## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Robert M. Doran, SJ</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Two Ways of Being Conscious: The Notion of Psychic Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>John R. Friday</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Considering the &quot;Religious Other&quot;: Revisiting <em>Dominus Iesus</em> in the Light of Functional Specialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paul G. Monson</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>The Cosmopolis of Elfland: Bernard Lonergan on G. K. Chesterton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>John Volk</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Lonergan on the Historical Causality of Christ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* is published by the Lonergan Institute at Boston College
Dear Subscriber,

With this issue of *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies (MJLS)*, I write to inform you of a major transition. After founding and serving as editor of *MJLS* for thirty years, Mark D. Morelli has decided to step down from his editorial activities. In the first decade of the existence of *MJLS*, founded in 1983, Mark alone saw to the reviewing, approving, and revising of submissions in order to ensure the quality of scholarship. This was at a time when no other journal invited submissions specifically dedicated to the advancement of scholarship on Bernard Lonergan’s thought. Mark also worked with the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, and especially with the late Fr. Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, to make available carefully edited versions of Lonergan’s most important, previously unpublished papers. In those days, Mark’s dedication even extended to the manual tasks of assembling and mailing the journals to subscribers. Since 1992 it has been my privilege to serve with Mark, and Charles C. Hefling, as a co-editor, contributing to the work that Mark began. During his thirty years as editor of *MJLS*, Mark made possible the publication of some two hundred scholarly articles and reviews.

On behalf of the international community of Lonergan scholars and readers, I wish to express to Mark my deep gratitude and admiration for inaugurating this journal and for his tireless efforts. We look forward to his future contributions to Lonergan scholarship, and especially his leadership of the *West Coast Methods Institute* and its annual conference.

Two new scholars will be joining the editorial board of *MJLS*, along with Thomas McPartland and myself:

Randall S. Rosenberg holds the Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet Endowed Chair in Catholic Thought at Fontbonne University, St. Louis, Missouri. Randy received his doctorate in theology from Boston College. His main areas of scholarly interests concern the intersections of art, imagination, religion, and Catholic thought. He has published works on Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar, Charles Taylor, and Walker Percy.

R. J. Snell is associate professor of philosophy, director of the Philosophy Program, and research director of the Agora Institute for Civic Virtue and the Common Good at Eastern University, St. David’s, Pennsylvania. He received his doctorate in philosophy from Marquette University. His scholarship focuses on the intersections of ethics, civic virtue, natural law, religion, and
the common good. His publications include *Through a Glass Darkly: Bernard Lonergan and Richard Rorty on Knowing without a God's-Eye View* and *Authentic Cosmopolitanism: Love, Sin, and Grace in the Christian University* (with Steven D. Cone). He has also written on Lonergan and John Finnis, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Taylor, and Thomas Aquinas.

Although I will miss my long-time collaboration with Mark Morelli, I look forward to working with Tom, Randy, and R. J. I promise that you will greatly benefit from the scholarly talents, new ideas, and energy that they bring to *M/LS*.

Sincerely,

Patrick H. Byrne
Co-editor, *M/LS*
TWO WAYS OF BEING CONSCIOUS: THE NOTION OF PSYCHIC CONVERSION

Robert M. Doran, SJ
Marquette University

In this essay I will present an overview of what I have called psychic conversion. I will begin by narrating the birth of the idea, then will present a brief schematic history of its development and principal applications to date, and will conclude by presenting my current thinking, which involves connections with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the depth psychology of C. G. Jung, and the mimetic theory of René Girard. It will be clear from the first section that Heidegger and Jung were influential in the very emergence of the idea, but in my current work I have developed some new perspectives in their regard, and I will mention these at the end.

1. THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA

An idea is the content of an insight, of an act of understanding. Some acts of understanding are exciting, while most are mundane and go almost unnoticed. The insight in question was a "Eureka!" type of event. I can still remember vividly where I was and how it happened. (The quality of excitement or exhilaration, of course, is no guarantee that the insight is correct.) It occurred in February 1973 in my room at the Jesuit Residence at Marquette University. I was a doctoral student in theology at Marquette at the time and was enrolled in a course on the work of Rudolf Bultmann, writing a paper on the Heideggerian aspects of Bultmann’s thought. Bultmann was heavily influenced by Being and Time, which provided him with what Lonergan would call the general categories of his theology, the categories that his theology shared with other disciplines. ¹ I had been deeply

¹ On general categories, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, latest printing 2005), 285-88.
immersed in the work of Lonergan since 1967, when I first read *Insight*, and in the spring of 1969 I had participated in a graduate seminar on the later Heidegger conducted by William Richardson at Fordham University – the most difficult but also the best course I have ever taken. From that time forward, and indeed even until today, I have been interested in the relations that might be creatively established between Lonergan and Heidegger. These relations are quite complex, but let me be quick to add that my interest is in a possible mutual self-mediation of these two figures, which will make each of them better than they are without the fusion of their horizons. I’m aware that the task has become much more complicated since I raised my original questions, due to the emerging information regarding Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism and the very complex question of the relation of his philosophy to National Socialism. This is a question that cannot be answered easily, one way or the other. This political involvement – and I don’t think there can be any question but that it was a very deep and long-standing commitment, and that he was not honest about it in at least some of his post-war statements – contrasts sharply with Lonergan’s passionate commitment to democracy and to the educational and intellectual development that he judged was required to make democracy really work. That commitment forms the basis of his critical portrayal of totalitarian systems such as Nazism and Stalinist communism (both of which are mentioned by name in chapter 7 of *Insight*) as the culminations of what he called the longer cycle of decline in cultural history. There are recorded statements that Heidegger made while he was rector of the University of Freiburg that embody precisely the following description by Lonergan of the final stages of this cycle:

"Reality" ["Being" (Sein)] is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war.²

Nonetheless, far too often, engagements by Lonergan’s students with other thinkers are one-way streets. I have always resisted that and found it quite antithetical to Lonergan’s own way of reading other authors. As David Tracy remarked to me some years ago, Lonergan in general—there are always exceptions to statements like this—was a very generous reader, and a number of his students are not generous readers; they prefer to sniff out counterpositions rather than follow his example of making his interlocutors better than they really are. I have endeavored to follow Lonergan’s example in my engagement with Heidegger and the other authors that I treat in this essay and elsewhere.

William Richardson had commented once that the key to understanding *Being and Time*, the central work of the early Heidegger, was a book that Heidegger published two years after *Being and Time*, namely, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. And so while I was working on the Bultmann paper, or more accurately while I was working on *Being and Time* while writing a paper on Bultmann, I was also reading Heidegger’s Kant book. It was while taking extensive notes on that work that I experienced a breakthrough to the notion of psychic conversion.

Heidegger’s book on Kant stresses the role of the transcendental imagination in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and further emphasizes that this role is not stressed as strongly in the second edition. Heidegger wants to retrieve the emphasis on the transcendental imagination from the first edition. In Heidegger’s interpretation, the transcendental imagination as pure time or pure self-affection is the ground of the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge, that is to say, of the knowledge of the Being-structure of beings. It is for this reason that William Richardson interprets the Kant book as the key to understanding *Being and Time*.

It was in this context that the notion of psychic conversion emerged. I realized that what I was struggling to integrate with Lonergan’s thinking could also be called a transcendental imagination, though in a sense very long quotations in chapters 10 and 11 of Victor Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

3 For Heidegger, I am relying on two English translations of *Sein und Zeit* and one of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. For *Being and Time*, there is the first translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) and a later one by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York, 1996). Quotations here are from the first of these. For *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (dedicated to the memory of Max Scheler), see the translation by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

different from Kant’s or from Heidegger’s twisting of Kant’s meaning. The language of conversion was familiar to me from the work of Lonergan, whose Method in Theology had appeared in 1972, with its emphasis on intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The work on Heidegger, both the early and the later Heidegger, had begun to give me a way of articulating a conviction that there is more to what Lonergan calls interiority than the operations that begin to be appropriated with the reading of Insight and that are developed further with the discussion of judgments of value and decision in Method in Theology. Lonergan himself points to that “more” in Method in Theology, when he writes, “Distinct from operational development is the development of feelings.”

But it is a “more” that at least by 1973 few of Lonergan’s students were ready to take seriously. The conviction arose for me because for over a year before the notion of psychic conversion emerged in my thinking I had been experiencing quite unexpectedly a period of intense and very interesting dream activity. I had consulted a psychologist in Milwaukee, Charles Goldsmith, who used some Jungian techniques (in a very non-dogmatic fashion, I’m grateful to say) in the work of dream interpretation, though he was not a Jungian analyst in the strict sense of the term. The dream work and the relation of dreams and symbols to feelings confirmed me in the conviction that there is more to interiorly differentiated consciousness than can be found in Lonergan’s philosophy, particularly the philosophy expressed in Insight (which I continue to regard as a great philosophical classic, perhaps the greatest of the previous century).

Reading Heidegger’s Kant book was the Archimedes’s bath that

---

5 Ernst Cassirer says that beginning in section 3, Heidegger “no longer speaks as a commentator but as a usurper,” wrestling with violence from Kant what he “intended to say” but “recoiled from” because he was a prisoner of tradition, “namely, that not only is temporality the ground of the transcendental imagination, it is also the basis of the ‘selfhood’ of the self.” Ibid., translator’s introduction xix-xx. Cassirer probably is correct, but this type of interpretation of other thinkers is typical of Heidegger, who is always out to speak his own mind and does not hesitate to twist the thought of others in doing so. Contrary to Lonergan’s way of reading, however, he makes the other thinkers worse than they really were rather than better. Thus, for instance and by contrast, Lonergan has interpreted Kant’s transcendental imagination as inquiry transforming mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation, trying to promote something imagined into something intelligible. This comment was made in the first lecture of Lonergan’s 1979 course at Boston College on Method in Theology. Recordings and some written transcriptions of this course will be uploaded on the website www.bernardlonergan.com.

6 See Method in Theology, esp. 237-44.

7 Method in Theology, 30.
produced the "Eureka!" that became psychic conversion. This does not mean that I was comfortable with everything Heidegger says in the Kant book or in Being and Time. I am not—far from it. For example, the first sentence of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the Critique of Pure Reason reads: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed." This is central for Heidegger no matter how much he complicates it with hermeneutic phenomenology. For Lonergan, on the other hand, Kant’s statement represents the basic counterposition. I agreed then and agree now with Lonergan on that point. Moreover, when I first read Being and Time, I could not avoid having constantly in mind the statement that Lonergan makes in his chapter on objectivity in Insight that "'time is' by being within the universe of being," rather than that being is to be interpreted in terms of time. This is a radical difference, and the diagnostic is none other than what Lonergan calls intellectual conversion. I suspect that the difference is rooted in Heidegger’s work on Scotus in his Habilitationsschrift. Certainly it is in the tradition of the univocity of being that stems from Scotus. I agreed then and I agree today with Lonergan that such interpretations of the meaning of being are “mere intrusions of imagination.” I further regard Heidegger’s Kant book, where the time structure of the transcendental imagination becomes the horizon for interpreting the Being-structure of beings, as Exhibit A in demonstration of that claim. And yet there is a dimension that is opened by this emphasis that is precisely what had been occupying my attention ever since I first started reading Heidegger and that had simply become more urgent with the exposure to the dream world and to Jung. Somehow, some connection had to be made between the unrestricted desire to know whose objective is everything about everything, an objective “within” which time is, and the time-bound concern, Sorge, established by the Einbildungskraft that is for Heidegger the ground of the knowledge of the Being of beings. The original meaning of psychic conversion, then, as the notion emerged in my own thinking, lies precisely in this connection, in this link between two dimensions of consciousness (Lonergan) or of Dasein (Heidegger)—and I’m aware that Heidegger would not want to speak of Dasein in terms of consciousness, but I suspect that this may be because his notion of consciousness (Bewusstsein)

8 Insight, 404.
is not as radical as Lonergan’s, or it may be due to his unequivocal rejection of neo-Kantianism – or both.

Equally important, then, in the emergence of the notion of psychic conversion was the statement in *Being and Time* that *Verstehen* (understanding) and *Befindlichkeit* (state of mind or disposition or mood) are equiprimordial constitutive ways of being *Dasein*. “Understanding is grounded primarily in the future [whereas] one’s state-of-mind ... temporalizes itself primarily in *having been.*” Transposed into the terminology of *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, intentional operations, with understanding at their center, and the sensitive psyche, are two distinct but inseparable dimensions of the self-presence that Lonergan calls consciousness. In either case – and in whichever language one wants to use – psychic conversion is the discovery of the link between these two dimensions, the establishment of the interior communication between them, to use the language Lonergan himself employed in *Method in Theology* when speaking of symbols. Moreover, in my view an adequate objectification of psychic conversion would have to extend Heidegger’s notion of *Verstehen* to cover all of the dimensions of the act of understanding in Lonergan’s philosophy, even while Heidegger’s *Verstehen* adds an essential clarification, as we will see, to one dimension of Lonergan’s thinking.

Lonergan offered a series of courses on method at the Gregorian University from 1959 to 1962. In the first of those courses, “*De Intellectu et Methodo*” ("Understanding and Method") Lonergan enumerates the problems that give rise to the issue of method. Among these he includes the great chasm that has developed in Western intellectual history and in particular in post-Scots Catholic theology: the chasm opened up between a conceptualist intellect, on the one hand, and the images into which genuine insight occurs along with the sensitive, affective, and imaginal lives of the faithful, on the other. This is the same problem in another context. It is only partly resolved by correcting Scotist conceptualism and by the intellectual conversion that a correct cognitional theory effects. In my first public presentation on psychic conversion in 1974, at the first Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, I referred to it as a psychic rift.

At any rate, these are the threads that suddenly and unexpectedly

---

9 See the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time* at pp. 171-72 and 390.
10 I am currently editing a volume for publication in Lonergan’s Collected Works that includes his notes for these courses.
came together for me one afternoon while reading *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. My insight was that, in addition to the foundational conversions that Lonergan speaks of as intellectual, moral, and religious, there is a fourth dimension of conversion. This fourth conversion establishes or reestablishes a link that should never have been broken, the link between the intentional operations of understanding, judgment, and decision, and the tidal movement that begins before consciousness, emerges into consciousness in the form of dream images and affects, continues to permeate intentional operations in the form of feelings, and reaches beyond these operations and states in the interpersonal relations and commitments that constitute families, communities, and religions. Needless to say, the inner and outer words that are reflected in this recollection had not yet emerged or emanated for me; in fact at the beginning I had different names for the conversion of which I was speaking—affective, aesthetic, psychological—but a friend, Vernon Gregson, who knew exactly what I was talking about, convinced me to use the term “psychic conversion.”

2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA

The original idea, then, was that there is a fourth dimension of personal transformation, one not specifically included in Lonergan's discussion of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This does not mean that it is unrelated to what Lonergan was talking about, however, and as I attempted to weave this idea into the substantial contribution that I hoped to make in my doctoral dissertation, I began to frame some of these relations.

When I first presented what I was doing to Lonergan in the fall of 1973 as I was beginning to put the dissertation together, he asked whether what I was saying was in harmony with what he had said about symbols and feelings in *Method in Theology*. He wanted, I could tell, an affirmative answer, and indeed thought that the answer should be affirmative. I answered affirmatively—but was glad that he didn't ask me to elaborate, since I was not yet ready to do so! It was in writing the dissertation that the elaboration emerged. The key was the intermediate position of feelings between Lonergan's discussion of values in the second chapter of *Method in Theology* and his account of symbols in the third chapter. The link is found when one connects the following two citations from those two chapters: “Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie
apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings”¹¹ and “A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling.”¹² If symbols evoke or are evoked by feelings, and if values are apprehended in feelings, then feelings may be understood as linking symbols and values. And if that is the case, then what I was beginning to call psychic self-appropriation, the appropriation of one’s life of feeling, particularly as that becomes manifest in the elemental symbols of one’s dreams and similar psychological deliverances, might be expected to be relevant to one’s existential stance as a moral subject, as one having to do with values and disvalues; that is to say, it might be expected to play a role in what is known as moral and religious discernment. This is the idea that was developed in my dissertation, subsequently published by Marquette University Press as Subject and Psyche,¹³ where the principal interlocutors were not only Lonergan but also Paul Ricoeur, Eugene Gendlin, and Jung, with an occasional appreciative nod to Heidegger.

It remained for me next to relate what I was talking about to the material in Insight on the dialectic of the subject, where Lonergan relies on a somewhat moderated or reoriented Freudian position to speak of scotosis, repression, disassociation, and dramatic bias. Through a renewed study of Insight from the perspective of what I was trying to say, I was able to define psychic conversion as the transformation of the censor from a repressive to a constructive role in a person’s development. I continued to hold to that definition, and would regard it even today as an essential, even if perhaps not complete, notion of what I mean by psychic conversion.

Through the 1980s in published articles, in a second book entitled Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations,¹⁴ in courses that I taught at Regis College in the University of Toronto, and in presentations at the Boston College Lonergan Workshops, I continued to mine the resources contained in the twofold set of relations that I had made with Lonergan, namely, relations with Method in Theology and relations with Insight. But at the same time I was engaged in writing another book, one which took a good

¹¹ Method in Theology, 37.
¹² Method in Theology, 64.
Doran: Two Ways of Being Conscious
decade to put together and became Theology and the Dialectics of History. All of this work had for me from the beginning a theological finality, and this theological component began to be elaborated in this new work, where I was attempting to derive the categories of a theology of history, that is to say, a theology that would understand the principal Christian doctrines in relation to the constitution of history. I discovered in my explorations of Insight that Lonergan himself had located a sensitive-psychic component of both the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of community.

The dialectic of the subject is the dialectic between the neural undertow that emerges into consciousness in the form of images and affects, on the one hand, and the orientation of the intelligent, rational, existential subject constituting one’s world and oneself through one’s insights, judgments, and decisions, on the other. The point of the dialectic is not to choose one over the other but to ensure that they are working harmoniously with one another. And so I came to call the respective poles of the dialectic, not contradictories but contraries. To regard them as contradictories is to head toward personal disaster. There is a tendency among Jungians and other psychologically minded people whose implicit or explicit cognitional theory needs some work to emphasize the psychic pole at the expense of the spiritual dimension. But I think there is also a tendency among some Lonergan students to neglect the psychic pole and overemphasize intellect.

The dialectic of community is the dialectic between a vital and indeed primordial intersubjectivity and practical intelligence in its work of establishing capital formation, economic systems, and political arrangements. Again, the dialectic is one of contraries, not of contradictories. Again too, communities are headed to disaster if they so emphasize either the intersubjective pole or the pole of practical intelligence as to neglect the other pole.

To these two dialectics taken from Lonergan I added a dialectic of cultural constitutive meanings. I called it the dialectic of culture. The dialectic of culture is the dialectic between cosmological and anthropological constitutive meaning. In cosmological cultures the measure of integrity lies in the rhythms of nonhuman nature, and the process of integrity moves from these rhythms first to the community and then through the community to

15 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). The material on the dialectics of subject, culture, and community and on the scale of values contained in the next several paragraphs are all developed in this book.
individuals. In anthropological cultures at their best the measure of integrity lies in a world-transcendent reality that beckons us through conscience and grace to attunement with itself, and the process of integrity moves from this world-transcendent measure to the individual and then through the collaboration of attuned individuals to the establishment of a community living in harmony with the measure. But this dialectic, too, is one of contraries, not of contradictories. Cultures that emphasize the cosmological and have not developed the anthropological are given to a fatalism that is linked with too close an identification with nonhuman schemes of recurrence, while cultures that neglect the cosmological risk endangering the natural environment with its delicate ecological balances.

I related these three dialectics to one another through Lonergan’s scale of values – vital, social (the dialectic of community), cultural (the dialectic of culture), personal (the dialectic of the subject), and religious – and emphasized that in each of the three dialectical processes the human psyche has a constitutive role to play in the establishment of integrity, whereas distortion would occur, whether in the subject, the culture, or the community if one pole of the dialectic (either the spiritual or the psychic) was stressed to the neglect of the other. Jungians, I argued, tend to err on the side of stressing the psychic over the intentional, whereas Lonergan’s students may tend to the opposite mistake. I was able through these paths to argue that Lonergan’s understanding of the dialectic of history in terms of the simultaneous interplay of forces that make for progress, influences that make for decline, and the redemptive grace of God, could perhaps be further differentiated in terms of the integral functioning or the breakdown of the scale of values.

At this point, the background work was finished that was required before I could turn my attention to what I have been engaged in since the early 1990s, namely, the construction of a systematic theology. My approach to that endeavor has been to begin with the systematic theology that can be found in Lonergan’s own work, which may be the best theology written in a Scholastic mode since Thomas Aquinas, and to transpose it into the categories that he suggests in Method in Theology. I have endeavored to amplify these categories with the developments that would be provided by including psychic conversion in the foundational reality from which the categories are derived. I soon discovered – if I had not been aware of it from the beginning – that such a task must be collaborative. No individual
can write a full systematic theology, in my estimation, no more than any single individual can know the whole of contemporary chemistry. It must be the work of a community. My own efforts have been centered around what Lonergan wrote in the areas of grace and Trinity and, to a lesser extent, Christology (though I hope to expand soon on what I have done thus far in Christology). I doubt that I will be able to move much beyond these three central areas, but at least it will be a start, and I’m hoping that others will pick up on it. What I wish to do here is simply to indicate the role of psychic conversion in the so-called foundations of such a systematics.

