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LONERGAN ON CONSCIOUSNESS: 
IS THERE A FIFTH LEVEL?

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1. THE QUESTION

In the Fall of 1972, the same year his Method in Theology appeared in print, Bernard Lonergan gave a series of three lectures at Gonzaga University. The lectures were delivered in circumstances designed to foster subsequent dialogue between lecturer and hearers; and both lectures and dialogue were later published under the title Philosophy of God, and Theology. In the dialogue following the second lecture, there occurred the following exchange:

**Question 4:** You say in your lecture that “being in love does not presuppose or depend on any apprehension of God.” In Method in Theology you cite Rahner’s statement to the effect that “consolation without a cause” means “consolation with a content but without an object” (p. 106, n. 4). Could you explain more precisely what this content without an object is?

**Lonergan:** The content is a dynamic state of being in love, and being in love without restriction. It’s conscious but it’s not known. What it refers to is something that can be inferred insofar as you make it advance from being merely conscious to knowing. And then because it’s unrestricted, you can infer that it refers to an absolute being. But the gift of itself does not include these ulterior

steps. They are further steps and consequently this content without a known object is an occurrence, a fundamental occurrence, the ultimate stage in a person’s self-transcendence. It’s God’s free gift. It involves a transvaluation of values in your living, but it’s not something produced by knowing. It’s going beyond your present horizon; it’s taking you beyond your present horizon.

Question 4 (continued): There would be no insight, no concept, no judgment?

Lonergan: Not of itself, no. You can say it’s on the fifth level. It’s self-transcendence reaching its summit and that summit can be developed and enriched, and so on. But of itself it is permanent.2

In this exchange, the focus of our present interest is the fact that Lonergan speaks of a ‘fifth level’ of consciousness. Later, in the third lecture of this series, he again alludes to a fifth level, though without actually using that expression. He is arguing that there are four different fundamental forms of the question about God, forms arising respectively through inquiry into one’s inquiring, reflection on one’s reflecting, deliberation on one’s deliberating, and reflection on one’s religious experience. He speaks of these forms as arising “on a series of successive levels,” indeed, “on four different levels.”3 The context makes it clear that he means levels beyond the one on which sensation occurs.

To my knowledge, these are Lonergan’s only published references to a ‘fifth level’ of consciousness,4 and they set the question with which the present essay is concerned. Should Lonergan’s remarks be treated as merely passing comments, at most adversions to a notion he toyed with, tested, and soon dropped? Or do they indicate an incipient devel-

2 Lonergan, Philosophy of God 38. The remark of Lonergan with which the questioner begins occurs not in the second lecture but in the first: see p. 10.

3 Lonergan, Philosophy of God 52, 54; emphasis added. I was reminded of Lonergan’s allusions in the third Gonzaga lecture by a set of Frederick Crowe’s personal notes on the ‘fifth level’ question, notes which Crowe generously shared with me.

opment of some significance, something that Lonergan might well have pursued and that his successors ought to follow up on? The issue is not limited to one’s reading of Lonergan: it extends to one’s reading of oneself. Not just in Lonergan’s writings but in the actual features of my concrete human living, are there grounds for asserting a distinct level of consciousness beyond the four well-defined levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding? The question is an important one, for at least three reasons. In general, the levels of consciousness are primordial structural features of my concrete self and, in turn, of all the cognitional and existential enterprises in which I may be engaged. Hence how I enumerate those levels has profound implications for my account of virtually everything else. More specifically, the question of a fifth level is the crucial foundational theological question of just how I conceive the relationship of my human striving and my religious experience (if any). And it is the crucial systematic theological question of just how I conceive the relationship of human openness and divine gift — or, in more traditional terms, the relationship of nature and grace.

2. AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER, FROM ROBERT DORAN

In the years since Lonergan’s remark, it has become increasingly common for writers following in his wake to mention the possibility of a fifth level of consciousness. Some merely underline the question, but others go further and broach at least tentative affirmative answers. Frederick Crowe, for example, periodically ponders the question and the implications of answering it affirmatively; but, so far as I know, he has not asserted an affirmative answer to date. An expansive illustration of the second approach is provided by two recent works of Robert

5I assume the reader has enough familiarity with both Lonergan and herself that she does not find it problematic to speak of the (first) four levels as ‘well-defined.’

6For more light on the relationship of questions I am here labelling ‘foundational theological’ and ‘systematic theological,’ see below, note 34.

7See, for example, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea 57, 68, 347.
Doran. In *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, Doran tentatively advances the claim that there is indeed a fifth level of consciousness. He invokes the letter and spirit of Lonergan's writings in arguing for that claim, and he goes on to give it an important (though not pivotal) role in the overall argument of his book. The same claim is a central element of a subsequent article, "Consciousness and Grace," where Doran presents it with more assurance.

The relative richness and detail of Doran's account of a fifth level make that account an excellent representative of affirmative answers to our question. Let us consider his two presentations in turn.

2.1 In *Theology and the Dialectics of History*

Doran's book is a large one, and the 'fifth level' stance qualifies it as a whole. Hence a mere summary could not in any case do full justice to his views on this matter. But the following report is even more limited, for — restricted to a small space — it sketches elements of what Doran says about the fifth level but without reviewing the appeal to Lonergan's writings through which (in part) Doran aims to justify his views. Bearing these limitations in mind, let us recount four key elements of what Doran says.

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Vertin: Lonergan on Consciousness

First, Doran argues that a fifth level of consciousness, the level of falling in love and being in love, is clearly intimated in Lonergan's work long before the 1972 comment, as well as after it. Indications are present from the beginning of what Doran calls the second stage in Lonergan's account of the human person, the stage beginning with the post-Insight writings and extending through Method in Theology; and they are even more abundant in the subsequent stage. It remains that Lonergan's increasingly intense concern is not mainly to argue that love stands on a distinct level of consciousness but rather to highlight its preeminence in consciousness.

The position on the subject as falling in love and being in love, and specifically the position on a dimension of love as constituting a fifth level of consciousness is already present, and far more than inchoately so, in the frame provided by the second stage's position on existential subjectivity. But only after Method in Theology, and so after 1972, is there mention, albeit brief and even somewhat offhand, in Lonergan's writings of a fifth level of consciousness. What is important, I believe, is not so much the question of an additional level, but the increasing centrality of love. The discussion of love constitutes one of the principal distinguishing and unifying themes in the book A Third Collection, which contains some of Lonergan's most important post-Method essays.11

Second, in Doran's view the conscious-intentional striving that is partly constitutive of consciousness may be conceived as a 'creative vector' oriented from the first level of consciousness toward the fifth. The striving distinctive of the fifth level is at root a transcendental intention of unrestricted love, a pure desire for the other-worldly standard of this-worldly truth and goodness, a transcendental notion of world-transcendent mystery.12 Something of one's success or failure in

11Doran, Theology 30-31; compare 634.
12Here I am interpreting what Doran says, not merely recounting it. He does not expressly say that the transcendental notion of unrestricted love is a fifth-level notion distinct from the transcendental notions on levels two through four respectively. Could he simply be providing an additional characterization of the notions on levels two through four, a characterization based on the experience of their ultimate fulfillment? The structure of what he does say (in passages such as the ones I cite here)
implementing this dynamic orientation (along with the other ones) is reflected in whatever one says.

[T]he creative vector that moves from below upwards proceeds through five levels of consciousness.\(^{13}\)

The transcendental notions that inform the pure question that consciousness is, and whose incremental implementation and satisfaction constitute the cumulative realization of the search for direction in the movement of life, are the anticipations of beauty, intelligibility, truth, goodness, and unrestricted love.\(^{14}\)

The pure desire is consciously — attentively, intelligently, reasonably, responsively, lovingly — headed toward self-transcendent acts, acts whose terms are being as mediated through the true, being as appreciated and realized as good, and being as world-transcendent measure of all created participations in the true and the good. In this sense the pure desire is a notion of being, a notion of value, and a notion of world-transcendent mystery.\(^{15}\)

Statements, spoken or written, ... in effect manifest the achievements and failures of the subject as notion of being, notion of value, notion of transcendent mystery. They express the subject’s cognitive, existential, and religious relation to the objectives of the pure desire. As outer words they mean immediately inner words ...; and the inner word means some instance of the objective of the pure desire — some instance of what might be or of what is, of what might be good or is good, of what can be discerned as attracting us to itself beyond the realities found to be and to be good in this world.\(^{16}\)

Third, Doran maintains that the conscious-intentional fulfillment distinguishing the fifth level satisfies all of one’s conscious-intentional strivings, including those on the prior levels. The ultimate fifth-level fulfillment is nothing other than the core of what the word ‘God’

makes such an interpretation quite awkward and thus unlikely, in my view; but I must admit that it is not impossible.

\(^{13}\)Doran, Theology 222.
\(^{14}\)Doran, Theology 530.
\(^{15}\)Doran, Theology 564; compare 564, 587.
\(^{16}\)Doran, Theology 564-65; compare 564, 565.
properly designates. That ultimate content is related to the prior strivings as fulfillment to exigency, as satisfaction to capacity; and insofar as one possesses it, one rests.

[T]here are moments when we are drawn to move beyond all of these previous [four] levels and to rest in the state of being in love, to rest in the goodness of another, or in the truth, or in the discovery of intelligibility, or in beauty. Moreover, our relationship of love may be with an unqualified good, an unconditioned reality, a complete intelligibility, a beauty that is the earthly reflection of the eternal light of glory. Then we are resting in the mystery of God, the world-transcendent measure of the integrity of all of our intentional operations. Consciousness in the realm of transcendence ... rests in the fulfilment of the exigencies that impel us to operate at the first four levels of consciousness. Our resting in God is no obliteration of these exigencies, but rather their momentary satisfaction in the mystery of their ground. We are oriented to world-transcendent mystery, we desire complete intelligibility, unconditioned truth, unqualified goodness, and we are meant to find these, however darkly, in the development of our relationship with God.\textsuperscript{17}

[O]perationally defined, spirit is the capacity manifested in the process of question and answer, the capacity to discover meaning, to affirm truly, to decide responsibly, and to rest in the mystery that satisfies this capacity.\textsuperscript{18}

Fourth, Doran affirms that although the ultimate fulfillment wholly satisfies one’s conscious-intentional striving, possession of it is not one’s own achievement. On the contrary, it is a gift. For integral consciousness is constituted not only by a ‘creative vector’ oriented from the first level upwards but also by a complementary ‘healing vector’ oriented from the fifth level downwards; and the first manifestation of the latter is one’s experience of being loved unrestrictedly. To experience the gift of being loved unrestrictedly is to experience the basic religious value. And just as the basic religious value conditions personal, cultural, social, and vital values in turn, so one’s experience

\textsuperscript{17}Doran, \textit{Theology} 224-225.
\textsuperscript{18}Doran, \textit{Theology} 225.
of the basic religious value conditions one's experience of the other values; so that the pattern of relations among the five levels of value and the pattern of relations among the five levels of consciousness are similar.

The basic structure of integral interiority ... is constituted by two reciprocal and complementary vectors in human consciousness: a creative vector that moves through the levels of self-transcendent creativity ...; and a healing vector that affects therapeutically the various biases that interfere with genuine creativity.\(^19\)

Our striving to constitute ourselves with resources inadequate to the task ceases only when we rest in being unconditionally loved. Then the good that I have striven for is given to me, the longing of my consciousness is fulfilled. The gift is independent of the upward striving of my consciousness. It is a good in which I rest, not one that I have achieved. As a gift that fulfils the upwardly directed striving of consciousness, it meets me at the highest level of consciousness ...\(^20\)

The movement from above downwards is such that religious values condition personal integrity, such integrity grounds the authentic function of culture, cultural values are genuine to the extent that they enable the social order to be constituted by the integral dialectic of intersubjectivity and practicality, and such a social order grounds an equitable distribution of vital goods. But these relations are isomorphic with analogous movements in consciousness itself, in the development of persons.\(^21\)

[Personal value] is placed at the fourth level of the scale of values, corresponding to the fourth level of consciousness. Corresponding, respectively, to the third, second, and first levels of consciousness are cultural, social, and vital values. And religious values correspond, perhaps, to a fifth level of consciousness. The relations among the levels of value, then, can be postulated as being isomorphic with the relations among the levels of consciousness.\(^22\)

\(^{19}\)Doran, *Theology* 176; compare 162, 245, 676.


\(^{21}\)Doran, *Theology* 178; compare 178-179, 195-196, 476.

\(^{22}\)Doran, *Theology* 88; compare 95, 248 and note 31.
2.2 *In "Consciousness and Grace"

The task Doran sets himself in "Consciousness and Grace" is located in systematics, the sixth functional specialty of a methodical theology. His aim is to begin elaborating a methodical systematic theology of grace, and he pursues that aim by working on Lonergan's 1946 Latin treatise *De ente supernaturali*. The first thesis of that treatise affirms the existence of "a created communication of the divine nature ..., a created, proportionate, and remote principle by which there are present in the creature operations by which God is attained as God is in God's own self." Guided by the later Lonergan's principle that a methodical theology envisions a conscious intentional correlative for every valid term and relation, Doran attempts to transpose certain elements of the first thesis from the metaphysically-based scholastic theological categories in which *De ente supernaturali* was composed into the psychologically-based categories of methodical theology. At the heart of this attempt is his effort to ascertain the conscious intentional correlative of 'a created communication of the divine nature.'

What precisely is a 'created communication of the divine nature' in a theology whose basic terms and relations are found in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and not in the metaphysical categories of substance, nature, potencies, and so on, employed by Lonergan in *De ente supernaturali*? "For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness." What are the elements in intentional consciousness that correspond to the metaphysical categories in which Lonergan elaborated the notion of a 'created communication of the divine nature'?  

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24 Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," 52 (Doran's translation).
26 Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 52-53; compare 59.
Doran's answer to this question is apparent in his own 'first thesis,' which he presents near the beginning of the article and devotes the remainder of the article to expounding.

The gift of God's love for us poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace that effects in us, as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of a fifth level of consciousness, at which we experience ourselves as loved unconditionally by God and invited to love God in return. This experience of being loved unconditionally and of being invited to love in return is the conscious basis of (1) our share in the inner life of God, (2) our consequent falling in love with God, and (3) the dynamic state of our being in love with God. The dynamic state of being in love with God, in turn, as equivalent to what the scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained as God is in God's own self. But the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations — what scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature — is the fifth level of consciousness, the experience of resting in God's unconditional love for us and of being invited to love in return, the real relation to, and constituted by, the indwelling God as term of the relation.27

While there are many nuances in this thesis as presented and subsequently expounded, on my reading its main lines emerge exactly insofar as Doran affirms, distinguishes, and correlates the members of four successive groups of terms.28

The first group of terms, unlike the remaining three, stands within an explanatory framework that is basically metaphysical rather than psychological. Like the remaining three groups, however, it has three members. Doran's affirming and distinguishing of its members simply reflects what, in his view, was common in scholastic systematic theology. The three terms, really distinct from one another, are (a) a created communication of the divine nature, identically the entitative habit of sanctifying grace, by which we are elevated to participation in

27Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 54; compare 75.
28As will be obvious, what follows in this subsection is to some extent an interpretation of what Doran says, not a mere report.
the inner life of God; (b) the operative habit of charity, the infused virtue by which we are disposed to love God above all things and all things in God; and (c) the acts of charity that flow proximately from the habit of charity and remotely from sanctifying grace, operations by which in this life we reach God as God is in God's own self.29

Doran's treatment of the second group of terms falls within his own effort to contribute to methodical systematic theology as such. He affirms the occurrence and real distinction of (a) our created experience of God's unconditional love for us in us, our experience of resting in God's unconditional love and being invited to love God in return; (b) the dynamic state of our responsive falling in love with God and being in love with God; and (c) the concrete acts of loving God (and all else in God) that in turn we perform. Moreover, he correlates these three terms respectively with the three terms of the first group, presenting the terms in the second group as the methodical theological transpositions of those in the first.

It is worth noting that in Doran's view the success of his attempt at transposition depends crucially upon the validity of his distinction between the first two terms of the second group. "The experience of God's love for us ... is a different experience from the experience of our being in love with God. On this distinction rests the central argument of this essay."30 Moreover, he recognizes31 that drawing this distinction and making it parallel to the initial distinction within the first group of terms puts him at odds with what the later Lonergan writes. For Lonergan32 correlates 'the dynamic state of being in love with God' not with the habit of charity but rather with sanctifying grace. Doran views his own proposal as a precision necessary for both retaining the distinction Lonergan draws in De ente supernaturali between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity and transposing that distinction from scholastic into methodical systematic theological categories.33

29Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 54, 57-60, 62-63, 75.
30Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 62.
31Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 57-58.
32For instance, Lonergan, Method 107.
33Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 61-62.
Just as methodical foundational theology is presupposed by methodical systematic theology, so Doran’s treatment of the third group of terms is presupposed by his treatment of the second, although in “Consciousness and Grace” he does not expressly distinguish the two. Effectively, if not explicitly, Doran affirms the occurrence and real distinction of (a) our experience of being loved unconditionally, (b) our experience of being in love unconditionally, and (c) our acts of unconditional love. These three terms are respective methodical theological presuppositions of the second group’s three terms.34

Doran’s treatment of the fourth group of terms, like his treatment of the third, is proper to methodical foundational theology rather than methodical systematic theology, though he does not dwell on that point in this article. He affirms the occurrence and real distinction of (a) a fifth level of consciousness beyond the first four; (b) the fourth level of consciousness simply insofar as it is experientially transformed by the occurrence of the fifth level; and (c) the fourth level of consciousness insofar as acts proceeding on it are also transformed by the occurrence of the fifth level. Moreover, Doran correlates these terms respectively with those of the three preceding groups.35

Overall, then, in “Consciousness and Grace” Doran is affirming the occurrence, real distinction, and respective correlations of the following: (a) sanctifying grace, our experience of God’s love for us, our experience of being loved unconditionally, and a fifth level of our consciousness; (b) the habit of charity, our dynamic state of falling and

34Systematics, the seventh functional specialty of a methodically differentiated theology, presupposes doctrines, the sixth functional specialty; and both systematics and doctrines in turn presuppose foundations, the fifth functional specialty. It is in foundations that one first objectifies one’s experience of unrestricted love. It is in doctrines that one identifies that experience with the presence of what the religious tradition calls ‘God.’ And it is in systematics that one seeks some explanatory understanding of God and all else in relation to God. (See for example Lonergan, Method, chs. 5, 11-13.) Consequently, although talk about one’s experience of unrestricted love as an experience of God is talk that is proper to doctrines and systematics, it is talk that presupposes an initial objectification of the experience in foundations. (Not for a moment do I suggest that Doran is unaware of this distinction, only that he does not bother to make it explicit here. Indeed, in other contexts he often presents it lucidly himself. See, for example, Doran, Theology 140-142, 548-549.)

35Doran, “Consciousness and Grace” 54, 62-64, 74-75.
being in love with God, our experience of being in love unconditionally, and the transformed state of our fourth-level consciousness; and (c) acts of charity, our acts of loving God above all things, our acts of unconditional loving, and the transformed acts of our fourth-level consciousness. Obviously the account of a 'fifth level of consciousness' that Doran offered in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* has undergone a considerable refinement in detail, clarity, and precision.

3. A QUALIFIED NEGATIVE ANSWER, FROM THE PRESENT WRITER

Personally, I think the question of whether there is a fifth level of consciousness must be answered in the negative, at least insofar as the word 'level' retains the meaning it ordinarily possesses in Lonergan’s work. In expounding this view, I would like to discuss in turn (1) certain recurrent claims in Lonergan’s writings; (2) Lonergan’s oral replies to certain queries bearing on the issue, at the 1982 Lonergan Workshop; (3) my own interpretative synthesis of those oral replies with the written claims; and (4) what I take ultimately to be the crucial point. Then I will offer some brief comments on what Doran says.

3.1 Lonergan’s Writings in so far as they bear on the issue

On my reading, Lonergan’s writings offer very little basis for claiming that Lonergan himself was headed toward presenting the human subject as operating on five rather than four levels of consciousness, at least if the word 'level' remains univocal. On the contrary, it seems to me that by the end of his career Lonergan the writer clearly and almost without exception was portraying the human subject as proceeding on exactly four levels of consciousness, and that the three exceptions — all in the same lecture-series — can easily be accommodated to his prevailing practice. While I cannot document my position exhaustively here, let me clarify it through the following eight-step

\[36\text{Below, in § 3.3, I will suggest that even for the later Lonergan the word 'level' is not invariably univocal, and that a certain occasional variability in its meaning is one reason for puzzlement about Lonergan's stance on the issue at hand.}\]
synopsis of certain contentions I see as typical of Lonergan by the time of his later work.

First, the interaction of data and three successive operators yields four successive kinds or 'levels' of conscious-intentional operations in the concrete human subject that I am, namely, experiencing, understanding, making judgments of fact, and evaluating and deciding. The data are the basic materials on which the operators work. The operators, my transcendental notions of the intelligible, the real, and the truly good, promote me from operations on the first level to operations on the second, third, and fourth levels in turn.37

Second, just as the transcendental notions are my radical intelligent and reasonable and responsible yearnings, my dynamic spiritual capacities oriented toward fulfillments, my intentiones intendentes, so intelligibility and reality and goodness are the contents that would satisfy those yearnings, the fulfillments toward which those capacities are oriented, my intended goals.38

Third, within the fulfillments the methodologist distinguishes between individual instances of intelligibility and reality and goodness, which would partially satisfy the transcendental notions, and integral intelligibility and reality and goodness, which would totally satisfy them.39

Fourth, within the total fulfillment the methodologist distinguishes between the primary component, namely, the unique and unitary unrestricted intelligent intelligible and reasonable reality and


38See, for example, Method 11-12, 23-24, 73-74, 282; Second Collection 81-84, 127-128.

responsible good, and the secondary component, namely, the plurality of restricted intelligibles and realities and goods.  

Fifth, in terms of the stages of my encounter, the methodologist distinguishes the fulfillments in so far as I merely intend them, anticipate them *a priori*, treat them just heuristically; and in so far as I actually encounter them, embrace them *a posteriori*, empirically attain or receive them.  

Sixth, again in terms of the stages of my encounter, the methodologist distinguishes actually encountered fulfillments in so far as I encounter them initially or inchoatively, that is, merely experience them and respond to them in light of that experience; and in so far as I encounter them finally or ultimately, that is, know them and respond to them in light of that knowledge.  

