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I. INTRODUCTION

LONERGAN BEGINS THE chapter on “Religion” in Method in Theology with a section entitled “The Question of God.”¹ In that section he raises a series of questions to which he does not provide an explicit, systematic reply either in Method itself or, as far as I have been able to determine, anywhere else in his writings. Of particular interest to me is the last set of questions in that series, which are as follows:

To deliberate about “x” is to ask whether “x” is worth while. To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether any deliberating is worth while. Has “worth while” any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant with this world? ... is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of decline? The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers. Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the

primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?2

The significance of ‘deliberating about deliberating’ in the fullest sense is enormous. It is no mere hypothetical question, but one of ultimate existential import. It would seem that if ‘worth while’ has no ultimate meaning, if moral enterprise is incompatible with this universe, then surely we are ‘just gamblers and ... perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity.’ But if ‘worth while’ has no ultimate meaning, then the struggle for authenticity is ultimately doomed — for what meaning of authenticity could be applied to a fool? Once the universe had been made to seem inhospitable to moral endeavor, the problem of personal authenticity was bound to become acute. Such deliberating intends an authentic response — but could it be that the only way to be authentic is to oppose not only the structure of reality, but also to oppose or to negate or to overcome oneself in the most radical way possible? Such, I believe, are some of the fundamental problems underlying the impasses of much of twentieth century thought.

These questions are especially significant in our time; they are the questions grappled with by the great existentialist thinkers, as well as thoughtful people everywhere. It is the negative answer — no, the universe is not on the side of morally serious people — which seems to have carried the day in our contemporary culture.

Yet it is clear enough to anyone even moderately familiar with Lonergan’s writings that he himself rejects the negative answer, holding instead that there is both a benevolent ground to the universe and an ultimate worth to moral living. For this reason it is especially lamentable that Lonergan did not himself employ the resources of his theological method and elaborate his response to this set of questions. Nevertheless, I believe that such a response can be worked out, and I hope to do just that in this article. If I am successful, I hope to also have shown, indirectly, something about the value of Lonergan’s way of conceiving of method in theology.

2Lonergan, Method 102-103.
Byrne: Analogical Knowledge of God

My approach to this problem proceeds in four steps: (1) a brief summary of Lonergan's conception of the theological 'functional specialty' of Systematics, and its relation to the specialties Doctrines and Foundations; (2) an attempt to fill in certain lacunae in Lonergan's writings about the valuative or ethical structure of human consciousness; (3) a use of key elements of that structure as the basis for an analogical knowledge of God as valuing and loving; and (4) a Systematics account of why human moral endeavor is of value, on the basis of such analogical knowledge.

II. LONERGAN ON METHOD IN THEOLOGY

It is not my purpose in this article to engage in a critical investigation of Lonergan's project of a 'method in theology' as an integrated series of eight functional specialties. Rather than explaining, evaluating, or defending that method, I propose simply to employ it. Nevertheless, the reader has the right to expect at least a brief summary of the relevant aspects of Lonergan's way of conceiving of method in theology. Such is the purpose of this section.

The functional specialties most germane to the purpose of this article are Foundations and Systematics. Now it is true that the questions which inspired this article — for example, whether any deliberating is worth while — in the form in which Lonergan posed them clearly intend judgments. As such, the functional specialty within which these questions would be properly answered is Doctrines. However, for the purposes of this article I will presuppose affirmative answers to these questions for judgment, for such affirmations do not present the major problems under consideration here, for a couple of reasons. (1) I think there is little doubt that many religious traditions, Christianity included, affirm the worth of moral living in all sorts of ways. The assurance for such affirmations flows from a transcultural...
source which Lonergan identified as 'religious experience.' Nevertheless, it is one thing to affirm the worth of moral endeavor, and quite another to be able to answer further questions about that worth. (2) The broader context of the passage quoted makes it clear that the questions Lonergan poses arise from a very specific modern context: "Are cosmo-genesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?" It is the context in which the processes of the universe and their prolongation into the human realm have been made to seem inhospitable to moral endeavor. Thus, Lonergan is not simply asking whether moral endeavor is worth while, but why or perhaps how it can be affirmed to be worth while.

As such, these questions are as much about how such affirmations can be "reconciled [with other doctrines] and with the conclusions of science, philosophy, history." This type of reconciliation is, properly speaking, the task of Systematics. While Doctrines is concerned with the considerable problem of arriving at judgments of fact and value which arises within religious traditions, a further difficulty arises with regard to the meaning of the judgments of fact and value which result from Doctrines. As Lonergan points out, the initial expression of a doctrinal judgment may be figurative or symbolic. It may be descriptive and based ultimately on the meaning of words rather than on an understanding of realities. It may, if pressed, quickly become vague and indefinite. It may seem, when examined, to be involved in inconsistency or fallacy.

Thus, even if affirmation of the value of moral endeavor can be presupposed, there remains need for a Systematics whose role Lonergan describes as follows:

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5Lonergan, Method 105ff.
6Lonergan, Method 103.
7Lonergan, Method 267.
8Lonergan, Method 132.
The functional specialty, [S]ystematics, attempts ... to work out appropriate systems of conceptualization, to remove apparent inconsistencies, to move toward some grasp of spiritual matters both from their own inner coherence and from the analogies offered by more familiar human experience.9

The use of analogy will tend to be a fundamental procedure in Systematics, especially when the ‘spiritual matters’ from which ‘apparent inconsistencies’ are to be removed surpass ordinary human cognition. As Lonergan puts it,

there is the intelligibility within the reach of the human mind, and there is the intelligibility beyond it, and there is the intermediate, imperfect, analogous intelligibility that we can find in the mysteries of faith.10

Given Lonergan’s way of approaching fundamental problems in philosophy and theology, it is clear enough that when he spoke of ‘more familiar human experiences’ forming the basis for such analogies, the familiar experiences he had in mind would be ‘psychological.’ In other words, “the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will be not metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological.”11

9Lonergan, Method 132.
10Lonergan, Method 339.
11Lonergan, Method 343. Although metaphysical terms and relations are not primary in Lonergan’s version of Systematics, neither are they to be banished from use in Systematics. Rather, there is a reversal of priority between metaphysical terms and terms derived from the analysis of consciousness. This reversal results in a ‘critical metaphysics’ which has the potential for eliminating the “vast arid wastes of theological controversy” as well as “any authoritarian basis for method” (Method 343-44). Lonergan goes on to indicate that the metaphysics he has in mind is the dynamic schema of ‘generalized emergent probability’ which he had worked out on the basis of intentional operations in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (revised edition, New York: Philosophical Library, 1958; hereafter referred to as Insight); Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). Technically speaking, Lonergan’s own use of the phrase means a ‘generalization’ of ‘emergent probability’ to encompass things and developmental processes, as well as systematic and non-systematic processes (Insight 462 = CWL 3:487). Nevertheless, lacking any suitable alternative, I mean to extend the connotation of the term here to also include both the ‘bipolar’ dialectical processes of position and counterposition, as well as the ‘tripolar’ dialectical process that includes the supernatural agency of grace (Insight 728 = CWL 3:749). These extensions are needed to concretely intend the universal process in which human history is a real component.
Lonergan's use of the term 'psychological' is somewhat idiosyncratic. By 'psychological' he means that which pertains to 'conscious and intentional operations' of the human subject, including the basic acts of cognitional structure, acts pertaining to the 'fourth level of consciousness,' and as well acts of conversion and acts differentiating consciousness. That is to say, 'conscious and intentional operations' of the human subject are the primary analogues by means of which mysteries are to be explored systematically.13

Now it is with regard to 'the analogies offered by more familiar human experience' that certain issues arise which pertain to neither Systematics nor Doctrines, but to Foundations. The task of Foundations is to formulate conscious operations and their structures in 'general theological categories.'14 First there is the task of formulating a 'basic nest of terms and relations' — that is, formulating the results of self-appropriation or intentionality analysis. This basic task, according to Lonergan, is then to be followed by formulating sets of 'interlocking terms and relations' ('models') reflecting conversions, differentiations and integrations of these operations as they concretely occur in various subjects.16


13Lonergan, Method 343. As it happens, the exercise in Systematics being undertaken in the present article does not invoke any strictly supernatural, revealed truths in its set of terms and relations, except perhaps the 'absolutely supernatural' character of God's loving. Even so, Lonergan's manner of defining Systematics does not require that the affirmations related in Systematics be strictly supernatural. In addition to the relevant passages in Method, see also Philosophy of God, and Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973) 52-58.

14Of course, Foundations is also concerned with the task of formulating 'special theological categories' grounded in the experience of 'the dynamic state of other-worldly love' (Method 289).


16Lonergan, Method 286-287.
The foray into Foundations in the next section of this article was prompted by a need to fill in certain lacunae in Lonergan's own account of certain aspects of the 'basic nest of terms and relations' formulating the structure of human consciousness pertaining to the process of deliberation. There are certain questions about the processes of deliberating which I was not able to completely resolve on the basis of Lonergan's texts alone. Moreover, certain of these ambiguities made it difficult for me to develop an adequate set of analogous terms and relations by means of which to answer why and how moral endeavor is affirmed to have 'ultimate meaning.' Following my own attempt to supplement Lonergan's formulation of these basic terms and relations in the next section, I will then attempt to apply Lonergan's conception of Systematic theological method to the problem of the analogous conception of God as unrestricted act of valuing and loving, and finally return to the questions about the worth of moral living.

III. SELF-APPROPRIATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF ETHICAL INTENTIONALITY

By 'values' people usually mean abstract 'concepts' like the value of life, liberty, respect for others, honesty, fair play, and the like. One then takes up the difficult problem of trying to live according to these lofty concepts. But Lonergan insists that 'value' refers to something utterly concrete: "by the good is never meant some abstraction. Only the concrete is good." While differing radically in his conclusions, Lonergan's seriousness about the concreteness of values is reminiscent of Friedrich Nietzsche's approach. For Nietzsche, a 'value' is referred to the concrete felt-valuation of its proponent. For example, the value of

17Lonergan, Method 36.
'purity' can be either a 'noble' value or a ressentiment 'value,' depending upon the respective power or impotence of its advocate.\(^{18}\)

Similarly, Lonergan clarifies what he means by value as concrete through reference to the actual structure of conscious intentionality in which a subject's judgments of value and decisions emerge. Lonergan took up some of the fine details of this structure relatively late in his career and, as a result, never gave his results the polished presentation he provided for cognitional structure. Nevertheless, the elements of the structure of ethical intentionality are all present in his later writings. Thus the Foundations project of this section is not so much to identify 'conscious and intentional operations' Lonergan overlooked, as to knit together his observations in a way that adequately represents the structure of ethical intentionality itself. In my presentation, I shall reverse Lonergan's usual procedure, and begin with the final act in the structured series of acts, namely the act of deciding. For this reversal there are two reasons. First, it is in acts of deciding, and only in acts of deciding, that values are actualized. Second, I think this mode of presentation best facilitates the objective Lonergan always stressed — self-appropriation of the structure of the reader's own conscious intentionality.\(^{19}\)

(A) First, then, values are only realized fully in decisions. The justification for this assertion will be provided toward the end of this section. For the present, however, let me simply describe deciding as the conscious act of choosing, of personally committing oneself to a course of action.\(^{20}\) As Lonergan puts it, "Value ... is what is intended in questions for deliberation,"\(^{21}\) and deliberation terminates in decision.

\(^{18}\)Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{The Basic Writings of Nietzsche}, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968) 468. I have taken up certain problems regarding Christian values posed by Nietzsche in a related article, "Ressentiment and the Preferential Option for the Poor," \textit{Theological Studies} 54 (1993) 213-241. Hence, my occasional references to Nietzsche, which are developed in a more thorough and critical fashion in that article.

\(^{19}\)Lonergan, \textit{Insight} xviii-xix = CWL 3:12-13; \textit{Method} 7-9.

\(^{20}\)For a more technical specification, see \textit{Insight} 612-613 = CWL 3:636-637. It should be noted that the words I have used to characterize 'deciding' above are, in Lonergan's own terminology, merely 'descriptive.' A fully rigorous account, freed of ambiguities, would be what Lonergan called an 'explanatory' definition of deciding. However, an explanatory definition is one where the term is 'implicitly defined' by
(B) Second, decisions do not come out of the blue; deciding is an act which completes a process of deliberating. Ordinarily people have a more heightened awareness of the fact that they are deliberating than of the decisions which result from their deliberating. In Aeschylus's *Suppliants* as well as in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, we have forceful presentations of the drama of one person trying to arrive at one decision. Existentialist writers from Kierkegaard through Dostoevsky to Camus and Sartre have written extensively on the complexities, even the agony, of reaching a decision in the post-modern period. The forcefulness of such dramatic accounts attest, I believe, to the intensity of awareness which often accompanies the process called 'deliberating.' While people also deliberate in routine ways which lack such intensity, I believe that most human beings come to recognize themselves as deliberators out of such experiences of intensity.

Yet it is one thing to have an intensified awareness that one is deliberating about a choice to be made, and it is quite another to formulate an explanatory account of that process of deliberating. Let me begin my attempt at such a formulation by claiming that deliberating is not just a single act or operation of consciousness, but a structured sequence of conscious operations. Thus, to explain what deliberating is consists in providing an account of the operations and their structure in that sequence.

(C) Next, I believe that the single act which is most focally and forcefully present in the consciousness of the deliberator is the question, Shall I do it? It is experience of the tension intrinsic to such questions that gives deliberating its intensity. Moreover, such a question 'intends' an act of deciding. Hence, an act of deciding can be more

means of its explanatory relations to other terms (*Insight* 10-13 = CWL 3:35-37). In the case of 'deciding,' the other terms are those referring to other acts of consciousness to which the act of deciding is related in the actual structure of consciousness. A fully explanatory definition would be: deciding is the terminal conscious operation in a process of deliberation. Since it is the purpose of the remainder of this section to outline the further acts and relations which constitute the meaning of the phrase, 'process of deliberation,' I must begin with a preliminary, descriptive definition of 'deciding.'

precisely defined as an act of either consenting or refusing\textsuperscript{22} which brings final resolution to a question, Shall I do it?

(D) People are frequently so preoccupied with the question, Shall I do it?, that they fail to notice the other acts which inevitably accompany it. These other acts can, however, be detected with some effort and care. Among these, and next in ease of detection, is the act indirectly referred to by the pronoun, 'it.' What does 'it' refer to in 'Shall I do it'?\textsuperscript{23} I suggest that the 'it' which deliberation reflects upon is a possible course of action which, in turn, comes to awareness as the content of what Lonergan calls a 'practical insight.'\textsuperscript{23} The practical insight is an act of intelligence by means of which a person comes up with some idea about what she or he might do. Clearly, the practical insight, which gives a subject awareness of a possible course of action, precedes and is presupposed by the question, Shall I do it?

As the process of deliberation presupposes a practical insight, so also practical insights presuppose processes or structures of conscious activities that result in practical insights. It is a process Lonergan investigated extensively in his writings, especially Insight. That process begins in experiencing — usually experiencing both the data of sense and the data of consciousness, since most practical insights have to do with human affairs.\textsuperscript{24} That process proceeds as experiencing gives rise to a series of questions about the situation: 'What is going on?' 'How do they manage to accomplish that?' 'Why do they do it that way?' and so on. Parallel to these questions there is a dynamic flow of presentations\textsuperscript{25} consisting of selected sensations, memories and constructed images. Some of the contents (phantasms) of this dynamic flow, when suitable, give rise to insights which 'release the tension' experienced by the subject who is raising these questions.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{22}Lonergan, Insight 612 = CWL 3:636.
\textsuperscript{23}Lonergan, Insight 609 = CWL 3:632-633.
\textsuperscript{24}See, for example, Lonergan's remarks about the need to take into consideration both the data of sense and the data of consciousness when endeavoring to comprehend the human 'milieu' (Insight 243-244 = CWL 3:268-269).
\textsuperscript{25}This is what Lonergan means by a 'pattern of experience' (Insight 181-82 = CWL 3:204-205).
\textsuperscript{26}Lonergan, Insight 3-5 = CWL 3:28-29.
These sorts of insights are not yet ‘practical insights’ in the sense of consciousness of a possible course of action for oneself. These are merely insights a subject comes to as he or she ‘sizes up’ the situation. But merely having insights does not by itself constitute a correct assessment of a situation. For these assessing insights in turn give rise to questions for judgments of fact: ‘Is my idea of what is going on, in fact what is going on?’ ‘Is my idea of the way they manage to accomplish that correct?’ ‘Have I correctly understood why do they do it that way?’ And so on. These further questions intend still other distinct acts of consciousness — either acts of affirming or of denying, acts of judgment.

Yet no one is content in either affirming or denying (in response to an ‘Is it so?’ question) without first knowing that they have sufficient reason for doing so. Sufficient reason provides the sole satisfactory motive for going ahead with an act of judgment. According to Lonergan, knowledge of sufficient reason for affirming or denying is had in yet another, subtle but distinct conscious operation, which he calls ‘reflective understanding.’27 Reflective understanding consists in a grasp of the judgment under consideration as ‘virtually unconditioned.’ Only in light of such an act of reflective understanding does a judgment have its properly reasonable ground and motivation.

Now a great deal in Lonergan’s work rests upon this notion of an act of reflective understanding which ‘grasps a prospective judgment as an instance of the virtually unconditioned.’ By this Lonergan means that a

prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned if (1) it is the conditioned, (2) its conditions are known, and, (3) the conditions are fulfilled.28

Do acts of reflective understanding ever occur? Are all of the requisite conditions for any one judgment ever fulfilled? How can one know if acts of reflective understanding do occur? It would take us too far afield to scrutinize Lonergan’s analysis of such acts in this article. Suffice it to

27Lonergan, Insight 279 = CWL 3:304.
28Lonergan, Insight 280 = CWL 3:305.
say that there is no single, universal formula for determining when a given proposition is grasped as virtually unconditioned. Different conditioned judgments demand different kinds of fulfilling conditions: Aristotle noted that certain propositions are only ‘known in the unqualified sense’ when one possesses a scientific demonstration of them, while other propositions are immediate (amasos) and cannot be so known. In the former case, immediate propositions will fulfill the conditions for the conditioned conclusion; in the latter case something other than immediate propositions is required to fulfill the conditions.

Lonergan sets forth a complex analysis of different kinds of conditioned judgments — culminating in the judgment of self-affirmation — in *Insight*. The case most relevant for purposes of this article is that of the judgment of the correctness of an insight. There he argues that, when there are no further insights which could modify or correct a specified insight, it is ‘invulnerable.’ Again, he claims that no further correcting or modifying insights can arise if there are no further pertinent questions, that is, questions that lead to further insights that correct or complement the insight being scrutinized for correctness. It follows, therefore, that if there are no longer any such questions, then the conditions for the judgment, ‘this insight is correct’ are fulfilled. Why? Because an insight that is incapable of further correction is incapable precisely because it is correct.

Of course it is one thing to work out a formal criterion for the correctness of insights, such as there being no further pertinent questions. It is quite another to dedicate oneself to the enormous, personal struggle required in order to develop the self-awareness and honesty needed for discerning whether or not there are lurking questions one has overlooked or fears one must face. Most frequently, of course, one’s initial

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30See 281-332 = CWL 3:306-357.
32Lonergan emphasizes that the criterion is not that ‘no further questions occur to me,’ but rather that ‘there are no further pertinent questions’ (*Insight* 284 = CWL 3:309-310). Various strategies of biases may block one’s awareness of further pertinent questions which, if entertained and answered, would indeed lead to a partial or total correction of the insight under consideration.
insight is not invulnerable, but on the contrary very vulnerable. In that case further pertinent questions will tend to occur to a person, and the further insights which ensue from these further questions will lead one to modify and qualify his or her original idea. Be that as it may, Lonergan holds that at least sometimes this 'self-correcting' process does indeed reach a limit (the exercise of self-affirmation provides a paradigmatic instance), and in such cases reflective understanding grasps that there is sufficient reason for affirming the insight as correct.

(E) In this fashion a person comes to understanding and knowledge of a concrete situation. It is against the background of this assessment of the concrete situation that one might raise the question, 'What can I do?' These 'practical questions' extend a process of coming to know a situation into a process of practical response to the situation as known. Once this occurs, additional insights ('practical insights') respond to 'What can I do?' questions; once again, as with insights which assess, practical insights emerge from the dynamic flow of sensations, memories and images that happen to come into the particular subject's awareness. These practical insights deliver the 'it' to the deliberative process of whether one should do 'it.' Practical insights, therefore, culminate a series of conscious and intentional operations which constitute a reasonable assessment of a situation and awareness of possible courses of action. This series, in turn, spontaneously gives rise to questions for deliberation such as 'Shall I do it?'

(F) Thus, questions for deliberation such as 'Shall I do it?' arise out of a prior process which supplies the 'it' which the deliberator ponders. In turn, such questions initiate the process of deliberation.

Lonergan claims that the process of deliberation itself is structurally similar to, but not completely identical with, the process of reflection which leads to judgments of fact.33 It is similar, for several reasons. First, the question, 'Shall I do it?,' like the question 'Is it so?,' intends one or the other of a mutually exclusive pair of conscious operations: in this case, affirming or denying the value or worth of doing 'it.' Again, the process of deliberation is similar to reflection, for just as judgments of fact will be reasonable only insofar as they are

33Lonergan, Method 37.
motivated by reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned as ground for affirming or denying, so also judgments of value will be responsible only in so far as they are motivated by an act of reflective understanding which grasps the possible course of action as virtually unconditional value. Likewise, just as a reasonable judgment of the correctness of an insight rests upon the insight as virtually unconditioned because invulnerable, so also responsible affirmation of a possible course of action as valuable emanates from grasp of the practical insight as virtual unconditioned (‘there being no further pertinent questions’).

Yet to these structural similarities there is need to add two or three qualifications. First, processes of reflection reach their natural end in judgments of fact. On the other hand, processes of deliberation do not reach their natural end in judgments of value. Judgments of value provide but an ‘initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence.’

Judgments of value are completed only in acts of deciding — consenting or refusing. Just as judgments (whether of fact or of value) are motivated by reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned, so also acts of deciding are motivated by judgments of value. Any hiatus between a judgment of value and the appropriately corresponding decision has the effect of prolonging the deliberative process — ‘Why can't I do this when I know I should?,’ and so on — until a decision is finally made.

Second, while all cognitional acts are constitutive of the subject, decisions are constitutive in the most profound and thoroughgoing way. Compilation of acts of experiencing constitute one as increasingly aware; accumulation of insights constitute one as learned and, when they combine with judgments which they ground, one is constituted as wise. But it is decisions that constitute the kind of being one is to be. Decisions constitute one as authentic or inauthentic — a real, genuine being-oneself or a falling into the habits of das Man or bad faith. That is to say, decisions most often bring to actualization two things simultaneously: a reality independent of oneself realized through one's course of action, and the being one becomes through such a course of

34Lonergan, Method 38; emphasis added.
action. Now through much of a person's life, he or she may be focused almost exclusively on the 'external' value to be realized by his or her decisions — whether it be a tidy apartment, a loving family, a thriving business, an inspiring speech, a shelter for the homeless, a book or a successful artistic performance, or a relationship reconciled through an act of forgiveness. Yet whether one recognizes it or not, one is also, at the very same time, constituting oneself by those decisions as a certain kind of person. If and when one does recognize this fact, there is a drastically altered 'assessment of the situation' which now encompasses a certain knowledge of oneself. Such a discovery raises the stakes involved in making decisions, and indeed confronts one with a radically different kind of decision. As Lonergan puts it:

Finally, the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an inauthentic one.35

One has to have found out for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to make of oneself; one has to have proved oneself equal to that moment of existential decision; and one has to have kept on proving it in all subsequent decisions, if one is to be an authentic human person.36

Yet while existential decisions are most profound, I would stress what Lonergan makes evident: such decisions also arise from accumulated knowledge of situations, and from the questions 'What can I do?' and 'Shall I do it?' put to such situations. The dramatic shift has to do with the fact that the situation is now known to include one's self and one's destiny as well.

Third, although feelings are immanent and operative in the process of reaching commonsense judgments of fact, their role is heightened in deliberation, and this forces upon us a somewhat detailed discussion of the role of feelings in deliberation.

35Lonergan, Method 38, emphasis added; see also Insight 601 = CWL 3:624-625.
36Lonergan, Method 121.
Lonergan claims that feelings (that is, 'intentional responses to value') are 'intermediate' between judgments of fact and judgments of value. This seems to suggest that feelings play no role whatsoever in the processes of arriving at judgments of fact— which seems contrary to the realities of human cognition. It also seems to suggest a temporal order: experiencing, understanding, factual judging, feeling, value judging. I do not believe Lonergan intended either of these readings. Rather, I believe, his remark has to be interpreted as drawing attention to a greater prominence of feelings in deliberation, rather than as excluding feelings from the processes of human knowing or as isolating them in specific moments in intentional process. My interpretation rests on a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, feelings about what is agreeable or disagreeable, satisfying or dissatisfying which Lonergan also refers to as 'self-regarding feelings' and, on the other hand, self-transcending or 'disinterested' feelings. I shall endeavor to elaborate on this distinction in the remainder of this section.

Feelings about what is agreeable and disagreeable, satisfying and dissatisfying, are intensely self-regarding feelings. They take the subject as he or she is; they regard the already achieved, de facto constitution of the subject and dwell upon it. Unfortunately, as Lonergan points out, a feeling which responds to

the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous. What is agreeable may very well be what also is a true good. But it also happens that what is a true good may be disagreeable. Most good men have to accept unpleasant work, privations, pain, and their virtue is a matter of doing so without excessive self-centered lamentation.

Although feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction are self-centered, Lonergan's remarks indicate that there are also other feelings which, by way of contrast, are self-transcending. These are the kind of

37Lonergan, Method 37.
38Lonergan, Method 31.
40Lonergan, Method 31.
feelings that Lonergan called ‘intentional responses’ to value. This kind of felt, intentional response to value "both carries us toward self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or which we transcend ourselves." These feelings, like questions, ‘break in’ like an ‘other’ upon the self as constituted. A person following the call of what is agreeable and refraining from what is disagreeable to her or him can end up as a ‘couch potato.’ By way of contrast, a person can feel the value of vitality and, so to speak, be pulled out of herself or himself—the self as thus far constituted. Such a felt response to the value of vitality can lead to a regimen of physical exercises initially felt as disagreeable. Eventually, of course, what was originally felt as disagreeable comes to be felt as agreeable, and this is as true of exercises which lead to refined aesthetic appreciation, intellectual acumen, moral virtue, or reverent worship as it is of those leading to physical vitality. This change in satisfying and dissatisfying values is a result of the change in the subject—there is a different person whom such feelings self-regard. Furthermore, the felt responses to value exhibit a natural, self-transcending hierarchical 'scale of preference' ranging from "vital [to] social, cultural, personal and religious values in an ascending order."

Now I believe that the role of feelings in deliberation can be clarified through a contrast: In reaching commonsense judgments of fact, the pertinence of further questions is dictated by whether their answers will yield an "immediate difference to me." By way of contrast, there is also the criterion of pertinence of further questions as it pertains to correct explanatory insights: will the further question lead to a difference in my understanding of "how things relate to one another?"

If we shift from the process of reflection to that of deliberation, we may ask, What determines the pertinence of a further question? The answer, I believe, is feelings which are intentional responses. Such

42Lonergan, Method 31.
43This is why Lonergan speaks of the agreeable or disagreeable as 'ambiguous.'
44Lonergan, Method 31.
feelings 'select an object for the sake of whom or which' we deliberate. That value or 'object,' made present to the subject in and through intentional feelings, functions in a way that is analogous to the way 'immediate difference to me' functions in commonsense judgments of fact or 'difference in my understanding of how things relate to one another' functions in explanatory judgments. If the 'object' made present through feeling is myself as already constituted, my feelings are self-regarding. That is to say, the sorts of questions of concern to the self-regarding subject's reflection are questions about the sorts of things which are likely to bring proximate satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and these are matters determined by his or her feelings. However, if the feelings are self-transcending, then I am oriented by my affectivity toward some value which transcends my limited constitution. When this happens, it is because self-transcending feelings have displaced the narrower concerns of the self-regarding feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness, of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

In either case, the feelings which have become prominent will guide and control the flow of my deliberations. When self-transcending feelings do emerge and are allowed their full measure, their guidance and governance of the process of deliberation amounts to what Lonergan calls 'moral self-transcendence.' Such feelings control the selection of presentations, memories, and images employed in the process of reaching insights,46 both those hitting upon the original possible courses of action, as well as those which will complement and correct the idea as originally posed. In particular, such feelings determine what questions are, and what questions are not, taken to be 'pertinent' as the subject seeks a virtually unconditioned value as ground for assenting or dissenting to a possible course of action. In the deliberative process, therefore, pertinence is fixed by the subject's actual feelings of intentional response to value.

