LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 7
Editor's Note

It is great to have Patrick H. Byrne once again lead off our issue of *Lonergan Workshop*. As the mainstay of Boston College's "New Scientific Visions" year of its PERSPECTIVES Program, Pat uses Lonergan's way of heeding Einstein's famous advice to pay attention to what scientists do rather than to what they say to reveal how the exact sciences no less than systematic theology or poetry provide a window upon the mystery of the Cosmic Word. Here we have a sample of the way Pat works in a paper on the foundations of modern mathematics.

We are always honored to have a contribution from the seemingly tireless and ever creative Frederick E. Crowe, President of Toronto's Lonergan Institute and Editor-in-Chief of Lonergan's *Collected Works*. His paper complements his oft-cited earlier essay on Lonergan's notion of value; and it gives us an idea of the shape *Method in Theology* might have taken if Lonergan had written it after having reached the full clarity he attained in the 1970s about consciousness's two ways 'from-below-upwards' and 'from-above-downwards.'

Fr. Crowe's close associate at the Institute and Co-editor, Robert M. Doran, specifies with helpful precision the affective dimensions of the times of Ignatian discernment in his essay; it integrates feelings and cognitive structure in order to clarify dialectic for us in a way that only one who has explored the psyche as well as lived the *Spiritual Exercises* could undertake to do.
Fr. Crowe's outstanding student and professor at the seminary in Buffalo, Peter Drilling, offers us one of the all-too-rare applications of Lonergan's categories to the theological thinking-through of the pastoral issue of preaching and hearing God's Word.

Charles Hefling's dialectical treatment of Schleiermacher is one of the best pieces on that great nineteenth-century theologian I have ever read. It ranks with work by Barth, Gadamer, and by Gadamer's student, Heinz Kimmerle, providing a virtually definitive account of the apparent similarity between him and Lonergan long since suggested by theologians such as Langdon Gilkey and George Lindbeck.

Glenn "Chip" Hughes makes his first appearance in *Lonergan Workshop* as co-author with one of our perennial contributors, Sebastian Moore, in an article which combines richness of literary allusiveness with depth of psychological understanding. It helps to illuminate the interplay of cognitional structure and affectivity as they develop and mediate each other. Chip's fellow Washington native, the genial teacher and scholar Thomas J. McPartland, also joins the ranks of our newcomers in this issue. His paper shows how fertile the relationship between the kind of intellectual history plied by his colleagues Eugene Webb and Rodney Kilcup and the seminal suggestiveness of Lonergan's thought can be.

The papers of Kenneth Melchin, Quentin Quesnell, and Terry Tekippe operate more strictly within Lonergan's sets of basic terms and relations. Ken Melchin's dense and rather technically expressed essay supplies us with an amazingly terse summary of the ideas spelled out in a more leisurely fashion in his recent book, *History, Ethics and Emergent Probability*: 
Ethics, Society and History in the work of Bernard Lonergan (University Press of America, 1987). Quentin, who is a man of so many parts, brings the professional competence of scripture scholar to an exposition of Lonergan’s interpretation theory. Quentin has a knack for avoiding unnecessary complexity that is unusual among Lonergan exegetes. This avoidance is utterly for the sake of clarifying the real complications of the issues he treats. Terry Tekippe, longtime Editor (with the late Michael O’Callaghan) of the essential Lonergan Newsletter, is like Ken a newcomer to this journal. He shares with Quentin this bent for being clear in his meditation on Lonergan’s structure of the human good vis-à-vis the contemporary crisis.

Bernard J. Tyrrell returns to the pages of our journal with a piece in which he once again displays his acumen for returning to the sources underlying Lonergan’s treatment of some important issue. This time the issue is feelings as intentional responses to values in Method in Theology. Bernie uses great sensitivity and economy in comparing and contrasting Lonergan’s thoughts with those upon whom he depended.

Finally we must once again thank all those workers without whom this issue of Lonergan Workshop would never see the light of day: word-processors, Paul and Paulette Kidder and Marcia Mulligan; manuscript editor and general factotum, Charles Hefling; business manager, Pat Byrne; and the many proofreaders, especially Pat Brown.

Fred Lawrence
Boston College
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INTRODUCTION

This paper came out of my attempt to contribute to the theme of the 1981 Lonergan Workshop—"The Mind and the Mystery of Christ." I have attempted to explore that theme from my own scholarly speciality, namely the philosophy of science and mathematics. The title of my contribution suggests a connection between mystery and modern mathematics, a connection which must seem baffling to both practitioners of present-day Christianity and to contemporary mathematicians.

On the one hand, mathematics is taken to be a complete, comprehensive, closed, logically rigorous and systematic discipline. Mathematicians, it is held, postulate basic concepts and axioms from which all of mathematical knowledge can be logically deduced, thereby yielding a systematic organization in which nothing is left out. The supporters of such a view extol mathematics not only for its completeness, but for its rationality, which is taken to be its ability to systematically face up to the consequences of its position no matter how startling. Detractors from mathematics so understood attribute its successes to arbitrary definition and manipulations of abstract symbols. They detect therein totalitarian ambitions to dominate nature and humanity, to eliminate every vestige of what is irreducibly human (the Lebenswelt), as well as every vestige of religious mystery.

Mystery, on the other hand, is taken to be that which is properly unintelligible and irrational, that which runs counter to and defies comprehension. Those who cherish and praise mystery do so precisely because it disrupts oppressive 'rational'
orderliness (even at times citing 1 Corinthians 1:17-25 in support of their position, in a way which fails to distinguish between the reality and the pretense of rationality). Those who find the notion of mystery repulsive do not disagree with their opponents about the nature of mystery. To them it is indeed the force of irrationality which threatens to plunge the world into nihilism. They disagree only with the positive evaluation held by the proponents of mystery.

This apparent conflict between mystery and modern mathematics, and the real conflict between various groups identifying themselves with one pole or the other, constitute a deep and serious problem within our contemporary culture. It is my intention here to show how the work of Bernard Lonergan can help in clearing a way toward the resolution of these conflicts. My effort is divided into three parts. First, a discussion of Lonergan's interpretation of Mystery will be presented, along with a brief consideration of the way Mystery differs from the irrational forces of nihilism. Second, a historical outline of the evolution of the modern mathematical concept of infinity will be presented. In the third section, the historical outline will be transposed into the framework of intentionality analysis. This analysis will reveal that the link between Mystery and modern mathematical understanding of infinity is to be located in the self-transcending dynamism of human consciousness, the unrestricted desire to know and love. The analysis will include a brief discussion of relevant elements of Lonergan's philosophy of mathematics. The paper will conclude with some indications of the tasks that lie ahead in order to promote the connection between mystery and modern mathematics.

1. MYSTERY, MYSTERIES, AND MYTH

In order to avoid the pejorative connotations of 'mystery,' I shall introduce the label, Mystery, to stand for a radically different meaning than that sketched in the Introduction to this
paper. That radically different meaning has been discussed by Bernard Lonergan in *Insight* and in *Method in Theology*. In those discussions, Lonergan also related Mystery to a plural term, 'mysteries,' and contrasted both with what he called 'myth.' The intention of the present section is to explicate Lonergan's discussions of Mystery, mysteries, and myth. In doing so, it will be seen that what is *commonly* meant by 'mystery' is most closely associated with what Lonergan designates as 'myth.'

In *Insight*, Lonergan engaged in an analysis of the distinctions and interrelations within the undifferentiated "primary field of mystery and myth" (Lonergan, 1957: 531-549) when he turned to apply his method of metaphysics dialectically to the data on "concrete historical process" (530). To apply the method dialectically means to take actual historical conflicts between the actions and expressions of individuals and groups of individuals as the starting point. From there, one moves to identify the sources of conflict—for example, conflicts due merely to differences in specialization or stage of development

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1In a 1970 interview, Lonergan remarked that "there is a terminological difficulty with the usage of 'myth' in *Insight.*" (Lonergan, 1974: 225) indicating that his use of the term is at variance with contemporary scholarly usage. Most notably, contemporary scholars are reacting against trends which depreciated all non-scientific symbolisms. They seek to restore an appreciation of the authentic meanings of myths. For Lonergan, however, 'myth' originally denoted a distortion of mystery. His remark seemed to indicate that he would bring his terminology in line with more common usage. However, the publication of *Method in Theology* two years later did not reveal any significant change in his terminology from that found in *Insight.* I believe this is because contemporary scholarly usage frequently lacks the precision of Lonergan's distinction between mysteries and myths. Within contemporary scholarship, there is a tendency to focus on visual or auditory structures of expressions in correlation with certain intentional experiences, but without a clear specification of the acts of meaning and their sources in the dialectic of the 'already out there now real' versus the unrestricted desire. Hence, in writing about this field, one is caught in something of a terminological dilemma. If, on the one horn, one follows Lonergan's usage, one seems to give a pejorative evaluation not just to some, but to all expressions which contemporary scholars classify as 'myth.' On the other horn, however, if one follows the more generally accepted usage, one runs the risk of failing to differentiate expressions directed toward nihilism from those oriented toward transcendence. One solution would be to introduce a whole new set of terms, eliminating the use of 'myth' altogether. I fear, however, that this would only serve to multiply misunderstandings and thus, for better or worse, have decided to adopt Lonergan's usage here.
(Lonergan, 1972: 236). The proper concern of method as dialectic, however, is with the actual conflicts whose sources lie in oppositions between positions and counterpositions, in the presence or absence of conversions. Because the deepest of conflicts are conflicts concerning the ultimate nature of our universe, and because a stance regarding that ultimate nature is humanly inescapable, Lonergan first turned to the task of providing an outline of likely dialectical oppositions on the nature of Mystery.

Lonergan's method of metaphysics— as well as the more general, transcendental method of Method in Theology— is grounded in the self-appropriation of the structure of human consciousness. The possibility of a non-arbitrary distinction between positions and counterpositions, between presence and absence of conversions, is likewise grounded in the objective knowability and normativity of this structure. Hence, Lonergan began his discussion of Mystery by referring back to this structure. It will facilitate matters, therefore, to briefly recall some of the less frequently noted characteristics of the structures of human consciousness, as a preliminary to the discussion of Lonergan's discussion of Mystery.

First, Lonergan's theory of consciousness was intended as an explanatory account of insight and other acts of human consciousness. However, by "explanatory" Lonergan did not mean the mechanistic, reductionistic conceptions of scientific explanation which so vexed Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl when applied to human consciousness. Rather, Lonergan drew upon David Hilbert's innovation of 'implicit definition' in the field of geometry— where terms and relations mutually define one another— as the paradigm for fully explanatory accounts (Lonergan, 1957: 12-13). Yet there is a significant difference between Hilbert's use of implicit definition and Lonergan's use. While the terms and relations of Hilbert's geometry are conceptual, the terms and relations of Lonergan's theory of consciousness are, not words or concepts, but the consciously occurring acts and dynamisms of a concretely existing subject (1957: 272-275, 332-335). It is for this reason that this theory cannot be properly separated from the personal
achievements of self-appropriation. The statements employed to formulate the theory will appear merely formal or abstract if this intrinsic connection with actually occurring conscious activities is overlooked or forgotten.

Second, the approach via implicit definition makes clear that conscious acts and dynamisms never occur in isolation. The terms are conscious acts. These acts can be distinguished, according to their inherent degree or level or quality of consciousness (the type of experiencing that accompanies and is intrinsic to them), into acts of experience, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. The relations are the dynamisms of a level of consciousness bringing itself to act in awakening, inquiry, reflection, or deliberation. In other words the dynamisms are the successively differentiated levels in the overall project of human self-transcendence. Thus, an act of experience is defined as that which is presupposed by an act of insight through intelligent inquiry. An insight is defined as what presupposes acts of experience which have been inquired into, and what is presupposed by acts of formulation and judgment. The remainder of the definitions follow this pattern.

Third, the relations between acts are not abstract universals, any more than experiencing, understanding, judging, or deciding is an abstract universal. In Lonergan’s theory of consciousness, the appeal to the subject as foundational means an appeal to a concretely existing unity-identity-whole of experiences, thoughts, judgments, values, and decisive actions. The subject as subject is not merely the unity of distinct acts, but the unity of acts as concretely related to one another. Furthermore, such relations go beyond the particular inquiries which relate particular experiences to particular insights, the particular reflections which relate particular formulations to particular judgments, particular deliberations which relate particular insights and feelings to particular judgments of value and decisive actions. Beyond these particular relations of acts there is an overarching dynamism of human self-transcendence, the unrestricted desire to know and love. This unrestricted desire concretely relates insights to insights as each insight gives rise to further questions, the further questions to still
further insights and so on. In a similar fashion the unrestricted desire concretely relates contexts of judgments to one another and ranges of decisions to one another in a unique, developing (and sometimes even declining) pattern. So, Lonergan arrived at the foundational character of the subject as subject, not by means of some impoverishing abstraction about the subject, but by being more concrete than any other philosopher in this regard. Through his more concrete approach, Lonergan discerned the self-transcending dimension of consciousness which is immanent in the concrete activities of the subject as subject.

These preliminary recollections provide the background for Lonergan's discussions of Mystery in Insight and in Method in Theology. In Insight, Lonergan introduced his discussion of the field of Mystery and myth by drawing attention to the fact of a "known unknown" (1957: 531-532). From the dynamism of human consciousness Lonergan had established that being—all that is—is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know and love (1957: 348-357). In a sense, then, the subject is aware of being—'knows' of being in a certain sense—through the unrestricted desire's operative presence in his or her conscious acts. But that 'knowledge' of being is not the full knowledge mediated through understanding and judgment, but the anticipatory knowledge of questioning. Moreover, precisely because the desire is unrestricted, everyone experiences the fact that their questions run far ahead of their answers. Hence, the unrestricted desire to know and love which is the core of human subjectivity is consciousness of an objective which is for the most part unknown—a "known unknown."

In Insight, the 'known unknown' (and therefore the unrestricted desire) is identified as the basis of Mystery. Lonergan does not specify Mystery in terms of the unrestricted desire alone, but in terms of the connection between the unrestricted desire and the psyche. By 'psyche' Lonergan means the dimension of conscious functioning whereby activated neurological states are selected, edited, and integrated into experiential consciousness (1957: 185-191). It has already been noted that in human beings experiential consciousness is
constituted through its dynamic relationship to intellectual, rational, and moral self-transcendence. Hence, Lonergan observes that the human psyche must possess a 'dynamic orientation' of its own in order to permit psychic representations to keep pace with higher levels of development (1957: 532; see also 451-479). In other words, since insights are always into images (that is, psychic representation), the human psyche must have an orientation which develops its capacity to supply images in a fashion that parallels developments in understanding, judgment, and value.

From these observations, Lonergan concludes that "such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of un_plumbed depths that accrued to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments" (1957: 532). Lonergan goes on to suggest that Rudolf Otto's *Idea of the Holy* documents a variety of manifestations of this orientation in various cultures. Perhaps somewhat more familiar to the reader are the feelings of strangeness, wonder, and awe elicited by an occasional sunset, a view from a mountain's peak, photographs of the planet Saturn taken by Voyager I, or the scanning across the surface of a massive space cruiser in the most recent science fiction films. In each case, there is a visual suggestion of the vastness of space and time. These phenomena appear so vast and oneself so small by comparison! What seems to be more to the point is an affective apprehension of the sweeping range of questions yet to be raised concerning data to be found in such ranges of space and time, and the limits of one's own meager achievements of understanding and judgment.

Mystery, then, means consciousness of strangeness, wonder, awe; the feeling of un_plumbed depths on the psychic level—that is, on the level of experiencing. More accurately, Mystery is this consciousness as being in a dynamic correspondence with the unrestricted desire to know and love which operates not on the psychic level but on the levels of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. It is this consciousness in its primordial and undifferentiated sweep. This is the principle meaning of Mystery in the context of *Insight*. 
It should be noted that Lonergan's citation of *The Idea of the Holy*, and my examples, move beyond consciousness of Mystery in its primordial and undifferentiated sweep, for they invoke images in order to elicit this consciousness. Hence, Lonergan draws attention to the fact that feelings of unplumbed depths in fact become "integrated in the flow of psychic events inasmuch as they are preceded by distinctive sensible presentations or imaginative representations and inasmuch as they issue forth in exclamations and bodily movements, in rites and ceremonies, in song and speech" (1957: 531). According to Lonergan the "primary field" of Mystery "consists in the affect-laden images and names" which are evocations of the consciousness of unplumbed depths and facilitate the integration of such feelings within concrete human living. While consciousness of Mystery itself is primordial and undifferentiated, such images are not. They may be referred to either as 'mysteries' or as 'myths.' Insofar as such images serve to keep psychic functioning in a dynamic correspondence with the self-transcendence of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility, they are to be called 'mysteries'\(^2\) (1957: 547). On the other hand, insofar as the images themselves (or the sensible objects they represent), rather than the 'known unknown,' are taken as the proper objectives of awe, Lonergan referred to them as 'myths.'\(^3\) Myths, as Lonergan uses the term, weaken or shatter the essential connection between the consciousness of awe and the unrestricted desire through a refusal to abandon the imaginable as the essential criterion of reality—the 'already out there now' type of reality. Myths in this sense range all the way from the symbols, stories, and practices of undifferentiated consciousness where mysteries and myths interpenetrate, through the numerous varieties of idolatry, to the expressions of nihilistic rebellion which Eric Voegelin has termed "Apocalyptic Nightmare" (Voegelin, 454). Clearly, myths in this sense involve some form of abandonment of

\(^2\)Moreover, since all experiences can be inquired into, the whole sensible world can be an evocation of Mystery. See Lonergan, 1957: 689.

\(^3\)See footnote 1.
intelligence, reason, and responsibility. Hence, those who count themselves among the detractors of mystery are correct in their opposition insofar as they intend to oppose myths in this technical sense. However, Mystery and mysteries do not involve such an abandonment. Rather, they are essential to the concrete possibility of living in fidelity to the unrestricted desire to know and love, of being intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

What I have outlined thus far is the specification of Mystery and mysteries and their opposites in *Insight*. But Lonergan also discusses these issues in *Method in Theology* (1972: 104-124, 320-324, 340-347). There he again takes as his starting point the unrestricted desire to know and love which is essential to human subjectivity, but moves his discussion in a different direction. Lonergan notes that the analysis of human consciousness reveals a natural and spontaneous orientation from acts on the experiential level towards acts of loving. One might say that human beings experience in order to understand, understand in order to know, know in order to grasp values, grasp values in order to decide, decide in order to love; and that loving reaches its fulfillment in unrestricted loving. All acts of human consciousness are therefore oriented toward loving, and, because the dynamism of human consciousness is unrestricted, all human activity is naturally oriented to being in love in an unrestricted fashion—being in love with God (Lonergan, 1972: 105; see also 1957: 692). Hence, being in love in an unrestricted fashion, being in love with God, is the basic and proper fulfillment of conscious intentionality (1972: 105-106). From a strictly natural point of view, that fulfillment would have to be the end of an indefinitely long and arduous process of raising and responding to all manner of questions and, once the fact of Sin is admitted, such a fulfillment is recognized to be a virtual impossibility. However, deeper analysis of human consciousness reveals that this basic fulfillment, while it cannot be achieved by human power alone, is nonetheless received as a gift beyond human activity. In the Christian context it is named God’s grace. Lonergan’s reflections on Mystery in *Method in Theology* take their point of departure from this fact.
To speak of unrestricted being in love as an accomplished basic fulfillment of the self-transcending movement of human consciousness is to speak of that love as conscious. Otherwise it remains simply beyond any conscious desiring. However, consciousness of being in love with God differs significantly from consciousness of un plumbed depths in the sense of consciousness of Mystery in *Insight*. Lonergan calls unrestricted being in love a "conscious dynamic state" and remarks that to "say that dynamic state is conscious is not to say that it is known" (1972: 106). For Lonergan, consciousness is not a content of some inward, introspective look (1958: 320); rather, it is an awareness, an experiencing that accompanies and is intrinsic to the acts we call conscious (1972: 106; see also 1967: 173-192). Moreover, being in love in an unrestricted fashion is not the type of consciousness simply found on the psychic level. It is the consciousness-as-experience that accompanies acts of deliberating, valuing, deciding, and acting. Hence, the experience of being in love with God differs as radically from the experience of unplumbed depths as the fourth level of human consciousness differs from the first.

As Lonergan has so frequently pointed out, human knowing is not a simple matter of experiencing, but a matter of correctly judging one's understandings of one's experiences. Hence, experiencing without correlative understanding and judging is not knowing. If being in love with God proceeded naturally, from below upward, then it would entail an unrestricted understanding of everything about everything, an unrestricted knowing of the nature and scope of the Being whose being is unrestricted being-in-love. However, because unrestricted being in love comes as a gift from beyond immanently generated conscious activity, it is initially only experience and, as such, what is being experienced is unknown. Moreover, because as a dynamic state it is unrestricted, consciousness of being in love with God occurs as an experience of a transcendent unknown, as transcendent Mystery (1972: 340-341). According to Lonergan, this is what is properly meant by 'religious experience.'

Let me pause for a moment to stress the intrinsic connection between being in love in an unrestricted fashion, and
the unrestricted desire to know and love. Just as Lonergan's discussion of Mystery in *Insight* is tied to that dynamism of human consciousness, so also is the discussion of Mystery in *Method in Theology*. As Lonergan notes, "when the love of God is *not strictly associated with* self-transcendence, then easily indeed is it reinforced by the erotic, the sexual, the orgiastic" and, one might add, all the aberrations and horrors of the history of humanity (1972: 111; emphasis added).

Something further needs to be said regarding the way in which consciousness of Mystery on the fourth level relates to the rest of conscious functioning. Being in love in an unrestricted fashion does not imply abolishing or brushing aside questions. Quite to the contrary, far from undermining the validity of questioning, this dynamic state is intrinsically connected with questioning as its basic fulfillment. Moreover, while the dynamic state is the *basic* fulfillment of questioning, it is not the *apical* fulfillment. Since unrestricted being in love is simply *basic* fulfillment, it leaves all particular questions intact, for it does not answer them. Yet it does liberate the unrestricted desire to know and love as natural from the smothering manifestations of Sin in bias. Again, it adds to the natural desire a fervor and devotion that come from absorption with the Beloved. Since God is identical with the unrestricted act of understanding which understands everything about everything, identical with truth itself, and identical with the *summum bonum*, this experience of Mystery can add to the natural but easily swayed curiosity for discovery, correct judgment, and right living the passionate absorption of a lover for the Beloved. Far from being antithetical to intelligence and reason, the experience of Mystery on the fourth level is the very perfection of reasoning.

