# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jeremy W. Blackwood</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Eighteen Days in 1968: An Essay on the Maturation of Lonergan’s Intentionality Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brian Cronin, C.S.Sp.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>The Purpose of Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco V. Galán</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Rendering It Explicitly Accountable: Shedding Light on Lonergan’s “Pragmatism” through Robert Brandom’s Normative Pragmatics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Mason</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>The Reconciliation of the Manifest and Scientific Image in Bernard Lonergan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Book Review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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EIGHTEEN DAYS IN 1968:
AN ESSAY ON THE MATURATION OF
LONERGAN’S INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS

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In their introduction to A Second Collection, William F. J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell suggested two main themes in Lonergan’s development in 1964 and 1965: first, the clear emergence of the primacy of the fourth level of consciousness; and second, the significance of historical consciousness. Although the transition from substance to subject is a good characterization of this point in his development, and these two themes are manifestations of that transition, I would like to suggest that perhaps the transition wasn’t completed in the 1964-65 period, after all. Two of Lonergan’s lectures in 1968 suggest that this transition did not achieve its fullest maturity until at least that year.

In “The Subject,” a lecture first given on March 3, 1968, Lonergan’s account of subjectivity reached its summit in the individual: at the end of a summary statement of the advancing levels of consciousness, Lonergan said, “[s]ixthly, finally, rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness, when we deliberate, evaluate, decide, act. Then there emerges human consciousness at its fullest. Then the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake.” In “Horizons,”


given eighteen days later, on March 21, his account of subjectivity reached its summit in the community: after noting the sensitivity we share with other animals, Lonergan highlighted questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, and he then commented that these last are where “self-transcendence ceases to be intentional and becomes real.... That real self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of willing what is truly good and doing it, of collaboration and true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a genuine person in a human society.”

Succinctly put, “The Subject” expressed the summit of conscious subjectivity as the place at which the individual subject’s personal character and essence are at stake, while “Horizons” expressed the summit of conscious subjectivity as a social genuine personhood. Insight had situated the subject socially and highlighted the relative priority of the dialectic of community over the dialectic of the subject. Other, earlier works reveal Lonergan’s awareness of the historical and communal situation of subjects, and appropriate qualifications must be recognized in terms of audience and purpose. All the same, with these two 1968 lectures we find a maturing confluence of the two threads Ryan and Tyrrell identified, as for the first time historical consciousness came into play, not just in Lonergan’s account of the environment of subjectivity, but as an element in the immanent intelligibility of consciousness.

An examination of Lonergan’s materials from a few years to either side of these eighteen days will reveal that the three-week period between “The Subject” and “Horizons” is a marker for Lonergan’s full recognition of the


5Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), at 243: “[O]ne might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual dialectics. In this relationship the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands, and it molds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship. Still, as is clear, one must not suppose this dominance to be absolute....”

meaning of the social context of subjectivity. This article will first document some of Lonergan’s work prior to 1968 to show him heading toward this development. A second section will focus on the two lectures from March of 1968, “The Subject” and “Horizons,” to mark off the confluence itself. Finally, a third section will trace the effects of this confluence in the post-1968 period.

Before March 1968

Lonergan’s accounts of subjectivity prior to 1968 emphasized the individual subject. Though it cannot be denied that in this period he understood the individual subject to be socially situated and impacted, it is clear that community was for him a derivative, distinct, and secondary reality, and it was not integral to the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity as such.

Freedom and Responsibility

Perhaps Lonergan’s most significant breakthrough in the immediate post-Insight period was his explicit identification of a distinct fourth level of conscious evaluation, deliberation, and action. By 1964, Lonergan had realized that this fourth level linked individual subjects and their communities. In “Cognitional Structure,” he could comfortably state that upon reaching the fourth level of “rational self-consciousness,” there emerge freedom and responsibility, encounter and trust, communication and belief, choice and promise and fidelity. On this level, subjects both constitute themselves and make their world. On this level, human beings are responsible, individually, for the lives they lead and, collectively, for the world in which they lead them. In this collective responsibility for common or complementary action resides the principal constituent of the collective subject referred to by “we,” “us,” “ourselves,” “ours.”


The dynamic, historically conscious perspective pushing forth in his work in the mid-sixties opened the door to a full consideration of freedom, which he affirmed to be at the meaning-constituted and meaning-constituting level of history and community. The truly free and responsible subject “can exist only in a freely constituted world,” which can be neither the world of immediacy nor the world mediated by meaning, but must instead be the world constituted by meaning. This is “the properly human world, the world of community, ... the product of freely self-constituting subjects.”

While this arrangement suggests strong links between community, freedom, human nature, and the properly (not only “distinctively,” but also “authentically”) human, at this point there was also an explicit distinction between the world of community and individual subjects: community is “the product of freely self-constituting subjects.” Although Lonergan would say that the field of community, where “historical causality exerts its sway,” is the intelligible locus of the highpoint of man’s freedom and the realm of freedom is where we make ourselves, still communal constitutive meaning results from subjects. In other words, in terms of freedom, community remained extrinsic to the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity.

Fulfillment

Despite being derivative, the constitution of community resides in history, is accomplished through belief, and gives to the members of the community

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10“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 226. In fact, “John XXIII affirmed that freedom is constitutive of human nature.” Moreover, “to exclude freedom is to exclude Existenz” and “[t]o exclude freedom is to exclude personality.” (The later phrasing can be found in the “revised version” of “Existenz and Aggiornamento”; see editorial note p at “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 306.)

11“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 226 (my emphasis).


their own self-meaning and fulfillment. Lonergan opened "Existenz and Aggiornamento" (1964) with the words, "To speak of Existenz, on being oneself, is to speak in public about what is private, intimate, more intimate perhaps than one has explicitly conceived." Yet, while to speak of Existenz is to speak about one's own self-meaning, the "revised copy" of the same talk (apparently intended for a non-Jesuit audience) replaced "on being oneself" with "religious experience." While both phrasings point toward the fulfillment of the subject, their apparent interchangeability sheds light on Lonergan's subsequent development, especially in light of the following paragraph, in which this "private, intimate" speaking was called "a Besinnung, a becoming aware, a growth in self-consciousness, a heightening of one's self-appropriation." If at this point Lonergan considered "being oneself" and "religious experience" to be interchangeable phrases, then it seems he understood religious experience to be in some sense an encounter with the fullness of one's own self.

At the same time, because this "becoming ... growth ... heightening ... is possible because our separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common circle of reference, the human community, and an ultimate point of reference, which is God," religious experience is not only materially and experientially, but also intelligibly, linked to the community. Yet here again, although community makes possible the heightening, the distinction remains, keeping individual subjects (in their "separate, unrevealed, hidden cores") quite distinct from "the human community."

Lonergan eventually understood fulfillment to come in the form of conversion. By 1967, it was clear, likewise, that he understood conversion to be a concrete event (or events) placed on the historical, dynamic, community level. Conversion changes not only "one's apprehensions and one's values," but also "one's relations to other persons and ... one's relations to.

14"Method in Theology – Georgetown," 404. (For example, Lonergan notes that the community’s meaning is given to the "cradle Catholic" by historical Catholicism).

15"Existenz and Aggiornamento," 222.

16"Existenz and Aggiornamento," 222.

17Crowe's notes indicate that the changes were because of differences in audience and give no reason to suspect that they had anything to do with significant substantive shifts.

18"Existenz and Aggiornamento," 222.

19"Existenz and Aggiornamento," 222.

God." But again, while many are aware of his insistence that conversion is not solitary, still the community of the converted is treated as following on the individuals who are so converted. In terms of fulfillment, as with freedom, community was important but remained extrinsic to the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity.

Concrete, Dynamic, Historical Emphasis

As early as 1963, Lonergan was emphasizing that development took place in a performative, concrete context, which allowed him to express such development narratively. This concreteness, however, was applied most significantly to conscious subjectivity. Thus, in "Metaphysics as Horizon," his general agreement with Coreth was tempered by his critique that the latter derived the total and basic horizon from an abstract and metaphysical account of the subject rather than from the concrete performance of the social and historical subject.

In the following year, Lonergan would insist that "it is not objective knowing but human living that is the main point." Though appearing in an essay titled, "Cognitional Structure," this emphasis on concrete living led to an insistence on communication as "the condition of possibility of the collective subject." At the same time, his focus remained on the individual subject, though clearly it was a subject in relation to others: "the principal communication is not saying what we know but showing what we are [and] it is not by introspection but by reflecting on our living in common with others that we come to know ourselves." Although this concrete emphasis produced closer links between community and the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity, at this point (1964), community was still understood to result from subjectivity and remained distinct from its immanent intelligibility.

24"Metaphysics as Horizon," 204.
27"Cognitional Structure," 220.
Other aspects of his thought, however, were pushing toward a central breakthrough on the topic. Lonergan noted that in the move from [static] nature to [dynamic] history, “the world becomes unstuck” – the world really does become different for the converted. The fulfilling meaning of God, as thematized and known, is “mediated by the body of Christ,” which is a concrete, historical, dynamic community. In fact, the “critical point in the increasing autonomy of the subject ... is reached when the subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself,” which is precisely the point at which the subject must appropriate his or her concreteness and historicity. There is here something about the subject, and especially about the authenticity of the subject, that is intrinsically connected to concreteness and historicity.

Moreover, the autonomy of which he spoke at this point was far from absolute. Drawing on Karl Jaspers, Lonergan highlighted “the sin of modernity ... [which] is the fully deliberate and permanently intended determination to ... liberate humanity from the heavy hand of ecclesiastical tradition, ecclesiastical interference, ecclesiastical refusal to allow human beings to grow and be themselves.” Human beings cannot be monads, divorced from tradition, and for this very reason, it is good that this “sin of modernity” pushed Christian theology to discover the error of adhering to a conception of a permanent and abstract human nature to which only minor adjustments need be added to deal with any concrete situation. In reality, we are dynamic, concrete, and historically embedded, and this realization opened “the door to historical consciousness, to the awareness that men individually are responsible for their lives and collectively are responsible for the world in which they live them.”

Thus, he was able to make a quick progression from the emphasis on the concrete to the dynamism constitutive of conscious being, and from

30“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 223.
31This connects to the account of the free and responsible subject in “The Subject.” See editorial note i at “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 305.
32“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 228.
33“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 229. He is not suggesting that historical consciousness as such arises from the sins of modernity. Rather, he is suggesting (and these are my words) that Christianity has drawn the good of a more authentic self-understanding from the evil of modernity’s sins.
there to an openness to God, overflowing Christian love that includes one’s neighbors, and membership in the mystical body of Christ through adoption. When, finally, he affirmed that the being in love that constitutes this membership is not abstract but is instead “identical with personal living,” he had all but stated that concrete personal living is intrinsically interpersonal, communal. Within a year of this affirmation, he would also insist both that the structure of conscious subjectivity is known in concrete activities and that once our attention turns to the concrete, we no longer deal with human beings conceived as abstract monads, but we instead conceive more holistically.

This had a tremendous effect on his understanding of theology, which then flowed back into his understanding of the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity. In 1966, he explicitly affirmed that theology’s proper domain and concern lies in the concrete. He insisted that theologians need understandings of the concrete unfolding of history, not just abstract law applied casuistically. Theology’s inadequacies had their root in the historical fact that, just at the point where modern science and the Enlightenment began to recognize the significance of ongoing, dynamic, historical changes in meaning, Catholic theology retreated defensively into busying itself with ahistorical certainties. Yet Lonergan insisted that “[r]eligion is concerned with man’s relations to God and to his fellow man, so that any deepening or enriching of our apprehension of man possesses religious significance and relevance.” In an overcoming of the earlier defensive move, the “new conceptual apparatus” adds to older analyses of human nature “the quite distinctive categories of man as an historical being. Without repudiating the

56“Dimensions of Meaning,” 245.
58“The Transition from a Classicist World-View,” 6-7. (Thus the “liberal doctrine of progress,” “Marxist . . . dialectical materialism,” and “de Chardin’s cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and christogenesis.”)
60“Theology in Its New Context,” 60.
analysis of man into body and soul, it adds the richer and more concrete apprehension of man as incarnate subject.”

This strong turn toward the concrete then began to shape Lonergan’s conception of the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity. He had broadened from an emphasis on the concrete subject to an emphasis on the concrete historical context of concrete subjectivity. The dynamism of this context requires that foundations be placed, not in the abstract, but in concrete, performative method: the “foundation ... lies not in a set of verbal propositions named first principles, but in a particular, concrete, dynamic reality generating knowledge of particular, concrete, dynamic realities.”

In one of his most focused statements on the issue, Lonergan affirmed that theology’s foundation is to be found in reflection on conversion, which is “concrete and dynamic, personal, communal, and historical.”

**Horizons**

One of the principle aspects of such concrete, dynamic, communal, historical conversion is horizon. Already in 1963, Lonergan placed great significance on it: “horizon is prior to the meaning of statements.” This is an early but incomplete indicator that he was open to subordinating conscious subjectivity to a higher context, but that higher context went beyond simply community. Initially, he conceived horizon as generated by an objective context.

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41“Teology in Its New Context,” 60-61. This was, of course, precisely what Lonergan had been doing during this period.


44“Metaphysics as Horizon,” 198. “Metaphysics as Horizon” (1963) primarily was an account of Coreth, but it highlights the elements of Coreth with which Lonergan agreed. Here, Lonergan had noted that Aristotle and Aquinas both distinguished the “expert” from the “wise man”: while the “expert” knows a domain, the “wise man” knows the interrelation of domains. The highest, unrestricted, viewpoint is the one which grasps the interrelation of all domains and from which no new questions can emerge: “[that viewpoint] is wisdom and its domain is being.” Lonergan notes that this point is easier to express in terms of “horizon,” and while the editorial notes indicate that the term already had a technical meaning for Lonergan, here in “Metaphysics as Horizon,” “we now have what may have been his first published exposition of the concept” (“Metaphysics as Horizon,” 298; see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Insight: Preface to a Discussion,” in Collection, vol. 4 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988]).

45“Metaphysics as Horizon,” 199.

46It’s much more complicated than that. He affirmed, for example, that the term ‘horizon’ transposes Aristotle’s phrase ‘formal object’ (“Method in Theology – Georgetown,” 395).
and a subjective pole, but later the correlatives became the “pole,” the subject in the concrete, and the “field,” the “totality of objects.” With the first definition, it appears that there are two coequal generators of the boundaries of a horizon, but with the second, it becomes clearer that there is an individual subject within a context.

In 1964, he conceived of that context in a dual fashion with the terms “relative horizon” and “absolute horizon.” The relative horizon is in relation to other horizons. It can be understood by distinguishing the horizon of a theologian from that of a lawyer, or that of a lawyer from that of a medical doctor. There is no question about the legitimacy of all of these horizons, but there is also no question that there are many things within the theologian’s horizon that are not within the lawyer’s, or that are within the lawyer’s but are not within the medical doctor’s. Such horizons are socially affected (and, it seems clear, effected), and they likewise affect (and effect) social reality.

Absolute horizon is a much starker reality. It marks the boundary of anything whatever that is or could be meaningful; beyond it is meaninglessness. It is defined by the normative, individual subject, the structure of which provides the heuristic range of meaning within which social meaning resides. Here, though the individual subject and the community aren’t sharply walled off, they are clearly distinct, with one (the individual) taking priority over the other (the community).

Later that same year, the distinction continued. In “Philosophical Positions with Regard to Knowing,” Lonergan stated that “human living is strictly human when you move to that fourth level where people are acting, relating with one another.” The human realizes itself as such at the interpersonal level, while in the same text, this interaction required the (apparently prior) presence of common meanings. Although he affirmed

47. “Metaphysics as Horizon,” 199-200.
51. “Method in Theology – Georgetown,” 398. At this point in this lecture, Lonergan detailed the “normative subject”; “deviations”; the “neglected subject, truncated subject”; “actual subject”; and “existential subject.” This material is very similar to what would appear in “The Subject” four years later, but clearly he had yet to boil it down to the more succinct form it would later take.
52. “Philosophical Positions,” 235.
a “we,” giving individual subjects a viewpoint, here he did not explicitly place that “we” in a station of priority over the meanings (common or otherwise) derived by individual subjects. This presents an interpretative difficulty: earlier the same year he had affirmed a clear distinction between the horizon derived from human subjectivity as such and the horizon derived from human subjectivity in a communal or social context, but here he was suggesting that human subjectivity as such was to be found in those interpersonal contexts.

The solution to this difficulty began to be realized when Lonergan centered his attention on meaning. Although discussions of the topic had appeared in earlier works, meaning didn’t receive central attention until 1962, when it was discussed in both the Method in Theology Institute at Regis College and in the lectures on time and meaning that he delivered at both Regis and the Thomas More Institute. The following year, portions of his Knowledge and Learning lectures at Gonzaga and the lecture on the analogy of meaning he gave at Thomas More both addressed meaning. Once this focus came into play, Lonergan had a tool with which to negotiate the meaning of individual subjects’ embeddedness in community. Community then took on a more significant role: it not only rises from subjectivity, but also works back down “into” subjectivity. Meaning is generated by subjects, but the world mediated (and constituted) by meaning is “brought to us.”

The Status of Community

Let me summarize all of the above by answering the following question: How did Lonergan understand the relation between community and conscious subjectivity leading into 1968? Initially, the two were conceived quite distinctly, as revealed by his treatment of the absolute and relative horizons in the Georgetown lectures (1964) – there, community clearly resulted from subjects and was treated derivatively. While later in that year (“Existenz and Aggiornamento”), community was conceived as making

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53“Philosophical Positions,” 235.
55See editorial note a in “Dimensions of Meaning,” 308-309.
possible a heightening of consciousness,58 his account of “drifting” was a commentary on the negative role of community59 and he explicitly stated again that “the world of community, ... [is] the product of freely self-constituting subjects.”60 Although he conceived community as more than just spatiotemporal proximity (it is “an achievement of common meaning”61), it remained derivative and quite distinct from the immanent intelligibility of the subject.

At the same time, he knew that these common meanings weren’t solely the work of individuals or even single generations. “They originate in single minds,” but then they become common through communication and are transmitted through training and education.62 In some parts of “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” community nearly had a priority:

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes himself.... At any time in any place what a given self can make of himself is some function of the heritage or sediment of common meanings that comes to him from the authentic or unauthentic living of his predecessors and his contemporaries.63

Yet even after this strong statement of the dependence of individuals on community,64 when he discussed this further, the example suggested, again, the community’s dependence on individuals.65

“Philosophical Positions with Regard to Knowing” (still 1964) complicated the matter further. It contained two sequential accounts of subjectivity, both

58“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 222.
59“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 224. It should be noted that Lonergan did not use the word “community,” here, but was speaking of a merely coincidental aggregate of people; this can be surmised from his point, which is a failure to have commonality of meaning.
60“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 226, my emphasis.
63“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 227. This was not a new idea for Lonergan; it was present in his thought as early as “PANTON ANAKEPHALAIOSIS.”
64His context was authenticity (“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 227).
65“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 227-28. The example dealt with unauthentic individuals skewing the authenticity of a tradition.
of which reached an individual summit. Community, here, clearly was distinct and derived from individual subjects, but he would also state that "human living is strictly human when you move to that fourth level where people are acting, relating with one another." Such strictly human living required the prior presence of common meanings, but while he had here an account of multiple individuals forming a "we" that would provide a new viewpoint, he did not yet explicitly place that "we" or its viewpoint in a station of priority over the meanings (common or otherwise) derived by individual subjects. On the other hand, in the question and answer period after this talk, he reiterated that intersubjectivity provides the primordial basis for the possibility of common meanings, much as he had done in *Insight*.