Seventh, the dynamic state of being in love without restriction is the fundamental datum of my religious consciousness. I experience that state as a gift, not at all my own achievement. It is the initial or inchoative stage of what the methodologist explicates as my actual encounter with the primary component of the total fulfillment of my transcendental notions. It is the first step of what the theologian explicates as the supernatural satisfaction of natural desire. It is my consciousness — inner experience, though not yet knowledge — of the unrestricted intelligent intelligible and reasonable reality and responsible good. It is the beginning of an exhaustive actuation of my capacities on the second, third, and fourth levels, an actuation rooted on the fourth level and extending thence to the third and second. And my personal response to the gift of unrestricted being in love is at best my own loving in light of it, a loving that takes shape in lovingly

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performed acts of understanding, making judgments of fact, evaluating and deciding.43

Eighth, the existence of exactly four levels of conscious intentional operations, together with the fact of two basic phases in any discipline that both studies the past and takes a stand on the present, means that there are exactly eight functional specialties in theology and, more broadly, in scholarly human studies.44

3.2 Certain of Lonergan's oral comments that bear on the issue

From Monday through Friday, 14-18 June 1982, the ninth annual Lonergan Workshop took place at Boston College.45 Following the pattern that was standard during the Workshop's first decade, Lonergan himself presided at a few sessions during the week, offering his responses to written questions submitted earlier and to the additional questions his responses evoked. Three exchanges that occurred during these sessions bear directly on the issue of Lonergan's stance regarding a 'fifth level' of consciousness. Let me present each exchange, along with my own comments on it.46

43See, for example, Method 105, 105-106, 107, 115-116, 241-244, 283, 277-278, 338-339; Philosophy of God 8-10, 54-56; Second Collection 145-147, 170-173, 228; Third Collection 93, 124-126. Compare Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) 92-94; and Collection (1967) 84-91 = CWL 4 81-87. On my interpretation of unrestricted being in love as both (a) my being loved by God and (b) my loving God, see below, §4.2.

44See, for example, Second Collection 211; Method 133-136, 281-282, 292-293, 349, 364-367; Philosophy of God 21-23.

45The general theme of this Workshop was "Christian Imagination: Biases and Transformations."

46A complete set of the written questions submitted at the 1982 Workshop may be found in File 1001 of the "Lectures and Institutes" collection at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. As reproduced here, the initial question of each exchange comes from that set. Lonergan's responses, together with any subsequent discussion, come from tape recordings of the 1982 question sessions, also available at the Institute. The (slightly edited) transcription from those recordings is my own work, done in July of 1992.

A word on the tapes and transcription is in order. From Lonergan's delivery, it seems clear that his initial answers to the prepared questions were written out beforehand, as distinct from his spontaneous answers to follow-up questions asked on the spot. This suggests that at least those initial answers should be given more weight than purely impromptu responses, though not as much weight as answers prepared
The first exchange comes from the question session of Wednesday, 16 June 1982.

**Question 6:** From time to time, in recent years, you have spoken of (unrestricted) love as a 'fifth level' of intentional consciousness. Since the levels of functional specialization are correlated with the levels of intentional consciousness, would this not imply the addition of two further, 'fifth-level' functional specialties? If so, what might they be or do?47

**Lonergan:** Well, there are sensitive consciousness, intellectual consciousness, rational consciousness, moral consciousness, and religious consciousness. But if you have religious consciousness as well as moral, it takes over the moral. (It's a perfection added to the moral, with a broader horizon. So we're back to four. However, it's a different four for different people.) Religious consciousness has a fuller horizon than a purely moral consciousness, and the two are conjoined inasmuch as grace perfects nature, the supernatural perfects the natural.

In this reply, nearly ten years after his 'fifth level' remarks in the Gonzaga lectures, Lonergan reaffirms the distinction between moral consciousness and religious consciousness. But he rejects the suggestion that the latter constitutes a different level from the former, at least where the word 'level' has the sense it ordinarily possesses in the expressions 'levels of intentional consciousness' and 'levels of functional specialization.' There are four levels, not five. Not everyone has religious consciousness, but inasmuch as one does, it 'takes over' one's moral consciousness. Both stand on the fourth level; and their relation is that of less full horizon to fuller horizon, of perfectible to perfection, or — in theological terms — of nature to grace, of natural to supernatural.

The second exchange also comes from the question session of Wednesday, 16 June 1982.

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47 The person who submitted this written question beforehand was myself.
Question 14: Does your differentiation of a fourth (and perhaps a fifth) level of consciousness in post-Insight work force a modification of the triadic metaphysical structure of proportionate being which, in Insight, is isomorphic with the subject whose conscious operations take place at three levels of intentionality?

Lonergan: The triadic metaphysical structure of Insight corresponds to the triadic cognitional structure of Insight. Metaphysics is dealing with reality, and that by which you know the proportionate reality is this threefold structure. The fourfold structure in Method corresponds to the fourfold structure of religious consciousness. (And you could have a fourfold structure without religious consciousness if you had a moral consciousness, which [if you do have a religious consciousness] is included in the religious.)

Here Lonergan recounts the structures that characterize the concrete subject as cognitionally, morally, and religiously conscious. His first two sentences, however, present us with a puzzle. Referring with apparent approval to Insight, he says that merely as a knower of proportionate reality one's structure (like the corresponding structure of proportionate reality itself) is threefold. And, in light of the question, it is obvious that by 'threefold' he means 'three-level.'

Now, our central question throughout this essay has been whether the later Lonergan affirms four or five levels of intentional consciousness, but here — as late as 1982 — he seems to be saying that when considering the concrete subject simply as a knower of proportionate reality there are only three levels. Does not the supposed advance of Method over Insight include the recognition of a fourth level of intentional consciousness, with evaluation — the initial operation on that fourth level — a cognitional operation? Let us set aside this important question for a moment, returning to it after studying the third exchange, below.

The remaining part of Lonergan’s reply corresponds to what he says in the first exchange. As morally conscious, one’s structure is fourfold. But if one is religiously conscious (which is not necessarily the

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48 In fact, it is not at all uncommon for the later Lonergan to speak this way. See, for example, Method 364-65; Third Collection 240.
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case), one’s structure is still fourfold, with religious consciousness subsuming moral consciousness. In effect, then, Lonergan reiterates his earlier assertion that there are four levels of consciousness at most, that both moral and religious consciousness (if any) are on the fourth level, and that the latter (if it occurs) takes over the former.

The third exchange comes from the question session of Thursday, 17 June 1982.

**Question 2:** What are the ontological correlates of the distinct kinds of cognitional acts on the third, fourth, and fifth levels, respectively, of consciousness? 49

**Lonergan:** The third, fourth, and fifth levels are judgments of fact, moral judgments, and religious judgments. (a) Judgments of fact, of possibility and probability, whatever exists or could exist. (b) Moral judgments. The reality of good men and the reality of bad men, and extending to all the different manners in which people can be good or bad morally. And (c) religious judgments. The existence of God, and theological issues. Moral judgments with a religious basis. Factual judgments with a religious basis.

**Question 2 (continued):** Would you say, in terms of the traditional distinction of potency, form, and act, that the achievement of judgments of fact, moral judgments, and religious judgments in each case is a kind of actus, a kind of act, and — if so — how would they differ?

**Lonergan:** Well, they differ in their objects. They’re all acts, eh? Any judgment is an act.

**Question 2 (continued):** I’m speaking of the content that the judgment achieves. If experience is correlative with potency, and understanding is correlative with form ...

Lonergan: Oh, I see. Well, the judgment is an act. It’s in so far as that, that they’re knowing acts, eh? The cognitional correspondent, the ontological correlative to an act is an act. The judgment’s of fact, eh? Socrates existed. You can have an act in act of central form and act of accidental form. And in that case, what you know

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49 Again, the person who submitted this written question beforehand was myself. I am also the questioner with whom Lonergan continues the exchange.
as corresponding to the judgment as distinct from understanding and experience gives you the distinction potency, form, and act.

**Question 2 (continued):** So, on the third, and the fourth, and the fifth level, those respective judgments all achieve or are correlative with act, as distinct from potency and form.

**Lonergan:** Right. If they're confined to an actuality.

**Question 2 (continued):** Now, is there any further distinction that can be drawn within the act which those judgments respectively achieve, by virtue of the fact that as judgments they differ as levels three, four, and five?

**Lonergan:** Well, yes. They regard a mere fact, or a moral fact, or a religious fact.

In pondering this extended exchange, let us begin by noting two things about Lonergan's remarks, things that are especially pertinent to our central question. The first is that although only a day earlier he has denied a fifth level of intentional consciousness *so understood as* to require change in either (a) the total number of functional specialties as set forth in *Method* or (b) the metaphysics of proportionate being as articulated in *Insight*, in the present instance Lonergan readily accepts and even employs language that distinguishes (and thus implicitly affirms) a fifth level along with a fourth and a third. Evidently there is some sense in which the expression 'fifth level' remains legitimate.

Second, the sense in which Lonergan views 'fifth level' talk as legitimate is clearly related at least partly to the way such talk can help express the distinctions among three kinds of judgments. In general, judgment is the cognitional operation by which one grasps act (as distinct from potency and form). In particular, 'a judgment of fact,' the culminating moment in one's knowing of 'a mere fact,' is on 'the third level.' 'A moral judgment,' the culminating moment in one's knowing of 'a moral fact,' is on 'the fourth level.' And 'a religious judgment,' the culminating moment in one's knowing of 'a religious fact,' is on 'the fifth level.'

How does all this fit together? If, as we have seen, Lonergan usually does not employ 'fifth level' language, exactly why does he accept it here? And what of his assertion above, in the second
excluence, that as a knower of proportionate reality the concrete subject proceeds on just three levels? Let me sketch an interpretation that, I believe, does justice to the various elements of what Lonergan says and writes about these matters.

3.3 An Interpretative Synthesis

Not surprisingly, the linchpin of my interpretation is the suggestion that the word 'level' as used by Lonergan has more than one sense. In general, it means the place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern of increasing (or decreasing) complexity. An element situated in a place of less complexity stands on a 'lower level,' while an element situated in a place of more complexity stands on a 'higher level.'

More specifically, in such expressions as 'level of intentional consciousness' and 'level of the consciously intended,' the word 'level' can have either of two principal senses. In its strict sense, the sense that Lonergan the writer almost always presupposes, 'level' means the place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are (a) ordinary data, namely, data of sense and of ordinary consciousness, and (b) the transcendental notions. In its wide sense, the sense that Lonergan only occasionally presupposes (and in just one of his written works), 'level' means the place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are (a) ordinary data, (b) the transcendental notions, and (c) what I will call the agapic datum, namely, religious experience, the feeling of unrestricted being in love, the fundamental datum of religious consciousness.

Let us note three uses of the word 'level' in its strict sense. The first is typical of the early Lonergan, Lonergan before about 1964. During this period he envisions (in effect) two transcendental notions, the notions of intelligibility and reality. Moreover, he envisions both notions simply as cognitional, as desires to know. Consequently, using

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50The following interpretative sketch of various meanings and uses of the word 'level' makes explicit something I think Lonergan concretely recognizes but — I admit — does not directly express. In elaborating this sketch, I try to stay as close as possible to Lonergan's own terminology, while not shrinking from introducing my own when I think it might be useful.
the word in its strict sense, he ordinarily speaks in *Insight*, for example, of three 'levels' of cognitional consciousness (and of the cognitionally intended), levels correlative at root with ordinary data and the two transcendental notions respectively.

The other two uses of 'level' in its strict sense reflect the perspective of the later Lonergan, Lonergan from about 1964 onward. By this time he has come to envision three transcendental notions, the notions of intelligibility, of reality, and of goodness. Moreover, he envisions the notion of goodness not simply as cognitional, a desire to know, but also as decisional, a desire to choose. Consequently, in a second use of the word in its strict sense, he ordinarily speaks in *Method*, for example, of four 'levels' of intentional consciousness (and of the consciously intended), levels correlative at root with ordinary data and the three transcendental notions respectively.

Lonergan's wish on occasion to highlight a certain relationship gives rise to a third use of the word 'level' in its strict sense. The early Lonergan maintains that one knows the proportionate knowable exactly in so far as one experiences and understands and judges. The later Lonergan continues to maintain that one knows the proportionate knowable exactly insofar as one experiences and understands and judges, but judging now is subdistinguished into making judgments of (mere) fact and making judgments of value. It remains that sometimes the later Lonergan finds it useful to emphasize the continuity of his later account of knowing (and the proportionate knowable) with his earlier account. On such occasions he prescinds from the subdistinction within judging, in order to say with equal accuracy (if not equal completeness) that, for example, both *Insight* and *Method* envisage cognition of the proportionate knowable to be a compound of experiencing and understanding and judging. Moreover, he is even apt to say that both *Insight* and *Method* envisage three 'levels' of cognitional consciousness (and, correspondingly, of the proportionate knowable), levels that at root remain correlative with ordinary data and the transcendental notions respectively. I suggest that this is what

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51 For an especially apt account of this transition, see Kenneth Melchin, "Ethics in *Insight,*" *Lonergan Workshop* 8 (1990) 135-147.
is happening when, in the second of the three exchanges above, Lonergan asserts that as a knower of proportionate reality one’s structure (like the corresponding structure of proportionate reality itself) has just three levels.\(^{52}\)

For present purposes, what is important about the three foregoing uses of ‘level’ is that the word’s meaning remains constant even as its uses vary. Whether employed by the early Lonergan to elucidate cognitional consciousness (and the cognitionally intended), or by the later Lonergan to elucidate intentional consciousness (and the consciously intended), or by the later Lonergan to highlight the continuity of his earlier and later accounts of cognitional consciousness (and the cognitionally intended), the word retains what I am calling its strict sense. That is to say, throughout these different uses the meaning of ‘level’ remains ‘place in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are ordinary data and the transcendental notions.’

Now, as I mentioned earlier, this strict sense of the word ‘level’ is what Lonergan the writer almost always presupposes. Moreover, it is in this strict sense that he is using the word when, in the first two exchanges above, he denies that there is a fifth level of consciousness. Recall, by contrast, what I have specified as the wide sense of the word: ‘place in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are ordinary data, the transcendental notions, and the agapic datum.’ This wide sense is what Lonergan presupposes when, in the Gonzaga lectures, he makes the ‘fifth level’ remarks noted at the beginning of this essay. Again, it is in the wide sense that he is using the word when, in the third of the three exchanges above, he accepts a fifth level. What might be behind Lonergan’s occasional employment of the word in the wide sense?

\(^{52}\)Just as the later Lonergan prescinds from a subdistinction, within judging, between judgments of fact and judgments of value when he says simply that knowing the proportionate knowable is a compound of experiencing and understanding and judging, so — I conclude — he must be prescinding from a corresponding subdistinction within act when he says simply that the proportionate knowable is a compound of potency and form and act. His readiness to admit the latter subdistinction is evident in his reply at the end of the third exchange, above. (Also see Michael Vertin, ‘Lonergan’s Three Basic Questions’ and a Philosophy of Philosophies,” Lonergan Workshop 8 (1990) 213-248, at 227-228 and note 11.)
The root of the difference between ordinary living and religious living is religious experience, the feeling of being in love unrestrictedly, what I am labeling ‘the agapic datum.’ The agapic datum is a datum not of sense but of consciousness. More precisely, it appears within the horizon of conscious intentionality as an intrinsic enrichment of the transcendental notions in their conscious dimension, first the notion of goodness and then the notions of reality and intelligibility. In their conscious dimension, it is the correlative of the notions' intentionally possessing the primary component of their total fulfillment, even though such intentional possession is not yet realized. By virtue of the agapic datum, the transcendental notions of goodness, reality, and intelligibility become notions of holiness. In turn, my subsequent operations of understanding, of making judgments of fact, and of evaluating and deciding are not ordinary operations but religious ones, operations radically both motivated and oriented and normed by the feeling of unrestricted being in love. And what I know and choose by means of those operations is manifest as not simply the intelligible, the real, and the good but — more amply — the holy.

But if the agapic datum intrinsically enriches my transcendental intending and, in turn, my actual knowing and choosing, then the distinction between the absence and presence of the agapic datum is analogous to the distinctions between the respective absences and presences of the first, second, and third transcendental notions as such. In this analagical relationship, the similarity is that all four distinctions are distinctions between the absence and presence of some basic

53Recall note 41, above.

54The practice of using the words ‘holiness’ and ‘holy’ in just this way is my own, not Lonergan’s. Nonetheless, I think it neatly expresses something that Lonergan himself clearly maintains, namely, that for a person unrestrictedly in love, everything bespeaks the unrestrictedly lovable beloved. Hence, every notion becomes a notion of holiness, and every subsequent cognitional or decisional operation is the knowing or choosing of holiness. (The specific texts inspiring this language are Method 116-117, 242-243.) In the third of the three exchanges above, Lonergan himself articulates a narrower version of the same point when he characterizes as ‘religious’ not only those judgments that regard the existence of God, theological issues, and the like, but — and, I would say, more fundamentally — any factual or moral judgment ‘with a religious basis,’ that is, any judgment made by a person who is unrestrictedly in love.
dynamic factor that consciously prefigures an intentional goal, impels me toward it, and is the criterion of my actually possessing it. The *difference* is that the transcendental notions as such are purely heuristic yearnings presupposing nothing, mere anticipations of intentional fulfillment, absolutely *a priori* dynamic structures that remotely motivate, orient, and norm my operations of knowing and choosing. The agapic datum, by contrast, presupposes the transcendental notions, is the consciousness (though not yet knowledge) of the primary component of their exhaustive fulfillment, and reconstitutes them as relatively *a priori* dynamic structures that in turn proximately motivate, orient, and norm my operations of knowing and choosing.

In his various discussions of the relations between the transcendental notions and what I have been calling the agapic datum, Lonergan ordinarily adverts to difference as well as similarity. That is to say, he makes clear that both the three transcendental notions and the agapic datum are fundamental dynamic features of the conscious subject; but he makes clear as well that the former are pure heuristic structures whereas the latter is the conscious (though not yet properly cognitional) satisfaction of those pure heuristic structures and, as such, transmutes them into enriched heuristic structures. In these *typical* discussions, Lonergan employs the word ‘level’ in its *strict* sense. On this usage, there are exactly four levels of consciousness, correlative at root with ordinary data and the three transcendental notions. The agapic datum (together with operations performed under its influence) does not stand on a ‘fifth level’; rather, it inchoatively fulfills and structurally enriches the conscious intentional strivings (and operations) on the only four levels there are.

Occasionally, however, eager to highlight the novel intentional capabilities the agapic datum engenders in the conscious subject, Lonergan emphasizes the aforementioned similarity without also emphasizing the aforementioned difference. In these *atypical* discussions, he is apt to employ the word ‘level’ in its *wide* sense. On this sense, there are four levels of consciousness, correlative at root with ordinary data and the three transcendental notions, just as before. In addition, however, and correlative at root with the agapic datum, there is a fifth level of consciousness, a level on which one’s awareness of
ordinary data and one's (pure) intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness (plus the consequent operations) are sublated by one's (enriched) intending of holiness (along with the consequent operations).  

3.4 The heart of the issue

What is the heart of the 'fifth level' issue we have been considering at such length? It is not ultimately the terminological question of the senses and uses of the word 'level.' It is ultimately the methodical foundational theological question of the relationship of the transcendental notions and the agapic datum. Do I experience the agapic datum as a gift that (a) stands apart from what I intend transcendentally but complements it, or (b) stands apart from what I intend transcendentally and, indeed, displaces it, or (c) stands within what I intend transcendentally?

Or, again: Is unrestricted being in love my possession of something surprising that (a) is in discontinuity with the objectives of my transcendental notions but supplements them, or (b) is in discontinuity with those objectives and, indeed, supersedes them, or (c) is in continuity with those objectives?

Or, again: Is the fundamental datum of my religious consciousness something novel that (a) simply augments my ordinary moral

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55. To express the same basic point in a slightly different way, I am suggesting that at least concretely if not expressly, Lonergan recognizes that by virtue of the agapic datum there arises a new notion, a notion I am labeling the notion of 'holiness.' (See above, note 54.) Sometimes his remarks manifest something of his concrete recognition that the notion of holiness, like the notions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, is transcategorial, 'transcendental' in the scholastic sense. But in certain atypical discussions his remarks do not convey what he also recognizes concretely, namely, that the notion of holiness, unlike the notions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, is only comparatively heuristic, only relatively a priori, not purely heuristic, not absolutely a priori, not 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense. (And, as a related point, this reminder: what is not 'transcendental' in both the scholastic and Kantian senses is of course not "transcendental" in Lonergan's own sense. See Third Collection 76; compare Method 13-14, note 4, Second Collection 207, Third Collection 140-141 and note 8.)

56. Recall above, note 34.
and cognitional consciousness, or (b) wholly replaces them, or (c) intrinsically enriches them?

This is the crucial question, the fundamental substantive issue in all the cogitations about whether or not there is a fifth level of consciousness. In itself, it is a question of considerable foundational theological importance. Moreover, it is a question central to the pivotal systematic theological issue of just how one conceives the relationship of human openness and divine gift — or, in more traditional terms, the relationship of nature and grace.\(^{57}\)

Now, I have maintained that ‘level’ has a strict sense and a wide sense in Lonergan’s work, that he uses the word ordinarily in its strict sense but occasionally in its wide sense, and that he denies a fifth ‘level’ of consciousness in the strict sense but admits one in the wide sense. This, however, is Lonergan’s stance not on the crucial, methodical foundational question but merely on the secondary, terminological question connected with it. What I have claimed to be his stance on the crucial question, a stance I also affirm as my own, is the third alternative in each of the three versions of that question that I presented just above. The distinctive features of this stance may be both underscored and amplified by the following five sets of queries and replies.\(^{58}\)

(1) Do I ever experience the gift of unrestrictedly being in love? Yes. Is this feeling, the agapic datum, the most basic element in my conscious life? No, still more basic are ordinary data and my transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness.

(2) Does the agapic datum present itself as a profound conscious (though not properly cognitional) satisfaction? Yes. As a satisfaction that is ‘totally other,’ in no way foreshadowed by anything in my consciousness? No, it is rather the conscious correlative of the exhaus-

\(^{57}\)In traditional terms, the systematic theological issue itself may be put as follows: Is the experience of unrestrictedly being in love the experience of grace (a) as simply added to nature, or (b) as wholly supplanting nature, or (c) as intrinsically perfecting nature?

\(^{58}\)As with so much else in this essay, these formulations are my own, though I contend that the stance they express is indeed Lonergan’s.
tive fulfillment of my transcendental intentions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, even though such exhaustive intentional fulfillment is not yet actual.

(3) Is the agapic datum the *distinctive* basic motivating and orienting element in my intending of the transcategorial objective that is aptly labeled 'holiness'? Yes. Is it the *sole* basic motivating and orienting element in that intending? No, my intending of holiness results from the agapic datum's enrichment of my transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness.

(4) Is the agapic datum the *distinctive* element of the basic criterion by which I assess the success of my efforts to know and choose particular instances of holiness? Yes. Is it the *sole* element of that criterion? No, the basic criterion as such is my intending of holiness, intending that results from the agapic datum's enrichment of my transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness.

(5) Is the agapic datum a heuristic, *a priori* element of my intentional consciousness? Yes. Is it purely heuristic, absolutely *a priori*, like my transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness? No, it presupposes (and enhances) my transcendental intending and thus is only comparatively heuristic, just relatively *a priori*.

