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CONTRIBUTORS

David A. Nordquest

received his doctorate in political science from Duke University and is the author of recent articles in Polity and P.S.: Political Science and Politics. He has taught at Mercyhurst College and at Penn State - Erie, and is currently completing research on Eric Voegelin’s criticism of natural law.

Robert M. Doran

is Professor of Systematic Theology at Regis College, University of Toronto, and Assistant Director of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto. He is one of the general editors, with Frederick E. Crowe, of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. His own most recent book is Theology and the Dialectics of History (University of Toronto Press, 1990).

Terry J. Tekippe

has been interested in Lonergan’s work since studying at the Gregorian University in the early 1960s. Past editor of the Lonergan Studies Newsletter, he has edited Papal Infallibility: An Application of Lonergan’s Method, and his Lonergan and Thomas on the Will: An Essay in Interpretation is forthcoming. Currently the holder of a Lonergan Post-Doctoral Studies Fellowship at Boston College, he is Professor of Theology at Notre Dame Seminary in New Orleans.
EDITORIAL NOTE

Book reviews

In future issues, it is hoped that METHOD will include reviews of many of the growing number of books on Lonergan and his work, books that develop or draw on his thought in important ways, and books that are likely to be of interest to readers of this journal.

Potential reviewers are invited to make themselves and their areas of expertise known. The editors will also welcome suggestions as to titles that might appropriately be reviewed in METHOD.

Books for review should be sent to: Charles Hefling, METHOD, Department of Theology, Carney Hall 417, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806.

Submission of manuscripts

Please note that beginning with the current volume METHOD asks that references to Insight, Collection, and Understanding and Being cite the editions published in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. As further volumes of CWL appear they will be included in this policy. It will be helpful, however, though not required, to include as well a citation of the corresponding page or pages in the older editions.

Manuscripts submitted to METHOD must be double-spaced throughout, including footnotes. Printouts should be 'letter quality.' Three copies should be sent, which will be returned only if proper postage is included.

METHOD is word-processed using Apple Macintosh computers and Microsoft WORD® software. All authors, but particularly those who use the same equipment, are urged to submit accepted articles on diskette.

Responses

In the spirit of 'ongoing collaboration' that Lonergan envisioned as emerging from his work, the editors invite responses to any of the articles appearing in METHOD. Responses of substantial length will be refereed in the same way as articles.
LONERGAN'S
"ANALYTIC CONCEPT OF HISTORY"

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

WE CONTINUE HERE the publication, begun a year ago with Lonergan's "Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,"¹ of papers from that most intriguing file which he numbered 713 and named simply "History." The Pantôn essay was dated with all precision "Dominica in Albis 1935." We cannot be so precise on the one being published here, but reference is made early in the work to a book that first appeared in 1937, so we are able to assign the summer of that year as a limit ante quod non.² The limit post quod non can be assigned with high probability as the fall of 1938, when Lonergan began his doctoral program and would be fully occupied with courses and dissertation.

More general indications support this dating. Thirty-five years later he himself spoke of 1937-38 as the period in which he became interested in a philosophy of history,³ his own catalogue of his papers lists 713 with the title and remark "Philosophy of History — from 1937


²See the reference to W.R. Thompson, p. 7 of the text, and our note 3 at that point. The book says of itself "First published 1937." Lonergan finished his basic theology with a two-hour oral examination on June 29 of that year; it seems unlikely that he would have seen Thompson's book or worked seriously on his history essays before mid or late summer.

Eight sheaves in this file are obviously a group, written before World War II broke out and while Pius XI was still Pope. That the present work belongs to that group and, therefore, to the 1937-38 period is part of a general picture that need not be narrated here.

It is possible indeed, and even probable, that "Analytic Concept of History" was Lonergan's final effort in this early period to work out a theory of history, and the last in chronology of the eight sheaves he kept together in File 713. For one thing, it has the notation on the title page 'Return to Father Lonergan,' an indication that this is the paper he would lend to those who wished to study his views on history. That would account for its being on top of the others, and tend to justify the 'reverse order' for the location of this item at least. Again, Michael Shute, in his doctoral work on this file, came to the conclusion on internal evidence that of the eight items this had the most advanced doctrine.

Nevertheless, three of the papers are so closely related to one another in title and content as to be practically contemporaneous; they are: "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History," "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," and the present paper, "Analytic Concept

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4The file begins with notes on Toynbee, A Study of History. A 1981 interview in Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1983), p. 88, enables us to date these notes with fair precision in the years 1940-42: Lonergan read Toynbee when he was teaching theology at l'Immaculée-Conception College in Montreal (1940-46), and his friend, Jim Shaw, would get him the books from the McGill University Library (Shaw and Lonergan were in the same community 1940-42). The file has other stray items of bibliography and notes, all on paper of the size in favor at l'Immaculée-Conception when Lonergan was teaching there; John Hochban, who certainly catalogued the papers in the order in which he found them, quite rightly grouped these together with the Toynbee notes and called them 'Item 1.' Lonergan's catalogue notation, 'from 1937 on,' can be taken as a rough guide only, since the 1935 Pâton paper is included, and perhaps the same may be said about the notation, 'probably in reverse order.'

5For the general unity and rough sequence of the eight papers, see Michael R. Shute, The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History, 1933-1938 (Th.D. dissertation, Regis College, Toronto School of Theology, 1990).
Lonergan's "Analytic Concept of History." The first of these seems to be an initial draft, and the others two separate efforts at a final draft; in any case cross-references among the three often illuminate obscurities in one or the other.

This is not the place to set forth the long story of Lonergan's work on the structure of history, but two salient points will show the interest of this paper for his later writings, and in particular for the volumes of the Collected Works being published at the present time. To begin with, he regarded chapter 20 of Insight as the structure of history on which he had worked fifteen years earlier. Further, in Topics in Education, his 1959 lectures, he tied his notion of this structure to his notion of the developing human good. With these two works now appearing, Insight in the spring of 1992, Topics probably within the next year, it seems time to make this essay of 1937-38 available, more especially in view of the long wait before papers from the Archives are likely to be published in their own volume of the Collected Works.

Our present editing follows the pattern established for that collection. Lonergan's spelling, punctuation, and other such usages are made to conform to the Oxford American Dictionary and The Chicago Manual of Style. We use numbers for subsections where he often used letters. Editorial insertions are enclosed in square brackets. Scripture quoted in English is left as we found it, but Latin quotations are transferred to the footnotes and the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) used in the text. With rare exceptions other Latin and Greek words and phrases are likewise transferred to the notes, and the editor's translation inserted in the text.

Lonergan's listing of subtitles is repetitious, but we include them all. As usual we leave alone his use of 'man' and his unecumenical

6 A Second Collection, p. 272; chapter 20 of Insight was written in 1953. See also Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), p. 55, n. 21.

7 See the transcript prepared by James and John Quinn under the title, The Philosophy of Education (1979), p. 28, at the end of lecture 1. The lectures are to be published under the title, Topics in Education, as volume 10 of the Collected Works.

8 In the present plan, various archival papers will be published in volume 21 of the Collected Works.
language, but since the latter is strongly in evidence here, it may be noted that Yves Congar published his *Chrétien désunis* in the very year that Lonergan began to develop the interest shown by the history essays in File 713 (1937); it would be several years before the ecumenical movement that Congar represented touched his work.

—— F.E. Crowe
ANALYTIC CONCEPT OF HISTORY

Bernard J.F. Lonergan, s.J.

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1. ANALYTIC CONCEPTS

1.1 Concepts of apprehension and concepts of understanding

1.2 Analytic and synthetic acts of understanding

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1.1 Concepts of apprehension and concepts of understanding

By the concept of apprehension we know the object, what it is, what it is not; we do not understand it, know why it is what it is. The botanical definitions of flora would seem [to be] of this type.

By the concept of the understanding, in addition to knowing what the object is and what it is not, we also know what makes it what it is; and in this knowledge we have a premise to further knowledge. From the definition of a flower you can deduce nothing, save by what W.R. Thompson calls 'descending induction,' which is either a begging of the question or a guess. From the definition of the circle you deduce the properties of the circle.

1.2 Analytic and synthetic acts of understanding

Any act of understanding is the apperceptive unity of a many: rather, any human act [of understanding], for God's is One of the One.

Now if the many be abstract terms, we have analytic understanding.

If the many be concrete, we have synthetic understanding.

Examples of the latter are, say, Christopher Dawson's historical essays, Newman's illative sense. Examples of [the] former, infra.

1.3 Logical and real analysis

When the act of understanding is the unification of abstract terms, these terms may be a logical or a real multiplicity.
The essential definition of man, 'rational animal,' is a logical multiplicity, genus and difference.

The following analytic concepts are based upon real analysis.

The metaphysical concept of material reality as a compound of existence and essence, accident and substance, matter and form.

The chemist's concept of material things as compounds of elements.

The Newtonian analysis of planetary motion as a straight line modified by accelerations towards the sun and the other planets.\(^8\)

1.4 Progress of the understanding

Understanding progresses from the more general to the more particular; it progresses through incomplete acts to the perfected act.\(^9\)

First we understand things diagrammatically, in outline; we get the main point, the basic point of view; then we fill in the details.

1.5 The analytic concept of history

It is an act of understanding: knowing why history is what it is.

It is based upon analysis not synthesis: it does not proceed from historical fact to theory, but from abstract terms to the categories of any historical event.

Its analysis is real not logical: nature, sin, and grace are not a logical but a real multiplicity.

Its real analysis is not of the static (being) but of the dynamic (action), and so its conclusions are not merely metaphysical categories as essence and existence but a causally and chronologically interrelated view, as the Newtonian astronomy.

Finally, the analytic concept of history is of maximum generality:\(^10\) we aim only at the fundamental and primordial understanding of history.
2. HISTORY

2.1 History and historiography
2.2 Material and formal objects of history
2.3 The formal object of the analytic concept of history

2.1 [History and historiography]

Distinguish [a] history that is written, history books; call it historiography; [b] history that is written about.\(^1\)

2.2 [Material and formal objects of history]

The material object of history is the aggregate of human thoughts, words and deeds.

The formal object of history is this aggregate placed in a perspective by the historian’s principle of selection. Now this principle of selection is that ‘an event is historic in the measure it influences human action.’ Hence we may simply say that history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes. As such it is a science.

But it is to be noted that the historian considers the aggregate only by considering the parts, that he finds his causes principally not without but within the aggregate, and finally that effect is only a different aspect of cause so that asking what are the effects of given actions is tantamount to asking the cause of subsequent ones.

2.3 [The formal object of the analytic concept of history]

The formal object of the analytic concept of history is to be obtained by removing from the formal object of history all that is not subject to a priori determination, so far as our knowledge goes.\(^2\)

The formal object of history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes (or effects). From this we remove the following elements.

First, because there is no science of the particular, we shall not be concerned with, Who did it? with persons or peoples, but solely with, What is done?
Second, because the action of the First Cause though more excellent in itself is less known to us, we shall confine ourselves to secondary causes. N.B. This will not exclude a hypothetical consideration of the supernatural virtues and the conditions of their emergence in history.

Third, among secondary causes we must distinguish essential and accidental, to omit the latter.

Among accidental causes are acts of a human person that do not involve the human element and ‘acts of God’ such as plagues, famines, earthquakes, floods. We do not pretend to deny that such events may have the greatest historical importance (for example, the Black Death); our position is that history is not essentially a succession of such events.

The essential causes of history are human wills, not in their immanent merits or demerits, but in their effective transience by which they influence others both directly and indirectly.

By direct influence we mean the influence exerted by one man upon others, whether it is convincing of what is true, persuading to what is right, indoctrinating with falsehood, conspiring to evil, or adding to all these the necessary use of force.

By indirect influence we mean the influence of the manmade environment, for instance, that of being born and brought up in Mayfair or in the jungle; also, the influence of the historical situation which past action created and present action has to face.

Fourth, in the essential causes of history we distinguish between those of formal and those of material import, that is, between vectors which give the magnitude and direction of forces and mere friction. The former is will exerted upon the manner of life; the latter is the will to live and to propagate.

Briefly, the formal object of the analytic concept of history is the MAKING AND UNMAKING OF MAN BY MAN.

To the objection that the human will is free, that it is not subject to a priori determination, that therefore it cannot enter into our own view of the formal object of the analytic concept (see §2.3 above), we answer that we have a method of outflanking this difficulty which will appear in due course.
3. THE DIALECTIC

3.1 The nature of the dialectic

By the dialectic we do not mean Plato's orderly conversation, nor Hegel's expansion of concepts, nor Marx's fiction of an alternative to mechanical materialism.

We do mean something like a series of experiments, a process of trial and error; yet not the formal experiment of the laboratory, for man is not so master of his fate; rather an inverted experiment, in which objective reality molds the mind of man into conformity with itself by imposing upon him the penalty of ignorance, error, sin and at the same time offering the rewards of knowledge, truth, righteousness.

Suffice to note that objective reality does not mean merely material reality: it means all reality and especially Reality itself.

The illustration of the process is to be had from the microcosm: as the individual learns and develops so does mankind.

3.2 The existence of the dialectic

The material object of history is an aggregate: if it is simply a many without any intelligible unity, there is no possibility of there being a dialectic. If there is some unity, then at least the dialectic is possible.

That the dialectic is possible follows from the solidarity of man.

What is this solidarity? Apart from the obvious biological fact, it may be summed up in the phrase: We make ourselves not out of ourselves but out of our environment (where environment has the universality of the Ignatian 'other things'15).

We make ourselves, for the will is free.

We do not make ourselves out of ourselves: "Anything that is moved is moved by something else."16 The motion of action comes from outside us; the specification of action comes from outside us,
though we may choose this specification in preference to that, or refuse any.

We make ourselves out of our environment: the physical environment that makes the geographical differentiations of men and manners and cultures; the social environment of the family and education, the race and tradition, the state and law.

Solidarity makes the dialectic possible. Is it actual?

The question is already answered. Man's freedom is limited. The will follows the intellect in truth, or obscures it to error, or deserts it to leave man an animal. The last is either sporadic and accidental and so of no concern to essential history, or it is based upon the second, the obscuration of the intellect. Now whether men think rightly or wrongly, they think in a herd. The apparent exception is [the] genius, who however is not the fine flower of individuality but the product of the age and the instrument of the race in its progress. The illusory exception is acceptance by the herd of the liberal dogma of, Think for yourself, along with all its implications.

3.3 The subject of the dialectic

Strictly the subject of the dialectic is any group united in time and place that think alike.

Practically, we may consider as the subject of the dialectic the social unit of tribe or state. The tribe or state creates a channel of mutual influence and within it men both tend to agree and, when not so inclined, are forced to agree, at least to the extent of acting as though they did. Thus, in all public affairs and variously in private matters, the members of a social unit are ruled by a common way of thought. This is the dominant and the socially effective thought; it governs action; and all other, whatever be its future, is for the moment little more than mere thought.

But ideas have no frontiers. Thus above the dialectics of single social units we may discern a 'multiple dialectic' whose subject is humanity. It is constituted by the many dialectics of the different social
units, in their interactions and their transferences from one unit to another.

3.4 The form of the dialectic

We have already defined the dialectic as an inverted experiment in which objective reality molds the mind of man into conformity with itself.

The following observation will make this more precise.

Because the unity of the dialectic is the unity of thought that goes into action, it follows that this thought produces the social situation with its problems. If the thought is good, the problems will be small and few; thus the situation will require but slight modifications of previous thought and leave man opportunity to advance and develop. If, on the other hand, the thought is poor, then its concrete results will be manifestly evil and call for a new attitude of mind.

Taking the matter more largely, we may say that the dominant thought at any time arose from preceding situations; that its tendency is to transform the actual situation either by correction or by development; that the transformed situation will give rise to new thought and this not merely to suggest it but to impose it by the threat of suffering or the promise of well-being.

3.5 Rates of the dialectic

Roughly we may distinguish three rates of the dialectic: normal, sluggish, and feverish. Normal defines itself. Sluggish would be the lack of response to the evils in the objective situation, whether this be from lack of intelligence or from fatalistic resignation or from the imprisonment of the individual in a straightjacket social scheme. Feverish would be excessive activity and this from the intolerable pressure of objective evil or from unbalanced optimism or from the breakup of society.

From this difference of rate, it will be seen that when the dialectic is sluggish essential history is at a standstill; when it is feverish, then essential history moves at a dizzy pace. Thus the dormant East will not
exemplify our theory as does the history of the last four hundred years in Europe.

4. THE THREE CATEGORIES

4.1 Human actions fall into three categories
4.2 This division is metaphysically ultimate
4.3 Higher synthesis is impossible

4.1 Human actions fall into three categories

Man acts according to nature, contrary to nature, above nature.

The three categories are nature, sin, grace.

4.2 [This division is metaphysically ultimate]

Action according to human nature is intelligible to man.

Action contrary to nature is unintelligible.

Action above nature is too intelligible for man.

But the intelligible, unintelligible and too intelligible are metaphysically ultimate categories: they stand on the confines of our intelligence itself.

N.B. By stating that action contrary to nature is unintelligible, we do not mean that it is unknowable. Sin is a possible object of the judgment; it is not a possible object of the understanding. For the understanding is the power by which we know why a thing is what it is: but sin of its very nature has no 'why it is what it is.' Sin admits no explanation: it is a desertion of reason and so has no reason that is more than a pretense. Why did the angels sin? Why did Adam sin? There is no 'why.' We do not say there is a why which we cannot know: we say there is no why to be known. We do not say that God had not excellent reasons for permitting sin: so we do not evacuate the 'mystery of lawlessness'; indeed, we add another mystery which however is not a mystery from excess of intelligibility but from lack of it. Hence, "Let no one try to learn from me what I know I do not know; unless perhaps he learns not to know what should be known as something that cannot be known" (Augustine, The City of God 12, 7).\textsuperscript{17}
4.3 *Higher synthesis is impossible.*

To posit a higher synthesis there must be the possibility of setting an antithesis against the thesis. But our thesis includes the intelligible to man, the simply\(^{18}\) unintelligible, and the too intelligible for man. Outside these categories there is nothing, and so an antithesis is impossible.

5. **THE IDEAL LINE [OF HISTORY]**

5.1 What is meant by an ideal line
5.2 What is the ideal line of history
5.3 What is the earthly task of man
5.4 That there is progress
5.5 That the progress may be determined from the nature of mind
5.6 The nature of the mind of man, insofar as concerns us
5.7 The three periods of history and their characteristics

5.1 *What is meant by an ideal line*

In mechanics the ideal line is drawn by Newton's first law: That a body continues to move in a straight line with uniform speed as long as no extrinsic force intervenes. It is the first approximation in the determination of every mechanical motion. And its value is undiminished by the fact that in this world of ours, the first law is absolutely impossible of actual verification.

Hence by an ideal line of history we mean the determination of the course of events that supplies the first approximation to any possible course of human history.

5.2 *What is the ideal line of history*

The ideal line of history is the history that would arise did all men under all conditions in all thoughts, words, and deeds obey the natural law, and this without the aid of grace.
It envisages, then, a state of pure nature, in which men as a matter of fact do not sin, though they are not destined to a supernatural end and do not need the 'healing grace' that counteracts the wounds of original sin.

5.3 What is the earthly task of man

The proximate end of man is the making of man: giving him his body, the conditions of his life, the premonitions to which he will respond in the fashioning of his soul.

Essentially history is the making and unmaking and remaking of man: in the ideal line we consider only the making of man by man.

5.4 That there is progress

The earthly task of man is not a routine but a progress.

"In the genus of intelligible things the human being is as potency." "Understanding progresses through incomplete acts to the perfected act."