My first venture into systematic theology as such occurred in an article entitled “Consciousness and Grace.” It was an attempt to transpose into the language of interiority Lonergan’s first thesis in a supplement on grace entitled “De ente supernaturali.” The thesis claims that there is a created communication of the divine nature through which operations are elicited by which we attain to the very being of God. My question was, What in terms of consciousness is a created communication of the divine nature? This article aroused a great deal of debate, far more than I expected. The debate centered mainly around my affirmation of a fifth level of consciousness beyond the levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision so prominent in Lonergan’s work. I’ve always felt that a number of other important elements in that article received scant attention, and one of these touches intimately on the issue of Befindlichkeit, on the way one finds oneself, on the disposition or mood or self-taste that accompanies all our intentional operations, that is, on that element of interiority that my talk of psychic conversion attempts to highlight. I was affirming that this self-taste is changed by the reception of God’s love. That in fact was the central point in the article, and it was by and large lost in the debate over how many levels of consciousness there are. The difference in one’s self-presentation that results from being on the receiving end of unqualified love, whether that experience be explicitly religious or not, had already been explored in chapter 8 of Theology and the Dialectics of History, but now I was explicitly linking that change to the religious dimension as, if you wish – and this is not language that I used in “Consciousness and Grace” – a formal effect of the gift of God’s love. In other words, I was proposing that what in my

Ignatian tradition was known as discernment, which has to do with what Ignatius Loyola calls "the affections," could be intimately related to what I was speaking about in my talk of psychic conversion.

This emphasis on the change in one's dispositional immediacy (i.e., self-taste) became more and more prominent in successive papers on the same material through the 1990s, and into the new century, culminating as such in several papers delivered in 2005 linking my thought directly to the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises. To address Heidegger for a moment, there is a Befindlichkeit that results from what Karl Rahner called the supernatural existential. This term arose from Rahner's implicit dialogue with Heidegger. I would probably conceive the latter somewhat differently from Rahner, as the gift of God's unqualified love appropriated by the existential subject. This appropriation occurs either through some intense religious experience or, as is more often the case, through recollection of the gifts of God in the course of one's life. This appropriation attests to a Befindlichkeit that is quite different from the prevailing mood conveyed in Being and Time. The latter mood can hardly be called either peaceful or happy. (The later Heidegger may be a different story.) This emphasis, and not anything about the number of levels of consciousness, was the central affirmation of "Consciousness and Grace."

This emphasis on dispositional transformation (Befindlichkeit) as a result of the gift of love has figured more centrally of late as I have attempted to make a contribution to the reawakening of the Augustinian and Thomist approaches to a psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions. But before I mention anything in that regard, I wish to indicate another return to Heidegger that occurred in the early years of the present century. It appears in a paper entitled "Reception and Elemental Meaning" and in other papers that built on affirmations contained in that first development. The psyche is for Lonergan identical with what he calls empirical consciousness, the level of experience as distinguished from the levels of understanding, judgment,

17 The two most important of these papers may be found on www.lonerganresource.com as Essays 18 and 19 in the e-book Essays in Systematic Theology.

18 Lonergan students would be well advised to move as quickly as possible beyond the "level" language that figured so heavily in the debate over "Consciousness and Grace," but only once the clarification has been made of precisely what Lonergan himself was talking about when he affirmed five and in one place six levels. The metaphor of levels is now an obstacle, and the issue is one of focusing on sublating and sublated operations and states, which is what the metaphor was intended to elucidate in the first place. It has done its job, and it is time to discard it.

19 See Essays 13 and 14 in Essays in Systematic Theology.
and decision. But the fact that Lonergan in *Insight* begins his presentation of what he would come to call intentional consciousness with five chapters on empirical science has, in my view, contributed to an impoverished notion of empirical consciousness among many of Lonergan’s students as simply data uninformed by any human acts of meaning. This impoverished notion of empirical consciousness had been haunting me from the beginning in the work on psychic conversion, but I didn’t find the appropriate way to address the problem until this work on “Reception and Elemental Meaning.” The fact is that in *Insight* itself Lonergan mentions, in his initial presentation of levels of consciousness in chapter 9, that “utterances” and “free images” are among the data presented to consciousness at the empirical level, and that these are already under the influence of “higher” levels even as they are presented at the empirical level.20 Later he would emphasize that the data of human science and theology are themselves invested with human and at times divine acts of meaning, so that (and here I am using my own words) there is some kind of Verstehen involved at the very first level of consciousness—not, of course, the originating act of understanding that emerges from one’s own questions, but something that I think is compatible with Heidegger’s insistence on the universality of hermeneutic structure. Again, I related psychic conversion to this emphasis, in that psychic conversion establishes the link of the higher so-called levels with empirical consciousness. This link, I suggested, also enables us to integrate Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, undisclosedness, and Lonergan’s insistence on the truth of judgment emanating from the grasp of a virtually unconditioned. In brief, that grasp is not possible without aletheia. The “letting-be” of data and insight is part of the very process of verification that leads to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Nonetheless, that letting-be must yield to the unconditioned before the truth that occurs formally only in judgment is attained.

Let me return, though, to the attempts that I am currently engaged in to offer some developments on the psychological analogy for understanding Trinitarian processions.

There are four versions in the history of Western Trinitarian theology of what has come to be called the psychological analogy. Neither Augustine nor Aquinas used the language of analogy in proposing their views, but the effective history of their Trinitarian theologies has established analogical

20 See *Insight*, 299.
language as the correct way in which to retrieve their achievements. The structure of the analogy is the same in all four versions, and the principal difference lies in the first element in the analogy, namely, the analogue for the Father.

All too briefly: In Augustine, the analogy begins with *memoria*, which on one interpretation means the state in which *mens*, the mind, finds itself, and so *Befindlichkeit*; that state gives rise to a word, *verbum*, and from *memoria* and *verbum* together there proceeds love. Thus the Father is remotely analogous to *memoria*, the Son to *verbum*, and the Holy Spirit to *amor*.

In Aquinas, the analogue for the Father is *intelligere*, the act of understanding as it speaks or utters (*dicere*) what it understands; the Son is the Word spoken by the Father; and the speaking and Word together breathe the Love that is the Holy Spirit.

Essentially the same analogy is found in the early Lonergan, but with refinements. First, the word that is the proper analogue for the Son is a judgment of value, *iudicium valoris*, though this is mentioned explicitly only once in Lonergan’s Trinitarian systematics, *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica* (now available with Latin-English facing pages as *The Triune God: Systematics*).\(^{21}\) Second, the analogical process of “intelligible emanation” in the human subject has been submitted to far more rigorous analysis by Lonergan than ever was explicit in the work of Aquinas, though Lonergan has argued convincingly in his study of *verbum* in Aquinas that what he is saying is entirely congruent with Aquinas’s understanding.

The fourth version, if you want, of the psychological analogy is presented by the later Lonergan, and in this account the analogue for the Father is the higher synthesis of knowledge and feeling that is the dynamic state of being in love. From this there proceeds the judgment of value that is the analogue for the Son, and from the two together there proceed acts of love that are the analogue for the Holy Spirit.\(^{22}\)

All four, in my view, work to provide a remote and obscure hypothetical understanding of what Christians confess about God every time they recite the Nicene Creed: God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God. The analogies of Aquinas and especially the early Lonergan manifest

---


strictly what the First Vatican Council said about theological understanding, namely: that reason illumined by faith, when it inquires devoutly, carefully, and soberly, is able to achieve some imperfect, obscure, and fruitful understanding of the divine mysteries by analogy with what we know by our native powers of understanding and reason. In other words, such effort can yield a valuable analogy with naturally known realities. Augustine’s presentation and, I submit, that of the later Lonergan are taken from the dimension of graced experience, and I follow through on this in my own suggestions for an analogy that is explicit about the graced or “supernatural” context of the analogy. I retrieve Augustine’s memoria precisely as the graced realization of Befindlichkeit, that is, as the state of mind that results from a summation of one’s life gathered to provide evidence that one has known unqualified love in one’s own regard. This evidence, grasped in what I would call an existential-ethical reflective insight, grounds an ineffable judgment of value that slowly and over time becomes formulated in the faith that is the knowledge born of religious love. And from these together there proceeds the love of the one who gave the gift, a love that Christian theology calls charity. Thus for me grace itself has a Trinitarian structure: gift, faith, and love. That structure may be vécu or thématique, implicit or explicit, in actu exercito or in actu signato. As I have expressed it here, it is appropriated in a quite thematic fashion, but it is “ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join.” And the graced Befindlichkeit that I first tried to call attention to in “Consciousness and Grace” now becomes the analogue for the eternal Father. Psychic conversion has, then, become part of the ground for the derivation of special theological categories.

3. Contemporary Applications

In this final section, I can only briefly sketch where my thought has gone regarding the applications and significance of the notion of psychic conversion. I will begin with the mimetic theory of René Girard, move to the notion of individuation in the analytical psychology of Jung, and conclude with a suggestion regarding the appropriate relation of Heidegger’s Verstehen and Befindlichkeit.

23 Method in Theology, 290.
24 This suggestion may be found in Essay 32 in Essays in Systematic Theology, “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei.”
The mimetic theory of René Girard has become for me the principal way of designating what I mean by what Lonergan calls dramatic bias, that is, the aberration of sensitivity itself that psychic conversion enables one to acknowledge. Girard’s work can be related to Lonergan’s if we begin with the following statement that appears in Lonergan’s Trinitarian systematics:

we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act.25

Again, this statement provides a perfect introduction to what I am attempting to do in proposing the notion of psychic conversion: establish the link between these two ways of being conscious. They are never distinct from each other. However, the first way, which Girard discloses to be not only sensitive and psychic but also intersubjective or, to use his neologism, “interindividual,” stands in need of a great deal of therapeutic endeavor on the part of the vast majority of human beings. This therapeutic endeavor is aimed at the purification of the motive at the heart of our beseeching (to draw from T. S. Eliot and remotely Julian of Norwich), lest that motive be contaminated with unacknowledged mimetic impulse and consequently distort the very unfolding of our intentional operations. We are originally interindividual in ways that differ from one person to another, depending, in my view, on the extent to which love has been communicated to the psychic dimension of the person in one’s earliest years. But no matter how healthy that interindividuality may be, without some prolonged work on our part we will almost inevitably covet what our neighbor has or is, not for its own sake, but simply because he or she has or is what he or she has or is. This is the mimetic dimension to which Girard calls attention, and his elaboration of the manner in which it wreaks havoc on the human community is a permanent contribution, in my estimation, to our understanding of desire.

My recovery of the notion of psychic conversion, now in relation to the

25 *The Triune God*, 139.
interdividuality that is stressed by Girard, has given me a way to return to Jung, and specifically to his notion of individuation. The individuation process is the process of untangling the vagaries of interdividuation. But I would suggest that a remarkably reliable way in which to pursue the individuation process is through the self-appropriation of the operations entailed in being intelligent, reasonable, and responsible—a self-appropriation aided greatly by immersion in the work of Lonergan.

Finally, all of this brings me back to further reflections on Heidegger and his equiprimordial ways of being Dasein, that is, Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. I think Befindlichkeit became Gelassenheit in the later Heidegger, where thinking is thanking, Denken is Danken, and Dasein is more at rest and at peace than in Being and Time. I may be wrong, but I hope this is the case. But I would also like to propose in conclusion that Lonergan can teach Heidegger something about the relation of Befindlichkeit to Verstehen, of affective states to understanding, that might facilitate finding the link between these dimensions (and between these two thinkers). In Lonergan’s thinking there is a vertical finality of the psyche to participation in the life of the human spirit, in the operations of understanding, judging, deciding, and loving. In one sense they are equiprimordial, as Heidegger insists, in that they are seldom or never found apart from each other. But in another sense that equiprimordiality is qualified. In Lonergan’s emergently probable universe, what is purely coincidental from the standpoint of a lower level becomes intelligible as it is “systematized” at a higher level: physical, chemical, biological, psychological, spiritual, to paint the picture in broad strokes. Befindlichkeit has its own horizontal finality, and the early Heidegger seems content to remain there. But the reality meant by the term Befindlichkeit never becomes what it could become until it finds its link with the adventures of understanding, affirming, deciding, and being loved and loving. That link provides it with a vertical finality to something greater than itself, and as it finds that link it becomes what it could never have become otherwise. I genuinely hope that there might be evidence of this in the contemplative atmosphere found in some of the later writings of Heidegger, but whether that is the case or not, I propose that these later writings provide us with clues that we might well rely on as we learn what it is to obey the first of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts, the precept that enjoins a task on empirical consciousness itself, on Befindlichkeit, and so the precept that is related to psychic conversion: Be attentive.
CONSIDERING THE "RELIGIOUS OTHER": REVISITING DOMINUS IESUS IN THE LIGHT OF FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION

John R. Friday
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

More than a decade ago the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) released the document Dominus Iesus and in its wake there ensued a considerable amount of conversation and controversy both within and without Roman Catholic circles. Though the swell of controversy surrounding the declaration may have died down, conversations concerning the practice of interreligious dialogue and the various theologies associated with it (i.e., theologies of religion and comparative theologies) are ongoing and very much a part of the theological landscape. The experience of religious pluralism in an increasingly globalized world is one that has seized the attention of religious individuals and communities, including, in a Roman Catholic context, professional theologians and the magisterium. In light of the conviction that theology...
is, at best, a discursive and collaborative effort involving open and respectful conversations between theologians and the magisterium, it seems advantageous for such conversations to transpire in a context of dialogue. It is in this spirit that I propose to revisit the declaration Dominus Iesus and in so doing I hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion.

I enter into the discussion by focusing on one particular truth claim affirmed by the CDF in Dominus Iesus, namely, that followers of other religions are, "objectively speaking, [...] in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of salvation." This claim has been understood as both problematic and offensive, especially to those to whom it refers. While the claim may put Catholics engaged in interreligious dialogue in a difficult and perhaps embarrassing situation, it seems unwise to dismiss it entirely without carefully considering its meaning, presuppositions, and implications. Therefore, I will subject this particular claim to critical examination with the help of the methodological, philosophical, and theological insights of Bernard Lonergan.

This essay is structured according to Lonergan’s notion of functional specialization. After providing a brief explanation of functional specialization, I proceed to work in four of the eight functional specialties, what Lonergan called the second, mediated phase of theology: doctrines, foundations, instances, not ordained. See Richard R. Gaillardetz, Teaching with Authority: A Theology of the Magisterium in the Church (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 159-61, 244.


6 Dominus Iesus §22

7 It is worth noting that, as a theologian, Lonergan recognized his own limitations and the need for the magisterium. Indeed, Lonergan exercised his function as a professional theologian in the context of a dialogue with the magisterium. As early as 1954 he wrote, "Because the theologian is aware of his inescapable limitations, he propounds even his clearest theorems as merely probable. Because his clearest theorems are only probable, he is ever ready to leave judgment upon them to the further exercise of faith that discerns in the church’s dogmatic decisions the assistance of divine wisdom." See Bernard Lonergan, “Theology and Understanding,” in Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), 126.
systematics, and communications. Under the heading of “doctrines” I highlight the character of the declaration and focus on the meaning of the relevant claim. I then move on to “foundations” by examining the explicit grounds upon which the claim rests. Third, I employ “systematics” by asking how this claim can be more profoundly understood in relation to the theological doctrine that the church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church. Finally, in the section on “communications,” I indicate how the proposed systematic understanding might influence the way in which interreligious dialogue is actually pursued.

1. The “Questions and Answers” of the Functional Specialties

Functional specialization fundamentally intends to help theology to advance toward the goal of understanding and communicating the truths of Christian faith. More specifically, functional specialization distinguishes and separates successive and interdependent stages in a process that begins with data and ends with results, and in so doing does justice to the high degree of specialization that has come to characterize contemporary theology. One of the effects of such specialization is that many different tasks must be performed. A common feature of each of the specialties is that questions are raised and answers are sought. However, the kinds of questions they involve and the answers to which they give rise differ. Let us briefly review the sorts of questions raised in the four functional specialties treated in this essay.

Charles Hefling has referred to the questions that correspond to

---

8 According to Lonergan, in the mediated phase of theology one ultimately strives to communicate an understanding of one’s religious faith within a specific cultural matrix. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), xi, 135. The limited scope of this essay does not allow the specialties that pertain to the “first” so-called mediating phase of theology (i.e., research, interpretation, history, and dialectic) to be engaged in explicit fashion. Following Frederick Crowe, these four specialties can be summarized, respectively, as follows, “assembling the data, determining their meaning data, proceeding from meaning to what is going forward in the history of thought, and investigating the conflicts uncovered in this history with a view to taking a position of one’s own.” Frederick E. Crowe, “Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1989), 235. In this essay, the existence of the mediating phase of theology and the exercise of its respective specialties is presupposed and on occasion, referenced. See, for example, the references to the historical scholarship of Francis Sullivan and Karim Schelkens, 54n38.

9 Dominus Iesus §16.

10 Method in Theology, 126.
doctrines as whether-questions. Such questions ask, Is it so? and, Is it true? Answers to these questions take the form of affirmative propositions, what may also be called truth claims. Truth claims open up at least two lines of further questions. On the one hand, we may ask how the proposition is true. Following Heffling, we refer to these as how-questions. Such questions reveal a desire to understand the truth proposed by the doctrine. Within the framework of functional specialization, these questions are considered in the seventh functional specialty, systematics. The other line of questioning that a propositional truth claim opens up concerns the reasons or grounds upon which the claim rests. Heffling refers to these kinds of questions as for what reason-questions, and following Lonergan, has placed them in the specialty, foundations. In addition to these three sorts of questions that Heffling mentions, I would like to suggest a fourth kind of question that corresponds to the functional specialty, communications. Unlike questions of foundations or systematics, this kind of question does not directly follow from doctrines. It is a second-order question that presupposes the answer to the question of systematics. We refer to this question as the how to-question, for it concerns how an understanding of Christian truth is to be communicated, and in this way, shared.

2. DOCTRINES

Dominus Iesus explicitly acknowledges its own doctrinal character:

The expository language of the Declaration corresponds to its purpose, which is not to treat in a systematic manner the question of the unicity and salvific universality of the mystery of Jesus Christ and the Church, nor to propose solutions to questions that are matters of free theological debate, but rather to set forth again the doctrine of the Catholic Faith in these areas, pointing out fundamental questions that remain open to further development, and refuting specific positions that are erroneous or ambiguous.

---

13 Dominus Iesus §3.
As such, this document pertains to the fifth functional specialty, doctrines, as Lonergan understands it. The answers (i.e., doctrines) that Dominus Iesus puts forward are responses to questions that emerged from some theologies of religion which, according to the CDF, cast doubt upon the unicity and salvific universality of Jesus Christ and the Church.14

In Method in Theology Lonergan succinctly states that doctrines express judgments of fact and judgments of value.15 Judgments of fact affirm or deny that something is really so. Judgments of value affirm what is good and worthwhile and are either “simple” or “comparative.” When judgments of value are simple they affirm or deny that something is truly good, and when comparative, they “compare distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better or more important, or more urgent than the other.”16 Both kinds of judgments are claims to truth by which one takes a stand and reveals one’s commitment to what one deems to be true, good, and/or better.

Dominus Iesus reiterates doctrinal claims that are, as the CDF states, “part of the Church’s faith.”17 As truths of faith, such propositions require the obedience of faith, implying a “free assent to the whole truth that God has revealed.”18 Throughout the document such propositions are signaled with the injunctions “...must be firmly believed” and “...must be firmly held.”19 As Heffing notes, “assenting to such propositions is what Dominus Iesus means

15 Method in Theology, 132.
17 Dominus Iesus §3. In this regard, Charles Heffing suggested that the document could be described “as a fabric of quotations arranged and connected by transitional passages and summaries.” See “Method and Meaning in Dominus Iesus,” 108.
18 Dominus Iesus §7.
19 The document employs the phrase “required to profess” on one occasion and does so in relation to the proposition that there is an historical continuity between the Church founded by Christ and the Catholic Church. See Dominus Iesus §16.
by believing."

On the other hand, when referring to non-Christian religious traditions, *Dominus Iesus* does not use the aforementioned injunctions. Instead, the document reads:

If it is true that the followers of other religions can receive divine grace, it is also certain that *objectively speaking* they are in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of salvation.21

This quotation raises two distinct but related issues. This first issue concerns the meaning of the "if" that opens the claim. Specifically, the "if" is potentially misleading in that it could raise some degree of doubt regarding the actual presence of grace in the lives of other religious persons.22 However, any such doubt is unwarranted in light of *Dominus Iesus*’ unequivocal affirmation of the judgment of *Gaudium et Spes* that grace is invisibly active in the hearts of all people of good will, regardless of religious creed or lack thereof.23 Still, exactly how grace comes to other religious believers with no formal relationship to the church, remained an open question, both for the Council and *Dominus Iesus*.24 Thus, the second issue at stake concerns how the situation of non-Christians, especially in regard to salvation, is to be judged.