4. COMMENTS ON DORAN'S ANSWER

Let me complete this essay by commenting in turn on Robert Doran's two presentations, sketched earlier, of his claim that an integral Lonerganian account of the concrete subject's dynamic structure will include the affirmation of not just four but five distinct levels of consciousness. My comments make no pretense at being exhaustive.

4.1 *In Theology and the Dialectics of History*

I surely agree with Doran that the later Lonergan makes the experience of love a central feature of one's intentional consciousness, emphasizes the experience of unrestricted love, and maintains that the latter
presents itself both as a gift and as in some way fully satisfying one's transcendental intending. Furthermore, with Doran, I accept Lonergan's contentions here as correct. On the other hand, and in light of what I have argued above, I am uneasy with certain features of what Doran says in his own elaboration of those contentions. In particular, I have one fundamental and one consequent reservation about what he seems to assert in his book when he speaks about the dynamism and objectives of transcendental intending.

My fundamental reservation stands in the realm of methodical foundational theology. On my reading — and hearing — of the later Lonergan (and myself), the gift of unrestricted love is the inchoative total satisfaction of the transcendental intentions of goodness, reality, and intelligibility (in that order). By contrast with what I read Doran as claiming in his book, unrestricted love is not the satisfaction of a distinct transcendental intention of unrestricted love, for the very good reason that there is no such intention. Distinct transcendental intentions (pure desires, transcendental notions) are just three in number, not four, and surely not five. They are the intentions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness. One's sentient intending is not transcendental; and one's anticipation of beauty is either not a transcendental intention at all, or else not a distinct one. What is most to the point of our present considerations, however, one's intending of 'unrestricted love,' 'transcendent mystery,' and the like, (in Doran's sense of those terms) is not transcendental. For that intending is not purely heuristic, not absolutely a priori; rather, it is only comparatively heuristic, just relatively a priori. It is the resultant of (a) one's transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality, and goodness and (b) one's experience of being in love without restriction. And its objective is identical with the primary component in the exhaustive objectives of those three transcendental intentions, save that now that primary component is not merely intended but also inchoatively possessed — experienced (though not yet known).

My consequent reservation is terminological. Earlier I argued that in its strict sense, the sense Lonergan the writer almost always presupposes, a 'level' of intentional consciousness is a place in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are ordinary data and the transcendental
notions. But if, as I just now reiterated, there are only three transcendental notions, then there are only four levels of intentional consciousness. Hence, it would be incorrect to speak of unrestricted love as intended and given on a 'fifth level' of intentional consciousness. On my reading of his book, however, just as Doran affirms a distinct transcendental notion of unrestricted love, so also he means 'level' in its strict sense when he claims that one's notion and experience of unrestricted love stand on a 'fifth level.' On my reading, therefore, the affirmation of a fifth level of consciousness as Doran presents it in his book is incorrect.

4.2 In "Consciousness and Grace"

In his recent article, what Doran means when he affirms a 'fifth level' of consciousness is, I believe, somewhat different from what he means in his book. Whereas earlier his crucial distinction between the alleged fifth level and the fourth falls between (a) the transcendental notion and gracious gift of unconditional love and (b) the transcendental notion and actual achievements of goodness, that distinction now falls between (a) the experience of being loved unconditionally and (b) the experience of being in love and loving unconditionally. In my judgment, this proposal is an improvement over the earlier one, for it no longer includes (indeed, perhaps no longer even allows) the assertion of a distinct transcendental notion beyond those of intelligibility, reality, and goodness. Nonetheless I have one fundamental reservation and one consequent reservation about it.

As before, my fundamental reservation stands in the realm of methodical foundational theology. Quite simply, even Doran's second version of his crucial distinction strikes me as dubious; for I am inclined to think that there is no real difference between my experience of the gift of being loved unconditionally and my experience of the gift of being in love unconditionally. Although my present view of the

More exactly, my fundamental reservation stands in the realm of methodical foundational theology as complemented by the philosophical component of methodical systematic theology.
matter is tentative rather than definitive, and while space does not in any case permit me to be prolix, let me sketch why I think as I do.

The hallmark of one’s intentional awareness is the distinction between the content of one’s awareness and one’s awareness of that content. By contrast, the hallmark of one’s non-intentional or conscious awareness is the absence of this distinction. That is to say, in conscious awareness there is an identity between the content of one’s awareness and one’s awareness of that content. Next, in some instances of conscious awareness this awareness-content identity is merely self-present, as in the conscious self-presence of an act of sensing, for example. But in other instances of conscious awareness the awareness-content identity is not just self-present. It is also self-constituting, as in the conscious self-presence of an act of understanding, for example, or of affirming or valuing or choosing.60

Now, the conscious awareness Lonergan calls ‘being in love without restriction’ at root is more like the latter kind of conscious awareness than the former. It is an awareness-content identity that is not merely self-present but also self-constituting. On the other hand, it differs importantly from the self-constituting self-presence of my acts of understanding, affirming, valuing, and choosing. For, in the first place, the latter is the awareness-content identity of acts that are not only conscious but also intentional, acts whose contents include not only the acts themselves but also contents distinct as such from the acts themselves. But unrestricted being in love is the awareness-content identity of an act that is wholly non-intentional, purely conscious, an act whose content is totally identical with the act itself. In the second place, the conscious awareness characteristic of my acts of understanding, affirming, valuing, and choosing is the awareness-content identity of acts that are distinct from one another. But unrestricted being in love is the awareness-content identity of an act wherein choosing, valuing, affirming, and understanding (and — in light of the

prior point — being chosen, being valued, being affirmed, and being understood) are not really distinct. In the third place, the conscious awareness characteristic of my acts of understanding, affirming, valuing, and choosing is the awareness-content identity of acts that are restricted in yet another way, for they are limited in their actual attainments. But unrestricted being in love is the awareness-content identity of an act that, precisely by means of being fully in possession of itself, is fully in possession of the plenitude of intelligibility, reality, and goodness. In the fourth place, the conscious awareness characteristic of my acts of understanding, affirming, valuing, and choosing is the awareness-content identity of acts that are radically mine, acts that are expressions of my personal intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. But unrestricted being in love is the awareness-content identity of an act that is radically other, an act that I experience (without yet properly knowing) as the inchoative total satisfaction of my deepest personal striving, and an act that I possess in my own name only secondarily — and then only insofar as I understand, affirm, value, and choose in function of it.61

It seems to me, then, that when Doran draws a real (not just notional) distinction between my experience of my being loved unconditionally and my experience of my being in love and loving unconditionally, he proceeds at variance with the facts. My suggestion is that one’s experience of unconditioned love is an experience (though not yet knowledge) of a conscious act whose content is totally identical with the act itself, an unlimited conscious act of loving (and knowing) and being loved (and being known). First I experience this perfect act-content identity as something radically other that nonetheless is given to me, a gift; and then I take personal possession of it by making it the proximate stimulus, guide, and criterion of my own operations of knowing and loving. In my view, the crucial (and, I admit, initially elusive) real distinction falls not where Doran places it but rather

61 This paragraph depends especially upon my reading of Lonergan, Verbum 32, 88, 188-205; Collection (1967) 84-95, 198-201 = CWL 4 81-91, 185-87; Insight (1957) 644-51, 657-69 = CWL 3 667-674, 680-692; Method 101-124, 240-44; and Philosophy of God, and Theology 1-68.
between (a) the gift of my being loved and loving without restriction, a
gift that I experience; and (b) my particular acts of loving, acts that in
my own name I perform. That is to say, the gift of my loving
(identically the gift of my being loved) both really differs from and
methodically precedes the particular acts of my loving.62

I have challenged the reality of Doran’s methodical foundational
theological distinction between (a) my experience of being loved
unconditionally and (b) my experience of being in love uncondition-
ally. If this challenge stands, however, then on Doran’s own principles
it also impugns the two systematic theological distinctions that he
would draw and correlate with the aforementioned one. Specifically, it
casts doubt upon the reality of both the methodical systematic distinc-
tion between (a) my experience of the gift of being loved by God and (b)
my experience of the gift of loving God, and the scholastic systematic
distinction between (a) sanctifying grace and (b) the habit of charity.63

On the other hand, it also eliminates the awkward problem of main-
taining that, in an area he undoubtedly pondered at some length, the
later Lonergan is less precise than the early Lonergan.64

Consequent on my fundamental reservation about the substance
of what Doran proposes in his recent article is a reservation about his
terminology. Earlier I argued that in such expressions as ‘level of inten-
tional consciousness’ the word ‘level’ as used by Lonergan can have
either of two senses. Besides the strict sense, which he almost always
presupposes, there is a wide sense, which he occasionally presupposes.

62In theological terms, the gift of my loving and being loved is radically the gift of
my participation in God’s own self-loving and being loved.

63Moreover, it also implies the reversal of Doran’s concluding suggestion that
“we must turn to human love to find the analogy by which we are able to reach some
further understanding ... of the reality of grace” (Doran, “Consciousness and Grace”
75). If my analysis is correct, we gain a fuller understanding of human love by
referring to our experience of divine love, not vice versa. (It remains, of course, that
experiencing divine love and recognizing it as such are not the same; and thus what
we call ‘human’ love may often involve not a little of divine love.)

64See Doran, “Consciousness and Grace” 57-58, 61-62. If correct, my conclusion
do not of course prove that sanctifying grace and charity are not really distinct, only
that their real distinction is not implied by the methodical systematic distinction
Doran alleges.
In its wide sense a 'level' of intentional consciousness is a place in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are ordinary data, the transcendental notions, and the experience of unrestrictedly being in love. On this sense, in addition to the four levels of intentional consciousness respectively correlative at root with ordinary data and my (pure) notions of intelligibility and reality and goodness, there is a fifth level, a level correlative at root with my experience of unrestrictedly being in love, a level on which my (enriched) notion of holiness (plus the operations following from that notion) sublates the other notions (plus the operations following from them).

Now, in which of its senses is Doran using the word 'level' when he claims in his article that one's experience of unconditional love stands on a 'fifth level' of consciousness? Doran himself seems to believe he is using the word in some Lonerganian sense, since a key element of his own effort in the article is to "advance and promote Lonergan's very few and somewhat hesitant references to a fifth level of consciousness." But in my judgment this is not correct. On my reading of his article, just as he no longer asserts a distinct transcendental notion of unconditional love, so also he no longer means 'level' in its strict sense. Nor does he mean it in its wide sense; for on that sense 'fifth level' properly indicates the experience not just of being loved unconditionally, as Doran would have it, but the experience of being loved and loving unconditionally, as (on my interpretation) Lonergan would have it.

In short, whatever else may be said about it, if the affirmation of a fifth level of consciousness as Doran presents it in his article is correct, it is correct on some other sense of the word 'level' than either of the two senses Lonergan imputes to it.

Doran, "Consciousness and Grace" 62. At the same time, Doran's terminology also suggests some awareness that he may be developing rather than just interpreting Lonergan; for in this presentation, as distinct from his book, he sometimes speaks of a "fifth level or enlargement of consciousness" (62, 63, 74, my emphasis; compare 60).
4.3 Conclusion

By making and elaborating his claim that an integral Lonerganian account of the concrete subject's dynamic structure will include the affirmation of not just four but five distinct levels of consciousness, Robert Doran has performed yet another service for the scholarly community in general and Lonergan scholars in particular. He has highlighted a question of major importance both in the interpretation Lonergan and in itself: Is there a fifth level of consciousness? He has shown how the question arises, why it is crucial, and what is implied by one rather than another answer to it. Moreover, he has pursued this effort as part of his courageous broader attempt to begin addressing the mammoth but essential task of transposing Christian theological claims from the metaphysically-based scholastic categories in which often they were originally formulated into the psychologically-based methodical categories required in our present day. For these labors he merits both high admiration and warm gratitude.

It remains that the two successive affirmative answers I see Doran offering to the question about a fifth level of consciousness both strike me as problematic. On my reading, in Theology and the Dialectics of History he answers yes by virtue of incorrectly positing a distinct transcendental notion of unconditional love and, in consequence, incorrectly employing the word 'level' in its strict Lonerganian sense. And in "Consciousness and Grace" he answers yes by virtue of incorrectly positing a real distinction — within unconditional love — between being loved and being in love and, in consequence, employing the word 'level' either incorrectly in its wide Lonerganian sense or else confusingly in a non-Lonerganian sense.

For my own part, I have argued that the correct answer to the question about a fifth level is negative on the strict and far more common Lonerganian sense of 'level' but affirmative on the wide though far less common Lonerganian sense of that word. More basic than this answer, however, is a claim I have made about the character of the question itself. On my assessment, the question about a fifth level of consciousness is first and foremost a methodical foundational theological question and only second and consequently a termino-
logical question. In terms of what Doran argues, this means that the fundamental issue is the following twofold methodical foundational one: (1) Beyond the transcendental notions of intelligibility, reality, and goodness, is there a distinct transcendental notion of unconditional love? (2) If not, at least is there a real distinction between my experience of being loved unconditionally and my experience of being in love unconditionally? As far as I can tell, Doran initially replies yes to the first, and later no to the first but yes to the second; whereas my own answer to both is no. Here is where our basic disagreement lies. Our disagreement over whether a 'fifth level' of consciousness should be affirmed is secondary and derivative.66

66 As I was completing this essay, I learned of an unpublished paper by Lonergan that was recently discovered by Frederick Crowe in File 725 of the archives at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. The paper, which is scheduled for publication in the next issue of this journal, is entitled "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon." On internal evidence Crowe establishes that it was written in late 1977 or early 1978. Fascinating in several respects, the paper is pertinent to our present considerations in its mention of not just four or even five but, indeed, six levels (pp. 13-14)! Far fromcontroverting what I have argued here, however, in my judgment the newly discovered paper confirms it insofar as it again manifests Lonergan's willingness occasionally to use the word 'level' in other than what I have called the strict sense of that word. (For a close published parallel in substance, though not in terminology, see Third Collection 28-30.)
READING AS UNDERSTANDING

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In the authoritative volume, Extending Beginning Reading, the authors note that “Definitions of reading are almost as numerous as the many experts who have committed their thoughts to paper.”\(^1\) Summing up the recent history of the subject they say,

the main trend in definitions of reading, throughout this century, has been away from the earlier ideas of reading as a mechanistic process towards an acceptance of it as a thoughtful process, requiring the reader not only to understand what the author is endeavouring to communicate but also to contribute his own experiences and thoughts to the problem of understanding.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Southgate et al., Extending Beginning Reading 22-23. Today there are three main emphases among reading theorists. There are, first, those who place major emphasis on phonics, on the recognition of the sounds associated with certain letters and letter combinations. Second, there are those who emphasize ‘whole word’ recognition rather than individual letter recognition, the so-called ‘look and say’ school of reading. Third are those who claim that reading is not properly reading unless it is a reconstruction of the author’s meaning; the ability to ‘decode’ print into sound is not enough. Reading is only successful if it involves the reader in thinking, reasoning, understanding, and acquiring meaning.

In what follows I do not enter into the debate about the best method for the effective teaching of reading. I should perhaps add that while I believe that the work of Frank Smith, whose views I discuss at length, has been of great value to teachers I also agree with a fairly widely held criticism that he fails to distinguish adequately between the needs of fluent readers and the needs of beginners. Beginners would appear to require more instruction in phonics than Smith appears to countenance, so that they have strategies for coping with new words and letter combinations. That, however, is a personal opinion and is not among the issues discussed in this article.
This emphasis on reading as a process of understanding or acquiring meaning, in which the reader plays an active role, now has many academic champions, foremost among whom must be counted the psycholinguistic school of reading theorists. Psycholinguistics grew out of the intersection of two academic disciplines: psychology and linguistics. Linguistics is the study of language as a system; psychology — or, more precisely, cognitive psychology — is the study of how "humans acquire, interpret, organize, store, retrieve, and employ knowledge."

As measured by influence on classroom teachers, the most prominent exponent today of the psycholinguistic approach to reading is probably Frank Smith, and it is Smith's thinking about reading and reading comprehension that I wish to compare with Lonergan's theory of cognition. The advantages of such a comparison are several. In the first place, it is important that philosophers' theories of knowledge are tested against practical examples of how knowledge is acquired and developed; reading provides such a test. Secondly, the comparison should help to draw out and illuminate certain aspects of Lonergan's theory of inquiry that can easily be overlooked. Finally, the comparison should help to bring out elements of incoherence in Smith's position; more positively, it might indicate how Smith's position could benefit from the rigorous theoretical underpinning which Lonergan's philosophy can provide.

3Southgate et al., Extending Beginning Reading 23-24.


FRANK SMITH ON READING

In his revised preface to *Understanding Reading*, Smith explains how his understanding of the reading process has been extended by a theoretical liberalization as the behavioral sciences have continued to free themselves from constraints of behaviorism and ventured more into the realm of mental life, which is surely the area of reading ... There is still a great deal of research that I would consider peripheral to main issues in reading, studies that restrict themselves to eye movement or to letter or isolated word recognition. But there have also been many attempts ... to understand better the notions of meaning and comprehension, and it is these that I feel are contributing most to theoretical and practical issues in reading.

For Smith 'reading' and 'comprehension' are virtually interchangeable terms. Offering what he terms 'a provisional definition of comprehension' he says that it is

relating what we attend to in the world around us — the visual information in the case of reading — to what we already have in our heads. And here is a provisional definition of learning: modifying what we already have in our heads as a consequence of attending to the world around us.

This provides a paradox which Smith loves to play with and impress upon his readers:

the skill in reading actually depends on using the eyes as little as possible ... As we become fluent readers we learn to rely more on what we already know, on what is behind the eyeballs, and less on the print on the page in front of us.

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7 Smith, *Understanding Reading* v.
8 Smith, *Understanding Reading* 8.
9 Smith, *Understanding Reading* 56.
Visual information is, of course, necessary for reading to occur but visual information is not enough. Non-visual information is also necessary. By this Smith means an understanding of the relevant language, familiarity with the subject matter and the ability to read in the sense of decoding signs into sounds.\textsuperscript{11} He shows by a number of experiments that what we already know about English reduces our uncertainty about letter or word sequence. We can, for example, predict the letter that will follow Q or fill in the blanks in a well-known phrase.\textsuperscript{12} But familiarity with letter or word sequence is not all that is meant by non-visual information. The term also includes the model or theory of the world I carry around with me.

All of the order and complexity that I perceive in the world around me must reflect an order and complexity in my own mind. Anything I cannot relate to the theory of the world in my head will not make sense to me. I shall be bewildered.\textsuperscript{13}

This model or theory is the basis of all new learning. It is not a catalogue of facts, nor simply 'memories' but a system, an ... internally consistent model of the world, built up as a result of experience ... If we can learn at all, it is by modifying and elaborating our theory. The theory fills our minds: we have no other resource.\textsuperscript{14}

The way in which the knowledge we carry about with us assists learning is related to the guessing and predicting that are basic to learning. Learning is inextricably linked to the activities of hypothesizing and predicting and these rest on our theory of the world. Our theory cuts down the number of possible alternatives, reduces the choices we need to make in order to make sense of the printed words.

We make predictions about what we are about to read in order to comprehend, and we make hypotheses about what a particular word or passage is likely to be in order to learn. Our predictions

\textsuperscript{11}Smith, Reading 13.
\textsuperscript{12}Smith, Reading 26.
\textsuperscript{13}Smith, Understanding Reading 57.
\textsuperscript{14}Smith, Reading 77.
and hypotheses come from what we understand about the passage already: and our feedback, the information that tells us whether we were right or wrong, comes from what we go on to read. If we have made a mistake we will probably find out about it — and that is the way we will learn.  

Against those who would teach reading letter by letter or word by word and thus overburden short-term memory, Smith advocates reliance on the child’s natural desire to make sense of things.

We learn to ready by reading, by conducting experiments as we go along. We have built up a sight vocabulary of fifty thousand words — not by someone telling us fifty thousand times what a word is, but by hypothesizing the identity of new words that we meet in print and testing that our hypotheses make sense in the context ... By conducting experiments as we read, we learn not only to recognize new words, but everything else to do with reading. We learn to make use of spelling-to-sound correspondences, not by memorizing the 166 rules and 45 exceptions of formal phonics instruction but by developing implicit procedures for distinguishing one word from another when the number of alternatives is limited to the most likely few.

Guessing or predicting are not blind conjecture, but reasoned hypothesis-testing, “a precise and natural exercise of the human brain.”

Questioning is an integral part of predicting and comprehension is getting our questions answered: “Now at last I can say what I mean by comprehension,” Smith announces. Questioning in that sense is predicting.

We do not look out of the window and wonder, “What shall I see?” we ask, “Shall I see buses or pedestrians?” and provided that what we are looking at falls within that limited range of alternatives our perception is effortless, efficient and unsurprised.

15Smith, Reading 95.
16Smith, Reading 94-95.
17Smith, Reading 94.
18Smith, Reading 83.
19Smith, Reading 83.
The question determines how much we need to eliminate in order to get an answer; and the answer we get is dependent on the questions we ask.20 "If we do not know the right kind of question to ask of a maths text or knitting pattern, then obviously we will not be able to read a maths text or knitting pattern."21

Questioning is, of course, related to meaning and meaning is the guiding thread in all that Smith wants to say about reading. Another of the paradoxes he likes to impress on his readers is that "it is not in print that the meaning of written language lies."22 This is paradoxical because it is commonly assumed that we read in order to get meaning from the printed word. Smith overturns this idea by insisting that we bring meaning to print rather than get meaning from it.23 To illustrate the point he distinguishes between the 'surface structure' of language (the sounds in the air or marks on the page) and the 'deep structure' (its meaning). That there is no one-to-one correspondence between surface structure and deep structure is easily demonstrated. Ambiguity is an inescapable feature of words and sentences: 'Visiting teachers can be boring,' for example. Such ambiguity is endemic in both spoken and written language and is not clarified by an inspection of the surface structure but by attention to context. Again, a single meaning can be expressed in a variety of ways: 'the dog chased the cat' or 'the cat was chased by the dog.' Nor does the order in which words are placed determine their meaning: 'man' at the beginning of a sentence may be either a noun or a verb.24 Against linguists who argue that it is grammar that determines meaning, Smith convincingly argues that we often cannot determine the grammar of a sentence until we have understood its meaning. Is the sentence "Mother was seated by the bishop" active or passive? Only the correct meaning will determine

20Smith, Reading 84, 104, 110.
21Smith, Reading 104.
22Smith, Reading 49.
23Smith, Reading 40.
24Smith, Reading 70.
this, as only the correct meaning will determine the grammatical function of 'by.'

Others have argued that meaning inheres primarily in the spoken word and only derivatively in written language. But Smith shows that there is no one-to-one correspondence between spoken and written language. Many words that sound the same when spoken are in fact written differently (pair, pare, pear); and many printed letters and letter combinations have different pronunciations in different words (for example, ho in house, hose, honey, hour, honest). Written language does not mirror spoken language and so there is no route to meaning simply by decoding print into sound. Besides, we are all familiar with interpreting wordless road signs; we might be able to express their meaning in words but only in so far as we have already interpreted their meaning. Meaning lies as much beyond spoken language as it lies beyond written language.