But this gradual actuation of man's intellectual potency is the achievement not of the individual, nor of a few generations, but of mankind in all places and through all time. What the angel, a species to himself, attains instantaneously in an eon — an indefinitely distended point, that man achieves in time, the whole time of his earthly existence.

5.5 That the course of human progress may be determined from the nature of the human mind

The instrument of human progress is the mind of man. If then the mind of man is such that some things must be known first and others later, an analysis of mind will reveal the outlines of progress.

5.6 The nature of the mind of man

The human intellect is a conscious potency conditioned by sense.

Insofar as it is a conscious potency, there are two types of intellectual operation: spontaneous and reflex.
Since the reflex use of intellect presupposes the discovery of the canons of thought and the methods of investigation, it follows that there is first a spontaneous period of thought and second a period of reflex thought.

Next, inasmuch as the human intellect is conditioned by experience we may roughly distinguish two fields of knowledge.

First there is the philosophic field in which thought depends upon the mere fact of experience (general metaphysic) or upon its broad and manifest characters (cosmology, rational psychology, ethics).

Second there is the scientific field in which thought depends not upon experience in general nor upon its generalities but upon details of experience observed with the greatest care and accuracy.

Finally, roughly corresponding to these two fields of knowledge are two manners or methods of thought: deductive from the general to the particular; inductive from the particular to the general.

Now on the one hand deductive thought proceeds in a straight line of development, while on the other inductive thought proceeds in a series of revolutions from theses through antitheses to higher syntheses.25

Deductive thought proceeds in a straight line, for its progress is simply a matter of greater refinement and accuracy. There is an exception to this rule, for deductive thought does suffer revolutionary progress until it finds its fundamental terms and principles of maximum generality: there were philosophers before Aristotle, and, more interesting, modern mathematics has been undergoing revolutions not because mathematics is not a deductive science but because the mathematicians have been generalizing their concepts of number and space.

Inductive thought proceeds by thesis, antithesis and higher synthesis. This follows from the nature of the understanding, the intellectual light that reveals the one in the many. For 'intellect is per se infallible';26 but de facto understanding is of things not as they are in themselves but as they are apprehended by us. The initial understanding of the thesis is true of the facts as they are known, but not all are known; further knowledge will give the antithesis and further understanding the higher synthesis.
Thus, there are two ways of being certain of one's understanding: the first is philosophic and excludes the possibility of higher synthesis; the second is full knowledge of the facts, Newman's real apprehension. Granted a real apprehension and an understanding of what is apprehended, we may be certain: for 'intellect is per se infallible,' while the real apprehension excludes the possibility of antithetical fact arising.

5.7 The three periods of history and their characteristics

First, from the distinction of spontaneous and reflex thought, we have three periods of history: (a) spontaneous history and spontaneous thought; (b) spontaneous history and reflex thought; (c) reflex history and reflex thought.

The first period is from the beginning to the discoveries of philosophy and science. The second period is from these discoveries to the social application of philosophy and science to human life in its essential task: the making of man.

The third is society dominated by the consciousness of its historic mission: the making or unmaking of man.

We would note that the second period does not end with the writing of Plato's Republic, nor even with the medieval application of philosophy to society, but rather with the social passion for an ideal republic that marked the French Revolution, the nineteenth-century liberals, the modern communists, and the promised Kingship of Christ through Catholic Action and missiology. The 'class consciousness' advocated by the communists is perhaps the clearest expression of the transition from reflex thought to reflex history.

Second, from the distinction of philosophic and scientific, deductive and inductive thought, we may distinguish two levels of thought in each of the three periods. Thus:
(a) Spontaneous thought and history
Deductive field: popular religion and morality
Inductive field: agriculture, mechanical arts
          economic and political structures
          fine arts, humanism
          discovery of philosophy and science

(b) Reflex thought but spontaneous history
Deductive field: religion and morality on philosophic
          basis
Inductive field: applied science, international law
          (universal law)31
          enlightenment
          theories of history

(c) Reflex thought and history
Deductive field: the 'general line' of history philo-
          sophically determined (compare
          Stalin's general line)32
Inductive field: edification of world state

Third, to this table we may add certain general norms.
(a) Progress is from the spontaneous social unit of tribe or race to
    the reflex social unit of the state.
(b) The development of humanistic culture presupposes large-
    scale agriculture, its universalization presupposes applied science:
    priority of the economic as a condition.
(c) The tendency of progress is to remove man from his depen-
    dence upon nature to dependence upon the social structure, to substi-
    tute state for kinship.
(d) The greater the progress, the greater [also is] the differen-
    tiation of occupation, the more complex the social structure, and the
    wider its extent: for man progresses by intellect's domination over
    matter; but this domination is that of the universal over the many: its
    exploitation, hierarchy.33 (Progress as intellectual)34
(e) Man must not permit himself to be led by the nose by this
    progress: the result would be wonderfully intelligible but not human.
Man has an intellect, but he is not an intellect. Virtue is in the man, even the virtue of progress. (As human)

6. DECLINE

6.1 The nature of decline
6.2 The goal of decline
6.3 The three forms of decline
6.4 Minor decline
6.5 Major decline
6.6 Compound decline

6.1 [The nature of decline]

We defined the ideal line as the constant and complete observance of the natural law. Decline is the deviation from the ideal line that is consequent to nonobservance.

It is to be noted that we deal not with a new line but with a deviation from the line already established. Though in this outline we merely indicate the abstract form of decline, it is not to be inferred that we have left over a problem of relating decline with the ideal line but only of making the theory of decline more full and detailed.

6.2 [The goal of decline]

The goal of decline is contained in its principle, sin. Sin is the repudiation of reason in a particular act. Decline is the social rule of sin, its gradual domination of the dialectic and the minds of men dependent upon this dialectic because of their solidarity. Thus the goal of decline is the unchaining of the animal with intellect, so far from being master, that it is the slave of instinct and passion.

Plainly this triumph of the beast differs in the three periods: the degenerate savage, Nero, and the New Paganism of Germany differ vastly; but they would seem to be triumphs of the beast on different levels of history.
6.3 [The three forms of decline]

The three forms of decline, minor and major and compound, are distinguished as follows.

Minor is the effect of sin in the inductive field of thought.
Major is the effect of sin in the deductive field of thought.
Compound is the combination and interaction of both together.

6.4 [Minor decline]

Practical progress or social improvement proceeds by the laws of inductive thought: its theses indeed are not simply false, else they could hardly begin to function; but they are incomplete, as classical education is incomplete and so finds an antithesis in the modern side.

Now the new syntheses of progressive understanding have three disadvantages: (a) it is not clear that they offer the better, for concrete issues are complex; (b) it is certain they threaten the liquidation of what is tried and established, and so they meet with the inevitable bias and opposition of the vested interests; (c) in most cases they contain an element of risk and demand the spirit that contemns the sheltered life — insured from tip to toe — and so meet with the condemnation of all whose wisdom is more lack of courage than penetration of intellect.

Thus the mere fact of progress produces social tension, and every little boy or girl is born liberal or conservative. But minor decline begins with sin.

"For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil."36

Self-interest is never enlightened because it is never objective: it sees the universe with the 'ego' at the center, but the 'ego' of the individual or the class or the nation is not the center.

This bias of practical thought transforms the distinction of those who govern and those who are governed into a distinction between the privileged and the depressed. The latter distinction in time becomes an abyss: its mechanism would seem [to be] as follows. Insensibly the privileged find the solution to the antitheses of their own well-being and progress. Too easily they pronounce nonexistent or
insoluble the antitheses that militate against the well-being of the depressed.

Thus it is that with the course of time, the privileged enjoy a rapid but narrowly extended expansion of progress, and meanwhile the depressed are not merely left behind but more or less degraded by the set of palliatives invented and applied to prevent their envy bursting into the flame of anger and revolution. The total result is an objective disorder: both the progress of the few and the backwardness of the many are distorted; the former by its unnatural exclusiveness, the latter by the senseless palliatives. And this distortion is not merely some abstract grievance waiting on mere good will and polite words to be set right: it is the concrete and almost irradicable form of achievements, institutions, habits, customs, mentalities, characters.

So much for minor decline.

6.5 Major decline

The essence of major decline is sin on principle. When men sin against their consciences, their sins are exceptions to a rule that is recognized and real. When they deform their consciences, sin from being the exception to the law becomes the law itself. This erection of sin into a law of action is the essence of major decline.

There are three elements in the deformation of the conscience.

First, there is the tendency to self-justification. The consciousness of man seeks the harmony of unity and consistency: by his actions man is sinful; therefore he will either reform his actions by doing penance or he will reform his conscience by denying sin to be sin. See Isaiah 5:20ff.

Second, there is the objective foundation that gives this lie in the soul its color of truth. Men sin, and the effects of their sins are concrete and real and objective. They set a dilemma to the just man: for if he acknowledges the fait accompli he cooperates with injustice; and if he refuses to acknowledge it, then he lives in an imaginary world and cannot cope with the real one. But to the unjust such situations are but proof that justice is injustice, that good is evil and evil good, that right is wrong and wrong right.
Third, as a combination and generalization of the preceding two: there is the discrediting of deductive knowledge. Socrates can demonstrate to his heart’s content: it is obvious he is wrong and that’s all about it (see Gorgias). Or in the period of reflex thought, philosophy turns from the contemplation of truth to the problem, Why are all the philosophers wrong?

Thus the major decline is the gradual procession, from sins to sins on principle, and from sins on principle to the dethronement of reason and the emancipation of the beast (see Nebuchadnezzar, Apocalypse).

But major decline may be viewed from another standpoint: that of the understanding. The yielding of deductive thought is marked by an invasion of understanding into the deductive field. The inertia of a culture makes for the preservation of all the good that can be saved at each stage of the wrecking process. Thus we have a series of lower syntheses. In the spontaneous period this is expressed by the gradual corruption of the gods. In the reflex period we have: Christendom, Protestantism, rationalism, liberalism, naturalism, communism, nationalism.

6.6 Compound decline

Both the major accelerates the minor and vice versa.

The major accelerates the minor. It deprives science — notably, economics — and practical thought of the guidance of the first principles of religion and morality. Of itself the minor tends to disorder; coupled with the major its goal is an unintelligible chaos. For sin is unintelligible: action guided by sin results in the unintelligible — no mere antithesis to be easily swallowed by some higher synthesis, but an indigestible morsel refractory to all intellect, that can be solved only by liquidation.

On the other hand the minor accelerates the major, inasmuch as it supplies the real mechanism for the imposition of the successive lower syntheses. The tension between liberal and conservative, the opposition between privileged and depressed take on a philosophic significance when the disputes engendered by the major decline are made the sponsors of slogans for rival cupidities and hatreds. The goddess,
Reason, is enthroned amidst blasphemy and bloodshed. Liberalism gains the fascination of a snake by its polite contempt for religion. The proletariat attains consciousness by militant atheism.

Nor are we to overlook, in the combination of major and minor decline, a third element that is prior to both: progress. The French Revolution rid the world of feudal survivals. The liberal revolution was founded upon an amazing industrial advance. Communism not only excites rabid nationalism but does so because it would transcend the tribes.44

7. RENAISSANCE45

7.1 The essential character of renaissance
7.2 Characteristics of renaissance
7.3 Consequences of renaissance

7.1 The essential character of renaissance

Progress is the thesis of nature; decline the antithesis of sin; the higher synthesis of these two necessarily lies beyond the confines of this world and the intellect of man. It is not the mind of man that can make issue with the unintelligibility of sin and the distortion and dethronement of the mind itself.

Hence the essential character of renaissance is that it presupposes a transcendence of humanity, the emergence of a 'new' order.

(Compare truth and error in Trotskyist 'continual revolution.')(46

7.2 Characteristics of renaissance

What transcends man is to man as man is to the beast, the beast to the plant, the plant to the nonadaptive element.

From this follow the four characteristics of renaissance, the basic principles of a 'higher criticism' to replace the Hegelian.

First, the new order transcends man: therefore it would be to man mystery; it would be to his understanding as his understanding is to the brute; 'things beyond.'47
Second, the new order would be knowable: man knows being and outside being there is nothing. But because of the lack of understanding, this knowledge would be as the scientist's of empirical law.\textsuperscript{48}

Third, man could not raise himself into the new order: nothing can transcend itself.

Fourth, in the new order, man's nature would not be negated but included in a higher synthesis. This, on analogy: man transcends but does not negate the orders beneath him; as a mass of matter, he is subject to the laws of mechanics; as living, he is subject to the laws of cellular development and decay; as sentient, he has the perceptions and appetites of the brute.

Hence, in the new order we would still have life under social conditions to an individualist end; the acceptance of the new order and life in it would be rational, and so be rationally acceptable (miracles) and humanly livable (authority).\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{7.3 Consequences of renaissance}

We have envisaged the new order as the higher synthesis of progress and decline. Hence it will restore progress and offset decline.

To offset decline, the new order must attack major decline at its root: against self-justification it will set penance, against the objective unintelligibility and chaos it will set justice-transcending charity, against the discrediting of reason it will set faith.\textsuperscript{50} Again, against minor decline the new order must introduce what will compensate for the unbalance and bias of egoism: against cupidity, poverty of spirit; against revolution, obedience; against the beast, chastity.

To restore progress the new order must restore ordered freedom: the order which holds the balance between the fields of reason and understanding, philosophy and science; the freedom that is the auto-liberazione of the self-renouncing will; the ordered freedom in which all individuals find their own place of themselves, and all conspire for that infinitely nuanced 'better' that is the goal of progress, but can be known only by the work of all intelligences each in its own field, that can be attained only by individuals bearing the risks that each advance involves. Etc., etc.
8. THE MULTIPLE DIALECTIC

8.1 Single and multiple dialectic
8.2 Single dialectic without grace
8.3 Single dialectic with grace
8.4 Multiple dialectic without grace
8.5 Multiple dialectic with grace
8.6 Meaning of history

8.1 Single and multiple dialectic

The single dialectic is, as we have seen, the succession of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, etc., within the social unit.

The multiple dialectic is the synthetic unity of the aggregate of single dialectics: it is this aggregate in their solidarity and differences, their transferences and reactions.

8.2 Single dialectic without grace

Progress is of nature. Decline is the cumulative effect of sin. Hence it follows that the course of the history of the social unit, influenced by grace, is an initial progress that gradually is submerged in the mounting flood of sin. Further, this curve — first ascending, then descending — is accentuated by the priority of the economic over the cultural: to labor for economic improvement is easy; to sacrifice for the impalpable benefits of culture is difficult. Thus the course of the history of the social unit in the case we are considering is: first, economic development; second, a certain measure of cultural advance; third, the animalization of man on the higher level of his achievement. (Compare Spengler’s theory.)

8.3 Single dialectic with grace

The ‘new order’ eliminates the possibility of major decline within its own frontiers.
In the measure in which the evangelical counsels are embraced by an elite and their spirit observed by all, the 'new order' excludes the possibility of minor decline.

But adherence to the new order is a matter of free individual choice: hence the insertion of grace into the dialectic tends in the long run to disrupt the social unit. I have come on earth to bring not peace but the sword [Matthew 10:34]. In a word, the 'vessels of wrath' [Romans 9:22] will find in the constraints of the new order not the guarantee of their initial progress but a hindrance to its expansion; they will find in the disproportion between the profession and the practice of the counsels an occasion for rebellion and so open the door to major decline; and in major decline, the successive lower syntheses will be all the more violently asserted and vigorously brought into execution because of the presence of opposition.

The disruption that follows from grace must be distinguished from the atomization, the Zersplitterung,\(^52\) that follows from decline. Grace divides society into two opposing camps in vital conflict: it is the Socratic gadfly.\(^53\) Decline reduces man to the animal level, the stagnation of the sluggish dialectic. All the anti-Catholic syntheses and 'mysticisms' of the modern world have their significance and their force in their anti-Catholicism ultimately.

(Compare Donoso Cortes: Blood must flow: the only question is whether it flow in love or hatred.)\(^54\)

8.4 Multiple dialectic without grace

The transition from the single dialectics to the multiple may best be made by considering transference and reaction.

Transference is the importation by a social unit of the achievements or the miseries of another.\(^55\)

It is spatial when the units are contemporary; it is temporal when one unit inherits from another now in decay.

Reaction commonly denotes opposition to progress or decline within the social unit: here we use it to denote opposition to importation. We distinguish healthy and unhealthy reaction: healthy is oppo-
sition to the importation of foreign decadence; unhealthy is opposition to the importation of foreign progress.

The synthetic unity of the multiple dialectic without grace is [stated as follows].

Transference with healthy reaction results in the continuity of human progress despite the fact that each progressive social unity in turn succumbs to decline.

Transference without healthy reaction universalizes decline: it makes the backward people 'bruler l'étape' in the downward course of decline. Russia under the Soviets expiates the sins of the West. Native tribes learn the sins without emulating the achievements of the modern world. (Wars, conquest, white man's burden.)

8.5 Multiple dialectic with grace

First consider the single dialectics with grace. These will be either in the initial stage of progress or the later stage of disruption. In the former case, the different social units will be united in a superstate, [as in] Christendom, and will act as one, more or less, against what is alien to them [as in the] Crusades. Again, as long as major decline is avoided, then no matter what the minor decline in any unit, there will remain the seeds of renaissance, of a second spring: [as in] the vitality of the West, rising out of the ruins of the Roman Empire and despite continual lapses into minor decline steadily advancing to achievement hitherto unattained.

If on the other hand, the social units are tending to disruption we would seem threatened with the persecutions and wars of the Apocalypse.

Finally, the relations between the dialectics with grace and those without form the subject matter of missiology.56

8.6 Meaning of history

The meaning of history is the relation of its three elements, progress, sin, and grace, to the First Cause and Last End.

Progress expresses the goodness of God — to whom all glory from all the multitudinous golden hearts in the world.
Sin is the wickedness of man, and decline "that no flesh should glory in his sight" [1 Corinthians 1:29].

Grace is the higher synthesis of both in God's transcendence: on earth it is the cross, for Christ lived only till he was big enough to be crucified, and the rest of history is but a dilution of that expression of the value of man; but in heaven it is an exceeding weight of glory [2 Corinthians 4:17], when amazed and awed by the Infinite we exclaim in the one instant of eternity the one word, Holy, Holy, Holy!
EDITORIAL NOTES

1There are three sheaves with similar titles in File 713: "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History," "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," and the present work. They surely represent three efforts of Lonergan to work out his idea. Michael Shute is of the opinion that the work we publish here was Lonergan's final version. (The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History, 1933-1938 [Th.D. dissertation, Regis College, Toronto School of Theology, 1990]). Certainly, it does not go back beyond 1937, for there is reference to a book that was first published in that year (see note 3 below).

2Concepts of apprehension and concepts of understanding are related to the nominal and essential (or explanatory) definitions of later writings; see Collection, CWL 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) pp. 93-98 and 272 (note c to ch. 6); likewise Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, CWL 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 781, note g to ch. 1. But there has been a significant change in the interval: the later Lonergan would not set knowing 'what it is' apart from understanding.

3Lonergan surely had in mind Thompson's Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1937), which speaks of induction that goes from the particular to the general as an ascension, and of its reversal as a descending induction (p. 32); neither form of argument can avoid uncertainty, even though the descending induction is put into deductive form. For Lonergan's 'begging of the question' Thompson had 'a surreptitious assumption' (p. 33).

The date of the book ("First published 1937") puts a definite limit on that side to the date of this essay by Lonergan.

4In Latin in the MS: 'petitio principii.'

5No doubt an allusion to Kant. Lonergan left notes (Archives, Batch 1-A, File 7) on Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, a work which he seems to have been reading in Italian around this time (there are verbal linkages with the papers of File 713), but we have no data on his familiarity then with the Critiques; Kant's name does not appear in this essay or in either of its two companion pieces.

