CONTENTS

Hugo Meynell  77  Post-Analytic Philosophy: Its Causes and Its Cure

Michael H. McCarthy  89  The Critique of Reason

Joseph Flanagan, S.J.  127  The Jesuit University as Counter-Culture

William F. Ryan, S.J.  147  The Incompatibility of Intuition and Constitution in Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology (1907)
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I WANT IN what follows to register a complaint, and to sketch out a program. I shall not have the space fully to justify every detail of my argument; but I hope to go far enough to convince my readers that there would in principle be no difficulty in doing so. I take the phrase ‘post-analytic philosophy’ from a recent anthology of papers by representative contemporary practitioners of what is often referred to as the ‘analytic tradition’ in philosophy.¹

Very roughly, analytic philosophy in its early stages was characterized by a defective epistemology, as would now be very generally agreed by philosophers.² The tendency of later analytic philosophy, or post-analytic philosophy as we will call it here, is to purport to get by without any epistemology at all. The fundamental cause of post-analytic philosophy, as I shall try to show in summary fashion, is the defective epistemology of analytic philosophy; its cure is the correct epistemology, which I shall try to sketch.

Why should post-analytic philosophy need curing? The answer is simply that it subverts the enormously important, and indeed increasingly urgent, cultural role which ought to be played by philosophy. Philosophy above all other subjects has traditionally been in the


business of promoting, clarifying, and intensifying our efforts to know what is true and good, where 'true' and 'good' are not merely a matter of the say-so of powerful groups in our own community or any other community. The conclusion to which post-analytic philosophy tends is that 'anything goes' in claims about what is true and what is good, provided such a group can be induced to sponsor it. The basic line of thought appears to be, that epistemology is represented in its most cogent and coherent form by analytic philosophy, and that the enterprise of analytic philosophy has ended in failure. Thus Rorty declares that the notion of logical analysis has turned upon itself and committed suicide, and that the distinctions on which analytic philosophy depends, like that between the conceptual and the empirical, have been gradually eroded; John Rajchman says that analytic philosophy ultimately achieved the negative result of showing, in great technical detail, that the problem of showing how words hook onto the world does not admit of a solution; Arthur Danto says that it assumed a representational relation of discourse to the world, which could not survive scrutiny; while Hilary Putnam wonders whether the basic programs characteristic of professional philosophy have not come to a dead end.3

According to the majority of traditional philosophers, scientists, and reflective persons of common sense, for a statement to be true is, in typical cases at least, for there to be a fact in the world which makes it true, such as is the case prior to and independently of anyone's making a statement to that effect. For example, on the view that I have just mentioned, that there were millions of dinosaurs roaming about the earth seventy million years ago, and that there are two planets in the solar system within the orbit of the earth, are each the case independently of there being scientists who make statements to that effect; and whether the statements "There were millions of dinosaurs roaming round the earth seventy million years ago" and "There are two planets in the solar system within the orbit of the earth" are true, depends on whether these corresponding facts are the case. Again, according to

3See John Rajchman, "Philosophy in America," Rajchman and West, Post-Analytic Philosophy, pp. x-xi.
these traditional assumptions, for an action (or whatever) to be good is something other than for any group confidently to commend it; the badness of the killing of six million Jews, and the goodness of feeding the hungry and clothing the naked, do not depend on anyone's say-so. In this view, if anyone maintained that the large-scale killing of Jews because they were Jews was good, or that feeding the hungry and clothing the naked was bad, they would be wrong, and their wrongness would not consist merely in the disagreement with them on these topics by powerful or influential groups. However, if the position to which post-analytic philosophy tends is right, both of these traditional assumptions about truth and goodness are to be rejected.

The phrase, 'position to which post-analytic philosophy tends,' has been chosen with some care. Probably no one assents quite clearly, distinctly, and consistently to the position which I have just outlined; perhaps Rorty and Feyerabend have come closest to it. Quine and Putnam seem in effect to charge Rorty and Kuhn with it, only to face the counter-charge that their own positions are inconsistent and unstable compromises. Rorty reproaches Kuhn and Feyerabend for incautious talk, and assures his readers that 'of course' his principles do not have the absurd or frightful consequences which I have attributed to them.

But the fact is that absurd and frightful consequences do follow rather directly from the repudiation of epistemology. Either a claim as to what is true or what is good can be justified by principles which can themselves be justified, and so on until one arrives at principles which are justified simply in themselves; or at one point or another all that can be appealed to is convention, brute force, or the counting of heads. And if this is done anywhere in the proceedings, it might just as well

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5See Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?", pp. 6-7, 10. On the apparent implied denial of any rational content to moral discourse which follows from this trend in philosophy, see Rajchman, "Philosophy in America," p. xxii, and West, "Afterword," p. 269; West refers to its "relativist, even nihilist, implications" (p. 269). Rorty adroitly sidesteps the charge of relativism on the pretext that he has no theory of truth at all, and therefore not a relativist one (p. 6).
be done everywhere. If a judgment of fact or value is justified by a principle, which is justified by another principle, which is justified by appeal to convention or brute force, it would surely be less disingenuous to justify the original judgment by convention or brute force in the first place.

But, the reader may object, has not the whole epistemological enterprise foundered on irrefragable arguments? It is pointless to lament the plight of contemporary philosophy, if one does not attempt to contest the arguments by which contemporary philosophers feel forced to their positions. The point is a perfectly reasonable one, and must be answered. What in general I want to indicate, however briefly, is that the epistemology developed in early analytic philosophy did have defects and inadequacies; but that these can be remedied, and epistemology accordingly be put on a surer footing.

I believe that Rorty is quite correct in maintaining that any epistemology must include two elements: a basis for knowledge in experience, and a way of arriving at conclusions and justifying them on this basis. There are two outstanding difficulties here. First, it seems impossible to articulate the alleged empirical basis in a manner uncontaminated by the 'theory' which is supposed to belong to the other component in the ensemble. Second, no satisfactory account can apparently be given of how the appropriate conclusions are to be arrived at and justified on that basis.

As to the first, it is true, as has often been pointed out, that we could not talk about sense-impressions unless we could talk about perceivable objects in a public world. We could not talk about visual impressions as of magenta, or aural impressions as though of an oboe playing middle C, unless there were magenta objects and oboes playing (or at least things sufficiently like them) in the real world. We can only talk about sense-impressions in a language which is parasitic on our ordinary language about the world of perceivable physical objects; in that sense, and to that degree, the language in which we describe sense-experience is inevitably contaminated by the 'theory' implicit in

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ordinary language. But it appears to me that we can talk of sense-impressions by *ad hoc* modification of the language in which we talk about ordinary physical objects; we can talk of tomatoes eighteen inches in front of our eyes, and so of sense-impressions *as though of* tomatoes eighteen inches in front of our eyes (when we do not wish to commit ourselves to the sensory expectations to be entertained if a real tomato were so situated).

The term 'theory' is not univocal; ordinary language, which has evolved to cope with perceptible physical objects in our immediate environment, can be modified in different ways for different special purposes. One of these, it seems to me, as it did to many philosophers of an earlier generation, could be to speak of experiences as such, in abstraction from the things in our environment of which they are characteristically the experiences. What is prior in the order of *speech*, one might put it, is not necessarily prior in the order of *experience*. On the basis of her experience and the language she is taught, a child learns to talk about the perceivable physical objects in her environment. Later, as a result of wider experience and more teaching of language, she may master some of the modified forms of ordinary language which constitute the technical discourses of the sciences. But I do not see why one of these theoretical extensions of ordinary language should not be able to articulate the experience which is at the base of our use of ordinary language itself, as well as of the extensions of that in other theoretical developments.

I may have a 'theory' (in an inordinately simplified sense of the term that will do for the purposes of illustration) that there is a tomato in such-and-such a location which is close to my own. This is confirmed by the fact that I have visual, aural, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory sensations as though of a tomato when I go through appropriate procedures, in a manner I could not be expected to do had there not been a tomato there. (That I probably, short of special training, will not be able to speak directly of my experiences, or of the manner in which my judgments about the tomato are based on them, does not imply that the experiences do not occur, or that they do not constitute such a basis for the judgments). I have no adequate reason to suppose that some alternative explanation for my train of experience is correct —
say, that someone has put electrodes in my brain, and has arranged to have them stimulated in such a way that I keep seeming to perceive a tomato with all my five senses when I go through the appropriate motions. I can properly say that there is a tomato where there appears to be one is the best explanation available of the fact that I have been and am enjoying these impressions as though of a tomato.

We have moved from consideration of the first difficulty mentioned in the view that knowledge of the world is founded on experience, to the second. This relation between explananda and explanation will prove, if I am right, crucial in dealing with the problem of how experience relates to reality as it exists or may exist prior to experience. There is no strict entailment either way between any statement about the world, and any statement about actual or potential experience. But this does not imply that one cannot make a sound inference, or if it is preferred a sound quasi-inference, from the one to the other, owing to a relationship which I would like to term 'loose entailment.' If there is a goat at some time in the quadrangle of the college, you would expect on the whole that a normal passer-by at the time would have visual, aural, and olfactory experiences accordingly, and remember the apparent presence of the goat in that unusual spot for some time afterwards. Professor X passed the spot during the time at issue, and saw, or at least remembered afterwards that he saw, nothing unusual. This counts against the goat being present as stated, at least at first sight. (It is characteristic of loose entailments that, where \( p \) loosely entails \( q \), the denial of \( q \) counts against the assertion of \( p \), without being absolutely inconsistent with it, such that if \( q \) be false \( p \) must be false). But there are other things to be taken into account: the professor was preoccupied at the time with problems of linear algebra, and is in any case notoriously absent-minded. What it comes to is that experiences en masse tend to corroborate or disqualify statements about ordinary material things; but no one particular set of experiences on the part of any particular person in any particular set of circumstances is strictly entailed by such statements, or strictly entails them. What applies to

\[7\] I have tried to work out this notion in detail in *Freud, Marx and Morals* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1981), chapter 6, and in *The Nature of Aesthetic Value* (State University of New York Press, 1986), chapter 1.
the statements of ordinary language in relation to experience, applies to scientific statements in relation to the statements of ordinary language. If the scientific statement is true, you would expect certain observable states of affairs to obtain, and you would expect certain other observable states of affairs not to obtain; but the absence of any one or more such confirmed expectations may be compensated for by the presence of others.

It appears to me that a great deal of the motivation of the move from (early) analytic philosophy to post-analytic philosophy is due to the assumption that statements cannot really be justified by experience, unless they strictly entail statements about experience. I have been trying briefly to indicate that this assumption is a mistake. The claim made by Quine, that our scheme of concepts and beliefs is related as a whole to experience as a whole, rather than piecemeal, can easily appear, from this perspective, to be an intrinsically-unstable half-way house between the (early analytic) claim that statements of science or statements about material objects strictly entail statements about particular experiences, and the (post-analytic) claim that they are not justified by experiences at all. The point to be learned from Quine's thesis, I should say, is that at a pinch even the most crucial of experimental corroboration or disqualifications of a theory about the world can be got around, if there are enough compensatory disqualifications or corroborations elsewhere. But if one takes up the position that our whole way of looking at the world is justified by our whole range of experience taken together, it is very difficult to see how any one way of conceiving the world could be shown to be more liable to be correct than any other, since the gods of Homer as much as electrons and protons are somehow related to experience (we know too well, some of us at least, what it is to be devastated by Mars or possessed by Aphrodite). Also, this view does not seem well to represent the way we actually go about con-

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8It has been suggested to me, by Donald McQueen, that loose entailment might be accounted for in terms of strict entailment of a disjunction. This does not seem to me to work; see Hugo Meynell, "The Objectivity of Value Judgments," (Philosophical Quarterly, April 1971), pp. 129-30.

9See "Two Dogmas of Empiricism": "Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but as a corporate body" (W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, [New York: Harper and Row, 1963], p. 41).
firming our beliefs, whether in science or matters of common sense; the following-through of which, over hundreds of years, may plausibly be supposed to have led to our rejecting the gods of Homer as anything more than poetic fictions, and to our postulation of electrons and protons instead. A particular range of experience does seem crucially relevant to the question of whether my head of department has measles, or whether the liquid in the retort is acidic or alkaline; for all that, virtually whatever that range of experience is, we may conceivably have reasonable grounds for revising the judgment we had made on the basis of it. The solution to this problem, I propose, is that statements of science and common sense are typically related to a particular range of actual and possible experiences by the 'loose entailment' which I described in the last paragraph.

But, someone might say, how do we know that the assumption intrinsic to common sense and to science as generally understood is right, that there is a real world which exists, and is largely as it is, prior to and independently of ourselves or myself (to talk of 'ourselves,' it may be said, is to presuppose that there is a real world consisting at least of persons other than myself)? I believe that there are two essential steps to be taken in the answer to this question: (1) It is self-destructive to deny that there are true judgments, or that there are judgments made for good reason (a denial is a judgment — is that denial a true judgment? Is it made for good reason? If it is, it is a falsifying counter-instance to itself; if it is not, it is pointless to attend to it.) (2) 'Reality' or 'the actual world,' or whatever we call it, can in the last analysis only be what true judgments are or would be (if made) about, and what properly confirmed judgments tend to be about.10

What is it, in outline, to make judgments for good reason, and so, if I am right, to tend to assert what is the case about the real world? Recently it has been alleged, with what degree of authority or plausi-

10Donald Davidson seems right to insist that there is no veil or gap between the world and what (actual or conceivable) beliefs are or would be about ("A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," Kant oder Hegel? [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981], p. 429). But I do not think that his account, which denies that sense-experience can provide grounds for as opposed to being merely a cause of true belief (p. 427), leaves open the possibility of testing whether one set of mutually-coherent beliefs is more liable to be true than another.
bility I am in no position to say, that Admiral Peary did not reach the North Pole in 1909, and that his claim to have reached it was a fraud. In support of this allegation, it has been pointed out that, before making what was purported to be his final dash for the Pole, Peary sent away the only other members of his expedition who knew how to take navigational readings; and that to have reached the Pole within the available time Peary's team would have to have covered an average of twenty-five miles a day, moving three times as fast as when they had competent witnesses (other than Peary) with them, and over twice as fast as the pace of an expedition of 1968 equipped with snowmobiles.\textsuperscript{11}

This case, whatever be the ultimate verdict upon it, can serve as a convenient model of how we make judgments for good reason, and so tend to get at the truth about the world. Let us consider five possibilities as to Peary's conduct: (1) He never claimed to have reached the Pole. (2) He claimed to have reached it and did. (3) He claimed to have reached it, did not, and made an honest mistake about the matter. (4) He claimed to have reached it, did not, and his imposture was incompetent. (5) He claimed to have reached it, did not, and his imposture was competent. Now one attends to what I have called the loose entailments of each hypothesis (if \( p \), you could not have expected \( q, r, \) or \( s \); but you would have expected \( t, u, \) or \( v \)).\textsuperscript{12} The evidence is presumably quite overwhelming against (1); Peary's competence as a high-ranking naval officer would presumably tell rather heavily against (3) or (4). If (2) were correct, as has generally been accepted up to now, you would not have expected the states of affairs mentioned at the end of the last paragraph. These do not conclusively falsify (2); but at first sight at least they count against it. To revert to the terminology adduced earlier, their contradictories are loosely entailed by it. These considerations seem to leave us with (5), which loosely entails the states of affairs themselves.

\textsuperscript{11}See Greg Heaton, "In Search of the True North," \textit{Alberta Report}, September 26, 1988, pp. 38-41, citing Pierre Berton.

Further to test the credentials of the rival claims (2) and (5), one might look for evidence on Peary's character as illustrated by other incidents in his life (Was he inordinately ambitious? Did he show a tendency to cut corners to get ahead?). It is to be noted that each piece of relevant evidence ultimately depends on actual or hypothetical sense-experience — if you consult relevant documents, you are liable to have visual impressions as of one set of possible collocations of marks rather than another; if you go to appropriate human authorities and stimulate them in certain ways, they will seem to respond with one set of possible noises rather than another; and so on and so on.

I believe (it would obviously be impossible to show this in detail here) that this model can be applied to all inquiries into matters of fact, from physics to history and palaeontology. In every such case, one has to (1) attend to evidence available in experience, (2) envisage a range of possible explanations, (3) judge to be so the explanation best corroborated by the evidence. It has of course to be emphasized that absolute certainty is never in the nature of the case available in such studies; and the reason for this is worth some attention. More evidence in experience relevant to any matter may always in principle turn up; more possible explanations may be envisaged. However, that this overall method is the means par excellence of getting at the truth about things is much more certain than any particular result of its application. It ought also to be remarked that to say that such and such evidence in experience is our only basis for knowledge of a fact is not to say, as on the pristine theory of logical constructions, that to state the fact is nothing other than simply a way of saying that a complex pattern of experience has been had or might be had. Henry VIII of England having married six wives is one thing; the evidence available in experience here and now for the fact that he did so is something different. Once again, one may suggest that it is obsession with strict entailment which has made some philosophers overlook the characteristic
gap between any fact and the (loosely-entailed) evidence which may exist for it.\textsuperscript{13}

While it was characteristic of analytic philosophy to propound an objective view of truth, but to subjectivize and relativize the good, the tendency of post-analytic philosophy is to subjectivize and relativize both. I believe that the correct epistemological principles will yield an objective account of the good as well as of the true. At the root of the theory of value in analytic philosophy was G.E. Moore's argument against what he labelled 'the naturalistic fallacy.'\textsuperscript{14} But this argument, at least as it was understood and applied by Moore's successors,\textsuperscript{15} is perhaps the classical example of the shifts to which philosophers are driven by neglect of loose entailment. Since, as Moore showed at length, the goodness of (say) an action did not strictly entail any particular properties or effects of that action, Moore's successors inferred that it could not be a matter of such properties or effects. To say that it was good, then, could not really be to describe it, but only to commend it or to evince a positive emotion about it.\textsuperscript{16} This doctrine has shocking consequences, for all the skill shown by philosophers in trying to evade them. Does the badness of Hitler's actions consist only in the fact some people disapprove of them? Why should this cut any ice with other people who happen to approve of them? If objective moral standards could be adduced, such that approval of Hitler's actions appeared to be

\textsuperscript{13}The heart of the matter seems to be an obsession with a truth-functional analysis of the verification of propositions in experience. But a truth-functional analysis will not accommodate loose entailment. "In logic a way of connecting statements is called 'truth functional' if the truth value of the resulting statement can be determined given just the truth values of the components" (H. Putnam, *The Many Faces of Realism* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987, p. 88).


\textsuperscript{15}Moore himself did not draw this conclusion, maintaining as he did that good was a simple intuitable non-natural property (*Principia Ethica*, chapter 1).

\textsuperscript{16}A classical statement of this position is to be had in A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Gollancz, 1946), chapter VI.
incompatible with them, and disapproval of them entailed by them, of course it would be quite a different matter.\footnote{See the famous passage in Tom Stoppard's Jumpers (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), pp. 48-49:  
Bones: He thinks there's nothing wrong with killing people?  
George: Well, put like that, of course ... But philosophically, he doesn't think it's actually, inherently wrong in itself, no.  
Bones (amazed): What sort of philosophy is that?  
George: Mainstream, I'd call it. Orthodox mainstream.}

Moore's argument does not begin to refute the view that there is a loose entailment, such that \textit{ceteris paribus} promotion of the greater happiness of the greater number constitutes an action as good. \textit{Ceteris imparibus}, where, for example, the action is unfair (as in the famous instance where one 'punishes' an innocent person in order to appease a raging mob), such an action may not be good. The goodness of (for example) an action loosely entails both its promotion of happiness, and its fairness; its possession of these properties in its turn loosely entails a range of experiences (that those affected by the action will look happy rather than miserable about it, that they will appear to observers to behave in one set of ways rather than another, and so on and so on). Someone who does not know that on the whole it is good to enhance the happiness and fulfillment of persons, and on the whole bad to contribute to their suffering or frustration, does not know the meaning of 'good.'

The solution to the basic problems set by analytic philosophy, and to the question of how in general we may come to know about the world and about how to act for the best within it, has now been publicly available for over thirty years;\footnote{B.J.F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1957); Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).} but the philosophical profession has generally failed to attend to it, for reasons which remain obscure to me.
THE CRITIQUE OF REALISM

Michael H. McCarthy

Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

Prior to Kant’s systematic critique of theoretical reason the theory of knowledge was dominated by epistemic realism, the explicit conviction that the object of human cognition exists independently of the process by which it is known. It is a mark of Kant’s enduring influence that now, two hundred years after the publication of his first critique, it is no longer possible to take realism for granted. Kant put realism on the defensive by arguing that it was an unreflective position based on an erroneous understanding of human knowing. He believed that a careful analysis of epistemic activity would subvert the realists’ understanding of the epistemic object and severely confine the scope of theoretical knowledge. A central claim of this essay is that while Kant failed to refute the grounds for realism he did require its adherents to become critical and articulate in their defense of its truth.