While the undifferentiated experience on the fourth level is thoroughly compatible with intelligent, reasonable, and moral self-transcendence because it is their basic fulfillment, the same cannot always be said concerning the ways in which that being in love is expressed in the actual words and deeds of human subjects. Lonergan has devoted much writing and course material to the problem of the dialectical development of religious expression, but adequate discussion of that subject is
beyond the scope of this essay. Two points, however, can be noted for the present. The first is that every expression of Mystery on the fourth level is the expression of an insight. As such, it is always a limited expression. Insofar as Mystery is attributed either to the limited expression or to the image which gives rise to the represented insight, one is caught in myth in the pejorative sense. Second, to grasp the expression as limited means to grasp the intrinsic connection between the experience of Mystery and the unrestricted desire. In other words, the more one achieves self-appropriation the more the genuine fulfillment of Mystery will not to be distorted into myth which involves an abandonment of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to a greater or lesser extent. Now all expressions of Mystery which maintain this intrinsic connection between the experience of Mystery and the native unrestricted desire to know and love can be called 'mysteries.' Strictly speaking, however, 'mysteries' refers to expressions of Mystery which transcend the natural capacities of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. Consequently mysteries are not incompatible with reason but go beyond any finitely attained reasons. In the strictest sense, then, they are revelations by God, and the value of accepting them as true expressions of Mystery is apprehended by the subject who recognizes the expression of the Beloved (1972: 320-323, 344-351).

The foregoing can be summarized by paraphrasing Philip McShane: there is an upper and a lower ground of Mystery. The lower ground is the dynamic principle on the psychic level of consciousness which apprehends in feeling the unplumbed depths of the 'known unknown.' The upper ground is the dynamic state on the fourth level of consciousness which is an unrestricted being in love with a transcendent unknown. Both grounds remain truly Mysterious only insofar as they are linked with the unrestricted desire to know and love. Moreover, the two grounds require one another for completion. By itself, the lower ground of Mystery evokes only feelings of awe, smallness, worthlessness. In a world permeated by Sin, it cannot be transcended by understandings and judgments that grasp the unrestricted benevolence of the unknown nor by decisions
which accept that benevolence. By itself, the lower ground of Mystery would collapse into anxiety and despair, where seemingly the only way out is the orgiastic embrace of nihilism passing itself off as heroism. The upper ground, by itself, is an unrestricted state requiring translation into the restricted conditions of one's concrete living. Without such translation, one is prone to forms of absolutism, dogmatism, and naiveté which assure one of one's own salvation while blinding one to the sources of evil within oneself. Finally, both the lower and upper grounds of Mystery are the conditions for the possibility of sustained intellectual, reasonable, and moral self-transcendence.

2. MODERN MATHEMATICS AND INFINITY

I turn now to the second concern of this essay, namely modern mathematics. Clearly, a comprehensive study is not possible here. My intention is to identify the connection of certain developments in modern mathematics with the foregoing discussion of Mystery. That connection could be drawn between Mystery and any one of several mathematical developments, but I have chosen to focus on the topic of infinity in modern mathematics. That topic has a certain privileged relationship to the issues of Mystery. However, somewhat surprisingly, the relationship regards not the concepts of infinity but the generative context of those concepts.

The concern with infinity in mathematics is probably as old as the discipline itself. Thus the modern concern with mathematical infinity has a long pre-history, and it would be difficult to say exactly when reflections on infinity became properly modern. What is clear, however, is that by the late seventeenth century, the development of the calculus independently by Newton and Leibniz had established infinity as a central and foundational concept in what is generally regarded as the crowning achievement of modern mathematics.

In its initial steps, the calculus dealt with problems of finding tangents and quadratures, especially as these pertained
to the mathematical analysis of motion. To put the matter descriptively (and somewhat inaccurately for certain classes of curves), finding a tangent is a matter of finding a line which just touches a curve at a given point and no other. A familiar illustration is that of a tangent to a circle—any line passing through one and only one point of the circle and simultaneously perpendicular to the diameter through that point. (See figures 1 and 2.)

Figure 1: Tangent to a circle
Figure 2: Tangent to a curve

Figure 3: Area bounded by a curve and two straight lines
Finding a quadrature, on the other hand, is a matter of determining the area constituted by the intersection of a given curve with one or more straight lines. For ancient mathematicians, finding a quadrature meant constructing a rectilinear figure (normally a square—hence the name, quadrature) equal in area to the enclosed figure. In the modern period, however, the problem shifted to determining a number which would be correlated with the area if one possessed a formula or equation which was associated with the curve. (See Figure 3.)

Prior to Newton and Leibniz, various techniques were devised for finding tangents and quadratures for various classes of curves. Descartes, for example, used the familiar properties of tangents to circles as the basis for finding tangents to more complicated curves. (Boyer, 1949: 166.) Newton and Leibniz improved upon these disparate sets of techniques by discovering a general and systematically unified approach to the entire range of these problems. They were able to accomplish this feat because they realized, independently of one another, that finding a tangent was the inverse process of finding a quadrature and vice versa (Boyer, 1949: 187-192, 203-206). In other words, in order to find the quadrature of a difficult curve, one merely needed to view the given curve as holding the solution to a tangent problem, and work backwards. In most cases this inverse procedure was much easier than the direct approach.

Newton and Leibniz expressed their discoveries in sets of rules: to find the quadrature for this sort of curve, do thus and so. While the results of their rules were substantially the same, the terms they employed in formulating their rules reflected differences in their ways of justifying both the rules and the more general theorem that finding tangents and finding quadratures are inverse processes. That these differences were significant is testified to by the great and in some ways intemperate controversy between the two which focused on the priority, independence and adequacy of their attempts at justifying their conclusions. It is in these justifications that their assumptions concerning mathematical infinity are found, and for
this reason mathematical infinity became such a foundational issue in modern mathematics.

Central to the justifications of both Newton and Leibniz were calculations involving infinitesimal quantities. Descriptively, those calculations went very roughly like this: (1) Consider how a curve is correlated with a certain parameter. (2) Let that parameter be increased by the addition of an infinitesimal quantity. (3) Calculate how the curve changes with this increment. (4) Divide by the infinitesimal quantity. (5) Neglect any remaining infinitesimal quantities, and the result will be the instantaneous rate of change of the curve. A fundamental difficulty, however, arose with regard to neglecting or deleting these infinitesimal quantities at crucial stages in the calculations. What justified the deletion of these quantities at these stages?

Newton's account of the justification for this procedure passed through three stages, but the underlying idea is basically the same. In order to determine the area under a curve, one must advert to the motion which generates that curve and area. During any infinitely small interval of time, the motion will produce a momentary increase or 'moment' in the area. The rate at which the area increases can be had by dividing the moment of area by the infinitely small time interval, and neglecting the remaining infinitely small terms. Perhaps in order to avoid some of the arbitrariness of admitting infinitesimals at one point only to neglect them at another, Newton later explained his procedures by means of approximations to 'prime and ultimate ratios.' Ratios of related parameters were considered over finite motions of generations which infinitely approached the last or first moment of generation. The existence of such prime or ultimate instants (and therefore, ratios) was guaranteed by the appeal of the geometrical, visual imaginability—the already-out-there-realness—of continuous motion as the intuitive source of such conception (Boyer, 1949: 193-198).

Leibniz, on the other hand, discovered that the inverse arithmetic operations of finding sums and differences underpinned the problems of finding tangents and areas. He
focused his attention on the problem of finding differences (differentials) between ordinate and abscissa values at two infinitely near points, since in his method derivatives (finding tangents) and integrals (finding quadratures) would involve calculations with these differentials. In his calculations, he would neglect terms which were 'infinitely infinitely' small in comparison with other quantities which were only infinitely small. He justified his procedures by an appeal, not to geometrical imagination, but to the coherence and intelligibility of the rules of his method—rules which he claimed were 'continuous' with the already well-known arithmetical operations of addition and subtraction, as one passed from operating on finite to infinitesimal quantities. Yet, despite his claim to ground his method in an intelligible 'law of continuity,' Boyer has shown that Leibniz likewise ultimately relied on geometrical intuition to justify his procedures (1949: 205-212).

Clearly, Newton and Leibniz skirted the conceptual difficulties posed by the infinite and the infinitesimal by appealing to geometrical imagination. As is clear from the above summaries, their justifications implicitly contained assumptions concerning the infinite. If neither Newton nor Leibniz was especially bothered by the disconcerting implications of these assumptions, several of their contemporaries—especially Bishop Berkeley—were, and quickly pointed out the inconsistencies in their justifications and methods (Boyer, 1949: 224-232; Berkeley, 1951). It took more than two centuries of mathematical developments to devise adequate concepts and to focus the basic problem of the calculus. While it is not possible here to enter into the details of these developments (see Boyer, 1949: 232-284; and Grattan-Guinness, passim), the basic issue can be stated as follows: the determination both of derivatives (tangents are but one example) and of integrals (quadratures are but one example) involves the determination of the limit of infinite series or sequences.
By an infinite series is meant an ordered set of numbers, for example,

1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, ... etc.
1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, ... etc.
1, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{6}$, $\frac{1}{24}$, $\frac{1}{120}$, ... etc.

(This is the same as
1, 1/1, 1/(1·2), 1/(1·2·3), 1/(1·2·3·4), 1/(1·2·3·4·5), ... etc.)

By an infinite sequence is meant what contemporary mathematicians refer to as a “series of partial sums,” for example,

1, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{4}$, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{4}$ + $\frac{1}{8}$, ... etc.
1, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{3}$, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{3}$ + $\frac{1}{4}$, 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{3}$ + $\frac{1}{4}$ + $\frac{1}{5}$, ... etc.
1, 1 + 1, 1 + 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 + 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{6}$, 1 + 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{6}$ + $\frac{1}{24}$, 1 + 1 + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{6}$ + $\frac{1}{24}$ + $\frac{1}{120}$, ... etc.

It is possible to show that any derivative or integral is the limit of such a series or sum.

Much of the research on nineteenth century analysis and number theory (the branches of mathematics concerned with these issues) was devoted to questions of the convergence of series and sequences. To put the matter imaginatively (and therefore somewhat inaccurately), for any given series or sequence, is there a number beyond which the series did not go? The answer proved problematic, for it rested on the answer to another question, namely, what is meant by “number”?

This problem can be illustrated if we refer back to the examples of series and sequences just presented. It is clear that all three series tend toward the number, 0 (zero), and their limit is said to be 0. On the other hand, each of the three sequences has a different limit. The first one tends toward the number, 2, and it can be shown that 2 is its limit. The second series simply keeps increasing with each additional term, and indeed does not converge on any number—it has no limit. The third sequence is problematic, however. Extend the sum to as
many terms as you or your computer like, and you will never compute a number greater than, say, 3. However, it is also possible to show that there is no rational number—no number having the form \( \frac{P}{Q} \), where \( P \) and \( Q \) are integers—which is the limit of this sequence. This would leave us with the rather strange set of circumstances that the sequence converges, but has no limit.

It would seem that one could resolve this issue by defining a new set of numbers as the limits of such convergent series. Unfortunately, this is circular reasoning, for it presupposes the existence of the limit (number) which it is supposed to be defining. The problem was solved in a truly arithmetic sense by Richard Dedekind and Karl Weierstrass, who defined a field of numbers (now known as 'real numbers') as an aggregate of rational elements. Certain of these aggregates could have an infinite number of elements (Boyer, 1968: 285-286; Jourdain, 17-23). Dedekind and Weierstrass were able to show that these aggregates were related both to one another and to the rational numbers by means of ordinary mathematical relationships such as well-ordering, addition, subtraction, multiplication, and so on. (Indeed, the work of Dedekind, Weierstrass, and others revealed that to be a number is to stand in such relationships.) In addition, these infinite aggregates served as independent definitions of the limits of the problematic sequences. The real numbers thus included ordinary rational numbers as well as irrationals. (These in turn were divided into algebraic irrational numbers and transcendental numbers. The limit of the last sequence above is a transcendental number designated by the symbol, \( e \).)

Clearly, although Dedekind and Weierstrass solved one sort of problem, they introduced another, for their theories of the real numbers reintroduced the old problem of the infinite—this time as infinite collections or aggregates. It fell to Georg Cantor, who was influenced by Weierstrass's work, to tackle this problem.

Cantor's work led him to reflect on "the different manners in which numerical magnitudes, finite or infinite in number, behave" (Jourdain, 25), and these reflections eventually led to
the theory of transfinite numbers. Cantor observed that the mathematical infinite appears in two forms: an improper and a proper infinite. The improper infinite is "a magnitude which either increases above all limits or decreases to an arbitrary smallness, but always remains finite" (59). The proper infinite transcends the finite—is trans-finite. While the concept of a greatest finite number leads to a logical contradiction, there is no logical contradiction involved in the concept of a new, non-finite number which is the first after all the finite numbers (54). To emphasize that his new numbers would be properly infinite, Cantor introduced the symbol, $\omega$, in place of the old symbol, $\infty$. In order to define his new, transfinite numbers, Cantor considered the ordinary series of positive integers.

$$1, 2, 3, \ldots, N, \ldots \text{ etc.}$$

The series "arises from the repeated positing and uniting of units" so that "the formation of the finite real numbers rests on the principle of the addition of a unit to a number [united units] which has already been formed" (56). It will be noted that the series of finite integers imposes an ordering, by the operation of adding, upon otherwise non-ordered units. (This is an issue which will be considered more carefully in the next section.) Cantor called this ordering operation 'the first principle of generation.'

Cantor recognized, however, that there was a kind of limit to this set of numbers. That is, although there were infinitely many such numbers, they were only the numbers ordered or generated by a determinate, limited principle of generation. Now, just as the symbol, $N$, expresses that a certain number of units is united into a whole, so also could one consider the whole which is determined by the first principle of generation itself, and represent that number by the symbol, $\infty$, which would be the first number after the integers. Moreover, further posittings of units allow one to define the next number, $\omega + 1$ and so on, so that a new series of numbers, represented by

$$\omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \omega + 3, \ldots, \omega + N, \ldots \text{ etc.}$$
can be generated. Moreover, the series of numbers generated by starting with \( \omega \) and adding further units also has a determinate wholeness, so that one can speak of that wholeness as the first number after the numbers in the series, and it is usually designated by \( 2\omega \). The operation which introduces \( \omega \) and \( 2\omega \) is clearly distinct from the operation which generates the integers, or the numbers having the form \( \omega + N \), and Cantor referred to it as the "second principle of generation" (57). This second principle is a matter of recognizing that a series has a principle of limitation, and that this recognition is itself a transcending of the limitation.

Numbers such as \( \omega, \omega + 1, 2\omega, 2\omega + N \), and, in general, any numbers generated through the repeated combinations of the first and second principles of generation, are referred to as 'transfinite ordinal numbers.' Thus, Cantor defined ranges of transfinite ordinals, briefly indicated by the symbols, \( \omega, \omega + 1, \ldots, 2\omega, 3\omega, \ldots, \omega\omega, \omega + 1, \ldots, \omega^2 + 1, \ldots, \omega^N \ldots, \omega^\omega \ldots, \eta \ldots \) etc. (The symbol, \( \omega^\omega \), means 'the first ordinal after the sequence of ordinals of the form \( A_N\omega^N + A_{N-1}\omega^{N-1} + \ldots A_0 \).') (Jourdain, 57-59).

Now, it might seem that one has reached the end of the transfinite (infinite) numbers by the repeated combinations of the first and second principles of generation, but this impression is mistaken. In order to see that this is so, it is necessary to draw attention to another notion of number known as cardinality. While ordinality refers to the position in an ordering, cardinality refers to the totality of units in a whole. Each set of five units is distinct from every other group of five units, yet they all have something in common that we call 'five.' But just what does that something in common consist in? It consists in the fact that every set of five stands in a one-to-one relationship with every other set of five. A one-to-one relationship means that each element in one of the two sets being related can be matched with exactly one element in the other set, with no element left over in either set.

The point can be made in a more descriptive fashion. Suppose, for a moment, you walk into a bank and notice a very large glass jar filled with jelly beans and next to it a sign reading "Guess the exact number of jelly beans in this jar and win a free
trip to Bermuda." Given the constraints imposed, no more than a guess would be possible. Yet ideally one would like to have those constraints removed so that an exact determination of the number of jelly beans would be possible (of course then there would be no contest). Given the ideal situation, what would one do in order to make that exact determination? One would first impose a serial ordering upon the jelly beans and then count them. Such a serial ordering could be had by lining them up spatially in a straight line, a zig-zag, a curve, or even in closed or intersecting figures. The only requirements are that the jelly beans not hop around while one is counting and that no one cheats by adding or subtracting jelly beans from the array when you are not looking—that is, they remain in the same serial ordering during the count. One could also impose a temporal serial ordering by removing the jelly beans one by one from the jar, and counting as each one is removed. The serial order will then be the temporal order of one's hand movements.

All this seems pretty obvious until one raises the question whether different serial orderings would produce different answers to the contest question. According to Jean Piaget, if you put that question to a seven-year-old child, he or she will suspect that different orderings produce different answers (Piaget and Szeminska, 1952). For them, unlike ourselves, it is still an open question. One might say that for children 'number' means serially-ordered numbers. On the other hand, people who achieve what Piaget calls the "formal operations period" operate in terms of a second notion of number. They do not expect that exchanging a red jelly bean for a yellow one will change the answer to "How many?" Neither will spreading out the total arrangement, realigning the beans into a different figure, or changing the order in which they are selected from the jar. Although this second notion of number depends upon the existence of some ordering, it is independent of any particular ordering. To put it more precisely, this notion of cardinal number is invariant under the group of transformations from one serial ordering to another because the transformations presuppose and preserve a one-to-one correspondence of the elements to the set we call the 'counting numerals.'
As long as one contemplates finite bank contests, each addition of another jelly bean to the jar will change the set of possible serial orderings and, at the same time, change the cardinal number. However, if one shifts from bank contests, jelly beans, and finite orderings to infinite sets of numbers, one discovers that these sets have the peculiar property that part of a set can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the whole set. (In fact, Richard Dedekind used this property to define infinite sets; see Boyer, 1949: 271.) For example, one would intuitively expect that there must be twice as many integers as there are even integers, since the even integers seem to be only half of all the integers. However, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the even integers and all the integers. (This can be seen from the following rule: "If you give me an even integer, I will tell you which among all the integers it corresponds to by dividing by two.")

If we now ask about the cardinality of the transfinite ordinals generated by the first and second principles of generation, we come to the discovery that they all share the same cardinality as the integers. Of course this is a rather startling discovery, since each application of the second principle of generation yields an ordinal number infinitely more infinite than those which precede it. Nevertheless, it can be shown that all ordinal numbers generated by combinations of the first and second principles have the same cardinality, which is, in fact, the first cardinality after the finite cardinalities. Cantor introduced the symbol, $\aleph_0$ (‘aleph sub zero,’ aleph being the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet) to designate this cardinality. He then employed another principle of generation (Jourdain, 59)—namely, that there would be a set of transfinite ordinals sharing the next transfinite cardinality after $\aleph_0$—namely, the transfinite ordinals of cardinality, $\aleph_1$. It can be shown that there would be a first such transfinite ordinal, and through repetitions of the first and second principles, a whole new series of transfinite ordinals could be introduced. Moreover, there would be infinitely many such series, since there would be no largest transfinite cardinal. Perhaps the most startling result of all, however, is that the generation of the idea of a cardinal number
of size \( \aleph_1 \) or larger is consistent with the supposition that its units can no longer be serially ordered. In other words there are so many that it is impossible to order them in such a way as to say, for any given unit, which unit is “next.” Hence, such sets are “non-countable” multitudes or aggregates. The very process of serial ordering itself is a limit which can be transcended. Finally, Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers supplied the needed ground upon which a rigorous definition of the real numbers could be built, so as to solve the problem of whether convergent sequences indeed possessed limits.

3. INTENTIONAL SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AS A PRINCIPLE IN MODERN MATHEMATICS

If one steps back for a moment from the detailed material covered only cursorily in the foregoing historical outline, one will notice throughout a process of limitation and that transcendence has been operating. In the calculus, sequences of rational numbers, when pressed to their limit, yield numbers with properties which transcend those of the rationals. When taken to their limit, the finite numbers open up a possibility of transfinite orderings of units which go beyond all finite orderings. The transfinite orderings themselves reach limits which generate numbers like \( 2\omega, 3\omega, \) and subsequently \( \omega\omega \). Even this serial generation of numbers is itself limited to a certain cardinality, and that limit, too, can be transcended into non-serial, non-countable orderings. If we inquire into the source of this transcendence, mathematics will not help us. I believe, however, that the work of Bernard Lonergan does prove most fruitful in answering this question, although he himself did not explicitly address this issue.

In order to gain an appreciation of Lonergan’s contribution to this problem, it is pertinent to return to the various series and sequences given as illustrations in section 2 of this essay, and notice that each one terminates in ‘etc.’ What does this ‘etc.’ mean? Intuitively, it would seem to mean, “one can go on
forever." This intuitive interpretation is upset, however, by the fact that in fact we do not go on forever—nor could we do so. Lonergan has noted this fact and has suggested a radically different interpretation:

As the acute reader will see, the one important element in the above series of definitions, is the etc., etc., etc. ... Without it, the positive integers cannot be defined; for they are an indefinitely great multitude; and it is only insofar as some such gesture as etc., etc., etc., is really significant, that an infinite series of definitions can occur. What, then, does the etc., etc., mean? It means that an insight should have occurred (Lonergan, 1958: 14).