The following year, in "Dimensions of Meaning," he affirmed that subjects are embedded in the meanings of their communities, but it was not clear just what Lonergan meant when he insisted that community is the "source" of common meaning. Did he mean, as he seemed to indicate during the "Philosophical Positions" question and answer period the previous year, that intersubjectivity is the source of common meaning? It is unclear. There may be an equivocation on the term "community": it sometimes indicated that which is constituted by common meaning, but here it seemed to refer to merely spontaneous, intersubjective connection. What did he intend by the term here? This is not a trivial or merely terminological question: this terminological difficulty may be the marker of the emergence of the concepts that issued forth into a stronger connection between subjectivity and community.

This possibility is supported by the fact that in "Dimensions of Meaning" the role of community was pushed farther in a top-down direction. Here he discussed, in a more distinct fashion than before, the world of immediacy, the

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66"Philosophical Positions," 220 and 222, respectively. The significance of these could be questioned, given that in "Philosophical Positions" Lonergan was addressing knowing. However, subsequent material in the same lecture suggested an effort to provide a context for knowing that went beyond the individual.


68"Philosophical Positions," 235.

69"Philosophical Positions," 235.

70"Philosophical Positions," 241.

71See *Insight*, 237.

72"Dimensions of Meaning," 233-34.

73"Dimensions of Meaning," 234.
world mediated by meaning, the world constituted by meaning, and "man's transformation of man himself."\textsuperscript{74} The last was the strongest recognition yet of a movement from the community to the individual; although he previously had discussed self-appropriation, in this context the "transformation" is more communal that it previously had been conceived. It is accomplished in and through, and realizes, human freedom, and it is in and through history. This offered ground for Lonergan's insistence on the "priority of poetry" and perhaps indicates the beginning of the breakthrough for Lonergan. At this point, he clearly had "the human spirit express[ing] itself in symbols before it knows, if ever it knows, what its symbols literally mean," and before the moves to demythologization, literal truth, and classical rhetoric.\textsuperscript{75} This may be the beginning of Lonergan's recognition of, not just the priority of the historical community over individual subjects,\textsuperscript{76} but the fact that the human as such found its intrinsic fulfillment in community. In fact, in subsequent paragraphs, he emphasized the prior, spontaneous, affective, intersubjective response of subject to subject out of which we emerge "to become freely and responsibly, resolutely yet precariously, the persons we choose to be."\textsuperscript{77}

By 1966, although he discussed the individual in one paragraph and community in the immediately subsequent paragraph and he clearly positioned community as, again, resulting and derivative from individual subjects, still he would state that the "locus of development" is in shifting meaning at the historical, community level, giving that level a certain priority.\textsuperscript{78} The following year's "Theology in Its New Context" presumed from the beginning that the change of meaning in history and community set the field for individuals (in this case, theologians). Although this had been stated before, here he sharpened his emphasis on changes of meaning at the level of history and community to the point that he now insisted that it was at that level that God enters the realm of meaning and partakes of "man's making of man."\textsuperscript{79} Out of that principle, then, theology works top-down, taking meanings from the historical, community level and drawing

\textsuperscript{74}"Dimensions of Meaning," 234-35.
\textsuperscript{75}"Dimensions of Meaning," 241.
\textsuperscript{76}He had acknowledged as much in Insight, 243.
\textsuperscript{77}"Dimensions of Meaning," 242-43.
\textsuperscript{78}"The Transition from a Classicist World-View," 3-6.
\textsuperscript{79}"Theology in Its New Context," 61-62; see also 55-58.
them down to individual subjects.  

Prior to 1968, then, although Lonergan recognized the embeddedness of individual subjects and the important role that community played in the intersubjective basis of community, he displayed sharp distinctions between conscious subjectivity and community, and he clearly treated community as derivative on and secondary to conscious subjectivity. Yet from at least 1964 through 1967, the sharpness of the distinction waned and community was given more and more priority, to the point that theology, “in its new context,” engages with God’s own meaning at the level of history and community and, in its own function in “man’s making of man,” transmits that meaning to individual subjects. This set the stage for an even fuller recognition of the role that community plays in the immanent intelligibility of human subjectivity.

**MARCH 1968**

We are now in a position to examine “The Subject” and “Horizons,” the two central works of concern for this study. Given a mere eighteen days apart, they serve as markers for the transition to an account of the subject that incorporated community as an intrinsic element.

“**The Subject**”

In many ways, Lonergan’s March 3, 1968, lecture, “The Subject,” was the culmination of the more individual understanding of the subject, with community derivative and clearly distinct from and in no significant way part of the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity. The lecture was built around a matured version of material that had appeared in the 1964 Georgetown Method Institute, and while, certainly, his title and topic partly dictated his focus on the individual subject, this account clearly marked off a philosophic distinction between the dynamic, historical, communal field and the individual, for which that communal field is not part of the immanent intelligibility.  

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81“The Subject,” 69. “But besides specifically historical, social, and psychological determinants of subjects and their horizons, there also are philosophic factors, and to a consideration of such factors the present occasion invites us.”
As noted in the introduction above, "The Subject" contained an account of the subject that reached its summit in individual authenticity:

We are subjects, as it were, by degrees. At a lowest level, when unconscious in dreamless sleep or in a coma, we are merely potentially subjects. Next, we have a minimal degree of consciousness and subjectivity when we are the helpless subjects of our dreams. Thirdly, we become experiential subjects when we awake, when we become the subjects of lucid perception, imaginative projects, emotional and cognitive impulses, and bodily action. Fourthly, the intelligent subject sublates the experiential, that is, it retains, preserves, goes beyond, completes it, when we inquire about our experience, investigate, grow in understanding, express our inventions and discoveries. Fifthly, the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject, when we question our own understanding, check our formulations and expressions, ask whether we have got things right, marshal the evidence pro and con, judge this to be so and that not to be so. Sixthly, finally, rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness, when we deliberate, evaluate, decide, act. Then there emerges human consciousness at its fullest. Then the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake.  

Here, the culmination of subjectivity was individual: "finally, ... the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake." The immanent intelligibility of subjectivity, then, was contained within and confined to the individual subject; it need not involve the community.

A second, briefer, account of the subject also reached its summit within the individual, and it is only with the discussion of the alienated subject (in the final section of the lecture) that intersubjectivity entered. While the first paragraph under the heading, The Alienated Subject, spoke beautifully of the intersubjective bonds between persons that draw us into the tremendous world constituted by "language, art, literature, science, philosophy, history," and more, this account still clearly positioned community as derivative from conscious subjectivity.

82"The Subject," 80.
83"The Subject," 84.
84"The Subject," 85.
On the other hand, as understood in this lecture, the subject was concrete and embedded in dynamic history. Lonergan emphasized that the study of soul is the study of an abstraction, while the study of subject is the study of concrete (dynamic, historical) operations. Moreover, the matured material from the Georgetown Institute proceeded upward through ever more adequate contexts until it embraced historicity and its vicissitudes. In fact, the “existential subject” was explained here as more than a knower: the “existential subject” is a doer, and our doing changes more than just the world of objects. It also changes us – subjects – because doing involves freedom, responsibility, and self-constitution.

Along the same lines, in his discussion of the notion of value, Lonergan used Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous, just, or temperate actions are those actions that would be performed as virtuous, just, or temperate by a virtuous, just, or temperate person. In other words, “Aristotle ... is refusing to speak of ethics apart from the ethical reality of good men.” Good subjects, and subjects’ good choices and actions, “are not found in isolation.” Instead, “[w]e come to know the good from the example of those about us,” and Lonergan stated clearly that he had “been affirming the primacy of the existential.” This emphasis on the concrete context of subjectivity was even extended all the way up to a cosmic level.

The emphasis on existentialism followed by alienation/intersubjectivity and the cosmic context shows that even when dealing with the individual subject, he did not see the dynamic, historical, community field as foreign to the subject. Both elements – the subject and the community context – were relevant in “The Subject,” but the communal, dynamic, historical order clearly follows from the subject. This lecture’s status as the pinnacle of his treatment of the communal as derivative on the individual subject can be nailed down with a simple, but ironic, realization: in this text he clearly and explicitly affirmed the priority of the existential, but he located the import of that affirmation within the individual subject. At the same time, he still

83“The Subject,” 73.
87“The Subject,” 79.
88“The Subject,” 82.
89“The Subject,” 83.
90“The Subject,” 84.
91“The Subject,” 85-86.
gave pride of place to the individual subject over history and community, a position which, when it comes down to it, was not a priority of the concrete and existential, but was instead a priority of a (less, but still) abstracted individual conscious subject.

"Horizons"

"Horizons," given on March 21, 1968, began much like “The Subject,” but concerned itself with subjects’ horizons, rather than the subjects “within” the horizons. In order to have a horizon, Lonergan affirmed, the subject must self-transcend, get beyond him- or herself. In this context, “Horizons” offered an account of the subject that found its summit at the community level: we begin with sensitivity, which we share with animals; on sensitivity follow questions for intelligence; on questions for intelligence follow questions for reflection; on questions for reflection follow questions for deliberation; and then this is where “self-transcendence ceases to be intentional and becomes real.... That real self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of willing what is truly good and doing it, of collaboration and true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a genuine person in a human society.”

Here, a “genuine person” was understood to be “in a human society.” Now this was clearly not an abstracted, individual subject at all. Subjectivity reaches its own intrinsic summit in community, after which transformation and new meaning proceed back “down” (to go with the spatial metaphor), just as they did in “Theology in Its New Context.” In “Horizons,” the fulfillment of self-transcendence was understood to occur in unrestricted being in love, which radiates through everything and opens the subject’s horizon. Quite clearly, this being in love is not solitary but intrinsically springs forth into and from community. Moreover, communities are, as such, historical. They endure over time, and Christian religious
community, especially, is a historical response to a historical initiative. The "knowledge born of religious love" (faith) is recognized concretely, existentially, and interpersonally through the religious community "on the level of feelings, values, beliefs, actions, personal encounters, community existence, community action, and community tradition." This fulfillment of conscious subjectivity is intrinsically interpersonal: "being-in-love [with God] determines the horizon of total self-transcendence by grounding the self and its self-transcendence in the divine lover whose love makes those he loves in love with him, and so with one another."

To be blunt, in "Horizons," the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity included its fulfillment in a being in love with God that incorporated love of neighbor and was encountered on the level of dynamic, historical, interpersonal community. To remove the subject from a social, communal setting would be to remove from it the possibility of its fulfillment and thus to change what it was. The immanent intelligibility of subjectivity included the social context as an intrinsic constituent element.

**After March 1968**

The two lectures, "The Subject" and "Horizons," serve as markers for two elements in Lonergan's development, the first an earlier, sophisticated account of conscious subjectivity in which the social was derivative, and the other an account of subjectivity that included social embeddedness as part of its immanent intelligibility. As his earlier work made clear, there was not a sudden and wholesale pivot from a conception of subjectivity as monadic to a conception of subjectivity as intrinsically social. At the same time, there is a clear development for which these two lectures serve as convenient signposts. He began with an examination of the individual subject whose meanings contributed to a community grounded in and secondary to the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity as such, but he came to understand that social, community field as, not secondary to subjectivity, but a constituent element in the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity.

After these two lectures in March of 1968, Lonergan described the summit of that immanent intelligibility as an interpersonal, graced state

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100 "Horizons," 22-23.
in which we are able to grasp religious values. In his seminar that year on “Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion,” he noted that religious values (which are communicated by the community) have two aspects: (1) “Relationship to God as fulfillment within the human person” and (2) “source of proper human action in this world.” First, the new, fulfilling, interpersonal relation to God is found in the religious conversion that “transforms the existential subject into a subject-in-love.” Second, while moral conversion radiates to one’s operations, religious conversion begins with a change of heart that Lonergan identified with operative grace (it happens to us, we do not perform it) but continues in cooperative grace – our “using the heart of flesh to transform all [our] living.” In this way, fulfilling religious conversion becomes a new basis for “valuing and doing good,” and while intellectual and moral conversion are not “negated” or even “diminished,” the human pursuit of the good attains a cosmic context beyond the reach of individual, unfulfilled, unloving human conscious operation. Sinfulness, which he explicitly distinguished from moral evil, becomes “the privation of total loving, a radical lovelessness,” instigating a radical disconnect between the human subject and the full cosmic context of, not just authenticity, but holiness.

With one aspect focused on subjectivity and its fulfillment and the other aspect focused on the wider horizon of action within the world, these two points provide a useful tool for understanding his statements after the March of 1968 period.

Divine-Human Relation as Fulfillment

After March of 1968 Lonergan explicitly stated that we are born both with a natural desire and into a community, and his understanding

102 “Seminar,” 566.
103 “Seminar,” 564-65.
104 “Seminar,” 565.
105 “Seminar,” 566.
106 “Seminar,” 566. The relation between authenticity and holiness will be discussed below.
of subjectivity’s fulfillment addressed both of these. He first situated the religious differentiation of consciousness as the summit of subjectivity.\(^{108}\) The authentic subject is the self-transcending subject who “become[s] a principle of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and true love,”\(^{109}\) and our capacity for self-transcendence becomes achievement of self-transcendence when we fall in love and being in love takes over.\(^{110}\) Lonergan’s accounts of such being in love included various descriptors, many of which were repeated often. For him, if the fulfillment really is a being in love with God, then it is unrestricted, it is the fulfillment of our conscious subjectivity, it must include a love of neighbor as well as an experience of mystery, and it must provide a new horizon.\(^{111}\)

Secondly, all of this finds a potentially surprising ground in Lonergan. It was not, fundamentally, his conception of human nature (the “levels” of consciousness, etc.) that gave this ground, but rather it was his understanding of the God revealed in Christian experience and tradition. Because he understood God to have made us in the divine image, Lonergan affirmed that “our authenticity consists in being like him, in self-transcendence, in being origins of true values, in true love.”\(^{112}\) Our being in love with God,

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\(^{110}\) “Faith and Beliefs,” 38. See also 45.

\(^{111}\) “Faith and Beliefs,” 38-40. These descriptors were very common through the publication of Method in Theology.

\(^{112}\) “Seminar,” 550. Drawing on Rahner, Lonergan agreed that because man is for God, theocentrism and anthropocentrism coincide in theology (“Theology and Man’s Future,” 148). This does not mean that theological statements are merely statements about human reality; instead, it means that, inasmuch as statements about God tell us about that for which we are, they tell us about us, and inasmuch as statements about us tell us about a creature for God, they tell us about God.
the pinnacle of our being like God, fulfills what we are as human because we are made for God: because the object of our being in love with God is unrestricted, the dynamic state of being in love with God “actuates the unrestricted character of human conscious intentionality. And because it actuates that unrestricted character, it is fulfillment in a singular manner.”

Finally, this fulfillment is conceived not statically, but dynamically. This not only meant that our being in love with God is a dynamic state preceding particular acts of love, as is clear to any attentive reader of Method in Theology. By conceiving of the state of being in love dynamically, Lonergan was able to affirm that the state resides on the level of dynamic history and community, naturally situating it as the foundation of love of neighbor and of one’s fidelity to other human beings and easily suggesting that the fulfillment of consciousness is reached by traveling the dynamic, historical, interpersonal road of “love of one’s neighbor, and even of enemies.” On that same level, religious community both flows from those who, through the gift of God, are currently on that road, and it precedes them and is needed for religious conversion “to be encouraged, fostered, interpreted, guided, developed.” Because it is on the level of dynamic history, community, and interpersonal encounter, such being in love is with someone, and when being in love is with God, the someone with whom we are in love is “highest in truth, reality, righteousness, goodness,” bringing the argument full circle and affirming that this divine someone with whom we are in love “is the fulfillment of man’s aspiration to self-transcendence.” In the end, this love relates us to God, to all other human beings, “and to the whole cosmic and historical process.”

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113“Seminar,” 551. See also “Theology and Man’s Future,” 145-46.
114“Theology and Man’s Future,” 147.
115Method in Theology, 107.
116“Theology and Man’s Future,” 145-46. Recall that in “Horizons,” human subjects’ fulfillment consisted in their ability to become members of a human community. This was reiterated in “Theology and Man’s Future,” 144: “Man’s development is a matter of getting beyond himself, of ceasing to be an animal in a habitat and of becoming a genuine person in a community.”
117642B0DTE070, 10.
118“Theology and Man’s Future,” 146.
119642B0DTE070, 10.
120“Seminar,” 551.
Divine-Human Relation as Source of Authenticity

The fulfilling relation with God constituting that dynamic state is all-encompassing and brings true authenticity to the individual subject; it is “when we are in love, and in the measure that we are in love, that we discern values and disvalues clearly, finely, delicately, fully, and that we respond to them firmly and powerfully.” The fulfilling relation also brings a new existential stance and horizon, constituting human subjects in a real self-transcendence to “the human good, ... fellow men, ... their needs, ... their development, [and] to God.” The source of authenticity – this dynamic state of being in love with God – lies in the realm where authenticity has its final measure and impact: the dynamic, concrete, historical field of community and interpersonal relations.

Subsequent to 1968, Lonergan clarified this dynamic context of authenticity. For example, he highlighted that the university is no longer a place “where traditional wisdom and knowledge are dispensed.” Instead, it has become “a center in which ever-increasing knowledge is disseminated to bring about ever-increasing social and cultural change.” The shift here was from a conception of the university as a dispensary of abstract and timeless truths to the university as a concrete, interpersonal community in an ongoing historical context within which it attempts to influence community through the increase of knowledge. Theology’s part in this dramatic shift has largely been the result of concrete interaction with other disciplines. Classicism, the traditional horizon of theology, didn’t truly deal with concrete persons, and the traditional Aristotelian emphasis failed to account for this concrete, dynamic field: it generated “sharply defined terms” that were “abstract
and so outside the realm where change occurs." Thus, philosophy's contributions need to come together in a concrete interaction generating new models, where the key contribution from philosophy to theology will be its ability to deal in an explanatory fashion with changes at this dynamic interpersonal level from which horizons emerge.

But the authenticity generated by the fulfillment of conscious subjectivity in the dynamic state of being in love exceeds the range of philosophy, the merely proportionately human. In a question and answer session during the Seminar on Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion (1968), Lonergan was asked directly about the relation between human authenticity and being in love with God: Is charity (being in love with God) authentic because it is Christian or Christian because it is authentic? Lonergan responded by indicating that the specific grammatical arrangement of noun and adjective didn’t matter all that much. More important was the fact that “it isn’t the same as ‘attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible.’” For him, when one goes beyond “authentically human” to “authentically religious,” one gains “love of God above all things, with your whole heart, your whole soul, all your mind, and all your strength.”

This has a profound effect on how one conceives the authenticity reached in the dynamic state of being in love. Upon their fulfillment, human beings develop, not only in terms of human development and human good, but in terms of holiness, and this sets the human good within a whole universe that goes beyond the merely human good. Although authenticity as such offers a certain union between subjects engaged in the pursuit of a common human good, being in love with God exceeds that union. Our union with God is not just a coequal coworker relation on a horizontal plane. Instead, the relation constituted by our being in love with God “refers back and around and forward,” extending all the way to a cosmic level to include “all men,” progress and decline, and not for the good of human beings alone but

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130 “Philosophy and Theology,” 205-207.
131 “Seminar,” 583. Though the context of this article does not include Lonergan’s later affirmation of love as a “fifth level of consciousness,” and I have therefore avoided comment on that issue, this statement may shed significant light on that discussion.
132 “Seminar,” 583.
133 “Seminar,” 590.
because the human good is the glory of God. Religion, then, and progress are bound together: the communal expression of the dynamic state of being in love with God expresses the authenticity by which the world is changed to accord with the created order God intended.

Conclusion

I have argued that "The Subject" and "Horizons" are convenient markers in the development of Lonergan's understanding of the subject. The first reached an individual summit of subjectivity; the second, given a mere eighteen days later, reached a community summit. While the first directly and succinctly encapsulated an earlier phase of Lonergan's development, in which the individual subject was primary and the community was derivative therefrom, the second revealed the intrinsically social immanent intelligibility of subjectivity that he would come to emphasize later in his career.

