### CONTENTS

**James Marsh** 1  
Self-Appropriation, Polymorphism, and *Différance*

**Robert Doran, S.J.** 13  
The Ninth Functional Specialty

**Michael Sharkey** 17  
Heidegger, Lonergan, and the Notion of Being

**Patrick Brown** 45  
Functional Specialization and the Methodical Division of Labor in Legal Studies

**Paul Osslington** 67  
Lonergan’s Reception Among Economists: Tale of a Dead Fish and an Agenda for Future Work

**Hugo Meynell** 79  
Groarke, Aristotle, and Induction

**Nick Olkovich** 89  
Beyond Radical Particularism: A Lonerganian Response to S. Mark Heim’s ‘Pluralistic Inclusivism’

**David Oyler** 123  
Review of Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, *Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas*
SELF-APPROPRIATION, POLYMORPHISM, AND DIFFÉRANCE

James L. Marsh

I have, for some time now, been involved in writing a book on post-modernism, French Ideology, which is meant to complement my book on Habermas, Unjust Legality: A Critique of Habermas's Philosophy of Law, which was a critique, among other things, of the way his philosophy of law functions as an ideology for capitalism expressing, legitimating, and covering up its irrationality, exploitation, and oppression. Habermas's, I argue, while ultimately more insightful than post-modernism and on whose thought I draw in many positive ways, is a modernist ideology, whereas post-modernism is a form of post-modern ideology, aiming to criticize, transcend, and transform modernist forms of rationality and social life, but in attempting to do so, ending up, like Habermas, expressing, legitimating, and covering up capitalism.¹

These two books are intended to complement, build on, extend, and test my earlier, three volume, systematic trilogy, Post-Cartesian Meditations, Critique, Action, and Liberation, and Process, Praxis, and Transcendence. A phenomenology of self and self-appropriation leading horizontally to an ethics and social theory and vertically to a metaphysics and philosophy – theology of liberation. In these three books the main idea animating my thought is the link between rationality and radicalism, self-appropriation and liberation. No fully adequate rationality without radicalism, no adequate radicalism without a fully developed defense and account of


© 2011 James Marsh
rationality. In the light of this claim, both Habermas and post-modernism fall short, one by a deficit of radicalism, the other by a defect of rationality. In this book on post-modernism, I also criticize it as counter-positional, inconsistent, experientially and hermeneutically oversimplified, and totalizing. In contrast to its proclamation of différance, it flattens out human experience and history in a way that minimizes or denies différance. Another task is to give an account of positive, redeeming, fruitful questions and insights and claims that can be incorporated into a more adequate philosophy, social theory, and philosophy of religion. It is this task that I take on today.

Unlike Mark Antony, therefore, I have come today not to bury post-modernism, but to praise it. I was helped in conceiving this task by a very fine book on Lonergan by Gerard Walmsley, Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy, one of the many fine books on Lonergan coming out of the University of Toronto Press. In this book, Walmsley links polymorphism and pluralism in philosophy, including the kind of pluralism represented by post-modernism. He contrasts an earlier more negative, less sympathetic critique influenced by Insight with a later, more nuanced version based on Method, able to do justice to both positive and negative aspects of post-modernism.

I propose in this essay to develop and emphasize the positive by discussing the link between self-appropriation, polymorphism, and différance, this latter term and concept referring not just to Derrida in a specific way, but also to a more general sense and emphasis running through many post-modern thinkers. Polymorphism becomes the middle term between self-appropriation and différance, used not only to criticize

---


5 The full reference is Gerard Walmsley, Lonergan and Philosophical Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 2008). Pp. 47-52. Among the many commentators, on Lonergan mentioned by Walmsley, Mark Morelli is mentioned the most and is thus the hero of this discussion. See, among other citations, pp. 6, 9, 11, and 252-253.
but also to integrate it into a more adequate philosophical account, shorn of difficulties, counter-positions, and ideology, but also expanded to include the legitimate light post-modernism can throw on our shared human situation.

**Polymorphism and Différence**

"Polymorphism" is less well-developed and emphasized by Lonergan than some of his other notions, but does turn out to be key. Indeed at one point, in *Insight*, he says that "the polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy." 6

In contrast to the objectivity based on intelligent inquiry and reasonable reflection, there is the unquestioning orientation of an extroverted biological consciousness and its survival not only in dramatic and practical living but in much philosophical thought – knowing as taking a good look. In contrast to the concrete universe of being, of all that can be intelligently conceived and reasonable affirmed, there stands an apparent prior completeness of the world of sense, in which the "real" and "apparent" are subdivisions within a vitally anticipated “already out here now real.” In contrast to the self-affirmation of a consciousness that is at once empirical, intelligent, and rational, there is the native bewilderment of the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable, and eventual death, and, before death, with disease and, even insanity. 7

This is a Beckettian, modern, and post-modern world.

There are not only logical but lived antitheses rooted in the concrete unity-in-tension that is the human being.

For human consciousness is polymorphic. The pattern in which it flows may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical. These patterns alternate; they blend or mix; they can

---

6 Bernard Lonergan, CWL 3 452.
7 Ibid. p. 410.
interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down. The intellectual pattern of experience is supposed and expressed by our account of self-affirmation, of being, and of objectivity. But no man is born in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently; and when some other pattern is dominant, the self of self-affirmation seems quite different from one's actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal as Plato's poetic heaven, and objectivity becomes a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are really our there.\(^8\)

These quotations of Lonergan are his initial formulation of polymorphism in *Insight*, and in reading it, we are struck by a negative emphasis: polymorphism is contrasted to self-affirmation, the universe of being, and true objectivity, and can lead us to human and philosophical stands that are false, counter-positional, and confused, but patterns of experience, though they may be confused, are not necessarily so, and they remain universal and necessary components of the human being. Common sense can become distorted, absolutized, and biased, but nonetheless it is necessary to deal practically with the world as we negotiate it and make a living and survive and flourish. Consequently, the task is not, as with the counter-positions, to eliminate patterns of experience, but to distinguish them and order them and to figure out their role and importance in our lives. Moreover, while cognition is important and essential, it is not everything; there are embodied, emotional, sexual, interpersonal, and aesthetic aspects to our lives on which post-modernism can shed light. Post-modernism as expressing a polymorphism can give us a salutary warning and caution against an over-emphasis on cognition. "There is more in heaven and earth, Horatio..."\(^9\)

I wish, therefore, to distinguish several different senses of polymorphism. The first is operational polymorphism, the fourfold level of consciousness, experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. The second is orientational polymorphism, the different patterns of experience and their interrelationships. Third is developmental polymorphism, the gradual differentiation and integration of human consciousness in society and history, the way in which, for example, science has become

\(^8\) Ibid. pp. 410-411.

distinguished from philosophy, common sense, and religious experience. The fourth is foundational polymorphism, the distinction and relationship among different kinds of conversion, intellectual, moral, and religious. A fifth is deviant polymorphism, the reality and role of bias in human life and thought, general, dramatic, egoistic, and group. A final form, my own addition to Walmsley's list, is lived and philosophical counter-positionality. All of these kinds of differentiation can be seen as differentiation in a more general sense, a point I will develop later. Differentiation is related to polymorphism as positive making sense and articulation of polymorphism in a way that is essential to self-appropriation.10

In addition to these, Walmsley discusses other patterns mentioned but not developed by Lonergan, or mentioned and developed by commentators. There is an artistic pattern distinguished in chapter 14 of *Insight* from the aesthetic pattern. There is also a practical pattern rooted in our commonsensical orientation to getting things done, already mentioned in Chapter 8 of Insight, and a mystical pattern. Commentators add symbolic patterns rooted in the expressive tendencies of the psyche and a moral pattern.11

I am content just to mention further patterns of experience in Lonergan's account as sufficient for my purposes here. What is more pertinent here is to quote Lonergan from *Understanding and Being*, as he discusses the issue of the number and kinds of patterns:

Perhaps the most relevant thing with regard to those patterns of experience is this: the ones I give are simply indications of the fact that people differ from one another, that they live in different ways, that this or that is a possibility .... What I am trying to indicate is the possibility of different components that can enter into human living.12

Post-modernism expresses and gives rise to and is rooted in both positive and negative versions of polymorphism. In articulating this point, one can make two mistakes. One is to so emphasize the negative that the positive insightfulness of post-modernism is missed; such has been the tendency

10  Walmsley, p. 51.
12  Bernard Lonergan, CWL 5 309.
the last 15-20 years of some or many of the critics of post-modernism. The opposite mistake is to so emphasize the positive that deleterious, philosophically problematic, and ideologically pernicious aspects are missed.

The task of self-appropriation is to integrate polymorphic post-modernism in its different aspects and kinds into a properly differentiated consciousness and one coherent interpretation or story. Because, as Lonergan says:

> The philosophers have been men of exceptional acumen and profundity. On the other hand, the many, contradictory disparate philosophies can all be contributions to the clarification of some basic but polymorphic fact; because the fact is basic, its implications range over the universe; but because it is polymorphic, its alternative forms ground diverse sets of implications.¹³

Self-appropriation and polymorphism go together. No adequate account of the difference of polymorphism without the unity of self-appropriation. No adequate unity without difference. Post-modernism in its negative and positive aspects can contribute to philosophical knowledge. Negatively, by raising questions and making claims, even erroneous claims, that deepen and clarify such knowledge; positively, by its insightfulness into the human condition.

But how does all of this relate to post-modern accounts of différence, such as Derrida’s. I want to argue that, while the primary and dominant meaning of différence is linguistic, there are broader and deeper implications of that account. Diference is a concept of linguistic meaning that is differential and structural, meaning dispersed between and among linguistic units. A letter, syllable, word, or phrase does not mean simply itself but refers in its meaning to other letters, syllables, words, or phrases. Meaning, in other words, is both differential and deferred; it links up with other linguistic units, and is deferred in its relationship to those units as they occur and recur in past, present, and future contexts. Because meaning is not simply present in one of its units, we see the basis here for Derrida’s critique of

¹³ Lonergan, CWL 3 412.
Perhaps a few examples will make the point clearer. When I utter a sentence in conversation, any words are apprehended in the immediate present as spontaneously linked to what came before in the utterance and what will come after. The letters of the alphabet, 'a', 'b', 'c', and so on, need to be seen in relation to one another; 'a' by itself or 'b' by itself is more or less meaningless. This particular claim by Derrida should not be unwelcome to Lonerganians; he is simply making, in different words, a critique of one-sided immediacy.

Linguistic meaning for Derrida is structured by 'quasi-transcendentals'; 'différance', 'supplementarity', and the 'trace' are examples. As commentators such as Caputo and Gasche describe them, quasi-transcendentals are 'almost' transcendental, functioning up to a point in an a priori manner but too intermingled with the body, world, and history to be purely or strictly transcendental. There are many such quasi-transcendentals, or 'infrastructures', another word for the same reality. One distinction from traditional accounts such as Husserl's or Kant's is that there is no overarching unity, such as a transcendental ego.

There is no 'being', 'subjectivity', or 'objectivity' outside of différance or preceding différance. In this sense, there is nothing outside of language. Reality, then, whether subjective or objective, comes to us mediated by language. Because such is the case, I can talk about the 'ontological' import of Derrida's thought. I take it, therefore, that when he describes 'justice' as 'undeconstructible' in Specters of Marx, he is referring to justice as another quasi-transcendental or infrastructure.

Différance, therefore, even in the strict Derridean sense, opens onto reality. It becomes in a very real sense ontological, without being metaphysical. But it is sufficiently that, both linguistic and ontological, to allow us to talk

---

14 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 7-8. I am indebted to my friend and colleague Marty De Nys for some of the content and form of the following discussion.


about diffé_rance within and related to the world. But do we have enough basis here for arguing that polymorphism as linked to self-appropriation is related to diffé_rance, albeit in a critically transformed sense?

Part of that critical transformation is to see Derrida's structural account of diffé_rance as embedded in a more complex account of discourse, as including both structural and conscious, third person and first person aspects. And meaning, of course, in Lonergan's sense is not only conscious and life-worldly but essentially linked to linguistic expression as well, and within such expression is room for third-person, explanatory aspects.

Polymorphism is diffé_rance in this more qualified, critical sense, or more precisely, polymorphism is diffé_rance in the sense of a variegated, unified ground and context for diffé_rance in the linguistic sense, and diffé_rance is the linguistic expression of polymorphism. Self-appropriation only fully becomes itself in linking up with polymorphism-diffé_rance, and polymorphism-diffé_rance must be seen in relation to a self-appropriated consciousness and community. Polymorphism is, again, the middle term between self-appropriation and diffé_rance. Post-modernists are right to be critical of a notion of self that minimizes or excludes diffé_rance but not of selfhood as such. Selfhood as such is related to diffé_rance.

Now, I wish to reflect on some of the implications of my account. First, it opens up to us the possibility of integrating in a positive way other insights of post-modernism. I have done this already in some of my other work. Heidegger's Denken, the questioning that is the piety of thinking, does not have to be seen as lying outside the practice of philosophizing or doing metaphysics as he does. Rather, if we understand thought in philosophy and science as moving from question to answer, preconceptual to conceptual, evaluation of evidence to judging, then questioning as the piety of thinking before the mystery of being can be seen as part of philosophy and metaphysics. Also the practice of deconstruction can be seen as a way of applying Lonergan's canon of residues to texts, being open to the way texts do not hang together and thus deconstruct themselves. Derrida's mistake is not in asserting the value of deconstruction but in absolutizing it at the expense of other hermeneutical canons. Lonergan shows himself to have a more nuanced, differentiated hermeneutics and thus is a truer friend of difference. 17

17 James Marsh, Post-Cartesian Mediations, pp. 118. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory:
Secondly, in a similar way, Derrida's "critique of presence," mistaken if it is absolutized, can be fruitfully linked to a critique of the "already out there now" as a critique of the insufficiency and invalidity of immediate presence as a criterion of truth. Derrida's insistence on mediation is, up to a point, similar to Lonergan's, and his critique of philosophy as representational is similar to Lonergan's claim that the history of modern philosophy can be seen as the history of various attempts to conceive knowing as taking a good look. Where Lonergan disagrees with Derrida is that it is not presence as such that is the problem, but one kind of false presence. Once again Lonergan shows himself to have a more differentiated account of presence and evidence.¹⁸

Third, if it is not presence as such that is the problem, but rather a certain deficient form of presence, then it is not philosophy as such that is a problem, but a certain deficient form of it based on this illegitimate presence. We can as confident philosophers use and learn from this critique, and others as well, very similar, such as Rorty's critique of philosophy as an immediate mirror of nature, without conceding one iota to the anti-philosophical thrust of these critiques.¹⁹

But, fourth, a post-modernist might say, your account of self-appropriation, polymorphism and différance still stresses unity too much, integrating différance with identity, with self-appropriation, in a way that does violence to its otherness. I answer this objection in two steps. First, one strategy for dealing with this objection is to use 'self-appropriation' when I wish to stress unity and to use 'polymorphism' when I wish to stress difference. Sometimes, in my practice of philosophizing, I wish to emphasize the task of becoming an authentic, unified self, and sometimes I wish to stress an acceptance and even rejoicing in my polymorphism. "Enjoy your polymorphism." There is no problem of illegitimate privileging as long as I am conscious of what I am doing as a philosopher, as long as I am employing a certain finesse.

A second way of answering the above objection is to distinguish


between understanding and judgment. On the level of understanding, I can grasp the otherness of *différance* as minimizing or denying any relationship to unity or identity, but I do not have to agree with that strong sense of *différance*. I am legitimately making a judgment that difference with little or no relationship to identity is invalid, and that relationship to identity is essential. Post-modernism in its practice does that all the time, for example, in understanding or misunderstanding the concept of evidential or epistemic presence, but judging that to be invalid.

"Becoming polymorphic," is, then, a "becoming different." An openness to otherness, a self-transcendence that is the hallmark of authenticity, an objectivity that is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. But this "becoming different" is at the same time the achieving of self-appropriation. There is in such becoming different a self-transcendence that moves from intellectual to moral to religious conversion, falling in love with God, the absolute other. There is at the same time a movement from above that involves a becoming aware of, accepting, and rejoicing in my body, my psyche, my sexual, aesthetic, and political self that complements intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Even such apparently outrageous discussions of "becoming animal," in Deleuze-Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, the second volume of their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, can contribute to this movement from above. "Becoming animal" becomes a complementary aspect, enabling me to resist a crypto-idealism, to become spirit.20

Fifth, as I have already indicated, the relatively negative emphasis on polymorphism needs to be complemented by and lead into the relatively positive account of differentiation in *Method*, something that Walmsley does not do sufficiently; and differentiation implies the achievement of self-appropriation as not only a fully integrated but a fully differentiated consciousness. "Polymorphism" thus relates to "differentiation" as problematic context to a fully worked out account, question to answer, experience to understanding and judgment, metaphysics as troubled or problematic to metaphysics as achieved, consciousness to knowledge. Polymorphism as merely experienced is both problematic and full of possibility; polymorphism as known is differentiated in a full, relatively

---

adequate self-appropriation.21

Sixth, for me, certain of these thinkers, especially Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze-Guattari, and Levinas, up to a point, become partners in my project of social-political critique, adding weight and insight to my claim that intellectual, moral, and religious conversion lead, or should lead, to radical political conversion. Without such conversion, in my opinion, self-appropriation flowing into the other conversions is incomplete, truncated, and self-contradictory. And, of course, the opposite is true as well; radical political conversion without the other conversions is incomplete, truncated, ungrounded and self-contradictory. To sharpen the point, these thinkers contribute to a legitimate Lonergian ‘materialism’ or even “historical materialism,” the noematic side of critical realism. All of which is not to deny the relevance of post-modernism to liberal or conservative persons. All of us these days, conservatives, liberals, or radicals, need to be concerned with différence and alterity.

For me, of course, the philosophical and socio-political dig into one another. No philosophy is complete without a socio-political component, and the socio-political needs to be grounded in a cognitional theory, epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. Consequently, these thinkers in encouraging and forcing us to recognize difference and alterity as these are done in a capitalistic, imperialistic system, educate us. Levinas, for example, forces us to see the way the marginalized other functions or does not function in contemporary society, and Foucault shows us how the disciplinary society in our politics, schools, economies, and prisons expresses and serves capitalism. “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospital, which all resemble prisons?”22

I end with a quotation from Derrida’s Specters of Marx, that may be one of the most important philosophical and socio-political statements of the last 15-20 years, and illustrates much of what I have tried to say here, the socio-political implications of taking différence and alterity seriously.

A “new international” is being sought in these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights

21 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 302-05.
that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the "foreign debt," the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history; never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth.23

23 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 85.
THE NINTH FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY

Robert M. Doran, S.J.
Marquette University

I WISH TO suggest in this brief note that we divide what currently is the functional specialty 'foundations' into two specialties, 'horizons' and 'categories.' These two specialties would fulfill the tasks currently assigned to the specialty 'foundations,' namely, the objectification of conversion and the ongoing derivation of both general and special categories. But dividing these tasks into two specialties would have at least two advantages. First, it would acknowledge that these are two quite distinct tasks involving distinct methods. Second, it would respond to some of the difficulties raised by Lonergan's recognition of a fifth (and even sixth) level of consciousness, in that the specialty 'horizons' would have as its objective the thematization of the normative subject in all its concrete dimensions, no matter how many so-called 'levels' that might eventually entail. The present location of the objectification of the normative subject in the structure of functional specialization runs the risk of a conceptualistic objectification, not of the normative subject at all but of a truncated subject. I am suggesting that 'Horizons' become a ninth functional specialty in generalized empirical method and in theological method in particular, one whose sole task it is to articulate the structure of the concrete universal that is the normative subject.

But how does this suggestion relate to the structure of the functional specialties as we know it? The ninth specialty, Horizons, would stand outside the other eight, since it objectifies the source of the movement from the functional specialties of the first phase to the functional specialties of the second. The normative subject is responsible for the movement from the specialties of the first phase – research, interpretation, history, and dialectic – to those of the second phase – categories, doctrines, systematics,
and communications. The space that Lonergan provided in his chapter on Foundations for the tasks of what I am calling the specialty 'horizons' is quite crowded. 'Foundations' in Method in Theology is assigned two quite distinct tasks with distinct methods. It seems to me that the articulation of the first set of both general and special categories, both of which are involved in the specialties of both the first and the second phase, should be assigned to a distinct specialty, Horizons. The derivation of other categories from this base would then fit into the structure of functional specialization as we know it, in a specialty called Categories. The ninth functional specialty as I conceive it would articulate the base of the general categories in generalized empirical method or interiorly differentiated consciousness and the base of the special categories in religiously differentiated consciousness. Thus, the major contribution to this ninth specialty is, and perhaps always will be, a little book called Insight. This specialty belongs neither to the first nor to the second phase, since it objectifies what is responsible both for authentic performance in either phase and for moving from the first to the second phase, namely, religious, moral, intellectual, and, I would add, psychic conversion.

The responsibility of the normative subject for moving from the first to the second phase has always been acknowledged in Lonergan’s presentation of the specialties, from the very first draft of the specialties written in his hand, where it is called the “mediating subject,” to the articulation in Method in Theology itself, where it is “foundational reality,” providing “the added foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states what is so.” The language of Method obviously places the objectification of the normative subject in the functional specialty Foundations itself. I am suggesting simply that such objectification constitutes a distinct functional specialty outside the eight differentiated by Lonergan, a specialty I would call Horizons. Its sole task would be the objectification of “the mediating subject,” “the normative subject,” “foundational reality.” The place in the structure currently assigned to a specialty called Foundations, the specialty that begins the second phase, I would call Categories. And since both

24 See the website www.bernardlonergan.com at 47200D0E060.
general and special categories are employed in all functional specialties, practitioners in the other specialties would constantly be moving into the work of Categories as they write their work, whether that work be exegesis, history, the mediation of conflicts, doctrines, systematics, or communications. This specialty would continue to fulfill the second task currently assigned in the chapter on Foundations, namely, deriving the general and special categories that are employed not only in Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications but also in Interpretation and History. In other words, I am suggesting that the present specialty Foundations be differentiated into two specialties, Horizons and Categories, and that the first of these be placed outside the framework of the other eight specialties, as the articulation of the motive force that propels the movement between the two phases.

The need for the distinction that I am suggesting is at least remotely analogous to the need for an expansion of the levels of consciousness beyond the three articulated in Insight to Lonergan's acknowledgment of a distinct fourth level soon after the publication of Insight. This need was experienced by many readers of Insight's chapter 18, who found the framework provided by cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics too small, too restricted, for the content of a chapter on ethics, even as it does suggest one manner of making authentic decisions. In similar manner, much of the talk that has transpired over the question of a fifth level of consciousness acknowledges a similar straight-jacket imposed by the four-level structure, this time on love, whether the love be the human love of family and community or the divine love that introduces us to a new and vibrant communion with the three divine subjects and that overflows into the self-sacrificing charity of the suffering servant in the world. There results the acknowledgment of a distinct, interpersonal level of personal consciousness. Human development begins with the primordial intersubjectivity or 'interindividuality' of psychic Mitsein. It passes through the individualization made possible by fidelity to the transcendental precepts in their call for the autonomy by which one gives the law to oneself. The law is precisely to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. But development heads toward communion. At the distinct level beyond what this law calls for, one enters an interpersonal community of love, where the beloved ones are in the consciousness of the lover by reason of love
alone. That love always begins as a gift from others, human or divine. The subject in whom all of this has occurred – interindividuality, individuation through the transcendental precepts, and communion – approximates the normative subject, the concrete universal capable of effecting the movement from the phase of study that reports on what others have said and done, thus mediating from the past to the present, to the phase of creativity where one says and does what one knows is true and right, and so mediates from the present to the future. That normative subject is the focus of the ninth functional specialty, Horizons. The remote objective of the ninth specialty is the objectification of normative subjectivity in all its dimensions.

At one point in a question-and-answer session Lonergan envisioned the possibility of such a specialty, and named it Spirituality. I think this word as it is presently used connotes less than what is to be objectified when one articulates the concrete universal that is the normative subject. The ‘spirit’ that perhaps could be intended in the word ‘spirituality’ is closer to the Geist of Hegel’s Phenomenology than it is to narrow, descriptive, and parochially confined notions of ‘spirituality’. It is true that I have employed the word ‘spiritual’ in rendering the meaning of emanatio intelligibilis as “autonomous spiritual procession,” so we might risk at least provisionally using the word ‘spirituality’ for the ninth functional specialty, as long as we acknowledge that the specialty extends beyond the articulation of religiously differentiated consciousness to the objectification of intellectual, moral, and affective integrity as well. But I think the risk too great. The specialty Horizons envisions what in one place Lonergan calls the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft, the scienza nuova composed of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, existential ethics, and the phenomenology of authentic religion. All of these are topics to be articulated in the ninth functional specialty. The normative subject articulated in that specialty propels the movement from the first phase of theology to the second. ‘Spirituality’ as this word is currently employed simply has too narrow a connotation to suggest all the tasks involved in objectifying the normative subject.

26 These comments will appear on www.bernardlonergan.com in the audio recording of the Question and Answer sessions from the 1982 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College and in the corresponding transcription of that recording.

HEIDEGGER, LONERGAN, AND
THE NOTION OF BEING

Michael Sharkey
University of Wisconsin — Platteville

There is, in the work of the early1 Heidegger, something like Lonergan’s “notion of being.” In Lonergan, the notion of being is our a priori, heuristic, and trans-categorial intention of all, manifest in (and as) inquiry, and serving to make possible knowledge of essence and existence. In Heidegger, by contrast, it is our a priori, possessive, and trans-categorial intuition of all, now gone dim, but still present in inquiry, and serving to make possible knowledge of essence and its modes. Scholars may suggest that there can be no such, in Heidegger, because he was interested not in notions or being but in what is more basic than both, namely ecstatic temporality (Zeitlichkeit) and Time (Temporalitat). But I show that the notion, as described, is present in History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, and is retained in Being and Time, where Heidegger has temporalized understanding and being. And having done so, I offer a defense of Lonergan. Not only does experience tell us that our a priori notion of being is no-more-than-heuristic. It also tells us that we must distinguish within it between orientations to intelligibility (essence) and affirmability (existence).2


2 Throughout I prescind from the question whether there is, in Heidegger, anything like Lonergan’s notion of value, or transcendental intention of good. For which, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 10-12, 23-4.
A. An A Priori Notion

"Deep within us all," Lonergan writes, "emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain." "Just what is wanted," he notes, has many names." "In what precisely it consists," he admits, "is a matter of dispute." "But the fact of inquiry," he affirms, "is beyond all doubt." And this he entitles our notion of being.3

It may seem odd to speak of a drive as a notion. For there are both the drive of the foetal eye, unconscious and biological, and the drive of hunger, conscious and sensitive; and neither of these is in any way cognitional.4 Yet "[t]he notion of being," again, "is our ability and drive to ask questions for intelligence (What? Why? How? What for? How often?) and for reflection (Is that so? Are you certain?),"5 and so it is conscious, intelligent, and rational. It thus makes full sense to speak of it as notional.

Again it may seem odd to think of the drive's term as being. For several philosophers have considered being to come in already with objects of thought; and the notion of being pushes beyond thought to reality.6 However, 'being' is simply the name Lonergan gives to whatever it is that we seek when we inquire; he is ever willing to revise its sense to accord with what we learn of our approach to it.7 Indeed this is a methodological principle for him.8 So we may think of being's meaning as functionally defined, and leave its precise designation open.