When Lonergan stated that 'etc.' means an insight should have occurred, he meant that there is an intelligible relation to be grasped by understanding (by insight) which is the principle of order of any infinite sequence. This grasp of intelligible relation can occur in two ways. For the author of the sequence, it precedes the series or sequence, and guides the written expression of the elements. For the reader of the series or sequence, it is the grasp which figures out what principle governs the finitely expressed elements. In either case, it is unnecessary to write down the infinity of elements, because they add nothing further to the understanding of the relationship which underpins the series or sequence. Thus, an insight is simultaneously a principle of limitation and transcendence in an infinite series or sequence. It is a principle of limitation, for it is only one possible ordering of elements; it is a principle of transcendence for it goes beyond any finitely given set of elements to ground the possibility of further elements which stand in the same intelligible relationship. In the examples above, each element in a given sequence of sums is related to the other elements by one and the same intelligible law. (These laws may be expressed by the formulas, \( S_m = S_{m-1} + \frac{1}{2^m} \), \( S'_m = S'_{m-1} + \frac{1}{m} \), \( S''_m = S''_{m-1} + \frac{1}{m!} \), respectively. But these expressions would be meaningless arrays of symbols without an understanding—a grasp of the intelligible law of the sequence itself.)
While any insight is a limited principle of order, it is only known as limited once it has been transcended. In Lonergan's terms, the limitations of one's insight are grasped when the further questions lead to further insights. Historically, the limitations of the idea of number which formed the basis of the integers and rational numbers were not grasped until there arose questions of the convergence of sequences of sums of rational numbers, and a more general idea of numbering—of intelligible relations. Along this line, Cantor came to his insights into the transfinite numbers when he was working on a problem (a question) in point-set topology. In his work on that question, he discovered that a certain procedure need not reach a limit, even if it were to be repeated an infinite number of times (Jourdain, 30-38). Until this question took him beyond the classical infinite, he no more than anyone else suspected that it was a limit. Yet his discovery of that possibility requires a radically different way of conceiving of the foundations, the principles, of mathematics—hence his introduction of the principles of generation.

For most people—including most mathematicians and philosophers—the principles or foundations of numbers are things—or, to put the matter somewhat facetiously, jelly beans. Yet Cantor's insights and Lonergan's remarks on the foundations of mathematics force a revision of that view. It is not the thingness of jelly beans, but their individuality, which figures in the foundations of mathematics. Individuality pertains, not to intelligible unity-identity-wholeness (thingness), but to the discreteness of the empirical residue—of the aspects of human experience which would remain unexplained by a completed explanatory science (Lonergan, 1957: 25-29). To illustrate, among the data on jelly beans are their color, their shapes, their sweetness, their effects on children's teeth. Included in all these data are the discreteness or the continuity of these data. Rotate a jelly bean and its experienced shapes differ continuously—there are too many variations to count. But close your eyes, rotate it, and open them again, and the data differ discretely, individually. The data include experienced discreteness or continuity or both. What is countable is not
formally intelligible thingness (for this is one and nothing else) but the individuality of the data. One can count many discrete data on one thing without any difficulty.

Yet the discreteness or individuality of the empirical residue are merely the material aspect of the foundations of numbers. By comparison with what Lonergan called the 'formal' aspect, the material element pales in importance. As was indicated by the jelly-bean example, there can be no idea of number until the discrete data are given in some intelligible order—in other words, ordered in some way which only insight, understanding, can grasp. Moreover, to be an insight is to be an act concretely related to other acts by the unrestricted desire to know and love. Hence, for Lonergan, the foundation of numbers and of all mathematics is the unrestricted desire to know and love as it explores the possible intelligibility of anything which sufficiently resembles the empirical residue (Lonergan, 1957: 310-313).

This fact is confronted in an irreversible way in Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers. His first principle of generation is an insight grasping an invariant relationship underlying a series. That first principle is the insight as used, but not as appropriated. However, his second principle of generation involves both the appropriation of that insight—recognizing that the series is seriated by one, single idea and has a unity in virtue of that idea—and questioning its limits—is there any contradiction involved in positing a next after all such numbers? Is empirically residual discreteness intrinsically limited to this sort of ordering? In other words, if the first principle of generation is an insight generating empirically discrete yet ordered manifestations, the second principle is the unrestricted desire to know and love generating one insight from another. What Cantor gave mathematics was not an understanding of infinity, but a set of numerical ideas intimately connected with and intrinsically constituted by the unknown brought to awareness in the unrestricted desire. Hence, while few mathematicians or philosophers would put it in such terms, the unrestricted desire to know and love as the foundation of
mathematics has, in the work of Cantor at least, been manifested in a way that can still be opposed, but can no longer be ignored.

The link between Mystery and modern mathematics is now clear. Intrinsic to our experiences of Mystery is its connection with the unrestricted desire to know and love. Detached from that desire, one may experience intense excitement of all sorts, but there will be no experience of Mystery. Again, central to modern mathematics are the new ideas of number unknown to the ancients. Yet to show these ideas as intelligible, to remove the contradictions and restrictions found in the works of Newton, Leibniz and others, required a theory which located the unrestricted desire to know and love at the foundations of modern mathematics. Take away the connection between number and the unrestricted desire, and one engages in something that is no longer modern mathematics.

If the unrestricted desire forms the middle term between Mystery and modern mathematics, it remains that Mystery is only potentially constitutive of the lives of mathematicians, and mathematics, for the most part, only a potential path to Mystery for most. Yet the stirrings are there. One cannot help but experience a sense of the 'Fantastic!' in contemplating the prospect of an infinite set of infinities more infinite than one another. The connection was one Cantor himself experienced vividly (Dauben, 1979: 146-148).

Of course, this sense of Mystery is attained only insofar as one understands what Cantor was doing. In the absence of such understanding, the foregoing discussion is merely a baffling manifestation of symbols and there is no sense of Mystery, but rather of bewitchment. For the sense of Mystery comes with the consciousness of how unlimited the desire to know and love truly is, and each time we grasp the limitedness of our previous intellectual achievements by going beyond them, each time we grasp that a limited understanding is on the way to unlimited understanding, transcendent Mystery is manifested to us.

It remains the task for philosophers and theologians of mathematics to reverse the momentum of those affect-laden images of Mystery and modern mathematics produced by
modernity which prevent the connection from becoming actual and effective, and to develop new symbolic expressions of the doing of modern mathematics which will be simultaneously epiphanies of Mystery.
WORKS CONSULTED

BERKELEY, George


BOYER, Carl B.


CANTOR, Georg


DAUBEN, Joseph W.


DESCARTES, René

GRATTAN-GUINNESS, I.


JOURDAIN, Philip E. B.


LONERGAN, Bernard


MANHEIM, Jerome H.


MCSHANE, Philip


NEWTON, Isaac

PIAGET, Jean and SZEMINSKA, Alina


TRUEDELL, C.


VOEGELIN, Eric

Eleven years ago, during the first Lonergan Workshop held at Boston College, I gave a paper called "An Exploration of Lonergan’s New Notion of Value" (Crowe, 1977, 1982). If I move now from exploration to expansion, I am only following a course already mapped in a Boston College brochure, which describes this workshop as a "conference exploring and expanding the implications of Lonergan’s work." Of course, it is not just the implications of the work that need this double attention, but the work itself too; and so, having explored to some extent Lonergan’s work on the notion of value, I undertake now to expand it.

Not as if the task of exploring were completed. Even with the many studies now available—too many to take account of here—I would still maintain that we have only begun to explore Lonergan’s work on values, while its expansion is as yet little more than an idea. But the two tasks should go forward together, with attempts at expansion enabling us to explore more intelligently, and the resulting deeper understanding of the original helping us to achieve a more genuinely creative development. How much more intelligently, for example, do we read chapter 17 of Insight (Lonergan, 1957a) and explore its meaning, when we have at hand Lonergan’s own expansion of that chapter in the differentiated tasks of his later work on theological method (Lonergan, 1972: chapters 7 to 10; see 153, n.1).

Maybe that example of development from Insight to Method will serve also as a model for what I hope to do in this paper. In contrast to urban developments as we know them
today, where the first step is to bring in the wreckers and begin the work of demolition, I wish to develop Lonergan’s work, as he did himself, by drawing out what is already there in the potency of the original idea. He once remarked of such a thinker as Aquinas was, “what the span of mortal life or the limitations of his era force him to leave undone, that none the less already stands potentially within the framework of his thinking and the suggestiveness of his approach” (Lonergan, 1971: 140). There are those who favor, in their approach to Lonergan, a large measure of demolition and, in so far as that contributes to the human-divine world we are all engaged in building, let their work prosper. Myself, I continue to find it far more profitable to attend to what stands potentially within the framework of Lonergan’s thinking and the suggestiveness of his approach.

In this paper, then, I will attend to two notions that stand already within that framework. Both notions are general, but they suggest immediate implications in the field of values, with important consequences, I think, for that ‘crisis of the human good’ which is the theme of this workshop. They are, first, the two ways of human development and, secondly, the historical as opposed to the structural aspect of human consciousness.

I. THE TWO WAYS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

A brief, though rough, statement of my position under this heading is the following. During the years 1974 to 1977 there became fully explicit in Lonergan’s thinking and writing two contrasting ways of human development, one upward and creative, the other downward and traditional. These two ways were operative, but not thematized, in chapters 5 to 14 of *Method*. They were neither thematized nor sufficiently operative in chapters 1 to 4 of that book. And the work of expansion that I propose would make them thematic in chapters 5 to 14, and introduce them as a fully operative factor in chapters 1 to 4. That roughly is the position I have now to set forth, qualify somewhat, and justify.
What are these two ways that have emerged, for me at least, as a key factor in understanding Lonergan? Let us look at one of his own formulations of the idea.

[Human development occurs in two distinct modes. If I may use a spatial metaphor, it moves (1) from below upwards and (2) from above downwards.

It moves from below upwards inasmuch as it begins from one's personal experience, advances through ever fuller understanding and more balanced judgment, and so attains the responsible exercise of personal freedom.

It moves from above downwards inasmuch as one belongs to a hierarchy of groups and so owes allegiance to one's home, to one's country, to one's religion. Through the traditions of the group one is socialized, acculturated, educated (Lonergan, 1984: 10—with the correction of a minor misprint).

The first way will be fully familiar to students of Lonergan; from the 1940s to the 1980s it entered deeply into all his work. The second way is much less familiar, so let us see it again in a somewhat longer formulation.

[The handing on of development ... works from above downwards: it begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son, the pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows the growth in understanding of one who has found a genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one's growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptive by one's developed understanding (Lonergan, 1985: 181).

None of us, I trust, will give undue attention to the "spatial metaphor" of up and down movements: the type of image in use here is not the one that is the fertile source of insight; it is rather the type that is a handy mnemonic for an idea. Nor will we identify this pair of movements with the via analytica and via synthetica that figured prominently in Lonergan's Latin theology (1957b: 23-28; 1964a: 33-41); those are two ways of ordering ideas within the level of thought (with corresponding judgments, of course); but the present pair deals with the movement from one level of consciousness to another. Some of
us, however, will wish for what is so often necessary for an understanding of Lonergan's ideas: the history of their development in his thinking; if not the history of the upward movement—which may be well enough known—at least the history of the downward movement, which, so far as I know, has not been studied at all.

I cannot set forth that history here, but I will give a few pointers to guide further investigation. There is the pairing found already in Thomas Aquinas, and noted by Lonergan early in his career, of the *origin* and the *use* of insight. The act of insight originates in dependence on phantasm; it is a development from below. But acquired and now habitual insight is used in the other direction to call up the appropriate phantasm; it is development from above in the application of one's understanding. Now that pairing is explicit in the *verbum* articles of the late 1940s (1946: 376 = 1967a: 29; 1949a: 17 = 1967a: 156). A second pointer is the symbiosis of knowledge and belief. Knowledge is developed from below; it is a third step after experience and understanding. But belief is communicated in tradition; it is a handing on, or development from above. And that pairing receives a good deal of attention in *Insight* (1957a: 427-429, 706, and *passim*), with the downward path from the truth of faith to theological understanding being thoroughly studied in Lonergan's Trinitarian writings (1957b: 17; 1964a: 20-23). A third pointer is the fact that conviction can follow on our being in love. Love is fourth-level or maybe fifth-level activity, while conviction is third-level; to derive one's convictions from one's love is therefore development from above. And this idea, we may be surprised to learn, is already explicit in the Trinitarian treatise of 1957 (1957b: 179-180).

So we come to 1972 and *Method in Theology*, where, I have claimed, the two ways are operative but not thematized in chapters 5 to 14. They are clearly operative in the two phases of mediating and mediated theology: the first of these proceeds from the level of experience (data provided by research) through the levels of understanding (interpretation of the data) and judgment (the history of what really happened, of what was going forward) to the fourth-level challenge of values impelling
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us to decision (dialectic); the second phase moves through the four levels in the reverse order (1972: 133-136). Lonergan even speaks of the first phase as rising and of the second as descending (1972: 142). Nevertheless, that second phase, though following through the four levels the sequence of the downward movement, is not set forth in chapters 11 to 14 as resulting from a dynamism working from above. We shall see more on this presently, but my position may be tested at once in a preliminary way. Recall this passage from the essay, "Cognitional Structure": "human knowing is ... formally dynamic. It is self-assembling. self-constituting. It puts itself together. one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached" (1964b: 231 = 1967b: 223). Here we have the dynamism of the upward movement affirmed as a general principle. That principle is central to Lonergan's lifetime work. It reappears in chapter 1 of Method and it structures chapters 6 to 10; if those five chapters advert to it only occasionally, no more is necessary, so clearly is the principle operative there.1 But now consult the opening paragraphs of chapters 11 to 14, looking for a parallel dynamic to move one from foundations through doctrines and systematics to communications. One will not find it much in evidence. Nor should one expect to. If, as I believe, the first clear sketch of the dynamism at work occurs only in 1977 ("On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief"—as quoted above), we are hardly likely to find explicit advertence to it in 1972.

In my opinion then it was only in the period from 1974 to 1977 that the two ways, as a general idea of human development, each with its own dynamism but each also complementary to the other, came sharply into focus. The first

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1It was made operative in advance through the general basis given in chapter 5 where the upward dynamism of development is applied directly to the four specialties of chapters 6 to 10 (1972: 133, and again on p. 134). Notice that neither of these passages mentions the corresponding downward movement; and, even on p. 142, where this movement is mentioned, there is no discussion of its dynamism.

For a sample of particular advertence to the dynamism of the upward movement, see p. 246 on the task of adding (fourth-level) dialectic to research, interpretation, and history.
and rather groping effort to name the two ways in the present sense I would locate in "Mission and the Spirit," published only in 1976 but written, it seems, in 1974 (1976a: 76-77 = 1985: 32). The idea develops notably in "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections" (1976b: 48 = 1985: 76-77) and in "Healing and Creating in History" (1975: 63 = 1985: 106)—it's my surmise that this is the order of writing—to reach maximum clarity in two papers of 1977, one before The American Catholic Philosophical Association (1977a: 141-142 = 1985: 180-181) and the other before The Catholic Theological Society of America (1977b: 15 = 1985: 196-197). The emergence and repetition of a name that had not been used in this sense before, the clear progress in formulation from 1974 to 1977,2 the appearance of the idea in almost every paper Lonergan delivered during this period—all this evidence points to the breakthrough of a new insight and the thematization of what had not up to that time been attentively considered.

Of course, there occurs here the old problem of continuity versus development. It occurs in regard to any thinker of stature, and has been raised repeatedly in regard to Lonergan, some of us insisting more on the development, others more on the continuity. Where we put the emphasis matters less than understanding what went forward and assessing its significance. I have characterized the change from Method to post-Method writings as a progress from the operative to the thematic. Is that a significant change? As a type of change, I believe it is and I would adduce what seems to me an outstanding instance. For thousands of years, most of us would hold, the four levels of human consciousness have been operative: people have in fact noticed the data, tried to understand, raised in some way the

2What I take to be the first formulation, in "Mission and the Spirit" (1976a: 76-77 = 1985: 32) has the downward development move from God's gift of love through the three conversions; this is not the later formulation. Again, in "Christology Today" (1976b: 47 = 1985: 76) development is "ordinarily" from below upward; later formulations seem to put the two movements on an equal footing, so that both are "ordinary." There is a parallel development in Lonergan's ordering of knowing and loving. Some passages of Method (1972: 122, 278, 283, 340) make it an exception when love precedes knowledge, as it does in God's gift of love. I would not say it is an exception in later writings.
question of truth, and acted responsibly. Now, if we try to trace the emergence of this into thematic study, we might well take Plato as representing thematization of the intelligible, Aquinas as representing that of the existent, and Kierkegaard that of self-involving responsibility; and this in turn might incline us to agree that the thematic does indeed mark a significant step beyond the operative.³

But now, if there is any kernel of truth in my position, we have to go back to Method in Theology and ask what this work would look like, had Lonergan at that time conceived the two ways explicitly, and incorporated the idea into the structure of the volume. More to the point, how would we ourselves now incorporate it into Method? Personally, I would make little change in the Foreground chapters (that is, 6 to 14) or in chapter 5 that structures them; the two ways, I have claimed, are already operative there and could be made thematic with the introduction of little more than brief statements in the opening paragraphs of each chapter. Moreover, I have indicated the hints to be found already in chapters 6 to 10, on the dynamism at work to carry us from research through interpretation and history to dialectic; the problem is not so simple for chapters 11 to 14, but, in the backward light cast by the 1977 statements on the two ways, we should be able to find at work the dynamism that moves us from foundations through doctrines and systematics to communications. The Background chapters, however, where the two ways are not as such operative, are another story; what then would they look like if they were to incorporate the two ways?

My view is this. Chapter 1 is almost exclusively concerned with development from below, and so needs a complementary chapter (or section) to deal with development from above. Chapter 4, on the contrary, is almost exclusively concerned with

³Another way of putting the progression is to say that it goes from the universal in the particular to the universal set apart as universal and thus made available for use in myriad instances. Thus, the dynamism operative in foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications is a universal in the particular (or at least a genus in the species); but the universal set apart as a pattern is values, reflection, understanding, and experience.
development from above, and so needs its own complementary chapter or section to deal with development from below. Chapters 2 and 3 are somewhat different, not falling definitely into either pattern; both, however, would benefit from the organizing power the two complementary ways would provide.

Chapter 1, then, is almost entirely concerned with development from below. It deals with the basic pattern of operations, and that pattern shows a movement from experience through understanding and judgment to responsible decision. There is no attention to the development which begins in the affectivity of the infant, continues with apprehension of values, and goes on to belief and growth in understanding, to culminate in experience made mature and perceptive. For that second movement we need a whole new chapter; or, if we add a distinct part within the present chapter, the present treatment would be called, not "Method," but "Part One: Method in Development from Below," with the added section called "Part Two: Method in Development from Above."

One would base that second part on another and quite different dynamism. The dynamism of the upward movement is the eros of the human spirit (see 1957a: index, under "Dynamism"): it is the subject, the questioning subject, the subject as operator (1957a: index, under "Operator"). But in the new downward direction, the dynamism is not simply subjective; it is intersubjective, it is the intersubjective in its full range from spontaneous intersubjectivity to persons in community. We are "we" before we are "you" and "I" and this makes operative a dynamism of love that is quite distinct and different from the eros of Insight (1972: 57).

With the basic element defined and made thematic, we may go on to notice the great difference in modes of operation as the two dynamisms move us in opposite directions from level to level. To start at the top: it is one thing to move up from judgments of facts and values to a responsible decision (third

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4I use the word, intersubjectivity, to refer here to the full range of relations between subjects; this is not, I think, the particular use Lonergan sometimes makes of the term, as when it refers to the intersubjectivity that is "vital and functional," an intersubjectivity of "action and feeling" (1972: 57, 59).
level to fourth); it is quite another for a mother to ponder in love what is best for her child (fourth level to third). In the former we may well speak of duty as the "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God," but surely not in the latter. Or, to go to the bottom of the structure and the relation between image and insight: it is one thing to struggle for the upward emergence from the image to insight into the image (first level to second), and quite another to evoke images in illustration of an insight we already possess (second level to first). In the former case, as Lonergan said years ago, "we are at the mercy of fortune, the sub-conscious, or a teacher's skill ... in a ferment of trying to grasp we know not what," but in the latter "we can operate on our own, marshalling images to a habitually known end" (1967a: 29).

Let us turn to chapter 4 of Method, doubly fascinating now, for not only does it illustrate and confirm my general position, but also it ceases to be the puzzle it long has been in relation to chapter 19 of Insight. The main movement, then, in chapter 4 of Method follows a pattern exactly the opposite to that of chapter 1. Where the latter moves upward from experience to the existential self, and needs the addition of the complementary downward movement, this chapter in the main follows the line of development from above and needs the complement of development from below. For the key notion is certainly that of being in love with God. This is a dynamism that takes over the whole of life, a dynamism that dismantles old horizons to set up new ones, that appears in religious conversion, that is an inner word of love leading to faith, the eye of love, and eventually to the beliefs of a community which is formed and bound together through sharing in this love. And all this is the result of God's gift, not of our own doing. There can hardly be any doubt that the movement here is the religious form of the one described by Lonergan five years later as the development that begins in affectivity to move through values, judgments, and understanding to mature and perceptive experience.

Is this chapter 4 simply a movement from above and no more? I think not. The short first section (1972: 101-103) deals with the question of God. It does so in terms of the
unfolding structure of consciousness: inquiry, reflection, deliberation. It does not do so in terms of God's gift of love but rather in terms that a humanist could accept. Only later, neatly mediated by the notion of self-transcendence, do we move from the question of God to the gift of divine love: the upward movement of consciousness shows a capacity for self-transcendence but being in love with God is the actuality of self-transcendence (1972: 105). If, then, this chapter were to be expanded in the balanced form suggested by the two ways of development, everything in section 2 and what follows could stand as it is, but the short first section would become a fuller treatment of the question of God and of a philosopher's answer to that question: it would be chapter 19 of Insight as Lonergan might have rewritten it in 1977.

Let me digress here for a moment to deal with a long-standing puzzle in Lonergan's writings. This developed as follows. When Insight appeared in 1957 a great deal of attention was given at once to chapter 19, "General Transcendent Knowledge," a chapter which works out a philosophical notion of God and affirms the existence of the God who is so conceived. The attention was by no means entirely favorable, and Lonergan himself eventually added his own critique of this famous chapter:

the main incongruity was that, while my cognitional theory was based on a long and methodical appeal to experience, in contrast my account of God's existence and attributes made no appeal to religious experience (1973: 12).5

This admission led to the widely held view (and very welcome it was, for it dispensed one from study of that diabolically difficult chapter 19) that Lonergan had abandoned the ill-fated attempt of Insight to prove the existence of God. In fact, as he expressly declared on that same occasion and more than once repeated,

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5This particular admission was reinforced by the more general one Lonergan made on the last seven chapters and Epilogue of Insight: "Some of the points made then I still like; others have been superseded in the light of further reading, conversing, reflecting" (1974: 275).
he had not abandoned the *Insight* position at all (1973: 41). But then the puzzle ramifies into three questions: what really is the relation of chapter 19 to his later work—say, to *Method* or to *Philosophy of God, and Theology*? How is one to interpret his own statements on his earlier and later views? To which one adds the first question of all: how does one understand the arduous pages of chapter 19 itself?