I also argued that Lonergan's lectures and writings during the surrounding years (1964-71) indicate that this difference between "The Subject" and "Horizons" is not simply terminological, but instead does mark a real development in his thought. It is clear that, prior to 1968, Lonergan recognized the social situation of subjectivity. He did not treat the subject as an atomic monad, but sought to understand the intersubjective root of subjectivity as well as the social fund of meaning to which we contribute through our understanding, judgment, and decisions and by which we are influenced in our subsequent experiences, understandings, judgments, and decisions. At the same time, during that period, Lonergan understood community to be derivative and distinct from the intrinsic intelligibility of conscious subjectivity as such. He no more considered community to be an aspect of the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity than one might consider water to be part of the immanent intelligibility of a fish: although fish are always contributing to water's content, and they are always surrounded and influenced by that content, water is not intrinsic to what a fish is.

After 1968, however, there was a maturation of the turn from substance to subject that incorporated the two 1964-65 themes Ryan and Tyrrell

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134"Seminar," 550. Referring to STII-II, q.132, a.1, ad 1m. Notice the parallel to "The Subject," here. What was there given short shrift was now filled out, and we can see the consequences of his development.

identified: the clear emergence of the primacy of the fourth level of consciousness and the significance of historical consciousness. As substance, the human being is a nature that, while socially situated, is quite distinct and abstractable from that situation. As subject, the human being is primarily existential, dynamic, concrete, historical, and communal, and something that is not existential, dynamic, concrete, historical, and communal is not a human subject. Thus, these elements at the social level now become aspects of the immanent intelligibility of the human subject, intelligible especially in Lonergan’s twofold affirmation of (1) the human subject’s fulfillment at the social level and (2) the human subject, in its authenticity in virtue of that fulfillment, having an impact on that social level. The human subject arises from, returns to, and is what it is in that social context and, most importantly, at that social, historical level.

Finally, I wish to add a few concluding comments about the import of this contribution. First, it offers significant supporting evidence from Lonergan’s own development for John Dadosky’s suggestion of a fourth stage of meaning emphasizing alterity. If Lonergan did indeed develop to a point at which the social, interpersonal element became a constituent element of the immanent intelligibility of human subjectivity, as I have argued here, then it follows quite easily that there could be a stage of meaning that takes on that level of human subjectivity. Second, this position makes significant demands on theologies of grace that draw heavily on Lonergan. Our conception of grace cannot be individual; it primarily must be social. The fulfillment of human subjectivity of which Lonergan often spoke was, in its fullness, social, precisely because the immanent intelligibility of subjectivity was itself social, and to speak of a fulfillment in terms reaching anything less than the fullness of that fulfillment is to make it, at best, partial, and at worst, not a fulfillment at all.

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THE PURPOSE OF METAPHYSICS
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The word “metaphysics” does not evoke any happy connotations in our contemporary culture or even in academia. The word itself is mostly used in a derogatory sense as meaning, empty, speculative, abstract, useless, abstruse. Our local bookstore has six shelves on “Metaphysical Studies,” where you can find out all you want to know about ghosts, witches, vampires, magicians, astrologers, psychics, the “supernatural” and much more besides. Most modern philosophers are either anti-metaphysical or post-metaphysical. They do not feel the need to argue against metaphysics as it is considered dead in the water. What was once regarded as the noblest and most exalted of aspirations to wisdom and understanding is now despised, debased, and neglected.

This article confronts such negative criticism head on and resolutely defends the function of metaphysics for the health of our students, our culture, and our academic institutions. Without getting into too many technical details we go back to the original inspiration of metaphysics and see how that original thrust must be rehabilitated in contemporary culture. In focusing on the purpose of metaphysics, we try to get at the heart of the endeavour and to answer such simple questions as, What is metaphysics for? Why do we still need a metaphysics? Does it have any positive value, function, or use? My general answer will be that it does have such a positive function and that in fact we are all metaphysicians in a real sense and that metaphysics is actually unavoidable.

I will of course be appealing to the metaphysics of Bernard Lonergan as articulated in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. However this is not a technical presentation of his metaphysics in any detail, but an attempt


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to present the central purpose and function of metaphysics in an accessible and communicable form. What we need for a start is a correct notion of the purpose of metaphysics, as a worldview, as an integrating framework, as a method, as complementary to empirical science, as promoting a program to guide culture toward unity and development and away from fragmentation and decline. This is not an exercise in scholarship but a simple and general presentation of what metaphysics is supposed to be. I appeal to the example of Aristotle for the original inspiration of "first philosophy." We can then focus on metaphysics as a worldview, an integral heuristic structure; as complementary to the empirical sciences; as a pedagogy; and finally as unavoidable.

**Aristotle's First Philosophy**

The first significant point to be noted in appealing to the inspiration of Aristotle is that he did not seem to need a special technical term for what came to be known as "metaphysics." He was quite content with the term "first philosophy," or more commonly simply "philosophy." What does that say about his notion of metaphysics? Metaphysics as first philosophy was the core of philosophy, the heart of philosophy, the apex of philosophy, the first principle, the highest wisdom. It was not a discipline separate and apart from philosophy. It was neither a part of philosophy, nor a branch of philosophy, nor a subdivision of philosophy. Philosophy doing what philosophy does best is first philosophy. It does not have a subject matter or a method of inquiry different from that of philosophy itself. If philosophy is the search for wisdom, then first philosophy is where that search finds its central focus. If philosophy is conceived as searching for the first principles and causes, then that is achieved most perfectly in first philosophy. If philosophy is concerned with the first cause, the Unmoved Mover, then that is achieved most perfectly in first philosophy.

The invention of the term "metaphysics" by the ancient editor of Aristotle's works was a mixed blessing. It created the impression that metaphysics is a branch of philosophy, a part of philosophy, a specialization within philosophy, rather than the core of philosophy itself. If it were conceived as a branch of philosophy then it would have a subject matter proper to itself. This may have suggested the idea that *The Physics* deals with the principles of physical, changing realities and therefore *The Metaphysics*
deals with non-physical, abstract, super-sensible, non-changing, spiritual realities. But for Aristotle first philosophy deals with everything; it seeks the first principles and causes of everything, the unity of all through the notions of substance and being, and the origin of all in the notion of the Unmoved Mover. Turning metaphysics into a subdivision of philosophy dealing only with an abstract being qua being would make Aristotle turn in his grave.

In a famous passage from book Gamma of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle distinguishes the function of philosophy from that of the special sciences. The special sciences of their very nature cut off a part of being and study that material as the proper subject matter of that science. He gives the example of the mathematical sciences, which deal only with number and quantity, but he could just as well have mentioned biology studying living things, or astronomy studying heavenly bodies, or doctors studying health and what promotes health. By contrast the distinguishing characteristic of first philosophy is that it studies everything; it does not cut off part of being; it studies the whole of being; everything is included; nothing is excluded from the subject matter of philosophy. Philosophy studies the whole of being; the special sciences study various parts of being. That is why you need a first philosophy. Hence, from the point of view of subject matter you have a clear need for the special sciences that study respective parts, and a first philosophy that studies the whole of being, the unity of the parts, what holds them together.

The philosopher and the special scientist differ also in the perspective or point of view or formal object by which they approach their subject matter. The philosopher studies the whole from the point of view of the highest principles and causes, universally, from the most general point of view possible. The special science seeks an understanding of causes as they pertain to the proper limited subject matter of the discipline and in so far as they explain the data of that science. Hence Aristotle states the aim of first philosophy to be the investigation of being qua being and what belongs essentially to it; it is the search for the first principles and causes of being qua being; it examines universally being qua being. I take that to mean very simply that first philosophy studies everything from the most general point of view.

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3Metaphysics, 1003a20-32.
This notorious phrase "being qua being" has always tended to be interpreted in the direction of abstraction. By the Middle Ages it was common to distinguish three levels of abstraction; the sciences abstract from particulars to formulate general laws; mathematics abstracts from all sensible qualities except quantity; metaphysics abstracts even from quantity to consider being simply as being. In the sixteenth century and beyond metaphysics became an ontology, a further contraction in the direction of abstraction. Yet, there is no indication in the text of Aristotle or in the context that this was Aristotle’s intention. What he is defending is the existence and the need for some discipline other than the special sciences which will study everything from the broadest point of view possible. This he assigns to philosophy or first philosophy. This is what he is actually doing in the reflections on first principles and causes, on the definition of substance, on the Unmoved Mover, and his other few references to being qua being.

At least one renowned Aristotelian scholar supports this view. Giovanni Reale, in The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, defends the view that the fourteen books were intended by Aristotle to be a unified, coherent, single account of the universe and its first principles and causes. The themes of first principles and causes, three kinds of substance, being qua being, and Unmoved Mover, do not represent different chronological stages in Aristotle’s development of first philosophy but on the contrary represent overlapping, interrelated terminologies and approaches to a single subject. Reale particularly decries the misinterpretation of the phrase being qua being as an abstract ontology. Referring to Aristotle’s statement that there is a science which investigates being qua being and what belongs essentially to it he says the following:

It is this affirmation which has generated the greatest mistakes in the interpretation of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Under this formula, in fact, we find a whole history of thought, which goes from medieval to neo-scholasticism, and therefore it is easy to attribute to Aristotle what, on the contrary, has been achieved only through the rethinking of his doctrine.

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2Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy, 351.
Aristotle’s genuine doctrine of being qua being boils down to answering the question, What is substance? It is by distinguishing three kinds of substance that you get a unified view of the whole universe: (1) the perfect substance, the Unmoved Mover, (2) the separated substances, the heavenly bodies, and the (3) composite substances of the earth.

In conclusion: the formula being qua being does not have, in the scope of the *Metaphysics*, the value that many believe it to have. Only isolated from the contexts of which they are a part can the affirmations of Aristotle be understood in the sense of a pure ‘phenomenology of the various meanings of “being” or of a “general ontology.”

Aristotle’s great achievement and wisdom was to grasp how everything fits together in a single coherent worldview. He forged a worldview which unified the science of his time, first principles and causes, being, substance, and the Unmoved Mover. He needed different terminologies to express this unity of interrelated parts. He was doing this synthesis for the first time. The science of his time was undeveloped and very often quite wrong. However, his view of the permanent features of the whole was mostly right.

**Modern and Contemporary Divergence of Purpose**

Aristotle had a clear sense of the purpose of first philosophy as providing a unified view of all knowledge, a wisdom, a higher viewpoint, an integrating structure within which to view individual special sciences as constituent parts. Aquinas appreciated this position and elaborated it with more precise terminology incorporating it into a Christian wisdom. When Lonergan delved into the writings of Aquinas for his doctoral dissertation and the *Verbum* articles, he discovered that the conceptualist interpretation of Thomism was a consistent misinterpretation. Aquinas was not a conceptualist but an intellectualist. Lonergan rails against this conceptualist interpretation especially in the epilogue to those articles. Although he was referring

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5 Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy*, 352.
directly to epistemology, the conclusions have immediate relevance to the understanding of first philosophy and the notion of being.

In the neo-scholastics the Aristotelean and Thomist vision was lost and metaphysics focused instead on an understanding of being qua being as a concept. It aimed in the direction of abstraction; being was the highest level of abstraction. Metaphysics was about the definition and division of being and beings. Being qua being became an ontology, a study of the characteristics common to all beings. Being was the concept with the widest extension and the narrowest intension. This suggests that being must refer to some content, as if it were, behind and above and beyond individual concrete beings studied in particular sciences. Metaphysics considered itself superior to science; it was a higher wisdom. It considered the knowledge of scientists to be superficial, changing, and of appearances rather than of the essence. The metaphysicians continued abstract discourse on natures, essences, definitions and division, substances and accidents, being and beings, being qua being, ironically in the name of Aristotle but now far from his original intention. The words remained the same but the meaning had been changed.

During the Scientific Revolution metaphysics parted company with the empirical sciences and became separate and apart. To a large extent the modern rejection of metaphysics was a rejection of this abstract kind of metaphysics; it was a rejection of a straw man. The classical empiricists led the charge with the principle that we can only know what is sensible; the verification principle asserts that if it is true it must be sensible, verifiable is terms of data of sense. The tradition continued with logical positivists and linguistic analysts continually narrowing the scope of philosophy and its ability to make meaningful or true statements. Metaphysical knowledge was rejected because it went beyond the sensible and so talk of natures, universals, essences, and substances are dismissed as occult entities, as fantasies, as unreal.

More subtle is the critique of Kant. How can we know such noumenal realities if we have no direct intuition of them? We have sensible intuitions of sense objects but no intellectual intuitions of intelligible objects. Thus knowledge of the intelligible must be is imposed by the mind on reality rather than the mind being informed by reality. So we have a complicated structure of a priori concepts by which the mind imposes forms on reality. This sets serious limits to the possibility of metaphysics and knowledge of essence, of form, of being, of substance, of cause, of universal.
The masters of suspicion, Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx, undermined the possibility of true permanent knowledge by way of uncovering the hidden ideological underpinnings of knowing. For Marx it is the ideology of class interest that distorts our knowing and hence our view of the world. For Freud it is the unconscious and such processes as projection, regression, repression, sublimation, that determine the content of our knowing. Nietzsche claimed to have unmasked the will to power undermining all our knowing in various ways.

Postmodern philosophers claim to have entered the era of the post-metaphysical. Metaphysics is presumed to be dead and not even worth discussion. They reject any totalitarian claims of metaphysicians to know the whole as arrogant and deluded. They eschew any claims on their own part to universal knowledge. They accept Heidegger's critique of onto-theology. They are content with the bits and pieces, with an incoherent world in which we have to be satisfied with fragmentation, incoherence, alienation, and ignorance.

Metaphysics then does not rate highly in today's academy or culture. I think this is largely due to misunderstandings about what metaphysics is supposed to achieve. Metaphysics is not superior knowledge of the supersensible, of abstract being, of hidden occult entities. It should be the flowering of our attempts to understand the whole, to fit things together, to heal the fragmentation of our knowledge. Let us have a look at how Lonergan views the purpose and method of a contemporary metaphysics.

**Purpose of Metaphysics in Lonergan**

The aim of this section is simply to sketch the purpose of metaphysics as conceived by Lonergan and to show that it performs an essential, unavoidable function in the integration of our knowing. At the same time we show that this approach to metaphysics is immune to most of the criticisms of the anti-and post-metaphysicians.

*A Notion Not a Concept*

Lonergan responded to the conceptualism of the neo-scholastic tradition by replacing it with an intellectualist approach. This shift was clearly articulated in the aforementioned *Verbum* articles. According to Lonergan,
the conceptualist focuses on concepts as the object of knowledge on the model of “knowing by confrontation.” For the conceptualist, the human mind knows concepts by confronting them, just as vision confronts visible objects already out there in the external world. By way of contrast, Lonergan found in Aquinas (and Aristotle) an intellectualist model of “knowing by identity.” According to this intellectualist model, when the human intellect understands intelligible species, it becomes identical with such species insofar as they are intelligible. The intellectualist focuses on the act of understanding as the source of all ideas (intelligible species), concepts, and propositions. Concepts are products of intellect as it formulates ideas in an explanatory framework. Concepts are that by which we know the real world. Concepts are a means not an end. The end is to understand the world, God, mathematics, science, and the real world.

“Being” however is not a concept that can be defined. A concept includes what is essential to something and leaves out what is not essential; it includes what is universal as opposed to what is particular, what is abstract as opposed to what is concrete. But the term being must include everything. It is a unique term in that respect. It is all-inclusive. It must include the non-essential, the particular, the concrete, the accidental, the changing, the possible, the unknown, becoming, the magical, and the infinite. Being cannot exclude anything. So the normal rules of definition do not apply to the term being. It cannot be defined in terms of genus and specific difference, in terms of what it is and what it is not. If we were to understand the idea of being, we would understand everything.

For this reason Lonergan refers to a notion of being rather than a concept of being. By “notion of being” he means the pure desire to know which is in principle unrestricted. Hence he can define being as, “the objective of the pure desire to know.” While we cannot know all of being directly, we are familiar with the desire to know and the activities of knowing. This means that we have an indirect second-order definition of being.

The purpose of metaphysics then is not the formulation of the concept of being. Its purpose rather is the organization of the knowledge of the sciences, of common sense, and other disciplines. As Lonergan puts it simply in the preface to Insight, “But a unification and organization of what is known in mathematics, in the sciences, and by common sense is a metaphysics. Hence,

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7*Insight*, 372.
in the measure that insight into insight unifies and organizes all our knowing, it will imply a metaphysics." This is radically different from the scholastic and neo-scholastic conception of metaphysics. It is also radically different from the metaphysics rejected by the empiricists, Kantians, existentialists, and postmodernists. It is a return to the inspiration of Aristotle who tried to articulate first philosophy as an understanding of how everything fits together in a coherent framework, as a theoretical wisdom.

Metaphysics as Worldview

By worldview we mean a view of the whole, an integrating framework to fit everything together. There are many different worldviews, such as mechanism, determinism, naturalism, idealism, "scientism," reductionism, indeterminism, scepticism, relativism, constructivism, agnosticism, and the like. Not all worldviews are correct or coherent or comprehensive or articulated in a sufficiently differentiated manner. In addition to our knowledge of particular sciences, we also always have at the back of our minds some overall framework or criterion for sorting out what is significant and how everything fits together. One central task for metaphysics is to articulate a correct, sophisticated, explanatory, and critical worldview. This is what Lonergan means by an integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.

We are readily familiar with the role of specialization in any subject or field of study. One can narrow the field as much as one likes by setting boundaries and limits to the study. Most modern sciences are becoming more and more specialized, as we learn more and more about less and less. Such specialization is quite a legitimate and laudable undertaking. However, it does pose the problem of collaboration between specialists. How do they learn from one another? How do they make a contribution to the common field? Who is there to integrate their findings into a wider context? So we need the generalists, the persons who oversee the field, coordinate the specialists, direct the work of specialists, and incorporate their results into textbooks and wider views. A general practitioner in the field of medicine can deal with most common ailments but if something is beyond his competence he at least knows to which specialist to send you. All fields of knowledge have their specialists whose discoveries are coordinated

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8Insight, 5.
and incorporated at various levels of general studies. At the highest level, coordinating all branches of human knowledge, there is the metaphysician. As Aristotle would put it, as well as the special sciences which cut off a part of being to study that from a limited point of view, we also need a first philosophy, a science of the whole, which would study how all the parts fit together into an integrated whole.

Lonergan defined explicit metaphysics as the “conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” It sounds rather abstruse but in fact simply means an integrated and integrating framework for understanding the wholeness of proportionate being but without understanding everything that is within proportionate being. This framework has to be made explicit, it has to be correct, sophisticated, critical, and verifiable. Lonergan makes this framework explicit in terms of forms emerging from potency to exist and to survive. He also argues that there are two different kinds of forms, namely substantial and accidental (or in his explanatory terminology of central and conjugate potency, form and act), and therefore two correspondingly different kinds of potency, form, and act as well. Moreover, these forms are not found merely in some disconnected, chaotic set. Rather, they fall into an ordered hierarchy of genera and species, which emerge from one another and depend on one another in complex interrelations of events, things, and schemes of recurrence. These are the permanent invariable structural features of the universe of proportionate being. This invariable structure can be called “Generalized Emergent Probability.” It is called “generalized” because it applies to all nonliving and living beings, to data of sense as well as to data of consciousness. It is called “emergent” in preference to “evolutionary” because this is the characteristic of understanding emerging from sensing, and judging emerging from understanding; just as form emerges from potency, and act emerges from form. It includes the notion of “probability” because the emergence of new forms from preceding acts and potencies occurs nonsystematically, according only to norms of probability rather than in some rigid, systematic order.

