constitution in its occurrence is as factual as wonder. Constitution and the kinds of intentional 'genesis' of objects can, however, be examined by means of the epoche to display their essential features. The examination of what Husserl calls 'genetic phenomenology' comprises two parts, 'active genesis' and 'passive genesis.'68 This genetic phenomenology is later than the phenomenology of the early works, like The Idea and Ideas where he studies the genesis of intentionality mainly in static constitution. In static constitution the judgment as the terminal point reached by constituting is Husserl's central issue. Although Husserl does recognize some elements of passive genesis, and does so over a long period of time,69 he does not develop his thought on passive genesis explicitly as foundational for the judgment. And really, he only can discuss passive genesis and its elements in an adequate manner when he has thematized the concept of the life-world. The thematization of the life-world, as mentioned, is a concept developed late in Husserl's career.

Although he speaks of passive genesis and active genesis, for Husserl there is only one intending of the ego known in the eidos of the ego. Passive and active genesis are not two disparate intending states of the ego that are to be linked up together. The one intending of the ego makes use of the passive genesis with its 'objective' layers to arise to


active genesis with its completed objective achievements of the judgment. The intending ego heads towards the fulfillment of its passive and active constitution in the judgment. Then the ego moves on again with its repeated and recurrent intentional acts to engage in more passive genesis, and perhaps even to reach the goal of a judgment in active genesis.

Husserl describes the advance from passive genesis to active genesis by adopting the traditional term ‘association.’ But association for Husserl is a feature of intending governed by ‘eidetic laws.’

The universal principle of passive genesis, for the constitution of all objectivities given completely prior to the products of activity, bears the title association. Association, it should be clearly noted, is a matter of intentionality.

If one knows thus the significance of the eidos of the intending ego for Husserl, then one would know without hesitation that he uses the term ‘association’ in a radically different manner from Hume, and means a correlation radically different from anything that Hume might be talking about, as Husserl himself asserts. Hume’s notion of association is the desperate and cobbled attempt to identify the source of unity for his incoherent account of human knowing. Association is Hume’s effort to correlate the knower and the known, or in a mechanistic language more to his liking, it furnishes the desired ‘linkage’ between sensation and ideas. But his imposed concept of association only exacerbates Hume’s problem. In naming something ‘association,’ Hume in no way identifies whether it is another piece of sensation or another idea. Association is Hume’s ersatz fabrication for Husserl’s notion of intentional correlation.

70 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 79 [113].
By 'association' Husserl means the first intentional stage of the ego where the 'history' of all 'levels' of experiential phenomena are constituted. Association constitutes "a substrate of predicates with which I may become acquainted." The ego becomes 'acquainted' with these possible predicates through its active constitution. In this 'history' of the ego's intending, however,

we soon encounter eidetic laws governing a passive forming of perpetually new syntheses (a forming that, in part, lies prior to all activity and, in part, takes in all activity itself. Thanks to the aforesaid passive synthesis (into which the performances of active synthesis also enter), the Ego always has an environment of 'objects.' [The goal-form of constituting objects] itself points back to a 'primal instituting' of this form. Everything known to us points to an original becoming acquainted; what we call unknown has, nevertheless, a known structural form: the form 'object' [Gegenstand] and more particularly, the form 'spatial thing,' 'cultural Object' [Objekt] tool, and so forth.

Association for Husserl is the intentional act or set of acts that he qualifies as "the purely immanent connection of 'this recalls that,' 'one calls attention to the other. ...' But all immediate association is an association in accordance with similarity." Inasmuch as association is intentional, Husserl can immediately point it out as the most important aspect of passive genesis. His notions of levels of constitution and the history of intending, instead of confusing the meaning of association and its rela-

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73 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 79 [113].

74 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 79-80 [113]. The difference in meaning between Gegenstand and Objekt is alluded to in Dorion Cairns's introduction to his translation of Cartesian Meditations 3, n. 2 (translator's note); one may see a fuller treatment of the meaning of these terms and related terms in the definitive work on Husserl's vocabulary in English in Dorion Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

75 Husserl, Experience and Judgment 75. It should be noted, however, that in Cartesian Meditations just examined (#38-39), Husserl explains association as the intermediary intentional component between passive genesis and active genesis. Nonetheless, in both of these works, Husserl identifies association (1) as an intentional component (he explicitly speaks of the 'nexus' of the ego with its constituted objects); (2) as actually constituting the universal concept, or notion, 'similarity.' Finally, in Cartesian Meditations Husserl rejects Hume by name precisely because Hume's notion of association is not intentional, and thus not relational.
tionship to intending, clarify it by explicitly naming elements in passive genesis which are the context within which association operates.

In spite of Husserl's explanation of passive genesis, it must be admitted that 'association' is an unhappy term to describe what he wishes it to describe. The term conjures up Hume. But as soon as Husserl states that association is an act or set of acts in which the ego notes similarity and unity in the field of perception, he has indicated that association belongs essentially (eidetically) to intending. Association is Husserl's general term for the ego's necessary organization and constitution of the layers of meaning antecedent to the judgment. To grasp similarity, then, or that some things are similar, is not just more perceiving, looking, touching, or imagining of many empirical things, even at the same time and same place. For if one counters that the empirical things are assembled in some sort of order, it may be answered that precisely association puts order into randomness. Association indicates, then, the unity of the one intentionality, but its unfolding in different layers and levels. Husserl's concept of association finds a parallel in Lonergan's notion of abstraction. Both association and abstraction are intentional activities. But Lonergan's notion of abstraction is more precise. Abstraction, for Lonergan, is the act of grasping what is relevant in any data, such what is relevant in anything perceived in the flow of sensations. Abstraction is not an impoverishment of Hume's 'lively' sense knowledge of material things which he compares to the faint, abstract idea of causality associated with his billiard balls. Abstraction is the enrichment of knowledge, specifying what is important, and dropping out what is unimportant.76 Although Husserl clearly grasps the difference between passive and active constitution in the one intending of the ego, he still enumerates further specific elements of intentionality to explain the advance from the one to the other.

Husserl thus goes on to use several other terms together with 'association' in order to underscore some specific elements in the interrelationships of passive and active genesis. In his work *Experience and Judgment*, these terms have complete sections dedicated to them in Part I. Among these terms of primary importance is 'striving'(#50, c). Husserl's notion of striving pinpoints a further specific aspect of association.

Having established the eidos of the ego as intentionality which he names a 'directedness-to ...', Husserl needs to go on to examine this ego with more than just such a vague phrase to guide him. The phrase has some preliminary and informal advantage when used in describing intentionality, but does little to show that intentionality is a cumulative, advancing process, retaining previous levels of sense and arising to new, more comprehensive levels. The phrase does little to explain how the ego advances from passive constitution to the active constitution of judging. Lonergan, on the other hand, would qualify the phrase 'directedness-to' as descriptive and belonging to the world of common sense. To attain an explanatory account and the world of theory that Husserl seeks through eidetic studies, Lonergan designates the interrelated levels of consciousness in the subject's intending 'successive sublations.' The notion of Sublation is adopted and adapted from Hegel. Though Husserl did not read Hegel, he clearly understands levels of intending. They are his passive and active genesis that are components of the one 'directedness-to' objectivity of the ego's one intending.

Here, then, one can see the major function of the term 'striving.' The concept of striving properly speaking pertains to passive constitution as one of its component by which the ego arises to active constitution. The

77 See #16-21.

78 See the further examples of other terms which Husserl himself introduces in *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* cited in William F. Ryan, "Passive and Active Elements in Husserl's Notion of Intentionality," *The Modern Schoolman* 55 (1977) 37-55. This paper by Ryan is a sketch to assemble not only important terms in Husserl's vocabulary concerning genesis, but especially to point out the advance from passive genesis to active genesis. One can see also Ulrich Melle, "Consciousness: Wonder of All Wonders," *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1992) 155-173.

79 "The Subject," *A Second Collection* 80.
notion shows, however, that Husserl understands the necessity of expanding his study of the central feature of intentional constitution advancing from passive elements to the active performance of the judgment. But why, one may ask, is the judgment so important for Husserl when perception seems always to be indicated as the paradigm of intentionality in Husserl? The answer is that only the predicative judgment constitutes an object in the precise signification of what it means for something to be an ‘object’ (whether a Gegenstand or an Objekt, that which is independent of subjectivity). In Husserl’s blunt words:

It is once again necessary to remind ourselves that, when one speaks here [Husserl is speaking of passive constitution] of an object [von einem Objekt, einem Gegenstand], the term is not being used properly. For, as we have already pointed out several times, one cannot yet speak at all of objects in the true sense in the sphere of original passivity.80

Thus, the state of affairs, or the facts known through judgment, do not exist at all as something known until the intending of the ego reaches the level of the judgment. With a judgment an object is effectuated as something known. Husserl’s notion of striving points out that the known object is constituted at the end of a process of searching. Although speaking of the form of logical propositions, and the relation of the subject and predicate terms, Husserl points to the reality that a judgment constitutes, even in logic. In the judgment the object knows what is the case. Explicitly Husserl mentions the striving (streben) that the ego uses to go from passive genesis to actively constitute a judgment:

It is only in the ‘is’ of this connection that the positing of what ‘exists’ ‘once and for all’ in truly accomplished, and with this a constitution of sense of a new kind in the object substrate. The copulative connection is that to which the objectivating consciousness in its different levels ultimately aspires [hinausstrebt] … 81

80 Experience and Judgment 77, n.1 [81, n. 1]; see further the straightforward remarks of Husserl in this work about the relation of the judgment to the object and objectivity in #14.