Now this notion of being is a priori in an advised sense. It is not absolutely independent of experience, as are Kant's forms of intuition and categories of the understanding.9 To the contrary, it requires experience as the occasion

---

3 Bernard Lonergan, CWL 3 28.
4 Ibid., pp. 378-79.
5 Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in A Second Collection, p. 274.
7 Ibid., p. 374.
8 For affinities with Cajetan here, see Ibid., p. 392-93.
of its operation. But if it is made to function only in response to data, it is in no way ever acquired therefrom. And this must be so. For consider the alternative, that inquiry comes from experience. If that were true, it would be necessary to inquire into experience in order to become inquisitive; and that is absurd. Lonergan writes:

The fundamental moment in the notion of being lies in the capacity to wonder and reflect, and that as potency we have from nature. If a person naturally does not have the capacity to wonder, to be surprised by what he sees or hears or feels, to ask why, to ask what’s happening, what’s up, then there is no remedy; there is nothing we can do. ... However ... we cannot wonder or inquire without having something about which to wonder or inquire; and it is the flow of sensations, perceptions and images that provides the materials about which [we do so]. ... The potency is from nature; the exercise involves experience.\(^9\)

**B. A Heuristic Notion**

Because the notion of being is wonder or inquiry, it does not yet possess its term. But this does not mean it is in no way attuned to it. And in fact, in reaching or yearning for it, the notion of being prefigures its goal.

[The notion of being] is neither ignorance nor knowledge but the dynamic intermediary between [the two]. It is the conscious movement away from ignorance and towards knowledge. When we question, we do not know the answer yet, but already we want [it]. Not only do we want the answer but also we are aiming at what is to be known through [it].\(^10\)

And it is in virtue of this aim that our notion is heuristic.

Heuristic notions are familiar to us from math and science. In seeking after the definition of a circle, we do not merely gape, but search in the light of our assumptions that similars are similarly understood and the relevant 

\(^{10}\) Bernard Lonergan, CWL 5 164.

\(^{11}\) Bernard Lonergan, “Natural Knowledge of God,” in A Second Collection, p. 123.
similarities are those of things in relation to one another. That is, we proceed very differently than we would if we were engaged in commonsensical inquiry. Moreover, we make clear to ourselves all that we know of the other elements involved, so that in the light of those assumptions and these bits of knowledge, we may proceed more intelligently toward our goal. In all of this, we proceed in an anticipatory fashion, tipping ourselves off to the nature of the unknown by the light of what we know already, and by the light of what we do not know but intend.  

The notion of being operates in a similar way. But of course it does so at a more basic level. It is that by which we intend all we do not know, that by which we reach for the Truth, so that our assumptions and guiding anticipations may be guided by it. It is no particular notion, but the notion of being, simpliciter, for which reason Lonergan calls it our “supreme heuristic notion.”  

Prior to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known through that content. As each content emerges, the ‘to-be-known through the content’ passes without residue into the ‘known through that content’. ... Hence, prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through all answers. But once all answers are reached, the notion of being becomes the notion of the totality known through all answers.  

C. A Transcategorical Notion (Of Essence and Existence)  

We do not know totality in this life. Still, the notion of being directs us toward it, it orients us to it; and insofar as it does so, it comports us to all.  

Intending then is comprehensive. Though human achievement is limited, still [its] root dynamism is unrestricted. We would know everything about everything, the whole universe in all its multiplicity and concreteness, omnia, to pan, and, in that concrete and comprehensive sense, being.  

---  

12 Lonergan, CWL 3 60-62. And see CWL 5 60-65.  
13 Lonergan, CWL 3 380-81.  
Moreover, this must be so. For consider the suggestion that inquiry is limited. If it were, there would be a sphere about which we can’t inquire; yet, in speaking of some such, we clearly identify a candidate for inquiry. The attempt to delimit inquiry would seem to be self-defeating.

Every doubt that the pure desire is unrestricted serves only to prove that it is unrestricted. If you ask whether X might not lie beyond its range, the fact that you ask proves that X lies within its range.\textsuperscript{15}

Speaking in scholastic terms, Lonergan describes our notion as transcendental (by which, he says, he means trans-categorial\textsuperscript{16}). The reason is this. “The cognitional name for the object that includes absolutely everything, every aspect of everything, is being.”\textsuperscript{17} But “[b]eing does not lie within any restricted genus. While it can be divided up into beings of different kinds, being itself is not some limited kind.” And we know this because of the acts by which we intend it. It is true that, in the first place, we ask what-questions, and so intend or muster a notion of essence; but then we move to ask whether-questions, and so intend or muster a notion of existence — and this latter transcends sortal predicates. The notion of being, then, is transcendental or transcategorial insofar as it intends what is without categorial specificity.\textsuperscript{18}

But note: to say this is not to say there is no intention of essence in Lonergan. To the contrary, the reach for intelligibility is fundamental in his view.\textsuperscript{19} It is simply that this reach is sublated, or gone beyond in a way that includes it, in the further perfecting of inquiry.

\textsuperscript{15} Lonergan, CWL 3 352. The reader will note here affinities with Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Ding an Sich, Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of a limit, and perhaps also Donald Davidson’s critique of total incommensurability, for which, in turn, see section 44 of The Logic of Hegel, tr. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1873), pp. 91-92, and “Remark: The Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism,” appended to chapter 1, A (b) of Section 2 of book 2, of Science of Logic, tr. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), pp. 489-90; nos. 5.6-5.641 of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1981), pp. 149-53; and “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973-4), pp. 5-20. But, of course, the devil is in the details; and Lonergan would register many points of disagreement.

\textsuperscript{16} Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 13-14, n. 4.

\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan, CWL 5 148.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. And see CWL 3 356.

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, CWL 5 29-30, 64-5, and Method in Theology, p. 10.
What promotes the subject from experiential to intellectual consciousness is the desire to understand, the intention of intelligibility. What next promotes him, from intellectual to rational consciousness, is a fuller unfolding of the same intention: for the desire to understand, once understanding is reached, becomes the desire to understand correctly; in other words, the intention of intelligibility, once an intelligible is reached, becomes the intention of the right intelligible, of the true and, through truth, of reality.20

So there is a sense, indeed, in which we may say the notion of being, in Lonergan, is the transcategorial notion of essence and existence.

D. A Notion Manifest as Question

From all we have been saying, it ought to be clear, too, that the notion of being is manifest as question. “When an animal has nothing to do, it goes to sleep.” But when a human being is unoccupied, she may ask questions; and in so doing, she activates her intellectual eros.21

Where does the ‘Why?’ come from? What does it reveal or represent? Already we had occasion to speak of the psychological tension that had its release in the joy of discovery. It is that tension, that drive, that desire to understand, that constitutes the primordial ‘Why?’ Name it what you please, alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry ... [The] primordial drive ... is the pure question.22

This pure question is no particular question or even set of questions but their font or source.

It is not the verbal utterance of questions ... not the conceptual formulation of questions ... not any insight or thought ... not any reflective grasp or judgment. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to

---

20 Lonergan, “The Subject,” in A Second Collection, p. 81.
21 Lonergan, CWL 3 10.
22 Ibid., p. 9.
understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of judgments that is named knowledge.\textsuperscript{23}

And, as the foregoing suggests, it is a drive that precipitates into two strands. In the first place, there is the intellectual, and in the second place, there is the critical, strand.

We move from the level of sense presentations, perception, and images to a level of insight and conception, inasmuch as we are intellectually alert, inasmuch as we have not only verbal questions or questions conceptually expressed, but also that root of questioning that is intellectual curiosity, wanting to understand something. We move from the level of conception to critical reflective consciousness inasmuch as we are the root that is manifested in such questions as, Is it so? All efforts to understand and all understanding, all efforts to conceive and all conceiving, depend upon the wonder expressed in the questions, What?, Why? and How often? All efforts to grasp the virtually unconditioned and actually grasping [it], all efforts to judge and actual judging, depend upon the desire expressed in such questions as, Is it really so?\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{E. A Notion Manifest as Criterion}

Finally, it is in the light of such strands of Inquiry that our inquiries are normed. In fact, the notion of being, when understood in this way, is our \textit{lumen naturale}.

\begin{itemize}
\item [It is] the inner light, the light that raises questions and, when answers are insufficient, keeps raising further questions. It is the inner light of intelligence that asks what and why and how and what for and, until insight hits the bull’s eye, keeps further questions popping up. It is the inner light of reasonableness that demands sufficient reason before assenting and, until sufficient reason is forthcoming, keeps in your mind the further questions of the doubter.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 348.

\textsuperscript{24} Lonergan, CWL 5 150. And see “Cognitional Structure,” in CWL 4 211.

\textsuperscript{25} Bernard Lonergan, “Theology and Praxis,” in \textit{A Third Collection}, ed. Frederick E.
The notion of being, then, does not only put questions, but in so doing supplies a light by which we may answer. It is the light of intelligence and reason, in which the essence and existence of things are seen.

Let us consider, as an illustration, our example of the circle, from before. If, in response to the question, What is it?, What is its nature?, or Why is it round?, I grasp a relation between equal radii-length and roundness, and so hit upon the essential, here, I do so in part because I have been guided to do so by my notion of essence, proper. And if, in response to the further question, Is it?, Am I right?, I grasp the sufficiency of conditions for an affirmation, I do so in part because of my anticipation of existence. There is, in us, a dialectical relationship between questions put and answers given, that constitutes our intelligent and rational life. But it is only because of the questions that we have, and are, that we are ever in a position to answer.

[T]he intention of being ... demands, it initiates, the process of knowing, guides [it], and sets the criteria by which one carries [it] out .... It ... guides it by a requirement of intelligibility through which one effects the transition from essence to being, from essentia to ens. Once that transition is effected, you get your question, Is it? An sit? That question is not only asking for an answer; it is also setting up a criterion .... If you grasp the virtually unconditioned, you can answer, 'Yes,' and if you grasp it, you cannot be rational and not answer, 'Yes.'

II. THE NOTION OF BEING IN HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME (1925)

A. An A Priori Notion

For Heidegger, too, we possess an a priori notion of being. This is made clear in the penultimate draft of his opus, Being and Time, called History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. There, he asks "What does being mean?", and replies:


26 Lonergan, CWL 5 169.

The question seeks an answer which determines something which is somehow already given in the very questioning. ... When we ... ask about the sense of being, ... being, which is to be determined, is in a certain way already understood.  

 Being is "somehow already given," it is "in a certain way already understood," when we seek it. It is thus a condition of ontological inquiry, at least. And this is perhaps uncontroversial; for even Meno can admit that we cannot seek a thing if we have no idea of it. But how do we come by the idea? Do we begin from mere perception of beings, and abstract to produce the most universal concept? This is clearly not what Heidegger intends. For he adds that "We constantly make use of this indefinite meaning ... 'being'." We do so, perhaps particularly, when we ask, "What 'is' being?" But beyond this, "We always already live in an understanding of the 'is' ...." And this "indicates," he says, that "the understanding of 'being' ... is always already there."  

In a section of the Prolegomena, Heidegger even describes the a priori as "a title for being." By this, he means it is neither an imposition of the subject, nor an abstraction from particulars, which of course it cannot be, unless it is to be a posteriori. It is, instead, something like the field, or Sein-Dasein relation, on whose horizon distinctions between subject and object occur. It is our being, in thrall to being, simpliciter; and insofar as it is so, it is basic, or prior to all else. Heidegger writes that "the discovery of the apriori is ... identical with the discovery of being in Parmenides or in Plato," for whom being and thinking are the same. And if he will adjust their understanding, by highlighting the 'temporal' character of the prior, his 'destroying' will be more retrieval than razing.  

B. A Possessive Notion

However, if, for Heidegger, as for Lonergan, our notion of being is a priori, it is not heuristic, or strictly anticipative. To the contrary, it is in

29 Ibid., p. 144.
30 Ibid., p. 74.
31 Ibid., p. 75.
32 Ibid., p. 140. Heidegger speaks of 'refinement' and 'modification'.
possession of its term. It is ‘indeterminate’, we are told. And it is merely implicit, for if we understand being, “[w]e (‘Anyone’) do not know what being means;’\textsuperscript{33} and ‘knowing’ is ever a matter of explication, in Heidegger.\textsuperscript{34} But “[e]ven this unoriented and vague pre-understanding,” he says, “is still an understanding.”\textsuperscript{35}

The key here is Heidegger’s mereology. Cognition, for him, is ever the bringing-out of a part from a whole; i.e., it is ever the explication of what was previously implicit. This can be seen in his doctrines of understanding (Verstehen) and interpretation (Aus-le-gung), as well as in the Husserlian doctrines on which these are based. In Husserl we begin from “sensuous intuition,” in which we encounter the totality of what is, though in an undifferentiated mix of particular and universal; here the categorial is entirely implicit.\textsuperscript{36} We next proceed to “synthetic categorial intuition,” in which we explicitate the surplus of meaning contained in sense. Finally, if we desire, we move to “ideational categorial intuition,” in which we express the categorial in separation from the concrete. The process is a progressive unpacking of what was contained in the beginning.\textsuperscript{37}

Heidegger praises Husserl’s cognitional theory, but does not take it over, simply. Instead, he situates cognition, so portrayed, in socio-practical and temporal context. For him, Husserl’s sensuous intuition never occurs, save for in the context of ‘Being-in-the-World’, or ensconcement in sets of end-directed involvements.\textsuperscript{38} It never occurs, except in the light of ‘disposed’ ‘understanding’, or situated projection of ways to be.\textsuperscript{39} It never occurs, except on the horizon opened by ‘care’, or ‘being-ahead-of-itself-in-

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 143.
\textsuperscript{37} Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 47-72. For my understanding of Heidegger’s mereology, I am indebted to Einar Overenget, Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 7-33 and throughout.
\textsuperscript{38} Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 151-250
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 250-72.
already-being-involved-in'. It never occurs, except on the field of 'time,' or past-influenced anticipation of the future. In every case, the relevant 'founding' context, light, horizon, or field is basic, containing all that is explicated from it. And this basic understanding, in turn, is derived from our grasp of being, itself.

C. A Transcategorical Notion (of Essence and Its Modes)

Again, for Heidegger, as for Lonergan, our notion of being is transcategorical, or directed to all. If, a priori, or in advance of any induction, we operate "within an understanding of the 'is," this being which we understand is an undifferentiated whole. "What-is," Heidegger tells us, "is in a certain sense everything of which we speak, which we intend, toward which we act, and, even if only as to something inaccessible, everything to which we are related." It is at once our broadest, and our most concrete, notion. It is omnia, or totality, to be sure.

And yet, what is most interesting about it, for our purposes here, is the fact that it is something like essence and its modes. It is not, I think, essence and existence, as it is in Lonergan, but instead something like these collapsed, or existence as, to some degree, taken into essence. Heidegger says that being is "all of that which we ourselves are and how we are," and in this he seems to invoke Husserl's distinction between Dass- und So-sein.

Consider again Husserl's doctrine of cognition. "In ... simple perception ... the entity itself is first there simply [in 'onefold', as it were] without complication." That is, its "real parts and moments ... do not stand out in relief." But these may be brought out, and "[t]his bringing into relief takes place in new and special acts of explication."

Consider, for example, the simple accentuation of the q, of the 'yellow' in the perceived chair, in the S, that is, in the whole of the subject matter perceived as a unity. Simply drawing out the color as a specific property

---

40 Ibid., pp. 293-304.
41 Ibid., pp. 305-320.
42 Ibid. pp. 143-44.
43 Ibid., p. 145.
44 Ibid., p. 137.
in the chair first makes the q, the ‘yellow’, present as a moment, [that is, in a form] which was not present before in the simple perception of the thing.\textsuperscript{46}

I perceive a yellow chair, and in so doing see both yellow and a chair. But I do not for all of the world see the chair’s \textit{being} yellow; for this an act of categorial intuition is required. In such an act, I grasp the chair as \textit{yellow}, and I grasp it \textit{as being-yellow}, at once: I intuit \textit{essence}, \textit{existence}, “in a single stroke.”\textsuperscript{47} And I lay out my content “in a specific how of givenness.”\textsuperscript{48} Here, I “make present,” or present as static truth.

This doctrine is not unimportant to Heidegger. It is true that he modifies it, but he also remains indebted to it. In his own account, simple perception is ever book-ended by thrown-projection; it is ever contextualized by situated anticipation; it is ever founded by ecstatic temporalisation. And yet as such it is still founded \textit{intuition}; and the explications of being (essence and existence collapsed) and modalities that it makes possible are more of the same. To wit: Heidegger’s ‘interpretation’ is a laying-out (\textit{aus-legen}), and his ‘assertion’ is a saying-out (\textit{aus-sagen}), of what is already grasped in understanding (\textit{Verstehen}). And his primary conception of truth as \textit{aletheia} founds truth as correspondence. In every case, the motif ‘intuition-explication’ remains in force, even if the \textit{intuitus} has been rendered more deeply. And this means that the being which it accesses remains as well.

D. A Notion Manifest as Question

Now if, for Heidegger, as not for Lonergan, our notion of being is possessive, we may wonder why it is manifest as question, as it is. Why, if we already possess our term, would we ever need to inquire after it? There are three reasons. First, our \textit{a priori} notion of being is implicit and undifferentiated; if we understand it, we do not yet know it, explicitly. Second, false philosophic theories have covered over our sense of being, leaving us vague about what is in fact ours. Third, we are in our very nature prone to cooperate with such coverup, falling again and again into reducing

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 44, 55. Kisiel’s translation here is “in a flash,” but the stroke-formulation is more famous.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 62.
being to beings: forgetfulness rules.⁴⁹

However, we remain in touch with our ground. As we have seen, it is through our awareness of our own being, in various acts, that we are aware of being in general.⁵⁰ And so, despite having gone 'mute' about it, we are still in a position to inquire.⁵¹ In fact, our very being, now, is fundamentally in the interrogative mode. And this supplies the basis for Heidegger’s methodological approach.

"Now which entity ... is it," he asks, "... in which the potential sense of being can be obtained and read off?"⁵² The answer, of course, is our being, or the being that we are, Da-sein, or the being who, in her very being, cares about being. "The question of being," he says,

and its articulation will become all the more lucid, the more truly we have made this entity manifest, namely, the being of the questioning of the questioner himself. In order to answer the question of the being of entities, ... what is demanded is the prior elaboration of an entity on its being, that entity which we call questioning."⁵³

Questioning may not be the only act through which we understand our being, and hence being itself, but it is perhaps the primary of them; and this especially in our era of Verfall. Therefore, "proximately and for the most part," we might say, the notion of being is manifest as question.

E. A Notion Serving as Criterion

Finally, for Heidegger, as for Lonergan, the notion of being serves as criterion. In its a priori possession of essence and its modes, however gone dim, and however in need of unpacking, it guides our efforts to lay beings out as this or that, and in this or that way. In fact, for Heidegger, as for Lonergan, our notion of being is akin to a lumen naturale.

Dasein by itself, by its nature, in what it is, has a light. It is intrinsically defined by a light. To take an example, this means that a mere thing, a

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 128-31.
⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 143-44.
⁵¹ Ibid., p. 129.
⁵² Ibid., p. 145.
⁵³ Ibid., p. 146.
stone, has no light within itself, which means that what it is and how it is toward its environs, if we can speak at all of an environment for the stone, is without sight. We cannot even say that it is dark, since darkness is in fact the negation of light. There is darkness only where there can be light. The manner of being of a mere thing stands beyond or before light and dark. By contrast, the idea that the *lumen naturale* belongs to the Dasein of man means that it is *lighted within itself*, that it is involved in something, has and sees this something and together with it is this very involvement.\(^5^4\)

Dasein has a light within itself, in virtue of which it may find what it seeks. Indeed, it is its own light. But in Heidegger’s case, this also means Dasein is its own answer. For in him, as not in Lonergan, the light that is the notion of being is also ‘sight’, or possession; it is intuition. We do not say this because of the ocular metaphor alone — Lonergan also speaks of ‘insight’. We say it because Heidegger says Dasein ‘has’ and ‘sees’ what it is involved with, and indeed ‘is’ this involvement. Such language calls to mind Husserl’s doctrines of sensuous and categorial intuition, and suggests possession of being from the start, without any significant (or more-than-explicative) attendant process. It is, then, no surprise when Heidegger says, even of Dasein’s querying character, that it is utterly one with its term.

We thus have a very distinctive questioning inasmuch as in the content of the question, in what is asked for, what is asked for is itself what the questioning ... is.\(^5^5\)

Nor is it a surprise when, on the next page, Heidegger invokes Parmenides again in order to make the point.

If we turn back to history, ... when the question of being appeared for the first time, in Parmenides, here we already see this peculiar bond. The union is here taken to be so close that in a sense what is asked about and is determined in its being is identified with the interrogative and

---

54 Ibid., pp. 297-98.
55 Ibid., p. 147.
right, we err in likening Heidegger to a thinker for whom the notion of being is 'had' by a subject.

Consider, lastly, Taylor Carman's claim that Heidegger is in no way indebted to intuition. In opposition, perhaps, to the resurgence of interpretation to the contrary, he asserts that "categorial intuition remains alien to the substance and method of Heidegger's phenomenology."60 "Being and Time," he writes, "reconceives intentionality by removing it from the theory of consciousness and cognition in Husserl's work, in particular the 'Elucidation of Cognition' in the Sixth Investigation, and resituating it in an account of worldly practical activity."61 Once 'removed' and 'resituated', human understanding is no longer intuitive, but practical and temporal: it is "a future-directed projection into practical possibilities."62 And yet, again, if this is so, we are remiss in treating Heidegger as we do.

B. Heidegger Was Interested in Notions, but Sought to Highlight Their Lived, Practical Core

However, we believe that Heidegger was interested in notions, but simply sought to highlight their lived horizon. It is true that Cartesian interpretations of consciousness, subjectivity and intuition separate them from the situations in and through which they go forward, and so produce notions of notions as 'free-floating'. And it is true that, in some passages, Heidegger assimilates all notions of consciousness, subjectivity and intuition to Cartesian ones. But we would follow Overenget, Crowell, and Dahlstrom in holding him to his better angels, and note the ways in which he sublates, and does not jettison, the tradition.

Regarding 'consciousness', for example, we admit that, in his later years, Heidegger himself says "[a]ny attempt ... to rethink Being and Time is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term 'being there' [Dasein] is used in place of 'consciousness'.”63 But

---

61 Ibid., p. 66.
Heidegger says ‘rethink’, and not ‘understand’. And by ‘consciousness’ he likely means “consciousness as understood by Descartes” and not consciousness, simpliciter; for he is ever inveighing against Descartes, in *Being and Time*. However, even if Heidegger is, here, decrying the notion of consciousness, *per se*, he is so doing at a point in his work when he interprets human beings as near sieves for the revelation of being. Hence it is not surprising he would recast his earlier work in this way.

Regarding Heidegger’s sometime scorn for ‘subjectivity’, we might take a similar line. It is true that, in *Being and Time*, he is unwilling to designate Dasein as a ‘subject’, and he so brutalizes thinkers, like Descartes and Kant, who do, that it is tempting to think he equates subjectivity with inner-sphere, cabinet-like egoism. But in neighboring works he refers to Dasein as a ‘subject’, if one “in an understood sense.” And in any case, it is clear even in *Being and Time* that what he wants to avoid is construing Dasein as “present at hand.” This is most obvious in his account of self-presence, which he casts not as turning back on oneself in an act of reflexion, but as self-awareness concomitant with acts of understanding in a world.

The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call transparency [*Durchsichtigkeit*]. We choose this term to designate “knowledge of the Self” [“Selbsterkenntnis”] in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the Self [Selbspunktes], but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all...[its] constitutive moments.

The subject Heidegger rejects is not the subject as subject, but the subject as object. And this is a rejection consistent with, and required by, an interest in subjectivity.

Finally, regarding ‘intuition’, too, we believe that Heidegger is more

---

64 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 122-34.
experiential comportment.\textsuperscript{56}

III. THE LIKELY OBJECTIONS OF HEIDEGGERIANS—AND REPLIES

A. Heidegger Was Not Interested in Notions

In response to all we have been saying, it is likely Heideggerians would say Heidegger was never interested in notions, or any phenomena associated with “the philosophy of consciousness.” To the contrary, they might insist, his entire project was to cut below consciousness, subjectivity, and intuition, as well as the notions to which these give rise, to identify the comportments (\textit{Verhalten}) that lie beneath. And yet, if this is so, then our comparison is bankrupt. For it casts Heidegger in terms he rejects.

Consider, for example, Theodore Kisiel’s claim that “The Heideggerian retrieve opposes Husserl in situating the understanding and exposition of meaning not in acts of consciousness but first of all in a pre-conscious realm of being-in-the-world, which is already pervaded by ‘expressivity’.”\textsuperscript{57} Certainly, Kisiel does not mean to say that Dasein goes forward as knocked out cold. Nor, presumably, does he mean to find a doctrine of the unconscious in Heidegger. He can only mean to oppose Heidegger’s view to a Cartesian one for which consciousness is ever thematic. And yet, if consciousness is ever thematic, then we have erred indeed in likening Heidegger to a thinker for whom the notion of being is conscious.

Again, in the view of several scholars, there can be, for Heidegger, no talk of subjectivity. After expounding Heidegger’s notion of truth, Fr. Richardson asks, “Is this a subjectivism?” and answers, “It would be, if There-being were a subject. But this is what There-being is not.”\textsuperscript{58} And the analytic school of commentators on Heidegger even flirts with the idea that Dasein is not human. John Haugland understands it as a “social institution” or “way of life.” Charles Guignon denies that it may be taken as ‘shorthand’ for human being. And Hubert Dreyfus counts these measures as at least helpful correctives of counter-tendencies.\textsuperscript{59} Yet, again, if such readings are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 148.
\item \textsuperscript{59} See John Haugland, “Heidegger on Being a Person,” \textit{Nous}, Vol. XVI, March 1982,
\end{itemize}
friend than foe. In *Being and Time*, to be sure, he says that “[u]nder the unbroken hegemony of traditional ontology, the genuine mode of registering what truly is has been decided in advance. It lies in noein, ‘intuition’ in the widest sense.”\(^{68}\) And, to be sure, he takes himself in this text to qualify that hegemony: “By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding ... we have robbed pure intuition of its priviledge.”\(^{69}\) But it is only 'pure' intuition which he wishes to rob of its priviledge, and his intent is not to jettison it, but to ‘ground’ it in else: “The following division,” he says – the never published third – “will show that and how the intentionality of ‘consciousness’ is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein.”\(^{70}\) His intent is to situate, and not obliterate, noein.

On balance, then, Heidegger can be seen to endorse consciousness, subjectivity, and intuition, although these in qualified senses. And if this is so, he may well, too, endorse the notion of ‘notions’ which arise from them. So, we consider our enterprise, at least in this respect, valid.

\section*{C. Heidegger Was Not Interested in Being}

However, there is another respect in which commentators will reject our efforts. Not only will they say Heidegger was uninterested in the philosophy of consciousness; they will say he was uninterested in being. On the face of it, this is an unlikely claim to make of the author of *Being and Time*. But it is a claim that is frequent in the English scholarship.