What is lacking in the views of those who appeal to word order or the rules of grammar or the primacy of spoken language to explain how language means is, Smith contends, the notion of intention. Even the notion that deep structure consists of an underlying transformational grammar that generates meaning by arranging the surface structure of language remains inert without the notion of intention. What puts transformational grammar to work? "What determines that one transformational rule rather than another will be employed? ... Where is the dynamic element to put some force and direction into it all?" What comes first for writers and speakers is the intention to express a particular meaning. And they choose their mode of expression because they intend to address a particular audience. Words express meaning because someone has intended their meaning — hence our indignation and surprise when we find our meaning has been misinterpreted or distorted, that it is not as transparent to the audience as it is to our-

25 Smith, Reading 71.
26 Smith, Reading 55.
selves.28 Audiences and readers for their part are guided by their intention to understand. It is this intention that enables them to predict or anticipate in general what the topic is about and so eliminate the vast area of ambiguity that inheres in decontextualized utterances: unlikely alternatives are ruled out in advance.29

We do not read a sentence in order to generate a deep structure; we read it from a deep structure, seeking to fill gaps, to answer questions, to confirm expectations, and to reduce uncertainties among alternatives.30

Children behave like scientists by testing their hypotheses as they read on, Smith says, but then immediately takes exception to the analogy.

The analogy should go the other way. When scientists are conducting their experiments they are behaving like children ... The "scientific method" is the natural way to learn, displayed by all of us in our early years.31

Scientific method is only an instance of a much more general method of learning that is natural to children. It is not surprising that Smith is hostile to the behaviorist notion of learning as dependent on reinforcement; he considers learning and the search for meaning to be perfectly natural. The enemies of learning are boredom or situations which children cannot make sense of.32

How is Smith able to support his position on reading and comprehension? How does he gain access to the data on which he bases his fairly elaborate interpretation of the reading process? Smith explores these methodological issues in his book on writing. Here he makes the point that thoughts and intentions are not immediately accessible to observation; we cannot point to them or examine them under a micro-

28Smith, Reading 73.
29Smith, Reading 74.
30Smith, Writing 57.
31Smith, Reading 89.
32Smith, Understanding Reading 220, and Smith, Reading 95.
To gain access to thought we should not attempt to look into ourselves but rather should put our thoughts to work and examine the products of our thoughts and intentions. We specify our intentions by analyzing our behavior or intended behavior, but we cannot examine our intentions directly. This is why language is important, especially written language because of its permanence:

Language is not thought, although it is produced and interpreted by thought. And thought is not language, although it is only through language or some other manifest product that its currents can be perceived.

Smith is unusually insistent on the distinction between thought and language and he also insists on the distinction between thought and visual imagery.

We may believe we hear ourselves thinking when we hear ourselves manipulating language problems silently—such as “Tom is taller than Dick, and Dick is taller than Harry. So is Tom taller than Harry?”—but each proposition has to be interpreted.

Even the image of Tom, Dick, and Harry standing in line cannot replace the need for interpretation.

To be meaningful, to make sense, every mental image has to be interpreted. The scenes and events that we conjure up in the mind still have to be dealt with by the elusive processes of thought, just as much as the actual scenes and events that we perceive in the world outside the head.

This at first glance seems to be an area of profound agreement with Lonergan’s distinctions between mental acts and expression, and between looking and understanding. It becomes apparent, however, that this is in fact an area where a profound disagreement emerges between Smith and Lonergan. The immediate cause of disagreement is Smith’s contention that thoughts, intentions, and actions are somehow

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33Smith, Writing 29.
34Smith, Writing 38.
35Smith, Writing 39.
36Smith, Writing 40.
"beyond awareness." But this observation in turn is tied to a view of the mind's relation to the world (or rather the brain's — Smith uses the terms interchangeably but prefers to talk of the brain) — a view to which Lonergan's position is radically opposed. But I shall postpone discussion of this until the end of my comparison of Smith and Lonergan, where it fits more naturally.

**LONERGAN ON COGNITION**

To measure the agreement between Smith and Lonergan I propose to offer a series of propositions, each summarizing a salient feature of Smith's position. Using these as headings I shall then attempt to indicate Lonergan's position under each heading.

1. **Knowledge is dependent on what we already know**

Lonergan's philosophy is at odds with those philosophies that entertain any portion of the naive realist's assumption that knowing is like looking and that, as such, there are at least some facts to the establishment of which the knower contributes nothing: she or he simply, as it were, registers them on the retina of the mind. Lonergan's opposition to the theory that knowing is like looking is endemic in his writing. He maintains that knowing proceeds from the invariant pattern of experiencing, understanding, and judging. One implication of this cognitonal theory is that there are no non-interpreted facts and no epistemologically privileged facts that act as building blocks for more complex facts.

Furthermore, what we already know orientates us when we address problems or situations that are new to us and for this reason require fresh insights and judgments.

Past judgments remain with us. They form a habitual orientation, present and operative, but only behind the scenes. They govern the direction of attention, evaluate insights, guide formulations, and influence the acceptance or rejection of new judgments. They facilitate the occurrence of fresh insights, exert

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37Smith, *Writing* 31.
their influence on new formulations, provide presuppositions that underlie new judgments ... Hence, when a new judgment is made, there is within us a habitual context of insights and other judgments.\textsuperscript{38}

Faced with the puzzle of how new knowledge is attainable when such knowledge is not yet acquired, Lonergan finds the answer in what he terms the 'heuristic structure.' The acquisition of new knowledge need not be a series of wild conjectures. It can be a methodical process achieved by ordering means to an end. Heuristic structure gives method and system to our inquiries. It is very simple: "Name the unknown. Work out its properties. Use the properties to direct, order, guide the inquiry."\textsuperscript{39}

These two quotations, taken together, cover the points Smith makes in respect of new knowledge being dependent on what we already know. Applied to reading they suggest (a) that what we already know (about language, life, the area of knowledge being addressed in the passage) informs our reading, and (b) that we use the contextual clues to work out the meaning of words or phrases that are new to us.

2. \textit{We anticipate knowledge claims}

In many ways this follows from what has just been said, for inquiry is an anticipatory activity.

[B]y inquiring, intelligence anticipates the act of understanding for which it strives. The context of that anticipated act can be designated heuristically. The properties of the anticipated and designated content constitute the clues intelligence employs to guide itself towards discovery ... Of themselves, heuristic structures are empty. They anticipate a form that is to be filled.\textsuperscript{40}

Lonergan at this point is talking about scientific inquiry, but his remarks can be applied to all inquiry and therefore to reading. For


\textsuperscript{39}Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 44 = CWL 3 68.

\textsuperscript{40}Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 103 = CWL 3 126.
reading is a form of inquiry that is truly anticipatory, in which the reader uses available clues (including at times pictures and diagrams) to guide her or him to an understanding of what she or he does not yet understand. When Lonergan speaks of 'guidance' or 'determination' he has in mind much that Smith means when he speaks of the number of choices being reduced by virtue of what we already know and what we anticipate.

3. We carry a model of the world in our head

Elaborating on the relation of the text's meaning to what the interpreter brings to the text, Lonergan attacks what he calls the principle of the empty head. This principle bids the interpreter forget his own views, look at what is out there, let the author interpret himself. In fact, what is out there? There is just a series of signs. Anything over and above a re-issue of the same signs in the same order will be mediated by the experience, intelligence, and judgment of the interpreter ... the wider the interpreter's experience, the deeper and fuller the development of this understanding, the better balanced his judgment, the greater the likelihood that he will discover just what the author meant.41

Smith clearly relishes the paradoxical quality of this claim that we read from a model in our head. This chimes with Lonergan's assertion that the principle of the empty head rests upon a 'naive intuitionism.' It springs from the belief that objectivity amounts to a 'pure receptivity' that excludes 'any subjective activity' - the belief of the nineteenth-century empiricists.42 Lonergan, by contrast, refuses to identify objectivity with the absence of subjectivity. The enemy of objectivity is not the subject's wealth of knowledge but human bias in its various forms.

Another tenet that emerges from this is that

42Lonergan, Method 232.
4. The sources of meaning are immanent in the interpreter

Although this is Lonergan’s formulation, the idea is shared by Smith — for example, when he says that the theory or model of the world “fills our mind: we have no other resource”;43 or when he asks where meaning comes from if all that passes between the writer and the reader is the printed page. “The only possible answer is that readers ... must provide meaning themselves.”44

Lonergan makes the point when he repudiates the notion that the truly objective interpreter simply observes the meanings ‘out there’ while the subjective interpreter ‘reads’ his own ideas ‘into’ statements.

[T]he plain fact is that there is nothing “out there” except spatially ordered marks; to appeal to dictionaries or to grammars, to linguistic and stylistic studies, is to appeal to more marks. The proximate source of the whole experiential component in the meaning of both objective and subjective interpreters lies in their own experience; the proximate source of the whole intellectual component lies in their own insights; the proximate source of the whole reflective process lies in their critical reflection.45

Smith and Lonergan agree that in respect of reading or interpreting to overlook the contribution of the reader or interpreter is to talk nonsense. This is the cardinal point in the agreement between the two authors. It leads to the hope or expectation that Smith has a coherent and philosophically compatible understanding of the subject or reader. Unfortunately, as we shall see, this hope is not fulfilled.

5. Predicting and hypothesizing are basic to learning

Once more the proposition follows from and is integral to others that have preceded it. If inquiry is anticipatory and depends on a heuristic structure to be methodical, predicting and hypothesizing will play an important role in the move from ignorance to answer. In Lonergan’s cognitional theory understanding precedes knowledge. Understanding

43Smith, Reading 77.
44Smith, Reading 71.
45Lonergan, Insight 582 = CWL 3 605.
by itself is not knowledge but preparatory to knowledge; for understanding to qualify as knowledge, it stands in need of verification. It follows that understanding on its own has the status of a hypothesis that has yet to be verified.

Because the proximate sources of interpretation are immanent in the interpreter, every interpretation is, at first, no more than a hypothesis. Because initially it is no more than a hypothesis, it can become probable or certain only by approximating to the virtually unconditioned or by reaching it.46

For Lonergan, verification consists in the fulfillment of the conditions required for the hypothesis to be judged true or probable—that is, in achieving the status of what he calls a 'virtually unconditioned.' In the context in which the above quotation occurs he is attempting to work out "a general heuristic structure for a methodical hermeneutics"47 and this requires a "multiply interlocked coherence" as providing the virtually unconditioned that grounds true interpretation. Smith's ambitions are more restricted since he is concerned only with a correct interpretation of the author's intended meaning. His criterion of correctness is the fulfillment of the predictions, etc. we make as we read: if what we go on to read fits or coheres with what we have predicted our hypothesis is to that extent confirmed; if not, we need to revise our hypothesis.48 For both Smith and Lonergan, speaking in the context of interpretation, coherence provides the principle of verification.

6. Questions are the driving force behind comprehension

Smith is insistent on the role of questions in coming to understand a text. Questions direct our reading and it is only by asking the right questions that we can hope to grasp the meanings the text has to offer. On the topic of questions Lonergan is eloquent. It is questions for intelligence that promote us from the experiential to the intellectual level

46Lonergan, Insight 612 = CWL 3 612.
47Lonergan, Insight 616 = CWL 3 616.
48Smith, Understanding Reading 56.
(What? Why? How often? and so on); and it is questions for critical reflection that promote us from the level of understanding to the level of judgment (Is that so or not so? Is it probable or improbable?). Further, our realization that our understanding and knowledge are incomplete commonly generates further questions. The questions identify what we do not know, the 'known unknown,' and move us to further insights. Insights coalesce into viewpoints and lower viewpoints are raised by further questions and answers to higher viewpoints. In the area of intellectual development, Lonergan terms the question the 'operator,' the principle that moves us onwards and upwards. "Thus, unless one asks the further questions, one remains with the insights one has already, and so intelligence does not develop." For the same reason, it is when the stream of questions dries up, when there are no further relevant questions to be asked, that we know we have reached the end of our investigations of a particular situation.

7. There is no one-to-one correspondence between thought and language or between language and objects

8. Meaning is not in the printed word

9. The meaning of the printed word does not derive from the spoken word

These three tenets of Smith, all of them negative, arise as he attempts to explain whence it is that words are meaningful. Lonergan is in basic agreement with each. Language, he maintains, expresses experience, understanding and judgment. As affirmation or negation, it corresponds with judgment; as meaningful it corresponds with insight or understanding; as instrumental multiplicity it corresponds with experience. There is no identity of expression with knowledge but

49Lonergan, Insight 469 = CWL 3 494.
50Lonergan, Insight 471 = CWL 3 495.
51Lonergan, Insight 283-87 = CWL 3 308-312.
52Lonergan, Insight 553 = CWL 3 576.
expression is isomorphic with knowledge. There is discontinuity as well as continuity between expression and knowledge in the sense that deceit remains a possibility and that expression may be less than adequate or shaped to suit the needs of a particular audience.

In a strict sense, words do not mean but people mean. Lonergan distinguishes between principal acts of meaning and instrumental acts of meaning. The former are acts of understanding, judging, deciding, and acting. The latter are expressions of principal acts in gesture, speech, and writing. It follows that words do not mean but people mean through acts of understanding, judging, and acting. In so far as it is in judgment that statements are asserted as true or false, it follows that, strictly speaking, words alone are not true or false. What is true or false is judgment; words are true or false in so far as they express judgments. For that reason, words do not refer directly to things or objects or states of affairs; they refer mediately, through true judgments.

This position takes care of the eighth and ninth of Smith's tenets. For speech and writing are both derivative from principal acts of meaning, and speech is no more the source of meaning than writing is — though there may be other and quite intricate relations between the two. The distinction Smith makes between surface structure and deep structure corresponds to the distinction Lonergan makes between instrumental acts of meaning and principal acts of meaning. As instrumental, words, whether spoken or written, are merely marks on the page or sounds in the air — they are not yet meaningful but simply an experiential source of meaning. The distinction between surface structure and deep structure proves to be of great value to Smith in explaining some interesting features of reading. For example it explains how the same meaning can be expressed in a variety of ways; how we can often make sense of partial, blurred, or even mutilated texts; of how the bridge in translation from one language such as French to another such as English is not direct from French into English but from French into meaning into English idiom.

53Smith, Reading 70.
54Smith, Reading 74.
55Smith, Reading 74.
10. *Meaning is what is intended*

We have seen how Smith makes use of intention as something that is lacking in the Chomskian notion of transformational grammar: without intention the notion of transformational grammar remains mechanistic and inert. Likewise he uses intention to explain operations like attending, listening, and choosing a particular form of expression. In reading the intention of the reader helps eliminate the ambiguity that always accompanies decontextualized utterances.

Lonergan penetrates the notion of intention and intentionality more deeply. There is the intentionality peculiar to a wide range of psychological operations such as seeing, hearing, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so on.56 By virtue of being intentional each of these operations intends its object; by means of them the subject is aware of the object in a particular way. Thus by seeing, the object becomes present to the subject as what is seen; by understanding, it is present as intelligible; by judgment, as what in fact is so; and so on. But underlying these operations is a more basic orientation or intentionality. This is what Lonergan refers to as the pure, disinterested desire to know the truth. It is a fundamental psychic drive or thrust that binds together the various operations required for the real to be reached through true judgments. It takes Lonergan a great many pages to help the reader to grasp what is involved in the dynamic process of coming to know; but intentionality binds this process into one. This basic intentionality relates not just to this or that truth but to all that can be known, to the entire universe of what is, namely being. As such, it is the source of our questioning, taking us beyond the data of sense to the unities and relations that organize the data into a whole; beyond the uncertainties of mere understanding to the affirmation that is done with uncertainties and takes its stand on what is so; beyond each incomplete knowledge claim to further knowledge claims and viewpoints by means of further questions. All human knowing in all fields of inquiry is driven by this basic desire to know, by this conscious intentionality of the inquiring subject. For this

56This is an abbreviation of a list in Lonergan, *Method* 6.
reason Lonergan took to calling his approach to philosophy 'intentionality analysis' — in saying that, he had said it all.

11. *Children do not behave like scientists but scientists behave like children*

In putting the matter in this provocative way Smith wishes to draw attention to his claim that the pattern of comprehension which he outlines is the natural pattern we follow when we want to learn. Lonergan's way of expressing the same point is to say that the threefold structure of cognition is transcendental — or that it is a meta-method that underpins all other methods or forms of inquiry. That is, it is not an object of choice but a given; it is not the product of cultural development but the necessary condition for the development of culture.\(^{57}\)

The pattern of cognition is normative and the move from one level to another in the pattern is both conscious and spontaneous. It is constitutive of our humanity and we grow in humanity and as persons the more we conform to its precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, and be reasonable.\(^{58}\)

This takes us to a final component of Smith's theory of reading and of language.

12. *How do we come to understand the process of reading?*

I put it in the form of a question because Smith's analysis at this point is beset by not a little confusion. He claims that it is not possible to observe our thoughts and intentions directly, and with this Lonergan is in agreement if by 'observe' is meant looking inside to see what is there. But Smith goes further and claims that thoughts and the theory one holds in the head are "beyond awareness";\(^{59}\) skills, feelings, and intentions "are not open to direct inspection or immediately accessible to awareness; all are part of the concealed, mysterious, inconceivable


\(^{59}\)Smith, *Writing* 32.
realm of the mind’s internal processes.” Smith is alert to the objections that can be raised against a position that maintains that we are unaware of what we are doing. He says:

If we successfully drive our car we have presumably “attended” to that action ... but not in the sense that we were consciously aware of what we were doing. If we are engrossed in what we are doing, it is only afterwards that we can remove ourselves from the situation and say what we have done.

He claims that “[a]wareness is retrospective; it always involves reflection.” A major reason is that “we cannot simultaneously attend to something and attend to ourselves attending to it; ... the price we pay for awareness is stopping the action, interrupting the thought.”

Smith’s position is, then, fairly clear: thinking and doing things are beyond awareness because if we were aware of our thinking and doing at the time they occurred, this would get in the way of our thinking and doing, which would cease; so awareness is always retrospective. But while clear enough this position gives rise to some startling pronouncements:

Most of the time we are not aware of what we write and read (or say and hear) — certainly not while we are writing or reading it — although we can become aware of what we have written and read in retrospect.

This suggests that reading and writing are blind, unconscious activities over which the reader and writer exercise no control — only in retrospect do we become conscious or aware of what we have written or read. But it is difficult to see exactly how one could consciously recollect what one did while in an unconscious state. Is it a matter of stumbling across a piece of one’s own writing and saying, “Heavens, that’s my handwriting. I must have written that!” Besides, how could one retain

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60Smith, Writing 38.
61Smith, Writing 43.
62Smith, Writing 44.
63Smith, Writing 42, 43.
64Smith, Writing 42, 43.
what one reads if reading is 'beyond awareness'? Smith no doubt would object that such objections do not reflect what he intended. (But how could he know what he intended?) However, he does lay himself open to criticism in respect of what could possibly count as evidence if what he purports to describe is unconscious.65

Smith in fact makes an elementary, if understandable, error that appears to be linked to a further and deeper error which emerges when he speaks of the brain's interaction with the world. When he speaks about awareness Smith makes the erroneous assumption that awareness is an additional operation to the operations of thinking or doing something. He is right, for example, to say that when I drive my car I attend to what I am doing. He is wrong to say that I only become aware of driving the car afterwards. To say that I attend to my driving is to admit that this is a conscious and not an unconscious activity. When I am conscious or aware of doing something I am also conscious of myself as doing it. Being present to myself is both a necessary condition for conscious activity and a necessary condition for the possibility of retrospective awareness or memory. Such self-presence is not usually the focus of my conscious activity and to that extent is implicit rather than explicit. Even when I make it the object of my explicit attention, I am implicitly aware of myself attending to myself as the explicit object of my attention! At the level of performance, in other words, my self-presence is always implicit. Far from getting in the way of conscious activities like reading or writing such implicit self-presence is crucial to them because without it I would be unaware that it was I who was reading or writing. And without the T' there would in turn be no reading or writing at all.

This is what Lonergan is getting at when he says that consciousness is not only cognitive but also constitutive. That is, not only is the T' needed if consciousness is to take place, but consciousness is needed if the T' is to exist. T' am constituted by my consciousness. Because at the level of performance consciousness is implicit rather than explicit it is easily overlooked. And such is the use of the words 'conscious' or

'aware' in English that they are commonly understood to signify reflective awareness of an object or activity, a deliberate bringing into focus of an object, whether myself or something else. Smith seems to understand awareness in this sense of reflective or explicit awareness and, in consequence, to dismiss it as referring to implicit self-presence. It is this oversight that causes him to commit such howlers as to say that most of the time we are not aware of what we read or write or say or hear. Smith's obtuseness on the topic of awareness indicates a limitation in his notion of intention. For intention has a subjective pole as well as an objective pole. If seeing is an intentional act it is so by intending the object as seen; but this intention also makes the object present to the subject who sees. Smith tends to overlook the subjective pole and his blindness to the subject is reflected in his comments on awareness. It comes into the full light of day when he turns to speak about the brain's interaction with the world. Smith writes about the brain lodged in the darkness of the skull. It is a vivid description:

in prosaic fact the brain leads a life of almost complete isolation in a world without sights or sounds, without even smells or tastes or any kind of tactile sensation. All of these experiences the brain conjures up for itself ... it is only through a constant barrage of indistinguishable neural impulses ... that the brain has any contact with the outside world. The brain sits like a technician in a sealed control room at the center of a vast communication network — except that the brain has never been outside ... The brain knows

66Smith is guilty of the same oversight in his observations on James Britton's comment on awareness. Smith writes, "Britton beautifully sums up the relationship of awareness (which he calls consciousness) to experience as follows: '... consciousness, in fact, is like the little dog with the brass band: it is forever running ahead, or dropping back, or trotting alongside, while the procession of actual events moves steadily on.'" On this Smith remarks, "He might have added that the little dog often disappears altogether for long periods." But Smith's addition changes Britton's meaning radically; it also reveals his own confusion about the nature of awareness. It is, incidentally, worth noting that Lonergan also uses the metaphor of the parade to highlight the nature of consciousness. He writes, "As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become present to themselves; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them; and they are present to themselves by the same watching that, as it were, at its other pole, makes the parade present to them." Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitive Structure," Collection, ed. F. E. Crowe (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967) 226 = Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 210.
nothing at first hand. Everything it pictures as occurring in the world it depicts for itself... Oddly enough, although the brain's only access to the outside world is through neural networks, the incoming neural activity is not anything of which we can ever be directly aware... The brain is aware only of its own products, the images and sensations that it constructs; and we seem destined to remain ignorant of the immediate evidence upon which the brain bases its perceptual decisions.  

There is a good deal of this 'brain talk' in Smith's work. He speaks of 'events' being "superimposed by the brain on a continuous flux of occurrences in the world"; this is "the brain's way of interpreting its interaction with the world," and so on.

