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INTRODUCTION

In his essay included in this issue, Grant Kaplan suggests that Robert Doran’s *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions* should, indeed, have a “seismic impact on contemporary discussions in pneumatology and in Trinitarian theology.” “It is perhaps the most ambitious theological undertaking by a student of Lonergan,” adds Kaplan, “since David Tracy’s work in fundamental theology and hermeneutics, carried out in the 1970s and 1980s.” A planned symposium on Doran’s book at the 2014 West Coast Methods Institute, graciously hosted by Mark Morelli in Los Angeles, serendipitously coincided with our own editorial plans to devote a whole issue to this important work of Trinitarian theology. The essays by Jim Marsh, John Dadosky, and Neil Ormerod are refinements of what they presented at the WCMI. Grant Kaplan’s and Jeremy Blackwood’s contributions came later. All of the essays engage Doran’s work from different angles, and do so, generously, creatively, and critically.

Over the last few decades, we have witnessed a renewed interest in Trinitarian theology among scholars from a variety of perspectives: a thick retrieval of patristic sources, a Thomist *ressourcement*, feminist questions concerning gendered language for the Trinity, ecumenical discussions about the Holy Spirit, especially between Eastern and Western traditions, interreligious dialogue, among many others. Despite this proliferation, Lonergan’s voice in the conversation has not yet been fully heard. Nevertheless, the time seems ripe, especially in light of the University of Toronto Press’s recent publication of volumes 11 and 12 of the Collected Works – *The Triune God: Doctrines* and *The Triune God: Systematics*, along with the work receiving special attention in this issue of *Method*, Robert M. Doran’s *The Trinity in History: A Theology of Divine Missions*, volume 1, *Missions and Processions*. In this work, Doran creatively appropriates Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology for our contemporary context and does so in conversation with other key contemporary thinkers (Girard, Balthasar, N.T. Wright, Rahner, to name a few). That said, Doran is not just appropriating Lonergan; he also exhibits a large dose of originality, building on his own previous works, most notably *Theology and the Dialectics of History* and *What Is Systematic Theology?* Let me suggest that the explanatory systematic theology presented in *The Trinity in History* might not only be received as intellectually rigorous and demanding,
which indeed it is, but also as a kind of spiritual or wisdom exercise – a text that challenges us to experience the basic realities discovered in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness as Trinitarian presence.

At the beginning of this introduction, I highlighted Kaplan’s hope for a “seismic impact.” Perhaps it is fitting to end with a thought from another one of our contributors. Neil Ormerod suggests elsewhere, and reiterates the same claim in this present issue, that the “four-point hypothesis” is “the most significant advance, together with the scale of values, in systematic theology since Aquinas.” While the essays in this issue only begin to scratch the surface, our hope is that they communicate some sense of the gold mine – that is The Trinity in History – waiting to be critically explored. And, of course, Doran’s own exploration is by no means complete. Volume 2, which we eagerly await, is well underway!

Randall S. Rosenberg
Co-Editor, M/LS
TRINITARIAN LOVE IN THE DIALECTICS OF HISTORY

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In Robert M. Doran's *The Trinity in History*, the list of references to "love" take up an entire half-page column in the index. "Charity," likewise, fills out half a page, and if one adds to these the references to "being in love," "being on the receiving end of love/being loved," "fifth level of consciousness," and "lovableness, and active spiration," one finds that the topic of love occupies a significant place in Doran's theology of the Trinity. This is hardly surprising in a text on the Trinitarian persons and their historical missions, where the Son is repeatedly affirmed to be *Verbum spirans Amorem*, but one could miss the central role of love as the lynchpin holding together Trinitarian persons, relations, and missions, on the one hand, and concrete incarnation of an authentic scale of values, on the other. In this first volume one of *The Trinity in History*, love is the link between our participation in triune life, a theory of history, the Law of the Cross, and the human subject.

Doran's Use of Love

Doran sets love as the keystone: it is both participation in Trinitarian life and the redemptive solution in the created world. The human subject serves

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2 Doran directed my dissertation on Lonergan's understanding of love and the fifth level of consciousness, which I defended in March 2012. It was a blessing to know and work with him while he was finalizing the material that became volume 1 of *The Trinity in History*. However, the timing of both the dissertation and his book meant that we were unable to reference the completed versions of one other's arguments. This article is an attempt to rectify that situation and to clarify the role of love in Doran's theology in light of the position I developed in my dissertation.

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as the pivot-point between the two. This enables Doran to set, as his two key tools, the four-point hypothesis and a theory of history grounded in an analysis of subjectivity. These provide, respectively, the special and general categories for his theology, and they are genetic developments of the medieval theological concepts of the entitatively disproportionate supernatural order, on the one hand, and Aristotelian metaphysics, on the other.\(^3\)

**The Four-Point Hypothesis: Participation in Trinitarian Life through Love**

As basic initial context, it should be noted that virtually nothing Doran does with what many of us now call “the four-point hypothesis” would make any sense at all absent Frederick Crowe’s article, “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions.”\(^4\) There, as Doran affirms in *The Trinity in History*, the Holy Spirit, precisely as Proceeding Love, is understood to be God’s first gift (also affirmed in both Augustine and Aquinas), while the Son was sent in complementarity with that first gift.\(^5\)

Succinctly put, the four-point hypothesis drawn from Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology affirms that four absolutely supernatural created realities can be linked to the four Trinitarian relations. The secondary act of existence of the incarnation participates in paternity; sanctifying grace participates in active spiration; the habit of charity participates in passive spiration; and the light of glory participates in filiation.\(^6\) The full rationale for these claims is beyond the scope of this article; the key here is Doran’s

\(^3\) Doran, *The Trinity in History*, xii-xiii.


\(^5\) Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 73. See also page 30.

\(^6\) See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, vol. 12 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 470-73: “There are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore four quite special modes of grounding an external imitation of the divine substance. Furthermore, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, never found unformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. Therefore, it may fittingly be said that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so that it has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of filiation, and so that it leads the children of adoption perfectly back to the Father.”
use of the hypothesis, and he states his basic analogy fairly simply in thesis 4 of *The Trinity in History*:

The key to the *nexus mysteriorum* that is the concern of systematics lies in the links that Lonergan has drawn between the four divine relations and four created participations in and imitations of these relations. The starting point in unpacking that four-point hypothesis is the link between sanctifying grace and charity as created participations in, respectively, active spiration and passive spiration. From the standpoint of religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness, these created participations are (1) the recalled reception (*memoria*) of the gift of God’s love (that is, of sanctifying grace as it affects consciousness) grounding a subsequent set of judgments of value (faith), as these together participate in active spiration and so set up a special relation to the indwelling Holy Spirit, and (2) a return of love (charity) participating in the Proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit, which establishes a special relation to the indwelling Father and Son. Memory and faith combine to imitate and participate in active spiration, and charity imitates and participates in passive spiration.⁷

In terms of systematic theology, this provides the valuable tool absent from Lonergan’s account of basic terms and relations in *Method in Theology*.⁸ There, he offered conscious and intentional operations as general basic terms, the dynamic structure linking those operations and corresponding states as general basic relations, and God’s gift of love and Christian witness as special basic terms, but there was no mention of special basic relations. Doran’s contention is that the hypothesis provides these relations, because it links the operations and dynamic states of consciousness to one another and to Christian witness and the gift of God’s love.

The gift of God’s love is key for all of this: it is recalled in one’s sense of self-presence (*memoria*) and judged to be good, and from these together (as from one principle) flows charity, which Doran variously identifies as

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⁷Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 17.
universal antecedent willingness and nonviolent response. Here, one finds a structure consisting of an origin, a generated though co-equal judgment of value, and a love (also co-equal) proceeding from the two as a single principle, which parallels the classical Christian theology of unoriginate Father, begotten Son, and spirated Holy Spirit.

The central point with regard to the four-point hypothesis in Doran’s work is that our participation in divine life is established through the gift of divine love in the form of sanctifying grace, which is a term by which it is true to say that the relation between us and the Holy Spirit is one of the Holy Spirit’s “indwelling” us. All the rest depends upon that initial gift of Love.

The Theological Theory of History: Love as Key to Redemption

Doran sets much of his work in The Trinity in History within the context of chapter 20 of Lonergan’s Insight, the goal of which is to work out the heuristics of the divine solution to the problem of evil. Doran is able to link this divine solution to the four-point hypothesis by affirming that participation in and imitation of that Word in sanctifying grace releases the gift of speaking the true word in love, the word that establishes justice in history and in historical relations of human beings to one another, to God, to the environment, and to the entire created universe. Like faith as the knowledge born of religious love, so speaking the true word in love is a participation in the invisible mission of the Word.

The revelation of God’s Word in history is God’s avowal of love for us, and our response must consist of a similarly historical “yes” in order for the relation of love between God and us to reach its fullness. This “yes” may consist not simply in an explicit affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth is God’s incarnate Word in history, but in the sense that the revelation of God’s love

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9See, for example, Doran, The Trinity in History, 81.
10See, for example, Doran, The Trinity in History, 159.
12Doran, The Trinity in History, 76.
13Doran, The Trinity in History, 61.
14Doran, The Trinity in History, 91, 93.
and of the divine invitation to be in a loving relation with God demands some concrete, historical response, a response constitutive of that relation that does not leave it unrealized in history.

This need for concrete, relation-constituting, historical action opens the door to the use of the entire theory of history Doran worked out in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. While this is not the place for a full summary of that book, we can highlight the scale of values and social grace as central components of *The Trinity in History*. As an account of the normative heuristics of value in history, the scale of values provides the tool to analyze theologically the need for and effect(s) of our historical response(s) to God’s invitation. As a healing movement working to undo social sin (a concept already accepted and documented in theological terms through liberation theology), social grace draws concrete objectifications of the world mediated by meaning toward the normative conditions specified by the scale of values. Problems at the lower levels of the scale reveal failures at the higher levels and, consequently, demand solutions from the higher levels. For example, inequitable distribution of vital values – say, food or housing – both reveals a problem at the level of social value (there is a failure in the organized distribution of just amounts of nourishment or shelter) and demands a solution from that level (there needs to be a change in the intelligible organization of the economic system). Likewise, it reveals a problem and makes a demand at the level of cultural value (the civilization’s meanings and values do not promote justice; there needs to be a change in the society’s meanings and values) and the level of personal value (members of the society are not originating just values; they are not being fully authentic and they need to change accordingly).

Ultimately, the solution must come from the highest level – that of religious value. Here, we find the entrance of transcendent value into the world mediated by meaning through the gift of God’s Love and its avowal in the incarnation of the Word. This divine meaning draws subjects toward authenticity at each of the other levels of the scale: personal, cultural, social, and vital.

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The Law of the Cross: "How" Trinitarian Life Impacts History

Doran's emphasis on a concrete response to the revealed Word of God in history and the interior gift of God's love in hearts leads to a question about the specific, concrete mechanics of the level of religious value. What is the intrinsic intelligibility of the entrance of religious value into the world mediated by meaning? The answer to this can be found in Doran's emphasis on the Law of the Cross.

The Law of the Cross involves three basic steps: (1) an initial situation characterized by objective moral evils resulting from basic sin(s), (2) submission to those consequences, even to the point of death, which transforms them into good(s), and (3) a resurrectional transformation serving as the Father's divine ratification of the self-sacrificing submission.16

For Christians, of course, Jesus of Nazareth is the paradigmatic example, but as Doran highlights, Christianity is by no means the only place to find the affirmation of the basic idea that the solution to the evils of the world is to submit to them and to refuse to respond in kind.

Building on the heuristics for the divine solution to the problem of evil set forth in chapter 20 of Lonergan's Insight, Doran focuses specifically on the incarnation of the Law of the Cross by human beings under grace as the solution to the problem of evil.17 This is the key to the redemptive entry of God's meaning into the human world mediated by meaning.

Moreover, the charity spirated forth as the dynamic state of being in love unrestrictedly in response to sanctifying grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is exactly this nonviolent, returning-good-for-evil love. Whereas Lonergan speaks of three kinds of love - familial, civil, and religious - Doran provides the nonviolent Law of the Cross as the method by which religious love can be understood as more than merely human love: religious love is disproportionately self-sacrificing.18

It is from this position that Doran brings in the insights of Rene Girard's mimetic theory, which begins with non-retaliation (charity, for Doran) and proceeds to the forgiveness and reconciliation that overcome the violent mimetic rivalries that are a key part of the psychic/affective side of the

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16Doran, The Trinity in History, 237.
17Doran mentions this repeatedly: see The Trinity in History, 75, 90, 229, 255.
18Doran, The Trinity in History, 86. This is a precision not provided by Lonergan's own articulation of the three.
problem of evil.\textsuperscript{19} How does this happen? Instead of imitating one another in a negative, rivalrous way, saints become mimetic models who can draw us to authenticity grounded in God’s love.

With this argument, we have come full circle, for here is the key historical mechanism by which religious value enters into the human world mediated by meaning. On the affective/psychic side, we have the imitation of the saints who incarnate the Law of the Cross and toward whom we are drawn as we grow in our ability to do likewise. On the intellectual/intentional side, we participate in the life of the Triune persons as our consciousness imitates the very structure of that divine life. In both cases, we are made more like God through the interior gift of God’s love and by cooperating with God’s social grace to generate a more authentic civilization in accord with the scale of values.

The Fifth Level of Consciousness: “How” We Embody the Law of the Cross

Doran and Lonergan both emphasize that the point is the “Whole Christ, Head and members,” by which they meant that we must not conceive of Christ as effective in history solely through his particular historical incarnation, but also as through the extension of his mission through the church.\textsuperscript{20} By linking persons to one another, the Law of the Cross generates a new community, the Kingdom of God.\textsuperscript{21} A further, final question arises, however, when we ask just how it is that these events in history and these interpersonal connections come to have an effect on individual human subjects. It is all well and good to affirm what we have affirmed so far, but religious value must descend down the scale, which means it must reach persons and change how they originate value, not just quantitatively, but qualitatively; for persons must be the instruments of the entrance of God’s meaning into the human world mediated by meaning. Given that they do so by living out the Law of the Cross, we can still ask about the relation between religious value and subjectivity itself, and in a context heavily influenced by Lonergan, one might even say we must ask that question.

Doran relies on the notion of a fifth level of consciousness to generate an answer. Thesis 20 of The Trinity in History reads:

\textsuperscript{19}Doran, The Trinity in History, 212-14.
\textsuperscript{20}Doran, The Trinity in History, 233.
\textsuperscript{21}Through, for example, the reconciliation articulated via Girard.
The social dimensions of grace are rooted in a level of consciousness that is beyond the four levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision and that sublates them. This unitive and inclusive level of consciousness is interpersonal, and when self-transcendent it is marked by love in intimacy, in devotion to the human community, and in the reception of God’s love and the return of love for God in charity.\(^2\)

Notice that this returns us to the realm of the four-point hypothesis, as we here encounter the themes of receiving God’s love and responding to it in charity. The most important aspect of thesis 20 for the moment, however, is the affirmation that this occurs at a fifth level of consciousness, which is interpersonal, sublates the other four, and has to do with intimate, civil, and religious loves. Now we have an account of the mechanics of the pivot from transcendent religious value to objective social reality, a pivot that occurs in the consciousness of the individual subject.

**Doran’s Appropriation of My Analysis of the Fifth Level of Consciousness**

My own role in Doran’s book has to do with the development of our understanding of this fifth level of consciousness. Here, I will briefly outline the older position of mine that Doran used in *The Trinity in History*, and in the next section I will give an account of the developments my thinking has undergone since then.

*Earlier Work Used in The Trinity in History*

In a previous article,\(^2\)\(^3\) I affirmed Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer’s argument that sanctifying grace should be understood as having to do with the unity of consciousness, rather than with any particular level.\(^2\)\(^4\) I then argued for a better understanding of elevation to account for this change in the unity of consciousness, along with a stronger, fuller account of the structure of

\(^2\)Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 125.


the subject who is so unified and, as a unity, elevated. Drawing on three of Lonergan’s papers, I argued that, while elevation in the scholastic sense had to do with the addition of absolutely supernatural formal objects for the faculties of intellect and will, a methodical theology could affirm acts with contents that cannot fully be accounted for in terms of the acts themselves. With this qualification, I intended to indicate the disproportionate character of the object(s) of the acts.