Kant described his alternative to realism as transcendental or critical idealism. His governing strategy was to preserve the objective validity of scientific knowledge without basing that validity on a foundation of mind-independent objects. He sought to ground objectivity in a pure, timeless, transcendental subject, isolated from the conditioning influence of both nature and history. The shift to historical consciousness in the second, nineteenth-century phase of the Enlightenment led

to an open rejection of Kant's a priori transcendental perspective. The central themes of Kant's philosophy were largely preserved by his historically oriented critics even as they embedded the cognitive subject in social and cultural history. Their insistence that human rationality is essentially mediated by natural, social, and linguistic processes has led to a new critique of epistemic realism, one that differs in important ways from Kant's transcendental idealism. The expository strategy of this paper is threefold: to establish the epistemological context of Kant's epochal criticism; to explore the internal connections between Kantian theory and the approach of the linguistic post-Kantians; to clarify and appraise the grounds that have been offered for the rejection of realism.

A. PRE-CRITICAL REALISM

According to Wittgenstein, traditional philosophy has been held captive by several seductive pictures and metaphors and by the philosophical theories that were developed in their support and defense. The critics of epistemic realism treat this familiar theory as a particularly good example of Wittgenstein's claim. There are characteristic images of the human mind, of knowledge, and of being that the realist is accustomed to invoke in support of his position. In the pre-modern period, the dominant conception of knowledge in the West was based on ocular vision. The knower was pictured as an intuitive being, knowing itself as some type of contemplative awareness, and the knowable object as the immediate content of the knower's intuitive acts. This traditional picture has the dual attraction of simplicity and
immediacy. The cognitive subject enjoys an immediate intuitive acquaintance with reality and knows its object through that perceptual encounter. Within the framework of intuitive realism, there is ample room for disagreement about the range of intuitive operations and objects. Are human intuitions restricted to sensitive operations, or are there distinctively intellectual and rational intuitions as well? Are the objects of intuition confined to sensible entities or do they include specifically intelligible and rational objects? When this implicit picture of knowledge is raised to the level of articulate expression, it serves as the basis for naive or pre-critical realism. The naive realist claims that knowing is a form of unmediated intuition, that being is the antecedently given object of intuitive awareness, and that knowledge is the resultant condition of the subject produced by the direct confrontation between knower and known. As an epistemological theory, naive realism is the natural complement to what John Dewey called the spectator theory of knowing.6 For the naive realist, there is no critical problem internal to knowledge, no problem of correspondence between truth and reality. Given his insistence on cognitive immediacy, he treats true judgments as a simple recognition of what we already know in intuition. On this view, it is not through truth that we reach knowledge of being but through our prior knowledge of being that we reach truth.7

Modern representational realism has its origin in Descartes's rejection of the classical account of perception. Descartes denied that the immediate objects of the finite ego's awareness are mind-independent realities. Rather, he insisted, they are ideas, representations, dependent for their being on the consciousness of the subject to whom they belong.8 Although the epistemic goal of Cartesian method remains the understanding of formal or mind-independent reality, that goal is no longer directly accessible. According to Descartes, only in the case of the ego's self-knowledge does epistemic immediacy obtain. Human knowl-

7Lonergan, Collection, p. 163.
edge, unlike its divine exemplar, must reach mind-independent reality through the mediation of mind-dependent ideas.

In Cartesian epistemology, the influence of the spectator theory is still considerable. The central operations of the mind remain intuitive, even though their intentional objects are reconceived as mental representations. The pivotal term 'idea' is used by Descartes to refer to markedly different entities that perform equally dissimilar cognitional functions. The most important epistemic role of Cartesian ideas is that they serve as bearers of truth-value. When ideas function as the intentional content of acts of judgment, their truth or falsity depends on their correspondence or lack of correspondence to the external reality they represent. Descartes explicitly conceives of truth as a relation of conformity between mental representations in the subject and extra-mental realities, in his inherited medieval vocabulary between objective and formal reality. When the idea in the mind (in intellectu) corresponds to the mind-independent reality it represents (in re), then the idea is true. And more importantly, the bearer of the internal representation knows the external reality through the true ideas to which he justifiably assents. Descartes, then, gives partial support to the famous image of the mind as the mirror of nature. The support is only partial, however, because many human ideas, those of the proper sensibles, for example, do not truly reflect the natural world as it is. Because large numbers of the mind’s ideas are false, because they lack a correspondent in formal reality, the human mind is an imperfect reflection device in which we should place only limited trust.

Descartes’s epistemology is a species of representational realism because it holds that the human mind can know extra-mental objects through assent to true internal representations of them. While Descartes’s account of the semantical relation between representation and represented is very obscure, he often suggests that in the case of

9Descartes, Philosophical Works, pp. 160-163.
10Descartes, Philosophical Works, pp. 162-163.
truth the relation is one of intuitive similarity. The true idea that the finite ego intuits corresponds to, that is, intuitively resembles, the real object that the infinite God intuits directly. God's knowledge of formal reality is a case of intuitive immediacy; human knowledge of the same reality is a case of intuiting and assenting to mental representations that resemble the objects of divine awareness. What God knows directly through immediate vision human beings can only discover through the medium of true ideas.

There is a deep problem, however, with the Cartesian account of knowledge of truth. If human intuitions are confined to an awareness of representations, how are human beings to determine whether their ideas correspond to objects outside the mind? Unless we are capable of a superintuition that surveys both the idea and its correlative object, how are we to judge whether or not they resemble each other? Some of our immanent ideas might well be true, but how could we know that they were? Descartes answers this sceptical challenge by appealing to self-authenticating intuitions, to intuitions of ideas that are so clear and distinct that we have no grounds to doubt their truth-value. Richard Rorty refers to these remarkable ideas as privileged representations; and they are indeed privileged, for they guarantee the semantical correspondence that we are never in a position intuitively to confirm.

Taken as a whole, the Cartesian position is a strange amalgam of naive and representational realism. Like the naive realist, Descartes holds that human knowing is achieved through intuition; like the representational realist, he denies the human capacity to intuit mind-independent being directly. Following the example of Augustine, Descartes treats properly epistemic intuitions as rational rather than empirical in nature, and he treats their correlative objects as truth-


13Lonergan, *A Second Collection*, p. 15. "The witnessing from a higher viewpoint is the nonsense of naive realism, of the super-look that looks at both the looking and the looked at."


15Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, chapter IV.
bearing ideas rather than sensible entities. It is through the rational intuition and affirmation of true ideas that we come to know the reality of God, nature, and other minds.

B. TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

In his celebrated critique of epistemic realism, Kant attacked the limitations of both British empiricism and Continental rationalism. In their opposing accounts of human knowledge, the empiricists had relied too heavily on intuitions and the rationalists too heavily on concepts. Neither had correctly understood the functional interdependence of these distinct forms of epistemic representation. Kant’s rejection of naive realism is an important part of his comprehensive critique of empiricism as a cognitional theory. According to Kant, a critical account of human knowledge must recognize three distinct cognitive faculties: sensibility, understanding, and reason. Sensibility, the faculty of intuition, is inherently receptive; understanding, the faculty of concepts, is by nature spontaneous and constructive; reason, the faculty of noumenal ideas, like God and the rational soul, requires an epistemic object that is intrinsically unconditioned. As there are three distinct faculties of human cognition, so there are three distinct types of psychological representation and three distinct modes of cognitive functioning. In its account of knowledge, naive realism relies exclusively on the faculty of intuition, and fails properly to distinguish animal from human knowing. Kant insists that the only human intuitions are sensible; there are no intellectual or rational intuitions. But sensible intuitions, though they are necessary, are not sufficient for existential knowledge; they need to be supplemented by the spontaneous operations of understanding. In Kant’s memorable

16 Kant generally argued that strict adherence to empiricist principles led to skepticism and that the confusions of rationalism promoted dogmatism. He opposed his own critical strategy to both traditions. “Weary therefore of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, and of skepticism, which does not even promise us anything...” Prolegomena, p. 21.

17 This compact summary of Kant’s epistemology is based on the Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason.
phrasing, "Intuitions without concepts are blind."\(^{18}\) Human knowledge is essentially discursive, rather than intuitive, even though it depends on confirming intuition for its validation. It is through the mediating judgments of understanding rather than the bare intuitions of sensibility that we achieve knowledge of objects. We cannot derive epistemic judgments, knowledge *that*, from immediate intuitions, knowledge *of*. For Kant, human intuitions are distinguished not only from the concepts and judgments of the understanding but from divine intuitions as well.\(^{19}\) Divine intuitions are understood by Kant to be creative acts of awareness; they bring into being the object of knowledge they directly intend. Human intuitions, by contrast, are inherently receptive, and the objects they intend are phenomenal rather than noumenal in character. Like Descartes, Kant credits God alone with the ability to perceive formal reality directly. Judged by Kantian criteria, naive realism fails on two counts: its exclusive epistemic reliance on sensory intuition and its uncritical assumption that through intuition we directly experience mind-independent being.

Kant has more sympathy with the representational realists, even though he finally rejects major portions of their theory. He agrees with them that the objects of intuitive awareness are representations, not things in themselves; and he acknowledges their recognition of the need for cognitive mediation. However, according to Kant, human knowledge of objects is not mediated by the intuitive representations of the understanding. If empiricism failed as a theory of knowledge because of its exclusive reliance on sensory intuition, then rationalism failed because of its inadequate understanding of concepts and judgments. Against the rationalists Kant insists that concepts are not intuitive representations and that the faculty of understanding is incapable of intuitive operations. Yet, these objections by themselves are merely negative; what positive role do concepts play in the achievement of existential knowledge?

On Kant's account, the pure concepts of the understanding are transcendental laws regulating the mind's operations of unification.

\(^{18}\)Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B75, A51.

\(^{19}\)Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B72.
and synthesis. The understanding is an essentially constructive or form-creating faculty. But concepts without intuitions are epistemically empty. The synthetic operations of the mind need intuitive material to synthesize if they are to create intelligible objects of knowledge. Sensibility and understanding must work in tandem to provide the empirical matter and the intelligible form of the objects of science.

Kant agrees with the representational realists that the knowledge of empirical objects is mediated by true judgments, that truth is the medium through which objects are known. At the same time, he explicitly dissents from an analysis of truth based on intuitive, that is, sensible, similarity. The object of knowledge is not a mind-independent original of which the true representation is a faithful copy. The correspondence that is necessary for the achievement of truth is not a correspondence at the level of intuition at all. Any image or notion of that correspondence as essentially intuitive is profoundly mistaken. This does not mean that Kant rejects the correspondence theory of truth altogether. There is a correspondence, a formal isomorphism, between judgments and objects, but it is a correspondence at the level of understanding rather than sensibility. Both the mediating judgments of knowledge and the cognitive objects they make known have a common source in the categories of understanding. It is because the same laws of synthesis produce a logical form in the judgment that is isomorphic with the categorial form in the empirical object, that the former can be true of the latter. The representational realists are partly right; truth is a matter of correspondence between judgments and objects. Yet they are also wrong, for it is not a correspondence between representations and that which transcends representation.

20Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B75. "The mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding."

21Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxvi. "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects . . . We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success . . . if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."

22This is a major argument of Kant's Analytic of Concepts. See "The Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding," *Critique of Pure Reason*, B92-116.
Rather, it is a correspondence between two distinct forms of representation, both of which have their formal ground in the lawful operations of the mind. When human beings know objects through true judgments they are using one form of representation to know another. They are not breaking out of the sphere of representations into the knowledge of mind-transcendent being, for that knowledge is not available to them as humans.

Although Kant was highly critical of traditional realism, he did not entirely abandon its epistemic imagery. He preserved an intuitive aspect of cognition but made it insufficient for objective knowledge; he retained the language of representations but dramatically revised the concept of truth. His most significant change was to supplement the traditional imagery of confrontation and correspondence with a new picture of the mind as essentially constructive. Because of Kant, the epistemic subject was re-conceived as a constructive agent and the epistemic object as the intelligible product of that agent's constructive operations. When these contrasting images are integrated into a unified picture of knowledge, the cognitive subject is presented as simultaneously receptive and constructive; the cognitive process includes both intuitions and acts of synthesis; and the judgments and objects synthetically produced by understanding are connected by a formal isomorphism. Sensibility remains the faculty responsible for the matter of knowledge, and understanding becomes the designated faculty of form. But since understanding is now conceived as a constructive faculty, it is said to impose intelligible forms on the epistemic object rather than abstracting them from it.23

Kant's revision of the traditional pictures of knowledge is formally consolidated at the level of epistemological theory. The historical relationship between metaphysics and epistemology is now reversed. Human knowing is no longer treated as a special case of being; rather, being is reconceived as the object of knowledge and metaphysically assessed in the light of the transcendental principles.

23Kant retained Aristotle's nous poietikos but rejected his nous pathetikos. When the receptivity of intellect is wholly transferred to sense, we are left with a mind that literally constructs the objects of knowledge. For a more detailed comparison of Aristotle and Kant, see The Crisis of Philosophy, pp. 188-91.
Kantian epistemology has three correlative aspects. The transcendental aesthetic and logic disclose the a priori intuitions and categories necessary for the attainment of objective knowledge in mathematics and physics. Transcendental psychology explains how the rule-governed operations of understanding synthesize intuitive and conceptual representations into intelligible judgments and objects. The transcendental dialectic reveals the epistemic illusions that result from applying the categories beyond the field of intuition. A priori knowledge of objects is possible because their invariant intelligible structure depends on lawful and necessary operations performed by the mind on the intuitive content of sensibility; in the absence of that content both understanding and reason lack an epistemic object.

What is the import of these theoretical revisions for metaphysics and epistemic realism? Kant does not call for the elimination of metaphysics as such. Transcendental metaphysics, which aspires to knowledge of being beyond the range of possible experience, beyond the domain of confirming intuition, is precluded by his epistemology. But a transcendental metaphysics of the invariant formal properties of the epistemic object is clearly included in Kant's revised architectonic. For Kant, the critical issue turns on the metaphysical standing of the object of knowledge. Kant breaks with traditional realism, both naive and representational, with his claim that the object of human knowledge is phenomenal, that it has the character of subjective appearance rather than mind-independent reality. Behind this revolutionary declaration, which Kant compared to a second Copernican revolution, lie two Kantian theses: first, that the object of knowledge is an essentially intuitive object and that human intuitions are confined to the order of phenomenal appearance; second, that the epistemic object depends for its formal, that is, its intelligible, properties on the pure representations of sensibility and understanding. The object of human knowledge is

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24 "The word 'transcendental' ... does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment is termed 'transcendent' which must be distinguished from the immanent use, that is, use restricted to experience." Kant, Prolegomena, pp. 122-23.

25 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi-xxiii.
constituted by the powers and operations of the mind and has no reality outside of those operations. It is a phenomenal object because its mode of being is intrinsically being for mind.

Does this mean that Kant has entirely rejected realism? Again, the answer is neither simple nor clear-cut. For to whose mind are we referring when we contend that the epistemic object depends on its operations and faculties? Kant draws an explicit distinction between the transcendental and the empirical ego. The transcendental subject is an a priori ground of space, time, and causality, the empirical subject is itself a spatio-temporal object in the causal order. To which subject is Kant referring when he presents his complex views on realism? It is not always easy to tell, for the Kantian text is often obscure. I believe that his most coherent theoretical position takes this form. Kant is simultaneously a transcendent realist, a transcendent idealist, and an empirical realist.

There is a reality, a Ding-an-sich, that transcends the operations of the transcendental subject, but that transcendent reality is not the object of human knowledge. Human beings can only know that it exists, not what it is. By contrast, the phenomenal or epistemic object does depend for its being and intelligibility on the transcendental subject; it is transcendentally ideal. The error of traditional realism was to identify this phenomenal object with the epistemically inaccessible thing in itself. Kant thus opposes his transcendental idealism to the transcendental realism of the tradition.

At the same time Kant insists that his position is not solipsistic. The phenomenal object is, at once, transcendentally ideal and empiri-

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26Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B152-59. For a sharp contrast between Kant's and Lonergan's notions of subjectivity, see Collection, pp. 202-20 and A Second Collection, pp. 69-86. "While Kant envisages an Ich denke (I think) as a formal condition of the possibility of objective contents being thought, still he cannot find room for a concrete reality intelligently asking and rationally answering questions." Collection, p. 207.

27Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A367-81.

28Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B44. "We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality — in other words, that it is nothing at all, immediately we withdraw ... its limitation to possible experience, and so look upon it as something that underlies things in themselves."
cally real. While it depends for its being on the operations of the transcendental subject, it clearly transcends the internal representations of any empirical ego. The object of empirical knowledge is epistemically accessible to all empirical subjects and independent of their particular mental operations for its being. In this way, Kant tried to preserve epistemic objectivity by treating it as empirical intersubjectivity. He resisted the conflation of the empirical object to the solipsistic representations within particular empirical subjects, while identifying that object with a highly complex transcendental representation. The world of phenomenal objects, the realm of possible experience, has being only in and through the transcendental subject that serves as its constitutive ground. The empirical subject is a being within that phenomenal world, characterized by its invariant properties, and linked to its other constituents by the whole array of aesthetic and categorial relations. Like all objects in the world of experience, the empirical subject is itself transcendentally ideal.\(^2\!

C. THE VARIETIES OF REPRESENTATIONALISM

Despite its numerous internal divisions, modern epistemology is largely unified by its acceptance of representationalism.\(^3\!

The great modern theories of knowledge are framed in the idiom of ideas, in the language of mental representations. The moderns broke ranks with the ancients in their appraisal of the objects of perception and knowledge. Descartes treats intuitive objects as ideal; Kant extends the Cartesian treatment to epistemic objects generally. In classifying these objects as ideal the moderns emphasized their existential dependence on mind.

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Kant uses a variety of idioms to refer to the object of human knowledge. These idioms, though often differing in their sense, have an identity of reference. They include: 'the phenomenal object,' 'the object of appearance,' 'the object of empirical knowledge,' 'the empirical object,' 'the object of possible experience,' 'the object of sensory intuition.' The object of knowledge is explicitly contrasted with both the thing in itself (the noumenal object) and the internal representations of the empirical ego.

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By 'modern epistemology' I refer to the Western philosophical tradition that extends from Bacon to Kant. It includes within its scope of application British empiricism, Continental rationalism, and Kantian criticism.
McCarthy: Critique of Realism

and its operations. Their *esse est experii* by a psychological subject of some kind.

In itself, modern representationalism is consistent with both epistememic realism and idealism. Although the *representations* themselves are universally understood to be mind-dependent, the objects they represent may be either mental or extra-mental in nature. In representational realism, an extra-mental object is known through the mediation of true ideas. As modern epistemology developed, there was a gradual movement in the direction of idealism. This pattern is discernible in the changing accounts of truth within the representational tradition. For Descartes, truth is a relation of *correspondence* between ideas in the mind and the extra-mental substances they represent. Bishop Berkeley, whose subjective idealism depends on a rejection of material substances, treats truth as a relation of *coherence* between representations. An idea is true if it coheres in a regular manner with the perceptual representations that anteced and follow it in the course of experience. Perceptual coherence is the test by which God-given sensible ideas and those caused by the human imagination are effectively distinguished. Kant attempts a reconciliation between the positions of Descartes and Berkeley. For Kant, truth is a relation of correspondence between logical judgments and empirical objects, *pace* Berkeley; but the corresponding judgments and objects are themselves representations, *pace* Descartes. Kant rejected Berkeley's subjective idealism and opposed it to his own empirical realism. At the same time, he rejected Descartes's transcendental realism in favor of what he called critical idealism. Despite his explicit attempt to balance the virtues of ancient and modern theories, Kant's emphasis on the constructive understanding gravely weakened the tradition of epistemic realism and gave the weight of his reputation to its idealist rival.

There was already a tendency in modern representationalism to reconceive the act-content structure of intentional operations. In Kant's analysis of the empirical subject this tendency approaches the limit. For Kant, 'intuitions' and 'judgments' refer not to intentional acts but to

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31 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B274-75.
mental representations, to what we can call intentional signs. But when mental acts become intentional signs, their accusative contents simultaneously become what those signs represent or signify. The contents of mental acts cease to be objects of intentional consciousness and become what is meant or intended by semantical representations. This conflation of intentional and semantical relations helps to explain the transition to the next phase of representationalism, designated by Gustav Bergman and Rorty as the linguistic turn.

The linguistic turn, initiated by Frege and later consolidated by Wittgenstein, consists in an historic philosophical shift from ideas to words, from mental representations to their linguistic counterparts. Two results of this transition are especially relevant to the critique of realism. First, while mental representations are ideas in the mind, their linguistic replacements are signs in the world. By shifting its focus from ideas to words, philosophy breaks out of the psychological realm to which it had been confined since Descartes. But this very rupture weakens the case for idealism since the new representations no longer depend for their being on consciousness. Written or spoken words are extra-mental items in the world used to signify other aspects of the extra-mental world to which they belong. Second, the metaphysical break with idealism does not constitute a return to pre-critical realism. The linguistic turn is, after all, a variant of modern representationalism. Pictures of knowledge based on the imagery of sight or vision are gradually replaced by linguistic metaphors. The epistemic relation of knower to known continues to be mediated, but the nature of the mediating representations has dramatically changed. While the linguistic turn subverted epistemic idealism, it did not, by itself, insure the resurgence of realism. The internal controversies that agitated the new way of ideas soon re-emerge in the still newer methodological context of language. In abandoning psychological representations for

32 For the distinction between intentional acts and intentional signs, see The Crisis of Philosophy, chapter VII, sections D and E.

logical propositions, philosophers do not solve the problems of meaning and truth; they simply transfer them to a new theater of argument.