*Insight*, 416.
Knowledge

The knowledge attained in metaphysics is heuristic. It is general; it is an anticipation of the acts of understanding by which any proportionate beings will be understood in an explanatory framework. It is a knowledge of whole in which discoveries in the sciences provide the parts. The particular sciences understand the specific subject matter that is their specialization. If you want to know what is the essence of water you ask a chemist and not a metaphysician. The chemist is competent in the field of the periodic table, chemical compounds, reactions, measurements, and the like. The metaphysician is familiar with potency, form and act, essence and existence, substance and accidents, terms and relations, description and explanation, critical and naive realism, theory verified in instances. The metaphysician provides the expectations, the integrating framework, the general principles, whereas the sciences provide the specifics, the understanding of particular things from a limited point of view.

Metaphysics and the empirical sciences therefore should be understood as complementary. They depend on one another and are of benefit to one another. They cannot thrive separate and apart from one another. The sciences deal with specific questions from a limited point of view. But what is the significance of this part? How does it contribute to the picture of the whole? What are the implications for other fields? How does it fit into general presuppositions about how the universe is constituted, and what are its principles and causes? The sciences need such an integrating framework in which to fit their particular specialized results, and it is the function of metaphysics to provide such a comprehensive and correct framework. Metaphysics for its part has nothing to integrate, if it is not for the contributions of the sciences, common sense, and other sources of knowledge. Lonergan sees this mutual dependence as "the dependence,.... of a generating, transforming, and unifying principle upon the materials that it generates, transforms, and unifies."^{10}

It would be hard to overemphasise the importance of this shift in the understanding of the purpose of metaphysics. It is not superior to the sciences; it is not isolated and apart from the sciences; it is not a special kind of knowledge available only to those who have a metaphysical intuition; it

^{10}Insight, 418.
is not the third level of abstraction, it is not an ontology of being qua being, it is not a claim to know everything. It does bring metaphysics down to the level of every human person who tries to understand the kind of universe he or she is living in. In the end as we shall see it means that we are all metaphysicians of some sort and that there is no avoiding metaphysical commitments.

First philosophy is needed because it studies the whole from the widest point of view, whereas each of the special sciences by definition studies only a part from a limited point of view. Philosophers have an enormous contribution to make to the progress of the empirical sciences. The correct basic notions of philosophy would be a tremendous positive boost to the investigations of the scientists. The mistaken frameworks of reductionism, determinism, indeterminism, relativism, and the like, do enormous damage to the progress of science as they skew the direction of research, the relevant questions that are investigated, and the way results are interpreted and presented. Most scientists do not understand the difference between description and explanation and so are confused about common sense and theory, images and ideas, verifiable images and symbolic pedagogical images. “The perennial source of nonsense is that, after the scientist has verified his hypothesis, he is likely to go a little further and tell the layman what, approximately, scientific reality looks like!” Most scientists do not understand the difference between classical and statistical method the way that Lonergan does, nor do they understand these methods to be universal and complementary. Most scientists do not understand the difference between direct understanding and reflective understanding issuing in a judgment. Most scientists are confused about the reality of matter, of laws, of substances, of possible beings and real beings. Briefly, metaphysics has a real, immediate, positive, practical contribution to make to the progress of the sciences.

From Generalization to Isomorphism

Lonergan contrasts his approach to metaphysics to that of Aristotle. The Aristotelian proceeds by way of generalizing from common sense and science to the more general and most universal notions of metaphysics,
to the first principles and causes. This is legitimate but it means that metaphysics is directly dependent on the conclusions of common sense and science. It will also mean that the conclusions of science will be incorporated into the metaphysical framework. Hence it is difficult to rescue Aristotle’s metaphysics from the mistaken astronomy and physics on which it is based.

Lonergan instead starts from knowing, appropriated in cognitional theory and epistemology, and only then leads on to a metaphysics. The invariant structure of knowing, which is not open to basic revision, leads you into the invariant structure of the proportionate universe which equally is not open to basic revision. Each element of the integrating structure of the universe is verifiable by reference back to the experience of knowing. Potency, form, and act are meaningful as the content of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Substance and accidents, central and conjugate forms are to be understood in terms of two fundamentally different kinds of insights. The hierarchy of genera and species and their appropriate sciences are to be understood on the analogy of successive higher viewpoints. The finality of the universe is to be understood as parallel (isomorphic) to the finality of the human desire to understand. This approach has the advantage that metaphysics is not directly dependent on the conclusions of common sense or empirical science. Metaphysics is not a generalization based on the material conclusions of the sciences. The empirical sciences are always open to basic revision, always approximations to the truth, always probable rather than certain. Metaphysics, on the other hand, can be stable, progressive, verifiable, critical, and nuanced.

**How Does Such a Metaphysics Function in Relation to Disciplines?**

Lonergan comes up with unique way of relating philosophy to science, the whole to the part, which seems to be correct and fruitful. He states the functions of metaphysics as, “metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all other departments.”\(^\text{12}\) What does this mean?

Metaphysics underlies all other departments because the desire to know is the root of all knowledge, both empirical science and metaphysics, the parts and the whole. This is the principle which generates all knowing and

\(^{12}\text{Insight, 415.}\)
is common to questions and answers about the whole and about the parts. We are all metaphysicians in the sense that we have some grasp of the unity of knowledge, some vision of how the universe works, some worldview. It may be inadequate, incomplete, incoherent, incorrect, implicit, latent, magical, undifferentiated; but if it is a view of the whole, it is a metaphysics.

Metaphysics penetrates all other departments. Anything that is discovered in any department automatically makes a contribution to metaphysics. It is an advance in our understanding of both the part and the whole. It is progress toward a better understanding of the integrating structure of the whole, as well as of the particular science to which it specifically belongs. Whether it is knowledge of common sense, or knowledge of the empirical sciences, or knowledge of the human sciences or theology or mathematics, it is always at the same time an addition to our understanding of the whole.

Metaphysics transforms all other departments. Scientists are implicitly metaphysicians because they operate in the context of their own view of what kind of a universe we live in. The metaphysical view they adopt may be correct or it may be incorrect. Whatever view it is, it will tend to direct the flow of initial scientific questions. It will influence the interpretation and the presentation of results; it will interfere with the flow of further questions and the direction they lead in. Reductionism, physicalism, determinism, indeterminism, scientism, relativism are implicit metaphysical positions which are very common and usually do not help scientists to correctly understand the whole within which they practice their specializations. If these were replaced with a generalized emergent probability that supplies a correct, adequate, sophisticated, critical, methodical framework of thinking, then science could advance much faster and more surely. A correct metaphysics would transform how data is interpreted, how its implications are discerned, and what fruitful and significant further questions arise.

Metaphysics unifies all other departments. Any empirical science is a specialization; it deals with a part of the whole from a limited point of view. But the part needs to be fitted into a whole in order to be understood correctly in the total context. It is metaphysics that provides that overall framework uniting all the parts into a whole. Metaphysics studies the whole not from the point of view of knowing everything about everything, but from the point of view of grasping:
the whole in knowledge but not the whole of knowledge. A whole is not without its parts, nor independent of them, nor identical with them. So it is that, while the principles of metaphysics are prior to all other knowledge, still the attainment of metaphysics is the keystone that rests upon the other parts and presses them together in the unity of a whole.\(^\text{13}\)

Metaphysics in this sense is the department of knowledge that studies everything from the point of view of an overall worldview. The empirical sciences study specific areas of reality from the point of view of the intelligibility appropriate to that part. Hence we can distinguish the functions of the specialists and the generalists. These two functions are in principle complementary rather than conflicting.

**WE ARE ALL METAPHYSICANS**

If metaphysics is a worldview of the whole, then each one of us has such a worldview and each one of us is already implicitly a metaphysician. One mind must and can only embody one worldview. At the earliest stages it can be implicit, incoherent, inadequate, unsophisticated, fragmented, limited, ill-conceived, or downright wrong. We all have a view of the world which is a mixture of principles and causes that we have not worked out properly for ourselves. It may be dominated by religious view, or atheistic view; it may be relativist, sceptical, conservative, or progressive; optimistic or pessimistic. “Metaphysics, then, is not something in a book but something in a mind.”\(^\text{14}\) “Bluntly, the starting-point for metaphysics is people as they are.”\(^\text{15}\)

Lonergan traces the development of metaphysics from latent, to problematic, to explicit. This is a process of intellectual development, and it is primarily a process to self-knowledge. It is an educational process guided by principles of pedagogy. If successful, this educational process will result in a verifiable, critical, explicit, adequate metaphysical worldview of the whole, encompassing all our knowledge of science, common sense, and other disciplines and skills. Explicit metaphysics is the full development of the human mind in integrating, unifying, and transforming its knowledge.

\(^{13}\text{Insight}, 416.\)
\(^{14}\text{Insight}, 421.\)
\(^{15}\text{Insight}, 422.\)
It is the wisdom sought by philosophers.

This brings metaphysics very close to home as it is present to some extent in everybody. It means that metaphysical questions are not questions for armchair philosophers but for everyone. We all seek unity and coherence in our view of the world. We like to be sure of the ground for our opinions. We like to understand how things fit together, where is the beginning, middle, and end. We like to be able to distinguish the real from the possible, the factual from the fictional. We aspire to the wisdom of philosophers even if we have not the time to make this search explicit.

This also means that metaphysics is unavoidable. Once we start asking questions we are either latent, problematic, or explicit metaphysicians. The scientist does not normally consider himself a philosopher. However, he or she cannot avoid fitting the scientifically verified conclusions into a framework of the whole. This framework might be implicit, incorrect, fragmentary; vague, and confused. Or it might be adequate, critical, sophisticated, and clear. It might be materialist determinism, indeterminism, physicalism, constructivism, conceptualism. It might be a generalized emergent probability. But there is always the process of fitting the part into the whole, of interpreting the specific in terms of the picture of the whole.

Those who question the possibility and validity of metaphysics are themselves adopting a metaphysical position. The empiricist is adopting a materialist metaphysical worldview. The Kantian is adopting an idealist or agnostic metaphysical worldview. Post-metaphysical philosophers might explicitly reject and deride metaphysics but they are implicitly adopting a metaphysical worldview of this world as a fragmented, incoherent, disconnected universe. You can wriggle as much as you like but once you start asking and answering questions about the world, you are implicitly and unavoidably moving into a metaphysical position. This is not just a clever point of logic but a fundamental, deep contradiction at the heart of the present chaos in philosophy.

**Does It Matter?**

If metaphysics were a speculative, abstract discipline concerning being qua being, isolated from the real world, then we could happily ignore metaphysical disputes with no great harm done to anyone. But if metaphysics is the heart of a healthy educational policy, if we are all metaphysicians, if metaphysics
cannot be avoided, if it is the core of all intellectual and academic endeavour, then we have reason to care about the state of metaphysics. The fragmentation and alienation of individuals, educational institutions, and cultures are the direct result of a failed metaphysics. The real task of metaphysics is to unite and transform our knowledge, to promote genuine wisdom, to guide the pursuit of understanding in individuals, universities, and cultures, to promote development and reverse decline. In short, metaphysics matters.
We must not begin by talking of pure ideas, – vagabond thoughts that tramp the public roads without any human habitation, – but must begin with men and their conversation.

— Charles S. Peirce

This article aims to show that the American philosopher Robert Brandom’s cogitations enable us to have a deeper understanding of some of Lonergan’s foundational positions as far as pragmatism is concerned. In order to do so, I will present a comprehensive view of Brandom’s normative pragmatics. One of the reasons for doing this is the need to probe the extent to which Lonergan is at home with the linguistic turn. Given that from the early twentieth century onward the linguistic paradigm has increased its influence on the protagonists of the philosophical scenario, it is not irrelevant at all to ask if Lonergan’s philosophy is up to the challenges at the heights of our times. Our principal claim is that Lonergan’s reflections are not only capable of facing some of the challenges posed by the principal exponents of the linguistic turn, but that they intrinsically comply with the methodological commitments that such a turn entails without indulging in its immoderate pursuits. The reason is clear:

¹The work of Brandom has received increasing attention from many important philosophers, among them Habermas, who once remarked: “Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit is a milestone in theoretical philosophy just as Rawl’s A Theory of Justice was a milestone in practical philosophy in the early 1970s” (Truth and Justification [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003], 131.)
Lonergan’s thought offers a wealth of historical elements which open up avenues for a rigorous inquiry into the role played by linguistic interaction in the attainment of true knowledge. In his task of introducing history into theology, Lonergan developed a method whereby he could assume that responsibility. The thesis that we are in the world mediated by meaning has methodological consequences for philosophy and especially philosophy of language. For a conversation with linguistic bent to be initiated, though, we must make a distinction between the analytical philosophy, which did not always succeed in substantiating its approach to the paramount functions of language, and more recent trends, such as Brandom’s, which, while challenging the principles of the first Wittgenstein, logical positivism, and the Vienna Circle, makes a case for a linguistic focus that is founded on the later Wittgenstein and the most fruitful legacy of pragmatism. In this way, the dialogue can also serve for a better understanding and formulation of some points that Lonergan’s transcendental method has made.

This article is subdivided in four main parts. In the first, an overall view of Brandom’s philosophy is presented. In the second, his methodological approach is analyzed so as to explain his normative pragmatics. The third section presents Lonergan as a pragmatist and the fourth offers a Brandomian reading of *Insight*, chapter 10.

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3Compare with Brandom’s assertion that “the philosophical way forward from the ideas of the American pragmatists must be a linguistic pragmatism, allied with the later Wittgenstein.” “The Pragmatist Enlightenment (and Its Problematic Semantics),” in *European Journal of Philosophy* 12, no.1 (2004): 15 (his emphasis). Now, we must emphasize that the dialogue with the trend associated most conspicuously to the Vienna Circle and the analytics is not intended in an apologetic way. Aside from the fact that the linguistic turn is not a unified view, it is noticeable that the analytical tradition was dominated at the beginning by some reductionist semantics, as well as by empiricism. Likewise, it can be maintained that, however accurate the second Wittgenstein may be in positing the primacy of language, his pragmatism yields a reductionist view of ordinary language. Thus, in general the linguistic turn – as represented, for example, by logical positivists or the analytics – has entailed a narrowing scope. Not surprisingly, Lonergan held that view of the linguistic turn. The alternative was either to appeal to semantics, conceived of as reductionist, or to pragmatics, which implied giving up normative claims. Robert Brandom develops a system that proposes to offer a balance between pragmatics and semantics, albeit giving the priority to pragmatics. As Richard J. Bernstein has pointed out: “Since the time when Charles Morris introduced his distinction of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, it has become a virtual dogma that there is a clear hierarchical ordering among these three disciplines. First comes syntax, then semantics, and finally pragmatics; pragmatics is dependent on semantics, and semantics on syntax. Brandom radically challenges this dogma and turns things upside down. His basic thesis is that pragmatics has explanatory primacy; that is, we can give an adequate account of semantics only from the perspective of a properly developed normative pragmatics” (Richard J. Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn* [Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010], 119).
A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF BRANDON’S PROJECT

Having acknowledged that his main book, *Making It Explicit*, is very long and constitutes a difficult reading," Brandom wrote a short presentation of it: *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism*. For my present purpose and in order to offer an overall view, I have chosen to concentrate on that account of his own work.

From the outset, Brandom states that this work focuses on the nature of the conceptual. His main point – he adds – is that the meanings of linguistic expressions and the contents of intentional states (even awareness) should be understood “in terms of playing a distinctive kind of role in reasoning.” He then accounts for a “series of choices of his fundamental explanatory strategy.”

**Assimilation or Differentiation of the Conceptual?**

What does a thinker prefer to emphasize: “continuities or discontinuities between discursive and nondiscursive creatures?” Most thinkers begin

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3Robert Brandom (New York, 1950- ), who studied in Yale and Princeton (where he obtained his PhD), is a Distinguished Professor at the University of Pittsburgh (he has taught there since 1976). His work is mainly influenced by Wilfrid Sellars (whom Brandom calls his mentor, and for whom he has expressed his devotion in several texts), Richard Rorty (his thesis director), Michael Dummet, and John McDowell (his colleague). His primary models are Wittgenstein, Frege, Kant, and, most importantly, and strangely for an analytical philosopher, Hegel. He describes himself sometimes as a Hegelian analytic (in his home page he is in a photo reading in German the *Phenomenology of Spirit*). Brandom’s two main books are *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) and *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). The latter is a close reading of the history of philosophy from the perspective of his own system. Other books, some of them a collection of articles, are *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); *Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and *Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent and Contemporary* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). He is the editor of *Rorty and His Critics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010).

4Jeremy Wanderer has observed: “Despite good intentions, philosophers still seem to be finding it difficult to get to grips with the detail and implications of this immense work, giving Brandom the rather paradoxical status of being both highly influential and little read.” Robert Brandom (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008), 2.

5Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*.


with the nondiscursive and assimilate conceptually structured activity to the nonconceptual activity out of which it arises (principally in evolutionary terms). Now, this strategy is in "danger of failing to make enough of the difference," but the opposite strategy "courts the danger of not doing justice to generic similarities." 8 However, these perils notwithstanding, Brandom opts for the latter, as he is bent on emphasizing discontinuities, exceptionalism instead of assimilationism.9

In tackling the problem presented by Daniel Dennett, namely how we distinguish intentional systems from non-intentional, Brandom asserts: "One characteristic feature of that account is the idea that intentionality ought to be understood in terms of ascription of intentionality." 10 That is to say, we have to find the normative criteria by means of which we may attribute intentionality to some "system." What distinguishes specifically discursive practices from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is their inferential articulation. Our key question then is, What is one doing in taking someone to have knowledge?

In calling what someone has "knowledge," one is doing three things: attributing a commitment that is capable of serving both as premise and as conclusion of inferences relating it to other commitments, attributing entitlement to that commitment, and undertaking the same commitment oneself. (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 119)

Thus for Brandom, to talk about concepts is to talk about roles in reasoning. His pragmatism is a rationalist one, because priority is given to "practices of giving and asking for reasons, understanding them as conferring conceptual content on performances, and expressions, and states suitably caught up in those practices." 11 He condenses into a motto,
appearing in several places that his interest is in awareness in the sense of sapience rather than of mere sentience.\textsuperscript{12}

Conceptual Platonism or Pragmatism?

Brandom calls Platonism the strategy that gives an explanation of the use of concepts in terms of a prior understanding of conceptual content. In conceptual Platonism the center lies in declarative sentences and beliefs, and accordingly an explanation of truth conditions is its main task. Pragmatism is in stark contrast with this. It goes hand in hand with one of the main insights of Wittgenstein: the need to explain the meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of their use.\textsuperscript{13} Thus Brandom offers an account of knowing (or believing, or saying) in terms of what the knower is doing:

The sort of pragmatism adopted here seeks to explain what is asserted by appeal to features of asserting, what is claimed in terms of claimings, what is judged by judgings, and what is believed by the role of believings (indeed, what is expressed by expressing of it) – in general, the content by the act, rather the other way around. (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 4)

Is Mind or Language the Fundamental Locus of Intentionality?