6For a hint on Lonergan's reading of Newman, see note 27 below. And for one on his reading of Dawson see note 35 below. But we are not well informed on the breadth of his reading in either of these authors, both of whom he highly esteemed.

7'Infra' probably refers to the three examples of analytic concepts in the next section, §1.3.

8The analogy with Newton's laws of planetary motion is drawn again thirty-five years later; see A Second Collection (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), pp. 271-72, in the 1973 paper "Insight Revisited."

9Latin in the MS: "Intellectus procedit a maius generali ad maius particulare; procedit per actus incompletos ad actum perfectum." The second half of this sentence is reminiscent of the motto Lonergan put at the head of his "Pantôn Anakephalaiōsis:" (see METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9/2 [October 1991]: 139-
Lonergan had a passion for generalizing; not, however, for the generalizing of common sense (largely achieved by the *vis cogitativa*) but rather for that of understanding, generalizing in the explanatory sense; see *Collection*, CWL 4, p. 272, note d to ch. 6.

Although the distinction is already clear to Lonergan, it is only the history that *happens* that concerns him at this early stage; he will never lose that concern, but it is the history that is *written* that is the focus of chapters 8 and 9 of *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), and this surely is the history he had especially in mind when late in life he said, "All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology" ([I. Martin O'Hara, ed., *Curiosity at the Center of One's Life: Statements and Questions of R. Eric O'Connor* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1984), p. 427, in "Bernard Lonergan in Conversation," March 28, 1980 (pp. 414-38)].)

So far as our knowledge goes': Lonergan's 'quoad nos' freely rendered.

*acts of a human ... element': free rendering of the 'actus hominis' of the MS, a technical phrase in scholasticism, that needs a sentence in translation.

The fourth heading was written in by hand at this point, but appears at the beginning of the essay in the full table of contents. The fifth heading does not appear either at this point or in the full table of contents, but is found in the body of the text below.

In Latin, 'reliqua.' The reference is to the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola, where in the 'Principle and Foundation' he speaks of God's purpose in creating humankind, and then of the purpose of the 'other things on the face of the earth' (S23).

In Latin, 'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur'; a familiar tag in scholasticism — see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 2, a. 3.

Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 12, 7 (PL 41, 355), quoted by Lonergan in Latin, "Nemo ex me scire quaserat, quod me nescire scio; nisi forte ut nescire discat, quod scire non posse scendum est"); I have corrected his "ut scire discat" to "ut nescire discat." The 'mystery of lawlessness,' found in the text just before the quotation from Augustine, is the NRSV rendering of the Vulgate Latin, 'mysterium iniquitatis,' that Lonergan quoted; see 2 Thessalonians 2:17.

In the MS, 'simpliciter.'

In the MS, 'gratia sanans' — distinguished in scholasticism from 'gratia elevans,' elevating grace.

In the MS, "Homo est in genere intelligibilium ut potentia"; a reference to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 87, a. 1: "Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tautum"; see q. 79, a. 2: "Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium."

In the MS, "Intellectus procedit per actus incompletos ad actum perfectum." See note 9 above.
In the MS, 'aevum'; scholasticism distinguished eternity in God, aevum in angels, and time in human beings (see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 10, a.5).

The MS shows three slightly variant phrasings of this title: in the full table of contents, the table for this section, and the text itself.

There is a similar variation in this title.

In a letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane, dated January 22, 1935, Lonergan had spoken of the great influence Hegel and Marx had had on his own 'metaphysics of history' (p. 5); we have an example of it here. The recurring triadic structure appears also in the introductory pages of his doctoral dissertation; see METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3/2 (October 1985): 9-47.

In the Latin, 'per se intellectus est infallibilis' — a principle Lonergan found in Thomas Aquinas, and explained in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, CWL 3 (1992), pp. 431-32; 1957, p. 407. He quotes the Latin again in his next paragraph.

Lonergan during his philosophy studies some ten years earlier had written an essay on Newman's Grammar of Assent, taking up the question of real and notional apprehension: "True Judgment and Science," Blandyke Papers (Student journal, handwritten, Heythrop College, Oxon), No. 291 (February 1929), pp. 195-216.

File 713 has what was probably an earlier essay in which Lonergan distinguished two periods of history, each divided into two parts. "... two phases in human progress: the automatic state ... the philosophic stage ..." The actual course of events gives the subdivisions: "the world prior to the discovery of philosophy ... failure of philosophy to fulfil its social mission ... cultural expansion following upon the Dark Age ... The future" ("Philosophy of History," pp. 101-102 of the MS).

The 'promised Kingship of Christ' was a major theme in Lonergan's 1935 essay, "Pánton Anakephalaiósis" (see note 9 above). Catholic Action appears there linked with the focal topic (title, and p. 156). Lonergan has now added a special reference to missiology; see note 56 below.

Inserted by hand in the line of space after 'Thus,' and referring perhaps to the three-part schema that follows in the text, is this notation:

Note: thesis not wrong but incomplete; perhaps wrong fundamentally. Spiritual harm.

In the MS, 'ius gentium,' literally, the law of the nations.


Lonergan added the last three words by hand; their meaning, somewhat cryptic here, is revealed in the companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline": "The power of intellect is the domination of the universal over the material many: its exploitation is hierarchy" (p. 9 of the MS).

'Progress as intellectual' is a marginal notation to paragraph d, and 'As human' a similar notation to paragraph e; in each case the reference seems to be to the whole paragraph.
35 As Lonergan remembered it thirty years later, reading Dawson's *The Age of the Gods* had started "the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion" of culture (*A Second Collection*, p. 264). The correction continues here, but reaches its full sweep only much later; for example in the 1965 paper "Dimensions of Meaning" (see Collection, CWL 4, p. 238).

36 Thus, NRSV, 1 Timothy 6:10. In Lonergan's Latin, "Radix omnium malorum cupiditas"; quoted perhaps from memory, it differs slightly from the Vulgate.


38 Isaiah 5:20-22, in NRSV: "Ah, you who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter! Ah, you who are wise in your own eyes, and shrewd in your own sight! Ah, you who are heroes in drinking wine and valiant at mixing drink, who acquit the guilty for a bribe, and deprive the innocent of their rights!"

39 The reference does not seem to be to any particular exchange in the *Gorgias* but to the general difficulty Socrates has in dialogue with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

40 The first reference may be to Daniel 4:33, where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: "He was driven away from human society, ate grass like oxen, and his body was bathed with the dew of heaven, until his hair grew as long as eagles' feathers and his nails became like birds' claws" (NRSV). The second reference may be to Revelation 13:2: "And the beast that I saw was like a leopard, its feet were like a bear's, and its mouth was like a lion's mouth. And the dragon gave it his power and his throne and great authority" (NRSV).


42 There is written by hand below this paragraph: "Each its 'mysticism' propaganda persecution (you would think Protestants never used the torture chamber nor liberals the guillotine)."

43 Notably, economics is typed between the lines, without clear indication of its point of insertion.

44 This remarkable list of positive points in movements Lonergan so strenuously opposed does not include anything positive on Protestantism, though the companion essay, "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History," does so by implication (p. 13 of the MS). Of course the lists are not meant to be complete.

45 Redemption (or grace) is Lonergan's regular term for the third 'moment' in the structure of history. His purpose in using 'renaissance' here may be to remain within the confines of reason while pointing beyond them, as in chapter 20 of *Insight*; in fact, there are multiple links between that chapter and this section §7.

46 There is a longer passage on 'continual revolution' in "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History": "The Trotskyist doctrine of 'continuous revolution' is meaningless on the level of man: for though it have its palpable premise in the surds of the social situation, surds never completely eliminated, it can have no realization there. For the 'revolution' to succeed, capturing a society, is its betrayal: for if it holds its prey, it stabilizes itself in the old frame with bureaucrats supplanting bourgeois;
and if it lets its prey go, then what has it done? The real truth of the continuous revolution can be found only on a higher level, the level of a self-renunciation that is a new birth into a higher order" (p. 14; spelling adapted to Collected Works usage). This critique, somewhat shorter, made its way into print in the little essay, "Secondary Patrons of Canada," The Montreal Beacon, January 3, 1941, p. 3.

47 Ta epekeina: literally, the things beyond; geographically, the parts beyond, the hinterland; but the term is used here for grades of being.

48 'not completely so —' is inserted by hand at the end of this paragraph, presumably qualifying the analogy of a scientist's knowledge.

49 The companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," sheds some light here. On miracles (p. 14 of the MS): "acceptance of the new order must be rational, and so evidence of its emergence must be provided (miracles)." On authority (p. 15): "against the successive ambiguities of the dialectic ... the new order will set a living authority providentially infallible. ... against the dethronement of reason the new order will present its own rigorous and all-embracing rationalism under the higher synthesis of faith and authority."

50 It remained a favorite strategy of Lonergan to set the forces of grace, one by one, against the forces of decline. Most often in regard to the three theological virtues; for example, in the following passage on their 'profound social significance.'

Against the perpetuation of explosive tensions that would result from the strict application of retributive justice, there is the power of charity to wipe out old grievances and make a fresh start possible. Against the economic determinism that would result were egoistic practicality given free rein, there is the liberating power of hope that seeks first the kingdom of God. Against the dialectic discernible in the history of philosophy and in the development-and-decline of civil and cultural communities, there is the liberation of human reason through divine faith ... (Collection, p. 112, in "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World.")

See also A Second Collection, p. 8, in "The Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness."

51 "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline" (p. 16 of MS) sheds some little light on the reference to Spengler: "... this corresponds to Spengler's analogy of organic growth and decay." Skimming the sections suggested by the index to Spengler's The Decline of the West did not reveal a specific locus for the analogy. The reference may be general to the relationship of the animal and the human (see in volume 2 chapters 1-3 on origin and landscape, and chapters 4-6 on cities and peoples), or to the relation between economics and culture (chapters 13-14 and passim).

52 Zersplitterung occurs three times in "Pantòn Anakephalaiósis," pp. 4, 6, 20 (see note 9 above), without reference to its source.

53 Plato, Apology 30e.

54 Donoso appears in the Pantòn article with reference to the same theme (Blood must flow); see our note 53, METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9/2 (October, 1991): p. 169, on Lonergan's source, and on a later reference he made to Donoso. An interesting sidelight: at the opening of the Gregorian University academic year, 1937-
38, Petrus Leturia delivered a lecture "De Atheismi communisticici praevisione ac refutatione in postremis scriptis Ioannis Donoso Cortés 1848-1853" (Liber Annualis, Gregorian University, 1938, pp. 99-116). Leturia was offering a course on the philosophy of history during these years, but there is no evidence that Lonergan followed it.

55 In the space at the end of this line Lonergan wrote 'Formal Real (migration; conquest)'. Again "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline" comes to our aid, with the following remark: "Transference is real or formal: real in the cases of migration and conquest; formal in the case of imitation-importation of ideas" (p. 16 of the MS).

56 On missiology see also note 29 above. In the companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," Lonergan gives us a little more on the subject matter of missiology: "... the questions of transference and reaction here, belong to the science of Missiology, where Missiology is considered not as the concrete problems of the apostolate in particular countries but the larger questions of distributing and directing missionary effort over the globe" (p. 18 of the MS). Worth noting: the Faculty of Missiology and its courses first appear in the Kalendaria of the Gregorian University for the year 1932-33 (pp. 83-88), though courses on missiology had been given earlier and listed in the Faculty of Theology (see the Kalendarium for 1931-32, p. 56).

57 1 Corinthians 1:29, the Douay version; in the NRSV, "that no one might boast in the presence of God."

58 An approximation to the Douay version of 2 Corinthians 4:17: "exceedingly an eternal weight of glory"; in the NRSV: "an eternal weight of glory beyond all measure."
COSMOPOLIS: BOURGET’S AND LONERGAN’S

David A. Nordquest
4022 Marion Street
Erie, PA 16510

ON FIRST VIEW, there may seem little in common but the name between Bernard Lonergan’s cosmopolis and that elaborated by the nineteenth-century French writer Paul Bourget in his novel Cosmopolis. Bourget’s work is a “drama of international life,” featuring rootless “rovers of high life,” motivated by a variety of dubious interests—spectacles for the artist, romantic adventures for men and women of pleasure, escape from scandal for businessmen, freedom from their bad memories for other unfortunates.¹ They emigrate to Bourget’s cosmopolis for the divertissements which it offers in such profusion.² Gathered together from throughout Europe and the United States, Bourget’s cosmopolites have no country or religion, no standing or history.³ Their society does not rise to the level of a community because their different experiences and national characteristics cause them to lead widely different inner lives and so to be frequently incomprehensible to one another.

For this reason Bourget views cosmopolis as a world “that does not exist,” because “it can have neither defined customs nor a general character,” being “composed of exceptions and singularities.” Indeed, it resembles Lonergan’s social surd more than his reasonable cosmopolis.

²The term is Pascal’s in the Pensées.
³Cosmopolis, pp. 27-28.
Bourget's world-city does possess certain "exterior rites and fashions," but these have little to do with the inner lives of those who play at them. When the cosmopolites are finally forced into truly meaningful action, they are guided by their passions and by what Bourget rather unfortunately calls the "permanence of race," by culture so formative as to be almost determinative of character.4

Lonergan's very different cosmopolis is presented in the context of his discussion of common sense.5 Common sense is a knowing tied to the particular and the concrete, unsystematic because it is preoccupied with taking and dealing with things as they come. Various types of bias afflict common sense — the individual bias in which the individual good eclipses the social good, the group bias in which the group's intersubjectivity so preoccupies its members that they neglect wider claims, and the general bias inherent in common sense, which restricts us to matters at hand and thereby makes substantial reform impossible. This general bias sets up a longer cycle of decline, which features a gradual expansion of the social surd, of the unintelligible in thought and action. The decline is cumulative because a failure of vision produces actions which make the situation less reasonable, which, in turn, leads a situation-bound common sense even further astray. A particularly damaging type of rationalization may emerge which forecloses remedial action by popularizing the view that sin or evil is universal, that power, pressure or force is the only way to secure cooperation. While society can be counted on to combat individual bias and one group will contest the bias of another, some further element is needed to resist the rationalizations, screening memories and myths that affirm the perfections of the in-group, the inevitability of the status quo, and a narrow practicality.

For Lonergan, cosmopolis performs this role. Like Bourget's cosmopolis, Lonergan's is essentially related to common sense, but while Bourget sees his cosmopolis negatively as, in part, the lack of common sense, Lonergan sees his positively as the transcendence of common sense.

4Cosmopolis, pp. 2-3.
sense, which, however, remains as an ally. To transcend common sense, cosmopolis makes use of a disinterested intelligence which sees and rejects the rationalization of group and class egoisms, along with the short-sightedness of uncritical common sense. Lonergan's cosmopolis is cosmos in the sense that it transcends any particular loyalty to state, class, or group. It is polis because it is the community of those seeking to rally a disordered society to the cause of the same disinterestedness and truth which unites them. Lonergan says cosmopolis is "above all politics," which means not that it is pre-eminently politics, but that it transcends any politics, while not, we may be sure, neglecting its civic duties.

Lonergan's cosmopolis is not an organization or a floating abstraction or a blueprint for Utopia. In its impalpable character and its reformist task, it has some resemblances, I think, to the polis in the mind Plato writes of in the Republic — "a pattern laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen." Although Lonergan's cosmopolis finds its pattern in operations rather than in any institutional structure, like Plato's polis it, too, is composed of those who make themselves its citizens by following the transcendental precepts. However, Lonergan's cosmopolis depends not only on being attentive, intelligent, critically reflective, and responsible. Lonergan argues that, in addition to "higher viewpoints in the mind," there are "higher integrations in the realm of being" and that the higher viewpoint of cosmopolis is possible in practice only in the context of "an actual higher integration." We shall see that Bourget, too, looks to such a higher integration for the solution to the sin he presents.

The differences between Bourget's concept of cosmopolis and Lonergan's are great. Bourget's cosmopolis is a collection of individuals who share only certain superficial fashions and rites. Their common sense links them to their national and cultural progenitors, but it divides them from each other. They are motivated by their passions

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6Insight, p. 239 = CWL 3: 264.  
7Republic 592b.  
8Insight, p. 633 = CWL 3: 656.
and culturally-instilled inclinations and, as cosmopolites, inhabit “a world that does not exist.” Lonergan’s cosmopolites partly transcend common sense and seek to reform “a world that does not exist,” that is, to reduce the social surd and to expand a community based on the truly common. Still, “cosmopolis is a dimension of consciousness,” perhaps in a sense wider than the immediate context of Lonergan’s reference to the historical process implies. If Bourgefs concept of cosmopolis is not Lonergan’s, his book certainly reveals a critical distance from the society without community he describes and, I think, something like the “dimension of consciousness” Lonergan’s cosmopolis presupposes. Indeed, the whole point of his novel is to show the futility of a society without community. He might very well have written much the same novel and have given the name cosmopolis to those actions which point toward the true community foreshadowed in the conclusion. He did not because, for him, common sense was of such fundamental importance that he took Cosmopolis as his title to emphasize the lack of common roots and common sense as a key factor behind the corruption he presents.

Despite its very different account of cosmopolis, Bourget’s Cosmopolis can be of considerable use to Lonergan scholars. It deals with the same complex of problems as Lonergan’s account of cognition, common sense, and cosmopolis and can be read as a drama of common sense life — one which probes problems inherent to the interaction of persons with varying personal and social experiences. Although Bourget stumbles now and then, as with an occasional reference to the influence of “blood,” the incomprehension of those with different common sense receives considerable illumination in the book. His portrait of Countess Steno, for example, proves by example how a woman can have a common sense highly developed for business and pleasure and be highly adept at switching from one to another instantly, yet be utterly obtuse in understanding her own daughter. The skewed development of her common sense is seen even in her admonition to her artist-lover to avoid injuring her daughter’s eyelashes with the death-mask, deeply ironic because the very soul of the young

\[9\text{Insight, p. 241 = CWL 3: 266.}\]
woman was crushed by the mother's false life. Such portraits and details can be useful to the Lonergan scholar if Bourget's work is treated as a series of imaginative exercises through which aspects of Lonergan's theory may be explored and weighed. As Andrew Bongiorno has written, "just as a laboratory experiment, because it appeals to sense, confirms the scientist's theory or reveals its error, so the transmutation of a proposition into myth tends to show wherein the poet's knowledge is sound or unsound. A poem is roughly an experiment in psychology, moral philosophy, theology, etc." A poem, here, is any work of imaginative literature. *Cosmopolis*, as a concrete presentation of problems also explored by Lonergan, may be a useful tool first in grasping and then in reflecting on his views.

In examining Bourget's work to see how it might be used in this way, we may begin with the most obvious characteristic of Bourget's cosmopolis — its lack of substance and community. Because its citizens are drawn from several different cultures and have lived together only briefly, Bourget's characters have little in common that might make his cosmopolis more than superficial and ephemeral. In H. Richard Niebuhr's terms, we may say that one leg of the triad of faith and community is missing: we have selves and others, but no common cause. To emphasize the resulting lack of permanence in cosmopolis, Bourget sets his drama in Rome, the metropolis or mother of cities and the eternal city, where we find the "character of perrenity impressed everywhere." This contrast between the ephemeral and the permanent is also dramatized in the important conversations between a dilettante and a believer which frame the novel. The dilettante is the French writer Julien Dorsenne, author of best-selling collections of fiction and of travel works. Dorsenne is both a cosmopolite and a reflective connoisseur of cosmopolis. He hovers above life as an

10 *Cosmopolis*, p. 369.
13 *Cosmopolis*, p. 1.
observer, taking notes of scenes he might wish to include in his writings and pursuing a social life intended to provide a fund of experiences for literary distillation. The believer is his good friend the Marquis de Montfanon, a somewhat fanatical French nobleman, who lost an arm fighting as one of the Pope's Zouaves in 1867. Montfanon, once a young dandy, is now a deeply pious visionary come to Rome to spend his last years near St. Peter's. He is collecting documents for histories of the French nobility and the church and serves as trustee of St. Louis. He clearly speaks for Bourget in his criticisms of the cosmopolis Dorsenne inhabits. His love of history, of the church, of God are meant to provide a contrast with Dorsenne's love of the spectacle afforded by the present.