In 1981 Thomas Sheehan remarked that “we might enhance the explanation of Heidegger’s subject matter by retiring the terms ‘Being’ and ‘the question of Being’ from the discussion.”\(^{71}\) More recently he says that “Heidegger’s focal topic was not ‘being’ (the givenness or availability of entities for human engagement) but rather what brings about being, ... -- the opening of a clearing in which entities can appear as this or that.”\(^{72}\) His colleague John Caputo declares that “[t]he real concern of thought [for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(^{68}\) Ibid., p. 129. Cited in, and translated by, Carman, p. 66.
  \item \(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 187. Cited in, and translated by, Carman, p. 67.
  \item \(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 363, note. Cited in, and translated by, Carman, p. 67. The brackets are mine.
\end{itemize}
Heidegger] is, not the Being of the metaphysicians [taken in a broad sense to include transcendental and phenomenological thinkers] but that which grants Being as the subject matter of metaphysics. It is not the distinction between Being and beings which concerns [him], but that which opens up this distinction.”73 John Van Buren follows Caputo, saying “Thus [even] Heideggerians in their search for “Being” have for years been after the wrong thing... his question was never really the question of being, but rather the more radical [one] of what gives or produces being as an effect.”74 And, he adds: “what is sought after is ... a third thing, namely, the radical depth dimension of the temporal happening ... of ... being.”75 Finally, Theodore Kisiel concurs with all of the foregoing, when he writes:

[C]ontrary to the usual characterizations, what Heidegger is after ... is not so much a phenomenological ontology as something more basic, what he himself tentatively designated, appropriately in his first Logic course, as a ‘phenomenological chronology’ (199), a ‘chronologic’ (200). More than an ontology, since it will transcend being itself. For time ... ‘is the condition of possibility for the fact that something like being (not beings) be given, the condition of possibility that in fact gives being’ (410). Time ‘is’ the It that gives being.76

What is going on here? These commentators constitute a tradition of Heidegger-scholarship which increasingly emphasizes the Destruktion over the Wiederholung in his work, emboldened to do so by the recent publication of his juvenilia. However, its interpretations seem to us to be hyperbolic. Again and again, we think, it blurs the distinction between sublation and rejection, and does disservice to Heidegger. However, we admit these matters are difficult, especially since Heidegger himself was in no wise clear about them: he did not complete Division III of his opus. We will have to be tentative, then, in our reply.

75 Ibid.
D. Heidegger Was Interested in Being, but Sought to Highlight Its Absential Horizon

To us it seems that Heidegger was interested in being, but simply sought to highlight its absential horizon. Consider, again, his doctrine of understanding. In becoming aware of, for example, "white paper," I at once grasp it as white, and I grasp it as being white. In a single stroke, or flash, I grasp whatness and thatness, essence and existence. Or, I grasp these as collapsed; I grasp what Heidegger calls 'being'. But as over against Husserl, I do so in a way for which I have been prepared, by my past, which thus shapes and colors my construal, and in a way which is led by my future, or my anticipation of it, which thus also colors my grasp. And in this, I not only present a meaning, but do so on the field of time. I set forth this or that, as (being) this or that; but I do so only on the basis of what is not present, not set forth, and quite outstanding: I present on the field of an absence, or an absential horizon.

Now this absential horizon, time (Zeitlichkeit), is keyed to Time (Temporality) as the ultimate correlate of our temporal lives. And inasmuch as this is so, in Heidegger, it is tempting to posit it as "more basic than" being, in the sense of "some third thing," "lying beneath." That is, it is tempting to hypostatize it. But Heidegger is quite clear that, if being is inseparable from Time, Time is inseparable from being. So we would do well to construe it, not as what lies beneath or is beyond being, but as what makes it possible, or is its horizon. And if we do so, Heidegger's interest in Time does not replace but supplements and extends his interest in being, which in turn makes it possible for us to continue to ask after it. Let us, then, do just this now, to see that, in Being and Time, the notion of being remains.

IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE NOTION IN BEING AND TIME (1927)

A. An A Priori Notion

Even in Being and Time, when Heidegger has temporalized understanding and being, the notion of being is preserved; and, as in the Prolegomena, it is held to be a priori. "Inquiry, as a kind of seeking," Heidegger tells us, "must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being

---

77 Heidegger, Being and Time, e.g. p. 40, and 415-18.
78 Ibid., pp. 377, 458, and 472.
79 Ibid., p. 39, and most famously, p. 488.
must already be available to us in some way.” And, in fact, “we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being.” So a grasp of it is the condition, not just of onto-logical, but of any inquiry; which is to say it is a priori.

But how is this so? “Dasein,” Heidegger writes, “is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.” Dasein cares about itself, cares about its being. “But in that case,” Heidegger continues, “this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, [which] implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relation which itself is one of Being.” And this, he concludes, “means ... that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being.” In fine: “It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being.”

B. A Possessive Notion

Now, to say that, in being in relation to itself, Dasein understands its being, and so understands being itself, is in no way to say it knows either. For understanding, in Heidegger, is ever implicit; and knowing, in him, is ever implicit, as we have noted. “We do not know what ‘Being’ means,” he admits. “[B]ut even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’ , we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies.” “We do not,” he adds, “even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact.”

The position, we believe, is close to that of Coreth, who may have learned it from his teacher. “As I engage in the performance of my questioning,” he writes, “... I know, that I ask; I know that I am engaged in asking and am performing the asking; ... I know that the performance of my questioning ‘is’.” And, from this “immediate experience of being and the certainty of

80 Ibid., p. 25.
81 Ibid., p. 32. And note: Heidegger does not say Dasein understands merely its own being. “Dasein possesses — as constitutive for its understanding of existence — an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own” (p. 34). “Dasein is,” he says, “in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being” (p. 39).
82 Ibid., p. 25.
83 Emeric Coreth, S.J., Metaphysik. Eine methodisch-systematischen Grundlegung,
performance ... I know ... about being or the meaning of being in general.”

Coreth uses ‘know’ where Heidegger uses ‘understanding’ to be sure. But their view is the same: we come to know being, per se, by first knowing our own being. Or, rather, in being, we are concomitantly aware of ourselves as being, and so are aware of being, itself; a priori, or prior to any learning, we are, and are in possession of being.

C. A Transcategorical Notion (of Essence and Its Modes)

Moreover, this being, which we possess, a priori, is trans-categorical; it cuts across concepts. Just as my own being “is never to be taken ... as an instance or special case of some genus,” but is instead properly thought as ‘ex-istent’, or out-side of itself in thrall to all, so is being, per se, not to be taken as class, genus, or kind, but as what goes beyond or transcends specificity. And, just as my own being is thought, not to have ‘properties’, but to exist in this or that way, so is being, per se, thought to have various possible ‘modes’. Not only my own being, but the being, per se, I know in and through it, are comprised of essence and its modes, or essence/existence (collapsed), layed out in this or that fashion. (Or, at least, this is how things might haltingly be expressed from a Thomist standpoint.)

That being is transcategorical, for Heidegger, is clear. For he takes pains to note that, the being we grasp in ourselves, and grasp per se, is universal not in the sense of the concept, leaving out particularity, but in the sense of omnia, inclusive of all about all. He describes the question of being as “the most basic and the most concrete.” He says that “[e]verything we talk about, everything we have in view, [and] everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being.” And he likens being to the Medieval transcendentalia, which not only go beyond but include genera, and include all they discipline. “[T]he ‘universality’ of ‘Being’,” he says, “is not that of a class or genus. [Its universality] ‘transcends’ any universality of genus.”


84 Ibid., p. 137.
85 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 67-8.
86 Ibid., p. 29.
88 Ibid., p. 22.
Being ... is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. *Being is the transcends pure and simple.*

However, we believe that, more specifically, for Heidegger, being is essence and existence collapsed, taken along with the ways this amalgam may be modally expressed. “Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is,” Heidegger writes, be it “in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’.” And, again, he says that “Being is that on the basis of which entities are, and are as they are.” It might seem from these remarks that Heidegger holds being to be existence and essence, thatness and whatness, ever tied to one another yet still distinct. But, in fact, we think he takes existence into essence, and reserves for modal expression the job of deciding fact. Indeed, we think that, for him, questions of actuality and fact, or real existence, are trivial ones, having to do, as they do, with mere beings (Seienden) and not their being (Sein). And we think that this is, again, the inheritance of Husserlian intuitivist essentialism.

Consider, again, our white piece of paper. In a stroke, we grasp it as *white*, and as *being* white; we grasp its whatness and thatness at once or what Heidegger calls its being. But in so doing, what we get at fundamentally is the intelligibility of the white paper; we get at the meaningful datum, “white piece of paper.” And it is only subsequently, in a distinct act, that we explicate it in any number of ways; it is only in a distinct act, that we lay it out in one of its possible modes. For example, we lay it out, or interpret it, as present to hand, as *Vorhanden*, or as set before us, as an item for inspection. Or, again, we lay it out as ready to hand, as *Zuhanden*, or as an item of use, available to us in our practical living. But in either case, we articulate, or lay out, or express, a prior grasp of being, understood as intelligibility, in this way or that; we determine our datum, in this or that mode, and we do not bring anything new to it. We show that we take being to be essence and its

---

89 Ibid., p. 62.
91 Ibid.
modes.

D. A Notion Manifest as Question

If, again, we grasp being a priori, before we lay it out in any of its modes, we may wonder why it is manifest as question, as it is. For a grasp of being would seem to make needless any inquiry into it. But, in Being and Time, as in the Prolegomena, we have our answer; for our initial grasp of being is said to be implicit, undifferentiated, and dimmed. Our “understanding of Being,” Heidegger says, “([one] which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word,” in “its ... indeterminateness.” So it is up to us to render it more determinate and explicit. And it “may be so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood” and so misunderstood. So it is up to us to penetrate beneath the accretive overlay. But, if this is true — if our initial grasp of being is both indeterminate and covered over — then it is easy to see how our a priori understanding of it functions for us as much as a mystery (Ratsel) as an answer. It is easy to see how it is manifest for us as question.

Our understanding of being is implicit, and must be made explicit. It is indeterminate, and must be made determinate. It is covered over, and must be uncovered. But in order for explicitation, articulation, and excavation to be possible, we must remain in some touch with our source; and fortunately enough, we do. For Dasein, again is the being for whom its own being is an issue. It stands in inevitable relation to itself. And, insofar as it does so, it stands in inevitable relation to being: indeed, it grasps it. “[W]e always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being,” Heidegger writes. And from “[o]ut of this understanding arise both the explicit question of ... Being and the tendency that leads towards its conception.” That is, from out of our notion of being come both our confusion about it and our capacity to know it. And for this reason, Heidegger says: “the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-

92 Ibid., p. 25.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 23. Heidegger’s word here is ‘enigma’. But ‘mystery’ also translates ‘Ratsel’.
95 Ibid., p. 25.
Being which belongs to Dasein itself — the pre-ontological understanding of Being.”

E. A Notion Serving as Criterion

Dasein, then, is at once its own answer and question. It is its own answer to the question of being, insofar as it understands it a priori. And yet it is its own question too, insofar as its understanding is implicit and vague. On the one hand, it knows its ground; but on the other, it does not know it as it would. It longs to become (more fully) what it is, longs to enter into deeper communion with what it already knows.

For this reason, Dasein serves as its own criterion. It serves as its own guide, in coming to know what it already knows, better. In this way, it is like the traditional soul. “Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority,” Heidegger tells us, “was seen quite early, though Dasein itself was not grasped in its genuine ontological structure ....” That is, Dasein’s specialness among beings, as a guide to understanding beings in their being, was noted early on, even if it was not grasped fully, or in its full character as ecstatically temporal. “Aristotle,” Heidegger reports, “says: ... ‘Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities’. The ‘soul’ which makes up the Being of man has aisthesis and noesis among its ways of Being, and in these it discovers all entities, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are.” And:

Aristotle’s principle, which points back to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one which Thomas Aquinas has taken up in a characteristic discussion. Thomas is engaged in the task of deriving the ‘transcendentia’ — those characters of Being which lie beyond every possible way in which an entity may be classified as coming under some generic kind of subject-matter ..., and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is such a transcendentens. He does this by invoking an entity which, in accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to ‘come together with’ entities of any sort whatever. This distinctive entity ... is the soul (anima).}

96 Ibid., p. 35.
97 Ibid., p. 34.
Dasein and the soul, as traditionally understood, have in common an isomorphic relation with being. Both are uniquely fit to "come together with being"; or, as the inverted commas imply, both are already together with it, and thus are in a position to bring else in accord, too. Both serve in a criterial capacity. And, it is in virtue of their notion(ing) of being, that they do. Dasein, and the soul, are ever underway to Sein, because, "in a certain way," they are already there.

V. A Defense of Lonergan's Notion

A. Experience Tells Us Our Notion of Being Is No More than Heuristic

Heidegger's account of our inevitable concourse with being is beautiful. And it would be inhuman not to be drawn to it. But it is only partially true, we think; and so we offer a defense of Lonergan. In particular, we suggest our a priori notion of being is no more than heuristic.

Heidegger holds that, in understanding ourselves, in our being, we thereby understand being itself, and so possess a standard for understanding beings in their being. We are in possession of being from the start. But, because our grasp of it is implicit, indeterminate, and dimmed, we must unpack, articulate, and re-illumine it; and it is to this enterprise that Heidegger invites us in his work. In particular, he invites us to struggle against our native tendency to cover being over, forget about it, and reduce it to mere beings.

However, we may wonder whether Heidegger's premise is too strong. Why think we understand ourselves in our being, and so understand being itself? It is clear that we do not do so explicitly, or fully articulately, or without getting in our own way; and these facts alone may explain our confusion. But it is also quite possible that we simply do not understand being, and merely intimate it; and, in fact, this is what our experience reveals.

Consider the instance in which we are searching for the definition of the circle. In the beginning, we have perhaps only an inkling of the relevant intelligibility, as well as of the matter of fact here. We experience ourselves to be progressively homing in on the relation between equal radii-length and roundness, and to be doing so on the field of an orientation to what is understandable per se. And, we experience ourselves to be increasingly
Sharkey: Heidegger, Lonergan, and the Notion of Being

convinced that our hypothesis is correct, on the field of an orientation to absolute truth. That is, we experience ourselves to be on the track of this or that instance of essence and existence, on the field of an orientation to essence and existence per se; but we do not experience ourselves to know these latter. Thus it would not seem sober to claim otherwise. It may well be that “God’s knowledge of being is a priori.” For if he exists, “he is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything.” But, by contrast, “we advance towards knowledge by asking the explanatory question, Quid sit? and the factual question An sit?”

That is, we begin in intention, and not knowledge. Or, at least, this is what our experience tells us.

B. Experience Tells Us Our Orientations to Essence and Existence Are Distinct

Moreover, experience tells us that our orientations to essence and existence are distinct. They are not, perhaps, separable; a real distinction need not imply separability. But they are distinct: they constitute two folds in our interrogative orientation to all.

Consider, again, our previous example. In series, we ask ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions. In the first place, we ask after the intelligibility or order at hand, and we do so on the horizon of a wish to understand all. In the second, we ask after the truth of our hypothesis, and do so on the horizon of an interest in the unconditional. For “the notion of being remains incomplete on the level of intelligence; it moves conception forward to questions for reflection; it moves beyond single judgments to the totality of correct [ones] and ... it does not prescind from existence and actuality.”

In the limit, we would know everything about everything. But we know act as limited by potency. And so we ask, first about essence, and then about existence; we make our way to being through distinct intentions of these.

Heidegger does not agree and, we believe, to his detriment. He holds that we intuit being, or essence, or existence taken into essence, in an act of mind which precedes reflection. He holds that, immediately, we understand, and proceed to explicate. And so he considers judgment rather a fifth wheel, unnecessary for understanding itself, and liable to sediment meaning. In Being and Time it is “[b]y way of having a mood [that] Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is,” and by its ‘projective understanding’

98 Lonergan, CWL 3 370.

99 Ibid., p. 356.

100 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 188.
that it "goes to make up existentially what we call [its] 'sight'."\textsuperscript{101} And it is by its 'interpretation' (\textit{aus-legen}) and 'assertion' (\textit{aus-sagen}) that it lays-out and says-out what it intuits.\textsuperscript{102} That is, it is by its ecstatic temporalizing that it grasps being and unpacks it. But, if this is so, then it is no surprise Dasein "is ... that sight which is directed upon Being as such,"\textsuperscript{103} and no surprise that being is 'seen' \textit{a priori}, via the self's sight of itself. It is no surprise being, understood as essence, is intuited \textit{a priori}, prior to any interest in \textit{realitas}.

**Conclusion**

We might conclude by asking after the importance of our topic. As we have seen, Heidegger holds our \textit{a priori} notion of being to be possessive and to collapse essence and existence. That is, he holds our starting point to be full knowledge of reality, understood as essence, or intelligibility. And in this, he follows a distinguished Platonic, and Scotist, tradition. But we do not think he has adequate evidence for his stance; to the contrary we hold that we begin from mere intention of being, understood as really distinct essence and existence. And in this, we follow Lonergan, who in turn follows the tradition of Aquinas. But the issue is of capital importance. For it regards not only the questions of who, most basically, we are, and what is our main manner of relation to reality; it has also ethical and political significance. It is well known that Heidegger, for a time, engaged with the Nazis and endorsed a Romantic authoritarianism. And his permanent philosophical ideal seems to be that of remaining in thrall to being, in its luminosity, or intelligibility, undisciplined by act or Good. If this is so, whatever in his work is beautiful must also be dangerous.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 186.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp. 188-203.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 186.
Forty six years have passed since Lonergan’s break-through to functional specialization in February 1965. It was an important and indeed extra-ordinary discovery for him. Yet of all the brilliant and seminal ideas to flow from the decades in which Lonergan’s living was “more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand,” functional specialization is perhaps the one that receives the least sustained attention from Lonergan students.

Perhaps that is an exaggeration, but if so, it is only because so many of his ideas receive so little attention that the competition for the category of “least-attended-to seminal idea” is really rather stiff. Even Lonergan himself had his own candidate, in 1944, for the category of his most seminal-but-neglected idea. “Now it is true that our culture cannot be accused of mistaken ideas on pure surplus income as it has been defined in this essay; for on that precise topic it has no ideas whatever.”

One wonders what Lonergan might say about our academic culture on
the precise topic of functional specialization in 2011. He would insist, of course, that implementing any serious innovation takes time, and he might add something consoling regarding “the imperious pressure of really significant ideas” in the long run. But as a theologian perhaps he would also point out that even the Israelites managed to emerge from the desert after only forty years of wandering. So it would appear that already we are a little behind the curve.

Functional specialization is an odd candidate for the most orphaned of Lonergan’s ideas. After all, it is the central subject of one of his four or five major works and the culmination of a decades-long effort on his part. Yet more than forty-five years after its initial discovery, and almost forty years after its artication and publication in Method in Theology, functional specialization continues to languish in undeserved obscurity.

The phrase itself did not help, redolent as it is with a kind of off-putting polysyllabic Teutonic efficiency. Or perhaps the method he proposed was too strikingly original to be easily assimilated to existing routines in theology or other disciplines, and I suspect that, given a choice, academics will often opt for variations on an existing routine. Or maybe functional specialization simply seemed too difficult, or too remote, to tackle on any but a piecemeal basis. But whatever the reason, I think we can honestly say that for the moment, at least, little has yet come of it.

I suspect that Lonergan scholars are caught in a kind of dilemma. Put simply, to imagine concretely what functional specialist work in various fields would be like, we would have to begin to implement it. Yet we cannot begin to implement it until we have some idea of what it would be like.

---

4 CWL 21, at 110. Lonergan had a sense of the time-frames required for serious development. For example, in a conversation with Philip McShane in 1977 he estimated that his work in economics would take perhaps 150 years to become accepted and implemented. See McShane, “Work in Redress: The Value of Lonergan’s Economics for Lonergan Students,” chapter one of The Redress of Poise: The End of Lonergan’s Work, 4 (unpublished ms., available at http://www.philipmcshane.ca).

5 Notable exceptions include Fred Crowe’s Theology of the Christian Word: A Study in History (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), as well as a number of Philip McShane’s works. See, e.g., McShane, A Brief History of Tongue (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998), chapters three and four; McShane, Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002), chapters three and six; Sane Economics and Fusionism (Vancouver: Axial Press, 2010) and, more amply, two manuscripts, Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations and Lonergan’s Standard Model of Effective Global Enquiry, both available on McShane’s website, http://www.philipmcshane.ca.
Fortunately, the dilemma is merely apparent. As Lonergan reminds us, there is such a thing as the law of effect, and according to it, “the ground of functioning advances to a new ground of functioning where functioning occurs successfully.” Perhaps, then, the key to getting functional specialization functioning successfully so that it can advance to a higher ground of functioning is simply to make a start, however initially awkward or lame that start may be. For “development occurs along the directions in which it succeeds. ... [O]ne develops through functioning and, until one has developed, one’s functioning has the lack of poise, of economy, of effectiveness, that betrays as yet undifferentiated potentialities.” The same can no doubt be said of efforts to implement functional specialization in the human sciences. So with a bow to Lonergan’s articulation of the developmental law of effect, and with a second bow to G.K Chesterton’s version of that same law — that “if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly,” at least initially — I want to begin to take a stab at discussing the possibility of functional specialization in the context of legal studies.

I. PROGRESS, FANTASY, AND THE TURN TO METHOD

It may seem strange to mention ‘fantasy’ and “the turn to method” in

---

6 As this article goes to press, I have become aware of an effort by approximately 40 Lonergan scholars, under the direction of Philip McShane, to implement the functional specialties in concrete contexts over the course of the next few years using an electronic seminar. The first seminar, on functional research, began in late January 2011. See http://www.s8eme.org.

7 CWL 3492.

8 CWL 3495-96.

9 See, e.g., Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) (hereafter, Method), chapter five, section 5, “A Dynamic Unity,” 138 (“Development, then, seems to be from an initial state of undifferentiation through a process of differentiation and specialization towards a goal in which the differentiated specialties function as an integrated unity.”) See also below, n. 15 and n. 16.


11 By “legal studies” I simply mean scholarship regarding the law, together with the incipient “Wendung zur Idee” that can be discerned in the contemporary, wide-ranging, and protean efforts to understand law in the context of the full spectrum of developing human sci-ences and in light of the massive shift of perspective implicit in the turn to historical con-sciousness. Just as theology is a historically unfolding reflection on religion and its mutually mediating relationship to cultures, so too legal studies are a reflection on law or legal practices and their role in the developing and differentiating matrix of societies, economies, politics, and cultures in history.
the same breath. But at least in Lonergan’s thought, the turn to method involves a quite different way of envisioning both where we think we are going as a human group and how we think we are getting there. We tend to underestimate both the difficulty of envisaging it (and in that sense, the difficulty of fantasy12 concerning it) as well as its centrality in Lonergan’s thinking. Possible courses of action must be glimpsed before they can be deliberated upon, deliberated upon before they can be chosen, and chosen before they can be implemented — and that certainly includes the possible course of action known as proceeding methodically. As Lonergan notes, “besides the meanings by which man apprehends nature and the meanings by which he transforms it, there are the meanings by which man thinks out the possibilities of his own living and makes his choice among them.”13 It is both plausible and reasonable, I think, to associate the method of functional specialization ultimately with the meanings by which humans collectively think out the possibilities of human living. Certainly, Lonergan believed so, for he insisted that a critical human science has to be concerned, “to adopt a phrase from Marx, not only with knowing history but also with directing it,”14 and there is little doubt that for the later Lonergan functional

12 See, for example, Lonergan’s remark in the 28th place in chapter 20 of Insight: “The solution will be effective in the sense that it meets the problem of evil ... by introducing a new and higher integration that enables man ... to provide a new and more solid base on which man’s intellectual and social development can rise to heights undreamed of.” CWL 3 745. Chesterton is famous for his remark that “the Christian ideal has not been tried and found wanting. It has been found difficult; and left untried.” What’s Wrong with the World, Chesterton Collected Works, vol. 4, at 61. Does it not require a certain methodically informed imagination to envision the possibilities of progress that might result were Christianity to be tried, so to speak, within the third stage of meaning?

13 “Theology in Its New Context,” A Second Collection, ed. William Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Pres, 1974), 61. Perhaps a more directly relevant text is this parallel statement in Insight: “inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems, so that human living has its basic task in reflecting on systems and judging them, deliberating on their implementation and choosing between possibilities.” CWL 3, at 291.

14 CWL 3, at 253. Lonergan’s adoption and adaptation of the famous phrase from Marx’s “Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach” is remarkable on its face, but no less remarkable in his assigning the notion of a critical human science with a role to play in ‘directing history’ in this context. That turn of phrase was no accident: the original typescript of Insight tracked Marx’s use more closely by speaking of “changing it.” In that typescript, Lonergan crossed out the typed word “changing” and deliberately substituted the handwritten word “directing.” Archives file 40600DTE050, at 34. Compare Karl Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,” quoted in Ernst Bloch, Über Karl Marx, (Frankfurt: Verlag, 1968), 117 (“Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern”); Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. and trans.
specialization is the key to the possibility of critical human sciences.

Let me continue, then, by noting that we have arrived at yet another anniversary. Seventy-five years ago Lonergan finished his early manifesto on the historical determination of intellect, on the destructive fragmentation and atom-ization that characterize modernity, and on possible grounds and means for a restoration of human solidarity.\(^{15}\) Among other things, that manifesto drew pointed attention to the "low efficiency" of the human mind in history.\(^{16}\) It is not implausible to suggest that the turn to method in Lonergan’s own thinking had something to do with that early concern. And, further, it is not implausible to assert that the turn to functional specialization in the later Lonergan is relevant to that redemptive renewal of human thought and culture which Lonergan in his middle period discussed under the rubrics of ‘cosmopolis’\(^ {17}\) and “a practical theory of history.”\(^ {18}\) The same theme can be detected in the later Lonergan. Indeed, the very first page of Method characterizes “a contemporary method” by reference to the tasks of “collective practicality and coresponsibility.”\(^ {19}\)

In both his early and middle periods, Lonergan engaged in a certain amount of fantasy about “collective practicality and coresponsibility” in the context of how improvements in methods in the natural and human sciences might lead to progress, to concrete and cumulative improvements in human institutions. Let me give just a few examples. In one of his historical manuscripts (from 1935), he remarks that “we are beginning to

---

Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) (2nd ed.), 145 (“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point, however, is to change it” [emphases in original]).

15 “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis: A Theory of Human Solidarity,” \textit{Method}: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9 (1991) 139-162, at 147 (original manuscript dated April 28, 1935). The same phrase appears in the account of “general categories” in what may be one of the more oblique but important comments in Method on the nature of functional specialties: “Developments can be analysed as processes from initial global operations of low efficiency, through differentiation and specialization, to the integration of the perfected specialties.” \textit{Method}, 287-88.

16 \textit{Id.}, 147.

17 Lonergan may have borrowed the word “cosmopolis” from Toynbee’s account of its use in ancient Greece, but the usage is, of course, Lonergan’s own. For Toynbee’s use, see \textit{A Study of History}, vol. 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 332-338 (“The Hellenic Conception of the ‘Cosmopolis’”). For Lonergan’s use, see, e.g., “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World,” \textit{CWL} 4 109; \textit{CWL} 3 263-67.

18 \textit{CWL} 3 258.

19 \textit{Method}, xi (emphasis added).
understand more of human physiology and of the subconscious activity
of the soul on the organism so that a development of educational theory
may enable man to solve problems he now views with all the scientific
penetration of a Mongolian herdsman.”

In a similar vein, the historical manuscripts sketch how an understanding of the dialectical dynamics and
laws of historical process can be used to direct and deepen “man’s understanding and making of man” — to promote, as he later styles it in Insight, “a human contribution to the control of human history.”

In an economic manuscript from 1942 Lonergan muses on the transformations that might follow on a combination of economic and scientific advance. “Nor is it impossible that further developments in science should make small units self-sufficient on an ultramodern standard of living to eliminate commerce and industry, to transform agriculture into super-chemistry, to clear away finance and even money, to make economic solidarity a memory, and power over nature the only difference between high civilization and primitive gardening. But we are not there yet.”

Even in Method, Lonergan speaks of die Wendung zur Idee represented by functional specialization in theology and “its contribution towards meeting the needs of Christian living, actuating its potentialities, and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by world history.”