I believe we can throw considerable light now on the first two questions, and put the third in a clearer perspective. The relation of chapter 19 to the later work is largely the relation to one another of the two ways we have been studying: chapter 19 is the upward movement from experience (our world) through understanding (contingency of that world and the need of explanation) to the judgment (once we admit the real is being and being is completely intelligible) that God exists. Chapter 4 of *Method*, on the other hand, is largely the downward movement from the love of God as divine gift, to the effort to conceive the Giver of that love and render some account of the strange attraction we feel. This downward movement is plain in *Method* (1972: 109, 116, 340-341) but is spelled out far more fully in *Philosophy of God, and Theology*. Here, after speaking of religious experience as God's gift, Lonergan continues:

I have argued that it is this gift that leads men to seek knowledge of God. God's gift of his love is God's free and gratuitous gift. It does not suppose that we know God. It does not proceed from our knowledge of God. On the contrary I have maintained that the gift occurs with indeed a determinate content but without an intellectually apprehended object. Religious experience at its root is experience of an unconditioned and unrestricted being in love. But what we are in love with, remains something that we have to find out. When we find it out in the context of a philosophy, there results a philosophy of God. When we find it out in the context of a functionally differentiated theology, there results a functional specialty, systematics. So it turns out that one and the same God has unknowingly been found and is differently being sought by both philosopher and theologian (1973: 50-51).

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6For an example of the repetition see the unpublished transcript of the "Question Sessions" at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop of 1977 (First Discussion, p. 21—available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto, and at many of the Lonergan Centers).
What of our second question, Lonergan's own attitude toward his earlier and later work? I would say that all this time it was in process, that the last sentence of the passage just quoted represents his intermediate position of 1973, but that it would need the clarity of his 1977 principle of the two ways to get chapter 19 of *Insight* and chapter 4 of *Method* into a unified view. Finally, we can see chapter 19 itself in better perspective now. It was an answer to a question, but for the later Lonergan the question itself was more important than the answer: "In *Method* the question of God is considered more important than the precise manner in which an answer is formulated" (1974: 277). Not everyone will answer the question in the way chapter 19 does but, if they are not obscurantist, they will at least raise the question and do so under the influence, unknown perhaps to them, of God's gift of love.

Let us return now, though briefly, to the omitted chapters 2 and 3 of *Method*. The question occurs whether they too can be seen as under the influence, either of the upward movement (with chapter 1) or of the downward (with chapter 4). They do not, I would say, show any very clear pattern one way or the other. In any case both might gain in clarity from importing back into their structure the two ways of 1977. Then chapter 2 would speak first, as it does now, of values as a human creation, as determined by the person who is the originating value, as worked out intelligently and rationally and chosen responsibly by the human agent: of values in other words as terminal, as products of the upward movement of human development. But the chapter would deal also with values as handed on, as taught and communicated from generation to generation, of values as received, received with due criticism and openness to their revision, but still part of our heritage. Chapter 3 would be organized in a similar way, to study first the development of meaning from the ground up, in the slow learning process of the human race, but then to study also the communication of meaning, the handing on of meaning as a legacy and its

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7 At the 1985 Lonergan Workshop I was quite incautious on this point, putting chapters 2 and 3 too categorically in the upward pattern with chapter 1.
reception as a heritage. In both chapters this second, downward
movement would exploit Lonergan's later and repeated
references to the process of socialization, acculturation, and
education (1984: 10; 1985: 181, 197), a trio of terms to which I
will presently return.

I have been suggesting possible ways of importing
Lonergan's 1977 ideas backward into the chapters of Method,
but I would wish my suggested ways to be taken for no more
than they are worth: granted that there is a task here, there may
be several ways of going about it. One might, for example, divide
the whole "Background" of Method into two parts, one
beginning with the present chapter 1 and following the upward
process through its series of steps, and the other beginning with
chapter 4 and following the downward process through its
parallel but inverse series. The important thing for me is not
the diverse structures that might be erected, but the structuring
power itself of the two ways.

In this context a related question crops up with its own
particular fascination. For it is noticeable that the ideas of
chapter 2 are very much the ones that occur again in chapter 10
on Dialectic; likewise, that the ideas of chapter 3 are very much
the ones that occur again in chapter 7 on Interpretation. So the
question arises whether each of the first four functional
specialties should not have its own Background chapter (with
appropriate preparation also for specialties five to eight, once
the two ways are introduced into the Background). The question
has a special force when pointed at History: there is at present
no Background chapter for this, and one wonders whether that
is the reason why Lonergan needed two chapters (8 and 9) when
he came to expound this functional specialty. Even Research
might well have its own Background chapter, preparing for a
fuller explanation of that specialty and filling a lacuna which
Lonergan himself acknowledged late in life.\(^8\) We are here in the

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\(^8\)In a letter to me dated March 3, 1980: "I fear that my book did not emphasize
enough the importance of research: my own work in that specialty was Gratia
operans and Verbum, about eleven years of my life. It is from the mindset of
research that one most easily learns what Method is about: surmounting
differences in historicity."
position perhaps of the followers of Mendeleev: Lonergan often spoke of him as setting forth the pattern of the atomic table, leaving gaps which later scientists filled in as they discovered this or that missing element; one could well maintain that, in a similar way, Lonergan has suggested a "periodic table" for the Background of Method, and that it is up to us to fill in the missing chapters.

I have not forgotten the theme of this workshop, which is the crisis of the human good, but the clear relevance of the two ways to that crisis enables me to be brief on their application. There is need then to take seriously the double task of the creation and the handing on of values: the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible production of terminal values, and the love of and loyalty to a tradition that receives and guards and hands on the heritage of hard-won values. The crisis of the human good, as crisis, is a product of the present historical situation in regard to the relation between the two parts of the task. For in all stages of human development beyond the earliest, the creation of values and their handing on live in a symbiosis that is also a dialectic: the creation is not ex nihilo but out of a tradition that must be criticized, and the handing on is not a passive channeling but an effort also to improve, revise, build up. Then a major disruption of the relation brings on a crisis; that is the situation today, but more of that in the second part of my paper.

One question remains before I turn to my second heading: it is a major question and I can but introduce it. That Lonergan's own thought might be expanded through the suggestive power of his two ways of development is, I hope, clear enough. How that expansion might affect the structuring of his Method in Theology is a topic, I also venture to hope, that from now on we will wish to ponder. But there is a far larger task whose magnitude we should not ignore: it is the creation of a climate of opinion and mores in which our task can be seen and accepted as a task, especially that part of the task which is the handing on and receiving of a tradition: how is the community at large to be made aware of, and respond to, the dynamism that is at work here and its mode of operating? Lonergan's trio of terms for the
process by which any set of meanings and values is handed on is socialization, acculturation, and education; how can we measure the labor involved in bringing his expanded notion of meanings and values, through socialization, acculturation, and education, into the publicly received set of meanings and values? There is a clue to the magnitude of the task in the labor to give a domicile on earth to the upward movement. Of that latter we may say that chapter 1 of Method is largely a distillation of Insight, and that that huge book in turn was a distillation of years of study of the modes of common sense, the sciences, and philosophy. In my view something of a parallel magnitude must be undertaken to bring the process of socialization, acculturation, and education, as it regards the meanings and values in question here, to methodical maturity. The materials at hand are abundant enough; they are there in the enormous wealth of our literature, our history, our laws, our sermons and hagiography, our music and dance, our ceremonies and pageantry, our political traditions, our educational systems. By this sketchy list I mean to suggest that the materials at hand include not only the content of a set of meanings and values, but also ways of handing on that content. To have the materials at hand with unexamined ways of handing them on is not, however, to meet the need, or to come anywhere near it. The very urgency of the present crisis of the human good brings out the crying need to attend to the dynamism of the downward movement of development, to study its modes of operation, to appropriate in corresponding terms the process of socialization, acculturation, and education and make it methodically operative. The materials of common sense, of the sciences, of philosophy, were at hand in abundance when Lonergan undertook to write Insight, yet few of us would deny the magnitude of the task presented in writing that book; a task of something like similar magnitude must be envisaged if method is to enter and guide the path of development from above in the human situation.
II. HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The second part of my paper and my second heading for expansion of Lonergan's notion of value is equally important with the first, but it lies closer to the surface, at least in Method, so we can deal with it more rapidly. Once again, however, it will be a matter of setting forth a very general position before we can make applications; still, the applications are obvious and immediate, and will not delay us.

The expansion I call for now is the addition of the historical aspect of consciousness to the structural, where "addition" means merely bringing into focus what has been repeatedly touched on in Lonergan's writings, or means giving a distinct recognition and its own technical name to what has long been present; to borrow from other languages, it is making thématique what has been vécu or studying in actu signato what has existed in actu exercito.

First, then, the structural side of consciousness is clear enough: it is constituted by the four levels that are its invariant factor, enabling us to organize our conscious activity according to the categories of attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. But the historical aspect is the variable factor: it refers to what happens on any level of the structure and happens in variety, now one way and now another; or, we might say it refers to what fills the structure, and fills it in a multitude of diverse combinations, with different degrees of emphasis, and so on. It seems to me we can appropriately call this the historical side of consciousness, but it should be distinguished from that differentiation of consciousness which is a part of modern culture and which is already familiar to Lonergan's readers under the name, historical consciousness. This "historical consciousness" is a recent acquisition of the human race, hardly existing two centuries ago; it runs through the four levels, but is oriented toward the object, attending to data in their changeable character, attempting to understand them in that regard, and so on. But the historical side of consciousness that I refer to is not a recent acquisition; it lies within consciousness as such; it is a
permanent aspect of the subject, one that was there from the start.

Maybe it will be best, instead of trying to describe or define this aspect, simply to give a partial listing of the diverse states resulting from the various ways that consciousness unfolds. Many of these lie at hand, quite explicitly attended to in Lonergan’s work. There are, for example, the literally innumerable brands of common sense, the variety of the differentiations of consciousness, the different forms of conversion and the several possible states consequent on the presence or absence of any particular conversion, the two ways of human development and the changing ratios of emphasis they receive at different times or among diverse peoples and cultures. This diversity, I say, is already at hand in Lonergan’s writings; in fact, many of the items listed above can be found in a single paragraph of Method (1972: 286-287). But, though listed, they are mingled indiscriminately with the structural elements. They need to be distinguished, separated out, brought under one generalized heading, seen as pertaining to one general historicality of consciousness itself and as set in contrast with the general structural side of consciousness. To be noted: though the states are many and diverse and no one can combine the totality of states in one consciousness, nevertheless the consciousness of everyone is marked with the underlying historicality that gives rise to the many states, to some states in this person and to others in that.—With this brief exposition we can proceed to the theme of our workshop, applying our general category first to the field of values and then directly to the crisis of the human good.

I would maintain, then, that under the present heading too there is the possibility of expanding Lonergan’s notion of value. In fact, it is especially in the field of values, and rather strikingly here in contrast to the field of meaning, that the historical aspect of consciousness needs more thorough study, with corresponding attention to the developing character of values. This contrast can be seen, clearly with the aid of 1985 hindsight, in the early Lonergan of the verbum articles, where the development of understanding is very much in evidence
(1947a: 39-46 = 1967a: 51-59), but there is no corresponding study of the development of values. Now the 1968 lecture, *The Subject*, did set in motion a new approach to value; but only slowly, so it seems, did the full implications of his new position dawn on Lonergan. Thus, we have in *Method* a very extensive study of the stages of meaning (1972: 85-99), but no such study of the stages of value. Sebastian Moore has reported that the first thing Lonergan said to him was, "Concepts have dates" (Moore, 1985: 9). To one who knows Lonergan’s cognitional theory those three little words speak volumes, but I would say we need to hear the parallel statement, "Values have dates." There are elements in *Method* that could be brought together to underpin such a statement, and the statement itself might yet be found in the legacy of Lonergan’s papers, but his published writings do not seem to take up the question in any detail. Here then is one instance of a need to add the historical to the structural; for the structural side of the good had been worked out as early as *Insight*, in relation to the structural aspect of consciousness (1957a: 596-598).9

That values have dates does not, however, account for the present crisis of the human good. It does mean that values have to be created, handed on, and learned; but in more stable times or in periods of more gradual change the learning may well keep pace with the changes. What underlies the crisis of the human good in our day is the extraordinary rapidity of the changes that have been introduced pell-mell into our way of life. The upward way of development enjoys a luxurious growth, like that of vegetation in the rain forests of tropical lands, and takes on as many exotic forms. The downward way of development has not had time to adapt to the new situation, or to bring the moderating influence of a valid tradition into union with the critical spirit of the times, so that together they might create a new and viable set of values. Time, of course, inexorably passes; or, if you prefer, is eventually given. More serious is the lack of a

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9See also *Method* (1972: 47-52) on "The Structure of the Human Good." Not that the two accounts agree in every respect (a question too complex to take up here), but that in each case there is a concern for structure.
An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value

philosophy, in the broad sense that Newman would give the term, to provide the consolation we need in time of crisis and to forge the instrument of mind and heart, the new organon, that would enable us to deal with it. Meanwhile there is failure, chaos, catastrophe.

Let me put this in a parable, for a certain great Teacher, we are told, taught always in parables, and we do well at times to imitate, as best we can, that dominical practice. The present parable is about two lands and two peoples, each with its own problem. The problem of land one and people one is that they have no memory; they have phenomenal inventive power but remember nothing. Today they learn to spear fish with a stick, but they wake up tomorrow in complete forgetfulness of the day before, and must start all over again. Being geniuses for invention they are not especially bothered by this—until one day someone invents a nuclear bomb and, having no tradition to guide them in its use, they allow it to destroy them. The problem of land two and people two is not lack of memory; they have excellent memories. You might even say that this constitutes their problem: their memories are so good that they cannot get away from their past or do anything creative. Once by chance they captured a warrior from a neighboring nation that had the bow and arrow. Adopting this weapon as their own, they lived happily with it for many years—until one day their neighbors invaded their land with muskets and destroyed them.

There is little need to explain the parable. We ourselves, the human race, are those two peoples combined into one, with our double need for the winds of creative change and for the ballast of moderating memory. Not much need either, I think, to dwell on the significance, for the present crisis of the human good, of Bernard Lonergan's legacy of ideas, judgments and values. His analysis, twenty years ago, of the crisis in which we still labor ran as follows:

Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced; and what replaces it, cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that
new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait (Lonergan, 1967b: 266-267).

Lonergan's own period of waiting was not just passive but one of unremitting labor to work out the transitions that have to be made. May those of us to whom it falls to carry on his work, to explore and expand its implications, may we too wait actively and energetically, exploring what the span of mortal life forced him to leave undone, expanding what stands potentially within the framework of his thinking.
WORKS CONSULTED

CROWE, Frederick E.


LONERGAN, Bernard


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MOORE, Sebastian

DUALITY AND DIALECTIC

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INTRODUCTION

Bernard Lonergan concludes his treatment of common sense in *Insight* with an observation on method. He says, first, that, since his purpose has been to direct attention to an event that occurs within consciousness, his method has not been that of empirical science, whose data lie in sensible presentations. Rather, his method is "a generalized empirical method that stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of sense" (1978: 243). The treatment of common sense has brought to light the nature of this generalized method. When applied solely to the data of consciousness, it bears an analogy to classical empirical method, for then "it consists in determining patterns of intelligible relations that unite the data explanatorily. Such are the biological, artistic, dramatic, and intellectual forms of experience" (243). But when extended beyond the data within a single consciousness to study "the relations between different conscious subjects, between consciousness and its neural basis" (243-244), it demands the introduction of a new factor. This new factor consists of the procedures of dialectic.

Even with the introduction of these procedures, however, there remains an analogy to empirical science. For "dialectic stands to generalized method, as the differential equation to classical physics, or the operator equation to the more recent physics" (244). Dialectic is thus a component "from above" in

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1Unless otherwise indicated, references in this paper are to *Insight.*
the heuristic structure of human science, to be employed when this science studies data beyond those that are to be found within a single consciousness, whether these have to do with the relations of consciousness with the unconscious, with the relations among different conscious subjects, or with the relations between conscious subjects and their historical milieu.

If this is so, then if one would "take a professional interest in the human sciences and make a positive contribution to their methodology" (743), as Lonergan says contemporary theology must do, and if theology is to draw on the human sciences for some of its general categories, it is extremely important to get straight just what Lonergan means here by dialectic and understand how it is to perform its heuristic office. Just as one who studies physics without knowing the relevant mathematics is not really studying physics (Lonergan, 1959), so one who engages in human science without knowing how to use the procedures of dialectic will arrive at results that are less than scientific. I hope this paper might offer some minimal contribution to the interpretation of some of Lonergan's texts in Insight on dialectic, and display some of the applications that these texts have for reorienting human science, as well as for deriving some of the general categories of a contemporary systematic theology and for providing a context for the methodical employment of the special categories in a theology that would mediate between faith and culture.

**THESIS**

Dialectic is a major organizing principle of Insight. The problem of empirical human science in its relation to theology "in a large measure has dictated the structure" of Insight (743-744). Clarity on the meaning of dialectic, then, is a necessary condition for understanding Insight, and, because Insight is an essay in aid of self-appropriation, for understanding oneself in the dimensions of the self to which dialectic is applicable—the
relations of consciousness to the unconscious, to other conscious subjects, and to the social environment.

The notion of dialectic in *Insight* is a complex notion. My thesis is that the complexity can be controlled if we understand dialectic on the foundation of the distinction between consciousness and knowledge. I do not think there are several notions of dialectic in *Insight* (see McKinney). There is, rather, one complex notion that can be reduced to some manageable clarity by speaking of its integral and distorted realization. The understanding of these realizations constitutes differentiations of the one complex notion of dialectic, not two distinct notions. But the differentiation has a grounding in the quite sharp distinction drawn between consciousness and knowledge.

**THE PRINCIPAL TEXT**

The most complete statement of the complexity of the notion of dialectic appears in the observation on method at the end of chapter seven of *Insight* to which I have already referred.

Dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding; it can envisage at once the conscious and the nonconscious either in a single subject or in an aggregate and succession of subjects; it is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, break-down, and disintegration; it constitutes a principle of integration for specialized studies that concentrate on this or that aspect of human living and it can integrate not only theoretical work but also factual reports; finally, by its distinction between insight and bias, progress and decline, it contains in a general form the combination of the empirical and the critical attitudes essential to human science (244).

Dialectic is a pure form, and nothing but that: it provides "no more than the general form of a critical attitude" (244). Nonetheless it will be extremely helpful to the various departments of human science as they work out their specific criteria, for it will enable each department to distinguish
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"between the purely intellectual element in its field and, on the other hand, the inertial effects and the interference of human sensibility and human nerves" (244). The hope is expressed that a fuller study of the human mind "will provide us with further general elements relevant to determining a far more nuanced yet general critical viewpoint" (244). The major burden of that fuller study, of course, is borne by the succeeding chapters of Insight and the consequent developments in Lonergan's work. But for the moment we will concentrate on the passage just quoted and on related texts, and will try to unpack some of their principal elements.

**INTERPRETATION**

Dialectic constitutes an *a priori* element in the heuristic structure of the study of processes characterized by the concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change, where the principles are modified cumulatively by the unfolding (217). In the chapters on common sense some implications of this general form of a critical attitude are drawn for the dramatic subject and the social community. We will focus on the dramatic subject, and later suggest an analogy of dialectic that will enable us to understand both the community and, perhaps, culture, along the same lines.

I have argued elsewhere that with the emergence of Lonergan's differentiation of the fourth level of consciousness, the notion of the dramatic pattern of experience, of dramatic artistry in world- and self-constitution, must be given a more important position than is accorded it prior to this development in Lonergan's thought (Doran, 1981). For the dramatic pattern is the pattern of experience operative in fourth-level operations, in existential, interpersonal, and historical agency, in praxis. In more recent work I have amplified this contention into an artistic paradigm of praxis. But if the dramatic pattern becomes the principal pattern, where before it played a subordinate role as constitutive of the world of undifferentiated Heideggerian
Sorge, its own immanent constitution remains what it was in the sixth chapter of Insight. That is, the dramatic subject is immanently constituted by the dialectical unfolding of the linked but opposed principles of neural demands for conscious integration and psychic representation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the concern of dramatically patterned intentionality and imagination for dramatic artistry in world- and self-constitution.

Dramatically patterned orientation exercises either a constructive or a repressive censorship over neural demands. If the censorship is constructive, Sorge becomes character, the restrictive shaping of possibilities in the creative finalistic tension of limitation and transcendence; it is the responsible exercise of conscious finality. One develops, and one does so along a line of progress, to the extent that the opposed principles of neural demands and dramatically patterned existential intentionality are working harmoniously with one another. The development cumulatively modifies the opposed principles themselves, so that the underlying neural manifold becomes a more pliable support and instrument of artistic world-and self-constitution, and the censorship becomes character, habit, virtue.

But if, for whatever reasons or conditioning occasions, the censorship is repressive—and the most serious reasons are precisely those identified by Lonergan with the flight from understanding and responsibility—one's development becomes aberrant and heads in the limit to the breakdown, disintegration, and collapse of the artiste manqué. One is dragged through life by the forces, now of Kierkegaardian "shut-up-ness," now of the vengeful return of the repressed. The two opposed principles are not working harmoniously, and while the symptoms of the aberration are most manifest in "the inertial effects and the interference of human sensibility and human nerves" (244), the radical historical source is a disorientation of intentionality, a pneumopathology, conspiring with an oppressed imagination, a psychopathology, in the exercise of an intrasubjective domination over materials that, were they to become conscious, would be data for insight into the
discrepancy between the self one is and the self one could, might, or should be. The disintegration is a cumulative modification of precisely the same two principles that develop along the lines of progress under the exercise of character. Cumulative fragmentation of the neural manifold occurs as affects are unhinged from their appropriate imaginal counterparts and cathected with incongruous cognitive elements; and the orientation of the dramatic pattern itself becomes ever more fixed in the schemes and determinisms of waywardness. In the limit one destroys oneself, and the roots of the self-destruction lie in the lack of antecedent willingness for insight, in the love of darkness, in the renunciation of the artistic constitution of the first and only edition of oneself.

