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Among the more interesting items found among Bernard Lonergan’s archival papers is a set of fragments that belong to what was probably a series of attempts to write a seventh chapter of *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*. The chapter was entitled “De Nexu Mysteriorum” (“The Connection of the Mysteries”). All of the fragments can be found on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, the site for the Lonergan Archive. Most of them belong to item 78800D TL060, with several others being rejected pages that now serve as the reverse of other pages on which Lonergan wrote something he intended to preserve.

The most secure fragments consist of a two-page outline of the chapter, where it is clear the chapter was to be divided into three sections, and a sequence of pages that match perfectly the third of these sections. The present edition will present these parts first, divided by an incomplete set of remarks opening the entire work.

It would seem that Lonergan is attempting in these pages to construct an analogy of “word”: the word of the gospel, the incarnate Word, and the eternal Word, and that he is doing so in order to make the material in chapters 2 through 5 of *De Deo Trino* more concrete, more connected to the

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1The material in this contribution was translated by Michael G. Shields and edited with an introduction and comments by Robert M. Doran.


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bibilical bases (especially as found in the fourth Gospel), and more relevant to the spiritual lives of believers. The pages that constitute part 3, "The Eternal Word," may have an enduring value as part of Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity. They constitute a new expression of that theology.

These three relatively secure portions of the fragments are reproduced in translation here.

**EDITOR'S COMMENTS ON THE FIRST PORTION**

These two pages are headed "De Deo Trino II Index (p. 302 ad p. 241)." This refers to page numbers in *Divinarum Personarum*, where the index (Synopsis) begins on page 298 and continues to page 303; on page 302 we find that appendix 1 begins at 241; thus Lonergan meant to insert this outline as "index" items at this point. The outline provides an overview of the intended chapter. Lonergan added by hand the page numbers of the chapter in his typescript. These are included here. Most of the pages in the fragments, however, do not correspond to the page numbers in this outline, which is one of the reasons for presuming the work went through more than one draft. But the pages of the third section, "The Eternal Word," match perfectly the numbers inserted in the outline.

**THE OUTLINE**

**CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONNECTION OF THE MYSTERIES**

*I The word of the gospel*

1. Its principal use in the New Testament. (8)
2. Human evil resists the word of the gospel. (10)
3. Further remarks on the world and darkness. (14)
4. The word of the gospel is spoken in accord with truth and heard in accord with holiness as ordered toward eternal life. (15)
5. It is denied in accord with falsity and rejected in accord with impiety as ordered toward damnation. (16)
6. It is spoken to us by God the Father through his Son. (16)
7. The Son speaks the Father’s word to us in accordance with his knowledge. (17)
8. The word of the Father and the Son is heard in the Holy Spirit. (18)
9. Conclusion of the first part. (20)

II The word of the gospel, the incarnate Word, and the creative Word according to John (21)

1. The word λόγος. (22)
2. The prologue, John 1:1-18. (24)
3. Literary-historical comparisons. (26)
4. Twofold status of the word of the gospel. (32)
5. The gospel word bearing fruit interiorly is existential and interpersonal truth. (34)
6. “To be in,” “to remain in.” (36)
7. “And dwelt among us.” (39)
8. The word as the Father’s judgment. (42)
9. The word of life. (46)
10. The word of love. (47)
11. The glory of the Onlybegotten. (49)
12. The creative word. (51)
13. Conclusion of the second part. (53)

III The eternal Word

1. The inner word and the uttered word. (54)
2. The word spoken proleptically. (56)
3. The procession of the Holy Spirit. (57)
4. Divine speaking. (63)
5. Eternal Word. (66)
6. Analogy of the connection. (68)
EDITOR'S COMMENTS ON THE SECOND PORTION

These items consist, first, of two pages, headed, respectively, "De Deo Trino II [inter p. 240 et p. 241]" and "De Deo Trino II cap 7 – 2" that represent a draft of the beginning of the chapter. The second of these is incomplete. "Inter p. 240 et p. 241" refers again to Divinarum Personarum, where page 240 is the last page in chapter 6 and page 241 is the first page in appendix 1. Thus, this chapter is to be inserted between chapter 6 and appendix 1. These two pages indicate something of a desire on Lonergan's part to speak more concretely and with closer connection with the biblical text than his systematic treatise has done to this point.

Next, there is a full page "De Deo Trino II cap 7," numbered 4, which seems to fit with the same introductory comments. This page points to an analogy of the word of the gospel, the incarnate Word, and the eternal Word. This analogy, it would seem, is the means through which a more concrete way of speaking can be had.

CHAPTER SEVEN
ON THE CONNECTION OF THE MYSTERIES

[1] There are two sources, not one, for understanding the mysteries that the First Vatican Council affirmed. One is from an analogy with what is known naturally, and the other is from the connection of these mysteries with one another and with our ultimate end. I believe, however, that these sources are not so diverse that each of them offers a different understanding, and so the sole aim in this chapter is to complete, extend, and perfect what has already been presented.

What has been said up to now concerning the divine processions, relations, and persons, the metaphysical and psychological understanding of the persons, and their properties, notional acts, circumincession, perfection, and missions – all of these, as the discerning reader will have already perceived, are reducible to two headings. The first of these, also known through philosophy, is ipsum esse subsistens, self-subsistent being; the other lies in the two intelligible emanations, that of the word from the speaker and that of love from both speaker and word. These emanations, if admitted to be infinite in perfection and considered under one or other aspect, ground virtually the whole of the systematic theology of the Holy Trinity.
But no matter how purely and perfectly the intelligible emanations are conceived, it seems to accord with a certain law that the nearer we approach what is worthy to be said about God, what we say becomes more and more remote not only from all human experience but also from the biblical way of speaking. Therefore it is best now, [2] when we are seeking a fuller and more concrete doctrine, that we leave aside the more abstruse and return to what is better known and familiar.

There exists, then, an intelligible emanation from the grasp of the essence of some thing to a clear and distinct exposition of it. One who understands something, because of understanding it, is able to explain it very well. But how often does anyone understand anything! There are those who do not understand, those who understand poorly, those who have little understanding, those whose understanding is not perfect. Yet they do not remain silent. And so their conception and their explanation is largely incoherent, distorted, confused, obscure, inadequate, incomplete.

There exists also an intelligible emanation from a grasp of sufficient evidence to a judgment that is true and certain. For one who grasps the sufficiency of evidence, precisely because of grasping it, judges reasonably, truly, and with certitude. Still, not all judgments are of this sort. Besides those that are certain, there are those that are probable; besides those that are true, there are those that are false; and besides the rational ones, there are those that emerge rather from feelings and passions, from anger and jealousy, and from one or other psychological, professional, national, cultural, or social bias. This is why it is a commonplace that there are as many opinions as there are human beings.

There is, to be sure, an intelligible emanation that proceeds from a true judgment of value and leads to a right decision of the will. One who recognizes what is to be done, because of this recognition does it. This surely is what human rationality, human goodness, and our very notion of morality desire: it is immoral not to do what must be done. And yet perhaps it would have been better to have written, not “therefore one does it,” but “therefore one ought to do it.” For humans, this third intelligible emanation is far more easily begun than seen through to its end. Nor is that all. Evil is so pervasive that it cannot be reduced to weakness, error, or lack of understanding, so that hypocrites take refuge in excuses, and . . . [page beaks off here]

[4] Thus, although there are many different means of communication, the word is more common, more widely used, easier, more exact, and
more clear than the others. By "word," then, we understand that means of communication which either in articulate sounds or in written letters contains, expresses, and manifests meaning. A meaning that is being communicated is spoken and heard; as spoken, it is uttered according to the intelligible emanations of the speaker, and as heard it tends to arouse and produce intelligible emanations in the hearer. The importance of a word, therefore, can be seen in this, that through the mediation of words the inmost being of a person together with his/her intelligible emanations are rendered interpersonal, social, and historical.

So then, besides a human word there exists the word of God; there exists the Word made flesh who dwells among us; there exists the Word that was in the beginning and was God with God.

If the whole world is in the power of the evil one (1 John 5:19), the human word is also; "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks" (Matthew 12:34).

If the word of God is preached in the world, it must be preached in clarity and truth; and it must be listened to in integrity and holiness. Thus the word of God, preached and heard, as it is connected with intelligible emanations, so it is ordered to the end which is eternal life.

But if besides the word of the gospel there is acknowledged the Word, eternal and incarnate, we might ask in what sense is it called "Word," whether it itself is interpersonal or social or historical, and whether it is spoken by anyone and heard by anyone. And if the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, some connection among the mysteries will surely come to light. First, then, let us inquire about what the scriptures teach, first about the gospel word, next about the incarnate Word, and thirdly about the eternal Word.

**Editor's Comments on the Third Portion**

Eighteen pages (seventeen of them sequential in the file) correspond point by point to the outline for the third part. The pages were first numbered 1-18, but then Lonergan changed the page numbers of 2-18 to 55-71. The number of page 1 was not changed, nor was that page found together with the other seventeen, but it is clearly the first page in this section.
III THE ETERNAL WORD

1 The inner word and the uttered word

[1 (=54)] The Greek word λόγος, "word," in its everyday use was so ambiguous as to mean either speech or reason or even perhaps both. When a dispute was arbitrated κατά τόν λόγον, "according to logos," the quarrel or question at issue was settled not by the whim of some autocrat but by rational discourse, by discussion and reason. But the Stoics disliked this sort of ambiguity as being the cause of confusion and so they decided to eliminate it by a distinction, introducing a distinction between inner word (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and spoken word (λόγος προφορικός).

Hence whenever St John had used this ambiguous Greek word, St Theophilus of Antioch judged that a distinction should be made, so that "God with God" would be the inner Word of God, and the Word "through whom all things were made" would be the spoken word (Ad Autolyicum 2, 22; 182).

Still, one may doubt whether this ambiguity can be found in John such that the word λόγος in one place refers to a spoken word and in another place "reason."

First, then, in John the gospel word is not only uttered outwardly but also remains within (John 5:38, 8:31, 1 John 1:10, 2:14); but as uttered outwardly it is a spoken word; and a word that remains within seems to be simply and solely an inner word.

In response to this, however, it would seem that in John, in the same sense, not only λόγος but also ῥήματα (John 15:7) remain within; but where ῥήματα remain within, it is not a question of interior reason but of speech kept within oneself, as we read in Luke: "And his mother kept all these words (ῥήματα) in her heart" (Luke 2:51). Hence inasmuch as can be argued from this chapter, it seems we must say that the word λόγος is not ambiguous in John but simply means "speech."

[55] And so one can argue as follows from the identity of the Word (John 1:1) with the true light (John 1:9): what enlightens all people is that which creates every person (John 1:9-10); what is found universally in every person belongs to human nature and results from its creation; therefore it is the same thing to enlighten every person and to create every person. But the enlightenment that every person has from creation is the light of reason. The
source of this light is the true light and therefore the Word. Thus the Word is the supreme principle of all light of reason, and therefore the Word is the inner word, or reason.

To this argument there is the following response: (1) it is absolutely valid; (2) it does not seem to express the mind of John. For according to John, the light enlightens both believers and unbelievers. It enlightens believers: “I have come as light into the world, so that one who believes in me does not remain in the dark” (John 12:46). It enlightens unbelievers: “And this is the judgment, that the light has come into the world, and people have loved darkness rather than the light, for their deeds are evil” (John 3:19). Believers, therefore, are enlightened because they do not remain in darkness. But unbelievers are enlightened because they are judged, are shown to be evil. And this enlightenment is not natural but supernatural and is to be accepted voluntarily.

This is confirmed in the next verse: “All who do evil hate the light and do not come to the light, so that their deeds may not be exposed” (3:20). True, this “light” can be understood as the natural light of reason: for sinners act against the light of reason. But in the context the “light” is Christ, and similarly in John 1:9 the true light is the Word. Nor is there any text where John does not speak in concrete terms but rather distinguishes and to some extent separates the natural and supernatural orders.

If “word” in John means not “reason” but “utterance,” it seems to follow that God-with-God is named “Word” not on account of any eternal function or office, but proleptically from his temporal function of either creating or also enlightening and revealing.

This opinion is favored by the fact that John seems not to have given much thought to the eternal divine processions. For while he otherwise has spoken very clearly about the Son and the Onlybegotten, he makes no mention of any eternal day as mentioned in Psalm 2:7, “This day I have begotten you.” Nor does he note that the Word came forth from the mouth of the Most High (Sirach 24:3) or was ordered and conceived from eternity (Proverbs 8:22-24). Although he has identified the Word with the true light, he spoke first about the light of humankind (John 1:4-5, 1:9). He knows the glory of the Onlybegotten (John 1:4) and the glory of the Son before the
foundation of the world (John 17:5, 17:24) and that God is light (1 John 1:14), yet omits both the “splendor of glory” (Hebrews 1:3) and the “emanation of glory” and “reflection of light” (Wisdom 7:25-26). Finally, in speaking of the Spirit of truth hearing and accepting, he situates this in the future rather than in the eternal present (John 16:13-15).

This being granted, however, it does not follow that John has apparently excluded the eternal function of the Word. For he does not suggest that the Word received the status of “Word” only upon his incarnation, but rather supposes that same Word to have been in the beginning who in time became, not Word, but flesh. Similarly he supposes that that through which all things were consequently made was already in the beginning the Word. For although Moses wrote “in the beginning,” John, unlike Moses, did not immediately relate the creation of the world but postponed it to verse 3, after first saying that the Word was in the beginning, that the Word was with God, and that the Word was God. After saying this, he did not hasten to talk about creation, so as finally to arrive at what was his principal intention; rather, he took up again and repeated what he had previously said, so that between verses 1 and 3 there is this insertion: “He was in the beginning with God” (John 1:2).

Accordingly, even though John said nothing about an eternal function or office of the Word, still it seems that the question about such a function seems to have been raised.

Someone, of course, may say that where John has had nothing to say, both exegetes and historians of doctrine should also be silent. With this I completely agree. For a question concerning the eternal Word is not about what has been written or about the opinions of certain authors, but about the things themselves. Now when there is a different question, so there is a different method. For one who is asking about things is attentive to truth; but truth, since it has the quality of the unconditioned, is not bound by conditions. What is truly affirmed in one place or time is not truly contradicted at another place or time. What is truly affirmed in accordance with the mentality of this or that culture can also be transposed such that it may be truly affirmed according to the mentality of another culture. For this reason, what John truly said about certain things was not said for his time alone; nor can it just be said at other times, but also it can supply premises from which other true conclusions can be arrived at.
One who asks why the Paraclete is called the Spirit of truth (John 14:17, 15:26, 16:13) will find the reason in the text itself; for the Spirit will teach you all things (John 14:26), will give testimony about Christ (John 15:26), will teach you all truth (John 16:13), and therefore he is the Spirit of truth because he teaches the truth and guides into all truth (John 16:13, Gk.).

Yet this same Spirit is not the first source and origin of this truth that he teaches: “. . . for he will not speak on his own, but he will speak whatever he hears . . . he will receive from what is mine” (John 16:13-15). Therefore the Spirit of truth teaches truth that has been heard and accepted.

[58] Moreover, this Spirit of truth is God. Therefore, if in a divine person there really and truly exists any dependence, any hearing or acceptance, this dependence is necessarily eternal. Thus even if John thinks expressly about the future instruction of the disciples, and even if he puts almost all the verbs in the future tense, still this means that, if it is true, it necessarily derives ultimately from the eternal procession of the Spirit.

Moreover, there is no division in a divine person, no “this” and “something other,” and therefore a divine person can accept nothing except the totality of what is (cf. DB 691). Thus if John taught that the Spirit would accept a truth which he would be going to teach, still if there is true and real acceptance, necessarily the whole divine essence or substance is received.

With these premises and presuppositions, it remains for us to ask what sort of hearing or acceptance there could be in the Spirit of truth. And so we add a brief catalogue to illustrate Johannine usage.

_Hearing:_ Christ has heard truth from the Father (John 6:45; see 8:26, 15:15, 3:32); everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to Christ (John 6:45); one who is from God hears God’s words (John 8:47); everyone who belongs to the truth hears the voice of Christ (John 18:37); sheep hear the voice of the shepherd, but do not hear the stranger (John 10:3-5, 10:8, 10:27); anyone who hears the word of Christ and believes the Father possesses eternal life (John 5:24).

On the contrary there are those who do not hear what is spoken to them (John 9:27, Gk.); or those who say, “This teaching is difficult; who can hear it” (John 6:60); or “He has a demon and is out of his mind; why hear him?” (John 10:20); there are those who hear (Christ’s word) and do not keep it (John 12:47), those who do not hear it (John 8:47), and those who could not
hear it (John 8:43).

In these passages it is not about hearing with the ears, as elsewhere where we read, “He made the deaf hear” (Mark 7:27), nor about listening favorably to a request (John 9:31, 11:41), but about a spiritual reception or receptivity that comes from God.

[59] To accept (Gk. ανακαταλαμβάνω): One cannot accept anything unless it has been given from heaven (John 3:27); the world cannot accept the Spirit of truth (John 14:27); there are those who do not accept Christ’s testimony (John 3:11, 3:32), who do not accept Christ himself and yet accept glory from one another (John 5:43-44; see 12:43), who reject Christ and do not accept his words (John 12:48).

Christ accepted the Father’s command (John 10:18); he accepts testimony from the Father but not human testimony (John 5:34, 5:37); whoever accepts Christ’s testimony certifies that God is true (John 3:33); to as many as accepted him he gave power to become children of God (John 1:12); from his fullness we have all received (John 1:16); the disciples have received and know . . . (John 17:8); they received the Holy Spirit (John 20:22); the disciple received the Mother of Christ into his home (John 19:27); “whoever receives one whom I send receives me; and whoever receives me receives him who sent me” (John 13:20).

Hence various aspects can be distinguished in acceptance: it is voluntary, because those who accept are opposed to those who don’t; it is real, for word, commandment, testimony, glory are received; it is personal, whether because a person is accepted or not, or whether because not to accept the words of someone is to reject that person, or whether because not to accept Christ and not to accept his testimony amount to the same thing, or whether because acceptance concerning a person [60] passes to another person, so that the sender is accepted when either the one sent or one sent by the one sent is accepted.

With this in mind, it may be helpful to add the following considerations concerning the Spirit who hears and accepts, according to John 16:13-15.3

First, there is an interpersonal aspect. This is expressly present in accepting, for “he will receive from what is mine” (John 16:14-15) is repeated;

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3John 16:13-15: “When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you.”
but it is also implicit in hearing, since there is no sense in the Spirit hearing when no one has spoken.

Second, this interpersonal aspect regards the Father and the Son. For although the word \textit{meum,} "mine," refers to the Son, the Father and the Son have all in common, as is said in the same text (John 16:15, 17:10).

Third, it is clear that in Johannine usage "to hear" and "to accept" are by no means restricted to "hearing with the ears" or "accepting in the hand," but, even in humans, often signify spiritual operations.

Fourth, one who hears and accepts truth "does what is true" (John 3:21, 1 John 1:6), that is, wills and acts in accordance with truth. Also, one who hears and accepts truth can be called a disciple, not, however, in the Greek sense of one who learns speculative truth from another, but in the Johannine sense as in John 8:31, 13:35, 15:8.\footnote{John 8:31: "Then Jesus said to the Jews who had believed in him, 'If you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples...'' John 13:35: "By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another." John 15:8: "My Father is glorified by this, that you bear much fruit and become my disciples."}

Fifth, we have already concluded that the hearing and accepting spoken of in John 16:13-15 is to be retraced ultimately to the eternal procession of the Spirit, so that the Spirit himself is what it is to hear and accept truth.\cite{61} To this conclusion we must add this recent consideration, that the Spirit is said to hear and accept truth, not as if he learns speculative truth, but because he puts into effect what is meant by truth.

Sixth, the Spirit not only puts into effect what is signified through the truth but also does this on account of the very truth proposed. For in hearing and accepting and doing the truth there is a moral aspect; for truth is heard not by some blind impulse or some sort of spontaneous feeling, but truth is heard consciously, virtuously, and devoutly because it ought to be heard, accepted because it ought to be accepted, and observed because it ought to be observed. This conclusion is entirely coherent with the fact that the Spirit of truth is more commonly named the Holy Spirit.

Seventh, if you ask what truth it is that the Spirit hears and receives, there is a twofold answer. John had in mind that truth which the Holy Spirit would teach to the disciples. But when we think about the eternal procession of the Spirit, we are not investigating the mind of John but that reality about which John spoke. Hence one may move to conclusions in two ways: in one way, one proceeds from the antecedents to the consequents; in the other
way, one rises from the consequents to the antecedent.

Now, one who seeks to know what truth the Spirit hears from all eternity wants to ascend to what is antecedent. For there is to be sought a truth

- (1) that implies interpersonal relations, according to the expression "he will receive from what is mine";
- (2) that one does, and indeed not temporally and contingently but according to the way that is fitting for the eternal procession of the Spirit of God;
- (3) that is proper to divine and indeed trinitarian perfection;
- (4) that is consonant with what John has taught about hearing and accepting; and
- (5) that is consonant with what we know from other sources is to be believed about the Spirit of God.

[62] Concerning divine perfection, John taught "that God is love" (1 John 4:8, 4:16). But if this love, ἀγάπη, is understood, as often in the New Testament, as interpersonal love, we seem to have arrived at the truth we have been seeking.

Where there is interpersonal love, there are interpersonal relations, as (1) above calls for.

Where the truth to be done has to do with love, the Spirit of truth hears and receives this truth inasmuch as he is eternal proceeding love; this satisfies (2) above.

Besides, as John testifies, "that God is love" is proper to divine perfection; and this perfection is trinitarian, where love is understood as interpersonal. This in is keeping with (3).

Nor can any better spiritual hearing or receiving be thought of than that which consists in interpersonal love; this satisfies (4).

Finally, love seems to fit with what is taught about the Spirit, in accordance with (5). For the Spirit’s function is so to teach and suggest all things, to testify to Christ, to guide into all truth (John 14:26, 15:26, 16:13 Gk.), not because he himself reveals what is new and previously unknown, but because he disposes and moves souls to attend to, believe, ponder, penetrate, and keep what has been revealed. Further, the love of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to
us (Romans 5:5; cf. John 17:26). It is by this Spirit that sins are forgiven (John 20:21-23); by this Spirit that we are born again unto eternal life (John 3:5, 1 Corinthians 6:11, Titus 3:5), this Spirit whom we have as a down payment on a future inheritance (2 Corinthians 1:22 [“first installment”], 5:5 [“guarantee”], Romans 8:23, Ephesians 1:13), this Spirit who stays with you and will be in you (John 14:17), who makes us his temple (1 Corinthians 3:16), who possesses us (1 Corinthians 6:19), who works within us (Romans 8:15), who invokes the Father with us (Romans 8:15, Galatians 4:6) [63], who helps us in our infirmity and asks on our behalf (Romans 8:26-27), who is the common principle of the body of Christ (Acts 4:32, 1 Corinthians 12:12, 2 Corinthians 13:13, Ephesians 4:1-7), by whom we are in Christ and are able to be pleasing to God (Romans 8:8-10). Such a Spirit, surely, is fittingly conceived as divine love, eternal, interpersonal, doing this divine truth “that God is love.”

4 Divine speaking

Since we have now concluded that the Spirit of truth hears and receives truth eternally from the Father and the Son, we necessarily recognize some sort of speaking that proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son.

Concerning this speaking, it is clear above all that the Spirit is not the one speaking. For just as a messenger does not speak on his own but hears,

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5John 17:26: “I made your name known to them, and I will make it known, so that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.”

6John 20: 21-23: “Jesus said to them again, ‘Peace be with you. As the Father has sent me, so I send you.’ When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them ‘Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.’”

7John 3:5: “Jesus answered, ‘Very truly, I tell you, no one can enter the kingdom of God without being of water and Spirit.’” 1 Corinthians 6:11: “...you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name or the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.” Titus 3:5: “...he saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit.”

8Romans 8:23: “…and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies.”

9Ephesians 1:13: “you also ... were marked with the seal of the promised Holy Spirit.”

10...those who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.”
so one who hears and receives from all eternity presupposes another one who speaks and communicates.