Thus self-transcending feelings as intentional responses to values provide a kind of 'model' of the value, the 'end,' which the morally

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46See, for example, Lonergan's comments on 'connation, interest, attention, purpose' as the 'organizing control' responsible for selection of the actual contents of the flow or pattern of experience (Insight 182ff = CWL 3:205ff).
authentic subject concretely is intending to realize. Yet this 'model' is in no way analogous to anything like the content of a picture or diagram nor some sensible image, nor is it the content of some concept or combination of concepts into a conceptual scheme. The end is ‘modeled’ in and by feeling as such. As Lonergan writes:

We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished.47

Thus, in self-transcending feelings about persons and situations we are drawn out of ourselves toward what we are not — at least, not yet. In feeling ‘about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished,’ we feel how things could be. It is by means of our intentional responses that we not so much ‘envision’ as ‘en-feel’ the ends, the values which could be realized if we so chose.

From whence do self-transcending feeling responses to values originate? Such feelings, like insights, tend to arise spontaneously from ‘phantasms.’48 Such phantasms can be the contents of sense perceptions arising from nature, or our own memories or images constructed in our own imaginations; more commonly, they are symbolic expressions or artistic works others have constructed. Viktor Frankl, for example, described an incident from his imprisonment in the Nazi concentration camps. One day a fellow prisoner exhorted him and other prisoners to come outside to see a beautiful sunset. Frankl writes:

Standing outside we saw sinister clouds glowing in the west and the whole sky alive with clouds of ever-changing shapes and colors, from steel blue to blood red. The desolate gray mud huts provided sharp contrast, while the puddles on the muddy ground reflected the glowing sky. Then, after minutes of moving silence,

47Lonergan, Method 31.

48See for example Method 6ff.
one prisoner said to another, "How beautiful the world could
be!"\(^49\)

Frankl's companion was expressing a felt intentional response to value
which, for a time at least, affected his whole pattern of experiencing in
a way that made him want to bring into being a world of ineffable
beauty.

While it is commonly the case that intentional feelings arise from
phantasms, this is not always so. For one thing, such intentional
feelings may also arise in response to contents of insights or judg-
ments. For instance, a feeling of ecstasy may accompany an insight
especially long in coming, or a feeling of horror may arise in response
to the judgment that something terrible has happened. For another
thing, Ignatius of Loyola spoke of consolations that have no cause, and
other great mystics have used similar language. Nor are such feelings
necessarily the sole possession of mystics; in acknowledging this fact,
Lonergan modified the scholastic saying, *Nihil amatum nisi praecogni-
tum* by noting a minor and a major exception: people fall in love both
with one another and with God in ways that are totally disproportion-
ate to anything that went before.\(^50\)

In addition to this 'modeling' or teleological function of self-
transcending intentional feelings, there is also their determinative
function. *De facto*, such feelings determine the contents of the dynamic
flow of sensations, memories, and images. *How* one is actually feeling
determines what phantasms one will elicit or suppress during delibera-
tion. Feelings can make one more serious and sober, enabling one to
bring to light data one previously overlooked and thereby to raise
further questions and form more nuanced judgments about the
concrete situation. Or they can make one more impetuous, apt to
ignore even judgments of fact one has already made. Since a person
can have questions and insights only out of the phantasms he or she
actually entertains, any critique of one's comprehension of the actual
situation, any modification of a possible course of action, and any

\(^49\)Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (New York: Simon and Schuster,
Inc., 1971) 63.

consideration of alternatives will be at the mercy of this flow. Hence, feelings determine pertinence of further questions in deliberation.

This means, of course, that we can be only as responsible and authentic as our feelings permit. (Moreover, whenever ressentiment is present, it poses a powerful distortion of deliberation and responsible self-transcendence.) This feature of ethical intentionality implies the need for a maturation and refinement of a person's feeling life to bring it into harmony with what Lonergan calls the 'transcendental notion of value.' By this he means the dimension of consciousness from which springs all questions about what one ought to do and whether one ought to do so. This transcendental notion of value has its ultimate source in what Lonergan calls the human subject's unrestricted desire to know and love. Precisely because there is such an unrestricted dimension to consciousness, a person's felt intentional responses to values, including even ressentiments, are not ultimate. It is this last qualification which principally distinguishes what Lonergan meant by 'value' from what Nietzsche meant.

Finally, every act of deciding is an actualization of value. This means that it is a bringing to realization the intelligible content proposed in the original practical insight. Or more commonly, the

51 My account might seem to imply a certain fatalism about morality: Since feelings determine the flow of images, and since images are the sources of self-transcending feelings, it might seem that a consciousness patterned by self-regarding feelings is doomed to remain so forever, screening out any image which could elicit a self-transcending feeling. No doubt there are individuals who approximate to such a living hell. However, the determinative role of feelings is not absolute. In addition to the selectivity of consciousness, there are the pre-conscious sources of phantasms to be selected in one's neurophysiology and physical environment. Moreover, if Lonergan is correct about the ontological objectivity of the non-systematic component to the universe (see, for example, Insight 52-3, 87, 93, 96 = CWL 3:76; 110-111, 117, 120), one can expect that sooner or later physical stimuli will give rise to images beyond the systematic control of any person's patterning of experience. No pattern of experience is so total or systematic that it can screen out every disconcerting image. Hence the universe, through its 'non-systematic' dimension has a fertile capacity, or perhaps even a conspiratorial tendency, to provide even the most 'tight' personality with images which can elicit self-transcending feelings. Moreover, God's grace is immediate and can subvert the control of self-regarding feelings in an even more radical way.

52 Recall that 'the intelligible content proposed in the original practical insight' includes what the subject becomes by so deciding, and especially in the case of 'existential decisions.'
responsible decider chooses, not the crude intelligibility of his or her original practical insight, but rather the corrected and more nuanced intelligibility that is achieved as deliberation modifies the originally insight via further 'correcting' insights. Thus value is concretely realized intelligibility — intelligibility which there is 'good reason' to bring about. Any such intelligibility for which there is good reason to bring about is virtually unconditional value.

Concretely this always means, as Kenneth Melchin has pointed out, that value is the realization of a 'scheme of recurrence' in some concrete 'good of order.' What one is to do, what one in fact actually decides upon, virtually always amounts to either to joining in with some actually functioning natural or human scheme of recurrence, or modifying it through acting on one's new practical insight, or adding a new scheme of recurrence to those human and natural schemes already functioning.

(I) Let me recapitulate this lengthy section by reversing the order of the preceding presentation. (1) First, then, any human subject 'finds' him or herself at any point in their life with a formation and flow of sense experiencings which arise from his or her immediate situation. By 'formation' I mean the contents and habituations which have resulted from conscious and intentional operations (sense experiences, memories, insights, judgments of facts and values, and intentional feelings) which the subject has already performed prior to this moment. (2) From such sense experiencings, questions for understanding the situation and questions about the correctness of the resultant understandings arise spontaneously. If requisite phantasms manage to enter the flow of experiencing, the subject will have insights, reflective understandings, and judgments which constitute the assessment or knowledge of his or her situation. (Usually the great multitude of 'fulfilling conditions' will be supplied from the memories, insights and judgments constituting the subject's prior formation.) (3) Out of this assessment, there will spontaneously arise

wonderment about 'What can I do?' Again, to the extent that it is open, images will enter into the flow of experiencing and some practical insights about possible courses of action will occur. (4) The question, 'Shall I do it?' follows from such practical insights, and sets off the process of deliberation. (5) The process of deliberation seeks to establish the practical insight about a possible course of action as an invulnerable, unconditioned value. In so doing it operates under the sway of one or more intentional feelings. These feelings directly 'control' the sense experiences, memories and constructed images that may enter consciousness. They also indirectly control the 'further pertinent questions,' the modifying insights, the possible recognition of errors in previous judgments of fact, and ultimately the judgments of value. This complex, ordered series of intentional acts is what is meant by the 'process of deliberating.' (6) In light of a judgment of value about a practical insight, the subject decides — consents or refuses to commit him or herself to bringing the value to realization.

IV. ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
AND A SYSTEMATICS OF THE 'VALUE OF VALUING'

With this Foundational clarification of the phenomenon of human deliberating as my background, I shall now turn to a Systematics which responds directly to the questions posed in the introduction — namely, 'whether deliberating is worthwhile,' or equivalently, whether deliberating is of value. As we have seen, values are correctly understood as the resultants of a three-fold process of knowing, deliberating, and deciding — a unified process of valuing. Hence, to ask about the value of values is to ask about the value of valuing.54 I would emphasize that this is not a question about what valuing is — a question of the correct understanding of the process of valuing. That is a question finitely answerable through what Lonergan called 'intentionality analysis' and toward which I endeavored to make a contribution in the previous section. Rather, the question of the value of valuing is a question about

54 This was also Nietzsche's foundational question. See Basic Writings of Nietzsche 456.
whether it is good (whether it is of value) to live authentically in response to the questions for deliberation which arise from the concrete historical circumstances in which one 'finds' oneself. This is a question about what is to be achieved thereby — a question about the future of humankind, which was likewise Nietzsche's greatest concern.55

Lonergan claims that the question of the value of valuing is a question about God, that is, a question about God as "intelligent ground of the universe" and as "ground of moral consciousness."56 What Lonergan had in mind, I think, is that the process of human valuing does not occur in a vacuum; it occurs within, as part of, the process which the universe is. Lonergan analyzed that process as 'generalized emergent probability.' Values are realized resultants of valuing; valuing is a conscious process which emerges from experiencing. But human experiencing itself arises from concrete situations which, in turn, result from the interplay between pre-human natural processes, and the specifically human processes of 'apprehension and choice.'57 Thus, answering the question about the value of valuing requires that valuing be linked to the all inclusive process of the universe in which valuing itself is but a part. Hence, the question of the value of valuing is included in the question about the goodness of the universe in which human deliberating and valuing occur.

The question about the worth of the universe is a question about God, according to Lonergan, because it is a question which cannot be answered 'within' the universe. All acts of human valuing are based upon no more than the de facto, the virtual unconditionality of judgments of value. It is not necessarily that there are no more further pertinent questions in concrete situations; only that, in considering this or that concrete course of action, in fact there are no further pertinent questions. To seek an intra-universal reason, x, why further questions

55See also the subtitle of Beyond Good and Evil: "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future."
56Lonergan, Method 103.
57Bernard Lonergan, unpublished lectures on education, given at Xavier College, Cincinnati, Ohio, summer 1959, 26.
pertinent to value \( y \) de facto terminate, is to seek a value, \( x \), within the universe in virtue of which further questions about \( y \) become irrelevant. Of course such values can be found; these \( x \)s are the 'ends' in relation to which the \( y \)s take on the role of 'means.' For example, it is valuable to apply the Heimlich maneuver to this person here and now (\( y \)) in order to preserve her life (\( x \)). But if the \( x \)s are intra-universal, they too are only virtually unconditioned, and the question of the value of the universe itself — the question of the ultimate terminal value — is not reached. Hence, the question of the value of values turns out to be a question intending a transcendent end — God.\(^{58}\)

The question of what, if anything, can be known about God and God's relationship to other things is of course an enormous and complex one. As one might expect, Lonergan does not begin his own approach to this complex problem with the issue of the value of the universe. Rather, he begins more modestly with the problem of forming an adequate, albeit analogous, conception of God. It was from such a conception that he proceeded to the question of the value of the universe. Here I intend to summarize the relevant aspects of Lonergan's treatment of those issues, and to show how the extended account of human deliberating adds certain nuances to that treatment.

(A) Lonergan's way of taking up the question of knowledge of God, and God's relation to the finite universe and its processes, is analogous. That is, Lonergan works out an analogous conception of God as the unrestricted act of understanding that understands everything about everything.\(^{59}\) In this conception God is not understood 'directly' because to do so would require nothing less than understanding everything about everything. Rather, God is understood 'analogously' which is to say, God is understood only by means of the relation of \( X \) to the other terms in the analogy:

\[
\text{concrete question : insight which releases its tension :: unrestricted desire to know : X.}
\]

\(^{58}\)This particular way of approaching the question of the value of values was, of course, closed off to Nietzsche by the historical phenomenon characteristic of modernity which he called 'the death of God.'

The $X$ defined in this precise manner Lonergan calls the unrestricted act of understanding. It is *understanding* because it bears the same relationship to the unrestricted desire to know as a finite human act of understanding bears to a finite question. It is *unrestricted* because it answers to an unrestricted desire to know. From this analogous concept, a number of propositions can be derived — the most basic and salient of which are (1) that the unrestricted act of understanding is truly *unrestricted* (transcendent), and (2) that in the unrestricted act of understanding, all questions would be answered.\(^50\)

Lonergan goes on to show that the unrestricted act of understanding, so conceived, exists. Schematically, his argument proceeds as follows: First, there are contingent matters of fact, and primary among them is the mere facticity, the mere virtual unconditionedness, of one's own existence as a self — a 'unity, identity, whole' characterized by the activities and structures of intentional consciousness.\(^51\) Second, Lonergan argues that being is completely intelligible\(^62\) so that mere matters of fact which have no ulterior, intelligible 'reason why' are excluded.\(^53\) Lonergan then argues that these two premises, affirmed on independent grounds, can be reconciled only if there is a being which is "not contingent in any respect" and which also "must be capable of grounding the [intelligible] explanation of everything about everything else."\(^64\) Finally, Lonergan argues that the unrestricted act of understanding meets both qualifications completely.\(^65\)

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\(^54\) Lonergan, *Insight* 655 = CWL 3:678.
\(^55\) Lonergan, *Insight* 656-661 = CWL 3:678-684. The foregoing assertions are, admittedly, great stumbling blocks for many readers of Lonergan's work. It would take us too far afield from the main topic of this article to argue rigorously the coherence of Lonergan's claim. I would, however, like to briefly expand Lonergan's argument that the 'primary being' can "ground all possible universes [not just] as objects of thought but [also] as realities" because otherwise it would be 'imperfect' (*Insight* 661 = CWL 3:683-684) in the following way: the unrestricted act of understanding would not be unrestricted if it only understood all possible universes but did not understand how to make them actual. But understanding how to make them actual is included in understanding everything about everything, which is its being. Hence the power to
Now, since according to Lonergan being is completely intelligible and the universe is not ultimately contingent, then its reason for being is not 'arbitrary' but is a 'value.' Humanly realized values proceed from acts of reflective understanding which grasp the possible choices as having virtually unconditional value. 'Virtually unconditional value' here means that there are no further pertinent questions as to why this value is to be chosen. But an unrestricted act of understanding understands the answers to all questions, including the questions as to why a possible universal process should be chosen. Thus the universe as a whole, and its component processes of human valuing, are true realizations of value. In other words, there is a value of valuing. But just what is the value of valuing in such a universe, is known only in the unrestricted act of understanding. To know just what that value is one would have to understand everything about everything, just as God understands.

(B) Finally, I propose to go beyond what Lonergan explicitly wrote to a development of what is implicit in his writings. Hence, just as Lonergan distinguished a 'primary and a secondary component' in the idea of being, so also I contend that there is a primary and secondary component in the unrestricted value, for the following reasons:

(1) Lonergan defines the 'idea of being' as the content of (that is, as what is known in) the unrestricted act of understanding.

(2) He goes on to show that there is a primary and a secondary component in the idea of being. Since the unrestricted act of understanding understands everything about everything, it understands what it is to be an unrestricted act of understanding — otherwise it make contingent beings actual is true of the unrestricted act of understanding. It might be objected that I might understand how to make an automobile without possessing the power to do so; but this really amounts to not understanding how to assemble the elements and circumstances which would put my idea into effect. Hence, the distinction between understanding and power in the human case turns out to be due to limitations in understanding — limitations which are absent from an unrestricted act of understanding.

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would not understand everything about everything. Hence, the ‘primary component’ in the idea of being is the self-understanding of God as unrestricted act of understanding. There is identity between the primary component in the idea of being and the unrestricted act which understands it. Yet there is a secondary component in the idea of being, for the unrestricted act of understanding understands everything about everything else “inasmuch as the primary component is grasped.”

That is, when the unrestricted act of understanding understands the unrestricted act of understanding, it must understand its content, otherwise the understanding of the unrestricted act would be restricted; but the content of the unrestricted act is the idea of being, and so if the unrestricted act understands itself, it thereby also understands everything else.

In other words, the self-understanding of the unrestricted act of understanding would be incomplete if there were something about the content of unrestricted understanding which it overlooked. But then it would not have complete self-understanding, and neither would it be an unrestricted act of understanding. Hence, the unrestricted act of understanding would understand everything about everything else through its own self-understanding.

(3) The unrestricted act of understanding would be identical with an unconditioned act of reflective understanding of truth. Human insights are not automatically invulnerable; they are merely conditioned. They give rise to further pertinent questions. Only when all further pertinent questions are answered — when de facto there are no further pertinent questions — is the directly understood insight reflectively understood as an understanding of what is so. This conformity — between the corrected (and hence correct) insight and what is so — is what, according to Lonergan, is meant by truth.

Now the unrestricted act of understanding is what answers the unrestricted desire to know. It answers not just the further questions

69Lonergan, Insight 646 = CWL 3:669.
70Lonergan, Insight 648 = CWL 3:671.
71Lonergan, Insight 552 = CWL 3:575.
pertinent to this or that topic, but *all* questions whatever. Hence there is no 'second level' reflective process in the unrestricted act of understanding. The unrestricted act of understanding is, because unrestricted, a grasp of the unconditioned — not just a grasp of this or that virtually unconditioned, but a grasp of the 'formally unconditioned.' Again, human judgments answer to the further question, *Is it so?* But in the unrestricted act of understanding no further questions arise; there is simply the pure, unlimited grasp of being. Here, then, there is complete and unlimited conformity and identity of understanding and being. Hence, the unrestricted act of understanding is identically the affirmation of truth.72

(4) Unconditional truth is identically unconditionally truth of what is so as well as unconditionally truth of value. In human consciousness, 'What shall I do?' and 'Shall I do it?' follow upon concrete judgments of fact. Even true knowledge of what concretely is so does not settle the further question of what one is to make of oneself in response to such knowledge. Yet in an unrestricted act of understanding there are no further questions. The question of what the unrestricted act of understanding is to do in response to knowledge of being is identically answered in one and the same unrestricted act, and so the question does not arise. It follows, then, that the unrestricted act of understanding is also identically an affirmation of what truly is and of what is truly valuable.

(5) Just as the unrestricted act of understanding divides into a primary and a secondary component, so also does the unrestricted act of value judgment.

(a) There is a primary component insofar as the unrestricted act of value judgment affirms its own unrestricted value. The unrestricted act of understanding is of value, because it is intelligible. As we have seen (§III.H above), every finite value realized through human choice is the intelligible content of an insight, deliberately made actual through human choice because such choice was grasped as unconditionally valuable. Now the unrestricted act of understanding is not only intelligible, but the primary exemplar of intelligibility. Hence it

has the ‘right stuff’ for value. Again, it is actual intelligibility, for as Lonergan argues, it exists. Again, the unrestricted act of understanding knows why it exists; it knows its raison d’être. Moreover, in an unrestricted act, the reason for its existence is identical with its value. Therefore, the unrestricted act knows, affirms, its value. Finally, its value is unrestricted, otherwise one could ask, What would make it better? But if something could make it better, then that ‘something’ would be absent from its understanding — and there would be something it did not understand. But it is an unrestricted act. Hence, the primary component in the unrestricted act of value judgment is its own self-valuation. God is, therefore, truth itself and value itself.

(b) There is a secondary component to the act of value judgment, because the unrestricted act affirms the value of everything else of value. It affirms the value of everything else, for it knows everything about everything. In particular, it knows the value of this universe. Recall that, by the Foundations analysis of the structure of ethical intentionality in §III, ‘value’ always means a concretely realized intelligibility. Lonergan argues that the process of generalized emergent probability is the immanent intelligibility of this universe,73 which would clearly qualify it as a value. Again, since the unrestricted act of understanding is an unrestricted affirmation of value, it would affirm the value which the process of the universe is.

More especially, it knows the value of the process of human valuing, for human valuing is an intrinsic component in the process of the universe. Hence the unrestricted act of understanding knows the value of human valuing because it knows everything about everything having to do with the universe’s process. Moreover, through its own unrestricted valuation, the unrestricted act of understanding knows everything else as conditioned, and therefore as conditioned by itself. Therefore it knows the value of all values through its own self-valuation.

Thus, the self-valuation of God is the ultimate answer to the question of the value of human valuing. Nevertheless, to repeat, just what the value of values is, is known only in the unrestricted act of under-

standing. To insist that the 'value of values' must be answered in immanently human terms results in a distortion of the value of values.  

(6) Finally, the unrestricted act of understanding is also identically an unrestricted act of loving, which also has a primary and secondary component.

(a) The unrestricted act of understanding is identically an unrestricted act of deciding. For the content of the unrestricted act of understanding is unrestricted value, as shown in (5) above. Now a human being can ask, 'Shall I choose it?' because his or her self-constitution is not complete and, in so questioning, seeks the further completion. That further completion results from the act of self-transcendence in responsibly consenting or responsibly refusing the possibility presented by intelligence. But in the unrestricted act of understanding, no further completion or self-transcendence is to be achieved. It is perfection and transcendence itself. Were it not, it would grasp what was missing — in which case it would not be missing. Hence, the unrestricted act of understanding is identically an unrestricted act of deciding to accept its unrestricted value.

(b) To choose the value of a person is to become one with that person. For if in understanding one becomes intelligently identical with the understood, so much more so is there identity in the real self-transcendence of choosing whereby one really becomes the intelligibility one knows as unconditionally valuable, whereby one determines “what it would be worthwhile to make of oneself.” One ‘embraces’ that person by becoming one with her or his value. Thus,
“to will the [value] of a person is to love the person.”78 Yet God, the unrestricted act of understanding, is “a person, for [the unrestricted act of understanding] is intelligent and free.”79 Hence God’s self-choosing is God’s self-love. Since God’s unrestricted act of understanding is identical with God’s self-love, the primary component in God’s act of loving is God’s self-love — is the unrestricted loving of the unrestricted loving that is the very being of God.

(c) In choosing God’s own self which is unrestricted loving, God chooses all the values that God unrestrictedly understands to be unconditionally valuable. Hence God makes actual all values through one and the same act of unrestrictedly loving God’s own being as unrestrictedly loving. In so far as some of those values are persons, God’s choice of their value is a loving of their value. Hence, God loves all persons with the one, indivisible unrestricted act of loving which God is.

V. CONCLUSION

I began this article with the intention of investigating a question Lonergan poses in *Method in Theology*, but does not answer explicitly. That question is whether deliberating is worthwhile. In the second section I briefly sketched the relationship between Foundations and Systematics as Lonergan conceived of it. In the third section, I synthesized Lonergan’s reflections on ethical intentionality into a unified account of the Foundational reality of the conscious structure of deliberating. In the fourth section, I took up the elements in that structure as the basis for a Systematic, analogous knowledge about God as unrestricted act of valuing and loving.

Lonergan claimed that the question about the worth of deliberating is, in fact, a question about God, about whether there is ‘a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe.’ I have endeavored, first, to show the plausibility of Lonergan’s claim. Thus, reflective understanding of virtually unconditioned value stands at the core of

78Lonergan, Insight 698 = CWL 3:720.
79Lonergan, Insight 698 = CWL 3:720.
all human ethical activity. Ethical deliberation leads up to such acts of reflective understanding of value; ethical living flows from them. Acts of reflective understanding of value are primarily matters of arriving at particular practical insights for which there are, merely as a matter of fact, 'no further pertinent questions.' Thus all ethical endeavor is radically contingent. Furthermore, I endeavored to show that ethical intentionality always arises within, and is a prolongation of, the world-process Lonergan called 'generalized emergent probability.' To ask about the worth of any human being's deliberating apart from his or her actual, concrete setting is not to ask about it in all its reality. From this, I argued that to know the value of deliberating one must know the value of generalized emergent probability. That is to say, knowledge of the value of deliberating means asking whether or not the process of the universe has any worth.

I argued further that no intra-universal value is capable of grounding the value of the universe itself, and that therefore the universe, and all deliberating which is part of it, can only have worth if there is a transcendent act of valuing and loving. Up to this point, I believe, I was merely explicating positions Lonergan himself had already developed in Insight. However, I believe I have also extended Lonergan's analysis in proposing the notions of 'primary and secondary components' in God as unrestricted act of valuing and as unrestricted act of loving.

While these conclusions may seem to be of mere speculative interest, I believe they have consequences for the ways in which one may address vexing issues in contemporary philosophical and theological disputes. In particular, I believe they have consequences for the Nietzschean critique of Christian morality in general, and the Christian concern for the oppressed and the poor in particular. This I have endeavored to show elsewhere.
INSIGHT, LONERGAN TEACHES, is mysterious. A common thread in the numerous accounts of path-breaking discoveries that have come down to us over the centuries is a professed inability to explain the breakthrough in question, accompanied by an insistence that it was not achieved by logical, systematic, processes of induction or deduction. The stories all resemble the one that Lonergan recounts with such gusto in the opening pages of Insight — the tale of how Archimedes became discouraged while trying to devise a method for measuring the proportion of gold in a crown, and betook himself to the public baths.¹ There, as legend has it, he was idly noting the displacement of water by his body, when he had a flash of understanding so powerful that he ran naked into the street proclaiming his discovery with a "Eureka" that has echoed through the centuries.

Arthur Koestler has collected several modern accounts of scientific and artistic insights in a fascinating book called The Act of Creation. A typical instance is Karl Friedrich Gauss's description, in a letter to a friend, of how he discovered the solution of a mathematical problem that had resisted four years of struggle: "At last ... I succeeded, not by dint of painful effort, but so to speak by the grace of God. As a

sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved ... For my part I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected what I previously knew with that which made my success possible.” A common element in these discovery stories is that though the breakthrough could not be forced, it was usually preceded by intense and laborious effort. As Louis Pasteur put it, “Fortune favors the prepared mind.”

Lonergan, of course, situates creativity within the dynamic structure of human cognition: the recurrent and cumulative processes of experiencing, understanding, deliberating, and deciding. That process regularly generates insights, not only on rare occasions in the minds of great geniuses, but in the minds of all men and women every day in the course of our ongoing mental operations. Wondering about insight, it is natural to wonder about the conditions that may affect the frequency and quality of creative mental activity, in individuals or groups.

Thomas Kuhn took up that subject in a little essay titled, “The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research.” Addressing himself mainly to educators, Kuhn contended that the history of science shows that significant advances in the sciences have generally been made by people who combined the traits of traditionalists and iconoclasts: researchers like Charles Darwin who were fully immersed in the ‘normal science’ of their times, yet daring enough to break with it. Kuhn stresses, as Lonergan did, the importance of the community of specialized knowers. More often than not, it is the professional group rather than any single individual, that displays the traits of traditionalism and innovativeness simultaneously. Within any community of knowers, some individuals will be more tradition-bound, while others will be more inclined to challenge the tradition. This sets up the ‘essential tension’ which pulls all members of the

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3 Koestler, Act of Creation 113.
group in both directions. That tension, Kuhn believes, plays an important role in fostering creativity.

Explaining why immersion in normal science tends to promote the kind of insight that eventually transforms the tradition from which it emerges, Kuhn says that "no other sort of work is nearly so well suited to isolate for continuing and concentrated attention those loci of trouble or causes of crisis upon whose recognition the most fundamental advances in basic science depend." The typical prelude to an important discovery is "not ignorance, but the recognition that something has gone wrong with existing knowledge and beliefs." An indispensable precondition for insight, then, according to Kuhn, is rigorous training in the system of thought that represents the reigning paradigm, the normal science, of the time.

Can any more light be shed on the mystery of how and why insight comes to well-prepared minds, engaged in a vital tradition of collaborative pursuit of knowledge? The subject fascinated Arthur Koestler, whose studies of humor and of scientific and artistic creativity led him to believe that creativity was sparked by what he called 'bisociation.' Bisociation was his name for what happens when two or more well-developed matrices of thought and experience come into contact. Such encounters, according to Koestler, can set in motion a fruitful process of uncovering, selecting, re-shuffling, combining, and synthesizing data, ideas, and skills. As a comparative lawyer who has regularly experienced the opening up of productive new avenues of inquiry after examining the treatment of various problems in different legal systems, I am inclined to think that Koestler was on to something. But why should such encounters be productive of insights? This essay consists in some reflections on that question within the context of comparative law.

I first became aware of the way in which comparative law can provoke significant cognitive restructuring in the fall of 1969 when, as

5Kuhn, Essential Tension 234.
6Kuhn, Essential Tension 235.
7Koestler, Act of Creation 35ff.
8Koestler, Act of Creation 108-109, 120.
a beginning law professor, I attended the annual meeting of the
German comparative law society in Regensburg. During a session
devoted to the legal treatment of the surviving spouse in various legal
systems, I heard a striking presentation by a Swedish law professor,
Jacob Sundberg. What he said seemed so peculiar that I thought
perhaps I had not heard him correctly. Upon my return to Boston I
wrote him to inquire whether he had really meant to say that Swedish
family law was 'marked by the positive disappearance of marriage as an
institution,' and whether it was really the case that the Swedish
government had ordained that 'future legislation should be so drafted
as not to favor in any way the institution of marriage over other forms
of cohabitation.' In his reply, he not only assured me that I had under-
stood him correctly, but he furnished me with a full set of materials on
Swedish family law, which at that time was unique in many ways. He
included some of his own writings in which he traced similarities
between Swedish family law and the law of ancient Rome. I began to
see developments in American law in a new light. But why does
confrontation/comparison of separate legal discourses increase the
probability of productive developments?