I then referred to a few archival records to indicate Lonergan’s affirmation of a distinct fifth level of consciousness. This enabled me to take the basic position that the fifth level of consciousness is the experience of the relation between oneself and another with whom one is in love. Supposing that a level needed an operation, a question, and an object, I suggested that the operation of the subject at the fifth level consists in the “self-possessed handing over of one’s central form to the determination of another [person],” that the operative question would be “What would you have me do?,” and that the object of one’s operations at the fifth level would be persons as subjects, rather than as objects. To the extent that the fifth level of consciousness, thus understood, could be natural, it fits well with the first two of Lonergan’s categories of love (familial or intimate, and civil), and to the extent that the fifth level of consciousness is elevated, the objects become the absolutely supernatural formal objects that are the Trinitarian divine persons.

Doran was able to use this argument to link our participation in Trinitarian divine life to individual subjectivity, and to link these both to social grace and the scale of values. With this account of the fifth level of

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26 I was using the following (available at www.bernardlonergan.com): a question and answer session from the 1977 Lonergan Workshop (Monday, June 20, 1977, Lauzon CD/MP3 916 A & B [91600A0E070], transcript [91600DTE070], typed questions and notes [28880DTE070]), and a similar session from the 1980 Lonergan Workshop (Wednesday, June 18, 1980, Lauzon CD/MP3 977 A & B [97700A0E080], transcript [97700DTE080]).


consciousness, it was possible for him to draw out the impact of religious value on cultural, social, and vital value through personal value.²⁹

More Recent Developments

Unfortunately, Doran was finishing his book as I was writing my dissertation. The version of my analysis that appears in The Trinity in History, therefore, does not include the more adequately grounded and more fully developed position found in my dissertation. While I stand by nearly everything I said in my earlier work, especially the elements of the argument that he cited, my understanding of the fifth level of consciousness, love, interpersonal community, and grace in Lonergan’s thought has continued to develop. What follows is an account of those further developments, after which I will conclude by highlighting their significance in relation to Doran’s work.

Method in Theology was published in 1972, and it contains no reference to love as a fifth level of consciousness. In December of that year, however, Lonergan affirmed that we could think of love as a distinct fifth level of consciousness.³⁰ My work has emerged from the question about the grounds for this development.

Method in Theology links “levels of consciousness” to sublation, and one can see Lonergan working to establish the general characteristics of sublating levels:

From the very first chapter we have moved out of a faculty psychology with its options between intellectualism and voluntarism, and into an intentionality analysis that distinguishes four levels of conscious and intentional operations, where each successive level sublates previous levels by going beyond them, by setting up a higher principle, by introducing new operations, and by preserving the integrity of previous levels, while extending enormously their range and their significance.³¹

³¹Method in Theology, 340.
In other words, a level of consciousness is constituted by the introduction of new operations instantiating a higher principle by which previous levels are retained in their integrity while having their horizon broadened beyond their original limits. In this book, Lonergan explicitly applied all of these characteristics to love, save one. Love goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.\footnote{Method in Theology, 241.}

What is missing? A small bit of deduction reveals that it is the characteristic of introducing new operations, and my affirmation is that this is the key to understanding Lonergan's introduction of a fifth level of consciousness in December 1972. I suggest in my dissertation that he likely had an insight into the operative character of love, that the building blocks of this realization can be found in his scholastic theology of grace, that there are corresponding elements in his later theology of love and grace, and finally, that the link between these two was most likely the content of this insight.\footnote{For a more detailed account of my argument, see Jeremy W. Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan's Cogntional-Intentional Anthropology: An Inquiry on the Question of a 'Fifth Level of Consciousness,'" (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 2012), chap. 4.}

In his scholastic theology, Lonergan had clearly affirmed that there was (1) a state of grace linked to (2) a changed interpersonal relation that was itself linked to (3) an operative ontological change manifesting as the introduction of new formal objects for already-present faculties. Up to and including the publication of Method in Theology, Lonergan had clearly affirmed that love was (1) a changed state linked to (2) new interpersonal relations, which together went beyond [the levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding], introduce[d] something new and distinct, [put] everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with [those four levels] or destroying [them], on the contrary needs [them], includes [them],
preserves all [their] proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.\textsuperscript{34}

In the earlier context, the operativity of the interpersonal state of grace was to be found in the new manner in which the faculties operated. The key point here is that it did not involve the introduction of new faculties or even new operations, but consisted, instead, of the introduction of new formal objects for the faculties and the operations of which they were already capable. Still, given Lonergan’s analysis of levels of consciousness, in order for him to affirm love as a fifth level of consciousness, there would need to be some new element or aspect, though not necessarily a new operation, that still is operative.

The operativity in this case is to be found in the very introduction of the new horizon, the broadening conceived in metaphysical terms as the introduction of a new formal object.\textsuperscript{35} Insofar as love broadens the horizon of conscious-intentional operation, it is operative in precisely the same way that love was operative in Lonergan’s scholastic theology of grace. That is, it is operative insofar as it offers a larger horizon for operations of which the subject is already capable.

Once the links are drawn between formal object and horizon, on the one hand, and operativity and the introduction of a new horizon, on the other, the key pieces are in place for the affirmation that love is a level of consciousness. Now, in addition to the first four characteristics of a level of consciousness that Lonergan affirmed in \textit{Method in Theology}, love is understood as operative. Just as, in metaphysical theology, sanctifying grace was operative in its introduction of supernatural formal objects for the faculties of intellect and will, so love, in a methodical theology, is operative in its introduction of a new horizon.

An analysis of the historical development of Lonergan’s position on love reveals, in addition to the consistency of his position as outlined above, four themes, threads, currents, streams (choose your metaphor) that remained consistent both before and after the transposition. The key affirmation is (1) that individual subjects exist as potency that can be actuated by

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Method in Theology}, 241.

a disproportionate actor. This actuation, then, is (2) interpersonal, (3) concretely historical, and (4) a change in the world of meaning. Thus the change in horizon fulfills that potency or openness, and it occurs through concrete, historical changes in interpersonal relations that alter the world mediated by meaning.

Standing upon these points and linked tentatively to Doran’s work, I was able to argue that the nature of love is such that the more authentically one loves, the more one is lovable: gratia gratum faciens is ontologically correlative to charity, and vice versa; memoria is the conscious-intentional correlate to gratia gratum faciens; and, together with the judgment of value on the goodness of being so beloved, it spirates a dynamic state of being in love giving rise to particular, ultimately peculiarly authentic, acts of love.36

The operativity of God’s grace, then, consists in the new horizon within which self-presence, judgment of value, and the acts flowing from the dynamic state of being in love occur, and the relations of love between divine persons and human persons, as well as among human persons under grace, are constituted by the change in self-presence, the judgment of value, and the charitable acts. This horizon is what it is because of the new interpersonal relations that are a changed state characterized by conscious, nonintentional, subject-to-subject relations—a state operative proximately as an elevated fifth level of consciousness. Finally, the consciousness inherent in this new state is the consciousness of an “us” or a “we,” which is the mutual self-presence of mutually self-mediating subjects that is distinct (though not separate) from the self-presence of a single subject.37

Initially, these relations are not fully authentic and they retain characteristics that Doran would term intersubjective in a negative sense. Still, as with any level, we learn to develop and ever more deliberately shape the character of this level of consciousness. As something always constitutive of our subjectivity to one degree or another, this interpersonal level is transcendental even in its concreteness and historicity, and the more authentic our interpersonal relations become, the more we are drawn into the divine good of order. To the extent that this depends upon the entry of God’s own meaning into the human world mediated by meaning, this is the realization, under grace, of the Kingdom of God.

In the final section of this essay, I treat two points which contribute, in my estimation, to a fuller account of the intrinsic intelligibility of love. The first highlights the significant correspondence—a point that has not been sufficiently accounted for—between the role that love plays in Doran's and Lonergan's theology. The second centers this correspondence on the fifth level of consciousness, which involves the central contribution from my own work.

As I noted above, Lonergan's understanding of love displayed four consistent aspects that were present both in his scholastic theology and in his cognitional-intentional analyses. To reiterate, those aspects are (1) the fact that individual subjects are potency for disproportionate, higher-order actuation, and that this actuation is (2) interpersonal, (3) concretely historical, and (4) consists in a change in the world of meaning.

These four aspects are reflected in Doran's account of love in The Trinity in History. First, love plays a significant role in the four-point hypothesis. For him, the Love of God poured into our hearts (Romans 5:5) is to be understood as a relation, the created consequent condition of which is sanctifying grace, and this gift initiates and grounds our participation in the Trinitarian life as our new relation to the Holy Spirit participates in the Trinitarian relation of active spiration. Doran is explicit that the four-point hypothesis is a development on the medieval theorem of the supernatural; thus, in relation to the four aspects of Lonergan's understanding of love, the hypothesis specifies more clearly the specifically disproportionate aspect of the actuation of our potency.

Second, the very point of the four-point hypothesis is that we are brought into new relations with the Trinitarian persons. Moreover, Doran's position emphasizes that the Law of the Cross is the means by which new interpersonal relations are established in history, and that this is then the key to redemption in history. While the four-point hypothesis provides some clarification in terms of the interpersonal character of the new relations that obtain, the Law of the Cross is a central contribution in terms of understanding the intelligibility of love with regard to interpersonal relation. The fact that this interpersonal element is so central to the role of love in Doran's theology highlights the similarity between his position on love and the fourfold character of Lonergan's understanding of love.
Third, for Doran, love is clearly in the realm of the historical and concrete. This is evident in the centrality he gives to social grace and the scale of values. These specify both the heuristics of value in the world mediated by meaning and the entry of divine meaning into that structure of value. For Doran, this is not an exercise in abstraction but a formulation of the concrete intelligibility of value in history. Theology and the Dialectics of History is about the history that is concretely lived, rather than the history that is written, and the understanding of history generated in that book provides the general-categorical element in The Trinity in History, to which the four-point hypothesis provides the principle special-categorical complement.

Finally, that concrete historical reality is, in fact, the world mediated by meaning, and Doran is quite insistent that the entry of religious value effects changes at the levels of personal, cultural, and social value. Simply put, the world mediated by meaning changes as a result of the entry of divine meaning. This change offers a concrete, historical solution to concrete, historical problems and is rooted in a set of new interpersonal relations – relations grounded in the supernatural fulfillment of our potency that constitutes our participation in the Trinitarian relations.

The second concluding point I wish to make has to do with the fifth level of consciousness itself. To state it as briefly as possible, the fifth level of consciousness is concrete, historical, and interpersonal. It has to do with horizons, and is, in the limit, the entry-point of supernatural life into our consciousness. It thus has to do with all of the key elements that constitute Lonergan’s and Doran’s respective understandings of love. This shows clearly that the position love occupies in Doran’s theology is not foreign to scholastic theology, but is, rather, a development and consequent transposition from that horizon to the horizon of a methodical theology grounded on cognitional-intentional analysis.

This is important for two reasons. First, it means that the move Doran is making to socially and politically impactful Trinitarian theology is not a simple rejection of older modes of Trinitarian theology, nor is it a move that uses transposed “Lonerganian” language in a merely commonsense manner. Instead, Doran’s theology is solidly explanatory, and the transposition reflects a genuine genetic development that retains the achievements of past theologies while drawing them into a larger horizon that includes later developments.

Second, it means that the argument I developed in my dissertation
provides the explanatory understanding of the fifth level of consciousness that fills out love's role as lynchpin holding together all of these aspects. While it is significant to affirm that love has to do with our potency for disproportionate fulfillment through concrete, interpersonal relations that change our horizons, it is yet more significant to be able to specify the intelligible unity of these aspects. Insofar as one finds – at the fifth level of consciousness – an element of consciousness that is intrinsically interpersonal, concrete, historical, and by definition open to supernatural interpersonal relations, one has a formulation of the intrinsic intelligibility of love. Once this has been achieved, the reason for these four elements in both Lonergan's and Doran's understanding of love is clear – these are the constitutive elements of love – and one can affirm their intrinsic connection with one another. Doran's linking of Trinitarian theology, human subjectivity, and the constitution of our social and cultural values is not simply an extension of Trinitarian theology, but a recognition of the intrinsic intelligibility of love, which is interpersonal, historical, meaningful, and ultimately a Trinitarian fulfillment of the very meaning of what we are.
APPROACHING THE TRIUNE GOD: A RESPONSE

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I would first like to address the question of what philosophers can learn from Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity. Then I will address some questions that arise for me as I ponder the proposed psychological analogy put forth by Doran in his weighty work *Trinity in History*.¹

The question about what philosophers can learn from Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity is an interesting one because Lonergan often tended to ask a similar question in reverse, “What can theologians learn from philosophers?” In short, he presumes that the task of philosophy pertains to clarifying, developing, and implementing the philosophy of intentional consciousness as a generalized empirical method, and that, the more accurate is the account of the phenomenology of conscious intentionality, the more adequate is the foundation for systematic theology. Conversely, the more inadequate the account, the more one is burdened with distortions in theological viewpoints. For example, I argued elsewhere that the naive realist shows up in Catholic ecclesiology as the pervasive attitude that the visible church is the one that is “already out there now real,” visible in bricks and mortar, vestments and miters.²

However, the reverse is also true – that an adequate psychological analogy can give the philosopher insight into the adequate philosophy of intentional consciousness. For example, I was impressed to learn reading Aquinas’s discussion of the process and scope of angels’ understanding in the *Prima Pars*, how one really gains an insight into human understanding.


especially when Aquinas contrasts the two approaches between human and angelic understanding.

A second point regarding what philosophers can learn concerns the notion of questioning. Lonergan’s entire philosophy rests on the unrestricted desire to know, and questions delineate the line or demarcation between the various fields of human intellectual inquiry. The biochemist begins with the questions that are outside of the purview of the chemist to answer, the biologist begins with the questions that are outside of the repertoire of the biochemist, and so on.

At least two limiting questions (there may be more) delineate the field of philosophy from theology. The first, is the perennial question of evil, which according to Lonergan’s treatment at the end of chapter 18 of Insight, arises out of the incapacity of human beings for sustainable development, that is, their incapacity to solve the problem of evil by their own natural abilities. It follows, that the questions philosophers may ask about the solution to the problem of evil cannot be answered satisfactorily by a philosophy and so calls for a theological answer.

The second limiting question for philosophers was raised by Heidegger (reiterating Leibniz) in the past century, “Why is there something and not nothing?” Aside from the fact that the question is originally attributed to Siger of Brabant, a medieval scholastic who would not have neatly differentiated philosophy from theology, it seems that one cannot answer the question without expressing a theological view, whether it be a latent, a problematic, or an explicit theological view (leaving aside ideological and reductive responses to this question). Philosophers are interested in theological questions whether they know it or not. Which opens onto another kind of question: If the Trinity actually does exist, would not that make it the most relevant inquiry that any human being could investigate?

Finally, the value of Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity for philosophers is existential. As human beings, philosophers must at some point wonder about their own personal fate. The fifth chapter of Lonergan’s Triune God: Systematics describes how human beings with sanctifying grace are wedded to God intimately through the two missions, participating in each of the four divine relations of paternity, filiation, active and passive spiration, as Doran has elaborated on so well.3 Along these lines, Lonergan was apt to quote St.

Paul: “Nothing in all creation can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Romans 8:39).4

The presence of sanctifying grace, which indicates the indwelling of the Holy Spirit within the just and through Circumincession, implies also the mutual indwelling of the other two divine persons within the just. In other words, as I tell my students, “if you are among the just (and Lonergan is very generous in his understanding of the abundance of God’s grace to all), not only have you won the biggest lottery in the entire created order, but you have won the only lottery in existence.” Now isn’t this much more attractive than some Nietzschean eternal return?

DORAN’S PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALOGY

Doran’s Trinity in History is a work not just to be read but one to be studied. I will focus on one of the richest aspects of the text, his development of Lonergan’s psychological analogy of the Trinity in light of the so-called fifth level of intentional consciousness, another significant development by Doran of Lonergan’s work. However, allow me first to summarize briefly Lonergan’s psychological analogy both in the Triune God: Systematics and the later development. I will try to put this in the language that those familiar with his philosophy but perhaps not his theology can grasp what he is doing.