What Smith is giving us here is nothing less than a modern version of Cartesian dualism. The brain is the res cogitans, with the additional twist that we know that it has no direct contact with the world of bodies 'out there'; it is aware only of its own products, the images and sensations it 'constructs.' The world in turn is an endless stream of occurrences, stretched out in space and time. The brain 'freezes' this flow in order to 'superimpose' on it distinct 'events.' Awareness is part of this process of freezing time: it 'manufactures' cross sections of the continual flow of time. However, Smith is robust in his resistance to the doubt that afflicted Descartes. Although he speaks as if the constructs of the brain were somewhat artificial and superimposed, he is not disposed to any skepticism in their regard. He has a soothing bedside manner, telling us that "[a]s users of language... we need not let these theoretical conundrums confound us... we can usually produce sentences that will receive the appropriate interpretation." Well, that is comforting.

67Smith, Writing 26.
68Smith, Writing 42.
69Smith, Writing 42.
70Smith, Writing 46.
It is not possible to deal here with all the philosophical issues that Smith succeeds in raising. But there is one large philosophical fallacy that should be nailed. Throughout one section of his writing Smith talks as if the brain were a person. The brain 'depicts,' 'constructs,' 'manufactures,' 'superimposes'; it 'knows,' is presumed to require 'evidence,' it makes 'perceptual decisions.' Throughout this section Smith speaks about 'we' (the author and his readers) and 'it' (the brain) in a manner that presumes their equivalence. This is, in fact, a version of what has been called the 'homunculus fallacy.' The brain is conceived as a little man or person in the head, which enjoys all the attributes of persons. But if that is the case does the little person in the head have a brain? And if so, is that brain like a person? And if so, does that person have a brain? And so on, ad infinitum. Smith, in short, makes a 'category mistake,' talking about one thing in a manner suited to another, quite different thing.

This is an area of disagreement between Smith and Lonergan and illustrates how scholars specializing in non-philosophical subjects not infrequently come up against philosophical issues and can easily fall prey to philosophical attack which can be used to undermine what is of value in their specialist writing. Further, the disagreement between Smith and Lonergan points to two components of Smith's thinking that sit uneasily alongside each other.

On the one hand, Smith is opposed to a mechanistic account of reading that would reduce reading to the mere translation of marks on the page into sounds. He stresses that reading is a form of comprehension and he has a dynamic understanding of comprehension, one that stresses the role of the subject or the reader. We bring meaning to the text, we ask questions, we anticipate and predict; meaning does not reside primarily in the surface features of language but is what is intended by writers, readers, speakers, and listeners. Now all of this is about human beings exercising conscious control of their cognitive

71Smith, Writing 25-42.
72Referred to in Winch, "Reading and the Process of Reading" 305-306.
processes in order to increase their understanding and check that what they understand is the meaning intended by the author. As a conscious and intentional process, cognition is the opposite of processes that are blind, automatic or merely mechanistic.

On the other hand, Smith undermines his position on cognition or comprehension by denying that we are aware of what we say, hear, read, or write while we are engaged in these activities. He takes a further step away from coherence when he proceeds to treat the brain as a person and to confuse the unconscious responses of the brain to incoming neural impulses with conscious thoughts, feelings, and sensations. Smith is in danger, in fact, of reducing the whole edifice of his theory of reading and learning to the automatisms of the brain. He appears to have failed to work out thoroughly the implications of his own theory of reading and learning, which might have led to a more coherent theory of the subject who reads. To do him justice, Smith admits to a good deal of bewilderment in his thinking about the brain/thought interface and, whereas some scientists think that the problems and mysteries will be solved by further research into the brain, he considers that maybe the questions should be framed differently.

CONCLUSION

It would not be wildly speculative to hazard the opinion that those parts of Smith's work that have proved most useful and influential with working teachers happen to fall within the area on which Smith and Lonergan agree. For this reason Smith offers readers of Lonergan the encouraging message that Lonergan's theory of cognition and his comments on learning and interpretation can accommodate a theory of reading that has proved valuable to classroom teachers. Smith also offers a refreshing reminder of the dynamic structure of inquiry within which the triad of knowing is situated. And he writes with the pace and raciness of the former journalist that he is.

73Smith, Writing 26.
74Smith, Writing 27.
Lonergan offers a philosophical account of cognition that is a good deal more rounded and extended than Smith's account of comprehension. For example, Smith is not concerned with the problem of relativism that might be seen to emerge from his view that the reader brings meaning to the text. Yet such relativism has become commonplace in literary criticism: the authorial intention is not available as a guarantee that an interpretation is valid; all texts are plural; there is no true reading; interpretations serve ideological interests; and so on. It is to guard against relativism of this kind that Lonergan introduces the notion of the 'universal viewpoint.' In more general terms Lonergan's position can offer Smith a rigorous philosophical underpinning that could overcome some of the incoherence in his thinking and protect him from the criticisms ranged against him on philosophical grounds.

\[75\text{Lonergan, } \textit{Insight} 564-68, 583 = CWL 3 \textit{587-91}, 605.\]

\[76\text{See Winch, "Reading and the Process of Reading."}\]
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA were right that the revolutionary changes of 1989 signified "the end of history and the last man," then we would not have to worry about the crisis of identity and community in the wake of the New World Order. How is it possible that the end of the Cold War gave rise to a new cycle of decline? How did the new democratic promise of 1989 give way to the collapse of modern humanity into renewed nationalist, racist, and religious violence? Why does the growing multicultural reality on both sides of.
the Atlantic give way both to the fear of anomie and fragmentation and to a xenophobic backlash against those designated as ‘the other’?¹

I want to take up these types of questions and raise them through Jürgen Habermas’s critical social perspectives and Bernard Lonergan’s existential critique of the social surd. I will argue that both approaches not only complement each other — in so far as they present two aspects of ideology critique — but that they represent those types of suspicion of the present age that require one another in order to sustain that critique. The weak thesis is that the two positions offer a complementarity of equal partners; the strong thesis adds a more controversial aspect, namely, that each approach can sustain its own critique only in collaboration with the other. Yet in both theses, I address neither Habermasian nor Lonerganian audiences for the sake of scholarship. I am primarily interested in the general approaches to the problem how to maintain multicultural identity in difference. Habermas’s and Lonergan’s critiques of the present age provide a vantage point from which to conceive of a relation between critical social theory and existential thought.

Habermas takes up these types of questions in his recent work on the communicative theory of democracy. He argues that the rationalization of the traditional life-worlds both mobilizes modern individuals and leaves them alienated from their communities in ever more complex societies. The modern nation-state fails to stabilize and socially integrate this type of isolated individuality without recourse to either the politics of homogenizing identity or the politics of nationalist or fundamentalist difference. In so far as the nation-state reifies the self-reflexive capacity of its individuals, it also fails to foster the regional multicultural communities and the political cultures of deliberative democracy. Habermas attributes both failures to the absence of mature political culture institutionalized within democratic procedures. To correct this problem, he envisions postnational constitutional patriotism as those procedural or communicative conditions

of possibility with which modern individuals can maintain their different identities and communities on the basis of citizenship in a democratic republic. These conditions are inscribed in, what I will discuss below as, the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of normative discourse.2

Lonergan, not unlike Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, doubts that enlightenment rationality, when it harbors the myth about itself as the age of innocence, can either deliver us to authentic communication or stop the ongoing cycle of decline. Even though not an antimodernist, Lonergan allies himself with that strand of the postmodern attack on modernity which unmasksthe distorting effects that totalizing rationality exercises on identity-formation. Yet similarly to Kierkegaard and unlike the most prevalent postmodern narratives, Lonergan argues that making one's own the exigencies of theoretical and practical intelligence provides those authenticating conditions which foster open identity and community. These conditions are inscribed in, what I will discuss below as, the presuppositions of unbiased intersubjectivity.3

I will, first, lay out Habermas's argument for the procedural basis of the ideal communication community. Secondly, Lonergan's use of hermeneutics of suspicion and recovery as well as of irony and humor to articulate the existential basis for cosmopolis (that is, "not as an unrealized political ideal, but as a longstanding, nonpolitical cultural fact")4 will be discussed. In conclusion, my aim is programmatic: to link Habermas's formal-pragmatic presuppositions of discourse with Lonergan's fidelity to unbiased communication.5 In addressing the

2Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskursleorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), especially 541-660.


5For a further development of this linkage, see William Rehg, "From Logic to Rhetoric in Science: A Formal-Pragmatic Reading of Lonergan's Insight," in Thomas
question of how to claim one's identity within a global multicultural community we meet both Habermas and Lonergan beckoning us beyond a largely unproductive divide between modernism and post-modernism.

1. TOWARDS POSTNATIONAL IDENTITY IN A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY

If Habermas urges us to adopt a postnational attitude, this does not mean that he embraces either the Fukuyama-thesis of "the end of history and the last man" or some abstract ideal of identity that at end of the day leads to ethnic cleansing. Part of the problem with the renewed group polarizations is that they present us with two equally unacceptable alternatives: either adopt a homogenizing supranationalism or settle for a homogenizing local purification of aliens. In the former Yugoslavia it was the first option, held by Tito's strong hand, that today prompts the warring factions to resist any political settlement. And it is the myopic belief in the innocent origins of one's own tradition that makes the communitarian solutions equally shortlived. On the one hand we can sympathize with the suffering members of the repressed groups; on the other hand, when we are told that we do not understand why fighting must go on, we must wonder: is there anything to be understood in causing more suffering?

Communitarians object that the liberal state is too weak to resist the universalist marginalization of various groups, thereby leading to ever greater anomie and fragmentation. Liberals worry that the strong bond fostered by the communitarian definitions of some overlapping common good leads inevitably to intolerance and totalitarian violence. This problematic either/or has a Janus-face marked by the binary liberal-communication impasse. The social surd lies in the fact that both positions lead to some global or local forms of repressive identities and oppressive communities.6


Habermas put his finger on the depth of the present problem when he unmasked the two lies of postwar Germany: the first lie of the postwar Adenauer period was that Germans are all democrats; the second lie of the post-1989 unified Germany is that “we have all become ‘normal’ again.” Habermas located the problem of this double lie in the denial that there is no mature political democracy that would mediate between the communitarian interests of local cultures and the homogenizing trends of state administration and markets. If we have a conflict between substantive world views, such as the Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croats, and Moslem-Slavic Bosnians, or between equally resentful east and west Germans, we can settle the conflict only by appeals to some higher viewpoint. This can be neither the minimal-ist liberal atomism nor some heavy-handed communitarian final solution but rather something like Kant’s perpetual peace or Mead’s generalized other in the League of Nations.\(^7\)

Habermas makes his point against liberals and communitarians alike by adopting Kierkegaard’s resistance to the Hegelian nation-state. Hegel stopped short of extending to international solidarity his insight into reciprocal recognition from the dialectic of individuals, families, and groups within civil society. Since he denied the Kantian possibility of global political culture governed by perpetual peace, he granted each nation-state the rights of the supreme sovereign and let the international relations between them regress from ethical life to war of all against all. Kierkegaard defended the individual against conscription into wars by the nation-states. They wage these wars often with the hefty doses of ideological appeals to God, family values, or other such forms of gesturing towards the good of the community.\(^8\)


Habermas utilizes this existential protest against herd mentality in order to sustain modern individuals in communities on a non-communitarian basis. To preserve multicultural diversity, rather than the world-historical aspirations of homogeneous nation-states, we need that political culture which will promote identity without obliterating difference. Habermas argues that to effect this scenario we must appeal to formal procedures, not to a substantive principle of unity. The reasons for this move are obvious enough: Habermas attempts to read Hegel's insight with Kantian means and wants to effect this needed shift to a higher viewpoint while neither disregarding regional needs nor elevating some communitarian position to a supranational substantive framework of unity. Hegel's insight was that only when the individual is anchored in the social institutions that foster reciprocal recognition we can speak of her ethical life. Habermas agrees that the problem of the present age is a social integration of highly autonomous individuals. Yet he sees it neither necessary nor fitting, given the pluralist conditions of modernity, to seek such an ideal of integration in any historically definitive community. He gives up Hegel's notion of the ethical totality (that is, his emphatic institutionalism) and instead anchors the individual in the institutionalized procedures of deliberative democracy.9

An immediate objection is apparent: Habermas simply smuggles the substantive values of modern life back into his proceduralism.


What else are the requirements of reciprocity, equality, and justice but the ideas of 1789? Would not, then, Habermas want the Serbians to exchange their heroic vision of Greater Serbia or Germans their unified nation-state for some modern, Stoic ideal of disinterested legal or academic justice? Is it true that Habermas’s model appeals only to the better argument? Is it not more probable that in his model we are to give up a historically valued national world view for a historically sterile, albeit politically correct, postnational one?

The objection forgets how we came to this point in the discussion and overlooks the fact that the specter of political correctness that is haunting today’s Europe and the United States is fabricated by the binaries of the social surd. Postnational identity cannot be identified with a romanticized view of nationalistic spirit of the people. Rather identity and difference in community are now to become operative positionalities. By an operative principle of positionality I mean an ongoing, nonessentializing, formal conception of world, not a substantive world view. This principle is derived from a fact that conflicts arising among intransigent nationalist and fundamentalist worldviews give us no alternative but to adopt a postnational and multicultural attitude as a ‘better’ argument or a ‘higher’ viewpoint. When substantive or essential worldviews come into conflict, we are prompted to a procedural level of conflict-resolution. A communitarian nostalgia or utopia — short of some substantive ethnic or

10Note that charges of mere political correctness are usually brought from the other side of the polemic against multicultural fragmentation. But it will become apparent below that the forces against multiculturalism are the same ones that are upset also with democratic universalism.

11On the difference between the romanticist concept of nationalism (Volkgeist) and the political or open-ended view of nation, see Julia Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 2f., 41f., 45.

12On positionality, see Bill Martin, Matrix and Line: Derrida and the Possibilities of Postmodern Social Theory (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992) 75ff., 102, 121, 132, 149.

13Habermas characterizes the appeal to the formal pragmatic presuppositions of speech, of the claims to validity, as the logic of the better argument. Lonergan depicts the appeal to the higher viewpoint as an ongoing and open-ended heuristic structure of inquiry. Both thinkers indicate this type of appeal in nonessential terms, that is, as an operative principle on the move.
religious cleansing — will be of little help to settle the new wars of identity and difference. The procedural principle of their conflict-resolution emerges when in modernity we find no other essential standpoint or substantive world-view that could give us a normative viewpoint. The new viewpoint can become normative not in virtue of some essence we find in this or that community of meaning but because of the procedural ability to achieve distance from our communitarian frameworks.

Habermas's norm of the better argument is not, then, a communitarian value imposed upon or smuggled into discourse. Nor is it, necessarily, a common liberal denominator that results in homogenizing local cultures. Rather the argument lies in the speaker's and the hearer's self-appropriation of the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of speech. If there is no world view to which we may legitimately appeal in order to settle our substantive disputes, then the only recourse left short of silence or skeptical gesturing lies in the exigencies of the claims to validity. These become historically and individually available to us in the very grasp of what it means to have a competence for understanding speech acts, that is, what it means to raise, accept or reject a validity claim. This is the self-reflexive grasp of the Socratic ability to take a yes and no attitude towards the claims which others offer for us to understand. Habermas recognizes three basic operative types of validity claims: we cannot meaningfully engage in communication without raising a claim to something to be considered as true, normatively right, and sincerely so. Because, following Wittgenstein, Habermas denies that any one of us is born with a private language or private insights, we are individualized in so far as we are socialized. To become authentic speakers we must begin in an intersubjective context. Our self-appropriation is not then something that precedes community but rather it is stabilized intersubjectively — by reciprocal recognition and by the insight into what it means to raise and make a validity claim acceptable.14

Habermas's ideal communication community, which lays down the procedural framework for democratic institutions, is not, then, some substantive blueprint, a revolutionary utopia to be realized. Nor is it a nostalgic past projected onto the future. And it is not a postponed pleasure principle, eschatological paradise, or a postulate of harmony that could console modern individuals and communities for death. Rather, this ideal is that concretely operative integrative viewpoint which we must presuppose in practical discourse. In that sense, this ideal occasions transcendence towards the world and others here and now and yet it is a critically fallibilist principle on the move, not a deification of the here and now. This sense of one's critical sobriety gives one the requisite distance from a private ownership of truth, right, and sincerity; it engenders the way towards perpetual revolution, but not an erasure of regional cultures and traditions. For Habermas, it is this tension between individuals concretely deliberating about their needs and the procedures of practical discourse that allows for sustaining identity in difference. He believes that we should pledge political allegiance to the principles of procedural justice rather than to flags. We ought to replace nationalism with constitutional patriotism and thereby sustain modern multicultural identity in democratic community.\(^{15}\)

2. COSMOPOLIS AS A NONPOLITICAL POLITICS AND CULTURAL COMMUNITY

Whereas Habermas is worried that truthful, normative, and sincere appeal to validity claims becomes systematically distorted by anonymous power (administrative politics, legalism) and money (the profit oriented functions of the economy), Lonergan pays attention to the ideological role of bias in the very formation of identity and community. Habermas focuses on the systemic colonization of the cultural lifeworlds by modern, functionalist system rationality. Lonergan asks why

even in structurally and systemically undistorted life-worlds individuals and communities sometimes prefer a cycle of decline to a better argument. Habermas presupposes that communicative praxis is structurally oriented to a better argument or a higher viewpoint (that is, via equal and reciprocal access to raising and criticizing validity claims). And so his focus is primarily on how to satisfy these formal-pragmatic presuppositions of dialogue in order that we can, given sufficient time and space, offset any bias. But he does not explain what is involved when participants in communication refuse an insight into a better argument; yet this clarification is, as Lonergan's analysis of bias shows, a necessary complement to any thoroughgoing critique of distorted communication. Therefore, I will argue that Habermas's concern with the alienating effects of the functionalist rationality of subsystems of money and power provides the necessary but insufficient diagnosis of the present age. If the deficits in this one-sided diagnosis frustrate a stronger critique, integrating the above two approaches promises a more lasting and comprehensive prognosis.16

The difference between Lonergan and Habermas becomes apparent in their diagnoses of the present age. Habermas argues that cultures lose their ideological function when the contents of traditions become fully available to critique in practical discourse. With the discursive appropriation (or criticizability) of traditional cultures, normative discourse becomes capable of resisting all ideological distortions. To be sure, what results from this "linguistification of the sacred" are also modern crises of identity. The only remaining problem, then, lies in the social integration of fragmented identities and anomic communities. Modern nationalism emerges as a mere second-generation ideology that takes advantage of the disturbances by which systems of power and money distort the rationalized cultural life-world.17

While Habermas does not hold progress to be automatic, Lonergan would be critical also of any suggestions that the normative exigen-


17See Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2 Index under "cultural tradition," "ideology" and "sacred, linguistification of."
cies of practical discourse by themselves alone can secure us against new forms of alienation. Here Lonergan becomes an ally of post-modern critics who oppose any easy accommodation with enlightenment rationality. Lonergan's dialectic of bias and insight functions as "the general form of a critical attitude." Yet this dialectic is not something that a philosopher does in her privacy or that historical progress effects behind our backs. Rather, the reversal of bias is facilitated within an intersubjective context of inquiring intelligence, that is, by "the great republic of culture," a "cosmopolis." I shall first comment on bias, then discuss cosmopolis, and in conclusion argue that fidelity to validity claims and fidelity to the exigencies of theoretical and practical intelligence require one another.

A. Bias

In more than one place Lonergan argues that bias continues to distort one's self-reflexive capacity for sustained development. Yet in this point he does not raise a psychological or spiritual claim about individual dispositions brought against something like Habermas's intersubjectivist theory of identity. The philosophically significant difference here is not that Habermas has a socio-political theory of distorted culture and Lonergan espouses a standpoint of private inwardness. If this difference were the key contention, then Habermas would have an easier time in discarding a Lonerganian position as at best pertaining only to psychological motives and as at worst presupposing private, monological language or decisionist access to validity claims. It is more helpful to detect the significant relationship between Lonergan and Habermas in the complementarity of their two diagnoses of what leads to the distortions of intersubjectivity.

Lonergan situates his discussion of theoretical and practical intelligence in the hermeneutical context of traditions. The hermeneutical context is given in Lonergan's understanding that the existing

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individual "is no Leibnizian monad." Rather, she is always already situated in historical, cultural, and linguistic community. "[T]he primordial basis of ... community is not the discovery of an idea but a spontaneous intersubjectivity." Accordingly, Lonergan's critique of bias pertains in the same measure to the tensions in the individual as in one's "intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order."\textsuperscript{19}

First, individuals live in a tradition:

Even if anyone manages to be perfectly authentic in all his own personal performance, still he cannot but carry within himself the ballast of his tradition. And down the millennia in which that tradition developed, one can hardly exclude the possibility that unauthenticity entered in and remained to ferment the mass through ages to come.\textsuperscript{20}

Further, in a rare note, Lonergan links his critical analysis of culture with the "Hegelian-Marxist tradition" where "bias is treated obliquely under the name of alienation." Finally, when Lonergan speaks of community as "the ideal basis of society," he emphasizes that the moral principle of culture lies in the "universal dialogue." In sum, to be able to critique the ideological aspects of tradition the individual must confront oneself, but self-reflexive attitude towards oneself always implicates the dark sides of traditions in which one has been socialized.\textsuperscript{21}

The issue in all three interrelated perspectives is the following: by claiming that "the end of the age of innocence means that authenticity is never to be taken for granted" Lonergan questions a Habermasian Enlightenment belief that procedural principles are sufficient to sustain genuine communicative praxis. Yet unlike the postmodern thesis

\textsuperscript{19}For the first two citations see Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 212 = CWL 3 237; for the last quote, 214 = 239. "[T]he ineluctable privacy of each one's experience provides no premise for a monadic theory of man" (215 = 240).


\textsuperscript{21}For the first two citations see Lonergan, \textit{A Third Collection} 109 n.10, and for the final point and the last two references see Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology} (New York: the Seabury Press, 1972) 360f.
about the total depravity of critical rationality, Lonergan pursues an ongoing enlightening attitude towards the Enlightenment.22

Within the intersubjective and socio-political contexts, Lonergan critiques three types of bias that tend to distort communicative praxis: individual bias, group bias, and the general bias of culture. Individual bias results from the tension between sensitive spontaneity focused on satisfying the particular needs, on the one hand, and detached intelligence seeking the universal, on the other hand. The egoist gets stuck between the demands of spontaneity and intelligence. One gains an intelligent insight into one's situation but lets spontaneous desires interfere with this insight by refusing to include in it the intelligible order of the larger social whole.

