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SOCIAL GRACE

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I HAVE LONG REGARDED Bernard Lonergan’s 1977 address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” as one of his finest papers. It expresses as well as anything he wrote just what his work was really all about. Moreover, it opens upon possible developments of that work.

On a more personal note, reading “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” always takes me back to chapter 7 of Insight. My reading of that chapter was the beginning of my committed involvement with Lonergan’s work. Both writings attempt the articulation of the intelligibility of “a single object that can gain collective attention,” an intelligibility that can be articulated even though the situations that embody it are as a whole “commonly ... neither foreseen nor intended” by most people affected by them. In chapter 7 of Insight this single object is, in the words of the title of the chapter, “Common Sense as Object,” while in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” it is “collective responsibility,” the coalescence of “the manifold of isolated responsibilities” into the unfolding of a history that flows from a total and dialectical source of meaning. In each case the issue is the relation between a subjective field and at least a portion of what would play in Lonergan’s thought something of the role that objective Geist plays in Hegel’s. Thus chapter 6 of Insight is called “Common Sense and Its Subject” and chapter 7 “Common Sense as Object,” but “common sense as object” means at least partly the objectification in culture and society of the subjective field introduced in chapter 6; again, in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” the question is how “the issues that individuals have to deal with in their own

2 Ibid. 169.
3 Ibid. 176.

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minds and hearts” become ‘writ large’ in the dialectic of history.4 These are essentially the same topics. They are major topics. They must be addressed, and Lonergan has given us some of the tools to do just that.

Now the interest that began for me in reading chapter 7 of Insight and that gained precision from the presentation in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” of the plateaus on which that “single object” unfolds5 became, in some manner whose details can probably never be traced, the inspiration behind much of what I tried to do in Theology and the Dialectics of History. In my ongoing work, I am revisiting basic points of that world and I find that theology elevates “collective responsibility,” in the concrete dispensation that is ours, into something like “social and cultural grace.” By this term I mean the objectification, the being writ large in the overarching dialectic of history, of God’s entry into human affairs in the divine love that floods our inmost hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us and in the revelation of that love in Christ Jesus. The issue is the historical effects of the divine missions. What difference does it make to the dialectical processes of human history that there is a universal offer of what Christians call the Holy Spirit? What difference does it make to the same dialectic that the mission of the Son is among other things a revelation in incarnate and linguistic meaning of that universal offer? Here again, there are a subjective and an objective obverse and reverse. It is as though there are several manners in which to express the correlative subjective fields and objectifications: in one version they are “Common Sense and Its Subject” and “Common Sense as Object”; in another they are “the issues that individuals have to deal with in their own minds and hearts” and the coalescence of their negotiations of those issues into the dialectic of history; and in the present effort they are the reality that is given to many individuals and in fact that is offered to all, a reality that Catholic theology understands as participation in divine, that is, Trinitarian life, and that good Catholic systematic theology differentiates precisely in its Trinitarian form, and the coalescence of those individual gifts into a single object that can gain collective attention, an object that we might call the social objectification of grace, or in shorthand social grace, or in biblical terms the reign of God in human history.

4 Ibid.

5 The plateaus of ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ are the stages of meaning in Method in Theology, but their function as objectifications of the “single object that can gain collective attention” is much clearer in “Natural Right.” See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 85-99.
There is a second context, however, for my present remarks. It is the ongoing context of what I hope will be an annual colloquium at Marquette University sponsored by the Marquette Lonergan Project, a colloquium on "Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multi-religious World." At the first of these colloquia, held last October, papers by John Dadosky, Darren Dias, and myself emphasized the universal mission of the Holy Spirit as a central locus of twenty-first century Catholic systematics, stressed Frederick Crowe’s position on the relations of the mission of the Spirit and the Son, and brought into play and updated with Lonergan’s help some central Ignatian insights regarding discernment and dialogue. The upshot of the colloquium was twofold: the shared recognition of the need for greater clarity regarding the mission of the Son in relation to that of the Holy Spirit, but also a subtle agreement (subtle, at least in that for the most part it took the form of an absence of non-agreement) with my position that the global implications of Lonergan’s scale of values provide an extraordinary litmus test regarding the major authenticity of the various religious traditions in our world, where ‘major authenticity’ refers not to the authenticity of individuals vis-à-vis their traditions but to the authenticity of the traditions themselves as currently appropriated and implemented or exercised.

The two results of the colloquium are complementary. The mission of the Word is carried on, participated in, both in the church and beyond the church, partly through the gifts and vocations of theologians, philosophers, scientists both natural and human, and scholars, all speaking intelligible words of truth, justice, and reconciliation to a broken world. Of special importance are breakthroughs whose significance could so reorganize the social mediation of the human good that genuine transformation of social structures would take place. Paradigmatic in this regard, at least in its intention and I think partly in its execution, is Lonergan’s economic insight into the real significance of the potential social dividend that surplus income yields.

At any rate, it is time for theology to turn its attention explicitly to social grace, in the context of both divine missions. Liberation theologians

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6 The three papers can be found in PDF and audio on the website www.lonerganresource.com, under Events: Conferences: October 29-30 2009.

7 I suspect that the economic situation today, where macroeconomic dynamics are absorbed in information technology much more than when Lonergan was writing, will force us to add complications to Lonergan’s model of economic process, but I gladly confess that I am singularly unequipped to say just what these may be.
and others have made us aware of the social objectifications of sin. These objectifications were already captured by Lonergan in chapter 19 of *Insight* where he speaks of the 'moral evils' that are the consequences of 'basic sin.' Most of us have little difficulty today in acknowledging the existence of "sinful social structures," that is, of the social and cultural coalescence into a single object of manifold refusals or failures to do what is right or to reject what is wrong. But we should also attempt to disengage just what would be the structure of the coalescence into a single object of manifold instances, first, of fidelity to the transcendental precepts, and second, of the elevating and healing divine grace that maintains one as consistently faithful to these precepts.

The transcendental imperatives themselves are nature, in fact precisely part of the nature that is the immanent principle of movement and rest in 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.' Refusal or failure to observe the imperatives, though, is sin, and recovery or redemption occurs through a grace that elevates the nature whose law is expressed in the imperatives to participation in a radically other nature, a Trinitarian nature that is absolutely supernatural in that it cannot be attained in any immediate fashion by any created nature whatsoever, except and only insofar as it gives itself, bestows itself in gratuitous and extravagant generosity, even wastefulness, upon an obediential potency that is capable only of receiving it. This is the upshot of Lonergan's brilliant treatment of moral impotence in chapter 18 of *Insight*, an analysis that is permanently valid despite his own disclaimers regarding his approach to the dynamics of decision in that work.

However, by the time of "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," the source of progress or normative source of meaning in history resides not simply in the transcendental precepts but in the coalescence of individual

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8 See Bernard Lonergan, CWL 3 689-91.

9 I say "as part of nature" because, as we will see in a moment, embracing and including the transcendental notions that constitute the levels of intentional consciousness is the "tidal movement" that begins before intentional consciousness, permeates it as it moves through its various questions and answers, and reaches beyond it in being in love. That is the primary meaning of 'nature' in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," and to the extent that the love is God's own love, that nature is obediential potency for grace.

10 The disclaimer, I think, is only partially correct: there is a second presentation of those dynamics, one that achieves inchoate expression in chapter 2 of *Method in Theology*. But, as I have argued in several places, each presentation has its limited validity, and neither is to be discarded. See www.lonerganresource.com under 'Books': *Essays in Systematic Theology*, items 18 and 19.
responsibilities, in the communities that are faithful to the demands of ongoing self-transcendence, communities toward which the levels of consciousness themselves are oriented precisely because of their function in a “tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these” in “being-in-love.”11 And the source of decline now resides in collective infidelity to these demands, while the source of redemption or recovery in history lies, we may surmise (though this is not mentioned as such in the paper), in the coalescence into common living of the individual gifts of participation in Trinitarian life that God has bestowed, whether explicitly or anonymously. The self that God bestows on a nature that is obediential potency to receive it is Trinitarian and so interpersonal, and the bestowal itself has a Trinitarian and so interpersonal structure.12 What John Dadosky has called the fourth stage of meaning begins, I submit, with this movement beyond acknowledging the individual interiority of intentional consciousness to acknowledging an interpersonal level of consciousness, where, as Lonergan said as early as his Latin work on the Trinity, the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love itself.13 This interpersonal dimension coalesces into communities faithful to what the turn to interiority revealed in the first place.14 If this fidelity is itself a function ultimately of grace, then the expression “social grace” assumes some valid significance, at least as much significance as the expression “social sin.”

I am focusing on the contribution that Theology and the Dialectics of History might make to the question of just precisely what is the structure of the social objectifications of divine grace. In biblical language, what is the structure of the reign of God in history? The basic move comes with the recognition that the scale of values articulated on pp. 31-32 of Method in Theology and spelled out in greater detail in Theology and the Dialectics of

11 Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 175.
12 For an attempt to understand this interpersonal Trinitarian structure, see Robert M. Doran, ‘Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei,’ to appear in Lonergan Workshop 23.
13 See Bernard Lonergan, CWL 12 218-29.
History is an objectification of the structure of individual consciousness, just as "Common Sense as Object" is an objectification of "The Subjective Field of Common Sense," and just as negotiation of the issues that individuals have to deal with in their own minds and hearts coalesces into the situations that emerge from the dialectic of history. The scale of values is the structure of intentional consciousness writ large, and its unfolding is the unfolding of the coalescence of individual authenticity and inauthenticity into a single object that can gain collective attention. The relationship between the structure of consciousness and the scale of values, then, is analogous to that between the same structure and functional specialization, in that in each case we are speaking of a communal objectification of a subjective structure.

Each section of Theology and the Dialectics of History needs to be interpreted in relation to the issues understood in this manner. In the present paper I can address only the basic terms and relations proposed in the book, as these are introduced in the first part.

"Basic Terms and Relations," then, is the title of part 1 of the book. Needless to say, the first set of such terms and relations consists of those found in Lonergan’s analysis of conscious intentionality. These are traced in chapter 1 in accord with their chronological emergence in Lonergan’s thought: the self-affirmation of the knower, the emergence of a distinct fourth level, the post-Method focus on love and the possibility of an affirmation of a fifth level, the two vectors in consciousness – the creative vector moving from below upward and the healing vector moving from above downward. These together are conceived now as constituting some of the dynamics of the normative source of meaning that becomes a central category in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." But first, that normative source of meaning must be filled out by acknowledging another dimension of consciousness. This insistence is present in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ itself, where the dynamics of intentional consciousness are part of the tidal movement that I have just mentioned. This movement precisely as movement assumes conscious form in the dispositional or aesthetic-dramatic participation of the sensitive psyche in the adventure of conscious intentionality, an adventure that Eric Voegelin has called the search for direction in the movement of life.15 Second, the total source of meaning in history includes bias and its effects, as well as conversion in the

movement from above downward. The sensitive psyche is left to chapter 2 in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, but the dialectical functioning of bias and the healing of conversion are included in chapter 1's presentation of Lonergan's development.

I found it essential even fifteen years ago to relate this discussion to the notion of 'patterned experience' that appears toward the end of chapter 1. This notion already situates this structure in the dialectic of history, in the context, if you want, of the relative dominance of the dialectic of community vis-à-vis a plurality of individual dialectics of subjects. The notion of patterned experience became for me later what I call 'received meaning' as partly constitutive of empirical consciousness itself. All empirical consciousness, except for surprising events, is *patterned* experience. Presentations – sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, bodily movements, associations, spontaneous intersubjective responses, free images, utterances\(^\text{16}\) – are patterned presentations. Some of these patterns are governed by interests that we have made our own, and then we enter a given pattern because it is something we have chosen or accepted or perhaps been chosen for, whether the pattern be artistic or intellectual or practical or dramatic or mystical, to name the principal possibilities. But the pattern can be a function not only of my own self-determined interests, but also of psychological, social, economic, political, linguistic conditioning and seeming determinisms, conditioning operating 'from above' in one's development to establish schemes of recurrence that are inimical to development, and so not a function of autonomous artistic, intellectual, practical, interpersonal, or mystical orientations, but of psychological and social pressures. The person *governed* by negative patterns may also tend to believe that this is the way it has to be, that there is no alternative. Then the patterning is under the control of a bias, but in this case a bias that is not one's own doing. What is required is a recognition that can initiate a reinterpretation; the reinterpretation makes possible new patterns and the appropriation of the power to establish patterns of experience on the basis of new interests. Such a recognition occurs through a set of insights, including the "inverse insights" that interrupt the very flow of one's conscious

\(^{16}\) Why has it taken us so long to recognize the hermeneutic significance of *Insight*'s placing on the level of empirical consciousness the 'free images' and 'utterances' that "commonly are under the influence of the higher levels before they provide a basis for inquiry and reflection?" Lonergan, CWL 3 299.
intentionality with the recognition that one is on the wrong track. But such insights occur outside the normal patterns, outside the box, if you want, and launch a possibility of a new interpretation of experience, including the acknowledgment that insight itself is what begins to break these patterns.

Next is the further owning not just of a spirit of inquiry but also of the ability for critical reflection on one's own insights. What is the guarantee that the new insight or set of insights is not just the function of a new arbitrary and falsifying way of patterning experience? And we rise above the conditioned patterns of our experience not only by insight and judgment but also and primarily by decision, in which we select what it is worthwhile to do, what kind of world we want, what kind of people we want to be, and how we are going to move toward that. Finally, only being on the receiving end of a love that is unconditional and so graced, however that love may be mediated by human community, is the ultimate condition of possibility of such recovery and redemption.

Already by the end of chapter 1, then, the structure of intentional consciousness is coalescing into a single object that can command collective attention. A crucial second step in determining the basic terms and relations comes with the acknowledgment that consciousness is twofold, and so that the relatively dominant dialectic of community as it issues in received meaning, meaning that Eugene Gendlin argues becomes stored in the body for better or for worse, can affect either or both of its dimensions, and can do so either positively or negatively. I now make capital of the following quotation from The Triune God: Systematics: "[W]e are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act." The entire argument of Theology and the Dialectics of History from chapter 2 forward depends on what is affirmed in that sentence. As chapter 2 of Method in Theology speaks of operational

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18 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 139.
development and a distinct affective development, so the self-appropriation that constitutes the "total and basic science"\textsuperscript{19} has to include the vagaries of the dispositional, aesthetic-dramatic dimension of the sensitive psyche that precedes, accompanies, and overarches the operations of conscious intentionality, influences those operations, and is influenced by them. Self-appropriation without this dimension runs the risk of fostering the basic form of alienation, alienation from one's very self. As Heidegger affirmed \textit{Verstehen} and \textit{Befindlichkeit} to be equiprimordial but distinct ways of being \textit{Dasein},\textsuperscript{20} so I am affirming that the aesthetic-dramatic dimension is always co-constitutive of consciousness along with our intentional operations. And perhaps beyond Heidegger, I maintain that this dimension includes its own set of aesthetic-dramatic operators of human development. In like manner, if consciousness is a search for direction in the movement of life, the search is a function of intentional inquiry, while the movement is experienced in the pulsing flow of the aesthetic dimension. The two together are essential ingredients of the notion of dialectic that, along with the scale of values, functions as the key category in the entire work.

That notion of dialectic constitutes the next installment on basic terms and relations. From the addition of the psychic, dispositional, aesthetic-dramatic dimension to the structure of the normative and total sources of meaning in history, there comes a refinement on Lonergan's notion of dialectic. For Lonergan 'dialectic' refers to the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory. The refinement is to the effect that 'dialectic' is a notion that refers to the concrete, the dynamic, and the opposed, but that opposition can take two quite distinct forms. I believe this complex notion is already operative in chapters 6 and 7 of \textit{Insight}, though it is not articulate there precisely as a complication of the basic notion. We are conscious in two ways, one being more passive than active, the other more active than passive. These two ways are not contradictory to one another, unless they become so when one of them is neglected in favor of the other. Their opposition I call, for better or for worse, that of contraries rather than of contradictories. To confuse contradictories and contraries or mix them up with one another can be quite disastrous, not only theoretically but also existentially.

\textsuperscript{19} Bernard Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," CWL 17 355.

\textsuperscript{20} "In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the 'there.'" Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 171-72. 'Understanding' translates \textit{Verstehen}, and 'state-of-mind,' \textit{Befindlichkeit}.
I know this distinction has been a bone of contention among some, but I continue to hold to it, and for very serious reasons. I first came upon the distinction by negotiating the Jungian tendency to reduce all oppositions to what I am calling contraries and so to attempt to achieve a position beyond good and evil: a tendency that I regard as self-destructive and perhaps even demonic. But there is the other tendency, all too prevalent in Christian spirituality and moral teaching, and, may I add, in some of the "effective history" of Lonergan's own work, to regard the contrariness of sense and spirituality, neural demands and the censorship, intersubjectivity and practical intelligence, as a matter of contradictories and so, practically, to neglect or even suppress the sensitive psyche and intersubjectivity as if they were evil, and, theoretically, to interpret all the limitation that is imposed on intentional operations by their dependence on sense as itself, if not evil at least as concupiscent. I was dismayed to find Lonergan himself doing this when, in a response to a question asked him at a Lonergan Workshop regarding the notion of limitation that he sets in tension with transcendence in some brilliant paragraphs in chapter 15 of Insight, he limited his response to the discussion of the limitation imposed by moral impotence and sin. That is not what he is talking about when he first introduces the notion of limitation. Of course, to regard the criteria of the world of immediacy as though they were the criteria of human knowing in a world mediated by meaning does set up something contradictory, and the remedy for that philosophical blunder is, in Lonergan's terms, to break the duality of our knowing and to affirm that fully human knowing unfolds through the three dimensions of experience, understanding, and judgment. But breaking the duality of knowing does not mean breaking the duality of consciousness. It means rather affirming that duality in the series of sublations of empirical consciousness by the intelligent, rational, and existentially world-constitutive and self-constitutive operations of human conscious intentionality. To break the duality of the unity-in-tension of consciousness in favor of either sense or intellect is to invite either empiricism or idealism, whereas to affirm their unity-in-tension is to affirm at least implicitly a critical realism, where insights are into imagined data, where verification almost always entails a rational return to concrete sensible data, and where apprehensions of possible

21 This session (16 June 1980) appears on www.bernardlonergan.com as 97300A0E080, with a transcription at 97300DTE080. Lonergan's comments on limitation appear at the very beginning.
values are given in insights laden with feeling. The dialectical structure of
the aesthetic-dramatic and intentional ways of being conscious is then writ
large in the dialectic of community between intersubjectivity and practical
intelligence and in what I would like to promote as an emerging dialectic
of culture between cosmological and anthropological sets of constitutive
meaning. Contradictory dialectical relations obtain not internally to these
distinct but related processes, but with regard to requisite higher syntheses:
the higher synthesis of the dialectic of the subject in the acceptance or
rejection of grace; that of the dialectic of culture in the acceptance or rejection
of personal authenticity; and that of the dialectic of community in the pursuit
or refusal of cultural values.

Lonergan’s scale of values is complicated to yield an explanatory
account of the relations of these three sets of dialectical processes. And
it is also expanded to present a basic optic on the global situation of our
time, yielding a sympathetic impetus to the best of liberation theology in its
insistence on a certain preferential option for the poor and the marginalized.

Finally, the section on ‘Basic Terms and Relations’ concludes with a
chapter that begins to express some of the dynamics of the church’s mission
in the world. “As the Father has sent me, so I send you.” Those dynamics
would be swept by a systematic theology into a more heuristic view of the
church understood in reliance on the category of mission, where ecclesial
mission becomes a participation in the missions of both the Son and the
Spirit in the world, just as the character of ‘servant’ that was highlighted in
the chapter on the church in Theology and Dialectics of History understood the
church as participating in Jesus’ embodiment and fulfillment of the Deutero-
Isaian vision of the servant of God.

In conclusion, then, just as there is a graced elevation of the various
levels of consciousness (the relation of religious and personal values), so
the presence of grace can be acknowledged also at the levels of cultural
and social values with an impact on vital values. The establishment of a
category of social grace will depend on arguing that the objectification of
the subjective structure of intentional consciousness that is found in the
complete scale of values can, like intentional consciousness itself, receive
a graced elevation to the participation of society in divine life, in divine
meaning and in the divine community of the three persons of the Trinity. The
state of grace, as Lonergan begins to argue in the still neglected sixth chapter
of his Trinitarian systematics, is a social, interpersonal situation. It is likely
that we will be able to locate in communal living an objectification at the level of social values of the kind of elevation of the level of understanding that grace brings to individual consciousness, and that we will be able to locate in the same communal living an objectification at the level of cultural values of the kind of elevation of the level of judgment that accrues from elevating grace. Moreover, further work on the relation of religious to personal values will disclose an elevation of the operations of deliberation, evaluation, and decision, and this will no doubt find objectification in the communal sphere of policies and planning. The next move in a systematics based on Lonergan’s work, will, I suspect, be the objectification in culture and society of the individual structure of consciousness gifted by God with the grace of an unconditional and unqualified love.
SANCTIFYING GRACE, ELEVATION, AND THE FIFTH LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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AT LEAST SINCE Robert M. Doran’s 1993 article, “Consciousness and Grace,”1 Lonergan scholars have discussed the transposition of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity from metaphysical categories to a theology derived from the categories of interiority. In 2007, Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer offered a contribution to this ongoing conversation by suggesting that sanctifying grace should be understood in a methodical theology as “an intrinsic qualification of the unity of consciousness.”2 He was substantially correct in his conclusion; however, further development of his position is required on at least two points: the precise explanatory meaning of ‘elevation’ needs clarification, and recently-noticed material in the Lonergan archives suggests that the notion of a fifth level needs re-evaluation. This article addresses those two issues.

I will first review Jacobs-Vandegeer’s argument, giving special attention to the aspects requiring development. This will be followed by a more focused explanation of ‘elevation’ in terms of cognition and then in a more generalized sense. I will then discuss the question of the fifth level by examining newly discovered archival materials before comparing Jacobs-Vandegeer’s thesis, together with my developments herein, to the positions of the original contributors to the discussion – Robert M. Doran, Michael Vertin, Patrick H. Byrne, and Tad Dunne – in order to situate the conversation as it stands in light of this contribution.

I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIAAN JACOBS-VANDEGEER

Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer’s 2007 article was a significant development in the transposition of sanctifying grace into the terms of a theology based on the categories of interiority. Relying on Lonergan’s assertion that “for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness,” Jacobs-Vandegeer sought to specify the element in intentional consciousness corresponding to the metaphysical concept, sanctifying grace.

One of the reasons for the viability of Jacobs-Vandegeer’s position is his return to the point of departure: in a metaphysical theology, sanctifying grace is an entitative habit, residing in the essence of the soul. This presents a problem for Lonergan scholars engaged in efforts at transposition because the dynamic state of being in love unrestrictedly, which Lonergan had described as only notionally different from sanctifying grace, seems in fact not entitative but accidental. Noting this, Jacobs-Vandegeer identified the entitative element of human being as central form, and turning to consciousness itself, he suggested that the unity of central form is manifested by the unity of consciousness (“the unity of consciousness reveals the concrete, intelligible form of the whole person”). Thus, the enlargement of the unified whole, consciousness, that is the dynamic state of being in love with God is the conscious manifestation of the entitative change that is understood in a metaphysical theology as sanctifying grace.

Two areas requiring development present themselves. First, just what occurs in this elevation of central form and consequent enlargement of horizon is not fully explanatorily specified. A deeper appropriation of Jacobs-Vandegeer’s solution requires a fuller articulation of the meaning of ‘elevation’ or ‘enlargement.’ Second, the notion of the elevation of central form pertains to all the levels of consciousness, and a significant element in the discussion has been the possible relevance of a fifth level of consciousness. If the whole subject is elevated in virtue of the elevation of central form, a fuller grasp of the number of levels in consciousness is required. We turn first to the explanatory clarification of ‘elevation.’

6 Ibid., 72. I will refer to Jacobs-Vandegeer’s position simply as “elevation of central form.”
Although there are indications in Jacobs-Vandegeer's article of a more concrete meaning for 'elevation' in consciousness, the detailed explanatory specification of the term was not his intended focus. Therefore, any development of his position requires us to take a moment for such a specification. Two articles by Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God" (1949) and "Openness and Religious Experience" (1960), point us toward the elevation of cognitional activities as the primary example of elevation in Lonergan. A third, "Analysis of Faith" (1952), offers a detailed account of the elevation of such cognitional operation. From them, we can draw out the characteristics of elevation in consciousness for Lonergan.