81 Husserl, Experience and Judgment 215 [254].
Constitution brings the intending subject to a ‘sense of a new kind,’ to what really ‘is,’ to what happens to be the case. But further, this is the point to which the riddle of the correlation of knower and known, wonder, the epoche, the concept of intentionality, and the notions of immanence and transcendence have brought the student of Husserl:

Husserl maintains the transcendence of the world in relation to subjectivity. Reality is not reduced to consciousness; ... and yet, in this very transcendence, it is accessible to consciousness. This is what Husserl calls the riddle or enigma of transcendence.82

This riddle inspires an investigation into the notion of constitution in order to enlighten, not eliminate the riddle. The riddle, the enigma, is the way reality is. Subjectivity has only limited possibilities with it. One of these possibilities is to elucidate subjectivity’s constitution of a meaningful world. The enigma of transcendence is

at the same time the enigma of constitution, for intentionality constitutes an object which transcends itself, which acquires an existence and a sense that become independent of subjectivity. The theory of constitution is not an attempt to dissolve this enigma, but an endeavor to see what can be said about it. In describing the constitution of various objects, Husserl will show what subjective conditions are necessary for the emergence of their transcendent sense; he will show what subjectivity has to do in order that their particular type of transcendence can come about.83

As one observes Husserl multiply his terminology, for example ‘association’ and ‘striving,’ one realizes that he is uncovering and displaying the ‘marvelous’ structure of the ego that is directed through the diverse aspects of intentionality to arrive at what is yet unknown. This marvelous structure of intentionality is the foundation for Husserl’s method of doing philosophy. This structure is the source of wonder, and the epoche. But in addition, the wonder itself of the ego at its correlation to transcendence is the intending of the ego in its passive and active constitution. Husserl does not state these two aspects — thematic and operative — as two features of the ego with its correlation to transcen-

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dence. Husserl does not state thematically that the same wonder at the riddle of the correlation is the proto-intending that sets all acts of constitution in motion. This precision Lonergan makes. Lonergan states that the same wonder and awe at the correlation to transcendence is likewise the ground of the 'scheme' which he speaks of in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, the 'notion of being' in Insight,84 and the 'intention of being' of "Cognitional Structure."

In conclusion, one should remark with wonder that the problem of Meno 80d reappears and that Husserl deftly solves it: the ego is not born with answers; it is born with the questions of intentionality to find answers. The ego finds the answers in the nest of interlinking judgments which it makes through passive and active genesis. Finally, the fact that there is always this correlation of questioning to answers is the riddle of human knowing.

SUMMARY

The aim of this paper has been a brief examination of Husserl's notion of the riddle of knowing with a comparison to Lonergan's notion of wonder and the intention of being. The examination was undertaken by relating Husserl's concept of a riddle essentially to these central themes: wonder, epoche, and intentionality, with concomitant references to Lonergan's analogous notions. The paper was thus divided into two sections to address these themes of Husserl and Lonergan: Part I: "The Riddle of Knowing"; and Part II: "Wonder and Intentionality." The paper shows that for Husserl the very fact of human knowing in its correlation to transcendence is the riddle, and it shows that for Lonergan the subject wonders at this correlation, and consciously engages its structure of knowing and loving.

84 Insight, CWL 3 16 and of course ch. 12.
JUDGMENTS OF VALUE, FOR THE LATER LONERGAN

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INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that Bernard Lonergan's stand on the notion of the truly good, the notion of value, underwent a significant development between 1953, when he completed the manuscript of Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, and 1972, when Method in Theology appeared in print. Among the many evidences of this development, not the least compelling is the explicit testimony of Lonergan himself.

In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions.

1 I presented an earlier version of this paper at a meeting of the Graduate Seminar of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, on 30 March 1995. I am grateful for the comments I received from the members. I am also grateful for detailed written comments on that earlier version by my colleague Robert Doran.


Although the fact of this development is not in doubt, and its consequences for the Lonerganian account of judgments of value and decisions are by no means wholly obscure, it remains that Lonergan's own delineation of those consequences is terse and sketchy in some key respects. For example, is Method's 'apprehension of value' essentially a supplement to what Insight means by the 'grasp of the virtually unconditioned' in the context of 'practical reflection,' or, by contrast, does it replace it altogether? Precisely how is the apprehension of value related to the judgment of value? Just where is the value that the apprehension of value apprehends? In the crucial assertion that apprehensions of value "are given in feelings," what exactly is the force of the word 'in'? Lonergan's relative lack of detail on such matters has led to differing interpretations of what he means. And the existence of differing interpretations in turn has greatly complicated such important tasks as assessing certain basic objections to the later Lonergan's whole approach, employing his account in one's analysis of particular concrete evaluations and decisions, and elucidating precisely how evaluations and decisions are influenced by one's being unrestrictedly in love.

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5 The basic text is Method, especially 30-41. In his subsequent writings Lonergan often reiterates various points made here but, on my reading, does not expand them in a way that is significant for our present considerations. See, for example, Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 172-175.

6 Method 37; see, more broadly, 37-38.


8 By 'the later Lonergan' I mean Lonergan after about 1964. Frederick Crowe argues that Lonergan's works before and after this date respectively are the products of two distinct periods in the development of his interests, an earlier period when he was concerned above all to examine understanding and knowing, or 'mind,' and a later
In the present essay, my hope is to compensate in some way for Lonergan's own relative lack of detail by sketching what I suggest is a veritable Lonerganian account — partly interpretative and partly expansive — of certain key elements of the cognitional process on the fourth level of intentional consciousness. More specifically, I have three goals. My primary goal is to propose some particular augmentations of Lonergan's phenomenology of value judgments. My two secondary goals are to recall the distinguishing trait of value judgments that are true, cognitionally valid, epistemically objective; and to indicate how I think the presence of unrestricted love affects value judgments.

2. KNOWING VALUABLE ACTUALITIES AND POSSIBILITIES

One clear way of highlighting the characteristic phenomenal features of the cognitional process on the fourth level of intentional consciousness is to spell out phenomenal similarities and differences between that process and the cognitional processes on the prior three levels. That is the approach I shall take in what follows, making three schematic comparisons that are progressively more specific about level four.

period when his paramount interest was the study of feeling and loving, or 'heart.' See, for example, Crowe, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea 52-55; see also 5-12, 55-70, 98-105, 345-355.

9 See the following note.

10 By the phenomenal features of the cognitional process I mean its apparent features, the features whose articulation is sought by Lonergan's 'first basic question.' To speak of cognitional features as phenomenal leaves open the issue of whether they are merely phenomenal or also genuinely epistemic — an issue which emerges only with Lonergan's 'second basic question.' By (cognitional) phenomenology I mean the enterprise of articulating the phenomenal features of the cognitional process — the enterprise of answering the 'first basic question.' My use of the words 'phenomena(l)' and 'phenomenology' in this way is not without warrant in Lonergan's own writings, though Lonergan recognizes the potential ambiguity of the latter word. (See, for example, Understanding and Being, 2nd ed., Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5 [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990] 44, 45, 170, 196, 197, 198, 270, 271, 317, 329; compare Method 59-61.) Note that phenomenology in my sense, correlated as it is with Lonergan's 'first basic question,' is broader than the philosophical approach commonly attributed to Husserl and his followers. (On the precise meaning of the 'three basic questions' and their emergence in Lonergan's work, see Michael Vertin, "'Knowing,' 'Objectivity,' and 'Reality': Insight and Beyond," in Fred Lawrence, ed., Lonergan Workshop 8 [1990] 249-263).
2.1. Levels four, three, and two, versus level one

At the outset, it is worth contradistinguishing Lonergan’s phenomenology of the concrete subject from certain other accounts in the history of explicit philosophy by recalling five phenomenal features that he judges common to all my cognitional acts.\(^{11}\)

First, all my acts as a concrete subject — and thus all my cognitional acts — are conscious, not just intentional. That is to say, my every act of knowing or deciding includes a content-of-awareness phenomenally identical with the act itself, a content I grasp in and through performing the act. In no way is Lonergan a phenomenological *mere intentionalist* (or mere objectivist), a phenomenologist claiming that always or at least sometimes I am aware of nothing more than the intentional contents of my knowing and/or deciding.\(^{12}\)

Second, all my acts as a concrete subject — and thus all my cognitional acts — are intentional, not just conscious. That is to say, my every act of knowing or deciding includes a content-of-awareness phenomenally distinct from the act itself, a content I grasp in and through performing the act.\(^{13}\) In no way is Lonergan a phenomenological *mere non-intentionalist* (or mere subjectivist), a phenomenologist claiming that always or at least sometimes I am aware of nothing more than the non-intentional contents of my knowing and/or deciding.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{11}\) Here and throughout this essay, I ordinarily use such words as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitional’ in their *broad sense*, the sense in which they designate not just compound but also elementary knowing. (For this distinction, see *Method* 12-13.) On the other hand, by the word ‘act’ I mean something more specific than the states and trends that, though conscious, are not intentional. (For this distinction, see *Method* 30-31.) Finally, my labels for the five following non-Lonerganian accounts of the concrete subject either reflect currently common philosophical terminology or are developed by analogy with it. (See, for example, Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [New York: Macmillan, 1967]).