---

21 *Dominus Iesus* §22.
22 It must be noted that the doubt raised by the "if" with respect to the presence of grace in the lives of other religious persons is noticeably absent from the original Latin text, which reads as follows, "Verum est quidem aliarum religionum asseclas gratiam divinam accipere posse, at non minus verum est eos in statu gravis penuriae obiective versari per comparationem cum statu eorum qui, in Ecclesia, mediiorum salutis plenitudine fruuntur." See *Dominus Iesus* §22, available at [http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_lt.html](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_lt.html).
24 "With respect to the way in which the salvific grace of God – which is always given by means of Christ in the Spirit and has a mysterious relationship to the Church – comes to individual non-Christians, the Second Vatican Council limited itself to the statement that God bestows it ‘in ways known to himself.’ Theologians seek to understand this question more fully. Their work is to be encouraged, since it is certainly useful for understanding better God’s salvific plan and the ways in which it is accomplished.” See *Dominus Iesus* §21. This reference to the Second Vatican Council refers to *Ad Gentes* §7: "God, through ways known to himself, can lead people who through no fault of their own are ignorant of the gospel, to that faith without which it is impossible to please him."
Recalling that truth claims are kinds of judgments, we can add a degree of clarity to the nature of the doctrine under consideration. The claim makes a twofold judgment of fact. First, *Dominus Iesus* judges that followers of other religions are indeed recipients of divine grace. And second, it judges that such persons, nevertheless, find themselves in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with members of the Church. In addition, this latter judgment of fact concerning “a gravely deficient situation” is also a judgment of value. More specifically, it is a comparative judgment of value that Christianity is more efficacious in terms of the mediation of salvation, and in this sense, more valuable than other religions. This judgment of value is based on the conviction that Christianity possesses a unique ability to: (i) fully mediate the grace necessary for salvation, (ii) through the sacraments, (iii) in the context of the Church.

3. FOUNDATIONS

As stated above, doctrines directly provoke at least two kinds of further questions: how-questions and whether-questions. While both questions are important, I begin with the how-question in order to grasp the grounds on which the truth claim rests. The CDF answers the how-question when it admits that the document “sets forth again the doctrine of the Catholic Faith.” Thus, the foundations of *Dominus Iesus* are quite simply truths that have been previously and authoritatively taught. As Heftling comments:

These truths are being asserted as true because they have been truly asserted already...the only argument it uses is the argument from authority. No warrant is given for the teaching it “reiterates,” and none, it would seem, is required, except the authority of the other documents

---

25 *Dominus Iesus* §22.

26 *Dominus Iesus* does not consider the hypothesis that there may be multiple “salvations,” as S. Mark Heim has argued, correlative to a plurality of desired religious aims or goods. According to Heim, the inclusion of multiple religious ends would have mitigated the impression by many non-Christians that *Dominus Iesus* dismissed any salvific value to their own traditions. See Mark Heim, “A Protestant Reflection on Ecumenism and Interfaith Issues,” in *Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus*, ed. Stephen J. Pope and Charles Heftling (New York: Orbis, 2002), 77. For Heim’s discussion of the hypothesis of multiple religious ends see, *The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 17-45.

27 *Dominus Iesus* §3.
which this document quotes.28

Drawing on Lonergan, Hefling critiques this type of foundation as both simple and classicist, and argues that while it is suitable for a theology that is static and deductivist, it is inadequate for a contemporary theology that takes seriously an empirical notion of culture – an understanding of culture that acknowledges the mutability and developmental nature of cultural meanings and values.29 Lonergan’s “methodical” vision for contemporary theology understands the theological task as an ongoing collaborative process that gradually yields “a more comprehensive view.”30 For Lonergan, one of the hallmarks of a methodical theology is that its ‘raw material’ is not simply a large collection of logically demonstrable and unchanging truths, but rather is the data that emerges from the encounter between religion(s) and cultural factors.31 While the scope of the present essay does not permit elaboration on this point, it must at least be mentioned that the foundation appropriate for methodical theology is conversion (both personal and communal) in its religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic dimensions.32

The claim concerning the grave deficiency of other (non-Christian) religious believers reveals a specific example of the type of classicist foundations that are discernible throughout Dominus Iesus. In this assertion, Dominus Iesus cites a passage from Pius XII’s encyclical letter Mystici corporis that asks those outside of the visible body of the Catholic Church to follow “the interior movements of grace” and “to seek to withdraw from that state in which they cannot be sure of their salvation.”33 In this admonition, Mystici
**Corporis Christi** states that non-Christians “still remain deprived of those many heavenly gifts and helps which can only be enjoyed in the Catholic Church.” Such deprivation is, accordingly, the root of, and primary reason for, their apparent deficiency.

The issue of the relationship between the Church and human salvation raises further questions to be considered in the functional specialty, systematics. Among these is the question considered in the next section: whether the truth claim affirming the grave deficiency of other religious believers coheres with the judgment that the fullness of the means of salvation reside in the Catholic Church?

**4. Systematics**

As a doctrinal document *Dominus Iesus* does little in the way of systematics aside from stimulating systematic reflection. The main challenge posed by *Dominus Iesus* to systematics is that of mediation, and more specifically, the mediation of the grace necessary for salvation. As signs and instruments of grace, sacraments mediate God’s saving presence to humankind within the dimensions of space and time. Otherwise stated, they concretely mediate grace to historical beings. The locus of this mediation is the community of the church and their administration depends, at least in part, upon a valid episcopate and priestly orders. Clearly, systematic questions regarding sacramental mediation are connected with ecclesiological questions.

Recalling that the document is composed of a series of previously stated truths, it is hardly surprising that *Dominus Iesus* restates *Lumen Gentium’s* ecclesiological doctrine that the church of Christ subsists in [subsistit in]

---

34 *Mystici corporis* §103.

35 It is for this reason that *Dominus Iesus* is able to say that the communities that, at least in its judgment, have not preserved a valid Episcopate are not Churches in the proper sense, but rather, ecclesial communities. See *Dominus Iesus* §17. See also Francis Sullivan, “Introduction and Ecclesiological Issues,” in *Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus*, ed. Stephen J. Pope and Charles Hefling (New York: Orbis, 2002), 47-56. The distinction between ecclesial communities and Churches has been disputed by the members of these communities. For instance, George Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury said, “the Church of England, and the world-wide Anglican Communion, does not for one moment accept that its orders of ministry and Eucharist are deficient in any way.” See “Statement of Dr. George Carey,” in *Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus*, 27.
the Catholic Church. To be sure, the precise meaning of *subsistit in* is a *quaestio disputata*. However, full engagement in the discussion would lead beyond the functional specialty systematics and into those of research, interpretation, and history. While systematicians are not strictly confined to their own specialty, in order to actually propose some answers to the *how*-questions, they must rely on, and collaborate with other specialists. In the present essay I shall rely on the ecclesiological insight of the historian of theology and ecclesiologist, Francis Sullivan.

Sullivan notes that in *Dominus Iesus* the CDF interprets *subsistit in* to mean that the “Church of Christ, despite the divisions which exist among Christians, continues to exist fully only in the Catholic Church.” The corollary to this position is that churches and ecclesial communities outside the structure of the Catholic Church continue to possess efficacious elements of sanctification and truth. However, and this point is crucial, “they derive their efficacy from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church.” As Sullivan argues, the key word in the foregoing interpretation is *fully*. The affirmation that the *fullness* of the Church of Christ continues to exist *only* in the Catholic Church easily allows for doctrines – especially judgments of value – to be formulated in regard to all other religious entities, be they churches, ecclesial communities, or other traditions. It is important to recall that the supposed grave deficiency of followers of other religions is due to the fact that they do not possess the fullness of the means of salvation, obtained through a formal relationship with Christ by way of a formal relationship with the church. It is precisely this lack of fullness that, according to *Dominus Iesus*, gives those who are in

---

36 *Lumen Gentium* §8.
40 *Dominus Iesus* §16.
41 *Dominus Iesus* §16.
the Church a privileged position with respect to salvation.\footnote{32}

At the same time, this judgment of value must be held in tension with the judgments, both of fact and of value, that are more appreciative of religious differences. In Nostra Aetate, for example, the Council recognized the \textit{bona spiritualia et moralia} and the "socio-cultural values" present in the religions, as well as the elements of truth and holiness that "reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens everyone."\footnote{33} In addition, the Council rather boldly reinterpreted the axiom "No salvation outside the church" in a significantly less exclusionary fashion. Specifically, the axiom came to be understood as an affirmation of the church's universal role in the cause of salvation without precluding the possibility of salvation for followers of other religions.\footnote{34} While these judgments may seem to be some sort of concessionary prize to other religious believers they nonetheless expressed a deep appreciation of the religions, thereby opening up possibilities for authentic interreligious

\footnotetext[32]{The privileged position of the Christian does not guarantee that all who are formally in the Church will in fact be saved, for they, like all people, must respond to grace in a way such as to arrive at salvation. The offer of grace does not, in any case, override human freedom. This idea is well expressed by the Thomistic insight "gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit." See Saint Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, Pt. 1 Q. 1 Art. 8 Reply Obj. 2 and, Pt. 1 Q. 62 Art. 3 Reply Obj. 2. Lonergan makes explicit reference to this idea in the epilogue of \textit{Insight} saying, "Grace perects nature both in the sense that it adds a perfection beyond nature and in the sense that it confers on nature the effective freedom to attain its own perfection. But grace is not a substitute for nature ..." See \textit{Insight}, 767.}

\footnotetext[33]{Nostra Aetate \S 2. As Sullivan pointed out, the idea of the presence of \textit{bona spiritualia and moralia} in other religious traditions was anticipated by Pope Paul VI, particularly in the encyclical \textit{Ecclesiam Suam} in which he expressed: (i) admiration for "all that is true and good in [Moslem] worship of God" and (ii) respect for "the moral and spiritual values of the various non-Christian religions." See Sullivan, \textit{Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response} (New York: Paulist, 1992), 183-84. The full text of \textit{Ecclesiam Suam} is available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_06081964_ecclesiam_en.html. This idea was later developed by the Theological Advisory Commission of the Federation of Asian Bishop's Conferences (FABC). For example, in 1987 the commission stated, "its experience of the other religions has led the Church in Asia to [a] positive appreciation of their role in the divine economy of salvation. This appreciation is based on the fruits of the Spirit perceived in the lives of the other religions' believers: a sense of the sacred, a commitment to the pursuit of fullness, a thirst for self-realization, a taste for prayer and commitment, a desire for renunciation, a struggle for justice, an urge to basic human goodness, an involvement in service, a total surrender of the self to God, and an attachment to the transcendent in their symbols, rituals and life itself, though human weakness and sin are not absent." Quoted in Jacques Dupuis, \textit{Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism} (Marykonn, NY: Orbis, 2001), 220. The text is taken from a document published by the FABC entitled "Theses on Interreligious Dialogue," \textit{FABC Papers} 48 (Hong Kong: 1987), 7.}

\footnotetext[34]{The church's universal role in the cause of salvation was expressed by Vatican II via the notion of the church as the "universal sacrament of salvation." See Sullivan, \textit{Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response}, 156-61.}
dialogue. For its part, *Dominus Iesus* is hardly original in the way in which it draws out the positive elements of the religions. The declaration limits itself to citations from Vatican II, delivering few, if any, fresh insights.46

5. COMMUNICATIONS

The fact that communications is the last of the eight functional specialties certainly does not render it the least important. Lonergan considers communications the stage in which theological reflection ultimately bears fruit.47 In this functional specialty, theologians are especially challenged to enter into dialogue with their cultural context. In the context of religious pluralism, dialogue can be understood as “positive and constructive interreligious relations with individuals and communities of other faiths which are directed at mutual understanding and enrichment.”48 So, how is an understanding of the truth claiming the grave deficiency of other religious believers to be positively and constructively shared with them? Is it even possible to do so?

In the context of dialogue, it would be counterproductive to reproduce the language of *Dominus Iesus*. A more adequate way to conceive of the supposed deficiency of one, and the privilege of the other, is to frame it in terms of a gift-exchange. Margaret O’Gara has fruitfully applied this metaphor in the context of ecumenical dialogue – a metaphor that can also be extended to interreligious dialogue.49 O’Gara explains that, in ecumenical

46 *Dominus Iesus* §2, §8.
encounters, “gift-giving enriches all of the partners, since we do not lose our gifts by sharing them with others.” ⁵⁰ In interreligious dialogue, the gift that Christians are privileged to share is the gift of grace that is sacramentally mediated to them in the context of the church. How, then, can this gift be shared in light of the church’s commitment to interreligious dialogue, without reverting to the use of slogans such as “No salvation outside the church?” Certainly not by harkening back to the days of baptism en masse or by reverting to a tactics of fear whose slogan was “No salvation outside the church.” Christians can share the gift of grace by witnessing to the transformation that it effects in their lives. Within this horizon, grace ceases to be wholly exclusive to Christians to the extent that they bear authentic witness to it in their relations with others. Appealing to St. Paul, Lonergan equated the gift of grace with the gift of God’s love that floods human hearts through the power of the Holy Spirit. ⁵¹ Furthermore, he equated the reception of this gift with religious experience and maintained that it manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control, that is, the fruits of the Spirit as they were described by St. Paul in his letter to the Galatians. ⁵² Thus, the transformations brought about by grace are concretely experienced in the drama of human living. It follows that any shared experience of grace is not simply a private, internal experience; rather, it makes itself present, and eventually known, in the ways that we live out our lives. ⁵³ Recalling the different forms of dialogue proposed by Dialogue and Proclamation, it might be said that the lived experience of grace is most directly identifiable with the dialogue of life and the dialogue of


⁵² Method in Theology, 106. The reference to St. Paul is to Galatians 5:22.

⁵³ The distinction between the “experience of grace” and the “knowledge of the experience” follows Lonergan’s distinction between the various levels of human consciousness where knowledge is a compound of the first three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment. See Method in Theology, 106.
The other side of the metaphor of the gift exchange is the gift that Christians might receive from their partners in dialogue. It must be admitted that the language of Dominus Iesus seems to seriously question this very possibility. Is it really prudent to receive a gift from persons who, objectively speaking, are gravely deficient? While the language is striking, I do not think it entirely precludes the possibility of receiving a valuable gift from the other. If this were the case, it would make no sense to speak of dialogue as a means of mutual understanding and enrichment. In fact, it would be absurd to speak of mutuality in any sense. While the notion of mutuality is scant in Dominus Iesus, it is in fact there. For example, the declaration mentions that interreligious dialogue "which is part of the Church’s evangelizing mission, requires an attitude of understanding and a relationship of mutual knowledge and reciprocal enrichment, in obedience to the truth and with respect for freedom."

In relation to this passing reference to "mutual knowledge and reciprocal enrichment," James Fredericks comments that this is "as close as Dominus Iesus comes to acknowledging that Catholics might have something to learn by entering into dialogue with those who follow other religious paths." Fredericks regards this lack of attention to mutuality as a "sign of underdevelopment of Church teaching in regard to interreligious dialogue." For example, surprising because, as Fredericks points out, there is solid basis for the notion of mutuality in the more extensive magisterial teaching on interreligious dialogue. For example, Dialogue and Proclamation, a document underutilized in recent Vatican teaching, did not hesitate to say:

The fullness of truth received in Jesus Christ does not give individual Christians the guarantee that they have grasped that truth fully. In the last analysis truth is not a thing we possess, but a person by whom we must allow ourselves to be possessed. This is an unending process. While keeping their identity intact, Christians must be prepared

54 Dialogue and Proclamation §42.
55 Dominus Iesus §2.
to learn and from and through others the positive values of their traditions. Through dialogue they may be moved to give up ingrained prejudices, to revise preconceived ideas, and even sometimes to allow the understanding of their faith to be purified.\footnote{Dialogue and Proclamation §49. Two other examples highlighted by Fredericks are Pope John Paul II’s encyclicals Redemptor Hominis (1979) and Redemptor Missio (1990). As summarized by Fredericks, the former notes that the Church’s “self-awareness” (no. 11) is formed by means of interreligious dialogue,” while the latter recognized interreligious dialogue as “a method and means of mutual knowledge and enrichment” (no. 55). See Fredericks, “The Catholic Church and the Other Religious Paths,” 251.}


6. CONCLUSION

In applying Lonergan’s functional specialties to Dominus Iesus I have made at least two main points, one methodological and the other theological. With respect to the former, I have endeavored to demonstrate how Lonergan’s functional specialties can be used as a helpful (not to be confused with only) tool for examining and questioning theological claims. Increased specialization in theology requires the necessary methodological tools for adequately navigating the complexity of the issues. The theology of religions and interreligious dialogue exemplify this complexity. The methodological insight involves the greater clarity that emerges when theologians distinguish what types of questions they are trying to answer. Given the high degree of specialization, not every type of question can be exhaustively or even adequately answered by any one specialist. This reality calls researchers to develop intellectual humility and a spirit of collaboration. In this regard, one of the positive contributions of functional specialization is that it provides a corrective to “theological grandstanding” and challenges theologians to appropriate the relevant contributions of their colleagues working in other specialties.

The main theological issue raised in this essay – the connection between religious experience and grace – requires further investigation. This
question most clearly came to the fore in the section on communications and concerns the notion of religious experience. Lonergan sought to explain how religious experience — as an experience of grace — can be understood as a distinctly human experience concretely manifested in socio-historical contexts, an understanding not adequately manifested in Dominus Iesus. Matthew Petillo has keenly pointed out that one of the more recent versions of The Catechism of the Catholic Church describes grace as belonging "to the supernatural order, [and] grace escapes our experience and cannot be known except by faith." In relation to interreligious dialogue, the reticence to speak of grace in the language of human experience (including affectivity) is surprising given the emphasis on the necessity of the church and the sacraments for salvation. Sacramental practice is shaped by space and time and this inevitably has some impact on the experience of believers, which is, of course, not to say that the intrinsic value of sacraments is dependent upon historical circumstance. For example, we go to the physical building known as the church, we sing hymns, we kneel, we worship, we confess our sins, we (currently only males) receive holy orders, we enter into matrimony and, we tangibly partake of the Eucharist. It is precisely in and through our experience of church, so to speak, that we most fully experience the gift of grace and can be hopeful that we will share in the fruits of salvation. From the perspective of dialogue, one of the foremost challenges is to share that experience with our interlocutors. While in some instances the sharing will include a theological account of what grace is, in other contexts it will call for an existential account of what grace does. The account is likely to be most effective when it bears witness to the ongoing and transformative power of grace working in human history. Finally, while this transformation may


63 In light of the four forms of dialogue put forward by Dialogue and Proclamation, I would situate a theological account of what grace is in the dialogue of theological exchange. In addition, I would suggest that an account of what grace does can be given in each of the four forms to the extent the practice of dialogue is transformative. Again, the guiding principle here is that of Saint Thomas, “gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit.” The perfection made possible by grace includes a development or transformation that issues from the very practice of dialogue. In other words, the dialogue changes us in some definite way. For a description of the four forms of dialogue, see Dialogue and Proclamation §42.
be evident on an individual level, the graver challenge is, perhaps, for it to break through on the communal level of the church. When this occurs, the church will take a significant step forward as the “universal sacrament of salvation” that reconciles humankind with God and one another.
IN PLACING TWO GREAT INTELLECTUALS of the twentieth century in dialogue, few would elect G. K. Chesterton and Bernard Lonergan. The personae and worldviews of the two men at first appear so divergent that an imaginary conversation between them intimates a curious if not comical scene. The English Victorian and “apostle of common sense” would sit down with the much younger Canadian Jesuit and systematic theologian. Given Chesterton’s penchant for intellectual stimulants, they might share a fine tobacco product and a pint; if the conversation lingered on into the night, perhaps a bottle of scotch. And yet, such a whimsical encounter need not be purely imaginary. Curiously enough, Lonergan wrote two succinct essays on Chesterton early in his career. Recently republished in the Collected Works, the essays reveal Lonergan’s profound respect and admiration for Chesterton. To date no scholar has analyzed these writings in depth and mined Lonergan’s one-way conversation for its theological insights.¹ No one has paired together such a peculiar pair; no Fr. Brown, if you will, has pieced together such a perplexing mystery.

Such a mysterious meeting is the brazen task of this paper. In studying Lonergan’s appreciation for Chesterton, it poses a thesis that situates a Chestertonian insight within a Lonerganian framework, a move that is as provocative as it is potentially perilous: Lonergan appropriates Chesterton’s retrieval of common sense as the theological antidote to general bias via a soteriological reintegration of culture. The study further posits that

Chesterton’s soteriological insight fosters a Lonerganian theology of history in so far as Chesterton’s appropriation of common sense through the lens of salvation history corrects a scientific and instrumentalist worldview through the concept of gratitude, in turn balancing the dialectic of culture and giving rise to what Lonergan called “cosmopolis.” In other words, the soteriology of gratitude behind the façade of Chesterton’s comical commonsense world orients a Lonerganian theology of history toward its ideal of cosmopolis.

In order to solve such a riddle of insights, the present study first examines Lonergan’s 1931 essay on Chesterton in light of the former’s explication of common sense in his book, Insight. An analysis of Lonergan’s second, 1943 essay on Chesterton ensues and further situates Chesterton as a soteriological theologian. A third and final section integrates Lonergan’s discussion of cosmopolis with Chesterton’s “Ethics of Elfland” in Orthodoxy so as to apply Lonergan’s essays on Chesterton to an overall theology of soteriological gratitude.

1. Chesterton as Instrument of Common Sense: The 1931 Essay

Five years prior to Chesterton’s death in 1936, Lonergan published a concise summary of Chesterton and his contributions in the Loyola College Review. In the essay the reader encounters a Lonergan ostensibly far removed from the author of later systematic works like Insight and Method in Theology. His admiration for Chesterton is evident in the language and style of the essay, reflecting a fluid and vivid prose similar to Chesterton’s own work. Lonergan begins by qualifying Chesterton’s Romantic worldview and poses a comparison between Victor Hugo and Chesterton with respect to the “grotesque.” Lonergan maintains that the difference between the two lies in that Chesterton attempted to mold a Christian drama as an actual Christian. He praises Chesterton’s trademark “topsy-turveydom” toward his surrounding culture as a “metaphorical definition of his philosophy of life.” Such a philosophy Lonergan compares with Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean” and argues that Chesterton manifested this mean through its

---

3 “Gilbert,” 54-55.
4 “Gilbert,” 55.
“corollary,” such that “to avoid the extremes one had best journey in the opposite direction of the rest of men.” Chesterton is a man who “loves mental honesty and loathes sham” in his writings, one who “who finds nothing so great that he may not think about it, either to question or to adore.” It is precisely such a philosophy behind his thinking that Lonergan respects in Chesterton. He finds an implicit indictment against conventional higher education in that a man who never attended university should command such skill in letters and prose.