Moreover, it seems that one must grant that it is not the Son but the Father who speaks from eternity. For very often the incarnate Son denies that he is speaking on his own (John 7:17, 12:49, 14:10; cf. 8:26, 8:28, 8:38\(^1\)); nor is it clear that he said this only as to his humanity, since in the divinity the Son is called Word, whose function it is not to speak but to be spoken. \(^64\) Also, the Spirit proceeds from the Father (John 15:26) and, although he receives from the Son (John 16:14-15), he does not therefore proceed from two principles (DB 460, 691); it follows that he does not hear two persons speaking together but hears the Father speaking and the Word that the Father speaks.\(^12\)

The nature of this divine eternal speaking seems to be illustrated most of all by two things, namely, by the way in which the Father speaks, and by the motive on account of which he speaks.

As for the mode or way, it cannot be doubted that the Father speaks truthfully. For the truth that the Spirit hears and receives the Father speaks; and one who speaks the truth surely speaks truthfully. But to illustrate this truthfulness we must carefully note both what is similar and what is dissimilar.

First, the similarity. Just as the eternally truthful Father speaks the truth that the Spirit of truth does, so also in time the truthful (John 3:33, 8:26) and true (John 7:28) Father sent into the world the Word full of truth (John 1:14), indeed truth itself (John 14:6), that the truth may be done (John 1:17). Therefore the truthfulness of divine eternal speaking is not different from that upon which the entire Christian religion is grounded.

Next we must look at what is dissimilar. For the devil, in whom there is no truth, a liar and the father of liars, speaks a lie according to his own nature (John 8:44). God the Father and the devil are as far from each other as the former’s veracity is from the latter’s mendacity.

\(^1\)John 7:17: “Anyone who resolves to do the will of God will know whether the teaching is from God or whether I am speaking on my own.” 12:49: “I have not spoken on my own, but the Father who sent me has himself given me a commandment about what to say and what to speak.” 14:10: “The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his works.” 8:26: “... the one who sent me is true, and I declare to the world what I have heard from him.” 8:28: “I speak these things as the Father instructed me.” 8:38: “I declare what I have seen in the Father’s presence.”

\(^12\) Editor’s question: To what extent might this formulation advance ecumenical discussion with the Orthodox traditions?
Further, to turn now to the motive of divine speaking, it must first be borne in mind “that God is light and in him there is no darkness” (1 John 1:5). What sort of light, then, is this? Certainly it is not physical, since God is a spirit who is to be adored not in any geographical location but in spirit and in truth (John 4:24). Nor is he only some generic “ascensional” symbol that can signify many different things, since in John the context is very determinate. For [65] with him are associated light, truth, love, life, resurrection, so that light is opposed to darkness, truth to lies, love to hate, life to death, resurrection to judgment. Such a symbol, then, is “light,” which for us means “evidence,” not that the meaning is the same but that it is similar. For what we symbolically call “evidence” is associated with veracity and truth; but what John signified by “light” was associated not with intellectual honesty alone but also with love and life. The root of this difference is well known to all; for where speculative inquiry and practical deliberation are distinguished and practiced separately, truth can be obtained as a result of evidence without any reference to goodness; but where there is no such distinction and separation between the speculative and the practical life, it is through light that one arrives at truth and goodness together.

Accordingly, we must conclude, it seems, that God the Father, because he is light itself, speaks the same truth that the Spirit does. Just as we said above that the Spirit does the truth, not out of some blind impulse but because of the truth set before him, and does so morally, virtuously, and devoutly, so also now we must say that God the Father has eternally spoken, not constrained by some blind necessity, not because of some mechanical or vital or sentimental impulse, but on account of that infinite light, that is, on account of his grasp of divine evidence.

But what did the eternal Father grasp? Surely he grasped the evidence of that truth which he himself speaks and the Spirit of truth does. But this was the truth, as we concluded above, “that God is love” (1 John 4:8, 4:16). What the Father, therefore, grasped in the fullness of light, what he has spoken on account of this most clear light, and what he has produced by eternally speaking, was this: that God is not only “love itself” or “goodness itself” but that holy interpersonal love so often signified in the New Testament by ἀγάπη.
One who speaks what is true not only does not contradict himself but also speaks such matters that having been carefully considered, pondered, and penetrated coalesce of their own accord into a quasi-systematic unity. For this reason it is not altogether surprising that we proceed through conclusions that are not exegetical but theological, and those the more remote ones, so that nevertheless we now arrive at what John has expressly said: "In the beginning was the Word."

For what is said by one person and heard by another is indeed a word. But the Father is one person and the Spirit is another; the same truth that the Father speaks, the Spirit of truth hears; in God, therefore, there is a Word. Therefore just as a human word is spoken by one person and heard by another, just as the word of the gospel is preached by the apostles and their successors and heard by the faithful, just as the incarnate Word is spoken to us by God the Father and is heard by us in the Holy Spirit, so also the Word spoken by the truthful Father and heard by the Holy Spirit is also an eternal Word. Common in all this is that a word is interpersonal, uttered by one and heard by another. But the eternal and incarnate Word is different from all other words in that he is not only interpersonal but is also a person; "... for between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying a greater dissimilitude" (DB 432).

Also, one word is spoken truthfully and heard devoutly, but another word is spoken mendaciously and heard wickedly. The first is one of light, the second one of darkness. For the power of darkness is present in lying, in false witness, in hatred, in murder. The triumph of light is brought about through veracity and truth and love and good works. These two radically opposite elements are sometimes [67] far apart from each other, sometimes intermingled, and finally sometimes so closely found together that they wage war on each other.

For in God there is light without any darkness (1 John 1:5), but in the devil there is no truth at all; hence he is a liar and speaks lies according to his own nature (John 8:44). But the world, lying under the power of the evil one (1 John 5:19), has the devil as its head (John 12:31, 14:30, 16:11). The Father's judgment upon this world is the Word made flesh and crucified (John 19:37). But the same Word for those who hear, believe, and receive, is the Father's Word of life and love. Hence the incarnate Word has two
functions, since he reveals some as wicked (John 3:19) and releases others from darkness (John 12:46) into life and love. By this twofold function the world is overcome (John 16:33); the darkness vanishes, and the true light now shines forth (1 John 2:8).

But if we ascend from the incarnate Word to the Word-with-God, we find the same person and the same function, but the same function is performed in different ways. The person is the same, since in the prologue of John it is the same Word with God and God (John 1:1-2) that became flesh and dwelt among us (John 1:14). Nor is there any other function; for the Word of life and love spoken to us by the truthful Father is the same Word of trinitarian life and of that interpersonal love that is the triune God, eternally spoken by the same truthful Father. But the same function is performed in different ways: for what was made flesh and crucified is the judgment upon the world, what, falsely condemned, teaches truth, what in dying reveals life, and what being hated expresses love, that Word spoken to the hardness of heart of us who, “if we say that we have no sin . . . are deceiving ourselves and there is no truth within us” (1 John 1:8). But where the Word is spoken from eternity there is no darkness (1 John 1:5); there no liar opposes the truthful Father, there no lie opposes the truth of the Son (John 14:6), and there no hate opposes the Spirit of truth who hears (John 16:13). [68] For it is grasped in the fullness of light, spoken with the utmost veracity, performed with perfect holiness, “that God is love” (1 John 4:8, 4:16).

Still, the word of the gospel is not to be confused with the Word, whether eternal or incarnate. For the word of the gospel is either the commandment of love (John 13:34, 15:12) or that divine word “that God is love”: both are spoken in human words. But what signifies and what is signified are two different things. The commandment of love signifies what ought to be; and what ought to be is “that all may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I am in you, that they too may be one in us . . . that they may be completely one” (John 17:21, 17:23). Likewise, what is written, “that they may be one,” consists only of nouns and verbs. But we can know only analogically what these words signify, for they signify being itself and understanding itself, truth itself and affirming itself, goodness itself and love itself, where being and true and good and understanding and affirming and love are not all different but are the same; and yet it is because of understanding that there is true affirming and because of affirming that there is holy loving – as has been said elsewhere at greater length.
It was the teaching of the First Vatican Council that reason enlightened by faith can attain some understanding of the mysteries, both from what we know naturally by analogy and from the connection of the mysteries with one another and with our ultimate end (DB 1796). We are taking these two sources of understanding together, in a way, since we are seeking an analogy not from things by themselves but from connections that we know naturally. These connections we find not in a single mystery but in many connected mysteries.

Connections can be conceptual or real. There is a conceptual connection between “animal” and “mortal,” for example; but there is a real connection between things themselves, and, just as with things, so also with the connections between them, some [69] are found to be more perfect than others. But some things, even if they can be understood, do not themselves understand; others, however, can be understood because they understand. Hence among the former the connection is merely causal; but among the latter the connection is above all intellectual, rational, moral. And so in the case of humans, insofar as they have reached the age of reason at seven years, it is because they understand that they are able to speak clearly and distinctly, because they grasp the sufficiency of evidence that they are able to make a true judgment, and because they make a true judgment of value that they are obliged to choose the good. The first because manifests an intellectual connection, the second because manifests a rational connection, and the third because manifests a moral connection; and here because is not conceptual but real, since it exists and operates effectively long before anyone reflecting on oneself discovers, understands, and conceives such a because.

But in John the evangelist, inasmuch as we can gather from his writings, there is not that reflection, discovery, understanding, and conception that clearly and distinctly expresses this because thematically. Still, what is not known thematically can not only be very well known in a normal way, in practice, and in everyday living, but it can also be expressed quite clearly. For whoever “is of age” (John 9:21) exercises his own intellectual, rational, and moral autonomy; and one exercises it precisely because in him that real connection, which here we have called because and elsewhere, with St Thomas, intelligible emanation, operates not only effectively but also consciously. Moreover, like the man born blind, John himself was also “of
age," and like him he also knows the conscious force and power that is present in this because.

John did not know this because in a practical way only but was wholly intent on explaining it, not indeed analytically in order to abstract the connection from the connected terms, but concretely through those really connected terms themselves. He associated light, truth, love, fruit (good works), life, resurrection; he associated darkness, lying, hatred, murder, death, judgment. [70] He stated the mutual opposition between light and darkness, truth and mendacity, love and hate, good works and murder, life and death, resurrection and judgment. In this pattern were defined, as it were, the one divine region of light and the other worldly region of darkness; therein were designated, as it were, the boundaries from which the Son of Man has come to us and to which he desires to take us as he returns; there is explained, as it were, the very modus operandi by which there is overcome the world where Truth is condemned by lies, the Word of love crucified by hate, and the Word of life slain by murder. But note the "as it were": John does not define regions, designate boundaries, explain the modus operandi, delight in antitheses; he keeps to his subject and the words follow; the beloved disciple keeps to something new and unheard of and does his best to explain the matter. And I believe that we do not reach the mind of John unless we have pondered his words in our hearts, unless we know by experience our own hatred of the light, unless we are able to detect in ourselves the lies we tell ourselves to lead us astray. For what we have called real connections, according to clarification, according to truth, and according to goodness, were perfectly known by John, who so acutely and so exactly brought to light those for whom functions that are are clearer or more certain or more important have little appeal. It is not only one who has analyzed something who understands, nor is one who explains it thematically the only one who teaches.

Now, a connection that is real according to truth, and similarly a connection that is real according to goodness, are both known naturally and provide an analogy for understanding the mysteries. It is known naturally by one who ponders in one's heart. It provides an analogy, not for illuminating one mystery but for explaining many. For a connection that is real according to truth, that is, according to the fact that a true judgment proceeds from the grasp of evidence, provides an analogy [71] to the way in which the apostles preached the gospel (2 Corinthians 2:17, 4:2, 1 Thessalonians 2:13),
to the way in which Christ the Lord according to his knowledge taught us the word of the Father, to the way in which the truthful Father in these last days has spoken to us in his Son, and to the way in which the eternal Father speaks the Word of trinitarian life. And a connection that is real according to goodness provides an analogy to the way in which the faithful hear the word of the gospel, to the way of hearing which they learn from the Spirit of truth who teaches them, to the way in which the Spirit of truth leads the faithful into all truth, and to the way in which this same Spirit of truth eternally hears and receives the truth that the Father speaks in the Word.

But if a similar connection is found in many things, those many things are related not by their likeness only but are also bound together by their connection, so that the understanding of the mysteries that is derived from analogy is increased by this very connection of the mysteries. For the one who truthfully speaks the eternal Word is the same one who truthfully speaks this same Word made flesh, and is the same one who, through the mediation of the Word who was sent and the apostles who have been sent, truthfully speaks the word of the gospel. Again, the one who from eternity speaks the Word of trinitarian love also, loving first, expresses his love in the loving Word, so that also in the word of the gospel he says that he loved us first and bids us to love one another (1 John 4:10-11). But the one who from eternity hears and does the truth of trinitarian love is the same one who in time enables us to hear and receive the Word of the Father, so that by loving the Father and the Word we might love one another, and by meditating on the Word and on the words of the gospel we may be led to the fullness of truth, until we contemplate that glory which the Son loved by the Father received before the foundation of the world (John 17:24, 1 John 3:2).
LETTER OF BERNARD LONERGAN TO THE
REVEREND HENRY KEANE, S.J.

Opening Note from Robert Doran, S.J.

While continuing in December 2014 the project of cataloguing Frederick Crowe’s papers, I came across work that he and I had done in the early 1990s to edit for publication Bernard Lonergan’s letter of January 1935 to Henry Keane, S.J., his religious superior. Crowe wrote a note to several other Jesuits, including Terence Walsh, the third trustee of Lonergan’s estate, and Patrick Malone, asking their advice as to whether the letter should be published. As he said in this note, “. . . the subject matter is delicate: in a general way, because Bernie lays bare his soul so openly; in a particular way because the permissions asked will seem trivial to outsiders; but in a most particular way because of the references to George Nunan and Charles Bathurst [two Canadian Jesuits].” Still, Crowe wrote, “It is the view of Bob Doran and myself that we should publish the letter whole and entire, not leaving gaps that would lead to various surmises, but adding notes to soften the impact, and an introductory preface to give a better perspective on the whole letter.”

The Jesuit readers supported publishing the letter, but Crowe and I expected that perhaps it might appear in full in an appendix in William Mathews’s book, Lonergan’s Quest. While Bill made ample note of the letter, he did not choose to publish it, and for some reason that I do not remember our plan did not change form, so that when I came across our work in December I realized to my surprise that we had never published the full document anywhere. So I decided to prepare it for publication.

What follows, then, is, with very few exceptions, the document of Lonergan’s letter to Keane precisely as Crowe and I had prepared it in the early 1990s. I have added just a few other items in the notes, particularly one that softens Lonergan’s remarks about Erich Przywara, who has to be treated with much greater respect than Lonergan, obviously unfamiliar with his work, evinces in the letter.
Lonergan’s letter is prefaced by an Editors’ Introduction which, despite the plural, is entirely Fred Crowe’s work.

Editors’ Introduction

We present here one of the most important documents in Bernard Lonergan’s unpublished papers, a letter that he wrote to his religious superior in his student days, one in which he tries to set forth what he finds wrong with contemporary Catholic philosophy and what he believes he might do to remedy the situation. His inmost mind and heart become utterly transparent as he pours out the history of his frustrations and describes the role he might play in “the restoration of all things in Christ.”

One hopes for sympathetic readers in laying bare the deep secrets of Lonergan’s soul, his sharp critiques, his high ambition, his religious trust in what providence and his superiors will decide on for the use of his talents.

One hopes . . . while recognizing that hopes of this kind are not likely to be fulfilled one hundred percent, that the letter will in fact provide the unsympathetic with ammunition for criticism. But at least we can ask readers to remember that they are being given a document of the most private nature, the manifestation a religious is making to his religious superior, in the way that Ignatius Loyola taught his followers to be open to their superiors.

To those who would therefore take a more positive approach we recommend for a start what is as necessary here as in reading Lonergan’s later publications, namely, a willingness to learn. But more is needed to get the full benefit of this remarkable document. What is trivial should be seen in the context of the detailed permissions a religious had to obtain in everyday life. What is trenchant should be read in the light of his mellowing in later years. What seems brash in his hopes, proposals, and tentative plans might be reduced in intent to the simply plain-spoken utterance which it might have become, were he writing for the public.

Some of his statements may indeed be brash, but might we suggest that an important interpretive key to the letter lies in his description of his feelings on receiving his mission to Rome, first to study theology there and then (as was the first plan) to gain a doctorate in philosophy.
I had regarded myself as one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain. Here was a magnificent vote of confidence which, combined with the great encouragement I had had from Fr Smeaton after years of painful introversion and with the words over the high altar in the church of St Ignatius here, “Romae vobis propitius ero,” was consolation indeed.

These few words speak volumes about the spiritual and affective dimensions involved in Lonergan’s slowly emerging intellectual vocation, and about the interior obstacles that had to be faced, transcended, and transformed into elements of a personal integration along the way to the moment when that vocation was fully embraced. They also reveal some of the constants of character and personality that would remain with Lonergan all his life, as sources both of strength and of weakness, of unquestioned achievement and of sometimes painful misunderstandings from others.

Readers who approach the letter with this in mind will, we believe, find a whole hidden dimension of Lonergan’s later work illuminated, and will gain entry into his thought in a way that a dozen readings of Insight would not provide.

The letter was typed on four sheets (half legal size), front and back, with no right margin and small ones on the other three sides; pages 3 to 8 seem to have been written first, with two pages of introduction (the first sheet) added later.

As for editing minutiae, we bring details of style into conformity with the usage of the Collected Works. We have added numerous notes to explain references that were plain to both Keane and Lonergan but would puzzle most readers. Brackets without notes mean editorial insertions or changes; some corrections were obvious and are not indicated. We have broken up longer paragraphs in some places. Lonergan made marginal additions here and there; these are either found in the notes or incorporated into the text, which is published here in full.
Reverend Father Provincial:

Pax Christi. 3

Though sadly late, I wish you a most happy New Year followed by many more in Canada. 4 If it is not being extravagant, I hope you find your sojourn there as pleasant as the years I spent in England. 5 I begin with the matter of permissions and then go on to another topic at which I have been poking about for expression for some time; hence I write so late.

I have been smoking regularly since I received permission from Fr Hingston 6 in the winter of 1929. In my last retreat I thought of putting 7 an end to it but wisely compromised upon being more moderate; this has meant that I do not smoke absolutely every time that I have both the inclination and the opportunity.

The cost of smoking here is high, about $20.00 a year.

If you make it ever so plain to me that it would not be the decent thing for me to continue smoking in view of the financial condition of the V-Prov, 8 I shall be happy to do without it. That, I suppose, is the pure reason on the issue, and I desire to be reasonable.

On the other hand, the practical reason is very bourgeois; no wild-eyed

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1 "Via del Seminario, 120": the "Borromeo," originally a palace of that family, was used in Lonergan’s time as an international residence for Jesuit students in basic philosophy and theology, with a community of just over one hundred; later (1950), renamed the “Bellarmino”; it became the residence for Jesuits in doctorate studies.

2 Abbreviating either “theology” or “theologian.”

3 "The peace of Christ," traditional greeting when Jesuits write one another.

4 Fr Henry Keane, appointed Provincial Superior of the Upper Canadian Province of Jesuits on 20 November 1934, remained in that post till 8 November 1938, when he returned to England to become eventually tertian master.

5 Lonergan was in England from 1926 to 1930, a student at Heythrop College and the University of London.

6 William Hingston, Lonergan’s Provincial Superior from 17 May 1928 until replaced by Fr Keane.

7 "I thought of putting an end to it": correcting “I thought of thinking to put an end to it,” which we read as a careless lapse.

8 "the V-Prov.": that is, the Vice-Province; Upper Canada did not become a Province, with right to full representation at General Congregations and so on, till 18 January 1939. The precarious financial situation continued for another fifteen years or more.
radicalism! In fact, like others, I find smoking fully worthy of the praise Macbeth bestowed on sleep: nature's second course, and the like.\(^9\) Then, as I write, the "genius loci"\(^11\) rises before me to terrify my imagination. We appreciate in a special way Berchmans' remark about *vita communis*.\(^12\) But if I expanded this aspect of the issue you might find it difficult to take me seriously in the preceding paragraph.\(^13\)

Last October I received leave from Fr Hingston to read books on the index\(^14\) connected with my work, that is, I was supposed to be due for a biennium\(^15\) in epistemology. Biennists had told me of the impossibility of getting the necessary detailed background for a thesis during the two years. I had written Fr Hingston to the effect that the sources on my subject were under the ban, that, though the number of lectures and the amount of work was appalling, still there was the summer, while during the year a change, when not as good as a rest, was the only rest to be had.\(^16\) He fell in with my suggestion and sent me a permission conditioned by the approbation

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\(^9\)To push for freedom in principle to smoke hardly seems in our time like "wild-eyed radicalism."

\(^10\) Macbeth, Act II, Scene II, on "Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sheave of care . . . Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course . . ."

\(^11\)"genius loci": Virgil, *Aeneid*, Bk viii, line 136. The next sentence in the letter suggests that the reference here is to an element in the Borromeo community opposed to smoking.

\(^12\)"vita communis": common life as lived in a religious house. St John Berchmans was frequently quoted (often in banter) as saying common life is "mea maxima mortificatio" — "my greatest cross."

\(^13\)"in the preceding paragraph": Lonergan corrected this by hand from "three paragraphs back"; so he did check his letter to some extent, which makes it the more surprising that several errors remain.

\(^14\)The canon law on the Index of Prohibited Books was still strict on paper; in practice permission was readily granted for those in doctorate studies, less readily (if we may judge from Lonergan's having to argue his case) to those in earlier stages of study. In another letter to Fr Keane, written from Dublin, 10 August 1938, Lonergan very formally requests renewal of the permission: "In Rome I had your permission to read forbidden books on my work with the approval of a professor. Would you renew this? Also might the approval of the Rector if not the professors at the place [where] I am for the summer months take the place of Gregorian professors while I am away from Rome?"

\(^15\)"biennium": the two years granted Jesuits then to obtain a doctorate in philosophy or theology; "biennists" lived in another community (at the Gesù), as Lonergan did later during his own biennium.

\(^16\)Another sentence lacking the clarity of the mature Lonergan. We take the meaning to be: "two years are not enough for the doctorate work required; I could get a start now on the appalling amount of work imposed, if I could (1) read during the summer; and (2) also to some extent during the year (that would be a change, though not quite as good as a rest)." The whole argument was meant to renew permission to read books on the index.
of my Rector or Spiritual Father. I raised the question with the latter and he placed all his powers so acquired with any of three professors. Going to see the professors is exceedingly difficult – a trip from Toronto to Montreal is a trifle in comparison. Getting books from the university is simply a feat. So I have done nothing, but had intended to arrange something for the summer vacation.

When I left Canada for Rome my father gave me money for a typewriter. When I arrived here the Rector gave me permission to get one through the Vatican State. I use it constantly.

I have an assortment of books. Fr Hingston had given me a leave on the ground that the way I had studied a subject or the peculiarity of my interests gave rise to needs not normally met by the somewhat restricted libraries of houses in Canada. On this score I have a number of texts from the Oxford plain Classics (4 Plato, 2 Aristotle, Thucydides, Tacitus, Aeschylus), Pindar with translation, translated selections of Plotinus, a few manuals on the mechanics of French; by some principle of accretion I have an English and a Greek dictionary and a Shakespeare; a Douay Version and the new Merk’s Novum Testamentum were given me and seem spontaneously to have justified themselves; since in Italy I have yielded to the native language and to German and so have two more dictionaries; I also have a missal.

I spent last summer at the Germanico villa. It was a fifty-day frontal attack upon the language of science and something of an experience; a stranger in a strange land with a still stranger language to be spoken to seminary students, who if they have been students of the Society since 1552 are not yet members. This business of being a guest in every possible sense of the word made it a bit of a strain. However, I do not know much German yet, and there is no place to go before one is ordained. My Italian is not a

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17Two good friends on the faculty were Fr Bernard Leeming and Fr Leo Keeler; one surmises they were among the three named.

18Lonergan still had the Oxford Classics when teaching in Montreal in 1940-46; the late John Hochban remembered borrowing them, and noting Lonergan’s annotations (conversation with F. Crowe). The four volumes of Plato and at least one of Aristotle are now in the Regis College library; our surmise is that Lonergan brought his little collection with him to Regis when he was transferred there from Montreal (December 1946), but left it behind on departing for Rome (September 1953).