Because Dorsenne is the most self-conscious of cosmopolites and because it is his failure to respond which leads to the death which demonstrates the barrenness of Bourget's cosmopolis, his character merits our particular attention. Montfanon finds the source of Dorsenne's "intellectual athletics" in lessons he learned in "the circus of the Sainte-Beuves and Renan's." Bourget later speaks of Dorsenne's aim as being a cognitional one — to "intellectualize the forcible sensations," something he takes his favorite authors, Goethe and Stendhal, to have intended.\(^ {14}\)

Given Dorsenne's cognitional aim, it seems appropriate that we assess his life and thought according to the transcendental precepts — be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. Of Dorsenne's capacity for attention and intelligence there can be little doubt. His whole purpose in life is to experience and to grasp mentally. Bourget says of him that he "dreamed of meeting with, in human life, the greatest number of impressions it could give and to think of them after having met them."\(^ {15}\) The sensitivity of his nerves and his care in observing, often disciplined by the taking of notes, give his works at least a surface accuracy. Something of this attentiveness and intelligence may be glimpsed in the following note he takes on entering the

\(^{14}\) *Cosmopolis,* pp. 20, 43.

\(^{15}\) *Cosmopolis,* p. 43.
Palais Castagna, the only such note whose contents are reported in the novel:

Marvellous staircase constructed by Balthasar Peruzzi, so broad and long, with double rows of stairs, like those of Santa Columba, near Siena. Enjoyed above all the sight of an interior garden so arranged, so designed that the red flowers, the regularity of the green shrubs, the neat lines of the graveled walks resemble the features of a face. The idea of the Latin garden, opposed to the Germanic or Anglo-Saxon, the latter respecting the irregularity of nature, the other all in order, humanizing and administering even to the flower garden.¹⁶

Bourget finds the note "savoring somewhat of sentimentalism" and tells us that, although Dorsenne wishes to experience widely, he does not give himself up to his experience. This may be seen most clearly in Dorsenne's utter surprise that Alba Steno, whom he had pursued for several weeks, might have fallen love with him. He wished to gratify his "curiosity" concerning the forces which moved her, but his regard for her lacked "enthusiasm." Wishing to know the girl for the purpose of advancing his literary culture, but not wishing their relation to become for him "a bond, an obligation, a fixed framework in which to move," Dorsenne is unable, because he is unwilling, to see and grasp the girl's growing attachment to himself.¹⁷ The limited character of his understanding caused by his lack of self-transcendence also shows itself in his literary work. Once he has written up and construed a sentimental or social experience, he regards it as "not worth the trouble of being dwelt upon." He moves on to one subject after another, "lending his presence without giving himself" to these various studies. As a result, his works are characterized by what Bourget terms an "incoherence of custom" and "atmospheric contact."¹⁸ Although he sometimes fails to see or to grasp what he sees, these failures do not originate at the experiential or intellectual levels of cognition, although they produce symptoms on those levels.

¹⁶Cosmopolis, pp. 45-46.
¹⁷Cosmopolis, p. 360.
¹⁸Cosmopolis, p. 43.
If we turn to critical judgment, we find Dorsenne always ready to suppose that this rather than that is really so. At one point in the novel, he plays with the possibility that his young friend Alba, to whose "absolute purity" Bourget attests, might actually be the author of anonymous letters intended to stimulate a quarrel between her mother's current and her former lovers. Alba, of course, is entirely innocent, but Dorsenne seriously explores the possibility despite her closeness to him. Bourget attributes Dorsenne's speculations to "a moral deformity which the abuse of a certain literary work inflicts on some writers," arguing that "they are so much accustomed to combining artificial characters with creations of their imaginations that they constantly fulfill an analogous need with regard to the individuals they know best." Dorsenne later is ashamed at this particular bit of imagining, but it does show a certain failing in his judgment, although one which is due, again, not so much to internal weakness as to the lack of direction by a responsibility called forth by faith and love. Because "he cherished no ambition except for his pleasure and his art," Dorsenne's thought lacks the dynamism toward completion which a need to act would have imposed. The immanent character of his ambition leaves him somewhat inept at apprehending value. It also gives his life, as well as his art, a kind of aimlessness.

On this level of responsibility, it is through Dorsenne's conversations with Montfanon that Bourget makes the writer's failings particularly plain. In the beginning of the novel, when he is setting up the problem of his cosmopolis, Bourget has Dorsenne explain the pleasure he derives from observing the human mosaic of cosmopolis. Montfanon then interrogates him much as Socrates might have done:

"One more question! ... And the result of all that, the object? To what end does all this observation lead you?"
"To what shall it lead me? To comprehend, as I have told you."
"And then?"

19 Cosmopolis, p. 360.
20 Cosmopolis, pp. 98-99.
21 Cosmopolis, p. 52.
“There is no then,” answered the young man, “one debauchery is like another.” [Note that here we have the rationalization of sinning as universal which Lonergan finds contributing to the longer cycle of decline.]\(^{23}\)

“... Have you thought that you have some duties toward them, that you can aid them in living better lives?”

“That,” said Dorsenne, “is another subject which we will treat of some other day, for I am afraid of being late ... Adieu.”\(^{24}\)

Dorsenne then leaves to return to cosmopolis.

Dorsenne’s irresponsibility is further illuminated by his heedless pursuit of Countess Steno’s daughter Alba, whose growth to purity amidst her mother’s serial adultery and falseness seems almost miraculous. Alba admonishes Dorsenne in regard to the excellent Fanny Hafner, who is about to be sacrificed in a marriage designed to raise her father’s social position, that “this is what we cannot do — look upon as a tapestry, as a picture, as an object; the poor creature who has not asked to live and who suffers. You who have feeling, what is your theory when you weep?”\(^{25}\) Dorsenne has no good answer and he has nothing of use to say when a desperate Alba throws herself on his mercy by proclaiming her love for him and appealing for help in her despair at the corruption around her. After she finds no response and deliberately catches a mortal fever, Montfanon explains to Dorsenne in the final passages of the novel the significance of his failure:

“And do you remember what I said: Is there not among them a soul which you might aid in doing better?” You laughed in my face at that moment. You would have treated me, had you been less polite, as a Philistine and a cabotin. You wished to be only a spectator, the gentleman in the balcony who wipes the glasses of his lorgnette in order to lose none of the comedy. Well, you could not do so. That role is not permitted a man. He must act, and act always, even when he thinks he is looking on, even when he washes his hands as Pontius Pilate, that dilettante, too, who uttered the words of your masters and of yourself. What is truth? Truth is that there is always and everywhere a duty to fulfill.

\(^{23}\text{Insight, pp. 226-242 = CWL 3: 250-267.}\)

\(^{24}\text{Cosmopolis, p. 31.}\)

\(^{25}\text{Cosmopolis, p. 321.}\)
Mine was to prevent that criminal encounter. Yours was not to pay attention to that young girl if you did not love her, and, if you loved, her, to marry her and to take her from her abominable surroundings. We have both failed, and at what a price!"\textsuperscript{26}

When Dorsenne wonders what the use of such counsel is now, after Alba’s suicide, and what the solution is to the same “abuse of thought” even the most intellectual men of the age have suffered from, Montfalon tells him that seeing the truth will prevent future failings and, quoting Balzac, that “thought, principle of evil and of good can only be prepared, subdued, directed by religion.”\textsuperscript{27} In other words, the dynamism of a well-ordered consciousness is at least partly from the top down rather than merely from the bottom up. Thought is properly “directed by religion,” by what Lonergan refers to as “being in love in an unrestricted fashion.”\textsuperscript{28} This opens our eyes to value we would otherwise fail to detect and thus enables us to act more morally. It leads to the self-abnegation Montfalon shows to Dorsenne in commending Pope Leo XIII’s standard: “Faith is bound to martyrdom.”\textsuperscript{29} That this transcendence can lead to community and, perhaps, add an increment to the true cosmopolis, is suggested by the symbolism of Montfalon taking Dorsenne’s arm in his own good arm after Dorsenne shows his no-longer-dormant wish for faith. The gesture is a fine example of the mystery, the question of faith, in the midst of manners, common sense life, which Flannery O’Connor sees as the proper theme of fiction.\textsuperscript{30}

Bourget’s portrait of cosmopolis, along with his introductory remarks, reveal two major weaknesses in his cosmopolis, weaknesses Lonergan considered in his analysis of cognition, common sense, and cosmopolis. First, Bourget’s cosmopolis is rootless and contrary to the needs of human nature for the taken-for-granted: “we are so naturally creatures of custom, our continual mobility has such a need of gravita-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26]Cosmopolis, pp. 372-373.
\item[27]Cosmopolis, p. 373.
\item[28]Method in Theology, p. 106.
\item[29]Cosmopolis, p. 375.
\end{footnotes}
tion around one fixed axis, that motives of a personal order alone can
determine us upon an habitual and voluntary exile from our native
land."\(^{31}\)

This and Bourget's emphasis on national character argue that
common sense is so central to happiness that attempts to transcend it
in our relations will lead to misunderstandings, conflict, and disorder.
Although Lonergan's cosmopolis is more concerned about the short-
comings than about the utility of common sense, in a very interesting
passage in his Halifax lectures, Lonergan does make a similar point:

People from the country differ from people in the city. People of
one social class have different common sense from those of
another. People in one nation are strange to people from another.
If you go to Europe, you may find people odd, and they may find
you odd, because there are different specializations of common
sense. Common sense is not the same everywhere. I went to
England to study from about 1926 to 1930, and I found that every-
thing there moved about four times more slowly than in Canada.
Then I went to Rome to study theology, and I discovered that
there everything moved about four times more slowly than in
England. The difference, of course, is not merely temporal; it
involves a total difference in attitude towards living and toward
how things are to be done, what is the right thing to do, and so
on.\(^{32}\)

He goes on to argue that the stratification of classes within a country
tends to produce incomprehension between the classes and that this
incomprehension "is one of the fundamental social problems at the
present time." He remarks that similar problems exist at the level of
whole nations and concludes that "the more diverse the whole
cultural background is, the greater that incomprehension."\(^{33}\)

\(^{31}\text{Cosmopolis, p. 2.}\)


\(^{33}\text{Understanding and Being, p. 111 = CWL 5: 91.}\)
"race." Consequently, his Cosmopolis sees less of a possibility for intellectual development and reform.

Second, Bourget sees a lack of responsibility and faith as causes of the defects of his cosmopolis. This second diagnosis is more optimistic on the possibilities for a true cosmopolis than the first, and has obvious parallels in Lonergan's work. The most important action in the novel is the failure of Dorsenne to save Alba, both because it shows the futility of Bourget's cosmopolis and because it leads Dorsenne to transcend it. Although this particular failure may have been due, in some minor way, to different national characteristics, Bourget plainly implies that Dorsenne could and should have married Alba and that their marriage would have flourished. His diagnosis of the failure of his cosmopolis, then, depends more on the lack of responsibility and faith than on any excess of diversity.

At the end of the novel, the Dorsenne who had earlier affirmed that, after all, there is only one debauchery after another, now wonders whether any skeptic or dilettante "would refuse martyrdom if he could have at the same time faith." Faith is necessary because, as the passage just quoted from Balzac asserts, the thought which may produce either good or evil can only be "prepared, subdued, directed by religion." Because thought here is oriented toward good or evil action, Bourget apparently has the fourth or deliberative level of consciousness in mind. The preparing, subduing, and directing of that level of consciousness by faith is precisely what Method in Theology intends when it speaks of conversion to a new readiness "to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love" — in love first of all with the God who extends his grace.

That Bourget's analysis is similar to Lonergan's is clear. Whether Lonergan's concept of cosmopolis can be related to Bourget's solution to the evil of his cosmopolis is another matter. To judge, we must recall that Lonergan begins by treating cosmopolis as an X, many of whose aspects are open for determination. He says that his first presen-

34Cosmopolis, p. 375.

35Method in Theology, p. 107.
tation will consider only “a few of these aspects” and will “leave until later the task of reaching conclusions,” by which I assume he means more definitive determinations. Whether “later” refers to the synthetic view ventured three pages later or to the conclusion of chapter 18, where he returns to view cosmopolis again from a higher viewpoint, is not, I believe, entirely clear. On each occasion he refers back to the aspects previously determined. The later passage argues that a merely cognitional cosmopolis will not be effective:

Earlier in the chapter on Common Sense as Object, it was concluded that a viewpoint higher than the viewpoint of common sense was needed; moreover, that X was given the name, cosmopolis, and some of its aspects and functions were indicated. But the subsequent argument has revealed that, besides higher viewpoints in the mind, there are higher integrations in the realm of being; and both the initial and the subsequent argument have left it abundantly clear that the needed higher viewpoint is a concrete possibility only as a consequence of an actual higher integration.

Still later his tells us that “the need of some cosmopolis,” while showing the inadequacy of common sense, also reveals, on a deeper level, “the inadequacy of man.” A critical human science based on a “correct and accepted philosophy” will not easily become effective because of the sinfulness of human beings. Because an effective cosmopolis depends upon acquiring a good will, and because “the man of good will is in love with God,” it would seem that faith has an important role to play in Lonergan’s cosmopolis. He tells us in the Epilogue to Insight that faith is “the new and higher collaboration of minds that has God as its author and guide.”

Whether we should regard Lonergan’s cosmopolis as the X which, from the highest viewpoint, participates in this higher collaboration or,

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36 Insight, p. 238 = CWL 3: 263.
37 Insight, p. 633 = CWL 3: 656.
38 Insight, p. 690 = CWL 3: 712.
40 Insight, p. 731 = CWL 3: 753.
rather, as something which is itself transcended by this higher collaboration is an interesting question, beyond the scope of this article. If Lonergan's cosmopolis is identified with part of this collaboration, however, it becomes very close to the higher community established between Dorsenne and Montfanon at the end of Bourget's novel. If Lonergan's cosmopolis is not itself permeated by faith, it must still depend on faith to become effective and Lonergan's overall analysis, if not his conception of cosmopolis, would parallel Bourget's solution to the corruption he portrays.

So, what, then, is the value of Cosmopolis for the Lonergan scholar? As I have suggested and tried to illustrate above, it can be used as a series of connected exercises for concretely simulating and exploring Lonergan's views on cognition, common sense and cosmopolis. As Bongiorno argues, poetry can provide a concrete, a contextual understanding, that philosophy often cannot. Even for Lonergan, philosopher of self-appropriation, poetry such as Cosmopolis can be useful by providing the reader with images that facilitate insight, with examples that support or query ideas.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND GRACE

Robert M. Doran
Lonergan Research Institute
Toronto, Ontario M4Y 1P9

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper represents my first published attempt to move beyond the foundational concerns of Theology and the Dialectics of History¹ and into systematics. It is in keeping with the thrust of my earlier work, as well as with what Bernard Lonergan says in Method in Theology about special theological categories, that a contemporary systematics begin with a theology of grace; and I have made a general decision that, wherever possible, I will begin my own treatment of systematic issues by attempting to transpose Lonergan's systematic achievements into categories derived from religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness. Thus I begin my own work in systematics here by suggesting such a transposition of some of the principal elements in the first thesis of Lonergan's De ente supernaturali.²

This work, Lonergan's most thorough treatment of the systematics of grace and, it seems, his first major effort at writing a systematic


treatise, elaborates five theses: (1) There exists a created communication of the divine nature, that is, a created, proportionate, and remote principle by which there are present in the creature operations by which God is attained as God is in God’s own self. (2) This created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion not only of human nature but also of any finite substance, and so it is simply supernatural. (3) The acts not only of the theological virtues but also of other virtues, insofar as they are elicited in the rational dimension and in a manner befitting a Christian, are simply supernatural as to their substance, and this indeed by reason of their formal object. (4) The potency to the simply supernatural is obediential. (5) Internal actual grace consists essentially in second acts of intellect and will that are vital, principal, and supernatural.  

In his elaboration of these theses Lonergan manages, with a remarkable economy of words, to synthesize in a scholastic mode most of the major questions that have been faced in the history of the doctrine and of the scholastic theology of grace, and to take a position on these issues. But obviously his formulations have now to be transposed into the categories of a theology constructed in accord with the dynamics uncovered in Method in Theology, and here we begin that work by treating the first thesis. What precisely is a ‘created communication of the divine nature’ in a theology whose basic terms and relations are found in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and not in the metaphysical categories of substance, nature, potencies, and so on, employed by Lonergan in De ente supernaturali? “For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element

3Lonergan’s Latin formulation of these theses is as follows: (1) Exsistit creata communicatio divinae naturae, seu principium creatum, proportionatum et remotum quo creatureae insunt operationes quibus attingitur Deus uti in se est. (2) Haec creata divinae naturae communicatio non solum naturae humanae sed etiam cuiuslibet finitae substantiae proportionem excedit ideoque est supernaturalis simpliciter. (3) Actus non solum virtutum theologicarum sed etiam aliarum virtutum, inquantum in parte rationali et sicut oportet a Christiano eliciuntur, simpliciter supernaturales sunt quoad substantiam et quidem ratione obiecti formalis. (4) Potentia ad supernaturalia simpliciter est obedientialis. (5) Gratia actualis interna essentiaaliter consistit in actibus secundis intellectus et voluntatis vitalibus, principalibus et supernaturalibus.
in intentional consciousness." What are the elements in intentional consciousness that correspond to the metaphysical categories in which Lonergan elaborated the notion of a ‘created communication of the divine nature’? As we will see, later developments in Lonergan’s work give us many of the clues required to effect a transposition of his Latin theology of grace. But they are no more than clues.

As I have already said, to begin a contemporary systematic theology with the systematics of grace is one implication of the listing of the sets of special theological categories in Method in Theology. For the first of these sets is derived from religious experience, and the term ‘religious experience’ is used by Lonergan to refer to the reality of grace. Such a priority is part of Lonergan’s strategy of constructing a theology that has a transcultural base. On the understanding presented in at least Lonergan’s later writings, while ‘grace’ is a Jewish and Christian category, it refers to a gift that is offered to all men and women at every time and place. Thus, while the language is Christian, the reality to which it refers is not; it is universal. Our purpose in this paper, then, is to give an initial indication of what this universally accessible reality is, and to do so in terms of a transcultural core that is not restricted either to a particular set of cultural matrices or to a specific religious tradition.

2. THE ‘CREATED COMMUNICATION OF THE DIVINE NATURE’ AS A FIFTH LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS

2.1 A Transposition

Thesis 1 of De ente supernaturali reads: ‘There exists a created communication of the divine nature, that is, a created, proportionate, and remote principle by which there are present in the creature operations by which God is attained as God is in God’s own self.’ I will propose

Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) 343. The most recent reprinting is by University of Toronto Press, 1990. Subsequent references will be given in the text and in the notes in the form (Method page number).