However, it is not simply the breadth of Chesterton’s pen that Lonergan finds worthy of an essay. Coupled with Chesterton’s incisive inquisitiveness is an unnamed epistemology. In his critique of nineteenth-century intellectual snobbery and cultural superciliousness, Chesterton appeals to the knowledge inherent in common sense, a common sense that overturns in a topsy-turvy fashion the assumptions of the European Gilded Age. His is an epistemology rooted in the common sense of human experience:

He runs against the modern worship of science and scholarship to be the champion of plain thinking, not that he may think with the poetical scientists but that he may think for himself....When he speaks it is not with a mandate from science, such as so many popularizers arrogate; it is with an appeal to the lore of human experience and to the first principles latent in daily life. Great mental clarity and a remarkable aptitude for pertinent illustration are demanded of a man who would attack high-sounding theory with elusive common sense.

As the quotation suggests, Lonergan perceives a critical insight at work in Chesterton’s high esteem for human experience. In terms of Lonerganian cognitional theory, one might venture to say that Chesterton does not rush to judgment in his understanding; rather, he begins with human experience as informative. A Chestertonian schema is thus inductive in its appropriation of common sense and common experience. However, it is not a simpleminded, naive epistemology. For Lonergan, it is Chesterton’s erudite command of

5 “Gilbert,” 55.
6 “Gilbert,” 55.
7 “Gilbert,” 56.
8 Regarding the “first principles latent in daily life,” see §I.A of this article.
his pen in the form of illustrations and "prestidigital wordplay" 9 that makes sense of "common sense" – that raises human experience to the level of understanding. For a world inundated with theoretical meaning, Chesterton returns to the stage of common sense, both in terms of a Lonerganian stage of meaning and as a historical sense of the human drama surrounding him.

Indeed, much of Lonergan’s adulation for Chesterton rests on the latter’s historical context and contribution. Lonergan values Chesterton’s critique of the early twentieth century as an authentic unmasking of such a scientism as Marx’s combination of theory and history that substitutes a “monstrosity” for erudition. 10 He judges the Chestertonian insight as timely, placing the British Catholic within the drama of the world stage: “Democracy is faced with the alternative of teaching thought or meeting its decline and fall. Chesterton would undertake this task.” 11 And yet, the same man who composed a book on the topic of orthodoxy is most unorthodox in his methodology. In the place of syllogisms Chesterton employs imagery “closely allied to symbolism” that “puts awe and mystery into common things.” 12 He appeals not to common sense simply because it is common but rather because it is ripe with meaning. In a moment of his own wordplay, Lonergan characterizes the Chestertonian symbolism with an acute observation:

Swift once meditated on a broomstick; Chesterton seems always at it. And when the broomstick fails to suggest in some striking way the evil of capitalism, a weak point in evolution, or an absurdity of the agnostics, then he will turn to fable and legend, see witches riding brooms across a dark November sky, and reflect on the wisdom of old wives’ tales and nursery rhymes. 13

Aside from the mirthful image of a broomstick, the ending of the above quotation seems to point to Chesterton’s chapter on the “Ethics of Elfland” in Orthodoxy. Here Chesterton defends the “peculiar perfection of tone

---

9 “Gilbert,” 56.
10 “Gilbert,” 56.
11 “Gilbert,” 56.
12 “Gilbert,” 57.
13 “Gilbert,” 56-57. As noted in the editors’ notes in the Collected Works, Lonergan alludes to Jonathan Swift’s 1704 satire, A Meditation upon a Broomstick according to the Style and Manner of the Honorable Robert Boyle’s Meditations (56n110).
and truth in the nursery tales" in a comparison between the scientist and
the witch; the former reduces the wonder of an apple falling from a tree
into a law while the latter "does not lose either her wonder or her reason"
because she does not attempt to produce a syllogism for the relationship
between ogres and castles. Irrespective of whether Lonergan intends an
allusion or not, the image of a witch with either her broomstick or her ogre
conveys the same Chestertonian critique of nineteenth-century scientism:
the scientific monopoly on knowledge as a predetermined world of cause
and effect stamps out wonder and mystery. As it reduces knowledge to the
purely empirical, its own reduction becomes itself unreasonable in that it
advances philosophical claims that venture beyond its own data. Such is the
Chestertonian critique of the antebellum European continent.

Yet is such a critique merely burlesque Romanticism? Lonergan admits
that Chesterton appears to harbor a nostalgia for the medieval in his
writings: "It would seem that he envies the men of earlier times....Their
sense of the mysteriousness of things, even though due to an error, seems to
him preferable to a shallow cocksureness that denies there is any mystery
at all." He compares Chesterton’s prose to the work of a medieval painter
who includes a glimpse of heaven and hell in an otherwise innocent scene.
Chesterton maintains a “solemn background for his frolics” that bruises
the modern’s fragmentation of reality: “We like our fun unadulterated;
when Chesterton refuses this seemingly reasonable request, there is food
for thought.” And yet it is precisely his frolicking that tricks the reader.
Like the Grimm brothers, Chesterton buries a moral within his writings.
For illustration, Lonergan quotes one of Chesterton’s poems from “A Song
of Quoodle” and points to his short story character of Father Brown, the
“queer little priest” who occasionally introduces a digression on logic or
theology. And yet, for Lonergan, there is a logic to what would otherwise
be pure madness: “Basically he is revealing the grand confusion of great
and small, of important and trifling, that comes of seeing in the light of
eternity.” Thus if one may accuse Chesterton of clinging to medieval ideals
and fancies, one cannot simultaneously accuse him of vanity. Like most

14 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1995), 56.
15 “Gilbert,” 57.
16 “Gilbert,” 57.
17 “Gilbert,” 58.
18 “Gilbert,” 58.
things medieval, some hidden purpose underlies what on the surface seems trivial. Chesterton’s writing ultimately points to his Creator, toward the same eternal questions that undergird his thought. If he is a Romantic, it is in defense of the mysterious, the invisible, and the forgotten. His Romanticism thus stands in contrast to Hugo in that Chesterton searches not for art but rather for art with meaning.

Nevertheless, Lonergan locates one weakness in Chesterton’s writings. Since he occupies himself with contemporary issues divorced from systematic analysis, Lonergan fears that “much of his work will not survive.” Yet even here Lonergan finds much to be admired: “There is a singular detachment and nobility in making issue with ephemeral aberrations, in hoping to benefit posterity not by exquisite composition but by an endeavor to improve the present.” If Chesterton chooses to focus on contemporary concerns, it is only for the benefit of humanity through a critique of his contemporaries. “A more robust purposiveness stamps his work, makes it not so much an ornament as an instrument of civilization.” Although he fails to produce tomes of theology or literary masterpieces, one still finds a cultural awakening in his work that fosters higher thinking for later generations. It is particularly this cultural insight to which we shall return below.

1.1. Common Sense and General Bias

If Lonergan praises Chesterton as a man of common sense – one in tune with the exigencies of human experience – one might further question the limitations of Chesterton’s work. From a Lonergan viewpoint, “common sense” is a stage of meaning prior (although not sequential) to theory and, ultimately, interiority. Granted, these stages of meaning appear in Lonergan’s later works, such as Method in Theology. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Lonergan disavowed this essay on Chesterton or later critiqued the illustrious Victorian figure. Hence, one is left wondering what exactly Lonergan ascertained to be the contribution of Chesterton to the world of insight. If the “apostle of common sense” is indeed an “instrument of civilization,” one might further ask: how so? For an answer we turn to

20 “Gilbert,” 59.
21 “Gilbert,” 59.
Lonergan’s insight into common sense and the general bias arising from common sense.

In chapter 6 of *Insight*, Lonergan outlines his appropriation of common sense. He describes it as the nascent intelligence found amid one’s common surroundings, fostered through language and, above all, inquiry. He points to the child’s endless barrage of questions in his or her youth. One question leads to another, yet the child is unable to differentiate the questions and systematize their meaning. He or she cannot grasp their interrelation or how a question’s answer may be contingent upon further questions and further answers. “There is, then, common to all men, the very spirit of inquiry that constitutes the scientific attitude. But in its native state it is untutored.”

Questions upon further questions “bring forth fruit only after the discovery that, if we really would master the answers, we somehow have to find them out ourselves.” Questions and answers lead to insights; insights beget further insights. “From a spontaneous inquiry, the spontaneous accumulation of related insights, and the spontaneous collaboration of communication, we have worked towards the notion of common sense as an intellectual development.” Thus common sense is not necessarily anti-intellectual simply because it concerns itself with a basic level of inquiry. Common sense focuses on the “particular” and “concrete” rather than on the “universal” and “abstract” of science and theory. “It is common without being general, for it consists in a set of insights that remains incomplete.”

Its weakness is that it concerns itself only with the relevant, such that the accumulation of insights becomes a child’s chest of building blocks, yet he or she has no idea how to put the blocks of insight together. This rejection of insights due to their irrelevance is so “that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness.” These incomplete insights are grouped together in the form of analogies or generalizations. Lonergan’s prime example for this consolidation is the proverb—a principle or rule that retains its validity despite “numerous exceptions.” Common sense does not aspire to be universal and scientific because it deals with the practical and concrete,

---


23 *Insight*, 174.

24 *Insight*, 175.

25 *Insight*, 175.

26 *Insight*, 175.

27 *Insight*, 176.
because its object is the familiar, the relevant. In Lonergan's own words, "the business of common sense is daily life." Day to day life finds its meaning in the realm of common sense.

As noted, however, the concrete realism of common sense has its own flaws. According to Lonergan, its primary weakness is due to the limitation of its insights, in so far as a commonsense stage of meaning cannot interrelate these insights. "Unfortunately, common sense does not include an inventory of its own contents." This is not to say it lacks an epistemology; rather, common sense lacks a coherent, intelligible epistemology that can differentiate its insights. "Common sense knows, but it does not know what it knows nor how it knows nor how to correct and complement its own inadequacies." It is not fully conscious of the insights it possesses. As such, a society shackled to common sense inevitably encounters conflict and tension. Unable to make sense of its accumulation of insights, "the intersubjective groups within a society tend to fall apart in bickering, insinuations, recriminations, while unhappy individuals begin to long for the idyllic simplicity of primitive living in which large accumulations of insights would be superfluous." While some squabble over the meaning of collected insights, others in the society begin to scorn insight and human intelligence altogether, convinced that the absence of insight is preferable to insight plagued by conflict.

It is upon this internal tension arising within the realm of common sense that Lonergan locates the "dialectic of community." Within the community or society, two principles emerge that begin to move apart and consequently form a rift in the fabric of a community: "Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense.... these linked principles are opposed, for it is their opposition that accounts for the tension of community." Human interaction is inevitable in a community. With such interaction comes the exchange of various accumulations of insights. One grouping of insights comes into opposition with another accumulation. Suddenly many insights appear to be contradictory and mutually exclusive. What was once "common" becomes divisive and toxic as a multitude of biases emerge within a given society rooted in common sense.

28 Insight, 230.
29 Insight, 216.
30 Insight, 216.
31 Insight, 216.
32 Insight, 217-18.
As the "incompleteness" of common sense becomes clear, the problem "raises the basic question of a bias in common sense."33 In chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight*, Lonergan distinguishes among four biases within common sense: dramatic (psychological), individual, group, and general. The fourth bias is the most important with respect to Chesterton, since it is "general bias that tends to set common sense against science and philosophy."34 General bias arises from common sense because it is "concerned with the concrete and the particular ... [and hence] entertains no aspirations about reaching abstract and universal laws."35 As common sense is "incapable of analyzing itself," it fails to account for the complexities of the situation. Its vision becomes myopic in its obsession with the purely relevant and particular. Common sense thus becomes "incapable of coming to grasp that its peculiar danger is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results."36 Consequently, the general bias of common sense perpetuates its own problems in its apathy for the theoretical. It derides science and theory in the name of the practical and relevant, raising its banner of common sense as the solution to a myriad of social quandaries.

Here Lonergan’s critique of common sense might give one pause with respect to Chesterton. Is it not the latter’s concern for “daily life” and the “relevant” that Lonergan outlines in the above essay? Is not Chesterton’s concentration on human experience mixed with an “idyllic” romanticism in his writings? Does he not yearn for the medieval past, for its “simplicity of primitive living”? How then does Lonergan make the jump to state that, despite Chesterton’s concentration on present matters, his insights serve as an “instrument of civilization”? Whence the logical shift? Is not Chesterton an exemplar of he who elevates common sense to the detriment of theory and science so as to capsize the stability of society altogether?

As the Lonergan scholar scratches her head with these questions and the Chestertonian wipes the perspiration from his forehead, perhaps our deceased confreres would pour themselves another glass of scotch and continue in their suspended (perhaps celestial) conversation. Their pulses would remain calm as they smiled at this perplexing paradox. Yet as we
mere mortals return to Insight, the reason for their halcyon demeanor comes into view.

As one reads on, Lonergan’s account of general bias assumes a further component of historical responsibility. The telling symptom of general bias within common sense is a disregard for historical consequences. Lonergan explicates what he terms a “longer cycle” of general bias that cuts through the lesser biases and contorts history into a cyclical eruption of conflict. Although Chesterton was never shy of conflict, one certainly cannot accuse him of a disregard for historical precedent or consequence. Indeed, it was the future of civilization and its relationship to tradition that was the focus of most of his writings.

In describing the historical problem of underlying general bias, Lonergan points not to common sense itself but rather the nature of its insights. As it fails to understand its own insights, common sense scorns theory. Without theory, the quality of such insights suffers and unravels into general bias. Thus common sense attempts to solve the exigencies of society, yet its distain for a long-view solution forces common sense to halt in its own quagmire:

But the general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view or that set up higher integrations or that involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues. The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice. Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially.37

With respect to Chesterton, he not only accepted the challenge of democracy – as Lonergan himself claims – but also offered a long-term solution to growing economic problems through his theory of “distributism.”38 The man fond of common sense was not himself trapped in the general bias of common sense. In fact, Lonergan classifies general bias as “hard-headed practicality and realism,”39 and in his essay Lonergan himself

37  Insight, 228.
38  For an account of this theory, see Chesterton’s Utopia of Usurers (1917) and The Outline of Sanity (1927).
39  Insight, 228.
quotes Chesterton as disavowing not only the hardness of hands and head but also the heart.\textsuperscript{40} 

In addition to Chesterton's perspicacious concern for the perennial, his theological, philosophical, and cultural insights dismiss any association with the social decay of general bias. As Lonergan elaborates on the consequences of the longer cycle of general bias, he notes that alongside social disintegration there is a "mounting irrelevance of detached and disinterested intelligence."\textsuperscript{41} That which is deemed impractical from the perspective of common sense retreats and finds itself quarantined from the rest of society: "Culture retreats into an ivory tower. Religion becomes an inward affair of the heart. Philosophy glitters like a gem with endless facts and no practical purpose."\textsuperscript{42} Eventually there is a surrender to the regime of practicality on two levels. In this first instance, "men of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they live and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal that would lay the axe to the root of the social surd."\textsuperscript{43} The second level of surrender flows from the first, such that all value of speculation dries up with human intelligence:

The function of human intelligence, it is claimed, is not to set up independent norms that make thought irrelevant to fact but to study the data as they are, to gasp the intelligibility that is immanent in them, to acknowledge as principle or norm only what can be reached by generalization from the data.... It is empirical, scientific, realistic. It takes its stand on things as they are. In brief, its many excellences cover its single defect.\textsuperscript{44}

This final consequence is none other than a sort of scientism. Only that which can be measured or empirically observed enjoys validity. Authentic inquiry, the very inquiry that originally nourished common sense intelligence, ceases and gives way to the prosaic peddling of fact upon fact. Within this decay, the great irony of ironies ensues: instead of common sense rising to the stage of theory, general bias incarcerates it \textit{in the very name of}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{40} "Gilbert," 59.
\bibitem{41} \textit{Insight}, 229.
\bibitem{42} \textit{Insight}, 229.
\bibitem{43} \textit{Insight}, 230.
\bibitem{44} \textit{Insight}, 230.
\end{thebibliography}
theory, maintaining all along that it possesses the key to “realism” through empiricism and scientific explanations. Certainly a man who wrote on the “Ethics of Elfland” and mused on the flight of witches cannot be accused of succumbing to such scientism. Indeed, it was the very scientism of the Prussian military state and the Bolsheviks that Chesterton openly detested. Perhaps no better example of this fact is Chesterton’s forward in the 1927 edition of his 1908 novel, The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare. Upon hearing that the “Bolshevists” had attempted to make his little “Anti-Anarchist” satire into a play about anarchism, he characterized them as “barbarians” since “they have not learned to laugh.”

If there was ever a critic of pseudo-theory and banality, it was Chesterton.

What, then, did Chesterton contribute through his vehicle of common sense? As Lonergan points out, the “general bias of common sense cannot be corrected by common sense, for the bias is abstruse and general, while common sense deals with the particular.” Rather, Lonergan maintains that it is insight that is needed in order to dissipate the fogged common sense of a technocratic scientism. “Inquiry and insight are facts that underlie mathematics, empirical science, and common sense. The refusal of insight is a fact that accounts for individual and group egoism...and for the ruin of nations and civilizations.” Moreover, it is not just any insight that is necessary. Rather, a “higher viewpoint” is required, “for unless common sense can learn to overcome its bias by acknowledging and submitting to a higher principle...then one must expect the succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints.” Thus common sense needs not only theory but moreover the higher viewpoint of theory.

The answer to the above question may lie in a clarification. Beyond Dale Ahlquist’s nomenclature of Chesterton as the “Apostle of Common Sense,” one might better call him the apostle to common sense. It is precisely with his “higher viewpoint” of topsy-turvydom that Chesterton penetrates the general bias of his day. His scathing critiques of social assumptions ranging from the politics of the British Empire to the American obsession

46 Insight, 233.
47 Insight, 234.
48 Insight, 234.
with advertisements are none other than critiques of the common sense bias permeating the early twentieth-century technocratic world. He stands as an apostle to common sense in that he also grounds his common sense approach with – paradoxically – a view of the eternal, of God and his own theories about Christianity and world culture. His writings attempt to save common sense from its own bias and use it to attack scientism and theory gone awry. As argued below, his “higher viewpoint” is none other than a theological and, moreover, soteriological worldview that characterizes his contribution to society. Indeed, the theological character of Chesterton’s mystique occupies Lonergan’s second essay on Chesterton. Written in 1943, the essay intriguingly coincides with state scientism’s ravenous destruction of the world’s landscape in technological war and genocide.

2. CHESTERTON THE THEOLOGIAN: THE 1943 ESSAY

At first glance, Lonergan’s brief 1943 article in The Canadian Register bears a curious title: “Chesterton the Theologian.”\(^{50}\) He prefaces the essay by noting that its topic was solicited and proceeds to suggest that it might be easier to characterize Chesterton as an apologist or even a metaphysician. For the latter category, Lonergan refers to the “unmistakable strain to the man who explained the development of a puppy into a dog as a matter of becoming more doggy.”\(^{51}\) Yet he simultaneously notes that Chesterton himself denied that he was a theologian. Lonergan further references Joseph Keating’s review of Chesterton’s Orthodoxy in 1908 in which the priest recommended that Chesterton be “banished” to Monte Cassino and forced to read the Summa and Dante so that he might reemerge to “astonish the world.”\(^{52}\) Chesterton, Lonergan maintains, was a man who “insisted on the complexity of things,” an man set on creedal Christianity as the “walls of intellectual content” that prevent the “flood” of an emotive religious sentimentalism.\(^{53}\) There is little question that he dabbled with the theological, but does such dabbling constitute the title “theologian”?

\(^{50}\) Bernard Lonergan, “Chesterton the Theologian,” The Canadian Register 42 (1943): 5; republished in vol 20 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 89-91. Once again, all subsequent citations reference this re-publication.


\(^{52}\) “Chesterton,” 90.

\(^{53}\) “Chesterton,” 90.
Lonergan’s answer to this intriguing question is surprisingly historical. He concludes that indeed Chesterton was a theologian, not in the sense of the dumb ox of Aquino, but rather via the inquisitive insight of an Anselm:

Still there is a sense in which Chesterton was a theologian. Suppose that he wrote in the eleventh century instead of the twentieth. Then he could be ranked with St. Anselm, for of that age no one expects the intellectual elaborations later evolved. Then being a theologian was simply a matter of a cast of mind that seizes the fitness and coherence of the faith, that penetrates to its inner order and harmony and unity. Such penetration was the soul of Chesterton.54

This “soul” was the theological speculation of “Cur Deus Homo?”, searching for a theological whole without the complex philosophical system to do so. Such a “cast of mind” characterized Chesterton as his “questions go to the roots of things” and bear the “fresh and fearless vitality of medieval inquisitiveness.”55 In support of this categorization, he points to Chesterton’s quasi-autobiographical search in Orthodoxy. He traces several famous quotations in which Chesterton recognizes that upon creating his own “orthodoxy” he only came to discover its manifestation in Christianity. Yet there is no better compliment that Lonergan extends than his recognition of Chesterton as theologian not merely of medieval Christendom but also as theologian for the present: “Such a grasp of fitness and coherence is the essential object of the theologian at all times.”56 It is not just his inquisitiveness that earns Chesterton the title “theologian”; it is rather his “grasp” of the whole, his “penetrating” perception of the inner workings of theology, his brilliant recognition of the interrelation and “coherence” of Christianity’s eternal truths.