II.1. Textual Data on Elevation in Consciousness

"The Natural Desire to See God," suggests that the human intellect knows "the intelligible unity of the existing world order... imperfectly by philosophy, less imperfectly by theology, but satisfactorily only as a result of the beatific vision." Although Lonergan does not himself make this point explicit, I suggest that these levels - here termed philosophy, theology, and the beatific vision - are derived from the three scholastic epistemological realms known as the light of intellect, the light of faith, and the light of glory. The movement between each of these requires an elevation in the sense of a move from a lower horizon of knowing to a higher horizon of knowing. Thus, in "Natural Desire," we see elevation understood in terms of categories of knowing - natural, supernatural, and beatific - and therefore it is to knowing, and specifically to the horizons of knowing constituted by the light of intellect, the light of faith, and the light of glory, that we ought to attend in order to grasp Lonergan's notion of elevation in consciousness. In this sense, we have an initial clue.

In the article, "Openness and Religious Experience," Lonergan directly addressed the grace of elevation (gratia elevans) and healing grace (gratia

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sanans), neither of which had been dealt with directly in the “Natural Desire” article. In “Openness,” he identified gratia sanans and gratia eleoans within a framework governed by three distinct kinds of ‘openness’: openness as fact, openness as achievement, and openness as gift. Openness as fact is the primordial desire to know, the radical foundation of the human capacity to know. As achievement, openness is the concrete horizon to which the human being is actually open within the context and limitations of all the biases and errors that are mixed into the concrete knower. Finally, openness as gift is the openness given to us by God that brings our concrete horizon of achievement into line with the ultimate horizon of openness as fact. Insofar as such a gift compensates for the biases and errors of our actual performative horizon and brings us into conformity with the authentic, fully yet finitely unrestricted openness Lonergan identified as the fact of openness, it is gratia sanans. Insofar as the gift elevates subjectivity to a horizon beyond the possibilities of any finite consciousness and thereby completely matches the horizon of the unrestricted pure desire, it is gratia eleoans.

These two articles together suggest that elevation can be understood through a closer look at the dynamics of the light of faith in relation to the light of intellect, especially inasmuch as that relation is constituted by gratia eleoans. With that in mind, we turn our attention to Lonergan’s work, “Analysis of Faith,” which gives a very focused account of the impact of elevation on concrete cognitional operations.

According to Lonergan’s analysis in this text, there are two parts to the psychological faith process: first, the acts remotely preceding faith, especially the judgments by which one affirms a logical syllogism concluding that we ought to believe divine revelation; and second, the acts proximate to faith, including (1) the reflective act of understanding that affirms the sufficiency of the evidence for the performance of the succeeding proximate acts; (2) the act that affirms that belief in the mysteries of faith is a good; (3) the act affirming that the mysteries ought to be believed; (4) the willing of the supernatural end to which one is destined; (5) the willing of the means to that end; and (6) the actual assent of faith. In this series step (1), the reflective act that affirms the sufficiency of the evidence for the following acts, is “pivotal” because it brings together what preceded it, and it anticipates and grounds

12 Ibid., 187.
what follows.\textsuperscript{14}

What interests us here is the structure of the particular reflective act that is step (1). Lonergan makes it clear that intellectual light pertains to judgment (as opposed to understanding) insofar as it is what makes possible the questioning, affirmation, and willing that constitute judgment.\textsuperscript{15} The achievement of truth that occurs in judgment varies with the intellectual light by which that judgment occurs: “[h]umans arrive at truth in accordance with their nature through the natural light of the human mind, angels through the natural light of angelic minds, and God through the natural light of the divine mind.”\textsuperscript{16} Whether or not a given object is supernatural to a particular knower is not determined by the object itself, but by the light by which that object is attained; the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for an affirmation that is supernatural to human intellect is not supernatural for a divine knower because God’s grasp of that object is through “the natural light of the divine mind.”\textsuperscript{17} What distinguishes supernatural from natural truth, in other words, is not its truth, because any judgment reaches truth by its nature as a judgment. What distinguishes supernatural from natural truth is in fact the light by which that truth is grasped; thus, the formal object of the judgment of faith as a judgment is truth, but the formal object of the affirmation of faith as a judgment in the light of faith is supernatural truth because it can only be grasped in a light beyond the proportion of any created intellect.\textsuperscript{18}

Because the mysteries of faith are beyond the proportion of the natural light of created intellect, there is a threefold distinction: the light proportionate to the mysteries of faith is natural to God, is attained in the light of glory by those in heaven, and is attained in the light of faith by the faithful in this life, because the light of faith enables knowing by God’s light and God’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{19} Further, because the acts of the faith process that are proximate to the assent of faith itself are acts beyond the proportion of a finite intellect

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 128–9.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 136.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 138. And again, “that truth is supernatural which (1) is naturally unknowable by any finite mind, and (2) is attained through a proportionate light” (136) and “...truth is natural or supernatural, not according to what is known, but according to the light by which it is known” (147).
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 132, 136–7.
\end{itemize}
and they have a formal object beyond the proportion of a finite intellect, gratia elevans is required for their performance. Likewise, depending on the individual limitations, biases, and failures of attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness of individual knowers, gratia sanans is required in order to heal those failures for those acts more remote to the assent of faith.

The attentive reader of these works will see that “Natural Desire” and “Openness” are simpler statements of the principle Lonergan more fully elaborated in his “Analysis.” In “Natural Desire,” there is a statement about the enlargements of horizon involved in the moves from natural knowledge, to knowledge in faith, to beatific knowledge; in “Openness,” gratia elevans lifts the intellect beyond its created proportion, while gratia sanans heals finite failures in performance. What “Analysis” adds to both is the clear emphasis on judgment. Again, because elevating grace and the light of faith have to do with the affirmation of faith, they have to do with judgment: “elevating grace is given to enable one to see the reasonableness of faith as acquired; for this reasonableness by which a person adheres to and relies upon God’s knowledge is above nature.... God’s grace [enlightens] one’s intellect to grasp the sufficiency of the evidence.”

II.2. The Explanatory Specification of ‘Elevation’

Several attributes of elevation can be drawn from this material. In the cognitional context of all three of these examples, unelevated and elevated judgments both reach truth, but there is a formal distinction between the truth reached by these two types of judgment. What Lonergan offers here, in fact, is an explanatory account of elevation: it is the addition of absolutely supernatural formal objects for a judgment in human intentional consciousness. There appears to be no reason why this definition could not be extended to all the levels of consciousness, such that at each of the levels of both knowing and deliberating, an elevated subject has two formal objects – the natural/proportionate and the supernatural/disproportionate. Thus, in terms of cognition, the elevation of central form and the consequent horizon known as the light of faith elevate judgment by allowing the subject to know with God’s own knowledge. Likewise, on the level of decision, the

20 Ibid., 141.
21 Ibid., 142, 145.
22 Ibid., 146, emphasis mine.
elevation of central form and the consequent horizon of evaluation elevate
decision by allowing the subject to evaluate with God’s own values.23

Further, the relation between unelevated and elevated objects must be
specified, and it can be understood as one of obediential potency. Doran’s
previous work with the scale of values, though obviously not mindful of my
developments here, addressed the question of the relation between what I
am calling the elevated and unelevated objects of the level of deliberation.24
Drawing on an idea of Daniel Monsour’s, he suggests that we understand
the relation of the first through fourth levels of the scale of values to the
fifth level of the scale of values as one of obediential potency. Such a notion
should obtain in the levels of consciousness other than the fourth, as well,
such that the relation between the natural and supernatural objects of any
level of consciousness is one of obediential potency.

Finally, this analysis in terms of formal objects is highly metaphysical,
and we wish to emphasize the conscious-intentional side of the issue. Thus,
we must ask what the conscious experience of elevation would be. My
suggestion is that we identify it as an act, the content of which is not fully
accounted for by the act itself. Thus, we can say that the transposition into
the terms of conscious intentionality of what is meant by “a supernatural
object of human knowing” is whatever is intended by an act of knowing
that does not itself account for the knowledge it attains – the knowledge is
received at least partially as gift. Likewise, the transposition into the terms
of conscious intentionality of what is meant by “a supernatural object of
human deliberation” is whatever is intended by an act of deliberation that
does not itself account for the value it grasps – again, the value is received
at least partially as gift.

III. Five Total Levels?

One element of the ongoing discussion about the transposition of sanctifying
grace into the terms of a methodical theology was the possible relevance
of a fifth level in Lonergan’s cognitional-intentional anthropology. Given
that Jacobs-Vandegeer’s solution pertains to the whole subject, and that the

23 This would mean that one’s evaluation is made fully in line with the normative scale
of values (see Robert M. Doran, What is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto,
24 Ibid., 51.
question of a fifth level has been an important element in the discussion on sanctifying grace, any development of that solution must address not only elevation, but also the question of a fifth level.

III.1. Previous Discussion on the Fifth Level

In 1993, Doran took the position that the fifth level was the key to the transposition of sanctifying grace into a methodical theology. In subsequent literature, he has not focused as much on the fifth level itself, but in principle he has until recently maintained that the fifth level was the key to the transposition, despite the fact that the fifth level’s status as a ‘level’ need not be emphasized in order to effect the principle components of the transposition.\(^{25}\)

Michael Vertin, on the other hand, offered a fundamental distinction between two meanings for the term ‘level’ in Lonergan. What he called the “strict” sense of the term is derived from the combination of “ordinary data and the three transcendental notions”: data of consciousness and sense, together with the three transcendental notions of the intelligible, the true, and the good, yield four—and only four—levels.\(^{26}\) Insofar as this is our sense of the term ‘level,’ Vertin denied that there could be a fifth level. However, he also suggested that Lonergan had a “wide” sense of the term ‘level,’ by which he meant a “place occupied by some element in an intelligible pattern whose basic elements are (a) ordinary data, (b) the transcendental notions, and (c) what [Vertin called] the agapic datum, namely, religious experience, the feeling of unrestricted being in love, the fundamental datum of religious consciousness.”\(^{27}\) Within this understanding of ‘level,’ Vertin held that it was possible to affirm five levels, insofar as the fifth level incorporates that agapic datum.

Patrick Byrne, for his part, emphasized the underlying self-presence of the subject, as distinguished (but not separated) from the subject’s operations. He then granted the possibility of a fifth level insofar as the subject as subject

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\(^{25}\) In addition to the aforementioned “Consciousness and Grace” (n.1 above), see Robert M. Doran, “Revisiting ‘Consciousness and Grace,’” \textit{METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies} 13 (1995) 151 – 160 and idem., \textit{What Is Systematic Theology}, 112 – 116. Personal communication with Fr. Doran has revealed that he now believes that Jacobs-Vandegeer’s solution is the better option.


\(^{27}\) Ibid., 21.
can perform operations out of a self-presence characterized as the state of being in love unrestrictedly.\textsuperscript{28}

On the other hand, Tad Dunne, the final participant in the original mid-1990s conversation, essentially agreed with Vertin that Lonergan did not intend to affirm a distinct fifth level of consciousness. However, as with Vertin, there was for Dunne a sense in which one could speak of a fifth level. He noted that Lonergan affirmed something beyond the fourth level of human consciousness,\textsuperscript{29} and he distinguished between levels one through four, which have questions as operators, and this fifth level, the operator of which is not a question. Instead, for Dunne this fifth level “constitutes the subject as a term of an interpersonal relation, which the four lower levels do not,”\textsuperscript{30} and indeed, Lonergan “seems to recognize that our families, friends and communities exercise an enticement on consciousness that performs an operator function similar to the draw of God’s own self-communication in Word and Spirit.”\textsuperscript{31}

Jacobs-Vandegeer, finally, noted that because sanctifying grace is an entitative habit, “a coherent explanation of sanctifying grace in a methodical theology...will not identify the ‘dynamic state’ itself with a particular level in any sense of the word.”\textsuperscript{32} Thus, for him fifth level references in Lonergan most likely pertain to actual grace, and a full account of such actual grace would require a more developed notion of human cooperation.

\textit{III.2. New Data on the Fifth Level}

Clearly there is significant lack of agreement regarding the fifth level. Yet, the recent discovery in the Lonergan archives of two more records of question-and-answer sessions, from the Lonergan Workshops of 1977 and 1980, has offered up further data on the fifth-level question that may begin to clarify the answer.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{itemize}
\item[30] Ibid.
\item[31] Ibid., 165.
\item[33] Many thanks to Robert M. Doran for the opportunity to make use of this material mere days after he noticed it in the archives.
\end{itemize}
III.2.1. The 1977 Lonergan Workshop

In the question session from Tuesday, June 20, 1977, the following question and reply can be found:34

**Question:** Would your post-Insight reflection on the objective referent of fourth-level religious experience be the same as the theistic argument of Chapter 19 of *Insight*? If not, what form would it take?

**Answer:** ... it has an objective reference because love is to another, of another, so there's an objective reference to the experience once it is identified as love . . . .

Again, the — "the objective referent of fourth-level religious experience"35 — I conceive it more and more explicitly since about 1972 as a fifth level. This gift of God's love . . . is as much a sublation of all that goes before as any of the others are sublations of what went before them . . . .

Now, the experience of falling in love, how is it — it's a different experience, as being in love with God is something different from any of these other things because we haven't had being in love on those levels — we have it on a separate level. How does one tie together the objective referent of being in love with the teleology of questioning on the level of intellect or the level of reason — rationality — on the level of deliberation? I think the connecting link we find by going to the unconscious.

There are, in consciousness, horizontal finalities. The finality of attention: we wake up, see the world about us . . . learn to live in it. On the level of inquiry, we head for all that is intelligible. On the level of reflection, to all truth and reality. On the level of deliberation, to all that is good.

Now, the unconscious is related to all of these finalities with a vertical finality. How do the insights happen? They happen because the appropriate image comes into consciousness. And whether you call it the censor or whatever you please, what releases that image?

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34 I have eliminated elements of Lonergan's long answer that are less important for our examination.

35 His tone indicates that he is quoting the questioner, and he stresses 'fourth' when he does so.
Well, it’s released from the unconscious – it was a potential image that has become an actual image, and it’s just the image that gives you the insight that you were looking for. Again, it leads to truth. Why? By recalling memories that confirm or oppose the judgment you’re thinking of making. Or again, by envisaging possibilities, imagining possibilities, that would run counter to the judgment, or on the other hand, favor it. To the process of deliberation, by memories and images that remind us of our uneasy conscience, or warn us of the perils of our proposed course of action . . .

And finally, it’s related to being in love, for being in love is the consummation of unconscious desire . . .

God’s gift of his love is the agape that sublates eros . . . .

Here, we note several points. First, it is clear that for Lonergan, love is a conscious experience, and it is not in the abstract; it is about the concrete ‘other’ who is the object. Love is constituted as the relation between the conscious subject performing the operation of love and the other whom that operation intends. To fully explicate this, we would have to present an extended foray into Lonergan’s understanding of contingent predication, but in order that we might provide some understanding here, let us turn to Doran’s use of this notion in his original 1993 article. As he put it,

the reception of the love of another person for us changes us in such a way as to enable us to perform operations and experience states which previously were not within our capacity . . . [and] the love of another person for us is somehow constitutive of us . . . and not in the manner of a formal cause, but in the manner of inviting us into a relation to the one who loves us, who would thus be one term of the relationship.

For our purposes, we can say that the fifth level is constituted insofar as the subject operating is also operated on; it is a union of object and intending operator.

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37 Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” 75; see also 62 – 63.
38 On a related point, though cast in different language, see Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990) 163 – 169, where he discusses “[t]he actuation by the object of an openness to the object” and he relates this to material from
Second, the questioner is addressing what is termed "fourth-level religious experience," but Lonergan wants to emphasize that calling it "fourth-level" is inadequate. Instead, he clearly maintains that religious experience is fifth-level as over-against fourth-level. The proper understanding of the fifth level as a distinct level, was best explained in Lonergan's typewritten notes where 'love' was explained in language that Lonergan did not get use in his oral remarks: there, he wrote that "love is subjectivity linked to others."

Third, Lonergan explicitly affirms that the relation between this fifth level of love and the fourth level of deliberation parallels the relation between higher and lower levels in the already-accepted levels of consciousness. There is no reason, then, to suppose that the relation between the fifth and fourth levels is significantly different from the relation between the fourth and third, the third and second, or the second and first.

Fourth and finally, Lonergan explains the relation between the vertical desire toward being in love and actual (fulfilled) being in love as agape sublating eros. In other words, self-oriented desire is sublated by self-giving desire; one's desire becomes constituted by the benefit of the other rather than by the benefit of the self.

III.2.2. The 1980 Lonergan Workshop

The Workshop materials from Wednesday, June 18, 1980, contain the following exchange:

Question: There seems to be a case for recognizing the fourth level of consciousness as, in fact, two levels, corresponding to the "what-to-do?" and "is-it-to-be-done?" questions. Could you please explain why you do not, in fact, separate such levels as a fourth and a fifth?

Answer: Well, I suppose for the past ten years, I've been tending to call it a distinction, but I haven't written about it yet . . . as far as I know. I may have alluded to it. But, I do think that experience; understanding; judgments of fact, probability, and possibility are three levels. Moral judgments are a fourth. And this complete self-transcendence of falling


39 Lonergan's tone in the audio makes this very clear.
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in love on the domestic level, the civil level, and the religious level, are a fifth level. It’s the achievement of self-transcendence... you no longer count, or are thinking only of yourself. And my illustration of people who begin to forget about themselves, is when I was doing ministry at Dalkeith... And at one house that I was to go to, the lady of the house, her daughter wasn’t there, but I was to see her daughter explain to her daughter that she was out of that house and would never see her mother again if she married the Protestant she was intending to marry. And I was to put this point across clearly. So I saw the daughter, said what I could. Everything I could say to her... She only thought of what he’d do... It was complete self-transcendence. They were already two in one flesh—at least potentially. And, she wasn’t thinking of herself at all, she was thinking of—of him... Anyway, it’s an example of what is meant by self-transcendence—it’s self-forgetting...41

Here Lonergan insists that he has moved in the direction of distinguishing a fourth and fifth level for ten years (since about 1970). Moreover, one cannot miss Lonergan’s clear insistence that he considers there to be five levels: (1) experience; (2) understanding; (3) judgments of fact, probability, possibility; (4) moral judgments; and (5) falling in love. Finally, this fifth level is subdivided into (or at least encompasses) domestic, civil, and religious loves, and it is characterized as the level of self-transcendence, self-forgetting, the level at which the subject is no longer thinking of him—or herself.

III.3. Lonergan’s Development of a Fifth Level: A Hypothesis

It appears, then, that we can posit a development in Lonergan’s thought between 1970 and at least 1982, for which there are several signposts, some of which have been indicated previously in this discussion. Establishing something of a starting point, in the 1970 article “The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World,” Lonergan identified the presence of the gift of God’s love as located at “the topmost level” of consciousness—

40 The recording is less than optimal here, but the point still comes across.
41 Bernard Lonergan Archive: Resources in Lonergan Studies, http://www.bernardlonergan.com, files 28860DTE080 (typewritten notes) and 28860ATE080 (audio).
here identified as the fourth.\textsuperscript{42} Then, in “Philosophy of God, and Theology” (1972), Lonergan suggested that the dynamic state of being in love with God is a “transvaluation of values” that “you can say [is] on the fifth level.”\textsuperscript{43} Next, in the 1977 archival materials, Lonergan stated that he thought of love and subjectivity-as-linked-to-others “quite explicitly now as fifth level.”\textsuperscript{44} Then, in “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” (1977/8), he affirmed that “beyond the moral operator that promotes us from judgments of fact to judgments of value...there is a further realm of interpersonal relations and total commitment....”\textsuperscript{45} Finally, in the 1980 archival material, he stated that he had “long moved in” the direction of distinguishing a fifth level, one that appeared to be derived by positing the sublation of deliberation by self-forgetting love.

Admittedly, the clean stream of development suggested here encounters an apparent difficulty in material from the question sessions at the 1982 Lonergan Workshop.\textsuperscript{46} There, Lonergan appeared to reaffirm only four levels, especially when he stated that “if you have religious consciousness as well as moral, it takes over the moral; it’s a perfection added to the moral, with a broader horizon. So we’re back to four.”\textsuperscript{47} Yet, it would be odd for Lonergan to have moved toward affirming five levels for ten years, only to suddenly deny the fifth level in 1982. How then is one to understand this statement of Lonergan’s?

I think the key is the context provided by the question to which this statement was an answer, which read, in part: “Since the levels of functional specialization are correlated with the levels of intentional consciousness, would this not imply the addition of two further, ‘fifth-level’ functional


\textsuperscript{44} Bernard Lonergan Archive: Resources in Lonergan Studies, http://www.bernardlonergan.com, file 28880DTE070.


\textsuperscript{46} This material was previously cited in Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness,” 16 – 21.

\textsuperscript{47} Bernard Lonergan Archive: Resources in Lonergan Studies, http://www.bernardlonergan.com, files 30400DTE080 (typewritten notes) and 30400ATE080 (audio).
specialties?" Lonergan's answer, then, was with regard to functional specialties in the methodical performance of theology, and it is in that sense that we must take his answer. I think the best way to understand him here is to acknowledge that in the doing of theology, religious/revealed values take the place of immanently-generated values, and it is in that sense that Lonergan meant that the religious takes over the moral level. This interpretation of Lonergan's 1982 comments fits best with the previous ten years of Lonergan's development on this question as it can be understood from our current data.

Given these data, however, it is ironic that in relation to the discussion about sanctifying grace as it developed from Doran's initial article up through Jacobs-Vandegeer's contribution, Lonergan's possible affirmation of a fifth level may be less important than initially supposed. His primary affirmation in relation to the fifth level is that it is a fifth level of love, not (proximately, at least) a fifth level of religious experience. That is, Lonergan seems to be indicating that this level is constituted by love and that the level constituted by love is the level of consciousness at which religious experience is had, not that the fifth level is constituted by religious experience. Moreover, given that his primary examples of love are the love of community, of spouse, and of God, only one of which is intrinsically supernatural or disproportionate love, a fifth level of love need not be posited as the level, or even the proper effect, of sanctifying grace in consciousness. In other words, one can discuss the fifth level without the proximate intention of dealing with the issue of sanctifying grace.

On the other hand, because Jacobs-Vandegeer's solution hypothesizes that sanctifying grace be transposed as the elevation of central form manifested in the enrichment of consciousness and his solution therefore pertains to the whole structure of intentional consciousness, it will not do to simply affirm a fifth level "of love" and leave it at that. A full appropriation

48 Ibid.
49 Byrne made a similar point: "Consciousness," 144 – 145, n.33.
50 The same basic reply could be made to Dunne's citation of Lonergan's 1981 comments in Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen M. Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982) 19 (Dunne, "Being in Love," 163). Despite the position I am taking here on the existence of a fifth level, I would also maintain that there is a sense in which one can speak of only four levels (see below, n. 58). Regarding this question with respect to the functional specialties themselves, see Doran, What Is Systematic Theology, 116 – 117.
51 Lonergan, Method, 105.
of Jacobs-Vandegeer’s thesis requires a fuller account of the structure of the fifth level, requiring the identification of a fifth-level operation, a fifth-level question, and a fifth-level object, so that the structure of the entire elevated subject might be acknowledged.

III.4. Developing the Fifth Level: Operation, Question, Object

The fifth-level operation was in a sense specified by Lonergan himself in the 1980 archival material. There, he characterized the fifth level as “falling in love,” a description immediately followed in the typewritten notes with the parenthetical notation, “(complete self-transcendence).” Although each cognitional operation – experiencing, understanding, judging, and deliberating – is an example of self-transcendence, Lonergan specifically identifies the operation of the fifth level as complete self-transcendence, and it is this completeness that distinguishes it from the self-transcendence of the previous four levels. This complete self-transcendence, which he also identified there as “self-forgetting” and “no longer thinking only of oneself,” I would identify as the giving of one’s whole self or ‘self-gift.’ In this context love is the self-possessed handing over of one’s central form to the determination of another.

With respect to the fifth-level question, it can be identified as “What would you have me do?” and it is present throughout all three of Lonergan’s examples of love. In the love of community, one asks what the community would have one do in order to be an authentic member of the community. In terms of the love between spouses, one seeks to give oneself to one’s spouse by asking the same question. Finally, in one’s relationship to God, one asks what God would have one do in order to know, for example, one’s vocation or the proper theological-ethical position to take on a given issue. If the operation is the complete handing over of one’s central form to another, the question seeks to specify the content of that handing over; in other words, it seeks to know what one is to do in order to make one’s whole being subservient to that other.

52 I am indebted to Matthew Peters, a doctoral student in the MU Philosophy Department, and Anne M. Carpenter, a doctoral student in the MU Theology Department, for this formulation of the question.