Human beings are created in the image of God, that image in its fullest expression is to be found in the intellect and will of human beings, or their understanding, judging and deciding. These acts in human intentional consciousness are intellectual emanations (emanatio intelligibiles) as when a concept or formulation proceeds from a grasp of the possible intelligibility in the data or when a judgment proceeds from the grasp of sufficient evidence. There are multiple such emanations in the human spirit and so Lonergan chooses the intellectual emanations that are the “highest” expressions of the human spirit, that is, those internal intelligible emanations wherein act proceeds from act (processio operati) rather than those emanations that proceed from potency to act (processio operationis). An example of the latter would be at the level of understanding in a grasp of intelligibility – an emanation of potency to act, as illustrated when Lonergan often stated,
“insights are a dime a dozen,” meaning they are subsequent to the further scrutiny of judgment. Since the emanations of processio operati are act from act, they serve as a better analogy since there is no potency in God. Therefore Lonergan concludes that the best psychological analogy for “understanding” the two processions in God must be according to the mode of processio operati. In doing so, Lonergan effectively (at least for the most part) limits the analogy of the processions to the level of judgment and to the level of decision (grasp of value).

Having established all of this, Lonergan proceeds in the following manner. From the two emanations he articulates the analogy for two processions: the Word proceeds from the Father like a word proceeds from a grasp of the evidence in judgment; likewise the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son like a decision proceeds from a grasp of the evidence and the judgment. I should note here, however, that Lonergan seems to be straddling the judgment of fact and judgment of value in his early analogy. In his later analogy, as well as in Doran’s analogy, the judgment of fact does not seem to play a role, at least directly.

On the basis of the two processions he goes on to articulate the four real subsistent relations of paternity, filiation, active and passive spiration. From these three distinct real relations he goes on to speak of the three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. (It is important to note that the spirator – that is, the Father and Son breathing forth the Holy Spirit – as one principle does not constitute a fourth person of the Trinity.) Lonergan goes on to show how the three divine persons relate to one another in chapter 4 and how they relate to us in chapter 5. This leads him to speak of the two missions – one of the Son and the other of the Holy Spirit. From this, according to Lonergan, there follows the gift of grace, the indwelling, the lottery, and the whole kit and caboodle of our salvation.

Subsequent to Lonergan’s work, those of us working in the tradition of transpositional Thomism labor to develop the visible and invisible aspects of those two missions operative in the created order.

It is perhaps significant that Lonergan approached the psychological analogy differently in his later years, after the chapter on religion in Method

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4The Triune God: Systematics, 145ff.
in Theology had been published. The later analogy from “Christology Today” is one from the fourth (and fifth) levels of intentional consciousness. In brief, the Father is analogous to originating love, the Son proceeds from the originating love as judgment of value, expressing that love. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as originated love (acts of charity).  

Doran examines both of Lonergan’s analogies in detail and poses a crystallization of that analogy. He re-engages Lonergan’s analogies within the Augustinian tradition by bringing in an aspect not often highlighted by Lonergan, memoria. If I have understood Doran correctly, the Father is analogous to a principle of love remembered or recollected in the Augustinian sense of memoria, the Son proceeds from the Father as a judgment of value expressing the content of that love, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both an act of charity from the recollected appropriated principle of love and the judgment of value. I would like ask Doran to clarify and elaborate his reasons for the need of a crystallization of Lonergan’s respective analogies along these lines. I would further ask for an elaboration of what he means by this memoria and recollection.

I am curious about Doran’s starting point in his analogy for two reasons: (1) Recollection and memory do not seem to figure into Lonergan’s philosophy of intentional consciousness at least very explicitly. (2) At the risk of equivocating on the word memoria, I have been puzzling over the notion of memory in general. If we are to say that an act of remembering is an intellectual emanation, then would it be an act of processio operationis, of potency to act, or would it be one of processio operati, from act to act? I suspect that an act of remembering is an act of processio operationis, a procession from potency to act. To the extent that this is the case, given that our memories often fail, does this effect the strength of Doran’s analogy in that it begins with the fruit or term of an intellectual emanation (that is, a recollection) that derives from potency rather than from act?

Finally, given Lonergan’s claim that the exercise of one’s existential autonomy provides the basis for the best analogy for considering the likeness of intellectual emanations in God, would Doran comment on the following question: Does this relegate the emanations pertaining to levels

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8The Triune God: Systematics, 179-81.
prior to the fourth level to a lesser status for articulating the best possible analogy of the Trinity?
NEW PATHS FOR A GIRARD/LONERGAN CONVERSATION: AN ESSAY IN LIGHT OF ROBERT DORAN’S MISSIONS AND PROCESSIONS

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THE TRINITY IN HISTORY: A Theology of the Divine Missions, volume 1, Missions and Processions, represents the first step in Robert Doran’s multivolume undertaking. When completed it should have a seismic impact on contemporary discussions in pneumatology and in Trinitarian theology. It is perhaps the most ambitious theological undertaking by a student of Lonergan since David Tracy’s work in fundamental theology and hermeneutics, carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. Missions and Processions is a difficult but rewarding book to read. It represents the fruit of a mature theologian who has not only mastered the complex and intellectually daring work of Bernard Lonergan, but has also used this work to advance a bold thesis about the relevance of the Spirit’s mission for interreligious dialogue. Few theologians writing today have the courage, discipline, and fortitude to carry out such a demanding project. It is no overstatement, then, to apply the descriptive “groundbreaking” to Doran’s Missions and Processions.

It will be left to experts in Lonergan, Aquinas, and in Trinitarian theology to discuss the scope, problems, and merits of Doran’s achievements in these areas. My goal in the current essay is to reflect on Doran’s use of the mimetic theory associated with the French anthropologist and literary critic René Girard. More specifically, this review sets out to do the following: (1) assess the place of Doran’s contribution among recent engagements with Girard

1 Already in 2002, Frederick Lawrence wrote of Doran, “As far as I know, among students of Lonergan, Robert M. Doran, S J, has the most exigent, lucid, and dynamic grasp of systematic theology. What is so marvellous is that Bob not only talks about the nature of systematic theology – he does it.” See Lawrence, “Editor’s Note,” in vol. 17 of the Lonergan Workshop Journal (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2002), iii. The current contribution only further cements this claim.
by students of Lonergan; (2) suggest several hermeneutical approaches to Girard’s corpus that might make students of Lonergan in particular, and Catholic theologians in general, more positively disposed to Girard; (3) evaluate Doran’s integration of mimetic theory into chapters 9 and 10 of *Missions and Processions*, with special attention to bridging what Doran considers to be a significant disparity between a mimetic account of desire and a Lonerganian account of the natural *eros* of knowing; (4) suggest a possible solution to the impasse between a mimetic account of desire and the importance of maintaining human autonomy in upholding the analogy between habituation into charity and autonomous divine procession. This essay appreciates Doran’s robust appropriation of Girard. In addition, it encourages an even warmer reception by Catholic theologians, both by correcting misconceptions about mimetic theory, and by highlighting the compatibility between mimetic theory and orthodox theology. The stakes are high: if mimetic theory really does what Girard thinks it does, then theologians of Doran’s caliber will increasingly find it helpful for fulfilling the biblical command “to make a defense to anyone who demands from you an accounting for the hope that is in you” (1 Peter 3:15).

*Missions and Processions* in Light of Previous Engagements

*Missions and Processions* continues the most serious engagement with mimetic theory carried out over the last two decades by Lonergan scholars. Although Doran is more positively disposed to mimetic theory than other interlocutors, and although he offers a generous reading of Girard, still more brush needs clearing for an open view of how Girard fits into Catholic theology. It will be helpful, even at the risk of not doing justice to some of these authors, to recount briefly the “assessment” of Girard by students of Lonergan.

Girard’s corpus poses a number of problems for a theological audience and requires perhaps a greater generosity than should be reasonably expected. To put it another way, a negatively disposed engagement with Girard could, without too much difficulty, find a number of statements which flatly contradict Catholic teachings about original sin, the New Testament canon, human nature, cooperative grace, the saving work of Christ, and the sacrifice of the mass. For nearly forty years Girard’s work has raised concerns among theologians, often with good reason. It is no surprise that
such an adept group of theologians as Lonergan scholars would highlight some of these concerns.

The remaining paragraphs of this section take up the critiques expressed by Charles Hefling, Frederick Lawrence, and Neil Ormerod, keeping in mind that this overview does not cover all treatments by Lonergan scholars, or even the full range of engagement offered by these three authors. Hefling’s essay, “About What Might a ‘Girard-Lonergan Conversation’ Be?,” levels several accusations at mimetic theory. According to Hefling, Girard’s terminology resides at the descriptive or commonsense level, for it provides examples instead of definitions (106). Failing to distinguish between commonsense and understanding means that subsequent attempts at will inevitably fall short of what good theology is called to (107). Further, Girard’s understanding of the self as inter-dividual puts him squarely in the postmodern epistemology camp, meaning that talk of the subject as substantial self must be taken with a grain of salt (111-12). Hefling then notes that Girard’s skepticism about “sacrificial language” not only excludes Hebrews, but many other New Testament passages as well (117-18). Finally, Hefling’s Girard succumbs to a too textual attitude about Christianity, and thus repeats errors made in the first half of the twentieth century by the notable Protestant theologians Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth (100, 122; more on this below). Although Hefling notices many points of possible convergence between Lonergan and Girard, the overall tenor of his essay is cautionary.

Frederick Lawrence’s engagement with mimetic theory occurs in a larger paper connecting Girard with Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss. Lawrence has detected in Girard a modern anthropological perspective first articulated in

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3There is an especially acute concern among Lonergan scholars that bad cognitional theory leads to bad theology. For this point in Doran, see Missions and Processions, 316-28.

4Although Hefling acknowledges in this 2002 article some awareness that Girard had changed his position on sacrifice to allow for the goodness of “self-sacrifice” (119) so that the term could be recovered, he then overstates his case: “Nothing like that, to be sure, appears in Girard’s own writings” (120). Except it had, as detailed in the following section of this article.

5His earlier overview of James Alison raises some of these concerns, but is on the whole more laudatory: “A View from the Stern: James Alison’s Theology (So Far),” Anglican Theological Review 81 (1999): 689-710.

Hobbes, and later expanded by Heidegger. Lawrence writes, “If I have a hesitation with regard to Girard’s analysis, it is mimetic theory’s apparent naturalization of sin.” For Lawrence, Christian theology must maintain a biblical perspective on human nature as part of God’s creation, originally good as willed by God. If one confuses post-lapse humanity with human nature properly understood, then one will have virtually no chance to understand correctly how the supernatural relates to the natural. Despite this qualification, Lawrence seems more sanguine about the apologetic upside of mimetic anthropology for Christian theology. His summary of Girard’s understanding of the biblical texts leads him to conclude: “What more could an orthodox Roman Catholic theologian ask for!”

Neil Ormerod provides a more sustained and tenacious engagement with Girard. Besides his contribution in the current volume, two earlier essays also engage mimetic theory. In his 2004 article on sacrifice, Ormerod declares, “For Girard, Christianity is in fact anti-sacrificial;” further the use of sacrificial language in the tradition is “basically mistaken.” Although he acknowledges that in his later writings Girard had allowed for a more positive appraisal of sacrifice, Ormerod does not deem this newer position as a reversal, and still considers the anti-sacrificial position “dominant.” His 2013 essay also picks up the themes outlined by Lawrence and Heftling: Girard’s “dark” anthropology falls outside of traditional Catholic anthropology. Ormerod writes, “I think Girard’s analysis is more at home in a Protestant view of human nature as ‘totally corrupt’ than a Catholic one of human nature as ‘sick and in need of healing.’” These critiques seriously call into question Girard’s own claims that his project “is a search for the anthropology of the Cross, which turns out to rehabilitate orthodox

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7See Lawrence, “Philosophy, History, and Apocalypse,” 126. Lawrence also notes that Girard confirmed this reading in an informal conversation at Boston College.

8Lawrence, “Philosophy, History, and Apocalypse,” 125.


10Ormerod, “The Dual Language of Sacrifice,” 162.

Although the section below is not intended to respond directly to each of the above critiques, it will answer some of questions that typically arise when traditionally minded theology encounters mimetic theory.

A HERMENEUTICALLY GENEROUS APPROACH TO GIRARD

As commonly presented, there are three “steps” in mimetic theory. The first is the claim that our desires are given to us, more than generated by us. This step corresponds to Girard’s first major work: *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* (1961). The second is that the potential for mimetic escalation and rivalry posed too great a threat for the earliest human communities. For these communities to survive, there needed to be an outlet—the scapegoat mechanism, elaborated in *Violence and the Sacred* (1972). This mechanism became the foundation for all post-lapsum human culture. The final step is that the Bible fully reveals the scapegoat mechanism. This revelation fundamentally undercuts, as well as transforms, the religious edifice—rituals, sacrifice, and mythic concealment—around which the scapegoat mechanism was based. The third “Christian” part, announced in *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* (1978), had the most direct import for Christian theology. Girard’s openly Christian phase, beginning with *Things Hidden*, came almost twenty years after his own conversion, during Holy Week in 1959, which profoundly shaped *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*. Girard should be taken at his word, then, when he declares, “All of my books have been written from a Christian perspective.”

Given the constraints of the current essay, the remaining paragraphs in this section focus on two questions: Does Girard still regard Christianity as anti-sacrificial, as he did in *Things Hidden*? Further, is Girard’s understanding of mimetic desire compatible with orthodox Christian anthropology? The first question is best answered by looking at the correspondence between Girard and Raymund Schwager (1935-2004), the Austrian theologian. Schwager, a Jesuit, was the first Christian theologian to take up Girard’s theory and apply it to theology, which he did in his 1978 book, *Must There Be Scapegoats?* During the years that Schwager was working on this book, the

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two began a correspondence that became a friendship.\(^{14}\)

Schwager and Girard approached the question of sacrifice from two different perspectives. As a systematic theologian and Catholic priest, Schwager knew that one could not expurgate “sacrifice” from Christian theology. Girard came at the matter differently. After discovering the importance of sacrifice for archaic religion and connecting the object of this sacrifice with a false god, Girard’s discovery of the fundamental difference between biblical revelation and mythic concealment predisposed him to identify the essence of Christianity as anti-sacrificial. Schwager knew, for instance, that Hebrews spoke positively of sacrifice, and that the Council of Trent had anathematized all who denied that the mass was a true and proper sacrifice.\(^{15}\) Already in 1977, Schwager realized that, in order for Girard’s theory of the scapegoat mechanism to be integrated into Catholic theology, it would require further distinctions regarding sacrifice, especially pertaining to Hebrews. He was unable to convince Girard before the publication of *Things Hidden* in 1978 that the gospels made it possible to think about sacrifice differently.\(^{16}\) Indeed, the epistolary record indicates that Schwager’s promptings inclined Girard to argue more forcefully in *Things Hidden* how Hebrews reverts to a sacrificial logic that the gospels had overcome.\(^{17}\)

In time, the persistent efforts of Schwager helped Girard to revise significantly his conception of how to relate sacrifice to the cross. Over the past twenty years, Girard has consistently rejected, without equivocation, the position for which he had advocated in *Things Hidden*. The first public

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\(^{14}\)The correspondence is to appear shortly. My knowledge of it comes from attending the 2013 AAR session on this correspondence, as well from reading the articles that resulted from the session: James Williams, “Dialogue on Sacrifice and Orthodoxy: Reflections on the Schwager-Girard Correspondence,” 47-54; Mathias Moosbrugger, “Raymund Schwager’s Maieutics: ‘Mimesis and Freedom’ and the Transformation of René Girard,” 55-66; and Józef Niewiadomski, “Step-by-Step: On the Way to the Rehabilitation of the Sacrifice in the Correspondence between Raymund Schwager and René Girard,” 67-74 in *Contagion* 21 (2014). For the most thorough treatment of the sacrifice question in Schwager and Girard, see Moosbrugger, *Die Rehabiliterung des Opfers: Zum Dialog zwischen René Girard und Raymund Schwager um die Angemessenheit der Rede vom Opfer im christlichen Kontext* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 2014), my review of which appears in the December 2014 issue of *Theological Studies*.