19The Pontifical “Collegium Germanicum et Hungaricum,” founded by Ignatius Loyola himself, was staffed by Jesuits (six priests and ten brothers in the year of this letter). Roman Colleges regularly had a villa outside the city for the weekly holiday (Thursday) and the summer vacation. Frascati, mentioned by Lonergan as an alternative for the summer, was the location of the villa for the Borromeo students.
brilliant affair, I mean, not too nice about grammar and "le mot juste." But there are so few Italians here during the year and still fewer stay around for the vacation. As to choosing between the two places, it is really difficult to find reasons either way. Let us say that Frascati is more restful while the German place more alive and probably cheaper.

I suppose I ought to get up German better than to be able to make out the sense of a biography before ordination; item, there are a lot of good ideas floating around among the Germans which it would be well to pick up especially if I am not likely to have any better chance of knowing them. So if you do not mind my offending the extraordinary susceptibilities of some of the local nationalists20 I would suggest having another go at the German. If you decide that way, you had best drop a note to the Roman Provincial, and it would be well to write the Rector of the Germanico thanking him for last year and begging a repetition of the favor. (Address: Pontificio Collegio Germanico ed Ungarico, 8 Via San Nicolò da Tolentino, Roma.)

A Request: I have written this letter a number of times and probably this is not only the last but also the worst. But it has to be the last. I have to start again devoting my time to learning tons of stuff by heart. So please overlook all the reasons I see for trying just once more to do a good job. The next part fits on to the preceding by means of a hysteron proteron.21

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With regard to the project of my teaching philosophy22 I give you the following information because I think it my duty to do so, because I am in need of advice, and finally for a reason which the information itself will explain.23 I am here condensing what I had already written for your

20With so many nations represented in Rome, it is impossible to identify these "nationalists"; in Lonergan’s own house there were Jesuits from Belgium, England, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, besides those from overseas.

21"hysteron proteron" ("the cart before the horse"); these last words on page 2 of the letter suggest that Lonergan first wrote pages 3 to 8, then pages 1 to 2. Differences in typing indicate that the two parts were written at different times; for example, in part 1, paragraphs are indented ten spaces, in part 2, only five spaces. We have inserted asterisks to mark a division that the autograph suggests better than a transcription does.

22He had been given the “project of teaching philosophy” by Fr Hingston back in Montreal in 1933; in 1938, on the suggestion of the Gregorian University Rector, the assignment was changed by Fr Keane to theology; see “Insight Revisited” in A Second Collection, ed. W. F. J. Ryan and B. J. Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 266.

23"the information itself will explain": see note 62 below.
consumption at too great a length; so if you find this insufficient you have but to say the word and I shall unload reams of stuff on you or, on the other hand, answer precise questions succinctly.

I left Heythrop a votary of Newman’s and a nominalist. On my departure I had been to see Fr Bolland to ask him whether I had best devote my future efforts to mathematics or classics. I had done both for an external pass at London; I was obviously cut out to be a student; I could not keep on at both. He raised the question that I might be wanted to teach philosophy or theology; I put the obvious objection of my nominalism, while admitting philosophy to be my fine frenzy. He said no one could remain a nominalist for long.

He was right, in a way. I got interested in Plato during regency and came to understand him; this left my nominalism quite intact but gave a theory of intellect as well. I read St Augustine’s earlier works during the summer before theology and found him to be psychologically exact. I then put together a 25,000 word essay upon the act of faith and gave it with a challenge to Fr Smeaton now at Amiens. I had known him at school; he enjoyed a Homeric epithet of “invincible in argument”; he had been the star with the professors, all (that is, both) wanting him to defend their subjects in the disputations, and so on. In a word he was the sort I desired

24“Fr Bolland”: a conversation Lonergan often referred to in later years, especially when discussing his nominalist period; for example, “Insight Revisited,” 264; also Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen M. Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 44 (the “Prefect of Studies” referred to there is Bolland).


26And on his new interest in Augustine around the same time, see Caring about Meaning, 22.

27What appear to be fragments of this essay are extant in the archives in thirteen legal-size pages that Lonergan used as wrappers for papers he wished to save: numbered 7 to 9, 13, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32 to 36 (with false starts on the back of two). See now 16500DTE030 on www.bernardlonergan.com.

28Henry Smeaton (1901-80) knew Lonergan from their days as pupils at Loyola College, Montreal; as young Jesuits they corresponded regularly, and Smeaton all his life kept what Lonergan wrote him (eleven pieces, longer or shorter, between 1924 and 1934 – now in the archives). Lonergan’s reference to two professors “wanting him to defend their subjects” refers to public disputations, held twice a year; Smeaton had been chosen to “defend” theses “De Primatu Petri et De Notis Ecclesiae” on 24 February 1932. His undoubted brilliance justified the high regard in which Lonergan held him, but Smeaton never realized his hope of a career in scripture studies.
to try out. It was a complete success. Fr Smeaton admitted that the Catholic philosophers were content to serve theology as best they could without having any philosophic pretensions, that my views were far simpler and far more satisfactory, that there was no cornering me by appealing to any dogmatic decision; this was a lot in itself and a great deal more from Fr Smeaton with his un tarnished reputation for orthodoxy, with his undoubted brilliance, with the name he had been given for never yielding; incidentally, there are few men who would yield under the circumstances so that shows how just the names given people are. I then went on to study the Summa at first hand and began to suspect that St Thomas was not nearly as bad as he is painted.29

At this juncture Fr Hingston paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology.30 I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy. He put the question, Was I orthodox? I told him I was but also that I thought a lot. I was beginning to go into detail and happened to ask if I was making myself clear. He said he considered I had already answered the question sufficiently. Probably my profession of faith had impressed him; in any case I knew the futility of trying to express myself and so I allowed the matter to remain there. You see I had been completely elated at the prospect of going to Rome. I had regarded myself as one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain. Here was a magnificent vote of confidence which, combined with the great encouragement I had had from Fr Smeaton after years of painful introversion and with the words over the high altar in the church of St Ignatius here “Romae vobis propitious ero,” was consolation indeed.31

29There were two main stages in Lonergan’s discovery of Thomas Aquinas: the first can be dated around 1933-35, when he began to read Thomas and learn about him from Bernard Leeming, Stefanos Stefanu, and others at the Gregorian University; but the real apprenticeship (we borrow the term from William Mathews) started with his doctoral dissertation, 1938-40, and continued through the verbim studies, 1943-49; this is probably the period he refers to in saying “my interest in Aquinas came late” (“Theories of Inquiry,” in A Second Collection, 38).

30The assignments of 31 July 1933 had sent Lonergan to the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal. Theology classes began there in early September; in Rome they began on 4 November; Lonergan, sailing with fellow Jesuits on 16 November (S.S. Asconia), arrived in Rome three weeks after courses had started.

31This cri de coeur is eloquent on the way Lonergan suffered in the isolation of his pioneering ideas. His elation on being sent to Rome perhaps had less to do with the prestigious Gregorian University than with the removal of the cloud that had hung over his thinking. “Romae vobis propitious ero” — actually “Ego vobis Romae propitious ero” — (I will be propitious to you in
I can give you my present position in a few words. It is definite, definitive, and something of a problem. The current interpretation of St Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation. A metaphysics is just as symmetrical, just as all-inclusive, just as consistent, whether it is interpreted rightly or wrongly. The difference lies in the possibility of convincing expression, of making applications, of solving disputed questions.\textsuperscript{32} I can do all three in a way that no Thomist would dream possible.

I can prove out of St Thomas himself that the current interpretation is absolutely wrong. Not only can I prove it, but the issue has already been raised decisively though not completely or altogether satisfactorily by Fr Maréchal,\textsuperscript{33} whose views reign in our house at Louvain but are somewhat frowned upon here. The whole difficulty is to grasp Maréchal’s point not in the abstract but in the concrete; because Fr Maréchal is utterly in the abstract he is not understood. This may sound arbitrary so let me give the reason: the only argument raised against Maréchal is that it is “obvious” he is wrong; but in the abstract nothing is obvious either way since it is all a matter of argument, and against Maréchal they cannot argue; when they say it is obvious he is wrong in interpreting St Thomas, they mean no more than that they want an explanation that goes into the concrete. That explanation I can give and I can prove and I can confirm from every viewpoint; in a word it is that what the current Thomists call intellectual knowledge is really sense knowledge; of intellectual knowledge they have nothing to say; intellectual knowledge is, for example, the “seeing the nexus”\textsuperscript{34} between

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\textsuperscript{32}The mature Lonergan would almost always set out the plan of his lecture. There is the beginning of that here in the three criteria of a true metaphysics: convincing expression, making applications, solving disputed questions; but in this letter the execution of the scheme lacks his later clarity. The two paragraphs (our division) beginning “Finally, I can solve problems and make new applications” take up the third and second steps in that order; presumably, the first step is in the paragraph (ours again) beginning “I can prove out of St Thomas ...”

\textsuperscript{33}“Maréchal”: Lonergan is often quoted as saying he learned Maréchal by “osmosis” from a fellow student, Stefanos Stefanu (“Insight Revisited,” 265); we suspect that this does not do justice to his reading; in any case later discussions (for example, in Understanding and Being, ed. Elizabeth A Morelli and Mark D. Morelli [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990] indicate a more direct acquaintance.

\textsuperscript{34}On the matter of “seeing the nexus” Lonergan had been helped by reading Peter Hoenen, cosmology professor at the Gregorian University; see “Insight Revisited,” 266-67. See 10160DTL030, 1016ADTE030, 10170DTL030, 1017ADTE030, 10180DTL030, 1018ADTE030, and 10190DTL030 on www.bernardlonergan.com.
subject and predicate in a universal judgment: this seeing a nexus is an operation they never explain. From an initial Cartesian "cogito" I can work out a luminous and unmistakable meaning to intellectus agens et possibilitis, abstractio, conversion to phantasm, intellect knowing only the universal, illumination of phantasm, and so on and so on. The Thomists cannot even give a meaning to most of this. At the same time I can deduce the Thomist metaphysic: universal individuated by matter; real distinction of essence and existence; the whole theory of act and potency.

Finally, I can solve problems and make new applications. The Thomists find St Thomas disappointingly brief upon the act of faith. Why? Because they do not know what the term "intelligibility" means. I have a complete solution to the arguments against Bellarmine's opinion in the de Auxiliis, and not only is Bellarmine the only Doctor Ecclesiae who had an opinion on the precise issue but to defend Bellarmine you have to know what intelligibility is; indeed, if you know that, you are inclined to leave the question where St Thomas left it. So much for samples from the matter of disputed questions.

As to new applications, I am certain (and I am not one who becomes certain easily) that I can put together a Thomistic metaphysic of history that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade. I have a draft of this already written as I have of everything else. It takes the "objective and inevitable laws" of economics, of

35We tend to associate Lonergan's views on this list of terms with his verbum studies a decade later; it is a good question how much those views were already formed at the time of this letter.

36We likewise tend to associate Lonergan's views on grace with his gratia operans studies of 1938-42; it is again a good question how much those views are anticipated in 1935.


38A file Lonergan had numbered 713 and entitled "History" was found among his papers after his death; it contains eight essays or parts thereof that were almost certainly written in the years 1933-38 and would be related to the "draft" he mentions here. It is impossible to determine how many papers were discarded, but in those that survive we can find the themes mentioned here: for example, the higher synthesis of laws of human activity found in the mystical body of Christ is a key topic in Pantión Anákephalatosis (dated "Dominica in Albis 1935"); the historical sequence that follows in the letter is found, at least in a fragmentary way, in the papers dealing with history. One can find the papers contained in file 713 by entering "713" in the search option on www.bernardlonergan.com.
psychology (environment, tradition), and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of a civilization) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical body. Primitive psychology, the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Greek city, Hellenism, the Roman empire; then, regalism, the Protestant revolt, liberalism, romanticism, communism, modernism, German and Italian Fascism, and the Catholic Fascism or Action with Christ as King—these all work out from metaphysics and psychology together with, of course, the divine plan of grace. I should say that my theory of the will (appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus) is as much above the current Thomist theory as my theory of intellect [is] above theirs; that makes a difference.

The important thing about my views [is] that they are entirely a difference of interpretation. I do not say, Thomas said this and I say that. I say, Thomas said this; the current Thomists going into their own experience pick out this element to be what St Thomas is talking about; I go into my experience and find something entirely different to be what St Thomas means. Let me give two extrinsic arguments in my favor. St Thomas professes to agree with Augustine at every turn; the current Thomists frankly admit they do not know what Augustine is talking about when he speaks of intellect; I am quite certain that I understand Augustine, that St Thomas could hardly have been playing a game in insincerity in agreeing with Augustine, that he must have understood Augustine since Bonaventure certainly did and the whole environment prior to Thomas was Augustinian, that, therefore, the current admission of not understanding St Augustine is equally an admission of not understanding St Thomas.

39An arrow under this word points to the following marginal note: “As to ‘will’ I establish from introspective psychology that the ‘will’ is what Cardinal Billot wants the will to be to provide himself with an analogy for the Trinity. I prove what he asserts, and so on.” At the very beginning of the verbum articles Billot’s views on intellectual procession were a kind of foil to Lonergan’s own views. See Bernard Lonergan, Verbun: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 12.

40Lonergan is here on the way to (but has not quite arrived at) the approach to Thomas that he adopted in his doctoral dissertation: “we are not concerned with the implications of his position, the ulterior development of his position, or even the defense of his position. We ask what he said, why he said it, and what he meant in saying it” (Grace and Freedom, 159-60).

41In “Insight Revisited” Lonergan speaks of discovering at this time the Augustinian veritas and its relation to the Thomist esse (“Insight Revisited,” 265); in the interviews of 1981 he attributes to this period the discovery also of the Augustinian intelligere (Caring about Meaning, 22); only after his dissertation, it seems, did he advert to the Thomist intelligere (Caring about Meaning, 22).
On the other hand, there is no difficulty in conceiving a long tradition of misinterpretation.  

(1) There was every opportunity in the Middle Ages to confuse demonstrability with intelligibility, though intelligence is positive and demonstration is only *per impossibilitatem contradictorii*, that is, from the absence of intelligibility in the contradictory proposition. Why? (2) Because philosophy and disputation coincided in the Middle Ages. How could such a confusion be continued? (3) Well, think of the *sententia communis* it was in the Middle Ages that Rome had a primacy of jurisdiction; yet Gallicanism ended only with the Vatican Council. When did it begin? (4) Immediately, since the fourteenth century could not solve the question of the nature of the act of faith and that question was in the front rank in the fourteenth century. Why did no one suspect there was something wrong before? (5) Really, every philosophy since has been convinced there was something wrong. After Thomas there was Scotus, the nominalists, the conceptualists; then Suarez and the Spaniards with their naive realism (substance is the "something there"\(^6\)); then, the brilliant Jesuit pupil Descartes, who was brought up on this stuff; then the antithesis of Spinoza and Hume; then Kant (and do you see any difference between Kant’s need to go back to the causal origin of knowledge to know the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand, the Thomistic conversion to phantasm to know the singular? Only singular things exist; therefore, existence is not in intellect alone; nor is it in intellect plus phantasm, since one can imagine what does not exist\(^4\)); then traditionalism, ontologism, Hermesian rationalism; finally, Pope Leo’s "Back to Thomas." I take him at his word. I also accept his "*veterna novis augere et perficere*"\(^6\), hence my excursion into the metaphysic of history.

What do I know of modern philosophy? I confess I never read a line of it\(^6\) but only such summaries as history of philosophy gives and occasional

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42 The numbering (1 to 5) of the following sentences was inserted by hand as an afterthought, introducing a certain awkwardness in the transitions.

43 The "something there" of naive realism is the forerunner of the "already out there now real" of *Insight*.


45 Pope Leo’s *nova et vetera* would structure much of Lonergan’s subsequent work: the *verbum* articles were on the *vetera*, *Insight* on the *nova*.

46 If this statement is true Lonergan soon began to fill the gap; for example, copious notes he made, almost certainly around this time, on Kant’s *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, are
studies of particular authors. But I know something about it. I submitted to the professor of the history of philosophy here, Fr Keeler, an essay on Newman; it was just a feeler of some 30,000 words. He did not grasp my main contention because I was not out to be unpleasantly plainspoken. But he was quite impressed nonetheless. He told me that the trouble was that students usually came here and had no grasp whatever of modern thought, asked me had I read Hume, picked out inaccuracies, and so on. Now all this was not merely the kind of politeness that comes to one from living under the Italian sky. Because Fr K[ee]ler asked me to review his book "Problem of Error from Plato to Kant" for the periodical Gregorianum; and it cannot be said that scholastics ordinarily write for Gregorianum, or that the biennists would all be certain to turn up their noses if given the opportunity, or that the professors are all so extremely busy, or that Fr Keeler considers his excursion into the field of philosophic criticism such a trifle that any old fool could do it justice.

Again, it cannot be said that the time is not ripe for such ideas as mine. Louvain substantially agrees with me. The students at Valkenburg complain that they have a physicist, not a metaphysician, and an empirical psychologist, not a rational psychologist, teaching them in these subjects. Vals has turned out at least one man I know who is very keen on Kant and the idealists; the modern Italian thinkers, particularly Carabellese, are extent in his archival papers. See www.bernardlonergan.com, at 12000DTIE30.

47Leo W. Keeler, a Jesuit of the Missouri Province, tragically killed a few years later in an automobile accident. His book was entitled The Problem of Error, from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study. Lonergan's review of the book appeared in this same year in Gregorianum 16: 156-60. The original Latin version and a translation by Michael G. Shields may be found in Bernard Lonergan, Shorter Papers, vol. 20 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 131-40. Fred Lawrence reports (conversation with F. Crowe) that the style of Tacitus in which Lonergan wrote was rendered more Ciceronian by Eric Smith, a Canadian Jesuit (and outstanding linguist) at this time studying history at the Gregorian University. Nothing, so far as we know, remains of the essay on Newman submitted to Keeler.

48"Louvain" probably means Maréchal and the Jesuit school in that city, rather than the university – this gives a parallel with Vals and Valkenburg.

49Ignatius College, Valkenburg, was from 1894 to 1942 a house of theology and philosophy studies in Holland (across the border from Aachen) for Jesuits from Germany. The Jesuit catalogue for Valkenburg that year was consulted, but the editors would not hazard a guess on the professors referred to. The community numbered 288.

50Vals, a house of philosophy studies in the Toulouse area for the Jesuit Provinces of Campagne and Toulouse. Again, the editors hesitate to guess from the catalogues the identity of the Jesuit referred to. The community this year numbered 104.

51Pantaleo Carabellese (1877-1948), first a professor at the University of Palermo, then from
really brilliant, know what they are talking about, take a lot of refuting, and rightly simply smile at their Catholic adversaries.

Again, there is something wrong when the one Catholic who could represent Catholic thought with applause from all sides at the philosophy convention in Prague was Fr Przywara52 (if that is his name) who never could pass any philosophy or theology exam in the Society. Again, one does not have to be in Rome long to find out that the Gregorian is in a fix for philosophy professors53 and knows it: these things trickle out from the best sources in matters of detail; the broad fact is no secret whatever.

I should further say that my views are neither obscure nor difficult. It is entirely a question of being willing to submit to a bit of dialectic and, the big point, being willing to admit that (when you do not know the answer and the fellows who write the textbooks evade the issue and the professors you bring the question to tell you eventually that it is a very difficult and obscure point on which there are several excellent opinions none of which are completely satisfactory)54 nonetheless there is an answer and the answer has to be found out. The disputed question is the crucial experiment of a

1931 history of philosophy professor at the University of Rome until he succeeded Gentile there in the chair of theoretic philosophy. Michele Sciacca says of him (Encyclopedic Cattolica): “Spese nobilmente la sua vita nella meditazione e nell’insegnamento.” The low opinion in which Catholics were held by the intellectual elite was a potent factor in Lonergan’s view of his own mission in life, to bring Catholic thought to “the level of the times.” See the original preface of Insight, discarded in 1954, later published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3, no. 1 (March 1985), 3-7 and more recently in The Lonergan Reader, ed. Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 33-36; see especially 34-35.

52Erich Przywara (1889-1972) was born in the part of Poland then occupied by Germany and joined the German Jesuits. The convention Lonergan mentions was the 8th International Congress held at Prague 2-7 September 1934. The Revue Neoscolastique, reporting it, says that at a general session Fr Przywara “s’assura un succes triomphal qui semble bien avoir ete le plus grand de tout le Congres” (37 [1934] 476); his topic was philosophy of religion. Lonergan’s judgment, it must be said, was based on hearsay and completely neglects the great esteem in which Przywara was held at this time far beyond this one Congress, not only for his many lectures throughout Europe but also for his ongoing dialogue with Karl Barth and his fierce opposition to the Nazis. In 1934, the same year as the Congress to which Lonergan is referring, he published an article in Stimmen der Zeit against the notion of the Volkskirche. It is not impossible that Przywara had a reaction to the philosophy and theology he was taught similar to that which Lonergan experienced at Heythrop. Certainly his friend and student Hans Urs von Balthasar did.

53Lonergan himself was not yet slated to join the philosophy faculty at the Gregorian University; that decision was made only in 1938, but was changed almost immediately to put him into theology (“Insight Revisited,” 266).

54The spacing suggests that Lonergan thought of bracketing these lines only when he was part way through them; in any case, the construction is awkward, obscuring the sequence “to admit that . . . there is an answer.”
philosophic system; you have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation; otherwise, you are not a philosopher or your system is inadequate. But this, the presupposition of all argument, is precisely what 99 per cent of the people you would argue with neither grasp nor grant. They simply do not take philosophy seriously, they do not consider whether arguments are valid or not but simply what they prove, and when they prove what seems to them the wrong thing then you are a Bolshevist in character and a heretic in mentality.

For instance, otherwise you will say that I am talking through my hat, it is always assumed that an argument that simply devastates the whole system is no more, and can be no more, than what is called a difficulty, that is, a little point that is a trifle obscure on earth but will be perfectly clear in heaven; in any case, not to be bothered about.

To give a more precise instance, I was discussing the Nicomachean Ethics with Fr Nunan, our biennest here writing a thesis on the idea of the good. I advanced that Aristotle was a bourgeois, that he introduced the distinction between speculative and practical to put the "good" as Socrates and Plato conceived it out of court, that he did so because he could not answer the dialectic of, say, the Gorgias, and could not admit its conclusion that happiness was compatible with suffering. This I believe manifest

55 The "scandal" of disputed questions in philosophy and theology was another factor in the way Lonergan saw his own mission; see Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 20, Insight, 21-22, and "The Future of Thomism," A Second Collection, 51.

56 A marginal note, attached perhaps to this sentence, reads as follows: "That is, they confuse theology with philosophy. You cannot explain everything in theology. You have to in the natural order or give up." Lonergan's later position on explanation was put in terms of what is intelligible for us, that is, admits explanation: prime matter is not intelligible in itself but only in the form for which it is potency; form in matter is intelligible in itself; existence is not intelligible in itself, but only in its extrinsic cause; sin is not intelligible in any way whatever. See Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, 418-19, note d to Lecture 9.

57 Fr George Nunan (1896-1983) was at this time in the second year of his philosophy biennium, and living at the house for biennists, the Gesu; if Lonergan's report of the conversation is accurate, Nunan's practice was better than his theory, for he returned to Canada the following year to become a respected teacher at Regis College in Toronto (then the College of Christ the King), one who truly sought to understand and explain.

58 The history of Lonergan's changing attitude to Aristotle needs study, nowhere more than in ethics; later he attributed to Aristotle the view that the good is what the good person does, spoke once (conversation with Fred Crowe) of the empiricist element in Aristotle's ethics, and so on. On the dethronement of speculative intellect, see Method in Theology, 316-17, 340; "Revolution in Catholic Theology," in A Second Collection 236-37; and 'The Origins of Christian Realism,' in A Second Collection, 242-43. On the empiricist element in Aristotle's ethics, see also "The Subject," in A Second Collection, 82.
from countless texts. Anyhow I went on to argue that St Thomas threw out the Aristotelian view of the separation of speculative and practical with a “rationibus aeternis non solum conspiciendis sed etiam consulendis”\(^5\) till finally we go to the real issue, Is philosophy to explain? He assured me that explaining and trying to explain seemed to him to be the fundamental error of all modern thought.