53 Though I have incorporated the notion of central form where he did not explicitly do so, this position on loving is not foreign to Lonergan’s own writings. See, for example, Method, 33: “So, mutual love is the intertwining of two lives. It transforms an ‘I’ and ‘thou’ into a ‘we’
Recall that elevation as we defined it above does not directly affect the question or the operation at any of the levels. Rather, the change comes in the specification of a supernatural formal object at each of the levels, and this formal distinction is operative at the level of love just as it is operative at the other levels. Moreover, it is clear that for Lonergan the fifth level is constituted by love, and again, “love is subjectivity linked to others.” Love is thus concerned with other subjects, not as objects, but as subjects; it is precisely and of its nature interpersonal. Its object is persons as persons, and as elevated, the object of the fifth level of love remains interpersonal, but it becomes an absolutely supernatural personal object – namely, the divine persons of the Trinity.

Thus, elevation in this fifth level functions just as it does in the other levels. The elevation of central form and the consequent horizon of loving elevate loving by allowing the subject to love with God’s own love; the natural and supernatural objects of loving are in a relationship of obediential potency; and finally, the transposition into the terms of conscious intentionality of what is meant by “a supernatural object of human loving” is whatever is intended by an act of loving that does not of itself account for the love it embodies – the love that is that act is received as gift.³⁴

CONCLUSION

Doran was right to pursue the transposition of the metaphysical element, sanctifying grace, into the categories of an intentionality analysis, and his initial suggestions have served as an impetus to clarify both that transposition and the existence and/or structure of the fifth level. He has since modified and developed his position, and he has been supportive of both Jacobs-Vandegeer in his hypothesis on the elevation of central form and my suggestions on the explanatory specification of elevation and the clarification of the fifth level.

Vertin, for his part, was certainly on the right track when he affirmed that “the root of the difference between ordinary living and religious living is religious experience, the feeling of being in love unrestrictedly, what I am so intimate, so secure, so permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both.”

³⁴ I would suggest that this – love received as gift – is illuminative of Lonergan’s repeated references to Romans 5:5.
labeling ‘the agapic datum,’ [which] appears within the horizon of conscious intentionality as an intrinsic enrichment of the transcendental notions in their conscious dimension.” Furthermore, when he affirmed that “[b]y virtue of the agapic datum, the transcendental notions...become notions of holiness” and that one’s operations become, under the influence of the agapic datum, “not ordinary operations but religious ones, operations radically both motivated and oriented and normed by the feeling of unrestricted being in love,” Vertin was witnessing to the distinction between the elevated and unelevated formal objects of the operations. Indeed, if one were to replace the notion of the agapic datum with the notion of an enriched unity of consciousness, many of his statements would be largely in accord with the position I have presented in this paper. Moreover, his distinction between the “strict” and the “wide” senses of ‘level’ grasps a fundamental fact about the levels of consciousness: whereas the “zeroth” level of the psyche could be said to be non-intentional, and the four levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are properly intentional, the fifth level as we have characterized it here would more accurately be termed trans-intentional. Its intention is not, strictly speaking, immanently generated but is open to alterity and is received from another in answer to the question, “What would you have me do?” Thus, Vertin’s distinction between the ‘strict’ and the ‘wide’ levels pertains to their type of intentionality – proper intentionality on the one hand, and either non- or trans-intentionality on the other.

As Jacobs-Vandegeer noted, Byrne had grasped the fundamental point: that the solution to this problem lay in considering the subject as subject. He appears to have come very close to Jacobs-Vandegeer’s solution, as well as my developments of that solution, at many points. What was needed was the distinction between the fifth level per se and the elevation of central form that Jacobs-Vandegeer developed. The latter’s insight into the adequate transposition of sanctifying grace coupled with my development herein of the specifics of elevation and the fifth level generate a position that appears to be well in line with Byrne’s initial thoughts on the matter.

56 Ibid., 24 – 25.
57 Byrne, “Consciousness,” 131, n.3.
58 Again, a similar point applies to Lonergan’s comments in Caring About Meaning that were referenced by Dunne (see above, n. 50).
There is also a great deal of agreement, though more qualified, between our position and that developed by Dunne. Although he denied a fifth level of consciousness, he indeed affirmed Lonergan’s recognition of a level beyond the fourth level of conscious intentionality. Yet he suggested that the operator is not a question, but that instead this fifth level “constitutes the subject as a term of an interpersonal relation.” I think his essential concern here accords with what we have said above about contingent external predication, but to clarify this we would suggest that, rather than denying the existence of a fifth-level question, the better solution would be to affirm the co-presence of the question with its answer. It is only in encounter with the beloved – in the attainment of the object – that one is able to ask, “What would you have me do?” Conversely, it is only in the asking of the question that one is able to see the other as the one for whom one wishes to act.

The basic and initial supposition herein was that Jacobs-Vandegeer was right to identify sanctifying grace as an elevation of central form that is manifested as an enlargement of the unity of consciousness. This article complements and develops his position by suggesting an explanatory account of elevation in consciousness as well as by specifying the existence, operation, question, and object of the fifth level. In relation to the ongoing discussion concerning sanctifying grace and the fifth level, it is clear that each of the original contributors had valuable insights, but I would suggest that the position initially attained by Jacobs-Vandegeer and more fully developed herein offers a standpoint from which to more fruitfully move forward on these issues.

That position I offer here in a summary fashion in hopes that it will both serve as a focal point for critical examination of my proposals and offer a point of departure for future development:

Sanctifying grace is to be transposed into the terms of a theology derived from the categories of interiority by identifying it with the elevation of central form manifested in consciousness as an intrinsic enrichment of the unity of consciousness. Such elevation is constituted by the addition of an absolutely supernatural formal object for each operation of consciousness, which in terms of conscious experience is to be identified as an act attaining an object which cannot fully be accounted for in terms of that act. The consciousness of the human subject of these operations is constituted by five levels, the

topmost of which is the level of loving self-gift, the consummation of unconscious desire, which is to be understood as a self-possessed handing over of one's central form to the determination of another in which is effected the co-presence of the operator and the person who is the object of the operation.
LIVING IN THE ARTISTRY OF GOD:
BERNARD LONERGAN’S INTERPRETATION OF
THOMIST VOLITIONAL THEORY

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Of his experiences interpreting the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bernard Lonergan, in the final pages of his *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, wrote the following:

After spending several years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, I came to a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, that reaching had changed me profoundly. On the other hand, that change was the essential benefit. For not only did it make me capable of grasping what, in the light of my conclusions, the *vetera* really were, but also it opened challenging vistas on what the *nova* could be.¹

This article focuses on the *vetera*. It unfolds what Lonergan determined “the *vetera* really were” in the Thomist theory of human willing, and explains how Aquinas’ volitional theory fits into the broad sweep of Thomist thought on providence and grace. Lonergan’s works offer an incisive and compelling assemblage of some of the pertinent textual data on these topics. He recognized distinct, often subtle, evolutionary moments in Aquinas’ understanding of human willing, and was able to consider the import of maturing individual insights in relation to the systematic achievement of Thomist thought. In the first section, I outline the schema of volitional activity that Lonergan retrieved from Aquinas’ texts, and I emphasize the importance of three of its aspects for its theoretical account.

of the psychological data on decision-making: namely, (1) the relation between intellect and will in the deliberative process, (2) the distinct causes of diverse operations in the will, (3) and its conclusion on the nature of human freedom. The Thomist theory of human willing identifies a series of functionally interrelated operations in a unified pattern of deliberation and choice. The first section of this article clarifies the theory’s essential elements in the framework of a faculty psychology. In subsequent sections, I discuss Lonergan’s interpretations of the Thomist theories of providence and universal instrumentality, and highlight how the explanation of human willing relates internally to these general theories. In the final section, I discuss how, in Lonergan’s analysis, Aquinas applied instrumental theory and his theory of the will to the doctrine of grace to explain how human persons choose their connatural and supernatural ends. Emphasizing the interconnections among the theories of will, providence, instrumentality, and the theology of grace, I argue that Lonergan situates Aquinas’ volitional theory as a constitutive part in a comprehensive view of how human living unfolds in the universal context of divinely orchestrated world order.

This study also offers a measure of what a methodical transposition of Aquinas’ theory of human willing would need to consider in relation to Aquinas’ theological systematics. Lonergan held the Thomist view of human willing in his Latin works and incorporated it into his early theological contributions. If a methodical theology – a theology grounded in the conscious-intentional operations and states of the existential subject – should respond faithfully to the Leonine adage (vetera novis augere et perficere, to augment and perfect the old with the new), which Lonergan cited as instructive in developing his methodical project, then it needs to determine the relation (i.e., “genetic, complementary, or dialectical,” in Lonergan’s terminology) of Thomist volitional theory to the categories of interiorly differentiated consciousness. Again, though my article focuses entirely on Lonergan’s insights into what “the vetera really were” in Aquinas’s theory of the will, it opens, or at least anticipates, “challenging vistas on what the nova could be.” In the concluding section, I remark briefly on what this study may imply for methodical transpositions of Thomist volitional theory.

**The Mature Theory**

In Gratia Operans, Lonergan retrieved from the Thomistic corpus a significantly complex, coherent theory of the human will. Charting various
and oftentimes subtle changes in the texts, Lonergan argued that Aquinas developed and refined his thought over time on many key points of the theory, gradually overcoming the errors and oversights of other thinkers before finally articulating a view of human willing that adequately grounds a systematic exposition of the doctrine of grace. Of the errors of which Aquinas rid himself, perhaps the most important (i.e., in view of his theological achievement) lies in the Aristotelian understanding of the causal relation between the intellect and the will.3

Aristotle taught that the human will spontaneously desires whatever object the intellect proposes to it under the notion of the good. Depicting the will as a purely passive potency, Aristotle argued that the intellect – not the will itself – determines the act of willing.3 Lonergan suggested that Aquinas never strictly held to the Aristotelian view.4 Though Aquinas did not spell out the precise relation of intellect and will for the greater part of his career, he emphasized the fundamental thesis that “the free agent is the cause of its own determination.”5 His tendency to emphasize human self-determination may explain why he discussed the will and free choice in separate questions, even after he had explicitly rejected the idea of his teacher, Albert the Great, who contended that free choice constitutes a third potency distinct from the other two faculties.6

After returning to France from Italy in 1269, Aquinas walked into the heavy controversy over the Parisian Averroists’ assertion that the act of willing remains strictly determined.7 He worked out the relation between intellect and will in the context of this debate.8 As a Christian thinker, Aquinas needed to explain how to reconcile the freedom of the will with the causal dependence on God that all created activity shares. The liberty of the will negates neither its relation to intellect nor the governance of the divine artisan in human decisions. Aquinas met these exigencies by articulating

3 Ibid. 95; In III De anima, lect. 15, §830.
4 Lonergan, CWL 1 96, 319 n. 13.
5 Ibid. 318.
6 Ibid.
8 Lonergan, CWL 1, 97.
the theory of human willing that one finds quite maturely expressed in the *De malo* and *Prima secundae*. The schema that Lonergan recognized in those texts appears in some form throughout all of his own early theological works on whatever topic of discussion requires a view of human willing.\(^9\)

In his reading of Aquinas' mature position, Lonergan argued that Aquinas made a series of distinctions among functionally diverse mental activities in the analysis of deliberation and choice. Firstly, Aquinas identified two different operations in the will: one regarding the end, and the other the means. Secondly, he distinguished between the exercise of the act and the specification of its object. On the relation between the faculties, he explained that the will depends on the intellect for the *specification* of the object it desires (i.e., the end); the intellect apprehends and proposes to the will the good that specifies the goal of its inclination. On the other hand, the *exercise* of the act of willing the end depends on the efficient action of God. In turn, the act of willing the end moves the intellect to counsel on means to attaining the end. Once the intellect rates possible means according to their relative merit, it specifies the act of willing that chooses among the alternatives it presents. Finally, the will moves itself to the act of willing the means. Lonergan explained:

\[...\text{in the *De malo* a distinction is drawn between the two lines of causation that converge in effecting the act of choice in the will: there is the line of causation *quaed specificationem actus*; there is another line *quaed exercitium actus*. Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means.}^{10}\]

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\(^9\) For examples beyond the texts already cited in this section's exposition of Lonergan's interpretation, see his (currently unpublished) essays: "De ente supernaturali," (1946) ["On the Supernatural Order," trans. Michael G. Shields (unpublished manuscript, 2001)]; "De Scientia atque voluntate Dei" (1950) ["God's Knowledge and Will," trans. Michael G. Shields (unpublished manuscript, 2000)]. If methodical theologies should preserve insights from Lonergan's early works, then the fact that Lonergan incorporated this view of willing in his own systematic efforts in the early years of his scholarly career only underscores the significance of his interpretation of Thomist volitional theory for the methodical challenge of its transposition into the categories of interiority.

\(^{10}\) Lonergan, CWL 1 102.
Rejecting the Aristotelian view of the will as a purely passive faculty, Aquinas eliminated the position that isolates the intellect as the first mover. Instead, he asserted two first movers: the intellect for the specification of the act, and God for its exercise. "Both are required for the emergence of an act of choice; on the other hand, the lack of either will explain the absence of the subsequent process of taking counsel and choosing." Aquinas thus explained the will in terms of its passive and active acts. It passively receives the act of willing the end, but actively moves itself to a choice of the means.

The basic idea of the will moving itself to act remains consistent with the analysis of efficient causality that corresponds to Aquinas' notion that second act constitutes active potency. In order for an agent actually to act (actu agere), it must already exist in act itself. Though the will requires the efficient action of God to bring it to act with respect to its end, it needs no more than the presentation of suitable means for it to move itself to an act of choice. The same second act in the will at once constitutes the received perfection of the will (i.e., the willing of the end) and possesses the causal efficacy for the production of the act of choice. Analogously, the same second act at once constitutes the received perfection of the possible intellect (i.e., intelligere) and possesses the causal efficacy for the production of the inner word that spontaneously proceeds.

The analysis includes different kinds of functionally interrelated operations in the context of a unified pattern of human willing. On this point, Frederick E. Crowe draws a parallel between Aquinas' analysis of the will and Lonergan's analysis of human knowing, which he described as a "dynamic structure...not some single operation or activity but...a whole whose parts are cognitional activities." On the relations among the

11 Ibid.
13 Lonergan, CWL 2 146-47.
14 On freedom and necessity in the will, Aquinas wrote, "The end is the reason for willing means, and so the will is dissimilarly related to each" (De malo q. 6, a. 1, ad 8m).
parts, Lonergan said: "the parts of a structure are related to one another, not by similarity, but functionally...there is no reason to expect the several cognitional activities to resemble one another...each...must be examined in and for itself and...in its functional relations to other cognitional activities."¹⁶ Crowe suggests, in a commentary on these remarks, that "in a similar way...willing is a dynamic structure, the parts are related to one another functionally, and there is no reason to expect the several activities of will to resemble one another – for example to attribute freedom and necessity in the same way to every activity."¹⁷

Crowe's comments outline the shape of his response to a more recent installment in a debate with a long history over the liberty of the will and the interpretation of Aquinas.¹⁸ By emphasizing the functional interactions of diverse operations, Crowe highlights the theoretical underpinnings of the definition of freedom that Lonergan recognized in the later De malo and Prima secundae periods. In the complex process of human willing, Aquinas opposed freedom to necessity in one and the same act, but complemented the one with the other in the integral process of the whole pattern. In other words, freedom and necessity are qualities of different kinds of acts. Though the act of willing the end arises spontaneously, it remains a passive act produced in the will by the efficient action of an external mover; it is not free; "in later Thomist doctrine...such passivity [is] incompatible with freedom."¹⁹ On the other hand, the will moves itself to a choice of the means; it is free and not necessitated. Though the operations differ in kind, the entire process forms an integral whole where the latter presupposes the former. Since Lonergan stated quite plainly that "there is no question of

¹⁶ Ibid. 207-8.
freedom in the realm of ends," it seems reasonable to affirm, by way of a definition, that "if freedom means anything at all, it means freedom from necessity (that is, freedom of choice). Such freedom pertains only to acts of willing means."21

Aquinas took this analysis of the will and the parallel theorem of universal instrumentality and applied them to the doctrine of grace. He achieved a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the doctrine. In the sections that follow, I discuss important parts of his theological systematics in view of highlighting the following aspects of the theory of the will presented above: (1) the relation between intellect and will in human decisions, (2) the distinct causes of diverse operations in the will, and (3) the nature of human freedom. For a recap, Lonergan sketched the positions of the later Aquinas on these three points in the following paragraph.

A distinction is drawn between the specification and the exercise of the free act; the former is caused by the appetibile (desirable thing), the latter by the internal mover of the will. This internal mover is God with regard to the will of the end, the will itself with regard to the will of the means.22

**Divine Providence and Universal Instrumentality**

When Aquinas articulated his theory of divine providence in the *Contra gentiles*, he combined Christian doctrine with the Aristotelian idea of terrestrial contingency to achieve a theoretical explanation of how God foresees, plans, and brings about each and every created event.23

In his refutation of determinism, Aristotle appealed to "the fortuitous combinations and interferences of causes" that he labeled the *per accidens*.24 On these grounds, he undercut the fundamental assumptions of the determinist by showing that if an obstruction or interference occurs, an effect may not necessarily follow from a given cause. He also referred to the *per accidens* to argue that an effect may not have a cause *per se*. For example, no causal

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20 Lonergan, CWL 1 364.
23 Lonergan referred to Book 3 of the *Summa contra gentiles*.
24 Lonergan, CWL 1 79.
relationship exists between the tattered condition and the whiteness of my copy of Grace and Freedom. Though my copy of the book truly is tattered and truly is white, one would search in vain for a causal relationship between the two predicates. Aristotle attributed this kind of unnecessary combination of effects to the *per accidens*, which, he argued, reduces to the indeterminacy or multi-potentiality of prime matter (the principle of individuation).\(^{25}\) Since prime matter possesses intelligibility on an extrinsic basis only (i.e., in form), and itself remains indeterminate, Aristotle considered the objective absence of intelligibility for the *per accidens* as absolute. The *per accidens* does not count among the objects of science because it does not admit explanation.\(^{26}\)

Aristotle's consideration of terrestrial contingency as lacking determinate causality may seem on the surface as an outright contradiction to the Christian belief in the certitude of divine providence for all created events. In fact, Scotus dismissed Aristotle as "a benighted pagan" on this point.\(^{27}\) Aquinas, however, took the opposite track of salvaging as much of Aristotle as Christian teaching possibly could allow. In the *Contra gentiles*, he achieved the higher synthesis that acknowledges the lack of a natural cause for the *per accidens*, but attributes each and every coincidence, conjunction, and combination of contingent causes and effects to the plan of the divine artisan. Aquinas did not deny the idea of terrestrial contingency. Rather, he affirmed the transcendence of God and the causal certitude of providential design.\(^{28}\)

Aquinas stated: *Deus omnia applicat*, God applies all agents to their activities. His assertion arose out of his understanding of God as an intellectual agent.\(^{29}\) Since all agents act according to the mode of their substance, it follows that in God, the pure act in whom principle of action and substance remain identical, divine knowing, willing, and being are one. Hence, Aquinas stated that "God therefore moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect."\(^{30}\) He then drew out the implication. If contingent events belong to the *per accidens* in the created order, still they ultimately relate to God as "the *causa per se* of every coincidence...every

\(^{25}\) Ibid. 80.
\(^{26}\) Ibid. 375 n. 146.
\(^{27}\) Ibid. 80.
\(^{28}\) Ibid. 81-82.
\(^{29}\) Ibid. 280-87.
\(^{30}\) "Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines" (Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 14, 129). See Lonergan, CWL 1 82.
conjunction of causes, every combination of effects."31 For all of its random and chance occurrences, the concrete universe perfectly reflects the mind of the divine artisan.

Though later theologians explained the certitude of providence for all created events in terms of the special divine intervention in each created act, Aquinas explained the certainty of each act in terms of the providential design of the whole.32 He asserted that God applies all agents to their activities because he understood God in terms of an Aristotelian first mover and an intellectual agent. The cause of all motion causes each particular motion "inasmuch as his mind plans and his will intends...the dynamic pattern of the universe."33 Aquinas claimed not only that all motion in the universe conforms to the divine plan, but also that – having adopted the Aristotelian cosmic hierarchy – "this plan calls for a hierarchic universe in which the lowest things are moved by the middlemost and the middlemost by the highest."34 On this point, Lonergan noted that at all times Aquinas affirmed a mediated execution of divine providence. His emphasis on mediation consistently implies his correlative teaching on universal instrumentality.

Aquinas defined an instrument as a lower cause moved by a higher cause in order to produce an effect "within the category proportionate to the higher."35 In the cosmic hierarchy, all causes are moved except the highest; therefore, all causes, save the highest, are instruments. However, a lower cause requires some participation in the productive capacity of the higher cause in order to produce effects proportionate to the higher. Since each and every effect occurs in the category of being – and the only cause proportionate to the production of existence is the one in whom essence and esse are identical – each and every created action implies some participation of the universal principle of being proper to God alone. But what is this participation of the universal principle of being that actual activity in the created order requires and that Aquinas labeled virtus artis, intentio, esse incompletum [power of art, intention, incomplete being]?36

31 Lonergan, CWL 1 286.
32 Ibid. 79.
33 Ibid. 286.
34 Ibid. 76.
35 Ibid. 83; Aquinas, De veritate, q. 27, aa. 4 and 7.
36 Lonergan, CWL 1 83-84, 292.
Aquinas argued that all created agents have impressed upon them some participation in the design of the divine artisan. He called that productive capacity received by lower causes from the universal principle of being "fate," and explained that fate stands as the created counterpart to the providential design that God intellectually intends. The key to the theory of universal instrumentality lies in the fact that Aquinas viewed God as an intellectual agent, and he grasped what his view implies: actual created activity postulates some participation in the divinely ordained order of the concrete universe. All created action, all motion, reduces to the plan God has for the cosmos. Lonergan explained:

...this divine plan has a twofold existence: primarily it exists in the mind of God, and there it is termed providence; secondarily it exists in the created universe and there it is termed fate. The parallel seems manifest: if providence is the art of the divine artisan, then fate is the virtus artis in his tools...What then is fate? It is the order of secondary causes; it is their disposition, arrangement, seriation; it is not a quality, and much less is it a substance; it is in the category of relation. Together such relations give a single fate for the universe; taken singly, they give the many fates of Virgil’s line, ‘Te tua fata trahunt [your fates draw you].’

Regarding the instrumental power (virtus instrumentalis) that agents require for actual action to occur, Aquinas defined it as the order of contingent events – the necessary and sufficient conditions that enable particular secondary causes to produce their effects at specific moments in time. For example, when (former) Maple Leafs forward, Mats Sundin, has a breakaway chance at a shot on goal, there are an incredible number of causes and conditions presupposed by the actual occurrence of the shot. Not only does Mats need a puck to shoot and ice to skate on, but he also has to meet the puck in the appropriate place at the appropriate time to get behind the defense. Although Mats shoots the puck, he has no control over the vast web of conditions that his activity presupposes and that God alone is proportionate to fulfilling. Since God accounts for the endless range of relations that make possible any given instance of created efficient causality, each and every finite cause requires some instrumental power or

37 Ibid. 85, 293.
38 Ibid. 85-86. See Aquinas, ST 1, q. 116, a.2, ad 3m.
participation in the productive capacity of the first cause. The instrumental power, then, is fate, "and fate is simply the dynamic pattern of such relations – the pattern through which the design of the divine artisan unfolds in natural and human history." For Aquinas, the infinite movements of the cosmos of which we are an integral and incredibly significant part take place under the direction of "a transcendental artisan planning history: 'Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines.'" 

THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE WILL

The highest instruments in the hierarchy of the universe play a special role in the execution of divine providence. As intellectual agents, angels and humans occupy a distinguished place in the unfolding of the divine plan. In the Contra gentiles, Aquinas "even argued that there would be no execution whatever of divine providence unless God controlled the free choices of men and of angels through whom the rest of creation [is] administered." In light of the overwhelming influence human actors have on one another, numerous species of animals and plants, as well as the quality of the air, water and soil, it seems difficult to underestimate the significance of human actions for the fate of the earth.

Aquinas asserted that free choice always occurs under the governance of divine will. In fact, Lonergan pointed out that, with his theory of providence, Aquinas argued that "there is no end of room for God to work on the free choice without violating it, to govern above its self-governance, to set the stage and guide the reactions and give each character its personal role in the drama of life." How did Aquinas explain the governance of God in human history? He spelled out how "free choice has determinants over which it exercises no control."