Egoism, then, is an incomplete development of intelligence. It rises above a merely inherited mentality. It has the boldness to strike out and think for itself. But it fails to pivot from the initial and preliminary motivation, provided by desires and fears, to the self-abnegation involved in allowing complete free play to intelligent inquiry.23

For a good example of individual bias we may consult Herbert Marcuse's analysis of one-dimensional mentality. One-dimensionality bespeaks the loss of one's reflexive, self-critical attitude. It results from one's refusal of relevant questions, and with this repression of questioning comes the willed ignorance of one's genuine needs. Marcuse follows Freud and shows that by repressing the dimension of critical intelligence both the egoist and the neurotic paradoxically relinquish the unique source of liberation. Yet, given this individual bias, what are the possibilities of free development in a society, which itself thrives on total administration, one-dimensionality, and technocracy? Marcuse's contribution to this query lies in his attempt to retrieve sources of emancipation in the locus of critical inwardness — perhaps the only available resources of resistance within the totalitarian context. Harnessing such loci of self-reflexive critique — variously

23See Lonergan, Insight 220 = CWL 3 245-246.
called by him "great refusal," "radical subjectivity," and "new sensibility" — represents the possibility of reversing individual bias. To be sure, Marcuse envisions that this reversal is possible only if we reject Freud's conservative view and articulate the historical character of human needs. With this historical angle, we can unmask the developmental nature of bias and its role in keeping the individual from distinguishing genuine and false needs. The radically questioning subjectivity admits all relevant questions. Unbiased individuals become, thus, capable of discerning their genuine needs. This emancipated capability in turn allows for the possibility of fostering the unrepressive forms of civilization.²⁴

Habermas's model functions well after we confront individual bias. In other words: appeals to validity claims alone do not yet either diagnose or cure the refusal of insight. This is so because if one can use one's intelligence to undermine the spontaneity of that very intelligence, then it is possible that in discourse one could raise and even criticize validity claims while still being an individual egoist, and therefore while deceiving oneself or another. Yet this point about motives is not merely a psychological issue: the egoist is not simply inattentive to what constitutes his or her genuine needs but rather becomes self-consciously involved in "sizing up the social order, ferreting out its weak points and its loop-holes, and discovering devices that give access to its rewards while evading its demands for proportionate contributions." Although individual bias develops from the tension between spontaneity and intelligence, one does not remain blind spontaneously. Rather, it is only by silencing both one's further relevant questions and "the spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity" that individual bias can be sustained via feeding on false needs. Thus, only one's emancipated intelligence, with the genuine need to raise all rele-

vant questions in its striving for the higher viewpoint, and spontaneity, with its care for concrete others, can disrupt this hegemony of an individually biased discourse. Both liberated intelligence and intersubjective spontaneity are more other-regarding than the egoist's "intelligent selfishness."^25

Where the individual egoist failed to care for himself and the concrete other by silencing the self-transcending exigencies of both intelligent inquiry and intersubjective spontaneity, group bias blocks questions that are in conflict with its ethos, traditions, interests, social status, and conventional identity. Group bias thrives on a communitarian spirit. This communitarian sustenance of community remains blind to anything that would "reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end." Blind to its bias, social groups tend to hamper development. Communicative praxis will suffer whenever its orientation to rational consensus simply replaces "one inertial force with another." Habermas's model will be applicable in the situation where all responses to problem situations are made by an intelligence guided by the unrestricted desire to know. But, as Lonergan points out, "the responses are made by intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and the interests of groups, and, while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good of society."^26

The present peace negotiations about the future map of Yugoslavia are a good case in point: all parties represent a high degree of intelligence. Some of the present advisers of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosević, are distinguished philosophers who were listed in the editorial boards of such journals as *Praxis International*. The parties in the conflict raise claims and criticize one another's suggestions for ending violence, they strategize about war and develop sophisticated plans for peace, they understand the complexity of history and ethnic relations, and yet all of them refuse to raise further questions that

^25For all citations above see Lonergan, *Insight* 221 = CWL 3 246-247.

^26For all citations see Lonergan, *Insight* 223 = CWL 3 248. The problem of group bias must be addressed along with Habermas's claim that the moral point of view renders problematic every communitarian sectarianism.
would modify the proposed dead-end solutions. Both individual and group bias among them frustrates any insight into what would constitute a better argument about ending the Yugoslav nightmare. The biased group of intelligent egoists can go on for years debating perpetual peace.

Distortions of development occasioned by a biased group response to concrete problems lead to "offensive and defensive mechanisms" by which groups try to secure their success rather than any set of practical insights. Enter social hatred, racism, sexism, class conflict, the binary divisions of successful and unsuccessful nations, reformism, and revolutionary strife. The hegemonic groups tend to define the dominant, often distorted ideas and pursue them in theory and practice. Such distortions become the target of the suppressed groups. Yet the dominant groups might respond by stylizing themselves as victims: they present any attack on their own hegemony as a biased and intolerant political correctness (for example, in the North American multicultural debates, and among the Bosnian Serbs or South Africa's whites). The irony is that it is the New World Order, this abstract super-police-man, that dictates its group bias as a dominant version of political correctness.27

General bias, as distinct from individual and group biases, represents, on the one hand, skepticism towards critical inquiry and, on the other hand, a certain intolerance that transforms the specialized expertise of common sense into a bias. A disgruntled intelligence can give way to a postmodern tantrum-argument: because our age provides no access to original innocence and because human rationality fails to alleviate the problems that common sense seems to handle quite well on its own, we should not submit to the blackmail of enlightenment rationality. All attempts at intelligent arguments represent then only another form of police action. (This is how, for example, John D. Caputo characterizes both Habermas's and Lonergan's moves to retrieve critical modernism.) Yet the flip side of this disaffected critical

27For the citation above see Lonergan, Insight 224 = CWL 3 249 and compare my examples of group bias in this paragraph with Lonergan's own characterizations, 224f = 249f.
intelligence is the bias of the communitarian ethos itself. Here general bias joins with group bias to define the surd of the present age ethos. The nuance of Lonergan's position is that he neither embraces a modernist presumption of, nor a postmodern disenchantment with, innocence. The debate between modernism and postmodernism has reached the stage of a not very helpful opposition whose shared ethos "is to exclude some fruitful ideas and to mutilate others by compromise." But the cycle of decline lies, then, neither with the presumed police actions of modernism (though there might be some) nor with the caricatured anything-goes-postmodernism (even though for some any difference is as good as any other). Again, while we ought to rightly critique the reified and calculative reason of instrumental modernity, it is dubious to characterize all modernist rationality and its critical search for legitimate norms as forms of violence. At the same time, we might object to that anything-goes-attitude which Fredrick Jameson appropriately portrays as the postmodern "pastiche" of late capitalism. Yet we would do well to learn from the postmodern forms of transgression of and resistance to totalitarian thinking. The public sentiment might tell us that the impasse between the caricatures of modernism and postmodernism is the truth of our situation, but general bias mixed with a prevalent ethos of the age cannot suffice to get us beyond decline.

Lonergan calls any such impasse "the social surd." We cannot have a direct insight into its intelligibility but we may gain an inverse insight into the residue generated by bias itself. When Habermas speaks about seeking the vanishing point beyond which we envision no other alternatives but the democratic will-formation rooted in the presuppositions of communicative ethics, he refers to this same phenomena of


29For the first citation above see Lonergan, Insight 226 = CWL 3 251; on postmodern "pastiche" see Fredrick Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991) 21, 24, 34, 133.
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needing to reach a viewpoint beyond the social surd. Just as "the myth of nationalist totalitarianism," to cite Lonergan, often emerges after the demise of imperial states, so also uncritical celebrations of diversity or of the New World Order today clamor against the totalitarian ambitions of common sense or instrumental rationality. A postmodern carnival *ethos* replaces the modernist iron cage. Yet is it not true that in this situation simply "one totalitarianism calls forth another," that we have to do here with the "succession of lower viewpoints that heads towards an ultimate nihilism," and that "[t]he refusal of insight is a fact that accounts for individual and group egoism, for the psychoneuroses, and for the ruin of nations and civilizations"? To answer this we need an inverse insight into the social surd of both group hatred and the posturing difference bereft of responsible intelligence.30

B. Cosmopolis

If the life-world of human cultures provides the symbolic resources for intersubjective spontaneity and reflective intelligence, then it is via culture that bias entrenched in cycles of decline must be resisted. Habermas faults the absence of mature political culture, rather than global technocracy and markets alone, for the regressions into the nationalist upheavals of the last century. He argues that we share no collective guilt for the disastrous traditions. But he envisions the public debate as a sort of ongoing referendum, a permanent democratic revolution, in which citizens distance themselves from their local cultural roots and assume collective moral and political responsibility for those aspects of their traditions which should be continued and those that must be jettisoned. This normative debate, rather than the prevalent communitarian *ethos* of this or that group, functions as the focus of democratic institutions. Similarly, Lonergan argues that it is only if human intelligence cooperates with the intersubjective contexts of culture that the ossified social aberrations can be effectively reversed. Habermas offers postnational identity, institutionally integrated into a radically democratic multicultural republic as his political-procedural

30For citations in this paragraph see Lonergan, *Insight* 232, 234 = CWL 3 257, 259.
resolution to the postsecular and postmodern wars of nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms. Lonergan presents cosmopolis as "a non-political cultural fact," and "the great republic of culture."\textsuperscript{31}

In spite of their differences, both Habermas and Lonergan accentuate the intersubjective locus of culture. To repeat, it is wrong to read Lonergan as advocating one's private self-appropriation as an alternative to Habermas's public debate. Let us also remember that Lonergan does not depict cosmopolis as "an unrealized political ideal." On the other hand, Lonergan's disclaimer need not implicate Habermas's ideal communication community as a substantive political utopia to be realized. Mindful of the twentieth century left and right wing terror, both thinkers share a degree of theoretical sobriety and activist self-restraint. Yet they part ways in the manner in which they are highlighting the role of culture in the reversal of the social surd, such as is found in the formation of dogmatic identity or in the group bias of conventionalist and traditionalist communities. What fruitful link, then, can be established between Lonergan's longstanding, nonpolitical cultural fact and Habermas's regulative principle of democratic political culture?\textsuperscript{32}

When culture declines into a social surd it regresses from existential drama into what Kundera aptly calls "kitsch."\textsuperscript{33} In Lonergan's words, "[t]he actors in the drama of living become stage-hands; the setting is magnificent; the lighting superb; the costumes gorgeous; but there is no play."\textsuperscript{34} In Havel's stylization, we experience culture that has no narrative, that has lost its story.\textsuperscript{35} Totalitarian and factional

\textsuperscript{31}See Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 236f. = CWL 3 261f. and \textit{Collection} 109, 39, and 262 ed. note q.

\textsuperscript{32}For the citation above see Lonergan \textit{Collection} 109.


\textsuperscript{34}Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 237f. = CWL 3 262f.

\textsuperscript{35}On this theme, see Václav Havel, \textit{O lidskou identitu} [For Human Identity], (Praha: Rozmluvy, 1990), includes essays from 1969-1979 and the Biobibliography and \textit{Do různých stran} [To Different Directions], (Praha: Lidové noviny, 1990), includes essays from 1983-1989 and the Biobibliography.
cultures alike, in their subservience to the ends of technocracy, profit, and racist, sexist or classist hatred lose their imaginative resources and critical functions. Yet the task of cosmopolis in Lonergan, similarly to that of the practical discourse in Habermas, is not a romantic abolition of the systems of state power and the markets. Both thinkers, unlike Marx, envision some ongoing relation and tension between systems rationality and human intersubjectivity that is not the total reduction of one to the other pole. Both want to set some limits to the coloniza-
ton of the life-world by system. But Habermas envisions the public forum as a political force whereby citizens learn to resist encroach-
ments upon the life-world, whereas Lonergan argues for a tran-
sccultural, global, yet nonpolitical community.

Perhaps the allusion to an absence of existential drama in our culture is more revealing about the role of cosmopolis than seems apparent at the first reading of Insight. In his discussion of ethics and the problem of liberation, Lonergan assigns to satire and humor an essential place in reversing bias. To be sure, the comic effects change in oneself and in another not abstractly but through a concrete existential encounter, in a dramatic and performative staging. Lonergan turns here to the master of an ironical dramatization of bias through the pseudonymous masks of literary authorship. It is after all Kierkegaard who shows how the comic not only discloses hidden developmental aberrations in the individual and community — each book is a mask that represents a developmental stage with its biases and its opportuni-
ties for a reversal of decline — but also occasions an emancipation of radically honest communicative praxis. Let us imagine that Lonergan’s cosmopolis is revolutionary in this sense of what I would call a Kierkegaardian form of activism: it is inciting through indirect communication, namely, through subverting stagnant identities (individual bias) and dogmatic communities (social surd), be they bogged down in “moral impotence” or passionless religiosity:

For satire breaks in upon the busy day. It puts printers to work, competes on the glossy page of advertisement, challenges even the enclaves of bright chatter. It enters not by argument but by laugh-
ter. For argument would presuppose premises, and premises that would be accepted easily also would be mistaken. ... [P]roofless,
purposeless laughter can dissolve honored pretense; it can disrupt conventional humbug; it can disillusion man [sic] of his most cherished illusions ...36

If Habermas builds his political culture with the aid of the better argument, Lonergan’s nonpolitical culture intervenes where arguments fail because humans “are afraid to think” even though perhaps they might not be “afraid to laugh.” Lonergan is aware that satire and humor are limited in what they can do politically in reversing social hatred. Yet he indicates how a Kierkegaardian activism might collaborate with Habermasian public spaces:

For as satire can help man swing out of self-centeredness of an animal in a habitat to the universal viewpoint of an intelligent and reasonable being, so humour can aid him to the discovery of the complex problem of grasping and holding the nettle of a restricted, effective freedom.37

That bias incapacitates sustained development presents us with a “radical” and “permanent” problem. Because bias distorts the very reasonableness and willingness to interact communicatively, even Habermas’s model cannot presuppose that modern reflexive appropriation of traditions has reached a new age of innocence. If there is to be a radical enough revolution in identity and community formation it must go “to the root of the trouble” and engage in the permanent opposition to the refusal of insight and of responsible living. This response is called forth by the questioning of the violent impasse that concrete individuals encounter in the social surd: “Is everyone to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point?” Cosmopolis adopts, then, neither instrumental rationality nor communal thought control nor a police force. And it is not a whining cry of general bias, a cry that in the posthumanist age celebrates the death of the totalizing author but its uncriticized ethos ridicules any engaged stance and any normative agency of change as a spirit of

36Lonergan, Insight 626 = CWL 3 649 for the long citation and 627 = 650 for the short one above. For references to Kierkegaard and the spheres of existence, see 624f. = 647f.

37Lonergan, Insight 626 = CWL 3 649 for all citations above.
seriousness (such as that of Nietzsche's ascetical priest) to be relegated into the dustbin of history. Cosmopolis replies to the need for a viewpoint beyond this impasse and for its actual integration in a concrete form of life.38

We would not need such an integration if unbiased individuals alone could convince the biased majority that it is in love with prejudice and deception. Even though "the social surd resides ... in the minds and wills of men," the possibility of reversing bias and stabilizing insights lies in an ongoing critical praxis within cultural community. In short, we need others to overcome all forms of bias mentioned above.39

We need "the corrections and the assurance that result from learning accurately the tested insights of others and from submitting one's own insights to the criticism based on others' experience and development."40 When we are blocked in our development, we require others to effect a "praxis [that] acknowledges the end of the age of innocence. It [this praxis] starts from the assumption that authenticity cannot be taken for granted," and it proceeds via "a hermeneutic of suspicion,"41 (that is, "a critical human science"42) in order to facilitate "a hermeneutic of recovery."43 When entire traditions or gender groups or classes become untrue wholes (that is, only so many reservoirs of bigotry), we can be shaken from dogmatism by greater awareness of our multicultural contexts. "In that case dialectic becomes dialogue. It is particularly relevant when persons are authentic and know

38Lonergan, *Insight* 631-633 = CWL 3 653-655 for all citations above; see also 238f. = 263f.

39Lonergan, *Insight* 690 = CWL 3 712 for the citation above.


42Lonergan, *Insight* 690 = CWL 3 712.

one another to be authentic yet belong to differing traditions and so find themselves in basic disagreement."^{44}

Yet even here, in this ongoing critical praxis within and among multicultural traditions, it is the nonpolitical cultural fact of irony, satire, and humor that calls our attention to the cleavages within prejudiced or hegemonic relations. This is the role of cosmopolis. Without its aid we might not prevail against the domination by that social surd whose biased conflicts of the politics of identity and difference come to overshadow the very appeal to the validity basis of communication or even to open dialogue among different traditions.

3. CONCLUSION: VALIDITY CLAIMS AND UNBIASED COMMUNICATION

Habermas argues that undistorted communicative praxis requires a sustained fidelity to the performative constraints of validity claims. Lonergan shows that the reversal of bias requires a sustained fidelity to theoretical and practical intelligence. I am not claiming that these two fidelities form an isomorphic structure. Yet I submit that if we are to resist bias and the social surd, we in fact must envision these fidelities as a mutually complementary requirement. Unbiased communication invokes the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of communicative ethics, and the latter requires the former to sustain these presuppositions. To think otherwise is either stoicism or a naïve presumption of innocence.

If I am to be unbiased, then I must be attentive to myself and others, intelligent about my spontaneous intersubjectivity and regional interests, critical towards my place in traditions that victimize the innocent, and responsible for those aspects of traditions which we are to continue and those which ought to be jettisoned. Communicative praxis presupposes that I am such an unbiased speaker and hearer when it calls me to a performative fidelity towards validity claims. An unbiased speaker and hearer will be attentive, intelligent, critical, and responsible to the validity claims of truth, normative rightness, and sincerity raised in discourse. We need participants in discourse to get

^{44}Lonergan, *A Third Collection* 159, see also 164 and *Method in Theology* 360f.
our intelligence going (again, as there is no private language so there is no prelinguistic development of intelligence). But Habermas's insistence on the linguistic character of identity formation and intelligent development cannot possibly mean that letting intersubjectivity perform spontaneously by itself alone will give me spontaneous access to truth, rightness, and sincerity. For bias is that problem which interferes either individually with spontaneous intersubjectivity or collectively with critical intelligence and in our postmodern ethos generally with both.

Thus, it makes a difference whether one engages in peace talks with an openness to further relevant questions about what constitutes genuine needs or deceptively only to mark time. Appeals to validity claims — even that of sincerity — when disciplined by individual, group or general bias produce the mere social surd.\textsuperscript{45} The violation of one's intelligent inquiry and responsible living leads to alienation; the violation of the validity basis of speech distorts communicative interaction. The former violation, in so far as bias pertains to the intersubjective basis of identity and community alike, gives rise to the latter, thereby disabling communicative praxis altogether. The latter violation, in so far as it linguistically forms competent speakers and hearers, impedes the recovery of the former. Even though the cycle of nationalist violence is a case of close collaboration between stupidity and the breakdown of communication, the two problems remain analytically distinct. Interaction alone will not transform obfuscation into communication, and enlightened individuals alone will not transform the tradition entrenched in bias into a mature political culture.

Cosmopolis is that missing 'X,' the middle ground of authenticating cultural community, in which we can address the above double set of analytically distinct yet closely intermeshed problems. Again, taking our clue from Havel, we can envision his nonpolitical politics and permanent existential revolution (analogically to Lonergan's nonpolitical cultural fact of cosmopolis) to be a necessary complement to

Habermas's deliberative politics and permanent democratic revolution. In my foregoing account I implied that we will not do injustice to Lonergan if we read his descriptions of cosmopolis with reference to postnational, multicultural, and multilayered communities of dissent formed to resist bias and the totalitarian repression of communication in all its political or religious forms. With both Habermas and Havel, I may add now that these communities are nonpolitical in the sense of their opposition to technocratic politics and systems rationality. It is clear that Havel's understanding of the nonpolitical as also political, but in a different sense than opposed above, provides us in this instance with a bridge between Habermas and Lonergan: the communities of resistance to bias are to remain political in so far as they bring dissent into the very heart of deliberative democracy and insert it there (rather than on the outskirts of urban violence) as a permanent corrective. It is my understanding that when Habermas speaks about democratic counterinstitutions that will recover politics in the performative attitude of the grammatical first person and when Lonergan stipulates that "cosmopolis is above all politics," they stand close to Havel's existential understanding of politics with a human face and conscience, a politics emerging from the life-world, not driven by technocratic power and money. To be sure, for Lonergan, this Kierkegaardian or nonpolitical politics is not a "World Government." Yet he envisions its global reach as necessary "to offset the tendencies of that or any other government to be short-sightedly practical." 46

If we agree with Lonergan that cosmopolis is neither an unrealized substantive utopia nor party politics as usual, but if we are not to confuse the demand for such an antipolitically political complement to deliberative democracy with Ross Perot's charts and TV town hall meetings, then we should adopt the terms of existential politics. It is clear that Havel's nonpolitical politics is not a conservative withdrawal

46 For all above citations from Lonergan, see Insight 238-239 = CWL 3 263-264. On nonpolitical politics, see Václav Havel, "Politika a svědomí" (1984) [Politics and Conscience], in Do různých stran (1978) 41-59; on existential revolution, see Havel, Moc bezmocných [The Power of the Powerless], in O lidskou identitu 55-133. On democratic counterinstitutions, see Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2 396.
from the public sphere into apolitical inwardness. But then neither Kierkegaard’s critique of Christendom and his activist, manifest inwardness could be construed in strictly apolitical categories. Therefore, it would be a misunderstanding of the revolutionary role of the “parallel polis” (as some Czech dissidents characterized the movement for human rights, “Charta 77”) to depict as apolitical Lonergan’s cultural cosmopolis. Cosmopolis itself is not a forum for a political debate or a democratic institution. And yet it operates in both and, therefore is political in Havel’s sense of nonpolitical politics. Cosmopolis gathers individuals and groups in a form of radical existential praxis that disrupts the hegemony of biased identities and frees up the communication function of communities.

It is the business of cosmopolis to prevent the formation of the screening memories by which an ascent to power hides its nastiness; it is its business to prevent the falsification of history with which the new group overstates its case; it is its business to satirize the catchwords and the claptrap and thereby to prevent the notions they express from coalescing with passions and resentments to engender obsessive nonsense for future generations; it is its business to encourage and support those that would speak the simple truth though simple truth has gone out of fashion.47

I presented a weak thesis of complementarity: Habermas extends into a field that Lonergan does not develop, namely a socio-political and democratic theory, and Lonergan depicts levels of bias as those existential conditions that distort identity formation of individuals and groups. I argued also the strong thesis that Habermas’s critical social theory, in so far as it bypasses the question of bias, provides the necessary but insufficiently critical resistance to the distortions of the politics of identity and difference. Bias cannot be easily dissolved by appealing to the reciprocal structures of communication alone. Bias leads to closed identity formation as well as to the formulations of difference on the basis of hatred. And bias permeates individual as well as social, and particular as well as universal, forms of identity and difference.