The modern philosophical tradition was a mentalist one, for which the mind is the native and original locus of concept use. For it language had a secondary and merely instrumental role. Twentieth-century philosophy however, presented the opposite picture. Michael Dummett defends a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12}He acknowledges his debt to his teacher Wilfrid Sellars. “One of the most important lessons we can learn from Sellars’s masterwork Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (as from the ‘Sense Certainty’ section of Hegel’s Phenomenology), is the inferentialist one that even such noninferential reports must be inferentially articulated” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 47). Thus, we can have a machine that with certain inputs turns on a message which “says” red, or we can think of a parrot that does something similar. But “merely reliably responding differentially to red things is not yet being aware of them as red” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 17). We can say that the machine is classifying the stimuli in a certain way, but for Brandom this does not embody a conceptual classification, because the conceptual has inferential consequences. And this is the ground for his distinction between vocal and verbal response. Sapience response, in spite of the external similitude, is a different doing.
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Brandom calls this an “overarching methodological commitment” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, xii).
\end{itemize}
linguistic theory of intentionality which instead of viewing assertion as the expression of an interior act, considers judgment as the interiorization of the external act of assertion. Dummett, like Sellars or Geach, understands language as intelligible prior to and independently from private mental acts, "taking thinking as a kind of inner saying." Now, this is going too far. Donald Davidson says that "neither language nor thinking can be fully explained in terms of the other, and neither has conceptual priority. The two are, indeed, linked in the sense that each requires the other in order to be understood." Davidson's relational view seems more suitable insofar as it accounts for the significance of language as sapience, "taking it that concept use is not intelligible in a context that does not include language use, but not insisting that linguistic practices can be made sense of without appeal at the same time to intentional states such as belief." Brandom accepts this relational linguistic approach to the conceptual, following Sellars's principle: grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word. His type of account can be named linguistic pragmatism because concept use is an essentially linguistic affair.

The Genus of Conceptual Activity: Representation or Expression?

The master concept of Enlightenment epistemology and semantics, at least since Descartes, was representation. Awareness was understood in representational terms...Typically, specifically conceptual representations were taken to be just one kind of representation of which and by means of which we can be aware. (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 7)

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14Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 14.
15Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (quoted by Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 5-6).
16"Claiming and believing are two sides of one coin – not in the sense that every belief must be asserted nor that every expression must express a belief, but in the sense that neither the activity of believing nor that of asserting can be made sense of independently of the other, and their conceptual contents are essentially, and not just accidentally, capable of being the contents indifferently of both claims and beliefs" (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 6).
17For Brandom something of this could be found in James and Dewey, but they are not specifically linguistic pragmatists, as the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, Dummet, and Davidson are. On the other hand, as for the Platonic approach, he mentions: Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Tarski.
This orientation proves to be rewarding once we look at the contemporary research program, which constitutes an effort “to put in place a general conception of representation.” For this program the non-concept-using creatures already exhibit some simple forms of representation, and the specifically conceptual activity is just a more complex variation of this. But there was also a countertradition. If the Enlightenment spoke of the mind as a mirror, Romanticism preferred the metaphor of the lamp. Cognitive activity was not passive, but a sort of active revelation. However, it is not clear how this expressionist model can provide an adequate basis for understanding the genus of conceptual activity.

Brandom proposes a pragmatic change in the way we understand the process of expression, instead of the traditional transformation of what is inner into what is outer, whereby what is implicit is to be made explicit. “This can be understood in a pragmatic sense of turning something we can initially only do into something we can say: codifying some sort of knowing how in the form of knowing that.” In the process of explicitation we are applying concepts. There is a relation between what is expressed and the possibility of expressing it. “Such a relational expressivism will understand linguistic performances and the intentional states they express each as essential elements in a whole that is intelligible only in terms of their relation.”

18Leonardo spoke of “knowing nature as producing a second nature.” For Herder the inner becomes outer when a feeling is expressed by a gesture and attitudes are expressed in actions. It ought to be stressed that the ultimate moment for Brandom, although he does not mention it in this text, is Hegel, for whom Spirit is essentially exteriorization.

19Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 8.

20Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 8-9.

21For Brandom, expressivism is what “sets his project off from most other contemporary scenes,” not only among analytical philosophers. Representational paradigm dominates in such a way that it seems as if there were no other alternative, “not only in the whole spectrum of analytically pursued semantics, from model-theoretic, through possible worlds, directly counterfactual, and informational approaches to teleo-semantic ones, but also in structuralism inheriting the broad outlines of Saussure’s semantics, and even in those later continental thinkers whose poststructuralism is still so far mired in representational paradigm that it can see no other alternative to understand meaning in terms of signifiers standing for signifieds than to understand it in terms of signifiers standing for other signifiers” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 9-10). Moreover, in what seems a clear reference to Rorty, Brandom even observes that other pragmatist approaches have not embraced the development of the expressivist alternative.
Distinguishing the Conceptual: Intensionalism or Inferentialism?

Frege’s fundamental pragmatic principle was: in asserting a claim, one is committing oneself to its truth. Another way to look for it “is that a good inference never leads from a true claimable to one that is not true.”22 And such inference could be developed in two ways. The first is the standard way in which it is assumed that one has a prior grip on the notion of truth and uses it to explain what a good inference consists of. The second is the inferentialist pragmatism, in which the order of explanation is reversed: “It starts with a practical distinction between good and bad inferences, understood as a distinction between appropriate and inappropriate doings, and goes on to understand talk about truth as talk about what is preserved by the good moves.”23, 24 Inferentialism is an essentially propositional doctrine, because the fundamental form of the conceptual is its application in “propositionally contentful assertions, beliefs, and thoughts,”25 which entails being able to play the basic inferential roles of both premise and conclusion in inferences.26

22Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 12.
23Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 12.
24This doesn’t mean of course that Brandom is rejecting Truth. What he is rejecting, as was established in the former dichotomy, is the almost exclusive understanding of semantics as a representational theory, in which Truth plays the role of the privileged representation. In a wonderful article with a very provocative title, he says: “The claim is not that epistemic conscientiousness is not an important virtue... Once again, we can put this point in terms of truth: we should work hard to see to it that our beliefs are true. But once again, expressing this point in terms of truth is optional. For what doing that consists in is paying critical attention to our evidence, to the justification we have for endorsing various claims that we consider. What is incumbent on us as conscientious believers is not to be credulous, that is, not to acquire beliefs on the basis of insufficient evidence. It is not to be prejudiced or biased, that is, not to allow our preferences or desires – how we would like things to be – to suborn our assessment of the reasons there are to think that things actually are that way. It is to be critical, that is, actively to seek out and honestly to assess possibly countervailing reasons: carefully to consider what justifications there might be for claims incompatible with the one we are assessing. So long as we pay sufficiently close attention to the reasons that can be offered for and against various claims, their truth will take care of itself.” “Why Truth Is Not Important in Philosophy,” in Reason in Philosophy, 156-57.
26Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 12.
26aSaying or thinking that things are thus-and-so is undertaking a distinctive kind of inferentially articulated commitment: putting it forward as a fit premise for further inferences, that is, authorizing its use as such a premise, and undertaking responsibility to entitle oneself to that commitment, to vindicate one’s authority, under suitable circumstances, paradigmatically by exhibiting it as the conclusion from an inference from other commitments to which one is or can be entitled. Grasping the concept that is applied in such a making explicit is mastering its inferential use: knowing (in the practical sense of being able to distinguish, a kind of knowing how) what else one would be committing oneself to by applying the concept, what would entitle
Bottom-Up or Top-Down Semantic Explanation?

One very important corollary of inferentialism is that declarative sentences are prior to subsentential expressions. In a traditional approach to logic we build terms up from below. First, there come accounts of the meanings of concepts associated with singular and general terms (in a nominalistic representational way: in terms of what they name or stand for). Second, there appear judgments constructed by relating those terms, and third, properties of inferences relating to those judgments. In contrast, pragmatic semantics begins from the use of concepts, in terms of applying them in judgment and action.

Not less important is another corollary of inferentialism, namely the thesis that linguistic practice is discursive. The practice of giving and asking

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one to do so, and what would preclude such entitlement" (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 11). Brandom explains that there are three types of inferentialism: (1) Weak inferentialism: Inferential articulation is a necessary element in the demarcation of the conceptual; (2) Strong inferentialism: Inferential articulation broadly construed is sufficient to account for conceptual content (this is Brandom's position); (3) Hyperinferentialism: Inferential articulation narrowly construed is sufficient to account for conceptual content. The difference between 2 and 3 is whether or not noninferential circumstances of application (in the case of concepts such as red that have noninferential reporting uses) and consequences of application (in the case of concepts such as ought that have noninferential practical uses) are taken into account. The broad sense focuses attention on the inferential commitment that is implicitly undertaken in using any concept whatever, even those with noninferential circumstances or consequences of application" (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 28-29).

27"The sentences that express propositions typically have significant parts that are not sentences, which do not express propositions, and so which cannot serve as inferential premises and conclusions" (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 335). Justification of this inferential claim deserves a very long treatment, which includes not only subsentential expressions, but also perceptual reports, as well as referential terms. The whole of chapter 6 - one of the nine chapters of Making It Explicit - is dedicated to this aim.

28This order of explanation is also still typical of contemporary representational approaches to semantics. "Representationalism is motivated by a designational paradigm: the relation of a name to its bearer" (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 14).

29For Brandom this reversal approach started with Kant, who takes judgment to be the minimal unit of experience because it is the first element in the traditional logic hierarchy that one can take responsibility for. A second step was Frege, who starts with judgeable conceptual contents because that is what pragmatic force can attach to, and Wittgenstein's focus on use leads him to privilege sentences as bits of language, the utterance of which can make a move in a language game. "The more inclusive usage I am recommending and employing understands pragmatics as the study of Fregean force generally: of the moves one can use utterances to make in language games, encompassing the study of locutionary and illocutionary as well as perlocutionary force. A paradigmatic undertaking of a general theory of speech acts and practices of this sort would be trying to say what one should be understood as doing in making a claim or assertion" (Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism, 56).
for reasons has a privileged, indeed defining role with respect to linguistic practice in general. Practices that do not involve reasoning are not linguistic.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{Atomism or Holism?}

Traditional formal semantics is atomistic, as it goes from simple to complex expressions. “Atomism adds that the assignments to the simple ones can be done one by one...By contrast, inferentialist semantics is resolutely holist. On an inferentialist account of conceptual content, one cannot have any concepts unless one has many contents.”\textsuperscript{31} Because of its articulations with others, each concept comes in packages. Holism is a necessary consequence of inferentialism.

\textbf{Traditional or Rationalist Expressivism?}

Romantic expressivism takes as its paradigm the relationship between an inner feeling and an outer gesture by means of which it is expressed. For rationalist expressivism, though, explicitness is a specifically conceptual articulation; that is, expressing something is conceptualizing it in such a way that it is making it inferentially significant. To be explicit in the conceptual sense is to play a specifically inferential role. The most basic case is to be propositionally contentful in order to serve both as premise and as conclusion in inferences. To be thinkable or believable in this sense is to be assertible. “Pragmatism about the conceptual seeks to understand what it is explicitly to say or think that something is the case in terms of what one must implicitly know how (to be able) to do.”\textsuperscript{32} And the doing that characterizes the pragmatist approach is understanding saying as a form of doing, “saying

\textsuperscript{30}“Inferential practices of producing and consuming reasons are downtown in the region of linguistic practice. Suburban linguistic practices utilize and depend on the conceptual contents forged in the game of giving and asking for reasons, are parasitic on it. Claiming, being able to justify one’s claims, and using one’s claims to justify other claims and actions are not just one among other sets of things one can do with language. They are not on a par with other ‘games’ one can play. They are what in the first place make possible talking, and therefore thinking: sapience in general” (Brandom, Articulating Reason, 14-15). Brandom, of course, accepts that we do many other things as concept users besides applying concepts in judgment and action, but for him other linguistic practices are “late comings,” and “can be intelligible in principle only against the background of the core practices of inference-and-assertion” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 15).

\textsuperscript{31}Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 15.

\textsuperscript{32}Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 18.
(thinking, believing ....) that such and such (i.e., adopting a propositionally contentful attitude) in terms of a distinctive kind of knowing how or being able to do something. Inferentialism picks out the relevant sort of doing by its inferential articulation.”33

Is the Semantic Task of Logic Epistemological or Expressive?

In representational semantics the task of logic is conceived of as giving us special epistemic access to a kind of truth. Logic allowed us to prove the truth of some claims, so its principal role is epistemological. But logic can also be thought of in expressive terms “as a distinctive set of tools for saying something that cannot otherwise be made explicit.”34 We have said that to understand a conceptual content to which one has committed oneself is a kind of practical mastery, a know-how that has enabled us to discriminate what does and does not follow from the claim, what could be evidence for and against it. Logic is making explicit that know-how. Brandom distinguishes between rational and logical. Being able to speak a language is to be rational. To say something about what one does when one is speaking a language is logic. A central expressive resource is provided by logical vocabulary. Logic is, thus, semantic self-consciousness.35

33Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 17. Speaking again of the difference between sentient and sapience response, he points out: “What is implicit in that sort of practical doing becomes explicit in the application of the concept red when that responsive capacity or skill is put into a larger context that includes treating the responses as inferentially significant: as providing reasons for making other moves in the language game, and as themselves potentially standing in need of reasons that could be provided by making still other moves” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 17). An example of his model is what happens with the parrot, who does not treat “That is whiskey” as incompatible with “That is tequila,” nor as following from “That is Talisker” and entailing “That is single malt,” because it has no concept of whiskey.

34Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 19.

35This expressive understanding of logic embodies what is going to be fully explicated in the bulk of Making It Explicit. But Brandom does not assume that only formal inferences are valid: he distinguishes between material and formal inferences. Rejecting logical formalism, he states that “one must acknowledge that besides inferences that are formally good in the sense of being logically valid, there are inferences that are materially good in the sense of articulating the contents of the nonlogical concepts applied in their premises and conclusions” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 37). It is to be highlighted that Lonergan agrees in this respect when he says that there are materially good inferences, such as those we find in common sense: “Such a procedure, clearly, is logical, if by ‘logical’ you mean ‘intelligent and reasonable.’ With equal clearness, such a procedure is not logical, if by ‘logical’ you mean conformity to a set of general rules valid in every instance of a defined range; for no set of general rules can keep pace with the resourcefulness of intelligence in its adaptations to the possibilities and exigencies of concrete
Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is constituted by use led the analytical tradition to determine the primacy of pragmatics over semantics, which had been initially emphasized. This move has been called a revolt against formalism. There is not any entity that can be designated as “Language” as such, but only a number of games that the users play. However, apposite the analytical tradition’s focus on pragmatics may have been, it is true nonetheless that it implied an oblivion of any pursuit of the normative, thus paving the way for the emergence of different and specious forms of contextualism and relativism, and also, notwithstanding his conceptualization of language as a multiplicity of practices or games, to a reductive emphasis on ordinary language. We are at the paradoxical center of Wittgenstein’s problem about what it is to follow a rule. This is perhaps the core problem of his pragmatic bent. The apparent dilemma is either to identify the normative criteria (the rule) with some formal semantic ideal that distinguishes between meaningful expressions and those that are not, or to identify normativity with regularity – or even worse, with any use whatsoever:


36This second part does not draw from the introduction of Articulating Reasons but from the introduction of Making It Explicit, which delineates the steps that we have to take in order to reach a normative pragmatics. “Towards a Normative Pragmatics” is precisely the name of chapter 1 of Making It Explicit, which offers a very detailed discussion of some problems derived from the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s idea about what it is to follow a rule.

37It is worthwhile to consider Hilary Putnam’s characterization: “Many years ago, Morton White spoke of a ‘revolt against formalism’ in connection with pragmatism. This revolt against formalism is not a denial of the utility of formal models in certain contexts; but it manifests itself in a sustained critique of the ideal models, in particular, systems of symbolic logic, rule books of inductive logic, formalization of scientific theories, etc., describe a condition to which rational thought either can or should aspire. Wittgenstein, as you all know, began his career on the formalist side and spent the whole latter part of his life as an antiformalist” (Pragmatism: An Open Question [Oxford: Blackwell, 1995], 63-64).

38Referring to Wittgenstein’s insight about meaning and use, Brandom says: “For although he drove home the importance of such an approach, other features of his thought – in particular his theoretical quietism – have discouraged his admirers from attempting to work out the details of a theory of meaning or, for that matter, of use” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, xii). “One result has been a substantial disjunction between semantic theorizing (about the sorts of contents expressed by various locutions), on the one hand, and pragmatic theorizing (about the linguistic practices in which those locutions are employed), on the other” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, xiii).
The explanatory strategy pursued here is to begin with an account of social practices, identify the particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices, and then consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. The result is a new kind of conceptual-role semantics. (Making It Explicit, xiii)

The pragmatist school that followed the lineaments of Wittgenstein takes as its roots the actual practices of producing and responding to speech acts, and this makes sense only within a context of a specification of the vocabulary in which that use is described or ascribed. The specification of that context has oscillated between a very generous stance that permits too much on the one hand, while the other is so unhurried that it insists on a purely naturalistic vocabulary.\(^{39}\) Instead, Brandom searches for a normative vocabulary whose normativity is rational and social. For Brandom this does not mean some sort of unconscious software, or group commands imposed by force upon ourselves. Rather, we accept and follow this normativity, which in turn has intrinsic sanctions if we don’t follow the rule. It is social not in the “I-we form,” but rather in the “I-thou form.”\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\)Brandom rejects the attempt to eliminate the normative vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that embody the use of language, in favor of nonnormative or naturalistic vocabulary – a very strong tendency nowadays, fueled by the development of cognitive sciences.

\(^{40}\)It is very important to ascertain exactly how we understand “social.” By an “I-we sociality,” Brandom means an understanding of intersubjectivity that focuses on the contrast between an individual and the community. From this perspective the community is privileged. Objective correctness is identified with the “privileged” voice of the latter. Brandom categorically rejects this understanding of intersubjectivity, as it is the notion that lies behind all forms of conventionalism and those consensus theories that take “the community” as being the final arbitrator of what is true and objective. Brandom opts for a Davidsonian understanding of intersubjectivity, an “I-thou sociality that focuses on the relation between commitments undertaken by a scorekeeper interpreting others and the commitments attributed by the scorekeepers to those others” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 599). According to the “I-thou” construal (in contrast to the “I-we”), there is no privileged perspective. Or we might say that each perspective is temporarily “locally privileged in that it incorporates a structural distinction between objectively correct applications of concepts and applications that are merely subjectively taken to be correct” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 600). Objectivity then consists “in a kind of perspectival form, rather than in a nonperspectival or cross-perspectival content. What is shared by all discursive practices is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way of concept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is – the structure, not the content” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 600). And what is the most crucial is the “symmetry of the state and attitude between the ascriber and the one to whom a
The practices that confer propositional and other sort of conceptual content implicitly contain norms concerning how it is correct to use expressions, under what circumstances it is appropriate to perform various speech acts, and what the appropriate consequences of such performances are...Interpreting states, performances, and expressions as semantically or intentionally contentful is understood as attributing to their occurrence an ineliminably normative pragmatic significance. (Making It Explicit, xiii)

The target is this “ineliminable” normative dimension of linguistic practice, which is not treated as primitive, inexplicable, or mysterious. Brandom proposes two ways to approach their mystery. First, understand linguistic norms as instituted by social-practical activity, and second, explain exactly what is expressed by normative vocabulary. The result is a methodological project that combines in two steps both pragmatics and semantics, but gives the priority to the former. The first step is an elaboration of a pragmatics in terms “of practical score keeping attitudes of attributing and acknowledging deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement.”

The pragmatic significance of speech acts consists “in the difference those performances make to the commitments and entitlements attributed by various scorekeepers.” In other words, it is if we were in a baseball game, whose sense is changing all the time depending on how the score goes, and in which inning we are, and how many strikes or balls have been counted. Scorekeepers are presented in deontic form, but this deontic form is understood in terms of social status, instituted by the practical attitudes of those who attribute and acknowledge such statuses.

Mastering this sort of norm-instituting social practice is a kind of practical know-how – a matter of keeping deontic score by keeping track of one’s own and others’ commitments and entitlements to those commitments,

commitment is ascribed” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 600). See Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn, 121-22.