D. FROM REALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVISM

Ludwig Wittgenstein was the most important and influential philosopher to take the linguistic turn. He began his career as a philosophical realist but ended it as one of realism's most trenchant critics. Let us briefly trace the path he took from realism to constructivism.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein maintained an ambiguous relation to Kant. He explicitly repudiated all philosophical psychology including its Kantian variations. He implicitly rejected Kant's image of the epistemic object as a synthetic nexus of mental representations. At the same time that he abandoned transcendental psychology, he preserved Kant's transcendental logic and the formal ontology correlative with it. Like Kant, Wittgenstein insisted on a formal correspondence between logical representations and the ontological entities they signify. He grounded this isomorphism in the a priori requirement that the laws governing the formation of propositions be identical with those governing the formation of states of affairs. Kant drew an idealist conclusion from this correspondence because he grounded the structure of epistemic objects in the lawful operations of the understanding. By contrast, Wittgenstein based the laws of propositional formation on the ontological laws that constitute the identity of extra-linguistic objects. In the order of knowing, Wittgenstein made logic prior to ontology, but in the order of being the relation of precedence was reversed. The semantical realism of the *Tractatus* rested on the claim that the logical

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order, the order of meaning, derives its intelligibility from the extra-linguistic order of being. Linguistic meaning is founded on being.\(^{35}\)

Wittgenstein’s transcendental logic is an essentialist account of the conditions of linguistic signification. Linguistic signs have taken the place of Kant’s psychological representations, and a new metaphor of the sign-signified relation has been adopted. The linguistic proposition has become the primary vehicle of logical representation; picturing has become the model of the proposition’s relation to what it signifies. Language is a picture of reality.\(^{36}\) In the *Tractatus*, this claim does not mean that there is a sensible or iconic similarity between propositions and what they represent. Wittgenstein follows Kant, rather than Descartes, in insisting on a formal identity between the representation and what is represented. There is a structural isomorphism between the linguistic picture and its extra-linguistic semantical correlate, although the surface grammar of language conceals it from view.\(^{37}\)

Again, the parallels with Kant should not be overemphasized. While Kantian judgments are structurally isomorphic with epistemic objects, Wittgenstein distinguishes two distinct levels of semantical representation, namely reference and truth. Tractarian names refer to Tractarian objects; Tractarian propositions are true of Tractarian facts. It is facts rather than objects that are known through true propositions. Logically speaking, reference is subordinated to truth, just as, ontologically, objects are subordinated to states of affairs. The two distinct types of semantical relation between language and the extra-linguistic should not be conflated. As names differ from propositions and objects from facts, so linguistic reference as a semantical relation differs from propositional truth. Both reference and truth presuppose a formal

\(^{35}\) "It [philosophy] consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis.” Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916* (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 93. While Wittgenstein bases his transcendental metaphysics on an antecedent philosophical logic, it is important to acknowledge the foundational position of ontology in his Tractarian strategy. The primacy of ontology is implicitly recognized by the expositional order in the *Tractatus* itself.

\(^{36}\) Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.01. "A proposition is a picture of reality."

\(^{37}\) Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.002. “Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it.”
identity between sign and signified, but this common logical similitude should not obscure the semantical distinction between naming and saying.

The explicit realism of the *Tractatus* is semantical rather than epistemic in character. Wittgenstein emphasizes the relation between sign and signified rather than the connection between knower and known. To a significant extent, intentional episodes have become occurrent linguistic signs and intentional relations have become instances of signification. According to the early Wittgenstein, the study of language can be approached from both a factual and a philosophical perspective. These different perspectives correspond to the two constitutive dimensions of propositions. They are simultaneously facts *in the* world and pictures *of the* world. Philosophy abstracts from the factual aspect of propositional pictures. It is concerned with the syntactical relations between signs and the semantical relations between signs and the entities they signify. In this twofold concern, Wittgenstein recognizes the importance of both coherence and correspondence for the philosophical understanding of language. Syntactical relations are relations of coherence among linguistic representations. Semantical relations are intentional correspondences between language and the extra-linguistic domain of objects and facts. Yet even as Wittgenstein preserves intentional relations between language and reality, he makes these relations ineffable. The semantical relations of reference and truth cannot be put into words.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's semantic realism is extensive but not unqualified. Names refer to objects; meaningful propositions picture possible combinations of objects; truth is a relation of correspondence between propositions and the extra-linguistic facts they signify. Yet there is an important exception to this linkage of meaning with being. The logical constants and the tautologies and contradictions

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39Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.12. "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it — logical form." *Tractatus*, 4.121. "What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent."
are not semantically correlated with any stratum of reality. There are no logical objects or facts. Logical constants have meaning without reference; tautologies have truth-value without correspondence. Wittgenstein breaks the semantical tie between meaning and reality by using the algorithmic method of truth-tables as an implicit definition of the logical constants. Tautologies and contradictions are also dependent on truth-tables; they are special cases of molecular propositions in which the truth-conditions alone are sufficient to determine truth-value. These counter-examples to semantical realism are of considerable importance for they adumbrate Wittgenstein's general approach to linguistic meaning in his later philosophy.

Opposition to epistemic realism is not endemic to the representational tradition as the example of Descartes has shown. When that tradition shifted from mental to linguistic representations, support for idealism diminished and the case for realism was strengthened. The original proponents of the linguistic turn like Frege, Moore, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein all espoused some version of epistemic or semantic realism. At the risk of repetition, but for the sake of expository clarity, let me repeat the distinction between these two related positions. The epistemic realist holds that the object of human knowledge is an extra-mental, extra-linguistic reality whose being is independent of the process by which it is known. The semantic realist holds that the meaning of cognitive language is to be explicated in terms of the truth-conditions of declarative sentences. To understand the sense of a truth-bearing proposition is to understand what would be the case if it were true. To know that a proposition is true is to know that its truth-conditions are satisfied by the extra-linguistic source of its truth-value. The early Wittgenstein was an explicit semantical realist and an implicit epistemic realist. While his characteristic emphasis was on linguistic meaning rather than human knowing, he clearly allowed for knowledge of extra-linguistic fact. Nevertheless, there were limits to his realism even in the Tractatus. Not all linguistic meaning rests on a

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40 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.441. “There are no logical objects.”
41 This way of formulating semantical realism is borrowed from Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
foundation of reference; not all knowledge of truth rests on a correspondence with fact.

In his later philosophy, particularly in the *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein explicitly repudiated the realism of his Tractarian period. What reasons lay behind this deliberate rejection of his earlier beliefs? The best place to begin in identifying these reasons is with Wittgenstein's complex relation to Kant. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein had rejected Kant's transcendental epistemology while preserving a modified version of his logic and ontology. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein abandons the a priori altogether. The strict universality and necessity that Kant had grounded in pure representations of the transcendental ego are treated as philosophical fictions.\(^{42}\) But Wittgenstein does not retreat directly from the transcendental to the empirical ego. He replaces the epistemic authority of the transcendental subject with that of the inter-subjective community of natural language users. Such communities are rooted in nature and history, marked by a pluralism of linguistic purpose, and subject to ongoing change and development. For their individual members, they serve as the normative measure of rationality, objectivity, and truth. But that communal measure is not invariant; it undergoes transformation as the operating agreements of the community are ratified or altered in the course of its continuing linguistic practice.\(^{43}\)

New members of a linguistic community acquire rationality as they achieve mastery of socially sanctioned linguistic practices. One becomes rational through a process of pre-critical linguistic education. In this process the individual person learns to accept a complex set of concepts and judgments that serve as the common matrix for inquiry and argument. These concepts and judgments are the linguistic counterparts of the pure representations of the transcendental ego. But unlike transcendental representations, they are developed through a process of social history, communicated through the teaching of language, and subject to possible abandonment and revision. While


they constitute the community's working standard of rationality, they have no binding force for those reared in a community with different criterial norms. These conventions provide the ground for the practice of rational justification and cannot legitimately be subject to it. To put them into question is to place oneself outside the framework of agreement within which intelligible inquiry in the community occurs. The exercise of rationality, then, presupposes an inherited foundation of social conventions and groundless beliefs. Wittgenstein has taken Kant's innate categorial framework and made it social, historical, linguistic, conventional, and relative.

Wittgenstein's break with the *Tractatus* was analogous to his revision of Kant. He began by repudiating his original image of the language-world connection. In the *Tractatus*, language was conceived as a picture of reality. Linguistic signs stood in intentional or semantic relations with extra-linguistic objects or facts. There was a formal correspondence or isomorphism between sign and signified that warranted the inference from logic to ontology and from ontology to logic. In his later philosophy Wittgenstein abandons the image of language as pictorial representation, denies the existence of semantical relations between language and reality, and rejects the isomorphic principal as an unjustified philosophical requirement on natural language. According to the *Tractatus*, language has a twofold relation to being; it is simultaneously in the world and about the world. In the *Investigations*, language retains its presence in the world but its intentionality or aboutness becomes problematic. New non-representational metaphors are substituted for the Tractarian model of picturing. Language is compared to a tool that speakers can use and to a public game played according to rules; particular linguistic episodes are viewed as employments of that tool or moves made in that game.

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44“Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) ... It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish these old thoughts and the new ones (*Philosophical Investigations*) together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.” *Philosophical Investigations*, Preface.

45This idiom is borrowed from Wilfrid Sellars. See *The Crisis of Philosophy*, pp. 166-69.

The purpose of these metaphors is to break the hold on our imagination of a relational model of meaning and truth.

The *Tractatus* had pictured linguistic signification as a semantical relation between logical signs and extra-linguistic objects or states of affairs. Through these intentional relations the meaning of language was tied directly to reality. Both the reference of names and the truth of propositions were understood on this semantical model. Because atomic propositions were reducible to configurations of names and elementary states of affairs to combinations of objects, the plausibility of the model ultimately depended on the name-object relationship. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein concluded that there were no names or objects in the exclusive Tractarian sense. By implication, this meant that there were neither atomic propositions nor elementary facts as well. It also meant that the alleged isomorphism between sign and signified had lost its foundation at the level of linguistic reference. Since the Tractarian account of truth depended on this critical isomorphism, it was now left without underlying support. The intricate interconnections of the *Tractatus* became an ontological liability when the referential basis of the semantic theory was rejected, and Wittgenstein's transcendental logic and ontology became indefensible once the name-object connection was severed.

For Wittgenstein, the subversion of the relational picture of meaning required the rejection of semantical realism. Linguistic meaning was no longer tied to reference, nor truth to isomorphic correspondence. But these intentional ties between language and reality had been the core of his semantical realism. What alternative picture of meaning and truth could replace them? In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, language did not require a *semantical* tie to reality, because it was already present *pragmatically* in the world of the language game. The foundation of linguistic meaning was not intentional reference but socially sanctioned use. A sign had meaning for the members of a language community if they agreed on its use in their communicative transactions. Don't ask for the meaning of a sign as though it were an entity correlated with language; rather, ask for its use
in the common linguistic economy. As meaning was gradually assimilated to the conventions of public use, so truth was divested of its association with ontological correspondence.

On the view of language, propositions remained the bearers of truth-value, though this was only one of many linguistic functions they were equipped to perform. Wittgenstein drew a critical distinction in the domain of truth-bearing propositions between those that required epistemic justification and those that were learned in the process of mastering the common language. For a large set of interconnected propositions, to understand their meaning in the community was simply to accept them as true. This acceptance did not mean that these propositions were self-evident or that they were the objects of self-authorizing intuitions. Rather, they were groundless beliefs whose acceptance by language users was necessary in order for them to play the appropriate language games. They lay outside, or perhaps beneath, the epistemic practice of challenge and justification. To speak of their truth was really to acknowledge their unchallenged acceptance by the language community as a whole. It did not imply their correspondence with an independent order of reality. In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, truth is separated from correspondence just as meaning has been separated from reference.

Of course, not all true propositions are simply accepted on the basis of social authority. Those that are contested or problematic within the community require epistemic justification. But the linguistic practice of justification consists in showing that the doubtful proposition is coherent with the foundational beliefs of the community. In justificatory argument, one remains within the sphere of propositions, testing problematic cases against the standard of those whose prior acceptance is secure. The semantical metaphor of correspondence has been displaced by two new pictures, one pragmatic and the other syntactical. The foundational truths of the community are to be understood pragmatically; in their case, truth is essentially a matter of social acceptance. In the case of disputed propositions, syntactical considera-

47Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part I, pp. 43 and 120.
48"Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call
tions prevail. A contested proposition is taken to be true if it coheres logically with the complex network of groundless foundational beliefs. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein emphasized syntax and semantics to the neglect of pragmatics. In his later philosophy, pragmatics is given center stage. Meaning is essentially assimilated to use and truth to acceptance and coherence. What is now neglected, or at least obscured by the pragmatic idiom, is the intentional relation of language to the world.

Perhaps the clearest expression of the later Wittgenstein's anti-realism is his insistence on the autonomy of grammar. What does Wittgenstein mean by grammar and what is its intended contrast? In his later philosophy Wittgenstein uses grammar as a term of art. Its selective use is clearly meant to invoke the negative references to grammar in the *Notebooks* where the deep structure of logic was contrasted with the surface grammar of natural language. In the Tractarian context grammar concealed the pictorial isomorphism that logical analysis was needed to uncover. The earlier metaphor of concealment becomes problematic, however, when this allegedly hidden logical structure is rejected as a philosophical myth. With that rejection transcendental logic is steadily demoted and philosophical grammar comes to the fore as the favored term. The shift from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* can be profitably understood as a deliberate replacement of logic with grammar at the disciplinary center of philosophical inquiry.

In the *Tractatus* the laws of logic are the transcendental laws that govern the formation and transformation of propositions. These laws have an ontological ground in the order of Tractarian objects. It is because objects are lawfully governed in their possible configurations that the names which refer to them are subject to an identical regula-


49For the early negative aspersions against grammar, see the *Notebooks* 1914-1916. “Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing” (NB93). For the Tractarian context, see *Tractatus* 4.002-31; for the positive use of grammar in the *Investigations*, Part I, pp. 90, 111, 122, where grammar clearly lacks the sublimity of logic.
The laws of language rest on the laws of being. In the *Investigations*, Tractarian names and objects are both dismissed as illusory fictions. As a result, the transcendental laws of logic are converted into grammatical rules. These rules regulate the use of linguistic signs in the various human language games. Unlike transcendental laws, they are neither universal nor invariant in character. They are adopted by a community in the course of its linguistic history largely for conventional and pragmatic reasons. Natural language speakers create the rules in accordance with which they communicate; these rules do not circumscribe their discourse in the manner of timeless logical laws grounded in the nature of being. In fact, these rules rest on no ontological or epistemic foundation at all. There is no antecedent order of being or knowledge that constrains our linguistic practice. There are pragmatic constraints on the use of language, but they leave considerable room for grammatical maneuver. Grammatical rules only rest on our shared patterns of practice, on our contingent agreement in forms of life. The grammar of language is autonomous because language users legislate it for their own changing purposes and they can revoke it whenever they decide to do so.

Transcendental logic was the linguistic counterpart to transcendental ontology. But when linguistic meaning is dependent on social agreement rather than on ontological order, the inference from logic to metaphysics is invalidated. What follows from the investigation of grammar is not a new metaphysics, but a deflation of Fregean and Tractarian ontology. It is no longer possible to erect a metaphysics on a theory of linguistic meaning. In fact, there is no basis for a distinctive philosophical ontology apart from the beliefs of empirical science and common sense. It is not only logic and ontology that the later philosophy puts into question. Traditional philosophy is deprived of any legitimate foundational function, whether explanatory or critical. It can neither explain nor justify the social agreements on which the practice of rationality depends. When philosophy respects its appropriate limits, it becomes a purely descriptive endeavor. Nothing of

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50 "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or better it is difficult to begin at the beginning and not to try to go further back." Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, #471.
philosophical importance is hidden; everything lies open to view on
the surface of linguistic behavior.51 It is at that surface grammatical
level that all genuine questions of meaning and knowledge can be
resolved. But descriptions of our common linguistic behavior do not
amount to philosophical discoveries. They are reminders of what we
originally learned when we mastered our common language, but then
apparently forgot under the spell of perplexing philosophical imagery.
These behavioral descriptions have the effect of dissolving untenable
philosophical pictures and theories and returning us to the rough
ground of familiar linguistic practice. “What we are destroying are
nothing but houses of cards and clearing up the ground of language on
which they stand.”52

The autonomy of grammar confronts traditional realism with a
new form of immanence. In subjective psychological idealism the
object of knowledge and linguistic reference was a mental representa-
tion confined to the consciousness of the epistemic subject. Kant’s
transcendental idealism restored the semantic and epistemic objectivity
that empirical immanence was required to forfeit. It made the
epistemic object intersubjectively accessible to every empirical investi-
gator. But it restricted the object of knowledge of the field of transcen-
dental immanence by grounding its intelligible properties in the a
priori representations of the transcendental subject. The historic shift
from mental to linguistic representations liberated knowledge from
any form of psychological immanence, whether empirical or transcen-
dental. In the Tractatus epistemic and semantic realism were rehabili-
tated as being, meaning and knowledge were intentionally reunited.
But the restoration of realism was extremely ephemeral. In Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy, the historically rooted linguistic community
usurps the place of the transcendental ego. Its repository of rules,
conventions and accepted beliefs assumes the function of Kant’s pure
transcendental representations. The result is a new form of intersubjec-
tive linguistic immanence in which meaning, truth, objectivity, and
knowledge are relativized to the commitments of the prevailing

linguistic community. Theories of linguistic immanence resemble transcendental idealism in their commitment to retaining semantic and epistemic objectivity. The shared agreements of the community have authority for its individual members. But those commitments establish the floor of rationality. They do not admit of rational justification themselves, nor are they subject to rational criticism on the basis of a deeper understanding of meaning and being. The exercise of human rationality is confined within the operative framework of the existing linguistic community. The intentional transcendence or justification of that framework can no longer be a rational act.

E. SELLARS'S SCIENTIFIC REALISM

There are marked parallels between the Kantian theory of transcendental idealism and this naturalistic concept of intersubjective linguistic immanence. None of the linguistic Kantians has developed this affinity as consistently as Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars's philosophy is an ingenious attempt to integrate the deepest insights of Wittgenstein and Kant. He accepts the Kantian distinction between the causal order of nature and the intentional order of reason; but he understands the intentional order in the spirit of the Philosophical Investigations. For Sellars, human reason is ineluctably social, linguistic, and historical. There is an irreducible linguistic difference between causal and intentional discourse, but that linguistic dualism is consistent with a naturalistic ontology whose physicalism excludes both extra-linguistic abstract entities and immaterial mental acts.

Sellars endorses the insight of Franz Brentano that intentionality is the distinctive mark of human reason. Brentano enunciated this principle in developing a psychological account of intentional operations and objects. Mental acts are acts of intentional consciousness that take a psychological accusative or object as their content. Following the


54 See the Sellars-Chisholm correspondence in "Intentionality and the Mental," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958) as well as The Crisis of Philosophy, chapter VII, section D.
example of Wittgenstein, Sellars converts intentional acts into linguistic events and their accusative contents into inter-linguistic meanings. When the sign-signified model takes the place of the act-content structure of intentionality, it follows analytically that there are no pre-linguistic intentional episodes. Rational or epistemic life is impossible outside the framework of language.

Sellars's insistence on pervasive linguistic mediation is deeply subversive of intuitive realism and the ideal of epistemic immediacy. The different versions of the spectator theory of knowledge are accused of embracing the myth of the given, the belief that the mind can know its proper object through immediate intuitive acquaintance.55 According to Sellars, there are no self-authenticating epistemic intuitions, whether these intuitions are conceived empirically, intellectually, or rationally. Sellars accepts Kant's restrictive claim that the only human intuitions occur at the level of sensation. For Sellars, these sensory intuitions are the result of causal transactions between the natural world and the receptive faculties of sensitive organisms. But these causally produced sensations are pre-linguistic and therefore pre-intentional in nature. The psychological account of immediate intuitive knowledge provided by classical empiricism is therefore untenable. Immediate intuitions without linguistically acquired concepts are blind. All intentional awareness is essentially mediated by concepts which are distinct from and irreducible to intuitive sensations. Given their critical function in the epistemic process it is imperative to understand the nature and origin of these mediating concepts.