The human mind cannot dictate the concrete contexts in which it forms an integral part. The intellect and will operate in external situations they have no command over, situations authored under divine providence. Aquinas

40 Lonergan, CWL 1 86. "God therefore moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect."
41 Ibid. 76-77. See Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 3, c. 90.
42 Lonergan, CWL 1 117. See also Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 245.
43 Lonergan, CWL 1 117.
also argued that God controls the antecedents of mood and temperament which belong to the sensitive part of the soul, but influence the inclination of the will. For example, it makes sense that spending my childhood around horse farms in Kentucky eventually led to adult decisions for employment in horseracing rather than ice hockey. Though the decision to work at the racetrack belonged to me, the concrete circumstances that presented the possibility in the first place lay entirely outside the scope of my freedom. Similarly, growing up in a family that greeted the first Saturday in May (the day of the Kentucky Derby) with celebratory devotion – tears for “My Old Kentucky Home” and cheers for the favorites – it also makes sense that the possibility of working with thoroughbreds seemed quite appealing. Through these basic channels – external situations and psychic determinants – God indirectly controls free choice.

On a more direct level, God controls the activity of the will by causing its acts of willing ends. In fact, Aquinas argued that without this direct movement from God, the will cannot operate at all. He wrote: “God moves the human will, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything.”44 Briefly delaying discussion of the universal object of willing, I turn to the argument that Aquinas advanced for the primacy of divine operation in volitional activity.

He argued that if the will cannot move itself to choose unless it receives some intellectual specification of means, it follows that a prior act of willing an end must move the intellect to deliberate on possible courses of action. But if the will moves itself to that prior act of willing an end, it must also need some antecedent deliberation of reason. The necessity of positing an even prior act of willing a more general end for that deliberation results in an infinite regress. Aquinas concluded that the act of willing an end necessitates an external mover of the will.45 Notice that the validity of this argument presupposes the distinction between the exercise of the act and the

44 Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m; Lonergan, CWL 1 380.
45 Lonergan, CWL 1 379. See Aquinas, ST 1-2 q. 9, a.4; De malo q. 6, a.1, “And since the will has not always willed to deliberate, something else needs to move the will to will to deliberate. And if the will indeed moves itself to deliberate, it is also necessary that deliberation precede the movement of the will, and that an act of the will precede the deliberation. And since there cannot be an infinite regression, we need to hold that regarding the first movement of the will, something external, at whose instigation the will would begin to will, moves the will of anyone not always actually willing.”
specification of its object.\textsuperscript{46} In the absence of that distinction, the ultimate act of willing an end could refer to an intellectual apprehension as its sole cause. If, in the \textit{Prima pars}, Aquinas spoke of intellect and will in that manner, still the interval between then and later works includes a notable development of his theory of the will.\textsuperscript{47}

He gave a helpful illustration in the \textit{Prima secundae}.\textsuperscript{48} When a man wills his own health as an end, his willing of that end moves him to take counsel on means to its attainment. He may decide that taking a medicine prescribed by a doctor will enable him to achieve the healthy living that he desires. But since he did not always will his own health, something must have moved him to the act of willing that end. If one argues that the will moves itself, then one must posit a prior deliberation and an even prior act of willing a more general end. Hence, the argument concludes with two options: either the infinite regress or the external mover of the will.

As for its object, the will intends each and every lesser end for the sake of its ultimate end, that is, the good in general.\textsuperscript{49} Even in cases when the intellect does not explicitly advert to it, the good in general engages the natural inclination of the will.\textsuperscript{50} In fact, the will can will something only because it wills the good as such. Thus, with regard to its end, the will desires nothing other than the good or what participates in the good. Since the good in general extends to all being, the ultimate desire of the will is harmoniously ordered to all of reality. Now the agent proportionate to causing the act of willing a universal end must itself constitute a universal cause. "[B]ecause God creates the soul, he alone can operate within the will; again, because the will tends to the \textit{bonum universale} [universal good], this tendency cannot be the effect of any particular cause but only of the universal cause, God."\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} Lonergan, CWL 1 379 n. 167.
\textsuperscript{47} Lonergan contrasts \textit{ST} 1, q. 82, a. 4, ad. 3m. with \textit{ST} 1-2 q. 9, a.4; \textit{De malo} q. 6, a.1.
\textsuperscript{48} The following example is paraphrased from the one Aquinas gives in \textit{ST} 1-2, q. 9, a. 4, c.
\textsuperscript{49} "Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end...because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of the good. And if he desires it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good..." (Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1-2, q. 1, a. 6, c.).
\textsuperscript{50} "One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end" (Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1-2, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3m).
\textsuperscript{51} Lonergan, CWL 1 103.
In creating the will, God gives it a natural inclination or orientation to the good; in operating on it directly, "God is the principal efficient cause of every actual instance of willing." No instrument mediates between the divine operation and the act of willing the end. The external mover causes the act immediately, *immediatione virtutis et suppositi* (by the immediacy of power and contact), and moves or "inclinates the will as he himself wishes." On this point, Aquinas quoted the proverb, "The heart of the king is in the hand of God; he turns it whithersoever he will" (Proverbs 21:1). God implements divine providence by governing the world through the natural and volitional actions of all created beings; though again, God exercises a special control over rational and free agents in mediating providence to the rest of creation. Though each and every natural and free act presupposes an act of willing the good in general, God sometimes moves the human will to a more determinate end, for example, when God transforms the heart of stone into a heart of flesh (Ezekiel 11:19-20).

In the next section, I will develop what may already appear quite clearly, namely, that Aquinas' theology of grace structurally complements his mature theory of human willing. For now, however, I want to emphasize the point that in its natural activity the will acts as an instrument of divine causality. God makes possible all human acts of willing, God initiates them, determines when they occur, governs them internally and externally. The act of willing the end itself, the psychic determinants that affect volitional activity, and the external situations that contextualize the operations of the intellect and will, that make available the objects of choice, and that determine the background for a unique role in the drama of life — all internal and external factors originate in the mind of God.

To put it briefly...there is nothing in the intellect moving the will to the specification of its act, nothing in the sentient part of man inclining

53 "God is the external mover who *immediatione virtutis et suppositi* causes all acts of willing an end, whether natural or supernatural, *quod exercitium actus*" (Lonergan, "On God and Secondary Causes," 63). See also CWL 1 299-314, where Lonergan explains the theory of cooperation in detail.
55 Ibid. The Proverbs reference is cited from the *Summa contra gentiles*, 3, c. 88.
56 In the context of his refutation of Pelagianism, Augustine referred to this line from Ezekiel in explicating his distinction between divine operation and divine cooperation. See Lonergan, CWL 1 201, 58.
him to choose this or that, nothing in the will itself either by way of a first act as a disposition or a habit, or by way of a second act as an act of willing the end or willing the means, that God himself immediately or mediately has not brought about.\textsuperscript{57}

Aquinas taught that God causes the will's act of choice more than the will itself.\textsuperscript{58} "Like every finite agent, the will is an instrumental cause that participates efficaciously in the execution of the divine artisan's plan."\textsuperscript{59}

**The Need for Healing Grace in the Will**

Where the previous section focused on the metaphysical necessity of divine operation in the will and the *exercise* of its act, this section deals more with the *specification* of the act in the context of a psychological analysis. Though it proceeds under the theme of operative grace and addresses the development of Thomist thought on the topic, this section remains principally directed to clarifying the integral theory of the human will in Thomist theology.

In the climate of early Scholasticism, Philip the Chancellor's distinction between the natural and supernatural orders consumed the speculative theological discussion on the necessity of grace.\textsuperscript{60} Exclusive focus on what Lonergan called the "theorem of the supernatural" – Philip's distinction between two entitatively disproportionate orders (i.e., the natural and the supernatural) – created the practically undetected problem of obscuring in theological reflection the need for healing grace. Aquinas solved this difficulty by explaining that need in terms of a psychological analysis he recovered from Augustine. Using a fuller examination of the human will and the natural limitations of its liberty, Aquinas managed "to restore the notion of *gratia sanans* [healing grace] to its rightful position in the speculative elaboration of the doctrine of grace."\textsuperscript{61} Again, this section addresses a significant moment in the development of Thomist theology, but its main point of interest remains the insights into the nature of human willing that ground Aquinas' theological achievement.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Lonergan, "On the Supernatural Order," 114.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Lonergan, CWL 1 98-104, 303-14, 434-38.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 248.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Lonergan, CWL 1 185.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 90.
\end{itemize}
Before discussing human liberty's natural limitations, the explanation of which helped Aquinas solve the speculative problem noted above, it will help to clarify further the nature of free choice itself. In his interpretation of Aquinas, Lonergan identified four essential presuppositions in each and every act of human freedom. Though Aquinas emphasized each particular point at different times in the development of his own thought, Lonergan maintained that all four elements together constitute the necessary presuppositions of free choice. He wrote:

A free act has four presuppositions: (A) a field of action in which more than one course of action is objectively possible; (B) an intellect that is able to work out more than one course of action; (C) a will that is not automatically determined by the first course of action that occurs to the intellect; and, since this condition is only a condition, securing indeterminacy without telling what in fact does determine, (D) a will that moves itself.62

How do these presuppositions fit together in the developed theory of human freedom? Their coherence presupposes an understanding of human nature in relation to the integral patterns of the cosmos. The concrete universe admits the objective possibility of different courses of action. In this universe, the intellect can apprehend that range of possibility, but knowledge of some one possibility does not automatically determine the will. The will moves itself to an act of choice in the integral context of world order. All four presuppositions mentioned above are necessary for attributing freedom to the human will.63 Though it passively receives the act of willing the end, the will moves itself – in the presence of these four presuppositions – to an act of willing means. In the latter act, the will is free.64

The acute form of the problem of grace and freedom – namely, how to

62 Lonergan, CWL 196.
63 Ibid. 97-98. See also Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 87.
64 Note that since the will moves itself to the act of willing the means, the actual act of willing means is the contingent effect of the act that moves (i.e., the willing of the end), which is the free act. Though the effect, of course, is not free, Aquinas attributes freedom to the act that produces it. Lonergan wrote: "a free choice is not the contingent effect but the cause of a contingent effect; freedom lies in the dominium sui actus [dominion over his act]; the dominium does not lie in the act that is dominated but in the act which dominates; but the act which dominates is not the will of the means (which is effected) but the will of the end (which is necessary in itself, but free as a cause of something else)" (Lonergan, CWL 1 346, 321 n.21).
reconcile human freedom with the absolute need for grace – did not occur to Aquinas until he had recognized the error of his early view on the necessity of grace. In the commentary on the Sentences, he explained the need for grace strictly in terms of the disproportion between human nature and its supernatural end. Following Albert the Great, he focused his attention on the absolute gratuity of the divine gift in relation to the natural order. His interest in the explanatory potential of the theorem of the supernatural eclipsed the complementary insight of the Augustinian position on the moral impotence of the sinner. Aquinas, therefore, argued that the fact of freedom ensures the capacity to avoid sin. In the absence of grace, free human actors can, if they so choose, avoid each instance of sin; and since they can avoid each, they can avoid all. In the early period, he interpreted Peter Lombard’s non posse non peccare [not able not to sin] merely in terms of the sinner’s need for forgiveness of past sins. He considered the necessity of grace strictly in terms of its elevating function (gratia elevans).

Lonergan recognized in the De veritate a shift in Thomist thinking where Aquinas cited the Augustinian refutation of a Pelagian claim, namely, that human beings need grace for the forgiveness of past sins but not for avoiding them in the future. The text indicates that Aquinas realized the mistake inherent in his former view. Subsequently, he reclaimed the Augustinian insight into the moral impotence of the sinner. This retrieval, however, implies the challenge of reconciling human freedom with the absolute necessity of grace for doing good. In other words, Aquinas had to explain why persons possessing the ability to choose right or wrong nevertheless remain in absolute need of grace to choose the good.

Already in the commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas had established the need of habits for right action. He explained that, given the indeterminacy of human potentiality, humans do wrong for the most part even in spite of their natural desire for the good. In the hierarchy of rational beings, humans rank at the lowest point of perfection, complementing the pure deficiency of prime matter as its spiritual counterpart. Though naturally oriented to the true and the good, human beings possess an indeterminacy, which points them

65 Lonergan, CWL 1 50.
66 Lonergan, CWL 1 357-8; Aquinas, Super II Sententiarum, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2.
67 Lonergan, CWL 1 50.
68 Ibid. 51; Aquinas, De veritate, q. 24, a. 12, ob. 22.
69 Lonergan, CWL 1 340-50.
in all directions and statistically commits them to act against their natural inclination in most instances. The ontological solution to this persistent existential failure lies in a greater actuation of potency, the determination of an indeterminate potentiality, or, in other words, the grace that makes human desire for the good efficacious. Since God is fully proportionate to truth and goodness, God may increase the proportion of human beings by infusing habits that spontaneously give rise to good action and enable human persons to choose their connatural and supernatural ends. However, this analysis explains no more than why the sinner has difficulty avoiding sin and how grace takes away the difficulty.

Grace, in the Sentences, shifts the statistical odds in favor of the converted sinner doing the good. The De veritate, on the other hand, asserts that human beings cannot avoid future sins without grace. Without divine assistance, the human person simply cannot choose or act for the good; right action remains nothing short of impossible. Again, the problem lies in the reconciliation of the absolute necessity of grace with the liberty of the will. Aquinas solved the problem through an analysis of the limitations of human liberty. He explained that operative grace respects human freedom by operating beyond its limits.

Aquinas identified three natural limitations on the exercise of free choice. First, inspired by Augustine, he recognized the law of psychological continuity. In his extensive explication, Lonergan argued that Aquinas never considered the activity of free will along the lines of an indifferently ticking clock bouncing back to perfect equilibrium after each tick and tock. Aquinas explicitly asserted in the De malo that a change in the will occurs accidentally according to its condition as a changeable nature. In other words, a change in the will requires a proportionate cause, and change may result from an intrinsic cause or an extrinsic cause. The former include changes in knowledge, passions or habits; the latter denotes “God operating

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70 Ibid. 351.
71 Ibid. 355.
72 Ibid. 355, 55.
73 Ibid. 355-56; Aquinas, De malo, q. 15, a.5. Lonergan pointed out that Aquinas explicitly articulated the principle of psychological continuity only in the De malo. Though it is certainly presupposed at key parts of the De veritate, as we will see below, Lonergan conjectured that “perhaps the use of the idea of liberty as non-coercion in the De veritate and its rejection in the De malo have something to do with [the] clear and explicit statement on psychological continuity” in the latter text (Lonergan, CWL 1 356 n.73).
Either way, Aquinas insisted that a change of free will does not consist in the fact that someone can choose various things. Rather it consists in this: “that someone does not will the very same thing at the same time which earlier he did will, or that he wills what earlier he did not will.”

After advancing a mistaken view in the Sentences – namely, that the sinner can avoid mortal sin without the help of divine grace – Aquinas formulated an interesting paradox that nicely corrects his previous error. In the De veritate, he claimed that the “sinner can avoid any mortal sin but cannot avoid all mortal sins.” He explained the meaning of this statement through “an extremely subtle psychological analysis” that combines three points related to the nature of habits and dispositions in the will. Firstly, Aquinas stated that since a habit constitutes a state of willingness with respect to an end, its presence in the will means that free acts can occur without explicit, rational deliberation. Secondly, he argued that in order for sinners to avoid repeatedly sinning, they must argue themselves out of acting in accordance with the disordered habits that spontaneously orient them to the transitory goods they have made their ends. Explicit deliberation must occur if the sinner wants to stop sinning. Thirdly, Aquinas reasoned that the pressure of circumstance, the inevitable ways in which the mind becomes preoccupied with a multitude of things, leads unavoidably to future sins committed freely on the basis of disordered orientations in the will. Though the sinner can avoid any particular mortal sin if only he puts his mind to it, “he cannot always put his mind to it, and, when he does not, he sins. From this necessity of falling again and again into sin, the sinner is liberated only by the infusion of divine charity into the soul.”

In the De veritate, Aquinas not only corrected the error of the Sentences, he also began a remarkable integration of the theorem of the supernatural with the Augustinian tradition of healing grace. He significantly transformed his approach to human freedom in the psychological analysis of habits. Previously, the theory of the habit stated merely a fact: the sinner acts wrongly in the majority and needs habits to act rightly. Now it enunciates a delicate and complicated law according to an incisive rational psychology.

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74 Lonergan, CWL 1 357.
75 Aquinas, De malo, q. 15, a.5.
76 Lonergan, CWL 1 359.
77 Ibid. 360.
78 Ibid. 361. Lonergan identified the key passage as De veritate, q. 24, a. 12.
In the transition, Aquinas moved from considering human freedom in terms of degrees of perfection - that is, in terms of choosing our connatural and supernatural good - to emphasizing the law of psychological continuity, which places a natural limitation on the exercise of the liberty of the will.

Inspired by Augustine’s reference to the will of the sinner as “a crooked leg that cannot but limp along,” Aquinas argued that “the crooked will can avoid any sin but cannot avoid all.” He showed how the solution to the whole problem of grace and freedom boils down to “at root, a limitation of human liberty.”

Lonergan wrote:

...grace is compatible with liberty because of itself liberty is limited and grace enables it to transcend that limitation. [Aquinas] does not presuppose an unlimited liberty which grace confines to the good; he presupposes the limited liberty of psychological continuity, and makes grace an escape from the servitude of sin.

In the Prima secundae, Aquinas restored the Augustinian notion of healing grace to the speculative elaboration of the doctrine. “The whole of 1-2, q. 109, presupposes that fallen nature has a twofold need of grace; man needs a sanatio as well as an elevatio.” Through his fuller examination of human willing, Aquinas achieved an integrated explanation of the need for operative grace: liberating the mind from the effects of sin and enabling it to love God with perfect charity, grace heals and elevates the human soul.

Besides the law of psychological continuity, Aquinas recognized two other natural limitations on the exercise of choice that help specify further the absolute necessity of operative grace. He identified the second limitation in the Contra gentiles where he discussed the need for additional graces after justification. Human persons need continual assistance from God to avoid relapsing into sin, because a person simply cannot decide once and for all about the entirety of his or her life. An exercise of freedom can occur only with respect to a single choice. The grace of perseverance secures life on the

79 Lonergan, CWL 1 361.
80 Ibid. 363.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. 364.
83 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 3, c. 155. Lonergan cited this passage strictly for its reference to the second limitation on human liberty. He noted that its conception of actual grace along the lines of external providence does not affect his particular use of the passage.
supernatural order subsequent to justification. If the human person decides effectively about each act in the succession of free acts that span the duration of his or her life, still God accounts for the series as a whole. Lonergan explained:

Now, the constancy of perseverance and the form or pattern of a development pertain not to single free acts but to a series. It follows that the first mover of the will must be the cause both of the fact of perseverance and of the relation (ordo) that each act in the series bears to the attainment of the final goal.84

God creatively outlines the lives of the saints with the patterns of graces by which the predestined are led unto eternal life.85 The grace of perseverance accounts for the succession of free acts as a whole and, from the perspective of the whole, infallibly attains its effect as an instrument in the hands of the transcendent artisan. The second limitation on human liberty – the fact that freedom occurs in single acts but not with respect to the series as a series – corresponds to the pattern of graces by which the first mover of the will, transcending the limitation, causes the series itself.86

Aquinas identified the third limitation on the exercise of choice in “the fact that freedom regards not the end but the means,” and this limitation in particular significantly clarifies his theory of the will.87 As discussed above, the will does not select its end. It does not move itself to the good in general or to some more determinate end. In the Thomist theology of grace, this limitation on human liberty explains why the conversion of the will utterly depends on the divine initiative. Conversion to a supernatural end simply presupposes the efficacious intention of God.88 “For God to infuse grace into the soul, he does not require any disposition other than that which he himself causes.”89

84 Lonergan, CWL 1 367.
85 Ibid. 381. Lonergan noted that the pattern corresponding to perseverance includes internal and external, habitual and actual graces.
86 Lonergan, CWL 1 382.
87 Ibid. 368.
88 Lonergan noted that Aquinas spoke of an imperfect conversion that occurs prior to justification and may take place by successive stages; and he spoke of a perfect conversion that happens in the instant of justification (Lonergan, CWL 1 365); see also Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 112, a. 2.
89 Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 113, a. 7 c.; Lonergan, CWL 1 366.
By applying the theory of the will and the theorem of universal instrumentality to the doctrine of grace, Aquinas explained that in any instance of divinely inspired action God effects the willing of the end. In the Prima secundae, he articulated the synthesis of instrumental and psychological theory most clearly in considering the case of conversion:

In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved but not (actively) moving, and God alone is the mover, the operation is attributed to God: and this is accordingly called operative grace. But in that effect in which our mind is both moved and (actively) moving, the operation is attributed not to God alone but also to the soul: and this is accordingly called cooperative grace.  

In the event of conversion, God operates directly on the radical orientation of the will. Subsequently, given the act of willing a supernatural end, the will may then freely cooperate with the divine initiative in the choice, election, or willing of the means. Most significantly, the two effects are produced by the same grace. Aquinas considered a single grace as operative and cooperative according to the diversity of its effects, namely, the conversion of the will and the choices that consequently follow. As the mover of the will, God can liberate the will from its disordered patterns and vice, and enable it to act in accord with its natural and supernatural ends. In a statement that nicely reflects the thesis of this article, Lonergan noted that these “two effects of the one grace, mens mota et non movens [mind moved and not moving] and mens mota et movens [mind moved and moving], stand in splendid harmony with the theories of providence, instrumentality, and the nature of the will.”

The psychological account of human willing allowed Aquinas to establish the compatibility of grace and freedom. Though Albert the Great

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90 Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 111, a. 2; Lonergan, CWL 1 129-30.
91 Drawing from Augustine, Aquinas always distinguished – whether speaking of habitual or actual grace – between divine operation and divine cooperation. On operative grace, he cited the famous, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur [which God operates in us without us]; on cooperative grace, qui creavit te sine te, non justificabit te sine te [the one who created you without you, will not justify you without you] (Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 55, a. 4, ad 6m; Lonergan, CWL 1 63).
92 Aquinas, ST 1-2, q. 111, a. 2, ad 4m.
93 Lonergan, CWL 1 131-32.
and the early Scholastics did not fully reconcile the liberty of the will and its inability to choose the good without divine assistance, Aquinas eventually solved the speculative problem. His solution brought together the theory of creaturely instrumentality and the analysis of the will. In the metaphysical context of the cosmic hierarchy – in which God controls the activities of all created beings – human freedom is not absolute. The nature of the will itself limits the sphere of its efficacy. “It cannot select its ends, it cannot escape the restrictions of psychological continuity, it cannot ever choose the good once and for all.” However, “there is no end of room for God to work on the free choice without violating it.” Operating beyond the will’s limits, grace causes the will to desire its supernatural end, changes its spontaneous inclinations and secures its perseverance – all without intervening on the proper domain of human freedom. In light of this integrated framework, Lonergan articulated the necessity of operative grace accordingly:

...corresponding to the triple limitation of human freedom – psychological continuity, freedom with respect to the means, freedom with respect to each single act but not the series of acts – there exists in man the need of operative grace to effect his conversion from sin, to direct him to God as a special end, to maintain him in the supernatural life on the level of the Holy Spirit’s wisdom and love.

On the grounds of the cosmic hierarchy and his theory of providence, Aquinas explained the instrumental nature of all human action. He established the universal truth that “God is always operative and then cooperative.” His explanations of the structure of the will and the limitations of human freedom complement this truth in the context of a theoretical and psychological account of the necessity of operative grace, the conversion of the sinner, and the advancement of the justified in the spiritual life.

CONCLUSION

The Thomist theories of providence and universal instrumentality form the

94 Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 89.
95 Lonergan, CWL 1 117.
96 Ibid. 382-83.
97 Ibid. 432.
general context for Aquinas’ mature theory of human willing. If all created beings depend on this concrete world order for the fulfilling conditions that their activities presuppose, still this world order itself depends absolutely on God. The notion of universal instrumentality simply specifies the causal series that originates in the mind of God, extends to the whole universe of being, and makes possible the actual occurrence of any given instance of created action. That God envisages and executes this master plan means that each act in the endless series of movements that occur in this universe fits perfectly and infallibly into the cosmic symphony that efficaciously proceeds from its Creator. That we participate in this providential design means that though we act freely our freedom presupposes the initiative and cooperation of a transcendent artisan.