Legal sociologist and systems theorist Gunther Teubner theorizes
that the encounter between two separate spheres of meaning some-
times serves as a 'shock' that can lead to 'perturbations' that in turn can
promote transformative restructuring.9 The matter may be as simple as
that. The material Sundberg sent me surprised me; it shook up the
categories within which I was accustomed to work: marriage/non-
marrriage; private law/public law; civil law/common law. It had an
effect similar to the effect sometimes produced by humor. Both
Koestler and Lonergan take humor very seriously in connection with
cognition. In Insight, Lonergan points out how humor breaks in on
our routines, entering "not by argument but by laughter."10 Its signifi-
cance is profound: "[P]roofless, purposeless laughter can dissolve
honoured pretense; it can disrupt conventional humbug; it can disillu-

9 Gunther Teubner, "The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism," 13
sion man of his most cherished illusions ...” It can open the door to the “detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.” The effect on me of the material I received from Sundberg was not so much to teach me about Sweden as — like a Gary Larson sight-gag cartoon — to startle me into a new perspective on my own system.

Comparative law, then, is, among other things, an interesting source of ‘perturbation,’ potentially leading to cognitive restructuring. Cross-national legal comparisons not only assist us in seeing what remains invisible to us because we know it so well, but can sometimes aid lawyers in overcoming thorny problems. Comparative study, for example, reveals a historically conditioned weakness in the ability of the continental European systems to deal with case law, and a corresponding deficiency in the common-law systems where the interpretation of enacted law is concerned. These methodological weaknesses are of more than academic interest, for they have created serious problems of justice in modern legal systems.

1. Classical legal theory in modern regulatory states

As Max Weber pointed out in his sociology of law, different legal systems have historically fostered the development of somewhat different arrays of professional skills. Accordingly, traditional comparative analyses emphasize the centrality of court decisions (with accompanying elaborate techniques for dealing with precedent) to the common law, and of civil codes (with accompanying refined methods of interpretation) to the Romano-Germanic legal systems. For nearly a century, however, the relative predominance of the various sources of law in practice has been quite markedly at variance with the classical common and civil law descriptions. Indeed, the nature of both legislation and


case law have been transformed as liberal states evolved into liberal, regulatory, social welfare states.

The principal changes can be briefly summarized. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a new kind of legislation began to rival the importance both of judge-made common law in England and the United States, and of civil codes in continental Europe. Factory legislation, workmen's compensation laws, rudimentary social legislation, and laws regulating everything from employment contracts to commerce and public utilities, removed large areas wholly or partially from the coverage of judge-made law in the Anglo-American systems, and from the civil codes in civil-law systems. As the twentieth century wore on, the administrative apparatus of the modern state took shape: each country began to attend systematically to the needs of its most disadvantaged citizens, to lay down the main lines of its legal treatment of industrial relations, and to extend the reach of its regulatory powers. At the present time, one can say that England and the United States have evolved from legal systems dominated by court decisions, to systems in which enacted law has become the primary source of law. In a parallel development in the civil law countries, the ever-growing body of "special legislation" reinforces the traditional pre-eminence of enacted law, but diminishes the coverage of the codes themselves.

2. Civil law methodology and case law

In this new legal environment, civil-law lawyers would seem to have a methodological advantage, since their traditional strengths have been in dealing with enacted law. The process of adaptation has not been a simple one, though, for the techniques developed for code interpretation are not particularly well-suited to deal with statutes that possess neither the same level of generality, not the same degree of conceptual and terminological consistency as the great codifications.13

What has received less attention from continental Europeans is the continuing relative weakness of civil-law methodology where case-

law is concerned. The increased volume of enacted law of all sorts in modern legal systems has actually led to increased production of court decisions, and has therefore intensified the need for case-law analysis. Yet civil-law judges, hobbled by the traditional dogmatic view of their role as strictly limited to deciding the particular dispute at hand, have never developed techniques as refined as those of common-law judges for the reasoned elaboration of precedent. In France, moreover, the traditional narrow conception of the judge’s role plus revolutionary hostility to the judiciary led to the early adoption of a cryptic judicial opinion style which has further hampered legal development.

It does not seem accidental that those European legal scholars who have called attention to this problem have been comparatists. In 1974, Touffait and Tunc called for more fully reasoned judicial opinions in France.\(^{14}\) A recent comparative study by a Swiss scholar exposes the serious problems entailed by an inadequately developed theory and practice of precedent: a loss of predictability (Rechtssicherheit) and an unacceptably high frequency of violations of the principle that like cases ought to be treated alike. Thomas Probst’s conclusions to that effect are based on his meticulous analysis of over-ruling decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court over a two-hundred-year period, and of changes in direction by the Swiss Bundesgericht from 1875 to 1990.\(^{15}\) Probst demonstrates in detail how the traditional conception that a single case has no binding effect has hindered the development of sophisticated techniques for judicial opinion writing and scholarly case-law analysis in civil-law countries, with the practical consequence that similarly situated parties often receive unequal treatment. Moreover, these methodological failings have impeded the integration of case-law into the Swiss legal system, a

\(^{14}\) Adolphe Touffait and André Tunc, “Pour une motivation plus explicite des décisions de justice notamment celles de la Cour de Cassation,” 1974 Revue trimestrielle du droit civil 487.

problem that grows each passing year with the mounting accumulation of court decisions.

Probst has called, therefore, for a rethinking of the position of precedent in the civil law systems in the light of the principle of treating like cases alike. The time has come, he argues, for civil-law scholars and judges to bring the same level of skill and attention to the study of case law that they have traditionally brought to interpretation of enacted law. Like Touffait and Tunc, Probst would like to see fuller exposure of the reasoning process and grounds for judicial decisions. He exhorts legal scholars, for their part, to develop methodologies that would help to promote more coherence in judicial practice as well as in the materials of legal reasoning as a whole. He doubts, however, that American models could be of much assistance in such a process of reorganizing civil-law methods. The relevance of American law to his masterful study seems to be mainly this: intense study of the foreign system administered a 'shock' to his usual way of looking at things which in turn engendered a scheme for creative restructuring without borrowing.

3. Common law methodology and enacted law

The American legal system furnishes a kind of counterpoint to Probst’s demonstration. If civil-law lawyers, with their great sophistication in drafting and construing enacted law are not, in general, as adept as common-law lawyers in dealing with case law, common-law lawyers traditionally have had a corresponding deficit where codes, statutes and regulations are concerned. Just as his study of American law shocked Probst into heightened awareness of some weak points in his home system, encounters with the civil law have alerted some American scholars to our generally inept ways with statutes. Thus Roscoe Pound observed long ago:

[T]he common law has never been at its best in administering justice from written texts. It has an excellent technique of finding

the grounds of decision of particular cases in reported decisions of other cases in the past. It has always, in comparison with the civil law, been awkward and none too effective in deciding on the basis of legislative texts.\footnote{Roscoe Pound, "The Formative Era of American Law," in \textit{The Life of the Law}, ed. John Honnold (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1964) 60.}

Pound correctly surmised that attitudes and practices formed by such ‘long-taught traditions’ would not easily be dislodged. Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code (who had studied and taught in Germany), pointed out the ‘unevenness, the jerkiness’ of American work with statutes as contrasted with case law.\footnote{Karl N. Llewellyn, \textit{The Common Law Tradition} (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960) 379. As a legislative draftsman, Llewellyn borrowed freely from German models. Herman, “Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code,” 56 \textit{Tulane Law Review} 1125, 1130 n. 20 (1982).} Comparing American lawyers unfavorably in this respect to their civil-law counterparts, he wrote:

It is indeed both sobering and saddening to match our boisterous ways with a statutory text against the watchmaker’s delicacy and care of a … continental legal craftsman, or even of a good American lawyer when the language he is operating with is that not of a statute but of a document.\footnote{Llewellyn, \textit{Common Law Tradition} 380.}

The reasons for these deficiencies reside, in large part, in professional history. It was judges and practitioners who took the lead in developing English law, while the civil law was developed in important respects by university scholars, and was rationalized and systematized at a crucial stage by comprehensive legislative codifications.\footnote{Sundberg has written: “[T]he art of codification was attended by the art of construing and applying a code: the Civilians learned how to work with a code as well as how to write one.” Civil Law, \textit{Common Law, and the Scandinavians} 190. See also Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Gordon, and Christopher Osakwe, \textit{Comparative Legal Traditions} (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1985) 44-54.} One might say that Anglo-American and continental lawyers are like athletes, who as a result of playing different sports have developed muscular strength in different parts of their bodies. For centuries, so
long as American and English lawyers worked sitting at the common law bench, they did not need their spindly statutory legs. They had a simple set of tools that were adequate for dealing with pre-modern English statutes -- statutes which typically did not purport, as European codes did, to be complete new sets of authoritative starting points for legal reasoning.\textsuperscript{21} English judges, traditionally, treated statutes as a kind of overlay against the background of the common law, and tried where possible to construe them so as to blend them into the case law.

Those crude techniques worked well enough until the late nineteenth century. Before the Civil War, according to Pound, an American lawyer could number on his fingers the statutes with an enduring effect on private law.\textsuperscript{22} As late as 1875, nearly half the Supreme Court’s case load was still pure common-law litigation.\textsuperscript{23} But as the turn of the century approached, there was not only a great increase in legislation, but legislation of a type that did not blend easily with the pre-industrial common law.\textsuperscript{24} By 1925, the pure common-law portion of the Supreme Court’s docket had shrunk to only five percent.\textsuperscript{25}

Once it becomes clear that enacted law of various sorts had acquired a prominent and permanent place among the materials of legal reasoning, the question arises: why did American lawyers not systematically attend to the study of legislative drafting, and to the development of more differentiated techniques for interpreting the new and more complex types of statutes? In point of fact, many eminent legal figures, including Roscoe Pound,\textsuperscript{26} Benjamin N. Cardozo,\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{21}See generally Glendon, Sources of Law 666-673.
\textsuperscript{22}Pound, "Formative Era" 59.
\textsuperscript{24}Glendon, Sources of Law 667.
\textsuperscript{25}Frankfurter, "Some Reflections" 527.
James M. Landis, Felix Frankfurter, and Karl Llewellyn, did send out early warnings that traditional legal skills urgently required upgrading. In the cases of Pound, Cardozo, and Llewellyn, awareness of European contrasts seems to have prompted commentary. Cardozo's essay, with its title borrowed from the continent ("A Ministry of Justice"), called for the establishment of permanent commissions to draft laws and to keep the operation of all parts of the legal system under study.

The cry was raised again by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, who wrote in the 1950s, "The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation." And yet again by J. Willard Hurst in 1982. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1992, a Harvard Law School curriculum committee reported that Harvard (like most other law schools) was still teaching the basic required first-year program "almost without regard to the coming of the regulatory state, and without recognition that statutes and regulations have become the predominant legal sources of our time." It is not for lack of teaching materials that the field of legislation has remained "a scholarly backwater."

29Frankfurter, "Some Reflections" 527.
32"Statute law is a pervasive element of twentieth-century legal order in the United States ... Yet the schools, the legal literature, and the legal profession have given remarkably little attention to the legislative process." J. Willard Hurst, *Dealing with Statutes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) 1.
34Reed Dickerson was long a lone pioneer with his books and manuals on legislative drafting and interpretation. See especially, *The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986); *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975). Recently, William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P.
How, then, can one explain that, to this very day, American law schools have paid so little heed to calls from some of the century’s leading legal thinkers to tool up for the modern legal world?

At one time, it must have seemed that legal education would take a different direction. Beginning at the turn of the century, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, the American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute undertook ambitious drafting and lobbying projects. In the New Deal era and during World War II, many of the nation’s most talented lawyers were engaged in drafting legislation and regulations. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, it was constitutional law, not legislation or regulation, that became the glamour subject in the academy. Old practices and attitudes toward enacted law continue to cast their spell over courts and commentators as they deal with the form of enacted law that now dominates the American legal imagination: the Constitution. Craft traditions are an important but neglected part of the explanation for the state of affairs that led one leading American constitutional scholar to make the remarkable admission in 1991 that “our understanding of constitutional interpretation remains in a primitive state.”

Interestingly, foreign students in American law schools are struck immediately by their American counterparts: the typical constitutional law course begins, not with a study of the text, structure, and design of the Constitution, but with a case — usually Marbury v. Madison where the Supreme Court first claimed the power of judicial review. Their surprise turns to genuine puzzlement when, as the typical course goes on, the professor pays scant attention to the Constitution. American Frickey have entered the field with their Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (St. Paul, MN: West, 1988).


375 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It was not always thus. According to Paul Carrington, students in early American law schools were required to have a detailed knowledge of the Constitution, and The Federalist was often used as a basic text. Carrington, “Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democracy,” 41 Duke Law Journal 741, 759 (1992).
lawyers, for their part, are accustomed to the fact that not even a minimal consensus exists on the techniques to be used for construing their basic law. They find it hard to comprehend that in continental Europe substantial consensus does exist (across a wide political spectrum) on the outlines of a general approach to constitutional interpretation.38

Yet there is a sense in which Americans in practice, more often than not, do bring a common approach (or, more precisely, a common set of habits) to constitutional interpretation. For the sake of clarity, I will describe that approach first in a form that is perhaps too stark: in practice, American courts and commentators tend to approach the Constitution in precisely the same awkward way that Anglo-American lawyers have always dealt with all other forms of enacted law; and the same disarray that has long characterized their efforts at statutory interpretation is now replicated in the chaos of constitutional interpretation. A less tendentious way of putting the point is that historical happenstance—in the form of certain traditional professional strengths and weaknesses—has had a greater influence on constitutional interpretation, in the United States and Europe, than is generally recognized.

With hindsight, this state of affairs seems almost inevitable. At the time of the Founding, the American framers were torn "between a global rejection of any and all methods of constitutional construction and a willingness to interpret the constitutional text in accordance with the common law principles that had been used to construe statutes." In the early years of the republic, that problem was temporarily resolved

38 That approach essentially consists of adapting to constitutional interpretation the traditional set of techniques that lawyers in civil-law systems had developed for dealing with their civil codes and later adapted to special legislation. Needless to say, consensus on a general approach does not preclude vigorous controversy about how the approach is to be applied. On this point, I have benefited greatly from works-in-progress by Professor Winfried Brugger of Heidelberg University: Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology and Is There Something to be Learned from German Constitutional Law? (manuscripts on file with the author). See also Winfried Brugger, Rundfunkfreiheit und Verfassungsinterpretation. (Heidelberg: Müller, 1991) 50-60.
when a consensus developed on "original intent." That consensus, however, did not endure, and original intent became but one of many fiercely defended approaches to the problem of constitutional interpretation. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court embarked on its first sustained adventure with judicial review — the power it had claimed in 1803, but had up to then rarely exercised. Today it is commonplace to describe the behavior of American courts a century ago in striking down much economic and social legislation as showing the degree to which the judiciary was in the service of the economically dominant classes. But there is more to the story. The fact is that when American judges entered the relatively uncharted areas of interpreting these new types of statutes and reviewing them for conformity to the Constitution, they did not know quite how to handle the situation. Quite naturally, most judges during those years of transition proceeded in the way they knew best.

When turn-of-the-century judges encountered gaps or ambiguities in the written law, their tendency was to fill them with the common


40To an American lawyer, it is fascinating to see how continental theory treats 'original intent' as receding in significance with the age of a code or constitution. Thus French jurists regard the ideas and intentions of the drafters of the Civil Code of 1804 as almost irrelevant to the decision of present day cases. Rieg, "Judicial Interpretation of Written Rules," in Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions 229-230. The German Federal Constitutional Court, following the same practice, declined in 1977 to accord decisive weight to evidence of the intent of the framers of the 1949 Basic Law. See Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989) 316.

41Though the Supreme Court claimed the power to have the last word on the meaning of the constitutional text in Marbury v. Madison, it generally avoided direct confrontation with other branches of government until the late nineteenth century. See Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985) 122-123, 345.

In the first seventy-five years, only two federal laws were held unconstitutional (one was the Missouri compromise in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In the decade of the 1880s alone, however, the Court struck down five federal and forty-eight state laws. James Q. Wilson, American Government: Institutions and Policies, 5th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1992) 398.

law, rather than to search first for principles in the structure and design of the instrument. They fell back on the time-honored practice of construing enacted law (including the Constitution) in such a way as to blend in with, rather than displace, the common law background — a background where protection of property rights and freedom of contract were ensconced at the time as leading principles. As Roscoe Pound astutely put it, "[The common-law lawyer] thinks of the constitutional checks upon legislation as enacting common-law limitations, and systematically develops those checks in terms of the common law." Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and others insisted vigorously that the Constitution was not just an overlay on the private law of property and contract. But that point seldom got across until the 1930s, and even then it was not fully absorbed.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the preference for judge-made over enacted law that had been so evident in constitutional interpretation from the beginning of the century to the New Deal, enjoyed an Indian summer as the Supreme Court embarked on a second exciting adventure with judicial review. And that same reflexive preference persists today among many American teachers of constitutional law who treat the various provisions of the Constitution as mere discrete starting points for free-wheeling judicial elaboration — as if that document had not established a regime which places important limits on both judicial and legislative law making.

When the American Supreme Court first began regularly to review legislation for conformity to constitutional norms, it was an interesting theoretical question whether judicial review itself made it inevitable that the text and structure of the Constitution would be thrust into the background by case law. At a time when hardly any country besides the United States had judicial review, Ernst Freund theorized that this would indeed be the necessary consequence of

43Pound, "Formative Era" 61.
44See, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
giving such power to courts. But now that systems of judicial review have been operating for several decades in other liberal democracies, we can see that the text need not be thrust so deeply into the background as it has been in the United States. While recognizing that constitutions are more political and more open-ended than codes, continental courts and scholars have found it natural to approach them by taking the text seriously, and proceeding from close textual analysis in the light of overall structure, to consideration of purpose both in the light of history, and in the light of circumstances as they exist at the time of interpretation.

What has been lost through neglect of text and structure in American constitutional interpretation is far from negligible. The constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is laden with extreme and a-textual outcomes that do not even stand up to the criteria by which common-law lawyers have traditionally judged their own work — treating like cases alike, and assuring predictability and stability without foreclosing adaptation to changing social and economic circumstances. Happily, a growing group of American legal scholars — such as Akhil Amar, John Hart Ely, Michael McConnell, and Geoffrey Miller — are beginning to


46 See, for example, the decisions of the German constitutional court collected in Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany; but Brugger (above n. 38), makes the important point that the United States Constitution is much older than other single-document constitutions, and much less specific than, say, the German Basic Law of 1949.

47 Again, I am indebted to Brugger (above n. 38).


take up the challenge of 'constitutional architecture.' These scholars are exploring the relationship between our system of limited government and the system of rights that has been at the forefront of constitutional theory in recent years. And they are approaching interpretive problems by attending to the overall design of the Constitution and the mutually conditioning relationships among its provisions. Without neglecting the rights tradition or the principles embodied in two centuries of precedent, they are attempting to restore separation of powers, federalism, and constitutional text and structure to "a central and appropriate place" in constitutional theory.

Mainstream theory and practice, however, are still far from wholeheartedly embracing holistic or structural approaches to the Constitution. As for the long-neglected, but equally important, task of the study of legislation, practically everything remains to be done. And, regrettably, it seems likely that that work will go forward, if at all, without the salutary impetus to cognitive restructuring that might be provided by study of other models.

If, as Koestler suggested, creativity is often sparked through encounters between well-developed but autonomous matrices of thought and experience, European transnational courts, where judges with common law and civil law backgrounds now sit side-by-side, may well be the places to watch. Beginning with Tocqueville, many observers have speculated about why the United States, which has produced so many inventive persons like Thomas Edison, has contributed 'notoriously' little to the ranks of basic scientists. No doubt there are many reasons, but persistent American insularity, as arrogant as it is ignorant, must figure prominently among them.


53Miller, “Rights and Structure” 198.

THE ENTERPRISE OF philosophical communications is no easy endeavor. Philosophers like Richard Rorty place great emphasis on conversation and dialogue between the partners constitutive of our cultural tradition, but, in the cold light of day, one realizes how rare are instances of genuine dialogue in which there is an openness to personal transformation. Dialogue that is genuine cannot avoid the painful issues of intellectual, moral and religious conversion. However, if such dialogue is to begin at all a perhaps felicitous point of departure would be the small scale problems that are of interest to both parties. The invitation to conversion, to reverse the counterpositions involved in one’s horizon, is one that can become increasingly compelling the more one partner sees the explanatory efficacy of the other’s overall position. Nor is philosophical communication a one-way affair. Indeed, throughout Insight Lonergan himself elucidates his position through the method of clarification by contrast. If one recalls that it is not only counterpositions that invite reversal, but positions that invite development, then it is evident that it is often through philosophical dialogue that one witnesses a development of the positions themselves.¹

¹ So, while the responses Lonergan gave to papers both supportive and critical of his views at the Florida Conference in 1970 do not show a substantial development of the positions, still they are fine examples of the way critical dialogue serves to clarify and develop the implications of those positions. See “Bernard Lonergan Responds,” in Philip
The present paper is intended as an exercise in such philosophical communication. My intention is to compare and contrast some aspects of Lonergan's philosophy of history with recent work on the philosophy of history within the analytical tradition. Further, my hope is that such an exercise in comparison and contrast will serve not only to make apparent the explanatory efficacy of Lonergan's approach, but will also be of assistance in appreciating points made in chapters 8 and 9 of Method in Theology.

In the short essay "Reality, Myth, Symbol" Lonergan remarks that from writing on the issues of 'evolution and historical process' in Insight he moved on to extend his theory of knowledge to include 'critical history' in Method.2 This movement from a discussion of the philosophy of history to an 'epistemology' of historical knowing is, I think, illuminating when one examines the heuristic of historical inquiry Lonergan provides in Method. One of the points I wish to highlight in this discussion is the way Lonergan's identification of the objective of the historian's inquiry as a knowledge of "what was going forward in the past,"3 is not only descriptive but, in some sense, prescriptive. For the notion of emergent probability, as deployed in Lonergan's philosophy of history, is operative in his account of historical knowing. Kenneth Melchin has drawn attention to the way Lonergan's work has bearing on the recent debates over meta-history that have arisen within the analytical tradition.4 And one of the questions to concern us below will be the implications of Lonergan's work for the problems highlighted by Hayden White, Peter Munz, Haskell Fain, and Louis Mink.5


5Works representative of the positions taken by this group are: Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978); The Content and the Form (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); Peter Munz, The Shapes of Time: A New Look at the
It can be said that analytical philosophy of history has its origins with the work of Maurice Mandelbaum in the 1930s and W. H. Walsh in the 1940s and '50s. Walsh's book, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, of 1951 was decisive in setting the tone of the discussions to follow. It has been said that one of the main objectives of Walsh's book was to mediate R. G. Collingwood's work to philosophers educated in the tradition of Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. For such philosophers reflection on history could be made reasonable and attractive if it were presented as a reflection on the tasks of the practicing historian, and not as something concerned with the grand scheme of things, à la Hegel. Collingwood's analysis of historical practice, separated from his idealist speculations, would, then, provide a basic model for the kind of investigations to follow. However, the need to address further questions and wider philosophical issues has time and again manifested itself in analytical debates on historical inquiry. The dominant issue in discussions of the 1960s was the 'covering-law' question. On one side, Carl Hempel and Karl Popper urged that historical understanding, in order to be as 'objective' as scientific understanding, should be seen as involving the application of general laws to particular instances. There were differences between the approaches of Hempel and Popper in this regard. Hempel was insistent that, even if historical inquiry did not at present always manifest a concern with the verification of general laws, it ought to be reformed in order to do so. The opposition to this thesis was led by philosophers such as William Dray and W. B. Gallie, who insisted that historical explanation and description was narrative in character, but was no less objective for being


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Clearly, in such debates wider issues concerning scientific methodology and the worldview modern science suggests were at stake. Another debate, surrounding the ‘methodological individualism’ espoused by J. W. N. Watkins, also brought up questions to do with the ontological status of the entities referred to in claims made by historians and social scientists. Watkins held that statements about institutions and movements were statements about fictional epiphenomena that ought to be reinterpreted as statements concerning individual human beings.8

I think it is the merit of the work of the Metahistorians to have concentrated explicitly on these larger ontological issues, which repeatedly emerged in analytical discussions but which, even when acknowledged, were usually put aside as intractable. Where I think important work of lasting value has been done within the analytical tradition is in the area of the practice of the historian. The journal History and Theory founded in 1961 under the editorial direction of analytical philosophers such as Dray, Isaiah Berlin, John Passmore, and A. C. Danto has published work not only by professional philosophers but by historians with an interest in the methodological aspects of their work. It has also been significant as an organ of ‘philosophical ecumenism,’ publishing articles on thinkers like Foucault and Ricouer before the work of Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein encouraged dialogue between the analytical and continental traditions.

However, while much of the work done on the practice of historical inquiry has been impressive, the way problems concerning historical objectivity have been tackled in a piecemeal fashion has also led to something of an impasse. Even with disavowals of positivism, the positivist image of physical science as the paradigm of rational and objective inquiry has been influential, such that treatments of the objectivity of historical inquiry tended to revolve around the question as to how like or unlike history is to science. While the defense of the objectivity of historical


8For an account of Watkins’s views, and a critique of the empiricist epistemology they presuppose, see William Dray, Perspectives on History (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1980), chapter 3.
inquiry which indicates the similarity between procedures in both science and history is, no doubt, helpful, given the present condition of the philosophy of science appeals to 'scientific objectivity' can ring hollow. In so far as discussions of historical objectivity among analytical philosophers failed to address the larger issues concerning the objectivity of human knowing they invited the relativist and subjectivist response of the metahistory group.

In this article, by comparison and contrast, I will have something to say on the issues raised by the Metahistorians. But before turning to the topic of 'Metahistory' I will examine some of Lonergan's other contributions to the understanding of historical inquiry in the light of the work done in this area by philosophers within the analytical tradition.

PERSPECTIVISM

1. The finitude of the Historian

It is repugnant to me to place astrology and astronomy, alchemy and chemistry, legend and history, hypothesis and fact, on exactly the same footing. I am not content with theories, however brilliantly coherent, but insist on raising the further question, Are they true?

Some of the principal achievements of Insight were the adumbration of an explanatory account of cognitional structure, the provision of a critical vindication of that structure in self-affirmation, and the unfolding of the implications of such a vindication for the epistemological problem of objectivity. To have argued that objective knowledge is attainable is not to have shown in which areas of investigation such knowledge is possible. To show that knowledge of reality is within our reach, as Lonergan does

9So Charles Beard's worries over the objectivity of historical judgments were largely to do with the ways history is and is not like science (see his "Written History as an Act of Faith," American Historical Review 39 (1934) 219-29). John Passmore's generally excellent treatment of the problems of historical objectivity also manifests a dependence on the scientific paradigm of objectivity ("The Objectivity of History," in The Philosophy of History, ed. P. Gardiner (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 145-61).

in *Insight*, is not to have immediately decided for the claims of chemistry against those of alchemy or of history as opposed to legend. However, it is to have sketched out in brief the general criteria involved in deciding between such disciplines. That which is the case, or is probably the case, is that which is known to be so through attention to data, intelligent inquiry and formulation of hypotheses regarding the data, and reasonable judgment regarding one's hypotheses on the basis of the sufficiency of evidence — which will involve appeal to data as providing the fulfillment of the truth-conditions of the relevant propositions. But to descend from such general criteria to the various domains of human cognitive endeavor involves the raising of further questions regarding the possibility and actuality of objective knowledge within those domains.

The answer to the question as to whether objective knowledge is attainable in historical inquiry will, clearly, be conditioned by one's position on human knowledge in general. So, we can observe that Lonergan's epistemological position, which he terms 'critical realist,' is opposed to naive realism, empiricism, and the forms of representationalism that Richard Rorty has so eloquently attacked. While Lonergan's solution is not the fallibilism of Rorty, and the inevitable relativism to which it leads, his is a position equally opposed to positivist or empiricist views of historical objectivity. Historical knowledge is not a matter of training a camera on the past and 'letting the facts speak for themselves.' It is a matter of putting questions to the data available, coming up with hypotheses to explain the data, and reaching reasonable judgment as to the probable truth of the hypotheses. Historical inquiry is inevitably selective. Far from enhancing the probability of success in that inquiry by emptying his head of all previous cognitive and evaluative acquisitions, in order to stare in a unprejudiced way at the 'bare facts,' the more informed and historically cultivated the historian is, the greater the chances of his coming up with a fruitful explanatory hypothesis. Objective historical knowledge is the fruit of the intelligent selections the historian makes, it is not acquired in spite of them. In this regard Lonergan would be in agreement with John Passmore's critique of the criteria for objectivity history put forward by the Mach-inspired positivists.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)See Passmore's article cited above.
While there are some limitations on the historian’s ability to come to know the past which are shared with both the natural and the social scientist, there are others that are peculiar to his craft. Lonergan writes:

as in natural science, so too in critical history the positive content of judgment aspires to be no more than the best available opinion. This is evident as long as an historical investigation is in process, for later discoveries may force a correction and revision of earlier ones. But what is true of investigations in process, has to be extended to investigations that to all intents and purposes are completed.¹²

As in the natural and social sciences, so in history judgments are at best probable, and one favors one rather than another in terms of such probability. But there are ways in which historical judgments are probable or revisable that differ from revisability in scientific theory. Revision can occur through shifts in perspective as history moves on. Lonergan mentions this source of historical revision and it is one which has been highlighted in the work of A. C. Danto.¹³ The point is that as time moves on our perspectives on what was of significance in the past change. Thus, to people living in England in 1874, the birth of a child to the Churchill family, whom that family named Winston, did not appear a particularly important event for world history. It is only in the light of the impact that this person had on world history at a later date that we note this date as being of historical significance.