To promote democratic multicultures beyond the bias of individuals and groups, we need to rethink the relationship between the existential initiatives of cosmopolis and ongoing political institutions. The cultures of cosmopolis, just as singular acts of transgressions, by themselves alone cannot provide a substitute for the agency of civic life and institutionalized politics. So, the two positions require one another: cosmopolis without political life remains only an abstract utopia if not a quietist withdrawal into apoliticism. And normative agency without resistance to bias leaves politics quite vulnerable to homogenization and marginalization. Thus, in articulating the weak thesis of complementarity between the fidelity to inquiring intelligence and the fidelity to the validity basis of communicative interaction, I did not place in an opposition privatist inwardness and critical social theory. I rejected this way of posing the argument (and I consider this to be a mistake prevalent for opposing reasons equally among the readers of existential and socio-political philosophy). Instead, I insisted with a strong thesis on an internal link between an existential thematization of intersubjectivity and the critical theory of socio-political institutions that would provide the former's genuine complement. The task of overcoming the aporias of the politics of identity and difference — be they homogenization, marginalization, or all forms of bias — is, then to envision a collaboration between normative agency and political solidarity, on the one hand, and nonpolitical forms of critical transgression and resistance on the other. This is the task of socially integrating democratic multicultures and cosmopolis.
OBJECTIVE CHANCE: LONERGAN AND PEIRCE ON SCIENTIFIC GENERALIZATION

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In many respects the views of Bernard Lonergan and Charles Peirce concerning world process are strikingly similar. Thus, both outline an evolutionary cosmology which pays attention to both the law-like and the chance elements required to think of the universe as developing. Both reject the notion that the universe is mechanistically determined even if it is ordered. Both look upon 'chance' as an objective component of the universe and not merely as a cloak for our ignorance. The remarkable convergence of ideas of two thinkers separated by almost a century not only illuminates their place in intellectual history but more importantly adds an extrinsic

To the best of my knowledge Lonergan's position as found in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (NY: Philosophical Library, 1956); Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) was developed quite independently of Peirce's views. Peirce wrote some fifty years before Lonergan and I find no evidence that Lonergan knew Peirce's work until several years after Insight was published.

Lonergan referred to his theory as 'emergent probability' (Insight 121-128 = CWL 3 144-151). He characterized it as both generic and explanatory. Peirce referred to his theory as 'agapastic evolution,' an explanatory account of the growth and development of categories in world process by an appeal to the 'action of love,' that is, mediation between the necessity and the spontaneity of actual world process. I have treated this at some length in Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967) 171-190.
confirmation of a cosmological view which takes motion and change seriously.

As might be expected random differences play an important role in both Lonergan's and Peirce's account of physical laws. The insight into the significance of such differences amounts to this: the universe is in a process of growth and development from a state of lesser to greater complexity. Lonergan defines a situation as random "if it is 'any whatever provided specific conditions of intelligibility are not filled.'"\(^2\) The 'specified conditions of intelligibility' are those provided by a systematic understanding of the process. To the extent to which a situation fails to fall under such a set of conditions, it is non-systematic or random.

I

Let us consider first Lonergan's account of physical laws and let us begin with his distinction between systematic and non-systematic processes. It is not as simple and clear-cut as it might at first seem. First of all, it is at least unusual to talk of a process which is non-systematic. It would seem that for a process to be a process at all it must be ordered in some way and so be 'systematic' in some commonsense meaning of the term. Of course, the point is that Lonergan uses the terms 'systematic' and 'non-systematic' in a technical, not a commonsense, meaning. In short he uses them to indicate a definite type of order and its absence as we will shortly see. Even realizing that Lonergan uses these terms technically they still remain difficult to grasp since in experience processes always show both a systematic and a non-systematic aspect. They can be distinguished in understanding but they cannot be separated in experience. They are, then, for Lonergan, complementary; but we must not allow their complementarity to obscure their real distinction lest we lose the significance of randomness for understanding our world.

\(^2\)Lonergan, *Insight* 51 = CWL 374.
A process is said to be systematic, if it can be grasped in its entirety in a single insight or in a single set of unified insights. Classical physics, for example, seeks to grasp such process precisely as systematic by looking for an answer to the question, What kind of process is this? or perhaps better, What is the nature of this phenomenon? It does so precisely by correlating measurable relevant variables (time, speed, temperature, pressure, or whatever) into differential equations. These equations are used to predict future events of the appropriate kind.

Systematic process then is commanded, as it were, by a single idea which allows us to know a priori and in principle (through differential equations expressing laws) all the events/situations which make up the process. Consequently, any event or situation in the process can be deduced from any other in virtue of the idée maîtresse. In a word these physical processes are regarded as being subsumed under a covering law and so are ordered deductively. Such a grasp of events/situations possesses a tremendous predicative power. It enables us to organize vast amounts of empirical data and to make predictions which are regularly fulfilled. The insight into physical processes as systematic is that of so-called 'classical' physics.

A process is said to be non-systematic if it has not been (and indeed ultimately cannot be) grasped in a single insight or set of unified insights. In such a case there is no one idea which governs the whole and so one cannot deduce any event/situation from any other. (This does not mean that one cannot infer an event/situation from some other[s]; not all inference is deductive.) At best predictions are based on probabilities calculated statistically. Indeed Lonergan calls this

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3Lonergan, Insight 48 = CWL 3 71.

4Charles Peirce will also hold that classical (Newtonian) physics is deterministic in its view of the physical world because it took as its model of explanation deduction. Gerrit Smith, Professor of the Philosophy of Science, Fordham University, has pointed out to me that the real culprit behind this determinist mentality is the Pythagorean view which supposes a universe static and changeless, and so capable of being completely expressed mathematically (geometrically, first, and then algebraically).

5Lonergan, Insight 48 = CWL 3 71.
model of science 'statistical' physics and he sees it as complementary to the classical model.

These models of science, classical and statistical, are heuristics. A heuristic is an intelligent anticipation of intelligibility of a certain kind. Thus classical heuristic anticipates the systematic and abstract (the physical laws) on which the concrete observations converge. Statistical heuristic anticipates the systematic and abstract which sets a boundary (the ideal frequency) from which the concrete cannot systematically diverge (allows random divergence).

The statistical model deals with events as 'coincidental aggregates.' Events are assumed to have no relations to one another other than mere juxtaposition in space. Classical physics deals with events as intelligible wholes causally related. The laws which it formulates, however, always have added (explicitly or implicitly) to its generalizations the phrase 'other things being equal.' Hence, classical physics expects that there will be no differences between predicted and observed results. If such differences do appear, they are put down either to 'observational error' or to arbitrary isolation of part of the physical universe and so the observed results are expected to converge on the predicted as the observational errors or arbitrary isolation are overcome. To be sure, classical physics used statistical analysis when dealing with very, very large numbers (for example, the number of gas molecules in a container) but this was considered to be an unfortunate second-best and so to be a 'cloak of our ignorance' of the actual behavior of such large populations. In principle, then, if one were to adopt the classical model as uniquely correct, statistical methods would be expected to be gradually eliminated.

Statistical physics, on the other hand, renders an account of discrepancies between predicted and observed results, thus giving them a kind of intelligibility by distinguishing deviations which are merely random from deviations which are themselves systematic. It sets limits (ideal frequencies) from which observed data cannot diverge systematically. Non-systematic processes, then, manifest a certain intelligibility and so a certain order, but an order and intelligibility different from that of systematic processes. Hence, statistical investigation which deals with non-systematic process anticipates a different intelligibility
from that which is anticipated by classical. The order studied by statistical investigation is that of actual relative frequencies of events as diverging from an ideal frequency only at random. In effect it counts the number of times outcomes of a certain type actually occur. Thus, for example, the ratio of heads or of tails in tossing a fair coin turns out to be one half since the actual ratio of each for any series of tosses oscillates at random about the value 1/2. Statistical techniques can then reveal a certain order in a run of events which from a classical point of view has no immanent intelligibility. The mind-set (heuristic anticipation) fostered by statistics is to expect that there will be differences which do not make a difference provided they are merely random. The classical mind-set, however, expects every difference to make a difference and puts down divergences from predicted values to observational error or to the arbitrary isolation of a physical system.

Perhaps an example will make the point clearer. According to classical kinetic theory, the interrelations of pressure, volume, and temperature of a gas (Boyle’s and Charles’s laws) are accounted for by supposing that the gas is composed of a very large number of molecules moving at random inside the container. Any molecule has as much chance as any other of hitting the container’s wall. It was noted that the predicted values calculated for pressure or volume or temperature using statistical methods were only approximated by the

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6Dr. G. Smith points out that the difference between the expectations for statistical studies in Newtonian mechanics and in quantum mechanics are just what Lonergan says is the difference between classical and statistical heuristic structures. Newtonian mechanics supposes that there are available to the observer other parameters which he simply neglects out of ignorance, laziness, or technological limitations. If these parameters were to be taken into account the observed data would indeed converge on the predicted results. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, supposes that there simply are not such other parameters. Lonergan’s point is that, since classical and statistical heuristics are complementary, statistical techniques even when applied within classical physics are impossible to dispense with since their reason for existence is the empirical residue which cannot be eliminated by any abstract laws whether classical or statistical. Statistics is not a mere cloak of our ignorance even in classical investigation. Peirce’s agreement with the substance of this view may well have been what led him in fact to anticipate quantum theory. Lonergan’s understanding of the physical universe is anti-Pythagorean and pro-hylemorphic, since ‘prime matter’ is the analogue of the ‘empirical residue.’ Peirce is in the same camp by his insistence on ‘secondness’ as brute.
actual values when observed. It was thought that, since every difference must make a difference, if the laws governing the relations between pressure, volume, and temperature were correct, the discrepancies must be due to faulty measurement and/or observational techniques. The expectation then was: improve the accuracy of measurement and observation and you will reduce the discrepancies between predicted and observed values. It turned out, however, that just the opposite resulted; the more accurate the observations the wider the divergence. Something, then, must have been wrong with the theory; it must be missing something. This realization led scientists completely to rethink Newtonian (classical) mechanics on which kinetic theory was built. The outcome, of course, was the elaboration of quantum mechanics.

It turns out, then, that statistical techniques do indeed give to runs of events a certain intelligibility indirectly and from the outside as it were — through the mathematics of probability, not through the unity of cause and of nature. In the case of deviations from the ideal frequency of any run of events, since they are all merely random they do not have even the intelligibility of non-systematic process. They are in fact the surd element of concreteness and finiteness. In the real order, then, one finds no processes which are entirely systematic and no processes which are entirely non-systematic. Every real, observable world process exhibits aspects of each.

Both classical and statistical physics seek intelligibility in actual physical processes. Each, then, formulates 'laws' and in each case observed values and predicated values differ; in the case of classical physics those differences are unexpected and unwanted (merely 'observational error'); in the case of statistical physics they are expected and are permitted if and only if the differences are random. In both heuristics there is an inverse insight into the differences between observed and predicted results. In the case of classical heuristic, they are

7A convincing confirmation of a surd aspect, a brute and factitious element, in nature is the fact that physical constants, like K (specific gas constant), or R (universal gas constant), or C (speed of light), must be empirically measured and calculated. Indeed a theory may posit that there is such and such a constant, but the theory cannot assign it a numerical value. That value simply is whatever it turns out to be.
allowed as long as they are only the result of observational error which can be corrected by more careful and accurate measurement; in the case of statistical heuristic, they are allowed only when deviating from the ideal frequency at random.

Thus, the negative unintelligibility of random differences which make no difference to the generalization (the ideal frequency) is simply a recognition of the abstract character of our explanatory generalization. The positive unintelligibility of differences too large to be set down to mere observational error and too systematic to be ignored is recognition that our explanatory generalization has missed some relevant variable in the process and so forces revision of the differential equation. Lonergan puts the matter like this: “when differences are not random (too large to be merely random) further inquiry is in order; but when differences are random, not only is no inquiry attempted but also the very attempt would be pronounced silly.”

Because of the complementarity of classical and statistical heuristics implied in the foregoing, they are not to be regarded as competing views. On the contrary these heuristics are to be regarded as contributing positively to each other. Thus to return to the example of kinetic theory cited above, it should be noted that the anticipation that the gas laws, as worked out in Newtonian mechanics, would be perfectly confirmed by the coincidence of predicted and observed results was disappointed by further research so that the very laws of Newtonian mechanics had to be reformulated so as to incorporate statistics into the essence of the new mechanical theory and so not leave statistical predictions as simply a cover for ignorance.

Since these heuristics are truly complementary, it is plausible to assume a priori that they are irreducible in the sense that the greater development of one heuristic will not result in the elimination of the other. Suppose that classical physics succeeds in developing ever more inclusive frameworks in which to organize its data into more and more inclusive laws. Among other things this would mean that what was omitted by one framework was included in the next. Still in the more inclusive framework there would be other items which escape

8Lonergan, Insight 54-55 = CWL 3 78.
the new laws. In every case these items which elude inclusion under classical laws are considered in terms of statistical laws and are judged to be either random or systematic deviations. If the deviations are statistically significant, further investigation is in order. If they are merely random, no further research is required. In that case we are simply reflecting that the concrete, real situation reflects an empirical residue which can never be captured in laws whether classical or statistical. In a word, no matter how inclusive a framework is developed, in the concrete random differences will never be eliminated. Why is this so? What is the significance of differences which do not make a difference to any physical theory in question?

The classical heuristic, if taken alone, would have deduction as its model. Gödel proved that no non-trivial deductive system can be shown within the system to be both consistent and deductively complete. Deductive completeness means that every true statement appears as part of the system either as an axiom or as a theorem. Consistency, of course, means that the system is not self-contradictory. Clearly all logicians want a deductive system to be at least consistent. But Gödel showed that no consistent, non-trivial deductive system can contain all true statements. There will always be at least one statement known to be true which is neither an axiom nor a theorem of the system. If one tries to fix up the axioms so that the truth previously not contained in the system is now so contained, another, different, statement will be found which, while known to be true, is neither an axiom nor a theorem. These ‘undecidables’ are to the axiomatic system as the empirical residue is to classical physics. The strange, even disconcerting phenomenon is due, I think, to the abstract nature of our expressions of the world’s intelligibility in general principles and laws. The reality of the concrete always involves more than the abstract can express.

The question whether world processes are systematic or not is an empirical question. It seems to have been settled that they in fact manifest aspects of each. Hence, in so far as there were a non-systematic aspect to actual world processes, the randomness they manifest would not be just ‘a cloak for our ignorance,’ but rather a property of what exists.
Lonergan points out that even if we accept that, correctly understood, classical and statistical heuristics are complementary, we still need an explanatory idea which accounts for the characteristics of each of those anticipatory schemes. As he remarks, the laws formulated under the classical heuristic (for example, Newtonian mechanics) not only do not give any insight into numbers, distribution, intervals of time, selectivity, and other elements which enter into statistical analyses, but rather abstract from all particulars and concrete conditions under which those classical laws actually function. On the other hand, laws formulated under the statistical heuristic (for example, quantum mechanics) give no account of why there are "so many kinds of events or why each kind has the frequency attributed to it." They merely provide in various cases an ideal frequency of the occurrence of the events. Lonergan concludes:

To reach explanation on this level, it is necessary to effect the concrete synthesis of classical laws into a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, to establish that such schemes, as combinations of events, acquire first a probability of emergence and then a probability of survival through the realization of the conditioned series, and finally to grasp that, if such a series of schemes is being realized in accord with probabilities, then there is available a general principle that promises answers to questions about the reason for numbers and distributions, concentrations and time intervals, selectivity and uncertain stability, development and breakdowns. To work out the answers pertains to the natural sciences. To grasp that emergent probability is an explanatory idea, is to know what is meant when our objective was characterized as a generic, relatively invariant, and incomplete account of the immanent intelligibility, the order, the design of the universe of our experience.

It is further evident that Lonergan is satisfied that the world process is, at least in some significant cases, non-systematic. In the

section of *Insight* dealing with 'emergent probability',\(^{12}\) he spells out in some detail what is to be expected from an empirical examination of the actual world if indeed both classical and statistical laws were supposed to be true of that world. We would then expect that world to exhibit both regularities and novelties, both lawful and chance events, in short, a world of continuity and differentiation. We have only to go and look to judge whether such a heuristic anticipation is justified by empirical testing.

II

Consider now what Charles Peirce has to say of the same subject. He is writing just before the turn of the century and so before Einstein, Heisenberg, and Planck. His notion of physics has been formed largely in the Newtonian, and so classical, model in which emphasis had been laid on event converging on predicted outcomes and in which divergence of actual observations from the norm were considered to be due to observational error of one kind or another. And yet in a paper published in 1893 in the *Monist*, he remarked:\(^ {13}\)

The *Origin of Species* was published toward the end of the year 1859. The preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most productive seasons — or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering, the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginning until now. The idea that chance begets order, which is one of the cornerstones of modern physics ... was at that time put into its clearest light (CP 6.297).

Peirce was convinced that Darwin's evolutionism and any mechanistic interpretation given to science and its laws was incompatible. In Peirce's opinion the use of statistical methods in science did not give any aid or comfort to 'mechanical philosophy' as some, among


\(^{13}\) *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 6 ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), para. 287-317. All references to the *Collected Papers* will be entered in the text according to the standard form: CP + volume number + paragraph number. Thus CP 6.297.
them Peirce's friend, Chauncey Wright (see CP 5.64), supposed. To the contrary, Peirce regarded statistical methods as sounding the death knell for such views.

For Peirce the "mechanical philosopher" is "whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity coordinated with that of the physical world" (CP 6.38). Such a philosopher "will logically be carried to the proposition that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine anything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsions" (CP 6.38). Peirce calls this the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism. We recognize in this 'mechanical philosophy' the mind-set Lonergan spoke of as arising from the mistaken assumption that the Classical Model of Physics is uniquely correct. It is against this view of things that Peirce, like Lonergan many years later, mustered all his considerable logical, scientific, and philosophical resources.

What, Peirce asks, are the reasons for holding such a view? Three sorts of arguments are usually proposed: (1) absolute determinism is a postulate of scientific reasoning; (2) absolute determinism is supported by observational evidence; and (3) various a priori arguments support it (CP 6.39-65). The first class of arguments is based on a faulty understanding of scientific method; the second is simply gratuitously asserted; and the third does not exhaust all possible alternative hypotheses, in particular, the hypothesis that chance is in some sense real and not merely a function of our ignorance.

Let us consider Peirce's criticisms more closely. To think that absolute determinism is a postulate of scientific reasoning is to assume erroneously that induction is nothing but a special case of deduction. Peirce, of course, has in mind the sort of analysis of induction which grounds its effectiveness in the uniformity of nature. But Peirce points out that in fact all inductive inference is based on the principle of sampling. He gives this example: from samples of a shipment of wheat we find that four-fifths of the samples contain quality A wheat; hence we conclude 'experientially and provisionally' (Peirce's words) that about four-fifths of all the grain in the shipment is of the same quality. Such an argument is based solely on what we have experienced of the
wheat in the past and what we can experience of it in the future. Because that sort of reasoning is conditioned by experience (both actual and possible) its conclusion concerning the true proportion of quality A wheat in the shipment is only provisional. At any given moment, therefore, the inferred ratio is only an approximation of what would be found to be the case if more samples were to be taken. The inferred ratio, then, is really a hypothesis to be verified and/or modified by experience. If the outcomes of further sampling fluctuate irregularly so that no definite value can be assigned to this ratio, the limits within which it fluctuates can be discovered. If, however, further sampling yields definite ratios which change, that fact can be ascertained and the approximation modified accordingly. Thus Peirce remarks:

and in short, whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience, experience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them, so as to predict rightly, at last, what its ultimate value may be, if it has any ultimate value, or what the ultimate law of succession of values may be, if there be any such law, or that it fluctuates irregularly within certain limits, if it does so ultimately fluctuate.

For Peirce then the process of sampling is self-corrective and since it is this process which grounds inductive inference, that type of inference needs no postulates whatever, not to mention a postulate of absolute determinism.

As for the claim that there is observational support for absolute determinism, Peirce cannot understand how anyone acquainted with scientific research from the inside could take it seriously. He points out that any scientist knows that no observation determines the value of a continuous quantity with a probably error of zero. But what about observations of continuous quantities which are discontinuous at one or two limits? For example, take a line segment drawn by someone on a sheet of paper. How to determine its length? Since it cannot have a length of less than zero, if no length at all is visible, the observed length is zero. All this means, however, is that the length of the line segment is less than the smallest length visible with the optical power employed. It does not immediately warrant the conclusion that no line segment had been drawn at all. To reach that conclusion legitimately
one would have to have recourse to some indirect evidence, for example, that the person who supposedly drew the line in the first place was never anywhere near enough to the paper so to do (CP 6.45-46). Peirce's general point is this: to conclude that some quantity or other is absent from a certain subject matter there must be some experimental evidence, direct or indirect, to that effect. It is not enough simply to say that we are unable to detect it. Peirce points out further that when we try to verify a law of nature, the more precise our observations, the more certainly will they show irregular departures from the law (CP 6.46).

Finally consider Peirce's evaluation of the various a priori arguments advanced by the defenders of 'mechanical philosophy.' The most serious of these, in Peirce's view, is the claim that absolute chance cannot be an explanation of anything. The issue, then, is to determine in what an explanation consists and when one is required. Peirce maintains that regularity, not irregularity, is what par excellence requires an explanation. The reason is that an explanation is required only when questions arise and questions arise only when there is some thwarted or disappointed expectation. Now irregularity engenders no expectations whatever as to what is likely to turn up. Hence, it raises no questions and so needs no explanation. Again, purely formal regularities such as those found in mathematical laws (say, of probability) require no explanation either since they are simply part of the a priori conditions of our knowing randomness at all. The situations which require explanation are: (1) those empirically observed in nature since they are the exception to the preponderance of our experience; (2) breaches in empirically observed regularities since they disappoint our expectations and so raise questions; and (3) failure to discover empirical confirmation of a postulated regularity. In this third case, what needs explanation is not precisely why there is no regularity but rather why we were led to postulate it in the first place. In Peirce's view, then, in a universe such as ours regularity alone needs explanation. Consequently law cannot be posited as the ultimate explanation of the cosmos. Such a position would lead to this rather curious reasoning: on the one hand, since law and regularity cannot explain irregularity and growing diversity, the latter would have to be set down as
inexplicable; on the other hand, if laws cannot have evolved out of irregularity (precisely because of this account they are immutable and ultimate facts), then they have no explanation either. Hence, such a position would block the road to further inquiry and would violate what Peirce took to be the most basic tenet of scientific method.

Peirce points out that all the laws of classical mechanics deal with conservative forces, that is, with forces which are reversible and which obey the laws of conservation of energy. He further remarks that in fact most physical phenomena here on earth are non-conservative and so seem to be inexplicable by the laws of classical mechanics: birth, growth, life, friction, heat, conduction, combustion, capillarity, diffusion of liquids, and so on.