21 This theme, of course, runs all the way through Lonergan’s writings. See Lonergan’s assertion in 1937-38 that “the formal object of the analytic concept of history is the making and unmaking of man by man.” “Analytic Concept of History,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 11 (1993) 5-35, at 10. See also CWL 3, at 258 (“there is a convergence of evidence for the assertion that the longer cycle is to be met ... only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man’s understanding and making of man”); CWL 10 186 n. 23 (noting idealism’s attempt “to provide philosophy as instrument in man’s making of man”); id. at 232 (speaking of art as an exploration of the potentialities of concrete living, and noting that the “exploration is extremely important in our age, when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life unlivable.”); “Theology in Its New Context,” A Second Collection, ed. William Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 61-62; Method, 52; “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, ed. Frederick Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 171 (“For it is in history that man’s making of man occurs, that it progresses and regresses”). Note also the discussion of the dialectic of history, and of the possibility of “resolute and effective intervention in the dialectic of history,” in his lectures on logic and existentialism. CWL 18 305-308.
22 CWL 3 252.
23 CWL 21 20.
24 Method, 144-45.
Well, we are certainly “not there yet.” But for Lonergan the condition of getting there is a method adequate to the task, a method that is empirical, critical, and historical, a method which harnesses the efforts of scattered individuals and “splintered disciplines”\(^{25}\) into an efficient and methodical collaboration in the service of human and historical progress. That method turns out to be what he calls functional specialization, including “integrated studies” involving both “scholarly and scientific human studies.”\(^{26}\)

So what has all this to do with law or legal studies? Four things, at a minimum. First, the product of Lonergan’s lifelong struggle with method in the human sciences really is rather remote, and we should be careful of too casually domesticating it. In other words, we should not underestimate the difficulty of adequately envisaging the radicality of the paradigm shift he proposes. In his earliest historical manuscript, Lonergan speaks of the difficulty of discovery and the necessity of theoretic understanding. “Think of a Greek who heard of Icarus and wished to build an aeroplane that was no myth; could he have thought of the necessity of first discovering higher mathematics and advanced physics?”\(^{27}\) Are we in something like the same position vis-à-vis Lonergan’s achievement concerning method in the human sciences? If we are, ought we not to expect that it will be difficult to envision with adequate empiricallity and criticality its extension to human sciences or studies such as law? The second point is the converse of the first. Though functional specialization is remote in its basis and its ultimate goal, it is also something eminently practical. As with any practical scheme, it has to be implemented in some initial and defective way before it can be implemented in a more refined and adequate way, and there is no short-cutting the initial awkwardness. Third, Lonergan explicitly envisioned some sort of analogous extension of functional specialization to other scholarly disciplines, as a possible way of assisting the “turn to the idea” or “the shift toward system” in each of the human sciences. Fourth, there is a crying need for an alternative to the disorganization and fragmentation that haunt the human sciences and scholarly disciplines. And that certainly includes legal studies.


\(^{26}\) Method, 366.

\(^{27}\) “A Theory of History,” ms. circa 1936, at 3 (Archives file no. 71311DTE030).
II. THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTATION AND "THE NEED FOR DIVISION"

Lonergan has a wonderful illustration of the virtually unconditioned at work in concrete judgments of fact in *Insight*. "Suppose a man to return from work to his tidy home to find the windows smashed, smoke in the air, and water on the floor. Suppose him to make the extremely restrained judgment of fact, Something happened." I have always thought that the man in question would also have been rationally warranted in arriving at a slightly less restrained judgment best expressed in the utterance, "What a mess!" Anyone who has wandered into the smoky and puddled ruins of American legal scholarship, or stumbled over the slag heap that is constitutional jurisprudence, is entitled to arrive at the same 'restrained' conclusion. Whatever else may be true of the American legal system and the legal studies associated with it, it certainly is not a coherent and well-organized whole. Rather it is, as one might expect, a complex and fragmented product of the polymorphism of human consciousness, and in that sense, an ongoing illustration of the need for a division of labor in the effort to understand what law is.

Legal practice in the United States has always been a more or less sophisticated specialization of commonsense procedures — that is the nature of the common law, of legislatively enacted statutes, and of their interpretation in the particular culture or subculture that is constituted by legal and judicial practice. And while the reflection on legal process that is legal scholarship here and there has had a dose of history and a "tincture of system,” it too has been mostly a sophisticated extension of common sense in the mode of what Lonergan has called "post-systematic consciousness.”

28 *Method*, 136.
29 CWL 3 306-07.
30 I drew attention earlier to Lonergan’s emphasis on the “collective practicality” of functional specialization. It is a theme that recurs throughout Lonergan’s writings. See, for example, Lonergan’s comment in the question period following his lecture on “Merging Horizons”: “If you find that the concrete situation is a mess, well, you have to have a first-class history before you can start to do anything.” “Merging Horizons: System, Common Sense, Scholarship,” in CWL 17 67.
31 See, e.g., *Method*, 278, 329.
32 On “post-systematic consciousness,” see *Method*, 304-05, 312, 314, 319, 344-45. By that term Lonergan appears to mean something like the influence that prior systematic thought exerts on subsequent varieties of common sense among “the educated classes” who
But common sense cannot effectively critique itself, and the many and various attempts to import theory into legal scholarship have not been a conspicuous and notable success. Legal positivism, legal realism, legal post-modern-ism, critical legal studies — all represent various attempts to sort through the mess, and all more or less succeed in simply displacing the mess to a new level. At best, present legal studies “are lost in some no man’s land between the world of theory and the world of common sense,” to borrow Lonergan’s words from another context.

I will describe some of the disorganization and fragment-ation in legal studies in a moment. But it seems safe to say for now that some more efficient way of moving from data to results, from past to future, from listening to action, is needed. Can functional specialization meet that need? I once asked Lonergan whether Method in Theology could just as well have been titled Method in the Human Sciences. He responded with an emphatic “yes.” Nor is that answer sur-prising. When Rahner suggested by way of criticism that there was nothing dis-tinctively theological about functional specialization, Lonergan readily agreed. “Clearly functional specialties as such are not specifically theological. Indeed, the eight specialties ... would be relevant to any human studies that investigated a cultural past to guide its future.”

are not themselves “systematic thinkers.” Method, 304. For examples in legal scholarship, see the classics by Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1913) and Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1915). One cannot help wondering what light Lonergan’s economic analysis might shed on the history of the American founding, on debates regarding the development of the common law in the nineteenth century, and on disputes regarding the nature of polity and property. See CWL 21 9 (describing the movement from pure economic analysis “to historical synthesis”); CWL 21 12 (“Yet conditioning all culture and inextricably confused with it, there is the economic factor”); id. (distinguishing between a pure superstructure of cultural activity and the material fabric of the superstructure, and noting that at a later stage of the argument “we shall take into account the juridical concepts of property and exchange. Meanwhile we must be content with the vaguer characterization given; juridical concepts, like all others, have to be developed”). For a different attempt to assess the influence of the economic changes of the nineteenth century on the development of the American common law, see Morton J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Horowitz, The Trans-format-ion of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

33 CWL 6 121.

34 “Bernard Lonergan Responds,” in CWL 20 274. See also CWL 22 614 (“These eight functional specialties can be transposed to any subject in which an investigation of the past is consciously relevant to man’s future action.”)
Both law and legal scholarship seem to fit that bill. Each conspicuously depends on founding documents, legislative enactments, and judicial precedent, and so draws on a cultural and institutional past. And the present operations of each generate and then successively revise legal doctrines, which in turn guide legal, social, economic, and political processes into the future. Courts deciding cases search past legal doctrines for relevant clues about how to implement those doctrines in the present; in the process, they adapt and revise present doctrines and generate future doctrines; and legal scholarship, in turn, is a reflection on that pre-thematic process which draws on the past in order to guide the future development of law. Each in different ways draws on the past to guide the present development of the law, and in the process each anticipates the future effects or configurations of a given area of law, doctrine, statute, or line of cases.

It seems reasonable, then, to contend that functional specialization may be in some sense legitimately extended and applied to all the human sciences, among them law. As Lonergan explicitly notes in Method, “the functional specialties of research, interpretation, and history can be applied to the data of any sphere of scholarly human studies.” But the rest of the functional specialties can be applied to scholarly human studies as well. Because scholars “in historical and empirical human studies” do not always agree, “there is a place for dia-lectic that assembles differences, classifies them, goes to their roots, and pushes them to extremes by developing alleged positions while reversing alleged counter-positions.” Similarly, the specialties of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications would seem to be relevant to the methodical study and

35 Law and legal scholarship do not, of course, proceed in splendid isolation from one another; rather, they would seem to be intertwined in the complex way that church doctrines and theological reflection on those doctrines are intertwined. Method, 314 (noting that church doctrines and theological doctrines are “interacting contexts” in which “the theologians were under the influence of the church doctrines on which they reflected,” while inversely “without the theologians, the church doctrines would not have their post-systematic precision, conciseness, and organization”).
36 Method, 364.
37 Method, 365.
38 Method at 365-66. It is difficult to know with precision how to characterize the eight functional specialties in non-theological contexts, especially the eighth specialty. At the very least, the eighth specialty really is not the kind of thing studied by, say, a communications major. See Method, 132 (“Communications is concerned with theology in its external relations. These are of three kinds. There are interdisciplinary relations with art, language, literature, and other religions, with the natural and the human sciences, with
criticism of both law and legal scholarship.

III. A PRAGMATIC NON-TECHNICAL USE OF FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION IN LEGAL STUDIES

In various writings, Bruce Anderson has advocated for an eight-fold division of labor in legal studies. I want to take up that suggestion here. Because legal doctrines and theological doctrines are, at least in a rough sense, analogous, if not homologous, it would seem that functional specialization can be applied (at least in a non-technical way) to law and legal studies in a way that might yield useful and cumulative results. Might functional specialization be fruitfully applied, for example, to the tasks of constitutional interpretation, at least initially, in a pragmatic and descriptive manner? Lonergan, at least, thought that it could be: "Interpretation as I have been speaking of it would be understanding what the framers of the constitution meant. But the interpretation of a law is an ongoing process in the development of law, and that is interpretation in a different sense. This ongoing process of reinterpretation is more akin to things like the development of dogma than to scriptural exegesis or understanding St. Thomas." At the very least, the Constitution of the United States, which resulted from a constitutional convention, involves not just the meaning of individual authors but of an entire series of contributors. Not all of the authors agreed on the meaning of all of the provisions; the data on what any individual framer meant concerning a given provision are often ambiguous and fragmentary; and the resulting document has the complex intelligibility.


40 File no. 602BCDTE070, at 9 (transcript of the Boston College Method in Theology Institute 1970 [June 21, 1970]).
characteristic of an historical event and so goes beyond the intentions or plans of individual participants.\footnote{41}

Moreover, to the complexity stemming from multiple authors of the Constitution one needs to add the complexity of developing judicial doctrines cumulatively interpreting it. The text resulting from the constitutional convention gave rise to a series of authoritative judicial interpretations of its pro-visions, and these interpretations, as authoritative, create a sequence of constitutitional doctrines which are interpreted in their turn by later courts. Thus, what courts and legal scholars call "the Constitution" — in a kind of metonymic sleight of hand — is really a far larger whole of which the text of the original document is but a part. The Constitution, in this sense, involves texts, authoritative interpretations of the meaning of those texts, a history not only of such interpretations but also of subsequent reinterpretations, and, as well, different and often opposed views on the meaning of the texts and on the historical series of subsequent interpretations or reinterpretations in later cases. In other words, any particular stage of constitutional interpretation both results from prior items in the series, and also influences subsequent items in the series, and this process repeats itself over the history of any given constitutional doctrine, eventually culminating in the present configuration of constitutional law at any given point in time.

The field of constitutional interpretation, then, at least descriptively illustrates a field of studies in which the methodic division of labor offered by functional specialization might be productively applied. Constitutional interpretation involves data (a set of relevant texts and cases), interpretation (determining what any given text or case means), history (constructing what was going forward in the sequence of developing case law concerning the text), and dialectic (a kind of performative gathering and assessing of radical disagreements and differences of horizon concerning the meaning and history of various constitutional doctrines). Constitutional interpretation involves, then, a series of recognizably distinct tasks and a

\footnote{41} "Again, when you have a group of people drawing up a constitution, it is not quite the problem of interpretation; you are moving into history there. Interpretation is concerned with the meaning of this man saying this. When you have a group doing something, well, it is like a battle. ... [W]hat each man who takes part in the battle knows about the battle can be very, very little, and even the history of the battle is not the plan of the general that won or the general that lost, it is some resultant of the two, depending on a lot of accidents. A good account of the battle is an account of what was going forward." 602BCDTE070, at 11; compare Method, 179.
plurality of specialized operations, and these operations, while dis-tinct,\(^{42}\) need to be combined in some at least relatively efficient way if one is to fully understand the meaning, history, and dialectic illustrated by and culminating in particular doctrines.

In addition, constitutional adjudication (that is, the determination of the meaning of a constitutional doctrine or provision in light of a given concrete case or controversy) involves both the past and present configuration of various constitutional doctrines. But it also involves the question of what the doctrine or provision should mean in the future by means of the prospective precedential effect of any given judicial opinion on the developing body of constitutional interpretation and doctrine. It involves not just the meaning of a provision in light of its prior history, but also its subsequent meaning in light of successive interpretations of whatever policy it was (or is) meant to serve.\(^{43}\)

Perhaps, then, the division of tasks and labor offered by functional specialization might assist in the collaborative effort to unravel the tangled skein of accepted and contested constitutional doctrines as well as the seemingly endless interpretative disputes associated with them. Let me attempt to briefly illustrate this non-technical application of the functional specialties with an example from the field of constitutional law, namely, the constitutional doctrine of a “separation of church and state.”

A first distinct set of tasks relates to research, that is, to uncovering and identifying the relevant data on the doctrine. Contrary to popular belief, the phrase is not, of course, included in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Instead, it is an extrapolation from the command in the First Amendment that Congress not make any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” Relevant data include Thomas Jefferson’s use of the phrase “separation of church and state” in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists to characterize the effect of the Establishment Clause as “building a wall of separation

\(^{42}\) As Lonergan notes, “one is not pursuing a specialty, when one attempts to do it and something quite different at the same time.” Method, 232.

\(^{43}\) There is an obvious but important analogy here between the development of constitutional doctrines and the development of theological doctrines. That analogy has been explored by, among others, Jaroslav Pelikan, in Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). At a deeper level, the analogy poses questions concerning the ongoing intertwining of developing theological and church doctrines, on the one hand, and developing scholarly and constitutional doctrines on the other. See Method, 311-314.
between Church & State." Additional data might include the erased or deleted words in Jefferson's draft letter as revealed by state-of-the-art computer enhancement. Other data might include the roughly 3,900 state and federal appellate cases construing or mentioning the phrase "separation of church and state" in the last 150 years or so — the vast majority of them within the last 70 years.

A second distinct set of tasks relates to identifying the meaning of the phrases "establishment of religion" or "separation of church and state" or cognate notions for individual authors and framers around the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Precisely what Jefferson initially meant in his letter is disputed, yet at least some range of meanings he did not intend can be identified by studying his other writings. Yet the task of interpretation is complicated by the fact that Jefferson was writing years after the fact of the constitutional convention, a convention he did not actually attend. But if Jefferson had no direct role in drafting the Establishment Clause, what is the significance of his use of the phrase for constitutional adjudication? It is one thing to discover what Jefferson himself might have meant, but quite another to decide what role his meaning should have in normative interpretations of the Establishment Clause. For that matter, what did Madison, Mason, Morris, or other framers who actually participated in the drafting and adopting of the Constitution have in mind concerning the establishment of religion? As Lonergan suggests,


46 Westlaw search of combined federal and state case law databases, conducted in February 2011.

47 See James Craig, "In God We Trust, Unless We Are a Public Elementary School: Making a Case for Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education," 36 Idaho Law Review (2000), 529-561, at 532 (contending that the 1802 letter was "a simple note of courtesy written fourteen years after Congress passed the Bill of Rights.") But see Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, 6 ("Jefferson's principal motive in writing the Danbury Baptist letter was to mount a political counter-attack against his Federalist enemies.") (quoting James Hutson)

48 Jefferson was the fledgling country's Minister to France at the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1879).

49 See generally The Separation of Church and State: Writings on a Fundamental Freedom
determining the meaning of a provision in a constitution resulting from a constitutional convention composed of a group of framers shifts one from the functional specialty of interpretation (what was meant by X)\textsuperscript{50} to the still more complex functional specialty of history (what was going forward at or over a given period).

A third set of distinct tasks, then, relates not only to ‘the battle’ of the constitutional convention but also to the prior and subsequent contexts of the phrase “separation of church and state,” including the very long prior history of attempts to identify the proper roles and limits of temporal and spiritual authorities. Roger Williams had used the phrase “wall of separation” in a distinct sense many decades before Jefferson,\textsuperscript{51} and the man Locke famously called “the judicious Hooker” had delved into these matters before Williams.\textsuperscript{52} James Burgh’s writings in the 1760s and 1770s supply a more proximate historical context for Jefferson’s use of the “wall” metaphor.\textsuperscript{53} Yet however complex the nested contexts for Jefferson’s utterance in 1802 may be, it is safe to say that whatever was “going forward” at the time Jefferson made his pronouncement to the Danbury Baptists, it was complex and multiform. Further, what began to ‘go forward’ after Jefferson’s remark was eventually published in an edition of his writings in 1853\textsuperscript{54} is even more complex and moves far beyond whatever Jefferson might have meant in 1802. It includes, among many other things, the selective application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,\textsuperscript{55} as

by America’s Founders, ed. Forrest Church (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).


\textsuperscript{51} Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, 5, 38-43.

\textsuperscript{52} Id., 32-38.

\textsuperscript{53} See generally, Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State (New York: New York University Press, 2002), chapter five; see also Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, “The Baptists, the Bureau, and the Case of the Missing Lines,” 56 William and Mary Quarterly (1999), 817-822, at 819.


\textsuperscript{55} “Until the Everson decision [in 1947], the Establishment Clause had never been applied to the states.” Rupal M. Doshi, “Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause:
well as the shifting movements of nativism and separatism so thoroughly
documented by Philip Hamburger.

A fourth distinct set of tasks relates to the differing and opposing
interpretations and evaluations of the utterance by Jefferson together
with its subsequent history, as well as the conflicting interpretations of
its subsequent legal-doctrinal history once his phrase was taken up and
applied by a sequence of appellate cases as a kind of short-hand for the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. Some such conflicts can be resolved
by new data; others will depend on assessing the complex variations in the
religious, moral, and intellectual horizons of judges and legal scholars.

Dialectic as applied to these interpretations and histories would
assemble all the relevant materials, complete, compare, reduce, and classify
them, and select “the affinities and oppositions grounded in dialectically
opposed horizons.”56 Those scholars working within the functional
specialty dialectic would then reduplicate that process not with only with
respect to the assembled and sifted materials but also with respect to the
formulated results of their own attempts to work out which interpretations
and histories embody positions and counter-positions and to what extent.57

The almost hopeless tangle of differing and opposed interpretations and
histories concerning the Establishment Clause provides more than enough
grist for the mill of dialectic. For that matter, not only the interpretations and
histories, but also the legal doctrine itself, at least in its modern dress, are
rife with conflicting interpretations, even within modern Supreme Court
case law on the subject. “The ten words that make up what is known as the
‘Establishment Clause’ of the First Amendment have led to the application
of no fewer than ten — often contradictory — standards. The results are no
more consistent than the tests.”58 Without some sort of critical techniques by
which to reduce the disputed questions to some set of intelligible roots —
envisioned by Lonergan as the operations of dialectic specified on page 250
of Method — one might reasonably expect the tangled mess of constitutional
doctrine on the Establishment Clause to continue indefinitely pretty much

Satisfying the Demands of Equality, Pluralism, and Originalism,” 98 Georgetown Law

56 Method, 250.
57 Method, 250.
58 Rupal M. Doshi, “Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause,” 98 Georgetown
in the manner of its medieval theological predecessors.

The conflicting interpretations, histories, and doctrines conspicuously give rise to questions about foundations (or, if one prefers, anti-foundations). On what bases, if any, are these conflicts to be resolved? What kind of foundational reality or horizon would need to be thematized within and by legal scholars in order to answer that question? However one proposes to answer the question of foundations, the question itself refuses to go quietly away. To take one telling example, Justice Hugo Black inaugurated the modern era of separation of church and state jurisprudence by authoring a 1947 case, *Everson v. Board of Education*, which cemented Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor into the edifice of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

Yet Justice Black had joined the Ku Klux Klan as a young lawyer and was a Mason as a sitting justice. Why Justice Black’s opinions on the separation of church and state should be any more relevant or authoritative than his youthful opinions on the separation of the races raises the question of adequate or normative foundations. Does the modern version of the

59 Mr. Justice and Mrs. Black: The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black and Elizabeth Black (New York: Random House, 1986), 69-71. See also *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). I am not necessarily suggesting that *Everson* was wrongly decided; the Supreme Court actually upheld the statute in question. I am only suggesting that the grounds on which it was decided seem to have been a mixture of the cachet of Jefferson as a figure in the American founding, the conscious or unconscious power of the metaphor of “the wall,” and the conclusions drawn from the history lesson sketched by the majority opinion, *Everson*, 330 U.S. at 9-14. See also the long competing and contrasting history lesson in Justice Rutledge’s dissent. *Everson*, 330 U.S. at 28-73. As to the power of the metaphor, the opinion’s last few sentences read: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” 330 U.S. at 18. But suppose one conceives the relation between church and state more as an osmotic membrane than a brick wall, high and impregnable? Or suppose one recognizes the need for a third term, culture, which mediates between the terms church and state? Or suppose one conceives of the dialectic of sacralization and secularization in a manner other than as a long march of progress from the dark days when religious superstition ran rampant in the public square to the present day when an enlightened secularism is leading us into the broad and sunny uplands of public reason? However that may be, “an impregnable wall” does not leave much room for nuance, as the subsequent vagaries of the *Lemon v. Kurtzman* line of cases reveals; but that is another story, or history.

60 So far as one can tell from his memoirs, Justice Black was an honest and honorable man, and his majority opinion makes no expressly anti-Catholic argument. My comment in the text above simply raises in a pointed way the fact that judges and legal scholars spontaneously and performatively assent to some notion of normative objectivity, and they spontaneously and performatively shudder at (at least some versions of) pure positivism or judicial fiat. Even those who do not so shudder spontaneously manifest the normative
doctrine have any better basis than the cachet of a metaphor or phrase tossed off by Jefferson in a private letter, combined with regular doses of the anti-Catholic separatism documented by Philip Hamburger as an historical movement throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? If so, what is that basis? What sort of categories might be relevant and needed here? Perhaps we are here ultimately faced with the complexity of the fact that, in Voegelin's words, "the validity of the law has its origin in extralegal sources." But in any event, we are confronted with the fact that the question of the grounds or foundations for constitutional norms or doctrines must be faced in some way and at some level — even if one ultimately concludes with postmodernist scholars that no rationally arbitrable grounds exist. Can the question be raised and faced in a way that eventually yields cumulative and progressive rather than scattered and haphazard results?

On a more general level, that question looms large over the whole range of contemporary efforts to define, discern, develop, or defend foundations for constitutional doctrines and for the judicial interpretation of those doctrines. The literature is large and growing, but contemporary efforts commitments implicit in positivism.

61 See generally Hamburger, Separation of Church and State; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000)(discussing the history of the so-called Blaine Amendment). Constitutional doctrines on the separation of church and state, of course, have roots in the complex and variable history of human conceptions of an appropriate relation between temporal and religious authority. But how does one move from "a first class history" of that mess to concrete, nuanced, intelligent, reasonable, and valuable policies regarding the relation between church and state in a modern pluralist society? How are those doctrines or policies to be related to the existential history that is a nation's constitutional tradition? Without attempting to systematically address those very large and pressing questions, at least one may say that the transition from past history to future doctrine or policy would seem to need to be mediated by, among other things, an adequate theoretic of the dialectic of authority and the dialectic of sacralization and secularization. See Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," A Third Collection, ed. Frederick Crowe (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 5-12; "Sacrality and Secularization," CWL 17 259-281. On this "second use of dialectic," see Method, 365.


seem mainly to illustrate the fact that commonsense procedures alone, however sophisticated, are inadequate to the task — even when combined with a tincture of theory and a dose of post-systematic consciousness stemming from history or hermeneutics or pragmatism. How is a vast body of historical work to be integrated into the search for constitutional foundations?\(^{64}\) How are the many and disparate attempts at integration to be sifted and criticized in a way that manages to avoid simply adding to an unmanageable pluralism of ever-shifting opinions?

Moreover, in this context the question of doctrines and systematics (or policy and planning), becomes quite complex. The functional specialty doctrines draws on the specialty foundations as a basis for deciding between the alternatives discerned by the specialty dialectic.\(^{65}\) Which precise policies or doctrines are to be affirmed, and why? The contemporary doctrine or policy of separation of church and state has a history, and it is really a series of doctrines or policies emerging within an ongoing context. Any given slice of the ongoing context is a sigma of the prior stages in the process, and each slice in the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence means something different because it is responding to different prior cases and historically different sets of questions and answers. Given dialectically sorted and sifted histories of the policies and legal doctrines regarding the relations of church and state in United States history, what judgments of fact and value would constitutional doctrines on church-state relations objectify or express? Of these, which should be denied and which should be affirmed? What kind of “appropriate system of conceptualization”\(^{66}\) might emerge?

---

a conspicuous instance of the way in which contemporary con-stitutional studies are haunted by the problem of foundations. He abandoned the project of the third edition of that treatise after completing the first volume because, he said, “we find ourselves at a juncture where profound fault lines have become evident at the very foundations of the enterprise, going to issues as fundamental as whose truths are going to count and, sadly, whose truths must be denied. And the reality is that I do not have, nor do I believe I have seen, a vision capacious and convincing enough to propound as an organizing principle for the next phase in the law of our Constitution.” Laurence Tribe, “The Treatise Power,” 8 The Green Bag 2nd Series (2005), 291-306, at 295.


\(^{65}\) Method, 349.

\(^{66}\) Method, 132.
The same basic questions can be raised with respect to other areas of perennial disputed questions within American constitutional law including, for example, the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, the separation of powers, and a long list of others. All give rise to nests of differing and opposed interpretations, all have complex and contested histories, all stand in need of the application of critical-dialectical techniques, all involve questions of foundations, all spawn developing doctrines, and all cry out for more advanced systems of conceptualization — in short, all might be assisted by the method Lonergan names functional specialization.

One can see that, even in a pragmatic and non-technical use of functional specialization, interpreting constitutional law in light of the past and with a view towards the future becomes far more complex than merely identifying relevant past precedent and simply deducing a presently applicable conclusion. One might say, then, that although it once ruled the legal roost, naïve proof-texting is as out-of-date in legal interpretation and scholarship as it is in theological scholarship. There really is a complex historicity to constitutional doctrines; the polymorphism of human consciousness really is involved in the way we understand, interpret, and implement them; and we really do need some way of sorting through the mess in a manner that will yield cumulative and progressive results.

IV. SOME FURTHER RELEVANT QUESTIONS

I have been sketching a kind of descriptive use of the functional specialties applied to one area of the law. But that initial descriptive use, while pragmatically helpful, really is in some sense inadequate. It merely shows that some sort of division of the work makes prima facie sense. Laurence Tribe can be a master of American constitutional doctrines, but he cannot simultaneously master all the historiography relevant to those doctrines, and still less can he master the maelstrom of philosophical issues concerning

---

the foundations of constitutional law.⁶⁸ Some way of dividing the labor so as to allow methodical collaboration between different specialists and specialties makes elementary sense.

Still, establishing the descriptive plausibility of some sort of method of functional specialization or functional collaboration in the field of law is one thing; saying precisely how such a method would work is quite another. And without those further and more difficult steps, contemporary legal scholarship will continue to languish "in some no man’s land between the world of theory and the world of common sense."⁶⁹ How can the entrenched decadence and truncation of much of legal thinking be methodically addressed? How can law be lifted into an adequate interdisciplinary and critical context? What of Lonergan’s aspiration for an integral heuristic of human inquiry?