For Sellars, concepts are neither innate representations of the understanding (pace Kant) nor the residue of abstractive intellectual operations performed on the deliverances of sense (pace Aristotle). They are rather rule-governed linguistic roles that are mastered by the human being in the course of linguistic education. Prior to their acquisition the human organism lacks intentional capacities. Therefore, it is not possible to explain the genesis of concepts in the language learner by reference to his intentional operations. The human being becomes intentional or rational, becomes capable of knowledge, only through a

process of language transmission in which he exercises no anterior rationality. Of course, rationality is displayed by the adult members of the community who train the young child to appropriate his linguistic inheritance as they were trained earlier to appropriate theirs.

Sellars's semantical theory is delicately balanced to combine ontological and psychological nominalism with an acceptance of logical realism. The purpose of logical realism is to preserve the intersubjectivity of human discourse. Although the meanings of words are not extra-linguistic entities but rule-governed linguistic roles, different signs within the same language or in contrasting languages can play the same semantical role. It is this identity of semantical role for radically different sign designs that makes inter-linguistic translation possible. But the translation rubrics of unreconstructed discourse are deeply misleading. They give the deceptive impression that meaning is a semantical relation between language and the extra-linguistic order of being. In the case of predicates and abstract singular terms, this impression led to the traditional belief in ontological universals and abstract objects. Sellars is prepared to accept the existence of abstract entities in semiotics when they are conceived as inter-linguistic semantical roles rather than as extra-linguistic intentional contents mythically given to the intuitive mind. His critique of the epistemic given extends not only to classical empiricism but to any account that treats semantical entities as data of intuitive operations.

Sellars's philosophical position is actually quite subtle. He accepts the classical distinction between the linguistic and the logical orders, between predicates and sentences on the one hand, and the concepts and propositions they express on the other. But he denies the Fregean understanding of logical entities as inherently extra-linguistic. Frege's semantical realism overpopulated the world because it misconstrued the rubrics of meaning. According to Sellars, the early Wittgenstein was partially right; the surface grammar of meta-linguistic discourse is radically non-perspicuous. Taken at face value, semantical discourse

56 See The Crisis of Philosophy, chapter V, section D.

57 For Sellars's reconstruction of the rubrics of meta-linguistic discourse, see "Truth and 'Correspondence" and "Naming and Saying" in Science, Perception and Reality and chapters III and IV in Science and the Metaphysics.
appears to be straightforwardly relational. It appears to assert a determinate semantical relation between a linguistic expression and its extra-linguistic correlate. But the later Wittgenstein was also right to reject his own relational picture of meaning. For Sellars, there are no semantical or intentional relations between language and the extra-linguistic. This restrictive denial applies to both meaning and truth and to all other semantical notions. If there are no extra-linguistic abstract entities, it follows, a fortiori, that they cannot be given directly to the mind nor learned through a process of immediate cognition. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had argued that semantical relations were real but ineffable; Sellars contends that in fact they are ineffable because they are unreal.

It is important to recognize that Sellars does not favor the reduction of semantics to syntax and pragmatics. He requires the reconstruction of semantics and not its abandonment. On his proposed reconstruction, the semantical translation rubric becomes a form of metalinguistic classificatory discourse; and the idiom of truth becomes a way of acknowledging semantic assertability within a given linguistic economy. To say that proposition $p$ expressed by sentence $s$ is true is to say that, under the appropriate circumstances, the assertion of $s$ is justified within the linguistic community to which the users of $s$ belong. Sellars openly accepts the alethic relativity entailed by this strategy; meaning, truth, knowledge, and reality have all become language-relative. This is the point of deepest affinity between Kant's transcendental idealism and Sellars's linguistic relativity. As Kant had made the object of knowledge relative to the operations of the transcendental ego, so Sellars has made the world of knowledge relative to our operative conceptual scheme. The reality that we affirm through assent to true propositions is a conceptually immanent reality dependent upon our linguistic beliefs. Our world, the world in which our linguistic community believes, is explicitly contrasted with the real

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58 For the denial of semantical relations and the reconception of semantical categories, see *Science and Metaphysics*, pp. 82-102.

world, just as Kant's phenomenal realm was opposed to the thing-in-itself that serves as its intended metaphysical contrast.

But Sellars has one final dialectical move to make. For all his sympathy with Kant and the later Wittgenstein, his ultimate loyalties are, in fact, with scientific realism. He uses Kant's critique of epistemic realism to classify the world of western common sense as a world of phenomenal appearance. Yet he does not accept the Kantian view that human knowledge, as such, is confined to the phenomenal order. Sellars believes that empirical science is the operative human measure of what there is; if it were carried to its asymptotic limit, the practice of science could achieve a conceptual scheme adequate to the nature of being. If we call the idealized categorial framework at which an idealized science would arrive the Peircean scheme, or CSP, then the true sentences of CSP would make the world known as it really is. On Sellars's view, Descartes was right to espouse the project of transcendental realism; he was, however, wrong in thinking that his own conceptual scheme was the final installment in the development of science. The real world is knowable through the true propositions which a Peircean community of inquirers would affirm. In Sellars's unfolding epistemological dialectic, the last word belongs to the scientific realist.

F. RORTY'S DECONSTRUCTIVE PROJECT

Richard Rorty believes that Sellars has conceded too much to the philosophical tradition, by attempting to maintain inherited distinctions in a reconstructed linguistic form. Sellars essentially preserved the Kantian problematic in the course of historicizing and naturalizing its component elements. His dialectical strategy represents one way in which analytic philosophers have responded to Kant. They have tried to make philosophy a science without infringing on the autonomy of the empirical disciplines. Rorty explicitly favors another analytic

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60 Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 173: "in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not."

61 Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, pp. 141-42.
strategy that takes its bearings from the *Philosophical Investigations*. He calls this the reactive, therapeutic approach; it seeks to subvert rather than retain the problems and presuppositions of traditional epistemology.\(^5\) Therapeutic thinkers, like Dewey, Quine, and the later Wittgenstein, want to dissolve rather than rehabilitate the tradition. Linguistic philosophy, in its present incarnations, divides in its assessment of the past into those like Sellars who want to *reconstruct* it and those like Rorty who want to *deconstruct* it.

Rorty's deconstructive project is explicitly indebted to five thinkers: Dewey for his pragmatism, Quine for his linguistic holism, Sellars for his critique of epistemic immediacy, Wittgenstein for his epistemological behaviorism, and Hegel for his insistent historical consciousness.\(^6\) Let us briefly explore how each of these elements is coordinated by Rorty in his attack on epistemic realism.

Pragmatism presents a deliberately revisionary picture of scientific inquiry and discourse. It makes the motivating purpose of science not knowledge of objective reality but the prediction and control of human environment. It follows Francis Bacon in his open identification of knowledge with instrumental power. This identity suggests a new set of metaphors for understanding scientific discourse. The language of science is in no sense a picture of reality to be tested for fidelity of correspondence but simply a tool for coping with the environment and making it more responsive to human desire. The pragmatist thinks of knowledge as a way of controlling the world rather than of understanding its internal intelligibility. Viewed in his pragmatic light, many traditional epistemological concerns lose their compelling importance. When coping displaces correspondence, there is no need to worry about what makes true sentences true.\(^5\) The revisionary consequences Rorty elicits from pragmatism are dramatic: linguistic meaning without truth conditions, truth without extra-linguistic sources of truth-

\(^5\)Rorty outlines his explicitly therapeutic strategy in the introductory essays of two of his major texts, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

\(^6\)This indebtedness is elaborated in greater detail in *The Crisis of Philosophy*, chapter VI, section H.

\(^5\)Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, pp. xvi-xvii.
values, and knowledge without intentional relations between knower and known.

A second way to attack the correspondence picture of truth is through Quine’s linguistic holism. Quine arrived at his holistic continuum by opposing two dogmas at the core of traditional empiricism: the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and the thesis of logical reductionism. Both of these dogmas presuppose that empirical evidence is attributed to the sentences of language on a piecemeal basis. Quine argues, to the contrary, that the continuum of language approaches the tribunal of sensory experience as a corporate body. When this holistic perspective is adopted, it is no longer plausible to separate true sentences into those that are true by correspondence and those that are true by convention. All sentences in the continuum of discourse are empirically underdetermined; in the face of evidential conflict, epistemic decisions, when rational, are based on pragmatic grounds. When it is no longer possible to specify the referential import of the particular sentences of a natural language, then alternative ontological readings of the linguistic continuum cannot be empirically adjudicated.

Rorty’s pragmatism and Quine’s holism subvert a correspondence interpretation of truth and reference and thus weaken representational realism. Sellars’s critique of the myth of the given has equally serious consequences for intuitive realism. The ideal of epistemic immediacy rests on the picture of knowledge as direct confrontation with its object. But Sellars’s insistence on the ubiquity of language means that we have no epistemic relation to the world unmediated by discourse. There are causal connections between human beings and the natural world, but by themselves they are without epistemic significance. The intentional order of reason cannot be reduced to the causal order of nature; the acquisition and exercise of human intentionality depends on the mastery of a common language. Communal agreement on the use of language is the ultimate foundation of our discursive practice and

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65Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xvi-xvii.

66Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, pp. 195-96; Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xix-xxi.
therefore of our intentional life. There is no rational or epistemic way of getting beneath it; to use Sellars's favored idiom, there is no *arche* of discourse beyond discourse.

Rorty's adoption of Sellars's distinction between the causal and the rational order allows him to abandon realism without embracing epistemic idealism. Language is the rational measure of reality and not its ontological cause. We can surrender the traditional realistic metaphors of confrontation and correspondence without replacing them with the Kantian metaphor of the constructive mind. Intentional linguistic episodes are analogous to useful tools rather than creative fiats. They allow us to cope with an antecedently given environment by refashioning it to accord with our needs and desires. The causal transactions of nature occur independently of language, but our distinctively human commerce with the world is impossible without it.

Rorty urges philosophers to resist the temptation to justify or explain our existing linguistic behavior. The decisive insight here is attributed to the later Wittgenstein. Nothing of philosophical importance is hidden; there are no legitimate philosophical theories to supplement common sense or empirical science. Philosophy can only describe what we actually say and do; it cannot put our linguistic practice on either a causal or a rational foundation. The therapeutic importance of these behavioral descriptions is that they undermine the credibility of traditional semantical, epistemological, and ontological theories. All of these theories represent an attempt to ground the use of language on a foundation that is extra-linguistic. Abandoning that effort rather than continuing to sustain it is the purpose of Rorty's therapeutic behaviorism.

In the epistemological sphere, the deepest insights of analytic revisionism have been deconstructive. But, according to Rorty, philosophy's final contribution need not be entirely negative. If we recognize a plurality of authentic linguistic purposes, in which scientific prediction and control are no longer the canonical norm, then we

67Rorty follows Sellars and opposes Quine in insisting on a clear distinction between causal explanation and rational justification. See *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, pp. 139-48.

68See *The Crisis of Philosophy*, chapter VI, sections G and H.
become free to take a much less regimented approach to human discourse. We can divide the field of language on behavioral grounds into the regions of normal and abnormal discourse, the former resting on antecedent criteria of shared agreement and the latter as yet lacking such criteria. When language is seen as a patchwork of both strange and familiar conversations, then philosophy can be assigned a new, essentially hermeneutic function, namely to mediate the distance between normal and abnormal discourse. Through this hermeneutic mediation, philosophy keeps the ongoing human conversation open to reform, rearrangement, and change.69 When Hegel's emphasis on sociality and historicity is combined with Rorty's tolerant cultural pluralism, philosophy abandons its desire to be the critical judge of our linguistic practices. Instead of absolutizing some privileged stratum of normal discourse for the purpose of linguistic reduction, philosophy shifts its sympathy to the unfamiliar regions of conversation that are struggling for cultural acceptance. The priority assigned to knowing as a human activity, the preoccupation with epistemic certainty and the ideal of fidelity to the order of being lose their cultural authority. Viewed from the perspective of Rorty's pragmatic and eclectic historicism, these traditional concerns assume the shape of archaic allegiances that no longer command our assent.

G. THE CRITIQUE OF REALISM: AN ASSESSMENT

Having traced the critique of realism from Kant through the different phases of the linguistic turn, it is time to take stock of the enduring results. What are the merits and limitations of this important critical tradition?

The Kantian critics have mounted a compelling attack against naive realism. The ideal of epistemic immediacy fundamental to the spectator theory of knowing is no longer plausible. The picture of intentional operations as essentially intuitive acts has also been subverted. The familiar image of the mind as an internal eye capable of knowing its objects by direct inspection has been effectively decon-

69 For Rorty's special sense of hermeneutics, see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 359-65.
In opposing the metaphor of confrontation and in affirming the need for epistemic mediation, critical idealism has located itself on solid ground. The undeniable power of the negative clearly belongs to the idealist tradition. But before we abandon naive realism completely it is reasonable to ask why it seemed such a natural position to espouse. Naive realism has its roots in the polymorphism of human consciousness; it corresponds to the sensory experiences constituting animal rather than properly human knowing. There is an immediate sensory aspect to animal cognition in which we, as human animals, share. In criticizing naive realism the point is not to eliminate the role of empirical consciousness but to reject its sufficiency for human cognition. The fact that epistemic achievement is irreducible to intuitive awareness does not mean that sensitive operations are not intentional. What is does mean is that the whole of human cognition should not be reduced to its most elementary part. Cognitional process is a complex intentional structure in which empirical awareness plays an important but restricted role.

The critique of classical representational realism also has merit. Both Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism supported a copy theory of truth, based on an image of correspondence as intuitive similarity. To corroborate that image human beings would require a super-intuition capable of comparing the representational copy with its extra-mental or extra-linguistic original. The numerous critics of the copy theory are right when they deny the existence of this super-intuition and when they reject the requirement of intuitive similarity between truth-vehicles and their ontological sources of truth-value. If the correspondence theory of truth were reducible to the copy theory, then epistemology should properly reject it. But I think the issue is

70 For Lonergan's compressed account of the merits and limitations of idealism, see *Collection*, pp. 231-36; *A Second Collection*, pp. 75-78 and 240-42. In numerous contexts he argued that the power of idealism rests on its insight into the limitations of naive realism and the spectator theory of knowing.

71 "In brief, empiricism as a method rests on an elementary confusion. What is obvious in knowing is, indeed, looking. ... But empiricism amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is" (Insight, p. 416). For a compact account of the role of perception within cognitional structure see *Collection*, pp. 221-39.
considerably more complicated. Truth is a correspondence between what is affirmed in the act of judgment and what is in fact the case, but the relation itself and the knowledge of its existence does not depend on intuitive similarity.\textsuperscript{72} To understand truth as correspondence we need first to understand the full array of intentional elements and relations within the matrix of cognitive meaning; we need an adequate cognitional theory of the type Lonergan develops in \textit{Insight}. It is my contention that neither the copy theorists nor their linguistic critics understand the structure of cognitive intentionality as a whole. They both provide us with truncated accounts of epistemic mediation.\textsuperscript{73}

There are important constructive insights about knowledge to be found in the work of Sellars and Kant. Both are right to insist on the importance of epistemic mediation and to make the central mediating entities in knowledge propositions or judgments. Truth is the medium through which being is known and the proper bearers of truth value are the logical entities we call propositions. Language is also a central form of intentional mediation. While Sellars is correct in distinguishing linguistic and logical entities, there is a derivative sense in which the declarative sentences of language can also bear truth. By emphasizing the epistemic function of language, the metaphor of cognitional operations properly shifts from intuition and construction to conversation. Cognitive activity is importantly discursive; it is primarily a matter of asking intelligent questions and giving and defending reasonable answers. Although not all intentional operations are linguistic (direct and reflective insights, for example, are not), there is a central place for discursive operations in the recurrent structure of human cognition.

\textsuperscript{72}"We objectify the self by meaning the self, and we objectify the world by meaning the world. Such meaning of its nature is related to a meant, and what is meant may or may not correspond to what in fact is so. If it corresponds, the meaning is true. If it does not correspond, the meaning is false. Such is the correspondence view of truth. ... To deny correspondence is to deny a relation between meaning and meant. To deny the correspondence view of truth is to deny that when the meaning is true, the meant is what is so." A \textit{Second Collection}, pp. 15-16 and \textit{Insight}, pp. 549-62.

\textsuperscript{73}See \textit{The Crisis of Philosophy}, chapter I, section C, "The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning."
The critics of Kant are also justified in emphasizing the historicity of the logical order. Currently accepted categories and theories are subject to development, revision, and change. We cannot identify the exercise of rationality with a fixed set of a priori concepts and principles. Having said this, it is quite another question whether the contemporary proponents of conceptual change are able to explain the conditions of its occurrence. Conceptual historiography requires a deeper intentional foundation, in the acknowledgement of direct and reflective insights, before we can appreciate its full epistemic significance. I take exception, then, to the autonomy of grammar asserted by Wittgenstein and supported by Rorty. Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein has made grammar an historically sensitive notion. He has, in effect, substituted a variable linguistic conceptualism for an invariant transcendental one. But the deeper epistemological requirement is to go beyond conceptualism altogether to the sources of concepts and judgments in direct and reflective insights. This is the philosophical strategy that undergirds Lonergan’s critical realism, a theory of knowing, knowledge, and being that meets the Kantian tradition on its own critical grounds and carries the argument to a greater explanatory depth.

74 For the defects of conceptualism, see A Second Collection, pp. 74-75.
75 For an exposition and defense of Lonergan’s Critical Realism, see The Crisis of Philosophy, chapter VII, section I and chapter VIII, section D. For Lonergan’s own account, see Insight, chapters XII, XIII, and XIV.
THE JESUIT UNIVERSITY AS A COUNTER-CULTURE

Joseph Flanagan, s.j.
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3806

During the past several years I have had occasion to present two major papers on higher education. The first was at John Carroll's celebration of its hundredth anniversary, where I traced the history of the twentieth-century curriculum crisis as it emerged during the late nineteenth century with the dissolution of the classic curriculum and the rise of the research university with its specialized curricula. Last year I was asked to give a paper on where I thought Boston College would be twenty-five years from now. In reflecting on these papers it seemed to me that both overlooked a fundamental problem in Jesuit higher education — namely, that students are already well-educated before they enter college. I am not referring to their high school or grammar school education but rather to their cultural education in American ways of thinking and doing.

The questions I propose to consider are: first, what is the nature of this American cultural education? second, why do most of us working within the university fail to take into account the cultural education of our students and ourselves? and third, how could we as Jesuits begin to reorient the cultural identities of ourselves and our students? The urgency of these questions can be appreciated when you realize that a cultural education is primarily a moral and religious education. In

1This article is based on a paper delivered at “Assemby 1989: Jesuit Ministry in Higher Education,” Georgetown University.

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other words American students arriving at universities like George-
town and Boston College already have a philosophy and a theology. It
is embedded and incorporated in their ways of living. If we think of
institutions as recurring patterns of cooperation among people or,
more briefly, as the ways people behave, then we can define culture as
the motives and meanings that explain why people behave the way
they do. These motives are the concrete lived philosophies and theolo-
gies of the people. Such motives may be reasonable or unreasonable,
moral or immoral, religious or irreligious. Culture implies habits of
minds but more especially habits of hearts. Culture is the spirit of a
people, and it is expressed symbolically in the diction, demeanor, and
dress of the people, in their architecture, music, stories, cartoons,
posters, monuments, movies, and other media, in their technology
and modes of transportation. It is in these symbols that you will find
the lived dreams and drama of a people.

To focus the issue of this paper then: schools are one of the
recurring patterns of cooperation of a people, and culture is why the
schools operate the way they do. The first question of my paper, then,
is: what is the spirit of America, what are the habits of the American
heart?

Thanks to Robert Bellah and his associates this is a question that is
quite familiar for most of us. The authors of Habits of the Heart found
that there are two operative languages in today’s American culture —
the cost-benefit and career oriented talk of Benjamin Franklin and the
“I’m OK, you’re OK” therapeutic and self-expressive language of Walt
Whitman. They also found that rampant individualism is associated
with both of these languages. Individualism is what Americans are
doing these days. The starting point for these reflections was
Tocqueville’s classic study Democracy in America. But Bellah and his
associates do not think Tocqueville paid sufficient attention to the
problem of individualism as the real danger in a democratic culture. I
would like to offer a slight disagreement. I think a careful reading of
Democracy in America will show that although Tocqueville may not
have used the exact language of individualism, there can be no doubt
that is exactly what he meant, especially if one interprets his text in the
light of his basic question.
Tocqueville took his basic question from Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*. Tocqueville remarked that he never let a day go by without reading either Montesquieu, Rousseau, or Pascal. In Montesquieu we find the first classic text of the modern science of culture and it was by reading Montesquieu that Tocqueville came to the question: what is the spirit of American democracy? The first few chapters of *Democracy in America* present possible answers but fail to hit the bull's eye. Chapter four yields the major discovery. The spirit of the people is their belief in the sovereignty of the people and for Tocqueville this is astonishing. Not God, not Christ, not the King, not even the government; in America it is the people who are sovereign. More important, the sovereignty of the people is not some sort of a theory or leading idea; it stands out in 'broad daylight,' as Tocqueville likes to put it. You can see it everywhere in the way American people behave, in their mores and manners, in their social, political, economic, and religious behavior. The sovereignty of the people was first proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence but it was embodied and ritualized in the War for Independence and it has remained to this day the orienting spirit of Americans.