As in the 1931 essay, however, Lonergan notes Chesterton’s limitations as theologian, only this time he casts them in much more positive light. “He combined the wholehearted contempt for the irrelevant with an ability to appreciate enormously, one might say inordinately, what really was relevant.”57 As noted above, Chesterton reflects a great appreciation of

54 “Chesterton,” 90.
55 “Chesterton,” 91.
56 “Chesterton,” 91.
57 “Chesterton,” 91.
common sense and its view of the relevant and particular. However, Lonergan notes that just as one thinks that Chesterton is hopelessly immersed in the particular, his prose arrives at a profound theological point that dispels prior confusion and elevates this point from the realm of common sense into a world of striking meaning. Once again referring to Chesterton's biography of St. Thomas Aquinas, Lonergan writes:

[H]e sets up parallels and contrasts that seem hopelessly oversimplifications until - until you get the point. He does not fear to assert that because Christ was risen, Aristotle too had to rise again. He does not hesitate to leap from Manichaeism to Calvinism and throw in fakirs and Albigensians on the way. He does not, in modern style, nicely trace the influences of Christian tradition, Greek thought and Arabic culture on the mind of Aquinas; he sets up a cosmic background, names him St. Thomas of the Creator, and contrasts him with the Buddha and Nietzsche.

In light of Lonergan's above comparison with Anselm, the quotation further illuminates what he means by a medieval appreciation of the whole. Chesterton constructs a “cosmic background” that challenges the modern method of meticulous sequential analysis. Yet, as the quotation also suggests, Lonergan pinpoints Chesterton's consistent soteriological worldview that places such a biography not amid the dusty tomes of German history but rather the dynamic theological world of Christian salvation history.

All in all, the last succinct paragraph of this brief essay is perhaps the most illuminating. Lonergan locates Chesterton’s “deepest theological intuition” not in a theological treatise but rather in a work of satire, the “most bizarre of mystery yarns” – Chesterton’s 1908 novel The Man Who Was Thursday. His reasoning is simple. In “a labyrinth of double roles, of plots and counterplots, of aimless, painful quests, of buffoonery and high seriousness,” Chesterton “lures the unsuspecting reader face to face with God and the problem of evil.” In other words, Chesterton’s genius in the novel is his ability to intertwine seemingly indiscernible, “particular” threads into a great work on the drama of salvation and God’s relationship to humankind in history. In a plot where the great anarchist arch-villain

58 “Chesterton,” 91.
59 “Chesterton,” 91.
and heroic beacon of civilized sanity is the same man called “Sunday,” Chesterton, according to Lonergan, achieves the apogee of his theological insight. In a work blending common sense with the grotesque, Chesterton wrestles with the cosmological drama of salvation history and indirectly finds a soteriological answer in an anthropological riddle.

In continuing to understand Lonergan’s description of Chesterton as a theologian, one finally turns to a lecture on history written more than a decade later. In a 1959 presentation simply entitled “History,” Lonergan once again points to Anselm as a theologian of a pre-theoretical and pre-systematic era. He pinpoints the turning point of theology as the “discovery of the systematic notion of the supernatural order” by Philip of Paris in 1230. The “supernatural” became theology’s overarching method and means of differentiating between nature and grace. Prior to this breakthrough, Lonergan notes that there is “in Anselm, in Abelard, in Richard of St. Victor, who were men of great speculative ability, the difficulty of distinguishing between the mysteries of faith and the truths of natural reason.” The lack of method prior to 1230 by no means invalidates earlier theology, as the breakthrough itself would have been inconceivable without the “great speculative ability” of theologians during the Trinitarian and Christological debates of early Christianity. Lonergan’s point is that the development of method allows one to write accurately a history of theology as a science only after 1230.

Yet again, theology proper is not a slave to a specific method or era, since its subject matter and object are none other than eternal and cross-cultural realities. Lonergan argues that “there is in the church a mode of thought and expression that is independent of cultural differences.” This mode of thought is the church’s theological vision that can “provide a center of unity” and “reexpression in terms of the mentality of any age.” Theology is not purely a discipline of study but also a unifying means for understanding the human experience of the divine. “If one knows theology, one is not tied down to the technical terms. One has the habit of understanding.” Thus Lonergan does not minimize the contribution of figures such as Anselm and, by way of

---

63 “History,” 248.
the above essay, Chesterton. Both figures reflect a "habit of understanding" that offers speculative insights regardless of his cultural milieu.64

With respect to the interrelation between culture and history, one final point from this 1959 lecture is worth noting. The full thrust behind Lonergan's lecture is its overview of the problem of a general history. Once history is constricted to the German historical-critical empiricism of "wie es eigentlich gewesen," history neglects the complexities of regional and pre-scientific cultures that possess a "unity, not of an intellectual theorem, but of a style, a mode, an orientation."65 The "single whole" and "organic way of living" that characterizes pre-scientific cultures is "acquired in the way that common sense is acquired, not through any scientific study, but simply by an accumulation of insights that...influence your whole way of thinking and conceiving."66 For elucidation, Lonergan reflects on Christopher Dawson's claim that one can better understand Byzantium through a trip to Ravenna rather than via the books of history. The example embodies the very difficulty of constructing a general, systematic history of that which is not systematic:

The history of the sciences is the history of a movement that is strictly conceptual. But general history [i.e., that of a variety of cultures] deals with intelligence living in the concrete. In the concrete there is not the separation of percept and feeling, of understanding and willing, of judging and deciding and choosing. They are organically one, and consciousness is undifferentiated.

History, in other words, is not as simple as one damn fact after another. The historian needs also the heuristic "scissors," Lonergan's image for a theoretical analysis (the top blade) of empirical data (the bottom blade, in this case historical events). Yet, here lies the ultimate problem that Lonergan seems to unfold in the course of the lecture. Is history simply what "is" or "has been," or is it going somewhere? Is that "somewhere" simply relative, or does God indeed have a hand in history? As a theologian, Lonergan naturally concludes that "historical intelligibility is not without mystery. Human history is the realization of divine idea ... of just what God intends

64 "History," 248.
65 "History," 235, 252.
66 "History," 252-53.
and permits.” Human history is neither determined nor haphazard. Rather “it is free” under God’s providence. As he concludes his lecture, Lonergan introduces Christ’s resurrection as the heart of history, the “Christian hope that is a supreme force in history.”67 Simply put, history itself is subsumed by salvation history. Such is what Anselm understood; such is what Chesterton championed in his own worldview.

2.1. Cosmopolis and a Theology of History

Up to this point this study has examined both of Lonergan’s essays on Chesterton in light of his writings on common sense and history. A final task is to synthesize these insights via Chesterton as a theologian of cosmopolis through a soteriological appropriation of common sense.

As noted above, Lonergan locates a dialectic of community arising from common sense between intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. After expositing the ills resulting from general bias, he moves to the potential solution of a higher viewpoint that he names “cosmopolis.” Toward the end of chapter seven in Insight, Lonergan takes a more or less apophatic approach to the idea of “cosmopolis,” stressing that it is neither a world police force nor a “busybody.”68 Rather, it is a mind-set that rises above the general bias of common sense and attempts to solve long-term exigencies through diligent theory.

In order to better understand Lonergan’s vision of cosmopolis and its relation to human history, we turn to the work of Robert Doran in his book, Theology and the Dialects of History. In explicating Lonergan’s dialectic of community and the need for “cosmopolis,” Doran offers the following summary of what constitutes this complex ideal:

Cosmopolis is a transformation of intelligence that enables a collaborative intellectual enterprise committed to understanding and implementing the integral dialectic of community. And the integral dialectic of community is the condition of the possibility of a society maximally conducive to the intelligent and free participation of dramatic subject in the forging of world and self as works of art. Cosmopolis, consequently, is the innermost constitutive set of intellectual habits

67 “History,” 257.
68 Insight, 239.
informing the praxis of the creative minority without whose labors the distortions of the dialectic of community will not be reversed.69

In Doran’s view, cosmopolis operates at the level of cultural values, appreciating history and seeking to secure a common future. Cosmopolis is first and foremost concerned with long-term problems arising from the general bias of common sense. This mindset arises through the labors of a “creative minority” who possess the necessary “intellectual habits” that can understand the complexities of cultural and social issues. It is neither a purely superstructural ideal that discredits the practicality of common sense in the name of an empty theory (e.g., scientism), nor the myopia of general bias and its obsession with the practical on the level of infrastructure. “Cosmopolis assumes responsibility for the dialectic of community by attending primarily to the integrity of culture, at both the everyday [common sense] and the superstructural levels.”70 Cosmopolis returns to Lonegan’s heuristic “scissors,” appropriating the data of common sense via a theoretical, specialized understanding from above.

Although space does not permit a fuller account of Doran’s categories of history and scale of values, it is important to summarize his insight into the significance of cultural values informing social values. Lonergan describes general bias as forcing culture to flee to its “ivory tower” away from common sense. Doran further notes that this “abdication of culture from its genuine function in society has led to an attempt to institute an exclusive instrumentalization of intelligence and reason.”71 It is this “instrumentalization” that lies at the heart of general bias and the “scientism” that Chesterton criticizes. Fact rules supreme; practicality becomes the new religion of the day. To counter this sad consequence of general bias, Doran posits a dialectic of culture that must first be resolved in order to mitigate Lonergan’s dialectic of community. This cultural dialectic is rooted firmly in history and tradition. Consequently, a theology that wishes to appropriate social problems and achieve “cosmopolis” must itself be historical. With the Christ event and the eschaton in view, one needs a theology of history.

69 Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 364.
70 Doran, Dialectics, 365. For Doran, the dialectic of community (and of culture below) is one of contraries and not contradictories. See p. 368.
71 Doran, Dialectics, 377.
If one attempts to construct a theology of history, Doran maintains that it must begin with a transformation of culture: “The world that theology addresses as it mediates Christian faith to the contemporary cultural matrix is constituted by a more profound exigence...an exigence precisely for the transformation of culture.”72 With the aid of Eric Vogelin, Doran outlines three constitutive meanings that constitute theology’s transformative potentiality: “cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological symbolizations.”73 From these three arises a dialectic of culture between the cosmological and anthropological constitutive meanings; the former is one of “limitation” whereas the latter is one of “transcendence.”74 This tension stems from different appropriations of the divine in relation to the individual and society: “in cosmological constitutive meaning, the movement is from the divine cosmos first to the society, and then from the society to the individual; whereas in anthropological constitutive meaning, the movement is from the world-transcendent divine measure first to the individual, and then from the individual to society.”75 A cosmological worldview values the rhythm of the earth’s cycles, stressing the world as creation. The anthropological worldview begins rather with the individual in his or her transcendence of corporeality through some mediation of the divine. As a synthesis that mediates these two meanings Doran poses a third “soteriological” symbolization that “reflects on the experience of deliverance into freedom in history under God.”76 The soteriological frees the cosmological from an immanence or deterministic worldview while it simultaneously reorients anthropological meaning in an appreciation of creation and its historical redemption through Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection. In sum, it arrives at the “free” view of history in Lonergan’s lecture above. It re-appropriates the theological nature of culture through soteriological symbolisms that can lead to a true and authentic “cosmopolis.” Such a mind-set resolves the dialectic of culture and in turn informs and mediates the dialectic of community at the political and social levels. It is none other than a re-appropriation of human culture through a theology of history. Culture comes down from its ivory tower and embraces the cross on the path of human history.

72 Doran, Dialectics, 501.
73 Doran, Dialectics, 502.
74 Doran, Dialectics, 503.
75 Doran, Dialectics, 507.
76 Doran, Dialectics, 509.
3. A CHESTERTONIAN COSMOPOLIS

The two divines have been conversing for a while, and at this point their separate visions – one romantically Victorian, the other systematically modern – converge and intersect. After examining the philosophy of Lonergan in relation to Chesterton, it is only appropriate to engage the philosophy of Chesterton himself. For such a task, his famous work *Orthodoxy* offers an unparalleled window into the philosophy of his soteriological thought. In the very first pages he qualifies the book as a response to a request for his "philosophy," only he is quick to state, "I will not call it my philosophy; for I did not make it. God and humanity made it; and it made me." No book illuminates Chesterton's drama of the discovery of God more clearly. In his chapter, "The Ethics of Elfland," one finds his cultural and implicit theological insights into the great drama of human history.

For such a bizarrely titled chapter, Chesterton has a rather simple point: democracy and tradition are not opposites but two sides of the same coin. Here one encounters his famous quotation that tradition is "the democracy of the dead." For Chesterton, freethinking accompanies a humble respect for the past in order to grasp the great drama of human history as a whole. This move, however, is not merely an intellectual pawn of conservativism. Rather, Chesterton maintains a deep anthropocentric ideal at the heart of the chapter: "Man is something more awful than men; something more strange. The sense of the miracle of humanity itself should be always more vivid to us than any marvels of power, intellect, art, or civilization." For this reason, Chesterton begins the chapter with his scorn of "practical politics" as the natural successor of childhood ideals. His point is simple: practical, political solutions are not the answer; rather, it is the mystery of man.

To make this point, Chesterton commences with a quite characteristic move: he introduces, in Lonergan's words, the "grotesque" or the "bizarre," which in this case are nursery tales. He states, "I would always trust the old wives' fables against the old maids' facts." This he claims is his philosophy: "The things I believed most then, the things I believe most now, are the

---

78 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 53.
79 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 52.
80 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 51.
81 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 54.
things called fairy tales. They seem to me to be entirely reasonable things.” This seemingly abstruse statement might baffle even the most seasoned reader of Chesterton. Nevertheless, he has his own logic for such a position. “Fairyland is nothing but the sunny country of common sense. It is not earth that judges heaven, but heaven that judges earth; so for me at least it was not earth that criticised elfland, but elfland that criticised the earth.”

This “elfland” is for Chesterton a “certain way of looking at life.” Rather than the scientific world of “laws” and predetermined causes and effects, the world of elfland or fairyland retains a sense of the mystical and mysterious at work in nature. Nature is not reducible to “laws”; nature is a world of endless possibilities. “All the terms used in science books, ‘law,’ ‘necessity,’ ‘order,’ ‘tendency,’ and so on, are really unintellectual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do not possess. The only words that ever satisfied me as describing Nature are the terms used in the fairy books, ‘charm,’ ‘spell,’ ‘enchantment.’” Chesterton exults the worldview of elfland for the very reason that it does not make unreasonable claims; it does not create a philosophy of life from facts.

At this point the reader’s head is spinning in Chesterton’s world of topsy-turvydom. However, Chesterton has only begun to turn things on their heads. He proceeds to claim that humanity’s idolatry is a forgetfulness of its own forgetfulness. In other words, in presuming to know the world according to fact, the human being has forgotten who he or she is:

We are all under the same mental calamity; we have all forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget.

This quirky quotation exemplifies Chesterton’s overall project in the chapter. It is to come to one grand realization: “The test of all happiness is

82 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 54.
83 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 55.
84 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 58 (emphasis added).
85 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 59.
gratitude.86 If one can thank another for a present, why ought one not thank someone for the gift of existence? It is the burning questions of elfland that Chesterton admires, a world whose “vision always hangs upon a veto.”87 It is a world conditioned by the word “if,” a world contingent upon the unknown, that has been forgotten. Thus in the world of elfland, “a word is forgotten, and cities perish... A flower is plucked, and human lives are forfeited. An apple is eaten, and the hope of God is gone.”88 Suddenly the reader finds him or herself in Eden.

As Lonergan noted, one reads these ostensible simplifications until – until one gets the point. The point of the chapter is a critique of the modern world on two levels. The first Chesterton terms “scientific fatalism; saying that everything is as it must always have been, being unfolded without fault from the beginning.” This first fallacy Chesterton summarizes as a distain for repetition, such that one is convinced that repetition must be so rather than wonder at the fact that it is so. The scientific fatalist conceives of the world as fixed. Chesterton, on the other than, finds his recourse to elfland as an appreciation for the miraculous, a realization that what is does not necessarily need to be:

I had always vaguely felt facts to be miracles in the sense that they are wonderful; now I began to think them miracles in the stricter sense that they were willful ... now I thought perhaps it involved a magician. And this pointed to a profound emotion always present and sub-conscious; that this world of ours has some purpose; and if there is a purpose, there is a person.89

From this insight Chesterton goes on to attack the second modern presumption: that of cosmic materialism. He deems the whole modern cosmological schema to be disproportionate to its own anthropological center, such that the cosmos is no longer a wonderland but a prison. “This modern universe is literally an empire; that is, it is vast, but it is not free.”90 The materialist, like the scientific fatalist, misses the mark in his or her lack

86 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 60.  
87 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 60.  
88 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 61.  
89 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 66.  
90 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 68.
of gratitude. Chesterton thus returns to a point that opened his chapter—the lies of the men of his childhood. "Men spoke much in my boyhood of restricted or ruined men of genius: and it was common to say that many a man was a Great Might-Have-Been. To me it is a more solid and startling fact that any man in the street is a Great Might-Not-Have-Been." For this reason Chesterton yearns for the lessons of elfland. In elfland one is grateful for what is since that which is could be anything. In a sense, he accuses the modern version of common sense and practicality as unraveling into nihilism.

In this odd account of "elfland," one further discovers an analogous idea to Doran's cultural dialectic of the anthropological and cosmological. Toward the end of the chapter, we see how Chesterton wrestles with a modern anthropology that fails to see the wonder and fragility of the cosmos, and, at the same time, a modern cosmology that disproportionately exults the cosmos so as to restrict human freedom. Both poles obscure the point of Christian history: that "it is free" (in Lonergan's estimation above) and thus one should be grateful. Upon introducing this point of gratitude and the "Great-Might-Not-Have-Been," Chesterton effectively counters both poles with his own soteriology that he later discovers to be Christian. He perceives both an anthropological freedom in relation to the divine and a cosmological unity that presupposes a divine agent and, consequently, human praise. The soteriology of elfland is the great "if," the Anselmian "Cur Deus homo," the Chestertonian realization that history involves not only God but an active God working within history. It is the philosophy of "elfland" that gives rise to a theological insight, and as Chesterton himself notes, "all this time I had not even thought of Christian theology." It is only in his later writings, such as The Man Who Was Thursday, that Chesterton incorporates a clear Christological soteriology. Yet even in the maze of elfland one finds a differentiated consciousness that apprehends the cultural dialectic between anthropology and cosmology. What was first an "emotion" in his "sub-conscious" became a greater realization of the divine through his own inquiry and theoretical breakthrough. This theoretical breakthrough is the realization of humankind's freedom before its creator. For Lonergan it is the "essential object of the theologian at all times," a "grasp of fitness and coherence" that defines Chesterton.

91 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 69.
92 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 70.
Thus one finally arrives at Chesterton’s solution to the dialectic of culture in an “intellectual habit” of a soteriological “higher viewpoint.” It is gratitude that flows from this higher viewpoint such that it comprises a Chestertonian version of Lonergan’s cosmopolis. As stated above, Chesterton’s insight penetrates culture through common sense, yet he himself does not succumb to the general bias that often plagues a common sense society. Rather, it is the unabated, pure practicality of the scientism and materialism that he critiques. Lonergan’s insight into Chesterton is that it is his soteriological worldview that underlies his writings and draws the reader into a reflection on salvation history. It is only after one “gets the point” in reading Chesterton that one discovers a complex, unifying vision of nature and grace at work in the form of digressions and allusions to grace’s miraculous workings in nature. Through the “grotesque” one discovers the Christian mystery and its drama of salvation. Yet as Chesterton solves the dialectic between the aberrant anthropology and cosmology of his day, it is nonetheless from the infrastructural level of common sense. In a Chestertonian, topsy-turvy fashion, his theological and soteriological insight into the cultural values surrounding him is actually from below — from the language of common sense, from the insight of a comical “elfland.” This soteriological worldview is synonymous with a profound gratitude that serves as the analogical equivalent of the cosmopolis Lonergan seeks.

4. CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to bring into conversation the theological insights of Lonergan and Chesterton. In examining Lonergan’s unique and valuable essays on Chesterton, one finds not only a profound respect for the English champion of common sense but also an intriguing summary of him as a pre-scientific, though inextricably insightful theologian. Through Lonergan’s further work on common sense, cosmopolis, and the drama of human history, as well as Doran’s cultural dialectic in a theology of history, one also discovers that the insights Lonergan locates in his essays point to Chesterton’s soteriological solution to the cultural exigencies of his day. One finds this soteriological worldview operative in Chesterton’s famous chapter on the “Ethics of Elfland.” It is the discovery of gratitude within this essay that ultimately points to the Chestertonian version of a type of long-term thinking inherent to Lonergan’s cosmopolis.
As a final heuristic model, one might further imagine a superstructural solution such that Lonergan’s systematic method to theology meets a Chestertonian infrastructural solution of common sense theology from below and creates none other than the theological mindset of cosmopolis as the cultural value guiding exigencies on the social level. In other words, the redeemed common sense of Chesterton provides the necessary, timeless theological grasp of the whole that is needed for a higher, systematic theology to become effective in the world. It is ultimately Chesterton as a theologian that appropriates a soteriological vision of gratitude to God that solves the tension between anthropology and cosmology, nature and grace. However, just as Anselm needed Aquinas, so too does Chesterton need Lonergan for the cosmopolis of gratitude to become intelligible and meaningful in the modern world. In accord with this gratitude, and as a final kernel of Chestertonian wisdom, Chesterton notes at the conclusion of his chapter on elfland that “the proper form of thanks to [Creation] is some form of humility and restraint: we should thank God for beer and Burgundy by not drinking too much of them.”