Any serious answer to these questions would depend on a much more elaborate and technical analysis of the functional specialties themselves, their internal relations and interdependencies, and the manners in which they hand forward the results of prior specialties. For example, it would require taking dialectic seriously, not just as an inventory of differences, but as a precise, complex, and communally shared procedure which cyclically and cumulatively "brings to light oppositions in appreciative and evaluative interpretation and history, in the history of movements, in determining the meaning of texts," and in the performance of special research.⁷⁰ It would require taking foundations seriously, not just as vaguely involving intellectual, moral, or religious conversion, but as involving complex objectifications of the normative dynamics of human consciousness and its differentiations. And any resulting doctrines might seem quite odd to the contemporary legal academy, for they would stand within the horizon of increasingly explicit foundations and would receive "their precise definition from dialectic, their positive wealth of clarification and development from history, their grounds in the interpretation of the data proper to" legal studies.⁷¹ Such a development would be a step beyond the present horizon of contemporary legal scholarship — indeed, it would

⁶⁸ See above, n. 63.
⁶⁹ CWL 6 121.
⁷¹ Method, 132.
be a step up to a different stage or plateau of meaning entirely. But my suggestion is that it is worthwhile at least to begin to envision it.

**CONCLUSION**

The initial application of functional specialization to any of the human sciences or human studies is bound to be a complicated, tangled, and incomplete affair, as I trust my somewhat rushed example of constitutional interpretation or adjudication illustrates. I am afraid that at present, with respect to such matters, we are like "the Greek who heard of Icarus and wished to build an aeroplane that was no myth." Still, the tangled state of present legal studies is so unmanageable that almost any methodic ordering would be an improvement. And in spite of the awkward and unsatisfactory nature of any initial attempt, it is worth attempting the task of beginning to think out functional specialization in disciplines other than theology, even if initially we can only do so badly, as Chesterton might say. Perhaps after a sufficiently long series of faltering attempts, the "law of effect" might begin to take effect. For in the long run, I believe, when the method of functional specialization is brought to bear on human sciences or human studies such as law, they will eventually "develop through functioning to have a poise, an economy, an effectiveness," that will unleash "the as yet undifferentiated potentialities" of a methodical division of labor in legal and other studies.

---

73 Lonergan, "A Theory of History," unpublished ms. circa 1936, at 3. Note that Icarus is not a particularly encouraging illustration of Chesterton's dictum that "if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly."
74 See CWL 3 495-96; see also *Method*, 138.
LONERGAN’S RECEPTION AMONG ECONOMISTS:
TALE OF A DEAD FISH AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE WORK

Paul Oslington
Australian Catholic University

A great deal has been written on Lonergan’s economics, mostly by philosophers and theologians associated with him, but it has not attracted much attention from economists. The bifurcated reception is interesting to investigate, both for insights into the nature of Lonergan’s economics, and the nature of mainstream professional economics over the period since Lonergan wrote.

The next section of the paper reviews the production of Lonergan’s economics, from his reading in the 1930s to the manuscripts of the early 1940s, through to his renewed interest in the 1970s. I then turn to the reception among economists, and examine various explanations that are offered for the lack of interest. We are not in my view yet compelled to the residual explanation of the lack of interest – that it is not very good economics – and the final section of the paper sets out an agenda for engagement with professional economists.


© 2011 Paul Oslington
As is well known among Lonergan scholars, he produced two economic manuscripts, "For a New Political Economy" written around 1942, now published in volume 21 of the Collected Works, and "An Essay on Circulation Analysis," written 1944, now published with subsequent changes and additions in the volume 15 of the Collected Works.

It is worth reviewing the history of the production these manuscripts as it is relevant to their reception by economists. Frederick Lawrence's introduction to volume 21 provides a great deal of background information, and the other main sources of information are Lonergan's own reflections, William Matthews' account of Lonergan's intellectual development, archival material including letters and reading notes, and Lonergan's personal library held by the Lonergan Research Centre at Regis College in Toronto.

Lonergan was not formally trained in economics, though unusually for a theologian he had the training and aptitude in mathematics necessary to read professional economics literature. He studied mathematics, languages and philosophy from 1926-30 at Heythrop College, where he was exposed to Catholic social thought through one his teachers, Lewis Watt. Lonergan's interest in economics in the 1930s grew through observing the suffering of the Great Depression, his concern about the consequences for democracy of economic collapse, a sense of the inadequacy of existing Catholic writing on economic matters, and possible connections of economics with the historical

---

2 Collected Works refers here and elsewhere to the partially completed 25 volume University of Toronto Press edition under the editorship of Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran. The date of the "For a New Political Economy" manuscript is discussed by Frederick Crowe in an appendix to Volume 21 of the Collected Works. Incidentally McShane's suggestion on pxxiv of his introduction to the volume that it was Lonergan's intended primer on economics seems inconsistent with Lonergan's 12 June 1982 letter to Jane Collier, as Lonergan states he is working on a primer, and the only economics manuscript he seems to have been working on is published in volume 15.


5 I appreciate the assistance of Danny Monsour in tracking down materials in the archives when I visited Toronto in November 2009.
schemes he was toying with in an early essay, *Panton Anakephalaiosis*. It is not the purpose of this paper to assess the proposed explanations of Lonergan’s interest in economics. The relevant point is that he came to economics through reading that was dis-connected from professional mainstream economists.

The next stage of the story is somewhat murky. Having produced the manuscripts, Lonergan had to work out what to do with them. Lacking professional connections with economists it seems he charged others with seeking feedback on the manuscripts. Fred Lawrence’s introduction in the *Collected Works* states that Lonergan “spoke of passing the fruits of his labours on to experts in the field and getting little, if any, reaction or encouragement.” Lonergan himself in correspondence with Jane Collier wrote, “Friends had my typescript read by economists in Toronto, Montréal, Boston, and St. Louis. The opinions convinced me that the time is not yet ripe, and so my essay remained in my files until I came across Kalecki.”

This is consistent with Lonergan’s remarks in an interview around the same time, reproduced below, which I’ve drawn on for the title of the paper:

---


7 This reading however was prodigious with detailed notes from the 1930’s and early 40’s in the archives on Heinrich Pesch, *Lehrbuch Der Nationalökonomie: Teaching Guide to Economics*, Lionel Robbins’ *Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, 1932; Frank Knight, *Risk Uncertainty and Profit*, 1921; Schumpeter, *Theory of Economic Development*, 1991/tr1934, and *Business Cycles*, 1939; Hayek’s *Money and the Trade Cycle* 1933; Roos, *Dynamic Economics*, 1934; among others. Although there are no notes in the archives on Keynes *General Theory*, 1936, the discussion in the 1942 manuscripts suggests Lonergan was familiar with it. Lonergan has picked out most of the important works of economic theory relevant to his project, with a bias towards authors with classical liberal views. Kalecki’s work in macrodynamics was available in English by the end of the 1930s but was not well known – partly as a result of Keynes influence as editor of the *Economistic Journal*. An intriguing question is whether Lonergan had read Schumpeter’s *Capitalism and Socialism and Democracy* in 1942 before composing the manuscripts, because Schumpeter’s pessimistic assessment of prospects for capitalism, and prophesied bureaucratic suffocation of the entrepreneur connects with Lonergan’s views. Some of Schumpeter’s ideas were signalled in previous publications such as “The Instability of Capitalism,” *Economic Journal*, 1928. Another intriguing question is the connection between Lonergan’s work and Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom*, published in 1944, with its similar critique of the totalitarian nature of economic planning.

8 CWL 15 xl.

9 This is the 12 June 1982 letter from Lonergan to Jane Collier referred to in an earlier footnote.
Interviewer: Why did you leave your paper aside and unpublished?
Lonergan: Economist didn’t make head or tail of it. I didn’t want to publish a dead fish, eh?
Interviewer: You consulted economists?
Lonergan: Yes, I had consulted a fellow who was in charge of the Tax Foundation in Canada ... He was in contact with a professor at McGill about the manuscript. Also in Boston, through Joe Flanagan, and St. Louis, it was shown to economists, you see.”
Interviewer: This was later on?
Lonergan: No, at the time. I got no encouragement from anyone I showed it to in 1944.

......

Interviewer: What were the objections of people who saw your manuscript?
Lonergan: They didn’t know what it was all about.
Interviewer: They weren’t familiar with Kondratieff?
Lonergan: Oh yes, they knew Kondratieff.
Interviewer: Was there something peculiar about your model?
Lonergan: Well yes. They had never seen anything like it. No one has that.”

It seems from the remarks that it was the 1944 manuscript which was shown to others. The identities of the “friends” who were charged with obtaining feed-back, and the economist or economists who read the manuscript are not given. Who are the likely candidates?

One candidate is his former student and friend Eric Kierans. Frederick Crowe states that “Kierans, previously a student of Lonergan in Loyola College Montreal from 1931-33, was in close touch with Lonergan after Kierans moved back to Montreal in 1945. It was at this time that Lonergan gave Kierans the “For a New Political Economy” manuscript which was lost for many years before turning up in 1986. Crowe also notes “the contact Kierans mediated for Lonergan with McGill professors and other economists” in the period from 1948 that Kierans was at McGill in Montreal. Candidates for the McGill economists include Jack Weldon, Bertram Kierstad and Earl

11 CWL 21 319-20.
Beech. Contacts in Boston and St Louis are obscure.

Kierans himself was not overly impressed with Lonergan's contribution. Some have dismissed Kierans' opinion as reflecting his own limitations as an economist, or unwillingness to fully engage with Lonergan's model, or just failing to see the light. These sorts of defence mechanisms against adverse opinions of Lonergan's economics are unfortunately common in the existing literature.

Lonergan's energies, after the shelving of the economics manuscripts in the late 1940s, switched to philosophy and theology, leading to the publication of his masterpiece Insight in 1957.

The next stage in the production of Lonergan's economics was his renewal of his interest as Method in Theology approached publication, eventually appearing in 1972. Again a variety of reasons have been offered for Lonergan's interest at this time in economics. It seems Lonergan had much the same reaction to the economics of J. B. Metz and some of the liberation theologians in the late 1960s and early 1970s as he had to economics on which Catholic theologians of the 1930s relied. In a natural law framework, it is of course important to get the economics right if the moral theology on which it is based is to be right. Another factor was the ferment in the economics profession in the early 1970s, partly because of the rise of heterodox traditions such as Post-Keynesianism and partly because of the inability of mainstream models to explain and offer helpful policy advice during the period of stagflation which followed the OPEC oil crises. Lonergan saw connections between what he was doing and the work of the post-Keynesians, and particularly the work of the Polish economist Michael Kalecki who was becoming better known. Lonergan perhaps saw

12 Kierstad and Beech are named as Lonergan's McGill contacts in the early 1950s, in a letter from Eric Kierans to Eileen De Neeve 23 May 1989. Eileen De Neeve suggested Jack Weldon as a possibility in recent correspondence about the issue. I arranged a search of the Kierans papers held by the National Archives in Ottawa, but this shed no further light on the matter. I'm grateful for the generous correspondence of Eileen De Neeve and Ken Melchin in Montreal, Doug Macoullier in St. Louis and Fred Lawrence in Boston as I have sought information on Lonergan's economics contacts.

13 Lonergan sent Philip McShane a postcard in 1968 along these lines, discussed in Fred Lawrence's introduction to CWL 15 xl.

14 Among the Post-Keynesians, he seems to have been attracted to Joan Robinson's work (temperamentally an outsider like Lonergan) and the essays in Alfred Eichner's A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics. Above all though Kalecki's Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970, published in 1971, which made available his macrodynamic modelling from 1933-1970. At this time he also read voraciously in history
an opportunity for vindication of his earlier explorations in economics. Perhaps his own work would now be appreciated, like Kalecki’s after a lag of several decades.

The move to Boston College in 1975 offered the opportunity to read further in economics and rework his 1944 “Essay in Circulation Analysis” manuscript. From 1978 he taught a Boston College seminar, “Macroeconomics and the Dia-lectic of History,” to a small but admiring group. The teaching and reworking of his manuscript continued until poor health intervened in 1983. The 1942 manuscript, “For A New Political Economy,” was forgotten. A 1975 lecture, “Healing in Creating in History,” set as reading for the Boston College seminar, seems to have taken its place as the contextualizing essay around the terse analysis of the “Essay in Circulation Analysis.” My interpretation is that the 1942 manuscript was an early exploration of the economics, but became redundant as Lonergan narrowed his focus to the analytical questions. The 1942 manuscript was part of the path rather than being the conclusion of his economic investigations, though it is easy to see why theologians and philosophers have been attracted to it more than to the “Essay on Circulation Analysis.”

Reception

It is the reception of Lonergan’s economics among economists, rather than philosophers and theologians, which is the topic of this paper. In sharp contrast to the admiration of the “Essay in Circulation Analysis” among the small group around Lonergan who knew it, many of whom were involved in the Boston seminar, the few mainstream professional economists who have encountered it have found it eccentric and not worth the trouble of pursuing. Few have been able to be induced even to read the manuscript. For instance, puzzlement was the reaction of the two economists Francis McLaughlin and Harold Peterson from Boston College who attended a workshop connected with the publication of volume 15 of the Collected economic thought, including Schum-peter’s History Economic Analysis. posthumously published in 1954, and the early issues of the new specialist journal, History of Political Economy. On the advice of Eric Kierans he had also been reading back issues of the Economic Journal. At this time expectations were a hot topic among economists, and Lonergan found Robert Gordon’s Macroeconomics which provided the first textbook level treatment of the new theory of rational expectations.
Works. Their reactions were similar to Eric Kierans’ reaction mentioned earlier.

The best indication of the interest of professional economists in a work is the treatment in standard reference works, professional journal articles written about the work, and citations. Perhaps the most widely used multivolume reference work is The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, first published in 1987 and edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman. The editors managed to attract the top names in the field to contribute essays on economists and a very wide selection of topics in economics. If criticised, it was mainly for giving too much space to heterodox economists, especially the Post-Keynesians, who were then very much in decline after the peak of their movement in the late 1970s. There is no entry on Lonergan and an extensive search of likely topical entries reveals no trace of Lonergan’s work. A new and expanded edition was prepared in 2008 by S. Durlaf and L. Blume, and the electronic version is searchable. A fulltext search of the new edition for Lonergan revealed zero hits. The Journal of Economic Literature published by the American Economic Association abstracts and indexes an extremely inclusive list of economics journals as well as books likely to be of interest to economists. Again there is no trace of any impact of Lonergan’s work on professional economists.

Turning to citations, I have been unable to find a citation of Lonergan’s work in a journal or book which would be regarded by economists as part of the professional mainstream literature.

Thus the contrast is stark between the reception among a small group of philosophers and theologians, and the reception among economists.

Why?

I would now like to explore reasons for this bifurcated reception. There are some similarities with the reception of Lonergan’s work in philosophy and theology (a small group is deeply appreciative, though disappointed with the mainstream interaction with and impact of Lonergan’s work), but the economic work is my concern here.

I will deal with possible reasons in turn:

1) Circumstances of Production. Lonergan’s isolation from mainstream professional economists has already been discussed. Temperamentally
and by virtue of his circumstances teaching for most of his life in Catholic theological institutions, he had to rely on others for dissemination of his work. Among his close associates none could be regarded as a professional economist, except perhaps Eric Kierans, and he was increasingly absorbed in politics.

In my view, while these circumstances were unhelpful, similar circumstances have not stopped other work being recognised after a lag. Kalecki is the obvious example. Another is Von Thunen’s spatial equilibrium analysis.

2) Delayed Publication. As has been discussed, the economic manuscripts were not published until the late 1990s, though Lonergan’s position and teaching at Boston College meant that knowledge of the existence of the manuscript was reasonably widespread from the 1970s. Access to copies of the manuscript was not restricted in any way.

It has now been over 10 years since the publication of the relevant volumes of the Collected Works, and so this explanation for the bifurcated reception is starting to wear thin. Improved communications, especially the Internet, have made Lonergan’s work quickly and easily accessible to anyone interested. Many Lonergan websites around the world make texts available for downloading. Citation half-lives of works of economics are short, and even if we make the assumption that the work was unknown before publication, there is no modern precedent for a work which has not been cited for this length of time attracting interest.

3) Form of the Work. The “Essay in Circulation Analysis” is not an easy work to come to grips with. Philosophers and theologians have generally assumed the difficulty is that it is a technical work of economics, and they are not economists. Those with a background in economics, however, don’t find it easy either. In fact, just the opposite. The terminology is unfamiliar, the notation is unusual and not always consistent, nowhere is there a clear system of equations represented in the model, nor do predictions or policy advice flow from the model. There are few clues in the text about how the model fits into the literature of economics. It is quickly clear to an economist reader that a substantial investment of time is needed to translate the “Essay” into a digestible form.

Economists are professionally trained to ask whether the expected benefits justify such investments. It is difficult for the economist to form
expectations of the likely benefits, but the information that other economists have not found the investment worthwhile, that theologians mostly write complete rubbish eco-nomics, as well as the markers of heterodoxy in much of the secondary literature on Lonergan’s economics, do not encourage fulsome expectations of benefits for the typical economist reader. In some ways, philosophers and theo-logians have an easier time with the work than those trained in contemporary economics.

The form of the work is a barrier, but it is not in my view the fundamental reason for the bifurcated reception.

4) Response That the Work Calls For. As has been observed of Lonergan’s other work, it has an almost therapeutic quality and calls for some sort of conversion from the reader.

This suggests another plausible candidate explanation for bifurcated reception. The response the work calls for makes the expected benefit function not smooth, but discontinuous. This means that investments of time up to the point of conversion yield modest benefits, but beyond a critical point – the point of discontinuity in the benefit function – the benefits investment becomes larger and increasing as investment increases. If the population of readers is hetero-geneous, then some readers would be expected to make a zero investment in the work, while others would make very large investments. Although the prediction from the model is consistent with observation, it is hard to say though whether this is really what is going on with the reception of Lonergan’s economics.

5) Fashions in Economics. Lonergan’s own explanation for the lack of interest in his work seems to have been that the time is not right for it to be received.15 There are several things he could mean by this. Perhaps he means that price theory dominates contemporary economics, whereas he is offering an analysis of aggregate flows. Perhaps he means that economics must become properly dynamic – “cross the Rubicon” – before his contribution can be fully appreciated. Another possibility is that the intensification of the economic cycle in the future will refocus the attention of economists on models of the cycle.

None of those variants of Lonergan’s explanation are terribly convincing. In the 1940s price theory was not dominant, and other economists were

15 Lonergan’s explanation that the time is not ripe appears in the letter to Jane Collier cited earlier, as well as in the Caring about Meaning interview.
engaged in the sort of aggregate analysis of the essay, and there was intense interest in the economic cycle. This variant is perhaps more plausible for the late 1960s. Commentators on Lonergan’s economics have liked the second variant that economists cannot appreciate his work because it is not yet properly dynamic. The problem with this, though, is that even when Lonergan wrote in the 1940s others were offering similar dynamic economic models, and by the time he returned to economics in the 1970s dynamic economics had advanced well beyond what Lonergan was doing. If there is anything in this explanation, I suspect it is to do with Lonergan’s account of expectations within his dynamic economics. The problem with the third variant is that the economic cycle is if anything becoming less prominent, and the monetary authorities (at least in developed countries) are becoming more adept at managing the cycle. The crisis of 2008 was not a cyclical phenomenon, but an institutional failure.

6) The Work Is Not Very Good Economics. This must be the default position if the other explanations do not succeed.

AGENDA

I do not believe that we yet are forced to the default position, although this appears to be where the few professional economist readers of his work have ended up. To engage economists I believe something like the following is necessary:

A) Contextualize Lonergan’s economics, both within 1940s macroeconomics and contemporary economics. This means careful consideration of the influences on his work and connections with other similar work. The section of Fred Law-rence’s introduction to volume 15 of the Collected Works on “Lonergan’s Interlocutors’ (p. xliii), and parts of Matthews’ Lonergan’s Quest are a good start, but much more is needed. To do this properly, expertise in the history of economics for the relevant periods is required. If done well, contextualization would provide pathways into Lonergan’s economics for both historians of economics and contemporary economic theorists.

B) Translate the text of the “Essay in Circulation Analysis” into a clear and compact system of differential equations. This would dramatically lower the investment required by economists to consider Lonergan’s model,
and provide some assurance about its coherence.

C) Tone down the rhetoric of the special character of Lonergan’s economics and the sense that one needs some sort of secret knowledge passed from master to disciples to truly grasp Lonergan’s economics. This is offputting to economists and looks suspiciously like an entry deterring strategy commonly employed by monopolists. It is a strategy that would attract the attention of the antitrust authorities in another context.

The project that Neil Ormerod and I are coordinating at Australian Catholic University, “Transdisciplinary Vision of Bernard Lonergan: Theology, Economics and Finance,” is concentrating on A) and B). A number of professional macro-economists are involved in our group, and there is the specialist expertise in the history of economics required to make progress on contextualization. One of the components of the project for which we have funding is mathematizing the “Essay in Circulation Analysis” and carrying out the mathematical consistency checks on the model which are then possible. We hope this will clarify the nature and properties of Lonergan’s core model. I find it incredible that this has not already been undertaken.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the verdict that eventually emerges on the value of Lonergan’s economics, it is impossible to avoid admiring his achievement. I admire the depth of understanding he reached of state-of-the-art economics in the 1940s, an understanding which is reflected in a model that seems to compare well with contributions of professional economists of this period.

Finally, we must be careful with the criteria we use to evaluate his economics. This is not just the historiographical point about contextual vs. retrospective evaluation. As Lonergan explains, his aim is an understanding of the economic process, not prediction and policy control, and so it is fair to evaluate his models according to whether they facilitate this understanding.

GROARKE, ARISTOTLE, AND INDUCTION

Hugo Meynell
University of Calgary

LOUIS GROARKE'S BOOK, An Aristotelian Account of Induction, is a remarkable contribution to philosophy. I myself see in the postmodernist flight from reason a real threat to our Western civilization, as he does.¹ And I think that my diagnosis of our ills, and proposed cure for them, would be quite close to his. I do appreciate the seriousness with which Groarke takes Lonergan's work; I regard as an abomination the deafening silence with which the philosophical establishment as a whole has reacted to him. On the other hand, he describes Lonergan's thought as 'unwittingly' leading, like Descartes', to an "eliminative rationalism" and so ultimately to scepticism.² I believe this to be profoundly wrong, as I shall endeavor to show in what follows. The three elements of experience, understanding and judgment are constitutive of knowledge, for Lonergan; not of insight.³ Groarke is right, however, to associate 'insight', which Lonergan describes as "the act of understanding," with the "Aha Erlebnis";⁴ though Lonergan writes also of the "reflective insight" which he associates rather with judgment. In writings subsequent to Insight, Lonergan usefully distinguishes four "transcendental precepts" involved in all apprehension of what is true and performance of what is good: "Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible."

² Groarke, Account, 20.
³ Groarke, Account, 318.
⁴ Groarke, Account, 317.

© 2011 Hugo Meynell
Attentiveness is to experience (including experience of our own intelligent, reasonable and responsible mental operations). Intelligence is a matter of thinking out possibilities and hypotheses; reasonableness of determining which of these hypotheses is certainly or probably so. Types of question are associated with intelligence and reason. I cannot ask, except perhaps facetiously, "Why is this white mouse in my desk?", or "What accounts for that streak in this bubble-chamber photograph?" But I can properly answer 'Yes' or 'No' to the questions, "Is it a Carolina chickadee?", "Did young Deirdre want to entertain the class by driving me into a passion?", or "Is it the passage of an omega-minus particle?"

I believe that it is an index of Lonergan's greatness as a philosopher that he has solved "the problem of induction." How? To put the matter in my way rather than Lonergan's, at the basis of his theory of knowledge are some cardinal propositions (as I should like to label them), which are to be detected by the self-destructiveness of their contradictories. ('Self-destructive' is not quite the same as 'self-contradictory', which is one reason why these propositions are so largely overlooked. It is also worth noting that the contradictories of self-destructive propositions have a kind of a priori necessity about them which is not quite the same as the necessity of analytic propositions.) Examples are, "I never make a true judgment," or "I never make a judgment for good reason." Who utters the propositions in question is crucial, which does not apply to self-contradictions; thus Groarke can properly say, "Meynell never makes a true judgment," or "Meynell never makes a judgment for good reason," in a way that Meynell cannot on pain of self-disqualification from rational discourse. (Lonergan is one of the very few philosophers of whom I have heard who have noticed that positive leeway is to be got out of the famous "liar paradox," and out of the notorious self-refutation involved in the "verification principle" of logical positivism.)

The next point to note is that reality, or the actual world, is nothing other than what true judgments are about, and judgments for good reason, or well-founded judgments, tend to be or head towards being about. Finally, for one's judgments to be well-founded is nothing other than for them to be due to attentiveness to experience, intelligence in working out a sufficient range of possibilities, and reasonableness in each case in preferring as certainly
or probably so the judgment which best fits the evidence to which one has attended. To travesty Keats, that is all we know in epistemology, and all we need to know. A reasonable judgment is one that accounts for the relevant evidence, rather than gratifying one’s self-esteem, soothing one’s fears, or suiting one’s paymasters – think of a scientist whose livelihood depends on the tobacco industry, or of oil companies wrecking the environment in northern Alberta for the short-term gain of themselves and their investors.

An unreasonable judgment can be true, and a reasonable judgment may fail to be so; but at least, as I have said, a reasonable judgment heads towards truth. An expert team of detectives working conscientiously on the question may still identify the wrong person as the murderer; while Grandpa scrutinizing his tea-leaves may correctly identify the culprit. But one could only tell that Grandpa was right, and the detectives wrong, by further exercise of attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness.\(^5\)

What amounts to the same point about self-destructiveness was taken by Aristotle when he said that someone who did not accept the principle of non-contradiction was no better than a vegetable; and by Aquinas when he inferred from Averroes’ position, that individual human beings did not think (since the *intellectus agens* is transcendent and numerically one). In dealing with the individual Averroist, you infer that since that man does not think, as follows from his own principles, there is no point in arguing with him.

With this recognition of the role of active intelligence in coming to know the truth about the world, the point of philosophical idealism is acknowledged, but its teeth are drawn; the proper creativity of the human subject is recognized, but is in no danger of usurping the role of the creative intelligence that is God (as it does in the work of Hegel or William Blake). The laws of Kepler, Darwin and Einstein obtained in the world before these great human beings ever came to formulate them. Kant in effect denies this; for him, we impose intelligibility on the world, rather than finding it there. This subjectivizes science; and furthermore makes nonsense of statements about other minds or the past; which, when liable to be true, use creative

---

5 If Grandpa scored several successes of this kind, one might have good inductive grounds for taking him rather seriously. I have read an account, which for better or worse impressed me, of a ‘clairvoyant’ who is supposed often to have been helpful to the police in their investigations of crimes. See Robert V. Cox and Kenneth L. Peiffer, *Missing Person* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1979).
intelligence corrected by reason just as much as do the natural sciences. Reality was intelligible before we came to understand its intelligibility through these sciences. Kant was driven to his subjectivism, it should be noted – what he called being awakened from his dogmatic slumbers – due to the aporiae raised by Hume about induction. (But as Bertrand Russell acidly remarked, he soon invented a soporific which enabled him to sleep again.6)

Insight, or the grasp of a possibility, is a free creative act. Idealism emphasizes the creative role of intelligence, but neglects what is taken for granted by common sense and by the vast majority of scientists – that the world exists and is largely as it is prior to and independently of such human acts of intelligence. Water was a chemical compound of hydrogen and oxygen before Lavoisier, and there was a planet Neptune, with mass, chemical composition and orbital motions round the sun as they are now known to be, before the eighteen-forties. A proper emphasis on reflection and judgment, and so on the right kind of objectivity, gives us back reality, but also leads to a conception and affirmation of God.7 If we are not responsible for the intelligibility of the world, as Kant claimed, then what or who is?