Now such a view is perfectly outrageous yet absolutely in keeping with all contemporary Catholic philosophy. It is outrageous because the divinity of Christ or the “divina legatio” is purely and simply the explanation of the facts we know from the gospels, and we believe the authenticity of the gospels because that is the only possible explanation of the facts we know about them. But it is in keeping with contemporary Catholic philosophy and, indeed, a very profound judgment upon modern philosophy from that viewpoint; it is [so] because the Catholic philosopher does not formally appeal to the principle of sufficient reason even when as a matter of fact that is what he is doing; he always tends to express his thought in the form of a demonstration by arguing that opposed views involve a contradiction. The method is sheer make-believe, but to attack a method is a grand-scale operation calling for a few volumes.

On the other hand, give me someone I can speak to plainly and bluntly, that I can attack not only by argument but with the important ally of some well-deserved ridicule, and there is little difficulty in making him see the light. Mr Bathurst\(^6\) here is not given to wild speculation, used to hold the accepted view that modern thought was inexplicable stupidity while the current representatives of the Middle Ages were absolute masters of the philosophic situation, but now thinks quite differently because he knows that I can give him an illuminating answer where the professors and textbooks make out there is a terrific problem beyond the mind of man.

Let this suffice for the present. I should add that I am substantially a Jesuit with no difficulties about obedience\(^7\) on this matter. Naturally I think

\(^5\)“... not only contemplating but also consulting the eternal reasons.” Thomas several times quotes Augustine to this effect. In Verbum, Lonergan’s interest lies elsewhere, in the point that for Thomas “it is the light of intellect that replaces the Augustinian vision of eternal truth; and regularly one reads that we know, we understand, we judge all things by a created light within us which is a participation, a resultant, a similitude, an impression of the first and eternal light and truth” (Verbum, 95).

\(^6\)Charles Bathurst (1903-87) was in the same year of theology as Lonergan, but went to Rome earlier, in time for the beginning of classes.

\(^7\)Yet questions about obedience remained, and during his year of tertianship (1937-38)
this is my work but I know more luminously than anything else that I have nothing I have not received, that I know nothing in philosophy that I have not received through the Society. I do not say I am a Stoic or that I don't care; were I free, my cooperation with providence would have to be a more arduous affair than making my capabilities known to others; as things are, I have done my duty to Truth, to the Light that enlighteneth every man, when I have laid the matter adequately before superiors. If they consider me to be under an illusion, I can only offer to prove my point. If they want no such stuff, then that is all there is about it. What is Hecuba to me or I to Hecuba? But I am no tragedian. I do care enormously about the good of the church but I also know that what I do not do through obedience will be done better by someone else. God can raise up from stones children to Abraham. To produce philosophers is simply a matter in the natural order.

But I write not only to inform you of the matter. I would like advice on many points which I can ask for when I learn your general attitude. As to the problem that would explain itself, I suppose you fairly see it. What on earth is to be done? I have done all that can be done in spare time and without special opportunities to have contact with those capable of guiding and directing me as well as to read the oceans of books that I would have to read were I to publish stuff that is really worthwhile. Briefly, this question is: shall the matter be left to providence to solve according to its own plan? or do you consider that providence intends to use my superiors as conscious agents in the furtherance of what it has already done?

I can make all sorts of suggestions on this score. You have only to indicate the kind you would listen to.

I commend myself to your holy sacrifices and prayers.

Bernard J. F. Lonergan S.J.

Lonergan found opportunity to ask a Jesuit he respected "how one reconciled obedience and initiative in the Society"; the answer consoled him greatly. "He looked me over and said: 'Go ahead and do it. If superiors do not stop you, that is obedience. If they do stop you, stop and that is obedience.'" The advice is hardly very exciting today but at the time it was for me a great relief ("Insight Revisited," 266).

62See note 23 above.

63Another cri de coeur that reveals the loneliness of a pioneering thinker.

64This short paragraph was added by hand at the foot of the letter, with an arrow showing the place of insertion. There is no record of Fr Keane's response.
A NOTE ON LONERGAN’S LATIN

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In the spring of 1980, when I was on the staff of the Jesuit retreat house in Guelph, Ontario, my provincial superior suggested that I might assist Fr Fred Crowe in his work at what was then called the Lonergan Centre at Regis College in Toronto. A few years earlier, I had visited this nascent Lonergan Research Institute housed in a small windowless room where Fred had begun collecting various writings by Lonergan as well as secondary materials pertaining to his work. Many of those items were given to Fred by Bernie himself, who was then still living at Regis before going to Boston College in 1975.

Thus it was that I found myself in downtown Toronto in the autumn of 1980 working with Fred in the detailed and painstaking task of cataloguing, photocopying, and collating both primary and secondary materials for a rapidly growing little library. But I noted that a large amount of Lonergan’s writings, published and unpublished, was in Latin. My postgraduate studies were in Classics, and I had taught Latin for several years in various places. Here was a challenge I couldn’t resist.

As I recall, the first document I tackled was the “De Conscientia Christi,” which has recently been published.1 I did the translation of that opusculum on a typewriter; what a relief when not long afterward a word-processing computer was installed on my desk, making the work of translation so much easier.

There is considerable variation in the style of Latin to be found in the many books and notes that Lonergan produced until 1965, when he retired from teaching at the Gregorian University. They range in style from the classical Latin of a book review to the anglicized Latin of many typewritten documents to be found mainly in the Lonergan Archive. The style of most of

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his Latin writings, especially those that have been published, lies somewhere between these two extremes.

Lonergan was a superb Latinist. He first encountered that language when, still only thirteen, he went to Loyola High School in Montreal, which he attended as a boarder from 1918 to 1922. Such was his keen intellect and retentive memory that during those years, "Brains" Lonergan, as he was known, "who swept through four levels of learning in his first year there," would have soaked up Latin and Greek like a sponge. Immediately after high school, Bernard went to the two-year Jesuit novitiate in Guelph, followed by two years in the Juniorate, where the heaviest emphasis was on the Latin and Greek classics. For both the novices and the juniors, certain brief periods during recreation after dinner were designated for Latin conversation. One of his professors in the Juniorate was Fr. Joseph I. Bergin, S.J., a noted Latinist. A contemporary of Lonergan's once told me that Bernard was well acquainted with Goodwin's Moods and Tenses, an advanced textbook on Greek syntax, from which we may presume he had a similarly thorough knowledge of Latin grammar, even at that early age.

In the years that followed, 1926-29, he studied philosophy at Heythrop College in England. His last year there, 1929-30, was spent in preparing for the final examinations in "Latin with Roman history, Greek with Greek history, French, and mathematics for the BA degree at London University." I have heard it said that he could write Latin prose in the difficult style of Tacitus, and I can well believe it, although unfortunately no specimens of this feat remain. As part of his course, he would certainly have had to compose in the style of Cicero.

Lonergan spent the next three years at Loyola College, where among other duties he taught Latin and Greek. In the autumn of 1933 he arrived at the Gregorian University, Rome, to begin the four-year course in theology. Here, as in previous situations, his intellectual ability was quickly recognized, for in the following year he was asked by Leo Keeler, an American Jesuit and professor of the history of philosophy there, to review his recently published book. Lonergan's review appeared in 1935 in the journal Gregorianum. It was

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composed in a high classical style, occasionally diluted by an unavoidable Scholastic or modern philosophical term. But why, one may ask, did he choose to write a review in such a rather difficult style? The short and simple answer is, those were different times. In that same issue of Gregorianum, five of the eight book reviews were in very good Latin, the other three in three different modern languages. The readership of that periodical and similar ones would have had little or no difficulty with an elevated Latin style, since Latin was the lingua franca in ecclesiastical studies in those days, especially in Rome, and the students usually would have been well acquainted with the Latin language, at least at the high school level. I suspect that Lonergan was happy to have an opportunity to compose something in his best classical Latin.

In this regard, however, a note of caution. On rare occasions in his other writings Lonergan uses a phrase or an expression belonging to the classical period of ancient Rome that would make no sense if translated literally. A good example of this is the phrase studium partium, which occurs on page 26 of The Triune God: Systematics. Translated literally, it would mean “the study of parts”; actually, it means “partisan zeal,” “factionalism.” Then there is the puzzling medieval Latin expression, stat in indivisibili, meaning something that does not admit of degrees.

A different sort of problem arises from the fact that Latin vocabulary and syntax, unlike Classical Greek and English, are not sophisticated enough to handle adequately the subtleties of philosophical discourse. The Romans were men of action, not thinkers. As a result, to take one example, at the beginning of Article 38 of his “De Redemptione Supplementum” (see below), we find Lonergan having to explain that there he is using the one Latin adjective historicus not in the more usual sense of “historical” but in the sense of the English word “historic.” Again, Latin has only three participles, a present active, a future active, and a perfect passive participle, whereas a fully inflected Greek verb will have eleven. Latin also lacks both a definite and an indefinite article, and Lonergan often uses quidam in its various forms to function as an indefinite article.

Closest to but still at a considerable remove from the quasi-Ciceronian style of the review of Keeler, I would place the first sections of the two books

University of Toronto Press, 2007), 131-40.

on the Trinity, the “Introductio,” pages 6 to 27 in The Triune God: Doctrines, and chapter 1, “De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi” of The Triune God: Systematics. These sections serve as brief expository essays on theological method, which was always of paramount interest to Lonergan, and never far from his mind, and their style is in keeping with the importance of their subject matter. Similar in style to these would be the “Prolegomena” of volume 11 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan and much of the rest of volume 12.

In this category most certainly belongs the over 300-page typewritten Latin document, divided into six chapters, to which the title “De Redemptio Supplementum” has been given; it has been translated and is slated to be published in volume 9 of the Collected Works. Lonergan himself gave the title “Supplement” to two other works, De Ente Supernaturali and De Gratia Sanctificante. As Frederick Crowe notes regarding this qualifier, “... this procedure became a pattern that Lonergan would follow for many years: to use a standard manual as a basis for the positive part of his courses (introducing his own ideas by way of an excursus as he did so), and to devote his special energy to the theoretic side, sometimes by way of lectures, sometimes by way of a written supplement....”

When in 1972 Lonergan handed over to Crowe his typescript of this work on the redemption, he said that it was intended as an addition to his textbook De Verbo Incarnato, with the specific purpose of explaining the “historical causality” of Christ. Its style is expository, with generally lengthy paragraphs, carefully reasoned, expressed in rather elevated diction, and with an abundance of footnotes. From all this, especially in view of his professed aim of bringing history into theology, and from the division of this essay into six chapters, it would seem that Lonergan may

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7For a detailed account of this work, see chapter 9, “De bono et malo,” in Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982 (Ottawa: Novalis, 2005), 99-128.

8In Early Latin Theology, 53-255.

9Early Latin Theology, 563-665

10Early Latin Theology, 55.

have intended it for eventual publication in book form, separate and very
different in style and tone from the textbook treatment of the redemption in
Part V of *De Verbo Incarnato*.

A large body of Lonergan’s Latin writings, however, was composed in
what could be called Scholastic textbook Latin. By that I mean the style of Latin
commonly found in the manuals that were still prevalent in Catholic schools
of theology and philosophy at the time of the Second Vatican Council. On 22
February 1962, eight months before the beginning of the council, Pope John
XXIII issued a famous document titled *Veterum Sapientia* (“The Wisdom of
the Ancients”) calling for the continued use of Latin in classroom instruction
and textbooks in the ecclesiastical disciplines. Scholastic textbook Latin is
characterized by the technical terminology and idiom of Scholasticism that
prevailed in most Catholic seminaries and theological schools from the
medieval period to almost the end of the twentieth century. Here I would
classify the six monographs published in *Early Latin Theology*: on the notion
of sacrifice, the “supernatural,” God’s knowledge and will, analysis of faith,
the meaning of “fittingness” in theology, and the consciousness of Christ.

Such textbooks and monographs generally have very few footnotes.
Also, compared with the classical style, their sentence structure is relatively
simple – shorter sentences, and a word order that follows closely the word
order of English. Hence, for a student who had a reasonably good knowledge
of basic Latin words and grammar it would have been fairly easy to read
most of these Latin sentences, since they contain so many words that have
English derivatives.

Here is an example of this, chosen at random, from “De Ente Supernaturali.”

Sanctus Thomas sane admisit aliquos actus vitales produci ab eorum
subiecto; ita intelligere productum in intellectu possibili a subiecto per
phantasma ab intellectu agente illuminatum. (*Early Latin Theology*, 168)

The important words here all have obvious English derivatives. The use of
the infinitive *intelligere* as a noun might cause some students to pause; and
the only notable deviation from English word order is the postponement of
*illuminatum* to the end of the sentence.

Finally, there is the style and composition of many archival documents.
They are almost entirely typewritten, and of varying length; their sentences
are short and simple, often standing alone and numbered (a), (b), (c), and so forth. The vocabulary mainly consists of words that have an obvious English derivative or are Latinized technical terms common to English and many other European languages – for example, *electronibus* and *orientatione*. Here also one may find words like *intellectio* and *cognoscitius*, found in medieval Latin but not in a classical Latin dictionary. Many of these documents seem to have been written by Lonergan for his own use in preparing his lectures rather than for distribution to his students. Others give the impression of having been composed by way of organizing his thinking on a variety of topics, such as “Action,” “The Notion of Satisfaction,” “The Holy Spirit as Soul of the Mystical Body,” “Trinitarian Processions,” “Tradition as a Source of Revelation,” and so on. One such document on the notion of relation, for example, titled simply “Relatio,” is an eight-page sketch quite different in style and content from the longer and more formal treatment of the topic in “De Relationibus,” Appendix III in *The Triune God: Systematics*. Besides these shorter notes on a variety of topics, there are extensive notes on the Four Last Things, and on the sacraments of matrimony and the Eucharist.

The Latin language has had a very long history as a spoken language, and any spoken language is inevitably going to change considerably over the course of centuries. We have only to think of what spoken English was like in the time of Beowulf, Chaucer, Shakespeare, and in the eighteenth century. What sort of Latin, then, is Scholastic Latin today, two thousand years after Caesar and Cicero? Linguistic mutations over such a long period can be difficult to track. One very important factor, however, that helped to keep Latin from changing too radically was the *Vulgate*, Jerome’s fourth-century Latin translation of the Bible from Hebrew and Greek. It was The Book of Christendom during the whole medieval period and beyond. It was the Church’s book, read and commented upon by clerics: monks, churchmen, theologians, philosophers, and scholars, the literate minority of the population in those times. Not until the sixteenth century was it translated into vernacular languages. But it was the oral changes during those earlier centuries in the Latin-based vernacular languages that transformed Roman

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12 *Intelectio* is in my Lewis & Short *Latin Dictionary* but as a rarity with a totally different meaning.

13 Into Modern English, the Douay-Rheims Bible, 1583 and 1609. The King James Bible appeared in 1611.
Latin into the various Romance languages of the present day, mutually unintelligible for the most part, not only to Latin but also to one another. Yet, as Professor A. G. Rigg has pointed out,

Paradoxically, it was the rise of the vernaculars that led to the "classicization" of Latin. As French, Italian, English, etc., became the normal languages of communication in government, law, religion, and science, and as literacy increased among lay people, Latin retreated into the schoolroom. It became the object of scrutiny and scholarship rather than a tool of normal communication; thus, free from the pressures to change, it was in a position to be "purified" by the humanists.\(^\text{14}\)

Hence, "Medieval Latin was the descendant of Classical Latin . . . As such it was very conservative; . . . Cicero himself would have been able to read most medieval Latin with little difficulty, once he had accustomed himself to a few differences in spelling and some new vocabulary."\(^\text{15}\)

Thus, under the influence of the humanists during the Renaissance, this medieval Latin was further purified by a return to the classical spelling, syntax, and morphology of the ancient classical authors, especially Cicero. Considering the ongoing importance of classical education over the last five centuries, as well as the fact that this sort of Latin has been and still is the official language of the Catholic Church, it is not surprising that Scholastic textbook Latin has been able to maintain these classical forms largely unchanged.

Beginning in 1940 in Montreal, then in Toronto, and finally in Rome until 1965, Lonergan delivered his lectures and produced his lecture notes in Latin. But like all other languages, Latin was primarily to be spoken. As mentioned above, Lonergan would have spoken Latin as a novice and junior during his four years at Guelph, then much more extensively during his course of studies in England and Rome. An article on Lonergan in the January 22, 1965 issue of *Time* magazine refers to his singsong voice and unmelodious flat Latin pronunciation in delivering his lectures from the pulpit of the lecture hall at the "Greg." It also quotes him as saying that since he teaches in Latin by day, he reads English at night, "to keep in contact with


\(^{15}\)Rigg, *Medieval Latin*, 73.
the language.” I have no doubt that he thought and spoke in Latin, at least Scholastic Latin, as easily as he spoke English.

But here, one might ask, if Lonergan spoke in Scholastic Latin, how did it sound? The written forms of this Latin generally followed those of the purified medieval Latin mentioned above. But orthography is not nearly as resistant to change as pronunciation is: Think of how differently English sounds when spoken by a native Canadian, Irishman, Australian, or Texan, even though the spelling of English words, with very few exceptions, is uniform.

In the case of Latin, however, the matter is not so simple. After the medieval period and the subsequent “purification” of the language by the Renaissance humanists, Latin pronunciation naturally tended once more to diverge, especially as influenced by the ways in which various European language groups pronounced their own consonants and vowels. So toward the end of the nineteenth century, the pronunciation of Latin underwent a further reform, which took two directions: “Schools and universities undertook to ‘restore’ the Classical Latin pronunciation; the Roman Catholic Church and its educational institutions adopted an Italianate pronunciation, whose dissemination was especially promoted by Pope Pius X (1903-1914).”¹⁶ This Italianate Latin used in Catholic institutions and the classical or Roman Latin followed in other schools and colleges differ from each other, therefore, not in their written forms but in their pronunciation of certain vowels, diphthongs, and some consonants.

In Catholic high schools in Lonergan’s time, the teaching of Latin was, as we have seen, an important part of the curriculum. In the Bernard Lonergan Archive there are several lectures or parts of lectures delivered orally that one can listen to and hear for oneself Lonergan’s pronunciation of Latin and the manner of his delivery. It was, of course, that Italianate pronunciation, different from the classical or ancient Roman pronunciation restored over a century ago in non-Catholic schools and universities. It was the way young Bernard learned to pronounce Latin and the way I did in a Catholic high school a generation later. We have an excellent specimen of his spoken Latin in the lecture on the notion of structure that he gave to the Jesuit Scholastics at Gallarate, near Milan, in 1964, which fortunately was tape-recorded. Listening to it and translating it for publication was for me a most enjoyable task.¹⁷

¹⁶Rigg, Medieval Latin, 76.
¹⁷Latin text and English translation in Early Works on Theological Method 3, vol. 24 of the
Among the original typewritten documents in the archives there is another Latin lecture, quite brief, that Lonergan delivered to the Jesuit Scholastics in Montreal in the autumn of 1943. At the beginning of the school term it was customary for one of the professors to deliver to the assembled theologues a *Schola Brevis*, a “short lecture,” not as the introductory lecture of the course to be taught but rather as a more relaxed reflection on some suitable topic, usually not more than ten minutes in length, followed by a holiday for the rest of the day. However, what is of especial interest in this 400-word gem—unfortunately not recorded—is not its Latinity but its rhetorical character. At Loyola High School and shortly after that in the Juniorate at Guelph, Lonergan received a “classical education,” derived from the famous Jesuit schools in Europe and their *Ratio Studiorum*, and ultimately from the educational system of antiquity, both Greek and Roman, in which rhetoric was an essential element. The classical definition of an educated gentleman given by Cicero was *vir bonus dicendi peritus*: “a good man and a good speaker.” Loyola and similar Catholic high schools not only taught Cicero’s orations but also often had debating societies as part of their educational program. Rhetoric is simply the art of persuasion, aiming not just to inform but especially to move the hearer through the use of various figures of style.

In this *Schola Brevis*, Lonergan uses the rhetorical figure known as *asyndeton*, consisting of the piling up of a series of coordinate phrases one after the other without a connective. For example, in the long opening sentence he prays that God may grant his listeners “temporal and spiritual well-being, peace in your hearts and in the nation, intellectual delight, joy in your daily life, ease and diligence in your studies, hope for success in your courses, and patience, even forbearance, during the lectures.” Such a figure of style heightens the emotional tone of a speech, imparting to it a sense of importance or even urgency, and he uses it three more times in this


39“In ancient Rome itself, the formal teaching of Latin (particularly forensic oratory) was the basis of all education” (A. G. Rigg, *Medieval Latin*, 72). In the Province of Quebec, prior to the “quiet revolution” of the 1960s, the French-speaking eight-year colleges were called *Collèges Classiques*. They were linear descendants of the European Jesuit schools.
short speech. Incidentally, this little oration ends with a literary flourish consisting of two short quotations from the Latin classics, one from Virgil and one from Horace, which most of the students in those days, I believe, would have recognized.

Rhetoric, since it aims to persuade or to impress rather than simply to expound or explain, is not usual in philosophical or theological writings. However, as I was working on the translation of the long final paragraph of the "Prolegomena" of De Deo Trino: Pars dogmatica, and especially as I read it aloud in Latin, it seemed to me that there was in that passage something similar, in a way, to what we have seen in this Schola Brevis. After a short opening sentence, the second sentence as translated begins with the phrase, "There was a transition from...", repeated four more times, covering about two-thirds of the paragraph. This repetition of the same word or phrase or construction at the beginning of series of sentences for rhetorical effect is known as anaphora. Here it is followed by immediately a second anaphora, "To the question..., its answer was...", repeated twice, bringing not only this paragraph but indeed the whole long "Prolegomena" to a satisfying close. Rhetoric has by its very nature an emotional tone, and it seems to me that the emotion Lonergan has evinced here is one of triumphal satisfaction. For in this final paragraph, the peroratio, he sets forth the definitive answer to the initial basic question he had posed in the opening paragraph of the "Prolegomena." It is almost as if he is proclaiming, "Q.E.D.!"

Despite the best efforts of Pope John's Veterum Sapientia, I think we may confidently say that we shall not see the like of Lonergan's use of Latin again. Even at the Gregorian University most courses are now taught in Italian, while some are taught in English and other European languages. Latin, of course, remains the official language of the church and continues to be used in courses in Canon Law, in which terminological precision is essential. But it is likely that Lonergan's Latin corpus will now be regarded as a museum curiosity, a linguistic fossil.

But wait. Latin is not yet near death, it seems. From time to time these years one hears of a renewed interest in studying Latin among high school

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20The Triune God: Doctrines, 254-55.
21The Triune God: Doctrines, 28-29.
22Another good example of the effective use of anaphora to drive a point home is in Bernard Lonergan's Early Works on Theological Method 2, vol. 23 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, pages 443 and 445, where the phrase, "they certainly know..." is repeated five times.
students in North America. And on page 55 of the May 13, 2013 issue of Maclean’s, a Canadian weekly magazine, there is an article titled “A full-blown Latin revival.” It mentions Nuntii Latini, a weekly feature on Finnish radio that has been running for twenty-four years, using, I presume, the classical pronunciation. It reveals the existence of a Latin conversation group, the Circulus Latinus Lutetiensis, in Paris (originally called Lutetia Parisiorum), one of a growing number of such groups who gather to chat in Latin in that city’s bistros. The article also reports testimonials to the “mind-expanding benefits” of Latin, including one by Mark Zuckerberg, who has attributed his success to having studied the classics. But the ultimate accolade for Latin that it mentions must surely be the translation of some of the Harry Potter novels into the language of ancient Rome!