On the first set of categories, see Method 290. On religious experience and its correlation with grace, see 105-107.
that we transpose this thesis into the following terms: The gift of God's love for us poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace that effects in us, as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of a fifth level of consciousness, at which we experience ourselves as loved unconditionally by God and invited to love God in return. This experience of being loved unconditionally and of being invited to love in return is the conscious basis of (1) our share in the inner life of God, (2) our consequent falling in love with God, and (3) the dynamic state of our being in love with God. The dynamic state of being in love with God, in turn, as equivalent to what the scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained as God is in God's own self. But the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations—what scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature—is the fifth level of consciousness, the experience of resting in God's unconditional love for us and of being invited to love in return, the real relation to, and constituted by, the indwelling God as term of the relation. This will be our own 'first thesis,' if you want, in the systematics of grace. It is proposed as a transposition of Lonergan's first thesis in De ente supernaturali—a transposition into categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

In the present article I will attempt to work out the details of this transposition of the thesis. The related question of the transformation undergone by other levels of consciousness and even by the unconscious, by 'nature' as a principle of movement and of rest, will not be treated here but, under the rubric of the inner constitution of our life in God, in subsequent essays that I hope to write transposing the second and third theses of De ente supernaturali.

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6 I will not attempt in the present article a transposition of Lonergan's later suggestions on the systematics of this share in Trinitarian life as such. We are proceeding step by step, and we have enough to occupy us here.

7 On nature as a principle of movement and of rest, see Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) esp. 172-75.
Two steps entered into the process of arriving at the transposition that I have just suggested. The first treats almost solely the first thesis itself of *De ente supernaturali*, and attempts to work out as much as possible what would be the elements in intentional consciousness corresponding to the metaphysical categories there employed. The second considers several problems in the scholastic theology of grace raised most explicitly by Karl Rahner, watches Lonergan wrestle with the same problems shortly after the writing of *De ente supernaturali*, considers both the similarities and the differences between Lonergan’s treatment of these issues and that of Rahner, and attempts to work Lonergan’s position into a transposed version consonant with the directives of *Method in Theology*. These are the two steps that led to the proposed transposition that I have just suggested. Finally, at the end of this paper I offer a suggestion as to where we might turn for further systematic (and so analogous) understanding of the transposed first thesis of *De ente supernaturali*.

2.2 Gratia Elevans as Starting Point of the Theology of Grace

Thesis 1 of Lonergan’s *De ente supernaturali* identifies what the scholastic tradition called sanctifying or habitual grace with a created communication of the divine nature, a communication that, as remote principle, makes it possible for there to be elicited in us certain operations in which the living God is attained as God is in God’s own self. Thus Lonergan’s systematic ordering of the understanding of grace begins with what the theological tradition calls *gratia elevans*, grace as elevating, rather than with *gratia sanans*, grace as healing. It begins with the line of thinking about grace traditionally more identified with the Greek Fathers than with the mode of thought identified with the Latin and, principally, the Augustinian tradition. It takes as its starting point a line of thinking that emphasizes the divinization of human beings through God’s gift of grace.8 Lonergan states as well that the

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8I must add here the qualification of Henri Rondet: “Augustinian theology is sometimes contrasted with that of the Greek Fathers. The Greeks talk about divinizing grace, while Augustine presents grace as the remedy for sin. There is some truth in this contrast, but we must be on guard against all systematization. There is no doubt that Athanasius and especially Gregory of Nyssa stressed the ‘physical’ character
thesis both verbally and really affirms the same reality as is proclaimed in 2 Pet. 1:4: "so that through these things ... you may become participants of the divine nature." This is confirmed, he says, "by interpretation of the Fathers, who often speak of a certain divinization of ourselves." The tradition of gratia sanans appears in the presentation of the heuristic structure of the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil presented in chapter 20 of Insight. But the systematic theological ordering of ideas would not begin here, but rather with the principle that would order these and other ideas in a synthetic manner. That principle is for Lonergan the notion of a created participation in God's own life, and the related notion of the absolutely supernatural, which he discusses in the second thesis of De ente supernaturali.

2.3 Sanctifying Grace and Charity

The operations by which in this life we reach God as God is in God's own self are, for the tradition that Lonergan is here synthesizing, the
operations that flow from the infused virtue of charity.\textsuperscript{12} Nonetheless, the thesis draws a distinction between the habit of charity and the state of sanctifying grace. The proximate principle of acts of charity is the habit of charity. But thesis 1 of \textit{De ente supernaturali} speaks also and primarily of a remote principle, a change in our very being by which we are elevated to participation in the inner life of God, and it identifies this remote principle ‘materially’ with sanctifying grace.

A problem arises here in the exegesis of Lonergan’s various texts. It has at least partly determined the course of my reflection and transposition. It is the problem of the distinction and relation between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. I am assuming that it is the habit of charity that Lonergan is speaking of in \textit{Method in Theology} when he writes of ‘the dynamic state of being in love with God.’ But since he there identifies this dynamic state of being in love with God with what a ‘theoretical theology’ called sanctifying grace, might not his later terminology lead us to posit an identity between what scholastic language calls sanctifying grace and the habit of charity? What would have to be added to his later terminology in order to preserve the distinction made in the scholastic terminology of \textit{De ente supernaturali}? It was facing this question that led me to some of the suggestions I am making here.

The solution to these questions, and especially to the question of what might be added to Lonergan’s later terminology, or at least what further clarifications might be suggested regarding this terminology, can, I believe, be found by relying on the agreement of many scriptural exegetes that ‘the love of God’ in Rom. 5:5, the text of which Lonergan

\textsuperscript{12}The qualification ‘in this life’ is important. Lonergan’s first thesis in \textit{De ente supernaturali} is more than the beginning of a theology of grace in the limited sense of the religious or spiritual life of persons in this life. The ‘created communication of the divine nature’ of which he speaks is an analogous term that refers as well to elements of the hypostatic union and the beatific vision. These further considerations will not be treated here, since we are abiding as strictly as possible by the strategy of constructing our systematic theology step by step from an experienced and therefore verifiable transcultural core. When we turn to Karl Rahner’s presentation of the relationship between created and uncreated grace and to Lonergan’s treatment of the same issue, we will have to mention Rahner’s understanding of the beatific vision, since it is the basis of his presentation of the issue that most concerns us. But we are not here taking an explicit position on this issue, only on the reality of grace in this life.
makes so much, means, not our love for God, but God's love for us. The context speaks of our reconciliation with God, which is "but the restoration of estranged and sinful man to union and companionship with God." The initiative for that restoration lies with God, who floods our hearts with God's own love for us. In that case the uncreated gift of God's love for us could be considered as effecting a created and remote ground of our operations of love for God. That remote ground would be sanctifying grace, the 'created communication of the divine nature' of which the thesis speaks; and the proximate ground would be the habit of charity, or what in Lonergan's later writings is called the dynamic state of being in love with God. But then it is really the created experience of God's love for us that is notionally to be identified with what a theoretical theology called sanctifying grace, and that is also really distinct from the habit of charity, the dynamic state of our being in love with God. This is the key to the present transposition of elements of Lonergan's Latin theology of grace, not only into English, but also into the language of a systematic theology whose categories are to be derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

The gift of grace is explicitly distinguished from the habit of charity again in Lonergan's De Deo trino, where four absolutely supernatural realities are affirmed: the esse secundarium of the Incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. The arguments there, however, presuppose and complement the systematics of the Trinity, and into this we are not yet prepared to move. We must be content at this point with the affirmations (1) that there is a created state by which God's love for us is experienced in us, (2) that this state renders possible our falling in love with God and our being in love with God and thus that it grounds the habit of charity by which regularly, habitually, and consistently we love God above all things and all things in God, and (3) that this habit of charity is the proximate


principle of the operations of charity by which we reach God as God is in God's own self, the remote principle being the created experience of the gift of God's love for us. What we must do is identify in our experience, and in the terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, what this created experience is. Again, "for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness" (Method 343, emphasis added). If we are going to preserve the affirmation made in the first thesis of De ente supernaturali we must identify what element in intentional consciousness corresponds to the 'created communication of the divine nature.'

2.4 The Analogy of Nature

Lonergan indicates that not all scholastic theologians taught the distinction between the created communication of the divine nature and the habit of charity; though all affirmed the existence of a created communication of the divine nature, some (for example, Scotus) identified this created communication with the habit of charity. The question, Lonergan says in De ente supernaturali, affects not the substance of the matter but the intelligible ordering of materials. The difference lies in diverging understandings of nature and of the analogy or proportion of nature.15

Lonergan's understanding of the analogy or proportion of nature, which he says is also that of Aquinas,16 affirms the direct linking of three realities: operations, accidental potencies as proximate principles of operations, and substance or nature as remote principle of the same operations. In the order of our knowing, we move from the operations which we directly experience to a knowledge of the proximate principles of these operations and then to a knowledge of the substance or nature in which these proximate principles reside. In the order of being, substance or nature is the remote principle; from it flow the accidental potencies or proximate principles, and in these the operations are received. According to this analogy, we must first be different,

15Lonergan, De ente supernaturali 7, 10.
16He refers to Summa theologiae, 1, q. 54, aa. 1-3, that is, to Aquinas's treatise on angels.
be changed or transformed, if there is to exist the proximate principle (in this case the habit of charity) responsible for the performance of the acts of love through which we attain to God as God is in God’s own self. In Quentin Quesnell’s terms, “Thesis I does argue that God’s giving us a love directed to himself implies so changing us as persons that his love can be in us. Thus [Lonergan] does conclude logically to a ‘principium remotum quo’ — a basic principle in us by which such loving is possible: ‘just as if a cow actually understood something and made choices based on the understanding, you would not conclude simply “This cow understands and wills”; you would conclude, “This cow has a mind,” and even “Here is a cow’s body informed with a rational soul”’ ... Technically, sanctifying grace would be the change in us as persons (principium quo creatum, proportionatum et remotum); charity would be the habitual love.”

2.5 Sanctifying Grace and God’s Love for Us

What we must identify, then, in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness is precisely in what consists the change in us, in our very being, that would correspond to what the scholastic tradition would call a created, remote, and proportionate principle of operations. What so changes us as persons that God’s love can be in us? Our clue to a solution of this problem is the exegetes’ interpretation of Rom 5:5, the passage on which Lonergan relies but which he does not analyze in detail: God’s love in us is radically God’s love for us, and it is experienced as such. And this experience, the enlargement of consciousness that can be called ‘being loved unconditionally from the ground of being that is God’ is what radically changes us as persons, establishing an entitative habit (remote principle) and the consequent conjugate form of the habit of charity (proximate principle) by which we may perform the operations to which Lonergan is referring in the first thesis of De ente supernaturali.

Thus it must be asked whether the language of Method in Theology is precise enough on this issue. There 'the dynamic state of being in love with God' is identified with sanctifying grace, and so, if Lonergan is consistent with what he wrote twenty-five years earlier, with the created communication of the divine nature of which the first thesis in De ente supernaturali speaks. But then the remote and proximate principles of the first thesis of De ente supernaturali would seem to be collapsed into one another in Method in Theology, which in effect would negate the systematic ordering of ideas in this earlier thesis. The only distinction discussed in Method in Theology is that between the language appropriate to a theoretical stage of meaning and that fitting to a later stage that takes its stand on the self-appropriation of interiority.

This gift we have been describing really is sanctifying grace but notionally differs from it. The notional difference arises from different stages of meaning. To speak of sanctifying grace pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of theory and the world of common sense are distinct, but, as yet, have not been explicitly distinguished from and grounded in the world of interiority. To speak of the dynamic state of being in love with God pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority has been made the explicit ground of the world of theory and of common sense. It follows that in this stage of meaning the gift of God's love first is described as an experience and only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories (Method 107).

But this should not render the theology appropriate to the stage of meaning grounded in interiority less differentiated than the theology appropriate to the state of theory. Lonergan should perhaps have emphasized explicitly in Method in Theology — or at least I am suggesting here — that 'the dynamic state of being in love with God' is itself a consequence of a prior gift of God's love for us poured forth into our hearts and of an entitative change in us effected and constituted by this gift. This means, however, that the dynamic state of being in love with God is more than notionally distinct from sanctifying grace. It is identical with what the theological tradition in which Lonergan stands calls the habit of charity. The dynamic state of being in love with God is
radically a function of God’s love for us residing within us; as the habit of charity it is a habitual orientation within us by which we are directed to acts of love for God above everything else and of love for everything else because we love God.

Thus ‘the love of God’ of which Rom 5:5 speaks is God’s love for us poured forth in our hearts ‘from above,’ rendering possible acts of love ‘from below’ in us by which we reach God as God is in God’s own self. It may be, as Frederick Crowe wrote in some notes that he gave me in response to an earlier version of this essay, that ‘unless the context suggests otherwise, any unqualified use of ‘God’s gift of love’ refers [in Lonergan] to our being in love, to the created love flooding our hearts.’ But I am drawing a distinction between the gift of God’s own love for us and our love for God rendered possible by the gift. The experience of God’s love for us, of course, is not the gift itself, but a created reality; but it is a different experience from the experience of our being in love with God. On this distinction rests the central argument of this essay.

What, then, is this experience? What is the remote ground of which this thesis speaks, the created, habitual, entitative change effected by the gift of God’s love for us? What is ‘sanctifying grace,’ in categories derived from religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness?

The answer to this question requires, I believe, that we advance and promote Lonergan’s very few and somewhat hesitant references to a fifth level of consciousness. Unless I am mistaken, the only explicit published reference by Lonergan to the possibility of a fifth level of consciousness occurs in Philosophy of God, and Theology. But this reference is not particularly helpful, since it occurs in a discussion period following a lecture, it is made in a somewhat offhand manner, and it refers again, not to the experience of our being loved by God, but to the dynamic state of our being in love, and so to what I am claiming is the third-stage-of-meaning equivalent to what scholastic theology called the habit of charity. I propose, then, that we speak of a distinct level or enlargement of consciousness that is created in us by the gift of

God's love for us as a relational disposition to receive that love (and ultimately as a participation in the relations of the divine persons) and that we identify this level of consciousness with the created communication of the divine nature of which the first thesis in De ente supernaturali speaks, that is, with sanctifying grace.

Speaking of it in this way, as a fifth level or enlargement of consciousness created in us by the gift of God's love for us, allows us to think of it as a gift offered to all men and women at every time and place. And, as Lonergan emphasizes in De ente supernaturali, by this created communication of the divine nature something becomes common to us and God, something that without this communication would be proper only to God.19 In the language of the Christian tradition, we become children of God, partakers of the divine nature, justified, friends of God.20 This change in our very being — in the terms of the Greek Fathers, this divinization — and our assent to it, an assent empowered by the gift of love, are what make it possible for there to exist in us the habit of charity, the dynamic state of being in love, which in turn is the proximate principle of acts of love of God by which we reach God as God is in God's own self.

This is the essential matter in the transposition that I would suggest of the first thesis of De ente supernaturali. But these and further elements in the transposition that I am trying to make can become clearer if we turn to the cognate question of the relationship between created and uncreated grace, and draw out some of the implications of the difference between Lonergan and Karl Rahner on this question.

3. Created and Uncreated Grace

The first thesis of De ente supernaturali speaks of created grace — a created, proportionate, and remote principle of certain operations. We have here identified this created, proportionate, and remote principle with a fifth level or enlargement of consciousness, where we rest in the

19 "Communicatio: id quo commune fit quod secus esset proprium (non commune)" [By 'communication' I mean that by which there becomes common what otherwise would be proper (not common)]; Lonergan, De ente supernaturali 4.

20 Lonergan, De ente supernaturali 6-7.
experience of God’s unconditional love for us. But through this created grace, God’s own love for us is present in the depths of our being; and God’s own love for us is an uncreated love; hence the expression ‘uncreated grace.’ What is the relation between created and uncreated grace? In order to explore this question we will turn first to the reflections of Karl Rahner and then to some of the evidence on Lonergan’s position in the years immediately subsequent to the writing of De ente supernaturali.

3.1 Rahner on Created and Uncreated Grace

Rahner’s reflections are presented in the paper “Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace.”²¹ Is it the case, Rahner asks, that we possess our pneumatic being (that is, our ‘created sanctifying grace’) because we have the personal Pneuma of God, or rather that God’s Pneuma is present in us in a special way because we have created grace? Rahner finds that, for the most part, the scholastic theology of grace does not do sufficient justice to the first of these formulations, which, however, he finds to be closer than the second formulation to the scriptural and patristic data.²² Are we different because God dwells in us, or does God dwell in us because we have been made different? Or, in the terms we have just used, where created grace corresponds to, indeed in the first instance is, a fifth level of consciousness, is there a fifth level of consciousness because God dwells in us, or does God dwell in us because there is a fifth level of consciousness? Here is how Rahner formulates his difficulty:


²²It may be asked, too, whether Lonergan’s formulation of the issue in De ente supernaturali does not merit the same criticism. While the question is not treated as such in this 1946 work, the evidence that we will present in the next subsection would seem to confirm that Lonergan changed his mind on this issue after he wrote De ente supernaturali.
However diverse they may be among themselves, it is true of all the scholastic theories that they see God's indwelling and God's conjunction with the justified person as based exclusively upon created grace. In virtue of the fact that created grace is imparted to the soul God imparts God's own self to it and dwells in it. Thus what we call uncreated grace (i.e., God as bestowing God's self upon men and women) is a function of created grace. It is not difficult to see the basis of this conception: 'uncreated grace' (God's communication of God's self to men and women, the indwelling of the Spirit) implies a new relation of God to us. But this can only be conceived of as founded upon an absolute entitative modification of ourselves, which modification is the real basis of the new real relation of men and women to God upon which rests the relation of God to us. This absolute entitative modification and determination of men and women is created grace, which has in consequence a twofold aspect: it is ontologically the formal basis of the analogical supernatural participation in God's nature through entitative assimilation of men and women to God's spirituality and holiness ... and it is the basis of a special relation (union, indwelling) between us and God ... For our purpose it makes no difference how the various theories go on to explain the way in which created grace provides a basis for a new relation between us and the God of grace: whether for instance it is said that God's new efficient causality in respect of grace makes God present in a new way in the object of God's activity (in virtue of the identity of being and operation in God and God's immensity); or whether the view is put forward that the entitative elevation of ourselves as regards our spiritual powers, which are thus oriented to the beatific vision as last end, gives us a new capacity (of an actual or potential kind) to take possession by knowledge and love of the God who is present in us by immensity; or whether one sees a perfect friendship with God established by grace, a friendship which provides a new and in itself sufficient basis for the presence of God in us (already there in fact). For in each case the indwelling of the Spirit in the justified man or woman by grace is seen merely as a consequence of the bestowal of created grace, as the end-term of a (categorical) relationship of a man or woman to God given with created grace.\(^{23}\)

That such is not the viewpoint of scripture and of the patristic tradition is emphasized by Rahner in the first section of this paper. In

\(^{23}\)Rahner, "Some Implications" 324-25.
these sources what scholastic theology came to call created grace is “a consequence of God’s self-communication to the man or woman whose sins have been forgiven,” whereas in the scholastics “created grace [is] the basis of this communication.” Rahner wants to complete the scholastic theory “by elaborating in more explicit terms a pattern of thought (already in principle to be found in scholastic theology) and applying it to our problem in such a way that the admissibility of the patristic formula should become clear too, and hence make available a more adequate appreciation of the nature of uncreated grace.”

Rahner finds the presupposition of a solution to the problem in the relation of the state of grace as a whole — not distinguishing created and uncreated grace — and the scholastic understanding of the beatific vision. Grace is a commencement of the blessed life, and so, says Rahner, its ontology must be homogeneous with that of the beatific vision. The relation of the life of grace and the life of glory is not purely moral or juridical. Rather, the life of glory is the definitive flowering of the life of grace already possessed. This makes of grace an inner entitative principle, at least partially, of the vision of God. And so “the inner nature of grace as a whole in this life must allow of being more closely determined in terms of the nature of the ontological presuppositions of the immediate vision of God.”