Appropriately, our conversation partners finish their glasses of scotch, cork the bottle, put out their cigars, and return (hopefully) to the Beatific Vision.

93 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, 70.
LONERGAN ON THE HISTORICAL CAUSALITY OF CHRIST

John Volk
Marquette University

In thesis 12 of *De Verbo Incarnato* Bernard Lonergan included the following brief note: "... there is wanted a consideration of the historical causality that Christ as man clearly exercises."¹ Lonergan had considered Christ's historical causality in a previous text, but that text was never published. That text was written in Latin during Lonergan's Roman period. It has traditionally been titled *De Bono et Malo*, borrowed from the title of the first chapter. We have an unpublished English translation from the Lonergan Research Institute titled "The Redemption: A Supplement to *De Verbo Incarnato*."² I will refer to this text simply as the *Supplement*. In 1972 Lonergan handed over to Frederick Crowe the files containing the Latin text, and he stated that its purpose was to explain the historical causality of Christ.

The text takes its starting point from Ephesians 1:9-10, where St. Paul states that the hidden plan of God's will has now been revealed: to gather all things in heaven and earth under Christ. Lonergan states that we have little knowledge of how heavenly things might be gathered in Christ but it is a more serious matter if we neglect the question of how earthly realities are to be brought together.³ The *Supplement* aims to explain how.

The *Supplement* is a systematic work, but not your typical scholastic manual. It is written in prose and its investigation extends beyond what the


³ *Supplement*, 1.

© 2012 John Volk
typical manual of the era provided on the work of Christ by attending to the historical causality of Christ. The historical causality of Christ interested Lonergan as early as his 1935 student essays on history. The Supplement not only provides an explanation of the historical causality of Christ; it also stands on its own as a systematic treatise on the mystery of redemption. For those familiar with the final three theses of De Verbo Incarnato, including Lonergan’s “Law of the Cross,” they are all found in the Supplement. Lonergan stated to Crowe that the work dated to 1963-64, but there is evidence that the text was almost certainly completed in draft form in early 1958. So in this text we have Lonergan’s thought on the Law of the Cross two years prior to De Verbo Incarnato. Rather than discuss here the evidence for the dating of the text I have included that information in the footnotes.

The Supplement includes forty-five articles arranged over six chapters, coming to some 80,000 words in the unpublished English translation. It is scheduled for publication as volume 9 of the Collected Works. In the last chapter Lonergan explicitly addresses the historical causality of Christ,

---

4 For example, the “Philosophy of History,” also known as “An Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” Bernard Lonergan, “Philosophy of History,” unpublished essay (1935), 95-130. This text can be found at 71300DTE030 at www.bernardlonergan.com. See also Bernard Lonergan “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis [The Restoration of All Things],” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9, no. 2 (October 1991), 139-72.


7 In the summer of 1972, Lonergan handed over the text to Frederick Crowe. According to Crowe, Lonergan stated that it dated from 1963-64, with the specific purpose of explaining the “historical causality” of Christ. So one would assume that the text was completed after the first two editions of De Verbo Incarnato (1960, 1962). However, from 1956 to 1958, in at least three letters from Rome to Crowe, Lonergan spoke of a major work he was preparing on redemption. In the last letter dated May 25, 1958, he wrote: “I have got 6 chapters (45 articles) on the redemption pretty well done. May be able to bring manuscript to Halifax.” See Crowe, Christ and History, 100. So despite what Lonergan stated to Crowe in 1972, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a date of 1958, thus prior to De Verbo Incarnato. As Crowe notes, at that time (1972) Lonergan was “house-cleaning” his files and contributing to materials for the newly founded Lonergan Center, and it is possible that he did not scrutinize the contents of the files. Another hypothesis is that although the text was “pretty well” done in May of 1958, Lonergan may have resumed work on the manuscript in 1963-64.

8 Chapter 1: Good and Evil (articles 1 – 8)
Chapter 2: The Justice of God (articles 9 – 15)
Chapter 3: On the Death and Resurrection of Christ (articles 16 – 21)
Chapter 4: The Cross of Christ (articles 22 – 25)
Chapter 5: The Satisfaction Given by Christ (articles 26 – 34)
Chapter 6: The Work of Christ (articles 35 – 45)
providing a unique insight into his soteriology. The focus of this article is on that last chapter, with three specific aims. Part I will interpret Lonergan's use of general theological categories. Part II will provide a brief summary of Lonergan's understanding of the historical causality of Christ. Part III will argue that the Supplement is a notable example of Lonergan's long-range approach to practicality and a major contribution to a vision established in his Epilogue to Insight.

1. General Theological Categories and the Historical Causality of Christ

In the early 1960s Joseph Komonchak asked Fr. Lonergan about how one approaches an understanding of redemption in terms of Aristotle's four causes. Lonergan replied that redemption was one of those realities that could not simply or adequately be dealt with in Aristotelian categories, that it required a theory of history and historical categories. Fr. Komonchak kindly provided to me the historical context of his question:

As I recall it, my question was prompted by the fact that some theologians were making sense of the redemption (and particularly of the Resurrection) by appeal to notions such as "instrumental efficient causality." I think that Lonergan thought that such a metaphysical account remained abstract unless it were brought down to earth as historical causality. (It's analogous to his transposition from Aquinas's metaphysically articulated psychology to the terms and relations of intentionality analysis). Plus, I think he was always critical (e.g., in his dissertation) of understandings of causality, particularly efficient causality and instrumental causality, on the model of a billiard ball causing another to move by hitting it - it would be "already out there now real" causality. What, after all, would be meant by speaking of Christ's death and resurrection as instrumental efficient causes of our redemption?


10 Email conversation of October 27, 2010.
Komonchak's recollection of the context is summarized well in the historical investigation of Gerald O'Collins. O'Collins once noted that anyone who read Roman Catholic theological works from the 1950s would remember a stream of articles and books on the redemptive function of Christ's resurrection. Evidently the stream of works was a response, at least in part, to a rediscovered theme in Aquinas that Christ's resurrection plays an essential role in redemption. So the authors of these works went to Aquinas. They found Aquinas's use of exemplary and instrumental causality to explain the redemptive function of Christ's resurrection, and they employed these categories. But as O'Collins notes, these categories may have worked for the thirteenth century, but proved uncongenial to the twentieth century. The categories, on their own, were not able to answer questions raised by modern personalism and historical mindedness.

We should assume Lonergan was aware of the limitations of this renewed interest. But here is the enigma. Lonergan's explanation of the historical causality of Christ uses some of the very Aristotelian categories he cautions against. As I will explain later, he uses two of Aristotle's causes, final and efficient causality, and he also uses exemplary causality. So what are we to make of this enigma? I raise the question not only to peak an interest, but to answer a question that in my interpretation provides an insight into a challenge Lonergan faced, and his solution to this challenge. My interpretation of what Lonergan is doing in this text employs the notion of "general theological categories" developed by the later Lonergan in his understanding of theological method. The Supplement itself never uses the term and we would not expect this given the date of the text. I use the term because it is a hermeneutical tool to aid our understanding of what Lonergan is actually doing in this text. He is in fact using what he would later come to describe as general theological categories, but they are not limited to Aristotelian categories.

Now back to the challenge. Historical mindedness raises questions which anticipate that the answers are related to historical process. Vague answers prove unsatisfying to a natural desire for knowledge where that


12 In question 56 of the *Tertia pars* of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas explains that Christ's resurrection is both the exemplary and instrumental efficient cause of the resurrection of our bodies and the resurrection of our souls (justification).

desire is now informed by historical mindedness. History is concrete, not vague. In the first chapter of the Supplement Lonergan explains that “good” and “being” are convertible terms, that all being is good and all good is being.\(^{14}\) Since all being is concrete, the good is concrete. Lonergan conceives history in terms of changes in the human good through historical process. I will say more about this in the next section. For Lonergan history is the stuff of human affairs, and the general theological category he employs to describe human affairs is the human good, a hierarchy consisting of (1) particular goods, (2) the external good of order, and (3) the cultural good. These three correspond to what later in Method in Theology are vital, social, and cultural values. The point here is that as the good is concrete, the human good is concrete, and thus history is concrete. If redemption is an ongoing, historical process, there should be a concrete explanation of redemption commensurate with the nature of history. The challenge to explain the historical causality of Christ is the challenge raised by Komonchak and O’Collins, namely the challenge not to give the reader an abstract understanding of redemption but one that is congenial to contemporary questions. An explanation of the historical causality of Christ is meant to answer this challenge, to bring redemption down to earth so to speak. For Lonergan the challenge calls for a theory of history and historical categories.

In the Supplement Lonergan does provide a theory of history, or more properly a theological theory of history. His theological theory of history can be discerned from three major sources in the Supplement. The first chapter on good and evil provides the basic structure of history understood through the three approximations of progress, decline, and redemption. The second chapter on divine justice adds further determinations to this structure by explaining the nature of world order conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine will (divine goodness). This is why the chapter is titled “The Justice of God.” The norm and ground of divine justice is divine wisdom, since divine will always chooses from among the options conceived by divine wisdom. For Lonergan, to suggest otherwise is blasphemous. Divine wisdom has conceived a world order where the intelligibility of that order is understood by Lonergan in terms of emergent probability. Since there are no divine afterthoughts, redemption in history will be in harmonious continuation with emergent probability. Finally, in the last chapter of the

---

\(^{14}\) Supplement, 1.
Supplement Lonergan provides further determinations to understand the dynamics of progress, decline, and redemption in terms of individual, social, and historical agency.

As to Lonergan's use of historical categories, herein lies the key question. Are the Aristotelian causes adequate as historical categories to explain the historical causality of Christ? Based on what Lonergan actually does, the answer is yes and no. They do provide a basic framework. But that framework on its own is insufficient. Historical understanding does not omit the accidental, the particular, but includes them synthetically. To include them synthetically, Aristotelian causes need further determinations. They need a sociology. The best way to explain this is through a thought experiment. If I say to you that Christ works in history by efficient causality and you respond with the question of how, you are exemplifying the need for further explanation. You anticipate that there is something more to understand, and you know that unless that something more is understood, then my statement, although it may be metaphysically true, remains vague. But this does not mean that Aristotelian causes are useless. It simply means that they are insufficient on their own for Lonergan's objective. Lonergan did not say that Aristotle's causes had no value whatsoever. He stated that redemption could not be adequately or simply dealt with in these categories. Perhaps I am hanging too much on his literal words, but he did in fact use some of these categories and I find it unlikely that a few years later he thought his approach was a waste of time.

So how did Lonergan resolve this problem? He did so by employing additional general theological categories: individual, social, and historical agency. In fact the first third of the last chapter of the Supplement develops these three forms of agency before Lonergan utters a word about Christ's historical causality. The method is typical of Lonergan. His systematics typically follows the order of teaching. One cannot understand the historical causality of Christ unless one first understands the nature of individual, social, and historical agency. These categories add further determinations to the categories Lonergan does use: final, efficient, and exemplary causality. These further determinations enable Lonergan to develop a systematic theology commensurate with the concrete reality of history, a theology that in his own words from Divinarum Personarum is one which deals with and
seeks to understand the economy of salvation as it evolves historically. If one wants to understand the economy of salvation as it evolves historically, one needs a sociology, and I believe this is what the general theological categories of agency intend to provide. Collectively these categories amount to a sociology of human action.

The first of these categories is individual agency. Individual agents are subdivided into agents acting through nature and agents acting through intellect. Agents acting through nature act in accordance with either an innate or naturally acquired form. Their effects are limited to what is proportionate to their form. Agents acting through intellect act in accordance with an intentional form, an idea in the mind of the agent for the purpose of producing a proportional effect. For either type of agent, requisite conditions must be fulfilled to produce an effect. Agents acting through nature are at the mercy of nature to fulfill the conditions. Agents acting through intellect can understand and fulfill requisite conditions. In the language of Insight, we do not have to wait for the environment to make us.

Social agency is simply a collection of agents acting through intellect who share a common understanding and agreement as to a possible course of action. Social agency as opposed to individual agency is more likely to be an actual cause rather than merely a potential cause. We are potential

15 Consider the following statement from Divinarum Personarum: “According to Aristotle, science has two meanings: it is science in potency when it is merely of universals; it is science in act when it is applied to particular things. Besides a systematic exegesis, therefore, there is historical exegesis, which, far from omitting the accidentals, includes them synthetically. Besides systematic theology, there is a theology that is more concrete and more comprehensive, which deals with and seeks to understand the economy of salvation as it evolves historically. This new step in comprehension has over a lengthy period of time been gradually prepared by copious studies in the biblical, conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical, and other areas of research, but in such a way that its synthetic character is not yet clearly apparent, since today’s scholars seem to resemble more the twelfth-century compilers than they do the thirteenth-century theologians in the proper sense.” See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, vol. 12 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 753, emphasis mine. As Robert Doran has noted, Lonergan did not mean this statement as a criticism, but as a factual comment on the historical situation in 1957: “Far from making a merely negative assessment of the positive research of the recent past, even from a systematic standpoint, he regards this research as anticipating a new step in the comprehension of the history of Christian constitutive meaning.” Robert M. Doran, S.J., What Is Systematic Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 146-47.

causes inasmuch as we have in our minds the idea to produce an effect. But we are actual causes when we have the power to actually produce the effect. And that power is more commonly found in persons linked together than in a single individual. This is why Lonergan makes two strong, convictive judgments. First, virtually everything we do is done through others or for others. Second, mutual understanding and agreement is the foundation of all human cooperation and constitutes what is in fact virtually the whole of what is properly human causality. So human causality is almost always a social reality.

Finally, historical agency. An historical agent can be an individual or a group. An historical agent is one that causally influences the external good of order or the cultural good, for better or worse. A social agent is also an historical agent, and always a historical agent. This follows from Lonergan's understanding of history. First, Lonergan understands history in terms of development in the human good, that is, from one state to another, where the latter may be a preservation, an improvement, or a corruption of the former state. Second, the very fact that many people are linked together with a common understanding and agreement about a course of action is already a good of order. And since this social agency will bring about the next state in the human good, even if that state is merely the preservation of the previous state, then social agents are by nature historical agents. Third, in Lonergan's understanding of history, the past greatly influences the present human good. This of course is not a new theme in Lonergan. He was on to this in his 1935 essay on a fundamental sociology. Matthew Lamb, in interpreting that manuscript, says it best: "The past lives on in ways we have scarcely begun to understand." The future depends greatly on the past because intellectual

19 Supplement, 100.
20 An agent can be more or less historical depending on the length of the effect. An historical agent is partial or total according to whether he or she produces part or the whole of a human good. An historical agent is per se or per accidens whether the effect occurs according to or beyond the intention of the agent. An historical agent is either a proportionate or an actual cause, depending on whether the agent merely conceives the idea or whether the agent also brings the idea into reality. Finally, an historical agent can be an originating cause, a conservative cause, a destructive cause, or a restorative cause. An originating cause conceives an idea or implements it. A conservative cause propagates an idea already conceived or safeguards its implementation. A destructive cause changes the human good for the worse. A restorative cause restores a declining human good. See Supplement, 103.
21 Supplement, 103.
22 Matthew Lamb, "The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan's Theology,"
achievement in not a private enterprise. It is fundamentally social. It is not possible to overstate how important this is in Lonergan's sociology. One need only turn to the excursus on belief in chapter 20 of *Insight* or section 5 of chapter 2 in *Method in Theology*. Immanently generated knowledge is a small fraction of what any one of us knows. The vast majority of what we know is believed, and we draw our beliefs from a vast storehouse of public knowledge. So for Lonergan belief would not be possible without the historical solidarity of human thought that creates this public storehouse of knowledge that propagates through history. If the past did not live into the future, cultures would remain primitive. Each generation would be reinventing the wheel so to speak. Because the past lives into the future, no present state of the human good is created *ex nihilo*. And since the past informs the present, the present will inform the future according to this same dynamic. So the present human good through which the social agent is operating cannot but effect the future human good, whether that effect is preservation, improvement, or corruption.

Finally, we can say that historical agency depends to the greatest degree on human understanding and willingness, whether in the individual or social agent. Lonergan’s categories of agency are constructed in terms of human understanding and willingness, meanings and values, exemplifying and anticipating Lonergan’s later call for the transposition of metaphysics into terms of interiority.\(^{23}\) We could say that effective historical agency depends on the appropriation of common meanings and values at the cultural level. This is not to downplay the role of the individual historical agent. You may already be anticipating that Christ himself is the historical agent, and Lonergan explicitly acknowledges this. He judges that the Word made flesh is the greatest of all historical agents.\(^{24}\) Lonergan knows that great ideas come from the creative genius or the creative minority, to use Toynbee’s terminology,\(^{25}\) but such ideas do not become actualized without the appropriation by a community. So although Christ is the greatest of historical agents, Christ needs others. Christ needs human cooperation. Christ simply does not impose his will to effectively remove human

---

*METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 8, no. 1 (March 1990): 60.*


24 Supplement, 105.

beings from the equation of historical process. To do so violates world process conceived from all eternity by divine wisdom. There are no divine afterthoughts. So the effectiveness of the historical causality of Christ will depend on others who embrace Christ’s meanings and values to make them their own.

2. LONERGAN ON THE HISTORICAL CAUSALITY OF CHRIST

There are three essential aspects in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. The first is the historical effects intended by Christ. The second is Lonergan’s theological theory of history. And the third is how the historical causality of Christ brings about Christ’s intended historical effects.

2.1. The Intended Historical Effects

Lonergan begins the last chapter of the Supplement by summarizing the historical effects intended by Christ:

If, therefore, we consider the word redemption itself, or if we reflect that in neglecting the end we have a poor knowledge of the means, and that ignoring the effect we have a poor knowledge of its cause, we must now undertake a broader and fuller survey of the work of the Lord. Accordingly, leaving the work of understanding this matter for subsequent articles, we think it best at this point to collect a number of scriptural passages that will provide a foundation for our inquiry and throw light on the object we seek to understand: (1) the kingdom of God and (2) salvation in Christ, whereby being freed from (3) sins and (4) the Jewish Law and worship, we have access to (5) God who is faithful and just (6) with confidence, since (7) through our personal acts (8) we are incorporated into Christ and the People of God.26

In the above passage, the “object we seek to understand” is not the eight elements listed above. Those elements represent Christ’s intended historical effects. The object Lonergan seeks to understand is the historical causality

26 Supplement, 97-98.
of Christ. The foundation for the inquiry is the intended historical effects. As Lonergan states, if we ignore the effect we have a poor knowledge of its cause. This is his explanation for beginning with effects. But why does he think this? Is it simply a matter of common sense that one begins with effects? It could be, but I think there is a deeper reason here and it is based on his theological method. The reality of the effects of redemption is not separate from the mystery of redemption. To know these effects is not had through experiencing, understanding, and judgment, but they are judged to be true by the assent of faith to what has been revealed by God. By starting with effects Lonergan is essentially starting with the functional specialty of doctrines to establish a foundation of the inquiry. In other words, effects stand to causes as doctrines stand to systematics. The former involves judgment. The latter involves understanding. As a poor knowledge of doctrines would lead to a poor systematics, so also a poor knowledge of an effect would lead to a poor knowledge of its cause.

Lonergan’s discussion of the historical effect intended by Christ covers a diversity of topics. It begins with his list of the eight elements (as above). This listing amounts to a synthesis of the historical effects of redemption from biblical sources, prescinding from eschatological effects. There we can discern that the ultimate intended effect is the Body of Christ, the Kingdom of God. Once one is incorporated into this body, through personal acts of repentance and faith, one is freed from sin, justified, and has confident access to God. In Lonergan’s exposition of this statement he adds that we are justified by God who is faithful and just, and we are given the gift of the Spirit by which we become adopted children of the Father.

If this statement is taken in isolation it could lead to the impression that the Body of Christ is simply a means to an end, where the end is constituted by liberation from sin, justification, and the gift of the Spirit. But Lonergan’s further discussion reveals that the end is the Body of Christ itself. Or to be more precise, the Body of Christ is the ultimate historical end intended by Christ—the “secondary” end of redemption in Lonergan’s terminology. This is because the “primary end” – the absolutely ultimate end intended by Christ – is the divine goodness itself, enjoyed in the beatific vision. The secondary end is the Kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, Head and members, as all things are brought together and reconciled in Christ.27 This secondary end

27 Supplement, 120. It should be noted here that in the late 1950s Lonergan equated the Kingdom of God with the Church. After the Second Vatican Council he changed his position:
has a direct and indirect component in terms of Christ’s historical action. Christ’s historical action is directly aimed at ordering human life on earth to the future life in heaven. However, since this ordering liberates us from evils and turns us toward the good with the result that the human good itself is greatly improved, this improvement itself is necessarily intended indirectly by Christ.28

How then can we summarize the historical effect intended by Christ? I argue that the ultimate historical effect intended by Christ is the Body of Christ itself. Incorporation into this body gifts the members of that body with specific supernatural goods: liberation from sin, justification, reconciliation with God, confident access to God, the gift of the Spirit which makes the members adopted children of God, and the hope of the eschatological gifts which are the beatific vision, eternal life, and ultimately resurrection of the body. But these supernatural goods are not had without personal acts of faith and repentance through which one is incorporated in the Body of Christ, the Kingdom of God. For Lonergan, to arrive in this Kingdom is what salvation means.29 Thus I interpret that the ultimate historical effect intended by Christ is the Body of Christ, Head and members.