However, Lonergan argues that such forms of revision do not necessarily mean that previous views on history need be radically overthrown. He quotes with approval the historian Karl Heussi’s remark that while our opinions on Schleiermacher may be expected to undergo revision, our views on Frederick William III of Prussia are not so likely to be radically overhauled.¹⁴ Given the difficulty of interpreting Schleiermacher’s writing, and of assessing his significance in European thought, it is likely that opinions on his contribution will be more varied than those concerning the place of Frederick William III in Prussian history. This is no

¹²Method 191-92.
¹⁴Method 191.
less the case with estimations of the historical significance of large scale historical trends and decisive events. Historians of later generations may give explanations and accounts of the changes Gorbachev brought about in Russia, of the disparity in wealth between first and third worlds, and of the Gulf War, that are different from those current today. But it is unlikely that they will judge such events and phenomena to have been of no historical significance at all in understanding twentieth-century history. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of a new weighting being given to the importance of this or that factor operative in the past. This is very much at issue between the various 'schools' of historical writing: how important were the political machinations of monarchs as opposed to demographic or economic factors in shaping the course of the history of some region in some period? But these different approaches need not be irreconcilable. So, in his work *Europe in Crisis: 1598-1648*, Geoffrey Parker gives cautious support to Le Roy Ladurie's thesis of a mini ice-age as being an important factor in early seventh-century Europe (it altered the growing season and diminished crop production). However, this does not lead Parker to underestimate the influence which religious disputes in England or the Thirty Years War on the Continent had on the development of seventeenth-century Europe.15

Lonergan uses the term 'perspectivism' to designate a class of conditions and limitations on historical knowledge which have to do with what he terms 'the finitude of the historian,' or the limitations peculiar to the historian's craft. The term 'perspectivism' has often been used as a synonym for relativism or subjectivism when applied to historical inquiry. This is certainly not Lonergan's use of the term. His view is that, with all the conditions and limitations taken into consideration, still objective judgments in history are not only possible, but in all probability occur very often. His stance is similar to that taken by Carl Becker. Becker's early work no doubt tended towards subjectivism and relativism. However, later in his career, when responding to comments made by Maurice Mandelbaum, Becker insisted that, with all the limitations upon and

conditions of historical inquiry, that inquiry was, nevertheless, increasing our knowledge of the past.16

While perspectivism concerns the limitations on historical inquiry which result in differing but not irreconcilable histories, there are ‘gross differences’ between classes of historians which are irreconcilable on the level of historical research itself. Since these differences pertain to the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion as constitutive of the interpretative horizon of the historian they are not revisable on the basis of historical evidence. They are, therefore, to be identified and, if possible, resolved on the level of the hermeneutic specialization of Dialectic. It appears to me that Lonergan’s distinction between two interrelated specializations of History and Dialectic is crucial when one comes to tackle the vexed issues concerning value-judgments in history. This differentiation of two distinct yet interrelated tasks does justice both to the concern of those who, like Isaiah Berlin, insist that historians contribute to our moral education, and those like Herbert Butterfield who argued, against Berlin, that value-judgment is not intrinsic to the work of the historian.17

Clearly, if one believes, as Lonergan does, that one can reach some definite conclusions on epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical questions then it is reasonable to hold that one can offer a critique of historical judgments conditioned by such factors. Ernest Nagel recognized some of the problems for historical objectivity that have to do with disparate perspectives and suggested that

students operating within different social perspectives can obtain objectivity in a “roundabout fashion” by construing their inevitable


17See Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1955); Herbert Butterfield, Man on His Past (London: Cambridge University Press, 1955). Lonergan feels that writers on hermeneutics like H. G. Gadamer and E. Betti attempt to treat too many questions in a global and compact fashion (Method 153), and his solution is the differentiation of distinct but interrelated hermeneutical tasks. One may also note a sensitivity to larger hermeneutical issues in analytical work on history. So a theme highlighted in Michael Stanford’s work is the way our understanding of history conditions our present understanding of ourselves; see his The Nature of Historical Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
differences in the light of the differences in the structure of their perspectives.\(^{18}\)

Nagel's observation is important and helpful if one is considering problems which arise from differing perspectives, in Lonergan's sense of the term 'perspective'; that is, histories emerging from diverse but not incompatible viewpoints. However, it appears that Nagel is not sensitive to the distinct issue of incompatible interpretative horizons that have to do with the differing and opposed Weltanschauungen within which historians live their lives. Thus, while the task of identifying the roots of such incompatible differences is in itself a difficult operation, it is still the necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving the hermeneutic of suspicion and recovery required on the level of Dialectic.

2. The criterion of selection

This division of tasks implies, then, that Lonergan has a particular approach to the question of value-judgments and the way they play a part in historical understanding. As regards value-judgments in history Lonergan's view is that one should distinguish three separate issues: (a) The historian, just as the scientist, does what he does for a reason: he goes into history because he thinks it worthwhile to do so; a value-judgment is involved. (b) The historian's matter includes the value-judgments of others. History involves the description of human choices as an important part of its account of why things happened. We meet here further philosophical issues. Some would hold that if value-judgments are epiphenomenal then historical judgments concerning them cannot be objective. Naturally, on Lonergan's view such mental acts really occur. (c) It would be totally counterproductive to request that the historian assiduously avoid any 'value-laden' language in what he writes. However, that being said, it must be recognized, on Lonergan's view, that value-judgments are not the objective of historical investigation. Thus, while it would be counterproductive to ask historians to remove all value-judgments from their work, it can be recognized that the value issues which come up in

that work may be questioned by philosophers without these latter making a category mistake in treating historical issues as philosophical ones.19

A number of analytical philosophers have had problems with the idea that value-judgments are not intrinsic to the task performed by the historian. As indicated above, I think some of these problems are solved if we adopt Lonergan's view of the distinct but interrelated hermeneutic specializations of History and Dialectic. But other questions remain. A. C. Danto and William Dray argue that ultimately the historian's criterion of significant selection has to do with value-judgments. They argue that in the course of an historical inquiry the criterion of significant selection employed by the historian has to do with what best explains event X in terms of previous events. But one's selection of which historical trend or sequence to investigate will depend on a value-judgment.20 In this regard Dray agrees with a point made by Walsh, in some of his more recent work, that a value-judgment has been involved in the shift of interest away from history of the ruling classes to an investigation of the history of ordinary folk.21 I think Danto and Dray overlook distinctions which Lonergan's work highlights and considerable confusion results.

In F. R. Atkinson's work, on the other hand, one finds nuanced distinctions similar to some of those made by Lonergan. Atkinson makes a distinction between factors which are external and those which are internal to a cognitive discipline, both of which may play a role in structuring study.22 Such a distinction is important in the present context. While it is true that shifts in the cultural, ethical milieu of the historian will structure his selective choices in a profound way, I suggest that Lonergan's position leads one to see this as an external, not an internal factor in investigative structuring. His very selections will be evaluated by the community of historians in the light of the criterion operative within, and internal to, historical inquiry: the understanding of what was going on.

19Method 232-233.
20Danto, The Analytical Philosophy of History 111; Dray, On History and Philosophers of History 91.
21Dray, On History and Philosophers of History 78.
forward in the past. Some of the important implications of this identification of the heuristic of historical inquiry will concern us below. However, its bearing upon the issue of value-judgments can be brought out in the following manner. One can say that ‘historical wonder’ has to do with the basic question why things in the human world are as they are, just as ‘scientific wonder’ has to do with the question why things in the physical universe are as they are. As one’s historical wonder leads one into critical history one attempts to understand what was going forward in the past such that, eventually, things arrived at their present state. No doubt one’s moral, aesthetic, and religious interests can lead one into a study of the past and structure one’s approaches in that study. But as far as the specialization History is concerned one’s contributions will be evaluated in terms of how well they help us understand what was going forward in the past; such is the basic criterion of significant selection in history.

One may be attracted into mathematics or physics because of the aesthetic beauty of the theorems and theories involved, but this does not mean that one’s criterion of what is of explanatory importance or significance within these disciplines will depend on aesthetic considerations; as Popper observes, ‘importance’ may imply moral or aesthetic importance, or it may imply explanatory importance. Similarly in history, one may be stimulated to go into the history of women because of the moral climate of opinion in which there is prevalent the view that marginalized groups have been neglected in the past. However, professional historians, such as Olwen Hufton, who investigate the role of women in eighteenth-century European society continue to do so because they find that, indeed, social trends among women were important and influential factors in which was going forward in society in that period.23 A historian who, say, devoted his life to tracing the history of his family because he considered its members to be just as morally valuable as the next group of people, would not be considered by his professional colleagues to be pursuing history, unless this history of a family were a real contribution to our knowledge of some general trend during a certain period, or the history of a family that was in some way influential. The research programs suggested to the

historical community by the contemporary climate of opinion can be considered as ideal types. Such ideal types are assessed by the historical community, not in terms of their moral attractiveness, but in terms of the contribution they make to the descriptive and explanatory account of what was going forward in the human past.24

Under the rubric of perspectivism one may include the various forms of bias to which human beings and groups are prone. It is true, of course, that individual and group bias can affect and infect the work of the scientist, and the general bias of common sense can put pressure on the direction scientific research takes. One can think, not only of the more egregious examples of such bias operative in Nazi Germany and elsewhere, but of recent studies of cases in which personal ambition has been at work even within the citadels of the scientific establishment. However, given the structure and language within which scientific work occurs and its results are manifested, it is difficult, in the long run, to hide tamperings with the evidence. This is not the case with history. The absence of a technical language means that the role of value-judgments in structuring results is not so evident. Further, the fact that historians, like social scientists but unlike physicists, may be involved in investigating the origins and development of the social group to which they belong exposes them to the danger of group bias. Examples of 'Whiggish' histories written by the winners are all too familiar, and Michel Foucault’s work has helped to make us sensitive to such phenomena.

3. Ordinary Language

An important conditioning factor which Lonergan includes in his analysis of perspectivism has to do with the fact that the historian, unlike the

24Dray also appears to hold that in accounting for a development in terms of the relative freedom, or lack of freedom of agents in the past, the historian’s work becomes bound up with ‘subjective’ value-judgments (see the essay “Value-Judgement and Historical Causes,” in Dray, On History and Philosophia of History.) On Lonergan’s view the confusion here would result from failing to distinguish between the historian’s judgments of fact about the values and freedom for action that conditioned an agent’s acting, on the one hand, and any value-judgments the historian may make on the agent’s action, on the other. Dray’s paper is also a good example of the way a rather impoverished view of causality, restricted to efficient causality, can play havoc in the attempt to make sense of historical explanation.
mathematician, logician, or scientist, does not work with a technical language. John Passmore and R. F. Atkinson also draw attention to the importance of this factor. For Lonergan, Passmore, and Atkinson it is significant that history, normally and for the most part, is written in ordinary language. Of course the contemporary historian may use analyses and terms drawn from the social sciences, and may become acquainted with the techniques of archaeology, statistical analysis, or some other science, in the process of his investigations. Passmore suggests that because historians work in the medium of ordinary language there may arise a certain ambiguity regarding what an historian is really 'bringing to the test,' in proposing some theory. He writes:

it is characteristic of science that it uses expressions we can bring to "the test", i.e. allowing that there is always the risk of misunderstanding, we can be given explanations which will enable us to see how to criticize statements the scientist makes. History could certainly not be conducted objectively if its statements were not criticizable. ... It will, I should say, be a sign of a good historian, that he avoids *ex parte* assertions like "Lincoln was a great man", unless this is meant as a summary way of referring to a number of characteristics to which he has drawn attention; or that he makes clear to us how, if at all, "paying rent" differs from what we now understand by that same expression. So far as we can safely talk about degrees of open texture, I think we should have to admit that historical statements are "more open" than chemical statements; but this does not entitle us to dismiss them as "subjective".

As Lonergan points out, the process of verification in history usually takes the form of the historian or historian's colleagues retracing the steps of his initial investigation. If the initial expression in which that investigation was cast appears ambiguous to fellow historians, then the task of corroboration will be affected. For Lonergan the issue has to do with a technical distinction he makes in his account of cognition between insight, on the one hand, and conceptual formulation, on the other. In modern mathematics, formal logic, and science the attempt is made, through the

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26Passmore, "The Objectivity of History" 150.
use of a technical language, to control the meanings expressed, to formulate explicitly the underlying insights, so that when such meanings are 'brought to the test' the results are not so ambiguous as they otherwise might be. This is not the case with the meanings expressed in ordinary language, nor, therefore, is it the case with history. It is true that the historian must be gradually initiated into the current procedures and methods prevalent in the professional community, but no attempt is made systematically to express the accumulated insights and attitudes the historian has prior to and after his professional initiation, in some commonly understood technical language.

We have noted above R. F. Atkinson's distinction between the external and internal influences operative in the case of the sciences and history. Atkinson observes the way these factors operate differently in history and science, given the absence of a technical language in the former and its presence in the latter. He writes that the sciences,

as they progress in the development of laws and theories, acquire a structure, by reference to which a sharper distinction can be made between external and internal influences than is possible in history, which is innocent of systematic aspiration. ... Physics has to be learnt in a certain order, whereas history can be entered at any point, and the starting point cannot but have an influence on the perspective within which a student works. Individual preferences, external values, may thus structure study. In physics on the other hand, external influences which bring people to the subject remain external.27

In a similar vein Lonergan argues that because of their differences in starting points and perspectives historians will show variety in their differing accounts. Some may take for granted what others labor to prove, and when individual historians succeed, if possible, in surmounting such factors as personal bias this will affect their work in ways which will be peculiar to the development of the individual concerned. Lonergan writes that

the historian selects. The process of selecting has its main element in a common sense, spontaneous development of understanding...In

27 Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History 193.
turn this process is conditioned by the whole earlier process that can be objectified in its results but not in its actual occurrence. In turn, this process is conditioned by the whole earlier process of the historian's development and attainments; and this development is not an object of complete information and complete explanation. In brief, the process of selection is not subject to objectified controls either in itself or in its initial conditions.

... we can expect processes of selection and their initial conditions to be variables. For historians are historical beings, immersed in the ongoing process in which situations change and meanings shift and different individuals respond each in his own way.28

The result of these factors, which condition the work of the individual historian and which the community of historians does not labor to make explicit and systematic, is that

the historical process itself and, within it, the personal development of the historian give rise to a series of different standpoints. The different standpoints give rise to different selective processes. The different selective processes give rise to different histories that are 1) not contradictory, 2) not complete information and not complete explanation, but 3) incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality.29

An example of what Lonergan, Passmore, and Atkinson have in mind here may, I think, be found in the case of the debate between A. J. P. Taylor and his critics over the origins of the Second World War. This debate has been subjected to careful analysis by William Dray, and some of the ways in which Dray depicts the participants in this debate 'talking past' each other are good illustrations of how ambiguous expression can lead to confusion when historians are trying to bring issues 'to the test'.30

A. J. P. Taylor was, of course, celebrated in his lifetime for his capacity to infuriate his professional colleagues and thereby endear himself to the non-academic public. His style is often rhetorical and provocative. However, this does not imply that he is frivolous in his revisionist account of the origins of the Second World War. In his work Taylor was

28Method 218.
29Method 218-19.
understood to be arguing for a view which seemed to go against the orthodox position that pretty much laid the blame for the beginning of the war at the feet of one man, Adolf Hitler. Of course, any sophisticated account of the origins of the war had to include the various factors to do with the rise of Fascism and Nazism, and the movement towards war as this developed through the 1930s. But Taylor appeared to argue that (a) other people, Chamberlain, Beck, and Daladier, for instance, were more to blame for the outbreak of the war than Hitler was; and (b) that we cannot say that Hitler intended to start a war for world conquest. Critics such as Hugh Trevor-Roper and Allan Bullock, to name but two of many, attacked these controversial theses.

What is interesting to observe, for our purposes, is the way in which Dray attempts to sort out what some of the participants in the debate did or did not mean by the terms and expressions used in their arguments; such meanings, he points out, often appear opaque at crucial moments in the debate. Some of the problems which emerge concern what might be meant by ‘someone’s intention to do something.’ Of course it would be comical to imagine Hitler declaring war in 1939 with the intention that it should run in accord with a textbook of the 1990s, ending with his defeat and death in 1945. But short of this extreme, what is one to say Hitler intended? Did he intend a localized European conflict to settle the issue with Poland, or did he have more far-reaching intentions in mind? At what stage did these further intentions come to the ‘forefront of his mind’? Now these are indeed interesting questions for the historians, but Dray finds that the participants involved in the debate vary in their ability to articulate what they mean or do not mean by ‘Hitler’s intentions.’ Further, ambiguity hovers around the use of such expressions as ‘to blame’ employed in the debate. As Dray says, Taylor often writes as if Hitler were a determinate non-responsible force, which other European politicians were to blame for not preventing or stopping. Does Taylor really mean this or does he not? With regard to this part of the debate, then, there is the further confusion evident in the use of the term ‘blame’: does one imply by it that Hitler was morally responsible for the war, or simply that he was the main cause, as in the expression ‘the weather is to blame for my being late’? Dray shows, convincingly, I feel, the way such ambiguity regarding terms and meanings can dog the process of verifying a particular historical
account. From the viewpoint of Lonergan’s philosophy, Dray’s ‘interrogation’ of the participants is a nice example of that frustrating, and usually frustrated, Socratic endeavor to pin down insights in clear, conceptual formulation.

However, that such problems of ambiguous expression do not prove an insuperable barrier to the achievement of objective historical judgments is witnessed to by Dray’s own efforts to make explicit insights and assumptions operative in the debate. With some good will and effort it may be possible to make thematic the previously unthematized insights that are present in the argument of an historian.

DATA AND FACTS

The pervasive influence of empiricist and naive realist models of knowing in the analytical tradition has, naturally, caused considerable confusion in discussions of historical facts, and the relation between data and facts. This is the case despite the fact that many philosophers writing on history within the analytic tradition have been critical of crude empiricism and positivism, and have tried to disassociate their own accounts from at least the cruder versions of such positions. B. C. Hurst, in an article which, I think, very much complements Lonergan’s approach to the relation between data and facts, makes the ironic observation that the Metahistorians, for all their ‘subjectivism,’ work with the same model of ‘atomic’ or ‘discrete’ facts as do their empiricist opponents.31 Thus, Louis Mink insists that basic, atomic facts are what constitute the objective ‘chronicle’ of events, but the historian inserts these ‘objective ingredients’ into the subjective soup of his narrative.32 On the other hand, from the perspective of a philosophy still avowedly empiricist, Behan McCullagh argues that the basic facts about the past can be known to be true or false, but that


historical narratives can be said to be neither true nor false, but only more or less 'adequate.'

A way of introducing Lonergan's approach to data and facts in historical knowing is to turn to what he has to say on the relationship between history and the prior functional specialization of Interpretation. Lonergan writes:

In a previous section on Interpretation we spoke of understanding the author, but there the ulterior aim was to understand what he meant. In history we also seek to understand the authors of sources, but now the ulterior aim is to understand what they were up to and how they did it. It is this understanding that grounds the critical use of sources, the fine discrimination that distinguishes an author's strengths and weaknesses and uses him accordingly. Once this is achieved, one is able to shift one's attention to one's main objective, namely, to understanding the process referred to in one's sources.

We may note that Lonergan identifies here two types of inquiry the historian is engaged in: the inquiry concerning the reliability of his sources and the inquiry which uses those interpreted sources in the attempt to understand what was going forward in the past. For Lonergan a fact is that which is known in a judgment as to what is the case. Data are what play a part as evidence for the judgment made; and in general data may be described as anything which has the potential of becoming evidence for a judgment of fact. The claim that there is an object lying in a field is a judgment of fact, supported by the evidence provided by the experience of the situation. Similarly the claim that this object is an artifact of possible relevance to the historian is a judgment of fact. However, we may say that the facts the historian feels he has established during his research into sources play the role of data in the further inquiry as to what was going forward in the past; they are potential or actual pieces of evidence for these historical judgments.


34Method 189.
It is important to understand the generality of this distinction. Not only are artifacts from the archaeological dig, or the results of manuscript research and interpretation such data for the further level of historical inquiry, but all human historical experience is potentially such data. What is meant here is something which has been said in various ways by writers on history: historical experience is not the same as the explanatory knowledge sought by the historian. So a soldier has experience of a battle, and his memories of the battle constitute evidence for the further historical inquiry into the nature and significance of the battle as a whole. But his own experience and knowledge of his particular situation is not such historical knowledge. This is, of course, the thrust of Collingwood's observation about the way modern history critically uses its sources. The evidence provided by soldiers' letters home may support a historical thesis regarding conditions in an army which led to mutiny, or general political, social or religious attitudes of the day, but it may not have been the intention of the letter writers at the time to convey that information. It is interesting to observe, in this regard, that Karl Popper appears to have ignored this important aspect of critical history in his comments on the way history fails to reach the objectivity of science. Popper believes that, since all the data the historian has are already primed by human interpretation, the historian is never in the position, which the scientist hopes to find himself in, of being able to 'falsify' a theory on the basis of fresh evidence. For in science such fresh evidence, data, is not already primed by human interpretation. But as B. T. Wilkins points out, this objection fails precisely in its oversight of the way the historian critically interrogates his sources, using them as data to support interpretations or theories which may not reflect the direct concerns of the persons who have left us these data on their historical experiences.


36B. T. Wilkins, Has History Any Meaning? A Critique of Popper's Philosophy of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). Wilkins notes some rather disconcerting inconsistencies in what Popper has to say on historical objectivity. There are passages in The Open Society and Its Enemies in which Popper states that one historical theory is just as good as another; there is no way to arrive at critical judgment. There are other passages which suggest criteria for such critical judgement, whether, for example, the theory is supported by the records. But then a further problem arises. For, as Wilkins argues,
Historical 'experience' is naturally the womb from which critical history is born. As Lonergan observes, history grows out of history, for one already inherits the historical structuring which one's community gives to its past; a structuring which selects what is of historical significance. Lonergan writes:

What starts the process is the question for historical intelligence. With regard to some defined situation in the past one wants to understand what was going forward. Clearly, any such question presupposes some historical knowledge. Without it, one would not know of the situation in question, nor would one know what was meant by "going forward." History, then, grows out of history.37

As one moves out of this original matrix into critical history, one may revise, refine, correct, or reject the received view. The circuit of correction, refinement, and revision that is thus initiated also means that there is a two-way relation between the historical inquiry as to the understanding of sources and the inquiry which utilizes the sources as evidence for its judgments as to the facts of what was going forward; one's general historical view may lead one to reevaluate the nature or trustworthiness of the sources. This process has been described in exemplary fashion by B. C. Hurst in his article "The Myth of the Evidence."38 Hurst, using notions from Lakatos's work on research programs, outlines the reciprocal interplay between interpretation of data and the use of that data to support theories evoked in historical description and explanation. So, a letter which appears to be by Napoleon, written from Rome in 1800, is, despite some evidence in its favor, judged not to be authentic because our general picture of Napoleon's movements is inconsistent with his being in the city at that date. However, if opinions start to shift on the general picture of Napoleon's movements, the estimation of the authenticity of the letter may change, and then it would become a piece of evidence supportive of an alteration in the general theory.

Popper's view is that the better theory, the more falsifiable theory, is the one that will go far beyond the support offered by the records! And in light of this Popper recommends his own daring interpretation of Plato (Wilkins, Has History any Meaning 75, 86, 92-93).

37Method 187.
The self-correcting process of learning in the case of historical inquiry, then, involves a complex interplay between judgments about the significance of data and judgments regarding historical fact invoking such evaluated data. There is an interplay between lines of inquiry as data are promoted from potential, formal, and actual evidence on the level of Research, then on the level of Interpretation, and then on the level of History; such promotion occurring in accord with the questions appropriate to each level. Lonergan observes the way the to-and-fro movement between datum and question manifests the ecstatic nature of historical inquiry. The image of the historian foisting some aprioristic categories on the mute data is just not an adequate reflection of the canons of responsible historical inquiry with which the community of historians work. As Lonergan expresses it,

if one is on the right track long enough, there occurs a shift in the manner of one’s questioning for, more and more, the further questions come from the data rather than from images based on surmises. One still has to do the questioning. One still has to be alert. But one has moved out of the assumptions and perspectives one had prior to one’s investigation. One has attained sufficient insight into the object of one’s inquiry to grasp something of the assumptions and perspectives proper to that object.39

The historian E. H. Carr also draws attention to something of this ‘dialogue’ between the historian and the data. He writes:

As any working historian knows, if he stops to reflect on what he is doing as he thinks and writes, the historian is engaged on a continuous process of molding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts. It impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.

The historian starts with a provisional selection of facts, and a provisional interpretation in light of which that selection has been made — by others as well as himself. As he works, both the interpretation and the selection and ordering of facts undergo subtle and perhaps partly unconscious changes, through the reciprocal action of one on the other. And this reciprocal action also involves reciprocity

39Method 187.
between present and past, since the historian is part of the present and the facts belong to the past.40

One point to note in what Carr says is the way the historian begins his inquiry with an inherited interpretation and selection of historical facts. This is equivalent to Lonergan's point about history growing out of history, and it is one that is important when one comes to evaluate the rather static contrast which writers like Hayden White and Louis Mink make between 'chronicle' and historical narrative. For writers in the Metahistory group, the real, 'hard' facts of history are what constitute 'chronicle,' whereas the narrative of the historian is a subjective ordering, emplotment, or prefiguration of these facts according to tacitly assumed evaluative and/or aesthetic criteria.41

I noted above that the epistemological assumptions with which the metahistorians appear to operate are heavily indebted to naive realism and empiricism. There are problems of a general philosophical nature, then, with the views of writers on historical inquiry such as Hayden White. For instance, White's relativism and subjectivism become involved in counterpositional incoherence. Both Kenneth Melchin and A. Kuzminski have noted the self-defeating nature of White's denial of the objectivity of historical inquiry which itself takes place within the context of his study of the work of nineteenth-century historians; clearly, he intends his own historical judgments concerning these historians as objective claims.42

Paul Ricoeur has observed that White's remarks on the fictional aspects of history and the factual aspects of fiction appear promising as avenues of hermeneutical inquiry. However, Ricoeur also notes that, since White fails to provide criteria to decide between fiction and fact in historical writing and indeed suggests that the distinction is problematic, his invitation to

40E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: Pelican Books, 1961) 29-30. Although some of the expressions Carr employs here might, from the viewpoint of Lonergan's position, require modification, I think that, in general, this striking piece of 'introspection' on the part of an eminent practitioner of history is an eloquent confirmation of many of the points Lonergan brings out; particularly if one substitutes the notion of non-formulated insight for what Carr refers to as 'unconscious' process.

41What is meant by 'chronicle' here is illustrated by an example White provides for us: the First World War (White, Tropics of Discourse 108-113).

42Melchin, History, Ethics and Emergent Probability 176-77; Kuzminski, "Defending Realism" 324-25.
reflect on the interconnections between fact and fiction is rather hollow.\textsuperscript{43} One may note, further, the inconsistency involved in White’s critique of A. J. P. Taylor’s views on the history of inter-war Germany. White claims to separate Taylor’s ethical and aesthetic prefigurations from the real facts, the ‘chronicle’ of events in this period of German history.\textsuperscript{44} But one is left wondering how White accounts for the transcendental access to such historical facts he allows for himself but denies to Taylor.

One can, then, offer a critique of some of the views put forward by the metahistorians on the basis of general philosophical positions. But if one turns to the image of the practice of historians which such views suggest, one can detect further problems. The contrast drawn between chronicle, on the one hand, and historical narrative, on the other, ignores the point Lonergan makes that history grows out of history. Naturally, such constructs as ‘the First World War’ are already constructs of historical intelligence. They are already selections of facts made on the basis of an evaluation of what is of explanatory significance in a narrative of what was going forward. That such accounts itemize such events as the assassination at Sarajevo, the Battles of Mons, Ypres, Caporetto, and so on, rather than the way people tied their shoelaces in Colombia on 4 August 1914, is due to the selections made by historical intelligence. The reporting of current events in the media always presupposes such an ordering; if one suffers amnesia one will make no sense of headlines that go on about a man called Bill Clinton. The historian, and the community of historians, begin with such received interpretations as they enter upon the task of the critical evaluation of these explanatory structures.