41Brandom, Making It Explicit, xiv.
42Brandom, Making It Explicit, xiv.
43“the natural world does not come with commitments and entitlements in it; they are the product of human activity. In particular, they are creatures of the attitudes of taking, treating, or responding to someone in practice as committed or entitled” (Brandom, Making It Explicit, xiv).
and altering that score in systematic ways based on the performance each practitioner produces. (Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, xiv)

The second step “is to say what structures such a set of social practices must have in order to qualify as specifically discursive practice. This is a matter of moving from pragmatics to semantics.”44 It consists in “explaining exactly what is expressed by normative vocabulary.” We have to make explicit the normative conceptual contents that are found implicitly in normative practices, rather than reducing them to nonnormative terms, and this process is founded on the methodological principle “that implicit structures are often best understood by looking at how they can be made explicit.”45 The defining characteristic of discursive practice is the production and consumption of specifically propositional contents, which are understood as what can serve as premises and conclusions of inferences.

**LONERGAN’S PRAGMATISM**

If I were asked by an analytical philosopher how to describe Lonergan’s position, I would say that he is a pragmatist, in the sense we have been talking about here: in his analysis of language and meaning, pragmatics has precedence over semantics; however, I would add that such a move does not forestall his adamant resolution to pursue meaning – in its proper context.46

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46Of course there are different ways of understanding pragmatism. While there is a clear historical distinction between traditional American pragmatism and pragmatism in analytical philosophy, there are connections between them. That allowed Bernstein to write: “The confusion about the meaning of pragmatism was so widespread that on the tenth anniversary of James’s introduction of the term, Arthur O. Lovejoy set out to distinguish thirteen different meanings of pragmatism” (Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn*, 4). For Putnam James’s main idea was to find a connection between two different dichotomies presented by traditional philosophers: truth and value, on the one hand, and truth and verification, on the other. Without reducing truth to utility – the traditional way to present the philosophy of William James that he rejects – Putnam says that there is an interpenetration and interdependence of truth and value, on the one hand, and truth and verification, on the other. Related with these ideas is the pragmatist emphasis on effective collaboration and “democratization.” But Putnam also emphasizes that pragmatism doesn’t search for a semantics that could give us an algorithm (like a computer program) to establish which expressions are meaningful: “According to the pragmatists, whether the subject be science or ethics, what we have are maxims and not algorithms; and maxims themselves requires contextual interpretation” (Putnam, *Pragmatism*, 71).
1. What am I doing when I am knowing? In Lonergan the starting point is neither a Cartesian cogito, nor a strong foundation based on some sort of semantic analysis, but simply a doing. This doing is not something that only occurs to the great philosophers. This happens all the time; it happens to everyone. Insight invites its reader to verify in himself or herself whether or not this doing is happening to him or her. Why is precisely this doing and not any other thing, knowing? The task is to make it explicit, to find the normative criteria which guide this doing, and to develop its full implications. But we do not postulate any ideal of knowledge that is located away from this doing. We are to make explicit the rule that we are always following, the disobedience of which has implicit sanctions. Brandom would call this expressivism, which arguably runs in parallel to Lonergan's transcendental method. But it should be noted that the latter perspective (which indeed amounts to expressivism) is a complete explicitation of all the subject's dimensions, and not only of his rationality.

2. It is pertinent to point to the distinction between philosophical and real doubts established by Charles S. Peirce. Pragmatism does not disdain the former, but puts his intellectual efforts on the latter. Likewise, for Lonergan the main problem in cognitional theory was not the Cartesian problem of "the bridge," but "the Babel of endless philosophic arguments." Lonergan's dialectics is not meant for propositions, but for positions. The argument against relativism is not based on the immutability of some proposition, but on the unreasonable nature of the relativist position. The foundation offered by Lonergan could be called weak, because it is not built on a claim about a universal necessity of our cognitional structure - that it has to be the way it is. Rather, the argument is that our cognitional structure in fact is so. The argument employed is well-known to some as retortion, or to others as transcendental. It is an argumentation that employs the performance of the

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47 Bernstein emphasizes anti-Cartesianism as one of the main ideas that gave birth to American pragmatism, especially in Peirce.

48 Joseph Fitzpatrick has remarked: "Nevertheless, logic is not all that is transcendental; the whole of method, each of the operations of cognition and evaluation, and also the links between the operations, have the same transcendental quality of determining the legitimacy and validity of our rational investigations" (Philosophical Encounters: Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition [Toronto: University of Toronto Press], 2005, 112).

49 Mark Morelli compares Lonergan's reversion of counterposition with the use of an argumentum ad hominem. Morelli shows that we have lost the conversational sense of Greek logic. This sense appears in the reversal of counterposition that does not pretend to destroy
rival as a proof that the explicitation of the doing is correct. In order to attack it you have to employ it. And so we have this crucial passage of *Insight*, which, incidentally, provoked in me an enormous shock the first time I read it, because I was looking for a sort of universal semantic key, which would refute all kinds of psychologism, appealing to necessity and not merely to facts:

Self-affirmation has been considered as a concrete judgment of fact. The contradiction of self-negation has been indicated. Behind that contradiction there have been discerned natural inevitabilities and spontaneities that constitute the possibility of knowing, not by demonstrating that one can know, but pragmatically by engaging one in the process. Nor in the last resort can one reach a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. (*Insight* 356 [331])

3. Meaning is defined in terms of the acts of meaning, analyzing what we do when we mean something. Judgment is a full act of meaning because only there is it possible to fully answer the question, What do you mean?  

4. Some positions of Lonergan's critical realism could also be designated in terms of the analytical tradition as a rejection of the myth of the given. American and analytical pragmatists have taken a step away from empiricism. As we have pointed out, for Brandom, perception makes sense just in an inferential context. For Lonergan experience gives us something, but what is given are data, and not facts. The latter could not be known without understanding, which involves a relational aspect, nor without judgment, which clearly is inferential, as I shall try to defend in the next section.

5. The major thinker of this topic is perhaps Wilfrid Sellars (Brandom's mentor) in his *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.*
5. Very closely connected with the last point is the connection that pragmatism, since Peirce, establishes between truth and justification. Truth is defined by the procedure by which you arrive at it. You cannot speak ontologically of truth without the epistemological procedure of justification of beliefs. In different terms, what we find in Lonergan first, instead of the definition of truth, is an analysis of what we do in order to justify our judgment, fulfilling the conditions that grasp it as unconditioned.

6. Lonergan’s position could be called holist and coincides with what Brandom calls top-down semantics. Let me illustrate this with a text from section 7, chapter 10, of Insight. There he is arguing that we cannot obtain analytic principles from either common sense or science. In analytic principles there is an existential element we don’t find in just mere analytic propositions, but there is also a primitive character, explained by Aquinas in his account of Wisdom. Science could not reach them because their judgments are just probable. They have only a provisional character; they are probably existential. With commonsense judgments the main reason is that analytic principles are universal and common sense is particular. But there is another reason that common sense could not reach this primitive character of the terms:

Just as the common core of understanding has to be adjusted by complementary insights into the present concrete situation before judgment occurs, so also common concepts and terms receive their ultimate complement of meaning from those complementary insights. “This is a dog,” “What do you mean by a dog?” The question supposes that the term “dog” has a precise meaning outside the series of statements in which it occurs. But in fact what comes first is the series of statements, and what comes only later, and then only if one goes in for analysis, is

52In order to reach analytic principles we need Wisdom, which includes logic – by means of which we are helped to find some of the normative character of our practice – but goes further. Logic, though, is not some field apart from what the ordinary man is doing when he knows something: it is only that he cannot say correctly what he is doing, because his vision is narrow. “Precisely because it is so confined, common sense cannot explicitly formulate its own nature, its own domain, its own logic and methodology” (Insight, 322 [297]). So this point corresponds in a certain way with Brandom’s distinction between rational and logic. However, according to Lonergan, as we have mentioned, we must go further from logic, because this pursuit is based on the natural spontaneities and inevitabilities of the dynamic cognitional structure that in fact we are, a structure which is made explicit by a generalized empirical method.
the determination of the precise meaning of the single, partial term...

Hence it is that a dictionary is constructed, not by the Socratic art of definition, but by the pedestrian, inductive process of listing sentences in which each word occurs in good usage.53

7. Some of these points can be found to a greater or lesser extent in traditional philosophy, but context is really the great breakthrough which arguably affords Lonergan a place at the very heart of linguistic philosophy. Now, it must be noted that while "context" belongs properly to pragmatics, we should preferably connect this notion with inferentialism.

**LONERGAN’S INFERENTIALISM**

And so there is always context. Our intentions, our statements, our deeds, all occur within context. And it is to context we appeal when we explain our deeds. What are you doing? What are you up to? When we clarify, amplify, qualify our statements. What I really meant was this. And you appeal to the context within which you made your judgment. Or when you explain your goals you give a context.54

One of the many things that really bothered me in my first complete reading of Insight was the affirmation that the principal notion of objectivity comes within a pattern of judgments. It could be maintained that Insight embodies an attempt of Cartesian lineage, insofar as it poses that we are searching for one judgment. To introduce other judgments in the principal notion of objectivity was for me something that opened the door to indeterminacy in the quality of our judgment-representation. However, the reading of Robert Brandom has been very helpful in thinking of Lonergan’s description of the process of judgment in terms of inferentialism:

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53And he continues: “It may be objected that one cannot make a brick house without first making bricks. But one is arguing from a false analogy if one claims that the mind develops in the same fashion as the wall of a house is built. Prior to concepts there are insights. A single insight is expressed only by uttering several concepts. They are uttered in conjunction, and reflection pronounces whether the insight and so the conjunction is correct. The isolation and definition of concepts is a subsequent procedure, and common sense does not undertake it” (Insight, 332-333 [307-308]).

I distinguish a proximate criterion and remote criterion. The proximate criterion regards single judgments. The remote criterion regards the context of judgments within which any single judgment is inserted, through which it is interpreted, which it corrects or modifies. The remote criterion is that the judgments in the context in which the new judgment is inserted be themselves true, satisfy their proximate criterion.55

At first sight it seems that there is no relation between Brandom's deontic score (a social practice) and the problem of having an invulnerable insight (which seems like a private mental question). However, this is not the case. The process of judgment admittedly occurs in a mind, but it takes place in a context, in a social dialogue. It happens in the form of "I-we" in the sense that there is a historical context called realms of meaning. To put it more precisely, it principally takes on the form of "I-you" because the subject learns the game while engaging in dialogue with others, whom he or she recognizes and acknowledges as practitioners. At the beginning of his or her "training" perhaps this doesn't happen, but the process that leads to adulthood implies belonging to a community and mastering the inferential game. Let us return to *Insight*, chapter 10:

Let us now distinguish between vulnerable and invulnerable insights. Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or less extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue. (*Insight*, 308 [284])

Using Brandom's terms, the modification of implications changes the score. The conceptual distinction between correct and mistaken insights is grounded on "an operational distinction between invulnerable and vulnerable insights" that "reveals a law immanent and operative in cognitional process." When there is an invulnerable insight "there are no

further insights to challenge the initial position.” These texts show us that we are in a sort of baseball game in which, for all the changes in the score (i.e., the input received from a dialogue with others), what is going on still seems like a completely private ceremony:

Note that it is not enough to say that the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur to me. The mere absence of further questions in my mind can have other causes. My intellectual curiosity may be stifled by other interests. My eagerness to satisfy other drives may refuse the further questions a chance to emerge. (Insight, 308 [284])

Lonergan mentions there are phenomena such as rashness and indecision and comments that there is no recipe for striking a “happy balance” between both. We have to be satisfied with an “analysis of the main factors in the problem and an outline of the general nature of their solution.” Among the outlined solutions, which encompass social and personal features, the first one is to give the further questions an opportunity to occur; this is accomplished through the intervention of four resources: “By intellectual alertness, by taking one’s time, by talking things over, by putting viewpoints to the test of action.” The last two of these clearly have an inferential character:

Moreover, every insight has its retinue of presuppositions, implications, and applications. One has to take the steps needed for that retinue to come to light. The presuppositions and implications of a given insight have to knit coherently with the presuppositions and implications of other insights. Its possibilities of concrete application have to enter into the field of operations and undergo the test of success or failure. (Insight, 310 [285])

Now, it must be stressed that Lonergan’s proposal does not amount to saying that in everyday living our aim should be “to pursue this logical and operational expansion in the explicit, deliberate, and elaborate manner of

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56Insight, 308 [284] (my emphasis).
57Insight, 310 [285].
58Insight, 310 [285].
the scientific investigator." Nevertheless, it is still true that the mental steps taken by the ordinary man go along the lines of the procedures followed by a professional:

But what is done explicitly and deliberately by professional teachers also is done implicitly and unconsciously by parents with their children and by equals among themselves. Talking is a basic human art; by it each reveals what he knows and provokes from others the further questions that direct his attention to what he had overlooked. (*Insight*, 314 [290])

In the second place, Lonergan argues that behind the theory of the correct problems there is the theory of the correct insights – which, I should add, connects with Brandom’s notions of commitment and entitlement – especially the last of these. Lonergan observes:

In other words, there has been postulated an inquirer that understands the background of the situation and so knows what is to be expected; there also has been postulated a problem that exists, that is accurately defined by the divergence of the situation from current expectations, that in turn provides a definition of the pertinence of any further questions. (*Insight*, 310 [285])

We are situated, though, within a kind of dead end, because “good judgment about any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, connected, and correct insights.”* The solution to the vicious circle rests on the process of learning, which appears in the third place. (It is worth noting that in the way the process of learning is described we can find a relational element whereby Lonergan’s scheme becomes

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* *Insight*, 310 [285].

* *Insight*, 310 [285]; Lonergan observes that while children ask an endless series of questions, they have not attained the age of reason – or, as Brandom would assert, they do not have real commitment. Similarly, although young people prove to have acuity, the law still considers them to be not sufficiently judgmental, classifying them as minors – or, in Brandom’s terms, it does not recognize their entitlement in spite of their intellectual alertness. Touching on other kind of difficulties, namely those entailed by the re-learning process, Lonergan says: “Nor is there merely the initial difficulty of acquisition, but as well there is the subsequent necessity of keeping in touch” (*Insight*, 311 [286]). Lonergan puts the illustration of people returning to a craft or a field and trying to resume activities; for Brandom, they have no entitlement.
similar to Brandom’s posing of an interrelation between social practice and intentionality.) Though one is to develop and form its own judgment for the sake of exercising it autonomously, this undertaking has to be postponed for a more mature stage: “For the gradual acquisition and accumulation of insights are not merely a matter of advancing in direct or introspective understanding.” 67 In the meantime, it is necessary to fortify intellectual alertness against other desires. But the most important thing is to develop the inferential consequences, 67 the set of which is summed up in this way:

So it is the process of learning that breaks the vicious circle. Judgment on the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights. (Insight, 311 [286])

And, ultimately, the process tends to reach a limit, because “we become familiar with concrete situations; we know what to expect.” 68 Thus, there is a practice that gives us the entitlement. 69

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67Insight, 310 [286].

68Giving an exemplification of these, Lonergan explains: “At the same time, the logical retinues of presuppositions and implications of each insight are being expanded, either to conflict and provoke further questions or else to mesh into coherence. At the same time, operational possibilities are envisaged to be tested in thought experiments, to be contrasted with actual practice” (Insight, 311 [286]).

69Insight, 311 [286].

69A detailed analysis and how the process tends to reach a limit, and a close comparison with Peirce’s idea of “in the long run,” is something I could not develop here. For the present, I must assert that this phenomenon is very important in the treatment of what truth is. Do we have or not the possibility of making true judgments of fact? Without denying the inferential character of judgment and in this sense being open in the game of giving reasons (further questions for Lonergan), what does “in the long run” mean? That we never tend to a limit? Is the process something essentially unending? We can see here the influence of Kant’s regulative ideas in Peirce (and also in Apel and Habermas). But “in the long run” can also be interpreted in Lonergan’s sense of “tending to a limit.” However, as we have explained, we must distinguish the different realms of meaning in which the judgment occurs. Peirce, with his “in the long run,” is referring principally to scientific judgments. If it is interpreted as referring to all judgments there follows a fallibilistic position which has a counterpositional element, because the truth of the fallibilistic position must be affirmed in a concrete judgment of fact, and not “in the long run.”
For Lonergan, the general process previously described takes place in different realms of meaning (which correspond to Brandom’s social practices). Chapter 10 of Insight describes the dissimilarity between common sense and empirical science judgments. The process in general is the same, but the self-correcting process presents some variations, primarily in the way that further insights can change the deontic score.

A first distinction, which is endowed with “logical significance” and is made “in order to avoid contradictions,” is to separate two universes of discourse. In all the affirmations of empirical science there must be the qualifying reservation “from the viewpoint of explanation,” and all the affirmations of common sense must contain the qualifying reservation “from the viewpoint of ordinary description.” But underlying the logical separation there is a more fundamental methodological difference: the pertinence of further questions in each domain differs in criterion from that of the other – such divergence, in Brandom’s terms, connoting a social practice. Lonergan points out:

Both ordinary description and empirical science reach their conclusions through the self-correcting process of learning. Still, they reach very different conclusions because, though they use essentially the same process, they operate with different standards and criteria. What is a further, pertinent question for empirical science is not necessarily a further, pertinent question for ordinary description. Inversely...It is this fundamental difference in the criterion of the relevance of further questions that marks the great divide between a scientific attitude and a common-sense attitude. (Insight, 320 [295])

There is still a third difference in “the terms employed and in the possibilities they respectively offer for logical deduction.” (This is clearly what Brandom calls inheritance of commitments and entitlements.) Commonsense terms “do not shift in meaning with the successive revisions of scientific theories...the expectations of a normal course of events form a necessary and unchanged basis and context into which applied science introduces its improvements” (Insight, 321 [296]). But in science:
each great forward step of scientific knowledge involves a more or less profound revision of its fundamental terms. Again, because science is analytic and abstractive, its terms are exact; because its correlations purport to be generally valid, they must be determined with utmost precision; because its terms are exact and its correlations general, it must be ready to bear the weight of a vast superstructure of logical deductions in which each conclusion must be equally exact and valid generally. (Insight, 327 [296])

An amazing consequence of this scheme for the beginning reader of Insight is that we can make true commonsense concrete judgments of facts, whereas we only have probable judgments in empirical science:

The generalization of classical laws, then, is no more than probable because the application of single laws raises further questions that head towards the systematization of a whole field. (Insight, 327 [302])

But if empirical generalizations are no more than probable, what happens with the particular facts that ground them? We can call Lonergan’s answer holist, and clearly inferentialist:

Here a distinction seems necessary. Insofar as such facts are expressed in the terms of ordinary description, they fall under the criteria of the concrete judgment of fact. Insofar as they are relevant to be the establishment of a scientific theory, they come under the control of empirical method...Finally, the observables have to be the terms defined by the theoretical structure, and, as this structure is subject to revision, so also are its definitions. (Insight, 328 [302-303])

Terms that describe the same facts are not playing in an isolated way; they are playing in a context, and “subject to revision” signifies that their meanings are constituted in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This game is played in a social practice called a realm of meaning. For a thinker formed in a scholastic tradition, this position is really amazing.

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65 We can also notice the coincidence with Brandom’s position that scientific observation is meaningful only in an inferential context.