Now, as a general rule, physicists explain those actions which seem to violate the law of conservation of energy through the action of chance. In some cases a uniform distribution can be understood to result from conservative forces acting upon a collection of things whose distribution is fortuitous. This process is known as sifting. The converse, however, is not possible. By themselves conservative forces cannot bring about a fortuitous distribution; only another fortuitous distribution in the initial conditions can do that. Peirce gives this example. Suppose a jar to contain hot nitrogen. Add some cold oxygen. At first the nitrogen molecules will be moving with various degrees of force distributed fortuitously. The same will be true of the oxygen molecules. On the average, however, the oxygen molecules will be moving more slowly than the nitrogen. This is not a matter of chance. Furthermore in the course of time there will be continual fortuitous encounters of the two sorts of molecules causing continual interchange of energy between them with the result that gradually there will be an approximation to one fortuitous distribution of energy among all the molecules. Peirce observes:

That which happens, happens entirely under the governance of conservative forces; but the character of fortuitous distribution toward which there is a tendency is entirely due to the various fortuitous distributions existing in the different initial conditions of the motion, with which conservative forces never have anything to do (CP 6.81).
This is more remarkable, says Peirce, since, although the initial distribution of forces gradually tends to die out, the subsequent fortuitous distributions dependent upon the initial conditions not only hold their ground, but mark their effect wherever the conservative forces act. This is what Peirce means by the 'action of chance' (CP 6.81). The uniformity or regularity of a distribution, therefore, can be understood to have come about through the 'action of chance' but not conversely. Conservative forces within a mechanical system cannot, by themselves, reverse the sifting process so that a completely fortuitous distribution results from a uniform distribution.

Not all uniform distributions, however, are the result of the sifting of fortuitous distributions, and those that are always involve some sort of regularity in their initial conditions. Peirce gives this example. The density of a gas varies directly with its pressure since more molecules confined to a smaller space will strike the walls of the container per unit time. This is not due to chance alone, however, since the initial conditions suppose that the paths of the molecules are all nearly rectilinear, for otherwise it might turn out that the molecules not strike the container walls at all even though they are in motion. But such an initial condition is itself a regularity. Hence, regularity in a phenomenon requires some regularity in its initial conditions just as irregularity in a phenomenon requires some irregularity in its initial conditions. Thus regularity and irregularity are ultimate, irreducible, distinct yet inseparable, complementary aspects of all actual world processes. Peirce's hypothetical framework is called synechism (continuity) of which, he says, tychism (objective chance) is but a corollary. These rather exotic terms are perhaps best understood from their Greek roots. 'Synechism' is coined from syn, meaning 'along with' or in general 'accompanying,' and echein, meaning 'to have' or 'to possess.' Peirce meant it to stand for regularity or continuity. 'Tychism' is coined from tychē, meaning 'chance,' with the usual overtone of 'good luck' (dystychē would mean bad luck). That continuity implies randomness as a corollary comes from the mathematics of continuous quantities, that is, their analysis requires the introduction of discreteness and so implies either the notion of limits to which continuous series converge or of infinitesimals of which continuous series are
composed. I take it that Peirce looked on this as simply a generalized
tory of evolution and that Lonergan would recognize it as the first
cousin to his own heuristic hypothesis of emergent probability.¹⁴

For Peirce, then, the entire universe is in a process of develop-
ment which can be thought of as hyperbolic:

The state of things in the infinite past is chaos ... the nothingness
of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of
things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which
consists in the complete triumph of law and the absence of all
spontaneity (CP 8.317).

These states (infinite past and infinite future) are, however, only theo-
retical limits which are approached asymptotically. Between them,

we have on our side a state of things in which there is some abso-
lute spontaneity [chance] counter to all law, and some degree of
conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to
the growth of habit.

This is for Peirce the law of the universe, the law of habit-taking, the
law of Mind.

III

This essay was intended to make the following points:

(1) that two thinkers, Peirce and Lonergan, from very different social
and cultural backgrounds, arrived independently at strikingly similar
theories about the structure and role of physical science in under-

¹⁴Here are, according to Lonergan, some of the attributes the universe would in
fact manifest if emergent probability were true: (1) there is a success of world situa-
tions each one of which comes about, survives, and changes according to a schedule
of probabilities; (2) world process is open, that is, not determined; (3) world process is
increasingly systematic; (4) world process admits enormous differentiation; (5) world
process admits of breakdowns; (6) world process includes blind alleys; (7) the later a
scheme is in the conditioned series of schemes, the narrower its distribution in the
cosmos; (8) the narrower the basis for the emergence of the later schemes of emer-
gence, the longer the time interval; (9) the greater the probability of blind alleys and
breakdowns, the greater must be the initial numbers if the whole series of schemes is
to be assured. See Insight 125-128 = CWL 3 148-151.
standing the universe, increases the probability that their account, or something very much like it, is correct;

(2) that a major consequence of their account of the heuristic frameworks proper to physical science is to call into question the rational grounds for thinking that the physical universe is absolutely determined by laws such that, in principle, complete knowledge of any particular situation would allow one to deduce every other; in its place, is substituted an anticipation of the universe as indeed ordered and law-like in its behavior, but still not so rigidly determined that no real change or development is possible. The physical universe is truly developing and genuinely new situations are possible.

(3) finally, that a major mistake in interpreting scientific method and the physical theories it proposes is to confuse the abstract and the concrete so that properties of the abstract, such as necessity, be transferred to its concrete, contingent instantiation. Such confusion is compounded by a failure to distinguish explanation and description, since this leads to the erroneous supposition that explanations, like descriptions, must be imaginable as well as intelligible! Each of these category mistakes has led to very serious errors in both the scientific and philosophical understanding of our world.
A REPLY TO MICHAEL MAXWELL

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While I appreciate the attention Michael Maxwell has devoted to my book *In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Post-Modern World*, his critique seriously misrepresents some of my views, in part because it does not explain the context in which I develop them. In this response I will first try to explain why I have found Lonergan to be profoundly relevant to the themes I address in my book, and then I will turn to some of Mr. Maxwell's specific criticisms.

Though deeply influenced by him, *In the Throe of Wonder* is not about Lonergan, and does not purport to be a study of his thought. In it I am attempting to explore the possibility of a new way of thinking opened up by the deconstruction of the modernist project. The postmodern critique of the metaphysics of presence and representational epistemology has the potential of liberating thought from the totalizing ambitions of the subject. But postmodern thought consistently fails to explore its own most radical implications because it tends to equate being with presence, and rationality with representational thinking, instead of challenging the assumptions on which these equations depend. If Lonergan is profoundly relevant to the 'crisis of philosophy' precipitated by postmodernism, it is because he not only deconstructs


these equations but opens up alternatives to them. Far from "interpreting Lonergan" simply "as a deconstructionist," or claiming that he "exhibits a preference ... for postmodern wisdom," I argue that Lonergan’s way of thinking is neither trapped inside modernist presuppositions nor satisfied by the postmodern deconstruction of them, but points to a kind of wisdom that is beyond both.

If this assessment of Lonergan is correct, it is crucially important for us to thematize the deconstructive dimension of his thought since otherwise it will be impossible to appreciate fully the sense in which Lonergan’s thought points beyond deconstruction as it is customarily understood and practiced. There is, I confess, much in both the content and the rhetoric of Insight that can be taken to support the view that such a dimension is missing from it. One could argue, in fact, that Insight is the great, culminating text of modernity, in so far as it addresses the same fundamental issues that exercised Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, and attempts to resolve dilemmas generated by their inadequate response to them. In Insight Lonergan seems to (1) prioritize the congnitional subject, (2) use transcendental method to arrive at an archimedian principle, (3) proceed from this principle to a comprehensive orchestration of all intellectual methods (classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic), and (4) thereby construct a sweeping synthesis of common sense, modern science, and philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and natural theology). There is, of course, a ‘negative moment’ in Lonergan’s thought — as there must be, if he is to integrate Hegelian method into his system. But it could be argued that the very way Lonergan exploits this negative moment for his own positive purposes only shows how thoroughly Lonergan’s way of

3Maxwell, “Critique” 229.
4Maxwell, “Critique” 230.
6I think it is Ron McKinney’s failure to explore the deconstructive import of Lonergan’s own thinking that leads him to do a deconstructive reading of Lonergan; see International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991) 81. Fred Lawrence’s “The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other” in Theological Studies 54 (1993) assesses in a much more positive manner the relationship between Lonergan and deconstruction.
thinking is pervaded by modernist presuppositions and aspirations. In fact, given its (literally) unlimited scope, its claim to have found the key for resolving centuries of philosophical controversy, in short, its apparent ambition to be a master text, *Insight* seems to be a paradigmatic example of the kind of work that deconstruction was invented to undermine. It would seem to take a great deal of special pleading to argue otherwise.

Nevertheless, I believe that this way of reading *Insight* and this way of construing its relationship with both modernity and deconstruction is profoundly mistaken. For while it is true that Lonergan is preoccupied by the same dilemmas that exercised the great modernist thinkers (objectivism/subjectivism, empiricism/idealism, and so on), he responds to them by undermining in the most radical way the modernist equation of knowing with 'taking a look' and being with the 'out-there-now.' And since the privileged position of the modernist subject rests on these epistemological and metaphysical presumptions, she or he is upended when Lonergan calls them into question.8

But the failure of modernist philosophy to break the bonds of its habitual presumptions is, according to *Insight*, only an especially revealing case of the pervasive human tendency to overlook, avoid, or repress the radical tension within us that would, if we allowed it to, completely upset—deconstruct—our ordinary way of thinking and living. This radical tension is, in fact, constitutive of our very being as subjects: none of us is a simple, unified self because at the very core of our self is a tear, a rupture, an 'opposition' that is not only 'complete' but also 'ineluctable'—the 'opposition' between

being a "center in the world of sense operating self-centeredly" and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligibly ordered

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7 I argue in *In the Throe of Wonder* that his critique of the metaphysics of presence and ocular epistemology is more radical than Heidegger's or Derrida's.

8 The subject can do its best to evade this unsettling experience but it is "likely to make its force felt in the tranquility of darkness, in the solitude of loneliness, in the shattering upheavals of personal or social disaster" (Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) 625; italics added).

9 See Lonergan, *Insight* 730.

universe of being to which one can belong and in which one can function only through detachment and disinterestedness.\textsuperscript{11}

The call of being, the exigence of the pure desire to know, radically and irreparably disrupts both the immediacy of sense and all the self-centered worlds we try to construct as substitutes for its lost immediacy. It is understandable that we would want to silence this call and repress this exigence — that we would want to cling to our attachments and safeguard our interests so as to secure for ourselves a life immune to radical disruption. But, as \textit{Insight} unfolds, we find ourselves in the grip of an inescapable irony: we can be genuinely\textsuperscript{12} ourselves only by relinquishing our attachments, abandoning our self-interests, and undergoing an intellectual, moral and religious conversion that, over the course of a lifetime, utterly deconstructs not only all our self-centered worlds but the self-centered self which constructs them. This deconstruction does not serve, as it does in Hegel, as a negative moment to be sublated in and by the development of a 'more unified,' 'more fully integrated' subjectivity. According to the logic of self-abandonment immanent within the exigence of the desire to know, the subject participates in the universe of being only to the degree that it entirely abandons itself, embraces its own destitution,\textsuperscript{13} and surrenders to an exigence it does not control.

The 'complete' and 'ineluctable' tension (between a self-centered world and the universe of being), which is constitutive of our very selves, and the conversion we must undergo if we are to be genuine, provide, I believe, the terms in which \textit{Insight} as a whole is to be understood. \textit{If this tension, and the conversion which is the only genuine way to live it, are pivotal to the text, the text is misunderstood if it is read as foundational in the modernist sense} — that is, as providing the cognitional subject an irrefragable, immovable arche on which an all-inclusive edifice of knowledge can be built. For such an immovable

\textsuperscript{11}Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 474.

\textsuperscript{12}Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 475-479.

arche would secure for the subject immunity from precisely the kind of deconstruction which radical conversion entails.

Let me illustrate this issue by briefly considering alternative interpretations of chapter 11 of *Insight*. This chapter may be read as a classical modernist move to render the subject invulnerable to all possible objections — so that the reader, after appropriating Lonergan's argument, can self-satisfyingly affirm "Now, I cannot be moved. I cannot possibly be wrong in affirming myself as a knower, and so I have secured an incontrovertible ground on which to base all my affirmations." This way of appropriating Lonergan leads the reader to think not that she or he has a tentative foothold on, but that she or he now occupies an *invulnerable position* within, the universe of being. Being is, apparently, now in his or her possession. But the problem is that, if one assumes a possessive attitude toward the universe of being, then, far from having abandoned all one's attachments and interests, as the detached and disinterested desire to know requires, one is still intent on securing a position of privilege with respect to being as a whole from which it is impossible to be dislodged. And if one thinks that *Insight* provides one with an irrefutable argument by which to gain such a position, one has, I believe, failed to appreciate the fact that the detached and disinterested desire to know which governs the argument of the text requires one to abandon entirely (not once but over the course of a lifetime) precisely such an attitude of attachment and possession.

If *Insight* as a whole is a call to such self-abandonment, its pivotal chapter needs to be understood as *initiating it*, not as a way of securing a privileged position for the self-centered self. I will argue in a bit more detail in the second section of this response that chapter 11 invites the subject to acknowledge that she or he is subject to the normative exigence of a cognitional process she or he cannot escape and does not control. Acknowledging this is, indeed, an exercise in 'self-appropriation.' But *Insight* is written from a moving point of view. And its subsequent chapters reveal the profoundly ironic fact that we can be genuinely ourselves not by taking possession of ourselves (as the phrase 'self-appropriation' implies) but only by entirely surrendering ourselves (cognitionally, volitionally, affectively) to an exigence that
will turn out to be nothing less than the exigence of being itself. Far from being in a position of mastery in relation to this exigence, we are always already in the throes of it, and are called by it to relinquish all our attachments and interests — especially the one that, ironically and tragically, most interferes with the disinterested desire to know: the kind of desire that makes us take a possessive attitude toward knowledge itself.

In short, the subject does not appropriate to itself the pure desire to know. The pure desire to know, with its demand for detachment and disinterest, deconstructs the self-centeredness of one's subjectivity and inspires in one the willingness to entirely abandon oneself to it.

Why, then, not call Lonergan a 'deconstructionist'? Precisely because, unlike the postmodern exponents of deconstruction, Lonergan affirms 'an intelligibly ordered universe of being.' If one reads *Insight* without attention to its own deconstructive dimension, this affirmation will be taken to signify a retreat back to the modernist positions that the postmoderns have so radically critiqued. But being, as Lonergan affirms it, is not to be discovered by operating within the modernist framework — which confuses being with the presence of what is right-here-now-in-front-of-us, and knowing with the representation of presence. Being is, rather, that which is to be known by abandoning ourselves entirely to the exigence of inquiry — and this means that being is what is to be discovered precisely by undergoing deconstruction and becoming destitute. Lonergan is not, then, either the last of the great modernists, nor a postmodernist; unlike the former, he takes the necessity of deconstruction seriously, and, unlike the latter, he affirms the universe of being. What, then, is he? That which does not yet have a name — the beginning of something radically other. It is Lonergan as this prophetic beginning that I think we have only just begun to explore.
Mr. Maxwell states that I (1) exhibit, and attribute to Lonergan, "a preference for the unknown in its deconstruction of the known"; (2) set up (and foist on Lonergan) an exclusive dichotomy according to which we are either able to know everything or able to know nothing; and (3) choose (for myself and in Lonergan's name) the second prong of this dichotomy. I make these mistakes, according to Mr. Maxwell, because I fail to understand what Lonergan means by the virtually unconditioned.

I will now try to respond to these criticisms, which are colored, in my judgment, by serious misreadings of the text.

In *In the Throe of Wonder* I try to bring into focus the deconstructive import and normative exigence of the disinterested desire to know by exploring phenomenologically three pivotal human experiences: the experience of wonder which 'deconstructs' the immediately given by intimating to us that there is more to the given than is given to us; the experience of horror in the face of nothingness which 'deconstructs' all the efforts we make to totalize the universe of proportionate being; and the experience of awe which, if we respond to its exigence, leads us to prostration and worship. Each of these is a radical turning point — makes possible, in Lonergan terms, a vertical transformation of human existence — because in each of them we are, as it were, caught in the throe of an unknown which transcends us. These experiences can be epistemological, ontological, and existential breakthroughs, but only if we allow them to uproot our sense of being as a whole. The question on which their import hinges is whether being is to be equated with what we are familiar with before these breakdowns/breakthroughs happen, or to be equated with what we become aware of when we find ourselves in the throe of them: the unknown in its very character as unknown.

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14Maxwell, "Critique" 229.
15Maxwell, "Critique" 233-235.
I argue — in large part because of Lonergan’s inspiration — that being is that toward which we are drawn by these experiences, and this means that, from the vantage-point of one in the throes of them, being is to be equated with the unknown. But to affirm that this is so one must do more than experience wonder or horror or awe. One must ask the epistemological and ontological questions these experiences provoke, explore possible answers to these questions, and make a judgment about which answer satisfies the exigence of the desire to know. If, as a result of this process, one affirms that being is that which we experience as unknown when we are within the throes of wonder, horror, and awe, one must also affirm that it is that which we come to know by surrendering to the throes of inquiry these experiences set in motion.\textsuperscript{18}

Insight, it may be said, is one long self-referential argument designed to bring the subject to this affirmation — and to the insight that it is a non-revisable, irrefutable truth. That we can come to this truth does not mean that we can know everything but it does mean that we can know something — by responding, as Mr. Maxwell explains,\textsuperscript{19} to the exigence of the virtually unconditioned. But saying this still leaves unclarified in a crucial way the kind of relationship that exists between the non-revisable, irrefutable truth and the subject who

\textsuperscript{18}Since I make this affirmation, I do not myself identify being with ‘absence,’ nor do I in any way attribute such an equation to Lonergan as Mr. Maxwell charges (‘Critique’ 229). What leads Maxwell to make this charge is not especially clear but it seems to be a conclusion he draws as a result of the fact that he thinks I equate being with the unknown and the unknown with ‘absence.’ I have explained the sense in which I equate being with the unknown. As regards ‘absence,’ I argue (In the Throe 178-183) that this concept is parasitic upon the metaphysics of presence and that therefore it does not even enable us to appreciate the import of ‘nothingness’ — let alone the meaning of being.

Mr. Maxwell also claims that, “all textual evidence to the contrary,” I conclude that “Lonergan does not equate being with everything about everything” and makes it sound as if this is a major thesis of my work (‘Critique’ 229). In fact, the only reference to this issue is in a single footnote belonging to a chapter where I am trying to think my way between Lonergan and Heidegger — and trying to suggest Lonergan’s metaphysics is not the kind of ‘ontic’ science of ‘objects’ that, according to Heidegger, fails to think ‘being’ in a radical way. For both Lonergan and Heidegger ‘being’ concerns everything about everything, but it also requires a revolutionary transformation in our very concept of ‘thing.’

\textsuperscript{19}Maxwell, “Critique” 235-241.
affirms it. One is tempted to claim that the self-referential argument of *Insight* enables intelligence to *take possession* of the non-revisable, irrefutable truth of being. For, if it does *not* do so, it would seem to leave us in the same condition of epistemological anarchism, ontological confusion, and existential destitution that, given our postmodern situation, we were in before we read it.

This dichotomy — between being in possession of an irrefutable truth and being utterly at a loss because one lacks one — and not the one Maxwell attributes to me, is pivotal to my text and pervasive in postmodern thought: on the one side, the reason of modernism with its totalizing projects, and its desire to secure indubitable first principles, and on the other side the kind of radical skepticism fostered by a hermeneutic of suspicion which equates reason with such totalizing projects, un_masks its pretension to a ‘God’s-eye view,’ and affirms nothing.\(^{20}\) But I argue — it is, in fact, the point of the book as a whole — that the modernist, who wants to possess the truth, and the postmodernist, who abandons love of the truth because she or he equates it with trying to attain a ‘God’s-eye view,’ both overlook a third possibility: a way of loving the truth that requires both giving up the desire to possess it, and *abandoning* ourselves to it. Both modernism and postmodern skepticism are, I would argue, flights from, and avoidances of, the ordeal of vertical transformation that this third possibility entails. Vertical transformation gives reason no truth to hold onto and requires it to surrender entirely to an unrestricted exigence. In so surrendering reason does, indeed, have to ‘give up’ the truth — in precisely the same way that the lover has to ‘give up’ the beloved when she or he realizes that possessing the Other\(^{21}\) would be

\(^{20}\) Heidegger, of course, tries to transcend this dichotomy by developing a way of ‘meditative thinking’ that responds to Being without trying to possess it. But, to put an enormously difficult issue in enormously simplistic terms, I think Heidegger is wrong in restricting the provenance of intelligence and reason to the realm of the ontic, with the result that he has to ‘transcend’ them in order to think the ontological.

\(^{21}\) I think that, if its non-possessive implications and emphasis on vertical transformation are taken seriously, Lonergan’s cognitional theory can give us a way to talk about knowing the Other in a way that is compatible with, and not a violation of, the ethical relationship with the Other that Emmanuel Levinas portrays in *Totality and Infinity*. I discussed this in a paper on “Intelligibility and the Ethical” at the 1993 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
not a final consummation but a horrifying betrayal. The desire to know differs from other desires not just because it has a different object but because it is a radically different kind of desire: under the sway of it reason does not seek to possess, master, or control its 'object' but aban-
dons itself to its 'object,' and spends itself on it, without regard for its
own interests. Self-abandonment and self-expenditure are, we might
say, the transcendental grounds for disinterested knowing—except
that they deprive subjectivity all secure grounds and subject the subject
to the throe of a transcendent exigence. Giving up the desire to possess
the truth is the one and only way for reason to surrender entirely to the
desire to know it.

Now the desire to possess the truth is, I believe, inseparable from
wanting to be able to say 'I cannot possibly be wrong.' Even when what
is being affirmed is a non-revisable and irrefutable truth, even when it
is the statement 'I am a knower,' saying 'I cannot possibly be wrong' or
'Now I have an unmovable foundation on which to stand' subverts
the obediential rapport that ought to exist between the reason that
affirms and the truth that is affirmed in so far as such statements (and
the attitude expressed by them) subordinate the known to the knower
and place the known beneath the knower so that she or he can use it as
a secure foundation. Foundationalism inverts the vertical relationship
which ought to exist between the known and the knower, and subverts
the vertical transformation which the exigence of inquiry requires the
knower to undergo. When reason responds unreservedly to this
exigence, it is, indeed, led to the 'virtually unconditioned.' But reaching
the 'virtually unconditioned' does not mean having the truth in one's
virtual possession. Indeed, the same exigence that leads reason to the
'virtually unconditioned' prohibits reason from using the virtually
unconditioned to secure its own infallibility; reason must affirm the
truth not because it now possesses the truth but because it now knows
it is "caught irretrievably"\textsuperscript{22} in the throe of a truth to which it is always
vertically subordinate.

T.S. Eliot says in \textit{Four Quartets} that "humility is endless." If
reason, more aggressively perhaps than any of our other powers,

\textsuperscript{22}In \textit{The Throe of Wonder} 31.
recoils from vertical transformation, it is because such conversion does not *uplift* it but requires it to enter, in its own unique way, the depths of poverty. *Insight* is not just about this conversion; reading it is a way of undergoing it. Surrendering to the throe of this work, one finds oneself engaged in the obediential *noesis* that keeps this magisterial and all-embracing text subordinate to an exigence it does not even try to master. This exigence, this throe, and not any of its brilliances, is what I find finally most compelling about this text — and what I have tried to explore, perhaps with no great success, in my own.
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