To go back to Lonergan’s scriptural point of departure, in order for Christ to gather all earthly realities to himself, Christ’s intent is to propagate the Body of Christ such that this body becomes the human good in history, not just one human good among many. The Body of Christ, as a supernatural human good, does indeed improve the overall human situation to the degree that the members of the body imitate Christ. But in Lonergan’s understanding the human situation is to be transformed such that the human situation becomes the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ becomes the human situation. In other words the human good is meant to become a supernatural human good, the secondary end of redemption, the historical element of the “supreme good” Lonergan discusses in Thesis 17

"When I was a student of theology, the kingdom of God was identified with the church, and that is something that has been eliminated by Vatican II. The church is God’s instrument, one of God’s instruments, in this world for promoting the kingdom of God with regard to the whole world.” Excerpt from Lonergan’s lectures on Method in Theology at Boston College, July 3-12, 1968, as quoted in Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964, vol. 6 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 26n51. See also Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003, latest printing), 363-64.

28 Supplement, 114.
29 Supplement, 98.
of *De Verbo Incarnato*, where the supreme good as defined by Lonergan "... is the whole Christ, Head and members, in this life as well as the life to come, in all their concrete determinations and relations." This supreme good is the integration of two stages in obtaining the end of redemption: the first is the stage of pilgrims and the second is the stage of the beholders of the beatific vision. This supreme good, one community in two stages, is the communion of saints.

The supernatural human good which is the focus of Lonergan’s attention in the *Supplement* is this new community, this supreme good, *but in its historical dimension*, the stage of pilgrims. Yet this stage also possesses the goodness of the primary end of redemption, the divine goodness itself. Because this new historical community possesses the goodness of the primary end, Christ loves this new historical community out of his superabundant love for the primary end. Thus Christ loves this community, the Body of Christ, *for its own sake*, which is precisely why the Body of Christ in history is not merely a historical effect but also the secondary end of redemption. As Lonergan states in the *Supplement*, a means is not loved but only chosen with a view toward the primary end. Once the end is attained, the means is relinquished. But a secondary end can be loved for its own sake because it is loved out of a superabundant love for the primary end.31

2.2. Lonergan's Theological Theory of History

It is one thing to offer the sketch of an explanation of the historical effect intended by Christ. But it is another to show how this explanation is related to a theological theory of history. In order to understand Lonergan’s theological theory of history we first need to make a distinction between history in general, and a *general theory of history*. On the one hand, common sense would tell us that history is simply the aggregate of human thoughts, words, and deeds. In one of his early student essays “Analytic Concept of History,” Lonergan identified this aggregate as the “material object” of history.32 He then goes on to argue that the formal object of an analytic concept of history is “twice removed” from the material object. The first

30 *De Verbo Incarnato*, 554.
31 *Supplement*, 119.
remove comes in stipulating an event is historic in the measure it influences human action, resulting in a definition of the formal object of history as the aggregate of human actions in their causes (or effects). The second remove comes when the causes (or effects) are further limited to the specification of the “MAKING AND UNMAKING OF MAN BY MAN.” This yields an analytic concept of history, where the principle of selection involves four criteria. This aspect of Lonergan’s understanding of a theory of history persisted throughout his career. As early as his student essays of the 1930s his theory of history focused on those human actions which have a causal influence on human affairs. And as late as in his 1977 lecture “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” history was still described as “man’s making of man.”

33 “Analytic Concept of History,” 9.
34 “Analytic Concept of History,” 10.
35 (1) Since there is no science of the particular, Lonergan is not concerned with, Who did it? with persons or peoples, but solely with, What is done?; (2) Prescinding from the First Cause to confine the consideration to secondary causes; (3) Among secondary causes there is a distinction between the essential and accidental, and the latter is omitted; (4) In essential causes there is the distinction between those of formal and those of material import, that is, between vectors which give the magnitude and direction of forces of history and mere friction. The former is human will exerted upon the manner of life; the latter is the will to live and to propagate. “Analytic Concept of History,” 10.
36 Bernard Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 171. It is quite possible that Lonergan was influenced by his reading of Ortega y Gasset and R. G. Collingwood. The former, whose essay “History as a System” appeared in a Festschrift to Ernst Cassirer, made the statement “that man makes himself in the light of circumstances, that he is God as occasion offers, a ‘second-hand God’ (un Dios de ocasión).” See José Ortega y Gasset, “History as a System,” Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 283-32. Originally published in 1946 by The Clarendon Press, Oxford, England. The evidence is not strictly based on the affinity to Lonergan’s idea of history as the “making and unmaking of man by man.” File 713 in the Lonergan Archives contains extracts from two other essays in that same Festschrift [Specifically, extracts from Emile Brehier’s “The Formation of Our History of Philosophy” and the other from Johan Huizinga’s “A Definition of the Concept of History.” The former can be found at 71304DTE030/A713-04 at www.bernardlonergan.com and the latter at 71305DTE030/A713-5.] The extracts indicate the possibility that Lonergan may have also read the essay “History as a System.” Lonergan was also influenced by the work of R. G. Collingwood, evidenced by the repeated citations in Method in Theology to Collingwood’s work. Collingwood stated that the historian is not merely interested in events, but in actions. All events have an exterior component that can be described in terms of bodies and their movement. But actions are events that also have an interior element, and that interior element is human thought. So an action is an historical event where the cause of the event is the thought of the mind of the person by whose agency the event came about. See R. G. Collingwood, “Human Nature and Human History,” in The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 214-15. “Human Nature and Human History” was originally a lecture given in 1935. One can understand why, for Collingwood, all history is the history of human
As with Lonergan’s early student essays, the *Supplement* is concerned with those actions that effect the human good. There is an intelligibility to be grasped in how human actions maintain the existing human good, improve the human good, or corrupt the human good. Lonergan’s theory of history attempts to grasp this intelligibility. To do so, he filters out that which is not systematically relevant.

Here Lonergan’s thought in *Insight* on the empirical residue provides an interpretive tool. In the strict sense, the empirical residue comprises aspects of data that lack any immanent intelligibility of any kind whatsoever. But in a less rigorous sense, an empirical residue can be aspects of data not relevant to the particular kind of intelligibility that one is seeking. To grasp the intelligible from the empirical, one needs to grasp the essential and disregard the incidental: this is called abstraction, which is the selectivity of intelligence. In the *Supplement* as in Lonergan’s early essay “Analytic Concept of History,” Lonergan’s theory of history abstracts from incidentals not relevant to changes in the human good. These incidentals, in my interpretation, amount to an historical residue for Lonergan.

The *Supplement*’s theory of history is an intelligibility which can explain development in the human good, for better or worse, through historical process. The causality of such development is historical agency, which can be individual or social agency. Lonergan’s general theory of history becomes a theological theory of history when he takes account of how the supernatural order enters into history – that is, how God now enters into “man’s making of man.” The supernatural order enters into human history through the historical causality of Christ. At the time of the *Supplement*, Lonergan equated the advent of such agency with the Incarnation and subsequent

---

37 *Insight*, 55.

38 This judgment must be qualified. In *Insight* Lonergan states that the empirical residue is to be denied any immanent intelligibility of its own. Although Lonergan’s examples in chapter 1, §5, are from physics and chemistry, there is no evidence to the contrary suggesting that his definition of the empirical residue is anything less than completely general, meaning that the empirical residue would lack any immanent intelligibility, regardless of the immanent intelligibility one is seeking. However, I am suggesting that there is this case, the field of history, in which aspects of historical data are judged to be an empirical residue based on the particular intelligibility of history one is seeking. Does this mean that the incidentals in history, by Lonergan’s criteria, have no immanent intelligibility of their own? For the specific intelligibility he is seeking, I interpret that they do not. However it is my tentative position that one could seek a different intelligibility in the historical data than does Lonergan, and as such what is an historical empirical residue to one person may not be to another.
historical causality of Christ. Thus Christ is a new agent introduced into history, to transform history by bringing about the redemptive historical effects intended by Christ. Christ acts as both God and man. As God, he intends and commands what the Father and the Holy Spirit intend and command. As man, he is obedient to the intent and command of the Triune God. "To command is to move another through reason and will; to obey is to be moved in accordance with the reason and will of another."  

In brief, then, Lonergan's theological theory of history in the *Supplement* is grounded on a general theory of history with the added determination of a new, supernatural agency introduced into human history. The advent of such an agency adds the redemptive vector to the natural vectors of progress and decline.

2.3. The Historical Causality of Christ

In Lonergan's understanding the historical causality of Christ is not a new truth. It is *an aspect* of the truth of the mystery of redemption, but one that has arisen as a result of the advent of historical mindedness. So Lonergan regards his analysis of the historical causality of Christ as simply an extension of trying to understand imperfectly and analogically the mystery of redemption by asking new questions raised by historical mindedness.

Lonergan approaches these questions in multiple ways using several categories, similar to how Aquinas explained the efficacy of Christ's passion for our salvation through different ways or categories. Lonergan's ways or categories are: (a) Christ the Historical Agent and Christ the Mediator in Heaven, (b) Christ the Head, and (c) Christ the Exemplar. I will briefly touch on each, and I conclude with two fundamental notions critical to understanding Lonergan's overall thought on the historical causality of Christ: (d) the Body of Christ as a social and historical agent, and (e) the significance of interpersonal relationships within the Body of Christ.

(a) First there is Christ the Historical Agent and Christ the Mediator

---

39 The later Lonergan, specifically in *Method in Theology*, moved to a universalist position on the mission of the Holy Spirit. So the later Lonergan would not suggest that the advent of a supernatural agency into historical process begins with the Incarnation, but with the universal mission of the Spirit. But at the time of the *Supplement*, Lonergan held the traditional, common view that the visible mission of the Son precedes *in time* the mission of the Spirit.

40 ST, II-II, q. 104, a. 1 c; as quoted by Lonergan, *Supplement*, 105.

41 See ST, III, q. 48.
in Heaven. Actually they are two separate categories, but I will treat these together because Lonergan understands both in terms of efficient causality as informed by historical agency. In either category the aim of Christ’s causality is (1) to bring members into the Body of Christ; (2) to perfect those members by producing similar works in the members that are produced in Christ, such as satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession; and (3) improvement in the human good resulting from the works of the members. The category of Christ the Historical Agent refers to the agency Christ as a historical person performed twenty centuries ago but which has never ceased to have an influence on history. As a historical agent Christ continues to act socially and historically through his members because he was a historical person who influenced his immediate disciples who, in turn, have passed along that influence.

On the other hand, the category of Christ as The Mediator in Heaven affirms that Christ still acts socially and historically through his members, but he now also acts from heaven. Lonergan understands this action from heaven in terms of (1) Christ’s mediation of a new covenant, (2) Christ’s intercession on our behalf, and (3) Christ’s eternal priesthood in which he offers one, complete, and everlasting sacrifice.

Lonergan synthesizes all three elements into an explanation of Christ’s causality operative in the Eucharist, and as such the Eucharist becomes the focus within this category. Why is this the focus? Lonergan wants to explain the historical causality of Christ in terms of reconciliation because for Lonergan the entire work of Christ is summed up in this reconciliation.42 Through the Eucharist, the members “draw near” and “approach God” with confidence. These spatial metaphors capture the meaning of what scripture refers to as reconciliation, and for Lonergan it is best exemplified in participation in the Eucharist. This does not mean that Christ’s work, understood through the other categories, is not also oriented to reconciliation. The entire work of Christ is ultimately oriented to reconciliation. To bring members into the Body of Christ, to perfect those members, and to work through those members to improve the human good is the work of Christ to reconcile the world to himself. In my interpretation, Lonergan is selecting what he considers the appropriate category in which to bring the notion of reconciliation into an understanding of the historical causality of Christ.

42 Supplement, 118.
This work of reconciliation is accomplished in the Holy Spirit, who is also the Spirit of Christ. Christ, as a historical person, did not leave us alone upon his death. He gave to us his Spirit who opens up to us the mysteries of God, gives witness, and guides the Church. It is through the Spirit that we are even capable of living the Law of the Cross. Lonergan's category of The Mediator in Heaven is also meant to incorporate the power of the resurrection into an explanation of the historical causality of Christ. Christ's agency from heaven presupposes the ascension, and the ascension presupposes the power of the resurrection.

Explanation of the historical causality of Christ in terms of Christ the Historical Agent and The Mediator in Heaven bring Aristotelian categories down to earth so to speak, specifically in the form of instrumental efficient causality. We have already noted that for Lonergan all social and historical action is carried out through others who in some way share a common understanding and agreement as to a course of action. Lonergan is certainly familiar with Toynbee, who recognized that great ideas come from the creative genius or the creative minority. This is certainly true of Christ as the greatest of all historical agents. But those ideas do not survive if they are not appropriated by a critical mass of other people who consent to the idea. Christ's historical causality is not exempt from this law. So Christ's Kingdom, in order to be propagated in history, takes time and is mediated through his body, the Church, through historical process. It requires preaching of the gospel. It requires apostolic mission, succession, and tradition. And it is fitting that these historical processes are necessary because they harmonize with the actual world order conceived by divine wisdom.

(b) Second, Lonergan approaches Christ's historical causality in terms of the category of Christ the Head. There is no existing Aristotelian category that Lonergan can use to explore this aspect of Christ's causality. What Christ does as Head for his members cannot be understood in terms of exemplary or efficient causality, because this is a kind of causality that is proper to Christ alone. What is proper to Christ alone is Christ's paying of the price, Christ's vicarious suffering, Christ's sacrifice, and Christ's meritorious obedience, all done for the sake of others, on behalf of others, where the others are Christ's members, actual or future. This is what the tradition means by "objective redemption." There is a real effect in the members but the effect cannot be explained through the categories of efficient or exemplary causality because those categories imply "movement" in the members themselves, to employ
a kinetic analogy. And Lonergan wants to avoid such a notion. Why so?
Under the category “Christ the Head” Lonergan is not trying to explain
how Christ works through the members, work which implies “movement”
and can thus be explained through the categories of efficient and exemplary
causality. Here the members are not actively producing any work: the work
involved is work already done by the Head and thus done in and for the
whole body, since there is an interdependence between Head and members
in the analogy of “body” that does not involve any ongoing work of
Christ mediated through the members, but work proper to Christ that is
appropriated by the members since the members are parts of the whole, and
what is done by one part (the Head) is not done for its own sake but for the
whole. The kinetic analogy does not apply to this aspect of interdependence
and thus neither to the categories of efficient or exemplary causality.

But if there is no movement or change in the members, how can there
be a real effect in the members? One possibility might be by means of some
sort of imputation to the members.43 For Lonergan, however, it is not an
imputation. Rather, for Lonergan this form of causality is best illustrated in
Christ’s vicarious satisfaction. Vicarious satisfaction is satisfaction done on
behalf of others, for the sake of others. The ontological condition that makes
this possible is the union of wills through love. Through this union, two
persons become as one, and thereby one can do for another what the other
cannot do for herself. Lonergan has appropriated this from Aquinas, who
appropriated it from Aristotle and Augustine. For Aristotle, a friend is one’s
alter ego.44 For Augustine, a friend considers another friend as half of her
soul.45 This union of wills through love makes it is possible for one person to
do something on behalf of another, for another, where that “something” is a
real effect, an intelligible dependence. And if there is a real effect, there is a
real cause, and there is an intelligible relation between the two. The union of
wills through love is not the cause per se, but the requisite condition for the
cause to produce the effect. Christ himself brings about this union of wills
by love, through the created gift of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity.

43 The notion of imputation is constitutive of Luther’s doctrine of “justification by faith”
by which the fruit of Christ’s objective work is ascribed, rather than imparted, to sinners. The
sinner is justified by the “alien righteousness” of Christ. See Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian
Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Volume 4 Reformation of Church and Dogma*
44 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 1166a 31, as quoted by Lonergan in the *Supplement*, 73.
45 St. Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 6, as quoted by Lonergan in the *Supplement*, 73.
Therefore, because of this union, Christ is head of his members and can do for his members what they cannot do for themselves.

(c) Third, there is Christ the Exemplar, an explanation of Christ's historical causality in terms of exemplary causality. It is through this category that perhaps we are given the clearest insight into how the members of Christ's body are to produce good works. They do so by imitating Christ. But imitating depends upon and is only possible if there is an exemplar to be imitated. In offering himself as an example, Christ is exercising exemplary causality. This is not causality by means of some force. Authentic imitators of Christ do not follow him because they are forced to do so. Their imitation is real and authentic only if it is done freely and with some understanding of what they are doing. Christ is the exemplary cause of this because his followers' imitation is intelligibly dependent upon his example - and intelligible dependence is what Lonergan means by "cause" in his precise, technical sense.46

For Lonergan, the most important way of imitating Christ is to embrace the Law of the Cross. "The fundamental meaning of cross is the transformation of evil into good: 'Do not let evil defeat you; instead overcome evil with good' (Romans 12:21). As a precept to follow, the Law of the Cross is proclaimed in the New Testament in many different ways,48 but the following passage captures the meaning of this precept: "You have heard the saying, 'Love your neighbor and hate your enemy;' but I say to you, Love your enemies and do good to those who hate you, for then you will be true sons of your heavenly Father who makes his sun to shine on good and bad alike and his rain to fall on both the virtuous and the wicked" (Matthew 5:43-45).49

The Law of the Cross is a process involving three elements: (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will, and (3) good that emerges from evil through this victory.50 Here the victory of the will is self-sacrificing love that chooses not to return evil for evil, but returns good to evil done.

---

46 For Lonergan, causality is an intelligible relation of dependence of a created effect as influenced by a cause. See Supplement, 100.
47 Supplement, 60.
48 Supplement, 62. Lonergan quotes the entire passage of Matthew 5:38-48, the longest passage from scripture quoted in the Supplement. He also quotes Matthew 8:34-35 and John 12:24-25.
49 Supplement, 62.
50 Supplement, 60.
For Lonergan the Law of the Cross is the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption, a synthesis of the New Testament symbols and categories used by the evangelists to explain the salvific significance of the cross. This transformation of evil into good is for Lonergan the highest principle in the whole economy of salvation. Christ did not invent the Law of the Cross, but he made it his own. He gave it to his followers as a precept that they might choose. The Law of the Cross does not ask people to become doormats of physical or emotional abuse, or to become indifferent to social injustice. To the contrary, nonviolent resistance, as exemplified in the movements of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., are among the most authentic incarnations of the Law of the Cross.

The Law of the Cross calls for great sacrifice, very difficult sacrifice indeed. This is because our inclination toward sin is partly because we shrink from suffering, and by choosing to shrink from suffering we performatively admit that the absurd is intelligible. In one’s mind one may know that the absurd is absurd. But only self-sacrificing love that returns good to evil done truly and performatively acknowledges the absurd as absurd. So unless one is willing to performatively return good to evil done, then in shrinking from suffering one is tacitly and performatively accepting the absurd as intelligible. And perhaps most dangerously, this shrinking from suffering can incline one toward further sin by rationalizing one’s failure to accept such suffering. As Lonergan notes, when we shrink from suffering we admit the irrational and absurd into our mind and gradually ease the intelligible and true out of its rightful place. This is what is meant by rationalization, and it is the source of great evils in our history.

The good news is that there is a solution to the problem of evil. The “bad news” is that it calls for voluntary self-sacrifice, voluntary suffering. Lonergan states that “unless human psychological and social laws are suspended” then human beings cannot be turned from evil to good except according to the Law of the Cross. For God to suspend such laws would contradict the theological principle of continuity. This principle can be summed up as follows: there are no divine afterthoughts. The world conceived by divine wisdom includes universal laws, both natural and human, and these laws have been conceived from all eternity. The historical causality of Christ, and thus the Law of the Cross, is not abrogated from these laws.

51 Supplement, 25.
52 Supplement, 124.
Though the Law of the Cross does not abrogate psychological and sociological laws, it does enable a more authentic functioning of those laws, in accordance with God’s will, in what Lonergan would call a “higher integration.” As Lonergan states in Insight, if the solution to the problem of evil is to be a solution and not a mere suppression of the problem, “it has to acknowledge and respect and work through man’s intelligence and reasonableness and freedom. It may eliminate neither development nor tension yet it must be able to replace incapacity by capacity for sustained development.”53

For Lonergan, only a higher integration can meet such requirements. Only a higher integration “leaves underlying manifolds with their autonomy yet succeeds in introducing a higher systematization into their nonsystematic coincidences.”54 The Law of the Cross is, for Lonergan, the intrinsic intelligibility of this higher integration. The Law of the Cross does not abrogate human intelligence, reasonableness, and freedom (i.e., psychological laws). Nor does the Law of the Cross abrogate human development (i.e., sociological laws). Yet the Law of the Cross does replace incapacity by capacity for sustained development because through this law God introduces into history a higher integration of human activity that transforms the irrational, nonsystematic element of evil without abrogating the underlying manifolds of psychological and sociological laws.

(d) Finally we come to what is perhaps the key notion which unifies all of these different categories of causality. The unifying theme is the Body of Christ. Previously I noted that for Lonergan the Body of Christ, which at this time in his career he equates with the Kingdom of God, is the secondary end of redemption and thus the ultimate historical effect intended by Christ. But in terms of causality, the Body of Christ is also a means to its own end. Since it is God’s custom to act through secondary causes, the members of the body are ministerial agents of Christ’s historical causality. The Body of Christ is a social and historical agent for mediating Christ’s agency in history, not only to build up and perfect this same body, but through the actions of its members to improve the human situation.

This improvement is the liberation of human affairs from evil and a turning of human affairs to what is truly good. The locus of this liberation is not at the social level of the human good, the level Lonergan calls the

---

53 Insight, 655.
54 Insight, 655.
"external good of order," but at the level of the cultural good. The cultural level has to do above all with the interior ordering of our habits and desires, the habits of our minds and hearts. And it is the aberrations at this level that result in historical decline. So in the Supplement, Lonergan is explicit that it is specifically cultural evil that calls for a heaven-sent redeemer. Evils at the social level can tend to their own reversal. This is the axiom that we learn from our mistakes. But cultural evils are grounded in moral impotence. We cannot liberate ourselves from this evil through strictly natural means. So the historical causality of Christ, which aims at improving the human good, targets the cultural level because it is at this level that humanity most needs divine intervention.