\(^{15}\)Council of Trent, Session 22, Canon 1: “Si quis dixerit, in Missa non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium, aut quod offeri non sit aliud quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari: anathema sit” (Denzinger, 1751).


manifestation of this revision came in his 1993 interview with Rebecca Adams, where he stated of his reading of Hebrews, "I was completely wrong," and "That’s the one part of Things Hidden that I would like to change."18 Two years later, in a Festschrift for Schwager, Girard penned an essay that unpacked his laconic statement in the Adams interview.19 Here Girard unequivocally declares that Christianity is not essentially anti-sacrificial, but instead self-sacrificial: "I saw the logic of Schwager’s argument, but I could not bring myself to approve it. It aroused in me a feeling of unease that over time grew fainter and finally disappeared."20 Girard later declared: "We have then to use the word ‘sacrifice’ as self-sacrifice, in the sense of Christ. [...] No greater difference can be found: on the one hand, sacrifice as murder; on the other hand, sacrifice as the readiness to die in order not to participate in sacrifice as murder."21 Still, despite Girard’s reversal, the damage was done: in his most cited book, he gave the impression of wanting to conform the Christian canon to his own understanding about Christianity’s true essence. The evidence now available – interviews, letters, and Girard’s own writing – make it harder if not possible to maintain that Girard’s position on sacrifice does not adhere to traditional Catholic teaching.

The question of the compatibility between Girard’s notion of mimetic desire and orthodox teachings about human freedom and the natural desire for God, is, admittedly, a tougher nut to crack. Girard’s understanding of desire, as well as his notion of the scapegoat mechanism and its universality, have led many to conclude, along with Ormerod, that Girard posits a dark, agonistic worldview rife with violence.

The most helpful way to get a better handle on Girard’s theory of desire is to understand his project as a reaction against Romanticism. The French title of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel brings out this point in the wordplay that contrasts romantic “deceit” (mensonge romantique) with novelistic “truth” (vérité romanesque). By insisting on mimesis, Girard means to deconstruct the

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19See Girard, “Mimetische Theorie und Theologie,” in Vom Fluch und Segen der Sündenböcke, ed. Józef Niewiadomski and Wolfgang Palaver (Innsbruck: Kulturverg, 1995), 15-29. This piece was also republished as part of the 2001 French original of The One by Whom Scandal Comes, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 33-48. Before 2014, however, there was no English-language version of this translation.
20Cited from The One By Whom Scandal Comes, 34
Romanticism that Fred Lawrence captured in his 1993 article on Lonergan and the postmodern subject. He writes: “The Romantic subject is deep, because it likes to feel its own feelings, which are inexhaustibly deep. [. . .] The inner feelings of the Romantic subject are so deep that they can only be discovered by expressing them through imagination.” This sense that our choices express something about our identity – a notion perfectly captured in I-Tunes – filters all the way down: fashion, music, friends, and profession are understood in our culture as means to express individual uniqueness.

Girard’s work challenges the sometimes naïve assumptions about the purported enclosed existence of the individual.

It is often unacknowledged how Hegelian Girard is, yet this Hegelianism helps clarify Girard’s anti-Romanticism regarding the individual. In Hegel’s steps toward higher consciousness, one passes through various phases, many of which are deeply enmeshed in the self’s assessment of the other. Girard has poked and poked at one element of self-consciousness, perhaps that element most liable to be taken as self-generated: desire. Girard deconstructs the notion of the self that presumes to arise from within us. Mimetic desire, as opposed to a Romantic anthropology, sees the human individual as “inter-dividual”: there is no self before the Other. Or as James Alison says, “The other is always anterior to me.” Therefore culture educates desire. The Catholic theologian Paul Griffiths makes this point more succinctly than any passage I have found in Girard:

Culture educates desire. Desire without culture’s pedagogy is intense but inchoate, unformed, without goal or purpose: the newborn sucks as the nipple touches its lips . . . its eyes move to light . . . Everything else is taught and learned . . . . Here you fall to your knees, there you curse, this is disgusting, that is beautiful.

24For Girard’s reflections on his Hegelianism, see Battling to the End, 30.
Above the appetitive, instinctual level, human wants and perceived needs are learned rather than imagined ex nihilo.

The anti-Romantic bent of Girard’s project has led many to regard mimesis as fundamentally sinful, and mimetic theory as a denial of human freedom. Neither of these conclusions need follow from Girard’s anthropology. Girard himself has affirmed the goodness of mimesis as well as the reality of human freedom. The mimetic nature of the human brain explains the enhanced capacity for both good and evil. Girard’s most sustained exploration of this capacity has focused on violent escalation, but the theory itself offers a single explanation for human virtue and vice. Of its positive outgrowth Girard writes, “Human beings are essentially mimetic, saintliness is mimetic, innovation is mimetic.”27 The goodness of mimesis is not unqualified, yet human mimetic capacity is part of God’s creative plan. Girard continues by humorously contrasting the biblical with the modern account: “In the Gospels, everything is imitation, since Christ himself seeks to imitate and be imitated. Unlike the modern gurus who claim to be imitating nobody, but who want to be imitated on that basis, Christ says, ‘Imitate me as I imitate the Father.’”28 The same capacity that allows the highest form of ethical life to take root – imitation of Christ – also explains the frequent departures from God’s intention for humanity.

Even if man the imitator is not sinfully inclined through the mimetic capacity, the question still remains whether the human being is ethically free, or just simply a puppet?29 Girard answers “I’m not saying that there’s no autonomous self. I’m saying that the possibilities of the autonomous self are always hindered by mimetic desire and by a false individualism whose

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27 René Girard, When These Things Begin, trans. Trevor Cribben Merrill (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 46. As Doran’s quotation on page 310 illustrates, there has persisted a doubt among Lonergan scholars about the goodness of mimesis. Hefling acknowledges that mimesis can also be positive, but wants to downgrade this point when he writes, “Mimesis, for example, is not (in later works) always or invariably acquisitive and rivalrous. But to say ‘not always or invariably’ amounts to writing a blank check” (Charles Hefling, “About What Might a ‘Girard-Lonergan Conversation’ Be?,” 105). For a more properly neutral articulation of mimesis by a Lonergan scholar, see Mark T. Miller, “Imitating Christ’s Cross: Lonergan and Girard on How and Why,” in Heythrop Journal 54 (2013): 859-79, at 869: “In itself, mimesis is not necessarily positive or negative.” Doran has it both ways, following Hefling: “There is, then, a radical ontological sickness at the core of mimetic desire” (210), and Miller: “Now mimesis in itself (or in the abstract) is neutral” (212).

28 Girard, When These Things Begin, 47.

appetite for differences tends to have a leveling effect.” This qualification is important, especially in light of his diagnosis of the Romantic worldview: “In Romanticism, there is an excessive belief in individual autonomy.” Mimetic theory qualifies the Romantic impulse, especially the impulse that correlates society with human sinfulness, and a person detached from that society as pre-lapsarian. Or as Allan Bloom puts it in his summary of Rousseau, “The trouble with man comes from society, not from nature.” Mimetic theory calls into question the theoretical separation of the individual from society that so enthralled modern political theory.

In its most basic contours, Girard’s account seems compatible with Catholic understandings of human freedom, which the Catechism of the Catholic Church calls “limited and fallible” as a consequence of original sin (no. 1739). Aquinas, a thinker with a robust affirmation of human freedom, locates a threefold good of nature: its principles (nature), an inclination to virtue, and the gift or grace of original justice. Although the first good remains after the Fall, the second is diminished, and the third disappears entirely. For Aquinas, we are naturally habituated into the virtue for which we were created, but after the Fall, although the natural capacities remain, the concupiscent moral impulse inclines toward evil. This understanding builds on the Augustinian account, in which the post-lapsum human, burdened by an original sin already present at birth, needs divine grace to live and to achieve her natural end. Thus the Council of Trent, Sessions 5 and 6, confirms both Augustine and Aquinas when it insists on the need for this grace (Denzinger, 1515, 1525, 1528).

**Girard and Freedom in Missions and Processions**

Even if one accepts Girard’s qualification of human freedom, it would not foreclose the possibility that Lonergan corrects Girard regarding the natural desire for God. Girard’s notion of mimetic desire seems incompatible with Lonergan’s articulation of the *eros* of knowing, which he describes as the “pure, detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know.” Girard’s

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30 Girard, *When These Things Begin*, 12.
31 Girard, *Battling to the End*, 33.
33 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85 a. 1
works elide a discussion of eros, a term which serves as the driving force for Lonergan’s account of how the human being comes to know. The wind behind these sails comes to a near stop if all human desiring, especially desiring for knowledge and for the good, is derivative of mimetic desire. Doran notes: “For Girard our desires are elicited, not natural” (198). This includes the desire to know, which for Lonergan, following Aristotle, is natural (*Metaphysics* I, i).

Despite the apparent incommensurability of these arguments, *Missions and Processions* sets out to reconcile them, chapter 9, which accurately describes mimetic desire (205-11). Its import is also underlined by Doran when he writes, “The theological significance of Girard’s work is momentous.” A few sentences later, after mentioning the theological appropriation carried out by such scholars as James Alison, he adds, “If all these statements are true, then any systematic theology that purports to be a theological theory of history must take Girard’s work with utmost seriousness” (214). At the end of this paragraph Doran even hopes that future understandings of grace will tease out its “interindividual” qualities. He reads Girard’s account of human desiring, and the level of consciousness that mimetic theory provides, as providing positive and even transformativ elements to Lonergan’s cognitional theory. After recalling that “No one, not even the greatest saint, lives in that realm untroubled serene, free of temptation and distortion” (201). Doran elaborates, “Among contemporary authors, René Girard in particular has called our attention to the extremely precarious nature of any human claims to autonomous subjectivity” (203).

Here Doran’s willingness to supplement Lonergan with Girard seems at odds with his concern to uphold human autonomy. This previous citation puts on shaky ground claims to “autonomous procession” so central to Lonergan’s insistence about the way human beings freely respond to the promptings of the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5 – “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit” – does for Lonergan what Romans 3:24 did for Luther). Doran’s own theology of conversion helps clear a path through this thicket.

Longtime readers of Doran know the importance of the category of “psychic conversion,” which Doran uses to fill out Lonergan’s categories

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the vagaries of desire, and especially of desires that would interfere with the unfolding of the transcendental, spiritual autonomous, active desire for being and value, the pure, unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire for what is, what is true, and what is good” (197).
of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The psychic element, writes Doran, "connect[s] spiritual intentionality with the energic resources, the primordial intersubjectivity, the tidal movement, the passionateness of being," with the "intentional operations" that together constitute conscious operations (7-8). Mimetic theory puts meat on the bone of these categories in a far superior way than Freudian or Jungian analysis did. Doran summarizes, "Girard has introduced a necessary hermeneutics of suspicion into the project of self-appropriating initiated by Lonergan, a hermeneutics that is probably the best categorial articulation to date of what my own work has anticipated heuristically by speaking of psychic conversion" (224). Conversion, therefore, does not occur when a purportedly pristine self blocks out the other, in the mode of the Romantic hero, but rather when a self allows the intrusion of "another Other" who donates gentle landing space for the newly discovered self. The question remains, however, to what extent Girard’s notion of a desire learned from another undermines the possibility of an "autonomous spiritual procession that alone qualifies as an analogue for divine procession" (225). This procession lies at the heart of Doran’s theology of mission, the central subject of The Trinity in History. This point will be picked up in the concluding section of the essay.

Mimetic theory also contains radical soteriological consequences, which Doran seeks to integrate into Lonergan’s Christological writings. Doran uses Lonergan’s somewhat underdeveloped dialectic of "sacralization" and "secularization" as a heuristic to understand the movement of progress and redemption in history. Both Girard and Lonergan include a strong moral element in their theologies of the cross. Lonergan articulates this element in thesis 17 of De Verbo Incarnato: "Divine wisdom had ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with the evils of the human race through power, but to convert those evils into a supreme good according to the just and mysterious Law of the Cross" (231). To this statement Doran appends a quotation from Girard, stating that, according to divine plan, the long reign of evil would be overcome through the cross. In this rendering, Girard outlines with greater precision the evil that is overcome — "[Girard’s] model of mimetic desire, contagion, and rivalry contributes

35Doran reiterates this point in the concluding chapter, especially pages 337-38.

36The most rigorous application of mimetic theory to soteriology, in my mind, is found in Mark Heim’s Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. Eerdmans, 2006).
to our understanding of the concrete dynamics entailed in the Law of the Cross” (245) – while Lonergan gives a thicker theological account of the consequences of that overcoming by connecting the cross with deification and the communion of saints (236).

Doran also highlights a corresponding model of redemption in Girard and Lonergan. Both thinkers offer modern versions of the “Christus Victor” type that Gustav Aulén trumpeted as an alternative to the Anselmian (penal atonement) and Abelardian (exemplary) types. Doran writes, “The Girardian perspective would agree with Lonergan that God the Father raised Jesus from the dead precisely as a manifestation of the ‘victory’ of the cross” (237). In this chapter Doran draws a tighter connection between Lonergan and Girard, at least in terms of their understanding of redemption, than given in his 2010 article on the topic.

On the near shore of any soteriology must lie an account of human sin from which liberation or salvation comes. Both Lonergan and Girard develop vocabularies to understand with greater accuracy the nature of human sinfulness. Lonergan’s account of bias in Insight distinguishes between individual, group, general, and dramatic forms of bias. Lonergan uses these terms to explain how human individuals and groups “sin against the light.” Bias names how the human cognitional process goes off the tracks. Doran helpfully locates Girard’s mimetic desire within Lonergan’s dramatic bias, noting how much of an improvement Girard is on Freud, who had served as Lonergan’s example in Insight:


38See Robert M. Doran, “The Nonviolent Cross: Lonergan and Girard on Redemption,” Theological Studies 71 (2010): 46-61. Doran writes, “In the present case, Lonergan’s ‘Law of the Cross’ is an upper blade, while Girard’s notions of acquisitive mimesis, mimetic rivalry and violence, and the victim mechanism provide at least some of the data that the upper blade allows the theologian to organize into an understanding of this particular doctrine” (51). Missions and Processions jettisons the language of “upper and lower blades” while continuing to maintain, as did the 2010 article, that mimetic theory helps fill in Lonergan’s heuristic structure (“The Nonviolent Cross, 59). It should be noted that Doran also integrates another article on Lonergan and Girard into Missions and Processions, chapter 10: Doran, “Lonergan and Girard on Sacralization and Desacralization,” in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 63 (2007): 1171-1201. This article indicates greater continuity in Doran’s thinking through these topics.

[Girard’s] understanding of the dynamics of what, following Lonergan, we may call dramatic bias, the bias of unacknowledged motivation, exposes its mechanism in a manner that is almost epochal in its cultural implications. In *Insight*, Lonergan relied on a modified Freudianism to expound what he meant by dramatic bias. But Girard goes far more directly to the source and root of a specifically psychogenic religious aberration and departure from coherence (248).\(^4^0\)

Like tectonic plates, these factors can affect our the cognitional process more than strictly intellectual accounts of human knowing often recognize. Mimetic theory, which underscores how deeply the individual receives an identity from an Other, colors in more accurately and more boldly the elements of dramatic bias that explain patterns of sin and cycles of decline. Girard answers from what we are saved through the cross.

From these examples it is easy to understand why Doran has sought to integrate mimetic theory into his ambitious undertaking. *Missions and Processions* offers the fullest and most generous appropriation of Girard by any Lonergan scholar to date.\(^4^1\) Despite all that this book does to positively dispose Lonergan students to Girard, I hope that additional suggestions might further encourage this reception. In the concluding pages of chapter 10, Doran echoes Hefling’s assertion that Girard emphasizes texts at the cost of events (254).\(^4^2\) After mentioning that Girardians should be less skeptical about affirming authentically sacred elements in non-biblical religions, Doran returns to the textual difference, “I think ultimately that Lonergan could ask of Girard only that he transcend the emphasis on texts to focus on the events that the texts narrate and the history in which those events occurred” (255). This point is not fleshed out, and it comes with no corresponding citation from Girard that would demonstrate a prioritization of the texts over the event of the passion. Hefling, who expounded on this point in greater detail, remarked that Girardians have mostly done biblical theology, that is, exposition of biblical texts. The New Testament, however,

\(^4^0\)For a recent assessment by Girard on the relationship between mimetic theory and Freudian analysis, see *When These Things Begin*, 105-12.


provokes further questions, such as the questions Doran addresses in this book, and biblical theology cannot answer all of them. Thus Girard’s project has a gaping lacuna, according to Hefling and Doran.