Naturally, an empiricist attitude to fact would lead one to make a contrast between ‘fact,’ on the one hand, and the knitting together of fact in narrative, on the other. So Louis Mink informs us that ‘chronicle’ is characterized by simple parataxis, the items are linked by a repetition of ‘and.’\textsuperscript{45} But the sort of narrative we find in medieval chronicle, for


\textsuperscript{44}White, \textit{Tropics} 108-13.

\textsuperscript{45}Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive instrument,” in Koziki and Canary, \textit{The Writing of History} 132.
example, is a matter of the selections made by historical intelligence. Indeed, it is very difficult to find examples of such pure 'chronicle' in human discourse. Even shopping lists and washing bills are lists of things selected in a purposeful way. If one tells a story to a two-year old it will not be an instance of such purposeless itemization. One may say, 'and then we went to the store, and then we went to the park,' but there is an implicit reference to factors already understood by the child: 'we like going to the park,' 'we need to get food from the store.' Just a listing of unrelated items would either bore the child or would, perhaps, be taken as some kind of naming game.

I think that historians would take it as odd if they were told to refrain from calling their partial or more large-scale explanatory or descriptive accounts 'facts,' and that they should rather refer to them as 'more or less' adequate hypotheses covering the 'hard facts' of history. The resemblance between such a position and that of the sixteenth-century sages who insisted that Copernicus's theory could only be regarded as, at best, a 'useful fiction' is no mere appearance. Practicing historians make claims such as 'it is a fact that rural riots increased in eighteenth-century southern England as a result of increased grain demand from London,' or 'it is a fact that Italian unification was not the result of a popular movement so much as the political alliance between Lombardese industrialists and the House of Savoy.' And I think it would appear to them totally artificial to suggest that these claims should not be regarded as factual. No doubt, they would admit that such opinions are not absolute certainties but are probable judgments as to what is so. But that simply puts them in the same class as most of our other judgments in which we claim to know the facts.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{46} Against the Metahistorians Dray also urges that the search for 'bare historical facts' is chimerical. However, he does admit that there may be cases of 'discrete' historical facts such as 'George Washington was born in 1732' (Dray, \textit{On History and Philosophers of History} 69). But the contrast he suggests here between 'discrete' and 'non-discrete' historical facts is, I think, a confusion. Again, the selection of the birth of this particular American colonist, rather than that of his fellows, is due to the historical significance attributed to this person.
In the introduction to this article I observed that Lonergan's examination of critical history in chapters 8 and 9 of Method in Theology demonstrates a dependence his work on the philosophy of history adumbrated in Insight and other earlier writings. In Method Lonergan observes that the historian may have recourse to 'philosophies of history' to be employed as ideal types in his investigation. Such ideal types, however, will be handled with caution, and will be evaluated according to the canons of critical history, not in terms of their claims to explain in an a priori manner. Lonergan also allows the possibility that the historian's work can be illuminated by correct philosophical positions. And, further, the contributions of a correct philosophy are to be effective at the level of Dialectic, where the work of historians is to be critically evaluated in terms of the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. However, I want to suggest here that there is an interconnection between Lonergan's work on philosophy of history and critical history that is intrinsic to the treatment of critical history, or the 'epistemology' of history in chapters 8 and 9 of Method. What I have in mind here is the way the prior work on the philosophy of history enters into the formulation of the heuristic of historical inquiry: the understanding of what was going forward in the human past. I also noted above, the way in which this heuristic, proposed by Lonergan as descriptive of the practice of historians, can also manifest its prescriptive force. To that point I shall return in what follows.

On Lonergan's view, the practice of history is neither doing social science nor is it writing biography for its own sake. He makes clear what he means by the phrase 'what was going forward' when he describes the move from writing simple biography to writing history.

While in biography the 'times' are a subordinate clarification of the 'life' in history this perspective is reversed. Attention is centered on the common field that, in part, is explored in each of the biographies that are or might be written. Still this common field is not just an area in which biographies might overlap. There is social and cultural process. It is not just a sum of individual words or deeds. There exists a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by

47 Method 228-29.
cooperations, by institutions, by personal relations. ... Within such processes we live out our lives. About them each one of us ordinarily is content to learn enough to attend to his own affairs and perform his public duties. To seek a view of the actual functioning of the whole or a notable part over a significant period of time is the task of the historian.$^{48}$

In the 1980 essay “Reality, Myth, Symbol,” Lonergan used the expression ‘historical process’ when describing what his philosophy of history sought to understand. Such usage serves to draw our attention to the connection between his references to ‘social and cultural process’ in the chapters on history in *Method*, and the work on human history in *Insight*. In the earlier book we find passages that clearly complement and expand the remarks on historical process we have quoted from *Method*. For example, Lonergan writes:

> As in the fields of physics, chemistry and biology, so in the field of human events and relationships there are classical and statistical laws that combine concretely in cumulating sets of schemes of recurrences. For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations... Inventions outlive their inventors and the memory of their origin. Capital is capital because its utility lies not in itself but in the acceleration it imparts to the stream of useful things. The political machinery of agreement and decision is the permanent yet self-adapting source of an indefinite series of agreements and decisions.$^{49}$

The position on emergent probability in human affairs also provides the explanatory background to the position Lonergan takes in *Method* on the difference between history and social science. He writes:

> To their study [i.e. that of the social sciences] the historian leaves all that is the repetition of routine in human speech and action and all that is universal in the genesis, development, breakdown of routines.$^{50}$

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$^{48}$*Method* 184.

$^{49}$*Insight* 209 = CWL 3:234-235.

$^{50}$*Method* 180.
The prior philosophical position on the philosophy of history is, then, very much operative in the identification of the heuristic of historical inquiry as the understanding of 'what is going forward,' which we find in Method. My own experience of attempting to explain and defend Lonergan's notion of 'what was going forward' led me to see the importance of underlining the link between the position in Method and the earlier work Insight. In discussing Lonergan's heuristic of historical inquiry with both a philosopher and an historian unfamiliar with his work, I found that one needed to situate the heuristic notion within the context of emergent probability in order to avoid any impression of 'Whiggish,' liberal, moral progress such as that phrase could be taken to imply.

What, then, of the prescriptive force of the identification of the heuristic of historical inquiry as understanding 'what was going forward'? The basic strategy Lonergan employs in philosophy is the raising and answering of the three questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do that? The answering of these questions results in a critically validated cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. In order to investigate human understanding Lonergan analyzes the cognitive practices of science, common sense, and mathematics in the first part of Insight. With regard to physical science Lonergan follows Einstein's celebrated advice, to note not so much what scientists say about what they do, but rather what they do. But, of course, this descriptive task in Insight did not imply that Lonergan's adumbration of basic positions was without revisionary or prescriptive import. Although Lonergan saw physics as basically 'in order' as it is, he nevertheless warned against the picture-thinking that scientists could go in for when popularizing their results. What is the case with the cognitive discipline of history? I would suggest that Lonergan's views on the heuristic of historical inquiry, as the understanding of 'what was going forward,' could appear more or less controversial depending on a historian's commitments regarding the various styles of historiography which are current. In general I do not think that the community of historians suffer from the temptations to reductionism or representationalism which,

51 The philosopher and historian were, respectively, Prof. Kai Nielsen and Dr. Timothy Travers.
according to Philip McShane, still beset those who work in botany or zoology. Such tendencies are manifest in our culture not only because of the influence of 'scientism' and materialism since the seventeenth-century, but because of the underlying polymorphism of human consciousness which, in part, explains the rise of those cultural influences. Historians as a community have not tended to go in for wholesale anthropological reductionism, even where, until recently, they worked in political regimes committed to dialectical materialism. The tacit humanism of historical studies has, rather, been something of a cultural counteractive to the impulses of reductionism and materialism. However, precisely because physics has been the dominant paradigm of cognitive normativity in our culture, practitioners of history have been affected by its magnetism. This has probably not been so marked in the case of history as in the social sciences, but it is in the years since the Second World War that we have witnessed the rise of historiographic styles manifesting a desire to render history more 'scientific.' Some have argued that such scientific respectability could be achieved by assimilating history to the social sciences. Lonergan’s analysis of the heuristic operative within historical inquiry can, I believe, make important contributions to these debates on historiography.

The identification of the heuristic of historical inquiry which Lonergan provides might appear to be something which is quite obvious, even trivial. But it is interesting to observe how difficult it is to hit on quite the right formula here. Thus Collingwood describes the goal of the historian when he writes: "What kind of things does the historian find out? I answer res gestae; actions of human beings that have been done in the past."


53 It is true that the 'scientific' style of Marxist historiography pre-dates the Second World War, but it appears that it was in the after war years that professional historians in the West began to take Marxist approaches seriously.

54 A useful anthology of papers highlighting the interrelation between philosophical inquiries into critical history and the debates among historians concerning historiographic method is William Dray and David Carr, eds., La Philosophie de l'Histoire Pratique Historienne d'Aujourd'hui (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1982).

This is, of course, all very well as a description of what historians do, but it is not sufficiently precise. Neither Collingwood's emphasis on history as the history of the 'inner action' of thought, nor Popper's designation of the historian's task as an understanding of the 'logic of an individual's situation' takes us far enough. For we can observe that the selection of, say, Julius Caesar's thought and actions for attention is conditioned by the prior assumption that this man played an important role in 'what was going forward' during a particular period of history. Again, one might suggest alternatives to Lonergan's heuristic designation. Would not the phrase 'what was going on' in the past avoid any misleading notion of 'moral progress' implied by the word 'forward'?56 But one can see that such a phrase fails to capture an essential feature of the selective process used by the historian. For the historian selects as significant trends and events which had some important causal role. What 'went on' in the past includes every event that occurred; so that historical work, with such a goal in view, would just be endless cataloguing of such items as the way each blade of grass behaved on Bosworth field in 1485 while the future Henry VII battled against Richard III.

In an article assessing the various trends in historiography since the Second World War, the distinguished historian Lawrence Stone identifies three principle trends that have taken their place alongside Marxist analysis and the older 'political' history: the Annals school, the Cliometricians, and mentalité history.57 The Annals school, which arose in France in the 1950s, championed analysis of large-scale environmental, economic, and social factors; we have already noted in passing the work done on the weather in history by Le Roy Ladurie, one of the prime movers in the group. In North America the Cliometricians became influential. This group emphasized the importance of statistical analysis, using computer techniques developed in the social sciences. Stone is not convinced that the results of such statistical analysis have proved fruitful; a vast amount of data has been assembled, but whether it is of much use to

56 This alternative was suggested to me by Kai Nielsen.

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historians is, Stone suggests, a moot point.\(^{58}\) A more recent trend in historiography has been *mentality* history. This style of investigation is concerned with social and cultural attitudes manifest in groups in different periods. Thus, P. Brown’s *The World of Late Antiquity* employs a pointillist style in showing aspects of the mentality of that world; G. Duby provides an account of a single battle, Bovines, in order to bring out the mentality of the nobility of feudal France; and C. Ginsburg explores the attitudes to religion and reformation of a sixteenth-century Italian miller. Stone’s own work on attitudes to love and marriage in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England is another example of this genre.

However, despite the sometimes over confident claims made by adherents to one or other of these styles of history, Stone suggests that these different approaches should be seen as complementary in their positive results, and that one needs to be aware of the danger of pushing any one of these approaches too far at the expense of the others. From the perspective of Lonergan’s work one could suggest that each one of these styles functions as a large-scale ideal type. It is clear that Stone is in agreement with Lonergan’s point that attention to historical data will ultimately correct over confidence in the explanatory power of any one ideal type. Stone writes:

> The historical record has now obliged many of us to admit that there is an extraordinarily complex two-way flow of interaction between facts of population, food supply, climate, bullion supply, prices, on the one hand, and values, ideas and customs on the other. Along with social relationships of status and class, they form a single web of meaning.\(^{59}\)

The negative side of the picture as regards recent trends in historiography is, according to Stone, that emphasis placed on analysis of the mentality of a particular individual or group may fail to provide us with a representative sample. That is, concentration on, say, one person’s journal

\(^{58}\)From the viewpoint of Lonergan’s position perhaps one could say that, to the present, the Cliometricians have contributed more to the functional specialty Research, than to History; not denying that such potential evidence may become formal and actual evidence in future historical work.

\(^{59}\)Stone, “Revival of Narrative” 8.
may end up with the historian writing biography for its own sake, rather than history, and the danger is that such approaches “may lead to a return to pure antiquarianism, to story-telling for its own sake.”

For our purposes it is interesting to see what Stone, as a historian, sees as dangerous here. It is clear, when one examines examples of mentalité history that they are intended for the most part as representative samples of important and influential social trends during particular historical periods. There are difficulties for such an approach which have to do with the securing of a representative sample. Indeed, critics of Stone’s own work on social mores in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England have questioned how representative his samples are. But such difficulties by no means suggest that such an approach is methodologically unsound; rather, an acknowledgment of such problems sets standards for the evaluation of work performed by the community of historians. What Stone identifies as ‘antiquarianism,’ however, is a different matter. He believes historians can recognize that when a piece of work is the retrieval of past events simply because of one’s fascination for the ‘old,’ without any attempt to contribute to the explanatory goals of history, then that work will not count as history. There is a recognition here, then, of the heuristic of historical inquiry as an understanding of ‘what was going forward.’ Further, Stone’s article serves to highlight what I have termed the ‘prescriptive force’ of Lonergan’s identification of that heuristic. For Stone there are criteria, tacitly assumed in the work of the community of historians, which may be invoked to decide what is and what is not historical inquiry. Thus, the critical force of what both Lonergan and Stone have to say in this area becomes evident when one compares their approach with that of Stephen Bann. Bann takes it, that with the proliferation of different styles in the writing of history, there is nothing normative one can say about what constitutes and what does not constitute historical inquiry.

When one asks further what is meant by Lonergan’s identification of the heuristic of historical inquiry as understanding ‘what was going forward’

60Stone, “Revival of Narrative” 22-23.

forward,' one sees that there is an inevitable progression from the question 'What am I doing in historical inquiry?' to the question 'What do I know when I am doing history?' Because Lonergan's work on history faces both of these questions, and answers them in terms of a study of both critical history and the philosophy of history, his contributions are invaluable for contemporary debates over metahistory. For in recent years the work of Hayden White, Peter Munz, Louis Mink, and Haskell Fain has once more drawn attention to ontological and metaphysical issues involved in making sense of history. One of the questions their work has raised regards the evidence which may be brought forth to support the claim that the historian does, if he is successful, provide us with knowledge of reality not had through other cognitive disciplines. The question emerges as to whether the knowledge claimed by the historian is in some way 'epiphenomenal.' Are the claims made by the historian to be reduced to science or sociology, or, perhaps, to be understood in terms of the moral, aesthetic, and cultural preferences of the historian, or do they, potentially at least, provide us with a particular kind of knowledge of reality?

We have noted how the phrase 'what was going forward' is to be understood in terms of historical process, and the way that this process is characterized in terms of Lonergan's theory of emergent probability, adumbrated in Insight. Since the objectivity of human knowing is defended by the argument concerning cognitional structure, or process, the acknowledgment of the fact of objective knowledge is at once an acknowledgment of the reality of cognitional process — a recognition of its ontological status. For the attempt to argue that one is not a knower, or that one is not involved in a process of coming to know on three interrelated levels, provides evidence for the truth of the propositions denied. But that argument succeeds precisely by leading one to acknowledge that there really are a series of interrelated mental activities in which one is involved. It can be further noted that coming to know that one is a knower has what we can call a narrative aspect to it. For human knowing involves a process that moves from operations on the level of experience to operations on the level of intelligence, to operations on the level of reasonable judgment. One cannot ask what one's interlocutor's argument means until one has heard it (not before that); one cannot judge the truth or probable truth of that argument until after one has understood something of its
meaning. Cognitional process, then, is a temporal process and can be verified as such. There is an instance of an aspect of reality, then, that has a 'story,' or narrative aspect to it.62

As such, I think part of the Lonerganian response to questions raised by Hayden White, Louis Mink, and others concerning whether reality has any 'narrative aspect' would begin by referring to the narrative aspect of cognitional process itself. This is rather akin to the response David Carr has made to these positions.63 However, it needs to be pointed out that from the perspective of Lonergan's philosophy there are problems in the Husserlian approach which lies behind Carr's argument concerning time-consciousness. In the confines of the present article it would be impossible to enter into this matter. Suffice it to say that from the viewpoint of Lonergan's philosophy, given deficiencies and ambiguities in Husserl's account of knowing, it is not clear that Husserl succeeds in showing that we can achieve knowledge of the facts concerning our own experience of time consciousness, or concerning other matters. It can be argued that Husserl's philosophy does not provide a wholly successful response to sceptical challenges to the claim to reach objective knowledge.64

There are further aspects to Lonergan's treatment of the notion of development, or process, which are relevant to the discussion. While acknowledging the force of David Carr's move against the epistemological and ontological atomism of the metahistorians, Dray emphasizes the further question of the connection of the individual's time-consciousness to the social domain, a connection which is obviously relevant to under-

62 The implications of Lonergan's work for the philosophy of 'narrative' are brought out in an article by William Mathews, "Wonder as Narrative," _Philosophical Studies_ N. U. I. 36 (1986/87) 258-79. Mathews's article, however, does not concern the recent debates over narrative in the philosophy of history.


64 One of the major problems has to do with the fact that Husserl sought certainty in terms, not of Cartesian indubitability, but as necessary truth. For Lonergan a judgment is certain when the truth-conditions of a proposition are known, _de facto_, as given; as in the case of the propositions on cognitional process. On this see, Michael McCarthy, _The Crisis of Philosophy_ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) 255. See also, Lonergan, _Insight_ 415 = CWL 3:440-41; Hugo Meynell, "From Crisis to Insight," _METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies_ 6 (1988) 93-106; and William Ryan, "The Incompatibility of Intuition and Constitution in Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology (1907)," _METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies_ 10 (1992) 147-181.
standing the nature of historical process. On Lonergan’s view, however, the account or ‘narrative’ we give concerning the process of coming to know should lead us away from the image of that process as something which occurs in some isolated monad, to recognize evidence within the process itself that it is conditioned by factors outside it. Thus, my very attempt to conduct the type of ‘thought experiments’ involved in the self-affirmation of the knower will be conditioned by my having come into contact with Lonergan’s books. My following through on such discussions will depend on the time I have at my disposal for such philosophizing. Such factors themselves provide evidence of the frequency with which conditions occur in my life which allow such opportunities for study and thought, and those frequencies have to do with the probability of my having had the education and the economic advantages which allow these philosophical questions to arise and be pursued. My individual biography in these respects provides evidence for, and itself becomes intelligible within, the accounts historians may provide of the cultural, economic and educational trends in the Britain of the 1960s and ’70s. Reflection on the ‘narrative’ of cognitional process, then, leads on to an investigation of conditions of that process which have to do with the wider context of the social and cultural process of the community of which I am a part.

These considerations regarding the nature and situation of the process of coming to know lead one to consider the application of Lonergan’s work on emergent probability to the discussion of metahistory. For, on Lonergan’s view, it is through a grasp of the heuristic concept of emergent probability in the human world that one may come to understand the notion of the ‘enormously complex reality’ that historians strive to describe and explain in some partial fashion.

In *Insight* Lonergan offers an analysis of understanding as it occurs in contemporary science. In the course of the analysis he identifies a number of significant shifts in modern science which imply a view of the physical world rather different from that of Aristotle, Newton, or nineteenth-century science. One important shift in scientific method has been the trend towards seeing statistical analysis as necessary in order to grasp

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65William Dray, *On History and Philosophers of History* 158.
something of the ineligibility immanent in general evolutionary process. In light of these developments Lonergan worked out an account of evolutionary process in terms of the statistical probability of the emergence and survival of recurrent schemes in which the emergence of the prior schemes conditions the emergence and the survival or destruction of subsequent schemes. Such a world-view implies that both the 'general' laws of science and laws which are ideal frequencies, from which actually events diverge but non-systematically, are to be invoked in an understanding of evolution. The role of statistical analysis seems firmly established in the area of quantum mechanics. As Lonergan remarks, however,

quantum mechanics is not some limiting case or isolated instance. Darwinian thought easily moved from chance variations to probabilities of emergence and from survival of the fittest to probabilities of survival. A statistical view of emergence, distribution, and survival of forms of plant and animal life naturally suggests a similar approach in the investigation of emergence and distribution of the chemical elements and compounds.\(^5\)

However, the human world, which historians in their own way investigate, is no less part of emergent world process. Lonergan writes:

the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations that yields conclusions of the type, If x occurs, then x will recur... Inventions outlive their inventors and the memory of their origins. Capital is capital because its utility lies not in itself but in the acceleration it imparts to the stream of useful things. The political machinery of agreement and decision is the permanent yet self-adapting source of an indefinite series of agreements and decisions. Clearly, schemes of recurrence exist and function. No less clearly, their functioning is not inevitable. A population can decline, dwindle, vanish.\(^6\)

If contemporary scientific methodology does not lend support to the view that statistically estimated states are, in reality, ordered by classical

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\(^6\) *Insight* 209-10 = CWL 3:234.
general laws, then this implies that the actual juxtapositions which condition states of affairs and evolutionary trends are only partially understood through these general laws. For there is thought to be real unpredictability: ideal frequencies are what actual frequencies are expected to differ from, but differ non-systematically. The view that evolutionary trends and natural processes are really conditioned by factors which can, at best, be estimated statistically, and not predicted precisely in terms of general laws, was one adumbrated by C. S. Pierce in the nineteenth-century, and has been steadily gaining ground among the scientific community. What has been given the rather unhelpful title 'chaos theory' is now an increasingly influential paradigm in contemporary science. Computer techniques, such as 'fracturing' serve to enhance the idea that however versatile the hardware for calculation becomes in the future it is simply impossible, in principle, to predict in a completely determined manner the course of natural trends: the slightest variation in initial conditions means that radically divergent states and trends will emerge in the case of two states of affairs whose initial conditions were almost identical. Contemporary science, then, provides evidence for the view that natural trends and processes are not predictable in a wholly determinate way from knowledge of general laws, which are, of course, nevertheless relevant to understanding them. This implies that complete knowledge of the genesis and evolution of these developments is to be had, not through prediction, but through a post factum account: a history.68

This point is brought out in Philip McShane's work on the logic of scientific discovery.69 McShane observes that one of the reasons behind the

68 Two recent studies of the way 'chaos' paradigms have importance for the philosophy of history are to be found in History and Theory 30 (1991): George A. Reisch, "Chaos, History and Narrative," 1-20, and Donald N. McCloskey, "History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration," 21-36. Reisch points out that the tables are now turned in the debate over science and history. In the covering-law debate of the 1960s Hempel evaluated historical practice in terms of whether it did or did not employ the general laws of science. But now 'chaos' paradigms bring out the way that science itself may be concerned with sequences to be 'narrated.' An interesting question here is whether Hempel's own deficient account of stochastic laws in science may not have affected the way the covering-law debate proceeded. On the deficiencies of Hempel's account see Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (Dublin and London: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), chapter 4.

69 McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence.
hesitation Popper at one time expressed over calling evolution a ‘theory’ has precisely to do with the way the account of the actual course of evolution cannot be exclusively in terms of general laws or theories. Unpredictable concatenations and juxtapositions, deviations from some ideal frequency, may have been the most decisive factors in the actual genesis of situations, which themselves determined the probabilities of the emergence of further events and trends. McShane summarizes some conclusions to this effect arrived at by T. A. Goudge.

Goudge rightly remarks that “no scientific account of organisms can be satisfactory if it abstracts them from their concrete history.” ... Goudge outlines the state of affairs which would have to exist if evolution were fully explained: “we may say that at least the following would have to be known: 1) the detailed historical course of evolution; 2) historical explanations of all those single, non-recurrent events which were transitional episodes of major significance in 1); 3) systematic explanations involving generalizations or laws of the various evolutionary patterns or recurrent events in phylogenesis; and 4) the precise manner in which 2) and 3) are to be combined in an overall theory, such that it will account for 1) regarded as a single, complex historical process with large-scale features of its own.70

As these remarks by Goudge suggest, then, the task of historical investigation, be it natural history or human history that is concerned, will involve the attempt to understand, in Lonergan’s phrase, ‘what was going forward’ in some period in the past; and that understanding will involve both the application of combinations of general laws and a genetic, narrative account of emergence. The relationship between the general laws and the narrative account involving their instantiation will be very different in science from what it is in history, as we shall observe further below. However, a loose analogy between the two is still evident. The natural scientist invokes general laws to help him understand a perhaps unique, ‘non-retrodictable’ process. Similarly, the historian can employ the general laws of social science, or his own stock of ‘colligatory concepts,’ or ideal types

70T. A. Goudge, The Ascent of Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961) 61, 127, quoted in McShane, Randomness 244-45.
in order to help him understand what was probably a unique process in the development of the human community.

Also worthy of note is Goudge's point that one needs to highlight 'non-recurrent events which were transitional episodes of major significance' in the history of evolution. Just as the scientist concerned with evolution will not detail the precise way in which every blade of grass brushed against another in some spot on the earth at some time, so the historian will not be concerned to relate in minute detail the way in which example after example of routine behavior occurred in a medieval village. Of course, both scientist and historian will, from time to time, give details of events which are regarded as examples typical of processes, or schemes of recurrence important in the history of evolution. So an historian may quote examples from letters which provide evidence on the attitudes of an electorate which toppled an important regime from power. The community of historians, no less then scientists involved in giving genetic accounts, develop criteria of selection as to what are the more or less significant causal factors in some process of change.  

I have so far been illustrating what is meant by understanding 'what was going forward,' with reference to the work of the natural scientist. But one needs to understand the differences which distinguish the investigation of the historian from that of the scientist. First, it should be realized that the goal Goudge describes for knowledge of evolutionary processes is something of an ideal one, and that, besides, not all who are involved in the physical sciences are concerned with such a detailed account of natural genesis. Indeed, as mentioned above, Popper saw evolutionary 'theory' as something of an odd man out as far as scientific theory goes. It remains true, then, that in general the cognitive endeavor of the historian is different from that of most natural scientists. For as Lonergan writes:

All discovery is an accumulation of insights. But in the sciences this accumulation is expressed in some well-defined system, while in history it is expressed in a description and narrative about particu-

\footnote{In the light of the foregoing it is difficult to concur with Hayden White's opinion that modern science has jettisoned any notion of narrative investigation (White, "The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory," History and Theory 23 (1984) 1-34; see 1).}
lars. The scientific system can be checked in endless different manners, but the description and narrative, while it can come under suspicion in various different ways, is really checked only by repeating the initial investigation. Scientific advance is constructing a better system, but historical advance is a fuller and more penetrating understanding of more particulars.72

Second, while the 'enormously complex reality' the historian seeks to understand is the emergent probability of world process it is that process in its human phase. The subject matter of the historian is the human world of which meaning is constitutive. So, as Lonergan explains,

if human affairs fall under the dominion of emergent probability, they do so in their own way ... as human intelligence develops, there is a significant change of roles. Less and less importance attaches to the probabilities of appropriate constellations of circumstances. More and more importance attaches to the probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communication, agreement, decision. Man does not have to wait for his environment to make him.73

The complex reality historians seek to understand, then, is that of the development of the human world, and the meaning integral to that development is a product of the intelligent or unintelligent, reasonable or unreasonable, and responsible or irresponsible choices, decisions, and actions of individuals and communities.

The analogy which exists between the scientific understanding of evolution and the understanding sought by the historian is of significance for the debates over different styles of historiography which were discussed above.

It is sometimes thought that the characterization of historical writing as narrative implies the view that history should be committed to a 'kings, rulers and statesmen' style. However, given the interpretation of history as narrative suggested above one may argue for a much broader and more encompassing notion of what historical narrative involves. I think it evident from what has been said that Lonergan's notion of 'what was

72 Method 219.

73 Insight 210-211 = CWL 3:253-56. For a comprehensive study of the implications of Lonergan's work on emergent probability for history see the work of Kenneth Melchin already referred to.
going forward' would encourage the positive contributions made by the various schools or styles of history: that is, the contributions made by the Annals school, the studies in mentalité, the statistical calculations of the Cliometricians and the style of political history one associates with G. R. Elton. If one bears in mind Goudge's description of the complex interplay of interpretative strategies required to give an explanation of the story of natural evolution, this openness to the diverse schools of historical method may not appear exaggerated. For as Goudge points out, in such an understanding one must take into account general laws, trends, destruction of trends, and unrepeatable events that were, perhaps, the agents of such destruction and initiation. On such a view of narrative, then, the study of large scale factors, such as the weather and the economy is important to understanding the genesis and decline of historical trends, and equally essential is the study of both the relatively improbable and, on the other hand, routine decisions of powerful individuals, and the effects of chance occurrences: "for want of a nail ..."