66 My emphasis.
In light of this, we can maintain that for linguistic practices to attain a higher degree of meaningfulness, the theoretical structure is needed. Otherwise, the gatherings of common sense would be spoiled. To be sure, there are a number of risks involved in the use of common sense, as its preoccupation with the concrete and the particular facets of life makes it prone to ignore universal principles. Insofar as individuals appeal to commonsensical judgments, their conclusions do not generally reach for the set of ideas which, on account of their profoundness, prove to be transcendental at different moments in the dialectical evolution of the community. While it manages to overcome the individualistic selfishness and to dismiss the prejudiced views of hegemonic or subjected groups, the common sense held by ordinary people cannot fully meet the challenges posed by successive avenues of thought regarding the development of history:

But the general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view or that set up higher integrations or that involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues. The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice. Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially. It needs to be guided but it is incompetent to choose its guide. It becomes involved in incoherent enterprises. It is subjected to disasters that no one expects ... that can be explained only on the level of scientific or philosophic thought. (*Insight*, 253 [228])

Thus, painstaking attention to the concrete leads to the enthronization of practicality, to the detriment of speculatively sound attempts: "In the limit, practice becomes a theoretically unified whole, and theory is reduced to the status of a myth that lingers on to represent the frustrated aspirations of detached and disinterested intelligence." Now, for Lonergan it goes without saying that the study of the human being is to a large extent empirical, for in the absence of that which is given there can be no place for the formation of correct insights. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the

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*I am in debt to my reviser of the article, Dr. Fausto Trejo, for the final part of this paragraph.

*Insight*, 257 [232].
given in itself does not suffice when it parts company with the data provided by consciousness. Only a clear presentation of empirical data enables us finally to obtain unquestionable insights, which connote normativity: “In other words, human science cannot be merely empirical; it has to be critical; to reach a critical standpoint, it has to be normative.”

CONCLUSION

I have tried to pinpoint some affinities between Brandom and Lonergan’s transcendental method, thereby bringing to the fore the legacy integrated by Lonergan’s outlook on linguistic uses and highlighting his view of language as essentially embedded in a historical process – contrary to the analytical tradition. Brandom’s ideas have helped me attain a better understanding of some of Lonergan ideas, especially the discursive character of judgment as intentional and social. By calling Davidson’s notion of a relational linguistic approach “conceptual,” Brandom facilitates a closer reading of Lonergan’s remarks on the function of dialogue and the chain of corrections leading to solid thought. Moreover, if it is true that “intentional” and “rational” cannot be analyzed as something private, it is also true, and especially nowadays, that “social” could not be thought reductively in naturalistic terms without “intentional,” nor without the normative exigencies of “rational.” Although Brandom’s expressivism is clearly included and sublated in generalized empirical method, for me it is always satisfying to find philosophers pursuing the transcendental method, which indeed is capable of grasping some fine new details heretofore overlooked.

At the risk of falling into artificiality with a classification, we can say that Lonergan’s thought belongs to the linguistic turn, but keeps profiting from the great achievements of other paradigms and thinkers. His critical realism could be presented as inferentialism (in its full implications), and his generalized empirical method as a normative pragmatics.

There is another feature of pragmatism that I have not mentioned here. Putnam has said: “The problem of subjectivity and intersubjectivity was in the minds of pragmatists from the beginning not as a metaphysical worry about whether we have access to a world at all, but as a real problem in human life.” He deems it essential for a pragmatist approach the search for

69Insight, 261 [236].
effective collaboration (to which Peirce referred in speaking of “men and their conversation”): “Cooperation is necessary both for the formation of ideas and for their rational testing.” This feature is clearly something we can attribute to Lonergan: As I have observed, Lonergan’s efforts are not a Cartesian affair, a private way of reaching for certainty, but rather a search for public cooperation, as well as for social transformation. Implementation is part of Lonergan’s very definition of metaphysics. This topic also connects with the classical locus of American pragmatism, the relation between truth and value – a point which perhaps might have been more pertinent to develop than the others in order to render a full account of Lonergan’s pragmatism, a task that will have to be pursued on another occasion.

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70Putnam adds: “But that cooperation must be of a certain kind in order to be effective. It must, for example, obey the principles of discourse ethics. Where there is no opportunity to challenge accepted hypotheses by criticizing the evidence upon which their acceptance was based, or the application of the norms of scientific inquiry to that evidence, or by offering rival hypotheses, and where questions and suggestions are systematically ignored, then the scientific enterprise always suffers” (Putnam, Pragmatism, 71).

71Insight, 416.
THE RECONCILIATION OF THE MANIFEST AND SCIENTIFIC IMAGE IN BERNARD LONERGAN

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The philosopher Wilfrid Sellars sees a fundamental conflict between what he calls the "manifest image of man" and the "scientific image of man." In very simple terms, the manifest image of the world is the image of the world we form based on our everyday experience. It is a world of everyday objects that possess various properties (colors, texture, tastes, sounds, etc.). The scientific image is the world as defined by science, and it is made up of theoretical entities like atoms, electromagnetic waves, neurons, and electric impulses. These two views of the world seem to give us conflicting views of reality. The distinction really goes back to Galileo and his distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and ever since Galileo philosophers and scientists have been trying to figure out how the scientific image and the manifest image could possibly fit together.

The attempts to fit them together have tended to take one of two forms. On the one hand, there have been philosophers who have attempted to maintain the primacy of the everyday world of experience. Wilfrid Sellars describes this route as the claim that "[m]anifest objects are what really exist; systems of imperceptible particles being 'abstract' or 'symbolic' ways of representing them." The alternative route would be to take the route followed by Galileo himself and claim that "[m]anifest objects are 'appearances' to human minds of a reality which is constituted by systems of imperceptible particles." For ease of expression I will refer to the former

group of philosophers as anti-realists, and the latter as realists.

Both paths encounter problems. The first path requires a fundamental re-interpretation of the nature of science and what it is attempting to achieve. Scientists tend to assume that the goal of their scientific activity is the construction of theories that reflect the way the world really is independently of the representative activities of scientists. Anti-realists would argue that the scientists are wrong about what they are doing. Scientists believe they are searching for theories that are true in the strong sense implied by the correspondence theory of truth, but what they are really doing is searching for theories that are useful, that allow us to manipulate the world effectively, or that "save the phenomena."4 Taken to an extreme this view leads to relativism.

The second path also encounters problems. Once appearances are eliminated from the world of true being their ontological status becomes very difficult to determine. Perception is, itself, an event in the world, and if we interpret it purely in terms of the scientific image, secondary qualities wind up being eliminated from our world picture entirely. As Sellars writes, after "[w]e have pulled perceptible qualities out of the physical environment and put them into sensations. If we now say that all there really is to sensation is a complex interaction of cerebral particles ... We will have made it unintelligible how things could even appear to be coloured."5 Once we have admitted the distinction between appearance and reality, the latter tends to swallow the former entirely, making it impossible for us to account for our everyday experience.

In this paper I will attempt to give what I believe Lonergan’s solution to this problem would be. I begin with an outline of Galileo’s metaphysics and Lonergan’s critique of Galileo’s metaphysics. In the next two sections I explain Lonergan’s distinction between pure and experiential conjugates and his distinction between human and animal knowing. In the final section I explain how those two distinctions allow Lonergan to reconcile the two images while avoiding the problems faced by the anti-realists and realists.

**Galileo’s Metaphysics and Lonergan’s Critique**

Galileo’s metaphysical system takes space and time to be fundamental metaphysical categories. Galileo’s distinction between primary and

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secondary qualities is based on the fundamental priority Galileo accords to spatial and temporal properties. This is a radical departure from the Aristotelian metaphysical system in which substances were treated as primary, while predicates pertaining to quantity (shape, length, measured duration, etc.) were treated as secondary. For Aristotle, the quantitative aspects of a substance were merely accidental. Galileo reverses the priority given to the qualitative over the quantitative in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In Galileo’s own words:

Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many.  

For Galileo, it is impossible to think of a body without thinking of its necessary connection with its spatial properties (shape, size, location), its temporal properties (past, future, now, duration), and its motion (velocity, acceleration). These are properties that bodies possess simply in virtue of their existence. Galileo claims that it is necessary to think of a body as possessing spatial and temporal properties “[b]ut that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments.” These properties, for Galileo, “reside only in the consciousness.” Galileo reasons that, if there were no conscious bodies around to perceive objects, these sensitive qualities would not exist at all. It was often assumed, before Galileo, that for an object to produce the sensation of a particular quality, the object had to possess that quality. For an object to taste sour, it had to be sour, for fire to feel hot, it had to be hot. Galileo claims that it is not necessary for bodies to possess any qualities “except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements” in order to “excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds.”

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7Galilei, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 274.
6Galilei, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 274.
5Galilei, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 276.*
Galileo’s rejection of substance metaphysics also led to a rejection of final causality. The shift of focus from substances, and their naturally determined ends, to mathematically determined bodies in motion, led to a fundamental alteration in the intelligibility of motion. For Aristotle, to understand motion was fundamentally to understand why a substance moved, or the end that determined motion. For Galileo, the intelligibility of motion was a matter of grasping the mathematical function that expressed the how of motion. According to Lonergan, “Galileo supposed that some correlation was to be found between the measurable aspects of falling bodies... the body traverses a determinate distance; it does so in a determinate time.” The law of falling bodies is the equation that expresses the correlation between distance traversed and time travelled. One can see immediately the fundamental role that the metaphysical categories of space and time play in Galileo’s determination of the nature of motion.

It is time now to turn to Lonergan’s critique of Galileo’s metaphysics, but before I do, I would like to point out that Lonergan’s assessment of Galileo is not wholly negative. “Galileo inaugurated modern science,” according to Lonergan, by taking the step “from sensible similarity, which resides in the relations of things to our senses” to “relations that hold directly between things themselves.” Galilean physics represents a genuine step forward in relation to Aristotelian physics precisely because it moves beyond classifications based on sensible similarities. Galileo gives precise definitions to terms “such as force, resistance, moment, velocity, acceleration, and the like” by “giving them an exact mathematical meaning.” Galileo is able to give these terms precise definitions by defining them in terms of their mathematical relations to one another. Force, for example, can be defined in terms of the acceleration it produces, and this relation can be specified precisely in mathematical terms. Galileo’s definitions abstract from our subjective feelings of force and define them entirely in terms of their relations to one another.

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12I should also add that there is one important element of Galileo’s metaphysics that I have left out of account, and that is his determinism. Lonergan is critical of Galileo’s determinism, but his critique of Galileo’s determinism would require an analysis of the classical and statistical heuristic structures which, unfortunately, lies outside the scope of this essay.

13*Insight*, 62.

While Galileo’s scientific achievements represent a real step forward, his metaphysical interpretations of his results wind up violating two of Lonergan’s canons of empirical method: the canon of parsimony and the canon of complete explanation. The canon of parsimony “excludes from scientific affirmation all statements that are unverified and, still more so all that are unverifiable.” Galileo’s assertion of the reality of primary qualities, and his denial of the reality of secondary qualities, violates the canon of parsimony in two ways. First, it affirms something that is unverified, namely, the reality of primary qualities. “Galileo,” according to Lonergan, “did not base his affirmation of the reality and objectivity of primary qualities upon a claim that these qualities, as he conceived them, were verifiable or verified. Accordingly, his affirmation was extra-scientific.” Second, Galileo’s claim that secondary qualities are unreal violates the canon of parsimony as well since secondary qualities are verifiable and, therefore, “possess an equal claim upon reasonable affirmation.”

Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities also violates the canon of complete explanation. The canon of complete explanation states that “[t]he goal of empirical method is commonly stated to be the complete explanation of all phenomena or data.” Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities violates the canon of complete explanation because it treats space and time purely descriptively, and as in no need of explanation, meaning, he saw no need to specify their explanatory relations to other things and data. Galileo failed to draw a distinction between “extension and duration as experiential and as pure conjugates.” Galileo never moves from a description of space and time “defined as correlatives to certain familiar elements within our experience” to an explanation of space and time “defined implicitly by the postulate that the principles and laws of physics are invariant under inertial or, generally, under continuous transformations.” The latter step is only taken in Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.

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15 Insight, 102.  
16 Insight, 109.  
17 Insight, 109.  
18 Insight, 107.  
19 Insight, 108.  
20 Insight, 108.
Lonergan replaces the distinction between primary and secondary qualities with his own distinction between pure and experiential conjugates. Lonergan’s distinction is able to save the genuine insights of Galileo without violating any of Lonergan’s canons of empirical method. Lonergan defines experiential conjugates as “correlatives whose meaning is expressed ... by appealing to the content of some human experience,” and he defines pure conjugates as “correlatives defined implicitly by empirically established correlations, functions, laws, theories, systems.” Another way of saying this is to say that experiential conjugates describe things in their relations to us, while pure conjugates explain things in their relations to one another.

The distinction is easy to grasp if we think of an example like weight. If I am loading luggage and someone asks me “How heavy is that bag?” I can respond by saying “It is very heavy. It is very hard to lift.” I am defining its weight in terms of the difficulty of lifting it. This is an experiential conjugate because it defines the weight of an object in terms of the human experiences of lifting. If, instead of describing the weight of a bag in its relation to the human experiences of lifting, I decide to define the mass of an object through its relation to other variables, I will wind up with an equation: mass = force/acceleration. This definition of mass abstracts from the object’s relation to us and defines mass purely in terms of empirically established correlations.

Lonergan believes that Galileo’s major positive contribution to science was his move from experiential conjugates to pure conjugates. This is a step that his Aristotelian predecessors failed to take. Galileo believed he had invented a method for getting at the primary qualities of objects while abstracting from their secondary qualities. This was a misinterpretation of what he was doing, but in correcting the misinterpretation, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Philosophers who attempt to mitigate what they take to be the negative consequences of Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities by treating scientific explanation as merely symbolic wind up denying the genuine achievements of modern science.

If scientific theories are merely symbolic constructions then the entire distinction between pure and experiential conjugates is erased. We are

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21Insight, 102-103.
22Insight, 62.
trapped in what the philosopher Quentin Meillassoux calls the “correlationist circle.” By “correlation” Meillassoux means “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.” 23 We can never get outside the description of things in their relations to us. Science is just another way of describing things in their relations to us. This attempt to reconcile the manifest image with the scientific image by reducing the latter to a symbolic construction is the first path outlined by Wilfrid Sellars in the beginning of this paper. For Lonergan, following this path would be tantamount to rejecting the genuine step forward inaugurated by Galileo.

Lonergan’s distinction between pure and experiential conjugates is able to save the objectivity of science and maintain the possibility of abstracting from things in their relations to us without violating the canons of parsimony and complete explanation. Lonergan argues that his notion of “pure conjugates satisfy the canon of parsimony. For the equations are or can be established empirically.” 24 Pure conjugates do not affirm anything beyond the immanent intelligibility contained in the data. Pure conjugates avoid, therefore, making any extra-scientific declarations. Experiential conjugates also satisfy the canon of parsimony since “[t]he fundamental set of such terms is verified, not only by scientists, but also by the secular experience of humanity.” 25 Lonergan’s distinction does not lead to the affirmation of anything that cannot be verified, nor does it lead to the denial of anything that can be verified.

Lonergan’s distinction also satisfies the canon of complete explanation. We saw that Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities failed to satisfy this canon because Galileo himself failed to distinguish between space and time as experiential conjugates, and space and time as pure conjugates. Lonergan has a distinct advantage over Galileo in this case since Lonergan was living after the development of relativity theory. It was Albert Einstein who really discovered the relativity of our standard space and time measurements. Our standard space and time measurements require reference to a reference frame. Since different observers are capable of constructing different reference frames, our standard space and time

24Insight, 103.
25Insight, 103.
measurements will be relative to our chosen reference frame and will not coincide directly between observers using different reference frames. Einstein's equations allow us to translate space and time measurements from one reference frame to another through equations that express invariant relationships. This is the crucial step that Einstein makes from space and time as experiential conjugates to space and time as pure conjugates. Lonergan is able to avoid violating the canon of complete explanation by applying the distinction between experiential and pure conjugates to space and time themselves.

**HUMAN AND ANIMAL KNOWING**

Lonergan distinguishes between two kinds of knowing. Human knowing comprises three interrelated sets of operations – experience, understanding, and judgment – while animal knowing takes place entirely on the level of experience. Since human beings are animals there is a dynamic tension between the two ways of knowing:

Against the objectivity that is based on intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, there stands the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness ... Against the concrete universe of being, of all that can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, there stands in a prior completeness the world of sense, in which the "real" and the "apparent" are subdivisions within a vitally anticipated "already out there now."  

The failure to distinguish between these two types of knowing, and the two notions of reality that they give rise to, results in philosophical confusion. As Lonergan says, "the difficulty lies, not in either type of knowing by itself, but in the confusion that arises when one shifts unconsciously from one type to the other."  

Human knowing, according to Lonergan, is a dynamic and interrelated set of operations: experience, understanding, and judgment. Experience provides the data for intelligent inquiry. Experience is not, however, purely passive. There are various patterns of experience: biological, aesthetic,

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26 Insight, 410.
27 Insight, 278.
intellectual, and dramatic. The conscious flow of experience is always structured by one or the other of these basic patterns of experience. "We speak of consciousness as a stream, but the stream involves not only the temporal succession of different contents, but also direction, striving, effort." The pattern determines, to a large degree, what data of sense become prominent, what questions are asked, and what insights result from the asking of those questions. Human knowing presupposes a structured pattern of experience that is capable of providing data for inquiry.

Experience does not, on its own, constitute human knowing. Experience can provide data, and that data can give rise to questions, but in order to become knowledge in the human sense, acts of insight and judgment are also necessary. The act of insight is the grasp of the intelligible form immanent in the data. As Lonergan says, a good detective story is a story in which "the reader is given all the clues yet fails to spot the criminal ... for the simple reason that reaching the solution is not the mere apprehension of any clue ... but a quite distinct activity of organizing intelligence that places the full set of clues in a unique explanatory perspective." The fact that the reader can be in possession of all the clues, and still be unable to spot the criminal, is direct evidence that the act of insight is not the mere apprehension of data. It is a separate act.

It is possible to illustrate this point with a scientific example as well. Physics found itself at an impasse in the early twentieth century. Einstein explains the impasse in his book Relativity: The Special and General Theory. Physicists found themselves forced to assent to two principles that seemed to be inconsistent with one another. One was the principle of relativity (in the restricted sense) which stated that the laws of physics should be the same for all observers whatever their uniform relative motion. The other principle was the principle of the speed of light in vacuo. The speed of light is supposed to be a fundamental constant. If we also accept the standard theorem of the addition of velocities employed in classical physics it is easy to show that the two principles lead to what seem to be contradictory results.

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"Insight", 205.
"Insight", 3.

Unfortunately, I do not have space here to give detailed summaries of Einstein's thought experiments which illustrate the supposed contradictions. They can be found in Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1961), 3-25.
Physicists were aware of the problem before Einstein. They were all given the same data. Only Einstein, however, had the insight that was capable of resolving the problem. Einstein realized that a fundamental transformation in our understanding of space and time would resolve the problem. Einstein expressed his insight through the equations of special relativity. The insight, on its own, however, was not enough to constitute knowledge. Einstein could have been wrong. Einstein was successful in having an insight, and he was able to express that insight successfully as a set of equations, but there was a further question to be asked. Were Einstein's equations actually correct?

That leads us to the third operation involved in human knowing: judgment. The question "Is it so?" is, according to Lonergan, a question for reflection, and a judgment is "answering 'Yes' or 'No' to a question for reflection."31 In order to answer a question of reflection it is necessary to have a grasp of what Lonergan calls the "virtually unconditioned":

By the mere fact that a question for reflection has been put, the prospective judgment is a conditioned ... The function of reflective understanding is to meet the question for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status of a virtually unconditioned; and reflective understanding effects this transformation by grasping the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfillment32

The virtually unconditioned is conditioned in the sense that its existence is not necessary. The fact that we are asking "Is it so?" proves that. There are conditions that must be fulfilled if we are going to be able to answer "Yes" to that question. If we are able to grasp those conditions, and we are able to grasp that they are in fact fulfilled, then we have transformed a conditioned into a virtually unconditioned. In science this is the stage of hypothesis testing.33

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31Insight, 297.
32Insight, 305.
33Science, for Lonergan, is never able to judge with certainty. All scientific theories remain hypotheses open to the possibility of further revision. However, science does attempt to move past the stage of the formulation of hypotheses. Scientists do attempt to determine, to the best of their abilities, whether their hypotheses are actually true, and they are able to reach probable judgments of truth.
All three sets of operations are interrelated, and they are all necessary for properly human knowing. They are interrelated because the formulation of an insight by understanding is still related to the data provided by experience. It is precisely the immanent intelligibility in the data of experience that is understood through insight. Similarly, the judgment of truth is related directly to the formulated insight. It is the formulated insight that is either true or false. All three are necessary for human knowing because the data of experience are not their own explanation. They require a separate act of insight that grasps their immanent intelligibility. This insight can be either true or false so a further act of judgment is necessary to determine which.