What does this study imply for methodical transpositions of Thomist volitional theory? Though a sufficient answer to this question would require a much longer treatment than what I can provide here, I think this study offers two significant points for immediate consideration: Firstly, it does not seem possible to transpose the central elements of Aquinas’ theory of human willing – (1) the relations between the intellect and will, (2) the distinct causes of diverse operations in the will, (3) the nature of human freedom – independently of the general theory of creaturely instrumentality. These theories are internally related. Secondly, Aquinas applied both instrumental theory and his analysis of volitional activity to his speculative elaboration of the doctrine of grace. If a methodical theology should transpose Aquinas’ (and the early Lonergan’s) theoretical theology of grace, then it should also account for the same psychological data in the unified pattern of human willing that Aquinas accounted for in the metaphysical categories of his theory.

Lonergan offered an interpretation of Aquinas’ volitional theory that clarifies the essential elements of the faculty psychology while underscoring its critical context. By incisively articulating the vetera on human willing, Lonergan not only illuminated Aquinas’ comprehensive view of how God’s governance shapes human living in this concrete universe, he also opened challenging vistas for methodical theologies that seek to explore, critically and systematically, what the nova could be.
THE HYPOTHESIS OF A NON-ACCIDENTAL
HUMAN PARTICIPATION
IN THE DIVINE ACTIVE SPIRATION

Philip McShane

The hypothesis, as considered here, may be likened to the early hypothesis of the existence of the neutrino in physics: it is the undeveloped hypothesis of a reality required to meet empirical needs. The hypothesis may be nicely located in the context of Aquinas' systematics, as sublated by Lonergan, by considering it as a hypothesis within the developing sequence that would begin "In the 27th place" in Lonergan's consideration of God. The locating is nice numerically, in that one can then envisage another continuation of Insight after chapter 19 which would correspond to Aquinas 27th Question in the first part of the Summa Theologica. But it is nice in a much larger sense which can only be hinted at here. It is God as re-conceived of by the theological community living in the general categories of Lonergan that we are - normatively - dealing with and in. It is the God that is conceived of by Lonergan and print-pointed to in chapter 19.

1 A context here, as we shall see, is Chapter 19 of Insight which deals with God in a scientific manner. Cantower 19 brings this out by a parallel with the science of the neutrino. Roughly, one can consider section 8 of the Insight chapter to be the initial cloudy hypothesis and verification of God [or the neutrino] and section 9 the genesis of a decent hypothesis with verification following in section 10. Here we are concerned about a hypothesis regarding sanctifying grace, mentioned once, neutrino-trace-like, in "Finality, Love, Marriage," CWL 4 2-3. (The essay is referred to below as FLM.) I end the essay with a feeble and relatively nominal hypothesis: the sequence of fuller hypotheses, components of a future genetic systematics, is a matter for later generations of theologians.

2 "In the twenty sixth place, God is personal" (CWL 3 691) ends the pseudo-deduction of chapter 19.

3 One could consider this as a possible take-off point for the missing second volume, Insight and Faith, mentioned below in note 55.

4 "Dealing with": getting a precise heuristic meaning for this is the underlying challenge of this essay, for we are dealing with the messy beginning of the future of a functional theology, to be dominated by a genetic systematics of the geo-historical efforts of humanity to get its minding in order. More on this as we move along: see, e.g. notes 11 and 27.
of *Insight* and in his two volumes on the Trinity, up to that point in Volume 12, where Lonergan introduces the minimal hypothesis.5

Further, the consideration here is focused on the participation as nonaccidental as opposed to accidental in the usual metaphysical sense that is sublated by Lonergan’s meaning of conjugate, and indeed by the particular meaning of conjugate that he gives that participation when it is placed in a clearheaded effective thinking of “the ecstasy and the intimacy that results from the communication of the absolute and unbounded love that is God himself”7 that is to be attained in the adventure of intussuscepting section 5 of chapter 20 of *Insight*. I am considering, then, the clear-headed context, suggested by Lonergan, of the absolutely supernatural solution to the problem of history.8 Finally that consideration fits in with my holding to the minimal character of the assumption in that, if one considers the question “What is that participation?” with the usual back-up of analogies of nature, then one grasps that the question is one regarding conjugates. Conjugates,

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5 Lonergan, CWL 12 470-73. It is as well to bear in mind, have as mind-set, the analogy with science. The neutrino hypothesis emerged in a context, and this context is a tricky reality to specify. It is helpful here to brood over Lonergan’s comment on conceptualization: “the conceptualization of understanding is, when fully developed, a system, and one must advert to the implications of systematic knowledge .... if one is to grasp the precise nature of the concept: the concept emerges from understanding, not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of a source which is equally the source of other concepts” (CWL 2 238). The context of any concept of sanctifying grace is, in a mature functional theology, to be dominated openly by the genetic systematics mentioned in note 4.

6 There is a massively important point to be noted here regarding focus. Thesis 5 of Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Doctrines* shows how mystery can and should be focused so that natural analogues be clearheadedly developed. The attitude he draws attention to dominates the present effort, whether I am reflecting about functional collaboration or about prayer. The hymn question, “What a Friend we have in Jesus?” benefits from the distinction, but also the more subtle issues of the practicality of functional collaboration. So, e.g, Karl Rahner, responding to the version of chapter 5 of *Method* published in the *Gregorianum* in 1969, is right on: “Die theologische Methodologie Lonergan’s scheint mir so generisch zu sein, dass sie eigentlich auf jede Wissenschaft passt” (“Lonergan’s theological methodoogy seems to me to be so generic that it actually suits every science.”), Karl Rahner, “Kritische Bemerkungen zu B.J.F.Lonergan’s Aufsatz: ‘Functional Specialties in Theology’”, *Gregorianum* 51(1971), 537. Global culture is at present a ferment of the need for the omnidisciplinary collaboration that was Lonergan’s great final achievement. There is no mystery about its need in theology. Karl Rahner objects to the lack of theological focus in Lonergan’s functional methodology; but he does so in a non-focused way that is undermined by Lonergan’s Thesis 5.

7 CWL 3 741.

8 “The problem of general history, which is the real catch” (Lonergan, CWL 10 236) The solution to the problem, posed by Lonergan in that work, was published a decade after those lectures were given (see note 6 above) with little fanfare or follow-up.
as conceived, are what are given unity, identity, wholeness, by central form. A central form’s meaning is given simply by that necessary and sufficient unity, identity, wholeness. The further What? Pushes the thinking to an investigation of conjugates. The key issue here, then, is the tentatively verified unity and identity in the human subject of the absolute supernatural.

But are we dealing: here with a someway-added central form to the human subject? I would note that, in envisaging an absolute supernatural and its embedding in this aggreformic finitude we are in the thinnest air of Gauging What’s Real. A serious grip on the “detailed metaphysics of proportionate being” “reveals that the theologian is under no necessity of reducing to the metaphysical elements, which suffice for an account of this world, such supernatural realities as the incarnation, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and the beatific vision.”

What then of the absolutely supernatural realities? They must be

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9 See CWL 3 270-75, 362, 461. I would invited you to add to that the consideration of beauty, and - in relation to sanctifying grace - the beauty of holiness. It is useful to think of Lonergan’s threesome, unity-identity-whole as contained in the first two of Aquinas’ wholeness-harmony-radiance.

10 Think of the initial efforts to conceive of the neutrino with the help of the relevant suggestive data of the time. The ramble here is towards an existential pause over the complex of data that is the I who loves Jesus, whatever your present age, and the single writing of the I of Lonergan as he produced “Finality, Love, Marriage” at the age of 38. The fuller control of the ramble, shifting the ramble into the beginnings of the mesh of genetic systematics with the universal viewpoint (see the next note), would be the developed second canon of hermeneutics (CWL 3 609-10).

11 Recall notes 4 and 5. The crisis in Lonergan studies is the absence of a Standard Model such as is assumed in the more elementary science of physics (indeed, the name, Standard Model comes from physics). See note 27 below.

12 By this reference, I am bringing into the present context the work of Richard Healey, Gauging What’s Real. The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Gauge Theories, Oxford University Press, 2007. I would note that physics is the most elementary of sciences, so, more advanced than higher sciences, yet still struggling and muddled. Lonergan appeals briefly to it for clues on method at the beginning of Method in Theology but he does not develop the appeal as it needs to be developed in the search of this millennium for integral omnidisciplinary functional collaboration. This becomes very evident when it comes to seeing for a coherent contemporary eschatology, which requires a fulsome grip on “The Concrete Intelligibility of Space and Time” (CWL 3 194-95). On a parallel need regarding incompleteness theorems, see note 25 below. Return to the first topic, of gauging the real with the help of physics, it is important to intussuscept that Lonergan embraced this help from physics in his life: it was a core piece of his Weltanschauung. To that topic chapter 10 of Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas, Axial Publishing, 2010, is devoted. The biography will be referred to below as Lonergan.

13 Insight, 756.

14 Ibid.
conceived in a multiplicity of obscurity tensions. These realities are suited to any other type of finitude, not only the types that Thomas envisages at the beginning of the Third Part: not, then, tuned tightly into the aggreformic reality of the layered aggreformic being that grounds a three-layered developmental potential in humans. The fourth "added" level of being is added within an open "obediential" potential of being and of consciousness that, in an intimate mystery-meshed manner, escapes all definitions of consciousness that emerge from empirical investigations: more about that below. So, its study involves a clear recognition of discontinuity in the study of finite spirit. That clear recognition requires, for one, an acknowledgment of the immaturity of our present scientific grip on the immaturity of Thomas' grip on "natural res ultance" in the dynamics of finitude. Further, that clear recognition must reach to a full recognition,

15 I am thinking here of the flights of Thomas' Questio 3, and indeed particularly of Article 6 regarding two divine persons in one human nature. We are here "dealing with" (that phrase again) flights of minding that would have the first and second persons of the trinity gracing each of us pilgrimwise and in a genetic eschaton. I make mention of the latter on and off here and elsewhere, though nothing serious has been done about that zone of being in recent centuries. I give a brief indication of the need and problem in Field Nocturnes CanTower 116.

16 See CWL 3 762-3, 541-3.

17 "Adds to man's biological, psychic, and intellectual levels" (CWL 3 762, bottom of page). Adds is a very tricky word, intimately related to the problem mentioned in the next note.

18 "Obediential potency is mentioned in FLM twice (20, 36) as well as in the editor's note g (261). I pass over the topic, but recall the comment on Verbum 149: "one may ask if this neglect of natural potency has not some bearing on unsatisfactory conceptions of obediential potency". This in the quotation refers to debates around natural potency as receptive, but there is also the context of the previous few pages on Thomas' incomplete development of "natural res ultance" (see note 22 below).

19 Recall the comment on mystery-focus above, note 6. Existentially, this focus can be carried over into action, even the action of prayer. Think of the Ignatian adage: "do everything as if it depended entirely on you, knowing that all depends on God". The address of prayer, to which we turn later in the essay, can be redeemed from psychic fuzziness by such an operative balance.

20 The below refers especially to some footnotes below. It is useful to give two short lists, one with focus on the ontic and the other with focus on the phyletic. One might consider note 87 as the linking note, as well as note 9, on the beautiful. So, ontically focused are notes 10, 18, 32, 35 and 36; the phyletic focus is found in notes 1, 5, 6, 43, 48, 73. But of course below has also a curious self-referential meaning that relates to the note 87 on incorporation: the below of one's neuromolecular dynamics. That below is a zone of cosmic dynamics that, especially in darker personal and historical times, needs the focus mentioned in note 6 above.

21 This is a very complex area of aggreformic reality in its own right. See Insight 541-543. See also my Sane Economics and Fusionism, Axial Publishing, 2010, chapter 8, on the long climb ahead of us in following the question, "What is spirit?"

22 On this important gap, see Verbum, 144-8.
within eschatological science, of the permanent immaturity of our grip on the “natural resultance” of the invitation that is the absolutely supernatural invitation internal\textsuperscript{23} to the molecules of the present “order’s dynamic joy and zeal.”\textsuperscript{24} Finally, however, I would note the core of the perspective on incompleteness – and on theorems of incompleteness\textsuperscript{25} – is nevertheless given in the incomplete science of Aquinas, who had no doubt from his limited science, that the comprehension of the divine reality is permanently beyond the finite mind of the Incarnate Word.\textsuperscript{26}

Coming to grips with the science of the previous paragraph would poise us to envisage the modest grip on “our neutrino” of which we are at present capable. The development of our grip, as Robert Doran regularly suggests, is a massive enterprise that I would associate with a quite new second part of the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologica, and so a new sublation of the genetic systematics that is to emerge as part of the Standard Model of a new theology.\textsuperscript{27}

I wish only to make two further points here about the long-term enterprise. There is, related to both, the issue of the sublation of Thomas notion of convenience into the fullest meaning of contextualized hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{23} A provocative use of the word internal. There are deep issues here related both to the meaning of obediential (see note 18 above and note 89 below) and to the reality of secondary determinations of quantified realities (see CWL 3 ch. 16). But an interesting start is to muse over such questions as “What is a molecule of oxygen? Might it fly? Might it flow in the blood of Jesus? Might it thus flow now?” On the finality of oxygen, see FLM, 23.

\textsuperscript{24} CWL 3 722: final words of page.

\textsuperscript{25} There are theorems of incompleteness within contemporary logic of course, but here the issue is the set of such theorems as they apply to eschatological reality. Might there be, for instance - I recall Thomas’ magnificent suggestion that you cannot exclude an infinite number of ancestors (Summa Ia Pars, q. 46, a.2, ad 7m) – an incompleteness in an endlessness of humanity’s emergence and invitation to eschatological circumcession? I would note that all such theorems of incompleteness would constitute a fuller position that is given in the brief pedagogy of Insight’s “positioning” (CWL 3 413), which is lacking in more evident theorems, such as theorems of intentionality and of infinity.

\textsuperscript{26} Summa Theologica, III, q.10, “De Scientia Beata Animae Christi”.

\textsuperscript{27} A compendious comment on the genetic systematics may help. First, think of the slice of the organism that is the topic of the Insight 489 (see below, note 42). One is invited at the end of that page to move to the dynamics of the organism. This gives a first glimpse of the theological systematics. But the genetic dynamics is of local theologies, and of overlapping, merging, etc contexts. So one needs to image it as tunneling forward from the globe geohistorically - imagine flies eyes! Finally, the GS is heavily dependent on reversing counterpositions thematized in the component of the Standard Model identified as operating towards “cumulative results” (Method, 4) of the universal viewpoint. Regularly I symbolize the integral perspective of the Standard Model of any age by UV + GS + FS. It is, normatively, the mindset of all functional collaborators.
That full meaning carries us into the full science of the Theory of God that is the Second Person in that Person’s wholesome reality of an integral grasp, embrace,\textsuperscript{28} of the present finitude. The larger point regards the coherent convenience that is to be the new terminal systematics-slice of the genetic systematics required for functional collaboration. The lesser, first, point has to do with the question of the non-accidental nature of the reality faithfully known to Thomas as sanctifying grace.

The convenience of that grace being something non-accidental is the issue, but the concrete context of coming scientifically to grips with that issue is the central focus of my pointing here. We cannot afford to skip the climb of \textit{Insight} with its various bridges\textsuperscript{29} into and forward in metaphysics. The effort to do elementary metaphysics only enters the stage at the beginning of the final section, section 7, of chapter fifteen of the book \textit{Insight}.\textsuperscript{30} That effort needs the context added in chapter 16, on distinctions and relations, with its discomfiting demand of an existential shift rare in our times: the comeabout\textsuperscript{31} to a Position\textsuperscript{32} in being. It further needs the sublation of the poisioned persons into the remote world of the fusion “into a single explanation”\textsuperscript{33} – an echo of the Theory of God that is the central Person of finitude – of the full story of stumbling perspectives.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} I would draw attention to the massively discomfiting norm presented by Lonergan: “Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.” (CWL 3 442).
\item \textsuperscript{29} The key bridge of \textit{Insight} is the one identified by Lonergan at the beginning of chapter 5. See, on the Website, Bridgepoise 5, “2010 Moves towards 2020 Collaboration of Lonergan Students”. A relevant context is my “Features of Generalized Empirical Method: A Bridge too Far?”, \textit{Creativity and Method}, edited by M. Lamb, Marquette University Press, 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{30} A reach to “prepare our statement of the integral heuristic structure that we have named metaphysics.” (CWL 3 484)
\item \textsuperscript{31} It is as well to cite the shocking existential passage, since it is relevant to the prayer-patterns of the Tower People in the future. “So it comes about that the extroverted subject visualizing extensions and experiencing duration gives place to the subject orientated to the objective of the unrestricted desire to know and affirming beings differentiated by certain conjugates potencies, forms, and acts grounding certain laws and frequencies” (CWL 3 537).
\item \textsuperscript{32} The task indicated in the previous note blossoms into a molecularization that constitutes a poise, a walk in being, the walk of a “character” (see below, notes 50 and 80). Some hints about this are in \textit{Cantower} 9, “Position, Poise, Protopossession”. My Website book, \textit{The Redress of Poi/e}, is an aid to the climb.
\item \textsuperscript{33} CWL 3 610, line 9. See note 10 above: it involves an incarnation of the second canon of hermeneutics.
\item \textsuperscript{34} The push for the full story is the task of Fusionism, which seems to me now to be a better title than Lonerganism for the movement of following Lonergan pointers. See Part Two of my \textit{Sane Economics and Fusionism}, Axial Publishing, 2010.
\end{itemize}
Within that large climb of the future there are to be many personal and communal climbs, quite beyond present fantasy. But here I must restrict my hints, my fantasy, regarding these climbs to a single illustration of the challenge to climb towards a sublation of Lonergan's effort of the early 1940s expressed densely, tentatively and modestly, in his essay, "Finality, Love, Marriage".

I sense now that I should preface talk of that sublation by explicitly adding two context that need self-digestion. There is the "study of the organism" asked for by Lonergan as a beginning of serious self-digestion. And there is the seemingly simpler context of prayer-poise.

First, then, you have to take a position regarding the challenge of a beginning of your study of the organism, "study of the organism begins ..." whether that study is the study of a flower, or a panda, or the Person of Jesus, or the quasi-organism that is the mystical body, a study pursued here, pilgrimwise or in the eschatological genetic dynamic of sweet surprise.

The study of the organism that is you, always in the presence of the fullest personal context, needs to drive head-to-toe molecularly inward in the dance of such passages of Insight as that paragraph "Study of the organism begins ...." I do not wish to enter here into the complexity of the

35 The serious self-digestion is expressed rather bluntly on page 755 of Insight: the famous "breathless and late" paragraph. One illustration may help here. What is consciousness? The question is a massive empirical challenge of this millennium, moving up from the irritability of plants through higher levels of self-presence in plant and animal to the shades of human consciousness, where different consciousnesses of inquiry, judgment, planning and decision will be specified by investigating the chemical patterns of hierarchies of brain neurodynamics.

36 I have an elementary consideration of foundational prayer in Precarious 5-8. Prayer-patterns relevant to the mediations to be effected by the eighth specialty are primarily kataphatic patterns. They are to be contextualized (see note 5 above) by the positioning and positioning mentioned in notes 31-35. The contextualization is a matter of praying in the mode of the strategy of generalized empirical method pointed to in note 43 below. One expects, then, the I of the stating "I love you, Jesus", to reach some contemporary plane of self-luminosity.

37 The "taking of a position" is a necessity for everyone, but the advancing of communal position is formally and per se the task of the dialectic community, a task carefully named on Method in Theology, page 250. That task is to become a refined business of subtle additions: it will, in the main, have little to say to the various counterpositions of the past and present. Dealing with these is to be a challenge of the eighth specialty.

38 CWL 3 489.

39 Again I recall the inspiring comment from Verbum quoted in note 5. I would further note the sophistication of context that is reached by contexts being held in a genetic sequence: recall note 27 above.

40 I had intended accumulating a strategic list of such passages that would lift the community forward towards "dealing with" (recall note 4 above) the future task of enriching
dance, and the deceptive nature of the writing in *Insight*,\(^\text{41}\) but I would note that I concretely illustrate the difficulty of the dance in a commentary on that paragraph which runs through 41 essays called *Field Nocturnes*.\(^\text{42}\) Those essays range beyond the plant that is Lonergan’s topic there, and so they invite a like dancing round other paragraphs of *Insight*, some mentioned in the notes here, a dancing that would generate an expansion of the work *Insight* into a detailed pedagogy for later generations.

Secondly, I turn briefly to the issue of prayer. The seeds of the community of the Tower of Able need to blossom into Little Flowers of a new kataphatic non-mystical self-luminous\(^\text{43}\) personal prayer that I wish especially to associate with the drive of the mind-set, minding-set, underpinning the print of FLM: we get on to that drive in the notes to the third last paragraph of this essay. But already I can pose the challenge that asks us to ferment forward in the two contexts named: the challenge of prayerfully intussuscepting the brief prayer: “Jesus, I love you”.\(^\text{44}\) Obviously, there are variants of this that must occur to you: translations into your own languages that would change the twist of my suggestions below – a relevant feature in that not only the word order changes, but some words seem to slip away, as “I” does

the hypothesis regarding sanctifying grace, but that listing would involve complexifications due to needs of different individuals. I do leave you with a decent illustration of the pursuit in the commentary mentioned in note 42 below.

\(^{41}\) Lonergan viewed *Insight* as an introductory text, much as Aquinas viewed his *Summa*. But for decades I have found it useful to view it as a graduate text, comparing it to a graduate text in physics that I was fortunate to use in the years just before 1957, when I confronted *Insight*. The text is Georg Joos, *Theoretical Physics*, Blackie and Son, London and Glasgow: second edition, 1951. That text is of the same length as *Insight*, and one finds in it e.g. 20 or so pages on each topic that is treated in books and exercises of the undergraduate years. The difficulty with *Insight* is that the next generation has to write those undergraduate texts. Think of the dense brilliant treatment of canons of hermeneutics crying out for comprehension and expansion.

\(^{42}\) The series is a Website series, eventually merging with Cantowers 1-41 at number 42, to go on, as *Field Nocturnes CanTower* to the due number 117. (My original notion was to parallel Ezra Pound’s 117 *Cantos* with a million-word series). References below will be to FN, *Cantowers*, and FNC.

\(^{43}\) See note 38 above. The issue is the clear-headed pursuit of thinking and living in the existential context of the description of generalized empirical method that Lonergan gives in *A Third Collection* at the top of page 141: “Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.”

\(^{44}\) Obviously, I am restricting us here to the special categories of Christianity. And perhaps I should note that the meanings of the words in the prayer are to have the positional and contextual remoteness suggested above in various note. So, Jesus disappears as Jack and Jill do (See note 58 below).
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in my native gaelic, "Gradhim Thu, a Iosa."45 And there are variants that are cherished in different tradition: I think of Catherine of Siena’s "Sweet Jesus, Jesus Love". Having recourse to such translations and variations is important to our global efforts here but it is certainly vital to your vital involvement in the search for the meaning of your I of faith.

One can pray the four words with a stressing of any of the four words, but the stressing that is of central interest to our problem of non-conjugate participation is the stress that is expressed here by bold-facing and enlarging: "Jesus, I love You."46 The statement, best made aloud in mysterious confidence,47 even in the loudness of the touch48 of sign language, is conscious in the range of ways and levels noted heuristically in the first point. In so far as the heuristics becomes a habituated achievement, a post-Proustian presence to self, then you become the character required for life in The Tower, caring for the planes of plain meaning.49 Further, some level

45 The word "I" does not have a Gaelic equivalent. For example, Taim means "I am" as "Gradhim" means "I love". I have to hand the Anglicized Japanese of the passage mentioned in the next note: "

46 One can lift the prayer into various personal situations, to contexts similar to Peter’s in John 21: 15-17.

47 One may bring into focus here all the pointers made in other notes (see the short list of "ontic" notes in note 20 above), and add the question of the manner in which the "not my words but His" is mediatey given in consciousness.

48 I am thinking of touch as focused on both by Helen, in her leap to the truth about signs, and Merleau-Ponty, in his failed leap, through an analysis of touching, to reach the luminous post-Hegelian objectivity we reference below in note 57. Both struggles are relevant to luminous kataphatic prayer. See FN 28, "A Touching of Touch: Getting on your Nerves"; FN 32, "Seeing is Deceiving", FN 35, "Helen’s Halting Hand", FN 36, "Desire and Distance". Desire and Distance: Introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception (Stanford University Press, 2004), trans by Paul B.Milan) is Renaud Barbaru’s magnificent but unsuccessful effort to lift phenomenology to a luminous position. His previous book, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Legacy, trans. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (Indian University Press, 2004), was directly concerned with Merleau-Ponty’s final effort, a book mentioned by name in anticipation by Lonergan in 1957 (note 23, p. 278 of CWL 18). Merleau-Ponty’s book appeared in French in 1964 (Le visible et l’invisible, Paris: Gallimard, 1964), and in English as The Visible and the Invisible, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston Northwestern, 1968). An elementary introduction to the problem of Helen and the problem of touching-objectivity are available, in chapters 1 and 5, respectively, of McShane, A Brief History of Tongue. From Big Bang to Coloured Whales (Axial Publishing), 1998.