Let us take this instance of dialectic as paradigmatic, not only because it is the first instance discussed by Lonergan, but also because it is foundational of other instances. True, the dialectic of community exercises a certain dominance over the dialectic of the subject, but that dominance is relative (218). Distortions in the dialectic of community are reversed best by the transformation of subjects and the contributions of converted subjects to the reorientation of culture.

In the light of the general methodological observation at the end of chapter seven of *Insight*, the dialectic of the dramatic subject provides a heuristic element for understanding the relations between consciousness and its neural basis. We may consider it an application of the pure form of dialectic to the conscious and nonconscious in a single subject. The dialectic is "adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious workings of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration" (244). The linked but opposed principles that normatively are to work harmoniously with one another are neural demand functions and the exercise of the censorship. These principles are the sources of events of a determinate kind, namely, the contents and affects emerging into consciousness. The link between the two principles is that one (the neural) is what is patterned, and the other (the censorship) is what is responsible for the patterning. The
changes that occur are cumulative, in that the exercise of the censorship and the neural demands to be met at any time depend on previous interactions of the two principles and provide the basis of their future workings (217). Since the censorship can be repressive, and repression results in neglected neural demands forcing their way into consciousness in ways that disrupt the dramatic project of artistic self-constitution, the opposition can result in a distortion of the dialectic, and “the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal. For dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles; the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium” (233).

My interpretation of Lonergan’s position on dialectic in the sixth and seventh chapters of Insight rests to a large extent on my understanding of the passage just quoted and of the methodological observations at the end of chapter seven. These two passages lead me to affirm that Lonergan holds out both the possibility of a dialectic that would not be distorted and that of a dialectic that is distorted. Clearly he speaks of the latter, for he writes that “the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal” (233). Does he also at least suggest the former? Well, he speaks of “dialectic rest[ing] on the concrete unity of opposed principles.” It is not the opposition as such but “the dominance of either principle” that “results in a distortion.” The distortion undermines the dominance and “strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium” (233). Is it possible, then, to speak of the equilibrium, or the concrete unity of opposed principles as an undistorted or integral instance of dialectic, and of the breakdown of that unity as a distorted dialectic? This will be my position. It receives further confirmation from the methodological observation at the end of chapter seven. The pure form of dialectic is applicable to, can envisage, and is adjustable to both “an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles” and “any degree of conflict, aberration, break-down and disintegration” (244). The first of these possibilities is what
I have chosen to call an integral dialectic, the second what Lonergan calls a distorted dialectic.

FOUNDATIONS

I said at the beginning of this paper that my interpretation can be connected with the distinction that Lonergan draws between consciousness and knowledge. The distinction in itself is too familiar to require extended comment here. What perhaps does require some elaboration is the contention that there is a duality not only of knowledge but also of consciousness, and that the duality is to be negotiated in a different manner in each case. The duality of knowledge is a principal fact to be affirmed as a result of the reading of Insight.

In each of us there exist two different kinds of knowledge. They are juxtaposed in Cartesian dualism with its rational 'Cogito, ergo sum' and with its unquestioning extroversion to substantial extension. They are separated and alienated in the subsequent rationalist and empiricist philosophies. They are brought together again to cancel each other in Kantian criticism. If these statements approximate the facts, then the question of human knowledge is not whether it exists but what precisely are its two diverse forms and what are the relations between them. If that is the relevant question, then any departure from it is, in the same measure, the misfortune of missing the point. But whether or not that is the relevant question, can be settled only by undertaking an arduous exploratory journey through the many fields in which men succeed in knowing or attempt the task but fail (xvii).

Again,

the hard fact is that ... there exist in man two diverse kinds of knowing, that they exist without differentiation and in an ambivalent confusion until they are distinguished explicitly and the implications of the distinction are drawn explicitly (xxii).

Now, consciousness and knowledge are distinct, which is explicitly established in Lonergan's work; but there is a duality to both, which can also be documented from Insight: that is, of the sensitive psyche and the spiritual intentionality of the pure
desire to know. It follows that one way of departing from the "relevant question," and so one instance of "the misfortune of missing the point," would be to consider the duality of consciousness in the same way as one treats the duality of knowing. What is needed is a different posture suitable to the distinction of consciousness from knowledge. Perhaps the suitable posture in regard to the duality of consciousness is a necessary condition for the appropriate negotiation of the duality of knowledge.

The appropriate negotiation of the duality of knowledge is spoken of by Lonergan in terms of "breaking" it. "Breaking" here means "explicitly distinguishing kinds, and drawing the implications of the distinction."

Unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism (xxviii).

But on my reading of Insight, an essential element in breaking the duality in one's knowing, and so in affirming that understanding correctly is fully human knowing, and in drawing the implications of that affirmation, lies not in breaking but in affirming, maintaining, and strengthening consciousness as duality of sensitive psyche and pure desire to know. Both the "bog of a knowing that is without understanding" and clinging to "understanding that sacrifices knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism," are consequences of breaking the duality of consciousness by opting for one or other of the opposed principles rather than for the concrete unity of the two.
Lonergan speaks explicitly of the unity of consciousness, and maintains not only that this unity is given, but also that if it were not given it would have to be postulated (324-328). But this unity is a "concrete unity of opposed principles" (233), both of which are "I" rather than one being "I" and the other "It" (474). The duality of human consciousness is not the duality of two things, nor does it call for the choice of one principle and the exclusion of the other. It does demand discrimination of the two constituent elements, but for the sake of their harmonious cooperation, not for the sake of the elimination of one and the dominance of the other.

The duality that is also a concrete unity of opposed principles is the duality of the sensitive psyche and spiritual intentionality, or the pure desire. The position on knowing, where "the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming" (319), implicitly acknowledges the duality of consciousness as constitutive of full human knowing. The two general forms of the counterpositions on knowing break this duality of consciousness; in empiricism this results in "the bog of a knowing that is without understanding," and in idealism in the clinging to "understanding that sacrifices knowing."

Breaking the duality of consciousness results in conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration in the unfolding of the linked but opposed cognitive principles of psyche and spirit. But preserving the duality of consciousness results in the cognitive progress consequent upon the harmonious working of these principles. It strengthens the unity of consciousness. More existential implications appear in the following passage, which I will interrupt with a couple of parenthetical remarks that will indicate my meaning:

Nor are the pure desire and the sensitive psyche two things, one of them 'I' and the other 'It'. [To regard them as two 'things' is what I mean by breaking the integral duality, or concrete unity of opposed principles.] They are the unfolding on different levels of a single, individual unity, identity, whole. Both are I and neither is merely It. [To regard both as 'I' is what I mean by affirming the duality of consciousness as a concrete
unity of opposed principles.) If my intelligence is mine, so is my sexuality. If my reasonableness is mine, so are my dreams. If my intelligence and my reasonableness are to be thought more representative of me than my organic and psychic spontaneity, that is only in virtue of the higher integration that, in fact, my intelligence and reasonableness succeed in imposing on their underlying manifold or, proleptically, in virtue of the development in which the higher integration is to achieve a fuller measure of success. [Existentially, to cooperate with the finality that heads toward this higher integration is to affirm and strengthen the duality of consciousness.] But no matter how full the success, the basic situation within the self is unchanged, for the perfection of the higher integration does not eliminate the integrated or modify the essential opposition between self-centeredness and detachment. The same 'I' on different and related levels of operation retains the opposed characters (474-475).

As *Insight* proceeds beyond the discussions of dialectic in chapters six and seven, the notion of dialectic comes to be used more exclusively in the sense of the philosophical method that advances positions and reverses counterpositions. All positions are rooted in the basic position on knowing, and all counterpositions in some form of the basic counterposition on knowing. The philosophical use of the notion of dialectic as *Insight* proceeds regards "conflict, aberration, break-down, and disintegration" (244) of the duality-as-integral-dialectic of consciousness. A distorted dialectic of consciousness yields a counterposition on knowing; dialectical method reverses the counterposition on knowing precisely by reversing the distorted dialectic of consciousness and appealing to the integral dialectic of consciousness as constitutive of full human knowing. The integral dialectic of consciousness, and so the concrete unity of linked but opposed principles which is not to be broken but only brought into consciousness and abided in, involves the sublation and so enrichment of the sensitive psyche, but not its elimination as a constitutive element of one's being, one's knowing, and one's self-understanding.
APPLICATIONS

1. The preservation of the unity-in-duality of consciousness is a realization of the law of limitation and transcendence which Lonergan discusses in his treatment of the heuristic structure for studying human development (472-475). This law, he says, is one of tension, and so the equilibrium of linked but opposed principles is to be conceived, not as a mere homeostatic balance, but as conscious finality, in which "the operator is relentless in transforming the integrator" (476). Psychic spontaneity heads toward the transforming enrichments effected by successive sublations caused by spiritual intentionality raising questions, first, for intelligence, then for reflection, and finally for deliberation.

These questions are principles of movement, and the insights, judgments of fact, and judgments of value respectively emergent from them are principles of rest (Lonergan, 1985a: 172-175). The movement and rest are experienced at the level of the sublated sensitivity, and this experience changes with the emergence of insight, then of the grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and finally of the grasp of the fulfillment of conditions for a judgment of value. The psyche's rest in intelligibility, truth, and the good, is a manifestation and sign, indeed a criterion, of the integrity of the process of inquiry. This has long been realized in the tradition of discernment in Christian spirituality, where what is at stake is integrity in that form of inquiry that culminates in judgments of value and decision. But further study would show something analogous regarding the scientific and philosophical inquiry that specialize, respectively, in explanatory understanding and truth. Rest in the process of inquiry is in each instance a new level on which the creative tension of limitation and transcendence is felt, and on which one abides in that tension. The feeling of the creative tension is the affective indication of integrity in the process of inquiry whereby one arrives at the intelligible, the true, and the good.

The cumulative process of movement and rest is, among other things, a continuous and relentless transformation of the
sensitive psyche until one's living in the dramatic pattern is dominated by the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire. Thus Lonergan speaks of the importance of "disinterested feelings" that "recognize excellence" (1985a: 173). But the displacement of the tension between limitation and transcendence that constitutes a failure in genuineness (478) can occur in either direction. Lonergan emphasizes, perhaps, the displacement toward limitation, for it is this particular breaking of the unity-in-duality of consciousness that is responsible for the counterposition that conceives knowing and objectivity as analogous to ocular vision. But he does not overlook the danger that the perfection of the higher integration might try to eliminate the integrated (475); he speaks of the mistake of supposing that there are no limits to the versatility and flexibility of neural demands (191); and he refers to the neglect of the sensitive component of our orientation into the known unknown as *hybris* (549).

To speak, then, of the integral as opposed to the distorted dialectic of diverse sets of linked but opposed principles of change, and to emphasize that distortion can occur by a dominance of either principle, is not to promote a counterposition, as long as one keeps in mind that the integral dialectic is based on a certain duality, not of knowledge, but of consciousness. The distortion of the integral dialectic of consciousness in either direction is the root of the basic counterpositions, which arise from the "ambivalent confusion" about what it is to know. The use of the complex notion of dialectic as a philosophical tool for the advancement of positions and the reversal of counterpositions that becomes predominant as *Insight* proceeds, is an application of this complex notion to these basic counterpositions in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. But the root of the power of the one complex notion of dialectic to reverse counterpositions and advance positions is the unity-in-duality of consciousness. It is to be affirmed, promoted, and strengthened as a unity by maintaining the integrity of its duality. Then it is the source of progress, not only in philosophy and human science, but also
and first in the life of the dramatic subject and the transactions of the intersubjective community.

2. From this basis we can proceed to an understanding of what I have called psychic conversion and of its function, not only in dramatic living but also in the establishment of the basic positions of philosophy. I understand psychic conversion as a release of the capacity for the internal communication that occurs in intelligent, reasonable, and responsible negotiation of the sensitive psychic component of consciousness. It is a transformation that primarily occurs in and with regard to the dramatic pattern of experience. For in its immanent intelligibility it is a transformation of the censorship over neural demands from a repressive to a constructive function in one’s development.

The affects emergent from neural demands for conscious representation and psychic integration are sublated by all the levels of conscious intentionality, and change with the performance of the operations at each level. These changes, precisely as affective, are indications of the relative integrity or inauthenticity of the subject in his or her performance of the operations of intentional consciousness. We have an experience of the very movement of life given in the sensitive psychic concomitant of the operations of question and answer through which we pursue direction in that movement. If this experience is one of creative finalistic tension between the dialectic opposites of limitation and transcendence, it indicates authenticity in the search. But when it is displaced in the direction of either too little or too much possibility, it indicates a failure in character; and it restricts the shaping of possibilities that ought to mark the self-constitution of one who knows his or her place in the universe of being and faithfully and resolutely implements that knowledge.

Psychic conversion is conversion to attentiveness to that stream of sensitive consciousness, to internal communication with it, to responsible activity in its regard, and to an openness to negotiate it persuasively and patiently. The close connection between images and affects renders the dream a royal road to
psychic conversion. For the dream provides images that represent the affects that are to be negotiated, transformed, refined, purified, and conscripted into the artistic forging of a work of art out of one's world, one's relations with others, and one's very self. That negotiation, transformation, refinement, purification, and conscription help the subject to move toward what Lonergan calls in several late papers "affective conversion," conversion to being in love in the family, in the community, and with God.

While the occurrence of psychic conversion is most likely to occur in and affect directly the dramatic pattern, its role as an aid to arriving at and abiding in the basic position on knowing should not be overlooked. If the concrete unity-in-duality of the psyche and the spirit have been strengthened through the internal communication of intentionality with the psyche, the integral dialectic of consciousness is consolidated by habits emergent from repeated sublation, and fortified against the breaking or displacement of the tension of psyche and spirit in either direction that is operative in the development of the counterpositions. The tendency to displacement in either direction assigns a precise meaning to Karl Rahner's special theological category of "concupiscence." And Rahner's "gnoseological concupiscence" can be pinned down with greater precision through Lonergan's delineation of the basic counterpositions. Establishing of a relative integrity of limitation and transcendence in the dialectic of consciousness would contribute to the foundations in the subject for advancing positions and reversing counterpositions.

3. The apprehension of values in feelings can also be illuminated by what we have been saying. What precisely is the structure of the evaluative process of Lonergan's fourth level of consciousness? Where in that process does the apprehension of value in feelings occur? What is the function of that apprehension in the process of arriving at judgments of value and decisions?

Although these questions demand more work than I am able to give them at this time, I would suggest that the place of
feelings in the evaluative process depends on the character of the feelings. The apprehension of value in the feelings of one who is affectively converted to love in the family, love in the community, and the love of God is related to judgments of value as reflective understanding is related to judgments of fact. That is, it is analogous to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

But more often the apprehension of value in feelings is to judgments of value what insight is to judgments of fact. Then it is only the apprehension of \textit{possible} value. It must be followed by such questions as, Is it really or only apparently good? Is it genuinely better than another object or course of action? These questions are to judgments of value what questions for reflection are to judgments of fact. The movement to a true and effective judgment of value will be mediated by feeling in the same way as the movement to a true judgment of fact is mediated by reflective understanding. But the feeling being described here is the feeling of one living in the finalistic tension of limitation and transcendence, that is, the feeling of one who is genuine. To arrive at genuineness one has to work on one's feelings, which may and often does reveal that what one first apprehended as a value was not a value at all.

4. These two instances of the apprehension of value in feelings can be related, it seems to me, to the “times” which Ignatius Loyola proposes for election in the \textit{Spiritual Exercises}. He proposes three such times. Only the first, as instanced by the conversion of Paul and the calling of Matthew, involves an immediate apprehension of value in feelings in which there are no further questions and one knows there are no further questions. Such times, he says, are rare. By extension, we can say without distorting Ignatius's meaning that Augustine's “Love God and do what you will” is speaking of a condition in which one's affectivity is so refined that values are whatever one loves and evils whatever one hates. But this condition is almost as rare as are the extraordinary moments to which Ignatius refers. Usually we are involved in one of the other two “times.”

The second time is one in which we are affectively drawn in various directions, or drawn in a particular direction without
yet being in the solid condition of creative finalistic equilibrium. Our inclinations are moved, now to this object or course of action, and now to that, or to one object rather than another but in a manner not marked by the unity-in-duality of the psyche and authentic intentional orientation. We are not in the condition that Ignatius refers to as equilibrium, but are moved by the pulls and counterpulls of conflicting inclinations.

In the third time, on the other hand, we are in a state of equilibrium, but without a strong inclination in one direction rather than in another; nor are we affected by conflicting inclinations. We are open to the persuasion of intelligent and rational consciousness, and are to make our decision on that basis.

The correct procedure for reaching the judgment of value and the decision differs depending on which "time" one finds oneself in. If one is affected by a strong inclination or by conflicting inclinations, it is precisely the negotiation of these inclinations that will lead one to a genuine judgment of value and a good decision. The rules for the discernment of spirits that Ignatius proposes for the first and second weeks of the Exercises have to do precisely with this "second time" of election. They are guidelines for the negotiation of the affectivity in which possible values are apprehended. The one exception is the "consolation without a cause," which is the source of the first "time" of election, in which we are placed by the grace of God in the condition of creative tension in which values can be truly apprehended by feelings in a manner that, because there are no further questions and one knows that such is the case, is analogous to reflective understanding in arriving at the truth.

The third time of election does not figure in these rules. When one is already in the condition of equilibrium of which Ignatius speaks when writing of the third "time," but is still not strongly inclined, one does not negotiate conflicting affective inclinations—there are none to negotiate. Instead one proceeds to the judgment of value and the decision through a process of rational weighing of the cons and pros of the various alternatives. One can do this precisely because one is already in the state of
detachment and openness that is required for an authentic decision. When one is in that state of detachment, one can follow the lead of rational consciousness in moving toward one's decision. The third "time" thus corresponds to Lonergan's discussion in chapter 18 of *Insight*, where behavior is moral precisely because one follows the lead of rational consciousness.

What, then, is the process of negotiating affectivity during the second "time"? The various inclinations that one is experiencing are apprehensions of possible values in feelings. Such apprehensions are to decision what insights are to cognition. They are a dime a dozen, and the problem arises in figuring out which of them are genuine and which are illusory. One has to negotiate the feelings in which the possible values are apprehended, and so Ignatius counsels us to pay careful attention to every moment of an inclination, to watch its beginning, its entire process, and the end to which it leads. Only if all are good, is the inclination to be assented to and followed. And what characterizes this "good" in this context? I think it is precisely the finalistic tension of the dialectic of consciousness. This is the state one already finds oneself in in the third time of election, where one proceeds to decision by following the lead of rational consciousness. In the third time, one is to move to judgments of value and decision by reasoning. In the second time, therefore, one is to move to judgments of value and decision by following those inclinations that would lead one to the equilibrium of the integral dialectic of consciousness, and by rejecting those inclinations that lead one away from it.

If this interpretation is correct, the Ignatian counsel regarding the process of arriving at authentic decisions is remarkably comprehensive. At any time we either are or are not abiding in the state of creative finalistic equilibrium in the authentic dialectic of consciousness. And if we are, we are either experiencing strong affective inclinations in the face of a decision or we are not. If we are experiencing strong inclinations in this state of genuineness, and if they are those which Ignatius refers to as "consolation without a cause," there are no further questions. If we are not experiencing strong inclinations, we are advised to follow the lead of rational
consciousness, weighing the cons and pros of the various alternatives against the measure established by the gospel. But if we are not in the state of equilibrium characteristic of the first and third "times," we are advised to follow those inclinations that would lead us to the integral dialectic of consciousness and to reject those inclinations that would distort the tension of consciousness in either direction.

Moreover, the distortions can be related to the different states of the soul that figure in Ignatius's advice to people in the second "time": desolation, consolation, and, by implication from the Ignatian text, false consolation. The interplay among these states is complex, and I cannot go into all the various forms that it may take. But I would suggest that generally consolation is the state of dynamic creative finalistic orientation that I have been calling the integral dialectic of consciousness; desolation distorts this dialectic in the direction of "too little possibility"; and false consolation apprehends as possible value what is not of real value. The latter can either distort the dialectic of consciousness in the direction of "too much possibility"; or, if followed, lead one to the desolation of "too little possibility." (In the last analysis, this is not an either/or, for distortion in the direction of too much possibility will strengthen the opposed principle, leading to either a righting of the dynamic equilibrium or a manic-depressive oscillation of consciousness from one distortion to the other.)

5. What affective apprehension of values can be to judgments of value, not what insight is to judgments of fact, but what reflective understanding is to the latter judgments? Lonergan gives us at least two complementary indications of an answer to this question. First, the value-apprehension of an affectivity converted to love in the family, love in the community, and the love of God: as long as one is in love, one abides in self-transcendence, in the dynamic equilibrium of the dialectic of consciousness, as "a successful way of life" (Lonergan, 1985b: 208). Second, the value-apprehension of an affectivity in the dynamic state in which feelings respond to values, not in accord with just any scale of preference, but in accord with a scale of
preference constituted by successive degrees of self-transcendence: the successively heightened tension of the consciousness of the genuine person responds to values in accord with the hierarchy of values that Lonergan speaks of in *Method in Theology* as a normative scale of preference for measuring affective integrity: vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values. When one is in such a dynamic state, and as long as one remains in it ("Abide in my love"), one's apprehension of values in feelings is to the judgment of value what reflective understanding is to the judgment of fact. But when one is not in such a state, one's apprehension of values is to the judgment of value what direct insight is to the judgment of fact; it is an apprehension of possible value, and it must be submitted to questions for deliberation in which one negotiates the affective apprehensions in the manner suggested by Ignatius in his rules for the second "time" of election.

Now, what I have been calling psychic conversion is an aid to this process of negotiation. It enables one to understand and work on one's affective state. Again, the interpretation of the dream and the analogous symbolic processes of Jung's "active imagination" and Ira Progoff's various "internal dialogues" are ways (though somewhat time-consuming!) of conducting this negotiation. They all involve associating affective states with imaginal representations, and negotiating the affective states by internal communication with the symbolic figures.