Here we have an initial answer to my first question concerning the basic orientation of American students and faculty, including Jesuits — our basic cultural commitment is to the sovereignty of the people. From the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of the self is a somewhat small step and that step was taken by John Stuart Mill.

I received dramatic proof of Mill's modification of the American spirit when I was teaching a course to law students several years ago. After discussing Tocqueville's text we took up Mills' *Essay on Liberty*. Everyone in the class suddenly felt at home. The language of Mill was the language they were being taught in their other law courses. It was today's language of individual rights and liberty, the language of my right to choose what I as sovereign decide to think and do. Mill had read Tocqueville and he was disturbed by Tocqueville's warning that the sovereignty of the people could easily turn into the tyranny of the majority, and so he developed his theory of individual rights to counter the tendency. Since the sovereignty of the self seemed like a
corollary to the sovereignty of the people it was readily implemented by American judges and legislators and soon became the law of the land.

I think Bellah would agree that the 'rampant individualism' he finds abroad in American culture today is completely consistent for a people who feel they are the sovereign. The behavioral motives embodied in the two major cultural languages that Americans are speaking today may not be exactly the languages that Tocqueville heard spoken in America in 1833, but they are certainly direct descendants of that language of the people's sovereignty.

Directly related to Tocqueville's basic orienting question about the spirit of American democracy was his advice to any people who were going to establish a democratic government. Tocqueville did not question whether Americans or Europeans were going to establish democratic governments; he thought that was inevitable. Rather his question was whether they would establish virtuous and meaningful democracies or vicious and meaningless ones. Democracy was inevitable, but the basic worth of such democracies had still to be decided. And the decisions depended on whether the people understood, as Tocqueville himself claimed to have understood, what the problems and the possibilities were that democracies had to face. As you read through the first volume, Tocqueville is still somewhat optimistic about solving these problems and realizing the possibilities of a democratic way of living. But by the end of the second volume, written five years after the first, he is very pessimistic, and toward the end of his life he becomes even more so. In these later writings Tocqueville's warnings about what might happen to democratic men and women sound like Nietzsche's description of the 'last man' in the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra or like what Alan Bloom has called 'easy going American nihilism.'

Contrary to what many Americans think, Tocqueville makes it clear that American democracy is not founded on the Bible; nor do its basic principles stem from a biblical heritage. The disturbing conclusion to these reflections on Tocqueville as a source for identifying the spirit of American culture is that it is almost impossible to be an authentic American and a true Christian. An authentic American tends to think
of himself or herself as a sovereign while a true Christian thinks of self as a servant. There is a basic opposition, then, between living the story of the New Testament and living the American story as it has been interpreted and embodied in the personal and communal lives of Americans. But human beings are never a single story and the orientating spirit of a person or a people always involves tensions or struggle between opposing tendencies. This is why Bellah and his associates frequently found Americans unable to find a language to talk about some of their deeper desires, especially those which centered on friendship and love. It seems to me we can find these same tensions in our students, in our faculty, and in ourselves.

Not only do we not have the language to talk about our religious lives, but most of the current language is fundamentally disorienting when it comes to talking about religious friendship. One of the strange paradoxes I have found among students who are actually doing Christianity is that they still talk self-centering therapeutic language. They are actually living as servants of other people but they talk the language of sovereigns. They feel genuinely obligated to help their neighbor but they talk in terms of their neighbor’s rights, not their own duties. If one wonders why the present debate on abortion is about rights and not about duties, if one wonders why we can no longer sustain our social and religious commitments, if one wonders why the economic marketplace has assumed such sovereignty for Americans, if one wonders why the Jesuit university has become more and more like other American universities, then Tocqueville is the place to start one’s reflection. There is in addition a brilliant series of books on American culture, beginning with Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land and including recent publications by such authors as Leo Marx, Marshal McLuhan, Michael Kammen, and Robert Bellah. The history of culture has become one of the most interesting and important fields in the university today.
I did not mention Alan Bloom’s book The Closing of the American Mind because this text raises deeper and more complex questions, and it is to these reflections I will now turn. I will begin by asking my second question: why did I, like most writers considering the contemporary university, place the central emphasis on the curriculum and not on the concrete cultural behavior of our students, faculty, and administrators? The answer is complex but we can begin by noting that the American culture Tocqueville observed during the nineteenth century grew out of the two great cultural movements of the prior century, namely the Enlightenment and Romanticism. More specifically, we are closer to Kant’s way of thinking than to Aristotle or Ignatius. It may seem surprising to group Aristotle and Ignatius against Kant. Let me explain.

There seems to be a significant parallel between Ignatius’ Exercises and Aristotle’s Ethics that opposes them both to Kant’s ethics. Aristotle and Ignatius have written manuals for the practice of moral and spiritual virtues while Kant gave us a theory of ethics that prescinds from the practice of the theory. To understand Aristotle’s Ethics you have to go out and practice the virtues and to understand Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises you have to pray and live them. The doing and praying are intrinsically necessary and both require of the exercitants considerable effort if they are going to understand what Ignatius and Aristotle were writing about. With Kant, however, there is no practice necessary; it is rather a question of correct thinking.

A second and perhaps more important similarity and difference among these three thinkers regards the importance of feelings. In both Aristotle and Ignatius feeling and affectivity are an important part of the exercises. For Aristotle the test for verifying the presence or absence of virtuous actions is the ease and pleasure with which you perform them. For Ignatius the standard for knowing the activity of God’s movements in your heart is in the careful discernment of the affectivities of the soul. Kant, on the other hand, distrusted any appeal to
affectivity as an appeal to the empirical, which (as he learned from Hume) is very contingent and so cannot serve as a norm for universal and necessary judgments. The affective or emotional state of the subject could not provide a discerning norm for making moral judgments.

A third contrast among these authors is the role that tradition plays. For Aristotle a person who does not live in the presence of virtuous people who exemplify and dramatize the right way to live does not stand much chance of becoming virtuous and living the most choiceworthy way. For Aristotle, to know virtue is to do virtue, but to do this you need to observe and imitate fellow citizens living virtuous lives. For Ignatius, likewise, to know Christ is to study his way of living and imitate him. Kant, on the other hand, following Rousseau, opts for a self-enlightened, self-legislating, autonomous subject whose decisions cannot be based on any anthropological tradition since these traditions are empirical and contingent and therefore unable to provide the universal and necessary standard for determining personal or social decisions. Only a pure science of morals that is intrinsically independent of concrete circumstances and situations could provide universal, certain, and necessary norms for making moral decisions. Aristotle explicitly denies that such a science of morals is possible. The concrete circumstances of our lives are not necessary but contingent, and they change in such unexpected ways that only a practically wise and virtuous person will know in any given situation what is the morally right way to behave.

A fourth and final difference between Kant on the one hand, and Aristotle and Ignatius on the other, is in our knowledge of God. For Aristotle supreme human happiness is an activity of the soul in conformity with virtue, and the best way to live is according to the highest virtue and in conformity with the best part of us. This for Aristotle would be to live like the gods, for there is a part of us that is divine. And this 'divine participation' is not only knowable but doable. Kant would insist that the divine is not knowable but can only be postulated. Aristotle disagreed. For this reason it was not difficult for the Greek Fathers to take over Aristotle's ideas on the contemplative life and to transform them into a model for Christian living. But this
transformation involved a fundamental shift from a virtuous life that
could be developed by human efforts to a virtuous life involving
habits that could only be formed by the direct action of God working
within the human soul in a supernatural way. The issue was put in a
vivid and dramatic way in the *Confessions* of St. Augustine.

In the *Confessions* we have an account of the problem of living an
intellectual, moral, and religious life. From his studies in neo-
Platonism Augustine learned about the contemplative life of the
scholar but at the same time he could not succeed in straightening out
his moral life. Like St. Paul he realized that just because you know the
right way to live does not mean that you will do it. For Augustine
there was nothing wrong with the Greek notion of the good life except
that it did not work. People are morally impotent. What is needed is
not only an intellectual conversion of the mind but a religious con-
version of the heart. What is needed is for God to take out the heart of
stone and put in a heart of flesh. What we need are habits of the heart
that only God can give. Here we find the central mistake of Tocqueville
as well as most members of the academy, including ourselves. We tend
to think that if we know the right way to behave, then that is what we
will do. We are unwilling to admit that there is no moral solution to
our immoral living. The only solution is religious. That is the differ-
ence between Aristotle and Ignatius.

Like Socrates, Aristotle knew that it is better to suffer injustice
than to commit it. But to base your way of life on the Beatitudes, to
choose to follow Christ in his passion as Ignatius proposes, is to live
not naturally but supernaturally. Such a way of life does not contradict
nature but it does transform and transcend nature. When we try to live
naturally we fail. Naturally we ought to be willing to do what we know
is correct, but concretely we are frequently unwilling to do so. And this
problem is not superficial; it is radical. It does not happen once or twice;
it happens every time human beings make decisions. Moral impotence
is a radical and recurring problem and no one escapes it without
receiving a special grace from God. Augustine's reflections on our
moral impotence are as relevant today as they were in his own day.

The question that now has to be asked is: if medieval culture did
in fact assimilate these Aristotelian and other Greek sources, how
could thinkers like Kant have so misinterpreted Aristotle's *Ethics*? Two books that provide a context for answering that question are Alan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* and Alasdair Maclntyre's *After Virtue*. I will return to Bloom's book in the next section; here I will focus on *After Virtue*. What is especially interesting is the way Maclntyre argues that accepting Benjamin Franklin's account of the virtues means rejecting Aristotle's position. I have already noted that in *Habits of the Heart* Franklin's utilitarian individualism forms one of two major languages in our contemporary American culture. This means that the language horizon of American students and faculty involves a rejection of the ancient and medieval moral horizons. I think Maclntyre's explanation of the loss of the medieval and ancient moral horizon by Enlightenment thinkers like Kant, Hume, and Benjamin Franklin is a helpful first step in answering my question. However, his failure to properly evaluate Kierkegaard's own criticism of these same thinkers seriously limits his explanation. Since Kierkegaard's criticism can provide a framework for answering my question I would like to stress several of his important discoveries.

Kierkegaard's criticism of Kant's ethics is that the autonomous, self-legislating subject of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is neither autonomous nor sovereign. The so called self-enlightened subject is simply a mask for the dark fears of a person who dreads his own sickness unto death. Thus it might seem that Kierkegaard is returning to the concrete subject of Aristotle's ethics. But while to some extent this is true, in a more important way he goes beyond Aristotle in introducing a new way to express the basic moral and religious meanings of a person's lived world, and this places him closer to Augustine and Ignatius.

Aristotle assumes that the subject of his ethics is an Athenian citizen, and his questioning directs attention to the best way to live as a citizen in the Greek *polis*. In answering this question Aristotle outlines the virtues to be practiced and vices to be avoided in moving towards the good life of the statesman and the philosopher. Kierkegaard on the other hand presents one with three different and dialectically related life-scripts or stories — aesthetic, moral, and religious — each of which is related to a basic decision and attitude toward one's own horizon of
death. The important point of contrast between Aristotle and Kierkegaard, however, is not in the way of life chosen but in the type of decision that they are referring to. Kierkegaard draws attention to a basic decision that will ground a whole series of subsequent decisions, a basic commitment from which will flow a whole way of life. Second, and equally important, this decision is characterized by a basic mood or emotion that is essential to understanding the nature of the basic choice. The mood of this decision is spelled out by Kierkegaard in terms of ‘fear and trembling.’ Third, and most important, the reason why this choice is basic and foundational for other commitments is that it involves a choice about the infinite and eternal. Put simply, every basic choice involves committing oneself for or against God. This can be seen if we briefly examine the dialectical relation between the three different ways of living — aesthetic, ethical, and religious.

For Kierkegaard, to shift from an aesthetic way of life to an ethical way or from an ethical to a religious way of life involves a fundamental conversion or turning away from one basic commitment or orienting identity and reconstituting oneself within a new horizon. It is not a question of development but rather a rejection of one way of living and selecting a new and opposite way. Certainly this notion of conversion as the aim and basis of dialectical method was well known among ancient and medieval thinkers like Plato and Augustine. But there is a basic methodological difference between the way Kierkegaard discusses conversion and the way it was understood in the ancient and medieval cultural context.

You can certainly argue that a conversion from self-centered satisfactions to a life according to the virtues provides the normative foundation for Aristotle’s Ethics. But, as MacIntyre has pointed out, Aristotle’s Ethics presupposes a metaphysical biology. In such a context ethics depends on metaphysics and metaphysics depends on first principles which, in turn, are necessary and true because they are self-evident. Metaphysics for Aristotle was primary; moral virtues were secondary and derived. With Descartes the subject moved to the center of the metaphysical stage, and with Kant metaphysics was out and the practical intellect was given pride of place over speculative intellect. Kierkegaard accepts the turn to the subject but insists that the subject is
not an autonomous, self-legislating subject but a particular person who is going to die. Therefore the central problem in ethics becomes whether death is a basic boundary condition or an invitation to a divine transfiguration. The question for Kierkegaard is not whether a man or woman has an immortal soul but whether you — the concrete conscious subject — are immortal. More important, the answer to the question depends not on principles but on the sort of person you are. If you are actually living, or have been cultivated to live, the aesthetic or Don Juan way of life, then the religious way of life simply has no meaning for you. The only way it can come to have a meaning is if the Don Juan in you dies, and this means going through the stages of dying which may include denial, dread, despair, resignation, and rebirth.

With Kierkegaard, then, dialectical method becomes central to philosophical and religious reflections. And the purpose of dialectical method is a conversion of the subject from one foundational horizon to another. From this brief account of Kierkegaard’s thought we can reformulate the answers I have given to the original questions of this paper.

The first question was to determine the cultural orientation of students and faculty. This question was answered through a brief examination of Tocqueville’s account of the origin of the American spirit as the sovereignty of the people which was subsequently transformed into the sovereignty of the self. More important, the sovereignty of self is not an idea; rather, as Mircea Eliade would say, it is the lived story of the American people. Or, as Kierkegaard would say, it is the basic commitment and orienting identity of the American people.

My second question was why I failed in the past to consider the concrete cultural orientation of faculty, students, and Jesuits as a basic context in reflecting on the nature and purpose of Jesuit universities. The reason why a faculty tends to think of ethics primarily as a theory taught in a classroom and not a story practiced in student dormitories and in their own lives is that we are all in varying degrees children of the American enlightenment-romantic tradition and not of the ancient and medieval tradition. Not only are our lived languages for the most part forgetful of those ancient traditions, but the basic orienting
meanings of American culture are in fundamental opposition to these meanings and values. For most Americans who not only story themselves as sovereigns but also behave that way, the lived language of being a servant of the people would mean recalling a very 'dangerous memory.' For such people to change their basic commitment would mean not only living a different story but becoming a quite different person. And as Kierkegaard has argued in a very Augustinian context the problem is not discovering what is the proper moral way to live, since most people know this. The real problem is that they are unwilling to do what they know is right. The problem is moral impotence, what St. Paul meant when he said, "A man who is unspiritual refuses what belongs to the spirit of God. It is folly to him. He cannot grasp it because it needs to be judged in the light of the Spirit. A man gifted with the Spirit can judge the worth of everything" (1 Cor 2:14). This position was repeated by Augustine and a host of Christian thinkers, but forgotten by Kant and Hegel and, even more surprisingly, by such a remarkable cultural scholar as Tocqueville.

Certainly Tocqueville recognized, unlike Kant and Hegel, that the problem was not only that of instilling proper mental habits but more importantly that of forming affective or motivating habits of the heart. But Tocqueville never recognized that moral impotence is permanent, radical, and recurrent and that the problem will not be solved by discovering a new political philosophy. The problem is to discover and develop a religious democracy grounded in a religious culture whose basic orientation and fundamental destiny is to God.

Tocqueville did not grasp this problem. For him religion served a utilitarian purpose, acting as a booster for motivating people to be moral in their mores and manners. More important, Tocqueville accepted the Enlightenment prejudice that religion was to be a private affair, a matter of personal choice. Religion was to be depoliticized. Politics and economics were intrinsically moral and cultural for Tocqueville, but they were not intrinsically religious as they were for Augustine and Aquinas. Tocqueville did not see a contradiction between the spirit of American democracy — the sovereignty of the people — and that the way to God is by repentance, suffering, and the love of our neighbors. He correctly grasped that American culture did
not grow out of a biblical context, but he did not realize that if you try to keep God out of the American marketplace, the law courts, and the legislative halls, the recurring problem of moral impotence will invite the emergence of the sort of soft tyranny that he prophetically described at the end of his second volume.

My conclusion from this reflection, then, is that the faculty and students in Jesuit universities are living within a cultural horizon that is not Christian and that we are for the most part critically and reflectively unaware of this cultural context. This does not mean that we may not be living or trying to live Christian lives. What it does mean is that there is, in varying degrees, a contradiction between the cultural lives we are living and the way they tend to think about themselves. Now if a Jesuit university wanted to set as its goal the cultural reorientation of its students and faculty, how could it go about achieving this goal? I do not think that Kierkegaard would be of much help in solving such a problem within an academic culture. I will give my reasons by presenting a brief account of what happened in the Western university after Kierkegaard's death.

III

It was not until late in the nineteenth and early twentieth century that Kierkegaard's voice began to be heard. The reason for the delay was that Kierkegaard did not address the major theoretical problems that were emerging during his own lifetime, namely the ongoing developments in mathematics and the natural sciences and the emergence of new social sciences. Kant and Hegel did deal with these problems and so it was their philosophies that set the framework for most of the university research in the nineteenth century. Because Kierkegaard failed to address these questions he had little to say about what became the central problem of the late nineteenth century, namely, how to develop human or cultural sciences that were not modeled on the methods of the natural sciences. It was these problems which brought into focus two of the major questions of the twentieth century — history and hermeneutics. And it is these questions that still lie at the heart of the twentieth-century curriculum crisis, namely how to inte-
egrate into a meaningful whole the new natural sciences with the new human or cultural sciences. The first step in solving this problem was to retrieve the ancient wisdom of Plato and Aristotle that had provided the framework for the Christian medieval thinkers. The preliminary work in this retrieval was carried out by German classical scholars, but the major step was taken by Martin Heidegger. For the sake of brevity I will not discuss Heidegger himself but instead focus on two of his most famous students whose scholarly research relates directly to our question, namely, Leo Strauss and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Both Strauss and Gadamer have followed Heidegger in cutting through the Enlightenment prejudice against the basic importance of tradition and have reopened the conversation with the ancient and medieval world. The influence of Leo Strauss' teaching and scholarship in American universities is simply stunning. There are professors at practically every major university who are students of his or have taken their questions from him. Alan Bloom is at present the best known of his students and the basic thesis in The Closing of the American Mind is unthinkable without Strauss' reading of the Great Books. Strauss' contribution to our present discussion was to analyze the context in which Tocqueville wrote and to show that the modern liberal state proclaiming the sovereignty of the people was grounded in a series of philosophers who had explicitly rejected both the ancient and biblical context.

Gadamer went even further. Having rejected both the neo-Kantian and Husserlian posing of the question within the horizon of the modern scientific project stemming from Descartes, he returned to the Socratic-Platonic dialectical conversation that focused on questions concerning the best way to live. He insisted that an authentic interpretation of ancient texts would involve putting your own cultural and personal assumptions on the table and letting the text question your own horizon. Gadamer has reformulated the Kierkegaardian proposition that to discover the truth of a text could mean changing the basic orientation of your own cultural horizon. More important, Gadamer has retrieved the pivotal importance of Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom for discerning and deliberating about the truly wise or truly noble way to act in personal and public affairs.
Finally, Gadamer has shown that Aristotle's practical wisdom lies at the heart of all the social sciences, which means not only that the social sciences, law, and business are intrinsically moral but also that lawyers, politicians, and business managers will make practically wise decisions only if they are virtuous persons. The fact that universities are now adding courses in legal ethics, business ethics, and medical ethics does not mean that they understand and accept Aristotle's paradoxical position that you know the just way to act by observing and practicing just ways of acting. Rather the present rash of ethics courses in law, business, and medicine is the belated realization that the social sciences are not value-free and cannot be modeled on natural science methodologies. This is a negative realization. Positively, what has to happen is that social scientists have to realize not only that human sciences are intrinsically ethical but also that they are intrinsically historical and grounded in meaning.

Following Heidegger's discovery that we live in language Gadamer has argued that we live not in an immediate world but in a world mediated by meaning, where the meanings are carried in cultural symbols that together form our tradition or what I have called culture. Unlike MacIntyre, Gadamer would insist that the second Enlightenment stemming from Hegel must be made central to the social sciences if one is to situate correctly within an historical context the problems that Aristotle and Kierkegaard raised. And it is not only the history of human deeds that stands in need of interpretation but, more importantly, the prior context that motivates our personal and collective decisions, namely our symbolic living in stories, songs, and other cultural modes of communication.