\(^{13}\) Mystical knowing is a state rather than an act; hence, it does not constitute an exception to this assertion. (See, for example, *Method* 83-84, 257, 266.)

\(^{14}\) For example, *Method* 7-9, by contrast with F.H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (1893), book II.
Third, my initial acts as a concrete subject are acts of discovery, not acts of decision. That is to say, the contents first present to me become present simply as contents of my discovering, not as results of my deliberate constituting or producing. In no way is Lonergan a phenomenological absolute voluntarist (or absolute decisionist), a phenomenologist claiming that all the contents of my awareness are contents I deliberately constitute or produce.\(^{15}\)

Fourth, acts of discovery not only precede but also undergird all my acts of decision, at least in so far as the latter are responsible. That is to say, every one of my well-made decisions is conditioned by the contents of my prior acts of discovery, rather than emerging simply on its own.\(^{16}\) Lonergan certainly recognizes the possibility of decisional inauthenticity, but in no way is he a phenomenological normative voluntarist (or normative decisionist), a phenomenologist claiming that all or even some responsible decisions are based on nothing but themselves.\(^{17}\)

Fifth, my acts of discovery all are acts of knowing, not acts of mere feeling. That is to say, what I discover is what I know, not simply what I feel. Lonergan surely recognizes that acts of knowing invariably have an affective dimension, but in no way is he a phenomenological emotivist (or noncognitivist), a phenomenologist claiming that all or even some acts of discovery are simply acts of feeling.\(^{18}\)

Now, although in Lonergan’s view my cognitional acts are conscious, intentional, my sole means of discovery, prior to my decisional

\(^{15}\) For example, Method 9-10, by contrast with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Sonnenklar Bericht ...* (1801), III. Whereas the preceding counterposition minimizes intentionality and thus *a fortiori* radicates everything (immediately) in the self, the present counterposition does not minimize intentionality but nonetheless ultimately radicates everything (mediately) in the Self.

\(^{16}\) A decision *conditioned* by discovery is not necessarily a decision *determined* by discovery. Unless I possess the beatific vision, no object of my knowledge is so compellingly desirable as to eliminate my freedom to reject it. On the other hand, if a decision is not even conditioned by what I have have discovered but rather is an expression of my freedom alone, then it is arbitrary; and an arbitrary decision is an irresponsible decision.

\(^{17}\) For example, Method 31-41, by contrast with Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’Existentialisme est un humanisme* (1946).

acts, and conditions of those decisional acts in so far as I proceed authentically, he nonetheless asserts an important difference between the cognitional process on the first level of intentional consciousness and the processes on levels two through four. Cognition on the first level is immediate.\(^{19}\) On the first level of knowing another, sensory experience is merely receptive, not constitutive and productive. It is evoked simply by some content that is given (a color, sound, odor, and so on); and the evoking content and the ultimate known content are one and the same.\(^{20}\) Similarly, on the first level of knowing myself, conscious experience is merely self-present, not self-constitutive. It is my non-reflexive\(^{21}\) awareness of my intentional acts and non-intentional states and trends — on all four levels — simply in so far they are given and present to me, data upon which I can reflect. By contrast, cognition on levels two, three, and four, whether it regards another or myself, is mediate. In its intentional dimension it is constitutive and productive, not just receptive; and in its conscious dimension, self-constitutive, not just self-present. It is evoked conjointly by some content that is given and the radical spontaneity that is a transcendental notion. And it proceeds in discrete steps to an ultimate known content that is abstractly intelligible, or real, or valuable — a formal, full, or active term of meaning.\(^{22}\)

From the foregoing there follow three points of central importance to our Lonerganian account of knowing the valuable. First, the valuable, like the real and the intelligible and the experienceable, in its basic instances is discovered, not created.\(^{23}\) In particular, the valuable is not engendered by

\(^{19}\) I prescind here from acts of constructive imagination, which, though on the first level, are not strictly immediate. (See, for example, Lonergan, \textit{Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas} [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967] 166-167.)

\(^{20}\) 'Evoking content' corresponds to what in \textit{Verbum} Lonergan calls 'agent object.' ‘Ultimate known content’ is broader than either ‘terminal object’ or ‘final object.’ (See, for example, \textit{Verbum} 128-133, 139-140, 176-179.)

\(^{21}\) To characterize consciousness as 'non-reflexive' is to characterize it as self-awareness that antecedes any folding-back of intentional awareness upon itself. This is another way of expressing the earlier claim that Lonergan is not a phenomenological mere intentionalist.

\(^{22}\) For example, \textit{Method} 28, 73-75, 76, 262-263. Compare \textit{Insight}, CWL 3 329-330, 381-382, 592.

\(^{23}\) First, I know some valuable thing or property. Second, if that valuable thing or property is actual, I can choose to enjoy it; while if it is merely possible, I can choose to
my feelings. On the other hand, the valuable, like the real and the intelligible, is phenomenally distinct from the experienceable. Again, like the real and the abstract intelligible, the valuable is known only mediatly, not (like the experienceable) immediately.

2.2. Levels four and three versus level two

On my Lonerganian account, the mediate cognitional processes on levels two through four are similar in so far as each comprises three main steps. The first step is questioning. Aware of some concrete diversity, and motivated and directed by the radical spontaneity that is a transcendental notion, I seek some supra-experiential unity in that diversity. The second step is having an insight. Moved conjointly by the transcendental notion and the diversity as asked about, I grasp a concrete supra-experienceable unity in the diversity I have questioned. The third step is producing a mental word. Moved by my grasp of the unity in the diversity, I produce a mental expression of what I have grasped; and my production of that mental expression is a process not of mere natural spontaneity but rather of intelligence, reasonableness, or responsibility, as the case may be.

actualize it. In the latter case, my choice (and its successful implementation) increases the total number of actually valuable things or properties. (Also see below, §2.3.)

Finnis misreads Lonergan on this point (Fundamentals of Ethics 42-45; see also 32-37, 48-50, 54). For the early Lonergan, both the object of desire and the good of order are genuinely good — namely, valuable — only in so far as they are possible objects of rational choice (see, for example, Insight, CWL 3 624). The later Lonergan identifies the valuable with what is to be known through value judgments based on feelings that are self-transcending (see, for example, Method 34-41). But to specify the valuable in terms of rational choice or self-transcending feelings is a far cry from specifying it (à la Hume) as the object of desire. I would guess that Finnis's misreading stems from his oversight of Lonergan's equation of genuine good with value, and his antecedent exclusion of Lonergan's view that feelings can have cognitive potential. (An abbreviated version of the same misreading appears in Finnis's subsequent "Historical Consciousness" and Theological Foundations [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992] 12-13.)

Hence Lonergan's view of this matter is quite different from the (Humean) view Finnis incorrectly imputes to him.

The mature Lonergan regularly characterizes the second-level cognitional process in terms of inquiry, direct insight, and formulation; the third-level, reflection, reflective insight, and judgment; and the fourth-level, deliberation, apprehension of value, and evaluation. These three triplets refine and extend his characterization in VERBUM of the second-level cognitional process in terms of objective, apprehensive, and formative abstraction. (See, for example, VERBUM 176-180.) On all three levels, the
The preceding paragraph's 'Lonerganian account' introduces the chief interpretative expansion of Lonergan that I am proposing in the present essay. While I shall be elaborating this expansion more fully below, let me promptly register two of its elements — one substantive, the other terminological. The substantive element is my claim that not just on level two but also on levels three and four the pivotal step in the respective cognitional processes is the grasping of a supra-experienceable unity in a concrete diversity. The terminological element is my claim that not just on levels two and three but also on level four that pivotal step may appropriately be labeled 'insight' — and, specifically on level four, 'deliberative' insight.