The last two paragraphs of Hefling’s essay sharpen his critique by extrapolating on the deleterious consequences of such a textual approach. He claims that Girardians, like Barthians and “all theologians who immerse themselves in texts,” are dangerously inclined toward a “Functional Binitarianism [. . . which] affirms the divinity of Christ (as Girard does), so that there are in some sense two who are divine.”43 Hefling vastly overstates his case here, and it appears that Doran follows him, even if only impressionistically. Initiates in mimetic theory know that Girard has a robust pneumatology: In The Scapegoat Girard writes, “The Spirit is working in history to reveal what Jesus has already revealed, the mechanism of the scapegoat, the genesis of all mythology, the nonexistence of all gods of violence.”44 In addition to this text, I suggest the following as well: I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, Things Hidden, and James Alison’s Knowing Jesus, all of which deal specifically with the role of the Holy Spirit, especially as expounded in John’s term paraclete. Whatever the faults of Girard as a Christian thinker, Functional Binitarianism is not one of them. And if Binitarianism follows necessarily from a too textual approach, then one would need to revise the judgment that Girard emphasizes texts over events if his pneumatology is acknowledged.

CONCLUSION

Previous sections of this essay have referred obliquely to autonomous procession, for which human consciousness serves as an analogue of divine autonomy. In the concluding chapter of Missions and Processions, Doran states:

Even the autonomy of human consciousness, which supplies the analogy for the divine processions, is subordinate not to any object, and, we might add in the context of our considerations from Girard, not to


any mediator of objects, but only to the infinite subject in whose image it is made and which it is bound to imitate. Its autonomy resides precisely in the image in which it is made, the image of divine autonomy understanding, affirming, and loving; its authenticity resides in its fidelity to that image. (338)

This quotation packs a strong punch and also refracts the erotic quality of knowing so central to Lonergan’s cognitional theory. This statement forces readers to revisit the commensurability between Lonergan and Girard that played a central role in earlier chapters. At this juncture, besides pointing the preceding section of this essay in order to suggest how mimetic theory might contribute to a theology of divine mission, it behooves us to return to an interview with Girard where he qualifies his understanding of mimetic desire. Girard says that that mimetic phenomena interest him because of their wide application. He goes on to add: “But I’m not saying that they exclude all other types of explanation. For example, I believe in the love that parents have for their children, and I don’t see how you could interpret that love in a mimetic fashion.” His interlocutor then asks whether all desire is religious, to which Girard responds, “All desire is a desire for being.”

Here we have the inchoate basis, I believe, for the possibility of a love that exists apart from the vagaries of mimesis, and a desire unrestricted in the sense insisted on by Doran and Lonergan.

In the history of theological schools, those which turn inward and become self-referential inevitably grow stale. As an eager pupil of the Girardian school, and an occasional interloper in the school of Bernard Lonergan, I am doubly thankful to Doran. It is not inconceivable that a North American Jesuit could compel a rethinking of eros among Girardians that recalls how an earlier, Austrian Jesuit compelled such a reconsideration by Girard himself.

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45Girard, When These Things Begin, 12.
WHY LONERGANIAN PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD READ LONERGAN’S AND DORAN’S THEOLOGY

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In this essay I explore the question, "Why should Lonerganian philosophers read Lonergan’s and Doran’s theology?" Such a question is rooted in my own experience of really getting into Lonergan’s theology after retiring from Fordham in 2006, truly one of the best things that has happened to me in retirement. Because of the University of Toronto Press, we have access to many of Lonergan’s writings on theology, and more are on the way.

As a result, I had the sense when reading Lonergan on theology of only having half-known him before I started such reading. I realized that, in addition to being a philosopher and a methodologist, Lonergan throughout his life was a practicing theologian and that his main philosophical and methodological works, *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, are linked to and motivated by his work as a practicing theologian. Such reading also enabled me to see in the theological work at least a partial verification of the claims of *Method in Theology*, which might otherwise seem too abstract and programmatic. "Indeed," one might ask, "is *Method in Theology* on the right track?" "Yes," Lonergan might reply, "it is on the right track because I have been using and practicing some of its tenets in the doing of theology, especially in the 1950s and 1960s."

Thus, we develop a more concrete and robust sense of the way *Insight* and *Method in Theology* emerge out of issues that arise in his teaching and writing theology, and that his theology as that develops over the years is more and more informed by philosophical and theological method. Not perfectly, of course, because the language is often metaphysical rather then phenomenological, is often in Latin initially, and is not, at least initially, grounded in method.

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At this point, enter Robert Doran, whose name is not totally unfamiliar to members of this audience. He is well-known as an interpreter of Lonergan, a co-editor of the collected works of Bernard Lonergan, and an original philosopher-theologian basing himself on Lonergan but going beyond him to speak in his own voice. As Doran himself says on the first page of What Is Systematic Theology?, "I am speaking in my own voice and not primarily as an interpreter of Lonergan."

When I first read Theology and the Dialectics of History in the early 1990s, I asked myself whether there was a more important Lonerganian book, by anyone other than Lonergan himself. Its range, sweep, and originality were and are impressive. Having read the works on psychic conversion, which addition to the pantheon of conversions Lonergan himself endorsed, I was prepared for the further discussion of psychic conversion. What came as a pleasant surprise was the importance of criticizing and overcoming imperialism or neo-imperialism, and linking that overcoming to a preferential option for the poor. Since I was already moving in a similar nefarious direction in my own work, I felt encouraged and confirmed in such a choice. To be self-appropriated and to be converted intellectually, morally, religiously, and psychically, is by implication to be committed to a critique and overcoming of imperialism, both capitalist and state socialist versions, and to a preferential option for the poor.

This current volume on the Trinity in history follows the two earlier volumes in theology by Doran. Also, Doran intends at least one more volume on the Trinity in history. This current work further establishes him as a major, important voice on the contemporary theological scene, perhaps the most important, in North America.

The core claim in this volume in systematic theology is that there is a unified field structure in theology, which has two main aspects, a four-point hypothesis concerning Christianity and a theory of history. The four-point

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3Namely, the aforementioned Theology and the Dialectics of History, Doran's own version of fundamental theology, and What Is Systematic Theology?

4Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 17-39.
hypothesis links four supernatural, created realities in the human being to different relations in God: Christ’s secondary act of existence to paternity, sanctifying grace to active spiration of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, charity to passive spiration, and the light of glory to the filiation. The theory of history, in turn, combines at its core Lonergan’s cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics. As the special categories peculiar to Christianity are present in the four-point hypothesis, so the general categories that theology has in common with other disciplines are present in the total and basic science, which is the basis for formulating a theory of history. Thus a systematic theology will be an account of the Trinity in history, of God’s action in history.5

Doran gives most of his attention to the second and third elements of the four-point hypothesis, sanctifying grace and charity. Understood psychologically, sanctifying grace is the experience of being on the receiving end of God’s love, and the reflective act of understanding grounds a judgment of value, the “yes” that is faith, the knowledge born of religious love. From such evaluative judgments proceed the loving decisions through which we love in return. Thus we have an analogy on the level of grace for understanding the Trinitarian processions as they are in themselves and as they relate to us.6

But such an analogy on the level of grace presumes an analogy on the level of nature such that procession of the inner word as a judgment of value is similar to the generation of the Son from the Father, and the procession of an act of loving decision from judgment of value is similar to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son and the Father.7

Many rich, fruitful explorations flow from this basic field structure. These include the following examples: (1) the way that the notion of social grace allows Doran to link up his account with that of liberation theology; (2) the way that the mission of the Holy Spirit understood as not only following but also preceding the Incarnation allows an opening of Christianity to other world religions; (3) Doran’s use of René Girard’s work shows how Christian practice in Jesus and in ourselves is a nonviolent overcoming of evil through suffering love, and therefore, liberates human beings from mimetic violence;

7Doran, The Trinity in History, 259-309.
and (4) his distinguishing between sacralisations and secularizations that should be accepted and those that should be rejected.

Now I wish to go more into detail on a couple of issues that arose for me in my reading and re-reading of the book. I should say that I have discussed both of these with Doran privately, and that he has more or less satisfied me. But perhaps more detailed exploration of these will enable us to get more into some of the rich content of the book and to gain a sense of the considerable resources Doran has to answer such questions.

The first question, and the most bothersome, concerns claims about autonomous spiritual procession in chapter 8 of the book. Autonomous spiritual procession means the conscious origination of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act. Such a procession is exhibited in the procession of concepts from acts of understanding, of judgments from reflective grasp of evidence, and of good decisions from authentic judgments of value. It is only in the procession of act from act that an analogy for the Trinitarian process can occur. Such autonomous spiritual procession must be distinguished from spontaneous procession exemplified in the procession of understanding from questions; which is a procession of act from potency.8

Such a distinction is important, according to Doran, because it solves the fundamental Trinitarian problem, namely, how it can be true that the Son is both a se and not a se, how it can be true that the Holy Spirit is both a se and not a se, and how it can be true that the manner in which the Son is not a se differs from the manner in which the Holy Spirit is not a se. Consequently we see how within consciousness as spiritual a remote analogy can obtain between one act to another distinct act in ourselves and one act in God in which there are processions based on mutual relations of origin. In the human knower operating autonomously according to the dynamics of the desire to know, a definition emerges from the act of understanding and further specifies it, a judgment from reflective grasp of evidence, and an act of will from judging some good as obligatory. A definition perfects and completes understanding operating according to the desire to know, as judgment perfects and completes reflective grasp of evidence, and as decision perfects and completes a judgment of value. The desire to know operating in us and moving to understanding, judgment, and decision in us acts as a unity in

8Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 190-95.
diversity in us remotely analogous to the unity in diversity in God.⁹

My question here relates to a tension I sense between psychological or phenomenological accounts of autonomous procession and the metaphysics that flows from and completes these accounts in Lonergan and Doran. If it is indeed true that a definition or concept flows from an act of understanding, then it seems to be true psychologically that act is in further potency to being completed by definition, and similarly for judgments related to reflective grasp of evidence, and decisions related to judgments of value. There is something vague and incomplete and unsatisfactory about an act of understanding, of a cartwheel for example, that does not end in definition. The question, then, is this: In saying that autonomous spiritual procession proceeds from act to act, are we doing justice to the way in which insight requires and completes itself in definition? Is there a danger of seeming to make insight too independent of linguistic formulation rather than seeing them as bound up together? Doran recognizes this necessary interrelationship elsewhere in his book, for example, in his affirming the necessity of the inner word in chapter 12, “Enriching the Context.” There is no doubt that both he and Lonergan make the linguistic turn, Lonergan at least by the time he writes the Verbum articles.¹⁰

Perhaps we begin to meet this concern of mine, as Doran indicated to me in private conversation, by more adequately understanding Thomistic metaphysics. Just as central or substantial form is in potency to central act, so also insight is in potency to linguistic formulation. Yet, at the same time, act proceeds from act. As central act proceeds from central form, so also the inner word proceeds from insight. In any event, what Lonergan and Doran add to Thomas’s metaphysics is a phenomenology of knowing that grounds without replacing metaphysics.

A second question has to do with Doran’s claim that there are two different treatments in Lonergan of value and decision. In Insight the good is the intelligent and reasonable. Decision is an extension of intelligence and reasonableness. There is no explicit mention of a fourth level of consciousness beyond the first three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment. If, in fact, there is a fourth level latent in this account, it only lies in free choice and consequent action. Even the judgment that one should act in a certain way is not explicitly called a judgment of value but is an instance of rational

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⁹Doran, The Trinity in History, 328-36.

¹⁰Doran, The Trinity in History, 328-36.
self-consciousness.

In *Method in Theology*, on the other hand, the good is distinct from the intelligent and reasonable, and the operative question is not “Is it so?” or “Is it true?” but “Is it valuable?” or “Is it really or only apparently good?” The good is aspired to in an intentional response of feelings to values, a claim which is not discernible in *Insight*.11

I found myself surprised by this argument of Doran’s, perhaps because, influenced by *Method in Theology*, I have over the years been reading the discussion in *Insight* as an account of the four levels, albeit one that is less complete. The passages from *Insight* that have motivated my interpretation stem from Lonergan’s distinction between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness, between judgments related to fact and judgments oriented to a possible free action in the world.12 Now I realize that one takes on Doran on Lonergan interpretation at his peril, but still a question lingers for me. Is a fourth level only latent in *Insight*, or is it at least partially explicit, albeit incomplete in relationship to what comes later in *Method in Theology*?13 In any event, these are examples of the kinds of fruitful questioning that can emerge from Doran’s treatment of the Trinity.

For a philosopher such as myself, influenced by Lonergan, the most exciting aspect of the book is the way Lonerganian self-appropriation can expand into theological speculation and be fruitful in such expansion, for example, in the two analogies and in the way such speculation can flow back on and enrich such self-knowledge. Not only am I an experiencing, understanding, judging, and choosing subject oriented to being, but I am a subject that is in the image and likeness of God. Self-appropriation thus leads me to falling in love with God, to being appropriated by God, to lose myself and to find myself in God. I become more able as a Christian philosopher to join in the work of the Trinity in history and to engage in intelligent, loving discipleship.

So, in conclusion, why should Lonerganian philosophers read Lonergan and Doran on theology? We should do so because our own philosophy, our own special edition of ourselves, is anchored in the love of God as the

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11Doran, *The Trinity in History*, 154-56.


13See *Insight*, 633-42.
goal of the desire to know, and expanded. In this intellectual and volitional ascent, we are enabled and invited to become our own original theologians as that work flows from the desire to know and our own self-appropriation. On the other hand, the theology becomes a context and content in relation to the form of method, and what finally results is a unity of form and content, method and truth, method and theology.

Or, to put the matter slightly differently, the knowing of self begins in self-appropriation and this knowing is for Lonergan both of a universal, transcendental structure and of ourselves as individuals. But in religious conversion, in falling in love with God, we are the recipients of a revelation that is also universal in the content of the Christian message and also of myself as an individual before God and Christ. I as an individual only fully know and love myself through the wisdom and love of God. And theological reflection on this gift reveals both universal and individual aspects. Theological reflection thus conceptually completes the task begun conceptually in Insight. The Lonerganian circle is thus completed and joined.

All of us engaged in the Lonerganian project live in the throes of a paradox. The best way to remain faithful to Lonergan is to become the best and first editions of ourselves, to throw away anti-oedipally the Lonerganian ladder, so to speak. And the best way to discover, affirm, and choose ourselves is to be faithful in a non-literal way to Lonergan’s vision in its broad sweep and in the details, to restore the ladder. A helpful way, perhaps to conceive this paradox is to see it as a process of continually removing and restoring the ladder. Robert Doran, in this book and in others as well, exemplifies and lives this paradox in an extraordinary way.

DORAN’S THE TRINITY IN HISTORY:
THE GIRARDIAN CONNECTION

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Robert Doran’s The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Mission, volume 1, Missions and Processions, marks the culmination of over two decades of writing on the question of the nature of systematic theology, the notion of a theology of history, and the significance of what has become called “the four-point hypothesis,” which relates the four Trinitarian relations to various created participations in the divine nature. Drawing on Lonergan’s notions of the scale of values, of dialectics at the personal, cultural, and social level, together with the four-point hypothesis, Doran is providing a framework for a systematic theology for the next millennium. Just as Aquinas developed his remarkable synthesis on the basis of the grace-nature distinction and the visible and invisible missions of the Son and the Spirit, Doran deploys the scale of values, as an unpacking of the grace-nature distinction, and the four-point hypothesis as an enrichment of the missions of Son and Spirit, to project a Trinitarian theology of history. Nonetheless the final achievement of a theology at the level of our time can never be the work of a single person, or even perhaps a single generation of scholars:

In the last analysis, such a theology must be a collaborative enterprise, the work of a community of persons building on common or complementary foundations, employing common or complementary methods, and sharing common or complementary presuppositions as to what systematic theology is and what is needed to move it forward.