Perhaps it is too soon, after all, to pronounce R.I.P. over the corpus linguae Latinae.
Bernard Lonergan once characterized Thomas Aquinas as "a singularly traditional thinker, [who] also was a great innovator." He could as well have described himself. Soaked in Aquinas and deeply traditional in his orthodoxy, still he intended a new paradigm for theology. His hero was not the Aquinas – praised rather than imitated – of the neo-scholastic manuals, but the adventurer who squared up to Aristotle. In his own quest for foundations, Lonergan dug deep; some would say, too deep. His brilliant contributions to constructive theology were like nuggets turned up, almost incidentally, in the digging. Centuries have inured us to the novelty of Aquinas; somewhat bleary, he became the tradition. Lonergan, however, remains a sign of contradiction. At least part of the reason is circumstantial. Lonergan left pitifully few examples of the theology he envisioned. Except for a few tantalizing suggestions, he was obliged to squeeze his theology into neo-scholastic chrysalides. If there is ever to be a metamorphosis, it must come at other hands.

Like all scholastic theology, Lonergan's is overwhelmingly metaphysical. Just what is worth retrieving, and what the retrieval might look like, have been vexed questions. My present purpose, however, is exegetical, and

1Lonergan remarked that Aquinas's achievement on operative grace "was but an incident in the execution of a far vaster program" (Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000], 143).

the question bears not on the content of Lonergan’s theology but on his method. Remotely, the question is how Lonergan envisaged a methodical transposition of scholastic achievement. However, as that is the question for a monograph, the proximate inquiry bears on the meaning of a single statement regarding metaphysical method: “For every [metaphysical] term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.” Conveniently, this principle relates our inquiry to previous discussion, and diverse interpretations will be seen to entrain divergences on further questions of theology and method.

Probably no one has sought to develop Lonergan’s theology with greater urgency, boldness, and creativity than Robert Doran. In his seminal 1993 article, “Consciousness and Grace,” Doran announced his intention to begin


Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1972), 343. (Numerous photostatic reprintings by University of Toronto.)


a project in systematic theology with an attempt to transpose Lonergan’s scholastic theology of grace into “categories derived from religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness.” In so doing he also inaugurated an extensive de facto collaboration. This he has encouraged vigorously, calling for “a community that would continue this work, refine it, correct it where needed, and move it forward.” Doran has understood himself, in part, to be implementing the principle of correspondence enunciated in Method in Theology. In effect, he took this statement as the charter for correlating or linking the concepts of scholastic theory with corresponding data in religious interiority.

Here I propose a different interpretation of Lonergan’s statement. Where Doran takes Lonergan’s statement broadly to include not only metaphysical notions in the strict sense (for example, potency, form, act) but also the generically metaphysical categories of scholastic theology (for example, sanctifying grace, habitual charity), I take it narrowly to mean metaphysical notions alone. Positively, I demonstrate the lucidity of the statement with respect to strictly metaphysical notions. Negatively, I show that it was never intended to refer to scholastic theological categories and quickly loses its lucidity when made to do so. I submit that the transition from the scholastic to the methodical style in theology is more complicated – or differently complicated – than Doran’s procedure suggests. However, I also suggest that the expectation that the order of grace will be analogous to the order of Trinitarian relations may provide a sufficient warrant for Doran’s program.

A first, preliminary section establishes the question by reviewing Doran’s interpretation and highlighting the points of divergence. The next three sections establish my positive claim: Lonergan’s statement is presented and interpreted in its context; its meaning is illustrated by two examples from his scholastic theology; and the interpretation is confirmed by its congruity to the metaphysical program of Insight. Three further sections develop the negative claim by examining the viability of a broader reading in context, practice, and theory.

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6Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 51.


8See Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 42-44.
In “Consciousness and Grace,” Doran took his charter from Lonergan’s assertion that “for every [metaphysical] term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.” His interpretation of this statement shaped his inquiry:

What we must do is identify in our experience, and in the terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, what this created experience is. Again, “for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.” . . . [W]e must identify what element in intentional consciousness corresponds to the “created communication of the divine nature.”

There is no dispute about whether grace enters our experience. Rather, the question at hand is simply whether Lonergan, when he made his statement, had the categories of scholastic theology in mind. Doran invokes it, with added emphasis, to justify a program that expects to find elements in experience corresponding to Lonergan’s scholastic categories.

“Consciousness and Grace” provoked a firestorm in the Lonergan community. Old hands and new raised important questions about Doran’s method, assumptions, and results. Doran would revisit the question numerous times over the next two decades. In his first sequel, “Revisiting Consciousness and Grace,” he again invoked Lonergan’s statement as the “prescription” underwriting his program:

9Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 59 (emphasis supplied by Doran). Compare: “What are the elements in intentional consciousness that correspond to the metaphysical categories in which Lonergan elaborated the notion of a ‘created communication of the divine nature’?” (53).

I took seriously Lonergan’s prescription in Method in Theology that “for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness,” and I was asking what those elements would be if we were to try to transpose Lonergan’s distinction between sanctifying grace and charity...  

Note three elements in this initial position: (1) the “terms and relations” include (at least) the special categories of (Lonergan’s) scholastic theology; (2) the “corresponding element” seems to entail a direct correspondence to data in our experience, and (3) the statement is a prescription for transposition from scholastic to methodical theology.

Later writings would nuance the second element of this position slightly, but not, as far as I can tell, the first and the third. Thus, he later explained that there is not “an interior equivalent to every metaphysical term,” a point “too often neglected.” Some “metaphysical terms” – his examples include agent intellect, sanctifying grace, and habitual charity – are indeed to be identified in consciousness. Others, however – his illustrations include the secondary esse of the incarnation, and the term “consubstantial” – do not refer to conscious states, processes, or events. For the secondary esse, “we would have a difficult time finding a conscious equivalent but... we may and indeed must name the intentional operation from which that category was derived.”


13See, for additional examples: “Because the metaphysical categories in which the systematic understanding of that treatise (De ente supernaturali) is expressed, while not being jettisoned or rejected, must be grounded in terms and relations derived from what Lonergan calls interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. (The footnote [53] quotes “for every term and relation...”) How may we speak in the terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness about an absolutely supernatural ‘created communication of the divine nature?’” (Robert M. Doran, “Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology,” in Theological Studies 59 (1998): 569-607 at 589); an almost identical statement occurs in Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 42-43; compare Robert M. Doran, “Reflections on Method in Systematic Theology,” in Lonergan Workshop Journal, vol. 17, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2002), 23-51 at 40-43.

14Doran, The Trinity in History, 22.

15The Trinity in History, 22. Compare: “The theologian working in the second phase [of theology, i.e., direct discourse] must be prepared to specify just what that element is... If the term ‘consubstantial’ is retained, its base in interiorly differentiated consciousness has to be made explicit. The ‘corresponding element in intentional consciousness’ has to be named: in this case, what is affirmed in true judgments” (Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 96).
it is what he had in mind all along. This nuance does not, however, eliminate his expectation that at least some of the concepts of scholastic theology will be found to correspond to immediate data of consciousness. This is revealed by a friendly amendment he proposed in a 2006 article:

The qualification is to the effect that the corresponding conscious element is most often found in intentional consciousness, but it may also be found in nonintentional conscious states. This is particularly the case with the basic gift of God’s love, which is not a response to an apprehended object.15

The statement recurs, in a slightly revised form, in his more recent The Trinity in History.16 With this qualification, Doran is plainly trying to reconcile his understanding of the principle of correspondence with Lonergan’s characterization of the gift of God’s love as constituting a state that has a determinate, conscious content, but no intellectually apprehended object.17

Doran’s qualification raises questions to which we will return in the last section. For the moment, it is enough to underscore Doran’s ongoing assumptions about the meaning of Lonergan’s statement: (1) the “terms and relations” include the categories of scholastic theology, (2) the expected correspondence is, at least in some cases, an immediate datum or set of data in consciousness, and (3) the statement is a directive for theological transposition.

Indeed, it is even characterized as the “basic rule” for the transposition. The new theology, Doran writes,

will be expressed in categories derived explicitly from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. The basic rule governing the

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15Robert M. Doran, “The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,” in Theological Studies 67 (2006): 750-76 at 758, note 17. He introduces this qualification by quoting at some length the passage in which Lonergan’s statement occurs. The statement itself is italicized. Ellipses connect the “terms and relations” of the statement to the theological categories mentioned in the previous paragraph (“Starting Point” 757-58).
16Doran, The Trinity in History, 144. See too Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 100.
formulation of such categories is stated in Method in Theology: "For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness."\textsuperscript{18}

He explains that some of the categories encompassed by this statement “will be metaphysical, in the sense of the metaphysics proposed by Lonergan in Insight.” But he also takes it to apply to the larger set of general and special categories employed by Lonergan’s scholastic theology.\textsuperscript{19}

Herein lies the nub of the question. By my lights, Lonergan’s statement does not intend this larger group of categories. It intends only metaphysical notions in the strict sense. Thus, I interpret the statement to mean (1) the “terms and relations” of metaphysics in the strict sense only; (2) the correspondence or isomorphism of ontological to cognitional elements, not the discovery that some scholastic concepts name data of experience; and (3) the derivation of critical metaphysics but not, directly, the formulation of new theological categories.

**The Statement in Context**

The immediate context of Lonergan’s statement is an enumeration of the consequences, for the systematic function of theology, of the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis (“Closed Options”).\textsuperscript{20} Four consequences are named, the first two briefly and the latter two in greater detail. First, the old question about the relationship of intellect and will is recast. Second, the existential dimensions of scientific learning come into focus. Third, the principle that nothing is loved unless it is first known is revised, and the implications of this revision are outlined in seven paragraphs. Fourth, metaphysics no longer supplies the basic terms and relations of systematic theology.

This fourth consequence is spelled out in four paragraphs. It will be expedient to quote the first three. For the sake of convenience I designate them A, B, and C, and italicize the statement in question.

\textsuperscript{18}Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 95-96 (internal citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{19}Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 97.

\textsuperscript{20}Method in Theology, 340-44.
[A] There is a still further consequence of the shift from a faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. It is that the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will not be metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological. As has been worked out in our chapters on method, on religion, and on foundations, general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states.

[B] The point to making the metaphysical terms and relations not basic but derived is that a critical metaphysics results. For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. Accordingly, empty or misleading terms and relations can be eliminated, while valid ones can be elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived. The importance of such a critical control will be evident to anyone familiar with the vast arid wastes of theological controversy.

[C] The positive function of a critical metaphysics is twofold. On the one hand it provides a basic heuristic structure, a determinate horizon, within which questions arise. On the other hand, it provides a criterion for settling the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning and, again, between notional and real distinctions.21

A note at the end of paragraph [C] refers readers to various loci in Insight if they wish to fill in the meaning of heuristic structure, of reality, and of real and notional distinctions. A concluding paragraph adds two other virtues, namely that, the structure is open to progress, and that it is verifiable.

The question for interpretation regards three issues in the italicized passage. (1) What “terms and relations” does Lonergan mean? (2) What kind of “correspondence” is intended? (3) What is the point of the precept? The answer to the first question determines or at least informs the answers to the other two.

As we have seen, on Doran’s reading (and in his practice), (1) the terms and relations are metaphysical in a broad sense that includes (at least) the

21Method in Theology, 343 (emphasis added).
special categories of (Lonergan's) scholastic theology (for example, sanctifying grace, habitual charity, light of glory, secondary esse); (2) the correspondence entails, at least sometimes, the discovery of the conscious states, processes, or events meant by the scholastic categories; and (3) the statement is a precept is for theological "transposition." De facto, the scholastic categories supply a heuristic structure for determining the new categories.

On the interpretation proposed here, (1) the terms and relations are the categories of a critical metaphysics (for example, potency, form, act); (2) the correspondence is the isomorphism of cognitional and ontological structure; and (3) the precept is for the derivation of ontological structure from cognitional structure, and not the other way round.

Prima facie, the context set by paragraph [A] might seem to favor the first interpretation. The basic terms and relations of the new theology (which are to be "psychological") are compared to the basic terms and relations of the old (which were "metaphysical"). The various sources of the new categories are listed. It would be easy to think the issue at hand is how to get from the old categories to the new ones. In effect, "for every (valid) term and relation in a scholastic theology, the new theology will discover a corresponding element in intentional consciousness."

However, a closer examination turns up many reasons to doubt this impression. In the first place, the comparison of the old and new categories in [A] suggests, not a correspondence, but a contrast. The old were derived from metaphysics. The new are not derived from metaphysics, not even from the generically metaphysical categories of Lonergan's scholastic theology. They are developed in a manner set forth in three earlier chapters, none of which mention a program of correlating scholastic categories to consciousness. Besides the contrast, there is also the derivation. Metaphysics is to be derived from cognitional theory; nothing is said about the derivation of new categories from metaphysics. The section itself concerns the consequences of shifting from faculty psychology. In [A] Lonergan names the fourth consequence: the displacement of metaphysics from basic to derivative. The development of new categories, on the basis of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, is mentioned only incidentally.

In [B], Lonergan assigns "the point to making metaphysical terms and relations not basic but derived." This point is not that scholastic concepts can

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22 See Method in Theology, 282-83.
be correlated with psychological data. It is not that the technique provides a "prescription" or a "basic rule" for developing theological categories. The point is that "a critical metaphysics results," because "for every [metaphysical] term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness." A critical metaphysics is developed on the basis of the isomorphism of knowing and being, so that every metaphysical term and relation is derived from some element in cognitional structure.\(^2\)

Readers familiar with Lonergan's thought will recognize this immediately as the metaphysical program he developed in *Insight*. It was also endorsed earlier in *Method in Theology*, in which Lonergan indicated the "systematic" function of transcendental method.

In the measure that transcendental method is objectified, there are determined a set of basic terms and relations, namely, the terms that refer to the operations of cognitional process, and the relations that link these operations to one another. Such terms and relations are the substance of cognitional theory. They reveal the ground for epistemology. They are found to be isomorphic with the terms and relations denoting the ontological structure of any reality proportionate to human cognitional process.\(^2\)

The ontological structure of proportionate being is the topic of metaphysics. Both in this passage and in ours, cognitional theory (intentionality analysis) is said to be basic, and metaphysics derived. In both places, ontological elements are elucidated on the basis of the cognitional. The derivation is making explicit what is implied by the isomorphism of cognitional and ontological structure. Because of the isomorphism, all the terms and relations in a critical metaphysics (the ontological structure of proportionate being) will be grounded in corresponding terms and relations verified in

\(^2\)Note that Doran grants the relevance of the statement to metaphysics in the strict sense, while also maintaining that the statement has a wider significance as "the basic rule governing the formulation of [theological] categories" (*What Is Systematic Theology?*, 95-97).

cognitional structure.\textsuperscript{25} The elements of this structure cannot be the special categories of scholastic theology, first because these regard supernatural being, and also because they are not themselves the structural elements, but rather are analyzed into their structural elements.

Like [A] and [B], paragraph [C] is also concerned, not with scholastic theological concepts and the method of correlating them with experiences, concepts, or language proper to the new context, but rather with “the positive function of a critical metaphysics.” This function is twofold: heuristic and critical. The heuristic function of metaphysics is the provision of a “basic heuristic structure, a determinate horizon” for inquiry.\textsuperscript{26} The critical function is the provision of a criterion for controlling meaning and classifying distinctions. For more on these functions of metaphysics, Lonergan refers the reader (in the footnote to [C]) to his chapters in \textit{Insight} on “Heuristic Structures of Empirical Method,” “The Method of Metaphysics,” and “Metaphysics as Science.”

As a whole, the present passage is not concerned with the generation of new categories or how the new categories are to be related to the scholastic categories. Rather, it is concerned to explain why metaphysics has been made not basic but derivative, and what advantages result from its displacement as the basic science. This coheres with the overall purpose of this section of \textit{Method in Theology}, which is not to reprise the earlier discussion of theological categories,\textsuperscript{27} but rather to name some consequences of the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. From both the literary context and the nest of interrelated questions, it is clear that the statement, “for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness,” enunciates Lonergan’s familiar strategy for

\textsuperscript{25}The notion of structure as a set of terms defined by their correlations is a fundamental and recurrent idea in Lonergan’s thought: “For every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the insight fixes both” (\textit{Insight}, 14) “…with the relations settled by the terms and the terms settled by the relations” (\textit{Insight}, 417). See too Lonergan’s, “De Notione Structurarum,” in \textit{Early Works on Theological Method} 3, vol. 24 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 160-86 [English translation on facing pages]. See too the passage quoted at note 48, below.

\textsuperscript{26}In \textit{Insight}, metaphysics is defined as “the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being” (\textit{Insight}, 416). The description of metaphysics as providing “a determinate horizon” [C] seems to suggest that a horizon is objectified through the formation of categories. This may be relevant to the question whether “horizons” and “categories” can be functionally distinguished, as suggested by Doran in \textit{The Trinity in History} (111-15).

\textsuperscript{27}See \textit{Method in Theology}, 281-93.
developing metaphysics from the isomorphism of knowing and being. It does not enunciate a new precept for correlating the scholastic special categories with "psychological" special categories.

**TWO ILLUSTRATIONS**

This interpretation is confirmed by observing how the procedure was implemented in Lonergan’s theological writings. In our passage, Lonergan claims that a critical metaphysics will eliminate empty and confirm valid metaphysical terms and relations. “The importance of such a critical control will be evident to anyone familiar with the vast arid wastes of theological controversy” [B]. He adds that a critical metaphysics “provides a criterion for settling the difference between . . . notional and real distinctions” [C]. Consider two examples.

Exhibit A is the Scotist “distinctio formalis a parte rei,” which Lonergan treated both in *Insight* and, more extensively, in *De Deo Trino.* In *Insight,* after laying out his method for the derivation of metaphysics from cognitional structure, that is, from the isomorphism of knowing and being, Lonergan introduced, in a chapter called “Metaphysics as Science,” a series of questions designed “to test the method and to reveal its power . . . to reveal in concrete fashion the existence and the power of the method.” The first test was the problem of distinction, and it concludes with a note on the Scotist formal distinction.

The Scotist formal distinction on the side of the object (1) presupposes the counterposition on objectivity, and (2) finds its strongest argument in the field of Trinitarian theory. God the Father is supposed to intuit himself as both God and Father; the object as prior to the intuition cannot exhibit both aspects as completely identical, for otherwise the Son could not be God without being Father. The fundamental answer is, *Ex falso sequitur quodlibet*; and the supposition of the intuition rests on a mistaken cognitional theory.

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28 *Insight*, 513-14.
29 *The Triune God: Systematics*, 298-304.
30 *Insight*, 424-25.
31 *Insight*, 512.
32 *Insight*, 514 (internal citation omitted).
The details of the question, as a matter of Trinitarian theology, are perhaps too recondite to detain us. What is of interest here is Lonergan’s critical method. The major premise of Scotus’s argument, Lonergan asserts, is a cognitional theory based on perceptionist myth, the myth of knowledge by confrontation, transported into the conception of divine knowledge to imagine the Father beholding in himself the formal non-identity of paternity and divinity.\textsuperscript{33} Once this myth yields to the fact of knowledge by identity, Lonergan argues, the problem vanishes, and with it, both the exigence for the “distinctio formalis a parte rei” and its meaningfulness.

The Scotist formal distinction is a classic example of an empty metaphysical category corresponding to no conscious intention in cognitional performance. A distinction is drawn on the basis of a negative comparative judgment, $A$ is not $B$. If the judgment means that the reality of $A$ is not the reality of $B$, the distinction is real. If the judgment means only that our concept of $A$ is not our concept of $B$, the distinction is notional. Notional distinctions may be further subdivided, based on the reason for the difference in our concepts. If the concepts differ because of some cause in the object – for instance, we may conceive diverse relations on the basis of a multiplicity of terms standing within a single real order – then the distinction is notional but is said to have a basis in the object. But if the cause of the diversity is solely in our way of thinking, then the distinction is merely notional (with no basis in the object).\textsuperscript{34}

Lonergan, then, acknowledges real distinctions, notional distinctions with a basis in the object, and merely notional distinctions.

\textsuperscript{33}The Scotist formal distinction aims to be a kind of middle road that “acknowledged in one reality [God] formalities [divinity, paternity] that are not identical on the side of the object” (\textit{The Triune God: Systematics}, 300 [trans. Shields, 301, alt.]).

\textsuperscript{34}For instance: We conceive wisdom one way and power another. But we know that, in reality, divine wisdom is divine power. The distinction is merely notional, merely a function of the way we think. On the other hand, we know that the Father is really not the Son, so divine paternity is really not divine filiation. The distinction is real. Finally, we conceive the Father’s relation to the Son one way, and his relation to the Spirit another. Thus, our concept of generation is not our concept of spiration. But we know that, in God, generation really is spiration, for the Father, by one and the same real ordering, utters the Word and breathes the Spirit. A multiplicity of really distinct terms does not constitute a diversity of real relations. However, it does provide a basis in the object, for distinguishing, notionally, the order of the Father to the Son, and the order of the Father to the Spirit (see \textit{The Triune God: Systematics}, 246-60; 732-36).
To these there cannot be added a formal distinction on the side of the object, that would formally distinguish, on the side of the object, one as formal from another as formal. For what would “as formal” mean? Either it means the real or it does not. If it means the real, then the one as real is not the other as real, and there is a real distinction. But if it means the not-real, then one as not real is not the other as not real, and the distinction is not on the side of the object.\(^ {35}\)

Distinctions are either really in the object, or only in the way we conceive the object. There is no third, “formal” distinction that somehow posits distinct formalities on the side of the object, yet somehow also is not a real distinction. If the formalities are different in the object, the distinction is real; and if they are not different in the object, then the distinction is notional.\(^ {36}\)

Lonergan’s discussion of the Scotist formal distinction, both in *De Deo Trino* and in *Insight*, illustrates both the constructive and the critical aspects of his metaphysical method. Constructively, the validity of real and notional distinctions is “elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived,” namely, the negative comparative judgment. If the negative comparative judgment bears on the object, the distinction is real. If it bears only on our thinking about the object, the distinction is notional. (We know divine power and wisdom are one; but we conceive power one way and wisdom another.) Critically, the “distinctio formalis a parte rei” is eliminated as vacuous, by showing that it cannot be derived from any conscious intention. It does not correspond to any meaningful prospective judgment.

Here, then, is a case of Lonergan’s metaphysical method at work: the elucidation of valid metaphysical categories (real and notional distinctions) and the elimination of an empty category (the Scotist formal distinction) on the basis of cognitional intentionality. In this procedure, intentionality analysis is basic, and metaphysical categories are derived; nor can the derivation proceed in the other direction, except by begging the question of

\(^ {35}\)The Triune God: Systematics 302 (my translation).

\(^ {36}\)While we do not understand how it can be the case that the Father is really identical to God, the Son is really identical to God, and the Father is really distinct from the Son, if we accept the revelation of the Trinity we are rationally compelled to grant these statements as true. We cannot affirm the Father to be “formally distinct” from God “on the side of the object,” for such an affirmation would be meaningless. Either the Father is really identical to God, or partly different from God. But the latter is heretical and contrary to divine simplicity.
the validity of the metaphysical categories. It is just the procedure indicated in *Method in Theology*.

Exhibit B is the Suarezian "mode," a metaphysical category invented to explain how the humanity of Christ could be a complete substance (in the Aristotelian sense) yet not be a subsistent distinct from the divine Word. As with the Scotist formal distinction, Lonergan rejects "mode" as an empty category corresponding to no cognitional element. His central reasoning is worth quoting because it illustrates quite exactly the procedure endorsed in our passage from *Method in Theology*:

(g) Mode is nothing other than potency, form, act.

... The proportionate object [of human knowing] is a quiddity existing in corporeal matter, where corporeal matter is known through experiencing, quiddity is known through understanding, and existence is known through true judging. But the proportion that defines potency and form is the same as the proportion between matter and quiddity, between experiencing and understanding; and the proportion that defines form and act is the same as the proportion between quiddity and existence, between understanding and judging.

So, as you will gather, wherever we know by experiencing, understanding, and judging, it is possible to distinguish in the known between potency, form, and act.

You will also gather that unless another, fourth essential step should be detected in our knowing, it is impossible to detect another, fourth element - namely, mode - in a proportionate object.37

"Mode," then, is an empty metaphysical term, because it corresponds to no element in intentional consciousness, that is, in cognitional structure. On the other hand, the meanings of the valid, correlative terms potency, form, and act are elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived. This is exactly the procedure described in our passage from *Method in Theology*.