After two thousand years of reflection on the human person as the animal who reasons, contemporary thinkers have begun explicitly to explore the human person as the animal who symbolizes. This does not mean a rejection of the role of reason in our lives, but it does mean that symbols provide a prior and more comprehensive context for understanding why as a human race we have been motivated to do what we have done and how, as people and persons, we may decide to make ourselves to be and to behave in the future.
Despite these major achievements and contributions of Heidegger's students, both have failed when it came to the problem of integrating mathematics and the natural sciences with the human sciences. Central to the classical curriculum of the past and to the Jesuit schools was the study of mathematics and science, just as central to scholastic metaphysics was the problem of uniting the human and natural sciences into an integral whole that would provide for a unified and comprehensive curriculum of studies leading students to contemplation of God. This was the philosophical model that medieval scholasticism inherited from Aristotle. Granting the new context of the first and second Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we may ask if contemporary Jesuit thinkers can afford to turn their backs on contemporary math and science or write it off as Heidegger and his students have done, dismissing it as having fallen under the domination of what the ancients had referred to as a technical art. I would want to argue against Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger that, unless you know mathematics and science from inside the horizon of these disciplines, you cannot judge the truth of these human endeavors.

What Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have done is to accept the cover story that scientists had inherited from Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, that the sciences are practical and utilitarian and intended for the domination of nature. I would argue that the same sort of dialectic that Kierkegaard recognized between what the Danish Christians said they were doing and what they were actually doing also operates between what scientists say they are doing and what in fact they are doing. As Albert Einstein put it so neatly: don't pay any attention to what physicists say they are doing; instead, watch them. And a new generation of historians of science has done just that.

During the past twenty-five years historians of science have been assembling a surprisingly new account of the history of science. Their account of what scientists did during the past four hundred years is currently being assembled in a brilliant series of monographs from our major university presses. I am thinking of such classic studies as The Caloric Theory of Gasses by Robert Fox, The History of Statistics by Stephen Stigler, The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy by
Yehuda Elkana, and literally a hundred other titles all published in the last twenty years. The picture that is starting to emerge from these distinguished studies may call for a fundamental reassessment of our understanding of the beginnings of modern science. Rather than Newton's discoveries in gravitational physics, it seems that the emergence of thermodynamics in the nineteenth century marks the profound break with Western classical science as it had existed from the time of Aristotle. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science had developed a mechanistic and deterministic view of the universe that assumed world-processes were governed by certain necessary laws. On these deterministic assumptions Laplace presented the scientific world with an atheistic account of the order of the universe. In contrast, the statistical theories of the nineteenth century which grounded the new thermodynamic account of the world process have radically altered the mechanistic assumptions of seventeenth-century science. In place of a fixed, deterministic universe, statistical mechanics, quantum theory, and relativity physics present us with an infinitely more complex and mysterious universe that not only encourages but invites a new and more comprehensive religious interpretation.

More important, it was not the philosophers or theologians who did away with the former Aristotelian notion of science as a search for universal, certain, necessary laws. It was the scientists doing science who eliminated this classical notion of what science was and replaced it with the new twentieth-century notion of science, thereby setting the context for new ways of thinking about nature, history, person, and God. For Aristotle the sciences were simply a branch of philosophy, and the world he contemplated was a static, closed system governed by certain necessary causes. Today science is independent of philosophy, working with its own method and terms, and the universe it contemplates is no longer static and closed but open, dynamic, and incomplete. Aristotle's tendency to contrast the necessary natural sciences with the contingent sciences of human affairs has been set aside and a new synthesis among these disciplines is now possible.

A final source for reorienting the cultural horizon of ourselves, our faculty, and our students lies within our own Jesuit legacy. The central source of Jesuit inspiration in education has been the way
Jesuits have appropriated the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. At the heart of these exercises is an invitation to enter into a mystical communion with God and our neighbors, both those who love us and those who feel estranged or alienated or even deeply resentful. Jesuits have not always responded to that invitation with the generosity and dedication it deserves. The same is true of Christians in general. But we as Jesuits have special resources that could make the formation of a mystical community among our colleagues and neighbors more probable than ever before.

I would like to mention just one of these many resources, namely the enduring legacy of the Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan. In the twenty-two volumes of his writings which began to be published in 1988 by the University of Toronto Press, Lonergan has attempted to rethink the Christian tradition in terms of the developments in modern sciences, history, and hermeneutics. He has tried to do for contemporary Christendom what Aquinas attempted for medieval civilization. I would like to cite one reference in these writings that pertains to the problem of developing new religious communities among people from different religious traditions. Reflecting on recent histories of religion, Lonergan has argued that the fundamental characteristics of the world’s higher religions can be understood in terms of the traditional Christian theology of God’s sanctifying grace transforming our world. This means that God’s redeeming love has been and is being mediated through all of these religions. Such an argument does not diminish in any way the special mediation of God’s love through Christ, but it does invite Jesuits and Christians in general to a more profound reading and implementation of the universality of the gospel message than we have practiced in the past. This means that the same sort of opportunities that are emerging from science for developing a more value-centered humanism also invite us towards a more broadly conceived religious humanism, and we have in the legacy of Bernard Lonergan’s writings a marvelous resource for responding to this invitation.

Jesuits have a special responsibility for meeting these challenges, but Jesuits also understand that it is no longer possible nor desirable to do this without the collaborative effort of their university colleagues.
We need to find new ways to work toward the discovery of a new species of a Jesuit university that will reorient its faculty and students from thinking about themselves as sovereigns and towards believing and acting like servants.

A final word about this new species. New species cannot be planned. They can and do evolve from the creative efforts of a community dedicated in their beliefs to an intelligible but unknown future. To quote Jane Jacobs, author of *The Death and Life of American Cities*:

> There is a foundational difference between efficiency and creativity. Efficiency is for planners who wish to organize in more effective and intelligent ways what they already know how to do. Creativity is the related but prior process by which new economic enterprises, new cities and new universities are discovered.

Only fools would want to organize their efforts inefficiently, but it takes a wise woman to discover that creativity is very inefficient, very time consuming, a very messy business that it is filled with mistaken ideas, that is unpredictable, and that operates primarily by trial and error. Study the universe and you will soon discover the steady cadences of the seasons, the recurring solar rhythms of day and night, the monthly lunar cycles, the resonating rhythms of plants and people cycling steadily forward in regular recurring patterns. Yet listen again and look further and deeper and you will discover the vast intergalactic spaces where no living things dwell. Or think of the billions and billions of stellar systems where life as we know it could not exist. Think of the endless trials and errors in the history of plant and animal evolution, the breakdowns, the extinct species, the floods, the earthquakes, and other apparently random and disordered events. Consider finally our own human family and the disfigured, handicapped people and the very unequal distribution of human talent and intelligence. Our universe and our human family do not seem to be planned very efficiently. Yet they are incredibly creative, and if we can find the infinitely creative God who is at work within our lives and who can make all things new we will have the center for a new scientific and religious humanism and for a new species of Jesuit university.
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF INTUITION AND CONSTITUTION IN HUSSERL’S THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1907)¹

William F. Ryan, S.J.
Gonzaga University
Spokane, Washington 99258

THE PURPOSE of this brief essay is to identify and then contrast the two key, but incompatible, notions of intuition and constitution in Edmund Husserl’s pivotal 1907 work, the lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology (published in 1947). Although these two notions are irrevocably opposed to each other, and although these lectures are so compact in their exposition as to be obscure, nonetheless one can easily — and surprisingly — find sections dedicated to the study of intuition, and sections equally dedicated to the study of constitution, but on substantially the very same issues. One might believe, therefore, that intuition and constitution are exactly the same intentional operations of the ego with different names, or at least that they are both family members of the unassailable concept of intuition. The question, then, arises in a stark form: are the two notions equivalent such that they are interchangeable, or are they actually incompatible? Are they in fact notions whose usage manifests an incoherence in Husserl’s conceptions of intuition and constitution, and thus, as a consequence, in his conceptions of the basic triad of epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie),

¹This essay is based upon a paper read at the Inland Empire Philosophy Colloquium at Gonzaga University, April 27, 1991.
or theory of knowledge: knowing, inner time consciousness, and intentionality?

Put quite simply yet most accurately, these lectures are the watershed in Husserl’s phenomenology, because in them for the first time he presents the *epoche* (reduction) as the cornerstone of phenomenology. This essay, then, proceeds on the apparently reasonable assumption that Husserl’s own explicit emphasis upon the *epoche* is a clearly recognizable indication that he openly considers it the cornerstone of phenomenology. As far as Husserl himself is concerned, then, he aligns the basic elements of his phenomenology in their relation to the *epoche*, and he expects his reader to do the same, at least if his reader should wish to understand him. Among such elements of his phenomenology, one must name intentionality, knowing, inner time-consciousness, and then the elements that he himself names later in *Ideas* (1913), *noesis* and *noema*. Finally, then, one must say that the two elements of his phenomenology intuition and constitution, must be understood in their relation to the *epoche*. Thus one has, more or less, the outline of this paper.

I. INTUITION

Husserl’s goal in *The Idea of Phenomenology* is to establish philosophy “within a new dimension” by adopting “a new and radically new method.” Such a philosophy he will name ‘phenomenology.’

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2Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 21. Henceforth cited as *The Idea*. See also the excellent study of Husserl, James M. Edie, *Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Critical Commentary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). One should compare Edie’s study with a collection, *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1982) and the exaggerated, parochial claims of the editor in his introduction: “It took an analytic philosopher and logician, Dafinn Føllesdal, influenced by the study of Frege, to see what Husserl considered to be his greatest achievement: a general theory of the contents of intentional states which accounted for the directedness of all mental activity” (pp. 1-2). Husserl is first and foremost interested in the *epoche*, and the correlation between subject and object therewith discovered. His exposition of the *noema* (in *Ideas*) is grounded upon the necessity of performing the *epoche*, as he himself emphasized from the beginning to the end of his career, and as many phenomenologists consequently have pointed out over the years. Their names would
Husserl's goal with his language recalls Descartes's goal with his language: a new method to establish certitude in human knowing. In fact, Husserl acknowledges the influence of Descartes by affirming that he is recalling the 'Cartesian doubt,' and then goes on to implement his modified 'doubt' with his newly introduced elements. Besides the Cartesian doubt, Husserl wishes to establish a method in human knowing, as Descartes before him wished, that achieves certitude. Together with his modification of the Cartesian doubt, Husserl like Descartes assigns intuition a pre-eminent role, and deduction a secondary place in his account of human knowing. This new method of Husserl's is based upon a "pure 'seeing'" that reflectively sees the "manifold sphere of being" which is composed of the "thought processes" in one's "ego." For Husserl, as for Descartes, intuition and certitude go together.

be: Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Levinas, Schutz, Fink, Gurwitsch, Landgrebe, Ingarden, Boehm, Sokolowski.

Here one may note the one-sided concentration of Anglo-American philosophers upon the noema while ignoring that it is correlated to the noesis. One can cite this preoccupation with the noema as related to intuition-philosophy. Noemata are conceptualizations, precise and defined, like the Periodic Chart. But noeses are insights, conscious acts of intentional understanding that are occurring in the ego, correlated through the noemata to the object. The noesis is evidently a far more difficult area to examine; it is so rich and complex with its conditions and elements that it certainly cannot be something as simple as an intuition. One may recall the citation of Dreyfus just given above. For an admirable summary of the issue, one can see Johanna Maria Tito, Logic in the Husserlian Context (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), p. 216: "It can even be argued that Husserl draws so much attention to the noema only in order to reveal the constituting activity, the noetic activity, and, in the final analysis, to reveal specifically the pure noesis. The noetic acts are intricate, and Husserl speaks of their intricacy being 'mirrored' in the noema, cautioning that this 'mirroring' is not to be taken as a simple side-by-side relation. ..."


4The Idea, p. 23.

5The Idea, p. 23.

6The Idea, p. 23.

7The Idea, p. 34. The notion of ego is an explicitly new development after Husserl's Logical Investigations of 1900-1901.
Husserl claims that his radically new method uses a reflective seeing that he names the *epoche*. As modified from a pure Cartesian doubt, the *epoche* is a suspension of participation in any claim of any phenomenon, such as a theorem in mathematics, or an essay in aesthetics. The phenomenon is that which incessantly is appearing to the consciously intending ego. The notion of phenomenon comprises a subject and a correlated object; and in the language of *Ideas* of 1913, the *noesis* and the correlated *noema*. The phenomenon is correlated to the intending subject by reason of the structure and acts of the subject. To be a phenomenon is to be consciously intended in any manner whatsoever, whether known, felt, imagined, or loved. But to grasp that the structure of the ego intends objects is to perform the *epoche* and to possess the *epoche* attitude. When one performs the *epoche*, therefore, one brackets, one suspends the acceptance of all the valuations and claims of the "*natural attitude of mind*" (compare the Natural Attitude in *Ideas*) which Husserl describes in Lecture I. One brackets this 'natural attitude,' or 'natural knowledge,' inasmuch as one allows it to go on occurring just as it has always been occurring without any extraneous interventions of any sort, to continue to be the boundless conscious correlative of the subject's straightforward, *non self-reflective* intentionality. With the *epoche*, however, one suspends entirely one's evaluation of the reality or non-reality of any 'claims' which the phenomenon might as a consciously intended correlative possess together with its properties and specifications.

When Husserl describes the *epoche* by saying that it depends upon a certain type of seeing to achieve its goal of disclosing the structure of the ego, he is simultaneously asserting that the ego gives itself to be reflexively intuited by the ego itself. This type of seeing Husserl often calls 'intuition.' Intuition, then, is not just an intentional act corre-

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11See, for example, *The Idea*, p. 24.
lated to transcendent objects that are not immanent moments of the ego's acts. Intuition is likewise the self-reflexive seeing by the ego of itself. Further, when Husserl asserts that the self-givenness of any object in its evidence is the basic condition for that object to be seen, he is asserting that it is in this manner that the object is known. In brief, to be known is to be seen, or intuited, in self-givenness with evidence. Transcendent objects, like the seven regular bodies of Greek geometry, the city of Paris, or the parallelogram of forces can all be intuited, and immanent objects like the intentional levels in the structure of the ego can analogously be intuited. For to intuit is, according to Husserl, to know. But the description of the *epoche* in terms of intuition right at the beginning of Lecture I does not at all clarify the starting point of phenomenology in the *epoche*, and even less does its comprehensive claims for intuition, even here at the beginning of the lectures, in any manner anticipate and prepare some solution for the upcoming conflict of intuition and constitution in the following lectures. In all possible clarity one must understand these two related facts: (1) the *epoche* itself is an act of constitution, and (2) all the intentional acts of the ego are likewise acts of constitution. This character of constitution is stated here so strongly in order that the conflict between the notions of intuition and constitution in *The Idea of Phenomenology* can be clearly grasped.

Husserl's 'radically new method' has as its chief aim to disclose the conscious correlation of subjectivity to any object whatsoever which it actually is or might possibly be intending. As soon as this correlation is uncovered in the *epoche*, what Husserl terms the 'enigma' (Ratsel) of human knowledge is at the same time uncovered. The notion in Husserl's writings that the very fact of human knowing is an enigma is ubiquitous. The notion often appears in the contexts where Husserl avers that human knowledge is a correlation between intending ego and intended objects. Then Husserl relates the enigma that there exists human knowing at all with its structure to the notion of wonder

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12The examples are Husserl's. See the *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), vol. 1, p. 330, #31: "In sober truth, the seven regular solids, are logically speaking, seven objects precisely as the seven sages are: the principle of the parallelogram of forces is as much a single object as the city of Paris."
Wonder, the source of all philosophizing according to a tradition that goes back to the time of Plato and Aristotle, is the source of the *epoche* for Husserl.\(^{13}\) To use an available terminology, one could say that the notions of the *epoche* and of the given correlation of subject and object are thematic, for example, whereas those of wonder and the enigma of knowledge are operative.\(^{14}\)

In his "Trains of Thoughts in the Lectures," written down after the actual delivery of the lectures, Husserl notes that after the *epoche* there appears "the pure basic question: how can the pure phenomenon of cognition reach something which is not immanent to it?"\(^{15}\) The pure basic question concerns the correlation of the immanent knower and the transcendent object. The question is: how do psychic acts operating immanent to an ego have a permanent relation to something which is not an intrinsic, conscious component of the act, but rather transcendent? And so, immediately in Lecture I Husserl identifies the basic problem of human knowing which the pure basic question addresses, the duality of the knowing ego and the known object:

However, the correlation between cognition as mental process, its referent (*Bedeutung*)\(^{16}\) and what objectively is ... is the source of the deepest and most difficult problems. Taken collectively, they are the problem of the possibility of cognition.\(^{17}\)

The correlation between the ego and the object, then, it must be underscored, is not something effectuated or brought about by a certain intentional act, like hearing, or a set of intentional acts, like seeing and imagining, of any contingent subject. The correlation is pre-given to

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\(^{15}\)The Idea, p. 5.

\(^{16}\)Concerning the signification of the term *Bedeutung* at this period in Husserl's writings, see J. N. Findlay, "Translator's Preface," *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, pp. 39-40.

\(^{17}\)The Idea, p. 15.
the ego. It is the starting point of being a human being who can know in a certain manner. It is the condition of possibility for knowledge. Phenomenology, as Husserl never tires of repeating, is not a manual to instruct the reader in the 'method' of creating\(^\text{18}\) the object in its total being. Rather, phenomenology accepts everything which is already existing, inasmuch as such a thing or reality itself is already existing prior to any individual intentional act of the ego. Here Husserl joins Plato in wondering at the enigma of human knowing. For the given correlation between subject and object is precisely the topic of the profound question that Plato poses in the \textit{Meno} 80d: how is it possible for one to search for something when one does not know what he is searching for? And if a one should find the object, how can one recognize that this is the object for which he was searching?

The problem is hardly frivolous. Plato has identified it as the central issue in human knowing. Here it is a special case of Parmenides' problem about being and nonbeing. For Plato wants to know how being comes from nonbeing in the special case of human knowing in which the being of a known object comes to be in the nonbeing of the nonknowing subject. Husserl, however, without rejecting Plato's extraordinary thematization of the problem in the questions of the \textit{Meno}, wonders about the enigma of human knowing which is a correlation of the subject and the object. The recognition of this correlation allows Husserl to pick out the essential elements that constitute the correlation, such as diverse intentional acts, intuition, constitution, and immanence in the ego, and self-givenness and transcendence in the object. These elements are founded upon the pre-given correlation, and on the other hand, the correlation itself requires these elements precisely in order to be itself a relationship of one set of elements to another. In Husserl's vocabulary of \textit{The Ideas}, the eidetic moment of the \textit{epoche} is being achieved: when one performs the \textit{epoche}, one also uncovers these elements that are eidetic moments, or the essential elements in the correlation. The eidetic moment of the reduction is the search for the universal elements which one must know in order to set

\(^{18}\)On intending objects and creating reality, see section II below, on constitution.
up a systematic account of the structure and activity of human knowing.