What, then, is the scholastic ontology of the beatific vision? Thomas Aquinas says that in the immediate vision of God God’s essence itself takes the place of the impressed species in the created mind. The impressed species for Rahner is not the intentional image of an object, a copy of the object due to the object’s impression upon the mind, so much as it is an ontological determination of the knower, sharing in the knower’s determinate grade of being and participating in the consciousness of this knower in act: “knowledge rests for St. Thomas on an assimilation to the object entitatively determining the knower by means of the species as a reality of the knower’s own being,

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24 Rahner, “Some Implications” 325.
through which the knower and the known are really ‘the same thing.’”26

Given this concept of the species, an immediate, nonanalogical vision of God cannot be based on a created species, for this could reveal God’s infinite Being only in the measure of its own entitative capacity as a finite determination of the knowing subject. Thus Thomas says that God’s own being appears in the place of a created species of the finite mind. The real relation between creature and God in this case is not founded upon an accidental, real, nonrelative modification of God or of the creature: not of God, on account of God’s utter transcendence and immutability; not of the creature, because an accidental modification could not be the basis of a fundamentally and essentially new relationship of God to the creature. Thus for Rahner the new relationship cannot be thought of in terms of efficient causality, but only in terms of formal causality:

... all the strictly supernatural realities with which we are acquainted (the hypostatic union, the beatific vision and — as we shall go on to show here — the supernatural bestowal of grace) have this in common, that in them there is expressed a relationship of God to a creature which is not one of efficient causality (a production out of the cause ... ), and which must consequently fall under the head of formal causality (a taking up into the ground ... ); the ontological principle of the subsistence of a finite nature in the one case [the hypostatic union], the ontological principle of a finite knowledge in the other [grace and the beatific vision].27

Because of the difficulties attendant upon such a conception — that it does not imply that God’s active formal causality reactively impresses a new determination on God’s Being in itself that would do away with God’s absolute transcendence and immutability — Rahner prefers to

26Rahner, “Some Implications” 328.

27Rahner, “Some Implications” 329-30. The notion of a finite knowledge holds in the case of the beatific vision; in sanctifying grace, however, the question is not that of immediate knowledge of God, but of the presence of God’s love that renders possible our being in love. To what extent this position agrees with that of Rahner remains an open question. It may be that Rahner does not posit a sufficient distinction between consciousness and knowledge, and, if this is the case, this lack of distinction may be responsible for what seems to be his at times imprecise language on this point.
speak of a quasi formal causality. "All this 'quasi' implies is that this 'form', in spite of its formal causality, which must be taken really seriously, abides in its absolute transcendence (inviolateness, 'freedom') ... it provides an emphatic reminder of the analogical nature of our concepts in the matter of a relationship to the world known only through Revelation." The formal causality under consideration here determines the finite spirit to know and to love: "the reality of the mind in the beatific vision, so far as such a reality in itself is due to a species as the means of knowledge, is the very Being of God."29

What, then, is the relationship of the light of glory to God's Being as the quasi species of the spirit? The light of glory is "a [created] disposition of the spirit for the reception of the formal causality of God's intelligible Being upon it."30 Thus in scholastic terms it is a material cause in respect of God's immediate formal conjunction with the spirit, even though, as an entitative determination of the cognitive power, it is a formal cause in regard to the human spirit. It is also an ultimate disposition, and so as material cause it logically precedes the form and yet "depends for its subsistence upon the formal causality of the form, so that to affirm its presence is simultaneously to affirm with inner necessity the presence of the formal causality of the form and conversely."31

Rahner then goes on to transfer to uncreated grace in this life the concepts of formal ontology which appear in his account of the beatific vision: "God communicates God's own self to the person to whom grace has been shown in the mode of formal causality, so that this communication is not then merely the consequence of an efficient causation of created grace."32 Thus "the communication of uncreated grace can be conceived of under a certain respect as logically and really prior to created grace: in that mode namely in which a formal cause is

29Rahner, "Some Implications" 332.
30Rahner, "Some Implications" 332.
31Rahner, "Some Implications" 333.
32Rahner, "Some Implications" 334.
prior to the ultimate material disposition."\textsuperscript{33} Uncreated grace, then, is to be determined only in terms of the beatific vision: "it is the homogeneous commencement, already given though still concealed and still to unfold, of that \textit{communication} of the divine Being taking place \textit{by way of formal causality} to the created spirit which is the \textit{ontological presupposition} of the [beatific vision]."\textsuperscript{34}

There follow for Rahner three consequences.

First, the union of God and human beings in grace is not simply a consequence of created grace, but rather 'precedes' the created grace since the latter, as ultimate disposition to the union, can exist only when God's formal causality is actually being exercised.

Second, as the ontological presupposition of the beatific vision, this union is already posited independently of an actually exercised apprehension of the threefold God by us in knowledge and love, whether through the theological virtues or through the beatifying vision and love of fulfilment.

And third, this union is posited as a presupposition of the beatific vision. It is the ontological aspect of the unity of the created spirit with God in the act of immediate loving contemplation. It implies the highest degree of unity in the fullest distinction.

Rahner's position is summarized as follows:

Just as [in scholastic theology] the light of glory is seen as the ultimate disposition which is the necessity for the form, so here an analogous relationship may be assumed to hold between created and uncreated grace. In this regard created grace is seen as material cause (ultimate disposition) for the formal causality which God exercises by graciously communicating God's own Being to the creature. In this way the material and formal causes possess a reciprocal priority: as ultimate disposition created grace is in such a way the presupposition of the formal cause that it can itself only exist by way of the actual realization of this formal causality. From this objective reciprocal priority there follows further the logical justification for inferring the presence of one reality from that of the other. Because created grace as ultimate disposition can only exist along with the actual formal causality of the form for which

\textsuperscript{33}Rahner, "Some Implications" 334.

\textsuperscript{34}Rahner, "Some Implications" 335.
it is the disposition, it is correct to say: If created grace is given, so too necessarily by that very fact uncreated grace, and hence the whole grace of justification, is communicated to us ... In order that [created grace] can be a disposition for uncreated grace at all, it does indeed have first of all the character of a formal entitative, supernatural determination of the human spirit; as such, however, on our view too all those formal effects can be assigned to it ascribed to it by scholastic theology. Just in so far as and in virtue of the fact that it constitutes a man or a woman as a subject fit to receive the substantial gift of the divine essence for a future vision, it assimilates a man or a woman to God's nature considered as the principle of God's self-possession in Trinity; and thus it at once becomes the formal cause of all the properties of our supernatural elevation.35

3.2 Hints from Lonergan on Created and Uncreated Grace: A Clarification by Contrast36

Student notes in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute give quite detailed information on Lonergan's 1947-1948 course in Toronto, De Gratia.37 In this course Lonergan proposed three propositions relevant to our present question, and the third of these went through at least two versions. The first version comes close to what Rahner criticized in the scholastics, but the second not only corrects this articulation but also proposes another way than formal causality for understanding how the God of grace is a constitutive principle of the person to whom God's love is offered and by whom the gift is accepted.

The first two propositions are numbered in the notes 20 and 21. The first version of the third proposition is not assigned a number, but the second version is numbered 22. The text of Lonergan's own notes does not enumerate the propositions, but this text is preceded by a two-page list in which the propositions are numbered. Neither this list nor

35Rahner, "Some Implications" 341-42.

36I want to thank Frederick Crowe for directing me to the research materials on Lonergan's 1947-1948 and 1951-1952 courses on grace at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto.

37There are two sets of these notes in the archives, those of Frederick E. Crowe and those of William A. Stewart. Together they provide fascinating evidence of Lonergan's efforts to arrive at a formulation of this issue that satisfied him.
the text of notes contains the first version of what became proposition 22.

Proposition 20 may be translated as reading, "The Holy Spirit is not given without there being produced a finite effect in the justified." 38 Proposition 21 may be translated to read, "This finite effect is not the very uncreated gift in itself, nor is it the uncreated gift in us, but it is that by which the uncreated gift is in us." 39 The first version of the next proposition, which seems to reflect the scholastic position criticized by Rahner, may be translated to read, "Through this same finite effect there is constituted not only the indwelling of the Holy Spirit but also the vivification of the just through the same Spirit." 40 But the student notes have this proposition crossed out 41 and replaced by a proposition that, translated, reads, "The uncreated gift, as uncreated, is constituted by God alone, and by it God stands to the state of the justified person not only as an efficient principle but also as a constitutive principle; but this constitutive principle is present in the just not as an inherent form but as the term of a relation." 42

It seems clear, then, that Lonergan wrestled with the same question that occupied Rahner in the article we discussed above, and that during this 1947-1948 course (and so a year or so after he wrote De ente supernaturali) he changed his position on the understanding of the relation between created and uncreated grace. In the first attempt, the

38 "Quod non datur Spiritus Sanctus nisi effectus finitus in justis productur."

39 "Quod hic effectus finitus non est id quod est ipsum donum increatum, neque est id quod est donum increatum in nobis, sed ist id quo est donum increatum in nobis."

40 "Quod per eundem effectum finitum non sola inhabitation Spiritus Sancti constituentur sed etiam vivificatio justorum per eundem Spiritum" (emphasis added).

41 Crowe informs me that Lonergan, who was in some labor at this point to get his doctrine worked out, instructed his students to delete the first version of this proposition. In Crowe’s notes there is a large X next to this proposition, and in Stewart’s notes there are written in the margin, "omittitur" (it is omitted) and "propositio omitti potest" (the proposition can be omitted).

42 "Quod ipsum donum increatum qua increatum per solum Deum constituentur, quare Deus se habet ad statum justi non solum tamquam principium effectivum, sed etiam tamquam principium constituentivm, quod tammen principium constituentivm non justo adest per modum formae inhaerentis sed justo adest per modum termini relationis" (emphasis added).
indwelling of the Holy Spirit (the uncreated gift) is constituted through the finite effect of created grace without whose production the gift of the Holy Spirit is not given (proposition 20) and by which the uncreated gift is in us (proposition 21). But in proposition 22 as Lonergan got it worked out to his satisfaction at this time, the uncreated gift is constituted by God alone. And God's position as regards the 'state' of grace is not only that of an efficient cause but also that of a constitutive principle, and this precisely because the uncreated gift is constituted by God alone.

On the latter point, then, though not on the priority of uncreated grace, Lonergan's position as he worked it out in this course differs from that of Rahner, and this on two counts. First, for Rahner the new relationship constituted by God's gift of God's own self is not to be thought of at all, it seems, in terms of efficient causality, whereas for Lonergan it cannot be thought of only in these terms. Second, for Rahner the new relationship has to be a form of formal causality, whereas for Lonergan God is a constitutive principle of the person receiving grace, not as a formal cause, but as the term of a relation. Nor does Rahner's use of the expression 'quasi formal causality' minimize the difference, since for Rahner, while the form abides in its absolute transcendence and so is not whatLonergan would call an inherent form (what is explicitly negated by Lonergan in the second version of proposition 22), its formal causality "must be taken really seriously."

Lonergan's notes for his course on grace in 1951-1952 are even clearer on this question, and interestingly enough they also would call into question Rahner's 'strict homogeneity' between the ontology of the beatific vision and that of sanctifying grace in the 'just.' The ques-

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43 The notes of Crowe and Stewart show Lonergan defining _forma inhaerens_ as _forma recepta in potentia et per potentiam limitata_ (form received in potency and limited by potency).

44 Rahner, "Some Implications" 330.

45 These notes are contained in file 30 of batch II in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute. No date is given for the notes in this file, but a copy of part of the notes typed from Lonergan's own notes by Thomas Hoey, a student of Lonergan's at the time, indicates that they are the notes for the 1951-1952 course. The course on grace in 1951-1952 was divided between Lonergan and Fr. Elmer O'Brien.
We hold that such a doctrine is fitting in the case of the grace of [hypostatic] union (the humanity of Christ exists through the personal act of existence of the Word) and of the beatific vision (the divine essence is intelligible species). In these cases God fulfills in some way the function of act or form. We deny that this doctrine is fitting in the case of the justified, for everything can be preserved through the transcendental formal effects. De facto nothing is said of the just that requires God as form or God as act. Trent teaches that the only formal cause of our justification is the justice of God by which God makes us just, that is, sanctifying grace and its consequences.

'Transcendental formal effects' is the expression that Lonergan used at this time (1951-1952) to name the created effect in relation to the uncreated gift. Later, when in his Gregorian University courses he had worked out his own original analogy for the divine self-communication, he would make a corresponding change from 'transcendental formal effects' to 'consequent condition' (condicio consequens). Thus, what Lonergan came to account for through a consequent condition, Rahner accounts for through a created disposition, but with at least the difference that the latter is a material disposition for the reception of a formal (or quasi formal) cause, whereas the former has to do with the truth of a relation established in the person, one term of which is the

46“Utrum ipsae Deus se habet ad justum per modum formae vel actus eminentioris vel assistentis.” The primary meaning of assisto is not ‘to help,’ though this meaning is given in Latin dictionaries as a secondary meaning. Rather, its primary meaning is something like ‘to stand by,’ ‘to be present’ but in a supportive role. I wish to thank Michael Shields of the Lonergan Research Institute for his assistance (!) on this matter.

47To paraphrase a bit, “It is not needed, for the transcendental formal effects are quite sufficient to account for all the data we have on the just.”

48“Dicimus eiusmodi doctrinam esse convenientem ubi agitur de gratia unionis (humanitas Christi existit per esse personale Verbi) vel de visione beatifica (divina essentia se habet ut species intelligibilis). His in casibus Deus ipse implet quodammodo vices actus vel formae. Negamus eiusmodi doctrinam esse convenientem ubi agitur de iustis. Nam omnia salvari possunt per effectus formales transcendentes. De facto, nihil dicitur de iusto quod requirit Deum ut formam vel Deum ut actum. Tridentinum docet unicam causam formalem nostrae justificationis esse iustitiam Dei qua nos iustos facit, scilicet, gratiam sanctificantem et sua consectoria.”
uncreated gift of God; the relation is established consequent upon the gift, and so by reason of the divine initiative alone, but it is also the condition of the possibility of our having the truth that God dwells in us.49

Further study of the development of Lonergan's theology of grace may show that there are further and even more substantive differences between him and Rahner. But these differences have not been the principal point of this section of the present essay. Rahner is well known for raising the question of the relation of created and created grace, and on the issue of the relative priority of uncreated grace he has arrived at a position that corresponds to the transposition of thesis 1 of De ente supernaturali that I am suggesting here. But Lonergan came to the same position, it seems, on this limited issue only a year or so after he wrote De ente supernaturali, and he expressed his understanding in a manner that I find more satisfactory. He understands the divine self-communication in such a way that God is present to us and constitutively dwells in us as the term of a relationship that God has constituted. This seems to me preferable to Rahner's quasi formal causality. The created grace caused by the divine self-communication can, I believe, still be referred to as a disposition to receive the uncreated gift, but not as a material or quasi material cause in relation to a formal or quasi formal cause, but rather as a real relation of the creature to the creator consequent upon the divine self-communication and participating in the relations constitutive of the inner life of God, and conditioning the possibility of us having the truth that God dwells in us.

In this present essay I am suggesting that we identify this real relation with a fifth level or enlargement of consciousness. Further transposition of Lonergan's work on grace would regard the four levels of consciousness that constitute 'nature' as a principle of movement and of rest, as forming the human term of this relation and as standing in obediential potency to this real relation.

49 A full clarification of Lonergan's meaning here would have to go into his notion of extrinsic predication. The created gift is not per se a condition of God's dwelling in us — that is constituted by God alone — but of our having the truth that God dwells in us. Fuller explorations of these matters will, I hope, be undertaken in subsequent essays.
Before I close this paper, may I suggest that we must turn to human love to find the analogy by which we are able to reach some further understanding, albeit imperfect, of the reality of grace as we have presented it here. The positive dimensions of the analogy would be at least twofold. First, the reception of the love of another person for us changes us in such a way as to enable us to perform operations and experience states which previously were not within our capacity. I have made some initial forays into expressing this in chapter 8 of *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. Second (and this I still have to work out even in incipient fashion), the love of another person for us is somehow constitutive of us (without, of course, involving the indwelling of that other person in the same manner as the divine indwelling), and not in the manner of a formal cause, but in the manner of inviting us into a relation to the one who loves us, who would thus be one term of the relationship.

At any rate, let me close by simply repeating the transposition of the main elements of the first thesis of *De ente supernaturali* that, drawing on some of Lonergan’s later formulations, I have attempted to present here: The gift of God’s love for us poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace that effects in us, as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of a fifth level of consciousness, at which we experience ourselves as loved unconditionally by God and invited to love God in return. This experience of being loved unconditionally and of being invited to love in return is the conscious basis of (1) our share in the inner life of God, (2) our consequent falling in love with God, and (3) the dynamic state of our being in love with God. The dynamic state of being in love with God, in turn, as equivalent to what the scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained as God is in God’s own self. The created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations — what scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature — is the fifth level of consciousness, the experience of resting in God’s unconditional love for us and of being invited to love in return, the real relation to and constituted by the indwelling God as term of the relation.
TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE VISION IN CHRIST

Terry J. Tekippe
Notre Dame Seminary
New Orleans, LA 70118-4391

This essay is an attempt at a systematic understanding, in the sense of Lonergan's seventh functional specialty, of the Vision of God traditionally ascribed in Catholic theology to the human nature of Christ. That is, the interest is not so much to prove that the doctrine is true, as to ask how it could be true; and, if it is true, what positive and creative insight it may occasion into the mystery of Christ in the line of that "limited but fruitful" understanding spoken of by Vatican Council I.

Systematics, however, is properly preceded by and grounded in Doctrines and Foundations, and so a brief and preparatory word must be said on either of those two specialties.

I. FOUNDATIONS

For a full account of my Christian conversion, which constitutes the grounding and the context in which I theologize, I will refer the reader to a book I have written. There I present my Christology as basically one of identification: I am Christ, praying "Abba" to the Father, in the way for which he at once provided the model and empowered
Christians, according to the bold claim of Paul, "the life I live now is not my own; Christ is living in me."  

What I have come existentially more and more to realize, in the years since that was penned, is that it is true, but insufficient. Our relation to Christ is a dialectic. It is true to say, in one sense, I am Christ. It is also true, in another sense to say, I am not Christ. However much the Spirit is poured out into our hearts, so that we can say, "Abba, Father" — in the text Lonergan so loved to quote — it remains also that we are perpetually called upon to stand — or better, kneel — before Jesus as Lord and say humbly, Kyrie eleison. However much we may identify with Christ, even to the point of mystical union, the fact is still that we are sinners, and he is the sinless One. The statement of the New Testament which brings out most clearly Christ’s commonality with us, also underlines that: “For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weakness, but one who was tempted in every way that we are, yet never sinned” (Heb. 4:15). No Christian, except the Blessed Mother, may say the same.