How does all this bear on the problem of induction? Let us distinguish first between what might be called “simple induction” and what I shall label “general induction.” “Simple induction” is that by which one infers from the observation of ninety-nine black ravens, and the observation of no raven that is not black, to the general proposition that all ravens are black. Under the rubric “general induction” I would include all those cases where a theory, as is typically the case in natural science, is regarded, whether rightly or wrongly, as justifiable by appeal to empirical evidence; one may then say that the theory is “to be inferred from” or “is supported by” that evidence. Oddly enough, I think it is most illuminating to discuss “general induction” first; the ‘simple’ case is not so perspicuous, which is one of the reasons why this solution to the problem of induction is so often overlooked.

Suppose I say to a teacher of a class in elementary chemistry, “I can’t believe that water is really a compound; I prefer the older view that it is

7  Cf. Lonergan, CWL 3 Ch. xix.
an element not subject to further chemical analysis.” To convince me to the contrary, the teacher can show me the well-known experiment where an electric current is passed through water; I see bubbles of gas collecting at the anode and the cathode, and the level of the water going down. I am then very likely to conclude, “If water were indeed a chemical element, one would not see it turning into two samples of gas in the way that that water apparently did. But if it is a compound, one would expect the kind of thing I have just seen as a matter of course.” The reader will recognize in what I have said a reminiscence of C. S. Peirce’s account of what he called ‘abductive’ argument. A surprising fact, B, is observed. If A were true, B would be matter of course. Therefore there is some reason to think that A is true. In Lonergan’s terms, one envisages two possibilities, that water is a chemical compound, and that it is an element and therefore not a compound. One’s observation of the result of the experiment just described would be surprising if the latter were correct, but would be a matter of course if the former were. (I find really shrewd Groarke’s assimilation of Lonergan’s view to Peirce’s account of ‘abduction.’8) The schoolmaster might then persuade me that there were millions of observations which were to the same effect, and few or none which confirmed the view that water is a chemical element.

The case is really much the same with a far more recondite example, that of general relativity. On the Newtonian view which had prevailed for two centuries, there were anomalies in the motion of the planet Mercury which had made some even postulate the existence of a planet, Vulcan, which was within the orbit of Mercury. Of course, no such planet was ever found. On the other hand, on the hypothesis of general relativity, the motion of Mercury was not anomalous, but to be expected. Again, general relativity predicts, as Newtonian theory does not, that rays of light will bend palpably in the neighborhood of large gravitational bodies like the sun. Shortly after Einstein had first proposed his general theory of relativity, there was an eclipse of the sun in the southern hemisphere, such that stars in the direction of the sun would be visible in a manner that was not generally the case. When an expedition, led by Sir Arthur Eddington, was sent to the southern hemisphere, it was observed that the apparent position of these stars was

8 Groarke, Account, 317. The parallels between Lonergan and Peirce were emphasized by the late, and by me much lamented, Vincent Potter. S. J.
Indeed such as would follow from general relativity, rather than Newton's theory.

Now general relativity is quite difficult to understand, or at least I find it so. But every fool knows, exercite though probably not signate (as the Scholastics would have said – he lives by the principle, for all that he may not be able to spell it out), the following: that when you have two theories X and Y, and an observable fact Z seems inconsistent with X, but is to be expected given Y; then this provides some reason for thinking that Y rather than X is true. The reader will observe a certain vagueness here, that she may rightly suspect to be studied. Any particular instance of the apparent corroboration of theory by empirical evidence can always be got round at a pinch. A sufficiently complicated story could be thought up of how water might remain a chemical element, even when the well-known experimental results were acknowledged. This resulted in the fatal concession implicit in W. V. O. Quine's 'holism'; which is to the effect that a system of concepts, including that of science, is to be justified by its relation to the whole of experience, rather than any particular part or aspect of it. There is no exact deductive connection between any proposition of scientific theory, however well-confirmed, and any particular range of empirical evidence. From there, unfortunately, it is a short step to the typical postmodernist position espoused by Richard Rorty; that the whole notion that scientific judgments are better supported by the evidence than their contradictories is self-justifying myth. 'Science' consists in just those judgments which prestigious members of our society wish to dignify as such; and Rorty is happy to go along with them. Others are not so willing to oblige.

The moral is that so-called "simple induction" is best to be understood as a special instance of what I have called general induction; and general induction is to be justified on the a priori principles which I outlined earlier. Every normally-functioning human person, however stupid, automatically does in her own small way what Kepler, Darwin and Einstein did so impressively. After observing many black ravens, and never observing any that are not black, she conceives the possibility that all ravens are black, and almost simultaneously makes the judgment that they are so; this judgment is confirmed by subsequent observations. It is the apparently obscure cases of scientific theory which shed light on the supposedly 'simple' cases. In the one set of cases as in the other, it is always wise to hedge one's bets; there
may always be new and inconvenient evidence in experience to consider, and new theories may be envisaged. The particoloured raven could always turn up at last. It is well-known that this actually happened in the case of swans; when everyone had supposed, on excellent inductive grounds, that all swans were white, someone encountered swans which were black. (Perhaps it is better to say that they ran into birds which were in every other respect like what had always been called ‘swans’, and showed every sign of being closely related to swans, but were black. As Quine has shown at length, it is a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between what happens to belong to all instances where a concept applies, and what is analytic to the concept.)

Where does this leave us with regard to Aristotle? On what I have called ‘simple induction’, from the individual observed case to the general proposition – from the observation of a hundred black ravens, and none that are not black, to the generalization that all ravens are black – Aristotle has the following to say. He raises the question “whether those habits” (sc. of performing these kinds of induction) “do not exist in the soul from the start but come to be in it, or exist in it from the start but we are unaware of them.” He thinks it absurd to say we possess them from the start. “If, on the other hand, we acquire them without previously possessing them, how could we come to know them or learn them without previously existing knowledge?” He suggests that they arise from many memories of the same kind of sensation, and makes his famous comparison with “a reversal in battle brought about when one man makes a stand, then another, then a third, till a principle is attained; and the soul is of such a nature as to be capable of being affected in this way.” He goes on, “when one of the things without difference has made a stand, there is formed in the soul first (for though one senses an individual, the power of sensation is of the universal, e.g., of man, not of the man Callias), and then again another universal among these makes a stand,” such as ‘animal.’ It is this that “the power of

9 On this particular issue, I believe that John Locke’s suggestions are on the right lines. We do not have any innate ideas; but we have sensations, and we exercise our minds about these sensations, by questioning, hypothesizing, judging and so on. We subsequently have ideas not only of sensation, but also of these mental exercises, which Locke calls “ideas of reflection” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, sections 2-4). Locke thus anticipates the “generalized empirical method” of Lonergan; though I know no evidence of direct influence.
sensation produces in us the universal.”

Generalizing from observed cases, he seems to be telling us, is something we do naturally and spontaneously; I am sure he is right about this. But I cannot see that, in this passage at least, he gives us any idea of how to determine when such generalizations are apt to lead to truth, and when they are not. If you compare metals with (what we would now call) their oxides, you notice that the metals are nice and shiny, in a way that their oxides are not. It is thus fatally easy to leap ‘inductively’ to the erroneous conclusion, as eighteenth-century chemists in fact did, that the metals contain a common substance, which was called ‘phlogiston’, whereas the oxides do not.

Robin Smith remarks that, like modern philosophers, Aristotle appreciates the need for another kind of argument than the deductive, the inductive that “infers a general claim from a number of its instances.” But he adds that Aristotle simply does not give a complete account of induction, and that any attempt to infer one from hints in his works is bound to involve speculation. “Although he assigns inductive arguments a critical epistemological role as our means of coming to know generalizations, he never attempts to set out systematic rules for inductive arguments.”

However many black ravens we have observed, and even if we have never observed a raven that was any other colour, why should not the next raven we observe be white, or magenta? Smith provides the following as a typical inductive argument: “Socrates has two legs; Plato has two legs; Aristotle has two legs (as we know by experience). Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are humans; therefore all humans have two legs.” Smith suggests that one of two additional premises might be invoked: 1. “There is no other human who does not have two legs.” 2. “Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are all the humans there are.” Evidently we are in no position to know 1; and 2 is clearly and outrageously false. Yet passages in his works, according to Smith, hint that at times Aristotle leaned towards 1 or 2. A third, “Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are all the humans we have observed,” does not seem at issue for him. At all events, there is nothing in his work from which one can infer an answer to Hume’s famous objections. Where “simple induction”

10 Aristotle, loc. cit.; Apostle, 139.
or *epagoge* is concerned, I agree with Smith rather than Groarke on where Aristotle leaves us.

But earlier in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle does begin to articulate a position, on questions and the answers to them, from which the solution to the problem of induction is ultimately to be arrived, in the manner that I have tried to sketch, and has been exhaustively set out in Lonergan’s work.\(^{13}\) Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of question, which he then reduces to two; and these two turn out to be identical with Lonergan’s “questions for intelligence” and “questions for reflection.”\(^{14}\) So Lonergan’s epistemology, in spite of Groarke’s claim,\(^{15}\) does turn out to be in a sense Aristotelian after all.\(^{16}\) But so far as I can tell, Aristotle nowhere explicitly makes the link between what I have called “simple induction” (*epagoge*), which he discusses in *Posterior Analytics* II 19, and the two sorts of question, reduced from four, which he fleetingly distinguishes in *Posterior Analytics* II 1-2, and were emphasized by his Latin-speaking followers, including Aquinas, with their distinction between “*quid sit*” or “*cur ita sit*” questions on the one hand, and ‘*an sit*’ questions on the other. But I believe the link to be epistemologically crucial, for reasons which I have already given.

---

13 *Posterior Analytics*, II 1. For the roots of Lonergan’s philosophical position in this text of Aristotle, see *Verbum*, 12-16.


16 Every human being, wrote Lonergan once, understands and judges; but only Aristotelians take philosophical advantage of the fact that they do so. In later writings, for example *Philosophy of God and Theology* (see CWL 17), he was more inclined to emphasize Aristotle’s limitations and defects, and so would probably not thus have identified himself.
BEYOND RADICAL PARTICULARISM:
A LONERGANIAN RESPONSE TO S. MARK HEIM'S 'PLURALISTIC INCLUSIVISM'

Nick Olkovich

St. Michael's College, University of Toronto

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS ENGAGED in interreligious dialogue have traditionally responded to the fact of religious diversity in one of three ways.\(^1\) 1) Christian exclusivists regard Christianity as the uniquely true religion, and argue that the only way to salvation is through explicit confession of Jesus Christ as Saviour. 2) Christian inclusivists likewise regard Christianity as the uniquely true religion but argue that the salvation offered and achieved in and through Jesus Christ is made available to individuals who are not committed Christians. 3) Christian pluralists regard all religions as distinct but equally valid ways of achieving one and the same religious goal.

In recent years, Christian theologian S. Mark Heim has challenged the philosophical viability of this classic three-fold typology.\(^2\) Drawing

\(^1\) This basic three-fold typology is derived from Alan Race, \textit{Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions} (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1982). The particular definitions offered here are my own attempts at explaining the three basic positions that Race himself outlines. Each succeeding paradigm claims to advance the goals of openness and respect for the religious other perceived to be lacking in the preceding paradigm. In this way, inclusivists criticize exclusivists for failing to affirm the universality of the Triune God's salvific will, and pluralists criticize inclusivists for what they perceive to be a covert form of exclusivism that imposes Christian categories and aims upon the religious other. Pluralists call for a 'Copernican revolution,' an unconditional denial of Christianity's superiority and uniqueness. Christianity, they argue, is one religion among many equally valid religions.

\(^2\) See S. Mark Heim, \textit{Is Christ the Only Way: Christian Faith in a Pluralistic World} (Valley
on Nicholas Rescher's metaphilosophical "orientational pluralism" in his 1995 book *Salutations: Truth and Difference in Religion*, Heim argues that proponents of all three paradigms are guilty – in similar but significantly different ways – of feigning ahistorical neutrality, of claiming that they have discovered or identified certain universally normative standards that apply to everyone, in every place and time. Adapting Rescher's middle-ground approach to philosophical diversity, Heim develops a distinctively post-modern response to religious pluralism designed to walk a fine-line between absolutism and strong forms of relativism or indifferentism. According to Heim, although individuals are justified in arguing for the universal superiority of their particular 'salvation' and the metaphysical claims it presupposes (contra-pluralism), they are not justified in doing so without accounting for the real and enduring diversity of religious fulfillments (contra-exclusivism and inclusivism). The result is a new 'more pluralistic' paradigm focused on defending the particularities – the exclusive and distinctive nature of each tradition's salvation – without denying the believer's right to offer a definitive and supposedly objective ranking of these different salvations from within one's own context-dependent worldview. According to Heim, only this type of 'particularist' approach to religious difference can provide the conditions necessary for commending mutual growth and dialogue amongst individuals in different religious traditions.

Although Heim's respect for the constitutive character of religious language and praxis and his efforts to provide grounds for fostering encounter and dialogue ought to be commended, in my judgment, the methodological presuppositions that underlie his "pluralistic inclusivism" are at odds with a more accurate account of human knowing and choosing.


3 See Nicholas Rescher, *The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity* (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). According to Rescher, metaphilosophy is concerned with the methods and aims of philosophy as a discipline. In other words, a particular thinker's metaphilosophy supplies her definition of the 'nature' of philosophy, and would include not only answers to the question 'what philosophy is?' but, concomitantly, what its goals are and how individuals are apt to achieve them. In my opinion, the term metaphilosophy can be understood in Lonerganian terms as the collection of answers a philosopher might give – implicitly or explicitly – to the 'three basic questions' of noetic phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics.
Unable to provide any critical basis for genuinely post-conventional living, Heim appears poorly equipped to counter the very charges of indifferentism or ontological relativism his meta-theory aims to transcend. In addition, his radical particularism tends to overemphasize religious difference and inadvertently appears to hinder the very cooperation and mutual acceptance that he seeks to encourage.

In response to these deficiencies I will present an alternative account of post-conventional living grounded in Bernard Lonergan’s account of human knowing, choosing and religious experiencing that – while subsuming the good in Heim’s position – is capable of avoiding the uncritical historicism and religious tribalism correlative with Heim’s ‘pluralistic inclusivism.’ The challenge – that I believe Lonergan can most adequately meet – is to provide a methodological middle-ground capable of valuing historicity and diversity without sacrificing the *givenness*, both of human nature and of religious experience. Only this sort of middle-ground can provide a way to identify unity amidst difference and to value the intended realism of all religious claims without appeal to the relativity of basic standards. Only on this basis can one consistently defend the realism of Christian claims by something more than individual or communal fiat.

This paper will therefore proceed in four main stages. First, I will provide a brief exposition of Nicholas Rescher’s orientational pluralism, paying special attention to the way in which Rescher harmonizes rational commitment with the reality of philosophical diversity. Second, I will outline Heim’s ‘pluralistic inclusivism,’ noting how his appropriation of Rescher’s metaphilosophy provides the philosophical basis for his rejection of the classic three-fold typology and, by extension, for the development of his ‘more pluralistic’ hypothesis. Third, I will level several objections against Heim’s paradigm. Fourth, I will present a brief outline of Lonergan’s account of human knowing, choosing and religious experiencing, ending with an examination of how cognitive and religious self-appropriation provide the basis for genuinely post-conventional living. To Nicholas Rescher’s “orientational pluralism” I now turn.

1. Nicholas Rescher’s Metaphilosophical “Orientalizational Pluralism”

and Implications of Philosophical Diversity, Nicholas Rescher presents and rejects a number of responses to the fact of philosophical disagreement. The alternative he proposes identifies a limited form of relativism as inevitable and yet consistent with ongoing rational commitment. He calls this middle-ground “orientational pluralism,” and the non-philosophical factors that give rise to diversity without destroying the meaningfulness of the philosophical enterprise, ‘cognitive-values.’

1.1 The Roots of Philosophical Diversity

According to Rescher, cognitive values are extra-theoretical judgments or commitments that shape an individual’s ‘normative orientation toward the data afforded by...[her] experience of the world.’ They provide the foundations for a particular individual’s philosophical investigations by specifying the ‘inclinations’ or ‘paradigms’ that shape and norm her particular acts of knowing and choosing. These basic standards, and the orientation or basic horizon they constitute, supply the fundamental meanings of such words as “intelligible, true, real and good,” that provide the justificatory standards for one’s commitment to, and rejection of
particular philosophical theses.\textsuperscript{9}

For Rescher, the evaluative commitments that constitute an individual's basic horizon are primarily the product of an individual's process of socialization. Cognitive values are not the result of "intersubjectively invariant considerations but emerge as products of individual human judgment based on an individual background of experience."\textsuperscript{10} The cognitive values basic to any investigation are therefore context-dependent or tradition-specific, shaped as they are by an individual's cultural milieu, her educational and socio-economic background and historical context.\textsuperscript{11} In other words, the cognitive values that provide the basic standards for evaluating an individual's particular acts of knowing and choosing are not transcultural constants but are appropriated from her own context-dependent conventional world.\textsuperscript{12}

1.2 Philosophy and the Role of Cognitive Values

Rescher illustrates the way in which cognitive values effect an individual's philosophizing through his discussion of "aporetic clusters." Such clusters consist of collections of 'mutually incompatible' contentions, each of which has significant evidential support.\textsuperscript{13} The evidence alone cannot resolve the aporetic dilemma for, as Rescher argues, the claims themselves constitute the evidence \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{14} One of the claims must be sacrificed and in order to do so a 'decision' has to be made.\textsuperscript{15} The key point here is that 'theoretical reason' is insufficient to force a resolution of the dilemma. What is required is recourse to a basic horizon or orientation that guides one's resolution

\textsuperscript{9} Michael Vertin, "The Salvific Significance of Jesus of Nazareth," (paper presented at the 21st Annual West Coast Method Institute Symposium, Loyola-Marymount University, Los Angeles, 23-25 March 2006), 15. Although this connection of orientation or basic horizon with the basic meanings of the words 'intelligible, true, real and good' is not made explicit in Rescher's work, it nevertheless represents, in my opinion, an accurate reading of what is implicit in Rescher's position on cognitive values.

\textsuperscript{10} Strife, 129-130.


\textsuperscript{12} Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 126, 134.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 25, "(1) if virtue does not always produce happiness, it is pointless; (2) virtue is crucially important; (3) virtue does not always yield happiness." See also S. Mark Heim, "Oriental Pluralism in Religion," \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 13 (1996), 205.

\textsuperscript{14} Heim, \textit{Salvations}, 135. Joo, 87.

of philosophical incompatibilities: whenever an individual asserts a philosophical thesis, she operationally presupposes some set of context-dependent values that provide the groundwork for just such claims.\textsuperscript{16} Appealing to her own cognitive-values, an individual sacrifices a particular claim from the aporetic cluster and then subsequently presents a systematic and rational defence of her conclusion, relative to the basic horizon upon which it rests.\textsuperscript{17}

1.3 The Implications of Cognitive-Value Diversity

If the inevitable recourse to some scheme of context-dependent cognitive-values destroys the possibility of a value-neutral point-of-view,\textsuperscript{18} it also leads Rescher to the conclusion that there can be no ‘uniquely’ or universally valid philosophical conclusion. Since no individual can invoke a context-independent “position of reason” that transcends her own contextual limitations and that brings debate to an absolute close, by extension, no individual is ever in a position to claim that her particular standards are in fact universally normative. Since no thesis can be defended without accepting the basic horizon that underlies it and since there does not exist any single basic standard that individuals in all contexts can appeal to in making their claims,\textsuperscript{19} the result is a multiplicity of basic horizons normative for different groups situated in different times and places. What constitutes a “good reason” is therefore orientationally relative: the foundations of human knowing and choosing are rooted in value judgements that are ‘locally’ and not ‘globally’ compelling.\textsuperscript{20} The diversity of philosophical positions – each justified on the basis of its context-dependent cognitive values – makes

\begin{itemize}
\item[17] Ibid.
\item[18] Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 118, 127, 142, 143, 150, 160, 172, 179-180; 124-125. As Rescher puts it, ‘once we enter the value domain we are trapped; there is no way out, no way to resolve its issues by external means.’ In other words, there is no God’s eye view, no strictly objective standard – no ahistorically normative set of axioms or method – that compels uniform and certain conclusions. To feign neutrality in advancing one’s position is to invoke the myth of the God’s eye view, and to mistake the context variable and self-justifying nature of one’s own basic horizon for value-neutral standards.
\item[19] Heim, \textit{Salvations}, 141. “There is no definitive rational basis to allow only one type of evaluative orientation.”
\item[20] Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 140, 142.
\end{itemize}
pluralism inevitable and consensus impossible. As a result, Rescher argues that there can be no ‘absolutely correct philosophy.’

1.4 Orientational Pluralism and Orientational Monism

At the same time, Rescher is careful to note that this reciprocal validation of varying orientations does not destroy the meaningfulness of rational debate and commitment. Insofar as individuals operate in judgemental fidelity to their own basic horizon they may claim to have arrived at the “one truth.” Additionally, individuals who occupy a particular perspective are justified in arguing that others ought to adopt this perspective, even though the universal intent of one’s purported claims cannot be validated without recourse to one’s context-dependent cognitive values. In other words, from the perspective of those who share an evaluative framework, there can be only one rationally superior position: orientational pluralism becomes “orientational monism” at the level of the individual orientation.

Though individuals are justified in privileging their own judgments because they are uniquely correct when viewed from their own orientation, they must recognize that when they step back to survey the “strife of systems,” to view the wider community in its orientational plurality, they must admit that all individuals – supported by different basic horizons – make similar claims and none can do more than purport to be uniquely correct on the basis of its underlying values. To accept this fact is not to adopt the others’ perspective, but to acknowledge that on the basis of other cognitive values there are other rationally justifiable positions that can be espoused. This sort of reciprocity between orientations allows individuals

22 Rescher, Strife, 92, 135. Heim, Salutations, 141.
23 Heim, Salutations, 139.
24 Rescher, Strife, 187, 199. Heim, Salutations, 138. See also Rescher, Strife, 187, 199; 156, “The claims of reason are universal claims….But even though the ‘claims’ I make are absolute, and though I take myself to be fully entitled to make them, I cannot thereby validate my truth claims in an absolute way….In philosophizing we indeed ‘claim’ universality and absolutism. But that does not offset the relativity of our claims themselves.”
25 Rescher, Strife, 200, 149. Individuals are unable to privilege more than one horizon and its concomitant claims at once.
to respect and understand ‘the other’ in virtue of its ‘otherness’ (and so avoid a rigid ‘parochialism’) without surrendering one’s own claims to superiority.\textsuperscript{28} Indifferentism is avoided because one can present a rational case for one’s commitments and this rational case is normative relative to those who share such value presuppositions.\textsuperscript{29} Against the backdrop of such objectivity relative to one’s orientation, one cannot privilege other conclusions grounded in other orientations: I am correct from where I stand and others are wrong, for I am unable to consistently affirm the other’s equal validity from within my own orientation.\textsuperscript{30}

Oddly, orientational pluralism, in Rescher’s eyes, is strictly an epistemological doctrine.\textsuperscript{31} Individuals from each and every orientation make claims to know the whole of the “one reality,” but no claim is regarded as absolute, except from within the confines of the orientation that undergirds it. Reality is both one and knowable, though humans have no access to it without the mediation of a cognitive value orientation: one can only seek “the truth” by cultivating one’s “own truth.”\textsuperscript{32} The result is not an ontological relativism but an epistemological relativism that fragments not reality or truth but the ‘warranted justification’ of the multiple claims to the one truth.\textsuperscript{33} Aspirations to move beyond the inevitability of this sort of pluralism in philosophy are unrealistic. Knowing is shaped by the diversity of cognitive values and to hold out for the possibility of a God’s eye view that can impose unity upon diversity is misguided.\textsuperscript{34}

2. \textbf{BEYOND THE CLASSIC THREE-FOLD TYPOLOGY – S. MARK HEIM’S APPROPRIATION OF RESCHER’S “ORIENTATIONAL PLURALISM”}

Drawing on this middle-ground approach to philosophical diversity in his book \textit{Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion}, Christian theologian S.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid, 122, 135-136. Smith, “Against Orientational Pluralism,” 216.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 141, 168, 120, 194.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 146, 194.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 178, “It is a theory about the nature of philosophy and not about the nature of the world.” And Joo, 95.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 201. Joo, 96-97.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Rescher, \textit{Strife}, 188-189, 192; 195-196, “to be true from an orientation is not to be ‘true’, period, but conditionally true – to be something that might be held from a particular vantage point that one may or may not be inclined to adopt oneself.”
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 150.
\end{itemize}
Mark Heim rejects classical exclusivist, inclusivist and pluralist approaches to religious diversity. If the inevitable recourse to some particular basic horizon exposes the untenable pretensions to context-independence typified by certain pluralist interpretations of religious diversity, it also leads Heim to reject classical exclusivist and inclusivist approaches. More specifically, Heim argues that although individuals are justified in arguing for the universal superiority of their tradition’s particular conception of ‘salvation,’ (orientational monism) they are not justified in doing so without accounting for the real and enduring diversity of religious worldviews and their concomitant fulfillments (orientational pluralism). Heim calls this transposition of Rescher’s distinction between orientational pluralism and monism “pluralistic inclusivism,” marrying the two halves of Rescher’s dichotomy into one term. To a more detailed investigation of this new paradigm I now turn.

35 In Salvations, Heim’s constructive philosophical and theological proposals take their primary point of departure from the pluralistic paradigm associated with thinkers such as John Hick, Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Paul Knitter. Despite their obvious differences, all three authors share a common desire to isolate certain a priori features of human subjectivity that are common to all religious believers. In doing so, they hope to provide a universally normative meta-position for interpreting all confessional religious claims that transcend what they regard as the untenable triumphalism of traditional exclusivism and inclusivism. See also Heim, “Orientational Pluralism,” 210. Heim, Is Christ, 31. According to Heim, Kantian inspired philosophical interpretations of religion, therefore, represent one ‘religious tradition,’ with its own confessional norms, among other religious options. The typical pluralist efforts to find a way to ground the rough equivalency of all traditions can never transcend particularity in a way to offer a standard that would be ‘equally agreeable to all.’

36 Heim, “Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis,” Modern Theology 10 (1994) 344-345. Heim, Salvations, 145. Heim offers the following set of statements to describe his transposition of Rescher’s pluralist/monist dichotomy: “(1) religious truth is one; (2) religious truth is called by many names, experienced in many forms; (3) cultural and personal categories are constitutive of our knowledge and experience of reality: all reality is ‘experiencing as’; (4) religious aims and fulfillments are various.” The tension between (1) and (4) that Heim describes is analogous to the orientational monist and pluralist dichotomy proposed by Rescher to explain enduring plurality without capitulating to absolutism or indifferentism.