It remains that there are at least four significant differences between the second-level cognitional process, on the one hand, and the third-level and fourth-level processes, on the other. First, the radical spontaneity that motivates and guides my questioning on level two is the transcendental notion of intelligibility. And the questions in which it takes form are questions for intelligence, questions such as what, why, when, and how often. By contrast, the transcendental notions that propel and orient my questioning on levels three and four respectively are notions of what we might call supra-intelligibilities — global objectives that, though not apart from intelligibility, are not limited to it. And the questions in which the latter notions take form go beyond questions for intelligence.

Again, the concrete diversity regarded by my questioning on level two is the diversity of data — data of sense or consciousness. But the concrete diversity regarded by my questioning on levels three and four is the diversity of (a) some prospective judgment, the hypothetical synthesis of some intelligibility and data, (b) the link of that prospective judgment to conditions that, if fulfilled, would justify my asserting the judgment, and (c) the fulfillment of those conditions.

production of a mental word is what VERBUM calls an emanatio intelligibilis. (See, for example, VERBUM 33-45, 65-66, 82-83, 178-179.)

In short, I am generalizing a claim about intellectual knowing that Lonergan approvingly takes over from Aquinas: "Intelligere ... est multa per unum apprehendere" (De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964] 53; compare 45). I am grateful to Frederick Crowe for helping me retrieve the quotation.
Again, the unity-in-diversity grasped by direct insight on level two is an intelligible unification of the data of sense or consciousness about which I have asked. By contrast, both the unity-in-diversity grasped by reflective insight on level three and the unity-in-diversity grasped by deliberative insight on level four are supra-intelligible unifications of a prospective judgment, its link to sufficient conditions of its being asserted, and the fulfillment of those conditions. Or, again, the forms of both reflective insight on level three and deliberative insight on level four are illustrated by the form of deductive inference, though in themselves they are far more general than the latter.28

Finally, on level two the mental word that follows, is grounded by, and expresses my insight is simple — an abstract intelligibility, a concept. In that concept I express as universal something of the intelligibility that in the concrete I grasp as particular.29 But on levels three and four the mental word that follows, is grounded by, and expresses my insight is complex — an asserted judgment.30 In that asserted judgment I express the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned knowledge, as true, as justified. And through that asserted judgment I know the data-intelligibility synthesis as a virtually unconditioned known, as genuinely so, as a contingently noumenal thing or property.31

From the foregoing we may add three important points to our Lonerganian account of knowing the valuable. First, the valuable, like the real, is phenomenally distinct from the intelligible. Second, the valuable, like the real, is known in and through a complex mental word, not (like the abstract intelligible) a simple one.32 Third, the pivotal element in

28 See Insight, CWL 3 305-306.

29 For a concise overview of the various ways we form concepts, see Understanding and Being, CWL 5 165-168. Compare VERBUM 1-46.

30 "Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact" (Method 37).


32 As I see it, Lonergan quite agrees with Kant that 'being' or 'reality' is not a predicate (Critique of Pure Reason, B626-629), but he also maintains that 'goodness' or 'value' is
knowing the valuable, as in knowing the real, is grasping the supra-intelligible unity of (a) a prospective judgment, (b) its link to sufficient conditions of its being asserted, and (c) the fulfillment of those conditions. This stands in contrast to the pivotal element in knowing the abstract intelligible, namely, grasping the intelligible unity of data of sense or consciousness.

2.3. Level four versus level three

During the course of the prior section, I indicated four generic similarities I think obtain between the respective mediate cognitional processes on the third and fourth levels of intentional consciousness, by contrast with the second level. What then are the specific differences? For present purposes, I propose four.

First, on level three the basic dynamism that impels and directs my questioning is the transcendental notion of reality; whereas on level four it is the transcendental notion of valuability, value, the genuinely good. The questions to which the former gives rise are questions for reflection, questions such as is it, is this real, is that really so. The latter, by contrast, gives rise to questions for deliberation, questions such as is it good, is it worthwhile, is this more choiceworthy, ought that to be so, so what, what should I do.33

Second, I have suggested earlier that not only on level two but also on levels three and four my questioning always seeks some supra-experienceable unity in diversity, and that the pertinent diversity on levels three and four is that of (a) some prospective judgment, (b) the link of the prospective judgment to conditions that, if fulfilled, would justify my asserting the judgment, and (c) the fulfillment of those conditions. I now amplify that suggestion by claiming that on level three the prospective judgment is one of fact; and the conditions to which it is linked are not a predicate either. Values, like realities, are not intelligibilities (though they presuppose them); and knowing values, like knowing realities, is not like knowing intelligibilities (though it presupposes it).

33 The transcendental notion of value, not the affective response to a particular object, is what underlies particular questions of value. One’s affective response to a particular object underlies one’s answer, not one’s question. I find Ormerod’s account of this matter ambiguous at best ("Lonergan and Finnis on the Human Good" 201, 202).
sufficient conditions of its rationality — conditions that, if fulfilled, would rationally justify my asserting it. On level four, however, the prospective judgment is one of value; and the conditions to which it is linked are sufficient conditions of its responsibility — conditions that, if fulfilled, would responsibly justify my asserting it.34

Third, the unity-in-diversity grasped by insight on level three is the supra-intelligible unity of the prospective judgment of fact, its link to conditions sufficient for its rational assertion, and their fulfillment. And the insight by which I grasp this unity is an act of intellectual cognition, aptly labeled reflective. But on level four the unity-in-diversity grasped by insight is the supra-intelligible unity of the prospective judgment of value, its link to conditions sufficient for its responsible assertion, and their fulfillment. And the insight by which I grasp this unity is an act of affective cognition, aptly labeled deliberative.

The pivotal element of the fourth level process, what Lonergan in Method calls 'apprehension of value'35 and what I am calling 'deliberative insight,' may be elucidated more fully by situating it within the later Lonergan's division of feelings.36 Non-intentional states and trends are feelings whose causes or goals are not, at least initially, also intentional objects. Intentional responses, by contrast, are feelings evoked by

34 A basic supposition underlying this paragraph, and indeed this entire section of my essay, is that the later Lonergan's view of human knowing (including fourth-level knowing) is an expansion and refinement of the Aristotelian-Thomist account he elaborates in VERBUM, not a radical departure from it. This includes adherence to such principles as that knowing is essentially by identity and immateriality, human knowing on every level requires agent objects, and human knowing on every level beyond the first is mediate and discursive rather than immediate and intuitive. To be sure, Aristotle and Aquinas expound such principles in the categories and language of metaphysical psychology, not introspective psychology. But one of Lonergan's most fundamental and frequent arguments in VERBUM is that the characteristic Aristotelian-Thomist claims both rest on and reflect the claimants' highly skilled, albeit unthematized, introspective practice. (See, for example, VERBUM ix-x, 10-12, 56-57, 93-95, 184-190.) In VERBUM he begins his own thematization of that introspective practice, and in Insight he works out both the categories and the language in great detail. Notwithstanding their novelty in certain respects, my contention is that the developments in Method and beyond are essentially prolongations and adjustments of the initial thematization, not rejections of it in any significant way.

35 For example, Method 37-38, 66-67, 115-116, 245-246.

36 See Method 30-31.
intentional objects. Some intentional objects evoke feelings of pleasure, gratification, and fulfillment that do not necessarily derive from anything more than one's encounter with those objects themselves, feelings that are not necessarily more than self-oriented, self-centered, self-immanent. Lonergan denominates such objects 'satisfactions.' Other intentional objects evoke feelings of delight, joy, and fulfillment that derive from one's encounter — via such objects — with what stands beyond the objects themselves, feelings that are totality-oriented, universe-centered, self-transcendent. Lonergan denominates such objects 'values'; and the self-transcending feelings they evoke, 'apprehensions of value.'

Now, on the interpretation I am proposing, the intentional objects that evoke feelings are initially manifest as a subset of what VERBUM names 'agent objects'. On every level, human cognition both requires agent objects and is an intentional response to them, a response evoked at least in part by them. On the first level, agent objects act alone. On higher levels, agent objects act conjointly with what VERBUM names 'agent intellect' and what Method expands and renames 'transcendental notions.' On the first level, the agent object is a datum of sense; and the intentional response evoked by it is an act of sensing. On the second level, the agent object is the potentially intelligible unity in the diversity of data of sense or consciousness; and the intentional response evoked conjointly by it and the transcendental notion of intelligibility is at best an act of direct insight, an intelligent grasp of that potentially intelligible unity. On the third level, the agent object is the reflectively graspable unity in the diversity of a prospective fact judgment, its link to conditions sufficient for its rational assertion, and the fulfillment of those conditions; and the intentional response evoked conjointly by it and the transcendental notion of reality is at best an act of reflective insight, a rational grasp of that reflectively graspable unity. And on the fourth level, the agent object is the deliberatively graspable unity of a prospective value judgment, its link to conditions sufficient for its responsible assertion, and the fulfillment of

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37 For example, VERBUM 128-133, 139-140, 176-180; and Method 11-12, 36, 73-74, 282.
38 By contrast with sensing, consciousness is not itself an intentional act but rather a property of every intentional act (and of every self-present non-intentional state and trend as well).
those conditions; and the intentional response evoked conjointly by it and the transcendental notion of value is at best an apprehension of value, a deliberative insight, a responsible grasp of that deliberatively graspable unity.