Much of contemporary Christology has as a presupposition that Christ is like us in everything. With such a presupposition, the Vision in Christ’s humanity may be peremptorily excluded:

*We do not, in our earthly life, enjoy the Vision of God.
But Jesus is like us in all things.
Therefore Jesus did not, in his earthly life, enjoy the Vision of God.*

The minor premise, however, is open to serious question. In the first place, the text of Hebrews, on which it is usually based, does not support it. It does not say that Jesus is like us in all things, but that he was tempted like us in all things. Further, this single text has often been abused to the point of proof-texting, while myriad other texts of the New Testament witness are ignored. On almost every page Jesus emerges as quite unlike us; we do not walk on water, or multiply loaves and fishes. Nor was his unique character lost on his audience:

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At the sight, a feeling of awe came over the crowd, and they praised God for giving such authority to men (Mt. 9:8). The people were spellbound by his teaching because he taught with authority, and not like the scribes (Mk. 1:22). All were struck with astonishment, and they began saying to one another "What is there about his speech? He commands the unclean spirits with authority and power, and they leave" (Lk. 4:36).

I have spoken of my foundations in general, and of my Christology, not so much as abstract doctrine, but as lived, existential experience. I have written, without apology, in the first person, because I believe that Lonergan's project of Foundations demands ultimately a personal commitment, and its communication. In regard to the more specific question of the Vision in Christ's human nature, I have finally come back, not without my own meanderings into various theological cul-de-sacs, to Lonergan's affirmation of this doctrine: Jesus, the Word Incarnate, already living on this earth, enjoyed the Vision of his Father, in a way paralleling, but surpassing, the Beatific Vision of God we hope to have in heaven.²

This teaching, I am quite well aware, has been largely abandoned in post-conciliar theology.³ But I am persuaded there is still a rich field here to be cultivated, one that will offer fruitful rewards for understanding the mystery of Christ. Perhaps the point may be put more provocatively: I am convinced that post-conciliar Christology, because it is frightened by perplexing theological difficulties, has often opted for easier and more accessible, but also more superficial, and ultimately less satisfying, solutions. The understanding that has been thereby excluded is the quest of this effort. Lonergan, at least, has rarely been accused of a lack of theological nerve, and many of his most profound contributions to theology may be called upon in this essay. For in him were verified his own words about Anselm: "One has only to read over


the titles of Anselm's treatises and dialogues to see that his interest lay in all the profoundest problems of theology."4

II. DOCTRINES

Walter Kasper observes two waves of renewal in Christology in the twentieth century, a systematic and then a Biblical.5 In the event, both efforts have proved hostile to the idea of the Vision in Jesus. But Christian doctrinal considerations must always begin with Scripture, and it is perhaps the scriptural wave which has been most effective in excluding such an approach.

One of the most influential voices in this connection, if not the most influential, has been that of Raymond Brown. In 1965 he gave a talk, later published as an article, entitled "How Much did Jesus Know?"6 This was later published as part of Jesus God and Man.7 Since then Brown has returned to the subject, though more briefly, in articles, interviews, and talks.8

To explore the rise of modern critical Biblical studies, to see how they interlock with a theological attempt to decrease rather than increase the prerogatives of Christ, to understand why a Christology 'from below' has replaced a Christology 'from above,' to elucidate the way the turn to democracy has led to a re-envisioning even of God and Christ is obviously beyond the scope of this article. Here a narrowly doctrinal point must be made: there is a positive Biblical doctrine of the Vision in Christ which has been largely overlooked in post-conciliar Christology, and it must be adduced.

Brown's thesis, even, one might say, his ideological concern, is with the ignorance of Christ.

Ignorance does not seem to be excluded by such a statement; and while there are other statements in the New Testament that do seem to reject any ignorance on Jesus' part, an exegete working from the evidence implied by his own field would not have any a priori inclination against seeing limitation in Jesus' knowledge.\(^9\)

His final conclusion is a ringing affirmation of the same theme, in a text from Clement of Alexandria, "We have admired his goodness in that for love of us he has not refused to descend to such a low position as to bear all that belongs to our nature, included in which is ignorance."\(^{10}\)

This is by no means an illegitimate question to ask. Indeed, this concern of the second wave of Biblical scholarship may be seen as but an echo of the same concern in the previous systematic work of Rahner.

In other words, there is certainly a nescience which renders the finite person's exercise of freedom possible within the still continuing drama of history. This nescience is, therefore, more perfect for the exercise of freedom than knowledge which would suspend this exercise.\(^{11}\)

But again, the point is not how or why this interest became paramount; it is enough to see that, if one is looking for ignorance, one will probably find it. Still again, this is not to say it isn't there. But it is to point out that one is likely to overlook evidence for knowledge or Vision.

The premium on ignorance in Christ, then, and the general tendency to disparage John's gospel as 'unhistorical' mean that the Johannine evidence is simply ignored. Obviously Brown was aware of it; yet it does not figure in his treatment. For an adequate Doctrines, then, this biblical witness must first be restored. In an article devoted to Systematics, however, that may be done in the briefest fashion.

The Prologue begins by placing the Word in the presence of the Father \textit{pros ton theon} — the Word was with God. Though the language of vision is not used, it is implied. If one is with a person,


\(^{10}\)Brown, \textit{Jesus God and Man}, p. 102 (emphasis Brown's).

intimately present to him or her, and one is not blind, then one sees
the person. Jesus, then, must see the Father. But it is this same Word
who, in Jn. 1:14, becomes flesh, becomes man, becomes Jesus the Christ.
Nothing here implies that in doing so he ceases to see the Father. Indeed, the latest New American Bible translation has it: “The only
Son, God, who is at the Father’s side, has revealed him” (1:18).

The vision of the Father is hinted even more strongly at the end
of the Prologue. Appealing to an Old Testament tradition, John states
that no one has ever seen God. But, he implies, that is no longer true
with the Son. Moses and the law have given way to the grace and truth
of Jesus Christ. Not only does Jesus see the Father, John implies, he
lives in the very bosom of the Father. Jesus sees the Father’s glory,
and we in turn see Jesus’ glory, full of grace and truth (1:16) — the
hesed and emet, loving kindness and faithfulness so characteristic of
God in the Old Testament.

Jesus presents himself as the new Jacob’s ladder in Jn. 1:51: the
new medium of communication between heaven and earth. The
implications of this channel of revelation are explicitated in chapter 3,
when Jesus speaks to Nicodemus: “Amen, amen, I say to you, we speak
of what we know and we testify to what we have seen, but you people
do not accept our testimony. If I tell you about earthly things and you
do not believe, how will you believe if I tell you about heavenly
things? No one has gone up to heaven except the one who has come
down from there — the Son of Man” (11-13). In this text the language
of both vision and knowledge is used, to underline that the vision of
which Jesus speaks is not a physical but a spiritual one. Further, the
knowledge afforded by this vision is one absolutely unique to the Son
of Man.

In the same chapter, the Baptist’s witness is followed by this
soliloquy: “The one who comes from above is above all. The one who
is of the earth is earthly and speaks of earthly things. But the one who
comes from heaven is above all. He testifies to what he has seen ...”

12The usual translations do not, to me, sufficiently render the force of eis ton
kolpon tou Patros, with the eis in the accusative almost suggesting a movement of
encounter.
(31-32). Again, the exclusive claim to knowledge of heavenly realities is vindicated in terms of vision.

The Samaritan woman presents a tradition that the Messiah will mediate the fullness of revelation. "I know that the Messiah is coming, the one called the Anointed; when he comes, he will tell us everything." Far from correcting her, Jesus claims, "I am he ..." (4:25-26).

To those who question him about curing a sick man on the Sabbath, Jesus defends his actions by pointing to their divine origin. "Amen, amen, I say to you, a son cannot do anything on his own, but only what he sees his father doing; for what he does, his son will do also. For the Father loves his Son and shows him everything that he himself does ..." (5:19-20). Not only does the Son see the Father, but he sees everything the Father does, all the great works of God.

Jesus goes on to contrast his knowledge with theirs. "Moreover, the Father who sent me has testified on my behalf. But you have never heard his voice nor seen his form ..." (5:37), implying that Jesus himself does see the Father. This implication is made explicit in a succeeding text, as Jesus is speaking of the Eucharist: "Not that anyone has seen the Father except the one who is from God; he has seen the Father" (6:46).

The claim to a unique sharing of knowledge between Father and Son is again pressed at the Feast of Tabernacles. "Yet I did not come on my own, but the one who sent me, whom you do not know, is true. I know him, because I am from him, and he sent me" (7:28-29). Again, in bitter dispute with the Jews, Jesus said, "You know neither me nor my Father. If you knew me, you would know my Father also" (8:19). So intimate is the circumincession of knowledge between Father and Son that to know one Person is to know the other. That is because the Father is ever present to the Son. "I do nothing on my own, but I say only what the Father taught me. The one who sent me is with me. He has not left me alone, because I always do what is pleasing to him" (8:28-29). Jesus pursues by return to the language of vision: "I tell you what I have seen in the Father's presence" (8:38). Again, the unique mutual knowledge: "You do not know him, but I know him. And if I should say that I do not know him, I would be like you a liar. But I do know him and keep his word" (8:55).
In the good shepherd discourse mutual knowledge again becomes the topic: "I am the good shepherd, and I know mine and mine know me, just as the Father knows me and I know the Father ... " (10:14-15).

Finally, in the high priestly prayer Jesus returns to the insistence on a unique knowledge: "Righteous Father, the world also does not know you, but I know you ... " (17:25).

In the post-scriptural tradition the notion of the Vision in Christ's humanity represents a true instance of doctrinal development. Among the Fathers may be found affirmations of ignorance in Christ; but the emphasis increasingly falls on the fullness of Christ's knowledge. Augustine already has an obviously exalted conception of Christ's humanity. By the seventh century, Lonergan observes, ignorance is regularly excluded even from the human nature of Jesus.\textsuperscript{13}

Only in the Middle Ages, however, is the Vision of Christ explicitly identified with the vision of the blessed in heaven. Once adopted, this doctrine reigned unchallenged among theologians for some 700 years, until the eve of Vatican Council II, including the teaching of Lonergan and (in somewhat modified fashion) of Rahner.

The doctrine was also not without various papal affirmations. The clearest is that of Pius XII in \textit{Mystici Corporis}:

But the loving knowledge with which the divine Redeemer has pursued us from the first moment of His incarnation is such as completely to surpass all the searchings of the human mind; for by means of the beatific vision, which he enjoyed from the time when He was received into the womb of the Mother of God, He has for ever and continuously had present to Him all the members of His mystical Body, and embraced them with his saving love ...\textsuperscript{14}

In brief summary, the status of this doctrine may be judged to be authoritatively but not infallibly pronounced.

\textsuperscript{13}De Verbo Incarnato, p. 353.

\textsuperscript{14}Neuner and Dupuis, \textit{The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church} (Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1983). Conciliar texts will be quoted from this source, unless otherwise noted, as ND. Present reference is to 661 = DS 3812. Note a similar but less developed statement in \textit{Haurietis Aquas, DS 3924}. 
The doctrine of the Vision of God in the human Jesus is not without its problems. These difficulties will be taken up in turn, not — as is often done — as peremptory arguments against the doctrine, but, in the medieval mode of objections to a thesis, as calls for deeper understanding. Four such objections will be considered:

1. If Jesus knows everything, he knows what he will do; so how can he be free?

2. If Jesus already knew the outcome of his life, all the sting is taken out of his passion and death; he didn't really suffer as we do.

3. If Jesus knew everything, both ignorance and learning are excluded from him; but this is clearly unscriptural.

4. If Jesus had already in this life the Vision of God, he cannot be fully human.

1. Jesus' freedom

Part of freedom is the inability to know what one's action will effect, or even what one would do in the future. If, say, a fortune teller told a person exactly what would happen in the rest of his or her life, then that person would no longer be free; all would be fated; the person could only submit. In ignorance, then, is freedom.

This objection has a certain surface plausibility to it, which has apparently convinced many that the theory of Vision in Christ must be abandoned. But it will not stand up if seriously pressed. For example, it must immediately be revised if applied to God. If freedom is founded in ignorance, then God cannot be free. If not knowing the effect of one's action is constitutive of freedom, then again God is not free.

The positive understanding called for, however, is the possibility of omniscient knowledge and human freedom. Put in that way, it is easy to see that the question of Christ's human freedom is but a subset of the universal question, How is God's omniscience compatible with human freedom? Better put, in Christ's human freedom there only arises in a more acute and focused form the general problem of
human free action. But that is a question Lonergan addressed in *Grace and Freedom*.

First, the depth of the problem must be envisioned. It is not enough to say, God knows what I will do, and yet I am free. Rather one must say, God knows and causes what I will do, and yet I am free. The reason for this is that God’s knowledge is active and creative, not passive and receptive. God does not know something because it exists; it exists because he knows it. Otherwise God would be dependent on this object of his knowledge. Besides, a dilemma would be created: where did this thing come from? Did it arise by itself? No, because God is the creator of every shred of being in the universe. Did God perhaps cause it without knowing about it? No, because in God’s simplicity his will is his intellect. As Lonergan is fond of repeating, God wisely knows and lovingly chooses whatever exists.

But how can God know and cause my act, and it still be free? Lonergan’s answer is transcendent causality. Often an attempt is made to solve the problem of divine sovereignty and human freedom along the following lines: I see my daughter discover a piece of candy. I know her well, and I know she will eat it. But my knowledge of what she will do doesn’t take away her freedom. This analogy is inadequate. It speaks of a knowledge which is not causative; but God’s knowledge, as seen already, is causative. But, more deeply, the analogy is inadequate because it envisions a coordinate causality. A man and his daughter are both human beings; the father cannot cause his daughter’s act of will. He may anticipate it, he may encourage and reward it; he may threaten and try to force it; but he cannot cause it, because only God can do that.

How does God cause it? Lonergan, following Thomas, answers that God not only brings everything into being, but brings it into being precisely in its own way, according to its own nature. So a necessary reaction is created with its precise brand of necessity; and a free action with its special kind of freedom.

But how is that possible? How can God cause a free action, and it remain free? Ultimately one arrives here at the mystery of God’s

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15 See *Grace and Freedom*, pp. 103ff.
creation and human freedom; to understand it fully one would have to comprehend God's action. But we may also counter: How is it not possible? How could a free act exist, if God did not cause it?

*Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.* One may legitimately argue from actuality to possibility. If I have a free act, then a free act must be possible. But if nothing can exist unless God causes it, then the free act is possible only if God causes it. Without God's causation, it not only would not be free; it would not even be.

A strain of modern thought holds that divine and human freedom are incompatible. God inhibits my freedom. Feuerbach carries this to its ultimate conclusion: in order to be free, I must destroy God. But a sound theology not only rejects this, but affirms the opposite: I am free only if God causes me, and my every free act. Far from being the inhibition of freedom, God is the ground, the matrix, the cause, and the nourisher of my freedom. I do not become freer by fleeing from God, striving for some illusory independence from God, but precisely by coming nearer him, and recognizing my dependence: my freedom is a divinely caused, created freedom.

Ultimately the question of human freedom is a subset of the mystery of creation. How can a creature stand before the face of God? It comes forth from nothingness, it is but vanity, dust, and ashes; how does it not vanish in a puff of smoke in the divine presence? In a sense, creation adds nothing to being, since God is already the fullness of being, to which nothing can be added. And yet, in the mystery of God's gracious creation, a creature is not... nothing. It has its own solidity, its own nature, its own transitory but real endurance.

Thomas Aquinas had a particularly profound insight into this reality. Up until his time Christian theology had been largely Platonic. In Plato's thought, the really real is the unseen world of the forms, in which all other realities — especially sense realities — participate in but a partial and defective way. In spite of the corrective constituted by the doctrine of the Incarnation, there was a way in which everything was seen as a symbol of something higher, rather than being viewed in its own right. When he adopted Aristotle's philosophy, Thomas added to the Christian vision a grasp of the hardness and solidity of creatures. Josef Pieper is particularly good at evoking this cultural transition.
We find Thomas giving us ever new shades of the fundamental Aristotelian position. Aristotle, he says, refuses to withdraw from the realities present to the senses, refuses to be distracted from those things that are evident to the eyes. And Thomas himself emphatically accepted this principle. Here was the decisive turn to concreteness, to the empirical reality of the world. Those things evident to the senses, which can be seen, heard, tasted, smelled, and touched, are to be taken as realities in their own right, standing on their own ground — not as mere reflections, shadows, not as mere symbols of something else, something invisible, spiritual, otherworldly. The visible, and sight itself, the perceptions of the senses and the power of perception — all that is now affirmed and acknowledged to be valid in itself. Which means that the physical world of material reality, within man himself also, the body, the senses and what the senses grasp — is all to be taken seriously in a manner hitherto unknown. ... What the twelfth century lacked, and craved, was the concrete reality beneath this world of symbols. It was altogether logical that in the midst of the Christian West itself this irrepressible longing for the hard metal and the resistant substance of “real reality,” so long submerged, must at last burst forth as a mighty, many-voiced, and enthusiastic assent toward the Aristotelian cosmology, as soon as that whole complex of ideas about the universe hove in sight.16

Vatican II suggests that the mysteries of faith gain in intelligibility when their mutual analogy is grasped. Moving, then, from the analogy of creation, to the analogy of the free human act, one may grasp better the analogy of Christ’s human freedom. As God does not overwhelm, but fosters and sustains the existence of the creature; as God does not inhibit but creates the free human act; so the hypostatic union of the Word and the humanity does not destroy, but raises to an unprecedented pitch, the human freedom of Jesus. As God’s knowledge of our free actions, even while causing them, does not remove but rather grounds their freedom, so the divine and omniscient knowledge of the Word does not decrease but increases Jesus’ human freedom. The Word, then, in communion with the Father and the Spirit, exercises a transcendent causality with regard to his own human actions; he creates them in their freedom, just as is true of any human action. By a

fourth application of analogy, then, one may see that the same applies to the vision of God in the humanity of Jesus: it in no way cancels out his human freedom, but rather enhances it.

Even on a human level, it is not true that intelligence, knowledge, anticipation and forethought are opposed to freedom. Planning ahead is a human characteristic. A human being can never plan for all contingencies; but the more carefully one plans ahead, the more contingencies that can be anticipated, the more effectively free one is. Forewarned is forearmed: planning does not disperse freedom, but gathers it into a concentrated heightenedness. Does one become an automaton because one follows a pre-determined plan? By no means! Think of an airplane pilot. A pilot knows exactly what he will do when he gets into a plane. He has studied his check list, and gone through it perhaps innumerable times. He always does it in a precise order, almost as a ritual. Does that mean his or her action is unfree? Not at all! Indeed, human freedom is here at its most attentive; it operates with a gathered intelligence and a high judicialness and seriousness; and with full commitment. The pilot knows well his life, and those of his passengers, rely on the decisions he will make. Does he become free only when veering from the checklist? Does freedom rush in only when the unexpected occurs? Is the pilot a somnambulist on a routine flight? That would be a silly theory, as well as a dangerous practice. Foreknowledge is not opposed to freedom, but may indeed enhance it; and Jesus’ foreknowledge even in his human nature does not render his actions unfree.

The Third Council of Constantinople defined that Jesus had not only two natures, but two natural wills, and two natural operations. In other words, he had two free acts. One free act is the eternal act of knowing and loving which is the divine nature. It is the single act of transcendent causality which has been spoken of; by this act the Word, who is personally identical to Jesus, creates his own human free actions, just as he, with the Father and Spirit, creates every single human free action and every trace of being in the universe.

The other act is not a single one, but the series of human acts of will which constitute a human life; they are performed, not all at once, but one by one, as time unfolds. They are not less free because created
by the eternal act of the Word; because that is an exercise of transcendent causality which, far from limiting freedom, is the very condition of its possibility. Nor does the fact that this present act of will was anticipated, known in advance even in the human visionary knowledge of Jesus, mar its freedom; now the past is prologue; now Jesus knows his Father wants this; now he embraces it, wills it and freely chooses it with all the ardor of his being. "The Father loves me for this: that I lay down my life ..." (Jn. 10:17).