From the viewpoint of Lonergan's philosophy we can, then, give an affirmative answer to the question as to whether the historian provides us with a knowledge of reality which is not had through other cognitive disciplines. For, against the subjectivism of the metahistorians, it can be shown that there is a paradigm instance in which we give a narrative account of an aspect of reality. In coming to understand and judge oneself to be a knower, one comes to know a reality which unfolds over time: the intentional activities involved in coming to know unfold in such a way that one can affirm that in giving an account of the process from unknowing to knowing one narrates a development that truly occurs. This cognitive evidence for an aspect, or part, of reality which is to be known through an account which may be termed 'narrative,' meshes with the myriad instances in which the narrative accounts of both historians and of natural scientists (involved in certain types of investigation) have been convincingly supported by the data. Further, in so far as the narrative descriptions and explanations are those of historians, they will have concerned what was going forward in the human world, the world constituted by meaning.

One can, perhaps, express the matter in terms of explanatory residues. World process involves particular and individual trends and
events which, in their specificity, may never be repeated; in fact identical repetition is statistically highly unlikely. Neither the general laws of physical science nor the general laws or accounts of social science describe and explain these individual trends and events in all their particularity. In the case of the natural world such description and explanation is the concern of a specific type of scientific inquiry, the kind to which Goudge and McShane draw attention. In the case of the human world, the world not only of intelligibility but of intelligence, constituted by meaning, the investigation of causally significant trends and events is the domain of the historian. Lonergan's heuristic designation of the goal of historical understanding as an understanding of 'what was going forward' can be seen as free from any implications of 'Whiggish' or liberal progress. For the notion is an explanatory one in so far as it refers to an understanding of human history which accounts for a set, or scheme of situations in the human past in terms of their being conditioned by prior events or sets of situations. The task proper to the historian does not require the making of value-judgments.

CONCLUSION

Conn O'Donovan once remarked that what was required to facilitate understanding of *Insight* was not so much a summary of the book but works of expansion. The apparent length of the work was deceptive, for its myriad insights were expressed in an extremely compact fashion. I have received something of the same impression working on the chapters on history in *Method*. The experience of approaching those chapters in the light of debates over historical knowing within the analytical tradition has given me some inkling of their explanatory richness. That wealth has to do in part, no doubt, with the fact that Lonergan's own work in interpretation and the history of ideas meant that observing the work of the historian included a fine-grained scrutiny of his own operations in these fields.

74Concrete examples of this type of inquiry could be the investigation of precisely how and why the dinosaurs disappeared, or the investigation of the emergence of a hole in the ozone layer.

Given the challenge presented by Lonergan’s work, it is understandable that attention has been primarily focused on the way one is to understand the implications of *Method* for the practice of theology. However, my reading of the chapters on history against the background of the thirty years of debate on critical history, which one can find in a journal such as *History and Theory*, has heightened my appreciation of the importance of the work beyond its bearing on theological method. Lonergan’s examination of scientific and mathematical understanding in *Insight* had the ulterior aim of developing a method basic to human cognitive endeavor. But that examination bore fruit for the philosophy of science, as works in this field by those inspired by Lonergan’s method testify. Analogously, his work on critical history offers the prospect of illuminating questions concerning the practice of history that have been a major concern in the Analytical philosophy of history.

One reason for the lack of attention Lonergan’s work on history has received may be the way that work is necessarily embedded in the larger philosophical, theological, and hermeneutical discussions of *Insight* and *Method*. Lonergan never published a book with a title such as *Philosophy of History* which might have served to attract the attention of reviewers in the appropriate journals. But once one has some understanding of the unique fashion in which Lonergan tackles problems in both the ‘epistemology’ of history and the philosophy of history one can see why such a book might not have been that helpful. Lonergan’s approach to the solution of the complex problems which arise in these areas is neither the ‘global’ approach of Gadamer and Betti, nor the analytical approach of attempting to solve small scale problems piecemeal. Rather, the approach is in terms of the differentiated, but interrelated specializations of hermeneutical method. Such an approach, I suggest, does justice both to the analytical attempt to isolate and treat thoroughly individual problems, and to the demands of those who, like the metaphistorians, point to the need for a

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76 One thinks here of the work of McShane, Heelan, Byrne, Meynell, Danaher, and of Gibbons, Price, and Mathews.

77 Lonergan’s remarks on the importance of heeding Descartes’s advice to begin with apparently simple problems come to mind in this regard (see *Insight* chapter 1).
coherence which comes only from tackling the broader epistemological and ontological issues at stake.
A LONERGANIAN CRITIQUE OF THE PRAGMATIC METHOD OF EDUCATION

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Few can deny that America is in a state of moral decay. In the past two years we have seen riots in Los Angeles, political scandals in congress, and the rise of domestic violence. Pop stars are producing works barely distinguishable from the most degrading forms of pornography. Hate crimes, rapes, and murders continue unchecked. The values that most people once held as sacred seem to be disappearing from American consciousness.

While it is tempting to propose ‘quick-fix’ solutions to these ills, thoughtful reflection on the problem demands a consideration of the state of American education. If Americans are losing their values, the education they are receiving must share part of the blame. Again, if we are to reverse this trend for the sake of improving things in future generations, American education must be reformed.

This essay will examine one of the founding philosophies of American education, that of John Dewey. In the first section, I will survey Dewey’s educational method, the model on which he bases that method, and the aim of education as he conceives it. In the second section, I will attempt to offer a Lonerganian response to Dewey’s thoughts on the means and ends of education.
I. DEWEY’S PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

The educational method Dewey puts forth focuses on providing the conditions for experiential learning. Education "is not an affair of 'telling' and being told, but an active and constructive process" involving "cooperative or joint activity." Dewey stresses the importance of creating an 'environment' for learning. By 'environment' he means "those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being." By controlling the environment in which the young learn, adults control both what is learned and the manner in which it is learned. As schools are the typical environments framed for the purpose of "influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members," it is the business of the school environment to assist "through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided."

According to Dewey, learning is achieved only through shared experience. Taking his lead from the example of language acquisition, in which the child learns to apply the same words to objects as the mother uses, Dewey operates on a general principle about all learning: "things gain meaning by being used in a shared experience or joint action." So the method of education falls into two main steps:

Setting up conditions which stimulate certain visible and tangible ways of acting is the first step. Making the individual a sharer or partner in the associated activity so that he feels its success as his success, its failure as his failure, is the completing step. As soon as he is possessed by the emotional attitude of the group, he will be able to recognize the special ends at which it aims and the means employed to secure success.

All learning, then, is had by a cooperative experience in which things are used for shared purposes with shared results. Even advanced linguistic learning must involve such activity: if "words do not enter as factors into a shared situation, either overtly or imaginatively, they

2Dewey 11-23.
operate as pure physical stimuli, not as having a meaning or intellectual value."³

The practical aim of educating by means of shared experience is to prepare students for an ongoing learning process that is continuous and cumulative; "[a]ctivity must be centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for what comes next." The environment which educators create can only provide the stimuli for desired responses; as the responses ultimately come from the students' innate tendencies, nothing can be 'forced' into them. Dewey suggests that the best mode of 'control,' the best way of achieving desired responses, regards "the ways in which persons, with whom the immature being is associated, use things; the instrumentalities with which they accomplish their own ends." As meaning is what is to be learned, and a thing has meaning because of the uses to which it is put, so educators modify students' mental and moral dispositions by the use they make of physical conditions, for shared conscious purposes and with shared consequences. Thus, the "fundamental means of control" appeals to

the habits of understanding, which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others, whether by way of cooperation and assistance or rivalry and competition. Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared activities.⁴

As teaching is a matter of controlling shared experience for the sake of opening students to a cumulative process of learning, Dewey defines education as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."⁵ The school, in turn, as the environment framed for the purpose of fostering such shared experience, must be a community, a "genuine social medium —

³Dewey 14-16.
⁴Dewey 25-33.
⁵Dewey 76.
one where there is give and take in the building up of a common experience."\(^6\)

The model on which Dewey bases his educational method is natural science. As experience has both an active and a passive element, to learn from experience "is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence." By trying we "experiment with the world to find out what it is like," and our undergoing of the consequences is "instruction — discovery of the connection of things." The discernment of relationships between things is the "genuinely intellectual matter" of learning, but is perceived only by means of experience as "conjoint trying and undergoing."\(^7\) Science, for Dewey, is the making methodical of this experiential learning; "the introduction of the experimental method signified precisely that such operations, carried on under conditions of control, are just the ways in which fruitful ideas about nature are obtained and tested." Thus, experience is 'reasonable' or 'rational' when it is "a deliberate control of what is done with reference to making what happens to us and what we do to things as fertile as possible of suggestions (of suggested meanings) and a means for trying out the validity of the suggestions."\(^8\)

Two consequences follow from the experimental method. First, we cannot call knowledge anything except what we have effected by experimental activity in confirmation of a hypothetical conception. Secondly, thinking is shown to be "of avail in just the degree in which the anticipation of future consequences is made on the basis of thorough observation of present conditions." Dewey states that, eventually, "the theory of knowledge must be derived from the practice which is most successful in making knowledge; and then that theory will be employed to improve the methods which are less successful." Because Dewey sees natural science as the most successful means to attaining knowledge, he derives his educational theory from its method. The method of learning as experience, formulation of

\(^6\)Dewey 358.
\(^7\)Dewey 139-144.
\(^8\)Dewey 272-273.
hypothesis, and testing, he calls "pragmatic." The essential feature of such a method "is to maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment." Finally, as what is known by the experimental method of the natural sciences is limited, so on Dewey's pragmatic method of education "[o]nly that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge." 9

Dewey stresses that the educational process must be an end in itself. Still, Dewey himself has a social aim in mind in his efforts at making education methodical. In speaking of the dangers of interpreting vocational education as trade education, Dewey states that education "would then become an instrument of perpetuating unchanged the existing social order of society, instead of operating as a means of its transformation." Clearly, Dewey sees social progress as an aim of education. The existing social order is not acceptable to him; indeed, he warns that

[any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses, and thus to become an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social predestination. 10

For Dewey, as we shall see, the ills of the industrial society are to be overcome by a movement toward egalitarianism.

The mental disposition which Dewey hopes to effect through education as shared activity is that of 'like-mindedness.' To "be really members of a social group" is "to attach the same meanings to things and to acts which others attach." Shared knowledge of and feelings about the consequences of actions form a "common understanding [which] controls the actions" of the members of the social group. 11 Eventually, education may be expected to achieve peace by "the recon-

9Dewey 338-344.
10Dewey 316-318.
11Dewey 30.
ciling of national loyalty, of patriotism, with the superior devotion to the things which unite all men in common ends, irrespective of national political boundaries."\textsuperscript{12} On a more local scale, "[a]n education which should unify the disposition of the members of society would do much to unify society itself."\textsuperscript{13}

The central evil of industrial society which like-mindedness would combat is that of class distinction. Rather than giving human beings new ends, the scientific revolution "put at the disposal of a class the means to secure their old ends of aggrandizement at the expense of another class." The industrial revolution did away with feudalism, but "capitalism rather than a social humanism took its place."\textsuperscript{14} The capitalist society organizes itself on the basis of a division between the educated class and the laboring class. In such an organization lies the evil of exploitation:

Our economic conditions still relegate many men to a servile status. As a consequence, the intelligence of those in control of the practical situation is not liberal. Instead of playing freely upon the subjugation of the world for human ends, it is devoted to the manipulation of other men for ends that are non-human in so far as they are exclusive.\textsuperscript{15}

To engender a like-mindedness which will counter the effects of capitalism, education must focus on those things "which are socially most fundamental, that is, which have to do with the experiences in which the widest groups share." Education "must be first human and only after that professional," and it "is humanized in the degree in which it connects with the common interests of men as men."\textsuperscript{16} To have a truly human viewpoint, a fellow-feeling with all other human beings, one "must try to find a standpoint which includes the experience of others as well as his own." But this is just the value of science, both as a model for educational theory and as a subject matter in the

\textsuperscript{12}Dewey 98.  
\textsuperscript{13}Dewey 260.  
\textsuperscript{14}Dewey 283.  
\textsuperscript{15}Dewey 136.  
\textsuperscript{16}Dewey 191.
schools. For scientific "abstraction and generalization are equivalent to taking the point of view of any man, whatever his location in time and space." As such, the scientific method is "essentially a social device;" indeed, it is "an indispensable factor in social progress."\textsuperscript{17}

Dewey is so enchanted with the scientific method that he practically equates scientific progress with social progress:

Every step forward in the social sciences — the studies termed history, economics, politics, sociology — shows that social questions are capable of being intelligently coped with only in the degree in which we employ the method of collected data, forming hypotheses, and testing them in action which is characteristic of natural science, and in the degree in which we utilize in behalf of the promotion of social welfare the technical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry.

Ultimately, Dewey identifies social interest, "in its deepest meaning," with moral interest, and asserts that it is "necessarily supreme with man."\textsuperscript{18} So Dewey holds the scientific method to be that which promises social progress and, in the end, moral transcendence of the existing capitalist regime.

Such social and moral progress is necessary to democracy as Dewey conceives it. Democracy is "a mode of associated living" in which the extension in space of individuals whose activities are controlled by shared interests and feelings "is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity."\textsuperscript{19} To such a society, education is essential; for "if democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all."\textsuperscript{20} Social progress, which is achieved through education, is not merely an aim of education; it is necessary to the very idea of democracy.

\textsuperscript{17}Dewey 226-227.
\textsuperscript{18}Dewey 285-288.
\textsuperscript{19}Dewey 87.
\textsuperscript{20}Dewey 122.
Thus, for Dewey, democratic societies have a "conscious need of securing in individuals a consciously socialized interest, instead of trusting mainly to the force of customs operating under the control of a superior class."\textsuperscript{21} Rather than falling prey to the ancient division of society into working class and leisure class, a "truly democratic society" will be one "in which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy leisure."\textsuperscript{22} Such a democratic society does not yet exist, for capitalism still reigns in America. But the tide can be turned by means of education. Education must help reverse the disproportions of class distinction: "It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them."\textsuperscript{23} By offering equal educational opportunities to all, Dewey would emancipate all persons from the limitations of their class:

it is the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with the broader environment.\textsuperscript{24}

So we see that, although Dewey never explicitly condones egalitarianism as the abolition of classes in society, he seems to believe that all persons can be equal in terms of education, and that such equality, at the least, liberates individuals from the predestined fates inherent in the dictated class distinctions of aristocratic society.

\textbf{II. A LONERGANIAN RESPONSE}

Bernard Lonergan's contributions to educational theory stem primarily from his cognitional theory, a phenomenological account of the immanent structures of human consciousness as empirical, intelligent, and rational. Based on his distinction between conscious acts (as verifiable facts) and the contents of those acts (for example, formulated

\textsuperscript{21}Dewey 322.
\textsuperscript{22}Dewey 256.
\textsuperscript{23}Dewey 119-120.
\textsuperscript{24}Dewey 20.
Gilbert: Critique of Pragmatic Education 207

theories), Lonergan further distinguishes 'positions' from 'counter-
positions.' An implicit or explicit conception of knowledge and being
may be consistent with cognitional fact, with what knowing subjects
actually do, or it may not. So Lonergan names 'basic positions' those
(perhaps implicit) cognitional theories which are consistent with the
facts of cognition, and 'basic counter-positions' those (perhaps implicit)
cognitional theories which contradict cognitional fact. While epistemo-
logical or metaphysical 'positions' coherent with 'basic positions' lead
to development, 'counter-positions' (expansions derived from 'basic
counter-positions') invite reversal:

One can grasp and accept, propose and defend a counter-position;
but that activity commits one to grasping and accepting one's
grasping and accepting; and that commitment involves a grasp
and acceptance of the basic positions. The only coherent way to
maintain a counter-position is that of an animal; for animals not
only do not speak but also do not offer excuses for their silence."25

Part of the method suggested by Lonergan's thought, then, involves
reversing counter-positions and developing positions. I will now
attempt to evaluate Dewey's pragmatic philosophy of education in light
of Lonergan's notion of positions and counter-positions.

Dewey's philosophy of education contains a counter-position, for
the implicit cognitional theory which is its basis contradicts cognitional
fact. Dewey calls thinking "an explicit rendering of the intelligent
element in our experience." As thinking begins with experience, this is
ture as far as it goes. But for Dewey, the learner's interest always has to
do with action, with some instrumental end: "Mind appears in experi-
ence as ability to respond to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation
of future possible consequences, and with a view to controlling the
kind of consequences that are to take place."26 Thus, the intelligent
element of our experience has only to do with the external activities
which may or may not follow from thinking: "Thinking ... is the inten-

25Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York:
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 413.

26Dewey 130-131.
tional endeavor to discover specific connections between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous." In a consistent cognitional theory (a ‘basic position’), however, thinking is a process of experiencing, understanding, and judging. The meaning found in experience is not reducible to "the characteristic use to which a thing is put." While ‘characteristic use’ is part of the intelligibility immanent in the data of experience, intelligence is capable of grasping and affirming more than the merely potential instrumentality of things. The activities in which one engages in coming to knowledge, while they may begin with or seek verification in external action, are ultimately the conscious acts of the subject who experiences, understands, and judges.

The most obvious symptom of Dewey’s implicit counter-position is the self-referential problem which emerges from his educational theory: if knowing is not experiencing, understanding, and judging, but is indeed experience in shared activity, formulation of hypothesis, and verification in action, how can Dewey account for his own theory of knowledge? By subtly eliminating from education (and, implicitly, from thought) the types of non-instrumental questions and insights required for an understanding of understanding, Dewey deprives himself of the possibility of grounding his own work. Because he fails to recognize the exigencies of conscious intentionality operative in his own quest to understand thinking, he has no criteria to which to appeal in justification of his conclusions. Thus, his efforts to reduce meaning to use, and knowledge to action, are inconsistent with this simultaneous effort to establish educational (and epistemic) norms — norms which are certainly not derived from ‘consequent action’ based on an understanding of the ‘characteristic use’ of things.

But if Dewey’s conception of thinking is skewed, so must be his account of learning. He stresses that in each instance of experiential learning “methods are developed good for use in other situations. Still more important is the fact that the human being acquires a habit of learning. He learns how to learn.” This, again, is true in one sense; if

27 Dewey 145-146.
28 Dewey 29.
we could not learn how to learn, there would be no cumulative learning process. However, when Dewey speaks of the ability to learn from experience as "the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation," he fails to recognize that the ability gained has less to do with instrumental action than with the internal, conscious operations of questioning, insight, formulation, and judgment.29

Again, the problem here involves Dewey's notion of meaning. For him, "[t]he increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged."30 This means that learning is a matter of experimental trial and error, and that the success one has in one's trial is (at first, at least) largely a matter of luck. For Lonergan, however, activities are conscious; in learning, it is the conscious activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging which are of paramount importance, and it is these activities which must be the focus of education.

What is lacking in Dewey's thought on knowing and learning will be made clear by a closer consideration of the notion of interest. It has already been asserted that Dewey linked interest with instrumental action. While such action may be an important concern in our everyday common sense thinking, there are other ways of thinking; the objective of the pure desire to know is not control of the subsequent situation so much as it is knowledge of being.

Lonergan notes that "[t]here are all sorts of impressions made upon our ... sense organs, but not all of them get into consciousness. It is what we are interested in that gets into consciousness." Consciousness, then, is "a directed organization of selected data," and what governs the selection is "our concern."31 The experiences with which the knowing process begins never occur in a vacuum; rather, they always occur in a "dynamic context that somehow unifies a manifold

29Dewey 44-45.
30Dewey 76-77.
31Bernard J. F. Lonergan, unpublished lectures on education, Xavier College, Cincinnati, 1959, ch. 4 §1.3.
of sensed contents and acts of sensing." While we talk about a 'stream of consciousness,' that stream "involves not only the temporal succession of different contents but also direction, striving, effort" according to an interest or concern. So Lonergan defines a 'pattern of experience' as "a set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensation, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements."32

Now, as there are different selections and organizations of data according to our various concerns, so there are different patterns of experience. The biological pattern focuses all awareness on finding food, mating, and fleeing enemies. The aesthetic pattern frees one from biological purposiveness to allow an enjoyment of experience for experience's sake. But the pattern of experience most relevant to education is the intellectual, for it is that pattern which selects and addresses only those data which help bring about a sought-after insight.33

If thinking has to do with conscious operations, and learning has to do with gaining the ability to perform those operations correctly, then teaching must involve familiarizing students with that pattern of experience which focuses awareness on understanding. It is only in the intellectual pattern of experience that one's interest, one's driving concern, is the attainment of knowledge for its own sake. While Dewey's 'environment' of shared activity might be a good start, it is only that. "Since the real basis of the active method is the subject constructing his own world [according to his interest], active method does not necessarily entail external activity." Rather, it must involve providing those conditions which will increase the probability that insights will occur. For the insight by which the student grasps the intelligible element in sensible data "is a conscious process that people can be helped in. The teacher can help people form the correct phantasm ... [and] can stimulate them by making things puzzling in one way or another." Rather than simply setting up shared experiences and fostering trial and error, then, an instructor must direct the development of the pupil's intellectual pattern of experience by helping the

pupil "pick out correctly and accurately all the elements necessary for the understanding, and not more than the elements necessary for the understanding."\textsuperscript{34}

If Dewey overemphasized the experiential and instrumental aspects of thinking and learning, some reason for this may be found in his distorted view of the significance of science. As we have seen, Dewey hails the methods of empirical science as the surest means of achieving knowledge. Because of his faith in the experimental method, he is led to ascribe this same method to human knowing in general. But this is doing things somewhat backward. For a "method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."\textsuperscript{35} But such a normative pattern is merely an objectification of the recurrent and related operations that human beings spontaneously conduct in any endeavor at coming to knowledge; the scientific method is just one objectification and application of the normativity immanent in our own conscious activities. So the "account of scientific method stands to cognitional theory as the less to the more general."\textsuperscript{36} While it is worthwhile to study the methods of science, this is so because "science provides us with an opportunity to study intelligence as developing;" like the human learning process itself, science "is not finished, it is on the way."\textsuperscript{37} Dewey's faith in science seems to have led him to hold its method to be more fundamental than the human knowing process itself, and so caused him to reduce the latter to the former.

Dewey's faith in the scientific method grounded his belief in automatic scientific, social, and moral progress. His failure to take cognitional fact into account hindered him from achieving a proper understanding of development, and so hindered him from adequately grasping what the human good is and how it is achieved. For Dewey, as we have seen, the human good is the ideal of egalitarianism by means

\textsuperscript{34}Lonergan, lectures on education, ch. 4 §§3.1, ch. 5 §1.
\textsuperscript{36}Lonergan, \textit{Method} 248.
\textsuperscript{37}Lonergan, lectures on education, ch. 6 §1.1.
of education, an ideal achievable in the present without much attention given to the past. But Dewey fails to realize that any achievement which may be called 'good' results from human beings operating consciously, intelligently. Any concrete human good must be the product of historical human beings and their concrete acts. So Lonergan states:

The good is human insofar as it is realized through human apprehension and choice ... Human apprehension develops. One age understands things better and knows more than the preceding age. Human choice is good or evil, and hence the human good is a history, a cumulative process where there is both advance of apprehension and distortion, aberration due to evil.\(^{38}\)

As all human beings come to knowledge by experience, understanding, and judgment, so there are certain invariants in humans' knowing and acting. However, the knowing process is not infallible. Just as one can come to knowledge by performing certain acts correctly, one can come to have a distorted view by failing to perform those acts correctly. Either way, one's actions will affect the community at large. So history is "the drama of life," that is, "what results through the characters, their decisions, their actions, and not only because of them but also because of their defects, their oversights, their failures to act."\(^{39}\)

The human good, then, cannot be reduced to an ideal of egalitarianism. Rather, it is the human community as dynamically oriented; it is the history that results from concrete persons making choices in response to what is apprehended (that is, the conditions established by previous choices). As there are invariants in all human thinking, so there are invariants in the human good. As human thinking can be flawed, so the actions constitutive of the human good can be for better or for worse. So Lonergan implores to recognize that

man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that each man shapes his own life but does so only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to

\(^{38}\)Lonergan, lectures on education, ch. 2 §2.

\(^{39}\)Lonergan, Method 179.
have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors.40

Once one recognizes that the human good is human history as dynamic, Dewey’s faith in automatic progress proves naive. While there is intelligent progress, the human good that is history also involves the fact of decline. While intelligence yields insights that produce policies and courses of action that improve things, “the flight from understanding blocks the insights that concrete situations demand. There follow unintelligent policies and inept courses of action.” What is worse, decline tends to be cumulative; for the “situation deteriorates to demand still further insights and, as they are blocked, policies become more unintelligent and more inept.”41 Thus, just as historical human progress ultimately results of individuals’ choices, so too does the evil of decline. So belief in the automatic progress of any aspect of human reality is naive; while the human good is an oriented dynamism, that orientation itself is a historical compound including both progress and decline.

CONCLUSION

Dewey’s philosophy contains a counter-position, for his pragmatic method fails to take cognitional fact into account and so does not attend to that which is most crucial in the learning process. As a result, he offers a theory of knowledge and learning which cannot account for itself. Dewey’s enchantment with empirical science, coupled with his disdain for the social inequities of capitalism, led him to believe in the automatic progress of educated America toward the ideal of egalitarianism. Such a belief is ultimately naive. If we stand with Lonergan in taking a consistently asserted cognitional theory as the starting point for epistemological and metaphysical positions, the human good reveals itself to be, not the ideal of egalitarianism, but the history of which human beings are the authors. Human freedom, then, is not reducible to liberation from class structure or from aristocratic tradi-

40Lonergan, Method 81.
tions (although these possibilities are certainly not ruled out). Rather, human freedom is the self-transcendence achieved in authentic knowing and being. If educational method is to aid the young in becoming authentic knowers, it must focus on developing that pattern of experience in which human consciousness strives after knowledge for its own sake.
OMETIMES A PERSON has to go a very long distance out of his way to come back a short distance correctly."¹ Edward Albee's character in The Zoo Story expresses a maxim that we often lose sight of in our attempts to understand and live out our lives as responsible persons. In our technological world we have come to favor 'the direct route' in our approach to life's problems and complexities. We expect ourselves to be capable of assessing problems, sizing them up, diagnosing flaws and difficulties, proposing cures, implementing courses of action, and, generally, tackling problems head on with the courage and vigor of competent managers and technicians.

But in our intimate worlds of human relations and in our complex worlds of society, politics and economics, such approaches frequently leave us frustrated and disappointed. Our problems elude diagnoses, our cures prove to be misguided, and we find ourselves incapable either of knowing what to do or of doing what we know to be good. The 'direct route' is closed to us. And so we are forced to take the long detour into the world of reflection, study, moral self-analysis, and disciplined self-transformation. We need to forge for ourselves the proper tools before we can come back to our moral problems equipped

to understand and to act responsibly. This detour is the voyage into the world of ethics.

The fact of the matter is that for the most part we are a mystery to ourselves. Rosemary Haughton's brilliant account of the interior life of the child and the adult in The Transformation of Man illustrates graphically the massive iceberg which lies beneath the visible surface of our human relationships.2 How many times can we remember situations in which the actions of another person had the effect of triggering in us a sudden, unexpected outpouring of anger, of passion, of joy, of fear? Our reactions are often far and away disproportionate as responses to the actions of another. It is as if the other person had unwittingly opened a gate in our psychological depths and oceans of pent-up feelings were poured out upon them. Our response is not to their gesture but to some distant and forgotten injury or peak-experience. It is at times like these that we stand back and ask ourselves whether such hidden feelings and passions play a much stronger role in our normal, everyday decision-making than we might regularly think. This realization can mark the beginning of the long and difficult road of self-discovery whose distant goal is truly effective moral freedom.3

There are two types of approaches which one can take in the analysis of ethical decision-making. The first focuses upon the issue at hand, the issue which we are trying to decide on. It might be a social justice issue, a moral issue related to our business dealings, a family dispute, a career decision, a problem in our marriage, a neighborhood issue, a legal issue, a medical issue. In this approach, the questions focus upon the data at hand, the people involved in the decision-making, the possible courses of action, the consequences expected as a result of the various alternatives, the sacrifices, the core human values,

2Rosemary Haughton, The Transformation of Man (Springfield, IL: Templegate, 1980); orig. 1967).

the social impact, the long term effects on ourselves, our families, our children, and our neighbors in distant lands and in future societies.

But while this issue-centered approach to ethical decision-making is essential, there remains another approach which focuses on the less obvious, the hidden aspects of moral decisions. In this approach the focus is upon the person who is deciding. Actually moral decision-making is a skill which we learn very early in life. But like all skills, we learn how to use the skill before we understand what the skill is. In addition, moral skill is a peculiar kind of skill. In moral living our skills have the effect of changing who we are. In developing and using our moral skills each of us becomes a person with certain loves, hates, fears, and desires. It is these cares which shape our everyday moral living. These cares and these skills are the tools which we use in solving our countless daily problems and in working out our personal and social relationships.