37 Pluralistic denotes the multiplicity of religious worldviews that make purportedly universal and objective claims about the nature of reality and the character of salvation. Inclusivism denotes the propensity to regard one’s own conclusions as superior to all others. The former is analogous to Rescher’s orientational pluralism and the latter to Rescher’s orientational monism.
2.1 The Exclusive Nature of Religious Fulfillment – The ‘Pluralistic’ Side of Heim’s Hypothesis

According to Heim, fidelity to the praxis prescribed by a particular community is a means – a concretely distinctive ‘path’ – to the particular fulfillment or end\(^{38}\) that one’s community commends. ‘Salvation,’ the fulfillment of one’s distinctively shaped aspirations is the end result of the particular transformation that one’s community supports through its pattern of living. The salvation that one’s tradition regards as ultimate is not ‘enjoyed’ until one has ‘become’ what its distinctive path makes possible. Thus as Heim notes, ‘the way and the end are one,’ or, in other words, the distinctive and comprehensive pattern of living that one’s community commends is the means to the religious fulfillment that one regards as objectively real.\(^{39}\) The achievement of a particular fulfillment is anticipated by one’s commitment to a particular way of life and its actual realization is the fulfillment of one’s desires, themselves shaped by one’s choice to privilege a particular tradition.\(^{40}\)

The result is a plurality of exclusivisms. There are multiple, different fulfillments that are capable of being realized by those already committed to their objectivity and to the distinctive ways of life that lead to their realization.\(^{41}\) Religions are different: there is no “sole fate for all human beings.”\(^{42}\) If one has not already decided to privilege the claims and praxis of a particular tradition one cannot expect to realize the fulfillment concomitant with that religious worldview.\(^{43}\)

---

\(^{38}\) Heim, *Salutations*, 161. For Heim, ‘a religious end or aim is defined by a set of practices, images, stories and concepts....First, the set provides material for a thorough pattern of life....Second, at least some of the elements in the set are understood to be constitutive of a final human fulfillment and/or to be the sole means to achieving that fulfillment.... Third, for any individual or community the religious pattern is in practice exclusive of at least some alternative options.”


\(^{40}\) Ibid.


Since all fulfillments are realizations of the distinctive states anticipated by individuals already committed to the realization and objectivity of a particular type of fulfillment, no one is in a position to compel or impose one's own understanding of the nature of ultimate reality on another, either historically or in the eschaton. Salvation as a univocal human possibility is denied in exchange for a plurality of 'salvations.' Each religion is a 'one and only way' to the fulfillment it regards as ultimate. Those who do not share one's own cognitive and evaluative commitments, and the distinctive praxis that they commend, achieve different religious goals.

Thus, just as Rescher describes the diversity of available orientations, so Heim's hypothesis of multiple religious ends affirms a multiplicity of different religious worldviews from within which different visions of ultimate fulfillment may be specified and realized. Pluralism is real. Religious fulfillments, like philosophical conclusions, are relative to the basic horizons that individuals appeal to in affirming them. Just as there can be no absolutely correct philosophy, so there can be no singular true religion, no singular religious fulfillment that is identical across the spectrum of chosen basic horizons. No one tradition can have a 'monopoly on truth' and no particular fulfillment can exclude the truth and reality of any other chosen fulfillment: each is true on its own terms and, as Heim argues, "these truths are distinct." In this way each religion is relativized in relation to every other viable option, not to some absolutely correct religion or Kantian meta-theory that purports to transcend its context-dependent character.

---

46 Heim, Salvations, 227.
49 Joo, 102.
51 Heim, "Salvations," 347.
54 Heim, Salvations, 3, "the 'finality of Christ' and the 'independent validity of other ways' are not mutually exclusive. One need not be given up for the sake of the other unless we insist there can be only one effective religious goal."
Different salvations are therefore “real alternatives.” Although one person can stand committed to only one tradition at any one time, there is no contradiction in affirming that there are other, alternative ends capable of being realized by others who stand differently committed.

2.2 Heim’s ‘Inclusivism’ – Confessional Interpretations of Religious Diversity

It is this enduring diversity of religious fulfillments that places restrictions on the meaning and type of superiority that any one religion can claim. Following Rescher, Heim is unwilling to claim that individuals will share in Christian salvation – ‘communion with God and God’s creatures through Christ Jesus’ – without committing themselves to the truth and distinctive praxis of the Christian community. At the same time, he is unwilling to deny that individuals in other traditions will achieve some sort of religious fulfillment. A delicate balancing act ensues. The basic question changes from “which religion alone is true?” to “what end is most ultimate even if many are real?”

As Heim sees it, affirming this diversity does not imply the sort of indifferentism that Rescher seeks to avoid in philosophy. Members of each religion are justified in claiming that their tradition’s distinctive fulfillment and account of the nature of ultimate reality is superior to any other. Heim stands committed to the idea that reality has one specifiable character. Individuals are justified in arguing for the universal superiority of their fulfillment and the metaphysical claims it presupposes – up to the point of rejecting other metaphysical claims – but they are not justified in doing so without accounting for the real diversity of religious fulfillments. For

58 Heim, *Salvations*, 156.
61 Heim, *Salvations*, 215. As Heim puts it, the religion that is unable or unwilling to account for this diversity within its account of the whole jeopardizes the credibility of its own claims to truth. See also Heim, “Orientational Pluralism,” 208, 212, 213. In my opinion, Heim, more explicitly than Rescher, encourages dialogue among orientations to
Heim, this means that individuals may interpret and rank the distinctive fulfillments available in other traditions according to their own standards of what constitutes ultimate human fulfillment and the nature of ultimate reality. More specifically, individuals may justifiably argue that the nature of the religious referent most accurately described in their tradition is capable of grounding a diversity of alternative, real fulfillments. In this way, the nature of ultimate reality and the ultimate fulfillment specified by a particular tradition can provide a hermeneutic for ranking the various ends that are alternative to that which one regards as ultimate. When viewed from one’s own tradition, such alternative fulfillments are classed as penultimate. They represent religious ends that reflect an individual’s relation with, or experience of, certain isolated aspects of the one complex ultimate reality described in one’s own tradition or with certain objects that are intrinsically less than ultimate. This ‘hierarchy’ of ends is thus relative to the tradition that regards its own fulfillment as ultimate and its own metaphysical claims as uniquely correct.

serve the goals of mutual respect, understanding and learning. For Heim, it is only by communicating with individuals who espouse other orientations that “our own truth” can develop, insofar as other orientations – when encountered – challenge individuals to ‘include as much evidence and as many values as possible in their understanding of the world.’ Such a commitment to dialogue across orientations allows for mutual transformation: each participant is changed in the process of encountering the other. In other words, without denying one’s own right to differ fundamentally from others, dialogue allows one’s own context-dependent claims to be enriched by their insights and one’s own claims regarding the whole to be better defended by accounting for such differences in priority.

62 Heim, “Salvations,” 350-351, “such issues do determine the ‘nature’ of the religious fulfillments actually sought and achieved and their ontological relations ... answers to those questions will determine the ultimate status and possibility of those existing fulfillments.” Heim, Salvations, 155, 176.

63 Heim, Salvations, 176, 208-209, 227. Heim, “Many True,” section 1. The most ‘inclusive true religion’ is the religion that offers the most comprehensive understanding of this diversity, the religion that best balances (1) and (4), by seeking to affirm the alternative of the other’s fulfillment from within one’s own particular view of the whole.


65 Heim, “Salvations,” 350. Heim, Depth, 33-35. Heim, “Many True,” section 1, “this grammar is neither a two-option view (a right way and a mass of indistinguishable wrong ways) nor a no-option view (all ways inescapably right, and right about the same thing). Instead it has four options: a specific and ultimate religious fulfillment, an ‘inclusivist’ way by which others may converge toward that fulfillment...achievement of religious fulfillments that are concretely quite different from that of the ‘home’ tradition (and which others may regard as superior) and a state without religious fulfillment at all.”

66 Following the distinction between pluralism and monism yet again, Heim argues
Heim develops his hypothesis in a distinctively Christian manner in his Trinitarian theology of religions. For the Christian, communion with the Triune God "is thought to encompass dimensions of other fulfillments, to be better because more consistent with the nature of the ultimate and so more inclusive."67 As Heim argues, because the Christian understands God as a communion of three distinct but equal divine persons, that "nature itself has a variety of dimensions."68 For the Christian, communion with the three divine persons made possible through the saving activity of Christ, is the highest form of human fulfillment and therefore stands as the ultimate measure of all alternative fulfillments, both impersonal and personal.69 In this way, the Triune nature of God provides a hermeneutic for interpreting and ranking the distinctive fulfillments obtained by individuals committed to the ends concomitant with different systems of belief. For the Christian, the metaphysical claims that ground these different systems of belief are incorrect. However, the fulfillments themselves can nevertheless be real, insofar as they result from a particular tradition's concentration on certain aspects of the Triune God's nature.70 Such isolation from the fullness of fulfillment that God offers in Christ allows the Christian to affirm the availability of certain penultimate religious ends available to those who stand committed to their superiority and realization.71

3. Critical Reflections on Heim’s ‘Pluralistic Inclusivism’

Clearly there is much to appreciate within Heim’s approach. For starters, his emphasis on the tradition-specific character of all knowing and that individuals who stand committed to the realization of such penultimate ends regard these ends as objectively true. Each committed believer has his or her own metaphysical commitments that justify their own particular interpretation of religious diversity and their own distinctive ranking of religious fulfillments. No one's interpretation of this diversity is right in itself.

67 Knitter, 196. Heim, Salvations, 165.

68 Heim, Depth, 9. See also S. Mark Heim, “Witness to Communion: A Trinitarian Perspective on Mission and Religious Pluralism,” Missiology 33 (2005), 192-199. This short article provides a brief but comprehensive overview of Heim’s Trinitarian theology of religious ends. In it, Heim describes the three ways in which people can relate to the Triune God, themselves a reflection of the various ways in which the three divine persons relate to each other.

69 Heim, Salvations, 160.

70 Heim, Depth, 9.

71 Heim, Salvations, 165.
choosing usefully exposes the untenable pretensions to context-independence typified by certain pluralist approaches. At the same time, Heim works hard to balance respect for the purported realism of individual religious traditions with the irreducible diversity of their concomitant fulfillments, a middle-ground consciously designed to serve the purpose of commending dialogue and mutual growth amongst individuals in different traditions. In my judgment, however, the strengths in Heim’s approach appear to be more than offset by its negative implications, the majority of which stem from Heim’s appropriation of Rescher’s orientational pluralism. For the sake of brevity I will focus on two central areas of concern: (i) both authors’ position on cognitive-value diversity; and (ii) both authors’ attempt to save one independent world order by distinguishing between epistemological and ontological relativism.

3.1 The Charge of Indifferentism

As Rescher argues, the cognitive-values constitutive of an individual’s orientation are uncritically appropriated via the process of socialization. Individuals naturally privilege their own basic horizon and the conclusions that these standards lead them to, though they recognize that others situated in different contexts have different basic horizons and make similar claims testifying to the superiority of their own conclusions. Although this natural relativization of one’s own conventional values and beliefs is benign

72 Heim, Salviations, 123, 143. Yong Huang, “Religious Pluralism and interfaith dialogue: Beyond Universalism and Particularism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1995), 138. In Heim’s opinion, it is the distinctiveness of each tradition’s salvation and its rights to make purportedly universal and unrestricted claims that allows for genuine dialogue and mutual transformation. Only if the religions are engaging in different practices, and heading toward alternative goals can there be any hope of meeting “the other” in dialogue and in being transformed by his or her distinctive witness. In this way, learning can be balanced with teaching, and a dialogical openness effected that allows each participant to grow in its understanding of the whole by respecting the particularity of the other from within one’s own worldview.

73 First, I will move from Rescher’s position on cognitive values to the conclusion that Rescher fails to evade the charge of indifferentism except on strictly arbitrary grounds, and from this to the logical conclusion that truth and reality are relative to different arbitrarily constructed worlds. Second, I will point out how this relativism impedes Heim’s goals of encouraging dialogue and mutual growth. Third, I will note the ultimately self-defeating character of orientational pluralism.
enough, since the standards that individuals appeal to in evaluating their particular judgments of fact and value are context-dependent, Rescher appears unable to provide any critical basis for adjudicating between these relativized options. The results seem fairly obvious. Individuals are thus never capable of claiming that on the basis of some transculturally normative basic horizon they have moved towards a genuinely critical reappropriation of their past or have moved from one orientation to one more reasonable or responsible. Both decisions appear to be at best free but arbitrary decisions to privilege as superior one strictly different orientation or another.

This hardly seems to provide the basis for a sufficient answer to the charge of indifferentism that Rescher and Heim seek to evade. As Timm Triplett notes, relativists are quite content to argue that “within a given perspective ... one can speak of rationality and truth.” Different things are regarded as true, real and good in different orientations and these conclusions – made by individuals committed to their epistemic objectivity – are ‘rational’ insofar as they are made in fidelity to such basic standards. The problem, as I have already noted above, is that there are no rational grounds for choosing where to stake one’s claims for superiority or when to change them. There can be no grounds for claiming superiority ‘among’ contextually specified orientations that does not presuppose one’s arbitrary choice to privilege such an orientation in the first place. In other words,

75 Triplett, 221-224. Since the term ‘arbitrary’ is often used pejoratively to connote ‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘irresponsibility,’ and since it is not used by Rescher or Heim to describe their own positions, I feel compelled to note that several other terms – such as “sheerly creative” or “totally self-determining” – might be employed to serve a similar purpose of noting what I think is key for both authors, namely that for Rescher (and subsequently Heim) an individual’s personal selection of basic values occurs without reference to anything beyond his or her “free will.” It is in this last sense – of selection without reference to anything beyond the subject’s free will – that I will continue to use the term arbitrary when speaking of Rescher and Heim’s efforts to move beyond philosophical and religious imperialism. Thus, when I subsequently speak of “at best” arbitrary decisions to privilege a particular orientation or religion, the modifier “at best” is used to support my distinction between pre-critical socialization and the subject’s free decision (in this case made in reference to nothing besides his or her freedom) to re-appropriate or deny one’s heritage.
76 Triplett, 222.
at the wider level where individuals survey the multiplicity of available orientations an irrational parity thus exists. It is unclear how this position—despite Rescher’s best efforts to defend his pluralist/monist dichotomy—is anything other than a harmful form of indifferentism.\footnote{Rescher’s best efforts} The result of all of this seems to be a form of what Hugo Meynell calls conventionalism or subjective idealism, wherein what is regarded as true, real and good is relative to different arbitrarily constructed worlds.\footnote{Meynell's best efforts} As Meynell notes, once the possibility of genuine knowing is relativized to each and every arbitrary perspective the notion of truth, `which involves correspondence with what may exist prior to and independently of any beliefs,'\footnote{Meynell’s view} becomes untenable.\footnote{Meynell's view} The ‘real world’ becomes a construction, an arbitrary creation whose normativeness is relative to a particular individual or group.\footnote{Meynell’s view} Different orientations lead to the construction of different realities, each normative for those who presuppose it, none of which is “the real world” in any transperspectival sense.\footnote{Meynell’s view} Inhabitants of each ‘reality’ encourage others to construct their world similarly, but no one in any orientation is justified in arguing that their own conclusions obtain independently of another’s assent to them.

The problems with this position take distinctive forms in the religious realm. Believers in different traditions each regard the basic horizon that they invoke in reaching their own claims about the nature of ultimate reality and of human fulfillment to be superior to the standards invoked by individuals who stand differently committed. From within their own status one accords one’s own particular orientation does not condone a reckless disregard for the integrity and dignity of the other, but it is only the realization that one is superior on the basis of \textit{arbitrary choice} that makes possible this tempering of one’s universal claims.


\footnote{Meynell, Redirecting, 25-26.} Hugo A. Meynell, “The Importance of Religious Truth,” \textit{The American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings} 67 (1993), 44, “Conventionalism is the view that for \(x\) to be true is for it to be generally accepted within one’s group or society.” Meynell, \textit{Redirecting}, 25.


religious worldview individuals are justified in arguing that their particular conclusions are epistemically objective, insofar as they judge in rational fidelity to the basic horizon that they have appropriated uncritically or at best arbitrarily chosen. However, the at best arbitrary basis for selecting a particular horizon relativizes truth, reality and fulfillment to each particular religious worldview. There is no religion whose claims obtain independently of another’s assent to their truth and no fulfillment that is realized independently of one’s commitment to the praxis that leads to a particular goal. The best a Christian can do is to incorporate the other’s fulfillment, to provide a distinctively Christian – and nevertheless arbitrary – interpretation of religious diversity that respects the distinctiveness of the other without privileging her metaphysical claims. Although the Christian justifiably believes that all individuals ought to adopt the Christian worldview, the purported normativeness of these claims is relative to the worldview one has already arbitrarily chosen to privilege.

This ontological relativism also appears to impugn Heim’s efforts to encourage dialogue and interreligious cooperation. Since different religious worldviews constitute different, parallel realities, there does not appear to be, as Paul Knitter suggests, any common ground from which to ‘establish lines of communication between such real, apparently overwhelming differences,’ and thus no reason to encourage constructive interaction among the various religions. Believers live in different worlds, shaped around the anticipation of achieving different religious fulfiliements. Heim’s ‘preferential option for diversity’ thus appears to result in an irresponsible isolationism. In other words, despite orientational pluralism’s ability to defend each religion’s right to claim epistemic objectivity on its own grounds, Heim’s radical particularism provides no rational basis for critiquing or learning from other religions. “Orientational pluralism fulfills one pole of the pluralistic ideal – difference or uniqueness – but it fails to fulfill the other pole – relatedness – in such a way as to overcome relativism.”

All of this leads to my final and briefest – though potentially most decisive

---

86 Knitter, 229.
criticism of Rescher (and Heim’s) nonfoundationalism. When Rescher’s own principles are applied to orientational pluralism, his understanding of the nature of philosophy becomes arbitrary: it is “one position among others, none of which can be said to be correct” per se. As Meynell suggests, any philosophical position that intends to be taken seriously must presuppose certain transcultural foundations of reasoning. However, since Rescher has repudiated any sort of transcultural basis for knowing and choosing and is unwilling to impose his position on others who do disagree with him, his orientational pluralism degenerates into mere opinion, an opinion that on its own terms is no better grounded than any other.

3.2 Distinguishing Between Epistemological and Ontological Relativism

In light of the above, both authors’ efforts to deny an ontological relativism by distinguishing between ontological and epistemological relativism appears untenable. On their own internal principles, individual orientations each make epistemically objective (purportedly universal and unrestricted) claims to know “the truth,” to claim that on the basis of one’s arbitrarily enacted basic horizon one judges reasonably and responsibly that others are incorrect about the ‘one way’ the world is. This position seems to suggest that genuine knowing is nothing other than creative construction: reality is discovered through judgemental fidelity to a chosen orientation. Although it appears as if people in different orientations are each justified in arguing that the way the “one world” really is, is best characterized by one’s own conclusions, individuals are really trying to persuade each other to shift from one arbitrarily constructed reality to another. To admit that no orientation is better than any other – except arbitrarily – has ontological as well as epistemological implications, because Rescher has no check against

---

88 Joo, 120.
89 Meynell, Postmodernism, 75.
90 Ibid, 75, 83.
91 It does not seem that any advertence to fallibilism here can save Rescher’s position on objective knowing. Since such knowing is always grounded arbitrarily, fallibilism can no longer refer to the possibility that one is wrong about the ‘actual truth,’ because the ‘actual truth’ is nothing other than what one has constructed.
92 This seems to imply that despite the fact a God’s eye view of ‘reality’ is not possible, genuine knowing might still be possible by denying that reality is ‘out there’ but something that is one and yet constructed.
subjective idealism when he admits that genuine knowing is possible and yet arbitrarily grounded.

A contradiction thus emerges. Either reality is (a) something individuals construct; or (b) if one takes Rescher’s denial of ontological relativism seriously, it is something transperspectival, something ‘already out there’ that individuals are trying to know but to which no orientation has objective access.93 The latter would seem to imply that Rescher’s fragmentation of “warranted justification” is really a Kantian-inspired epistemological relativism that denies the possibility of genuinely speculative knowing without denying the idea of one independent world order.94 However, Rescher’s stance on the basic question of noetic phenomenology does not restrict an individual’s acts of knowing to merely practical or pragmatic judging. Furthermore, Heim is explicit in rejecting one particular variant of this stance by rejecting the Kantian-inspired universalism of his pluralist opponents. As a result, the claim that success in one’s apparent knowing results in merely apparent, not speculative knowledge, appears to represent a dogmatic insertion that does not follow critically from both authors’ more basic stance on noetic phenomenology.

4. Towards the Recovery of a Methodological Middle-Ground

In response to these deficiencies I will present a distinctively Lonerganian account of knowing, choosing and religious loving as a corrective that – while subsuming the good in Heim’s position – is capable of avoiding the uncritical historicism and religious tribalism correlative with Heim’s “pluralistic inclusivism.” In my judgment, the subject’s naturally given desire for cognitive and moral self-transcendence – together with the incipient fulfillment and consequent enrichment of this intending made possible by religious experience – can provide a critical basis for post-conventional living that is capable of respecting historicity without capitulating to historicism. To a preliminary exposition of Lonergan’s account of human

94 Joo, 111-114. Vertin, “Salvific,” 9-10. Since Rescher has provided no way to ground genuine knowing without succumbing to an irrational nonfoundationalism the only way he can save the idea of an independent world order and thus salvage his strictly epistemological relativism is to postulate this reality ‘out there’ that individuals have no speculative access to, a fact which Joo takes more seriously than his more basic claims to defend epistemic objectivity from within different chosen horizons.
knowing, choosing and religious experiencing I now turn.

4.1 Bernard Lonergan on Human Knowing, Choosing, and Religious Experiencing

(a) The Subject’s Inborn Orientation to Cognitive and Moral Self-Transcendence

According to Lonergan, human knowing and choosing is motivated, at its best, by a naturally given and unrestricted desire for cognitive and moral self-transcendence. This a priori yearning spontaneously calls forth a series of conscious intentional operations, a method or pattern of cognitional acts whose successive arising and performance is oriented to the achievement of the subject’s desire for cognitive and moral self-transcendence.95 At each successive level of consciousness the subject’s self-awareness changes and her a priori yearning spontaneously raises particular types of questions, an intending of the intended, where the latter stand as answers to the subject’s questioning. At the level of experience, the subject’s intending is an attending. At the level of understanding, the subject – driven by her inborn desire to “piece together the merely given into an intelligible unity or innerly related whole” – intends intelligibility, a desire or yearning that may be thematized by the question ‘what is it?’96 At the level of judgment, the subject – driven by her desire to distinguish fact from fiction – intends reality, an intention or desire that may be thematized by the question “is it so?”97 And finally at the level of responsibility, the subject – driven by


her desire to know, choose and enact the "truly good" – intends value, a desire or yearning that may be thematized by such questions as "how does what I know challenge me?" and or "ought it be so?" 98 This threefold desire or intending is transcendental – utterly open, strictly heuristic, prior to the categories of any particular method or discipline 99 – and unrestricted in orientation, satisfied with nothing less than the totality of intelligibility, reality and goodness.

When Lonergan speaks of method, most basically, as a "prior conscious reality," or as "conscious and operative," prior to objectification, 100 he speaks of the subject's tacit awareness of her cognitional performance, of her attending, understanding, judging, deciding and of the dynamism that drives her from one level to the next. 101 The "inner experience" of these operations as conscious is therefore pre-thematically given: it is 'infrastructural,' insofar as it is prior to any subsequent efforts to attend explicitly to one's performance and or to name and verify the reality of these operations themselves. 102 Thus, although the words used to objectify

98 Lonergan, Method, 104. Lonergan, "Faith and Beliefs," 35-36. Walter Conn, "The Desire for Authenticity: Conscience and Moral Conversion," in The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Vernon Gregson (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 36, 38. The culmination of this process of evaluation and deliberation – wherein the subject is driven to distinguish the really good from distorted forms of self or group interest – is a judgement of value that affirms the genuine worth of a particular thing or act. At this stage, the subject's yearning for moral self-transcendence is experienced as a desire for consistency between knowing and doing that orients the subject towards the commission of acts that are faithful to prior judgments of value.

99 Lonergan, "Second Lecture," 141. Lonergan, Method, 11-14 "the transcendentals [a priori intentions of intelligibility, reality and value] are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change. While categories are needed to put determinate questions and give determinate answers, the transcendentals are contained in questions prior to the answers. They are the radical intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge .... It is a transcendental method, for the results envisaged are not confined categorically to some particular field or subject, but regard any result that could be intended by the completely open transcendental notions. Where other methods aim at meeting the exigencies and exploiting the opportunities proper to particular fields, transcendental method is concerned with meeting the exigencies and exploiting the opportunities presented by the human mind itself."


the process of knowing and choosing are context-dependent or *a posteriori*, the realities to which they point – the dynamism that motivates the subject’s three-fold transcendental intending and the concrete operations concomitant with each intention – are transcultural and inescapably basic or undeniable. In other words, although the objectification of transcendental method in “concepts, propositions, and words,” is subject to revision, any fundamentally opposed account of human knowing and choosing must appeal to the very transcendental intending (and the concrete pattern of operations it spontaneously assembles) whose very existence it seeks to deconstruct.104

*(b) Authenticity and Inauthenticity – The Normative Character of Intentional Consciousness and the Interference of Bias*

As naturally given, the subject’s yearning or intending – her orientation to self-transcendence – is normative, it provides an inborn standard that *ought* to guide all particular instances of knowing and choosing. This yearning spontaneously demands of the subject a certain *quality* of performance at each different level of consciousness.105 As a result, Lonergan associates each particular level with a specific transcendental *precept*: the subject is naturally called to be *attentive* in her experiencing, *intelligent* in her understanding, *reasonable* in her judgement, and *responsible* in her decision-making and living.106 These imperatives thematize or describe the *a priori*

appealed to, are not yet the infrastructure. For, as appealed to, the data are named .... Only when one goes behind ordinary language and common sense knowing does one come to the infrastructure in its pure form. It is pure experience, the experience underpinning and distinct from every suprastructure .... As inner experience it is consciousness as distinct not only from self-knowledge but also from any introspective process that goes from the data of consciousness and moves towards the acquisition of self-knowledge.”

103 Lonergan, *Method*, 18, 20-21. Meynell, *Postmodernism*, 31. The *a priori* features of human subjectivity that he claims to have identified are not ideas or concepts that feign their transcultural status by abstracting from concrete diversity.

104 Ibid. As Meynell notes, the subject who attempts to justify the denial of these operations must presumably attend to his or her own cognitive operations as data, formulate a cognitional theory – an intelligent hypothesis – that aims to describe the acts one purportedly performs and to explain the relations among them, and must subsequently judge that his or her own self-appropriation best reflects the concrete reality of human knowing and choosing.


exigencies that motivate and norm the spontaneously arising levels of conscious intending: they specify the conditions necessary for satisfying the subject’s yearning for intelligibility, reality and value. To be authentically human is to recognize and heed the demands of one’s *a priori* basic horizon. Inauthentic living is the direct result of operating at odds with one’s inborn exigencies, of tacitly or willfully denying the naturally given demands of one’s own subjectivity. For Lonergan, the resistance to cognitive and moral self-transcendence that gives rise to inauthentic living is the result of certain biases that conflict with and or weaken one’s inborn orientation to know and choose authentically. Torn between their inborn and unrestricted desire for intelligibility, reality and value, and their prevolitional tendency to various forms of bias, human beings are profoundly conflicted.

(c) Religious Experience, Religious Conversion and Lonergan’s Heuristic Objectification of Religion’s ‘Inner Word’

If bias represents the primary impediment to the subject’s realization of her ultimate end, the concrete reality of religious experience is the means by which the subject progresses from habitual forms of inauthenticity to consistently authentic living. Lonergan describes religious experience in relation to the subject’s naturally given threefold intending as an inchoative or incipient fulfillment of the subject’s yearning for a value beyond all criticism. It is an experience, an infrastructure or datum of consciousness – though not knowledge – of transcendent or ultimate value, of what Lonergan describes as a desire for, and awareness of unrestricted goodness present at the fourth level of consciousness obtained independently of the subject’s striving. Since the experience occurs with a ‘determinate content,

but without an apprehended object,’ it is most immediately an experience of ‘mystery’ and is only subsequently named in phenomenological terms as an experience of transcendent value, a fulfillment and transformation of conscience received as gift.  