6. There are implications of this position for a reorientation of depth psychology. Lonergan has provided a heuristic structure of what it is to be "well" psychologically. The lead in establishing this heuristic structure is not taken by the psyche, whose affective apprehensions may be either genuine or illusory. Precisely as psychic—that is, without reference to their connections with intentional consciousness—affective apprehensions contain no more of a criterion for distinguishing what is genuine from what is illusory than does sensation for distinguishing what is true from what is false. The lead is taken, rather, by intentionality analysis, which unleashes the successive stages of self-transcendence that are the measure of the
authenticity of affective response. On the other hand, Lonergan explicitly links affective responses with one's orientation in the world motivated by values. Feelings as intentional responses mediate between elemental symbolic representations and value-orientation. Thus the various techniques of symbolic communication employed by depth psychology, beginning with dream interpretation, are reconceived as processes by which one either explicitly acknowledges or establishes in oneself a determinate orientation to the world of values. These techniques can be reinterpreted as steps toward the affective conversion through which one's apprehension of values in feelings moves from being to the judgment of value what insight is to the judgment of fact to being to the judgment of value what reflective understanding is to the judgment of fact.

7. There are also implications regarding the scale of values to which affectively converted subjects spontaneously respond. The integral dialectic of consciousness defines what is meant by "personal value," that is, "the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise" (Lonergan, 1972: 32). This originating value is placed at the fourth level of the scale of values, corresponding to the fourth level of consciousness. Corresponding, respectively, to the third, second, and first levels of consciousness are cultural, social, and vital values. (The association of culture with reflection and of the good of order with intelligence can be documented as a consistent factor throughout Lonergan's works.) And religious values correspond to the fifth level of consciousness. These relations may be considered as from below and from above. From above, the higher levels are the condition of the possibility of successfully functioning schemes of recurrence at more basic levels. From below, questions emerging at more basic levels evoke the operations that will lead to consolidations at the higher levels.

Personal value is dialectical, precisely in the sense of the integral dialectic of consciousness which I am here arguing to be discoverable in Lonergan's writings; and so are at least what
Lonergan calls cultural and social levels of value. The integrally dialectical quality of social values is a major emphasis in chapter seven of *Insight*, where the linked but opposed principles to be preserved in creative tension with one another are vital intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. It is precisely in speaking of this "dialectic of community" that Lonergan emphasizes what has become the major point of my interpretation: namely, that "dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles; the dominance of *either* principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore *an equilibrium* (233; emphasis added). The dialectic of community is rooted in the foundational dialectic of the subject. Now, cultural value is intermediate between personal value and social value, both from below and from above. From below, problems at the level of social value pose questions that will be resolved only by proportionate changes at the level of cultural values. From above, these cultural values are requisite for reversing the cycle of decline at the social level: "if men are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so" (236).

Can we speak of an as yet unrealized, and so still to be evoked, integral dialectic at the level of culture analogous to the integral dialectics of the subject and of community? I have tried to do so, drawing on Eric Voegelin's discussion of cosmological and anthropological symbolizations (read: constitutive meaning). I cannot go into details on this matter here; it is quite involved, and my explorations in this area are still very tentative. But if there is any validity to what I am saying, then we can understand historical process itself in terms of an "analogy of dialectic" obtaining among the relations of personal, cultural, and social values. More precisely, our understanding of these levels of value can enable us to contribute to the reorientation of human science and, drawing on this science, to derive the major *general* categories for a systematic theology that would understand Christian doctrines in the light of an understanding of history; and those doctrines would express our understanding
of religious value, precisely in its relation to personal, cultural, and social values.

This goal of a systematic theology that understands Christian doctrines in the light of an understanding of history is a distant one. But perhaps this paper helps to indicate the sources of the categories for understanding history which I wish now to employ in a systematic understanding of Christian doctrine. The major problem that some have found with these categories lies in my appropriation of the notion of dialectic from Lonergan's work. I have tried in this paper to indicate that there are grounds in Lonergan's work for understanding dialectic as I have. This understanding in no way conflicts with Lonergan's more usual use of the term, dialectic, to indicate the method that advances positions and reverses counterpositions. As I have tried to suggest, the root of the counterpositions lies precisely in breaking the integral dialectic of consciousness.

8. In a systematics constructed in light of an understanding of history the basic special categories would be derived from religiously differentiated consciousness and would ground contemporary theology's transposition of such metaphysical categories as could be systematically employed in medieval theology once the theorem of the supernatural entitative order had been developed. They will articulate the conditions for an integral dialectics of the subject, culture, and community. At each of these levels of value, integrity is a function, not of either of the two constitutive principles of dialectic, but of a higher synthesis that is conditioned in the last analysis by religious values. The source of an integral dialectic of community lies in authentic cultural values proportionate to the dimensions of the social reality, and so today in some very definite sense in crossculturally constitutive meaning. But the source of genuine cultural values lies in a personal integrity itself conditioned by the grace of the universal willingness that is needed for the integral dialectic of the subject. This grace is the foundation of soteriological constitutive meaning. This in turn is the proximate condition for authentic cultural values; or in other
words, the integral dialectic of cosmological and anthropological constitutive meaning.

Grace is thus the ultimate condition for the integrity of the three dialectics constitutive of historical process. Hence, the articulation of the experience of grace constitutes a set of special categories in a theology that would mediate between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of Christian faith in that matrix. This is why an objectification of the dialectics constitutive of history enables the construction of a systematic theology that would understand Christian doctrine in the light of an understanding of human history.

In this way, too, we may approach an understanding of that realization of dialectic that has to do with contradictories, and so with the dialectical method that advances positions and reverses counterpositions. The basic positions are a function of the integral dialectic of consciousness, the basic counterpositions a function of the distortion or breaking of that dialectic. But the intellectual conversion articulated in the basic positions is itself a function of the religious conversion that establishes the integral dialectic of consciousness. The radical dialectic of contradictories concerns the reception or refusal of the grace of charity. Only the supernatural conjugate form of charity establishes consciousness in the creative tension of its integral dialectic. Once consciousness is established in that tension, one’s knowing will be, and can be known to be, what one is brought to affirm it to be in the eleventh chapter of Insight. Unless one exists in the tension of the integral dialectic of consciousness, one will explicitly or implicitly fall into the knowing that is without understanding or the clinging to understanding that sacrifices knowing on the altar of immanentism, relativism, or idealism. The basic position on knowing is a function of the creative finalistic tension of the dialectic of the subject made possible by grace. This is how the personal values capable of deriving genuine cultural values come about, and these cultural values will be the condition for an integral dialectic of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence in the social order. From this basis in a theology of grace in history, I think, one can proceed to elaborate a systematic
theology of other doctrines as well that would be a theological understanding of human history throughout.

9. I close with one further comment that may help to clarify the relation between genetic and dialectical methods. At the end of his discussion of genuineness, Lonergan writes:

Finally, there is the sanction of genuineness. To fail in genuineness is not to escape but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence. Such a displacement is the root of the dialectical phenomena of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and religion, in educational theory and history. But this issue takes us from genetic method to dialectic and so the present discussion ends (478).

"Dialectic" is used here in the sense of the method that studies and reverses distortions. By interpreting this passage in the light of the quotation from chapter seven with which I began, we could say that genetic method in human science studies the integral dialectic of consciousness in the subject and its ramifications in culture and social order; and that dialectical method studies and reverses the distortions of this integral dialectic's tension between limitation and transcendence at these three levels of value.
WORKS CONSULTED

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PREACHING: A MUTUAL SELF-MEDIATION OF THE WORD OF GOD, A PREACHER, AND A CONGREGATION

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I

A SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF LITURGICAL PREACHING

There is a story about Harry Emerson Fosdick, the well-known pastor-preacher of New York City's Riverside Church, going to worship at a small church in Maine one summer Sunday. The young preacher at the church delivered a particularly well-composed and challenging sermon. After the service Fosdick approached the minister, expressed interest in his sermon, and asked how long it had taken the preacher to prepare. The young man responded: "Oh, it took me about three hours." "Young man," Fosdick replied as the younger man recognized who it was with whom he was speaking, "that sermon took me twenty-one hours to prepare!" Without hesitation the plagiarist shot back, "Well, Dr. Fosdick, you keep writing 'em and I'll keep preaching 'em!" (Miller, 1985: 337-338).

About three weeks ago I was present at a Confirmation ceremony in which the preacher lifted an entire section of a homily preached and since published by the highly respected Catholic theologian, Walter Burghardt.

These two brief stories provide some relevant images for elements of preaching that invite reflection inspired by this year's Lonergan Workshop theme, "Meaning and Mystery." A first is the difficulty of preaching the Word that will keep a congregation awake, touch their inner selves, and invite a
response of faith. Concern over their own abilities leads some preachers to lift what is better conceived and better expressed by the more famous, even to the point of plagiarizing an entire sermon. But what is the Word that the preacher ought to preach? Do preachers know what preaching means?

From concern on the part of the preacher to preach well it is an easy step to reflect on the desire congregations have to hear homilies well-preached. Actually it would be more accurate to express a hope that congregations learn to expect better preaching by their pastors than to claim that such expectations already exist. I say this because the Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life has gathered statistics which reveal that good preaching is not a high priority among Catholic parishioners. It ranks seventh out of ten characteristics considered by parishioners to be most important for their pastors (Leege, 1985: 6). For what it may be worth, I hasten to add that many of the parishioners with whom I am in contact week after week willingly comment on the quality of the homilies they hear at Sunday liturgy, my own and others'. However, it is difficult to do anything with such comments, because the criteria for judgment of a homily's quality are not often articulated.

So we might question the shameless young Maine preacher about what he was hoping to offer his congregation by preaching another preacher's sermon. We also can question what homilists in the Catholic church who make use of homily services, sometimes shamelessly, hope to be accomplishing. Or are they just lazy? What about preachers who search each week for a relevant story, a good joke, or a catchy gimmick? (I am acquainted with a preacher who has been known to mix a salad at the pulpit as part of his homily at Sunday Eucharist.) And what sort of preaching should congregations await who expect good preaching? Do the members of our Christian congregations know what ought to be intended by preaching?

The assumptions of preachers and congregations about good preaching may well be inarticulate beyond a hunch. And since so many of us who are students of Bernard Lonergan are members of Christian churches, either as preachers or as those
preached to, shouldn't we ask the question for understanding: what is preaching? More exactly for our purposes at this Lonergan Workshop: what has preaching to do with meaning and mystery?

Two preliminary notes will move us into the topic by eliminating from consideration what we are not talking about and focusing attention on what we are talking about. A first preliminary note has to do with the type of theological reflection in which we are engaged in the present analysis of preaching. I would say that there is no doubt among Christians who gather at the two liturgical tables of Word and Sacrament that preaching the Word of God holds a central place in Christian worship. The restoration of preaching was a major concern of the sixteenth-century Reformation, both Protestant and Catholic, although the restoration was inadequately achieved even officially on the Catholic side until revived again by the twentieth century's second Vatican council.¹ My point is that the doctrine is in place. What is needed is an understanding on the level of our times of the meaning of preaching, of its intelligibility within the mystery of God's loving action for humankind. In our culture, characterized by so much good will but also by both shorter and longer cycles of decline, and as well by congregations of worshipers who are rarely homogeneous, often widely diverse in their social, educational, political, and sometimes even religious make-up, what is preaching to mean? This is a question to be considered by implementing the functional specialty, systematics. The systematic understanding sought here will pursue only one aspect of preaching's meaning, namely, its use of language to express and contribute to the interaction of the subjects of preaching, that is, the living Word of God, the preacher and the congregation, and the transformation of the latter two subjects (Lonergan, 1967: 254-255).² Thus, the operative words of the title of this presentation, "mutual self-

¹Second Vatican Council, 1966: See the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, article 35, and the Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, article 4.

²My reference here is particularly to Lonergan's use of the word transformation in these pages. I intend the same use.
mediation." They come from a 1963 lecture of Lonergan at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal on "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer." Having transcribed that lecture some years ago, Mark Morelli has edited and published it in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies (Lonergan, 1984: 1-20). In the lecture and in his usual lapidary style (to borrow a word used by Frederick Crowe to describe Lonergan's prose), Lonergan leaves us an important installment of his spiritual legacy. The mutual self-mediation to which the title refers is of the human persons who become self-constitutive within the human communities to which they belong and through their interaction with God's Word. Thus, systematics here seeks an understanding of preaching that relates it to the foundational events it is meant to serve.

A second preliminary note focuses on the particular form of preaching to be considered here, one common to the experience of so many of us, preaching within the liturgical assembly. As a homily within the liturgical assembly, preaching is an act of religion. It is an element of a congregation's worship. It stands as a moment in the liturgy of the Word wherein a congregation, through and with its preacher, enters into Christ's high-priestly mediation of God's salvation for his people and the people's sacrifice of themselves in adoration, praise, and thanksgiving to their God (Rom 15:16). Liturgical preaching, then, is not an instance of catechetical or theological teaching, although theological reflection backs up the homiletic interpretation of a good preacher and their catechetical training enhances the ability of a congregation to comprehend.

II

SELF-MEDIATION

Preaching is an act of meaning. Although an individual is the preacher, preaching is a communal act of meaning which includes a group of people forming a liturgical assembly. These people are not passive, although not all preach the Word. The congregation actively hears the Word so that the quality of
worship at liturgy and the Christian life subsequently pursued are affected by the act of preaching. What are the components of the act of meaning that is preaching? The present analysis is based on the three parts of intentionality in its elements and in its summations as discussed in "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer." The intentional elements are: the acts of intending (which include any act that occurs within consciousness), the intended object, and the intending subject. When the individual elements multiply, the intentional summations result and they are three, one corresponding to each element: the gathering up of the acts of intending into living, the gathering up of intended objects into situations, one's world and the world, and the gathering up of intending subjects into the intersubjectivity of community (Lonergan, 1984: 8-9). Each element and summation will be described briefly in conjunction with its significance for preaching.

First, then, preaching and the intentional acts. Preaching implements the range of intentional acts, beginning with the external senses of hearing and sight and including understanding and reflection by which preaching mediates the meaning of divine mystery in the world of everyday affairs. Actively engaged in appropriating the Gospel, congregation and preacher also move together toward responsible judgments of belief and decisions about living even as they are together in adoration, praise, and thanksgiving of the triune God. Nor is any of this mediation and constitution of meaning accomplished without the whole complex of feelings relating the congregation to the values of the Gospel, and to the transformation of life's other values by the values of the Gospel.

Sometimes a tension has appeared between the preacher's role to mediate meaning for the congregation and the congregation's role to become engaged in constituting. This tension appeared in some criticisms of the Baptist preacher, to whom I have referred above, Harry Emerson Fosdick. One critic wrote:

He does not seem to take into account the probability of there being a body of truth that they [the congregation] should have presented to them.
irrespective of their ever-changing personal patterns and immediate needs (Miller, 1985: 340).

Fosdick countered critics of this sort with statements such as this:

The preacher's business is not merely to discuss repentance but to persuade people to repent; not merely to debate the meaning and possibility of Christian faith, but to produce Christian faith in the lives of his listeners ... (344-345).

And this: "Preaching is an opportunity so to mediate a knowledge of God and the saving power of Christ that lives can be transformed" (347).

In its current General Instruction on the Roman Missal the Roman Catholic church teaches something similar to this last citation of Fosdick. It places fresh emphasis upon liturgical preaching and implies that the homily mediates the truth of God's Word in order to show how it addresses and transforms the needs of the particular congregation. Here is how the Instruction phrases it: "The homilist should keep in mind the mystery that is being celebrated and the needs of the particular community."³

Good preachers never have needed to be told that their preaching should address issues both of mediating and of constitutive meaning. They include both intuitively. The celebrated French preacher of the seventeenth century, Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, never hesitated to interpret the existential meaning of the Word of God for the congregation sitting before him, even when the congregation was King Louis XIV and his court. The following excerpt from a Lenten sermon preached in 1662 at the Louvre to the royal court is a good example. Bossuet's text is Luke 16:22, from the parable of Lazarus and the rich man: "Now the rich man also died."

The rich man shows us that this other furious wrath, which extends its hands to violent deeds, possesses the hardness which closes people's ears to complaints, their hands to assistance and their hearts to compassion.

³General Instruction on the Roman Missal, April 3, 1969, article 41.
Messieurs, it is this hardness which makes thieves who do not physically steal and murderers who do not actually pour blood ... In the midst of the furious cries of impudent and insatiable [ambition, greed, fastidiousness] ... one can hear the languishing voice of the poor who tremble before you. ... They die of hunger; yes, messieurs, they die of hunger on your estates, in your fields, in the yards and at the doors of your grand homes. No one goes to their aid. My God, all they ask is for what is to be otherwise discarded, the crumbs of your table, some leftovers from your banquets (Bossuet, 1884: 395, 397).

Bishop Bossuet's passionate words make it quite clear that the intentional acts implemented in preaching lead to the summation that is living, a living on the part of individuals who keep the transcendental imperatives: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be in love with the divine mystery with an unrestricted and unlimited love and with your neighbor as with yourself.

What about the second aspect of the intentional element, the intentional object? Lonergan writes that "the intentional object is made present to the subject by the act of intending" (1984: 8). The summation of objects you or I intend comprises our situation, and the summation of our situations is our horizon. The intended object of the preacher and the congregation in liturgical preaching is the Word of God active for them in their world. Their horizon thus includes not only the realm of immanent reality but also the excess of meaning named divine mystery that is mediated by the Word of God. Every good homily acknowledges that the excess of meaning is the chief aspect and, indeed, the most friendly agent, in the realm of immanent reality. To live in the world is to affirm, welcome, and be transformed by the source of the excess of meaning.

While preaching's principal object is the Word of God, it is not the Word of God in its original context as the Word of God, which is the object of biblical exegesis and interpretation in the way they are practiced in the academy. The object of preaching is the Word of God addressing this congregation within this liturgy in order to lead to adoration, praise, and thanksgiving at this time and to Christian living in the world as the congregation moves beyond this particular act of worship. This complication
of preaching's object gives sermons their particular temporality—a sermon is remarkably *ad hoc*, almost like the daily newspaper—and their frequent controversiality. In evidence of the temporality of a sermon I invite you to peruse the volumes of Walter Burghardt's homilies. They are of high quality, but I find their cogency does not last. This is a tribute to Fr. Burghardt; he knows how to bring the Word of God to bear upon the present situation of this congregation in the summation of situations and horizons of many persons which make up the world of the present time. In evidence of the controversiality of sermons I refer you to the excerpt of Bishop Bossuet's sermon to the court of Louis XIV which I quote above, and to others among his celebrated sermons.

Knowing about the biases as we do, it is no surprise to find out that the preacher and his or her congregation often fall short of actually intending the Word of God or the world of human affairs as they really are and, moreover, that sometimes preacher and congregation are not aware of this defect and sometimes quite deliberately choose to fall short. We might well be among those who fall short. As corrective it is salutary to appropriate three points made by Lonergan in his 1965 lecture, "Dimensions of Meaning." First, preachers and congregations need to deal with their subjectivity and its worlds of immediacy, mediated meaning, and constitutive meaning (1967: 252-256). Such advice is not new to anyone here, but what is happily fresh is the marvelously practical program for appropriating human subjectivity recently published by Frederick E. Crowe in his book, *Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education* (1985). Whether Crowe's strategy is ever accepted by any educational system, it can be implemented by individuals or groups of individuals, like ourselves, without waiting.

Secondly, as Lonergan studied the development of human subjectivity in its historical progression he came to analyze the present state of the Christian Gospel and the Catholic Church in the contemporary world. In "Dimensions of Meaning," delivered just prior to the start of the final session of the second Vatican council, Lonergan notes that the new stage of human consciousness emergent in modernity and post-modernity has
ushered in a crisis of culture for Catholics and other Christians, and indeed we can say today, for all the world's people. But Lonergan emphatically declares that there is no actual crisis of faith:

There has been no new revelation from on high to replace the revelation given through Christ Jesus. There has been written no new Bible and there has been founded no new church to link us with him (266).

Preachers do their congregations a service and congregations can better hear the Word of God if both study and learn so as to keep in mind the distinction between the two crises. The possibility of interpreting God's Word for their living in the world is thus much improved. Of course keeping the distinction in mind is just the start. The crisis of culture needs to be understood. There is the need to appropriate the new stage of consciousness, namely, the many forms of self-consciousness lived but little understood by human subjects today.

Precisely because of the bewildering diversity of contemporary self-consciousness another point made by Lonergan in his lecture is useful. Contained in the closing statement of the lecture, it is a caution to avoid domination by extremes. It is a call to let a methodical exercise of human intentionality guide preachers and congregations to appropriate the Word in the real world, not in the world of the confused ignorance or deliberate choice of their biases. I quote the much-quoted passage again because of its eminent significance for today:

Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced; and what replaces it, cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait (1967: 266-267).
The third aspect of the intentional act is the intending subject. Each time any subject exercises an intentional act, not only does an object become present to the subject, but in the very act of intending the subject becomes present to itself at the level on which the intending takes place. The subject is present as apprehending, inquiring, understanding, reflecting, judging, deciding, affective, loving. When there are several subjects intending together in common then these subjects summate into the 'we' of community. The congregation with its preacher is the Christian community at prayer, worshiping God by being a community of hearers of the Word and by letting the Word be interpreted through the instrumentality of that member of the community commissioned to preach.

Each individual in the congregation becomes engaged by the Word of God as the meaning of God in life's situations is mediated and constituted through faith, hope, and charity. Of course the preacher also becomes personally engaged by the Word. In love in an unrestricted way, and acknowledging God as source and object of this love, the preacher seeks a deep-felt knowledge of God leading to service.

Further, the preacher needs to assess the summation of intended objects and of the intending subjects of the present congregation in order to learn the horizon of the congregation and its intersubjective meaning. This assessment is accomplished partly by considering the congregation as an intended object, but far more by attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating, feeling within and out of the intersubjectivity of preacher and congregation in the encounter that reveals to what extent common meaning exists, to what extent it is desired by the congregation, and to what extent it is demanded by the Word of God.