As long as moral tools are adequate to the tasks at hand, the hit-and-miss process of moral development takes care of itself. However, when we find ourselves inadequate to the moral challenge before us, as is so often the case, then we begin to ask whether the skill and the skill-formation process itself can come under our responsible care. Can we begin to understand the 'hows' and 'whys' of our moral decision-

4I am aware that the term 'skill' often refers to a type of technical or instrumental activity in which rationality is constrained to function towards narrow short-term, or 'pragmatic' objectives. This is not the way in which I am using the term here. I am following Bernard Lonergan in using the term to the full range of cognitional and cognitionally-mediated operations, many of which we develop early in childhood. These are the sensorimotor skills, the operations of language and meaning, the deliberative, social, and reflective skills which we utilize in the normal interpersonal discourse of any working day and which mature in breadth and depth as we proceed through the arduous processes of adult growth. See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972) ch. 2.

5Actually, all skill-development changes us in our capacities for action, in our openness to new ranges of experience, and in the way we feel about things in specific fields of human living. However, moral skills introduce a more profound type of change in our fundamental attitudes towards all experience. As we develop in moral skill we progressively apprehend ourselves as living within a wider ecology of social relations, we cultivate more and more complex and differentiated feelings about the 'health' of these relations, we experience a stronger exigency towards careful deliberation in our relational living, and we come to expect ourselves to live out our convictions in daily life.
making skills? Can this self-understanding help us in promoting our own personal character development? The following pages will be devoted to some of these questions.

**MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL QUESTIONS**

Have you ever had an experience in which you discovered that you had the right answers but the wrong questions? In *A Canticle for Leibowitz*, Walter Miller paints a portrait of a civilization in a far distant future, a future in which all memory and all understanding of modern science has been lost. Only a few dusty, old books in physics have been preserved. The leaders of this civilization pore over the mass, energy, and acceleration equations in these books as religious secrets, as special revelations of the gods. They are sung and chanted. Sacrifices are offered in their name. They are interpreted as magic spells, perhaps as the keys to healing terrible diseases, as fertility incantations, as the call to the gods to ward off evil. Are the equations still true? Do they remain correct expressions of physical phenomena?

The fact is that the equations are answers to questions. The future civilization never lost the answers. They lost the questions. The effect is that the answers, when they were dissociated from their proper questions, lost their meaning. We experience something similar to this the first time that we try to use a computer. How many of us remember sitting in front of a machine for which we paid a big price, staring stupidly at the screen, wondering at the mysterious meaning of 'C>' or an instruction like 'bad command or file name'? We do not know the precise questions to ask. We do not know how to understand the data — data which we know to be meaningful and true — because we don't know the right questions.

To be sure we can ask very general questions: What am I doing? What does this mean? Why am I getting nowhere? However, getting answers requires asking more refined, more precise questions. If we do

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begin to master the computer, it is because early on in our fumblings, we are told (or we accidentally stumble over) answers which begin to generate whole new sets of more precise questions. Through trial and error or through reading the manual we find answers to this next round of questions. And with each answer that 'works,' new sets of more and more precise questions emerge, questions which begin to reflect a more and more comprehensive understanding of how the various pieces of the puzzle fit together. As we accumulate insights, we refine our questions and come to grasp the context of meaning out of which the right questions must flow.

Moral knowledge, like all knowledge, is always an answer to a question. We not only have to get our answers right, but more significantly, as with the computer, we have to get our questions right. We have to get the answers properly matched with the questions they were meant to answer, within the experiential context of meaning which originally give them birth.

Let us consider an example. Through much of Christian history, charging interest on loans was called ‘usury’ and was judged morally wrong. However, we now take it for granted that we will be charged interest on our mortgages. In fact, we hold financial institutions responsible for paying a fair rate of interest on our deposits and investments. Has the moral norm changed? No. Rather, the moral question has changed.

The traditional condemnation of usury was formulated in a social context in which loans did not regularly perform the function of expanding the productive capacity of an economy. Rather, loans involved little more than redistributing income and were often required by the poor to help them and their families survive. The moral question here was: Is it morally right to take advantage of a poor person's needs and vulnerability for personal gain? The answer was, and still is: No, it is morally wrong. However, in our age, loans often function completely differently. Borrowed funds are frequently invested to launch initiatives which yield a service, expand the economy, and generate income for the investors. The moral questions here are linked to this new function of loans: Does the lender have a right to some measure of participation in the yields generated by the
investment? Is it fair to pay compensation for the lender's risk? Is it morally right to compensate the lender for the loss of his or her own potential investment income? Clearly, the answer to these questions is: Yes, interest of these types can be morally right.\(^7\)

To understand moral norms requires discovering the question to which the norm was an answer. Are there moral absolutes? If by moral absolutes we mean norms that can be transposed wholesale to entirely different questions, the answer is No. If by moral absolutes we mean norms which always remain true to the questions they were meant to answer, in the context of questions, insights, and experiences from which they originally derived their meaning, the answer is Yes. The key to understanding our heritage of values, virtues, and norms lies in asking ourselves, What is the question to which the moral norm is an answer?\(^8\)

**OUR QUESTIONS DYNAMIZE OUR MORAL LIVING**

The significance of questions in moral life cannot be understated. Different kinds of questions have profoundly different effects upon our attitudes towards human experience. In fact, our questions are inextricably bound up with our ways of feeling and caring about life. If our feelings about something change, we will often come to regard the experience in a new light, to wonder about it differently, to ask different questions about it. Conversely, if we can initiate a sustained discipline of asking new kinds of questions about our experiences, perhaps questions which probe beyond the surface of things, we can sometimes notice the beginnings of a subtle but profound change in the way we feel about things.


What are our own personal questions? It is important to identify what questions shape our human interrelations. Do we want to please people? Do we want to be proven right? Do we want to start things? Do we want to finish things? Do we want to clean things up? Do we want to mess things up? Do we seek to surprise people? Do we seek to make them angry? Do we look for projects to take on, for fires to put out? Do we look to make things beautiful? Do we look to sustain and nurture old things? Do we seek to reinstate and refurbish old things? Do we look to rip old things apart to make way for the new? Do we seek out authorities? Or do we seek to liberate ourselves from authoritarian figures?

What are the questions which dynamize our living? What are the questions which we refuse to care about? Which questions are we afraid to raise? Our questions are linked to our habitual patterns of caring. When we begin to answer some of these questions about our own questions, we begin to understand what we truly do care about. We also begin to understand others as, in fact, quite different from ourselves. For the other person is usually dynamized by a different set of questions. To come to know and to love another person requires coming to understand and to care about the questions which dynamize their lives. Often this process is extremely painful, for it may require coming to care about questions which we have spent a lifetime ignoring, rejecting, or hiding from.

One of the most important differences between kinds of questions that direct our lives concerns the difference between the pursuit of moral knowledge and the commitment to live out our values. Some of us tend to see moral living as a kind of problem-solving. Our conflicts with others, our relationships with family and friends, our political lives are seen as challenges for our moral understanding. For this group, the goal is to figure out the right thing, to understand it, and to know how to act in this or that situation. Others see moral living in quite different terms. For people in this second group, the moral question is not one of knowing what to do; it is a question of doing it. It is a question of moral action, of conviction, determination, courage, duty, or moral will. Morality here is a matter of having the inner strength to act out values which are taken for granted as known and as true.
In the final analysis full moral responsibility requires that each one of us must deal with both of these kinds of questions in our daily lives. We cannot act responsibly if we do not have right answers to moral problems. But right answers have no moral significance if we do not act on them. When the two sets of questions are fully operative in our lives we are set on the road towards moral maturity. However all of us will tend to favor one of these two kinds of concerns over the other. And whether we favor the first or the second will determine an overall style to our moral living. The differences in the two styles frequently causes problems in our ability to relate to others of another style. For a person of one style feels that someone of a different style is trivializing his or her own urgent concerns. If we recognize these differences between moral styles as complementary concerns then we realize that actually we need one another. For it is through the other that we learn to appreciate the importance of both kinds of moral questions.

"ECSTASIS" AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF QUESTIONS

Have you ever had the following experience? You are looking up a word in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, perhaps in the context of doing a crossword puzzle, or because of an argument with a family member over some trivial matter. You rapidly locate the word in the volume, eager to prove yourself correct, anxious to leap back to your game or your argument. But you discover in the reference work a dimension to the word of which you were previously unaware. You are puzzled by this new find. What is its significance? You read on. The volume makes reference to another entry. You flip to the other entry. You discover something in this new entry which fuels your fascination. You grab another reference work off the shelf in a hungry search for knowledge to quench this newly aroused wonder. You discover that you had been mistaken about something in a conversation with someone three weeks ago. You begin to understand the significance of something that he or she had said. By now, twenty minutes have passed. You have forgotten the crossword puzzle, or the person with whom
you were arguing has given up calling you and left the house. You sit reading, enthralled, for another two hours.

What has happened to you? In a nutshell, we might say that you have experienced ‘the transformation of the question.’ Bernard Lonergan uses the word ‘ecstasis’ to describe this process wherein a set of initial questions — the questions which originally inspired an inquiry — gives way to a new set of questions that arise within the inquiry process itself. As an inquiry proceeds you being to ‘stand out of’ your original set of questions and begin to operate within a new set of questions and concerns, questions which are proper to the context of meaning of the thing which you are studying.

Moral knowledge, like all knowledge, is only truly meaningful as an answer to its proper questions, and different kinds of questions dynamize our moral living in different directions. However, it also remains true that an appropriate engagement in a particular field of human experiences can give rise to the distinctive questions that point us towards the particular sets of relations proper to that field. The dramatic upshot of this fact is that if we are appropriately attentive to a field of experience, engagement in that field can have the effect of transforming our state of questioning and caring. The drama of this transformation in one’s questions is linked to the fact that the new-found questions have the effect of opening a door into an entirely new field of human understanding.

Quite often we encounter blockages in our efforts to make sense of our experiences. We find that we cannot properly understand a particular field of experience unless we hit on the right questions. Sometimes a clue, an image, a new piece of data, a fresh perspective from a friend, an obscure impression gained from a work of art can result in our stumbling upon the questions which unlock a new field of insights. This phenomenon is most dramatic when what is revealed to us is a dimension of human experience which we never knew existed or whose significance we could never previously appreciate. It is this ‘disclosure’ effect which renders the ‘ecstasis’ event so spectacular.

Lonergan, Method in Theology 185-196.
Let us illustrate with another example. You are in an argument with a friend or a loved one. It is an argument which you have had many times before. You are convinced that he or she fails to appreciate your point of view or consistently disregards your opinions. The conversation invariably shifts away from your central concerns to focus on irrelevant side issues. In fact, as often as you've had this argument the other person has obstinately refused to really 'listen' to you. You state your point again, this time more forcefully. And, as always, the conversation degenerates to an argument. Tempers flair. You become exasperated, not simply at this instance, but at your own inability, time and again, to avoid this degenerating state of affairs.

However, suddenly this time, the other person breaks down instead of stomping off in a huff. You become indignant. Why is he or she crying? I'm the one who should be crying! I'm the one who is always being misunderstood! You feel annoyed. But then the crying begins to touch something in you. The other person is genuinely suffering. Your anger and frustration begin to give way to compassion. This, clearly, is a revelation of a new dimension to this conversation. What is the source of this sorrow? Is there something about the issue which you have been overlooking? Is there something about your approach to this conversation which you have regularly misunderstood? You discover in your new and touchingly intimate exchange — an exchange now made possible by your compassion towards the other's newly discovered pain — that you are asking different questions about your relationship. You begin to wonder if the problem which regularly fueled the degeneration of the conversation had little to do with the content of the discussion. You begin asking if the real issue had to do with his or her — and your — sense of self-worth. You start to realize it had everything to do with justifying yourself convincingly before the other. It had everything to do with being bullied, with being beaten up in a fight, with always being in the wrong, with being made to feel a fool, with being made to feel worthless as a person.

What has happened here? I suggest you have experienced an instance of that 'ecstasis' which we have been speaking about. A new cluster of feelings have arisen in response to significant values operative in the conversation and these feelings have elicited new questions
about the role of these new-found values in your relationship. If your old questions focused on getting the other person to recognize your point of view, your new questions focused on your contributions towards eroding his or her sense of self-worth. What you discovered in your 'ecstasis' was a whole new dimension to your arguments which you had never before recognized. It is a dimension which might be characterized as a dimension of mutual affirmation as persons. It is a dimension which is present in every human conversation, but which comes to the forefront dramatically in some conversations more than others. Often the desire to be affirmed as a person, to be affirmed as loved and as worthy of love, is the driving concern in a conversation or an argument. In such cases we will never resolve the dispute until we experience the transformation of the question away from the topic of the argument to this dynamic of mutual self-affirmation.

The fascinating thing which often accompanies such an 'ecstasis' is that this new-found question has the effect of revealing a whole new dimension of human experience which previously was not known to exist or to be significant. In the case of the argument, what was discovered was the interpersonal dimension of mutual self-affirmation which is present in every human interchange. This new-found body of experience has the effect of revealing a new 'horizon' of human experience. Relationships with others are seen in a new light. It is as if something invisible had suddenly become visible, a something which had always been present and operative in our living but which remained beyond our horizon of concern. This new something sheds a new light upon all our interpersonal relationships. We suddenly begin to understand why some event in the past happened the way it did. More importantly, we begin to treat others in a whole new light.

When such an 'ecstasy' occurs we often begin to appreciate the deeper significance of human interrelating and this appreciation is the foundation for our getting the questions to which so many of the traditional moral norms and prescriptions are an answer.

**CONCLUSION**

What do we make of all of this? I suggest that we can draw out five implications for moral action and reflection.

1. The first implication concerns the fact that all moral norms, all moral values, all moral 'laws' are answers to questions. If we want to understand what the moral norms of our parents, our cultural heritage, and our religious traditions require of us, we have to know the questions which the norms were intended to answer. If we want to know when and how to apply these norms in our lives, we have to know the context of meaning and experience in which the norm was originally judged to be true. To be sure, a brilliant and valuable answer to one question is neither brilliant nor valuable when it is used to answer a completely irrelevant question. However, a discovery of the original questions and contexts behind older norms often yields insights and clues which prove helpful or even essential in wrestling with new types of moral problems.

2. The second implication concerns the fact that different kinds of questions dynamize our personal moral living. If we truly want to understand ourselves and to bring more of our lives within our responsible control, then it becomes important to find out what we truly do care about. To do so we need to identify the questions which dynamize our living. Even if we seek to leave behind our vices and seek some measure of moral excellence we can only get there from here. So we must know where 'here' is.

3. The third implication concerns the fact that certain moral problems can only be solved if we discover the right question to ask. Truly open and authentic moral inquiry can often bring upon us a conver-
sion in our questions, an ‘ecstasis.’ The key to moral discovery is finding the right question to ask. And the key to hitting on the right question is our immersion in the right experience in search of an ‘ecstasis.’

4. The fourth implication concerns the role of ‘ecstasis’ in our relations with others. When we seriously try to listen and understand the point of view of others with whom we disagree, we can discover a new dimension of human experience of which we were previously unaware. This ‘ecstasis’ experience enhances our appreciation of new and different kinds of moral questions. And this appreciation of different moral questions makes it possible to deal in a loving way with other persons.

5. The fifth implication concerns ‘foundations’ in ethics. What is foundational for ethics is the transformation of the ethicist which releases the patterns of caring and questioning that permit central experiences and insights to emerge in the inquiry process. Moral knowledge is not a commodity ‘out there’ to be acquired, negotiated, contracted, or passed on to others. It is not a bag or ‘deposit’ of norms, virtues, or values handed on by a culture or tradition. Nor is it a system of first principles from which can be deduced the variety of requirements for daily living. Moral knowledge is the term or goal of a human activity of inquiry into experience. This activity is driven by questions and it yields insights which are meaningful and truthful in relation to these questions. For ethics to proceed requires careful attention to the dynamic structure of this activity and, most particularly, to the role played by the questioning and the transformation of the questioning in the ethicist engaged in this activity.

Many of us continue to think of morality as a set of rules, as a set of dos and don’ts, as a set of norms which other people have formulated to direct our action. But the truth is that throughout much of our lives we engage in moral decision-making in which we play a key part in forging and implementing the tools. The questions which dynamize our moral living and the moments of ‘ecstasis’ which transform us are
calls issued from ourselves to ourselves. As long as we continue to think of morality in terms of rules imposed by others, the full truth of our moral living will remain hidden from us. The ideas sketched here are oriented towards helping us to understand and to appreciate the role played by one of the most important of these tools, the question, in living out the mystery of our humanity.
A CRITIQUE OF JEROME MILLER'S INTERPRETATION OF LONERGAN ON KNOWING AND BEING

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In his article "Deconstructing Lonergan," Ronald McKinney, S.J., sets about the task of 'deconstructing' Bernard Lonergan's thought by 'undermining' the set of hierarchical oppositions that he finds contained therein. For McKinney, one of these hierarchical oppositions is a preference for 'presence' (the known) over 'absence' (the unknown). In contradistinction, Jerome Miller attempts to interpret Lonergan as a deconstructionist in his recent book In the Throe of Wonder. Interestingly, the hierarchical preference that Miller discovers in Lonergan is dialectically opposed to the one discovered by McKinney; namely, a preference for the unknown in its deconstruction of the known. Based upon this interpretation, Miller concludes that Lonergan identifies being with absence and, therefore, all textual evidence to the contrary, Lonergan does not equate being with everything about everything.

Of concern to me is how two philosophers who have spent a great deal of time struggling to understand Lonergan can come to such fundamentally opposed interpretations of him. It is my judgment that

1International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (March 1991): 81.
3Miller, Throe of Wonder 207, n. 25.
the reason for this is that both attempt to interpret Lonergan in terms of a hierarchical opposition that Lonergan himself has transcended. This attempt is itself a result of their failure to appropriate what Lonergan means by a 'virtually unconditioned' judgment.

The purpose of this essay is to justify this claim with respect to Miller's presentation of Lonergan. In the first part of the essay, I will develop three aspects of Miller's position. The first is his distinction between, on the one hand, the 'inauthentic' unquestioning stance of a metaphysics of presence that gives hierarchical priority to the known over the unknown and, on the other hand, the 'authentic' questioning stance of 'postmodern wisdom' that gives hierarchical priority to the unknown in its deconstruction of the known. The second aspect is his justification for the claim that Lonergan exhibits a preference for the second option of postmodern wisdom. The third is his claim that Lonergan identifies being with the unknown and, therefore, does not equate being with everything about everything.

In the second part of the essay, I will set forth what seems to me to be a presupposed, dialectical opposition governing Miller's interpretation of Lonergan. It is this presupposition that forces Miller to interpret Lonergan as preferring the unknown to the exclusion of the known and to conclude that Lonergan does not equate being with everything about everything.

In the third part of the essay, I will delineate those aspects of Lonergan relevant to overcoming the dialectical opposition presupposed in Miller's interpretation. First, I will set forth Lonergan's notion of the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned in both the context of 'concrete judgments of fact' and the context of judgments on the correctness of insights.' Second, I will show that the dialectical development of a higher viewpoint does not necessitate the wholesale negation or deconstruction of a lower viewpoint. Third, I will explore how Lonergan's notion of a virtually unconditioned judgment allows one both to transcend the dialectical opposition presupposed in Miller's interpretation and to understand Lonergan's claim that being is the concrete totality of everything about everything.
Of central concern to Miller is whether there is any relevance to the notion of 'wisdom' with the advent of postmodern philosophy. For Miller, the classical or Aristotelian notion of the wise person is one who knows in an infallible way the first principles that govern the universe of meaning that is taken for granted by persons of common sense. In grasping these first principles, the wise person is able to master the whole as whole (being as such) and thereby make fully available and accessible (present) to him or herself the whole of 'what-is-to-be-known.' Moreover, these principles are accorded a privileged or unconditioned status as against all other principles in the construction of a metaphysical system. Accordingly, they ground a 'metaphysics of presence' in which the meaning of being is that which is accessible in its 'presence-at-hand' through these unconditioned first principles.

On Miller's reading, postmodern philosophy has discovered that this notion of wisdom is no longer tenable, for it has shown that these privileged first principles really only serve to protect, disguise and totalize a particular prejudice. As such, they are really presuppositions that are unquestioned and, therefore, taken for granted. However, with this discovery comes the possibility of a more profound notion of wisdom that does not ground a metaphysics of presence through a totalization of a prejudiced perspective in a set of unquestioned first principles. This more profound wisdom realizes that there are no infallible, unconditioned positions and, therefore, it does not pretend to reach any transcendent point of view. Rather, it sets about the task of deconstructing (unmasking) the prejudices that hide behind every claim to a set of infallible, unconditioned first principles governing the meaning of the whole as whole.
Lonergan and the postmodern notion of wisdom

There are two aspects to Miller’s interpretation of Lonergan that allow him to discover this notion of ‘deconstructive’ wisdom in Lonergan’s cognitional theory. First, he interprets Lonergan as holding that infallible judgments are not possible for human beings. This is because the movement toward knowledge is always mediated through a question for reflection which shows that there are many possible answers to any given question; that any one of them might be the correct answer; and that the distance between the question and the correct answer can never be completely traversed or closed. Accordingly, every judgment is subject to revision through further inquiry and, therefore, true wisdom consists in always remaining open to the possibility of being wrong by trusting oneself to the ‘eros of questioning’ without the hope or desire of reaching an unconditioned, infallible judgment.7

Second, because there is an ‘irreconcilable difference,’ ‘radical otherness,’ ‘heterogeneity,’ or ‘incommensurability’ between the unknown intended in further inquiry and the known reached in tentative judgments, to trust oneself to the eros of questioning is a matter not only of remaining open to being wrong but also remaining open to the ‘deconstruction,’ ‘disruption,’ ‘disintegration,’ ‘shattering,’ ‘complete undoing,’ or ‘undermining’ of one’s world ‘as a whole’ and ‘in a primordial way.’8 Accordingly, the attitude of true wisdom gives priority to the unknown intended in questions over the known reached in judgments because the known is always subject to deconstruction in the pursuit of the unknown. In short, the wise person is called to ‘question everything about everything.’9

Identification of being with the unknown

From this perspective that gives priority to the unknown intended in questions over the known reached in judgments, Miller interprets Lonergan’s notion of being. For Miller, Lonergan identifies being solely

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7Miller, Throe of Wonder 18-21, 23-27.
8Miller, Throe of Wonder 38, 65-67, 123-124, 127, 147-149, 156.
9Miller, Throe of Wonder 71.
with the unknown or the absent.\textsuperscript{10} Being is the 'radical other' that is 'irreconcilable' to the known. As such, being 'shatters' our dream of, and possibility for, unquestionable knowledge.\textsuperscript{11}

Of course, this interpretation forces Miller to claim that Lonergan really does not mean it when he says that being is everything about everything. Rather, he only means that it is "no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity ... Being is the transcendens pure and simple."\textsuperscript{12} It seems to me that Miller is forced to this conclusion because some things included in the notion of everything about everything are putatively known and, therefore, because being is equated with the unknown, everything about everything cannot be equated with being.

II

Throughout his argument that Lonergan gives priority to the unknown intended in questions over the known reached in judgments, it appears that Miller presupposes that one must choose between two dialectically opposed attitudes toward the known. On the one hand, one can unquestioningly accept the known, totalizing it into something that comprehends everything about everything. For Miller, this is the attitude of a metaphysics of presence that prefers what it knows because it believes that its judgments are unconditioned (unlimited) and, therefore, absolute without regard to context.\textsuperscript{13} On the other hand, one can question the known, deconstructing it as something that in some sense comprehends nothing about anything. This is the attitude of postmodern wisdom that prefers the unknown because it realizes that all judgments are conditioned (fallible) and, therefore, subject to deconstruction.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}Miller, \textit{Throe of Wonder} 18, 47, 51, 71.
\textsuperscript{11}Miller, \textit{Throe of Wonder} 155-157.
\textsuperscript{12}Miller, \textit{Throe of Wonder} 207 n. 25.
\textsuperscript{13}Miller, \textit{Throe of Wonder} 93.
\textsuperscript{14}Miller, \textit{Throe of Wonder} 29-30, 147.
That this dialectical opposition animates Miller's interpretation of Lonergan is exhibited most clearly when he attempts to resolve the self-referential inconsistency of affirming that all affirmations are subject to revision. Miller begins by stating that we must 'unconditionally' affirm at least one truth, namely, that there is truth. This is because without this truth arrived at in an unconditioned affirmation, the claim that all our judgments are conditioned (fallible) would become meaningless. However, the performance of unconditionally affirming this truth about truth seems to contradict the content of the affirmation that all judgments are conditioned. Miller attempts to resolve this problem by saying that the unconditioned affirmation of this truth does not allow one to claim that one 'possess' this truth. Rather, it is simply a 'recognition' or 'acknowledgment' of the fact that one is subject to the truth and cannot escape a relationship to it. The fact that we do not 'possess' this truth but only 'recognize' it means that we do not hold it in an 'immediate intuition' that is unconditioned.

However, by this distinction between 'possession' and 'recognition,' it does not appear that Miller extricates himself from self-referential inconsistency. Rather, it seems that he places himself right in the middle of it. In essence, he ends up saying that the unconditioned (unlimited) affirmation of the truth that all judgments are conditioned (fallible) is itself a conditioned (fallible) affirmation because we do not 'possess' this truth in an 'immediate intuition.' Miller seems to explicitly recognize and embrace this inconsistency when he states that "a personal act of insight and judgment can be both non-revisable and fallible." 

Throughout Miller's argument one can see how he gravitates back and forth between the two aforementioned attitudes toward the known. On the one hand, he could unquestioningly accept the judgment that there is truth as an unconditioned (unlimited) affirmation. On the other hand, he could question it as a conditioned (fallible) affirmation. Miller sees problems with both attitudes, but he is unable

15 Miller, Throe of Wonder 28-30.
16 Miller, Throe of Wonder 201-202 n. 19.
to discover and articulate the third attitude that would transcend the limitations of the other two. This third attitude is that the grasp of this truth is not constituted by an unconditioned (unlimited) judgment or by a conditioned (fallible) judgment but by a virtually unconditioned (infallible within limits) judgment. Only by appropriating the notion of a virtually unconditioned judgment is one able to navigate the Charybdis of asserting too much and the Scylla of asserting too little.

III

For Lonergan, a virtually unconditioned judgment is grounded in, and an expression of, an act of reflective understanding that emerges in response to a question for reflection. This act of reflective understanding consists of a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment. As such, it involves a grasp of both the conditions for the truth of the prospective judgment and the fulfillment of those conditions. The best way to elucidate what this means is to discuss it in terms of what for Lonergan are the two main types of judgments; namely, concrete judgments of fact and judgments on the correctness of insights.

Concrete judgments of fact

Concrete judgments of fact presuppose that one has already achieved familiarity with a particular domain through the accumulation of a complementary context of direct and reflective insights. For the most part, this context consists of beliefs, which are consequences of reflective insights that have their origin in a responsible decision to

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18 Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, CWL 5: 120-121. Lonergan notes that as a logical matter judgments on the correctness of insights precede concrete judgments of fact because the former do not presuppose an achieved context of insights. However, pedagogically, it is easier to 'back into' judgments on the correctness of insights from concrete judgments of fact.
collaborate in the search for truth by accepting the immanently generated judgments of others.\textsuperscript{19} The conditions for the truth of a concrete judgment of fact are specified by this complementary context of insights and their fulfillment lies in present or remembered data.\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, the virtually unconditioned status of a concrete judgment of fact consists in a reflective grasp of these conditions and their fulfillment.

This can be illustrated by the concrete judgment of fact that each of the jurors is called upon to make in a criminal trial. The question for reflection is whether the defendant committed the crime charged. It is a duty of the judge to instruct the jurors so that they each accumulate a context of insights sufficient to specify all the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to judge that the defendant committed the crime. The fulfillment of the conditions lies on the level of present or remembered evidence that is offered to the jury during the trial. In making their concrete judgments of fact, each of the jurors is expected to grasp through an act of reflective understanding the conditions for the truth of guilt supplied by the instructions and whether those conditions are fulfilled by the evidence presented.

Because the conditions for the truth of a concrete judgment of fact are specified by a presupposed, complementary context of direct and reflective insights, the meaning of the judgment can be determined only from this context. In other words, the context that specifies the conditions for the truth of the judgment qualifies and limits the meaning of the judgment.\textsuperscript{21} Returning to our example of a criminal trial, the meaning of a juror's judgment that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged can be determined only by an examination of the instructions provided to the jury. Through this examination, one discovers the complementary context of insights that elucidates, qualifies, and limits the meaning of the judgment. Such an examination in,
for example, a murder trial would show that a juror’s judgment that the defendant is guilty means, among other things, that the victim was a human being; that the defendant knew that the victim was a human being; that when the defendant acted, he either knew that his act would kill the victim or intended that it would; and that there was no justification for the killing of the victim.