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in *Theology*: for every valid ontological element, there is a corresponding cognitional element.

This analysis of Suarezian “mode” runs parallel to the deduction of the metaphysical elements, potency, form, and act, in *Insight*. The three components in the known are isomorphic to the three components in the knowing. As the cognitional elements unite into a single knowing, so the metaphysical elements coalesce in a single known. The meaning of each element is elucidated by the conscious intention from which it is derived:

“Potency” denotes the component of proportionate being to be known in fully explanatory knowledge by an intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue.

“Form” denotes the component of proportionate being to be known . . . by understanding [things] fully in their relation to one another.

“Act” denotes the component of proportionate being to be known by uttering the virtually unconditioned yes of reasonable judgment.

Manifestly, the procedure followed in *Insight* to validate the metaphysical elements – the basic set of metaphysical terms and relations – is identical to the procedure followed in *De Verbo Incarnato* to eliminate the Suarezian “mode.” Both implement the precept recommended in *Method in Theology*: the derivation of a critical metaphysics from the appropriation of cognitional intentionality, and the elucidation of the meaning of the ontological elements from the intentional elements.

Examples might be multiplied, and the fact is telling. Lonergan operated for years in a scholastic context where metaphysics was assumed as the basic science and provided the basic general categories for systematic theology. He found that as long as there was no more basic science than metaphysics, there also was no methodically effective way to cut through the fog of metaphysical nonsense. His solution was recourse to cognitional

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38*Insight*, 457. Doran also quotes and discusses this passage in his exposition of the meaning of Lonergan’s statement. But, for him, it is only one of the entailments – and not the first – of a statement that regards equally (or also) such scholastic theological categories as sanctifying grace, habitual charity, and consubstantiality (see *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 95-98).

39A series of metaphysical problems are examined in *De Verbo Incarnato*, 214-30; *The Constitution of Christ*, 44-74.
self appropriation. Cognitional theory became Lonergan’s basic science and his key to critical metaphysics.

A Broader Context

The broader context for Lonergan’s statement (as its literary context indicates) is his shift from metaphysics to cognitional theory as the basic science. Already in *Verbum*, Lonergan found himself “reversing” the traditional primacy of ontological and cognitional orders. He was constrained by the matter itself to begin “not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of the Thomist theory of intellect,” despite the novelty and apparent illogic of this procedure.\(^\text{40}\) By the time of *Insight*, he had embraced the turn. The priority of cognitional structure is programmatic, although the shift from faculty psychology was a delayed sector:

> Without the explicit formulations that later were possible, metaphysics had ceased to be for me . . . the Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft [total and basic science]. The empirical sciences were allowed to work out their basic terms and relations apart from any consideration of metaphysics. The basic inquiry was cognitional theory and, while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis.\(^\text{41}\)

The shift is significant. The basic science is cognitional theory. Metaphysics remains a component, the object-pole, of the “total science.”\(^\text{42}\)

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\(^{42}\)At the end of a very appreciative review article of the achievement of Emmerich Coreth, Lonergan noted that he could not, however, agree with Coreth on the priority of metaphysics as the total and basic science. The reason is that metaphysics can only be put on a scientific footing by thematizing the performance of inquiry. (“Metaphysics as Horizon,” in *Collection*, 204. See also Fred Crowe’s editorial note I, page 299.) Jacobs-Vandegeer adduces a statement from 1957 in which Lonergan refers to metaphysical and cognitional analysis forming a circle, so that one may begin in either place as long as one completes the circle (see “Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology,” 54-56; Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], 178). In the first place, Lonergan is referring to metaphysics, not the special categories of scholastic
sciences are autonomous in the formation of their basic categories. Last
in the order of discovery is the obsolescence of faculty psychology; in the
section of *Method in Theology* in which our passage occurs, it is first in the
order of explanation.

These points deserve some amplification. First, cognitional theory
is basic, and metaphysics is derived. "In any philosophy it is possible to
distinguish between its cognitional theory and, on the other hand, its
pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues. Let us
name the cognitional theory the basis, and the other pronouncements the
expansion."\(^{43}\)

Next, ontological structure is deduced from cognitional structure.

The major premise is the isomorphism that obtains between the structure
of knowing and the structure of the known. If the knowing consists of
a related set of acts and the known is the related set of contents of these
acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form
to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts . . .

The set of primary minor premises consists of a series of affirmations
of concrete and recurring structures in the knowing of the self-affirming
subject. The simplest of those structures is that every instance of
knowing proportionate being consists of a unification of experience,
understanding, and judging. It follows from the isomorphism of
knowing and known that every instance of known proportionate
being is a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of
understanding, and a content of judgment.\(^{44}\)

This is the method illustrated in the previous section, and very
compendiously described in our passage from *Method in Theology*. It
explains the sense in which metaphysics is said to be derived, the direction
of the derivation, what kind of "correspondence" is expected, and how
that correspondence elucidates the meaning of the ontological terms and
relations. The metaphysics is not structuring the analysis of cognition; the
analysis of cognition is structuring the metaphysics.

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\(^{43}\) *Insight*, 412.

\(^{44}\) *Insight*, 424-25.
In *Insight*, Lonergan defines “explicit metaphysics as the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” It is heuristic, “the anticipation of an unknown content,” and it is a structure, “an ordered set of heuristic notions.” The structure is relational, and so “provides the relations by which unknown contents of [cognitive] acts can be defined heuristically.”

As conjugate forms are defined by their relations to one another, so central forms are unities differentiated by their conjugate forms; and central and conjugate potency and act stand to central and conjugate forms as experience and judgment stand to understanding. The whole structure is relational: one cannot conceive the terms without the relations nor the relations without the terms. Both terms and relations constitute a basic framework to be filled out, first, by the advance of the sciences, and secondly, by full information on concrete situations.

Metaphysics is a structure, because it is a nest of interrelated terms. Relations are known by their terms, and terms are implicitly defined in relation to one another. The relations, then, are the correlations that fix the meaning of the terms, the order in which they stand, the processes that link them together.

Lonergan claims, finally, that the implementation of method in metaphysics will cut through the pseudo-metaphysical fog.

There is much to be gained by employing the method. Aristotelian and Thomist thought has tended to be, down the centuries, a somewhat lonely island in an ocean of controversy. Because of the polymorphism of human consciousness, there are latent in science and common sense not only metaphysics but also the negation of metaphysics; and only the methodical reorientation of science and common sense puts an end, at least in principle, to this permanent source of confusion. Further, without the method it is impossible to assign with exactitude the objectives, the presuppositions, and the procedures of metaphysics.

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45 *Insight*, 416.
46 *Insight*, 417.
47 *Insight*, 420.
48 *Insight*, 516.
49 Compare with Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 33-35.
Finally, the misconceptions in which metaphysics thus becomes involved may rob it of its validity and of its capacity for development.\textsuperscript{50}

The advantages Lonergan claims for methodical metaphysics in \textit{Insight} turn out to be the same advantages he assigns in our passage from \textit{Method in Theology} and illustrated in our examples. It might be asked what kind of metaphysical developments Lonergan has in mind. Besides the significant development represented by Lonergan’s method, other obvious instances might be found in his reconstruction of the Aristotelian accident as an explanatory conjugate\textsuperscript{51} and his elimination of the Aristotelian categories (predicaments) as descriptive and therefore not basic to metaphysics.\textsuperscript{52} Of perhaps greater moment, there is his solution to the problem of explanatory genera and species,\textsuperscript{53} or his development of the notion of finality and the corresponding genetic method on the basis of the isomorphism of cognitional and ontological process.\textsuperscript{54} For an example of theological implementation, readers familiar with the niceties of Trinitarian theory might compare Thomas Aquinas’s argument, reducing the four divine relations to three, to Lonergan’s treatment of the same question.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Theological Categories}

One of the most striking features of \textit{Method in Theology} is Lonergan’s call for an account of grace that begins with an empirical study of religious experience. He directs our attention to data. “The data on the dynamic state of otherworldly love are data on a process of conversion and development.”\textsuperscript{56} He calls for a broad program of investigation: “there are needed studies of religious interiority: historical, phenomenological, psychological, sociological.”\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, while Lonergan was committed

\textsuperscript{50}Insight, 425-26.
\textsuperscript{51}Insight, 458-60, 462.
\textsuperscript{52}Insight, 420, 520.
\textsuperscript{53}Insight, 463-67.
\textsuperscript{54}Insight, 470-76, 484-504.
\textsuperscript{55}Compare Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} 1.30.1 to \textit{The Triune God: Systematics}, 246-54. Thomas’s solution is based on divine simplicity; Lonergan’s is based on an analysis of relation as order.
\textsuperscript{56}Method in Theology, 289.
\textsuperscript{57}Method in Theology, 290. In this connection, Lonergan often referred to William Johnston
to the tradition and undoubtedly considered there was very much to be learned from Thomas Aquinas, he also did not hesitate to lay out his new program by way of a most explicit contrast with the old procedure.  

It is to this empirical turn that Lonergan directs our attention when, in [A], he recalls the proposal for new theological categories "worked out in our chapters on method, on religion, and on foundations." The first of these chapters lays out the transcendental method that, in Lonergan's view, has definitively superseded faculty psychology. It is on the basis of the new terms and relations that the chapters on religion and foundations unfold.

From its very first step, Lonergan's shift to a new paradigm has done away with any possibility of a straightforward correspondence to the terms and relations of scholastic theology. "Now, to effect the transition from theoretical to methodical theology one must start, not from a metaphysical psychology, but from intentionality analysis." While intentionality analysis covers the same data as a faculty psychology, the two theories employ basic terms and relations that not only are different but also do not correspond to one another. In fact, it is precisely this non-correspondence that is being reviewed, once more, in the section in which our passage occurs.

Lonergan's most explicit and sustained explication of how theoretical categories are to be formulated occurs in the chapter on foundations. He gives no expectation that the new categories will correspond to the old, except (we may infer) that they will cover the same data. Rather, he

and does so again in our section of Method in Theology (342); compare Lonergan's, "Emerging Religious Consciousness," 67. One thinks too of the monumental history of Western mysticism undertaken by Lonergan's student, Bernard McGinn.

See Method in Theology, 95-97, 288-90.

Method in Theology, 289.


Method in Theology, 281-93.

See Method in Theology, 287, where the matter is illustrated by successive accounts of the data on fire; compare Insight, 358-59. "Any future system of mechanics will have to satisfy the data that now are covered by the notion of mass. But it is not necessary that every future system of mechanics will have to satisfy the same data by employing our concept of mass. Further developments might lead to the introduction of a different set of ultimate concepts, to a consequent reformulation of all laws, and so to a dethronement of the notion of mass from its present position as an ultimate of mechanical system" (Insight, 359). Lonergan goes on to postulate a difference between natural sciences and intentionality analysis that is a function of the manner in which fundamental concepts are related to the data (discussed more fully in Wilkins, "What Will Won't Do"). For the present purpose, the most important point is the paradigm shift. There is no reason to expect a continuity of basic concepts or even anything like
emphasizes a shift in paradigms pertaining to a new stage of meaning. So great is the difference between these paradigms, that any straightforward correspondence between their conceptualities might well be regarded as surprising. This very contrast is invoked in [A] as its topic: “the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will not be metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological.”

According to Lonergan, in the old situation metaphysics was the basic science. Other sciences were generically metaphysical and added determinations to metaphysical categories. “In Aristotle the sciences are conceived not as autonomous but as prolongations of philosophy and as further determinations of the basic concepts philosophy provides.” The Aristotelian soul is not the psychological subject but the “first act of an organic body,” and the Aristotelian object is not defined by intention but rather is the agent or final cause.

As long as metaphysics was the basic science, the special categories were formulated as further determinations of metaphysical categories. Scholastic special categories like sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are generically metaphysical. To conceive them as accidental habits is to add further determinations to the generic metaphysical categories of form, which is related to act, and quality, an accident related to substance. In medieval theology substance, accident, form, act, quality are all basic, for they pertain to metaphysics, the basic science. They are all general, for they become specific to theology only by further determinations. The theorem of the supernatural proposes a structure of special basic relations by analogy with a metaphysical analysis of natural proportion. When St Thomas defines grace and the virtues as entitatively disproportionate accidents received in the soul and its various powers, he is formulating special categories by adding further determinations to general categories. Again, when he situates sanctifying grace in the essence of the soul and charity in the

the kind of structural isomorphism anticipated by Doran’s rule.

63On stages of meaning, see Method in Theology, 85-99; the account depends on the prior discussion of realms of meaning, since a new stage is brought about by the differentiation of new realms (see Method in Theology, 81-85); both the realms and the stages are implicated in the paradigm shift (see Method in Theology, 271-81).

64See Method in Theology, 95-97; 288-90.

65Method in Theology, 95.

66Method in Theology, 95-96.

67See Method in Theology, 288-89.
faculties, will, his argument is not based on any difference in experience but on considerations internal to his faculty psychology.⁶⁸

In the new context, intentionality analysis, not metaphysics, provides the basic general categories. "The base of general theological categories is the attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating subject along with the operations that result . . . and with the structure within which the operations occur." Self-appropriation yields a "basic nest of terms and relations" that can be verified and differentiated in different manners to derive the kind of further categories sketched in the first four chapters of Method in Theology and developed at greater leisure in Insight.⁷⁰ This basic nest of terms and relations does not correspond to the nest of terms and relations in a metaphysical psychology. There is no indication that these tasks of self-appropriation, verification, differentiation, or investigation may be guided by reference to the old terms and relations, or may be expected to yield an isomorphic set.

The role of transcendental method in this process is not the role played by metaphysics in the former arrangement. Metaphysics provided general analogical terms that could receive specific determinations. Transcendental method, on the other hand, grounds special methods.⁷¹ The special categories of the new theology are not further determinations of transcendental method the way the special categories of the old theology were generically metaphysical. Theology is an autonomous science with its own special categories.⁷² The special basic terms are the basic transcendental and categorial sources of Christian meaning: God's gift of his love and Christian

⁶⁸Summa theologiae 1-2.110.4.
⁶⁹Method in Theology, 285-86.
⁷⁰Method in Theology, 287-88. Lonergan lists the topics of the first four chapters – the human good, values, beliefs, meaning, the question of God, religious experience, expression, and development – before adding numerous illustrations from Insight, such as development, higher viewpoints, emergent probability, progress, decline, religion in relation to the problem of decline, the possibility of a comprehensive viewpoint (Method in Theology, 105, 109).
⁷²"... modern science had to develop its own proper basic concepts and thereby achieve its autonomy" (Method in Theology, 96; see 281-93. Compare Insight, 280-83, 463-67, on explanatory genera. A distinct explanatory genus involves a distinct set of basic terms and relations: "As one moves from one genus to the next, there is added a new set of laws which defines its own basic terms by its own empirically established correlations" (Insight, 281); "corresponding to the successive genera, there will be distinct and autonomous empirical sciences" (Insight, 464). See too "Mission and the Spirit," in A Third Collection, 23-34, on the entry of the "supernatural" into consciousness.
witness. Special basic relations are the order of those terms to one another. 73

The basic clarification of general categories is from an interior differentiation of consciousness. The basic clarification of special categories is from a religious differentiation of consciousness. 74 These are distinct differentiations and so yield distinct categories. But, while a religious differentiation of consciousness does not presuppose an interior differentiation, still the objectification of differentiations of consciousness would seem to presuppose the achievement of an interior differentiation. Transcendental method brings into focus the dynamic state of otherworldly love that is “the base out of which special theological categories are set up.” 75

In our passage, Lonergan indicates that “special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness.” In his fuller discussion of the formation of the special categories in “Foundations,” he explains that “the functional specialty, Foundations, will derive its first set of categories from religious experience.” 76 There is a slight puzzle here, though it is beyond the scope of this essay. If the first set of special categories is the basic set, from which the others are derived, then “Christian witness” does not seem to be included in the set of basic terms. In fact, it is expressly named as belonging to the second set: “Secondly, from the subject one moves to subjects, their togetherness in community, service, and witness, the history of the salvation that is rooted in a being-in-love, and the function of this history in promoting the kingdom of God.” 77

Possibly relevant to the solution of this puzzle is Lonergan’s observation that “God’s gift of his love has its proper counterfeit in the revelation events in which God discloses . . . the completeness of his love. . . . For being-in-love is properly itself, not in the isolated individual, but only in a plurality of persons that disclose their love to one another.” 78 Lonergan suggests that the Christian difference is the addition of a distinctive intersubjective

73Note that Father, Son, Spirit, missions, and gifts of grace – the realities of the four-point hypothesis – are named as a “third set” of special categories: “from our loving to the loving source of our love” (Method in Theology, 291). Compare Doran’s suggestion about the “special basic relations” proper to theology (The Trinity in History, 33-35 and passim). See also note 23, above.
74Method in Theology, 281.
75Method in Theology, 289.
76Method in Theology, 290.
77Method in Theology, 291.
78Method in Theology, 283.
component. A religious tradition has, as it were, its potential component in religious experience and its formal component in an interpretive suprastructure.

As infrastructure [Christian religious experience] is the dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, a conscious content without an apprehended object. Its suprastructure, however, is already extant in the account of Christian origins: God sending his only Son for our salvation through death and resurrection and the sending of the Spirit.

Perhaps Christian witness is basic, in the sense that it differentiates theology as "Christian."

I have no doubt Doran concurs with almost everything I have said about Lonergan's program. But I do not see how this program is compatible with Doran's claim that "the basic rule governing the formulation of [theological] categories is . . . . For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness." The procedure Lonergan describes does not fit this rule. Indeed, from its first step – from faculty psychology into intentionality analysis – it dashes the rule.

**Transposition in Practice**

Nevertheless, it might be suggested that Lonergan practiced transposition in the manner of Doran's rule. It was, after all, Lonergan who identified sanctifying grace with the dynamic state of being in love. It was Lonergan who identified the light of grace or infused wisdom with the knowledge born of religious love. Indeed, it was Lonergan who, in his Christology and Trinitarian theology, transposed the metaphysical conceptions of person and nature to the psychological conceptions of subject and consciousness.

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81 "Emerging Religious Consciousness," 71.
82 *Method in Theology*, 107, 289.
84 Lonergan argued that (in Christ) one person in two natures transposes to one subject of two consciousnesses, and again, (in God) three persons in one nature transposes to three subjects of a single consciousness. See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, "Christology Today:
One could readily suppose that a program of correlating scholastic and psychological categories was not only intended but auspiciously begun by Lonergan himself.

However, I do not think this supposition bears scrutiny. There is, first, a simpler and more satisfying explanation for Lonergan’s readiness to identify grace in consciousness. Already in his dissertation he was drawing attention to the psychological dimensions of Thomas Aquinas’s account. In his 1946 supplement De ente supernaturali there is a scholion defending the experience of grace. It is an explicit topic in Method in Theology, as we have seen, and also of a significant number of late papers. The psychological dimensions of grace were a recurring and constant theme in Lonergan’s thinking. It was a question he approached with the same skill he brought to intentionality analysis, and by way of similar procedures. His approach to a matter that he obviously regarded as psychological does not entail or confirm a general rule applying to other cases that obviously are not psychological. Conspicuously, it is unlikely that the secondary esse of the incarnation will be found to correspond to data in any theologian’s consciousness.

What is more, on closer inspection, Lonergan’s identifications seem to defy the expected correspondence. Lonergan conceded that his dynamic state of otherworldly love is an “amalgam” of sanctifying grace and habitual charity. Similarly, he identified the knowledge born of religious love with


See Grace and Freedom, 316, 355-57, 361-64, 373-77.

Early Latin Theology, 126.

For instance, “Mission and the Spirit,” in A Third Collection, 23-34; see especially 23, 31; compare, for example, “Religious Experience” and “Emerging Religious Consciousness.”

The scholastic “habit” is also not an immediate datum of consciousness: see Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Grace in the Third Stage of Meaning: Apropos Lonergan’s Four Point Hypothesis,” Lonergan Workshop Journal 24 (2010): 443-67 at 447-48 (originally a paper given at the 2007 Lonergan Workshop). Doran is well aware of the difficulties that concepts like the secondary esse pose to his approach, as noted above.

Archival materials 81500DTE070 and 81500A0E070. Doran has repeatedly sought “to back track a bit so as to avoid that amalgam, or rather to differentiate it in terms of interiority and religiously differentiated consciousness in a manner analogous to Aquinas’s metaphysical differentiation between sanctifying grace and charity.” (Robert Doran, “Divine Indwelling” 24; see also 8. Compare What Is Systematic Theology?, 43-44; The Trinity in History, 31-32, 37-38, and passim.) But, as far as I know, Doran has never raised the implications of the amalgam for his own interpretation of Lonergan’s “rule.” At the very least, it suggests Lonergan never felt bound by any such rule.
"what would have been termed the lumen gratiae or lumen fidei or infused wisdom." But, at least for Thomas Aquinas, these are not all synonyms, while Lonergan's own discussions of infused wisdom are (inquantum scio) always reporting Thomas's position. In both cases, a pair of scholastic terms is reduced to a single new description. If these examples are evidence that Lonergan transposed scholastic terms into interiority, they are also evidence that he was not exercised to retain all the distinctions.

Lonergan's passing identification of faith with infused wisdom raises a further question: Whose scholastic terms and relations are we talking about? Lonergan's scholastic theology is incomplete. There are many questions he does not touch at all, and many others that he touches only by way of interpreting Thomas Aquinas. We cannot assume terms and relations are valid because Thomas Aquinas used them, nor because Lonergan discussed Thomas's use of them, nor even because Lonergan may have at some time used them himself. As Lonergan's own later "amalgam" of grace and charity suggests, he did not presume their validity (or at least their significance) even if he had himself employed them in his scholastic theology.

It would be too much to examine the method of Lonergan's Christological and Trinitarian transpositions in these pages. But it does not seem to me that there is much evidence that he achieved his transpositions by leveraging an a priori rule of correspondence between scholastic categories and interiority. He explains that he worked out his notions through his own intentionality analysis, but was obliged then to transpose them "into the classical categories of scholastic thought; and obviously such a transposition supposes some research into the exact meaning and the latent potentialities of classical writers such as St Thomas." Interested readers are encouraged to study his late reflections on method in Christology and ask if anything like such a rule is enunciated or followed there.

In general, what Lonergan means by transposition seldom turns out to involve the discovery of point-to-point correspondences from one stage or realm of meaning to the next. At any rate there is no evidence he ever gave

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90Method in Theology, 123.
91Lumen gratiae and lumen fidei probably are synonyms, but neither is identical to infused wisdom: Summa theologiae 2-2.45.1 ad 2.
92The most extended discussion is in Verbum, 99-104.
93"Christ as Subject," 163.
95In his important 1979 paper "Horizons and Transpositions," Lonergan entered as
thought to a rule prescribing such a correspondence. There is yet a further aspect to the matter. The "prescription" not only anticipates a correspondence. It also indicates a direction: from intentionality analysis to metaphysics and not the other way around. Had Lonergan taken the scholastic, metaphysical categories as a heuristic structure for the formulation of psychological categories, he would have been deriving in the wrong direction.

Doran's own procedure is complex and nuanced. Still, at least in practice he seems to be deriving in both directions. In one direction, the scholastic categories supply a heuristic for discovering new categories. Thus, if Lonergan (following Thomas) distinguished sanctifying grace from habitual charity, a "corresponding" pair of terms is sought within the field of consciousness. In the other direction, the new terms are said to "transpose" the scholastic terms. But this suggests that we know what sanctifying grace and habitual charity "really" mean by identifying them as elements in consciousness - rather than by research into the exact meaning and latent potentialities of some such author as Thomas Aquinas.