49 The concluding section, 3.6, of Lack in the Beings talk (Axial Publishing, 2007) gives a glimpse of this problem of care. The following chapter 4 places that challenge in the context of a key analogy of science: "The Calculus of Variation" (Husserl’s thesis of 1882) as model of the new functional theological calculus. It gives a further perspective on the issue of The Standard Model (see notes 4, 5, 11 and 12 above).
of that habituation is required for statecraft,\textsuperscript{50} for statement craft, for a state meant, if one is living within the science: otherwise one is talking quite beyond one’s competence. Such biased beyond-talk is to be strategically excluded by the dynamics of functional collaboration: that is to be one of the Bell-curve statistical glories of Lonergan’s invention of that Tower of Able.\textsuperscript{51}

Within that full context one attends to the claim of the statement, “Jesus, I love You.” The statement is made in the absolutely supernatural present order. The focal issue of interest and concern now is, What do I mean by I?\textsuperscript{52}

Backed by the pointers given, we can move to intussuscept our intussusception of FLM. The intussusception is, of course, limited or problematic for the committed celibate, but the handling such limitations I must leave to the individual reader. But I think that it is helpful to note that there is a broader treatment needed of the subject that could be given the title “Finality, Love, Sex” that would give a new context for non-matrimonial love or self-love.\textsuperscript{53}

I suggest a final helping shift of focus that gives you the possibility of seeing the book Insight in a fresh manner: a paralleling of the statement “I

\textsuperscript{50} “Since our purpose is to speak about matters to do with character, we must first inquire of what character is a branch. To speak concisely, it would seem to be a branch of nothing else that statecraft” (The beginning of Aristotle’s Magna Moralia).

\textsuperscript{51} See Lonergan, 163.

\textsuperscript{52} The next five words in the text here are “backed by these two pointers.” But the backing needed to “go on” (I mention thus, discomfortingly, that same troubling point of the mid-paragraph of Method in Theology, 287: “one can go on”: can one?) is the personal meeting of the question of the Existential Gap (see Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic, the index under Existential) in present theology. A pond parallel of mine might nudge. One can “go on” from and through Bruckner’s eighth symphony if one has ingested the five notes (doh-, me, fah, so, so[low]) as they emerge, a quiet bridge, and dominate that symphony. But what cherishing and self-cherishing is called for to so ingest? And what of the self-tasting of those underpinning, pining, five notes in the symphony of each our life: be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, inventive, responsible?

\textsuperscript{53} The question bubbled up in FN 23, “Here Hear”, notes 7-10, and is compactly raised in FN 28, “A Touching of Touch: Getting on your Nerves”, note 23, where I posed the question: “What, then, is sexy to mean in the third stage of meaning? The question bubbles out of the concluding chapter of Kristeva, much as the question, ‘What, then, is objectivity to mean in the third stage of meaning?’ The new meanings both require a global collaborative structure to make probable their public emergence.” The reference is to Julia Kristeva, Colette, translated by Jane Marie Todd (Columbia University Press, New York, 2004). I note Kristeva’s frontispiece quotation from The Visible and the Invisible (see note 49 above) centering on “that innate anonymity of Myself that we call flesh …. Flesh is … an element of Being”. I am indebted here to the doctorate work of Christine Jamieson, who kindly made available to me her doctoral thesis from St. Paul’s University, Ottawa, The Significance of the Body in Ethical Discourse: Julia Kristeva’s Contribution. The question bubbles up now in so far as one seriously grapples with the final problem-laden pages of FLM.
love you Jesus" or some equivalent such as "I am your lover, Jesus" with statements that bring us into the problem of chapter 11 of Insight, like "I am a knower." The paralleling of "I love you Jesus" with such a statement as "I know the typewriter" could well nudge us towards envisaging the drive of the missing second volume, Insight and Faith, that Lonergan wrote of in 1952. but we won't go there in this context.

Instead, think now of reading the book Insight in order to make both it and the Bible disappear through the emergence – as a non-given – of a proper conception of self-attentive method and of its content. I am suggesting, then, through paralleling some such two short statements, a paralleling with chapter 11 of Insight, or indeed with the whole book Insight, not just the book journeyed but the book as habitually journeyed, at least re-journeyed with sufficient success and perhaps recycled in spiraling climbs till the book comfortably disappears, a seen played in your head, and you meet Bernard as Jack might sophisticatedly meet Jill. Then one might find oneself enjoying the deep parallel between the space-time bridge of Insight and the bridge, Jesus, of Catherine of Siena's Dialogue, the Dialogue considered not as an expression of mystical conviction, but simply of orthodox Christian Faith within the mode of theoretic embrace.

I speak of the emergence of a non-given, and I would have you hold that focus in order to consider the objection of Charles Hefling to the transposition into contemporary theology, as a central entity, of sanctifying

54 See Insight chapter 13, the second page.
56 The existential difficulty here for many is to hold to the minimum that Lonergan invites when he introduces the definition of being in chapter 12 of Insight, and so be confronted, or in fronted, with a personal decision by the printed position of page 413. See the next note.
57 I think here of Lonergan's talk of that leap of his in our first conversation together, Easter 1961. He paced the floor of the little room in Lower Leeson Street, Dublin, where we were, talking of having to go ask somebody. I have often wondered what that somebody replied to the post-Hegelian insanity. On that insanity, see Mark Morelli, "Lonergan's Debt to Hegel and the Appropriation of Critical Realism," Meaning and History in Systematic Theology. Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, S.J., edited by John Dadosky, Marquette University Press, 2009, 405-422.
59 There is a tricky set of questions here regarding expressions, like that of Catherine's Dialogue, dictated in a fervent rush, yet powerfully orthodox in what one might call ordinary theology. The mystic draws on contemporary and proximate traditions when articulating with some push for coherence: otherwise we are left with metaphor, as with St. Ignatius' talk of the Trinity as three bells.
grace. I must ask you to avail yourself of his text if you are to puzzle this out personally rather than be perhaps mislead by my selective citing. The issue comes up neatly in a passage of Lonergan quoted by Hefling. Lonergan has been giving a sketch of the metaphysical account of soul as a source of neglect of the subject, and then remarks: "The study of the subject is quite different, for it is the study of oneself inasmuch as one in conscious. It prescinds from the soul. Its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these is given in consciousness." This fits in with Hefling's earlier claim of "a need for derivation from an analysis of conscious intentionality" of A, B, ... in a "methodological theology" if A, B, ... are to have a "warrant of their validity."

I have no interest in venturing into the odd meanings of "methodological theology": rather I wish you to indulge in generalized empirical method as described uncomfortably in A Third Collection. I add here two quotations from Lonergan that help that venture. First, there is the comment of Lonergan a little further down the page quoted by Hefling: "Subject and soul, then, are two quite different topics. To know one does not exclude the other in any way.

But it very easily happens that the study of the soul leaves one with the feeling that one has no need to study the subject and, to that extent, leads to a neglect of the subject." Secondly there is the precise general methodological claim that comes, conveniently, at the end of the previous essay in A Second Collection, itself a context for our reachings: "Just as reflection on the operations of the scientist brings to light the real foundation of the science, so too reflection on the ongoing process of conversion may bring to light the real foundation of a renewed theology."

60 "Quaestio Disputata On the (Economic) Trinity: an Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran," Theological Studies 68 (2007). Various other people have entered the dispute in the years before and since, but best stick here with Hefling's clear presentation cited below as Hefling.

61 Lonergan, "The Subject," A Second Collection, edited by W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974, 73. The second sentence is quoted by Hefling at the bottom of 650, and the last seven words are repeated early in the next page as back-up to his point.

62 Hefling, 647.

63 The description is given in note 45 above.

64 As in note 61 above.

65 "Theology in its New Context," A Second Collection, 67. One may think of the comment as pointing to a new Quaestio Prima of a Summa, or pointing to the two volumes envisaged by Lonergan in 1952 (see note 55 above).
The second claim points us to core light on what we are doing when we lift the statement “I love you, Jesus” into the context in which we are invited to muse over the statement “I am a knower” or “I know the typewriter, and it’s not me.”66 Both statements are conscious statements of fact.67 “I” occurs in both statements. What happens to the meaning of I if you battle through Insight chapter 11 with that new statement about the I of love?

Your question is, is I given in consciousness in either case? And if it is not, how is I’s “derived from an analysis of intentional consciousness”?68

The derivation relating to unity, identity, whole, of the first statement, “I am a knower”, whether of self or the typewriter or of Jack or Jill is the tricky enterprise of chapter 11 of Insight.69 The I of “I love Jesus” as a unity, identity, whole, is in the ballpark defined by the second quotation above. But neither I is given in consciousness: certainly not, if you take given in the meaning given it by Lonergan in chapter 13 of Insight.70 Chapter 11 helps us to make sense of the I of nature. How are we to make sense, convenient or hypothetical sense,71 of the I of an absolute supernature, with God and I in a shocking72 friendship?

The task of getting to grips with this is yours, especially if you have aspirations towards being a serious member of the new global omnidisciplinary science of theology. It is a big reach in our times, but later times are to support it through the spiralling and mediations of the Tower of Able.

On, then, abruptly, to the reach for the reach of FLM within these contexts:

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66 Recall notes 58 and 59 above. There is the massive post-Hegelian shift of context for the content of Insight chapters 12 and 13. So, too, Jesus slips out of sight and into mind.

67 Here I slide past issues of the facticity of Faith-statements. See note 65 above and the text there.

68 Heffling, 647.

69 I have already commented on the tricky psychic weaving involved in lifting forward from chapter 11 to the position of page 489 of chapter 14. The deeper climb is to genuinely cross the bridges of Insight chapter 5 and chapter 8.


71 Both the human I and the I of God (quite strange: see CWL 12 397) “Do the divine persons say to one another ‘I’ and ‘You’), moving forward in genetic dynamic in both searches. It is useful to think of the question, What is a circle?, to which there is an elementally reply in chapter one of Insight. But what of Descartes’ efforts, and Fourier’s, and the related functions of complex analysis?

72 Recall note 6 above. The shock becomes focused. The manner in which, nonetheless, the mystery becomes globally resonant (see Insight, chapter 17, section 1 for a further statement of the problem) is an issue of the minding and aesthetic mediation of molecular resonances.
but not here. I could put brief effective words here, simply reminding an audience of a shared ethos, but I assured that the contexts mentioned above were shared contexts of the audience and the prior task a memory in its boned-in solution. But the sad reality is that the Standard Model that is to dominate the cycle of functional collaboration in a millennium, generating, with Bell-curve loveliness, “cumulative and progressive results” is only at present a faint hope. Then my pointing is more an encouragement to read seriously and with fantasy a few passages or even single words that may help in sensing the dynamics of a shift to a new heuristic of sanctifying grace. The few passages, indeed, lead to a freshening of sections of Insight touched on in notes above, written a decade later in clear compendious obscurity.

But prior to such detailing, left after all to you of these next years, I would like to emphasize what I call mood: the sharing of the 1930s mood of Lonergan that he carried into this work, a bent toward fullness that focused him on the restoration of all things in Christ, that tied him to economic studies and led him into grappling with both ancient history and modern physics. It was a mood that led him to express at length to his superior a deep lonely frustration, summed up in the concluding words of his letter: “what on earth is to be done? I have done all that can be done in spare time....” It was the mood of an existential call, a call involving a Hopkinsesque self-taste that he wrote of later. And the pull was the pull of the “dynamic joy and zeal” of history, of the molecules of “the world of sense, its finality, its yearning for God.” In our chats in the 1970s Lonergan remarked once, with a glint in his eye, that “when I wrote that essay [FLM] I had emergent probability”, but might we not say rather that emergent probability had him, that he was the

73 Obviously, the entire effort here is a call to the audience, but it is a call to the present audience to care for the future audience in pointing them to the bridges that were too far (see note 30 above) in this last half-century of Lonergan studies. There is here a central crisis, to be faced openly. The ethos is “an aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin and story operative whenever the group debates, judges, evaluates, decides and acts – and especially in a crisis.” (Lonergan, CWL 10 230)

74 Method in Theology, 4.

75 The detailing was to be much fuller, but now is a matter of a few illustrative footnotes inviting the sort of effort regarding FLM that Lonergan talks of in the first pages of the Epilogue of Verbum.

76 Lonergan, 154.

77 A Third Collection, 132.

78 CWL 3 722.

79 CWL 3 745.
“character”80 he wrote of in the final chapter of Method in Theology? 

But why do I invite this mood of reflection? The issue is “the grandeur of God”81 in the extreme reach of Their absolutely supernatural embrace of the feeblest of spirit-finitudes.82 A bone-marrowing limit-grace is the “final frontier”83 vibrant in the maternal embrace constituted84 by the so-tamely named secondary esse of the Incarnate Word. That participation in divine paternity/maternity is a shocking divine-dream-up leap into 13.7 billion years of genuinely anticipatory cosmic groaning85: what further leaps in being is in Their Minding, meeting in a limit-fashion the exigence86 in the bones of us gorillas in the mist? 

The Word’s adventure is towards a two-way ‘incorporation’87 that is to blossom into an endlessly incomplete circumincession of Them in molecular dance with us and within us. The dance begins in a will-surging mind-

80 Method in Theology, 356. Add the comment of note 52 above.
81 Line one of Hopkins’ “God’s Grandeur.”
82 Lonergan once spoke to Val Rice, outside the context of the Rice interviews, (see Lonergan, 110-12) of man being the most improbable of creatures.
84 A host of problems lurk here, regarding the meaning of constitution (See e.g. Lonergan, CWL 12 the index under Constitution). My use above may seem loose in that context, but it is permissible in one’s thinking of the external term. “This created substantial act is related to the person of the Son of God. For the same act both perfects the obediential potency of the human essence so that it is actually assumed by the Son of God and constitutes the external term whereby this contingent fact is true, namely, that the Son of God has actually assumed this human nature” (Lonergan, CWL 7 115).
85 Romans 8: 19.
86 The entire focus of this essay is, of course, on the exigence in each of us, and the Existential Gap we face as a group in coming to grips with it as an obedient natural resultance in this finitude. See the index to Phenomenology and Logic on both Exigence and Existential Gap.
87 Here you have a key detailed invitation to the ingestion of the text FLM (one has to not only follow the elementary descriptive norms of Method in Theology, chapter 7, sections 1-6, but to lift oneself into the remote realms of the second canon of hermeneutics). The detailed presence in oneself thus constituted is the context for asking the question that is at the heart of this paper: What hypothetical embeddedness of the divine in finitude meets the demands of the data of my senses and consciousnesses? The embeddedness is an “incorporation in the body of Christ” (FLM, 33; see Ephesians 5: 30-31). See also the six occurrences on FLM, pp. 46-47 of “incorporation / incorporate”. Is there not ground for personally suspecting that “the ascent of the soul to God is ... a personal function of the objective common movement in that body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life”, that it shares the friendly shocking lift towards a harmony with the graces of the Incarnate Word (see Lonergan, The Incarnate Word, Theses 12 ff).
bending cosmic call\(^8\) that backfires\(^9\) into a core lift of central form, a lift way too sublime and subtle to be viewed aggregformically in this life, or to be comprehended in the next.\(^{10}\) We call that lift “sanctifying grace”\(^11\): but what is it? OR who is it? That quest is to be the sacred heart and immaculate heart of both our pilgrim prayer and our everlasting delight.\(^{12}\)

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8 What is this cosmic call, this quest? The final paragraph of Lack in the Beingstalk, chapter 2 (Axial Publications, 2007) seeks to reach towards a symbolic lift towards the formation of characters of the quest: “All we know is somehow with us... it lurks behind the scenes’ (CWL 3 303). Skin-within are molecules of cos-mi-c-all, cauled, calling. The rill of her mouth can become the thrill, the trill, of a life-time, the word made fresh. Might we inspire and expire with the lungs of history? But the hole story is you and I, with and within global humanity, upsetting Love’s Sweet Mystery into a new mouthing, an anastomotic spiral way of birthing better the buds of Mother.” (Ana- again, stomein, to provide a mouth. ‘Using the device of anastomosis, Joyce attempts, in the last chapter of his last work, to bridge all the great ontological chasms,” Margot Norris, ‘On the Last Chapter of Finnegans Wake: Stephen Finds His Mother,’ James Joyce Quarterly (25) 1987-8, 11.’”

9 Behind, within, the metaphor there is a massive complex development of the perspective on trinitarian presence in history symbolized by the “line” in the Metagram, W3 (See Lonergan, 161). There is a shift from the phylogenetic to the ontogenetic, and the shift is in the context of the fuller heuristic of “natural resultance” mentioned above in note 22. Popularly put, there is the call of the passive spiration for the presence of the companionship of the active spiration, but a companionship in the human soul that is a slim participation, especially in that the second Person is a yearning absence. The everlasting genetically-structured adoption that is a participation in Filiatio is a pilgrim hope within a pledge of endless spiraling molecular circumference.

10 To put the matter startlingly, there is Paul’s exaggeration, about seeing God face to face, in 1 Corinthians 13: 12. St. Thomas was quite clear that, even for the mind of the Incarnate Word, the comprehension of God was an impossibility. Add to this the fact that if one does not comprehend Infinite Understanding, then one is infinitely remote from understanding that understanding. Of course, here we need analogies, e.g., from the mathematics of infinities: one can have a grip on a countable infinity yet be at an infinite remove from a grip on the continuum. Etc: into other transfinite zones.

11 I recall, in this final note, the point made in note 1: sanctifying grace is mentioned once in FLM, our neutrino-nudge: perhaps I have shared a little of the need of layered genetic and dialectic contexts in pushing forward the search for the meaning of such grace? And might I not end with a pointing towards the eight different contexts that groan in the beginning of this millennium for emergence as functionally distinct and globally focused?

12 A fuller perspective on the present issue is given in my forthcoming book, Method in Theology 101 Ad 9011: The Road to Religious Reality (Axial Publishing, 2012) where the I becomes strangely luminous in the eye, and the missing treatise on the Mystical (Insight, 763-4) is identified as a generic sequence of such theses pointed to by the word Comparison on Method in Theology, 250.
THE NOTION OF A LONERGAN ENTERPRISE

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INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Frederick Crowe published The Lonergan Enterprise, a short book that comprised a set of three lectures he had presented in various places the previous year. His central contention was that, among Bernard Lonergan's many achievements, one of the most outstanding was his elaboration of a powerful new method for achieving and implementing knowledge. Aristotle developed deductive logic as a basic instrument of mind, an organon, for use in the theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. Dismissing Aristotle, Francis Bacon set forth a scheme of experiment and induction as a novum organum for pursuing knowledge of nature. Moving beyond both Aristotle and Bacon, Lonergan proposed a set of eight interrelated functional specialties as the basic method of philosophy, theology, and human science, a method that may be viewed as an organum novissimum.

In his three-part study, Crowe recounted the long process that culminated in Lonergan's articulation of the eight functional specialties,

2 For Crowe's brief presentation of Aristotle and Bacon, see The Lonergan Enterprise, 7-14. (He makes clear, 7-10, that the view of deductive logic as an organon was merely implicit in Aristotle's own writings, becoming explicit only later in the writings of his followers.)
3 The Lonergan Enterprise, 14-41; the reference to Lonergan's method as an organum novissimum occurs on 34.

Whereas the objects of philosophy, theology, and human science are at least partly meaningful, the object of natural or positive science as such is just intelligible. See, e.g., Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 219. For an argument starting with that observation and concluding that the basic method of natural or positive science is a reductive case of eightfold functional specialization, see Michael Vertin, "Acceptance and Actualization: The Two Phases of My Human Living," METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 21 (2003), 67-86, at 83-86.
sketched the preconditions of their employment by others, and highlighted some contemporary tasks that require such employment. Like Lonergan, the discipline in which he illustrated functional specialization at work was primarily theology. And it is the use of functional specialization, whether in theology or elsewhere, that is what he meant by “the Lonergan enterprise.”

Today, some thirty years after the publication of Crowe’s book, the time seems opportune for a new reflection on the endeavor to which its title refers, a reflection both broader and more detailed than the one required by Crowe’s original purpose. Although such a reflection could be organized in various ways, one approach would begin by reviewing and expansively interpreting Lonergan’s own writings, delineating the properties that they anticipate a Lonergan enterprise would possess. Then it would turn from heuristic notion to historical fact, asking about the extent to which the enterprise as thus conceived is actually instantiated. More amply, the notional and historical stages of this reflection could each be subdivided into two parts, with the four resulting parts respectively addressing four main questions: From the standpoint of Lonergan’s writings, (1) what is a communal enterprise in general, and (2) what features would distinguish the enterprise of a Lonergan community in particular? From the standpoint of actual history, (3) what is the current status of the enterprise of the Lonergan community that has in fact emerged, and (4) what measures could enhance that enterprise’s future?

In April of 2010, at the 25th Annual Fallon Memorial Lonergan Symposium, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, I presented a paper entitled “The Lonergan Enterprise: What Is Its Future?” It aimed to sketch answers to all four of the preceding questions, though the answers to the last two in particular were expressly just preliminary. The present paper is a revised version of the earlier paper’s first half. Hence it is limited to addressing the first two of the preceding questions. Its ultimate goal is

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4 The Lonergan Enterprise, e.g., 6, 28, 37, 39, 62, 76.

5 If one concludes (as I do) that the core elements in the notion of a Lonergan enterprise that emerges from Lonergan’s writings are normative heuristic expectations rather than abstractive empirical generalizations, then one treats that notion not as an empirical hypothesis to be tested against the reality of whatever Lonergan enterprise has appeared in history but rather as a criterion for assessing the authenticity of the latter.

6 In this paper I prescind from considerations of divine and (at least hypothetical) angelic communities. Moreover, as will become apparent, I refrain from applying the label “community” to a group of interacting infra-human individuals. Consequently, throughout the paper the word “community” means “human community.”
simply to elucidate the features of a Lonergan enterprise that arguably are projected as characteristic by Lonergan's own writings. Such an elucidation would then be available for use as a criterion by anyone wishing in turn to address the last two questions in more than just preliminary fashion.

1. ANY COMMUNAL ENTERPRISE

The first of our two main tasks in this paper is to sketch the Lonerganian notion of a communal enterprise in general. Obviously, however, a communal enterprise would be an endeavor, venture, undertaking, project of a human community as such. Hence the crucial issue under our first main heading is the character, the nature, the intelligibility, of a human community. Let us address this issue by comparing the intelligibility of a human community with four methodically-prior varieties of intelligibility: that of transcendental being, of proportionate being, of an individual material being, and of an individual human being.

1.1. The Intelligibility of Transcendental Being

The intrinsic intelligibility of transcendental being is absolute, unconditioned, independent. This contention is a conclusion of phenomenological and metaphysical analysis, and the argument supporting it can be summarized briefly as follows.

First, the integral objective of my desire to know is the entirety of what can be asked about. It is what I know incrementally insofar as I get correct answers to questions, and it is what I would know completely if I were to get correct answers to every question that could be asked.

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7 See note 5 above.
8 An adequate discussion of the current status and prospective future of the Lonergan community's enterprise would require a good deal of quantitative research, sagacious assessments both of achievements and strengths and of failures and vulnerabilities, and sober estimates of future possibilities and the resources to realize them. It strikes me that such an undertaking would be an excellent dissertation project for an interested doctoral student.
9 Recall note 6 above.
11 To put this in another way, the contention is a development of positional answers to the first (and second) and third of Lonergan's "three basic questions." On these see, e.g., Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), 37, 86, 204, and Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 20-21, 25, 83, 238-40, 261, 297, 316.
Second, the entirety of what can be asked about is identically the entirety of what is intrinsically knowable, knowable \textit{in itself}. For my very act of asking a question anticipates that what I ask about is, at least in itself, able to be known. (The extent to which it is also extrinsically knowable, knowable \textit{by me}, is a further issue.) And what holds for a single question holds as well for the entirety of possible questions.

Therefore, the integral objective of my desire to know is identically the entirety of what is intrinsically knowable.

Third, what is intrinsically knowable is identically what is intrinsically intelligible. For to be intrinsically knowable is to be intrinsically graspable \textit{by intelligence}; and to be intrinsically graspable by intelligence is to be intrinsically intelligible.

Therefore, the integral objective of my desire to know is identically the entirety of what is intrinsically intelligible.