**Judgments on the correctness of insights**

Unlike concrete judgments of fact, judgments on the correctness of insights do not presuppose familiarity with a given domain through the previous accumulation of insights. Instead, they occur at the term of a process of learning that starts from a recognition that one lacks adequate familiarity with a given domain, proceeds through a self-correcting accumulation of a complementary context of insights, and ends with the judgment that one has sufficient familiarity with the given domain to pass reasonable, concrete judgments that certain limited insights are indeed correct. Accordingly, what is essential to the transformation of a prospective judgment on the correctness of insights from a conditioned to a virtually unconditioned through a grasp of sufficient evidence is the self-correcting process of learning. The condition for the truth of a judgment on the correctness of insights is that all questions relevant to a given domain can be asked and indeed have been asked and answered. The fulfillment of this condition lies in the normative exigencies of the self-correcting process of learning that are satisfied only upon the realization of this requirement.

The example of a criminal trial is again helpful in illustrating this point. Recall that it is the judge’s duty to make sure that each juror has accumulated a context of insights adequate for making a concrete judgment of fact about guilt. In fulfilling this duty, the judge, with the help of the attorneys, engages in a self-correcting process of learning.

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that terminates in a judgment that the instructions express the complementary context of insights sufficient for each juror to make this judgment. This self-correcting process involves the judge and the attorneys in a collaborative effort to discern both the legal issues (questions) relevant to the case before them and, based on this, the set of instructions adequate to meet these issues.

Because the condition for the truth of a judgment on the correctness of insights is that all questions relevant to a given domain have been asked and answered, the meaning of the judgment can only be determined with respect to the scope of the questions asked and answered in reaching the judgment. In other words, the scope of the questions relevant to reaching the judgment qualifies and limits the meaning of the judgment. In our example of a criminal trial, the meaning of the judge’s determination that the instructions adequately express the complementary context of insights sufficient for each of the jurors to make a judgment of guilt or innocence is circumscribed and limited by the scope of questions relevant to this determination. Usually questions regarding the defendant’s past criminal record, his character and personality, and his socio-economic status in the community are irrelevant to such a determination and, therefore, its meaning is qualified and limited accordingly.

The dialectical emergence of higher viewpoints

In most situations, one does not come to a given domain as a tabula rasa. Rather, one comes already constituted in a context of insights that one anticipates sufficiently specifies all the conditions necessary to ground virtually unconditioned, concrete judgments of fact. However, questions often emerge with regard to experiences within the domain that cannot be answered by remaining within the limits circumscribed by the context. These further relevant questions may set in motion a far-reaching, collaborative, dialectical development of one’s context such that one progresses to a higher viewpoint that transcends the

24Lonergan, Method 162-165.
limitations of the lower viewpoint. This dialectical development to a higher viewpoint terminates in a judgment on the correctness of insights that has for its condition of truth the correct answering of these further relevant questions.

The progression to a higher viewpoint does not necessarily imply a wholesale acceptance of the higher viewpoint or the wholesale rejection or deconstruction of the lower viewpoint. Rather, each viewpoint is differentiated, delineated and related to the other viewpoint in terms of the scope of questions relevant to reaching the virtually unconditioned judgment on the correctness of insights that grounds it. Accordingly, each viewpoint is accepted within its proper limits, which are known in an act of reflective understanding.

The same is true for all the differentiations of intellectual development, for each differentiation is delineated and related to the others in terms of the scope of questions relevant to its emergence. Lonergan himself delineates and relates common sense description to scientific explanation by means of this standard. From this he concludes that the meaning of common sense and scientific judgments should not in principle conflict, for "all affirmations of empirical science contain the qualifying reservation 'from the viewpoint of explanation,'" and "all the affirmations of common sense contain the qualifying reservation 'from the viewpoint of ordinary description.'"

Transcending the dialectical opposition in Miller

By now it should be clear that for Lonergan one does not have to choose between two dialectically opposed attitudes toward the known. One does not have to accept unquestioningly the known as though it resulted from a grasp of an unconditioned (unlimited) truth that is absolute without regard to context and, therefore, in some fashion comprehends everything about everything. Likewise, one does not always have to question the known as though it resulted from a grasp


\[26\] Lonergan, Method 162-165.

\[27\] Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3: 320.
of a conditioned (fallible) truth that is subject to deconstruction and, therefore, in some fashion comprehends nothing about anything. Rather, one can reasonably accept the known as resulting from a grasp of a virtually unconditioned truth that is absolute within its own proper limits and, therefore, in some fashion comprehends something about something. Bias or prejudice results from the failure to maintain this delicate balance of good judgment.

In the case of a concrete judgment of fact, this attitude is possible because that which determines the meaning of the judgment is the complementary context of direct and reflective insights that specifies the conditions for its truth. Thus, these judgments are known to be absolutely true within the limits circumscribed by this context. In the case of judgments on the correctness of insights, this attitude is possible because that which determines the meaning of the judgment is the scope of questions relevant to reaching the judgment. Thus, these judgments are absolutely true within the limits circumscribed by this scope.

Because Lonergan does not have to choose between these two attitudes toward the known, he is not forced into the position of having to prefer the unknown over the known. Furthermore, then, for Lonergan being is not an unknown ‘other’ that is radically incommensurate with the known. Rather, it is the objective of a notion that intends both all that is known and all that remains to be known through virtually unconditioned judgments. When one asks a question for reflection, one desires to know some aspect of being. When that question is satisfied by an act of reflective understanding issuing in a virtually unconditioned judgment, one actually does know some aspect of being. In a concrete judgment of fact, the context that specifies the conditions for the truth of the judgment qualifies and limits this aspect. In a judgment on the correctness of insights, the scope of questions relevant to reaching the judgment qualifies and limits the aspect. Thus, the notion of being is the supreme heuristic that is the principle of commensurability between the known reached in virtually unconditioned judgments and the unknown intended in further questions.

The difference between the known and the unknown is a difference within a single, all pervasive notion that anticipates being as everything about everything.29

FREDERICK CROWE, THE author of this short book, was a devoted friend of Bernard Lonergan. He has spent forty-four years in the study of Lonergan’s thought. He has a well-deserved reputation for thorough research, intelligently sympathetic interpretation, and carefully weighed judgments. Since Lonergan’s death in 1984 he has had access to the sheaves of unpublished material now housed in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto (including especially a few long letters that may never be made public). In *Lonergan* Crowe has brought these considerable personal and circumstantial resources to bear to produce a lucid overview, from a developmental perspective, of Lonergan’s lifework. Advanced students of Lonergan’s thought no less than newcomers will derive great benefits from a careful reading of *Lonergan*, although in different ways.

The scholar unfamiliar with Lonergan, for whom this book is primarily intended, will be sufficiently informed about what Bernard Lonergan was up to — the grand project, the major steps in its unfolding, the aims and emphases of major writings, the character and temperament of the man — to make the reading of primary sources much easier and gross misinterpretation of them and of Lonergan’s developing positions on major issues much less likely. Budding and mature scholars already engaged in Lonergan studies will receive these
benefits and more. If Crowe’s resources have enabled him to sketch clearly a big picture of Lonergan’s lifework for the uninitiated, they have also enabled him to speak with authority about specific details of that picture that are of special interest to Lonergan scholars. Crowe’s position on issues currently of concern in Lonergan studies, including the challenges he poses to some commonplaces of Lonergan scholarship, should at minimum stimulate scholarly debate and may even alter significantly the trajectory of much Lonergan scholarship.

Crowe’s aim in *Lonergan* is to provide ‘a chronological presentation of a developing mind.’ No attempt is made to give a systematic presentation of Lonergan’s final position. The systematic approach would run counter to Lonergan’s own procedure, which remained ever true to the principle that closed systems of ideas may be expected to be transcended by the same cognitive operations that generated them. Crowe’s interest lies in understanding Lonergan’s ideas within the dynamic intellectual and psychic contexts of their emergence. But the account Crowe gives of the series of dynamic intellectual and psychic contexts is, by his own admission, only a sketch of the background a biography would describe in much greater detail. That sketch, however, is sufficient for Crowe’s purposes, even if it makes *Lonergan* so tantalizing at times that this reader now awaits the biography with some impatience.¹

Crowe adheres to the principle that circumstances play an especially determinative role early in life and become less determinative as one matures; the child is father to the man. Accordingly, the first chapter, entitled “The remote context: home, studies, formation,” deals with the thirty-four years preceding the commencement of Lonergan’s doctoral studies. It is the longest chapter, and it is heavily biographical. In subsequent chapters biographical detail amounts to little more than places and dates as Crowe’s emphasis shifts to the questions, ideas, further questions, and new ideas that seem to take on a life of their own in virtual independence of extrinsic changes in Lonergan’s situation.

¹A biography is currently being prepared by William Mathew, upon whose research Crowe has drawn. See *Lonergan* 29 n. 3.
It is Crowe's contention that Lonergan's experiences in those early years constitute a context we must not ignore if we wish to understand properly Lonergan's later writings. There emerged in the young Lonergan of those pre-doctoral years a prayerful asceticism, a somewhat fatalistic obedience to his superiors, a related love-hate relationship to the Jesuits, a highly critical attitude towards Jesuit education in particular and Catholic education in general, a self-taught style, a respect for and appreciation of intelligence when he (apparently only rarely) encountered it, a deep appreciation for the Latin and Greek classics, and a preference for the synthetic rather than the analytic mode of intellectual activity. Crowe argues that (1) without an understanding of Lonergan's early ascetic training and his conflicts with his Jesuit superiors, we cannot grasp adequately the mature notion of 'self-transcendence' that plays so central a role in his later works; (2) without an understanding of Lonergan's early disappointments with his teachers, we cannot appreciate fully the "extremely negative view of the state of Catholic education [that] would characterize Lonergan throughout his life and orient all his efforts ... " [5-6]; and (3) without an understanding of the young Lonergan's interest in the theoretical analysis of history (the history that is written about), we cannot understand adequately his lifelong passion "to join history to systematics" [55]. This passion drove him in his youth, developed with his study of Thomas Aquinas, and culminated in the placement and function of the specialty Systematics in his last major work, Method in Theology. The penultimate section of Crowe's first chapter, entitled "File 713 — History," provides especially strong evidence in support of this third claim. In it he describes three essays, apparently produced in the middle-to-late 1930s, found in a manila folder marked History among Lonergan's papers after his death. One of the most finished of these was recently published in this journal\(^2\) and bears the lengthy title "Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis [The Restoration of All Things], A Theory of Human Solidarity. A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St Paul. A Theology

\(^2\)**METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies** 9/2 (October 1991): 134-172. The text has been edited by Crowe and R. M. Doran, who supply an editors' preface, endnotes, and editorial notes.
for the Social Order, Catholic Action, and the Kingship of Christ, in incipient outline.”

In the second chapter of Lonergan, “Apprentice to Thomas Aquinas: ‘eleven years of my life,’” Crowe puts in context Lonergan’s two major studies of Aquinas, Grace and Freedom and Verbum. Especially noteworthy here is Crowe’s explicit rejection of the widespread assumption that Lonergan began as a disciple of Thomas Aquinas and may fairly be described as a ‘Thomist.’ That view, which Crowe admits he helped propagate thirty-five years ago, is exploded by his account of the ‘remote context.’ The prominent figures in Lonergan’s early philosophical life were Newman, Augustine, Plato, Marx, and Hegel. Lonergan’s own recollection of his initial first-hand encounter with Thomas’s writings, as late as 1933 when he was nearly thirty, suggests a pre-existing bias, not in favor of Thomas but against him: his first-hand reading led him “to suspect that St Thomas was not nearly as bad as he is painted” [40]. This encounter began to blossom into something like discipleship only when Lonergan began his doctoral studies in 1938. The nature of that discipleship, moreover, is unique, and Crowe’s use of ‘apprentice’ in the chapter title, rather than ‘disciple,’ is deliberate and on the mark. The real value to Lonergan of his doctoral study of Thomas was subjective and methodological, and it was twofold: it lay in Lonergan’s appropriation of the way Thomas worked and thought, on the one hand, and in his appropriation of Thomas’s sense of God as mystery, on the other. Similarly, the Verbum studies of Thomas on the procession of the inner word reveal an already complex Lonerganian Begrifflichkeit at work, which at once exposes and transposes Thomas’s theory of intellect: Thomas’s explicitly metaphysical beginning is found ‘unmanageable,’ and metaphysics becomes a corollary of cognitional theory.

The last section of this chapter, entitled “Is the Later Lonergan Thomist?”, should make interesting reading for specialists and non-specialists alike. Crowe’s position on this question is that Lonergan’s

early studies of Thomas posed for him "a personal problem" [53]: "on
the one hand, his admiration for Thomas was almost boundless; on
the other, he could not deny that seven centuries had passed, and that a
mere repetition of Thomist ideas would fall on deaf ears. He had to
labour to retain his Thomism and yet live at the level of his time ... "
[54]. As Lonergan continued his slow ascent to the level of the times,
through his confrontation with human historicity and historical
consciousness, he came to view Thomas more and more as, in his own
words of 1968, "a man of his time meeting the challenge of his time"
[54]. Crowe is insistent that Lonergan "never lost his enthusiasm for
what Thomas had done in his time" [52], and that he received from
Thomas enormous help in developing a new notion of systematics
based in intentionality analysis; but it seems clear that, to his mind, the
later Lonergan was not a 'Thomist' in any traditional sense.

In the third chapter, "The level of the times (I): Insight," Crowe
turns his attention to Lonergan's most famous work. On Crowe's
account the controlling context of that work was the same passion to
"mount to the level of one's time" [57], "to join history to systematics"
in such a way as to come to terms with historicity without subordin-
nating it to systematics [55], that had driven Lonergan since the early
1930s. But Crowe distinguishes two stages in Lonergan's effort to raise
Catholic thought, which he viewed as seven centuries behind the
times, into the twentieth century. Insight, completed in 1953, consti-
tutes only the first stage, and in it Lonergan addresses two specific
cultural events with which Catholic thought had failed to come to
terms: the overwhelming advances of the scientific revolution and the
critical philosophy of Kant. The second stage, treated by Crowe in the
chapter that follows, is constituted by a variety of 'experiments in theo-
logical method' through which Lonergan comes to grips, not with
natural-scientific advances and their cognitional implications as in
Insight, but with the new human sciences and the specific problems for
Catholic truth posed by the rise of historical consciousness. Crowe

4Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, ed. F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran,
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, volume 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto
points to the putative fact of this two-stage effort to update Catholic thought as "an important corrective ... to the view that Lonergan was an intellectual recluse; on the contrary, he was ... not a pure intellect but a reformer concerned with social decline" [58] This is certainly a point worth making, given the disdainful attitude of praxis-oriented academe towards Catholic thought. However, precisely because that attitude is so widespread and so entrenched, it seems to me that Crowe might have said a little more about Lonergan's understanding of the relation between outmoded Catholic thought and social decline.

Crowe provides a concise overview of the contents of *Insight* and emphasizes the point, which can be made neither too forcefully nor too frequently, that the internal aim of the book is the reader's cognitional self-appropriation. He challenges the "superficial but curiously widespread" [62-63] objection, put forward by a good many reviewers of *Insight* and given undue credence by no less a figure than Karl Rahner,⁵ that Lonergan's cognitional theory is based on, and applies to, natural science alone. Crowe also provides the reader with a schematic account of the emergence of *Insight* through a series of exploratory lectures beginning in 1945. Most interesting to this reader from a research standpoint, though, is Crowe's account of the actual order of composition of the chapters of *Insight*; first, chapters 9-13; second, chapters 1-8; third, chapters 14-20 and the epilogue. Finally, he points out that *Insight* is in large part the result of 'rounding off' a much larger project on the method of theology, forced by a call for Lonergan to begin teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1953.

Crowe's fourth chapter, "Experiments in method: a quarter-century of exploration," deals with the second stage of Lonergan's effort to realize the 'bright dream' of the 1930s of a renovation of Catholic thought. He recounts Lonergan's long struggle to discover "a pass to take us through what he once called the 'impenetrable wall' that scholarship (read: the German Historical School) had set up between theology and its sources" [99]. The dominant theme in Crowe's account

of this struggle is Lonergan’s conception of theological science on an Aristotelian model and his resulting problematic relationship to the two possible orders in theology, the analytic and the synthetic. Crowe’s focus, accordingly, is on Lonergan’s gradual overcoming of a conception of theological sciences weighted towards the speculative. On Crowe’s telling, Lonergan had a somewhat stubborn predilection for the synthetic side of the analytic/synthetic pair. Analysis and history, Crowe observes, gave Lonergan trouble for years; his problem was to get the analytic order into perspective. Lonergan’s eventual solution, which emerged in outline with the breakthrough to the eight functional specialties in February of 1965, involved a twofold enlargement of the very notion of theology. First, the deductive model is replaced by an empirical one according to which scripture and tradition supply data rather than premisses; the theological character of the discipline of theology is not longer to be attributed to its reliance upon revealed truths. Second, the specifically theological component now resides in the intellectual, moral, and religious conversion of the theological subject who mediates the data supplied by scripture and tradition [121].

Two issues, in particular, raised by Crowe’s story of this struggle invite further exploration. Lonergan’s enlarged notion of theology required, on the one hand, a ‘turn to the subject,’ the completion of which Crowe locates in 1961-62, and, on the other hand, the overcoming of the classicist, Aristotelian notion of science, which Crowe sees accomplished in 1964. Both achievements occur, according to Crowe, a good while after the completion of Insight, yet Insight is often discussed and interpreted by Lonergan scholars as though it already bears the marks of these achievements. This phenomenon evokes a number of questions: Just how thorough was the ‘turn to the subject’ in Insight? And just how complete was Lonergan’s appropriation in Insight of modern empirical science?

Crowe provides ample evidence that the post-Insight years were considerably more than an unfolding of ideas already contained in Insight. His distinction of two stages in Lonergan’s effort to update Catholic thought appears well-founded. Lonergan’s confrontation with the problems posed by the German Historical School came later, occasioned by the accident of his move to Rome in 1953. But we may still be
perplexed by the slowness with which Lonergan came to terms after *Insight* with historicity and the history that is written, and by the tenacity with which he seems to have clung to an ideal of theology as fundamentally deductive and speculative. Further, Crowe’s insistence upon the distinction of stages would appear to force a qualification of his own description of *Insight*’s internal aim. How thorough a self-appropriation is promoted by *Insight* if the subject’s historicity is not addressed? It would also seem to weaken somewhat his argument against those who claim that Lonergan relies too heavily in *Insight* upon the model of empirical natural science, if it is only after *Insight* that Lonergan comes to grips with the human sciences. Crowe’s polite accusation of inadvertent anachronism, leveled against those who believe they find in germ in *Insight* the major developments in Lonergan’s position, is, of course, not sufficient to resolve these issues. Perhaps an interpretative study of *Insight* guided by Lonergan’s own account of the key transpositions in the movement from classicism to modernity would throw some light on the issue of just how much of a ‘turn to the subject’ has already occurred in *Insight*, and just how thorough a transcendence of the Aristotelian notion of science has been achieved by *Insight*’s analysis of empirical natural science.

The theme of the penultimate chapter of Lonergan, “The level of the times (II): *Instauratio Magna,*” is the culmination of Lonergan’s lifework in the unique vision of a methodologically integrated theology articulated in his last major work, *Method in Theology*.6 The chapter opens with a briefer rendering of a thesis Crowe elaborated at greater length but before becoming familiar with File 713, over a decade ago in *The Lonergan Enterprise*:7 Lonergan’s achievement “in realized theology fell short of his dreams” of the 1930s. “He did not write the new theology that the level of the times seemed to call for”; but “in potential” his actual achievement “far exceeded” those dreams, for he constructed a

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new organon that would be applicable in deduction or induction, in philosophy or theology, in the pursuit of any project in the field of human studies and human sciences, be it theoretical or practical, present or future, peculiar to one culture or to another ... [105-106]

This characterization of Lonergan’s accomplishment has gained wide currency and is especially helpful, as Crowe noted in The Lonergan Enterprise, as a way not only to emphasize the difference between Lonergan’s notion of method and more common conceptions of method as technique, but also to communicate the depth and breadth of its potential applications.

Crowe offers his own reflections on the widely noted differences between Insight and Method, and he admits the “Method does suffer in comparison” with the monumental earlier work. The treatment of basic categories is less extensive, its style is more schematic, “almost to the point of being laconic,” it does not have the same “leisurely sweep” [107-108]. By way of explanation Crowe points to Lonergan’s weakened condition subsequent to two bouts of cancer-related surgery between 1965 and the completion of Method in 1971. However, Crowe rejects the suggestion that these differences from Insight entitle us to conclude that the thinking in Method is less rigorous than that in Insight. Method has “its own proper standard of rigor,” one more appropriate to treatments of “matters of the spirit,” “reasons of the heart,” and ethics than to mathematics and the natural sciences [107]. This argument may not convince readers of such highly technical treatises as, for example, A. Schutz’s The Phenomenology of the Social World and S. Strasser’s Phenomenology of Feeling, and a better defense might be had by appealing to the emergence of a different manner of controlling and expressing meaning subsequent to the ‘turn to the subject’ that, as Crowe has already claimed, was not complete in Insight.

In Method in Theology history is finally joined to systematics in an enlarged notion of theology as constituted by eight functional specialties, four in a mediating phase and four in a mediated phase. The organization of the specialties in each phase is grounded in the four-level structure of conscious intentionality, and the specialties are distinguished from one another by their emphases on the different sets
of operations, with their proper objects, constitutive of the different levels of conscious intentionality. Crowe is careful to point out that although the various specialties are correlated with specific levels of conscious intentionality all four levels are nevertheless operative in each of the specialties. Those who come to Method without having first studied Insight are especially prone to overlook this complexity in Lonergan's method. Experiential operations are emphasized in Research; intellectual operations, in Interpretation; rational operations, in History; responsible operations, in the pivotal specialties of Dialectic and Foundations; rational operations, once again, in Doctrines; intellectual again in Systematics; and experiential again in Communications.

Crowe concludes the chapter with a review of the ways in which this vision of theology differs from the standard conception of theology as fides quaerens intellectum, faith seeking understanding. The contrast is fourfold. On the standard conception, theology "consists merely of doctrines and systematics," while the remaining specialties are viewed as ancillary [120]. On Lonergan's notion, all eight specialties are intrinsic to theology. More fundamentally, on the standard conception theology is a deductive science whose premisses are supplied by scripture and tradition. On Lonergan's notion theology is an empirical science for which scripture and tradition supply only data. Still more fundamentally, on the standard conception revealed truths supply the specifically theological component, and the holiness of the theologian is extrinsic to theology. On Lonergan's notion the authentically theological component lies in the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions of the theologian [121]. Finally, Crowe alludes to an enlargement of the roles of both the intrinsic and ancillary areas of standard theology entailed by Lonergan's new notion. More generally, the standard theology seeks to establish a fixed and unchanging content, and it would take its stand beyond time and history, in independence from cultural variation and generational change; whereas Lonergan's notion is of a theology for which "there is no definitive content" [105], which "will vary from culture to culture" [105] and, in a given culture, from generation to generation, which "speaks with authority to its time and on the level of its time" [121].
In his final chapter, "From the level of the times to the future," Crowe reflects on two questions to which definitive answers cannot now be given": What is Lonergan's significance? What is the future of the Lonergan movement? Crowe treats Lonergan's contribution under the three headings of 'Conceptuality,' 'Integration,' and 'The Generalist Principle.' A first contribution is the 'set of organized concepts' which Lonergan developed and with which he approached problems — his Begrifflichkeit. A second, more important contribution Crowe finds in the 'integral character' of Lonergan's thinking; that is, in his strategy of appealing always to the immanent dynamism of human consciousness for fundamental orientation and critical grounding. By means of this strategy, Crowe believes, Lonergan was able (1) to provide critical foundations for his metaphysics, (2) to bind the intellectual principle (represented by Plato), the judgmental principle (Aquinas), and the principle of responsibility (Kierkegaard) together in intrinsic relation to one another, and (3) to unite the transcendental and the historical [126-127]. The third contribution Crowe names 'the generalist principle,' by which he seems to mean an attitude and intellectual procedure consistent with Lonergan's transcendence, by virtue of his analysis of the mediating role of insight or understanding, of the universal/particular division [127].

It is Crowe's position that Lonergan's "achievement on the level of the times lies primarily in the instrument he created for doing philosophy and theology, and only secondarily in the philosophy and theology that he himself produced" [129]. Lonergan, then, was fundamentally a methodologist, and Crowe grants "first place in his contribution ... to the organon he constructed ..." [129]. He also maintains, however, that Lonergan did rethink profoundly some basic theological topics — for example, the Law of the Cross, the consciousness of Jesus, the Trinity, the Mystical Body — not to mention the relations of theology to the human sciences and economics. Crowe neglects to mention the philosophical topics Lonergan tackled and transposed, but this may be due to the fact that Crowe's training is theological, on the one hand, and that Lonergan's most basic methodological achievements tended to be philosophical ones, on the other.
For Crowe, who has devoted so many years to the study of Lonergan, the question about the future of the Lonergan movement is a highly personal one. His own view is that Lonergan will turn out to be very much more than his critics allow, and that his thought will give "a radical turn to theology, philosophy, the human sciences and human studies in general" [133-134]. But only time will tell. In the meantime Crowe offers some words of consolation to Lonerganians marginalized by academe. While our isolation from the academic mainstream may be to some extent our own creation, it is not entirely our doing. Lonergan's *Insight*, for example, is conspicuously absent from the bibliographies of books and conferences on understanding. Theologians dismiss Lonergan on the ground that he's a philosopher. Philosophers dismiss him on the ground that he's a theologian. For Crowe, our isolation is largely the result of this uninformed tendency to write Lonergan off. My own experience confirms this. I have sought Lonergan's name without success so often in the indexes of new philosophical books that I feel myself on the brink of deconstructive revelations whenever I think 'logic' and 'love' in sequence. I have also observed dismissals of Lonergan's work by top-ranking Thomists, post-Kantian idealists, linguistic analysts, and Reformed epistemologists. The core of the problem, Crowe believes, is not so much 'group bias' as it is the difference, difficulty, and revolutionary nature of the Lonergan idea. The profundity and breadth of that idea explain, partially at least, not only Lonerganians' isolation from mainstream scholarship but also their isolation from one another —

we are all of us reaching up to the mind of Lonergan; each has reached a plateau but at different levels and on different sides of the mountain of his thought; we talk from our several plateaus and relate what we have discovered, but mostly we are too far apart for the talk to issue in conversation [135].

Crowe recommends to those who study Lonergan the same relentless perseverance, patience, humility, and charity [136] that made Lonergan's life — and these are Crowe's final words on the subject — "no mean act of self-transcendence" [138].
Lonergan also contains a bibliography of selected primary and secondary readings and a seven-page computer-generated index. The index will be very useful to anyone who wishes to discover quickly Crowe’s estimation of the developmental significance of specific lectures and writings by Lonergan, for page references are given to both the text and the endnotes for every mention of these. On the other hand, it is primarily an index of proper names and titles and contains only six terms: ‘analysis/synthesis,’ ‘conversion,’ ‘economics,’ ‘functions of theology,’ ‘history,’ and ‘method.’ Any disappointment students of Lonergan may feel with the index in this regard, though, will be dispelled when they discover that ‘London, University of’ is separated from ‘Longman, T. M.’ by four columns of references to ‘Lonergan.’

In conclusion, the story Crowe tells of Bernard Lonergan’s intellectual journal does serve to reinforce the impression of Lonergan, widely held among those who have studied him the longest, as an extraordinarily exigent inquirer. He was committed to thinking at the level of the times and from the level of the times to the future. Consequently he was something of an intellectual ‘loner’ [ix], relatively unimpressed by ‘weekend celebrities’ [136], to use Lonergan’s own phrase, whose absorption in the effort to understand thoroughly is less than constant and whose theories amount to little more than old wine in new bottles. On the other hand, Crowe’s story will serve to inhibit the tendency adherents of great thinkers often have to view their mentor’s intellectual journey as a series of reflective and deliberative steps towards a fairly clearly envisioned goal. Lonergan’s life at least, on Crowe’s telling, was not ‘planned’ in this way: “He had an early dream of the pantôn anakephalaiosis, and he pursued it for many years, but he allowed circumstances (and his superiors) to direct him: One step enough for me” [137].

Crowe’s faithfulness to this realistic view is reflected throughout Lonergan in his attention to the complexity, the structural fluidity, the concrete particularity, and the variable direction of Lonergan’s actual intellectual life. Accordingly, for a small book, Lonergan is very rich, and one should not conclude otherwise from the unavoidably
schematic nature of this review. While Crowe’s familiarity with the relevant data scattered across eight decades and his facility at drawing connections between earlier and later developments may at times leave the reader a bit disoriented and wishing for a chronological table, they also serve to open up numerous avenues of further fruitful inquiry, only a few of which have been indicated here. And besides the further questions to be evoked for the interested reader by the text proper, there are those to be occasioned by the endnotes to which twenty-five of Lonergan’s 146 pages are devoted. For the Lonergan scholar this little book will be a feast. For scholars unfamiliar with Lonergan it will provide more than enough nourishment to fuel a first-hand investigation of Lonergan’s thought.
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