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I have written elsewhere on the issue of the four-point hypothesis, which I believe to be the most significant advance, together with the scale of values, in systematic theology since Aquinas. Indeed I argue that the seeds of the four-point hypothesis can be found in Augustine and Aquinas, who had the basics within their grasp, but simply did not join the dots. In this way Lonergan’s work is an element in a genetic sequence of systematic theologies going back at least to the fifth century, and to which Doran’s work further contributes. He does so by taking the four-point hypothesis as his starting point, bringing into a single perspective both immanent (God in Godself) and economic (God for us) concerns, unified by a new and “supernatural” version of the psychological analogy for the Trinity.

In this article, however, I would like to engage Doran’s ongoing dialogue with the work of René Girard, as someone with “complementary” foundations and methods, in helping clarify Doran’s notion of “autonomous spiritual processions.” This notion is an essential element in his attempt to use the four-point hypothesis to develop a supernatural psychological analogy which parallels the “natural” analogy developed by Augustine and refined by Aquinas and Lonergan. My concern here lies not so much with Doran’s own contribution but with the question of Girard’s suitability in providing a proper complementarity to the project.

The article consists of three sections. The first considers Doran’s proposed nexus between the four-point hypothesis and the psychological analogy, and how this nexus might evoke Girard as a potential dialogue partner on the question of mimesis. The second section provides a summary of Girard’s position on the question of mimesis for those less familiar with his work. In the third section I focus in particular on Girard’s notions of internal and external mediation of desire, arguing that this account is simply descriptive rather than explanatory, and as such fails to properly identify the real nature of the distinction involved.


“A trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas and Lonergan: Contingent Predication and the Trinity” (forthcoming).
The Four-Point Hypothesis and the Psychological Analogy

The basic structure of the four-point hypothesis arises from an analogy Lonergan adopts from his discussion of contingent predication, that is, the question of how contingent realities can be predicated of God. His answer to this is in terms of the category of relation. To predicate some created reality to God designates a real relation in the created reality, but only a logical relation in God, so that God is not really changed in Godself. For example, to call God creator designates a reality in the created order but not a new reality in God, who remains the same whether God creates or does not create. The question we need to then ask is whether this same logic of relations can extend not just to God, but to the individual persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit. Given these persons are defined by their mutual relationships, can we use the inner-Trinitarian relations to predicate created realities to the persons individually? The created reality that would then occur would in some sense participate in or imitate the divine relations, just as creatures generally participate in or imitate the divine reality by their very existence. This is spelt out clearly in Lonergan’s earlier writings on grace where he notes:

Now since every finite substance is something absolute, it seems appropriate to say it imitates the divine essence considered as absolute. But since these four eminent graces are intimately connected with the divine life, it seems appropriate to say that they imitate the divine essence considered as really identical with one or other real trinitarian relation. Thus the grace of union imitates and participates in a finite way the divine paternity, the light of glory divine filiation, sanctifying grace active spiration, and the virtue of charity passive spiration.5

5Augustine gives some hint of this possibility in Book 5 of De Trinitate where he notes: “But as for the things each of the three in this triad is called that are proper or peculiar to himself, such things are never said with reference to the self but only with reference to each other or to creation, and therefore it is clear that they are said by way of relationship and not by way of substance.” Augustine, The Trinity, ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991), 197. De Trinitate 5.12 (emphasis added). Significantly the translator dismisses this suggestion as confusion on Augustine's part. I would argue rather that it marks the beginning of the elements needed for the four-point hypothesis.

While this is not the final form the hypothesis takes, it does state clearly the ways in which the analogy operates, taking its stance on the analogy between creature and creator and extending it to the individual persons through the category of relation. In this way the created participations in the divine nature are an extension of the act of creation itself, drawing the creature into a more intimate sharing in the Trinitarian life of God.

Through his further reflections on the incarnation, Lonergan will tinker with the above structure slightly as he adopts a disputed position within Aquinas on what is called the "secondary act of existence" found in the incarnate Word. This position is then taken up in his final expression on the four-point hypothesis in *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*:

First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.

This is the form utilized in Doran’s discussions. It takes the twofold communication of the divine nature through the two processions manifest in salvation as the divine missions and generalizes it to the four trinitarian relations to provide four created participations of the divine nature in human history.

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The question is, how does this relate to a possible supernatural psychological analogy? The development that Doran is seeking to achieve is that of a supernatural analogy based on these created participations in the divine nature which would in some sense parallel the natural analogy based on cognitional and volitional operations in the human subject. While the natural analogy provides a natural imago Dei, present in us all, saints and sinners, the supernatural analogy is to be found where grace abides, as the indwelling of the Trinity within the saints. 9 I shall focus attention on only one aspect of this, largely because it is the one I have a best handle on, and take it as illustrative of the other aspects.

Let us then consider the natural analogy for the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son as found in Augustine and Aquinas. The analogy involved is that whereby a judgment of value gives rise to a loving decision to love that which is judged of value. This loving decision is “because of” the intelligent and reasonable grasp of the goodness of the thing loved. It is not automatic or spontaneous, but deliberate, an act (of love) from act (of judgment). In metaphysical terms it is a processio operati, for which Lonergan uses the term “intelligible emanation.” Here intelligible means both intelligible and intelligent, that is, under the control of intellectual process. Hence it is not just “caused,” but “because of” an intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation of goodness.

Doran then asks us to consider an analogous situation in relation to sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. These are related to one another as active and passive spiration are related to one another in the Trinity, the two relations simply being the single procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, viewed from the two possible vantage points. The argument is that these created supernatural realities in us thus provide a supernatural analogy for the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son within graced human consciousness. Acts born of the habit of charity flow from the sanctifying grace in a manner analogous to the way the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. How then shall we characterize this “flow”?

9 I think Augustine attempts something like this in the final books of De Trinitate, but in the end he admits defeat: “You cannot do it, I know. I am telling the truth, I am telling it to myself, I know what I cannot do” (Book 15:50). See Neil Ormerod, “Augustine’s De Trinitate and Lonergan’s Realms of Meaning,” Theological Studies 64 (2003): 773-94, for an account of how the final books of that work are best understood as operation in the realm of transcendence, where God is known and loved.
At this stage Doran draws the analogy Lonergan developed in his later writings that take their starting point not in cognition but in love:

The psychological analogy, then, has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments of value are carried out in the decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho theos, who is identified with agape (I John 4:8,16). Such love expresses itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments of value are carried out in the decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

As above, the question is how can we characterize the movement from the dynamic state of being in love manifest in judgments of value and decision as an act of loving? Rather than the term "intelligible emanation," Doran proposes the term "autonomous spiritual procession." This captures the reality of a spiritual act arising from and "because of and in proportion to" a prior spiritual act (so that it is "act from act"), where the term autonomous evokes the notion of personal agency or responsibility for the second act. It is a personal process, not spontaneous or automatic, but autonomous and hence something for which I am responsible. Doran uses this notion of autonomous spiritual procession to capture the "flow" from sanctifying grace to acts born of the habit of charity. If I am reading this correctly, what we have here is the classical distinction between grace as operative and as cooperative, cast in the language of interiority. According to this schema, sanctifying grace is operative, whereby God takes out the heart of stone and replaces it with the heart of flesh; the habit of charity is cooperative, dependent upon the work of sanctifying grace but also our "cooperative" autonomous spiritual procession of a decision to love. I am

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One could interpose here Doran's discussion of the three modes of election in the Ignatian exercises as three modes of coming to a judgment of value. This would make a complex discussion even more complex. However I would note that each such mode involves a procession of "act from act."

Doran, Missions and Processions, 176-95.
not sure this aligns with the position of Aquinas, who sees both sanctifying grace and the habit of charity as operative and cooperative, so there may be some more work to do here.  

Doran then brings this notion of autonomous spiritual procession into dialogue with the work of Girard. As Doran notes, Girard tends to collapse the notions of spontaneity and autonomy, relegating them to mythic constructs that mask the mediated nature of human desire. For Girard, as we show below, our desires are mediated to us; they are mimetic. Far from being a spontaneous expression of “who I am,” my desiring self is socially mediated through the desires of others. A further complication here is that the way in which the four-point hypothesis has been stated by Lonergan, each of the four created participations in the divine nature is the result of an exemplary causality. The four graces participate in and “imitate” the four inner-Trinitarian relationships. While this imitation is used in a metaphysical sense, it does raise the question of how this metaphysical notion of imitation may be transposed into the language of interiority and how such a transposition may draw insight from Girard’s account of mimesis.

**Girard on Mimesis and Desire**

Girard’s work is difficult to classify. It has points of contact with psychoanalysis, literary theory, cultural studies, and theology. Certainly his work has fruitfully been taken up by various theologians, particularly in the area of the theological understanding of original sin and soteriology. Perhaps the central feature of Girard’s thought is his analysis of desire, or more specifically the mimetic nature of desire. For Girard, our desires are mimetic, or imitative. Such a stance is a major critique of the notion of autonomous subjectivity prevalent in the Enlightenment, the self-directing, self-creating subject, who autonomously creates a personal world of meaning and value. If indeed our desires are mimetic then our desires in fact reflect the desires of those around us, and so are shaped and even manipulated by our social and cultural environment (a fact used, of course, by advertisers).

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13I have a preliminary suggestion here, but it will need development in a fuller piece.

Girard’s analysis of the mimetic nature of desire can be confirmed in the common experience of parents whose children begin to fight over a toy. The fact that one child desires the toy immediately makes the toy more desirable for the other child. More generally, “we learn to desire by copying the desires of others. Our desires are rooted not in their objects nor in ourselves, but in a third party, the model or mediator.” Thus the “ground of desire resides, not in any one subject, but between subjects.” Desire is thus interpersonal. In this process of mediation, Girard distinguishes two categories, external and internal mediation, where the distinction is one of the symbolic or psychological distance between the subject and the mediator. External mediation allows for some distance or objectification of the process, so that one may be “proud to be the discipline of so worthy a model,” while in internal mediation one “carefully hides [one’s] efforts to imitate the model.” In such internal mediation the mediator then becomes a mimetic rival, with whom one is in competition. “The mediator becomes a shrewd and diabolical enemy who tries to rob the subject of his or her most prized possessions.”

This mimetic rivalry lies at the heart of the phenomenon of scapegoating which Girard has analyzed in various works. This phenomenon works through five distinct stages: “1. Mimetic desire; 2. Mimetic doubling; 3. Mimetic crisis; 4. The Single-Victim-Mechanism; 5. Theogony and the genesis of culture.” The crisis engendered through mimetic doubling and rivalry threatens to destroy the society and is resolved through a focusing of violence on a single victim, the scapegoat. The sacrifice of the scapegoat restores social harmony, transforming the victim into a “divine” source of social healing and reconciliation. The efforts of the society to hide from itself this originating violence give rise to culture and religion, whose purpose is to perpetuate the lie of violence at the heart of the society.


What does mimesis reveal to us about the human subject? As Doran puts the matter:

Imitative desire, wherever it occurs, is always a desire to be Another because of a profound sense of the radical insufficiency of one's own very being. To covet what the other desires is to covet the other's essence... the subject really wants not only what the mediator wants or perhaps has, but even what the mediator is... They must be painfully conscious of their own emptiness to crave so desperately the fullness of being that supposedly lies in others.¹⁹

Girard refers to this desire as metaphysical desire, a "wish to absorb, or to be absorbed into, the substance of the Other," a desire coupled with "an insuperable revulsion for one's own substance." Metaphysical desire is "a will to self destruction as one becomes something or someone other than what one is."²⁰ This reveals a "radical ontological sickness at the core of mimetic desire" for which the "only triumph possible is the complete renunciation of mimetic desire and of the ontological malady that accompanies it."²¹

CRITIQUE OF GIRARD

I have published a more substantial engagement with Girard elsewhere, in which I focused on his failure to distinguish between natural and elicited desire and hence his oversight of the natural desire to know God, which according to Lonergan is not elicited but constituted by our unrestricted desire to know. This has implications in particular for Girard's account of the origins of culture where he fails to attend to what Doran, following Voegelin, calls the anthropological pole of the cultural dialectic.²² In this essay, I want to focus on one element of Girard's account of mimesis, that is, his distinction between internal and external mediation of desire. This distinction is defined in terms of the "distance," largely psychological and symbolic, between the subject and the one who mediates the desire.

¹⁹Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations," 176.
²⁰Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations," 177.
²¹Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations," 178.
While Girard groups mediated desires into these two fundamental categories, he allows that within this division there “can be an infinite number of secondary distinctions.” There is external mediation of the desire when the distance between the subject and the model is “sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres of possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centers.” There is internal mediation when this distance “is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more of less profoundly.”

What is of interest is the language deployed here – distance, spheres of possibilities, contact – language which is decidedly descriptive and metaphorical, but also not clearly explanatory. The basic distinction between external and internal mediation sounds like an either/or, but then is further expressed in terms of relativity, more or less. And it is difficult to grasp just what constitutes “distance” and how it is measured, and how much “distance” is required to move from one category to the other.

How then might we reframe this language? As an alternative I would like to suggest that the distinction Girard is seeking to express would be better stated in the more explanatory language of “conscious but not objectified” and “conscious and objectified.” Lonergan adopts the language of “conscious but not objectified” to speak of the world of affectivity to the extent that we fail to attend to it, leading to a growing conflict between the self as conscious and the self as objectified. This is a genuinely either/or distinction, while still lending itself to a “more or less,” through the more or less successful objectification of the conscious affects involved. It seems to me that most of the mechanism that Girard identifies as scapegoating operates precisely because of the non-objectified nature of the conscious states involved. Hence salvation for Girard involves the objectification of the mechanism, historically made possible through the life and death of Jesus which exposes mimesis and the scapegoat mechanism for what they are.

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22Doran, Missions and Processions, 205.
24It strikes me that there is a certain gnostic feel to Girard’s work, that is, salvation is through having the right knowledge, in this case knowledge of the scapegoat mechanism.
We can push this further by reflecting on the nature of internal mediation. Doran places this as operating within the “first way of being conscious” which is psychic rather than intentional, and so its origins are to be found in neural demands emerging into consciousness. In this regard Girardians have been excited by the discovery of what are called “mirror neurons,” neurons which seem to trigger in one subject when they see another performing a particular task, a reaction first identified in monkeys. These neurons seem to mirror the neural activities of the model. In evolutionary terms this would be quite adaptive as it facilitates the development of adaptive behaviors in the young which are necessary for survival. If verified this would suggest the deep biological origins of internal mimesis. In some ways it might even be the primary mechanism for what Lonergan refers to as spontaneous intersubjectivity, which he refers to as the “primordial basis” for community. If so, this would place internal and external mediation as two very different realities. Here I would like to draw a parallel between spontaneous intersubjectivity and interpersonal relationships on the one hand, and internal and external mediation on the other. Spontaneous intersubjectivity should not be confused with the intelligent, reasonable, responsible and loving formation of interpersonal relationships, however much such spontaneity might be its initial spark. Similarly I think it is a confusion to identify internal and external mediation of desire as two aspects of one thing. Rather, they are two distinct things altogether. The spontaneous emergence of desire though internal mediation should not be confused with the objectification of and responsible negotiation of such spontaneity leading to authentic decision making.

Of course there are many ways in which such objectification and decision making can go wrong, as we are all too familiar. However, such failures hinge on our failure to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in relation to our experience of mimesis. This observation is important, I believe, because there is a tendency within Girardians to think “internal

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26 There is a vast and controverted literature on the question of mirror neurons and their significance, but it is an idea which Girardians have taken up with great interest. See, for example, Vittorio Gallese, “The Two Sides of Mimesis: Girard’s Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation, and Social Identification,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 16, no. 4 (2009): 21-44.

mediation = bad” and “external mediation = good.” But on the reading above, as Doran notes, the mechanism of mimesis is neutral; the problem is not the type of mimesis per se, but a failure to conform oneself to the transcendental precepts. What Girard has done in his account of mimesis is, I think, to identify some of the ways in which the process of objectification of mimetic desire can be derailed, leading to irresponsible decision making (for example, scapegoating), much as Lonergan’s account of the biases does in relation to the pure desire to know.