This gift not only fulfills the subject’s yearning at the level of responsibility but it strengthens the subject’s response to the naturally given demands of her orientation to self-transcendence at all levels of consciousness by effecting what Lonergan calls a “religious conversion,” an enrichment of the subject’s a priori intending rooted in one’s desire for and experience of fulfillment, in one’s ‘apprehension of transcendent value.’ To commit one’s self to knowing and choosing in light of transcendent value is to commit to an ongoing effort to realize the total self-surrender that this gift demands. When these demands are accepted, the resulting transvaluation of values that faith precipitates initiates a particular type of development from above, a steady but nonetheless precarious ‘healing development,’ that provides the conditions necessary for overcoming the aberrations and biases that hinder authentic, creative development from below upwards. In other words, the sustained authenticity necessary for the reversal of ongoing decline within a particular culture is grounded not merely in the a priori potentialities of reason (creative development from below upward), but is rooted in the transformative effects of transcendent value that strengthen the subject’s yearning and his ability to respond in fidelity to the naturally given demands of his consciousness. In this way, it is the subject’s transformed self-presence at the fourth level of intentional

114 Lonergan, Method, 110, 283-284, “It is authenticity as a withdrawal from inauthenticity and the withdrawal is never complete and always precarious.”
116 Lonergan, Method, 117-118. Dunne, 115. Gregson, Lonergan, 118-119, “the liberation of knowing and doing to follow their own intrinsic dynamism is won at the point where doing becomes loving and being loved.”
consciousness - grounded in surrender to ultimate value - that provides the source of consistent self-control.117

Like the context-dependent categories that Lonergan employs for the purposes of thematizing and pointing to the subject's tacit self-awareness of her *a priori* orientation to self-transcendence, so too the terms such as 'fulfillment,' 'gift,' 'mystery,' etc., as well as the phrase "unrestricted being-in-love," are culturally conditioned ways of pointing to and describing the subject's tacit self-awareness of her religious consciousness, the pre-verbal and concretely universal foundation of all authentic religion.118 What is common or essential is not this phrase, nor the more general psychological terms that describe this experience as a fulfillment of the subject's intending received as gift, but the concrete, pre-verbal reality to which these terms point. Thus, like the terms employed by Lonergan to speak about, and point to, the purportedly *a priori* and pre-verbal features of human intentionality, so too Lonergan's account of the concretely universal features of religious experiencing and living are secondary and derivative. In both cases, Lonergan's formulations serve the purpose of heightening the reader's consciousness, of directing the subject towards explicit attention to, and appropriation of the realities he regards as already conscious but not necessarily known.119

A distinctive from of the question of God thus arises only when the subject attends to and describes both her immediate experience of fulfillment and her transformed subjectivity and subsequently questions who or what


118 The latter phrase 'unrestricted being-in-love' is particularly susceptible to charges of cultural imperialism. It is a distinctively Western (and indeed Christian) way of describing how religion's 'inner word' fulfills and transforms human subjectivity at the level of responsibility in a way that bespeaks the subject's encounter with, and unconditional surrender to, an utterly transcendent other. To imply the reality of an utterly transcendent other and to speak of a relationship of unrestricted love and intimacy - far beyond but analogous to human love between persons - is certainly problematic. The phrase itself appears to move beyond a mere description of the concretely universal features of religious living towards interpretation and verification. See Walter Conn, "'Faith' and 'cumulative tradition' in functional specialization: A study in the methodologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," *Studies in Religion* 5 (1975) 244.

could fulfill and or grasp her in such an unrestricted fashion. According to Lonergan, since the experience of and enriched desire for transcendent value is experienced as a fulfillment of the subject’s conscious intentionality as a whole, the experience may be objectified as a ‘clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness.’120 The term of one’s love is therefore identical to the unrestricted ground and source of all intelligibility, reality and goodness that is affirmed when one answers, authentically, the various forms of the question of God.121 In this way, the subject’s self-surrender to the demands of transcendent value may be interpreted as an ‘unrestricted being-in-love’ that unites the subject to an utterly unrestricted, transcendent other, the heuristic term of the subject’s unconditional self-surrender, the ground and source of all intelligibility, reality and value. This interpretation of religious experience as an encounter with the ground and source of all intelligibility, reality and goodness is not an abstraction from all particular religious traditions but is a conclusion or affirmation derived from a philosophical analysis of the concretely universal acts and states of human consciousness that prescinds from an examination of particular religious traditions. Lonergan’s appeal to the subject’s naturally given three-fold trans-cendental intending shows how the good beyond criticism encountered in religious experience can be named heuristically without downplaying the need for, and the believers right to characterize the term of her love in the more specific terms of her particular tradition.

In this paper’s next and final section I will draw on this account of knowing, choosing and religious loving to develop a distinctively Lonerganian account of post-conventional living, highlighting the ways in which cognitive and religious self-appropriation can help avoid both absolutism and indifferentism and also encourage dialogue and cooperation amongst individuals committed to the truth of different religious traditions.

4.1 Toward Post-Conventional Living – The Importance of Cognitive and Religious Self-Appropriation

Like Rescher and Heim, Lonergan is not naïve about the communal

and context-dependent character of human development: prior to the emergence of the subject's open-eyed capacity to accept or reject her *a priori* transcendental intending, her knowing and choosing is already contextualized, influenced or shaped by the givenness of a particular culture or context.122 Such conventional assimilation begins with the basic decision, often merely tacit, to trust or believe one's family and other figures deemed to be authorities within one's own environment of socialization. It is this trust that provides the basis for the subject's pre-critical appropriation of the particular judgements of value and fact that one's community and or religion regard as fundamental and worthy of transmission.123 In this way, it is the community and not the individual that is 'primordial' – at least developmentally – for by the time an individual takes explicit control of her own life, she is already imbedded within a particular conventional world.124

The crucial period of transition from conventional to post-conventional living generally occurs during adolescence or young adulthood. Slowly but surely the inherited judgements of fact and value – and the taken-for-granted trust that undergirds them – are relativized as the experiences of adolescence and young adulthood take the individual beyond the confines and comfort of one's conventional world.125 At this stage of "existential discovery" the subject is faced with the basic existential decision of human living: what will I value and how will I live my life?126 According to Lonergan, the shift from pre-critical reasoning to critical self-possession – facilitated ideally by the encouragement and guidance of teachers, parents and friends – is made possible by a process of self-appropriation that culminates with the subject's acceptance or rejection of her unrestricted

122 Bernard Lonergan, "First Lecture: Religious Experience," in *A Third Collection*, 119. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 236. Frederick E. Crowe, *Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1985), 13-14, 22. Although human growth begins with the subject's 'socialization, acculturation, [and] education' into a particular conventional world, individuals nevertheless develop from below upward even in the earliest stages of life. Take, for example, the wonder of a toddler who meets every new experience with a multitude of questions. My general point here is that conventional development or socialization occurs largely in a pre-critical or uncritical fashion through assimilation.


125 Fowler, 174-183.

desire for cognitive and moral self-transcendence. From this perspective, epistemic and moral objectivity are the product, not of judgmental fidelity to certain uncritically appropriated and purportedly absolute or arbitrarily selected norms (contra-Rescher and Heim) but to those exigencies correlative with the subject’s naturally given, three-fold transcendental intending of intelligibility, reality and value. As a result, Lonergan’s post-conventional or intellectually converted subject stands in a unique position to critically re-appropriate her heritage—passing judgment on the relative authenticity or inauthenticity of her tacitly appropriated values and beliefs—and to guide, in open-eyed fashion, not only her ongoing personal and communal development but also her involvement in intercultural dialogue and debate.

Just as individuals require a breakthrough to critical self-possession to achieve genuinely post-conventional living in a broad sense, so cognitive self-appropriation coupled with an appropriation of one’s religious subjectivity grounds the subject’s genuinely post-conventional answers to the questions of theological development and religious diversity. As Vernon Gregson notes, just as most people do not achieve cognitive self-appropriation—a genuine intellectual conversion—so too most people are not aware of the “phenomenological base” of their religious experience, for chronologically prior to a person’s appropriation of her own religious subjectivity, she receives and uncritically appropriates a particular religious heritage. Instead of reaching the stage of existential decision with the belief that all religions are simply different, arbitrary constructions or that one’s own religion is certainly and ahistorically correct, the subject who combines cognitive self-appropriation with an appropriation of her religious subjectivity stands in a unique position to identify and speak of

127 Lonergan, Method, 268, 121-122. To choose irresponsibly in this most basic sense is to choose arbitrarily, to choose at odds with one’s a priori orientation by freely creating and designating as basic some standard other than that which is given.


129 By religious subjectivity I mean two things: (a) the incipient fulfillment of the subject’s yearning for a value beyond all criticism; and (b) the subsequent enrichment of the subject’s three-fold transcendental intending. Interpretations of the former may be broadly heuristic in nature (i.e. Lonergan’s philosophical interpretation of religious experience) or they may be tied to the revelation associated with a particular religious tradition (i.e. Christian characterizations of religious experience as ‘sanctifying grace’).

commonality—both cognitive and religious—amidst difference and to relate her basic existential decision to the experienced demands concomitant with religious fulfillment.131

As a result of this combined cognitive, moral and religious self-appropriation, God can be named in three different ways: (a) as the ground and source of all intelligibility, reality and goodness affirmed in the philosophy of God (the goal of all human striving);132 (b) as the term of the subject’s unrestricted being-in-love encountered in religious experience; and (c) as the divine mystery revealed to humanity in the historical person of Christ, where this last level of affirmation may accommodate the metaphysical claims of any particular religious tradition.133

Since particular religious beliefs [(c) above] are not certain, but at best highly probable, every community’s claims must remain open to revision or development.134 The believer who already stands committed to the truth of her own position ought to be responsible when encountering the other: she ought to remain open to new data, to the insights and theories of other worldviews and to the possibility that her own community’s judgments of fact and value stand to be revised or rejected.135 The limit case that results from dialogue and the subject’s own self-reflection is her rejection of her own heritage, where this shift from one particular religion or worldview to

131 Lonergan, Method, 292. Gregson, Lonergan, 65-66, “Lonergan’s notion of cross-cultural categories based on interiority analysis can help the adherent to a religion locate within his experience what is referred to by his beliefs...it can also provide the base and a heuristic for understanding other’s religious experience as well as their beliefs.” Locklin, 398. As Locklin puts it, “what Gregson recommends, then, is not just ‘therapy for the theologian,’ but indeed a kind of ‘regression therapy’ whereby she traces her beliefs and values back to their foundation in a largely pre-conceptual orientation toward mystical union.”

132 See Lonergan, Method, 101-103. This first affirmation is particularly significant because it allows Lonergan to avoid the charge of fideism.

133 Dunne, 131, 134. Gregson, Lonergan, 103. Christianity shares (a) and (b) with all people at least implicitly. The distinctiveness of Christianity exists at the level of belief: the Christian claims not only that divine mystery gives itself to human consciousness pre-conceptually, but also to history in the form of God’s own Son. The objectification of religion’s ‘inner word’ in light of a revelatory ‘outer word’ thus serves to further differentiate the basic religious unity shared by all humans, a unity rooted in the preverbal experience of fulfillment and the transformative effects it supports. The key thing to note here is that the transcendent reality described by different religious traditions is the same reality anticipated by the subject’s unrestricted desire for cognitive and moral self-transcendence

134 Lamb, 60.

135 Meynell, “The Importance,” 46.
another is made – not as the result of an arbitrary shift in particular value orientations – but as the result of the subject’s fidelity to her basic horizon as given.\(^{136}\)

To encounter the other in this sort of exchange is not to encounter an alien or an enemy, but an other who possesses one and the same \(a\ priori\) intending that is transformed by the same mysterious gift of fulfillment and who thereby deserves to be respected and loved.\(^{137}\) Religious believers within all traditions are thus encouraged to encounter, correct and teach each other, but above all, to unite – even when ongoing disagreements over judgments of fact continue to separate them\(^{138}\) – in a common bond of love to promote authentic religious commitment and to stamp out systemic evil in their home cultures.\(^{139}\)

5. Conclusion

In my opinion, Heim’s rejection of the common three-fold typology is rooted, most fundamentally, in his (and Rescher’s) inadequate answer to the question of noetic phenomenology. In an effort to respect Rescher and Heim’s attempts to account for philosophical and religious diversity while avoiding the relativism concomitant with their methodological commitments, I have presented Bernard Lonergan’s superstructural account of the concretely universal features of human knowing, choosing and religious loving.\(^{140}\) Lonergan’s own account represents a methodological middle-ground,
a verifiable alternative that respects history and defends the possibility of objectivity without taking human authenticity for granted. Only this middle-ground is capable of defending the need for cross-cultural dialogue and exchange. Only if objectivity is the result of operating in fidelity, not to different, irreducibly particular standards, but to the naturally given, concretely universal standards of human subjectivity can indifferentism be denied.

The differences in the religious realm are in my mind stark. The subject’s naturally given three-fold transcendental intending and the incipient fulfillment of this desire in religious experience - coupled with the enrichment of this intending that flows from the latter – are pre-verbal, concretely universal realities that are shared by humans prior to any objectification. Together, they allow Lonergan to speak of different interpretations of a common infrastructural religious experience, grounded in the varying revelatory events held up as ultimate by the various religions that purport to characterize one and the same transcendent reality. The subject’s self-appropriation of these pre-verbal, common realities provide the groundwork for commending dialogue amongst believers who stand committed to different judgments of fact and value without downplaying the need for humility and tentativeness in dialogue and without denying an underlying affective commonality that unites all religious believers, whether theist or non-theist, and all non-religious people of good will in a common quest to overcome evil and oppression in the world.

In my opinion, it is counter-productive to attempt to move beyond the common three-fold typology of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism as Heim attempts to do. I believe I have shown how Heim’s concerns about the objectivity of religious claims and his efforts to commend dialogue and mutual respect can be grounded in a superior account of the concretely universal features of human knowing, choosing and religious experiencing that avoids the abstract universality that he rightfully seeks to deconstruct. The classical brand of inclusivism defended by Lonergan is, in my opinion, the only way to critically defend the realism of Christian claims without denying the need to dialogue with, and respect the religious other. Despite ongoing disagreements about the nature of transcendent reality

[141 Heim on the other hand, is forced to speak of different religious experiences being ‘created’ or denied entirely by the subject’s own arbitrary choice.]
and the precise ways in which salvation is mediated historically, all human beings are oriented to one and the same mysterious other, an unrestricted good who is identically the ground of all intelligibility and reality, a metaphysically necessary being who is Love Itself. It is this Love that unites all religious and non-religious individuals of good will. It is this utterly transcendent Love that overflows and enters into history in the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is this Love that is tasted and received in all time and places – both before and after Christ – in and through the gift of the Holy Spirit.
BOOK REVIEW

David Oyler


To understand the contribution made by Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas it may be best to briefly compare it to the biography by William Mathews, Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight. The titles themselves are telling. Mathews takes us through the writing of Insight while Lambert and McShane consider the whole of Lonergan’s life and career. The sizes of the books provide another clue. Mathews’ is almost five hundred pages. Lambert devotes about ninety pages to Lonergan’s life per se, McShane provides fifty-six pages to images of Lonergan and ninety pages to understanding the nature and significance of Lonergan’s achievements. The two works complement one another; one detailed with a more limited scope and the other broader in both scope and range of analysis. Both are of necessity incomplete as Lonergan’s legacy is still unfolding. But both provide valuable insight into the man and his work.

Since the book is in three parts it seems logical to take each one separately, which I will do shortly. But there is the question of their unity, the ethos of the work which, fairly quickly in the preface, is related to that of Lonergan and the reader. It is within that context that the book may be read, assuming the reader is with McShane early on. Even so, it does provide clues to the book’s structure and purpose. Those familiar with McShane’s writing know that he quickly pushes you from the prose to self-reflection or chasing down some reference of key importance left as a ‘pointer’. Pedagogy intertwines with exposition. A key point where both

© 2011 David Oyler
occur is his reference to "... the methodological suggestions of page 250 of *Method in Theology*, perhaps the most brilliant page in the book."¹ There Lonergan laid out the structure of dialectic. Dialectic is a social endeavor with uneven results from varied practitioners. It objectifies horizons including "... indicating the view that would result from developing what he has regarded as positions and by reversing what he has regarded as counter-positions."² These results themselves become material for dialectic as iterative. From objectification one moves to a new beginning leading to further development. I am reminded here of the moving viewpoint of *Insight* but more importantly of the structure of theological method itself which is iterative through the cycling of the eight functional specializations. But this also points to the iterations of our own development bracketed by the new beginnings of questioning and the achievement of some enlightenment. The ethos of the work includes that process, writ large, evidenced by Lonergan's achievements.

Lonergan the person presents difficulties for his biographers. There is the fundamental question regarding the degree to which we can understand another if we have not walked in his or her shoes. A creative thinker of Lonergan’s magnitude presents the challenge of understanding his thought, but also of understanding what it was like to be the discoverer, the first to enter the horizons opened via self-appropriation and then to attempt to communicate the new understanding. In *Insight* the communication regarded a process of self-transformation one needs to engage in to understand. It is fairly neatly laid out. Getting there could not have been as neat and easy even for one as intelligent as Lonergan. In reading *Insight* one is being taught, directed to the key elements required for understanding as one’s own moving viewpoint develops. As difficult as that journey is, I marvel at the ability and experience of Lonergan’s discovery of this on his own, a far more difficult achievement.

The authors focus on Lonergan’s journey, the decisions and difficulties involved. That Lonergan was not naturally forthcoming regarding the vicissitudes of his own interiority makes the task difficult. Though his intellectual life is a major concern, via anecdotes, letters and other’s reminiscences the

---

¹ Lambert and McShane, p. 11
full person comes to the fore. I wonder how much his reticence was due to knowing his listener would not understand versus not being naturally outgoing, for the Lonergan revealed in these pages was certainly full of life. His love of music, his humor, his ability to connect with people of common sense, the value others placed on his ministry, when he was able to practice it, all point to a vibrant personality.

Besides the inherent difficulties of being the first on the scene creatively, socially and culturally, there were those almost every creative, very intelligent person faces. They just play out differently depending on one’s vocation and time. For example, like many people who excel, there are points in Lonergan’s life where his disappointment in others’ intellectual standards and achievement find expression. I suspect that when things come easy for us, our natural inclination is to assume they do so for others as well. It can be a difficult lesson to learn that they do not. There also were frustrations arising from being in a social group expecting obedience when he had a sense that his superiors did not understand what he was up to. Their directing varied from his direction. This is likely the case for virtually everyone, but with his knowledge of what needed to be done and of what he could do, this had to be particularly difficult for him. Yet he remained a Jesuit which, I think, shows that his work occurred within a fuller personal context than even it indicates.

Lonergan’s intellectual life is considered in four parts. The first is his education both as a scholar and as a Jesuit. The second is his life as a theologian, followed by his development as a philosopher. The fourth is his work in economics. Key discoveries are discussed in the context of Lonergan’s ongoing development with insightful commentary on the challenges encountered and met, with emphasis on the changes to horizon intimated in the preface. What can only be intimated in a review is the tone of the work. This may be best captured at the end of the biographical section.

There was in Lonergan an increasingly luminous commitment of the whole man willing to “embrace the universe” as an inheritor of a redeemed Renaissance, in an embrace, a configuration of all, that was the tonality of his concrete life.3

---

"Embracing the universe" is a reference to the following statement in Insight.

Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.\(^4\)

The next two sections of the book reach for the content and future implications of that viewing.

The second section is a challenge in many ways. Titled "Images of Lonergan," it invokes the role of the image in understanding and the role of this section as a bridge between the first and the third. It is a bridge in the mode of functional biography, and this is one of a series of challenges. McShane claims the work is a functional biography. There is the corresponding challenge of understanding what functional biography is and then there is the challenge of actually understanding this one. Functionally these two overlap, but for understanding it is best to maintain their inadequate distinction. As I understand it, functional biography is understood within the context of functional history which is, in turn, understood within the context of functional specialization. It is not understood within the context of functional specialization as developed in Method in Theology alone. McShane is critical of Method as an inadequate expression of Lonergan's vision. More particularly he is critical of the chapters on history as not illustrating functional history, which is what is required. So there is a need for Method also to be subject to dialectical iterations. The context for understanding functional history is functional specialization as generalized and implemented across all the sciences. Each would have its specialized functional history. Functional biographies of key discoverers would play a role. What is that role? Partly it is to provide a lift to understand an achievement which appropriates the past and enables the future. Functional history selects the achievements that have led to the current state of a science and evaluates their heuristic value, drawing upon the other specializations, particularly dialectic and foundations. To what degree McShane achieves his goal is a question for the future. In a typical review of a typical biography we would show how the purpose of the author is immanent in the text. In a functional biography success is measured by

\(^4\) Bernard Lonergan, CWL 3 442.
future achievement. Minimally, McShane makes a courageous attempt at a massive undertaking, moving from Lonergan the person to thinking his vision and its consequences through the millennium.

The role of the images is equally complex. The images move from pictures to prose, key letters and passages from his work, to diagrams which are heuristic aids to imagining the whole enterprise. McShane provides a good account of their functions, and I refer you to that.

Part three, “Leading Ideas,” is less an exposition than an attempt, I believe, to situate and orient the development of Lonergan’s legacy. Chapter Ten, “The Dominant Context of Lonergan’s Life,” ends with a dialectical critique of present scholarship as not practiced in the context of adequate self-appropriation. McShane uses Lonergan’s discussion of haute vulgarisation to make his point: “... they have no personal knowledge of ... what it is to live the way a theorist lives .... They are lost in some no man’s land between the world of theory and the world of common sense.”5 The first part of the chapter lays the ground for this critique via a discussion of the role of Lindsay and Margenau’s Foundations of Physics in Lonergan’s intellectual development and valuable discussions of Maxwell and potency. Will the reader understand them? Will he or she understand why Lonergan thought theologians should be able to understand Lindsay and Margenau? Will this lack of understanding reveal an existential gap preventing the reader’s horizon from matching the field of being? I believe the exercise of reading the chapter is meant to assist in starting the journey of creating an audience receptive to Lonergan “a hundred years from now.” In an interview with Val Rice cited in the chapter Lonergan responds to Rice’s question, For whom was he writing Insight? with “Open it in a hundred years.”6

The title of Chapter 11, “Lonergan’s Three Major Cultural Shifts,” is ironic since none has occurred. The best we can say is some seeds have been sown. The three regard the emergence of a fully scientific economics, the emergence of adequate self-appropriation of rational self consciousness, and the emergence of functional specialization. Rather than laying out the full scope of these changes, McShane concentrates on seminal ideas. The

5 Lambert & McShane, p. 189. The quotation is from “Time and Meaning,” in CWL
6 Lambert & McShane, p. 191
bent is pedagogical.

For economics the key point is the distinction of the two circuits of production, one producing consumer goods and the other producing the goods used to produce the consumer goods. This distinction is fundamental to Lonergan’s model. Though not stressed here, it is the systematic comprehensiveness of the model combined with its verifiability that lifts economics into science. Key to the verification is the tracking of payments through the cycles of the circuits, statistics that do not exist today given the muddle that is contemporary economics and government policy. But how this is a cultural shift is not explained. This is a difficult issue since implementation of Lonergan’s economics, especially the acceptance of the static phase and what needs to be done and not done to maintain it, requires cultural shifts itself. For example, capitalist ideals are not effective in all economic phases, particularly the static phase. The shift required for Western democracies to accept that is huge.

The notion of acceptance provides a segue to the next shift. Again the focus is not on the character of the cultural shift proceeding from the emergence of the self-appropriation of decision making, but on seminal points. In this case, a key one is the notion of consent and its difference from decision. We can decide to do something, such as agree to an order from a superior, but not consent to it even though we do it. Such is part of the burden of institutional obedience. In the course of self-development we need to consent to the emergent self for progress to continue, a sometimes taxing process. Acceptance of a new scientific paradigm, a new style of music, and so on presents the same challenge. McShane points to the key challenge of attaining a standard model, analogous to models physics and chemistry, that provides the context for foundational self-understanding. The model is generalized empirical method. McShane distinguishes four manifestations which are discussed in the following chapter. By focusing on achieving self-appropriation in terms of the model, our biographies and Lonergan’s gain similarity. We again encounter the notion that understanding Lonergan’s biography requires understanding ourselves.

The third shift is enabling effective conflict management via the effective implementation of functional specialization. The focus here is on dialectics. Informed by foundations, dialectics selects the foundational conflicts

---

7 Bernard Lonergan, CWL 21 97 – 100.
requiring resolution at a particular stage of a science or discipline. Basically, if we do not know what we are arguing about and the criteria for resolving the argument, we are lost. The emergence of global consent to the standard model presumably will be the taxing process of approaching the effective standards for managing conflicts and successfully doing so. When many Lonergan scholars are asking “What is next?”, this seems a promising way to go.

In Chapter 10 McShane provided a context. In Chapter 11 he sketched a program. In Chapter 12 he asks, “Where do Lonergan’s ideas lead?” To understand the role of this chapter it may be useful to ask, “Where does this book lead?” This brings us to the question of style. McShane is a demanding writer. His style is fundamentally pedagogical where the reader is virtually always part of the subject matter and is being challenged to lift his or her self-understanding or understanding of Lonergan. Again, in many cases the task is the same. Beyond this there are additional complexities of style. There is irony and complex metaphors and puns. There are cross-references to other parts of the book, including prior footnotes. Most demanding are references to other key texts where understanding these texts is key to understanding the book. The reader has to go to the texts to get the point. Though we can consider this book as full of answers to questions, it does not have the answers to many of the key questions asked, and deliberately so. So the book can be considered a node in a complex web of McShane’s and Lonergan’s texts where the reader is invited to follow the questions to come back to the book with the context to understand it. The discussions of functional history, functional biography, dialectic and general history all are examples. The last is a key topic of this final chapter where he presents his “...view of a solution to ‘the problem of general history, which is the real catch.’”

The reference is to the last chapter of Topics in Education which discusses history and lays out the problem. However, McShane never tells us what the problem is. Here is Lonergan’s synopsis.

This is the fundamental problem in general history: the reality with which it deals is not a conceptualization, not the realization of clearly formed concepts, and consequently it cannot be adequately represented by a conceptualization. It can be communicated artistically rather than

---

8 Lambert & McShane, p. 223.
conceptually. We are back at the problem that was evaded by speaking of the history of the sciences. The history of the sciences is the history of a movement that is strictly conceptual. But general history deals with intelligence living in the concrete. In the concrete there is not the separation of percept and feeling, of understanding and willing, of judging and deciding and choosing. They are organically one, and consciousness is undifferentiated.\(^9\)

In fairness to McShane, providing this quotation does not really tell us what the problem is, but is only an indication taken from its broader context in *Topics in Education* and serves as a pointer to that work. And we can keep contextualizing until we get to our and Lonergan’s minds themselves. But in fairness to the reader, it would have been helpful to provide more detail in framing the issue, as both it and McShane’s solution are complex enough.

The discussion is a valuable contribution to the understanding of Lonergan’s thought. It is too wide ranging to provide a synopsis. The style is self-described as a pastiche. It is a pastiche of points and pointers. Of particular value are McShane’s distinction of four understandings of generalized empirical method and his critique of Lonergan’s account of history in *Method* as not being functional history.

McShane’s style invites a rereading of the book. This is not meant in the normal sense where you read a book from start to finish and then read it again. Because of the cross-references and the interweaving of themes you need to reread the book *while* reading it. This is also the only way to understand how all three parts form a unity. There are themes running through the work that are key to understanding the whole as a biography. Among them are the loneliness of the solitary climber, the frustration of a true vocation deferred, the counterfactual possibilities of a life and the continual beginnings required of even the highest achievers. And of course there is the invitation to understand the achievements of Lonergan by understanding ourselves and thereby understanding both his and our biographies.

---

9 Bernard Lonergan, CWL 10 254.