Fourth, the most fundamental characterization of transcendental being – the totality of what is, of what exists, of what is real – is that it is the integral objective of my desire to know. For transcendental being can be given countless additional characterizations; but for me to contend that some other characterization is operationally more accurate or more basic would be to entangle myself in performative oversights or even contradictions (though grasping those defects explicitly might require a considerable amount of self-study).

Therefore, transcendental being is identically the entirety of what is intrinsically intelligible.

Fifth, the entirety of what is intrinsically intelligible is absolute, unconditioned, independent. For to be relative to, conditioned by, dependent upon something else is to have an external intrinsically intelligible relation to it. But the entirety of what is intrinsically intelligible includes all intrinsically intelligible relations, such that none is external to it.

Therefore, transcendental being is absolute, unconditioned, independent.

Sixth, if transcendental being is absolute, unconditioned, independent, then the intrinsic intelligibility of transcendental being is absolute, unconditioned, independent. For when a content is understood in ways that are just notionally distinct from one another, what holds for the content when understood in one way also holds for it when understood in another way. But the content understood as transcendental being is just notionally distinct from the content understood as the intrinsic intelligibility of
Therefore, the intrinsic intelligibility of transcendental being is absolute, unconditioned, independent.

**Terminological excursus.** The careful reader will have noticed that whereas I began this section by speaking simply of *intelligibility*, I soon narrowed my focus to *intrinsic* intelligibility. In order to avoid cluttering the remainder of my text, henceforth I will avoid writing “intrinsic” as a modifier of “intelligibility” but continue understanding it as operative unless I clearly indicate otherwise.

1.2. *The Intelligibility of Proportionate Being*  

The intelligibility of proportionate being is *virtually absolute*, and *emergently probable in general*. Like the central assertions of each remaining section of Part One, this assertion is established by metaphysical analysis.

The previous section concluded that the intelligibility of transcendental being – the intelligibility of all that is, that exists, that is *real* – is absolute. Now, metaphysical analysis brings to light an utterly basic distinction and relation within transcendental being and a corresponding distinction and relation within its intelligibility. These distinctions and relations can be brought to light in two steps.

The first and preliminary step is to make explicit the distinction within transcendental being between *proportionate* being, being that is intrinsically apt for being known through human experiencing, understanding, and judging, and *transcendent* being, being that – since it is not experienceable – exceeds the capabilities of ordinary human cognitional process. Expressed alternatively, this distinction falls between *material* being and *strictly spiritual* being.

The second and final step is to recognize that, although all being is

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12 The more common label for the intrinsic intelligibility of transcendental being is “transcendental intelligibility.” Like the other so-called ‘transcendentals’ (e.g., transcendental truth, transcendental goodness), transcendental intelligibility makes explicit some aspect of transcendental being in relation to a potential knower and chooser – in this case, its intrinsic aptness for being known. However, since what is made explicit is already present implicitly, the difference between the various contents is merely notional, not real. This point is captured in the Scholastic dictum that the various transcendents are “mutually convertible.”

I speak here of “the intrinsic intelligibility of being” rather than the more familiar “transcendental intelligibility” in order to facilitate comparisons as the paper unfolds.

13 See, e.g., CWL 3 657-708; cf. 93-195, 270-95, 410-552.
absolute, unconditioned, independent, within the transcendent or strictly spiritual realm there is a being that is absolute formally, unconditioned by nature, independent essentially. The remainder of the transcendent or strictly spiritual realm and the entirety of the proportionate or material realm are absolute not formally but just virtually, unconditioned not by nature but merely by "participation" in the naturally unconditioned being, independent not essentially but only in dependence upon the essentially independent being. That is to say, the most basic distinction within transcendental being is between (i) a being that is both its own ground and goal and the radical ground and ultimate goal of everything else and (ii) everything else. Or, equivalently, transcendental being is differentiated most basically into (i) infinite being and (ii) finite being.

The key points of the two preceding paragraphs may be expressed in a way that differs just notionally, not really, from the first way of putting them. There is a distinction within the intelligibility of transcendental being between the intelligibility that is proportionate to human knowing and the intelligibility that is transcendent to it. Within the latter realm there is an intelligibility that is absolute formally, unconditioned by nature, independent essentially: infinite intelligibility. And the intelligibility of both the remainder of the transcendent realm and of the totality of the proportionate realm is absolute only virtually, unconditioned merely by "participation," independent just dependently: finite intelligibility.\(^{14}\)

Next, finite being is dependent upon infinite being not only as its radical ground or efficient cause but also as its ultimate goal or final cause. That is to say, the intelligible relation of finite to infinite is one not only of being an effect but also of finality. Now, let us turn briefly to the finality of proportionate or material being in particular. Moreover, in accord with our present purposes, let us limit that consideration to envisaging its ultimate goal in "this worldly" terms.

With that restriction, we may say that the intelligibility of proportionate being is that of a dynamic process whose orientation is toward an ever more complete systematization of the collectivity of this-worldly events, whose actual advances are neither strictly determined nor purely random but emergently probable, and whose ultimate goal is the maximum possible

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\(^{14}\) In traditional terms, besides the material cosmos and God, there is the realm of angels and separated souls. (And of course certain religious traditions claim to have revelatory evidence of that intermediate realm.)
organization of world process.15

1.3. The Intelligibility of an Individual Material Being16

The intelligibility of an individual material being is virtually absolute, subject to generalized emergent probability, and natural. This central assertion of the present section affirms that the intelligibility of an individual material being is absolute insofar as that being is, virtually absolute insofar as it is finite, and subject to generalized emergent probability insofar as it is proportionate. What then is the import of the further characteristic “natural” in this context? In brief, the answer is that “natural” signifies that the intelligibility of an individual material being is merely intelligible insofar as that being is material. Let us expand this compact response.

First, insofar as an individual material being is individual, its intelligibility is that of a concrete unity-identity-whole that is particular, the intelligibility of a concrete thing that differs at least countably from other concrete things.

Second, insofar as an individual material being is material, its intelligibility is merely intelligible rather than also intelligently self-constituting, spiritual. In more detail, insofar as the individual is simply a concrete physical, chemical, or botanical unity, its intelligibility is material in the sense that the individual’s self-constituting processes, if any, are nonconscious, those of a mere object. Alternatively, insofar as the individual is a concrete zoological unity, its intelligibility is material in the sense that some of the individual’s self-constituting processes are conscious, those of a subject, but conscious in a way that is just sentient rather than intelligent, those of a merely sentient subject rather than an intelligent subject, a spiritual subject. But intelligibility that is material in either the first sense or the second sense is intelligibility that is natural.

It remains that no individual material being exists in isolation. Rather, it always exists in a concrete context of interactions with other individual material beings. In the limit the context is that of proportionate being,

15 The finality of proportionate being is the actualization of potency that is material (albeit not purely, since it includes the material-spiritual potency that is characteristic of specifically human beings). Its intelligibility is what Lonergan conceives and labels as “generalized emergent probability.” By contrast, the finality of transcendent being that is finite, if any, is the actualization of potency that is purely spiritual. Consequently, it would seem that whatever precisely its intelligibility is, it does not involve probability (or at least not the probability associated with matter).

16 See, e.g., CWL 3 93-195, 270-95, 512-52.
the context whose intelligibility governs every individual material being. However, as we have noted in the preceding section, the intelligibility of proportionate being is that of a dynamic process whose orientation is toward an ever more complete systematization of the totality of events, whose actual advances are neither strictly determined nor purely random but emergently probable, and whose ultimate goal is the maximum possible organization of world process. It follows that the finality of proportionate being tends to foster ever more intensive and extensive systematic interactions between individual material beings, that its actual achievements are emergently probable, and that its final objective is that system of interacting individual material beings which would foster the greatest total interactive strength consistent with the inclusion of every individual.

1.4. The Intelligibility of an Individual Human Being

The intelligibility of an individual human being is virtually absolute, subject to generalized emergent probability, natural, and intentional. This central assertion of the present section invokes some notions that are now familiar and introduces one new one. The familiar notions underlie the affirmation that the intelligibility of an individual human being is absolute insofar as that being is, virtually absolute insofar as it is finite, subject to generalized emergent probability insofar as it is proportionate, and natural insofar as it is material. The new notion is "intentional". Summarily, it means that the intelligibility of an individual human being is not merely intelligible but also intelligent because and insofar as that being is not just material but also spiritual.

First, an individual human being is indeed individual, and to that extent its intelligibility is that of a concrete unity-identity-whole that is particular, the intelligibility of a concrete thing that differs at least countably from other concrete things.

Second, an individual human being is material; and to that extent its intelligibility, like that of any other material being, is merely intelligible rather than intelligently self-constituting, spiritual. More amply, an individual human being possesses some characteristics of concrete physical, chemical, botanical, and zoological things: for example, atomic composition, chemical composition, life, and sentient consciousness respectively. Insofar as the list of characteristics includes the first three groups, the individual human's

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intelligibility is just material in the sense that its self-constituting processes are nonconscious, those of a mere object. Insofar as the list of characteristics includes the fourth group, the individual human’s intelligibility is just material in the sense that its self-constituting processes are conscious but merely sentient, those of a simply sentient subject. But as we have seen in the previous section, intelligibility that is material in either the first sense or the second sense is intelligibility that is natural.

Third, however, the characteristics of an individual human being are not limited to those it shares with concrete physical, chemical, botanical, and zoological things. Its culminating characteristics, the ones that distinguish it as a specifically human thing, are those of intelligent consciousness. Its intelligibility is partly material in both senses, but its intelligibility is also partly spiritual in the sense that its self-constituting processes are at most not just conscious but also intelligent, those of an intelligent subject, a spiritual subject. That is to say, the intelligibility of an individual human being is not just natural: it is also intentional.

The processes that manifest the intentional aspect of an individual human’s intelligibility are her acts of intelligent knowing and choosing. Suppose, for example, that someone investigates a group of plants, discovers that they produce a chemical compound that proves to be extremely useful for treating high blood pressure in humans, and establishes a business to grow such plants and produce the salutary compound in large quantities. Each individual plant is a merely natural thing. Asking questions about the plants and reaching correct answers are intentional acts of the investigator. The answers in and through which the investigator knows the plants are the intentional contents of those acts, namely, her original or augmented botanical and pharmacological knowledge. The choice on the basis of that knowledge to establish the business is a further intentional act by the investigator now become entrepreneur. The resultant growth and production facilities are both natural and intentional: natural in that they are composed of bricks, mortar, and other material elements; intentional in that they embody something of the entrepreneur’s knowledge and choice.

The preceding account may also be expressed in terminology that makes explicit the lived cognitional and decisional basis of the underlying metaphysical categories, namely, the terminology of meaning. In that terminology, each individual plant is a natural term of cognitive meaning. Asking questions about the plants and reaching correct answers are acts
of cognitive meaning. The answers in and through which the investigator knows the plants are intentional terms of cognitive meaning. The choice on the basis of those answers to establish the business is an act of effective meaning. The resultant growth and production facilities are both natural and intentional terms of effective meaning. And the changes in the investigator-entrepreneur by virtue of her acts of cognitive and effective meaning are contents of constitutive meaning.

1.5. The Intelligibility of a Community of Individual Human Beings

The intelligibility of a community of individual human beings is virtually absolute, subject to generalized emergent probability, natural, intentional, and shared. Perhaps the reader will not be surprised that we begin to unpack the central assertion of this section by repeating our previous litany and adding one new item. Thus we affirm that the intelligibility of a community of individual human beings is absolute insofar as that community is, virtually absolute insofar as it is finite, subject to generalized emergent probability insofar as it is proportionate, natural insofar as it is material, intentional insofar as it is spiritual, and shared insofar it is communal.

We can amplify the notion "communal" by extending a point made above in section 1.3. Just as an individual material being in general never exists in isolation but always in a concrete context of interactions with others, a context which in the limit is that of proportionate being and whose intelligibility is that of emergent probability, so too an individual human being in particular. In the latter case, however, the emergently probable finalistic dynamism is oriented not simply toward an ever more complete systematization of the totality of events in general but more specifically toward ever more intensive and extensive commonalities between acts of human meaning, along with the corresponding constitution of ever more intensive and extensive communities of human actors. This specifically human dimension of world process may be named human history. And its ultimate goal is not simply a maximally organized system of individual interactions in general but more specifically a single maximally developed community to which every human actor belongs.

Let us conclude Part One by summarizing the finding that is most

18 See, e.g., CWL 3 196-269, 512-52, and Method in Theology, 73-81, 175-234, 355-68.
19 See, e.g., CWL 3 234-67, 619-56.
important for our present purposes. The intelligibility of any community of individual human beings presupposes and includes the intelligibilities that are proper respectively to what is absolute, what is virtually absolute, what is emergently probable, what is natural, and what is intentional. But what culminates and distinctively characterizes the intelligibility of any human community, what transforms a mere group of individuals into a community, is the intelligibility of shared meanings, common meanings, meanings that are both similar from one individual to the next and mutually communicated by all members of the group.

It follows that any communal enterprise is an endeavor, venture, undertaking, project of a community characterized in just this way.

2. The Lonergan Community's Enterprise: Its Distinguishing Features

Part One of our paper spelled out the notion of a communal enterprise in general that emerges from Lonergan's writings. It would be the endeavor of a group of individual human beings who have similar and mutually communicated meanings. Against the background of that finding, our main task in Part Two is to sketch the Lonerganian notion of the features that would distinguish the enterprise of a Lonergan community in particular.

Before turning to that task, however, let us consider a potential ambiguity in the very phrase "the Lonergan enterprise." The phrase could mean nothing more than the endeavor, venture, project, undertaken by Bernard Lonergan himself. Indeed, at least once Crowe appears to use it in just this limited sense. But the phrase also could mean the endeavor undertaken by the Lonergan community (a community that presumably would include Bernard Lonergan as not the least illustrious of its members). The remainder of the paper intends the phrase in this broader sense. Indeed, it customarily excludes the ambiguity by employing the phrase "the Lonergan community's enterprise" instead.

2.1. An Initial Lonerganian Characterization

Just as a communal enterprise in general would be an endeavor of a community as such, so a Lonergan community's enterprise in particular
would be an endeavor of a Lonergan community as such. But what features would distinguish a Lonergan community from other human communities? I propose the following as an initial Lonerganian answer:

A Lonergan community would be (1) a group of individual human beings, each of whom (2) aspires to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, (3) objectifies her threefold conversional orientation, (4) employs that objectification as the foundation of all her investigative and effective projects, and (5) achieves her common mind and heart with others in the group at least partly in and through interchanges with them about Bernard Lonergan’s accounts of these matters.

Five brief comments on this characterization are in order. First, condition 1 specifies the material element of a Lonergan community, namely, that it is a group of human individuals.

Next, conditions 2 through 5 specify four successive aspects of the formal element, a common meaning that emerges in and through interchanges between the individuals in the group and transforms that group into a characteristically "Lonergan" community. Condition 2 specifies the first aspect of this common meaning, namely, that on the level of her concrete living, each individual in the group aspires to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, where the latter words have the senses given them in Lonergan’s writings. An aspiration to such conversion is all that is required, since the achievement of conversion in any of the three senses is partly a gift (whether natural, supernatural, or both) and thus not wholly within one’s control.

Next, condition 3 specifies a further aspect of the common meaning, namely, that each individual objectifies or introspectively understands and judges her conversional orientation. To objectify one’s conversional orientation is to come to know it rather than just experiencing it. Moreover, to speak of a conversional orientation leaves open the question of whether one has achieved conversion or is merely oriented to it; hence putting the matter this way maintains consistency with the preceding condition.

Next, condition 4 specifies yet another aspect of the common meaning, namely, that each individual uses the objectification of her conversional orientation as the foundation of all her investigative and effective projects. One’s foundation is the basic stimulus, guide, and criterion of whatever one does. Notice too that “Lonergan” projects are by no means limited to
investigative ventures, cognitive undertakings, studies. They most certainly include effective ventures, executional undertakings, efforts not just to know the world but to change it for the better.

Finally, condition 5 specifies the culminating aspect of the common meaning that would characterize a Lonergan community. It is that the communal stance regarding threefold conversion, objectification of that conversion, and foundational employment of that objectification is a stance that emerges for each individual at least partly in and through her communication with others in the group about Bernard Lonergan's views of these matters. That is to say, although each successive aspect of a Lonergan community's formal element is necessary, only all the aspects taken together are sufficient. For one could have a community whose common meaning was limited to its members' aspiration to threefold conversion, a second whose common meaning was limited to its members' aspiration to threefold conversion plus their objectification of it, and a third whose common meaning was limited to its members' aspiration to threefold conversion plus their objectification of it plus their foundational employment of it. But none of these three communities would qualify as a "Lonergan" community. For the latter is distinguished by a common meaning that includes not only the first three aspects but the fourth as well: some explicit dependence upon Lonergan's work.

In light of the foregoing initial Lonerganian characterization of a Lonergan community, we arrive at the following initial Lonerganian characterization of such a community's enterprise:

A Lonergan community's enterprise would be the endeavor of (1) a group of individual human beings, each of whom (2) aspires to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, (3) objectifies her threefold conversional orientation, (4) employs that objectification as the foundation of all her investigative and effective projects, and (5) achieves her common mind and heart with others in the group at least partly in and through interchanges with them about Bernard Lonergan's accounts of these matters.

2.2. Toward a Fuller Lonerganian Characterization

As seen above in section 1.5, acts of human meaning occur within
the concrete context of proportionate being and thus are governed by its emergently probable finalistic dynamism. The specifically human dimension of this dynamism is oriented toward ever more intensive and extensive commonalities between acts of human meaning and, correspondingly, ever more intensive and extensive communities of human actors. The process itself may be named human history, and its ultimate objective may be envisioned as a single maximally developed community to which every human actor belongs.

Next, appealing to Lonergan’s identification of human history with the concrete human good,21 we may employ his account of the structure of the human good22 in order to delineate the character of the ultimate human community in more detail. That community would be one in which every member is an intellectually, morally, and religiously converted originating value who is cooperating fully with every other member in the effort of actualizing the maximum possible integrated and ordered plenitude of terminal values: religious, personal, cultural, social, and vital.23

Finally, the preceding refinement allows a fuller statement of Part Two’s central question. Rather than seeking broadly to identify whatever features would distinguish a Lonergan community’s enterprise from the enterprises of other human communities, we can seek more precisely to identify the distinctive contributions of a Lonergan community’s enterprise to human history’s realization of its ultimate goal. That is to say, our central question now becomes this: What would be the distinctive contributions of a Lonergan community’s enterprise to human history’s maximum actualization of universal religious conversion? of universal intellectual and moral conversion? of a universal culture that is truly good? of a universal good of order that is truly


23 For a rich and informative exploration of the meaning and origins of Lonergan’s scale of values, see Patrick Byrne, “Which Scale of Value Preference? Lonergan, Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Doran,” in John Dadosky, ed., Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, SJ (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), 19-49. Among other things, Byrne offers what strikes me as a very discerning suggestion that vital values, the lowest member of the value hierarchy as elaborated in Method in Theology, deserve to be differentiated more fully by taking account of the levels of explanatory genera as elaborated in Insight. “Then a full scale of values would run something like: physical, chemical, biological, psychic, social, cultural, personal, and religious” (46).
good? of a totality of instances of the particular good in which each instance is truly good?

In the next three sections I will appeal to the four functions of meaning in order to outline the components of what I propose as a Lonerganian answer to this refined central question. (For a visual aid to grasping what follows, see Figure 1 at the end of this article.)

2.3. Cognitive Meaning: Structural

Let us begin by recalling the four functions of meaning. Meaning functions cognitively insofar as its acts are oriented ultimately to determining whether or not its terms are real. Meaning functions effectively insofar as its acts generate terms that are distinct from the meanner as such. Meaning functions constitutively insofar as its acts generate contents that are part of the meanner as such, whether the intended terms of the meanner’s choices concerning self or the non-intended byproducts of the meanner’s cognitive or effective or constitutive acts, and whether the meanner is an individual or a community. Meaning functions communicatively insofar as it leads two or more individuals to know and embrace something of the cognitive, effective, and constitutive meanings of one another. Finally, given acts and terms of meaning can have more than one function. For example, one individual’s persuasion of another is simultaneously effective, constitutive, and communicative.

Next, the cognitive, effective, and constitutive functions of meaning all can be subdivided into structural and historical. Meaning functions


25 A comparison may be useful here. Just as one’s acts of knowing (i.e., experiencing, understanding, and judging) are direct insofar as they regard the other and reflexive insofar as they regard oneself, so one’s acts of choosing are effective insofar as they regard the other and constitutive insofar as they regard oneself. But besides having intended objects (whether the other or oneself), one’s acts of knowing and choosing also both constitute oneself and make oneself present-to-self not as an intended object but merely as intending subject. Again, just as non-objective self-presence is not an act but just the conscious dimension of an act of knowing or choosing, so non-objective self-constitution is not an act but just the self-constitutive dimension of an act of knowing or choosing. Finally, just as non-objective self-presence (i.e., mere consciousness) and objective self-presence (i.e., self-knowledge) ought not be confused, so non-objective self-constitution and objective self-constitution (i.e., the result of one’s choices regarding oneself) ought not be confused. (See, e.g., Bernard Lonergan, “Christ as Subject: A Reply,” CWL. 4 153-84, esp. 166n14; Method in Theology, 74-79, 356-57; and “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” in CWL 17 391-408, at 398.)
structurally insofar as its terms are characterized simply by heuristic, a priori, metaphysical features, features limited to those implied by the features of the acts through which the terms are known or chosen. That is to say, the terms of structural meaning are concrete but determinate just heuristically. They are terms whose full, a posteriori, empirical features all are implicit, unexpressed, unarticulated. By contrast, meaning functions historically insofar as its terms are characterized not by heuristic, a priori, metaphysical features but rather by full, a posteriori, empirical features, features distinctive of the terms as individual and not merely those implied by the features of the acts through which the terms are known or chosen. That is to say, the terms of historical meaning are concrete and determinate not just heuristically but to some extent fully. They are terms at least one of whose full, a posteriori, empirical features is explicit, expressed, articulated.26

Now, I suggest that the most distinctive contribution of a Lonergan community’s enterprise to human history’s maximum actualization of terminal value would lie in the line of cognitive structural meaning. More exactly, the contribution would be one of making explicit a series of prescriptive heuristic fields that originally are just implicit, articulating a sequence of regulative horizons that initially are unarticulated. Each of these fields or horizons has a subjective pole, namely, cognitive structural intending, and an objective pole, namely, the cognitive structural intended; and the structure of the subjective pole entirely governs the structure of the objective pole.27 The first three of these fields or horizons are simply given (the first two naturally, the third supernaturally), whereas the last two emerge in and through the employment of the earlier.28 Still more exactly, delineated in summary fashion and beginning with what I take to be methodically the most basic,29 the contribution of a Lonergan community would be one of objectifying five successive concretely operative but initially unobjectified

26 See, e.g., CWL 4 415-21, 521-33.

27 On the principle of isomorphism, see CWL 3 138, 424-25, 509-511. On the distinction between a horizon’s objective and subjective poles, see, e.g., “Metaphysics as Horizon,” CWL 4 188-204, esp. 198-204, and “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 393-94.

28 On the emergence of later horizons in and through the employment of earlier ones, see Frederick Crowe, “Transcendental Deduction: A Lonerganian Meaning and Use,” in Crowe, Lonergan and the Level of Our Time (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 58-76.

29 Whether what is methodically most basic is also existentially most basic is a further question. See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, “Bernard Lonergan Responds,” in P. McShane, ed., Foundations of Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 233-24. Cf. Method in Theology, 243.
sets of normative horizontal structures.

The first set of structures to be objectified would be the normative structure of knowing and the corresponding normative structure of the known, namely, basic transcendental method in its cognitional aspect. The second set to be objectified would be the normative structure of choosing and the corresponding normative structure of the chosen, namely, basic transcendental method in its decisional aspect. This set of structures is a decisional sublation of the first set. The third set to be objectified would be the normative structures of knowing and choosing, and correspondingly of the known and the chosen, insofar as they are motivated and oriented by unrestricted being-in-love, namely, enriched transcendental method. This set of structures is a religious sublation of the first and second sets.

30 Ultimately, far more than five normative horizontal structures can be distinguished. However, I limit my considerations here to those that are most pertinent to my present purposes. (See, e.g., Method in Theology, 286-87. Cf. Crowe, “Transcendental Deduction,” 61-73; and Vertin, “Acceptance and Actualization,” 74-77.)