Notice that on this interpretation every act of human knowing is an intentional response. In summary terms, every act of human knowing is an intentional response to what is knowable. In more expansive terms, every act of human knowing is an intentional response to an ultimate knowable content that differs from one level of knowing to the next. On the first level, the ultimate knowable content is a datum of sense (agent object), immediately grasped; and the intuitive cognitional response to that ultimate content is sensory.\(^{39}\) On the second level, the ultimate knowable content is a concept, an abstract intelligibility (terminal object), which latter emanates from the potentially intelligible unity (agent object) as grasped in direct insight; and the discursive cognitional response to that ultimate content is intellectual.\(^{40}\) On the third level, the ultimate knowable content is a reality (final object), grasped via the mediation of a fact judgment (terminal object), which latter emanates from the reflectively graspable unity (agent object) as grasped in reflective insight; and the discursive cognitional response to that ultimate content is, once again, intellectual. On the fourth level, the ultimate knowable content is a real value (final object), grasped via the mediation of a value judgment (terminal object), which latter emanates from the deliberatively graspable unity (agent object) as grasped in deliberative insight; and the discursive cognitional response to that ultimate content is affective.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) Recall the preceding note.

\(^{40}\) As complements to the label agent object, the labels ‘terminal object’ and, shortly, ‘final object’ provide a neat way to express the distinctions I am discussing here. For the latter two labels, see VERBUM 140.

\(^{41}\) In the pivotal cognitional step on each level, there is a coincidence of the agent object as grasped and one’s grasping of that agent object. More specifically: the sensible in act coincides with sense in act; the intelligible in act coincides with intelligence in act; the reflectively graspable in act coincides with rationality in act; and the deliberatively graspable in act coincides with cognitional responsibility in act. I suggest that the fourth-level version of this coincidence is what underlies the simultaneity of ‘apprehension’ and ‘response’ that Tyrrell expounds so lucidly in his penetrating analysis of the apprehension of value (“Feelings as Apprehensive-Intentional Responses to Values”). “For Lonergan there is no occurrence in consciousness of a cognitive ‘value-perception’
Notice further that on this interpretation the *fundamental meaning* of the word ‘value’ does *not* come from a certain class of intentional objects. Rather, the fundamental meaning of ‘value’ comes from the global objective of the third transcendental notion, the transcendental notion which goes beyond those of intelligibility and reality; and it is only because certain intentional objects (partly) fulfill that notion that they are properly labeled ‘values.’ Moreover, just how one applies the label depends upon how much detail one wishes to express. If one speaks summarily, then one first applies the word ‘value’ to some ultimate knowable fourth-level content *simply as known*, a real thing or property one judges genuinely good. Thus in *Method* Lonergan speaks of “the ontic value of persons” and “the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, truth, virtuous acts, noble deeds.” But if one speaks more expansively, then one first applies the word ‘value’ to some ultimate knowable fourth-level content *as prefigured in the content of deliberative insight*, and only secondly to that content *as known*. Thus in the quotation with which we began this essay, Lonergan speaks of what is “aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values” before it is “known in judgments of value.”

which precedes the intentional response of feeling to value. For Lonergan it is the very intentional response itself which ‘greets’ ... the value as value” (336). “Lonergan holds that feeling itself recognizes the value present in the object apprehended cognitively” (337). “It seems to me that the ‘intentional response to value’ as Lonergan understands it involves both a receptive and an active dimension. As *apprehensio* the intentional response is receptive of value; it recognizes value. As a *response* it actively greets and discriminates values” (338).

42 Hence, I am uneasy with Ormerod’s portrayal of (self-transcending) feeling as “responding to the actual ‘ontological’ value of the object” (“Lonergan and Finnis on the Human Good” 200; compare 203). Ormerod is rightly concerned to dispute Finnis’s claim that Lonergan presents values as created by feelings; but in pursuing this worthy goal I think he underplays another crucial feature of Lonergan’s stance, namely, that the basic meaning of ‘value’ derives not from certain objects to which one responds but rather from the transcendental notion in whose light one affectively cognizes certain objects as valuable. Values are not *created*, but neither are they *known immediately*. Rather, they are *known mediately*; and the transcendental notion of value is both the radical impetus and fundamental criterion of such knowing. (Parallel points could also be made about one’s knowing of realities and abstract intelligibilities.)

43 *Method* 31; see also 31-32, 37-38, 48-52, 115-116.

44 “Insight Revisited” 277; emphasis added. See also *Method* 37-38, 115-116.
Notice still further that on my interpretation Lonergan’s statement that values are apprehended “in feelings”\(^\text{45}\) means that values are apprehended by means of feelings that are self-transcendent, not within feelings (as within data). That is to say, one apprehends value ‘in’ feelings as in a \textit{terminus quo}, not a \textit{terminus quod}. Like acts of direct and reflective insight, self-transcendent feelings in the first instance are intentional responses, not intentional objects. Self-transcendent feelings (partly) constitute cognitional access to, not the content of, particular values.\(^\text{46}\)

My term ‘deliberative insight’ also merits additional comment. Let me begin by recalling that in \textit{Insight}, as in \textit{Method}, Lonergan discusses the conscious intentional process that culminates in value judgments and decisions. In \textit{Insight}, however, he portrays the value judgment, like the fact judgment, as proceeding from a pivotal act of intellectual cognition that is the initial outcome of ‘reflection’ — specifically ‘practical’ reflection in the case of the value judgment, by contrast with the ‘speculative or factual’ reflection associated with the fact judgment. And

\(^{45}\) \textit{Method} 37.

\(^{46}\) (a) I find Doran ambiguous on this issue (\textit{Theology and the Dialectics of History} 57-58, 86-87). (b) Without suggesting that its significance even roughly approximates that of a careful written comment, I would cite a spontaneous oral remark to me by Lonergan himself as a further bit of evidence in support of my interpretation. In August of 1975 Lonergan responded positively to one of my periodic requests for a clarifying discussion of philosophical issues. We met and talked for about an hour and a half at Regis College, then still located in Willowdale, Ontario. Our starting point was a set of written questions I had submitted beforehand, and one of my concerns was what it meant to say that values were apprehended ‘in’ feelings. About halfway through the conversation, my tape recording recounts the following exchange:

\begin{verbatim}
Lonergan: Do you know [J.A.] Stewart’s \textit{The Myths of Plato}?
Vertin: You read that, early on?
Lonergan: No, that was his \textit{Doctrine of Ideas} on Plato’s ideas — the argumentative side of Plato. But in this other book he gives you the Greek text and the translation of all the myths in Plato. And he has about ninety pages of an introduction. “And what are the myths about? Transcendental feeling!” In other words, values apprehended \textit{through} feeling, I’d say. That’s the sort of thing, you see, that’s prior to everything else.
\end{verbatim}

(This transcription, lightly edited, with the italicizing in the penultimate sentence, is my own. The tape of the entire discussion is available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.) Though we did not pursue this issue further, I clearly remember thinking at the time that I had gotten an important clue.
in both cases he labels that pivotal cognitional act 'reflective insight.' In *Method*, by contrast, while he still portrays the fact judgment as proceeding from reflective insight, Lonergan now presents the value judgment as proceeding from a pivotal act of affective cognition that is the initial outcome of 'deliberation.' And as we have already seen, he labels that pivotal act 'apprehension of value.' Now, in my opinion he introduces the latter expression to underscore his later view that the pivotal antecedent of the value judgment, while surely cognitive, is an act not of intellectual cognition but of affective cognition. Unfortunately, however, the expression 'apprehension of value' is apt to convey the notion of a direct and immediate grasp of particular values. Hence it tends to obscure an even more basic conviction I judge common to both the early and the later Lonergan, namely, that the cognitional processes on every level beyond the first are mediate and discursive, not immediate and intuitive. One knows particular values, just as particular realities and abstract intelligibilities, not immediately but mediately. In my expression 'deliberative insight,' 'deliberative' (rather than 'practical') neatly suggests the important discontinuity between Lonergan's later and earlier views; whereas 'insight' neatly suggests the even more important continuity.

47 *Insight*, CWL 3 632-635.

48 See the references in note 35 above.

49 I think Lonergan has the very same point in mind when he characterizes the pivotal element as a matter not of 'understanding' but of 'intentional response' (*Method* 245; compare 30 ff.). So, too, Charles Hefling: "Without retracting his earlier account of the good as intelligible, Lonergan treats it as a distinct notion, apprehended in the first instance not by insight but by feeling" ("The Meaning of God Incarnate according to Friedrich Schleiermacher," in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop 7* [1988] 105-177, at 111).