III

MUTUAL SELF-MEDIATION

While the category of self-mediation helps get us into an analysis of the dynamics of meaning and mystery in preaching, it
is mutual self-mediation that actually approximates the dynamic most closely. For mutual self-mediation is an encounter between persons that most effectively happens in community, and transforms the subjects of the encounter. Preaching is just such an encounter where a congregation and their preacher encounter each other and together are encountered by the mysterious Word of God.

How does the encounter happen and what is the mutual self-mediation that results? It begins with some objective recognition. The Word of God is using the words of the scriptures and the interpreting words of the preacher. The Word is at the same time God dwelling within the members of the congregation. The Word is the risen Christ present within each believer and in the liturgical assembly as its Head, and it is Christ the Word mediated through the historically expressed word. The Word is also the Holy Spirit alive within each member of the congregation and in the assembly as the teacher communicating the truth which the Spirit receives from the Father and the Son (Jn 16:12-13) and as the love poured out in our hearts that unites us with the Son and Father (Lonergan's recurrent Rom 5:5). The Word also communicates that the Father lives within each believer and is the One whom the assembly as the body of Christ animated by the Spirit worships in communion with the saints. The Father is further the goal of all Christian living which seeks to build up the kingdom of God.

The Trinity is itself a community of meaning, truth, and value that mediates the immediacy of its vitality through word and sacrament within the liturgical assembly. Specifically, the homily within the liturgy is an opportunity to focus the presence of God for this assembly on this day in this situation. To make this happen the preacher needs both to know the Word communicated by the words of the scriptures with the deep-felt knowledge in love of personal communion and to be living by the power of this relationship. For the preacher accepts the responsibility to lead the congregation to make the transition from hearing the Word through the words of the biblical text as proclaimed by members of the congregation to the personal and corporate deliberative act of choosing (not for the first time, but
once again) in love and loyalty the One who speaks, and then in the Creed to make the believing judgment that the One is the triune Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In this process the homily acts as pivot, swinging the congregation from hearing to belief and action.

The congregation, too, needs to experience the same communion. The preacher's role is not to create the communion, although this may be a happy effect of preaching on some members of the congregation who may have been marginally involved. The preacher's role is more to highlight one or another aspect of the communion with the Word in which the whole assembly already shares.

In this mutual self-mediation the divine Persons in their triune community do not grow nor are they transformed. They relate by giving of themselves in their truth and love, and accepting the praise, adoration, and thanksgiving of the congregation in love. The divine Persons enter into a totally interpersonal relationship with believers and, in and through the Word incarnate, they subject themselves to the human process, and they are committed, in creation and redemption, to our particular human history and its fulfillment in their divine fullness (Lonergan, 1964: 241-244; Kelly, 1970: 412-413). Here I paraphrase how Anthony J. Kelly expresses my point more fully:

So, the intervention of the Trinity in the self-constitution of human persons results in the coming to be of the New Person. The new humanity is not yet, not fully. But a process has begun which cannot fail; for it is structured on the Word, animated by the Spirit, and finalized by the Father. The Trinity stands out as the fact of God's total presence to the world of human beings in the essential concerns of their history. It initiates humanity's process of self-development, structuring it, rescuing it, finalizing it, and, in general, explaining it. The Trinity is the very Being of God in the triune God's own taking possession of themselves in truth and love that is the mysterious guarantee of humanity's ultimate future. The trinitarian community communicates something of its own self-consciousness. It makes its own self-possession the inner support of humanity's ultimate self-possession. It is the divine self-consciousness that is the promise of humanity's final coming to itself, as a being destined to 'arrive' and to find completion, finding itself not ultimately
alone but with God in the midst of many sisters and brothers (Kelly, 1970: 406-407).4

While the divine community relates but does not grow, human beings relate to the divine community so that they and their human communities, including the liturgical assembly, grow in stature as friends of God through their appropriation of the intentional elements and summations. By employing more of the intentional acts or employing them more adequately individuals are ever more completely engaged in communion with the triune God active in the world. More of the divine meaning in the world is mediated or the individual constitutes herself or himself more by the divine meaning. As the individual lives more out of engagement with the Word, she or he also comes to intend in an expanding horizon how all being accessible to the human horizon is affected by the living Word of God.

Mutual self-mediation between human individuals and the divine community also leads to stronger community ties among the members of Christian congregations. For the more all the members live by the Word and know the world by the Word, the more this mystery which they know and love and live in common leads them to bonds of love among themselves. Such development happens mostly in practice:

The community reveals itself to itself by its living, by its meeting its problems, by its revisions of its common sense, its common meaning, its common commitment, and by the way things work out in development and breakdown, by its growth and disintegration (Lonergan, 1984: 11).

The preacher is normally a member of the congregation who exercises the role of facilitating the mutual self-mediation of the living Word of God and the liturgical assembly by crafting interpretative words that become a sacrament to mediate the specificity of the encounter. The preacher exercises the art of preaching through spoken words, communicated by body language as well, evoking into conscious intentionality the

4I have amended Kelly's text solely to overcome its sexist vocabulary.
already present but immediate communion with the triune God, illuminating the situation, and promoting the intersubjectivity of common meaning. How this happens has been described by Walter Burghardt. First, it is a matter of weaving words whose power to create and destroy is appreciated by the preacher. Second, it is a matter of weaving words that are exegetically, theologically, and prayerfully informed by the Word, and that come from a mighty effort to craft them well, taking all these sources into account. Third, it is a matter of words brought to bear on the situation of the congregation, which reenforces the point made earlier that the preacher needs a feeling-toned knowledge of the congregation and its situation (Burghardt, 1980: 4-16). Moreover, since so many of the words of intersubjectivity are symbolic, preaching shares in the priority of poetry (Lonergan, 1967: 262-264). All this easily reminds us of Emily Dickinson’s poem (Dickinson, 1960: 1212-1213) which we may have learned in childhood:

A Word is dead
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
That day.

Finally, Burghardt suggests that preaching which does what it should is imaginative. It implements a capacity we humans have “to make the material an image of the immaterial or the spiritual” (Burghardt, 1982: 5). To use language more in the style of Lonergan we might say that the special value of imagination in preaching is to provide the relevant images for mediating the meaning and motivating the values that the Gospel proclaims and that preacher and congregation hope to communicate.

No doubt it is the role of imagination in preaching that has prompted the recent spate of writings on stories as an ingredient in effective preaching. And it is true, stories can galvanize into unity the scattered attentiveness of an audience
and communicate in their symbolic way effective religious meaning. Of course the words of which the preacher makes use are not simply to sound fine or tell a catchy story, but to provide images that generate the awesome, consoling, challenging, accusing, encouraging reality of mutual self-mediation where the congregation gathered for worship enters together into life with the triune God. There will be the ache of sorrow over sin as well as the joy of knowing God’s love and the ecstasy, which is neither sorrow nor joy, of tasting and seeing the goodness of the Lord. This reality is not easy to take but it cannot be shirked if preaching is to strike its mark and mutual self-mediation is to happen. In line with the remarks on story, listen to this bit of a story by Margery Williams that is pertinent here. It is from her tale, *The Velveteen Rabbit or How Toys Become Real:*

“What is REAL?” asked the Rabbit one day. ... “Does it mean having things that buzz inside you and a stick-out handle?” “Real isn’t how you are made,” said the Skin Horse. “It’s a thing that happens to you. When a child loves you for a long, long time, not just to play with, but REALLY loves you, then you become Real.”

“Does it hurt?” asked the Rabbit.

“Sometimes,” said the Skin Horse, for he was always truthful.

“When you are Real you don’t mind being hurt.”

“Does it happen all at once, like being wound up,” he asked, “or bit by bit?”

“It doesn’t happen all at once,” said the Skin Horse. “You become. It takes a long time. That’s why it doesn’t often happen to people who break easily, or have sharp edges, or who have to be carefully kept. Generally, by the time you are Real, most of your hair has been loved off, and your eyes drop out and you get loose in the joints and very shabby. But these things don’t matter at all, because once you are Real you can’t be ugly, except to people who don’t understand” (Williams, 1975: 16-17).

This is the personal treasure of years of mutual self-mediation with the divine Persons for each member of the Christian congregation, and it extends to the mutual self-mediation of the members among themselves. It is the preacher’s awesome and impossible enough task to be in touch
enough with this congregation's stage of mutual self-mediation to give some direction to the experience of the present liturgical moment. Once again I refer to the section of "Dimensions of Meaning" where Lonergan describes the complication of getting a handle on, exercising some control over, poetic expression, which preaching so thoroughly shares (Lonergan, 1967: 262-264).

There is one final point to be considered. Preaching does not achieve its end if it results in a congregation which is complacent in its relationship with the triune God. Both the Trinity and the church created by the Trinity move out beyond themselves. Patterned on the life of the Trinity the intentionality of human individuals and community also involves what Lonergan has described as "an extension outwards"; human beings, that is, can respond to anything they apprehend (Lonergan, 1984: 9).

What does a Christian congregation involved in mutual self-mediation with the divine Trinity apprehend? It apprehends itself as the church on mission to and for the world. Just as the triune God is not complacent in their exchange of Being, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, through the missions of the Word and the Spirit, so the church, called into being by the Father, incorporated as the Body of Christ, and animated by the Holy Spirit, gives itself in mission "as a concrete sign of the love of God for all people" (Haight, 1976b: 645). Expatiating on what "concrete sign" means, Roger Haight writes:

This commitment to developmental work, to the work of humanization, to the simple love of one's fellow men and women is thus conceived as an essential and integral part of what has classically been understood as the evangelization process—as indeed one might expect, since in teaching

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5Recalling the concern of this paper to relate preaching to the foundational events it is meant to serve, it is worthy of note here that linked with community in Method in Theology's chapter on foundations are witness, service, and promoting the kingdom of God. See Lonergan, 1972: 291.
this the [second Vatican) Council added nothing to the teaching of Jesus in the parable of the Good Samaritan (645).6

Because its function within the liturgical action is to focus the mutual self-mediation between the congregation and the Trinity, the adequate homily includes in its thrust the moment's opportunity for conversion and growth of the church and its members within themselves but through their extension outwards. In this way, one more step is taken towards the triune God's becoming all in all.

6But note a response by Robert T. Sears, S.J., which argues—rightly so, in my opinion—that the church also has a mission to its own self-development in conversion and growth (Sears, 1976a: 649-651). In addition, see Sears's own article following upon Haight's (Sears, 1976b: 652-679), and Haight's response to Sears (Haight, 1976a: 680-682). Perhaps the resolution of the difference of viewpoint between Haight and Sears is approached in an earlier study in the pages of Theological Studies by Frederick E. Crowe (Crowe, 1959).
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SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL


WILLIAMS, Margery

THE MEANING OF GOD INCARNATE
ACCORDING TO
FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER;
or,
Whether Lonergan is Appropriately
Regarded as
'A Schleiermacher for Our Time,'
and Why Not

Charles C. Hefting, Jr.
Boston College

Scholarship and thought may be expected
from the translator of Plato; but of
Christianity no more than is consistent
with Pantheism.

— EDWARD BOUVERIE PUSEY

It is in some ways odd that there has been virtually no attempt at illuminating Lonergan's Method in Theology by comparing it with the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher. The prima facie evidence would suggest that if there is any modern theologian whose understanding of religion and approach to theology seem to anticipate Method, that theologian is the author of the Speeches on Religion and The Christian Faith. But a case for real similarity has yet to be proved—oddly enough, seeing it carries some rather significant implications. For if, on closer inspection, the similarity should turn out to be more or less fundamental—if those who hail the Lonergan of Method as Schleiermacher redivivus are substantially correct—then an interesting possibility presents itself. Lonergan, as his critics are wont to observe, did not apply his own methodological conclusions to the writing of a systematic theology.
Schleiermacher did. The Christian Faith might therefore be expected to provide, if not complete answers, at least useful hints as to the way in which Lonergan's own program might be carried out.

That the issues at stake are important is shown by George Lindbeck's recent book on The Nature of Doctrine. As I have argued elsewhere (Hefling, 1985b), Lindbeck has not really come to terms with the complexity of Method in Theology. Yet he does make it clear that despite Lonergan's own 'quite conservative views' it is not impossible to locate Method on the theological map as yet another tributary belatedly flowing into the great stream of liberal theology, which Karl Barth damned but failed to dam, that first bubbled up at the turn of the last century with Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion. And if this cartography is accurate, then Lindbeck is also correct in pointing out that Lonergan is at least implicitly committed to specific theological positions on the central Christian doctrines. This is because, as Lonergan himself observes, a given dogma "can be clear only if it has a meaning, and it can have a meaning only if dogmas have a meaning. But today there is no lack of people that consider dogmas meaningless" (1985: 89). In other words, the kind of meaning doctrines have, if any, depends on what kind they can have, and that prior question, in all its ramifications, is one that modern philosophy and modern scholarship have forced theologians of every confessional stamp to address. Not only was Schleiermacher among the first to address it; he also showed in his Glaubenslehre what the meaning of the whole range of Christian doctrines will have to be if his is the right way to address it. Hence if Method does take essentially the same approach, so that Lonergan is, as Lindbeck contends, a typical representative of the 'experiential-expressivist' school—Schleiermacher's heirs in spirit if not in stature—it would follow that any theology based on Method can be expected to bear a family resemblance to The Christian Faith.

Such is the possibility I propose to investigate. And it should be said at once that such an investigation can draw little help from Lonergan himself. His references to Schleiermacher are few and for the most part concerned with the development
of hermeneutics rather than with theology as such; moreover they evidently rely on secondary accounts such as those of Palmer and Gadamer.¹ Not even in Method's discussion of religious experience—where if at all one might expect some mention of Schleiermacher's 'feeling of utter dependence' alongside Otto's *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*, Tillich's 'ultimate concern,' and Ignatius's 'consolation without a cause,'—is there any evidence for Lonergan's having been interested in or even acquainted with Schleiermacher the theologian.

Nothing much can be grounded, of course, on arguments from silence; still less can the indirect influence of Schleiermacher's views be ruled out, especially as Lonergan towards the end of his life showed some interest in protestant theology's more recent developments. In any case, however, I am here concerned with Schleiermacher's thought less as a source of Lonergan's theological method than as a possible, and possibly instructive, analogue. The question, as my title indicates, is this: are there any disparities so wide as to preclude envisioning the theology that Method calls for as, at least to a first approximation, a contemporary version of *The Christian Faith*?

I

BACKGROUND: SOME SIMILARITIES

*Videtur quod non:* it seems plausible that there is not a great dissimilarity; that in many respects, and those the most important, Lonergan and Schleiermacher approach the same problems in much the same way. Anyone who would defend

¹So three of Method's four references (1972: 165, 209, 318); the fourth (192) paraphrases a comment by Karl Heussi in which any number of names might be substituted for Schleiermacher's. It is the same with the essays in *A Second Collection* (1974: 183; 194-195, with citation of Schleiermacher's *Hermeneutik*) and *A Third Collection* (1985: 141, 153). In Insight, on the other hand, there is one longer and very interesting passage (1957: 678) that I will return to later.
such a thesis might begin by looking to the 'background' chapters of *Method in Theology*, and more specifically to three interrelated topics which are treated there and which I will discuss in this first part of my investigation—though it will also be necessary to dip into the 'foreground,' especially the chapter on Foundations. I shall argue that there is notable agreement, first, on the context of theology, using 'context' in Lonergan's sense to mean the related set of concrete questions that theologians endeavor to answer; second, on the nature of religion and, more particularly, on feeling as an intentional apprehension of religious values; and, third and most comprehensively, on the historical character of religious communities, from which the essentially hermeneutical character of theology follows.

1. *Theology as reflection on religion*

Schleiermacher's *Brief Outline on the Study of Religion*, the 'encyclopedia' that sets out his views on the distinctions and relations between different theological tasks, opens with the statement that theology "is a positive science, whose parts join into a cohesive whole only through their common relation to a particular mode of faith (Glaubensweise)" or a particular religion, as the first edition had put it (§1; *KD*, 1 = *BO*, 19).2 In defining it as 'positive,' Schleiermacher's aim is to distinguish this science from 'rational theology,' understood as a purely speculative philosophical discipline concerned with such things as theistic proofs. Theology in his sense is the study of

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2 In the interest of clarity my citations of Schleiermacher's major works depart from the usual style of the Lonergan Workshop journal. In place of dates, the abbreviations listed under WORKS CONSULTED are used and both the modern German editions and the standard English translations are cited. For the most part quotations follow the latter, but I have silently altered spelling and capitalization, and have occasionally substituted my own wording. Only important emendations are noted. In the case of *Der Christliche Glaube* (*CG*; translated as *The Christian Faith*, abbreviated *CF*) and the *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (*KD*; translated as *Brief Outline on the Study of Religion*, abbreviated *BO*), both of which have been re-published with varying pagination, the section number is given first.
something, a second-order discipline, which presupposes what it reflects on—piety, faith, religion. And however specialized and theoretical it may become, theology not only takes its start from praxis, the 'lived world' of religious persons and their communities, but also returns to it and indeed exists for the sake of it. Hence theology can only be ‘done’ in a setting where, so far from abstracting from devotion, worship, and the like, it takes these as its object both in themselves and in their relationships to all other aspects of life.

Religion is intrinsic to human being and piety is its essence: these together form the cornerstone of the theology Schleiermacher builds in The Christian Faith. Indeed his earlier Speeches on Religion remain a classic apologia for religious experience as a reality so pervasive and important as to be neglected by cultured despisers only at their peril. What this experience consists in will be considered presently. Here the point to be noted is Schleiermacher’s contention that the essential element in piety is “not an accidental element, or a thing which varies from person to person, but is a universal element of life.” For it follows that “recognition of this fact entirely takes the place, for the system of doctrine (Glaubenslehre), of all the so-called proofs of the existence of God” (§33; CG, I: 174-175 = CF, 133-134).

Here, surely, is an appropriate place to launch a comparison with Lonergan.

It is a well known but not always well understood fact that after Insight had been published Lonergan found reason to reconsider the much-debated nineteenth chapter, with its relentlessly objective proof of God’s existence as an unrestricted act of understanding. One interpretation of the resulting change has been that for the Lonergan of Method theistic arguments generally, even the one in Insight, have nothing whatever to do with theology once it has been conceived in a thoroughgoing way as an empirical discipline which, as such, must take its stand on religious experience. Without going into detail,3 what can be

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3For a more extended discussion, see Hefling, 1987 and Byrne, 1986: 73-77.
said for present purposes is that this interpretation is half correct. It is true that within the framework of Method philosophical proofs cannot provide the foundation of a theology that takes seriously the modern turn to the subject; but it does not follow that such a theology can simply discard chapter XIX of Insight altogether. It cannot. In the final sections of this paper I hope to indicate some of the consequences, none of them very happy, of supposing that an objective philosophy of God is antithetical to Christian theology. For present purposes, however, the point is that Lonergan's reasons for reassessing the function of theistic proof have to do with the concrete nature of religion.

From a methodological viewpoint it is of no small importance that belief in God precedes objective knowledge of God, if not in every individual instance certainly in the vast majority. Not that the inverse order is impossible. A given person might conceivably arrive at Christianity by the route that passes through Insight's final chapters, although it is far more likely that the effort needed to master those chapters will be forthcoming from someone standing within the horizon set up by religious conversion (see Lonergan, 1972: 12). Either way, however, the proof is neither more nor less than a proof. On the one hand, apprehending it is not an actus supernaturalis quoad substantium (1974: 133); on the other, it is really God, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of whom chapter XIX can help to generate real, objective knowledge. That being so, the methodological question is where such knowledge should be included within the overall theological program. To that question Lonergan gives his most extended answer in Philosophy of God, and Theology; briefly stated, it is that conversion displaces proof, not as a source of knowledge of God, but as the foundation of belief in God, while the philosophical theism so displaced serves to promote understanding of that belief.

Although Schleiermacher would no doubt cavil at giving theistic proof even the subordinate role that Lonergan gives it, there still seems to be agreement on the main question: concretely speaking, belief is primary, and the foundations of belief are experiential rather than demonstrative. Moreover,
they are transcultural. As Schleiermacher puts it, they do not rest “upon any particular modification of human nature (menschlichen Daseins) but upon the absolutely general nature of man (Wesen des Menschen)” (§33; CG, I: 175 = CF, 134). All of which leads to a second possible area of agreement.

2. Feeling

Another, related development that distinguishes Method from Insight, also frequently remarked upon, is Lonergan's emphasis in the later book on feelings. Here again the difference can be overstated; there is less a reversal of the views worked out in Insight than an enlargement of them that is consistent with Method's attention to the 'existential' as well as the cognitional aspects of authentic subjectivity. Without retracting his earlier account of the good as intelligible, Lonergan treats it as a distinct notion, apprehended in the first instance not by insight but by feeling.

The relationship of feeling to religion appears most strikingly in his transposition of Pascal's famous pensée about reasons of the heart unknown to reason. Having characterized religious experience as a dynamic, conscious state of unqualified being-in-love (1972: 105-106), Lonergan adds that in such a state there is added to the apprehension of other values—vital social, cultural, and personal, in ascending order—"an apprehension of transcendent value" that consists in an "actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe" (115). Thus, as feelings in general are "the mass and momentum and power of ... conscious living" and "the effective orientation" of human being (65), so too the affective transformation which is religious conversion reorients the whole of one's conscious activity, including not only decisions but also insights and judgments of fact and value. Hence Lonergan's definition of faith as "the knowledge born of religious love."

But important though feelings undoubtedly are in Method, it cannot be said that Lonergan's treatment of them is exhaustive or quite without ambiguities. For this and other reasons it would
be rash to assume that what he means by ‘feeling’ and what Schleiermacher means by Gefühl are simply identical. There are, however, a number of considerations which serve to raise the probability that, were a conversation possible, each would know what the other was talking about.

For one thing, they might agree that feelings are intentional; that feeling is no mere emotive state but an activity in which, to use Lonergan’s vocabulary, the conscious subject transcends himself and apprehends an object. For another—though here the parallel is not so clear—they might agree that feeling is nevertheless neither identical with nor reducible to cognition: it establishes a relation sui generis, and that to which it relates the subject may, as yet, be neither known nor understood.4 Both of these points, to clarify them by contrast, would seem to distinguish Lonergan and Schleiermacher from, on the one hand, Leibniz and others who allow that feeling (unlike a stomachache) is genuinely self-transcending while at the same time annexing it to cognition as a confused, indistinct, and to that extent inferior mode of knowing; and, on the other hand, from Kant and those who join him in affirming the autonomy of feeling while at the same time denying its intentional character by insisting that in feeling the subject apprehends the subject and nothing else.