Furthermore, this process of objectification and decision making arises from our non-mimetic (that is, unelicited) and natural desire for meaning, truth, and goodness which is at its heart a natural desire to see God. This desire is unrestricted in scope, natural to the human condition, and is a natural created participation in the divine nature as the source of all truth and goodness. There is a certain sense in which we could call this participation imitative, but not in either of the senses of internal or external mediation that Girard is speaking about. It is conscious, often unobjectified, but not mimetic in the usual Girardian sense of the term. It is, as Lonergan would say, natural, not elicited. This is significant because Doran wants to make connections between the supernatural created participations in and imitations of the divine nature that form the four-point hypothesis and Girard’s notion of mimesis. If grace completes and perfects the natural and non-mimetic desire to see God is fundamentally elevated through the experience of divine love that “dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on [to set] up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing,” then it is not clear to me that this

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28As I have said elsewhere, this is one of the reasons I find Girard’s position more Protestant than Catholic because there is a strong tendency to see human nature as inherently corrupt. See Ormerod, “Desire and the Origins of Culture.”

29Doran, Missions and Processions, 212.


31Method in Theology, 106. Technically I think one would say that grace does not supply human nature with a new end (which is God), but rather a new relation to that end. That “new relation” is then specified in terms of the various created participations in the divine nature, the foundation of which is sanctifying grace.
operative grace is mimetic in the senses in which Girard uses the term. If I am correct, then I think there would be ramifications for chapter 8 in Doran's book. I think Girard's work requires a significant re-orientation and transposition before it can be successfully appropriated into a theological project of the type Doran is developing.

**Conclusion**

What cannot be doubted throughout this discussion are the creative insights that Doran is bringing to bear on the theology of the Trinity. In previous works and in the current one under consideration, Doran speaks of a genetic sequence of systematic theologies, each building upon what has gone before, fleshing out potentialities in the previous stage, not neglecting previous achievements, but placing them into a new and enriching context. It seems to me that this is what Doran has himself done in relation to Lonergan's contribution. It is unclear to me that Lonergan fully appreciated what he had achieved in the four-point hypothesis. It is spelt out in his *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica* and not further developed. Doran has helped us see the riches it holds, unpacking its potentialities and placing the deep heritage going back to Augustine in a new and enriching context.

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32I am open, however, to the suggestion that the cooperative aspects of grace may have a mimetic component.

33See, for example, Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 89.
A RESPONSE
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I wish to thank Jim Marsh, JohnDadosky, Neil Ormerod, Jeremy Blackwood, and Grant Kaplan for their very generous remarks on my book. At the meeting of the West Coast Methods Institute in April 2014, I responded to the comments from Jim, John, and Neil, as part of a panel that Mark Morelli generously included in the busy schedule of the conference. My comments in response to their contributions are basically identical with those that I offered at the conference. Since both Neil Ormerod and Grant Kaplan address the issue of my appropriation of the mimetic theory of René Girard, I will respond to them together at the end. So the order here will be to address James Marsh's comments first, then JohnDadosky's, then Jeremy Blackwood's, and finally Neil Ormerod's and Grant Kaplan's together.

But prior to any of this I want to give some background that is relevant to all of the comments. The book, The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions, volume 1, Missions and Processions, is the third book in a series published by the University of Toronto Press, but the first to engage full-scale in the functional specialty "Systematics." The two earlier books, Theology and the Dialectics of History and What Is Systematic Theology? deal respectively with issues of Foundations (Theology and the Dialectics of History) and method (What Is Systematic Theology?).¹

We are not always the best interpreters of ourselves, but as I understand my own work, I see two strands cutting through most of what I have written. The first, which plays itself out in Theology and the Dialectics of History in the three dialectics of the subject, culture, and community or the social order, is the duality of human consciousness. I am fond now of constantly quoting the following passage from The Triune God: Systematics, a passage that had not yet influenced me in my earlier work but that makes sense out of this

strand in my work from the beginning, and so from around 1973 on: “we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act.” A great deal of my work has been invested in attempting to articulate the ways in which these two dimensions of consciousness either work together or conflict with each other, whether the conflict is by the immersion of the spirit in the psyche or by the neglect of the affective, aesthetic, and symbolic under the hegemony of what JohnDadosky has called an intellectualist bias. The work prior to Theology and the Dialectics of History was directly concerned with these issues, attempting as it did to get a handle on the dialectic of the subject, which was first introduced by Lonergan in the discussion of dramatic bias in chapter 6 of Insight, and which I tried to work out at first in dialogue not so much with Freud, who is Lonergan’s principal interlocutor in the first chapter on common sense, but with Carl Jung and Paul Ricoeur, each of whom, I judged, was more open than Freud to what Lonergan would call the vertical finality of his first way of being conscious toward participation in the second way. There are, of course, major difficulties in Jung’s work, and these I took up piecemeal over the years and in a less random fashion in chapter 10 of Theology and the Dialectics of History. But there is also something positional in Jung’s insistence on the polymorphism of human sensitive desire, over against Freud’s sexual monism, and in his insistence that sensitive consciousness can develop in many ways and be channeled into many different specializations, without that channeling being suspected as a displacement of aboriginal sexual energy. I always prefer to advance positions in other authors rather than constantly sniffing out counterpositions, which I find a very boring exercise, one that sniffs out the possibility of dialogue before it has even begun. Counterpositions tend to fall away of themselves as positions are developed. I did have to address Jung in a severely critical fashion once I had advanced what I thought was


positional in his work, because I believed his work was heading to a complete moral relativism and even to a Nietzschean ambition to achieve a position beyond good and evil, and that had to be addressed. Jung’s familiarity with the first way of being conscious was extraordinary, but it was not matched by an adequate objectification of the second way, of intentionality, knowledge, decision, and morality. At first I thought the problem was a residual Kantianism in his cognitional theory and epistemology. But Kant’s ethics is a highly moral affair, and Jung showed no appreciation for the integrity applauded by Kant. The problem in Jung was deeper, and I could not move on until I had addressed it to the best of my ability. As I have already said, chapter 10 in Theology and the Dialectics of History rounded off not only that engagement with Jung but also my almost exclusive attention to the dialectic of the subject.

And so my attention turned first to the dialectic of community, which is a social objectification of the dialectic of the subject. Neural demands and intentional consciousness writ large in the social affairs of human beings become primordial intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. This led to an engagement with Marx – and there is evidence that Marx was really Lonergan’s principal interlocutor in chapter 7 of Insight⁴ – and the engagement with Marx eventually became part 3 of Theology and the Dialectics of History, where the scale of values is appealed to in a manner that accords with Marx on what has since been called a preferential option for the poor but that also severely criticizes Marx for reducing culture to economic ideology. That section of Theology and the Dialectics of History also addressed liberation theology.

But if culture emerges in the encounter with Marx as something to be addressed in its own right, then the realm of cultural values in the scale of values had also to be addressed, and so there emerged part 4 in Theology and the Dialectics of History, where a dialectic of cosmological and anthropological constitutive meanings becomes the cultural objectification of the same duality of consciousness.

From what I have just said about social and cultural values it should be obvious that the second major strand in my work at least from the mid-1980s

on was the scale of values. The scale of values and the dialectics of subject, culture, and community are the essential building blocks of the position on the constitution of history explored in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. Every dimension in the scale is given some attention in that book, with distinct parts of the book devoted to personal, cultural, and social values in their relations to the other levels in the scale.

But it was only after the publication of *Theology and the Dialectics of History* that I began to do systematics in the strict sense of that term. I spent the bulk of the 1990s working out basic theses on grace and also refining my notion of just what systematics is and does. The latter chores gave rise to *What Is Systematic Theology?* in 2005, while the former tasks were reflected in papers and articles that began with “Consciousness and Grace” in 1993 and that are still ongoing.

All of this is leading up to the articulation of what Marsh is talking about when he says that the core claim in *The Trinity in History* is that there is a unified field structure in systematic theology, and that the two main aspects of that field structure are the theory of history worked out in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* and somewhat refined in *What Is Systematic Theology?* and the elaboration of Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis regarding grace, which began to get my attention in 1994. Jim Marsh has been a generous reader of *Theology and the Dialectics of History* for a number of years. And largely because of that book and his positive response to it, he and I have engaged in conversations over the years, especially with regard to the larger issues of imperialism, the preferential option for the poor, and what I am now calling social grace.

A unified field structure is basically a position on general and special basic terms and relations in systematic theology. For Aquinas, the first great systematic theologian in the West, the operative unified field structure (never objectified as such, of course) consisted in Aristotle’s metaphysics, which grounded his general categories, and the theorem of the supernatural, which grounded his special categories. For me the operative and articulated or objectified unified field structure lies, as Marsh correctly notes, in the theory of history proposed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, which

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is the ground or base of general categories, and the four-point hypothesis, which may correctly be regarded as an amplification of the medieval theorem of the supernatural. This begins to fill out, then, the realm of religious values in the scale of values, something that I had not done in the two earlier books, where the general categories were given most of my attention. In particular, for us, as opposed to Jesus the incarnate Word of God and to the enjoying of the beatific vision by the blessed, the realm of religious values in the scale of values is constituted by the participation in active and passive spiration in the Trinity manifested through sanctifying grace and charity. And so *The Trinity in History* takes up a basic position in chapter 2 on that participation. Marsh quite correctly articulates this as follows: “At its core, the theory of history combines Lonergan’s cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics. As the special categories peculiar to Christianity are present in the four-point hypothesis, so the general categories that theology has in common with other disciplines are present in the total and basic science which is the basis for formulating a theory of history. Thus a systematic theology will be an account of the Trinity in history, of God’s action in history.” And he goes on to add that I give most of my attention to sanctifying grace and charity, and so to the relation of religious values to personal values. The second volume, which I have started to write, will concentrate much more on the incarnation and so on the mission of the Word, and will be more fullsome on relating religious values to cultural and social values and to the equitable distribution of vital goods to the human community. While social grace is introduced in the first volume, it will be greatly developed in the second. But the concentration in this first volume on sanctifying grace and charity enables me also to develop an analogy for Trinitarian procession in the order of grace, to argue that grace itself has a Trinitarian structure, and in fact that it is an elevation into participation in the life of the Triune God.

Marsh proceeds to pose two questions. The first has to do with “act from act” as a way of designating what I call autonomous spiritual processions. Let me clarify that the expression “autonomous spiritual procession” is simply an attempt to render in a more or less modern English phrase what is meant by “emanatio intelligibilis.” The definition of autonomous spiritual procession that Marsh quotes on the bottom of page 42 in his paper is taken directly from Lonergan’s definition of intelligible emanation: the conscious origination of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and
conscious act – but I add to this, as Lonergan does, that the origination is in the intellectual or spiritual dimension of consciousness and that it occurs in virtue of the dynamism of that dimension of consciousness. He correctly notes that for me (as for Lonergan) it is only in the procession of act from act that an analogy for the Trinitarian processions can occur. The reason is that there is no potency in God, and so there can be no analogy of a procession of act from potency. Marsh wants to say that psychologically the act of understanding is itself in further potency to being completed by definition, that reflective grasp of evidence stands in further potency to judgment, and that judgments of value stand in further potency to decisions. And so he wants to say that what for me are processions of act from act can also be regarded as processions of act from potency. He distinguishes this psychological account from the metaphysical account, but also takes some comfort in the fact that I agreed with him in conversation that even from the standpoint of metaphysics form, while standing in relation to matter as act to potency, is also in further potency to central or conjugate act. Form is first act, and existence or operation second act.

What is important for Lonergan – and my use of “act from act” here is taken directly from his discussion in chapter 2 of The Triune God: Systematics – is that it must be under the rubric of “act from act” that the analogy is constructed. And even then there is a profound difference between us and God, since in our intelligible emanations one act emerges from a really distinct act, whereas in God there is only one act, and the real distinction of principle and what emerges is not a distinction secundum esse absolutum but a distinction secundum esse relativum: relations within the one Pure Act that is God. When the distinction is “absolute,” the principle of the emergence is also the cause of the emergent. For us, to understand is to produce a word, where “produce” refers to efficient causality. That cannot be admitted in God. If the Father were the efficient cause of the Son, the Son would be a creature, and we would be right back with Arius.

In teaching this chapter last spring, prompted by Marsh’s question I indicated to my graduate students that it would have been helpful here if I had made further use of chapter 3 in Verbum, and especially of the distinction that Lonergan draws there from Aristotle and Aquinas between actus perfecti – the act of what is complete – and actus imperfecti – the act of what is incomplete, in motion. The emergence of insight from inquiry is the emergence of actus perfecti from actus imperfecti, whereas the emergence
of concept or judgment from insight is the emanation of *actus perfecti* from *actus perfecti*. I cannot go into the details here, but I do want to note that Lonergan’s account is both metaphysical and psychological, and that he finds no conflict between the two, at least no conflict in which one would negate the other. Nor do I.

Marshall also asks about my claim that there are two different treatments in Lonergan of value and decision. Again, the claim is not mine but Lonergan’s. He admits it openly in “Insight Revisited.” I interpret the difference by appealing to St. Ignatius Loyola’s moments of decision. That certainly is my interpretation, not Lonergan’s. Lonergan tended, I think, to want to replace *Insight’s* position with that found in *Method in Theology*. I want to claim, rather, that they are both valid, and that they name different methods for making decisions depending on whether or not the person confronted with a decision is agitated affectively. If so, then one attends much more to feeling and tries to discriminate self-transcendent feeling from feeling oriented to satisfactions. If not, one uses one’s intelligence and reason to discriminate the pros and cons of various alternatives. The two modes are complementary, and the results of one mode must be able to be adjudicated by the criteria of the other; that is to say, a decision based on the discernment of affective movements must be able to be adjudicated by reason, and a decision based on reason must leave one with the peace of a good conscience. In terms of Marshall’s question, it is Lonergan himself who claims that the two accounts are quite distinct. Marshall asks, “Is a fourth level only latent in *Insight*, or is it at least partially explicit, albeit incomplete in relationship to what comes later in *Method*?” Certainly there is no explicit mention of a fourth level in *Insight*. If there is a fourth level in what Lonergan describes, it is only the decision, whereas in *Method in Theology* there is a whole panoply of operations that constitute a fourth level.

Turning next to John Dadosky’s contribution, I will start by agreeing with the claim he makes on page 1 that while Lonergan tended to ask what theologians can learn from philosophers, still the reverse is true in that an adequate psychological analogy can give the philosopher insight into the adequate philosophy of intentional consciousness. In fact, I think it can be asked whether the relation between insight and inner word would ever have emerged had it not been for the attempts to work out an understanding.

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of Trinitarian doctrine. That relation is first present in Augustine, and as Lonergan points out in “Subject and Soul,” while Aristotle definitely had insight into phantasm, he did not have insight grounding conception or inner word.⁸

Dadosky turns his attention to the development in The Trinity in History of a psychological analogy “in light of the so-called fifth level of intentional consciousness,” or, in my words, of a psychological analogy in the order of grace. In particular, John asks about my re-engagement of the Augustinian tradition in speaking of the analogue for the Father in terms of memoria. To quote John, “the Father is analogous to a principle of love remembered or recollected in the Augustinian sense of memoria, the Son proceeds from the Father as a judgment of value expressing the content of that love, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both as an act of charity from the recollected appropriated principle of love and the judgment of value.” He asks that I “clarify and elaborate [my] reasons for the need of a crystallization of Lonergan’s respective analogies along these lines,” and also that I “elaborate more on what [I mean] by this memoria and recollection.”

There are several factors involved here. First, as I began to argue in What Is Systematic Theology? and amplified in articles published shortly after that work appeared, while a full-scale systematic theology begins with God, and with the triune God, still the order of a contemporary Trinitarian systematics might not have to be quite the same as the order found in Aquinas or in Lonergan’s De Deo Trino: processions, relations, persons in themselves, persons in relation to one another, and missions. The reason is that by the end of that Trinitarian systematics it is established that the missions are the processions joined to a created external term, and those external terms are indicated in the case of both divine missions. If that is the case, and if systematic theology is a genetically and dialectically developing affair, why could a contemporary Trinitarian systematics not begin with the missions but precisely with the missions as the processions, so that one is not reversing the ordo doctrinae, since the processions are still front and center at the beginning but now approached precisely through the missions with which they are identical? That’s the basic point.