I do not think that is what Doran means to suggest, but it strikes me as an underdeveloped aspect of his procedure. Consider his attempted transposition of sanctifying grace and habitual charity. There are probably valid theological reasons to distinguish love received from love bestowed. At the same time, Doran's question and his reasons for making this distinction seem to have nothing to do with those which led Aquinas, and Lonergan after him, to distinguish sanctifying grace (an entitative habit in the essence of the soul) from habitual charity (an operative habit in the will). His appeal is to experience; their reasons had to do with a metaphysical analysis of natural proportion. Indeed, one might suggest Doran's pair is closer, in some ways, to Aquinas's distinction between grace as God's love

examples the transpositions from the New Testament world to the classical, and from the classical to the medieval scholastic contexts. A more detailed study of the first is offered in his dialectical analysis of the "way to Nicea," compendiously reprised in "The Origins of Christian Realism," in A Second Collection, 239-61. A more detailed study of the second is afforded by his Grace and Freedom. See also Matthew L. Lamb, "Lonergan's Transpositions of Augustine and Aquinas: Exploratory Suggestions," in The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin, ed. John J. Liptay, Jr., and David S. Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 3-21; and Wikins, "Why Two Missions?" and "Grace in the Third Stage of Meaning."

See Doran's The Trinity in History, 150-53; What Is Systematic Theology?, 43-44. Some indications, which might be adduced in favor of something like Doran's position, may be found in Verbum, 102-103, on the habitual felt presence of God.

See Summa theologiae, 1-2.110.3-4.
for us and grace as our love for God. In other words, it is one thing to verify a distinction in consciousness; it is another to assert that it “transposes” a different distinction responding to a different question altogether. It is not clear how that assertion is verified, unless we redefine the meaning of the original terms by locating them in consciousness.

Concepts are answers to questions. Sanctifying grace and habitual charity are scholastic concepts formulated in answer to scholastic questions. They belong to a tradition of inquiry, and we cannot deduce their meaning without grasping the nest of questions to which they were formulated as answers. I share Doran’s conviction that the best scholastic theology represents a high achievement of enduring relevance. But not every scholastic question is equally germane and, in particular – as Lonergan suggested in our section of Method in Theology – questions arising directly in connection with faculty psychology are good candidates for obsolescence.

Let me conclude this section by suggesting that a transposition of the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity is not important to Doran’s project. The real issue is not whether the scholastic terms can be made to correspond to psychological terms. It is whether we may legitimately expect a created participation in four real divine relations, and use that expectation heuristically to guide our investigation of the

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88More precisely, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes “gratia” as divine favor from “gratia” as a created gift making us objectively lovely and lovers of God (Summa Theologiae, 1-2,110.1). For Aquinas, then, the distinction is between cause (divine love for us) and effect (sanctifying grace); whereas for Doran, both the love received and the love bestowed are effects in the creature: divine love first “effects in us relational disposition to receive it,” which “is the foundation of our loving God in return in charity” (The Trinity in History 127; see 30-31, 38). The matter is complicated by Doran’s claim that our being loved is prior – not just ontologically but even in our experience – to our loving (see The Trinity in History, 33-39). Doran further claims (no evidence is provided) that when Lonergan speaks of “the love of God poured into our hearts” (Romans 5:5), he means the subjective genitive, that is, God’s love for us. “[T]he phrase ‘of God’ in the verse . . . is a subjective genitive. That meaning is clear in Lonergan’s writings, but it has been missed by many of his readers” (What Is Systematic Theology?, 43; compare The Trinity in History, 38). I should say the matter is somewhat under-determined in Lonergan’s writings; the basic, but not the only, meaning is God’s love for us; at least sometimes it means or includes our love for God (see “Emerging Religious Consciousness,” 71; “Religious Experience,” 124-25). God’s love for us, as contingent, requires an extrinsic denominator; for Doran it is the relational disposition to receive; but I am inclined to think that the extrinsic denominator of God’s special love for us is simply our special love for God; for what is love, if not a relational disposition to receive?

89Method in Theology, 162-65. Thomas was a reliable interpreter of his interior experience, as Jacobs-Vandegeer points out (“Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology,” 55), but this does not change the fact that his distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity was based, not on an appeal to experience, but an argument from metaphysical proportion.
structure of created grace.\textsuperscript{100} I do not think it matters especially whether Doran’s distinction between love received and love bestowed “transposes” the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity. His questions are not the scholastic questions and it remains to be shown that the scholastic questions are still relevant. What matters is whether Doran’s can be independently verified and legitimately related to active and passive spiration.

**Further Questions**

Doran understands Lonergan’s statement to mean, in effect, that at least for the concepts of the four-point hypothesis and some other concepts,\textsuperscript{101} there will be a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. There are reasons to suppose Lonergan meant something else. In this final section I would like to pose some theoretical questions to Doran’s interpretation.

In his initial explorations of consciousness and grace, Doran gave the impression that every valid scholastic concept would name a state, process, or event given in consciousness.\textsuperscript{102} If this was ever his assumption, he soon qualified it. In at least some cases, the principle simply requires “an ability to locate for every known the corresponding intentional operation in which it is known,”\textsuperscript{103} which, it would seem, must mean a judgment.\textsuperscript{104} In other cases, however, the principle requires us to locate a conscious state, process, or event, even, in the case of the dynamic state of otherworldly love, a “non-intentional conscious state.”\textsuperscript{105} It seems this can only mean the state as

\textsuperscript{100}Of course, the selection of the four real divine relations, rather than the three divine persons or the two divine processions or the five notions, would remain to be justified. Charles Hefling raises some important questions in this regard, including the fact that Lonergan more often refers to a threefold than to a fourfold divine self-communication (see "On the (Economic) Trinity").

\textsuperscript{101}See Doran’s What Is Systematic Theology?, 42-52; Doran, The Trinity in History, 22, 144, 162, 167, passim.

\textsuperscript{102}Doran’s initial efforts at correlating grace and charity with conscious experiences seemed to rest on this interpretation (see first section, above). However, his later works exclude it. More recently, he argued that the context of the statement “is too often neglected, with the result of attempting to provide an interior equivalent to every metaphysical term” (The Trinity in History, 22).

\textsuperscript{103}Doran, The Trinity in History, 22.

\textsuperscript{104}See Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 96; Doran, The Trinity in History, 22. However, there are intimations of something that might be more complicated (see The Trinity in History, 162, 167).

\textsuperscript{105}Doran, The Trinity in History, 144.
experienced, for the love as conceived and affirmed is also intended. Here, then, "for every term . . ." would appear to mean that the concept names an element of the theologian's intimate experience, "however much finding those equivalences depends on the cultivation of a spiritual life."\(^7\)

The diversity of application makes it unclear, to me, what exactly is being elucidated. In one case, the principle directs us to locate and name an experience. In another, it cannot direct us to locate and name an experience. Both sanctifying grace and the secondary esse are concepts, and conception is an intentional process. Both are affirmed, and affirmation is an intentional process. One is conceived metaphysically as a conjugate form, but said to correspond to an experience. The other is conceived as an act of existence, for which "we may and indeed must name the intentional operation from which that category was derived."\(^8\) This seems to imply that the conscious event of judgment (or the conscious process of conception and judgment) is to the secondary esse, as the non-intentional experience of love is to sanctifying grace. I am not sure what to make of that.

Perhaps Doran has in mind Lonergan's technique of "metaphysical equivalence," which involves getting a handle on truth claims by assigning their sufficient and necessary conditions.\(^9\) However, there are some

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\(^{7}\)Doran, The Trinity in History, 22.

\(^{8}\)Doran, The Trinity in History, 22. Parity of application would seem to demand analogous results. Doran has so far not committed himself (inquantum scio) to a transposition of the secondary esse of the Word. We are, however, bid to identify "the intentional operation from which that category was derived." It was derived, I should say, from a conscious process of analogical conception and judgment. I should say "the corresponding intentional operation in which it is known" looks something like this: The secondary esse of the Word is known in a judgment whose proper content is 'yes' and whose borrowed content is the analogical concept of an absolutely supernatural, contingent act of substantial being, received in a human essence, with a real relation to the Word. But if the very same procedure is applied to sanctifying grace, the result is something like this: Sanctifying grace is known in a judgment whose proper content is "yes" and whose borrowed content is the analogical concept of an absolutely supernatural communication of the divine substance (or a participation of divine active spiration) by way of a contingent conjugate form received in the essence of the soul. Or, if one prefers, the borrowed content may be the analogical concept of a love for God and all things in God without conditions or qualifications or reservations. On the transposition of secondary esse, see Charles Hefling, "On Understanding the Hypostatic Union," Lonergan Workshop Journal, vol. 26, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2014); and Charles Hefling, "What a Friend We Have: Jesus and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation," in Grace and Friendship; Theological Essays in Honor of Fred Lawrence, ed. M. Shawn Copeland and Jeremy D. Wilkins (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2016), 67-99.

\(^{9}\)"[Metaphysical equivalence . . . assigns to true propositions their grounds in the constituents of proportionate being and thereby reveals both what exactly the propositions mean and what the constituents are" (Insight, 533; see 530-33).
reasons to doubt this. Metaphysical equivalence is not, in itself, a method of theological transposition. Furthermore, the technique would seem to move opposite to the direction required. That raises the question as to how the scholastic terms and relations are validated in the first place.

**Conclusion**

It would be understandable if the foregoing has left an impression of deep difference. Though the difference is real enough, the impression would be quite misleading, for the shared commitments are far deeper. Both Doran and I are committed to Lonergan’s program for critical metaphysics and a methodical theology on the level of our time. We agree that scholasticism has had its day and something else is needed. But, with Lonergan, we also recognize the occurrence of genuine and even permanently valid achievements in the scholastic tradition. We both would let those achievements guide us as we find our way forward; they will make the theology to come substantially richer.

Nevertheless, Doran and I differ on important details of execution, and the difference comes to light in our respective readings of Lonergan’s “every term and relation.” For Doran, the statement includes the categories of (Lonergan’s) scholastic theology; in my judgment, it is restricted to metaphysical categories in the strict sense. For Doran, it prescribes a correspondence that may take diverse forms; in my judgment, it means precisely the isomorphism of knowing and being. For Doran, the statement is a “basic rule” for theological transposition; for me, it does not proximately regard transposition at all, but only the minor and derivative role played by metaphysics in the new context of theology. Undoubtedly the difference is real. Doran has claimed Lonergan’s statement in support of his project of transposition. But, while I regard Doran’s project with the keenest interest, I do not think it is an implementation of the statement in its intended sense.

In any case, Doran’s is an exercise in constructive, systematic theology. Its value is its explanatory power in relation to the mysteries. It does not depend directly on corroboration by scholastic results or Lonergan’s authority. What is important to Doran’s method, in my opinion, is not the “rule” of correspondence but the use of the four divine relations as a heuristic for investigating the structure of created grace. I would also draw a distinction between Doran’s practice and the objective implications of his
rule. Objectively, his rule seems problematic to me. In practice, Doran has seemed to sense the problems and worked around them.

Both for the intrinsic merits of Lonergan’s scholastic contributions, and as a test of his method, transposing them is an important undertaking. Doran’s is the most creative attempt to date to implement Lonergan’s method in systematic theology. His central topic is also at the heart of Christian faith: divine self-communication. It is a profoundly and practically significant work. If I have been obliged to complexify the transposition, I hope I also have contributed to the long-term success of the effort.\footnote{Thanks are due to Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, Grant Kaplan, Paul J. LaChance, Gilles Mongeau, and L. Matthew Petillo for their valuable comments upon earlier drafts; obviously the views expressed are my own. I also shared the finished paper with Robert Doran, whose generous reading and gracious personal reply was a model of friendly and constructive disagreement.}
TRADUCE NOT THE INNER WORD: ON READING AND RENDERING LONERGAN’S LATIN

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Virtually the last redoubt of the scheme of education and acculturation Lonergan called “classicism” was the Society of Jesus during the years of his formation. Despite his strictures against the normative pretensions of classicism, its too-ready alliance with philosophic counterpositions, its penchant for ahistorical orthodoxy, Lonergan appreciated his classical education for opening up a world of the past and inculcating a cultural perspective. A different language is another thought world. To operate, one has to get behind the words to the ideas.

Lonergan’s critique of classicism has special piquancy because, by force of circumstance, most of his own theology was composed in Latin. Lonergan was a fine Latinist, reportedly the best then on faculty at the Gregorian University. His textbook prose favors clarity over style, but he could write with impressive verve – despite his complaint to Eric Kierans: “Composing in Latin clips one’s lyric wings, however, and eliminates topical allusion. In fact, it is such a backward language that one does well to say anything at all.” He found it a frustrating vehicle for his ideas, not because it was foreign but because it was dead; he tartly remarked to Conn O’Donovan, “Latin is fine, if you have nothing to say that Marcus Tullius Cicero could not


3I owe this piece of information to Fred Lawrence.

3Letter to Eric Kierans, December 19, 1957. I am grateful to Pat Brown for pointing out this reference to me.
have said."^4 A language that has ceased to live as a mother tongue becomes inept to express living thought. Lonergan had enough trouble expressing his creative ideas in living English.\(^5\)

Because Lonergan produced a substantial literature in both English and Latin, translating his Latin into English has an interesting twist. It is impossible to avoid wondering how he might have expressed himself in English, for the very good reason that he did express himself in English. Of course, anyone with detailed knowledge of Lonergan’s corpus knows that his English is a moving target. He had original ideas and he tried to get them across in various ways. No doubt there were fundamental ideas Lonergan worked out in English and had to figure out how to explain in Latin. There is something delightful in reading the Latin and realizing one has bumped into some such familiar theme as intelligent grasp and rational judgment, levels and patterns of consciousness, schemes of recurrence and higher viewpoints.

However, there is a bit of a fallacy to asking how he might have put his Latin texts had he written them in English. Thinking is discursive and usually sustained by language. When Lonergan was composing arguments in Latin, I presume he was also (proximately) thinking them out in Latin.\(^6\) The ordering of Latin signs was his ordering, not only to express his points but also to work them out. As an act of communication, it was the order he judged and decided would be most efficacious to elicit the insights he

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^6It seems to me this contention speaks for itself to anyone who reflects on the experience of composing an argument. But here are two further pieces of possibly relevant evidence. First, Lonergan sometimes made notes for himself in Latin. Second, he tells us that writing and rewriting was his way of thinking things through: “it is only in writing and rewriting that you find out what you wanted to do” (Reported in Curiosity at the Center of One’s Life: Statements and Questions of R. Eric O’Connor [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1987], 389.) If sorting out one’s ideas is a matter of writing and rewriting, and the writing is being done in Latin, so is the sorting.
meant to evoke. A translation is an attempt to dispose a different system of signs in a manner that might elicit approximately the same insights, in approximately the same sequence. What it never can be is identical to the original flow of thought and expression.

My present purpose is not to construct a theory but to examine some cases on the basis of Lonergan’s theory, and with special reference to Lonergan’s texts. The cases illustrate what I take to be the unobjectionable thesis that translation is inseparable from interpretation. They also illustrate the surprising extent to which a translation determines the interpretive possibilities for its dependent readers. First, I outline a few possibly relevant, possibly explanatory terms and relations. Next, I turn to some cases illustrating the incommensurability of different languages. In the third section, I examine in detail two problems of interpretation and translation related to Lonergan’s Latin works.

Notions

The point here is simply to draw some distinctions that will let us get going. When we wonder about our use of language, it is easy to focus on the system of conventional signs and overlook the wondering. "The proximate sources of every interpretation are immanent in the interpreter, and there is nothing to be gained by clouding the fact or obscuring the issue."7 Wonder is not words, but its discursive way is worded. By words we focus attention, refine our questions, construct the apposite phantasm, sustain inquiry, and express discovery. "Prizing names is prizing the human achievement of bringing conscious intentionality into sharp focus and, thereby, setting about the double task of both ordering one’s world and orientating oneself in it."8 Our examples will illustrate the importance of attending to the questions if we would understand the language.

As a preliminary step, then, it may be helpful to distinguish meaning, interpretation, and translation. Meaning is formally in the understanding of the author and of the reader (including the translator). It is potentially in the text as a set of ordered signs. An interpretation is the reader’s take

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7Insight, 606.
on the meaning of the author; it is more or less adequate. A translation is an interpreter’s attempt to order another set of conventional signs as potency for the same meaning. It is mediated formally by the interpretation of the translator. It is limited materially by the resources of the language of expression.

In the first place, then, there is potency as a limiting factor: different languages have different resources. Furthermore, there is also what we might call an empirical residue of meaning, insofar as meaning is elemental. Third, there is the relationship between heuristic and actual contexts, that is, the context of the ordered signs (potentially meaningful), and the context of interlocking questions and answers (formally meaningful as understood, and actually meaningful as affirmed). Fourth, because this relationship must vary with variations in the ordered signs, a translation can only be an approximate expression.

First, a language materially is a set of potentially meaningful, conventional signs. Insofar as the signs belong to a conventional system, their resources for expression are limited; they have a more or less definite range of possible meanings. Sounds or shapes that do not belong to a conventional system, or at least imitate some recognizable pattern, have a sharply diminished utility as signs. Belonging to a system renders a sign proximately proportionate to focus intentional consciousness and express meaning. If Humpty Dumpty’s words can mean anything at all, they are inept vehicles for thought and expression.

Next, there is something like an empirical residue in potential or elemental meaning. To the extent that meaning is not only intelligible but also elemental, lossless translation is impossible. A rose, by any other name, would smell as sweet; but would Shakespeare, in another vase?

Third, any attempt to put the intelligible content of one expression into a quite different language presupposes an understanding of the original meaning and an understanding of how that meaning might be approximately expressed in another system of signs. As the heuristic context of the word is the sentence, of the sentence the paragraph, of the paragraph the chapter, and so forth, some of the examples illustrate to a startling degree how even very small details of translation may depend on an interpretation of a whole argument or even the place of one argument within a larger one. To put it a different way, they illustrate the relationship between the heuristic context – the material as ordered – and the actual context formed by an interlocking
set of questions and answers.⁹

Fourth, to translate is to construct an approximate instrument out of different materials. In any language, there occur expressions that are underdetermined. They may be taken different ways, and indeed their meaning may rest on their indeterminacy (as with a pun, for instance). There is no way to render the indeterminacies of one sign system adequately into another. One thing this means concretely is that a translator decides for the reader what range of possible meanings will be brought over, what will be omitted, and what will be added. Translation depends on interpretation, but it also restructures the interpretive possibilities for its dependent readers. This is probably less so of technical writing – writing in the intellectual pattern – than of other kinds, but it is still true.

**Language as Potential Meaning: Examples**

The resources of different languages are never strictly commensurable, because languages embody traditions, and traditions develop concretely. “Different languages develop in different manners and the best of translations can express, not the exact meaning of the original, but the closest approximation possible in another tongue.”¹⁰ Moreover, linguistic expression is related to, and evocative of, the dynamic situation of consciousness.

The fact is that words have not only their proper meanings, but also a resonance in our consciousness. They have a retinue of associations, and the associations may be visual, vocal, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, affective or evocative of attitudes, tendencies, and evaluations. This resonance of words pertains to the very genesis, structure, and molding of our consciousness through childhood and the whole process of our education. It pertains to the dynamic situation in consciousness that words evoke.¹¹

The material difference in languages means that there are ambiguities that cannot be retained in translation, and they may be linked to affective overtones.

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⁹See *Method in Theology*, 163.

¹⁰*Method in Theology*, 71.

¹¹*Topics in Education*, 229.
Japanese government's attitude toward the Potsdam Proclamation resulted in confusion both domestically and especially in translation:

The Japanese government intended, for the moment, to "ignore" the Proclamation [as adding nothing substantially new to the previously stated positions of the Allied powers] ... in a word, in a now famous and tragic word, mokusatsu ... kill it with silence. Moku means "to be silent" and satsu means "to kill"; taken together, the word is defined by the Kenkyashu Dictionary as "take no notice of; treat (anything) with silent contempt; ignore [by keeping silence]." It also means: "remain in a wise and masterly inactivity," and that, no doubt, was the sense [Premier] Suzuki had in mind - but unfortunately the other meaning sounded both more spectacular and more persuasive, and when the word appeared on the front page of Tokyo's newspapers the following morning, it was taken to mean that the government held the Proclamation in contempt - that the government, in fact, rejected it. So the word was understood in Washington ... [and] it was in American diplomatic circles that the word exerted its maximum damage.12

Mokusatsu was ambiguous in Japanese. It was carefully chosen to stall for time without seeming to concede too much. But its ambiguity could not be conveyed in translation, and only the meaning of contempt came across. Instead of buying time they may have aggravated the situation.

Similarly, in the third chapter of John's Gospel there occurs a fascinating exchange between Nicodemus and the Lord. Jesus says one must be born again, but at the same time he says one must be born from above. The ambiguity of the Greek adverb, anôthen, "again" or "from above" (John 3:3, 7), carries the meaning of the passage. It probably causes something of Nicodemus's confusion. But it cannot be brought directly into English; it has to be explained.

Languages develop, and different languages develop differently. "With the advance of culture and of effective education, there arises the possibility of the differentiation and specialization of modes of expression; and ... this development conditions not only the exact communication of insights but

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also the discoverer’s own grasp of his discovery.” Lonergan was impressed by Bruno Snell’s account of how the ancient Greeks gradually developed a language around the mind. Different courses of development equip languages with different resources. In Homeric Greek, apparently, there was no generic word for body. “In Homer you have the nekra, the dead people, all over the place, but soma never occurs, you see. It developed later.” In English the same word, body, is used to name objects as disparate as human beings, corpses, and automobile bodies.

Everyday speech is rife with idioms. I once lived with a Spaniard whose urbanity approached the standards of Hercule Poirot. During the Toronto winters he kept his room like a greenhouse, warm and moist. For two years I kidded him that his idea of camping was “sleeping with the window cracked.” One day he made the line his own: “You know me. My idea of camping is sleeping with the window broken.” His English was excellent, but my idiomatic “cracking the window” threw him off the scent.

An Italian proverb, well known even to English speakers, has it that translation is perfidy: Traduttore, traditore – Translator, traitor! Its provenance, and the route by which so abstruse an activity as translation came to be the object of popular reproach, are uncertain. The problem, however, is real, and the entry of an Italian proverb into English currency illustrates it. The very sound and vocal shape of the Italian words invites the association; the English “translator” and “traitor” echo it wanly. If we wish to approximate this resonance of the Italian in our own language, we might try something like, Interpretation, interpolation. The point is, we should be forced to compromise between resonance and meaning or, perhaps more adequately, between elemental and formal meaningfulness.

13Insight, 610.
14See Method in Theology, 86-93.
15Lambert, Tansey, and Going, Caring about Meaning, 89.
17The distinction between “resonance” and “meaning” occurs in Topics in Education, 228-29; it seems to reflect a predilection for thinking of meaning in terms of the relation of sign and signified. Lonergan later brought into focus the fact that the “resonance” is also meaningful and enriched his notion of meaning accordingly, for example, in his 1965 lecture “Dimensions of Meaning,” in Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Collection, vol. 4 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 232-45, esp. 241-42. On elemental and formal meaning, see Method in Theology, 73-76. On the development of Lonergan’s account of meaning, see Frederick G. Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity: Re-originating Augustine’s Hermeneutics of Love,”
This is a problem regularly faced by translators of literature. Thus the market presents prose and verse translations of Homer, Vergil, Dante, Shakespeare into modern English and other modern languages. Lonergan remarks,

Do you know the difference between [Evelyn] Waugh and Graham Greene? Waugh is a master of the English language. Graham Greene writes from his imagination and goes into any language. But translating Waugh is like translating Mallarmé.18

Here are two examples from Latin. Augustine, who knew how to turn a verse, has a wordplay on the theme, “homo novus novit canticum novum,” in a sermon on Psalm 34.19 It works visually, vocally, aurally. In English we might say, “the new person knows a new song.” “Know” and “new” are pretty good to the ear and the mouth, but not to the eye; and English cannot get them adjacent to one another. Lonergan could also exploit the language on occasion. In Constitution of Christ, for instance, he makes an effective rhetorical move with “convertendis” and “convincendis,” to convert and to refute.20 If we wished to capture something of the lyric force in English, we might say: apply oneself more to converting than to controverting others.

I have been illustrating some of the material problems presented by translation. They are a function of the different resources offered by different languages. They illustrate the meaning of potency as a principle of limitation. They are particularly acute for poetry and fiction, for these

introduce us to the world of human potentiality. They reveal the many dimensions of experience as experienced by the subject. They exhibit the concrete manner in which men apprehend their history, their


18Lambert, Tansey, and Going, Caring about Meaning, 196.