Lonergan's position here reflects his thought in Insight, most fully developed in chapter 7 of that text. Common sense, which is knowledge of the practical and concrete, is incapable of critiquing itself. Common sense limits its concerns to the concrete and practical, not to the theoretical. Theoretical insights are associated with culture. But the refusal to grant any relevance to the theoretical insights of culture results in what Lonergan calls general bias, the root of historical decline at levels that escape common sense. Common sense is unequal to the task of thinking on the level of history. But theoretical insights intend not only to know history but also direct history. Therefore it is through culture that humanity must meet the challenge of historical decline. History is ultimately directed by the meanings and values of a culture, and those meanings and values reside not in external institutions, but in the hearts and minds of women and men. External institutions merely reflect these meanings and values. Thus it is the liberation of culture that greatly improves the human situation. When the cultural level is improved, the social level is improved. And when the social level is improved there is a more just and equitable distribution of particular goods resulting in a situation in the world that more closely approximates the reign of God in human affairs.

In technical terms, the Body of Christ can be understood as a mediate efficient cause of Christ’s historical agency. The affirmation that God, any created cause, and the created cause’s effect form a proper causal series (as

55 Supplement, 18.
56 Insight, 253.
57 I credit this expression to Fr. Robert Doran. See Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 4.
distinct from an accidental series) is what is meant by “mediate efficient causality,” considered theologically.58 Lonergan’s favorite example for an accidental series is Abraham (A) begetting Isaac (B) and Isaac (B) begetting Jacob (C). His favorite example of a proper causal series is the typist (A), the movements of a typewriter (B), and the typescript (C). In the accidental series there are only two real relations of dependence: B depends on A, and C depends on B. The relation of C to A is not a real relation of dependence, but of conditioned to condition. Abraham is not a cause but a condition of the begetting of Jacob. In a proper causal series there are three real relations of dependence: B depends on A, C depends on B, and C depends on A even more than on B. In this case there is truly mediate efficient causality associated with B, even though C depends on A even more than B.

This notion of mediate efficient causality also applies to the historical causality of Christ. Christ as Head is first in the sequence, followed by Christ’s members, resulting in a realization of a created, historical effect. Since this is a proper causal series, the historical effect depends on Christ more than on the members, even though the members collectively act as Christ’s mediate efficient cause. Theologically this judgment is grounded in the fact that the created cause is not proportionate to the members acting apart from Christ. The created effect is supernatural and thus proportionate to the principal agent, Christ.

In summary, Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ is grounded in his understanding that the Body of Christ is a supernatural agency introduced into history to intelligently direct history in accordance with God’s will. Christ as Head of the body is the principle director, the principle historical agent. Christ’s agency is mediated through his members, who act as Christ’s ministerial historical agents to gather and reconcile all human affairs in Christ. This gathering and reconciliation is the Body of Christ itself.

Our interpretation of Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ would not be complete without attending to that aspect most essential to the Body of Christ: interpersonal relationships. The role of interpersonal relationships cannot be overestimated in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. In the Supplement interpersonal relationships are the most important element in the natural human good, as well as that supernatural human good that is the Body of Christ.\(^59\) Interpersonal relationships are centrally significant because they are the ground of social and historical agency on the human side of divine-human cooperation in the historical drama of redemption. Human cooperation, in order to be an effective ministerial historical agency of Christ’s historical causality, requires cognitive and appetitive habits such that those persons held together through interpersonal relationships understand and will the same thing. Let us note again that for Lonergan mutual understanding and agreement is the foundation of all human cooperation, and human cooperation is the foundation of human causality. Through this cooperation persons will the human good itself both for themselves and for others. Lonergan calls this mutual benevolent love, otherwise known as friendship, which he appropriates from Aquinas.\(^60\) Friendship is the glue that holds the human good together, including the Body of Christ. In the case of the latter, that friendship begins with the communication of divine friendship, mutual benevolent love with respect to that which is good by its very essence.

\(^59\) “The effect of this [Christ’s] historical action as a whole is the total human good of order both external and cultural, past, present, and future. This good of order comprises (1) a virtually continuous flow of particular goods of every kind, (2) human operations by which these goods are had, (3) interior habits and, so to speak, external human institutions, behavior, and customs whereby these operations are performed and coordinated, and (4) human beings themselves linked through their interpersonal relationships, who operate in accordance with these habits and institutions and enjoy the resulting benefits.” Supplement, 114, emphasis mine.

“Just as the human good of order refers to the steady stream of particular goods, coordinated operations, and interior habits and external institutions as all being closely knit together and vivified in a concrete synthesis through interpersonal relationships, so also is the kingdom of God, the Church, Christ’s body and pleroma. For this kingdom, this body, is a supernatural good of order in which are found the particular goods of grace and glory, the operations by which we do everything in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ (Col 3:17), the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, and all the institutions of the Church. All of this is held together through interpersonal relationships, since to be in this body and a member of this kingdom is nothing other than what St. Paul so often calls being “in Christ” or “in the Spirit.” Supplement, 118, emphasis mine.

\(^60\) Supplement, 121. Lonergan cites ST, I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3m..
Lonergan’s emphasis on interpersonal relationships is also constitutive of his understanding of the intended historical effects of the divine missions in his Trinitarian theology. The ultimate (or primary) end of the divine missions is the divine goodness itself communicated in the beatific vision, and the proximate (or secondary) end is a supernatural good of order which is the Kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, the Church, the economy of salvation.\textsuperscript{61} Within this supernatural human good, interpersonal relationships hold a certain pride of place because these relationships ground human cooperation. This is why in Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology he states that a divine mission is carried out not so much that works be done as that new personal relationships be initiated and strengthened.\textsuperscript{62} For Lonergan, the mutual benevolent love in interpersonal relationships is understood in terms of personal presence, whereby persons, pursuing a common good of order, are mutually in one another as the known is in the knower and the beloved in the lover.\textsuperscript{63}

When one understands the importance of interpersonal relationships in Lonergan’s understanding of the human good then his answer to the question \textit{Cur Deus Homo} (Why the God-man?) is easily integrated into an understanding of the historical causality of Christ. Lonergan takes up this question in the final article of the \textit{Supplement}. His answer to \textit{Cur Deus Homo} is that the Son of God became man to “communicate God’s friendship to his enemies in due order.”\textsuperscript{64} I have two brief points to make on Lonergan’s answer.

First, why is the question \textit{Cur Deus Homo} relevant to understanding the historical causality of Christ? Lonergan’s answer is that to ask “why” is to ask about a cause.\textsuperscript{65} His question is not so much about how Christ as cause does what he does, but rather why Christ is the \textit{type of cause} that he is, in other words why it is fitting that the end of redemption be brought about by one who is both divine and human. God communicates divine friendship through the God-man because it is customary for God to act through secondary causes. However, this secondary cause cannot be a mere human being, since that person would not be a friend of God by his own right. Only a divine person

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{The Triune God}, 495.
\item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{The Triune God}, 485, 487 (emphasis mine).
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{The Triune God}, 507.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Supplement}, 121.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Supplement}, 121.
\end{itemize}
is a friend of God by his own right. But a divine person subsisting in a human nature is not only a friend of God by his own right, but also a secondary cause. Both principles are preserved. So the answer to this question provides an additional insight into the historical causality of Christ.

Second, Lonergan could have simply stated that the answer to Cur Deus Homo is that the Son of God became man to communicate God’s love to his enemies. But Lonergan chose to use the category of friendship, which in Aquinas’s thought is a specific form of love. As Lonergan notes, friendship is *mutual benevolent love in the sharing of some good*. Mutual benevolent love is had when several persons will some common good, each one willing it to the others.66 So to communicate divine friendship is to communicate “mutual benevolent love with respect to that which is good by its very essence.”67 In other words, it is the communication of the divine life itself to humanity, an offer of participation in the Triune life of God. This is the first step in the establishment of the interpersonal relationships that make up the Body of Christ. We are first reconciled to God, become friends with God, because God offers divine friendship to sinners. Transformed by this love, we ought to love each other as Christ has loved us. If we assent to this call, new personal relationships are initiated and strengthened, promoting human cooperation in Christ’s redemptive work.

3. THE HISTORICAL CAUSALITY OF CHRIST AND LONERGAN'S APPROACH TO PRACTICALITY

According to Fr. Robert Doran one thing that characterized Lonergan’s mode of thinking and the cognitive authenticity that he encouraged in others was his approach to practicality or praxis.68 For Doran, the main source of data for this facet of Lonergan’s thinking is chapter 7 of *Insight*. Chapter 7 of *Insight* is concerned with progress and decline in history. There Lonergan states that the principle of progress is liberty, and the principle of decline is individual, group, and general bias. Collectively these biases set up the reign of sin, the social surd.

66 *Supplement*, 121. Lonergan appropriates the definition of friendship from Aquinas. See *ST*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1; I, q. 20, a. 1, 3m.
67 *Supplement*, 121.
As Doran also notes, the practical upshot of chapter 7 was already indicated in the Preface to *Insight*. There Lonergan asks the following question: “What practical good can come of this book?” His answer boils down to this: Insight into insight brings to light the cumulative process of progress, and insight into oversight reveals the cumulative process of decline. For Lonergan, “to be practical is to do the intelligent thing, and to be unpractical is to keep blundering about. It follows that insight into both insight and oversight is the very key to practicality.” For Lonergan this problem is at once more delicate and more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing than any other. And the reason has to do with the nature of the problem. How is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias originates from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?

Thus according to Doran, what Lonergan most wanted to say “included preeminently a position on the role of human intelligence in history and society, and on the relation of intelligence to social and cultural progress and decline, especially in the view of the distinct dangers confronting human society today.” In brief, Lonergan’s approach to practicality is a long-term approach to practicality, in his own words “a withdrawal from practicality to save practicality.” There is needed a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history.

The *Supplement* exemplifies this same long-term approach to practicality, and I would argue that this approach to practicality is not only exemplified in the *Supplement*, but constitutes Lonergan’s motive for writing this text in the first place. Furthermore, I regard the *Supplement* as a major contribution

---

69 *Insight*, 7.
70 *Insight*, 8.
72 *Insight*, 8. Here I am pulling elements from the following passage: “No problem is at once more delicate and more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing. How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?...At least we can make a beginning by asking what precisely it is to understand, what are the dynamics of the flow of consciousness that favors insight, what are the interferences that favor oversight, what, finally, do the answers to such questions imply for the guidance of human thought and action?” *Insight*, 8-9.
74 *Insight*, 266.
75 *Insight*, 265.
to the moving viewpoint of *Insight*, whether Lonergan was explicitly conscious of this or not. In support of my thesis I first single out some chief characteristics of the *Supplement*, and then explicitly consider its affinity to the moving viewpoint of *Insight*.

Lonergan begins the *Supplement* by quoting Ephesians 1:9-10: "To us has been revealed the hidden plan of God's will, 'to gather all creation both in heaven and on earth under one head, Christ.'" This passage equates the hidden plan of God's will with the restoration of all things both in heaven and on earth under Christ. As I noted earlier, Lonergan states that while it is hardly surprising that we here below have little inkling about how heavenly things might be gathered in Christ, it would seem to be a rather more serious matter if we were to neglect the question of how earthly realities are to be brought together, especially since it is our duty to work with "the one who holds the whole building together and makes it grow into a sacred temple in the Lord (Ephesians 2.21)." The second paragraph of the *Supplement* continues this theme. He judges that a careful consideration must be given to inquiring first about the nature of the good, how the human good is mainly put in order, by what law the human good is corrupted by sin, and finally what human resources there are for restoring the human good. Here he sets forth his well-known theory on the structure of history, the three approximations of progress, decline, and redemption. He then states that if we have understood these things then we shall have a deeper and more fruitful understanding of how important in addressing contemporary problems is the great gift that God has bestowed on us. This fruitful understanding is clearly aimed at informing praxis.

As Frederick Crowe has observed, the opening paragraphs establish the pastoral orientation of the whole work. Crowe suggests that Lonergan had experienced a strong influence directing him to the world and its needs,

---

76 *Supplement*, 1.
77 *Supplement*, 1.
and so to the influence Christ had for the world’s healing. The approach here mirrors that of Lonergan’s early student essays on history. Those essays reveal a person deeply interested in contemporary problems, but whose approach to those problems consists in trying to understand the root of the problem, not to offer quick solutions. As there is needed an intelligent critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history, so also there is needed an understanding of the historical causality of Christ before there can be any intelligent direction of our cooperation with Christ as ministerial historical agents. Our duty is to cooperate with Christ because in Lonergan’s understanding of redemption, evil is not transformed into good without human cooperation. This is the key to the practical orientation of the Supplement, even though it is a systematic work. It is intending to provide a more fruitful understanding of redemption by extending the inquiry into the historical causality of Christ, with the hope that the fruit of such an understanding will be a theory that informs the praxis of human cooperation with God in the historical drama of redemption.

That same approach is clearly embodied in the final work of Lonergan’s life: his work on economics. Economics is clearly for Lonergan that element at the social level of the human good that provides the most bang for the buck in solving contemporary problems. Economics is thus not far removed from the historical causality of Christ. In fact it has everything to do with the historical causality of Christ, just as other institutions and processes in the human good. Since economic activities lie within the human good, Lonergan would argue that economies matter to Christ and they are meant to reflect the meanings and values of Christ, which are the meanings and values of God entering into human history. So Lonergan’s soteriology is a very practical soteriology. As William Loewe has noted in his own research into Lonergan’s soteriology, “one wonders whether the Christian church has even begun to understand the scope of the intellectual responsibility in its redemptive mission.” What Loewe means here is that if we want to take redemption seriously, and if we want a contemporary soteriology that is relevant today, we need to realize that God’s historical plan of redemption is

79 Crowe, Christ and History, 18.
80 Insight, 265.
81 Supplement, 70; cf. Grace and Freedom, 63n4; The Triune God, 485.
not merely intended to sanctify individuals. God's plan is to transform the human good, in all its concreteness, in all its processes, in all its institutions.

4. The Supplement's Relation to Insight

Finally, the Supplement can be regarded as a contribution to the moving viewpoint of Insight. Within this moving viewpoint there are certain relevant points revealing a trajectory. The trajectory is a "curve fitting" if you will, to borrow a phrase from the early chapters of Insight. The central concern of the trajectory of Lonergan's moving viewpoint is the problem of historical decline and its solution. The chief points along that trajectory are the preface, chapter 7, chapters 18 through 20, and the epilogue. We have already seen how the concern for historical decline resulting from bias is presented in the preface and chapter 7. In chapter 18 Lonergan argues that human resources, on their own, are incapable of breaking out of this historical decline. He calls this the problem of moral impotence to overcome bias. We are essentially free by nature, but our effective freedom is restricted, due to incomplete intellectual and volitional development. Next, in chapter 19 Lonergan affirms general transcendent knowledge, including not only the existence of God, but also God's absolute goodness. Then in chapter 20 Lonergan states that because God exists and because God is good, God wills to remedy the problem of evil. If there is a problem, there is a solution, and there is a solution because God is good. So in chapter 20 Lonergan develops his heuristic of a solution to the problem of evil.

The final point in this trajectory is in the Epilogue. Lonergan now speaks explicitly as a Catholic theologian and states that the desired summary and completion of the moving viewpoint of Insight gives way to intellectus quarens fide, understanding seeking faith:

Only at the term of that search for faith, for the new and higher collaboration of minds that has God as its author and its guide, could the desired summary and completion be undertaken; and then, I believe, it would prove to be, not some brief appendage to the present work, but the inception of a far larger one.

So what we find here is that this trajectory of Insight envisions a far

83 Insight, 650.
84 Insight, 753-54.
larger work which takes the Christian faith as its point of departure. What would such a work look like? In the epilogue Lonergan states the following:

to the foregoing considerations that regard any individual that has embraced God's solution, there is to be added the consideration of the cumulative historical development, first of the chosen people and then of the Catholic church, both in themselves and in their role in the unfolding of human history and in the order of the universe.

It may be asked in what department of theology the historical aspect of development might be treated, and I would suggest that it may possess peculiar relevance to a treatise on the mystical body of Christ ... I would incline to the opinion that it [a treatise on the mystical body of Christ] remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history. It was at the fullness of time that there came into the world the Light of the world. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that gives good will and good performance. It was the advent of a light and a grace to be propagated, not only through the mystery of individual conversion, but also through the outer channels of human communication. If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruit without effecting a transfiguration of human living, and in turn that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to his social problem of evil.85

Lonergan is implying that when a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ is informed by a theory of history, it will provide a framework to affirm and explain why it was in the fullness of time that the Light came into the world. A Light that directs and enables good will and performance can be interpreted as a Light that directs history. It is a Light to be propagated through outer channels of communication, first for the preparation of eternal life, and secondarily as a solution to our problem of evil.

The Supplement is certainly not a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ. But the Supplement does provide a framework for answering the following questions which Lonergan implies can, and should, be answered when a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ is informed by a theory of history:

85 Insight, 763-64.
Why was it in the fullness of time, and not earlier, that the Light came into the world? Why is it a Light that not only provides grace for good will and good performance, but directs that performance in and through historical development, which takes time, very much time in deed? In other words, why not immediately transform the human situation in an apocalyptic manner? And why should the Light propagate itself at all, and if so why through “outer channels of communication?” Why not some other way? And perhaps the most basic question of all: Why a Light in the first place? Why the God-man?

The Supplement provides a framework, a general answer to all of these questions, certainly not in terms of necessity, but fittingness. The basic principle of that framework is the principle of continuity discussed earlier: since there are no divine afterthoughts, it is God’s way to act through secondary causes and in accordance with their natures. For Lonergan, this principle grounds the fittingness of the Incarnation: God himself became human that he might be a secondary and proportionate cause in restoring all things. The complete generality of the principle can also be extended to answer the question of why the Light came in the fullness of time and why the Light propagates itself through outer channels of communication. Lonergan states:

even though his [Christ’s] own had been taught by so many prophets and were given such striking miracles and were eagerly awaiting him, that first coming of his would not have been more successful had he come before the fullness of time (Gal 4:4) and without preparation by the Law “which was our guardian until Christ came” (Gal 3:24). Nor did the Lord at that time restore a kingdom of Israel that would suddenly and with manifest power bring all things under its sway; he preferred rather to sow a grain of mustard seed (Mt 13:31) which seems to grow slowly, because for one thing interior progress doesn’t make the headlines, and also because the kingdom is proclaimed and propagated through secondary causes, namely, human beings.

Furthermore, when a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ is informed by a theory of history, there comes a recognition that although the principal

86 Supplement, 32.
87 Supplement, 32.
function of the Light was to carry the seeds of eternal life, it could not bear its fruit without also effecting a transfiguration of human living, and so a solution not only to our individual problem of evil but also to our social problem of evil. This distinction in *Insight* between a principal function (to carry the seeds of eternal life) and a secondary function (transfiguration of human living) is also found in the *Supplement*, specifically in the distinction noted earlier between what Christ’s historical action directly intends and what it indirectly intends. Christ’s historical action is directly aimed at ordering human life on earth to the future life in heaven. But since this ordering liberates us from evils and turns us toward the good with the result that the human good itself is greatly improved, this improvement is also intended by Christ, though indirectly. Christ’s direct historical action equates to the “principal function” discussed in *Insight*, to carry the seeds of eternal life. Christ’s indirect historical action equates to the secondary function discussed in *Insight*, the transfiguration of human living, God’s solution to social evil.

I hope it is clear that what I am arguing here is that the *Supplement* has characteristics of this larger work envisioned by Lonergan.88 Lonergan even envisions that this larger work will address the critical importance of interpersonal relationships. He mentions this in a footnote in the epilogue:

> Since I believe personal relations can be studied adequately only in this larger and more concrete context, the skimpy treatment accorded them in the present work is not to be taken as a denial of their singular importance in human living.89

Even though Lonergan did say that the extension of his moving viewpoint would be taken up in the treatment of the Mystical Body, and even though the *Supplement* does not explicitly mention the Mystical Body, consideration should be given to what he actually did. The *Supplement* harmonizes with what he envisioned in the epilogue. In the epilogue Lonergan’s ultimate concern is not a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ. His concern is to suggest how one might understand cumulative historical

---

88 A qualification is in order. The *Supplement* is not a formal treatise on the mystical body of Christ. On the other hand, the Body of Christ plays a pivotal role in the text and it does so in the ways Lonergan called for in his epilogue.

89 *Insight*, 754n1.
development in God's solution to the problem of evil. Lonergan states that it may have peculiar relevance to a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ because he knows that the Body of Christ is a ministerial historical agent of redemption. This is why he states that such a treatise remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history. What I am suggesting is that aspect of a treatise on the mystical Body of Christ completed by a theory of history is in fact a treatise on the historical causality of Christ. It is thus my thesis that the Supplement is a major contribution to the larger work Lonergan envisioned. That larger work can be traced to a trajectory in Insight revealing Lonergan's long-range approach to practicality. Lonergan's understanding of the historical causality of Christ exemplifies this same approach and harmonizes with that trajectory. Given the harmony between the Supplement and this trajectory, I believe that the Supplement, even though it was never published, is a continuation, a contribution if you will to an exploration of the relation of human intelligence to social and cultural progress and decline, and specifically to Christ's historical causality gracing human intelligence with the power to direct history in accordance with God's will. As such, the Supplement harmonizes well with what Lonergan regarded as the ultimate implications of the moving viewpoint of Insight.