But if one wants to try to approach the processions through the missions,

and if one also holds that the structure of the psychological analogy – Speaker, Word, Love – remains permanently valid, then one is going to have to find in the order of the fruit of the divine missions themselves, and so in the order of grace, instances of the structure “Speaker, Word, Love.” In every instance of the psychological analogy, the second and third moments are Word and Love. What differentiates one suggestion from another is the designation of the analogue for the Father. In Aquinas and the early Lonergan, the analogue in the order of nature is intelligere. In the later Lonergan, as expressed in “Christology Today,” the analogue is “the higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love.” In Augustine it is memoria, where, at least if William Hill, the translator of the most recent English version of the De Trinitate, is correct, memoria is Augustine’s word for the self-possession of mind, of mens. In the order of grace, it may be claimed, I believe, that the self-possession of mind, the state in which the mind finds itself as gifted without qualification by God, is something like what Ignatius is getting at when he writes, in the “Contemplation for Obtaining Love”: “The first point is to call to mind the benefits received, of my creation, redemption, and particular gifts, dwelling with great affection on how much God our Lord has done for me, and how much He has given me of that which He has; and consequently, how much He desires to give me Himself insofar as He can according to His Divine ordinance”: that calling to mind is what I mean by memoria, and if Hill is correct, it is also very close to what Augustine meant by memoria. And even if it is not what Augustine means by memoria, it is what I mean by memoria in this development of an analogy. From it there follows exactly what Ignatius mentions next: “and then to reflect in myself what I, on my side, with great reason and justice, ought to offer and given to His Divine Majesty, that is to say, all things that are mine, and myself with them, saying as one who makes an offering” – saying, word, verbum; and saying what? “Take everything.” Charity.

That at least is precisely what I’m talking about in the analogy that I’m proposing. I’m proposing that if the missions are the processions, then they will have a Trinitarian structure, and I’m proposing one Trinitarian structure that is close to our own experience, namely, the structure that provides an analogy for the relation of active and passive spiration: Speaking and

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Word as active spiration, Love as passive spiration, in the order of the self-possession of a person who knows he or she is loved from eternity without qualification by the Triune God.

Dadosky goes on to present a possible objection. Isn’t an act of memory an act of processio operationis, and so of act emerging from potency, and if so can that work in a Trinitarian analogy? Insight itself emerges as act from potency, but it is not that emergence that is useful in a Trinitarian analogy, but rather the emanation of concept from insight. So too, even if memory as I am using it – and I am not using memory in the sense in which Lonergan speaks of it as part of the flow of sensitive consciousness, but rather in the sense of the self-presence of a person acknowledging the divine gift – emerges from potency, it stands as a self-presence in the order of graced reflective understanding or grasp of evidence that is capable of giving rise to a judgment of value that gives thanks for the gift; and from that reflective understanding and judgment together there flow the acts of love that coalesce into a circle of operations or habit that we can call charity.

Dadosky also asks whether this relegates the emanations pertaining to levels prior to the fourth to a lesser status for articulating the Trinitarian analogy. No. I finish the book by returning to that analogy as Lonergan presented it in The Triune God: Systematics. The book is also about the Trinity in history, and the Trinity in history is "religious values" in their relation to "personal value, cultural values, social values, vital values": in other words, it is about the scale of values. This volume concentrates on the relation of religious values to personal values. Personal values are the person being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, and so they are about intelligible emanations at other levels of consciousness. In these emanations there are found instances in the order of nature of the imago Dei in human beings.

I turn now to the response of Jeremy Blackwood. I begin with a comment on his dissertation, which is available on the website www.lonerganresource.com.¹⁰ The dissertation has the distinction of demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt that Lonergan did indeed intend to affirm a fifth level of consciousness. Whether one wants to agree with Lonergan on this issue is another matter, but nobody can now claim that his relatively few published

remarks in this regard are negligible. Jeremy has utilized the website www. bernardlonergan.com to examine thoroughly the evidence contained in Lonergan’s responses to questions at the Lonergan Workshops in the later 1970s and early 1980s. He has presented the materials clearly, and in my view has also given a most helpful interpretation and development of the position Lonergan expresses there.

As Jeremy indicates, he was completing his dissertation at the same time I was completing the book, and so, while I drew on his initial explorations into the notion of a fifth level in Lonergan’s work, I did not have at my disposal the full and rich account that eventually emerged. Thus his essay advances the position on this issue that I expressed in the book, and that advance will enter into my subsequent work. This is an instance of ongoing collaboration continuing beyond the initial steps into further reaches.

Blackwood’s exposition in the first part of his essay of my work from Theology and the Dialectics of History through the volume presently under consideration is exact and thoroughly accurate, as is his account of the use that I made of his own work. I was happy to see that he has picked up on my insistence that the four-point hypothesis offers to systematic theology special basic relations, something that Lonergan’s frequently quoted comment on page 343 of Method in Theology strangely did not account for.

I find Jeremy’s summary of his own work beyond the materials that were available to me very helpful, and especially his solution to the problem of how the fifth level introduces new operations. His treatment of the question, as he briefly indicates here, relies on the operative character of love as uniting Lonergan’s Scholastic theology of grace with his later presentations in terms of intentionality analysis. The key is the transposition of “formal object” in Scholastic theology to “horizon” in a methodical theology, something that Jeremy discovered in the crucial volume 22 of Lonergan’s Collected Works, Early Works on Theological Method 1.11 (This is just another instance of Jeremy’s painstaking research, which has brought him into publications and digital materials beyond the more conventional Lonergan corpus.) As he indicates, these later moves in his work on the fifth level are crucial for my own position on the relation of religious to personal values in the scale of values, and in this sense for the basic position that I have expressed in

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volume 1 of *The Trinity in History*. For this I can only express gratitude.

Neil Ormerod and Grant Kaplan have both addressed my engagement with the work of René Girard, from apparently different positions, with Ormerod tending to be more critical of Girard than I am, while Kaplan finds my comments perhaps not positive enough.

Neil has written extensively on my work and on this book, again in ways for which I find myself extremely grateful. In the present essay he questions my employment of the work of René Girard as contributing to the project of constructing a contemporary systematic theology. He asks about "Girard’s suitability as providing a proper complementarity for the project." The mention of "proper complementarity" is a reference to a sentence that Ormerod cites from chapter 1 of the book: "In the last analysis, such a theology must be a collaborative enterprise, the work of a community of persons building on common or complementary foundations, employing common or complementary methods, and sharing common or complementary presuppositions as to what systematic theology is and what is needed to move it forward."12

Perhaps I may begin my response to Neil by clarifying that I was not thinking of Girard when I wrote that sentence. I was thinking of the community of Lonergan’s students, hoping that this particular community would unite in the effort to construct a contemporary systematic theology. When I appeal to Girard’s work, I am not claiming that he shares or complements my foundations, my methods, or my presuppositions about systematic theology. He may or he may not, but whether or not he does it is not his concern, nor is it mine. *I am* claiming, however, that he has one central insight that I intend to incorporate into my own theological work because it is important for theological discussions of sin and redemption. That insight has a correspondence with Max Scheler’s insight regarding *ressentiment*, and Lonergan recognizes *ressentiment* as described by Scheler as perhaps the "most notable" aberration of human feeling.13 Lonergan is not claiming that Scheler shares or complements his foundations, his methods, or his presuppositions regarding systematic theology, but he certainly is saying that anyone who wants to develop a position on feelings that he would agree with must acknowledge that Scheler has an insight into human

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13*Method in Theology*, 33.
feelings that is extremely important.

My appeal to Girard is similar, if more extensive. In fact, Scheler’s insight and Girard’s are similar, but I employ Girard because he has more clearly emphasized than has Scheler the mimetic character of affective deviation and of its effects on the deviated transcendence of a good deal of religion. This is one of the principal reasons I have chosen to draw on his work. I am not claiming that Girard is working from an implicit or explicit cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, or ethical theory that is positional. He may or may not be. That is not my concern. I am claiming that he has one set of insights that I find extremely helpful. If I had to offer a critique of Girard’s work, I would center it around the lack of a robust theory of “nature.” But Girard is neither a philosopher nor a theologian, and I am not about the task of reversing Girardian counterpositions. I prefer to advance a valuable insight.

Besides, Lonergan very handily provides the notion of “nature” that Girard lacks and needs – “Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible,” with all that these imperatives mean and imply. Girard provides a good deal of insight into devices that lead human beings to be inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, and irresponsible, even though he would not phrase his contributions in this way. In so doing he is supplying something to Lonergan, not in the area of foundations, methods, or presuppositions regarding systematic theology, but through an insight that has theological consequences and resonances that are well worth developing, particularly in an era in which we are increasingly aware of the need for something of a paradigm shift in soteriology. Neil himself seems to admit this when he writes that Girard’s “work has fruitfully been taken up by various theologians, particularly in the area of the theological understanding of original sin and soteriology.” In fact his footnote at this point includes his own article, “The Dual Language of Sacrifice,” published in *Pacifica* in 2004. My own position at this point is that even Lonergan’s valiant efforts in his thesis on satisfaction in *De Verbo incarnato* do not go far enough to move us beyond the disturbing consequences of the misappropriation of Anselmian soteriology. Something new is needed. Lonergan offers an essential piece in the thesis on the Law of the Cross, but even that thesis moves too quickly from incarnation to the paschal mystery without passing through what comes in between, namely,
Jesus’s inauguration of the reign of God in the world.\(^{14}\)

Grant Kaplan has provided an extremely valuable account of the development of Girard’s thought on the crucial notion of sacrifice. However, I do not find the compatibility between Girard’s mimetic desire and Christian orthodoxy as difficult to establish as Grant seems to indicate. In my view the biblical story of the fall and of the first murder are thoroughly mimetic, in Girard’s sense. Furthermore, a phenomenological account of what Lonergan calls basic sin would, I maintain, find infected mimesis as a prevalent component. Perhaps I am misunderstanding Grant at this point, since I agree with him completely that Girard’s account of the difficulty of the notion of the autonomous subject is “completely compatible with Catholic understandings of human freedom.”

Grant may be correct in his criticism of my own critique of Girard as emphasizing texts at the cost of events. That is a point I borrowed from Charles Hefling, as I acknowledge in the book. But whether it is accurate or not, I certainly do not want to carry it as far as accusing Girard of “Functional Binitarianism.” I don’t think Grant is pushing my presentation that far, but I want to make it clear that I am not heading there.

Grant concludes with a discussion of what I have called “autonomous spiritual procession” and its relation to Girardian mimetic theory. I think he finds them compatible. At least I hope he does, because that is what I was arguing in the book. Lonergan and Girard are both students of human desire. It may be claimed, I believe, that a synthesis of their respective positions would provide the broad outlines of something approximating a heuristic structure for the study of desire. The basic categories of such a heuristic structure would be “natural desires,” “elicited desires,” “sensitive-psychic desires,” and “spiritual desires.”

The distinction of natural and elicited desires, as it is relevant to this discussion, is found in Neil Ormerod’s contributions to the Lonergan-Girard discussion cited by Grant. Natural desires emerge from the very structure of human reality, as is the case, for instance, in Lonergan’s account of the desire to know; elicited desires are prompted by the cognitive recognition of some object; sensitive-psychic desires are affective responses to an object that are most often mediated, as Girard has taught us, through models; spiritual desires reflect the capacity of human intentional consciousness for

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self-transcendence in knowing and choosing, so that in pursuing knowledge we want to know what really is so, and in deciding we want to choose what is really and not merely apparently worthwhile. Some but not all of the latter desires are mimetic, but in a positive way.

For the most part, Lonergan has elucidated desires that may be termed natural and spiritual, and Girard has elucidated elicited sensitive-psychic desires. But Lonergan has also alerted his readers to interferences in the pursuit of the natural desire for intelligibility, being and truth, and the good that may arise from elicited, sensitive-psychic desires and from biases that affect both psyche and spirit. Girard not only has provided a set of core insights for understanding elicited, sensitive-psychic desires but also offers, in my view, perhaps the most complete and accurate theory of these desires yet put forward, one that easily complements Lonergan’s work on bias – especially but not exclusively on dramatic bias.

This is the sort of thing I have been looking for ever since I added the category of “psychic conversion” to Lonergan’s work. In my initial explorations, as I mentioned earlier, I worked with Jung, and even there, where the counterpositions are far more serious than they are in Girard, I tried first to advance positions.

In terms of the statement of Lonergan’s on the two ways of being conscious that I quoted earlier, we may say that Lonergan has provided a thorough explanatory account of the second of these “ways of being conscious,” a careful analysis of the unfolding of the eros of the human spirit as we move by inquiry from data of sense and of consciousness to insight into the data, from insight to conceptualization and formulation of our understanding, from formulation to critical reflection, from critical reflection to a grasp of evidence, from grasp of evidence to judgment of fact, from judgment of fact to deliberation, from deliberation to deliberative insight and judgment of value, and from judgment of value to decision. This eros is driven by the native desire to know, which is Lonergan’s transposition of the Aristotelian-Thomist “agent intellect,” and which he extends beyond knowledge to an orientation to the good, and which he also identifies with Aquinas’s “natural desire to see God.”

All of this is for Lonergan “nature.” Nature is a category which Girardian theory urgently needs to incorporate. Obviously, in the concrete and real order of things there is no such thing as pure human nature. The concrete existential situation of human beings is infected by sin and stands under the
offer of divine elevating and healing grace, which we may either accept or reject. But sin distorts nature, while grace elevates and perfects it. Girard’s mimetic theory provides a powerful analysis of the distortions that arise from what Lonergan calls bias and that condition the likelihood of further basic sin. Girard has contributed to Lonergan’s overall analysis by elucidating the mimetic sensitive-psychic desire involved in bias of all varieties. Even before becoming familiar with Girard, I insisted that there is required a self-appropriation of the vagaries of sensitive-psychic desire. Girardian mimetic theory is a helpful means of fulfilling this second requirement. Girard’s basic contribution to Lonergan’s project is the elucidation of the sensitive-psychic dimensions of desire as these interfere with or even prevent the efforts of the subject to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving, or, in a word, self-transcendent.

In short, Lonergan contributes to Girard the distinction I have already summarized between spiritual desire and sensitive-psychic desire, and the distinction between natural desire and elicited desire. And Girardian mimetic theory is a theory of elicited sensitive-psychic desire. It can be related to Lonergan’s project insofar as such desire is responsible for the distortion and deviation of the operations of the human spirit in search of intelligibility, truth and being, the good, and God. The distortion and deviation of these operations converts the operations into instruments for the satisfaction of elicited, sensitive-psychic, mimetic desire, thus frustrating their natural function in human unfolding.

A further clarification that Lonergan provides offers mimetic theory a refinement of the notions of autonomy and spontaneity, specifying a legitimate meaning to these two terms, a meaning that, if it is mimetic in any way, is so in a manner quite different from the acquisitive mimesis whose dynamics Girard has elucidated. I wish to suggest a fruitful mutual self-mediation between Lonergan and Girard, where Girard offers Lonergan a more precise maieutic of the interference with the unfolding of the natural desire for intelligibility, the true and the real, the good, and God, and where Lonergan offers Girard a more precise understanding of the meaning of “nature,” a more differentiated understanding of spontaneity and autonomy, and, most basic of all, a theology of the graced imitation of divine goodness.

Finally, let me simply indicate that perhaps the clearest indication of Girard’s significance for me and of the compatibility that Grant asks about occurs in the first section of the final chapter, “The Rule of the Kingdom
and the Emergence of Genuine Autonomy.” All I can do here is cite the thesis (number 57) that this section elucidates, adding proper emphasis: “Analogy (for the Trinity) based on the genuine autonomy of the human subject, analogies of act from act in the spiritual dimension of consciousness, are available to us only inasmuch as we have been not only freed from the illusions of false autonomy but also freed into a genuine autonomy through the grace that operates us beyond the deviated transcendence of mimetic rivalry.”

Let me conclude by thanking once again all five interlocutors for their contribution to this most welcome discussion.