19Augustine, sermo 34, 1, in Sermones de vetere testamento (1-50), Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 41, ed. C. Lambot (Turnhout: Brepols, 1961), 424.

destiny, and the meaning of their lives.\textsuperscript{21}

As Lonergan became clearer about the potential meaning in intersubjectivity, art, and symbol, he recast his point.

Literary language \ldots attempts to make up for the lack of mutual presence. It would have the listener or reader not only understand but also feel. So where the technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float somewhere in between logic and symbol. \ldots For the expression of feeling is symbolic and, if words owe a debt to logic, symbols follow the laws of image and affect.\textsuperscript{22}

Lonergan’s Latin treatises are in the genus not of literary but of technical writing. The material limitations of language exercise a less pronounced influence on the composition of technical writing. In his 1959 lectures on education, Lonergan distinguished “meaning” from “resonance” to explain why technical prose would be relatively freer of what I have been calling the “empirical residue” of elemental meaning in a language.

In contrasting scientific and literary writing, we may recall Carlyle’s phrase that economics is the dismal science. In a sense, all scientific writing is dismal. Scientific words simply have meaning; they have no resonance. They are products of the intellectual pattern of experience, and this pattern is detached, concerned with things not in their relations to us, but in their relations to one another. The intellectual pattern is concerned with judgments that are valid for everyone, with propositions whose implications can be worked out automatically by logical calculations.\textsuperscript{23}

Because technical writing is less embedded in the matter of language as the living memory of a whole people, the problem of translation is also less affected by the material limitations of the languages. But it is not entirely free of them.

\textsuperscript{21}Topics in Education, 229.
\textsuperscript{22}Method in Theology, 72-73.
\textsuperscript{23}Topics in Education, 229.
Translation as Interpretation: Two Cases

Beyond the material difficulties presented by the differences in linguistic resources, there is the fact that translation is always interpretation and therefore is always mediated by intelligence. This is the formal element in the process of translation. As linguistically competent, translation presupposes a general and remote set of habitual insights into the resources available in both languages. But as an act of interpretation, it also presupposes the occurrence of proximate insights into the objects, the words, the author, and one's own limitations.24

As an act of expression or communication, moreover, translation involves further insights into the most effective manner of construing the original meaning in the second language. Because languages are not commensurable even when they are closely related, translation is always a construal of the meaning, or some limited range of possible meanings, that never can match the exact range of nuance and indeterminacy of the original expression. When the matter is technical there must be some grasp of the technical terms in the destination community of discourse.25 But the type of communication envisaged in translating a technical treatise is not the problem handled by the functional specialty, Communications. It is rather closely akin to the problem of stating the meaning of the text26 – with the closest possible approximation to the author’s original order of expression.

Let us turn to two cases that illustrate how the heuristic and the actual contexts are related. That is, in both cases the meaning of words and sentences is determined exactly and certainly only by understanding the overall argument to which they belong – not only the chapter, as a material whole, but the argument, as an ordered whole, an interlocking set of questions and answers.

A Case from De Deo Trino

The first case is drawn from De Deo Trino, Pars dogmatica. At the very end of the preliminary section known to us as The Way to Nicea, there occurs a double

24See Method in Theology, chap. 7.
25I have read translations of theological works by translators who had no sense of the technical meaning of terms, either in the original or in the destination community of discourse.
26See Method in Theology, 167-73.
negative that, it seems, might be taken either intensively or affirmatively. In the context, Lonergan has been explaining the aspects of the transition from the New Testament to the Nicene dogma. His last point is that the dogma laid a basis on which almost the whole systematization of Catholic theology would flow practically spontaneously; and he concludes,

... qua quidem systematizatione posita, nisi summa quadam difficultate a posteris non intelligitur quemadmodum antenicaeni, quae dixerunt, dicere potuerint.27

The "nisi ... non" construction is a double negative. Here are two published translations, with completely opposite meanings. In the recent Collected Works edition, Michael Shields renders it thus:

And with this systematization in place, the inheritors of Nicea have little difficulty understanding how the ante-Nicene authors could have said what they actually did say.28

In doing so, however, he is dissenting from Conn O'Donovan, who understood the same passage to have the opposite meaning:

Given that later systematization, however, it is only with the greatest difficulty that we who have inherited it can come to understand how the ante-Nicene authors could in fact have said what in fact they did say.29

The proximate problem is the double negative construction, "nisi summa quadam difficultate ... non intelligitur." Depending on how one construes the force of the twofold negation, it seems one might take it to mean either (1) except with the greatest difficulty, it cannot be understood (thus O'Donovan), or (2) only with the greatest difficulty can it not be understood – that is, one has to work very hard to miss it (thus Shields).30 Our two

28The Triune God: Doctrines, 255.
29The Way to Nicea, 137.
30Both translators take some liberties to lay out the problem clearly. The Latin "intelligitur" is passive: it cannot be understood how they could have said such things – or, it cannot not be
published translators have construed it in contradictory manners, the later (Shields) knowingly correcting his predecessor.\(^{31}\)

I take it Shields's case rests on an interpretation of the grammar. In standard English, two negatives resolve to a positive ("I am not unwilling"); but colloquially, an intensive or emphatic double negative is common ("There ain't no way!"). In Latin, according to Charles Bennett's New Latin Grammar, "two negatives are regularly equivalent to an affirmative as in English," but Bennett immediately observes exceptions (none of them quite like our case).\(^{32}\) Our clause is governed by "nisi" ("unless" or "except") which, Bennett explains, "negatives [sic] the entire protasis."\(^{33}\) If the protasis is negative and the apodasis is also negative — "non intelligitur," it is not understood — does that render the overall meaning positive? O'Donovan thought not, but Shields evidently thought so. He took it to mean, in effect: Only with great difficulty could they fail to understand. This he rendered positively as: It was easy for them to understand.

I mention these points, not to descend into the niceties of Latin grammar but to point out that merely knowing the rules does not settle the meaning. Both our translators are competent Latinists, yet they produced incompatible versions of this statement, and Shields deemed O'Donovan to have gotten it wrong. It is certain, however, that O'Donovan was right, not for a grammatical reason but because of the actual context: only his translation is compatible with the argument of the book.

Lonergan divided his Trinity textbook into two volumes, a dogmatic and a systematic part. What O'Donovan translated as The Way to Nicea was a sliver of the first, dogmatic part. The majority — approximately two-thirds — of that volume consisted of five dogmatic theses, in which Lonergan established from authorities the central doctrines of Trinitarian theology. These theses were prefaced by a long section Lonergan called "Praemittenda," what has to be set out first, the premisses (literally, "to-be-premissed"). Our disputed sentence is the very last of the Praemittenda.

O'Donovan translated only what Lonergan permitted. His edition begins

understood. But both translators found it easier to convert this into an active construction, They cannot (or cannot not) understand. And, taking the sentence the way he did, Shields translated the double negative as a simple positive: "little difficulty understanding."

\(^{31}\)I know this from personal conversation with Michael Shields.


\(^{33}\)Bennett, New Latin Grammar, 202 § 306.
abruptly with Lonergan’s discussion of dogmatic development. Ironically omitted are the three short prefatory paragraphs in which Lonergan frames the question he is attempting by means of his dialectical analysis, to answer. I say it is ironic, because those paragraphs decisively settle the meaning of *The Way to Nicea*’s last sentence, the sentence in question. O’Donovan obviously knew this, for he summarizes those paragraphs in his Translator’s Introduction. He writes:

In a short preliminary note Lonergan indicates the question that inspires this ten-stage inquiry and guides its progress: how is it that the ancient Christian writers not only did not anticipate the Nicene and subsequent conciliar decrees, but even appear at times to have held the opposite of what was later defined as dogma? With that question answered, he says, the dogmatic theses will become clearer and easier to understand.34

O’Donovan’s summary, is, in fact, virtually an abridged translation of Lonergan’s paragraph.35

The formulation of the question presupposes that there is some real difficulty to be addressed, a difficulty Lonergan supposed his students shared. The difficulty is linked to Petavius (Denis Pétau), a seventeenth-century theologian and historian whose “great glory,” according to Joseph de Ghellinck, “is due to his patristic works and his importance in the history of dogma. With good reason he may be styled the ‘Father of the History of Dogma’.”36 If we frankly admit that dogma has a history and the history is contingent, there arises a problem of how the faith can be ever the same. And if the ante-Nicene authors possessed the selfsame faith as the later, how could they have said so much that, on the face of it, is incompatible with the Nicene dogma? Lonergan proposes to face this difficulty in understanding through a dialectical analysis of the process by which the dogma developed.

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34 Editor’s introduction to *The Way to Nicea*, xi-xii.

35 *The Triune God: Doctrines*, 28 ("... inde a Petavio, quaeri solet cur antiquissimi scriptores christiani adeo decreta Nicaena aliique subsequentia non praevidenter ut opposita interdum sensisse videatur ... Hac enim quaestionem expedita atque amota, non solum clariora et facilitiora redduntur argumenta patristica postea in thesibus exponenda ... ").

In the sentence in question, then, he is repeating the problem to which his study is proposed as an answer. He does not argue that understanding the post-Nicene dogmatic context will make the ante-Nicene authors readily intelligible. Were that the case, he could have proceeded directly to the dogmatic theses in which he lays out the dogmatic systematization that emerged from Nicea "almost by itself." There would have been no exigence for this long section of Praemittenda. There would have been no need to caution against the two opposed methodological errors he calls "anachronism" – reading later developments into earlier stages – and "archaism" – reading the developments as corruptions. These errors, he says, share a common root in a non-understanding ("non-intellegentia") of doctrinal development – the very thing his Praemittenda sought to illumine.

In short, Lonergan's argument is not – as Shields's translation implies – that the system of dogma makes the ante-Nicene authors intelligible to us, but rather that understanding how dogma develops does.

_A Case from De Verbo Incarnato_

My second example is really a minor detail, but it is highly interesting as an example of how even a seemingly trivial word has its meaning determined by the actual context of an argument. It regards a phrase that comes up in the first thesis of _De Verbo Incarnato_: "in priori epistola." By itself, it might mean "in an earlier epistle," but it could also be taken to mean "in a (or the) foremost epistle." Since the epistle in question is Romans, there is a _prima facie_ case for the latter: Romans is the longest and most influential epistle in the New Testament, so it would seem natural to call it "the foremost epistle." Then, too, it is generally regarded as the latest of the genuine letters of Paul, so it would seem odd to describe it as an "earlier epistle," unless perhaps "earlier" refers not to the other Pauline writings but to the entire New Testament. Then it might mean something like, "in so early a writing as an epistle of Paul."

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37_The Triune God: Doctrines_, 254 ("fere sponte profueret").

38_The Triune God: Doctrines_, 268.

A little word study gives a sense of how Lonergan was wont to use "prior," but of itself settles nothing about the present passage. Within the current thesis, Lonergan most often uses "prior" in the sense of time, but occasionally also in an ordinal sense, in an ontological sense, and perhaps also in the sense of eminence.\(^40\) Again, if he did mean something along the lines of "foremost," Lonergan might have used other, less ambiguous words, for example, potissima, antica, primoris, principalis. On the other hand, there are also other words he might have used for early, for example, prisca, antiqua. But against the objection, there is the fact that typically, Lonergan uses "prior" to mean either temporal or ontological or ordinal priority, and, at least not typically, to mean pre-eminence of stature. At least it may be said that if "in priori epistola" means "in the foremost epistle," it would be an unusual use of "prior" for Lonergan.

The much more important finding from my rather perfunctory review of Lonergan's use of "prior" is what appears to be a parallel (or at least similar) locus: "tempore enim primae erant epistolae paulinae priores, et postea ex fontibus traditionalibus composita sunt evangelia": the "prior" epistles of Paul belong to a first period, and subsequently the gospels were composed from traditional sources.\(^41\) It is interesting to notice that the Pauline epistles are qualified as "priors," but they are compared, not to other, later epistles (of Paul or anyone else), but to the gospels. These are related as two stages in a single process. This process is the progressive revelation of Christ's divinity. Paul's "prior" letters belong to the first stage, the written gospels to a later stage.

\(^{40}\)These occurrences are all from thesis one; page numbers refer to the Latin text of 1964. Prior in a temporal sense, at least thrice: earlier, concrete formulations found in the New Testament (14); earlier and later stages in the development (17); earlier and later writings (anachronism, archaism) (22). Prior ontologically or perhaps eminently: John says the Word was present at creation, but he also says "alia et priora," other and "prior" things of the Word (65). Prior in an ordinal sense: a third text is invoked in favor of the first, and so forth (23). The "priority" of the first, earthly man, clearly taught by Paul (the sense must be temporal and ordinal; it cannot be eminence, since Christ is the second man) (54). Our present locus (46) must be taken either in the sense of eminence or temporally. Further examples, from thesis 12, the next longest in the book (references are to the pages of the Latin text of 1964). Prior in a temporal sense occurs seven times: earlier scholastics, Fathers, authors (297, 328 twice), the earlier tradition (299), earlier development of dogma (328), Thomas's earlier opinion (244); in the prior context, distinctions are not yet drawn; the later distinctions should not be introduced into the earlier context without care; but what is in the earlier context determines what should be said according to the later distinctions (325). One further occurrence has prior in an ontological sense: nature is prior to grace (290).

\(^{41}\)The Incarnate Word, 38-39.
Our apparent parallel occurs within a preliminary note on the progressive revelation of Christ’s divinity. This note is preceded by another on the development of the use of the name “God” in the New Testament. The “general rule” is that “God” is used as a personal name for the Father. It is illustrated by 1 Corinthians 8:6 and is said to be frequently exemplified in Paul. But, Lonergan explains, the general rule begins to change in later strata of the New Testament. In the context of this development, Paul represents the earliest stage. Lonergan claims, then, that Paul’s regular usage illustrates the status quo ante, the general rule before it begins to change. Paul belongs to the prior stage of this development.

It turns out that there are not only linguistic but also structural parallels between (1) the sketch of the stages of “progressive revelation” of Christ’s divinity (preliminary note 2), in which Paul is said to represent the earlier stage, (2) the sketch of the stages of the transfer of the name “God” from proper to common (preliminary note 1), in which Paul said to represent the earlier stage, and (3) the present context, in which the issue is whether the name “God” is applied to Christ, and specifically in a passage of Paul’s (Romans 9:5).

If we return to the immediate context of our passage, the parallel turns out to be very strong. The context is a discussion of Romans 9:5, and the question is whether Paul means to call Christ “God over all.” The RSV translators thought not: their version reads, “. . . of their race, according to the flesh, is the Christ. God who is over all be blessed forever.” Lonergan’s Latin has “ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula.” That is: “from whom is the Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed forever.” But, begging no question, Lonergan inquires whether the passage attributes the name of God to Christ, or whether it apposes God to Christ (as in the RSV translation).

Our full sentence, which comes at the end of a series of considerations that, on balance, favor reading the passage in the traditional manner (as applying the name God to Christ), reads as follows:

Regulariter in the NT “theos” est nomen Patris personale, et exceptio non est ponenda nisi indubia sit, praesertim in priori epistola et modo adeo solemni.

42“et passim apud Paulum,” The Incarnate Word, 36.
Regularly in the New Testament, "theos" is a personal name of the Father, and an exception is not to be posited unless it is beyond doubt—above all in a "prior" epistle and in so solemn a manner.

The sentence is an objection: Paul cannot mean to apply "God" to Christ because (1) the epistle is too early (or is it too eminent?), and (2) the benediction in too solemn a form—a form which elsewhere Paul applies to the Father.\(^4\) Lonergan's reply is this: Granted the rule, nevertheless there undoubtedly are exceptions, and they had to begin sometime. In the case of Romans 9:5, he concludes, we have reasons to deem this one of them.

The phrase has to be translated, and to translate it we have to know what it means. Our question, then, bears not on Lonergan's interpretation of Paul but on our interpretation—and consequent translation—of Lonergan. In light of the broader argument of the chapter, the structure of the immediate context becomes clearer and seems to settle the matter. Lonergan's observation that there are exceptions to the rule, and they had to begin sometime, reinforces the sense that what is at stake in the objection is not that Romans is eminent but that it is relatively primitive—too primitive, that is, for us to expect an exception to the general rule. The rule changed, but only gradually; we might expect a departure in the later strata of material, but not so early. That seems to be the objection. Both the objection and the reply seem to require a temporal sense: the application of the name "God" to Christ belongs to a later stage; Romans is too early.

In light of the foregoing, there is no reason to think that the question is whether Romans is early or late among the other writings of Paul, since there is here no discussion of Paul's writings as a group and, moreover, no discussion of any other authentic Pauline epistles at all. The context is the canonical New Testament.\(^4\) Once this is grasped, note the following:

\(^4\)Solemn benediction: "in priori epistola" is linked to "modo adeo solemn", an especially solemn manner. The different forms of benediction were discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. There is an ordinary form of benediction, which this case does not follow. There are, in addition, "interjected" benedictions, in which, however, the benediction clearly refers back to "the Creator" or "the Father." But the present instance does not seem to be either; it seems to refer to Christ. Why is this relevant to the objection? Perhaps an "especially solemn manner" of benediction would also tend to be more traditional; and more traditional means less likely to be an exception to the "traditional rule" by which "God" is a proper name.

\(^4\)Following his discussion of this passage, Romans 9:5, Lonergan examines a series of five New Testament loci that undoubtedly belong to a later stratum of materials, to wit: 1 John, John, Acts, Colossians ('doubtful reading'), and the prologue to John's Gospel. On the other hand, the discussion is preceded by citations from Hebrews, 2 Peter, Titus, and 2 Thessalonians.
(1) The undisputed letters of Paul (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon) clearly belong to the earliest stratum of New Testament Writings (2) Within this group, Romans is probably the last letter written. But that still places it, probably, seventh chronologically among all the New Testament writings, and, probably, within the first decade of a decades-long process of development exhibited in the New Testament (and outlined by Lonergan in his first two preliminary notes to this thesis). (3) The other writings in the present section— that is, the other passages in which Christ might be called “God” — are all probably later than Romans. If Paul is calling Christ God in Romans 9:5, it would be the earliest instance in the New Testament. We prescind from judgment on Lonergan’s tentative favorable conclusion; our present interest is restricted to sorting out the suppositions involved in the passage.

Recall the objection has two parts: that Romans is “prior” and that the benediction is especially solemn (“praesertim in priori epistola et modo adeo solemni”). Why is the solemnity of the benediction relevant? It is indirectly germane, because to pin down what “prior” is doing, we need to understand the force of the objection. If we understood the point of the objection, it would help us determine whether “in priori epistola” should be taken to mean “in the foremost epistle” or “in an early epistle.” Why, then, would the special solemnity of the benediction incline us away from interpreting it as a doxology of Christ God, rather than a benediction of God the Father?

In the immediately preceding argument, Lonergan distinguishes different types of benediction in Paul. The acknowledged source of his distinctions is Oscar Cullman’s *Christology of the New Testament.* Cullman’s discussion of Romans 9:5 touches on exactly the same points as Lonergan’s. Cullman gives the same examples of what Lonergan calls “ordinary” doxologies, which Cullman calls (in English translation) “independent doxologies.” He gives the same examples of what Lonergan calls “interjected” doxologies, which Cullman calls “doxological apposition.” Cullman even reaches a similar

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The Hebrews passage is unambiguous, however it is dated. 2 Peter and Titus are both later. 2 Thessalonians is ambiguous, and possibly not Pauline (did Lonergan know this?). These three (2 Peter, Titus, 2 Thessalonians) are discussed sequentially because they present similar grammatical issues. There is therefore no citation from Paul that is (1) genuine, (2) early, and (3) unambiguously applied ‘theos’ to Christ. At this point the Romans passage is introduced.

overall conclusion: "We conclude that it is quite probable, if not certain, that Paul designates Jesus Christ as ‘God’ in Romans 9:5."46

Cullman does not explicitly assert either that Romans is too early, or that it is too significant a letter, to mean such and such. Like Lonergan, however, Cullman puts the overall question of the application of the name God to Jesus within a developmental context. In general, he suggests that the name "God" applied to Jesus is a development, and the earlier one goes, the less likely one is to see it. He makes this general suggestion, not explicitly in connection with the interpretation of Romans, but in the form of the following observations: (1) later generations of Christians, post-New Testament, attached great importance to passages that apply "God" to Jesus, to the extent that they may have introduced textual corruptions; (2) the only sure cases of such application in the New Testament are in John and Hebrews, which "actually belongs to the Johannine environment"47; and (3) while Paul certainly believed Jesus was God, he tended to express this in different symbols and it is not certain that he applied the name God to Jesus. Both Lonergan and his source, Cullman, are concerned about the chronology. Neither seems concerned about the relative eminence of the writings.

This brings us to the peremptory objection against reading "in priori epistola" to mean "in the foremost epistle": it is not clear what this could possibly have to do with the argument. All of the indubitable applications of God to Christ occur in major New Testament writings: in John, 1 John, and Hebrews. Why should it be relevant that Romans is the "foremost" epistle? Nothing in the context gives us any reason to expect that applications of the name God to Christ are more likely in minor writings than in major writings, or vice versa. It seems irrelevant to the objection, and is not addressed in the reply.

On the other hand, the overall argument of the thesis urges a development in the New Testament use of the name "God" from a proper to a common name, and a progressive revelation of Christ’s divinity. In the preliminary notes, we are told that Paul represents an early stage in this process. These points are relevant to the present section, which is a question about the use of the name God. They are relevant to the immediate question, whether Paul in this one place calls Jesus God.

46Cullman, Christology of the New Testament, 313.
47Cullman, Christology of the New Testament, 310.
The objection against the traditional interpretation that takes the verse as a solemn doxology of Christ God is (1) “God” is generally a proper name, (2) exceptions are not to be affirmed without compelling evidence, above all (3) in a “prior” epistle and (4) a solemn benediction. The meaning of the objection is clear from the reply: (1) the general rule did change, and (2) exceptions had to begin sometime. Hence the question of fact: Is this an exception?

The meaning of the word is determined with certainty by understanding the actual context. “In priori epistola” must mean “in an earlier epistle.” What threw us off is that it is not early among Paul’s epistles. But the reference group must be the New Testament canon; Paul belongs to the earlier stratum in the process by which Christ’s divinity was disclosed.

The case at hand is, in itself, a minor element in a minor argument; a very small point indeed. It may seem that I have belabored it all out of proportion. But I have done so to illustrate another, much more interesting point. Here is a single underdetermined word in a massive Latin thesis. To render it into English it was necessary to determine its meaning. But that meaning could be determined exactly only in relation to the total argument of the chapter.

CONCLUSION

Lonergan always set great store by the importance of studying languages.48 When I was in graduate school a friend and I used to tease each other about settling for translations rather than learning languages. We called it being “Greedy for content.” Translations are a shortcut; they get you a quick approximation to an author’s mind. Mastering another language is a long game. My friend and former colleague Michael Shields related on several occasions an anecdote from his time living with Lonergan at the erstwhile Regis College Jesuit residence on Bayview (north of Toronto).49 Some scholastics were complaining to Lonergan about being obliged to study classical languages. Why, they asked, should they learn Latin,


49Shields recalls the episode as occurring at the poolside during Lonergan’s summer vacation from Rome. (Personal correspondence, September 9, 2015)
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when Thomas Aquinas might readily be studied in translation? Lonergan quipped laconically, "How can you learn what he meant, if you can't read what he wrote?"\(^5\)

It is easy to laugh at his quip with notional assent. Perhaps the point of my examples has been to provoke real assent. Reading in any language involves interpretation. Translation involves not only interpretation but a further process that terminates in a decision to arrange the signs a certain way. Reading in translation is reading through another, who has already made important interpretive judgments on behalf of the reader, and whose decisions about how to render the text in light of those judgments rearrange the dispositive finality of the outer to the inner word in the luminous mind of the reader. It is reading from afar.\(^5\)

\(^5\)The sense of the anecdote is echoed in another told by Lonergan himself. Asked whether his versatility with Latin had contributed to the success of his study, Lonergan retailed Bernard McGinn’s experience in medieval history at Columbia: “he read the Latin. (They translated it, you see).” (Lambert, Tansey, and Going, Caring about Meaning, 11)

\(^5\)Special thanks to Adrial Fitzgerald for perceptive comments on this article in draft.