Now just as one can point out the crucial problems which different philosophers have posed first of all for themselves,19 and even compare the problems over which they dispute with one another, so also can one point out the crucial problem that Husserl explicitly recognizes in The Idea of Phenomenology. Husserl calls it an 'enigma.' He is most explicit in stating his 'crucial problem,' and then most determined to return frequently to it. Right from the opening paragraphs of Lecture I he announces:

Our judgments relate to this world.20

Furthermore, the positive task of the theory of knowledge is to solve the problems of the relations among cognition, its meaning and its object by inquiring into the essence of cognition.21

Then in Lecture V, in the very last paragraphs, Husserl rounds to his crucial problem:

All this is to be investigated, and investigated in the sphere of pure evidence in order to throw light on the great problems of the nature of cognition and the meaning of the correlation of cognition and the object of cognition. ... But first we need the insight that the crucial problem must rather have to do with the relation between cognition and its object, but in the reduced sense. ... 22

For Husserl, then, the correlation between the knower and the known object is the crucial problem (Ratsel) in all of human knowing. Further, it is a pre-given fact. The detailed study of the essential features of this correlation, however, is not pre-given. It is rather (1) the identification by the reduction, and (2) the expanding achievement of investigations in the attitude of the reduction, as he states in

19 See, for example, what Noam Chomsky calls "Plato's problem" that is originally expressed in Meno 80d (see n. 37 below), and the problem for Leibniz — taken up by Heidegger and Voegelin: "Why is there something rather than nothing? And why are there the things there are rather than some others?"
21 The Idea, p. 17.
22 The Idea, p. 60.
the quotation from Lecture V above. Nonetheless, if the correlation between the knowing ego and the known object is pre-given, the correlation perdures as a constant enigma for Husserl. Its very givenness is what makes it an enigma. It may seem strange perhaps, but this givenness is Husserl’s central problem. With such a problem, he finds himself in a state of wonder and astonishment right at the beginning of this work, just when he is undertaking his phenomenological task of displaying a new method and its consequent new-found clarity. Husserl’s wonder is analogous to questions, like: Why is there something rather than nothing? Why are there the things there are, to be precise, correlated egos and objects? In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl has found that his crucial problem is the source of solving lesser problems in his study of human knowing. He has found that the reduction allows the correlation to be thematized with some of its elements. But he is also aware that the reduction has in no manner at all created the correlation with its two important elements — or poles, terms — the ego and the object (called ‘world’ above). Husserl grasps that the reduction depends upon the contingency of the ego performing it. For if the ego were not contingent, or a case of ‘facticity,’ why would it ever undertake the epoche in the first place? The epoche presupposes that the ego, though in correlation to innumerable intended objects and sets of intended objects, has not granted them their total being. The ego in the reduction is not in any way whatsoever a creator. The ego discovered in the reduction may be said to constitute through intentionality the Sosein of the object or objects known, but never in any way whatsoever their Sein.23

A systematic account of any phenomena or data which a person is investigating in order to thematize them in a methodological manner must start with the recognition that certain specific elements that the person has picked out in the data are correlated with one another in the account to be given. Further, a person must grasp that, since certain

23See, for example, the clear assertion of Husserl: “Author’s Preface to the English Edition,” Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, 3rd impression (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), p. 21. Although this assertion is written after the composition of The Idea (1907), nonetheless it represents a position that Husserl always held throughout his career.
of these specific elements are essential to the situation which encompasses the data, together with the method and the originating, thematizing questions, the interrelationship itself of these elements with one another is equally essential. When, therefore, a person grasps that certain elements are interrelated, and thus are poles interrelated essentially, then that person is in a position to grasp a systematic account of a situation. A person may render a systematic account for different situations and for different disciplines, such as those found in phenomenology or physics or algebra or Trinitarian theology.

Briefly, a distinction should be made here. A systematic account is different from a commonsense account. In the commonsense account diverse elements found in the data are related to the particular time, place, and psychic state of individual persons. One account, whether the commonsense or the systematic, is not necessarily truer or better than the other. But they are distinct, and there are occasions upon which one account rather than the other must be used. For an example, one might compare the commonsense account of American politics offered in Time magazine with the systematic account of the Two Cities and their two opposing attitudes of good and evil people rendered in Augustine's City of God. And finally, not entirely tangential to the topic of this paper, one may inquire: is not the almost omnipresent and insuperable predilection for the notion of intuition in philosophical discourse to render accounts of human knowing a sign that the distinction between a commonsense account of knowing as intuition and a systematic account of knowing as constitution is one of the pre-suppositions that Husserl himself would call into question? Would not the pursuit of Husserl's slogan Zu den Sachen require the establishment of the notion of constitution? Would not such a predilection be one of the presuppositions that must fall to the power of Husserl's epoche?

If one, then, should wish to undertake an examination of certain elements that are required to give a systematic account for some situation, one should realize that he or she is performing exactly what
Husserl would call a type of *epoche.* Now should this situation with its data comprise the specific phenomena occurring in actual human knowing, that is, the data involved in human knowing prior to any account of it, then one should understand, as does Husserl in *The Idea of Phenomenology* (and in all his work to the end of his career), that this is the manner in which the situation at hand must be designated: human knowledge is correlative to any object through the intentional workings of the subject who knows, and as a consequence certain essential elements of the knower-known relation can be identified and assigned names. Husserl constantly asserts the comprehensiveness of the relation between the subject knowing and the objects known in the most straightforward manner. To be concrete, in *The Idea of Phenomenology* one must not fail to understand the meaning of his sweeping statement, "Our judgments relate to this world," which is totally comprehensive in its claim about the correlation of any and all the judgments that the knower can possibly make to its totally encompassing correlative, namely this world. And when one speaks of the 'world,' as in this passage, one includes Husserl's notion of the Life-world. This world, then, with all its objective realities, is constituted from the matrix of continuous intentional acts of the knower, whether the objects are apparently simple material things, or the highly complex objects of mathematics, physics, architecture, and philosophy.

In a correlation, three essential elements must be identified. These three elements are the two polar realities (other manners of expression: poles of the relation; terms of the relation), and the basis (foundation),

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24 See, for example, the different attitudes with their corresponding accounts as densely outlined in Lecture I, and then more expansively in Husserl's late lecture "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man."


26 *The Idea,* p. 13 (Lecture I).
of the relation. The polar realities are of course not exclusively material, nor empiricist, things, like the buildings with their red tiles — a favorite example of Husserl — or even a man and a woman who are married but who nonetheless retain their distinct physical identities and realities. As soon as one surpasses the narrow limitations of empiricist attempts at classification and of so-called ‘pictures’ — a favorite term of empiricists — of correlations, one finds that polar realities are kinds of realities that demand a far more powerful criterion to account for any relation whatsoever, whether material things or ‘mental’ entities are involved. As for Husserl, he deals in this manner with the basic relationship and its polar realities that appear or occur (to be precise, they are constituted, as will be shown) in the ego: the polar reality that is human intelligence, and the other polar reality that is the intended achievements, namely objects, of human intelligence. Or again, the polar realities may be human free choices of genuine values and their achievements, like the authentic friendship between two persons existing in love with each other. Thus, the two poles can have their own independent existence, as completely separate and identifiable realities; even the empiricist has the possibility of ‘intuiting’ the material, physically distinct persons in their distinctness. And so, buildings and men can certainly be on one side of the tracks, and the red tiles and women on the other, but all of these can equally be realities.

But as for the knowledge itself of material things, it would seem to be a simple, uniform picture of quantitative things that can be seen, touched, and measured. Granted, one might easily admit that empiricist accounts acknowledge a correlation between knower and the known thing. The difficulty, however, is this: if this correlation is essentially an intuition on the side of the subject, then the correlation is presented as a one-to-one relation between the intuition and the intuited thing. That is to say, for each act of intuiting there is a corresponding objective empirical element. Intuition and intuited

objects parallel each other as empirical events and realities. The intuition, then, can be viewed in general as either (1) global and comprehensive, taking in all the object, or the total set of the elements of which the set is composed and can be intuited, or identified, as an object; or (2) the intuition can be an individualized act directed upon an individual thing or feature of a thing. So then, if intuition is taken as a global act, it is undifferentiated and undifferentiating. And yet, if intuition is an individual act, then it is particular, and still undifferentiated and undifferentiating. If intuition is such an undifferentiating act, whether global or individual, then only with difficulty can one grasp how intuition is more than an undifferentiated, empirical act, related one-to-one to the empirical object, or any one of its features.

To pursue the difficulty further: intuition, whether global or individual, is based on a one-to-one correlation. Both intuition and the objects to which it is related through a special type of seeing are one-to-one terms with respect to each other. A philosophical opinion that holds for the existence of comprehensive intuition by the same token holds that intuition and the intuited objects are the same kinds of things. But if they are the same types of things, then they are essentially things of the same composition. The intuited and the intuited object must be the same type of composition, or reality, to be correlated. As for this correlation, one is not a reductionist in pointing out that such a correlation is ultimately pictured as a physical confrontation between two physical things. The necessity of acknowledging the one-to-one relationship presupposed in appeals to intuition as the paradigm of human knowing, eliminates its possibility of serving as an accurate and comprehensive notion for human knowing, especially in Husserl. For in spite of the careful assertions that Husserl has made about intuition and its diverse types, whether sense or categorial,28 the essential elements of intuition blot out the careful distinctions that he has labored to identify in the different kinds of reality. In Ideas he calls these spheres of reality 'regions.' Other philosophers would call this diversity in reality the 'analogy of being.' In either case, diversity cannot be known in the one-to-one manner of intuition.

28See The Idea, Lectures IV and V.
Intuition is not a complex activity, either on the side of the ego or in its uniform relation to what are supposed to be differentiated and diverse objects. Both the intuition and the intuited object are uniform and undifferentiated. They are the same type of things. Wittgenstein's discussion of 'pictures' and 'atomic facts' in the *Tractatus* is an example of this misconception that a picture — like an intuition — is a one-to-one presentation of knowing. The picture and the atomic facts are imagined as the model of how human knowing of empirical things takes place. Thus: picture and atomic facts; intuition and objects. Even cruder is the imprinting relationship imagined by behaviorism of a one-to-one relationship between knower and object, as may be observed in the endless and pointless squabbles about the evil which one television program 'impacts' upon one person, or even on the 'impacting' of twenty programs upon one person. To 'impact' is an accurate word to describe one physical thing hitting another, but hardly for a context of cultural intellectual attainments and values conditioning one another. The notion of impacting in behaviorism is already a crude reductionism of the only type of cause behaviorism seems to know, the efficient cause. But to return to the topic of reductionism: one can grasp that the notion of human knowing as intuition is the reductionism in which the structure of the knowing subject and correspondingly the diverse known objects are oversimplified, and thus totally misunderstood.

The pervasive empiricism of the late nineteenth century which Husserl dismantles in *Logical Investigations* is based upon the stunted notion about reality according to which only empirical things exist as the ultimate units of reality. And so, for this notion 'mental' activities are constructs with no claim at all upon being real or 'really real.' This notion of empiricism serves as its absolute canon. According to this
absolutist canon of empiricism for determining what is real, anything like the relation itself, the correlation itself, taken as independent from the poles, would have to be at best some sort of a purely mental construction. The empiricist notion of a relation, inasmuch as it presupposes that the poles and even the basis itself are material things, does not explain at all that relations even between quantifiable things present insoluble difficulties. The empiricist notion of relations presupposes that only physical things are the realities involved, namely the two things, or the two poles of the relation.

Such physical things as Amiens Cathedral and a phone booth can each be seen and touched. But for empiricism the relation by which Amiens Cathedral is larger and the phone booth smaller should be represented in such a manner that one conceives the relation as some mental construct. According to the empiricist canon of reality that would cover relations, then, a relation cannot be anything really existing, unless it is a purely mental construct that possesses the same features as those of the strange tool, in Hegel’s tart comment, that the closed-in human mind handles in order to reach out to attain reality.\(^\text{30}\) But if one should, like Hegel and Husserl, take relations as a special kind of reality comprising certain elements, and consider all of these elements as conditions that are as real as the lime of the contraption to catch birds (in Hegel’s example), or the city of Paris (in Husserl’s), then one can grasp the crux of the problem of relations. That crux is the existence of a limited number of conditions and their actual fulfillment. In the case of human knowing a limited number of conditions sometimes occur, and sometimes these conditions are actually fulfilled. The limited number of conditions for human knowing is the set of elements found in actual human knowing.\(^\text{31}\) These elements can be named conditions. In Husserl’s later vocabulary, they can be thema-


These conditions are (1) the intending acts of the subject specified by, or focused on, the known object with the consequent correlation that the ego constitutes, and (2) the basis of the relation, which will be mentioned below. The correlation that one finds in human knowing may be abbreviated in a slogan in order to sharply identify the elements as conditions: if a knowing subject, then a known object.

Now evidently any appeals which an empiricist could make to the existence of mental constructs, or 'mental projections,' in order to support a relation between even material things is an appeal to non-physical conditions. But such an appeal is likewise a gross case of circular reasoning. For to grant the reality of anything nonphysical or nonmaterial, even a condition such as a bundle of mental constructings, is the very issue to be decided about human knowing. For the question remains: why does the human mind invariantly continue to produce as a condition some sort of construct, even mental, between two material things? Could one even ask whether the human mind is required to construct conditions? David Hume's notion of association, curiously dropped into his theory of knowing like a deus ex machina, comes to mind as a notorious example. The detection of this blatant circular reasoning can enable one to understand that relations can occur only where certain conditions are fulfilled, even for the production of a 'picture' of two material objects being compared, for example, to 'see' which has the bigger size. To state Husserl's position: when the conditions of intentionality are fulfilled by the ego's activity that constitutes the object, then there exists as known a relation, or correlation. The relation is neither a new material thing, a new person, a new object, nor a layer of empiricist reality laid upon each of the two poles, either simultaneously or separately. To take another example. Love is a human affect-laden activity and state that is the basis for a relation between the two realities called husband and wife. The empiricist-minded person sees and intuits and witnesses a wedding, and then looks at the notation of the marriage which is recorded in some physi-


But one can go beyond the self-imposed limitations of this empiricist knowing, Husserl would say, to affirm that the ego can know several relational characteristics of marriage which are more than just physical things. To know what a marriage is, according to Husserl’s thinking, is to constitute the object (here, a marriage) as a known object; many known objects fulfill more conditions than just physical conditions to be known. For the empiricist, such conditions and relational characteristics are literally unknowable because they are not physical things. Yet this known object, in addition to being an entry on the page of a register, fulfills the conditions of the relational characteristics of love, trust, and loyalty in two persons. So, one can affirm the reality of marriage with its abundantly rich characteristics which are more than merely a written contract kept in some civil or ecclesiastical register. Love, trust, and loyalty are relational activities and states, not new physical things, persons, objects, or a new material layer affixed to the husband and wife.

The basis (or foundation) of a relation has already been indicated as one of the elements in a relation. The basis of a relation is the ground or reason for the relation. It is thus a condition. But the basis itself is not identified with either one of the poles of the relation. Some passing remarks have already been offered about the basis of the relation between material things. Both the common sense anticipation and the empiricist’s reflective anticipation is that the basis of a relation between two physical things can lead any person to establish some sort of mental construct between the poles: for example, Hume’s ‘association.’ However, this basis can be a reality entirely different from the material quantity by which things are quantitatively related to each other, spatially or temporally. For Husserl, individual acts are the basis of the correlation between the subject and the object. Yet most important of all, the ego in its entirety — this is the eidos of the transcendental ego in the language of Ideas — is correlated to all possible and actual objects and sets of objects which it is intending or will intend. In terms

of human knowing, the knower is correlated to objects that it intentionally constitutes through the levels of structured acts of knowing. Such in a most condensed manner is a presentation of the essential elements that appear in a relation. And for the correlation with its elements that Husserl is considering in The Idea of Phenomenology, these are the elements for rendering a systematic account of human knowing inasmuch as it is a kind of correlation.

A systematic account in mathematics, physics, or philosophy never invokes the myth that the correlation between the knower and what is known is based upon the empirical — especially the visual — similarity of one thing to another sort of thing. In a systematic account, realities are not correlated to one another merely because they resemble each other in color and size. Thus, for example, parents and their children are correlated, not on the basis of looks, but on the basis of biological generation; not by whether everyone looks alike, but by whether the parents begot and bore the children. The acts of begetting and bearing are, of course, the basis of the relation. And so, one might take the totally different situation where the correlative elements for knowledge and the known object are inextricably bound together, as were parent and child, but look nothing at all alike. For an example here, one might take the correlation existing between a function in partial differentiation equations that, given the momentum of the flow of water, one can find the momentum of the rusty water in a car’s radiator. The correspondence between the function and the actually flowing water requires mathematical variables, not similar-looking things, for an act of understanding to occur. Now why, then, would anyone expect correlations, or correspondences, to rest essentially upon the material basis of similarity in looks between the two entities which are the two poles constituting the relationship? The mathematical function is not just another pipe filled with flowing water, or the sensation of flowing water, any more than the principle of the lever, as Bernard Lonergan would say, is itself another lever. Nor is the mathematical function a picture and image and icon of momentum or acceleration or velocity.  

35See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 300-301.
In this examination of Husserl's conception of knowledge as a conscious correlation and of the elements of the systematic account of knowledge, one should notice an important term and with it an equally important notion in Husserl: Ratsel, which may be translated as 'riddle,' 'mystery,' or 'enigma.' In human knowing, declares Husserl, is an enigma because the immanently conscious ego is intentionally correlated to any transcendent object whatsoever. In Chomsky's startling words, this correlation is quite simply Plato's problem which is most clearly dramatized in Meno. This is the primordial problem of philosophy, capable of being expressed in multifarious ways, such as those of Plato, Leibniz, or Husserl. And as seen, for Husserl, the problem is expressed as a Ratsel. Husserl would certainly raise no objection to Plato's cameo presentation in Meno 80d of the enigma of human knowing as the astonishing correlation in which a human ego (that of the slave) advances from not knowing an object in plane geometry to identifying the object correctly by reason of its own built-in procedures. Nor would Husserl with his acknowledgment of the enigma of human knowing make objections to Leibniz's questions of wonder: (1) Why is there something rather than nothing? and (2) Why are there the things there are and not some others?

Husserl, for his part, distinguishes two significations of the word 'enigma': (1) the pre-given conscious correlation of the ego to any transcendent object intended or to be intended (this is the essence of the ego: the ego is a reality that is consciously correlated to transcendent objectivity); and (2) the swarm of difficulties which arises when one does not understand this correlation, and ignores Husserl's method grounded on the epoche. The first meaning of enigma is the more important of the two for Husserl. For this notion of the enigma bears

39See The Idea, pp. 25, 28, 29, 57.
directly upon his avowed foundational enterprise in his phenomenology. Husserl (like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibniz) grasps that the very starting-point of phenomenology (or of any philosophizing, for that matter) begins with the pre-given enigma of the conscious correlation of intending egos and transcendent objects. This enigma of the intentional correlation that Husserl finds at the inception of his phenomenology he undertakes to discuss, now in terms of 'seeing' ('intuition') and 'constitution' together, now in terms of intuition and constitution to be understood as distinct types of intentionality. He examines the enigma of knowledge in terms of either seeing or constitution.

When Husserl speaks of seeing or intuition, he means (1) specific intentional acts, and (2) the attainment of certitude through evidence. First of all, then, this seeing as an intentional activity is both of individual objects and of universal objects (or states of affairs). An individual object is an object of perception, of imagination, or of memory; for example, an individual red thing, like a red tile (the example of red tiles is a favorite of Husserl). An example of a state of affairs is $2 + 2 = 4$ (another of his favorite examples). One should immediately concede the triviality of these examples, which do little to elucidate the discussion of knowing, intuition, and self-givenness. In fact, their apparent simplicity masks the enigma of knowledge by giving the impression that all objects are out there for the looking. A far superior example may be taken from the Logical Investigations where the number $\pi$ is said to be a transcendental number and a special type of object, and, as already noted, the parallelogram of forces is as much an object as the city of Paris.

Now Husserl, as noted, also calls seeing 'intuition.' The paradigm for knowing and objects according to him is, on the one
hand, seeing, and on the other, an empirical object, located in a place where one easily gazes at it. The knower sees and intuits the object. Seeing, or intuiting, objects is a specific kind of intentional act. Such seeing, of course, insures one of certitude. As for the object, in order to be intuited, it must have 'self-givenness,' or offer itself to be seen. This greatly condensed exposition is an obvious oversimplification, but it does enable one to pick out distinctly the elements which Husserl himself wished to pick out in human knowledge. Thus, the intentional acts of perception are acts of seeing; the object, in order to be seen, must possess self-givenness. Seeing, or intuition, parallels the self-givenness of the object. The notion of the paradigm in human knowing as presented in The Idea of Phenomenology may be stated: the notion of seeing would appear to explain adequately for Husserl the duality (not the dualism) of empty intending and fulfilling knowledge44 (as he would put it). This paradigm is for him comprehensive enough to cover the immanence of the ego and the transcendence of the object.45

Objections have certainly arisen from other philosophers who do not accept Husserl's notion of the function and necessity of intuition. But more pernicious, because irremediable, is his own permanently asserted set of inadequately explained incoherences in his theory of intuition. It is one thing for others to raise objections to a philosopher's work; it is another for the philosopher himself not to notice a fundamental incompatibility of ideas in his work. These incoherences appear in either the discussions on intuition by themselves, or in the exposi-

meaning is, provided one is immediately given the paradigmatic phenomena and the type in question in a purely 'purely' seeing and ideal (ideierender) reflection within the sphere of phenomenological reduction" (translation adapted from Alston and Nakhnikian).

44See The Idea, p. 47: "One time I have intuition; the other time I have an empty intending."

tion of his notion of constitution and its unstated relationship to intuition.

Some problems will now be indicated. Intuition, declares Husserl, is the 'principle of all principles.'\textsuperscript{46} By such a claim, he means that intuition is the basis for (1) the reflective act of knowing called the *epoche*, and (2) all intentional acts which attain the reality of the transcendent object. Although intuition has a passive aspect, for it is modeled on the image of gazing at something, it also denotes the active operation of intuiting of some person. So, if something is there, a person intuits it. If nothing is there, a person does not intuit it. But at this point one must pose a series of questions for Husserl, since he seems not to have posed them for himself in *The Idea of Phenomenology*.