Animal knowing, on the other hand, “is constituted completely on the level of experience.”34 The paradigm example of animal knowing is the “sense in which kittens know the ‘reality’ of milk.”35 If you present a kitten with a realistic painting of milk the kitten will go up and sniff it. The criterion for whether the milk is “real” is essentially the answer to the question “Can I drink it?” If the kitten can drink the milk, it is real, if not, it is just a deceptive appearance. Animal knowing is fundamentally extroverted in nature. What is real is what is “already out there now.” Human beings never engage in animal knowing in the pure sense but they can come close. When someone is lost in the desert and they see a distant mirage the way they determine whether the mirage is “real” is by taking a closer look. If they get closer to the mirage and it does not disappear, and if they are able to drink from it, and it refreshes them, then the mirage is real. This is animal knowing because it does not require the formulation of an insight or an intelligent grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Knowing, in this case, is simply looking closely.

The Reconciliation between the Manifest and Scientific Images

We have seen that there are two main paths that philosophers have taken in trying to reconcile the manifest and scientific images of the world. The anti-realists have attempted to maintain the primary reality of the manifest image and reduce the scientific image to the status of a merely symbolic representation of the manifest image. The realists have gone in the opposite direction and reduced the manifest image to a mere appearance in relation to the scientific image. In this section I will attempt to untangle the mistakes

34Insight, 277.
35Insight, 277.
in each view. Both sides of the debate fail to make a distinction between pure and experiential conjugates. That is the first mistake. The second mistake is that they each fail to make a distinction between animal and human knowing and they wind up misapplying, or mixing, different criteria of the real in incoherent ways. The dynamic tension between human and animal knowing pulls one group one way, and the other group the other way.

Anti-realists fail to make a distinction between pure and experiential conjugates. They believe that science is merely another human way of describing the world. Physical laws and unobservable entities do not really exist independently of human beings. Scientific theories are merely human tools. This winds up reducing all conjugates to merely experiential conjugates. Scientific laws simply state regularities of human experience. Positivism is this view taken to an extreme. For positivists the meaning of scientific theories is completely exhausted in the empirical regularities that they pick out. In other words, their meaning is entirely reducible to what they mean for us. All terms are defined in relation to us.

The anti-realist's failure to make a distinction between pure and experiential conjugates is really the result of their failure to distinguish between animal knowing and human knowing and to distinguish the different criteria of the real operative in each. The reason that they are led to uphold the manifest image as real, and deny the scientific image, is because they are operating with a criterion of the real that is derived from animal knowing. For animal knowing the real is what is already out there now, and the way I determine whether something is already out there now, is by looking, in a broad sense. Atoms are not real because I cannot see, smell, taste, or touch them. I cannot eat them. They are unobservable. The criterion of the real in human knowing, on the other hand, is what is reasonably affirmed. Atoms do meet that criterion. The basic problem, therefore, with those who uphold the primary reality of the manifest image is that they are applying the animal criterion of reality to acts of human knowing. Anything that fails to meet the animal criterion of the real is reduced to the status of a mere symbol.

Realists make a similar set of mistakes. They also fail, in their own way, to make the distinction between pure and experiential conjugates, or rather, they tend to follow Galileo in making the distinction in the wrong way. They treat the distinction as a distinction between reality and appearance rather than a distinction between things in their relations to us, and things in their
relations to one another. Scientific theories get at reality while our experience is reduced to mere appearance. The ontological status of appearance then becomes very tricky to work out, as we have seen. If reality is merely reality as defined by science it becomes difficult to explain how things could even appear to be different than they are in the world as defined by science.

Those who uphold the primary reality of the scientific image tend to leave experiential conjugates out of account. They are reduced to pure conjugates. The perception of color is reduced to third-person processes operating in the world and the nervous system. But where, in those processes, is color? How can we get from reality as defined by science to appearance? The problem is: the appearance/reality distinction is based on the misapplication of the criterion of the real operative in animal knowing. The real is being treated both as what is reasonably affirmed by science, and as what is already out there now. In a certain way the realists take a step forward in relation to the anti-realists because they admit that unobservable entities can be real. They admit that reasonable affirmation can be a criterion of the real. Atoms are real because they are reasonably affirmed after a process of scientific inquiry, but then, they mix the two criteria of reality, and say that, if atoms are really real, they must be already out there now in the sense of animal knowing.

The fundamental problem, according to Lonergan, is the attempt to imagine the unimaginable. Human knowing is conceptual and the move to conceptualization is a move beyond the imaginable. Lonergan explains this in relation to the definition of a circle. We begin with an imaginable cartwheel and we ask, Why is it round? We have an insight that it has something to do with the equality of the spokes, but we see that the spokes could be sunk unevenly into the circumference, or, the circle could be flat between the spokes. In order to avoid either possibility we reduce the circumference to a line, defined as length without width, so the spokes can no longer be sunk unevenly into the circumference, and we multiply the number of spokes to infinity, so the circle can no longer be flat between the spokes, and we arrive at the definition of a circle. It is impossible, however, to imagine a line without width or an infinite number of spokes. In formulating our insight we have moved beyond the realm of the imagination.

The same thing happens in scientific insights and in the move from experiential conjugates to pure conjugates. Lonergan writes that "[t]he perennial source of nonsense is that, after the scientist has verified his hypothesis, he is likely to go a little further and tell the layman what,
approximately, the scientific reality looks like!” To talk about what something looks like is to talk about it in relation to us, but pure conjugates are defined as the relation things have to one another. To then ask what those pure conjugates would look like is to return to experiential conjugates. It is to speak nonsense since pure conjugates are defined by the fact that they ignore the relations of things to us. To ask what a pure conjugate would “look like” literally makes no sense.

The realist is speaking nonsense when he applies the criterion of the real operative in animal knowing to his scientific theories. If the real is the already out there now, then it must be possible to confront it. The scientist then winds up talking about electromagnetic waves and atoms as if they were objects that we could simply run across and encounter in experience. As if we could have a bowl of fruit on our table filled with apples, oranges, electromagnetic waves, and atoms. As if electromagnetic waves and atoms were just kinds of things, like apples and oranges, that could exist alongside them. To treat them that way is to make a kind of category mistake. It is to treat an explanatory concept as if it could simply exist alongside what it is explaining.

We cannot have apples and atoms together. Apples are objects that exist in the everyday world and are defined through their experiential conjugates. They are red or green, they are edible, they taste sweet, and so forth. If we then want to explain the apple we can have recourse to atoms, molecules, cells, plant reproduction, evolutionary biology, et cetera, but the explanation cannot simply exist alongside the everyday object as if it were another object like an apple. The scientific realist treats the explanation of everyday objects as if they were also objects, and then treats the explanatory objects as real, and the everyday objects as appearances. This was Galileo’s mistake. Galileo treated his explanations as if they were already out there now real, and since there was no longer any place “out there” for secondary qualities, they were reduced to mere appearance. Then it becomes very difficult to fit reality and appearance together, to reconcile the two images.

In reality there are not two images because the scientific worldview is not based on the imagination. Lonergan is able, however, to reconcile the two worldviews. First, he does so by distinguishing between pure and experiential conjugates. We can describe things in their relations to us, or

36Insight, 278.
we can explain them in relation to one another. There are not, however, two sets of things (realities and appearances), but one set of things, either described or explained. Second, by distinguishing between two kinds of knowing, and the different criteria of reality operative in each, Lonergan is able to avoid misapplying the criteria. It no longer makes any sense to try to imagine what the scientific world looks like. Both criteria of reality have their validity within their own spheres. Apples are real because I can eat them, atoms are real because they can be reasonably affirmed, but they are real in different senses. Apples are the real as described and atoms are the real as explained. It is, of course, impossible to imagine the unity between the two images because the scientific explanation of the real is not an image at all, but it is perfectly possible to conceptualize it. Lonergan, by distinguishing between pure and experiential conjugates, and two ways of knowing, is able to conceptualize the unity between the manifest image of the world and the scientific understanding of the world.
BOOK REVIEW

The Quest for God and the Good Life:
Lonergan’s Theological Anthropology

Mark Miller, Catholic University Press, 2013. xvi + 223 pages

At the beginning of his article “Cognitional Structure,” Bernard Lonergan writes: “I have chosen cognitional structure as my topic, partly because I regard it as basic, partly because greater clarity may be hoped for from an exposition that does not attempt to describe the ingredients that enter into the structure and partly because I’ve been told that my view of human knowing as a dynamic structure has been pronounced excessively obscure” (Collection 221-24). Many of us who have studied Lonergan have often thought that this comment was more tongue in cheek than anything else. Nonetheless, it is true that Lonergan’s work can be demanding and challenging, not because it is obscure; rather, it is the depth of reflection, the precision of his writing, and the richness of his thought in philosophy, theology, science, and economics that demands a level of attentiveness usually not required of a number of thinkers. However, as with any significant thinker, it is important to have commentaries or secondary sources available to make one’s initial foray into the person’s thought a little smoother. One such specific and important contribution to the thought of Bernard Lonergan is the latest book by Mark Miller, assistant professor of theology at the University of San Francisco, The Quest for God and the Good Life: Lonergan’s Theological Anthropology. In the introduction to his book Miller states: “this book is a modest attempt to meet the need for a clear and basic, yet broad and solid introduction to Lonergan’s thought.” In this task Miller has succeeded admirably. Those looking for an accessible way to enter into the thought of Bernard Lonergan will find themselves well served by Mark Miller’s book.

Bernard Lonergan described his philosophical and theological reflections as an ongoing attempt to put history back into theology. History for
Lonergan is a dialectic of progress, decline, and redemption. Miller’s book, following Lonergan’s approach to understanding the nature of history, is divided into three parts. Part 1 is “Progress: Nature as Good.” This section has four chapters: Chapter 1: The Natural World; Chapter 2: Insight and the Self-Correcting Process of Learning; Chapter 3: Transcendental Method: The Larger Picture of Self-Transcendence; and Chapter 4: The Cooperating Human Community. Part 2 is “Decline: Nature as Fallen.” This part has three chapters. Chapter 5 is Sin and Evil; Chapter 6 is Bias; and Chapter 7 is Decline. The final part, Part 3, is “Redemption: Nature Raised into Supernature.” There are three chapters to this last section: Chapter 8, Grace; Chapter 9, Religious, Moral, and Intellectual Conversion; and Chapter 10, A Redemptive Community.

This book has many strengths to recommend it. The first is that Miller’s prose is jargon-free. Miller does not take the reader’s familiarity, or lack thereof with Lonergan, as a starting point. Rather, he seeks other terms and notions more familiar to the general reader in order to make the thought of Lonergan clear and basic. Miller tells us that in “both serving and arbitrating a community’s needs and desires, common sense cooperates with the natural drives to form an individual’s or communities aesthetic taste, its food preferences, physical habits, daily routines, and other standards and practices.” Here Miller spells out in detail what compactly Lonergan labels “common sense” (Miller, 39).

A second major strength is how Miller enables the reader to see the trajectory and development of Lonergan’s thought concerning such significant notions as the “human good,” and its relationship to cognitional theory. Miller begins his account of the human good by turning our attention to *Topics in Education*. Here Lonergan sees the human good as composed of “particular goods, the good of order, and value. . . . These are related in a way similar to experience, understanding, and judgment” (Miller, 86). Just as the operations of knowing are an invariant structure, so too is the human good. Thus, the human good “is not simply an accumulation of things that fulfill particular desires, but the whole system, which includes and provides for the fulfillment of these desires” (Miller, 88). From here, Miller shows how *Method in Theology* not only incorporates Lonergan’s account of the human good as found in *Topics in Education* but enriches it by adding liberty, orientation, and conversion to this invariant structure. Liberty is concretely about human freedom that is both “essential” and “effective”; the exercise of one’s
liberty and the choices they entail sets the person’s “orientation” toward development or decline; and “conversion” causes a radical shift in one’s freedom and orientation, and, therefore, in one’s horizon (Miller, 89-90).

Lonergan maintains that the human good dialectically unfolds in history with its opposite – evil. Miller gives an account of this dialectic in terms of sin, moral evil, and physical evil; this is followed by an account of bias – dramatic, individual, group, and general. This sets up Miller’s clear and concise account of the shorter and longer cycles of decline. The strength of this account of sin, evil, bias, and the shorter and longer cycle of decline is in the richness of Miller’s account of the longer cycle of decline. “When general bias is added to group bias, the result is a more deeply rooted decline.... But if the society’s problems are compounded by general bias’s neglect of long-term solutions good for the whole of society, then all groups neglect the kind of ideas that would reverse decline. There begins the longer cycle of decline” (Miller, 133).

A third strength of Miller’s book is the way he occasionally juxtaposes faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. Lonergan moves from a cognitive theory grounded in faculty psychology to a later account grounded in intentionality analysis. What Miller does is to situate us in that developmental context. For example, in *Insight* from the point of view of faculty psychology, “basic sin is a failure of the intellect and the will respectively, to identify the good rationally and to choose it morally” (Miller, 107). Later, from the perspectives of intentionality analysis and transcendental method, basic sin is characterized as the breakdowns “in a natural thrust toward intellectual and moral self transcendence.... It is not simply a failure of the will, but a failure to will” (Miller, 107). Another important example of this juxtaposition is the way one understands the theological virtues. Faculty psychology maintains that faith “provides the will’s hope with its object and assurance and the will’s charity with its motives” (Miller, 165). By way of contrast Lonergan later says: “In the language of transcendental method (intentionality analysis), faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence” (Miller, 165). What we see from the point of view of the transcendental method (intentionality analysis) is that faith is not just an individual activity; it is an activity fundamental to a dynamic universe that unfolds in time and is governed by schedules of probabilities. In short, “without faith, without the eye of love, the world’s too evil for God
to be good or for a good God to exist” (Miller, 166).

Finally, I found Part 3: Redemption, particularly chapters 8 and 10, to be the strongest and most rewarding chapters of the entire book. It is in part 3 that the theological voice of Miller is richest in its presentation and tone.

Chapter 8 is on Grace. Miller is clear that the Christian theology of grace “would include many other terms ... [s]uch as actual and habitual, operative and cooperative, healing and elevating.” Here, however, Miller focuses primarily on the difference between healing and elevating grace, which are differentiated notions of God’s supernatural gift of grace that augments the natural world order of emergent probability (Miller, 144). The importance of this focus is to reinforce the fact that “nature and grace are harmonious and cooperative with each other” (Miller, 145). Healing grace takes a heart of stone and replaces it with a heart of flesh capable of fidelity and justice to the risen Christ (Miller, 147). Conversely, sanctifying grace or elevating grace brings about the possibility of something new arising that is “not possible to the natural world of emergent probability” (Miller, 147). In short, elevating grace “infuses us with the supernatural virtues of faith hope and charity and it allows us to know God face to face, to know as we are known” (Miller, 147).

At the beginning of his chapter on redemptive community Miller provides a very accessible account of a difficult notion – Cosmopolis. “Cosmopolis is not an organized body, but the cultural embodiment of the unrestricted eros of the human spirit. ... It is men and women in different parts of the world, engaged in various types of work, but united in their attempt to promote social change through culture” (Miller, 178-79). Cosmopolis is followed by a rich theological meditation on “The Body of Christ.” It is this account of the “Mystical Body of Christ” as Trinitarian, Incarnational, and grounded in “The Law of the Cross,” which was for me a significant meditative experience. Miller structures his narrative of the “Mystical Body of Christ” in terms of a fivefold love. First, there is the love of the Eternal Father for the Eternal Son; second there is the love of God the Father for the Son’s humanity; third there is the love that constitutes the Mystical Body that is Christ’s love for all of humankind; the fourth form of love is the Father’s love for humanity that is the infinite love of the Holy Spirit; the fifth love is the gift of love or charity diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Miller, 187). It is this fivefold love that constitutes us as the body of Christ and then calls us “to incarnate the divine healing presence, to preach the
coming kingdom or reign of God, to pray and to work for increased knowledge and love of goodness and truth (Miller, 189).

While Miller’s book has many strengths and virtues, I do, however, have one criticism: Miller’s account of authenticity is not sufficiently differentiated or clarified, as when he writes: “authenticity is an abstraction merely an aspect of the whole picture” (Miller, 63). The term abstraction seems to imply that something is not concrete or related to the concrete, but for Lonergan, “so far from being an impoverishment...abstraction in all its essential moments is enriching” (Insight, 112) Furthermore, it is unclear to me what Miller means when he talks about authenticity as merely an aspect of the whole – the whole of what?

As enriching, Lonergan’s account of authenticity develops what in Insight he calls “the law of genuineness,” indicating the existential gap between what I am at any given moment and what I want to be; a tension between the real and the ideal, or what Lonergan later identifies as the tension between authenticity and inauthenticity. Moreover, Miller’s desire to differentiate between authentic historical human living and a nonconscious universe that unfolds in time governed by schedules of probability is not helped by the way he collapses these two separate ideas into one term – authenticity.

The above confusion is compounded by Miller’s use of such terms as authentic ideas, authentic judgments, and authentic experiences (Miller, 64). If one is living by the transcendental precepts, then presumably one is indeed being an authentic human being. It is not as if your experiences are now authentic or more authentic than before. Rather they are probably richer and more meaningful. Perhaps Miller is trying to draw the distinction that Aristotle makes in his Nicomachean Ethics between a virtuous act and a good act, but it is not altogether clear that this is what he is doing. As Aristotle points out, not every good choice or good judgment is a virtuous one. All of us can make correct judgments, all of us can choose what is morally worthwhile, and all of us have unique experiences, but just because the judgment is correct or the moral choice right does not ipso facto mean that the person as a whole is authentic. Lonergan emphasizes the fact that human authenticity is an ongoing activity that is a continuous dialectic between development and decline.

Miller places his account of authenticity in the context of Part 1: Progress. Then in Part 3, the section on Redemption, he provides an account of
the three types of conversion. Certainly one can understand why conversion was placed in the context of redemption and grace; nonetheless the choice seems to downplay how important intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is to the proper understanding of the nature of human authenticity. One is left with the impression that one is first authentic then converted. Miller splits the inseparable relationship between conversion and authentic human existence, something Lonergan denies: “attempts to separate and isolate the intellectual moral and the religious are just so many efforts to distort or to entirely block authentic human development” (Second Collection, 128). In other words, there is the experience that we all have of self-transcendence, then there is the way that authentic self-transcendence is conditioned by the threefold conversion. Or in the words of Julian of Norwich authenticity may be summed up this way: “truth sees God, wisdom perceives God, which is love. Where there is truth and wisdom, there is also true love, springing from both. And it is all of God’s making” (Julian of Norwich, All Shall Be Well, 86).

In spite of my lengthy criticism of Miller’s treatment of Lonergan’s notion of authenticity, the book overall is an important contribution that will help those unfamiliar with Lonergan’s thought to enter into his intellectual world and be surprised by the depth and richness of his thinking. The book is not only accessible, but parts of it are meditative and even contemplative. Anyone teaching an undergraduate course on the thought of Bernard Lonergan would do well to include this book in order to continue to make Lonergan’s thought “less obscure!”

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