50 Byrne clearly recognizes the continuity, but it does not seem to me that he does justice to the discontinuity ("Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor"). Even when explicating the later Lonergan, he portrays the pivotal cognitive element in the move toward evaluation and decision as 'reflective understanding' of the virtually unconditioned status of 'practical insight' (112-116, 123-125). He presents that pivotal cognitive element as merely influenced by self-transcending feeling rather than centrally constituted by it (119-125). He characterizes value as "concretely realized intelligibility — intelligibility which there is 'good reason' to bring about" (124), rather than as what is distinguished by its sublating transcendence of both intelligibility and intelligibility's 'good-reason based' concrete realization. In such respects, he strikes me
In my remarks on the term 'deliberative insight' I have partially anticipated the fourth and final specific difference I will now suggest between the cognitional processes on levels three and four respectively. On level three the complex mental word that follows, is grounded by, and expresses my reflective insight is an asserted judgment of fact. In that asserted fact judgment I express the prospective fact judgment as virtually unconditioned knowledge, as true, as rationally justified. And through that asserted fact judgment I know the data-intelligibility synthesis as a virtually unconditioned known, as real, as a contingently existing thing or occurring property. But on level four the complex mental word that follows, is grounded by, and expresses my deliberative insight is an asserted judgment of value. In that asserted value judgment I express the prospective value judgment as virtually unconditioned knowledge, as true, as responsibly justified. And through that asserted value judgment I know the data-intelligibility synthesis as a virtually unconditioned known, as genuinely good, as a contingently valuable thing or property.

The preceding paragraph expounds a view I attribute to the later Lonergan, though I admit that in its generality he does not articulate it very clearly. The view is that on both levels three and four the notion of a 'virtually unconditioned' can illuminate the culminating elements of both knowing and the known. A true judgment of fact, a true judgment of value, the contingent reality known through the first, and the contingent value known through the second — each of these can be envisioned as a virtually unconditioned, a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled. That is to say, virtual unconditionality is what is common to the truth of a true judgment of fact or value, the reality of a contingently real thing or property, and the value of a contingently valuable thing or property.

Or, again, virtual unconditionality is the unifying theme of proportionate as confining Method within the framework of Insight rather than subsuming Insight into the framework of Method. (Also see below, note 57.)

51 Among Lonergan’s passing comments, one I have found especially helpful in the present respect occurs in Method 263, where he speaks of “a conditioned with its conditions fulfilled and that, in knowledge, is a fact and, in reality, it is a contingent being or event.”

52 Hence, although the notion of the virtually unconditioned is apt to be puzzling, this is due not to its inherent obscurity but rather to its unfamiliar generality.
cognitional phenomenology, on the one hand, and proportionate metaphysics (of the real and the valuable), on the other.53

I would develop my interpretative expansion of Lonergan in another direction as well, by underscoring that both the realities and the values known through true judgments can be actual or merely possible. More amply, any question for reflection or deliberation asks whether the conditions sufficient for positing a given data-intelligibility synthesis are fulfilled; and an affirmative answer to such a question will be one of three distinct types. One type of affirmative answer is that the conditions are actually fulfilled. A second type is that the conditions are not actually fulfilled, but their fulfillment is concretely possible: the considered synthesis is indeed intelligible, and the material elements needed for an actual synthesis are present. A third type of affirmative answer is that the conditions are not actually fulfilled, and their fulfillment is just abstractly possible: the considered synthesis is indeed intelligible, but the material elements needed for an actual synthesis are not present. Hence, a fact judgment can be a judgment of actual, concretely just possible, or just abstractly possible fact; and a value judgment can be a judgment of actual, concretely just possible, or just abstractly possible value.

Among other things, the preceding analysis helps eliminate a small confusion to which Lonergan himself unwittingly contributed. The difference between fact judgments and value judgments is a function of the difference between the respective transcendental notions that radically underlie them, between the respective questions to which they respond, and between the respective intellectual and affective cognitional elements pivotal to their emergence. The difference is not that fact judgments manifest actualities alone while value judgments can manifest mere possibilities as well.54 On the contrary, both can manifest both actualities

53 Still more general than the notion of the virtually unconditioned is the notion of the unconditioned. It captures what is common to (a) the truth of true judgments of fact or value, (b) the reality of contingently real things and properties, (c) the value of contingently valuable things and properties, and (d) the formal unconditionality of that which has no conditions whatsoever. Or, again, it is the unifying theme of cognitional phenomenology, on the one hand, and (proportionate and transcendent) metaphysics, on the other.

54 Consider the following assertion: "Judgments of value differ in content ... from judgments of fact ..., for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can
Vertin: Judgments of Value

and mere possibilities. A value judgment that manifests an actual value belongs to a conscious intentional process in the pattern of complacency, the process that properly terminates in a decision to enjoy the actual value. Any such value judgment must be preceded by a judgment of actual fact. Alternatively, a value judgment that manifests a merely possible value belongs to a conscious intentional process in the pattern of concern, the process that properly terminates in a decision to attempt actualization of the possible value. Any such value judgment must be preceded by a judgment of possible fact. However, in so far as the effort to actualize the possible value is successful, the process in the pattern of concern gives way in turn to a fact judgment, value judgment, and decision in the pattern of complacency.

We are now in position to distinguish several different kinds of possibility and, in turn, to clarify the Lonerganian expression ‘possible value.’ First, then, we may distinguish (1) data’s possibility of being intelligently understood; (2) a data-intelligibility synthesis’s possibility of being reasonably affirmed as real, whether (a) actually real, or (b) concretely just possibly real, or (c) just abstractly real; (3) a data-intelligibility disapprove of what does” (Method 37). Although this assertion is susceptible of being interpreted as expressing an important difference between fact judgments and value judgments, I believe such an interpretation would be mistaken. For one thing, Lonergan’s overriding concern in the paragraph as a whole seems clearly to be the highlighting of structural similarities between fact judgments and value judgments, not their differences in content. Furthermore, later in the same book, after emphasizing the need to distinguish “between a sphere of real being and other restricted spheres such as the mathematical, the hypothetical, the logical, and so on,” Lonergan goes on to maintain that contents of each sphere, the restricted (or possible, in my present terms) spheres as well as the real (or actual, in my present terms) sphere, may be rationally affirmed — may be, in effect, the contents of fact judgments. (See Method 75-76.)


Hence I find problematic Byrne’s statement that “every act of deciding is an actualization of value” (“Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor” 123). Though some decisions (namely, those in the pattern of concern) are indeed choices to actualize really possible values, other decisions (namely, those in the pattern of complacency) are simply choices to enjoy actual values. It remains true, of course, that every good decision, whatever the pattern in which it stands, further actualizes the originating value of the decider — a point Byrne himself clearly recognizes (116-117). However, this does not appear to be the actualization he has in mind here.
synthesis' possibility of being responsibly affirmed as valuable, whether (a) actually valuable, or (b) concretely just possibly valuable, or (c) just abstractly valuable; and (4) a data-intelligibility synthesis's possibility of being responsibly chosen, whether (a) for enjoyment, or (b) for actualization.

Secondly, I maintain that for the later Lonergan the distinctive reference of the expression 'possible value' is possibility 3b, which from the standpoint of the content itself (as distinct from the standpoint of the actor) is identical with 4b. That is to say, I contend that for the later Lonergan a 'possible value' is a data-intelligibility synthesis that is able to be responsibly affirmed as concretely just possibly valuable and, in consequence, able to be responsibly chosen for actualization. More amply, value is distinctively the focus of conscious-intentional process on level four, not on any prior level.\(^{57}\) A value is whatever is able to be

57 The compactness of Lonergan's early account of knowing and choosing values, plus the difference between that and his later account, can create confusion for even a careful reader. One focus of this confusion is what Lonergan in Insight calls 'practical insight.' A practical insight is a species of direct insight whose content is 'a possible course of action.' Like any direct insight, it emerges on the second level, the level of intelligence. On the third level, in turn, 'practical reflection' may manifest the practical insight's content as able reasonably to be chosen, a 'possible object of rational choice' — which is what the early Lonergan means by a 'value.' And further on the third level, actual choice in so far as it is reasonable will choose to make that content actual, to carry out the possible course of action. (Insight, CWL 3 609-616.)

Now, I would make three comments. First, in my judgment this early account does not sufficiently distinguish the different kinds of possibility associated with practical insight. For even in Insight's own perspective, Lonergan's 'possible course of action' is possible in three very different though successive ways. (a) On the second level, it is 'possible' in the sense of 'able to be intelligently understood.' (b) On the third level, it is 'possible' broadly in the sense of 'able to be reasonably affirmed' and consequently 'able to be reasonably chosen,' a value. And (c) again on the third level, it is 'possible' specifically in the sense of 'able to be reasonably affirmed as concretely just possible (rather than already actual)' and consequently 'able to be reasonably chosen for actualization,' a merely possible value (rather than an actual one).