31 Two brief remarks are in order. First, here and throughout this paper I aim to follow Lonergan’s usual (though not exceptionless) practice of using the word “cognitional” and its cognates to designate acts and contents on the first three levels of conscious intentionality, while using “decisional” and its cognates to designate those on the fourth level. While it is true that the acts culminating in value judgments are cognitional, Lonergan situates them on the fourth level because they are the immediate grounds of responsible decision and thus integral elements of the decisional process. Second, the root of this way of distinguishing “cognitional” and “decisional” is the distinction between the first two transcendental notions (the notions of intelligibility and reality) and the third (the notion of value). Moreover, the relationship between the first two notions and the third is my basic reason for speaking of transcendental method in its decisional aspect as a “decisional sublation” of transcendental method in its cognitional aspect. (See, e.g., Method in Theology, 37, 120-21, 241-43, 316, 340, and “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 395-400.)

32 Just as the second level of consciousness sublates the first, and the third sublates the second (and first), and the fourth sublates the third (and second and first), so too the experience of unrestricted being-in-love sublates all four levels. However, on my interpretation of Lonergan the latter sublation differs far more fundamentally from the previous three than they differ from one another. For the first three sublations are events in the line of achievement, incremental attainments that at best just partially satisfy my inherent yearning for exhaustive cognitional and affective fulfillment. By contrast, unrestricted being-in-love is the primary event in the line of gift. It is the utterly gratuitous datum, conscious though not yet properly known, that brings incipient exhaustive contentment to my wondering mind and restless heart. The distinction between the lines of achievement and gift is a transposition of the scholastic theologians’ distinction between the lines of nature and grace; and it is that transposed distinction that my contrast between “basic” and “enriched” transcendental method aims to express. (See, e.g., Method in Theology, 101-24, 241-43, 282-93; “Mission and the Spirit,” in Bernard Lonergan, A Third Collection [London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985], 23-34; “Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response,” in CWL 17 352-83, esp. 358-63, 378-83; and “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 400-408. Cf. Michael Vertin, “Lonergan’s Metaphysics of Value and Love: Some Proposed Clarifications and Implications,” Lonergan Workshop 13 [1997], 189-219.)
fourth set to be objectified would be the normative scale of *valuing* and of the corresponding *values*. This set of structures is a differentiation of the first, second, and third sets.\(^3^3\) The fifth set to be objectified would be the normative structure of the *acts* of multidisciplinary collaboration and the corresponding normative structure of the *terms*, namely, the eight functional specialties. This set of structures is a differentiation of the previous four sets.\(^3^4\) Finally, in a complementary dimension, the Lonergan community's exercise of meaning in its *communicative* function would be fruitful both *ad intra* and *ad extra*. Communication between members of the community would strengthen their common engagement in the objectificational process I have just recounted and enhance their common grasp of its results. And communication with nonmembers would stimulate them to engage in that objectificational process and promote their grasp of its results, thus tending effectively to draw them into the community.

**2.4. Effective and Constitutive Meaning: Structural**

I suggest that the *second most distinctive* contribution of the Lonergan community's enterprise to human history's maximum actualization of terminal value would lie in the line of *effective* and *constitutive structural* meaning. More precisely, the contribution would be one of choosing to live in fidelity to the series of prescriptive heuristic fields one has elucidated, one of deciding to shape one's acts of categorial knowing and choosing in such a way that they accord with the sequence of regulative horizons one has articulated. Still more precisely, presented summarily and starting with what I take to be methodically the most basic, the contribution would be one

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\(^3^3\) *Sublations* are events in the unfolding of my lived knowing and choosing. Objectifying my lived knowing and choosing in its *most general* normative structural features yields explicit (as distinct from lived) transcendental method, including objectifications of the respective sublations that characterize basic transcendental method in its cognitional and decisional aspects and enriched transcendental method. By contrast, *differentiations* emerge from objectifying my lived knowing and choosing in its various *more particular* normative structural features, features that stand within the context of the more general ones. That is to say, the differentiations are in effect differentiations of explicit transcendental method. (See, e.g., *Method in Theology*, 281-93.)

of accepting the previously-noted five successive sets of normative horizontal structures as existential, as norms one commits oneself to be guided by.

The first set of structures to be accepted would be the normative structures of knowing and the known, namely, basic transcendental method in its cognitive aspect; and the acceptance is intellectual conversion. The second set to be accepted would be the normative structures of choosing and the chosen, namely, basic transcendental method in its decisional aspect. The acceptance is moral conversion, which sublates intellectual conversion. The third set to be accepted would be the normative structures of knowing and choosing, and correlatively of the known and the chosen, insofar as they are motivated and oriented by unrestricted being-in-love, namely, enriched transcendental method. The acceptance is religious conversion, which sublates intellectual and moral conversions. The fourth set to be accepted would be the normative scale of valuing and values. The acceptance is a differentiation of intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. The fifth set to be accepted would be the normative structures of the acts and terms of multidisciplinary collaboration, namely, the eight functional specialties. The acceptance is a differentiation of the four previous acceptances. Finally, just as in the case of objectification, so also in the case of acceptance: the Lonergan community’s exercise of meaning in its communicative function would have positive ramifications both within and beyond the community itself. Communication between members of the community would reinforce their common commitment to the objectified normative cognitional and decisional structures. And communication with nonmembers would foster a similar commitment on their part, thus further tending effectively to draw them into the community.

2.5. Historical Meaning: Cognitive, Effective and Constitutive

I propose that the third most distinctive contribution of the Lonergan community’s enterprise to human history’s maximum actualization of terminal value would lie in the line of cognitive, effective, and constitutive meaning that is not simply structural but historical. Unfolding within the

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35 The location of this claim in my overall account of normative structural meaning may be viewed as both an endorsement and a development of Byrne’s contention that the normative scale of value preferences presupposes intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. See "Which Scale of Value Preference?", 41, 47-48.
cumulative horizon established by objectifying and accepting basic and enriched transcendental method and its normative structural differentiations (such as the scale of values and the functional specialties), the contribution would regard terms of meaning as characterized not simply by heuristic, a priori, metaphysical features but rather by full, a posteriori, empirical features. More amply, whereas the acceptance of the structural objectifications is radically interior, the expressions of that acceptance are historical; and the contribution would be one of conceiving and implementing particular concrete projects that constitute such expressions.

Still more amply, any individual or group is free to undertake historical projects for the sake of fostering universal religious conversion, universal intellectual and moral conversion, a universal culture that is truly good, a universal good of order that is truly good, a totality of instances of the particular good in which each instance is truly good. What distinguishes a potential Lonerganian contribution in this line is not that it consists in research, teaching, or writing about Lonergan’s ideas (though it might), nor that it is an investigative or effective venture that explicitly uses Lonergan’s ideas (though it could be). Rather, it is any historical project that (a) expresses the acceptance of basic and enriched transcendental method and its normative structural differentiations and (b) is influenced by Lonergan’s ideas at least to this extent, namely, that it is pursued in the context of communication with others about Lonergan’s work. The field of such historical projects is potentially no less than the field of tangible human undertakings. In principle, therefore, one could be making a Lonerganian contribution to human history by eating a meal, planting a garden, voting for a candidate for public office, becoming a candidate for public office, seeing a movie, making a movie, taking a philosophy course, teaching a philosophy course, joining a religious group, starting a religious group, or engaging in virtually any other human activity.

2.6. A Fuller Lonerganian Characterization

In light of the foregoing five sections of Part Two, I now propose the following fuller characterization of a Lonergan community’s enterprise.

A Lonergan community’s enterprise would be the endeavor of (1) a group of individual human beings, each of whom (2) objectifies and
accepts basic and enriched transcendental method and its normative structural differentiations (such as the scale of values and the functional specialties), (3) employs that cumulative objectified and accepted structure as the fundamental stimulus, guide, and criterion for particular historical projects by which she aims to promote human history’s maximum actualization of its ultimate five-element compound terminal value, (4) pursues these structural and historical achievements in common with others in the group, and (5) possesses that common mind and heart with those others at least partly in and through exchanges with them about the ideas of Bernard Lonergan.

(For a schematic representation of the relationship of individual Lonergan specialists and individual Lonergan communities within the global Lonergan community’s enterprise of contributing to human history’s maximum actualization of terminal value, see Figure 2 at the end of this article.)

CONCLUSION

This paper has been limited to articulating two successive notions that arguably emerge from Bernard Lonergan’s writings. Each is the notion of a community’s undertaking, its endeavor, its enterprise: in the first case, the enterprise of a human community in general; in the second, the enterprise of a Lonergan community in particular. Both notions are normative heuristic expectations rather than abstractive empirical generalizations. That is to say, they anticipate the features the respective enterprises would possess if they were actually to exist, rather than universalizing the features that existing enterprises have been discovered to possess.

These heuristic notions can be extremely useful for evaluating any actually existing and nominally ‘human’ or ‘Lonerganian’ communal enterprises that historical investigation may happen to discover. For the notions would serve as criteria, standards, norms for assessing the authenticity of such historical enterprises, where the degree of an enterprise’s authenticity is the degree to which it measures up to the norms. Concretely, it seems that making such an assessment would be an important part of exploring in detail the current status of the “Lonergan” communal enterprise that has in fact emerged over the past five decades, and conceiving and implementing steps that could enhance its future.
FIGURE 1: FUNCTIONS OF MEANING

historical

effective and constitutive

cognitive

structural

effective and constitutive

cognitive

historical

effective and constitutive

cognitive

individual
(# 1)

individual
(# 2, etc.)
FIGURE 2
HUMAN HISTORY

FUTURE

PAST

1 - INDIVIDUAL LONERGAN SPECIALISTS

2 - INDIVIDUAL LONERGAN COMMUNITIES

3 - GLOBAL LONERGAN COMMUNITY
BOOK REVIEW

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William Sullivan’s *Eye of the Heart: Knowing the Good in the Euthanasia Debate* is an attempt to apply the ethical insights of Bernard Lonergan to the euthanasia debate. In the course of this task Sullivan also seeks to reveal the significant contribution that he feels Lonergan has made to the current revitalization of the Natural Law tradition. The breadth and clarity of his exposition of Lonergan’s work is exemplary. Sullivan also provides very detailed research into the lives of Sue Rodriguez and Dennis Kaye, two prominent Canadian activists suffering from Lou Gehrig’s disease who held opposing views about the legitimacy of euthanasia. Like Lonergan, Sullivan rejects the common reluctance of Anglo American philosophers to draw insight from personal experience. He draws extensively on his own personal experience as a medical doctor and ably demonstrates how much can be learned from such examination.

Sullivan does a good job presenting relevant details about the lives of Rodriguez and Kaye and the positions they publicly defended. He also ably connects these discussions to his exposition of the ethical outlook of Lonergan and his presentation of his own thoughtful and measured rejection of euthanasia. However, his analysis of Lonergan’s general understanding of ethics leaves unanswered four questions that are of critical importance for those seeking to reexamine Natural Law theory today. In the absence of clarification of these issues many readers might be uncertain about the adequacy of Lonergan’s specific Natural Law perspective and its ability to address some of the long-standing criticisms brought against Natural Law theory that have led to its eclipse among Western intellectuals. These
questions are:

1. Can Lonergan's concept of ethics include moral concern for animals and other aspects of creation?
2. Can all ethical obligations really be translated into fair legal mechanisms?
3. Must one ultimately believe in God if one is to accept a natural law outlook like Lonergan's?
4. By what principle is the "scale of preferences" to be ordered?

1. Lonergan on the Value of Non-human Nature

A great many thoughtful students of ethics today reject the notion that an ethical theory can make no clear commitments to the value of non-human entities. However, there is little or no reference in Sullivan's work about whether Lonergan's ethical outlook can encompass any broader concerns for non-human beings. His discussion of Lonergan's notions of the "thrust towards moral self-transcendence" (161) and the "transcendental intending of value" (162) seem to suggest that a proper grasp of morality must always involve considering needs beyond one's own, but it is unclear whether this move only involves including the needs of other human beings in one's deliberations. When Sullivan talks of the "totality-oriented" (160) nature of Lonergan's outlook, this seems to point to a view of ethics that must involve some conception of the necessity for seeking to support the thriving of the whole of creation. However, the focus of this discussion remains squarely on the "invariant structure of the human good" (220) and the interpretation of Aquinas' view "that to know what the end of human action consists in, one must identify the distinctive 'functions' of human beings" (71).

2. Lonergan on the Transition from Moral Obligation to Legal Obligation

Many people have the sense that there can be extreme individual circumstances when taking a life is a just and humane thing to do. However, as Sullivan points out, the issue of euthanasia is not just about such hypothetical extreme circumstances. As he puts this point, it is a "medico-ethical-legal question" (9). In other words, it is also about the institution of a public regulatory regime for controlling access to technologies of easy and
painless death. However, Sullivan’s explanation of the fundamental causes of the public controversy about euthanasia is very different from my own.

Sullivan observes that “a further curiosity about the state of the medical-ethical question of euthanasia is the disparity between the public’s apparent acceptance of arguments favoring euthanasia and a much more critical view of the proposed reforms among many bioethicists” (51). My suspicion is that this discrepancy is due to the fact that ordinary people tend to focus on specific examples of unique individual predicaments where euthanasia can appear to be ethically justified, whereas professional ethicists tend to focus on the ethical questions regarding the public regulation of access. However, Sullivan’s position is that the public is simply of a fundamentally different mind than him about ethical theory. As he states: “I shall argue that the frequently overlooked reasons for different positions on euthanasia are the varying stances on underlying philosophical issues such as the role of feelings and evaluations” (10). That differing views on ethical theory play a role in the public controversy over euthanasia is undoubtedly true. But if his point is that many people simply disagree that feelings have any relevance to ethics, I would have to observe from my own experience that this is simply not true. Few of my students are dispassionate Kantians. Many are Utilitarians or Social Contract thinkers who embrace various forms of hedonism. Many are still loosely attached to the Catholic natural law tradition and many are simple subjectivists. All such theories make room for feeling in their ethical considerations. So the issue cannot be that many people have simply discounted feeling from their ethical considerations.

Could the persistence of the controversy over euthanasia and the ongoing disparity between public attitudes and those of professional ethicists be based in some other cause than fundamental disagreements about ethical theory? The Canadian philosopher George Grant presents a position that suggests another explanation. Throughout his extensive work in the field of the Philosophy of Technology, Grant argues that any issue focused on the use of a specific technology always has a dual task: Of making judgments about appropriate individual instances of the use of that technology, and of making judgments about any social institutions of control (i.e. social technologies). He recommends, for instance, that people become more sensitive to the fact that legal institutions are themselves technologies that require our ethical judgment and this includes legal institutions created out of a need to enforce individual ethical judgments about the legitimate uses
of technologies. A key point of Grant’s analysis of technology, therefore, is to raise the possibility that there are instances where sound moral principles for the individual use of technologies might not be able to find perfectly satisfactory regulatory expression because we have reached ethical and practical limits to our ability to create. This kind of circumstance might be relevant to the case of the persistence of the euthanasia controversy and the ongoing disparity between popular and scholarly discussions of this issue.

My own sense is that euthanasia might present us with such a circumstance. Like Grant I suspect that a great deal of concern over euthanasia derives from an improperly uncritical attitude to the use of technologies including many modern medical technologies. If such a generally indiscriminate attitude to the use of technology could be properly addressed (as is slowly occurring in most Western countries) then much of the impetus for public concern about the need for active measures for terminating suffering would be dealt with. This might leave a much smaller number of situations in which individuals actually legitimately find themselves in circumstances where they could morally justify taking their own lives. However, even in such a circumstance any public mechanisms to verify and support such judgments in a systematic fashion might inevitably harm more people than they are meant to help. I’m thinking of the obvious potential social impacts such an institution would have on disabled people and others facing difficult circumstances in life. The issue of euthanasia might possibly be such a persistent controversy because we do not acknowledge that we can find ourselves in such an irreconcilable predicament regarding our moral and legal obligations. In other words, we too often and too easily assume that all ethical obligations can be translated into effective and just social institutions, when this might just not be the case. Grant’s work suggests that such an optimistic attitude might simply be another example of the faith in our own technological prowess that dominates our society.

However, if we accept Sullivan’s point that the conflict is essentially between ethical outlooks that integrate feelings into ethical consideration and those that do not, then his point reduces to the observation that the ongoing controversy is rooted in the obvious fact that people in multicultural societies do not share a common theoretical ethical outlook. But this way of conceiving of the roots of controversy can hardly be described as “overlooked.” My proposal for explaining the intransigence of the problem, drawing on the work of Grant, at least provides a possible way of seeking a
resolution to the controversy that does not require the complete resolution to disagreements between disparate ethical theories.

I also wonder if Sullivan’s attempt to resolve the question of the inconsistency between the popular perception that there might be occasions in which taking one’s own life could be justified and the current legal situation in the majority jurisdictions that prevents access to doctor assisted suicide does not come at a certain price. If we don’t acknowledge that we can find ourselves faced with situations where we might have moral rights, which we also reasonably accept cannot necessarily be fully supported legally, then we will always be forced to accept institutionalized legal solutions that will inevitably transgress important moral norms. Yet Sullivan seems unaware of any such possibility when he concludes that “If one concludes that I am morally constrained from inflicting self-harm, there is no longer an inconsistency between moral and legal limits” (283). Asserting such a moral principle certainly would justify maintaining the currently common restrictions on access to doctor assisted suicide. However, does Sullivan’s conclusion also imply an obligation to use every technological means available to preserve our lives, regardless of the social impacts of such technologies and any necessary attendant social means of control of these technologies? His position seems to imply that someone who refuses artificial supports of any kind would be doing something wrong that should perhaps be restricted by legal restraints.

Like Grant, I would argue that judgments to refuse to use certain medical technologies are fundamentally different from judgments about accessing some legally sanctioned means of euthanasia. A judgment to refuse a medical technology does not require the creation of a novel legal institution to control a specific kind of technology or technological system, which can itself end up posing a threat to the well being of others. By overlooking this distinction at the heart of the euthanasia controversy, Sullivan is able to reach a conclusion that embraces a fundamentally technocratic outlook that implies that people might not have a right to refuse to use technologies that are in any way able to prevent harms to themselves.

For a philosopher of technology like Grant, it is obvious that all technologies create new normative expectations in the wake of their introduction into a society. This is just as true of things like automobiles as it is for social technologies like the novel “normative public policies” (258) that we create to manage and control access to technologies, such
as processes of doctor assisted suicide. I think the euthanasia issue could hinge on this characteristic of all technology. When people suggest that there is no distinction between killing and letting die they overlook this ability of technologies (such as systems of doctor assisted suicide and the legal control mechanisms for controlling access to such systems) to create new moral expectations and social conditions. Letting myself die might only involve me making a decision to forgo the use of a certain existing medical technology or to simply refuse food or water. Such decisions do not require the creation of novel social institutions to manage and control access to certain technologies. However, the demand for doctor assisted suicide does require the creation of a novel social institution to manage and control access to doctor assisted suicide. Such novel social technologies will undoubtedly bring with them, as all technologies do, certain social forces and enticements to change the way we live. It is these influences that are of concern to disability activists and those concerned about the suffering and the aged, such as Richard McCormick, who is worried about how his elderly mother would fair in a future society (258). The heart of the controversy is not how people conceive of the role of “affectivity” in ethical decision-making, but how they conceive of technology. If they conceive of it very narrowly such that it does not encompass novel social institutions and can overlook the ethical question of the complex social and environmental impacts of any technology, then the debate about euthanasia will continue to everyone’s dissatisfaction.

3. Lonergan on the Origins of our Sense of Moral Obligation and the Relation of this Insight to the Question of the Religious Foundation of Ethics

Sullivan’s discussion of Lonergan’s distinction between the “intentional response to values” and “responses to satisfactions” is unclear. Intentional responses to values are supposed by Sullivan to be based in judgments that have emerged from a “discursive” (226) process and they are also based on both factual and emotive considerations. In other words, one’s sense of value is apprehended through a kind of deductive process which draws on both fact and value premises, like in Sullivan’s example:

(a) the prospective value judgement (Paul’s possible improvement with thrombolysis is worthwhile);
(b) the link of that judgement to conditions sufficient to justify responsible affirmation ('If the extent of damage to Paul's heart from his AMI can be reduced with thrombosis, then Paul's possible treatment with thrombolysis is worthwhile'); and

(c) the fulfillment of those sufficient conditions ('But the extent of damage to Paul's heart from his AMI can be reduced with thrombolysis'). (155)

However, it is not entirely clear how exactly feelings enter in to giving sense to the notion of "worthwhile" that is present in premise (b). Is it that we can have feelings of empathy towards other people in their happiness and pain (i.e. in some sense share in their happiness and suffering)? Is it that we just know (like some utilitarians suggest) that suffering is bad and its absence is good? Is it that we can simply feel good when helping others or cooperating in the project of maintaining a functioning society? Is it that we can feel good when using our intelligence and creativity in the resolution of complex challenges? Is that we can feel satisfaction when we can create principles of action that logically cohere with our expectations of others? Is it such affective possibilities (and others) in complex combination? If so, then does the distinction between "satisfactions" and "values" just boil down to a distinction between simplistic short-term calculations of how to achieve gratification and calculations that emerge from a much more reflective, discursive and longer term consideration of how we can achieve optimal satisfaction? If so, then it is unclear how Lonergan's outlook is significantly different from Utilitarianism.

What Lonergan seems to be suggesting is that it is through experiences of suffering that individuals can come to an affective understanding that there can be degrees of thriving and that this basic insight can be grasped intellectually and understood to apply to other people as well. Or as Lonergan puts it, these feelings and the insight born of them are what supply ethics with its "mass, momentum, drive, power" (159). Which brings me to my question about the ultimate foundation of ethics. If the "transcendental intention of value" is simply born of the insight we have from the emotive experience that there can be different degrees of thriving and the extrapolation of this to our understanding of other beings, then it would seem we can go one of either two ways. Either we can see thriving purely in terms of emotional satisfactions of human beings, or perhaps
other sentient creatures, in which case, as I suggest, Lonergan’s view simply reduces to a form of Utilitarianism. Or we can understand the positive and negative experiences of sentient creatures as merely being the affective way that sentient creatures are able to perceive thriving and comprehend its opposite. In other words, either we can conceive of thriving only in terms of the emotive satisfactions of sentient beings or we can use our insight into our experience of suffering and thriving to extrapolate to a more general concept of “fulfillment” of “potentialities” (193) that is applicable to all of nature. When Aristotle speaks of how all beings seek their natural ends I think this indicates that he has chosen the latter course. Or when Aquinas states: “Every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection . . . Furthermore, each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe” (STh. I, q. 65, a. 2). Which brings me back to my first question about the scope of Lonergan’s notion of the “thrust towards moral self-transcendence” (161) and my fourth question about whether, for him, there must be an acknowledgment of a theistic origin of all things for ethics to make sense. Sullivan leaves unaddressed this question that has clouded the fortunes of natural law theory for over two centuries, and which has encouraged people to embrace the apparently more secular ethical outlooks of Kantianism and Utilitarianism. It is my suspicion that for both Sullivan and Lonergan that any reliance on affectivity as a source for moral insight has to be based in a more basic sense of trust in the nature of the world and human nature – a trust that things (including our emotions) have been intentionally constructed for an end, which should be fulfilled. If so, could such a sense of trust ever be based in a non-theistic conception of reality? Sullivan seems to suggest that this may not be possible when he states that “Unlike a direct or reflective insight, a deliberative insight has a specifically moral/religious dimension” (157). Does this religious dimension require a belief in theism? What is meant by a “moral/religious dimension”? Sullivan leaves these questions unaddressed, but in a diverse multicultural society they must be addressed.

4. Lonergan on the Ranking of Values

Sullivan mentions on page 208 the necessity to “rank distinctive values.” This is a fundamental problem for all Natural Law outlooks. Nature clearly supplies us with a vast array of satisfactions and potentialities, some of
which can sometimes, if followed without limitation, result in obviously immoral outcomes. Thus some way of ranking and prioritizing of natural satisfactions and potentialities is necessary. Unfortunately, it is unclear from Sullivan’s analysis by what principle this ranking must be made and his statement that “subsequent value judgments rank distinctive values” doesn’t clarify the issue. Why are some values more important than other values? My own sense is that some satisfactions/potentialities, when prioritized, simply provide for a greater degree of the flourishing of the whole range of satisfactions/potentialities in the universe. If values like freedom, rationality, solidarity are prioritized they will clearly provide over the long term for greater satisfaction of myself and the fulfillment of the whole of the human race than if other values, like sexual gratification, competitiveness, or self-concern are prioritized. And we can learn about how to improve this immensely complex ordering for the fulfillment of the whole in terms of all of its potentialities as we grow in our level of understanding as individuals and societies. This is how I conceive of the natural hierarchy of virtues. But it is unclear how Sullivan sees it and how Lonergan might see it as well.