If intuition is the paradigm of human knowing, the 'principle of all principles,' then how could self-givenness likewise be an equal principle of principles? If one of these principles is foremost, then the other is not. For Husserl, intuition is an immanent act of intentionality\textsuperscript{47} that sees what is self-given, or what has evidence (*Evidenz*). But if an object is self-given, or evident, one may ask: how did it become so, or was it always so, and thus just waiting to be intuited? Could one say, then, that the ego constitutes both the self-givenness and therewith the object? It would seem that the self-givenness in the object is prior to, and more important than, seeing, even if one were to concur with Husserl that one intuits an object because it is self-given. In other words, if a person sees an object, whether physical or universal, and thus has knowledge of it, then the self-givenness of the object would seem to have greater ontological\textsuperscript{48} moment than the act of seeing. Does it not seem that the self-giving object has a more important function in human knowing than the intuition of the knowing person? Is the act of intuiting, then, not a passive accepting of what is already there,


\textsuperscript{47}Recall *The Idea*, pp. 27-28; and the three articles of Rudolf Boehm (n. 42 above).

\textsuperscript{48}'Ontological' here has nothing to do with either Husserl's later use of the term (in *The Ideas*) or Heidegger's. It means 'metaphysical.'
giving itself as an already prepared known object? Such an assertion is a contradiction of Husserl's basic conception of intentionality as the conscious activity of the ego effectuating transcendent objects as known. Thus, is there not some activity in knowing such that the subject is more than a case of behavioristic 'imprinting,' for self-givenness seems to be an already existing set of objects that works upon a passively intuiting ego?

If the self-giving object, whether an empirical object like the red tile or an ideal one like the parallelogram of forces, is required antecedently to intuition, if it is the central necessary condition for intuition, then how can intuition possess its apparent ontological priority? Or put abruptly, how could intuition be the central necessary condition of the self-giving object? But is this not Husserl's point, at least some of the time, and most explicitly at that? So, is Husserl affirming that intuition is the central necessary condition for constitution, and at the same time and in the same manner that constitution is the central necessary condition for intuition? Is there not here a case of some type of circular reasoning? One of the two either is primary (the 'principle of all principles'), or it is not. How can there be two equal principles of knowing that are the 'principle of all principles'? The query is not otiose, for Husserl himself explicitly takes up the problem in his later work of the 1920s, for example, in *Cartesian Meditations*, when developing his notions of genetic constitution.

In *The Idea of Phenomenology* itself, however, Husserl takes up the notion of constitution. Nor does he hesitate to use the very word 'constitution' on the same pages where he is discussing seeing (intuition) and self-givenness. As one becomes aware of such word usage, one arrives at the justified conclusion that Husserl himself is using these terms 'intuition' and 'constitution' interchangeably. After all, he is the person who is intermingling the terms on the same pages and on neighboring pages. One can, then, arrive at another justified conclusion that Husserl's exposition of the notions of intuition (seeing)

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and constitution to explain essentially the same issues in such close proximity with each other is confusing and, far worse, misleading. For Husserl introduces the notion of constitution to perform what he claims only intuition and self-givenness can perform. Husserl's own introduction, as it were, of the notion of constitution into The Idea of Phenomenology may serve as a transition to the second part of this paper, where one can come to the fundamental insight that constitution is nothing whatsoever like intuition.

II. CONSTITUTION

The epoche, in one of its moments, reveals to the ego that the ego is a conscious structure correlated to transcendent objects through it intentionality. Such a correlation is pre-given to any examination performed by the epoche. The epoche takes what is self-giving and examines it. The epoche has not created the subject, the objects, and least of all, the correlation between them. In fact, the epoche-performing subject has not the slightest idea why there is any correlation in the first place. The correlation is the very enigma, the very riddle (Ratsel) of human knowing. In language recalling Leibniz's question "why something should exist rather than nothing," Husserl declares, "But is this not an absolute marvel? And where does this constituting of objects begin and where does it end." First of all, for Husserl the whole ego is understood by means of the epoche as correlated to transcendence; secondly, the ego through its manifold acts effectuates a manifold of transcendent objects, some empirical and particular, like seven and five apples, and some universal, like the parallelogram of forces. To effectuate consciously a transcendent object as a correlative

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51See The Idea, pp. 25 (translated as 'enigma'), 29.

52"A Résumé of Metaphysics," in Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, #1, p. 145.

53The Idea, p. 57.
point of focus — or, put another way, to consciously make a transcendent object into a correlative terminus of intending — is to constitute an object. But to constitute an object is in no manner whatsoever to create it. Objects are constituted as known objects, not as totally new realities ex nihilo. To constitute an object, therefore, whether the simplest individual object or the most complex universal set of objects, is to make a specific focal point in a sphere or a realm or a region of reality a known reality. To make specific focal points ego’s conscious operations is what Husserl means by intentionality. For all intended objects, specifically of the type being considered here, namely known objects, are not lying around as ready-made intended things and ready-made known things — as Husserl dryly puts it, like rocks in a box.

Constitution, then, signifies for Husserl either (1) the whole essence of the ego which consists in the conscious correlation of the ego to any transcendent objectivity, or (2) any individual intentional act, or any interrelated set of such acts, all of which consciously focus on transcendent objects. As an intentional act, constitution may be called either ‘experience’ or ‘judgment’ (a ‘categorial act’). Correspondingly, objects of experience are empirical, ‘particular objects,’ whereas objects of judgment, inasmuch as they parallel the intentional acts that constitute them, are called ‘universal objects.’ And again the examples of Husserl may be summoned up: the parallelogram of forces, or the

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55Cf. Robert Sokolowski’s discussion of constitution as being analogous to a certain type of condition, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, pp. 136-139.

56Aesthetically felt objects and morally valued objects are also intended.

57See The Idea, p. 56.

58Recall the title of his book Experience and Judgment.

59See The Idea, p. 56.
seven regular bodies of geometry. Explicitly stated in Husserl’s own words: “It becomes clear that in the Cartesian sphere itself different types of objectivity are ‘constituted’.” And if “different types of objectivity are ‘constituted,’” then there is (1) a conscious ego correlated to transcendent reality, and (2) through its innumerable and incessant particular intentional acts it effectuates all constitution of know objects.

Husserl describes consciousness in *The Idea of Phenomenology* in such a way as to force a direct confrontation of the notions of seeing and of constitution with each other. Although ‘consciousness’ is an ambiguous term, which Husserl had analyzed in the *Logical Investigations*, in *The Idea of Phenomenology* it usually means the essential structure of the ego, especially as examined in its correlation to transcendence. Husserl can thus speak of the role of consciousness in constitution.

It is also at this point that the “self-constitution” of the actual objects takes place in cognitive acts which have been so formed. The consciousness in which the given object as well as the pure “seeing” of things is brought to fulfillment is, however, not like an empty box in which these data are simply lying; it is the ‘seeing’ consciousness, which . . . consists of mental acts which are formed in such and such ways; and the things which are not mental acts are nevertheless constituted in these acts, and come to be given in such acts. It is only as so constituted that they display themselves as they are.

Upon examining this text, then, one can detect that, as Husserl shifts and expands his phenomenological analyses of intentional acts, at the same time he shifts and expands his vocabulary from intuition to constitution. He shifts his analyses precisely from the declared

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60 See *The Idea*, p. 44.
61 *The Idea*, p. 56.
62 See, for example, Investigation V, #4-6.
paradigmatic and thus privileged notion of intuition to the notion of constitution when some of the intricate problems which he himself poses in the passage quoted above require a more precise and, at the same time, more comprehensive solution than it is possible for the notion of intuition to bring about.

Here two of the problem-areas that can be discerned in the incompatibility between intuition and constitution may be singled out for brief consideration: (1) the nature of self-givenness, or evidence, when referring to objectivity, and (2) the marked superiority of the notion of constitution over that of intuition for disclosing the meaning of intentionality. To take up the first problem, as concisely as possible: the ego constitutes transcendent objects as known by making them evident. Evidence and evident objects are no more 'out there' in some simple place of validation than any known object is. Certainly, the notion of seeing may underscore the importance of some sort of evidence in objects for achieving some certitude about them in some aspects of human knowing, for example, in driving a car or in many biology-laboratory experiments. But the attempt to make intuition a comprehensive 'principle of principles' obscures the very notion of evidence that the notion of intuition supposedly enlightens. And paradoxically with respect to intuition and constitution, as Husserl never tires of repeating, objects, whether particular or universal, are evident because of the intentional activity of the ego. The objects are known because the ego performs intentional acts that constitute the object as something known in a specific manner, such as Husserl's red tiles or the parallelogram of forces. The objects are known objects because the ego consciously constitutes them as intentional correlates. The objects are known objects because the ego makes them known. And finally, objects are evident because the ego constitutes, at one stroke, their evidence and their objectivity together. The evidence that the ego possesses by which it knows that an object (particular or universal) exists in some specific manner is effected by the ego itself, and (to recall Husserl's bluntness) is most certainly, or most evidently, not lying around somewhere ready-made, least of all as some empirical thing or grouping of empirical things. Thus, neither evidence nor objects are like things found ready-known in boxes. The conscious constituting
performance of the ego in which the ego intends an object of any type demands the fulfillment of conditions in order to establish evidence and transcendent objectivity.

One can recall what was said earlier about conditions. In general, a condition is that upon which something else depends. Examples are limitless. Thus symbolic logic considers conditions as indispensable, and represents the relationship involved as something on the order of $p \rightarrow q$. Two hands are required to play the violin well, as Heifetz and Milstein demonstrate. A knowledge of calculus is a necessary condition for understanding gravity well. And inner-time consciousness is a necessary condition for any intentional act. Further, with respect to human knowing, evidence, then, is the fulfilling of certain conditions. The constituting activity of the ego fulfills the conditions. According to Husserl, the ego moves from not knowing (Meno 80d) to knowing insofar as it depends upon its pre-given structure to effectuate the actual knowing. Such a pre-given structure (a component is inner-time consciousness) may be correctly termed a condition. The ego fulfills the conditions through a manifold of operations that constitute a known object, not through an undifferentiated type of looking at undifferentiated objects that, strictly speaking, are already, independent of the ego, prepared to be intuited. Are they not self-giving because they are already prepared for knowing?

But then, are not inner-time consciousness and intending unnecessary as conditions for the ego to know something? Is not the object thus known something ‘impacting’ physically (chemically, electrically) another thing in a one-to-one relation? And then could the term of this relationship in the person not be called behavior in reaction to an environment? These are hard questions, but one must raise them to ask if such a paradigmatic term as ‘intuition’ fulfills the special conditions of behaviorism.

In order to identify some of these manifold conditions that Husserl would require, one could mention the following: they are the constant operation of inner time-consciousness, germane and pointed questions aiming at endowing a situation with evidence, attention to levels and degrees of evidence, perception with its evidence, imagination with its evidence, memory with its evidence, judgment with its
evidence. For Husserl, each intentional act has its own type of evidence that the intentional act fulfills and does not find lying about. Each kind of intentional act and each individual intentional act has its boundary conditions, and therewith the objects likewise have their boundary conditions. Why? Because all objectivity is constituted as a correlative by the ego. Thus if the ego, through its inner time-consciousness and its manifold and differentiated operations, fulfills enough conditions, then the ego has established evidence by its intentional activity, and knows an object. None of these conditions is either an individual empirical thing or even a grouping of empirical things. Thus, none of these conditions is related to a component of something called intuition, whether intuition is a global look at groupings, or whether it is a one-to-one act of seeing related to a single thing to be seen.

The paradigm of intuition makes knowing seem quite straightforward, but really it thoroughly conceals the rich complexity of knowing. Taking a look at any type of data would seem to suffice. Though tourists stroll along the Roman wall in northern England and intuit and see it, and though R. G. Collingwood walked upon it and likewise looked at it, only Collingwood possessed the evidence through his questioning and research to know exactly what the wall was. He knew the wall, therefore, as an object comprising a series of lookout towers and connecting walkways. And though one could say that both Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson have the same set of data to look at, only Holmes truly has evidence, because his 'consciousness' constitutes the objective identity of some human being as the real criminal. To repeat, human knowing constitutes the evidence, and at the same stroke, the object is correlative constitute.

The second problem-area in the intuition-constitution confrontation is that of the superiority of the notion of constitution over that of intuition. In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl speaks of the...

... teleological coherence and corresponding connections of realization, corroboration, verification, and their opposites. And on these connections, which present an intelligible unity, a great

deal depends. They themselves are involved in the constitution of objects.

And it is in these interconnections that the objectivity involved in the objective sciences is first constituted, not in one stroke but in a gradually ascending process ... 65

It must be grasped that when Husserl finds himself in a position, as here, where he must describe the 'interconnections' and 'processes' by which objects are effectuated, he turns to the vocabulary of constitution. One may ask why Husserl seems to shift his thinking and vocabulary so quickly. The reason is that the notions of interconnections and processes are complex affairs and realities. Consequently, a subtle and comprehensive notion is needed to give an adequate account of such affairs. Therefore, the subtle and comprehensive notion of constitution is required. This notion denotes the activity of the ego passing through levels of evidence and stages of operations to effectuate either a particular empirical thing, like a red slate, or a state of affairs, like the parallelogram of forces, as a known object. Husserl calls it a 'gradually ascending process.' But the notion of intuition is incapable of distinguishing the differentiation in human knowing and in the diverse types of objects of which Husserl is always otherwise so keenly aware. And even if words are only words, and even if terms may be used in the manner Husserl wishes so that he introduces the phrase 'categorial intuition' to distinguish the different kinds of intuition that he claims to find, namely empirical intuition and categorial intuition — even so, he seems to discern that the notion of constitution explains better both the activity of the ego and the so-called self-givenness of a known object: the known object is made precisely as something knowable, and the ego does it.

Human knowing, as the epoche discloses, is a structure in which no one component visually resembles and looks like any other as it performs its function in knowing. A structure is a set of functionally

65The Idea, p. 60. See also Ryan, "Intentionality in Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan," pp. 189-90, for a discussion of intentionality conceived as the operator that moves the knowing structure through its different levels of pre-predicative and categorial constitution.
interlinking elements in which some are conditions of others. Not one of them, alone and by itself, is human knowing. Human knowing is not an undifferentiated activity in which only one type of operation, intuition, is occurring through which the ego is engaged in looking one-to-one at known objects, either globally or individually. The paradigm of intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology, early or late, collapses, not so much because of the external objections of other philosophers, but because of its own intrinsic incoherence with his fundamental notions. And those fundamental notions are that the ego is a structure of differentiated intentional operations that effectuate, or constitute, correlative objects together with the evidence of these objects.

Earlier, Husserl was cited as referring to human knowing as the ‘self-constitution’ of the object. The terminology is a startling manifestation of the conflicting notions of constitution and intuition. In a way, the phrase ‘self-constitution’ is a halfway house between intuition and constitution, with an attempt on Husserl’s part to import as many furnishings as possible from each of these notions. But then, in the next sentence Husserl calls upon his favorite term ‘seeing’ even as he is discussing the constitution of objects. Rather than offering a unified and coherent presentation of human knowing, these furnishings, taken partially from intuition and partially from constitution, confuse the attempt to understand the structure of knowing. After reaching such a halfway house, Husserl could advance to the next level to claim that intuition is a constituting-intuition act, by making an affirmation like the following: “We must learn to unite concepts we are in the habit of opposing: phenomenology is a philosophy of creative intuition.” But he makes no such explicit claim. Husserl’s multiplication and blending of terminology actually smudges the clarity that he would wish to achieve with his explanation of intuition and constitution. And why? Because the multiplication of terminology and phrases is, in

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66 See note 64 above.

this case, a sign that Husserl has not pinned down completely a system- 
tatic account of human knowing, in spite of his efforts after his 
estABLishment of the *epoche*.

The notion of intuition always labors under the difficulty of its 
vague and confusing image of being a physical confrontation between 
the looking ego and the looked at object. Sense perception and 
intuition are constantly recalled as the paradigm of knowing. So, when 
the known object is not empirical in any way at all, intuition immedi-
ately shows its inherent weakness, which prevents it from being set up 
as a paradigm for human knowing. Husserl’s universal objects can 
hardly be said in any way to be intuited. ‘Self-givenness,’ his favorite 
expression, if considered apart from the meticulous labor of the restric-
tions he lays upon the meaning of the expression, really describes 
known objects more like things lying around ready-known. Terms like 
‘intuition’ and ‘self-givenness’ seem to assert the passivity of the ego 
rather than its active intentional workings. In fact, most human 
knowing beyond the simplest cases of looking, perhaps even of looking 
at a red tie, has nothing at all to do with what might be called intuiting 
ready-made objects. For examples, one may return to the questioning 
inspection of R. G. Collingwood and the inquiring scrutiny of Sherlock 
Holmes. Questioning and inquiring are not at all similar to seeing or 
intuition.

But a recall here of the notion of the features of a systematic 
account, and an application of the notion to Husserl’s discussion of 
intuition and constitution in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, can clarify 
somewhat the *aporia* of intuition and constitution, and offer help for a 
solution. It may be said again, without doing violence to Husserl’s 
thinking, that the *epoche* uncovers certain systematic elements in the 
ego since Husserl himself says that they belong to the ‘essence’. From 
these elements one can draw up a list, such as was given above: inner 
time consciousness (the self-presence of the ego to itself that is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of any intentional act), the structure 
of the ego based upon its built-in intending, the correlation of the

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68 See, for example, *The Idea*, pp. 24-25 (notice how Husserl here mixes the terms 
‘seeing’ and ‘constitution’); p. 37.
immanent intending of the ego and transcendent objectivity, and finally, the wonder itself at the 'marvel' of human knowing. Though an operative notion, wonder is nevertheless an essential element in human knowing, whether it appears as the source for the performance of the *epoche* or as the specific wondering that initiates the performance in nonreflective intentional acts, such as wondering why a baseball curves. A systematic account requires poles (terms) that are interrelated.

The poles allow the identification of the interrelationship, and the interrelationship allows the identification of the poles. These elements may be treated in a systematic fashion because they are the basic related elements in the structure of knowing. The essential characteristic of the poles in human knowing, as already discussed above, is that of a correlation among these poles to ground another correlation between the ego and the transcendent object. That is to say, the ego is a pole for the correlation to any possible transcendent object, and individual intentional acts are poles for the correlation to a specific transcendent object, for example air pressure and a curving baseball. Husserl, then, means this: immanent elements of the ego are correlated to make possible the correlation of the ego to transcendent objects. The correlation is grounded, moreover, on intentionality, not on an imagined visual similarity of the poles with one another through a type of looking and seeing and intuiting from the side of the ego. The notion of intuition does not at all adequately identify and characterize these essential, complex elements on the side of the ego, or, consequently, the corresponding complex elements on the objective.

Now accounts in philosophy, as well as in physics or literary theory or some other discipline, are judged to be adequate or inadequate with respect to their comprehensiveness in explaining essential elements of a reality which they have taken for their field of study. The inadequacy of intuition vis-à-vis constitution has been the topic of this essay. The conclusion of this paper, then, can be stated: since the notion of intuition is inadequate to explain the essential elements of the ego, it should be rejected for a notion that does so more adequately. The notion of constitution is more adequate in its precision and comprehensiveness.
The *epoche*, here first introduced in 1907 in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, as it proffers an understanding of the structure of the ego to the person engaged in performing and then utilizing the *epoche*, at the same time immediately uncovers in this early work of Husserl the irremediable difficulties of intuition. In imitation of Descartes, Husserl has sought the grounds of certitude for human knowing, and like Descartes he identifies intuition as the paradigmatic act of human knowing. Properly speaking, Husserl never abandons his dedication to a comprehensive notion of intuition to ground certitude in human knowing, but later in his life he abandons the Cartesian way (*Weg*) to the *epoche*. Husserl abandons this Cartesian way because it is too abrupt, like a ‘leap’\(^69\) into the strange and disconcerting world of the intending ego. Rather, he introduces the notion of the Life-world (*Lebenswelt, Umwelt*) in the 1920s\(^70\) as, not any optional starting point whatsoever that a person might be pleased to take to initiate a study of phenomenology, but as the absolutely necessary way to perform the *epoche*. Since the Life-world is a rich manifold of interrelated objects effectuated by the pre-predicative and the active constitution of the ego, it is the locus for initiating the *epoche* to uncover the constituting ego. But already at the time of the lectures of *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl has identified the *epoche*, adumbrated the Life-world, and inadvertently shown the conflict of intuition and constitution.

**Summary**

The aim of this paper has been to point out in a concise manner the irreconcilable opposition between Husserl’s notions of intuition and constitution in his early lectures, *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Furthermore, Husserl’s introduction of the *epoche* in these lectures


\(^{70}\)But the notion of the Life-world is already adumbrated in Lecture I of *The Idea*: “Our judgments relate to this world” (p. 13). Then abruptly several paragraphs later, Husserl says: “With the awakening of reflection about the relation of cognition to its object, profound *abgrundtiefe* difficulties arise” (p. 14; translation slightly modified).
with its uncovering of the ego's structure also allows one to understand more easily this opposition between intuition and constitution. For the *epoche* uncovers the invariant structure of the ego (what Husserl will later call the *eidos* of the ego in *Ideas*), allowing one to understand the insurmountable incompatibility between intuition and constitution.
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