Second, it follows that even in Insight a content does not emerge as a value on level two. A content becomes manifest as a value only when one answers 'yes' to the third-level question 'Can this content be reasonably chosen?' And, more narrowly, a 'possible course of action' becomes manifest as a possible value (rather than an actual one) only when one answers 'yes' to the third-level question 'Can this course of action be reasonably chosen for actualization?' However, the ambiguous terminology of 'possibility' associated with 'practical insight' can easily mislead a reader in this regard.

Third, by the time of Method the possibility of a content as a value (whether an actual value or a merely possible one) emerges only on level four. As in Insight, it does not emerge on level two; but by contrast with Insight it does not emerge on level three.
responsibly affirmed. Some values, however, are able to be responsibly affirmed as actually valuable; and in these cases the affirmations are followed at best by choices to enjoy those actual values. Other values are able to be responsibly affirmed as concretely just possible; and in these cases the affirmations are followed at best by choices to actualize those concretely possible values. These are the later Lonergan’s ‘possible values.’ Still other values are able to be responsibly affirmed as just abstractly possible; and in these cases the fourth-level process at best terminates with those affirmations.\(^{58}\)

3. **Epistemic Objectivity**

After more than twenty years of shepherding undergraduate and graduate discussions of whether it is possible to know values ‘objectively,’

\(\)\(^{58}\) In light of this paragraph and the preceding note, I find myself at odds with Doran’s suggestion that “the answer to the question of the place of feelings in the evaluative process depends on the character of the feelings involved” (Theology and the Dialectics of History 86; more broadly, see 57-58, 86-87). Doran proposes that the apprehension of [actual] value is related to value judgments as the reflective insight is related to fact judgments, whereas the apprehension of possible value is related to value judgments as the direct insight is related to fact judgments. On my analysis, however, the apprehension of possible value is never like a direct insight in the way Doran seems to suggest; for ‘value’—like ‘reality’—is not a predicate, not an intelligibility, not a content that as such becomes manifest on the second level of intentional consciousness. On the contrary, any apprehension of value is always like the reflective insight in the sense that it is always the grasp of a conditioned as virtually unconditioned. But I have also argued that for the later Lonergan the apprehension of value is always unlike the reflective insight as well, though in another sense: the reflective insight is the first element of one’s response to the third-level question, the question for reflection; while the apprehension of value is the first element of one’s response to the fourth-level question, the question for deliberation. And more narrowly, an apprehension of possible value is the first element of one’s response to a specific version of the fourth-level question, namely, ‘Granted that this data-intelligibility synthesis is not actually valuable, is it concretely possibly valuable?’ (‘Would it be good if I were to run for mayor?’) The apprehension of possible value prompts the judgment of possible value. (‘Yes, it would be good if I were to run for mayor.’) And the apprehension and judgment of possible value at best prompt the decision to actualize the possible value. (I decide to run for mayor.)
I have concluded that most disputes about the matter have little to do with the specific issue of knowing values, and much to do with the prior and more general issue of knowing anything at all. Moreover, this holds true whether the disputes are in the classroom or in the journals, and whether they regard the value question in general or as it emerges in the writings of Bernard Lonergan. If my conclusion is correct, then a thorough epistemology of evaluative knowing must be preceded by a thorough epistemology of knowing simpliciter. Obviously neither is possible in a brief essay. However, since the matter is integral to a well-rounded sketch of value judgments for the later Lonergan, let me summarize four key points.

The first key point is what we might call the basic principle of Lonergan’s general epistemology: genuine epistemic objectivity is the consequence of my authentic phenomenal subjectivity.\(^{59}\) Epistemic objectivity is the characteristic of those judgments (and, derivatively, the propositions expressing them) that are cognitionally successful, valid, genuine, true. By contrast, epistemic subjectivity is the characteristic of those judgments (and, derivatively, the propositions expressing them) that are cognitionally unsuccessful, invalid, bogus, false. How, then, does epistemic objectivity arise? Not by virtue of some phenomenal non-subjectivity, some ‘escape from myself’ in my cognitional enterprise. Rather, it arises precisely by virtue of my authentic phenomenal subjectivity, where *authentic* means fidelity to the normative structure of myself in my cognitional enterprise — and, at root, fidelity to the self-transcending transcendental notions that motivate, orient, and norm all my cognitional and decisional operations. Moreover, this account of epistemic objectivity is operationally incontrovertible. I can argue against it however I will; but if I attend carefully to my own performance in elaborating and asserting my objections, I will discover that operationally I invariably invoke what verbally I would reject.

The second key point is a salient phenomenological conclusion by the later Lonergan regarding the process of knowing values: the

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\(^{59}\) This statement of the principle, slightly more detailed than what Lonergan himself actually says, makes explicit what I think he means by it in the context of cognition. (See, for example, *Method* 265, 292; compare 233, 338.)
cognitional reason for every judgment of value is an apprehension of value — what in this essay I have explicated under the name deliberative insight. As a matter of phenomenological fact, every value judgment I make is cognitionally grounded in, based on, justified by my grasp of that judgment as a conditioned whose sufficient conditions of being responsibly asserted are fulfilled.

But even if all my value judgments are cognitionally grounded in value apprehensions, are all those judgments correct, valid, genuine, true, epistemically objective? Lamentably, no: sometimes I am mistaken. Why? What is the epistemological (as distinct from psychological) explanation of such errors? What criterion do they fail to meet, what standard do they not fulfill? I formulate the later Lonergan’s answer to this question as my third key point, which is properly epistemological: the proximate cognitional criterion of every epistemically-objective value judgment is a value apprehension that is self-transcending. Consequently, some of my value judgments are mistaken because the value apprehensions on which they rest are not self-transcending. Through some deficiency — at least transient — in my ability as a value apprehender, I fail to apprehend as ‘value’ what is value, or I apprehend as ‘value’ what is not value.60 In the more detailed terms of my earlier account, I am deficient in one of the following ways. Either I link my prospective value judgment to conditions of mere satisfaction rather than self-transcendence. Or I take its conditions as unfulfilled when they are fulfilled (or as fulfilled when they are unfulfilled). Or I fail to grasp the deliberatively graspable unity that is in this diversity (or I ‘grasp’ a deliberatively graspable unity that is not in this diversity).61

60 What I am here calling deficiency sometimes might be more properly called corruption — at root, my refusal either of moral conversion in general, or of what moral conversion implies in some particular instance. (See, for example, Method 240-243.)

61 Beyond what I point out in my text, there is a broader and more basic way in which the value apprehension is the proximate cognitional criterion of the value judgment’s epistemic objectivity — and likewise the proximate decisional criterion of what I would call the decision’s praxic objectivity. For beyond the requirement that the value apprehension be self-transcending, there is the methodically prior requirement that the value judgment be based upon the value apprehension — and that the decision be based (immediately) upon the value judgment and (mediately) upon the value apprehension. Hence, a value judgment can lack epistemic objectivity not only through being based upon a value apprehension that is not self-transcending, but more radically through not
Still, if the cognitional criterion of my value judgment’s epistemic objectivity is my value apprehension’s self-transcendence, what is the cognitional criterion of the latter? What is the standard for determining whether or not my value apprehensions are self-transcending? Lonergan’s answer to this question is my fourth key point, also properly epistemological: the cognitional criterion of every self-transcending value apprehension, and thus the ultimate cognitional criterion of every epistemically-objective value judgment, is the transcendental notion of value — and, more precisely, the transcendental affectivity of the transcendental notion of value. Does my affective response in some given instance correspond to my notion of value that regards all instances, or does it not? Does the categorial affectivity of a particular apprehension of ‘value’ parallel the transcendental affectivity of my transcendental notion of value, or does it not? In the more detailed terms of my earlier account, is fidelity to the affective orientation of my transcendental notion of value what is reflected when I form some prospective ‘value’ judgment, link it to ‘sufficient’ conditions, experience those conditions as ‘fulfilled,’ and being based upon a value apprehension at all. Similarly, a decision can lack praxic objectivity not only through being based (mediately) upon a value apprehension that is not self-transcending, but more radically through not being based (immediately) upon a value judgment and/or (mediately) upon a value apprehension at all. (I have already indicated my view that Lonergan would see rejections of the cognitional and decisional normativity of the value apprehension as running counter to the normative pattern of our own concrete conscious-intentional process. In the opening paragraphs of this essay, I have argued that as a phenomenologist Lonergan, by contrast with some other philosophers, is neither an absolute voluntarist nor a normative voluntarist nor an emotivist.)