2. Jesus' suffering

Faith is a virtue that trusts, even when it does not know the outcome. Abraham went to Mt. Moriah without knowing about the ram; had he known, he would have been merely playing a role. Similarly if Jesus had known in advance that his passion and death were to issue in his resurrection, then he would have been merely biding his time, until his certain vindication would be accomplished. What otherwise would be excruciatingly difficult would become relatively easy; since the teaching is that Jesus redeemed us by his sufferings, this would undermine both his sufferings and our redemption. Therefore the theory of Vision must be rejected.

Again, this appears a formidable objection; but, once more, the principle becomes questionable when applied to God. For in his divine knowledge Jesus did know the resurrection, as well as every other created reality; obviously such knowledge did not make the redemption impossible.

The objection can be further undercut by denying, with Thomas Aquinas, that the merit of an action is measured by its difficulty; it is measured rather by the love with which it is performed. The difficulty enters in only if, indirectly, it is a measure of the love required for the action. But Jesus performs his actions with an infinite divine love and a perfect human love; so that his action is altogether meritorious and redemptive.

\[17\text{Summa theologiae, I-II, 114, 4.}\]
But perhaps this may seem insufficient, and so the objection must be faced more directly: is it really true that knowledge of an outcome eliminates the pain of the process? This is false for two reasons:

(a) Future bliss does not obliterate present pain. Think of a group climbing a mountain. They look forward to the exhilarating sight of the world from an unencumbered viewpoint, along with the sense of having achieved an arduous accomplishment. But one suppose someone were to fall on the trail and badly skin a knee. One might reasonably say, "Try not to think of the pain; concentrate on what we will experience tomorrow." But it would make no sense to say, "Because of tomorrow's exhilaration, it doesn't hurt now." That is simply not true. It does hurt now, painfully, whatever joys the morrow may bring. Similarly, it would be nonsensical to say to Jesus, "This nail going through your wrist now will not hurt, because in three days you will have a resurrected and glorified body."

(b) Foreknowledge does not preclude suffering. In a simple and dramatic example, try telling a person going to the dentist, "You have been through this all before, you know exactly what will happen, therefore it won't hurt." Foreknowledge of the outcome hardly takes away the painfulness of the process. Indeed, it may increase it, as one anticipates every moment of pain involved. Jesus' divine knowledge that he will rise again, then, in no way invalidates or renders implausible the total revulsion of this human nature as, in Gethsemane, he faces the immediate prospect of death.

Whether foreknowledge increases or diminishes pain may depend on whether tragedy or comedy is involved. Imagine two persons going to a movie, one having read a review, the other not. If the movie is a comedy, then the person who knows "how it all turns out" may be able to take more lightly the perils into which the heroine ventures. But suppose it is a tragedy. Then the opposite may happen. What to one person is an off-hand comment may be to the other the trigger that is pulled, all unwittingly, to engineer one's own destruction; this meeting is not a chance encounter, but the last time she will see him alive; and so on.

Ultimately Jesus' life is a comedy; yet in its earthly course, and from a merely human point of view, it ends in tragedy. Already it is
overlaid with foreboding when Jesus is but an infant. "This child is destined to be the downfall and the rise of many in Israel, a sign that will be opposed and you yourself shall be pierced with a sword ..." (Lk. 2:34-35).

He sets his face like flint toward Jerusalem, knowing full well what is to happen there (Lk. 9:51). The tragedy gathers as he glimpses that city: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you slay the prophets and stone those who are sent to you! How often have I wanted to gather your children together as a mother bird collects her young under her wings, and you refused me!" (Lk. 13:34). The onrushing swirl of events takes on a diabolical intensity: "But this is your hour — the triumph of darkness" (Lk. 22:53). Jesus had anticipated this moment, not stoically, but with a fierce joy: "I have come to light a fire on the earth. How I wish the blaze were ignited! I have a baptism to receive. What anguish I feel till it is over!" (Lk. 12:49-50). But now death stares him proximately in the face. The human being instinctively, spontaneously wills life; only the most gathered act of freedom can counter that. Retreat meditations suggest that Jesus in the garden foresees not only his death, but grasps at once in vision every human death and, much more painfully, every human sin. With the doctrine of Vision, that is not pious fantasy, but sober fact. His whole spirit resonates with that welter of dark despair. Paul limns the theological reality when he says dramatically: "For our sakes God made him who did not know sin, to be sin ..." (2 Cor. 5:21). Luke the physician records the physical trauma: "In his anguish he prayed with all the greater intensity, and his sweat became like drops of blood falling to the ground " (Lk. 22:44). On the cross death is even nearer, consuming him — death, the last enemy of human life. In that extremity, the only fitting words are those of Psalm 22, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me ...?"

In none of that foreknowledge and anticipation is Jesus' suffering in any way diminished.

As a positive understanding here, a distinction may be made between the knowledge of anticipation and the knowledge of realization. Lonergan's epistemological investigations are obviously of assistance here, and the distinction is akin to the one Newman makes between a notional and a real assent.
The knowledge of anticipation is a relatively intellectual knowledge. It may be extremely complete and detailed; but it is quite another thing to actually experience what is anticipated. For example, one may study all the data on the effects of a hurricane: 250,000 people homeless, 50 square miles where almost all the wooden structures are completely destroyed. But a person visiting the scene, no matter how well briefed, is likely to say, "I just didn't anticipate the extensiveness of the destruction."

Jesus' knowledge, then, of the future events of his life is such a knowledge of anticipation. It does not evacuate in any way the knowledge of realization — which is quite a different thing — when the event itself occurs. "You just have to go through it," as it is popularly said. The knowledge of realization can be gained only in that way; and no amount of anticipatory knowledge or preparatory briefing can obviate that process. The anticipatory knowledge of Jesus' vision, therefore, does not obstruct the joys and pains of his knowledge of realization.

3. Growth in Jesus' knowledge

The person who is an expert in a subject is a poor candidate to be a student in an introductory course in the same subject. He would be bored out of his mind. The same applies to Jesus: if he already knew, in a Vision of God, everything it was already possible to know, how could he learn anything? Yet Luke clearly says, "Jesus, for his part, progressed steadily in wisdom and age and grace before God and men" (Lk. 2:52). Again, if in Jesus "every treasure of wisdom and knowledge is hidden" (Col. 2:3), if it were true of him what Peter said, "Lord, you know everything" (Jn. 21:17), how could there be any ignorance in Jesus: "As for the exact day or hour no one knows it, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father only" (Mt. 14:36). Once more, the dilemma seems ineluctable. Knowledge and ignorance are opposites. As knowledge increases, ignorance decreases in proportion. When knowledge becomes total, ignorance altogether vanishes. But clearly there were things Jesus did not know — that is the burden of Brown's article,
already mentioned. So the unlimited knowledge of the theory of the Vision is impossible.

This objection, though many find it impressive, is answered relatively easily by distinguishing different kinds of knowledge in Jesus. Jesus may be cognizant of something in one way, while he has yet to learn it in another.

Historically, the church first discovered this possibility in the later fourth century, under the challenge of Apollinaris. He reasoned thus: the Word knows all things by the divine, omniscient knowledge. Jesus is the Word. Therefore any human knowledge in Jesus is useless — it would be gilding the lily. So the Word substitutes for the human mind of Jesus, and the Word is united to a human body. As John says, “The Word became flesh ...” (1:14). As plausible as the argumentation sounds, the church judged it inadequate. Arguing from the famous premise, “What is not assumed is not saved,” it concluded that if Jesus did not have a rational soul, then the rational soul of man was not saved. Thus the principle was established: the knowledge of the Word, though infinite, does not obviate or render useless the human knowledge of Christ. Again, the analogy of creation lurks in the background.

Some centuries later Gregory the Great made a similar suggestion. In wrestling with the problem already noticed of Mt. 14:36 — the ignorance of the Son — he has a suggestion:

This can also, therefore, be understood in a more subtle way by saying that the only-begotten Son Incarnate, made perfect man for us, knew the day and the hour of judgment in His human nature but did not know it from his human nature.\(^{18}\)

It is only teasing this out slightly to discern two kinds of knowledge within the humanity of Jesus: a knowledge in his human nature and from his human nature; and a knowledge in his human nature but not from his human nature. The knowledge in and from nature is what today would be called a developing, human knowledge: it is what Jesus learned from his parents, his teachers, his contemporaries, and his own experience. But there is in Jesus’ humanity another knowledge, a

\(^{18}\text{ND} 625 = \text{DS} 475.$
knowledge which is not accorded him by his human nature, but by the
grace of the hypostatic union: the Vision of God. The distinction is
quite apposite: in the Vision is known everything humanly possible to
know; in the developing knowledge is known only that which Jesus
has discovered for himself, and deduced from his experience. The
Vision of Christ accords with Col. 2:3 and Jn. 21:17 (and all the other
texts of John adduced above); the developing knowledge explains Lk.
2:52 and Mt. 14:36.

By the time of Thomas this tradition had developed to the point
where Thomas distinguished, besides the divine knowledge, three
kinds of human knowledge: vision, infusion, and a developing experi-
tential knowledge.¹⁹

But this may still seem an epistemological fiction. Can one really
know and not know something at the same time? Yes, and examples
lie easily to hand; one is the distinction already made of a knowledge of
anticipation and a knowledge of realization. Think of the person who
has studied a language until he or she is book-perfect — and then
meets a foreigner with whom to actually speak it. Imagine the doctor
who has studied human anatomy exhaustively — and now is
spending, with his wife, his honeymoon. Picture the fireman who has
drilled incessantly the way to handle a fire of hazardous chemicals —
and now faces a real emergency. Or envision a pilot who had handled
any number of induced stalls in his flight training — but now must
cope with a real, unexpected and unintended stall. In each case, the
person may validly be said to know the reality in depth; yet in each
case, obviously, there is yet much to learn!

How differently the same reality may be known! Compare a
scholar who has spent fifty years studying Dante’s Divine Comedy, and
a student who has just discovered the first few cantos. Undeniably, it is
the same poem — yet how contrasting the knowledges. But even then,
the expert can remember his or her own first tentative steps, and share
anew the enthusiasm of discovery by participating in the student’s
excitement. The two knowledges are not simply incompatible.

¹⁹Summa theologiae III, 9.
What precisely would be the difference between the visionary and the experiential knowledge of Jesus? It is on this point of understanding that Lonergan makes a particularly valuable contribution.20

It is often forgotten that the highest human knowing is intuitive. Man is classically defined as the animal rationalis, and the discourse of reason is what predominates in his knowledge. God does not use concepts to know, nor do angels; and the human being, in the beginning of his knowledge, in its final destiny, and in its highest achievements, touches on the divine and angelic modes of knowing.

As opposed to ratio, the logical, deductive and discursive knowledge proper to human beings, Thomas calls this intellectus. Man's knowledge begins here, in the habit of first principles. Aristotle brilliantly explains this in the Posterior Analytics: logical knowing cannot ground itself, because there is a disproportion between conclusion and premises: every single conclusion requires two premises. But those two premises, if they are deduced, will require four, and those eight, and so on, soon burgeoning towards infinity. So Aristotle grounds science in a higher kind of knowing — not episteme, science, but nous, intuition — which becomes Thomas' intellectus. It is the habit of first principles; and without those primary, self-evident truths, no other knowing is possible.

Thomas also suggests this is the ideal of human knowing. When one goes through a logical process over and over until one can zip through it, grasping the whole in one synthetic vision, then once more ratio tends toward intellectus, discursiveness toward a synthetic grasp.

But it is on the final, graced destiny of human knowing that Thomas focuses in trying to explain the visionary knowledge of Jesus. God can be adequately known by no concept; so in the Beatific Vision God himself, through the gift Thomas calls the 'light of glory,' becomes himself, as it were, our concept. Such knowledge, then, is not conceptual; ratio's endless discourse has now found its rest in intellectus' intuitive gaze.

20De Verbo Incarnato, pp. 401-412.
What precisely, Lonergan therefore asks, is the difference between rational and non-conceptual knowing, between Jesus' experiential, rational knowledge, and his knowledge of Vision?

Rational knowledge, the ordinary knowing of human beings, is at once accretive, dissociative, and discursive. It is accretive, in that it 'clumps things together' to know them more efficiently. The concept is a universal: it grasps what is common to all instances of a particular nature. Given the limitations of human knowing, that introduces a vast efficiency. Instead of having to learn every individual in the universe, one can learn a whole class at a time. Children already exploit this possibility. It only seems they ask incessantly, What is that? In fact, after a few instances, they can say confidently, That's a cow! Only when something new occurs do they have to ask, What is that?

Such universal knowing is of particular use to the scientist. One could spend a lifetime studying a particular atom of oxygen, but, from the point of view of the progress of science, that would be a very inefficient process. No, the scientist wants to frame general laws which will apply, not just to this sample of oxygen, but to all oxygen, everywhere on the earth, ultimately anywhere in the universe.

Rational knowing is also dissociative. Its strategy is to take one thing at a time, and to ignore, for the moment, everything else. So the scientist studying oxygen, for example, will refuse to be distracted by butterflies or supernovae.

Rational knowing is also discursive. It unfolds in time. Conclusion is deduced from premise, and that conclusion must be joined with another to take a further step. Only gradually does full understanding dawn; conclusions may be logically implied, but it takes time to deduce them; discoveries often travel the roads of dead-ends and false turnings. Given human limitations, one may have forgotten the original premise by the time one arrives at the end of the chain of reasoning; and most likely one will not grasp all the implications of all the intermediate premises.

Granting the limitations of the human knowing power, conceptual knowing has proved a successful strategy, in common sense, in philosophy and logic, and also in science. Yet for this success one pays a price: because it is accretive, and knows through the universal, rational
knowing grasps very imperfectly the particular; because it is dissociative, it understands parts rather than the whole; because it is discursive, it does not see everything at once.

It is intuitive knowing, rather, which has those virtues: it is particularistic, understanding each individual thoroughly in its own reality; it is total, grasping all the individuals in their relation to each other, and to the whole; and it is simultaneous, grasping everything at once. Such is the knowledge of God. Such, by analogy, is the human knowledge of the blessed in heaven; and such, again by analogy, is the visionary knowing of Christ.

For all its excellencies, however, intuitive knowing has its price: namely, it serves very poorly as a medium of communication with those whose mode of knowing is accretive, dissociative, and discursive.

Some years ago there was a film, with an invasion from outer space. The first inkling came when a spaceship shadowed a car; the couple inside turned on a tape recorder. Weeks later, the alien invaders had all but destroyed earthly civilization; electricity was gone and even the batteries were expiring. In the shambles, the couple aimlessly turned on the tape recorder: and there, through the slow revolutions of the fading battery, came a discernible message of a peace proposal from the alien invaders, and a deadline for a response. The problem was that their thought-processes were so elevated, their mode of communication so rapid that it could not be discerned by human beings until it was vastly slowed down.

Something similar is true of the visionary knowledge of Jesus. It is not that it is deficient in itself; it is simply that it is so particular, so total and so all-at-once that it cannot be communicated to an audience bound by accretion, dissociation, and discursiveness. Just as the knowledge of the Word, then, does not set aside Jesus’ human knowing, so his knowing of Vision in no way renders unnecessary an experiential, conceptual and rational knowing. In the pregnant phrase of Hegel, not even Jesus could avoid ‘the labor of the concept.’
4. **Jesus' humanity**

If Jesus truly had the Vision of God already in this life, he would be so far above us that he would have no commonality with us; as in the image just given, he would truly be an alien being from outer space. The meaning of the Incarnation is that Jesus became our brother, flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood. Had he the Vision of God, he could not have understood us, spoken to us, suffered like us. He became utterly and fully human, so he could not have enjoyed the Vision of God. Perhaps this is the nub of the contemporary discomfort with the theology of a Vision of God in Jesus' humanity.

Rahner has a good initial observation here: Jesus is the measure of humanity. We are not to look to ourselves to determine the parameters of what it means to be 'fully human,' and then contract Jesus to those limitations; but we are to gaze on his face and empathize with his heart, to discover the as-yet-unsuspected depths of our own human possibilities.

'Fully human' carries with it an ambiguity. Does it mean 'exhausting all the potentialities of human nature'? Or does it mean 'all too human, according to the ordinary run of humanity, the common achievement of the average man'?

When one thinks of it more deeply, what seems to be operative here is a theology of envy. We fear, perhaps, that Jesus will outstrip us; we are more comfortable if we can constrain him to our smallness. "Be all you can be," is the Army slogan. The plea of some post-Conciliar Christology to Jesus sounds like "Be less than you can be." Some years ago a candidate was proposed for the United States Supreme Court. He had, it was cheerfully admitted, no special qualifications for this position; but, it was argued, we have many outstanding supreme court justices; perhaps we also need a representative on the court for the mediocre. That did not make much sense in regard to a supreme court justice; does it make any more sense when theologians argue, in effect, 'We are all mediocre, and so we need a mediocre Redeemer'?

So the ambiguity must be eliminated for a fruitful understanding, and the question faced squarely: will the Beatific Vision in heaven make us more fully human? Or will it make us less human? The
answer, I think, is obvious. But the same question may be applied ana-
logically to Jesus. Did the Vision of God make him more fully human? Or less human?

Jesus became poor for our sakes. It would seem niggardly to com-
plain that he did not become poor enough.

But even from a narrow calculation on our part it does not serve us or our redemption to limit Jesus. For Jesus is the final revelation of the Father. "In times past, God spoke in fragmentary and varied ways to our fathers through the prophets; in this, the final age, he has spoken to us through his Son ..." (Heb. 1:1-2). Imagine an outstanding painter, someone on the order of a Michelangelo or a Raffaelo. Suppose one were to say, 'This man is simply too good for the other painters. Let us give him rough and uneven canvas, poor quality brushes, and runny paints. He's good enough; he can still compete, and will probably still create masterpieces, in spite of his defective materi-
als.' That would be an aesthetic crime!

An analogy exists here, if, following Thomas, we understand Jesus' humanity as the instrument of his divinity. It is through the humanity that God is revealed to us. "No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, ever at the Father's side, who has revealed him" (Jn. 1:18). In Irenaeus' theology, Jesus is the visibility of the Father. To limit that humanity is to posit a defective instrument and limit the revelation that can be made through it. Of course, God is all-powerful, and can communicate even through a defective instrument, far more than the greatest artist could. But then the revelation is no longer through, but around, in spite of, the humanity of Jesus — which undercuts the whole economy of the Incarnation.

The positive understanding occasioned by this objection, then, is that Jesus Christ is truly the mediator, the pontifex, the bridge-builder. He not only reveals God to us, he reveals man to us. In him we glimpse not only God's redemptive love for us, but we can envision our own highest possibilities. We recognize not only the unseen Father, but what he wants to make of us. "Dearly beloved, we are God's

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children now; what we shall later be has not yet come to light” (I Jn. 3:2). As seen already, the highest possibilities of human existence are constituted by an intuitive rather than a rational knowing, and the love which will flow from it. In the Jesus of the Vision of God we see that high possibility manifested in human and tangible form. What he was, we will be.

Vatican II expresses this in a particularly beautiful way:

In reality it is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear. ... Christ the Lord, Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling.

CONCLUSION

As made clear from the start, the goal of this inquiry has been understanding. Hopefully it will have exhibited something of the rich possibilities for understanding more deeply both the divinity and the humanity of Christ, which lie in the theology of his human Vision of God. Perhaps it will also suggest the poverty that is induced when short-term and superficial solutions are offered to Christological perplexities?

22 It is interesting to note that in Thomas’s intellectualist vision even the Beatific Vision is formally constituted by knowing rather than loving; see Summa theologiae I-II, 4, 2.

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