In light of the foregoing, I suggest that the main ways one can fail at cognitional and decisional self-transcendence on the fourth level can be illustrated with precision by the main ways one can fail at deductive inference. It would seem that there are at least nine. Begin with the form of deductive inference: If A, then B; A; therefore B. One can fail by (1) linking B to C rather than A; or (2) not grasping A as given when it is given; (3) ‘grasping’ A as given when it is not given; or (4) not grasping that ‘if A, then B; and A’ implies ‘B’; or (5) ‘grasping’ that ‘if C, then B; and A’ implies ‘B’; or (6) not positing B despite grasping that the preceding elements imply it; or (7) positing B despite not grasping that the preceding elements imply it; or (8) not choosing B despite grasping that the preceding elements imply it; or (9) choosing B despite not grasping that the preceding elements imply it. (Compare Insight, CWL 3 305-306.)
grasp a 'deliberatively graspable' unity in that diversity — or is such fidelity not what is reflected?62

The conclusion following from these four key points is obvious enough, namely, that for the later Lonergan a value judgment is epistemically-objective exactly in so far as the affectivity of the value apprehension whence it proceeds is correlative with the transcendental affectivity of the transcendental notion of value.63 Argue against this conclusion however you wish; but if you attend carefully to your own performance in devising and asserting your objections, you will discover that operationally you invariably invoke what verbally you would reject.

4. THE ROLE OF UNRESTRICTED LOVE

One of the most prominent, distinctive, and widely discussed elements of the later Lonergan’s writings is his frequent claim that we human persons, all of us, do or at least can experience ourselves as gifted with the dynamic state of being unrestrictedly in love. This state is conscious but it’s not known. What it refers to is something that can be inferred in so far as you make it advance from being merely conscious to knowing. And then because it’s unrestricted, you can infer

62 For example, Method 34-36, 73-74, 240, 282. As on the second and third levels, so also on the fourth level: determining in some given instance whether I am proceeding in fidelity to the transcendental notions is not necessarily a private task, but it is necessarily a personal one. It is not necessarily private, for other persons’ questions and objections often help me discern some inadequacy in the criterion of intelligibility, reality, or value I am initially inclined to invoke; and sometimes I literally cannot do without them. Indeed, one concrete measure of my authenticity is my eagerness for such questions and objections. (Specifically on the fourth level, my recognition that another person feels differently from me about something I propose can sometimes goad me quite dramatically to refine my own customary feelings, to stretch my habitual criterion of ‘value’ toward fuller correspondence with the transcendental notion of value.) On the other hand, determining my fidelity to the transcendental notions is necessarily a personal task. For at root it is a matter of understanding, judging, and evaluating the data of my own conscious proceedings, a task that in the nature of the case I am uniquely both placed and called to address.

63 Or, to put it another way, the pivotal element of an epistemically-objective value judgment is a self-transcending ‘value’ apprehension, not just any ‘value’ apprehension. Just as Finnis’s oversight of this point causes him mistakenly to interpret the later Lonergan’s account of knowing values as phenomenologically empiricist, so also it causes him mistakenly to interpret that account as epistemologically merely subjectivist. (See, for example, Fundamentals of Ethics 48-50; also recall above, note 24.)
that it refers to an absolute being. But the gift of itself does not include these ulterior steps. They are further steps and consequently this content without a known object is an occurrence, a fundamental occurrence, the ultimate stage in a person's self-transcendence. It's God's free gift. It involves a transvaluation of values in your living, but it's not something produced by knowing. It's going beyond your present horizon; it's taking you beyond your present horizon.\(^{64}\)

Though not devoid of theological correlatives, in Lonergan's view this characterization of unrestricted love and its effects is, at root, phenomenological. It purports to articulate certain very fundamental and profoundly influential features of my own concrete subjectivity. This, however, provokes a final question of major pertinence to my essay's central theme. What does the later Lonergan think his phenomenology of being unrestrictedly in love contributes to his phenomenology of knowing the valuable? How does he think the presence of unrestricted love affects value judgments?

In responding briefly to this question,\(^{65}\) I would first of all recall that Lonergan envisages unrestricted love as a datum that is identical with religious experience, a datum that is the root of the difference between ordinary living and religious living. Religious experience is a datum not of sense but of consciousness. It appears within the horizon of conscious intentionality as an intrinsic enrichment of the transcendental notions in their conscious dimension, first the notion of value and then the notions of reality and intelligibility. In their conscious dimension, it is the correlative of the notions' intentionally possessing the primary component of their total fulfillment, even though such intentional possession is not yet realized. By virtue of religious experience specifically in its cognitive aspect, which is what Lonergan means by 'faith',\(^{66}\) my transcendental notions of

\(^{64}\) Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973) 38. See also Method 105-107, 115-117.

\(^{65}\) For a more detailed response, including extensive reference to places where I think Lonergan's own works support the interpretation I am offering here, see Michael Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness: Is there a Fifth Level?", METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994) 1-36.

\(^{66}\) For example, Method 115-118, 123-124.
value, reality, and intelligibility become notions of holiness. In turn, my subsequent operations of understanding, making judgments of fact, and evaluating and deciding are not ordinary operations but religious ones, operations proximately both motivated and oriented and normed by my notions of holy intelligibility, holy reality, and holy value. And what I know and choose by means of those operations is manifest as not simply the intelligible, the real, and the valuable but — more amply — the holy.

Secondly, although unrestricted love is similar to the transcendental notions in its methodical priority to particular acts of knowing and choosing, it also is importantly different. The difference is that the transcendental notions as such are purely heuristic yearnings presupposing nothing, mere anticipations of intentional fulfillment, absolutely a priori dynamic structures that remotely motivate, orient, and norm my operations of knowing and choosing. Unrestricted love, by contrast, presupposes the transcendental notions, is the consciousness (though not yet knowledge) of the primary component of their exhaustive fulfillment, and reconstitutes them as notions of holiness, relatively a priori dynamic structures that proximately motivate, orient, and norm my all operations of knowing and choosing.

I suggest that it is congruent with Lonergan's perspective to maintain that the notion of holiness, (a) like the notions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, is transcategorical, 'transcendental' in the scholastic sense; but (b) unlike the notions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, is only comparatively heuristic, only relatively a priori, not purely heuristic, not absolutely a priori, not 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense. (See Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 26, note 55.)

Let me put this paragraph's main point in another way. Without necessarily asserting it to be total, I posit a certain parallel between (a) the transcendental notions, (b) unrestricted love, and (c) the notions of holiness respectively, and what Karl Rahner expresses in scholastic systematic theological categories as (a) 'pure nature,' (b) the 'supernatural existential,' and (c) 'historical nature,' where the supernatural existential is the dispositive grace that qualifies pure nature and together with it constitutes historical nature, which in turn is the possible recipient of justifying grace. Just as Rahner maintains that grace (here, the supernatural existential) does not override (here, pure) nature but rather presupposes and perfects it, so I am maintaining (and maintaining that Lonergan maintains) that unrestricted love does not override the transcendental notions but rather presupposes and perfects them. (See Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," in his Theological Investigations 1 [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961] 297-317. Compare Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 21-28.)
From the foregoing it follows that unrestricted love transforms ordinary value judgments into religious value judgments. In the perspective of faith, the 'eye' of unrestricted love every apprehension of value becomes an apprehension of holiness; every judgment of value, a judgment of holiness. On the other hand, unrestricted love does not constitute the basis of some totally new and distinct order of value judgments. For faith supplements and perfects the transcendental notion of value that stands behind every judgment of value, converting it into the notion of holy value. It does not override or replace it.

69 Method 106, 117.

70 In several of his recent writings, Robert Doran is concerned to emphasize that a distinctive feature of being unrestrictedly in love is the feeling of being gifted with radical certitude, contentment, and rest. He sometimes compares that feeling to the disposition that characterizes the first of Ignatius of Loyola's 'three times of election.' (See, for example, Theology and the Dialectics of History 57-58, 86-88.) In my judgment, the prominence Doran gives to the feeling of radical plenitude in his analysis of unrestricted love is phenomenologically discerning; and his correlation of that feeling with the first of Ignatius’s three times is fruitfully suggestive. I agree wholeheartedly with his accounts in this respect, and I have profited from studying them. On the other hand, in his eagerness to do full justice to the experience of being unrestrictedly in love, Doran sometimes makes two further suggestions that strike me as (a) not essential to his basic point and (b) problematic both within the Lonerganian framework and in their own phenomenological terms. One of these is the suggestion that value apprehensions influenced by the radical certitude, contentment, and rest which distinguish unrestricted love are analogous to reflective insights, whereas value apprehensions not thus influenced are analogous to direct insights. I have already indicated what I think are certain fundamental difficulties with this view. (See above, note 58.) The second of Doran's further suggestions is that the certitude, contentment, and rest which distinguish unrestricted love are both so utterly radical and so wholly novel that a correct phenomenology must situate that love on a 'fifth' level of consciousness, quite beyond the four levels of which Lonergan himself ordinarily speaks. (See, for example, Theology and the Dialectics of History 30-31, 88, 224-225.) Elsewhere I have presented what strike me as basic difficulties with this view as well. (See Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 28-36.) One of those difficulties is that I think Doran's suggestion implies the very conclusion I reject at this point in my text, namely, that unrestricted being in love (and, more specifically, faith) overrides rather than supplements the transcendental notion of value — or, in scholastic systematic theological terms, that grace overrides rather than perfects nature.