Not all states of feeling, of course, are religious. For Schleiermacher, as everyone knows who knows anything about him, the specific feeling which lies at the center of religion, and indeed constitutes it as religion, is das schlechtinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl, the feeling of utter dependence:

The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness

4My reading of Schleiermacher here and in what follows has been influenced by Williams, 1978: 24-26. Notice that I have said that Lonergan and Schleiermacher might agree. Especially on the question of whether and in what sense feelings are intentional, there will be more to say in Part III below.
of being utterly dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God (§4; CG, I: 23 = CF, 12).\(^5\)

So runs the famous fourth proposition of *The Christian Faith*. I shall return to it in Part III below, but already there are two points worth noting.

The first is a corollary to my discussion of theistic proofs in §1 above. By way of explaining his (at the time novel) identification of utter dependence with relation to God, Schleiermacher claims that it is a question, basically, of the "really original signification" of the word *God*. His answer amounts to a heuristic definition: *God* is "the Whence of our receptive and active existence" or that "to which we trace out being in such a state," namely the state of religious feeling (§4.4; CG, I: 28-29 = CF, 16-17). Certainly 'God' may mean more than this; as *The Christian Faith* shows, it does mean more—much more—for Schleiermacher. But any further meaning must grow out of this elemental one. Just so does Lonergan write in *Method* that "an orientation to transcendent mystery ... provides the primary and fundamental meaning of the name, God" (1972: 341; cp. 350). For both, then, it would not be too much to say that religion is in the first instance a 'fourth-level' reality, a matter of *Existenz*, an affair of the heart. That is why not only philosophical theism but all of theology, systematics especially, is subordinate and subsequent: however important such intellectual clarifications may be in themselves, "a true appropriation of Christian dogmas cannot be brought about by scientific means," but only, Schleiermacher continues, by "the love that wills to perceive" (§13 postscript; CG, I: 93 = CF, 67).

A second noteworthy implication of the proposition quoted above is similarly echoed in Lonergan’s treatment of religion. Piety, Schleiermacher suggests, can be expressed variously

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\(^5\)The 1928 translation I am quoting reads "the consciousness of being absolutely dependent" and elsewhere speaks of the 'feeling of absolute dependence.' Most English-language discussions of Schleiermacher have followed suit, but the possibly misleading connotations of 'absolute,' together with the peculiarity (which Schleiermacher notes) of the original *schlechthin*, seem to call for a different word; 'utter' is the one most often adopted, and I will be using it here.
without losing its 'self-identical essence.' Religious experience, this is to say, occurs in priority not only to the deliberate, reflective language of theology but also to the spontaneous objectifications, the symbols and rites, songs and stories, that are generally grouped under the label 'religion.' This, of course, is the point at which critics of Schleiermacher in particular and of 'liberal' theology in general rise in a body to voice their objections. Some would contend that religion is simply not the sort of thing that Schleiermacher—or, to the extent of the parallels adduced so far, Lonergan—supposes it is. Others would insist that while 'religion' may well be that sort of thing, Christianity is not, and that in fact there is an irreconcilable opposition between Christian faith, which is faith in a divinely revealed word, and those merely human aspirations that go by the name of religion but are really only attempts at domesticating the Almighty, open as such to the devastating critique epitomized by Feuerbach.

The first sort of objection, reinforced with recent philosophy and sociology of language, is the one Lindbeck brings against Lonergan from his own 'post-liberal' viewpoint; the second is the one raised against Schleiermacher by 'neo-orthodox' theologians, most notably Barth but also, in his wake, Brunner and Bonhoeffer. I am not concerned here with refuting either version, except in so far as each gives a distorted, because simplistic, picture of what Lonergan and Schleiermacher, respectively, think about religion. No doubt some kind of 'experiential expressivism,' as Lindbeck calls it, has long been a widely held paradigm of theological method. My contention, however, is that it is a paradigm which Schleiermacher himself does not really fit, and that for many of the same reasons neither

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6 See especially the postscript to §6 (CG, I: 45-47 = CF, 29-31), where Schleiermacher discusses the meanings of the word 'religion' and distinguishes between what Lonergan might call religion's 'inner' and 'outer' words. Generally speaking, however, Schleiermacher's writings—the Speeches on Religion are an exception—use 'religion' sparingly; he prefers Pröm-migkeit, usually and perhaps misleadingly translated 'piety.'

7 The Barthian critique will, however, turn up again in §11 below.
does Lonergan. What these reasons are will appear in considering a third point of comparison.

3. History and hermeneutics

According to Schleiermacher, "every essential element of human nature becomes the basis of a fellowship or communion," not least the religious element. Conversely, however, "[a]s regards the feeling of utter dependence in particular, everyone will know that it was first awakened in him ... by the communicative and stimulative power of expression or utterance" (§6.2; CG, I: 42-43 = CF, 27).\(^8\) Taken together these observations suggest that whereas the experiential-expressivist paradigm, at least in its usual and less sophisticated versions,\(^9\) tends to posit an atemporal, one-way relation between the 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of religion, Schleiermacher himself stresses their ongoing reciprocity. Hence it would seem that to refer to the feeling of utter dependence as a 'religious a priori' is, if not altogether incorrect, at least somewhat misleading. For while there is assuredly a sense in which this feeling is more basic than the gestures, symbols, and utterances that express it, Schleiermacher's work as a whole lays far more emphasis on the social context of religion and on its historical development in persons and communities, both of which follow from the interaction of inner experience and outer expression. Otherwise stated, there exists no religion-in-general. This is not to say that it is impossible or illegitimate to analyze religion per se; Schleiermacher does exactly that, descriptively and rhetorically in the Speeches and more theoretically in the first ten sections of The Christian Faith. Nevertheless, such an analysis can only be partial and preliminary, because the feeling of utter dependence as it actually occurs always occurs in a particular,

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\(^8\) "Fellowship or communion" here translates Gemeinschaft; "expression or utterance" translates Äußerung.

\(^9\) For one such, see Berger, 1979: 123-127 on "An Inductive Model," sc., for theology.
determinate way, and the determinations, which serve to 'awaken' this feeling, are always socially and historically mediated.

3.1 Christianity as immediate and mediated

A recent study of Schleiermacher's theology shows in a helpful way how the very structure of The Christian Faith reflects this understanding of homo religiosus. Robert R. Williams likens Schleiermacher's procedure to that of Husserlian phenomenology, arguing that in the First Part of The Christian Faith there is an attempt at 'pure description' in which factual questions are 'bracketed' in the manner of Husserl's epoché, while in the Second Part these brackets are removed. The First Part, that is, treats of God generically, as disclosed in the feeling of utter dependence; the Second, of God as related to specifically Christian, historically determinate experience, which for Schleiermacher is the experience of sin and grace found only in social and historical relation to Christ.\(^\text{10}\) Hence the first section of the Second Part notes that the propositions of the First Part are "in no sense the reflection of a meagre and purely monotheistic" religiousness—there is no such thing—but are instead "abstracted from one which has issued from fellowship with the Redeemer" (§62.3; CG, I: 344 = CF, 262), although these propositions may indeed apply to other monotheistic faiths as well. Nor can there be much doubt as to the particular religion and community from which Schleiermacher has drawn the general monotheism presented in the First Part: they are his own, just as they are in the Speeches and the 'Christmas Eve' dialogue (see Niebuhr, 1964:

\[^{10}\] The complete titles Schleiermacher gives to the two parts of The Christian Faith are instructive: "FIRST PART OF THE SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE: The Development of that Religious Self-Consciousness which is always both presupposed by and contained in every Christian Religious Affection"; "SECOND PART OF THE SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE: Explication of the Facts of the Religious Self-Consciousness, as they are determined by the Antithesis of Sin and Grace." The Introduction that precedes the First Part, and which is often the only section of the book that is studied, will be reserved for extended discussion in §11.
21-71). If theology is reflection on religious praxis, then its method will necessarily be, in part, introspective—a praxis of self-reflection.

Moving, then, to the full concreteness of Christian theism, the central point for Schleiermacher is that Christianity "is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth" ([§11; CG, I: 74 = CF, 52]). But—an equally important point—it is so related through the actual history of a specific community constituted by an ongoing tradition of faith and worship and, perhaps, of theology as well. This helps to explain some of the noticeably 'catholic' tendencies of The Christian Faith, especially in its Second Part—the prominence of the church, as that historical community in which alone 'fellowship with the Redeemer' occurs; the subordination of the authority of scripture to faith in Christ and hence, indirectly, to the church as the concrete locus of this faith; and so on (§§113, 128; CG, II: 207, 284 = CF, 525, 591). Indeed Schleiermacher makes it clear, presaging chapter xx of Insight, that the point of the Redemption was to bring into existence a historical community that not only mediates a new life of faith but also has a constructive role to play in relation to human progress and decline.12

11Schleiermacher's position is not unequivocal. In the First Part he defines the "antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism" as follows: "the former makes the individual's relation to the Church dependent on his relation to Christ, while the latter contrariwise makes the individual's relation to Christ dependent on his relation to the Church" ([§24; CG, I: 137 = CF, 103]). By the end of the section, however, this definition has been subjected to a good deal of qualification; and indeed it is difficult to see how Schleiermacher could consistently maintain it as initially stated, despite strong warrants for it in protestant theological tradition, along with his own strong emphasis on the historically mediated character of Christian piety.

12My terminology is of course Lonergan's, but in the Brief Outline, for instance, Schleiermacher writes: "Unless religious communities are to be regarded as mere aberrations, it must be possible to show that the existence of such associations is a necessary element for the development of the human spirit" ([§22; KD, 9 = BO, 24]). For a good summary of how chapter XX of Insight fits with Lonergan's theology of redemption, see Loewe, 1977.
3.2 Methodological implications: the 'Brief Outline'

Now if, as all this suggests, history in the sense of what historians study is the matrix of Christian faith, then it would seem that history in the sense of a scholarly discipline or science must similarly be a constitutive part of Christian theology. Which is exactly what Schleiermacher argues in his 'formal encyclopedia,' the Brief Outline. He never supposes that a system of doctrine, even his own Glaubenslehre, represents the whole theological enterprise. On the contrary, the Brief Outline classifies dogmatics, along with 'church statistics,' as 'historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity.' This places dogmatics in the second of three major major divisions, Historical Theology, which itself is preceded by Philosophical Theology and precedes Practical Theology\(^\text{13}\) - an arrangement of considerable interest. The position of Practical Theology is clear enough: it is the climax of the theological enterprise, its return to the same concrete praxis of worship and piety from which it always begins. Schleiermacher's ordering of the first two divisions is more problematic, however, largely because the kind of enterprise he is envisioning does not (as he was well aware) really 'begin,' in the sense that a logical argument begins, since whatever the 'first principles' of theology may be they are not propositions. Even a brief outline must start somewhere, however, and Schleiermacher puts Philosophical Theology first, on two grounds: it "essentially includes within it the principles of [one's] whole theological way of thinking" (§67; KD, 29 = BO, 39), and "a large part of its work is to define concepts" that will be used in Historical and Practical Theology (§24; KD, 9-10 = BO, 25).

Whether this arrangement is entirely successful will need to be considered later. Part of Schleiermacher's difficulty is that no such discipline as the Philosophical Theology proposed in his Brief Outline existed. Neither its apologetic nor its polemical

\(^{13}\)Capital letters on the names of these divisions will be used to mark them as such; similarly, I have capitalized the names of Lonergan's functional specialties.
aspect has yet reached full maturity, he writes (§68; KD, 29 = BO, 40); that is why there is so much diversity and disagreement in the various branches of Historical Theology, particularly in exegesis and dogmatics (§252; KD, 97 = BO, 88). Meanwhile, pending the advent of such a set of basic terms as Philosophical Theology would in principle provide, the study of theology generally must make do with propositions 'borrowed' from other disciplines.

Ethics is the most important source of these *Lehnsätze* or borrowed propositions, where by ethics Schleiermacher means "the science of the principles of history" (§§29, 35; KD, 12, 15 = BO, 27, 30; see also §2 postscript; CG, I: 14 = CF, 5) or, as his translator puts it, "an organization of knowledge representing the whole of human culture, not morality alone" (Tice, 1966: 116). The point is that the basic categories of theology, like those of the other *Geisteswissenschaften* and unlike the categories of natural science, can be defined only in conjunction with historical investigation. They are neither speculative nor *a priori*; certainly they cannot be metaphysical. Thus it falls to Philosophical Theology, not to demonstrate God's existence, but to determine the "essence of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other kinds of faith, and to understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in relation to all the other activities of the human spirit" (§21; KD, 8-9 = BO, 24). Yet because this *Wesen des Christentums* is "attached to a certain history" it can and must be understood only through investigation, conducted on 'ethical' principles, of that history itself. From one point of view, therefore, Historical Theology is the 'verification' of Philosophical Theology (§27; KD, 11 = BO, 26); from another, Philosophical Theology "presupposes the material of Historical Theology as already known," even though

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14Similarly, Schleiermacher writes a little later that Philosophical Theology's task is "to present (a) that perspective on the essence of Christianity whereby it can be recognized as a distinctive mode of faith, and at the same time (b) the form which Christian community takes, and (c) the manner in which each of these factors is further subdivided and differentiated. Everything that belongs to these three tasks, taken together, forms the work of Philosophical Theology" (§24; KD, 9-10 = BO, 25).
its own work is "to lay a foundation for the properly historical perspective on Christianity" (§65; KD, 28 = BO, 39).

3.3 The hermeneutic of Schleiermacher's 'foundations'

Methodologically speaking, then, there is no question of a simplistically sequential ordering of the first and second of the three divisions proposed in the Brief Outline. Christianity being what it is—a reality, to use Lonergan's terms, that exists partly in the world mediated by meaning—the very categories in which it can be understood must arise in the process of understanding it. Otherwise stated, Historical Theology and Philosophical Theology must proceed in tandem, each being refined in relation to the other. 'Which comes first?' is finally a misguided question, because, as I have suggested, the relation here is reciprocal but not logical. As Schleiermacher puts it, the understanding that theology seeks "is a kind of artistic or technical achievement (Kunstleistung), and thus requires a 'doctrine concerning technique' or method (Kunstlehre oder Technik), which we designate by the term 'hermeneutics'" (§132; KD, 53 = BO, 56).15

Lonergan once remarked that "the whole problem in modern theology, Protestant and Catholic, is the introduction of historical scholarship,"16 and perhaps enough has been said at least to indicate Schleiermacher's approach to the problem. To understand a religion is to understand a region of feeling; also, and equally, it is to understand the ongoing social process which both engenders and informs this feeling and which, moreover, in the case of Christianity, links Christians with their Redeemer. It follows that the procedures appropriate to such an

15 This observation refers specifically to exegetical theology, but in the context of the whole Brief Outline its wider applicability is plain. I have altered Tice's translation, which uses 'technology' to render Technik—rather misleadingly, although Tice himself notes that Schleiermacher is very far from implying anything mechanical.

understanding will be those appropriate to understanding persons, their communities, and their history. And there will be an evaluative as well as an interpretive component, because "even the especially scientific work of the theologian must aim at promoting the Church's welfare" (§11; KD, 4 = BO, 22), above all its leadership. But responsible leadership of the church

requires a knowledge of the whole community which is to be led: (a) of its situation at any given time, and (b) of its past, with the realization that this community, regarded as a whole, is a historical entity, and that its present condition can be adequately grasped only when it is viewed as a product of the past (§26; KD, 11 = BO, 26)

I find nothing in this admirable statement with which Lonergan would disagree, and it sums up nicely the main lines of my discussion in this section. For Schleiermacher, theology as a whole is the endeavor to determine what a religion is, by determining what it has been and in order to determine what it is to become. Because theology emerges to the extent that "any given mode of faith ... is communicated by means of ideas" (§2; KD, 1 = BO, 19)—in Lonergan’s vocabulary, to the extent that it enters the world mediated by linguistic meaning—the theological disciplines take their place among the Geisteswissenschaften, the sciences of meaning, in which historical scholarship is neither an extra nor an auxiliary but an integral component. This accounts for the centrality in Schleiermacher’s scheme of Historical Theology as “the actual corpus of theological study, which is connected with science, as such, by means of Philosophical Theology and with the active Christian life by means of Practical Theology” (§28; KD, 11-12 = BO, 26).

### 3.4 Parallels with ‘Method in Theology’

No doubt Schleiermacher’s three divisions are a long way from Method in Theology’s functional specialization. Yet they are closer than one might have expected. Postponing the differences for a later section, I would point out especially the similarity between his Philosophical Theology in its relation to Historical Theology, and Lonergan’s functional specialty
Foundations in its relation to the four 'mediating' specialties that precede it.

Foundations is concerned with the categories, general and special, that are to be used in the direct discourse of Doctrines and Systematics, which in turn lead to the 'executive reflection,' as Philip McShane has called it, of Communications. The reality from which these categories are derived is what Lonergan names 'conversion'; more especially, as regards the categories specific to theology, it is a religious conversion which, as an occurrence, is transculturally invariant (Lonergan, 1972: 267, 282; cp. 108-109). No more than Schleiermacher, though, does Lonergan suppose that such an experience comes 'neat.' "The data ... on the dynamic state of other-worldly love," he writes, "are the data on a process of conversion and development" (1972: 289; emphasis added). Accordingly, besides the categories derived from religious experience itself, there are others derived from the "history of the salvation that is rooted in a being-in-love, and [from] the function of this history in promoting the kingdom of God"; there are also the explicitly Christian—because Trinitarian—categories that move "from our loving to the loving source of our love" (291). Thus in suggesting that Foundations "will be concerned largely with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians understand themselves" (293), it is quite clear Lonergan has in mind a process that depends not only upon introspection, in the sense of objectifying the contents of consciousness (1972: 8), but also upon correctly understanding and responsibly evaluating the past. Foundations cannot get along without Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectic.

So much is clear from Method's account of religious experience. "This gift we have been describing really is sanctifying grace but notionally differs from it" (107)—how much is packed into that one sentence! Not only does it point to the retrieval of Thomas Aquinas's understanding of grace that Lonergan himself had achieved thirty years before in the articles which became Grace and Freedom; it adds as well the larger historical view in which Thomas's achievement can be seen both
in its continuity with and in its differences from the kind of theology *Method* envisions. Deriving foundational categories is a theological rather than a methodological task, but in this case *Method* for once offers more than hints. For the observation that a methodical theologian needs "the spiritual development that will enable him both to enter into the experience of others and to frame the terms and relations that will express that experience" (290; emphasis added) appears just after Lonergan's own sketch of what such terms and relations might be. And what the sketch does, in miniature, for *Grace and Freedom* is what the seven hundred pages of *Insight* do for the *Verbum* articles: it initiates a transposition, not simply of 'the traditional Christian doctrine of grace'—that is far too vague—but rather of what Lonergan regards as the climax of a historical development that began in Augustine's quarrel with the Pelagians and moved through Anselm's halting steps towards theory, through Philip the Chancellor's formulation of the theorem of the supernatural, and through Thomas's earlier attempts at a solution to his final position in the *Summa Theologiae*, II-II. Nor does this historical and, in the functionally specialized sense, dialectical retrieval of one of the 'genuine achievements' of the past (see Lonergan, 1972: 352) lack a contemporary relevance. If it is true that 'the doctrine of grace' is, as Lonergan proposes, an ongoing reality whose meaning is known "not by a definition but by a history of questions raised and answers given" (1974: 200; cp. 198), it is likewise true that not every possible question about grace and freedom is apt; not, for example, the questions that led to the mutually exclusive answers of Báñez and Molina; nor, perhaps, some of the questions over which Christians are still divided.

My present point, however, is methodological. Whether Lonergan begins *a posteriori* with a historical investigation of Thomas's teaching and its antecedents or *a priori* with an analysis of intending that rests on self-appropriation is, in the long run, the wrong question. As I suggested earlier in discussing Schleiermacher's *Brief Outline*, theology does not 'begin' in either of the ways these logical alternatives define. Rather, like the doctrines whose meaning it mediates and the
cognitional process on which it rests, Lonergan's theology is an ongoing process. Accordingly, "what is paramount is control of the process" (1972: 270), which is to say that what is paramount is method.\textsuperscript{17} The method Lonergan offers makes explicit two things that I have suggested are at least implicit in Schleiermacher's work, especially the Brief Outline: first, that "[t]he present simply cannot be regarded as the kernel of a future which is to correspond more nearly to the full conception of the church, or to any other notion, unless one perceives how it has developed out of the past" (§26; KD, 11 = BO, 26); second, that in this perceiving, to borrow Frederick Lawrence's formulation, "the coming to light of the tradition is one with the coming to light of the concrete self" (Lawrence, 101).

4. Concluding remarks

My observations in this first part have necessarily been global and suggestive rather than exact or exhaustive. Standing as it were with one foot in the Enlightenment, so to say, and the other in Romanticism, Schleiermacher attempts to do justice to both—to the affective element of piety, devotion, and feeling in religion as such, and to the historical particularity of specifically Christian faith—all without falling into either an enthusiastic irrationalism or a merely scholarly aridity. Broadly speaking, his solution to the problem of maintaining so precarious a balance lies in distinguishing different sorts of categories to be employed by the theologian. On the one hand are categories applicable to Christian faith alone, categories grounded in an irreducible realm of historically determinate experience; on the other, categories on loan from disciplines outside the specifically theological ambit; in brief, something not unlike Lonergan's 'special' and 'general' theological categories.

\textsuperscript{17}Compare the following: "If one conceives knowing as a perfection, then the question of the a priori ... is of little moment. ... It is only on the assumption that knowing is intrinsically a looking-at that the question of the a priori has any great significance" (Lonergan, 1980: 197). But notice also the initial if. Where Schleiermacher stands on the issue will be considered in Part III below.
True, Schleiermacher’s distinction is not drawn in the same place Lonergan would draw it. Ever the methodologist, Lonergan includes among the special rather than the general categories much that Schleiermacher would consider ‘borrowed,’ while the general categories in Method include much that Schleiermacher would probably regard as irrelevant to theology, since they include virtually the whole of Insight (see 1972: 287-288, notes 9-15). Again, compared with the distinctions Lonergan draws between the goals of the first four functional specialties, and with the equally well defined relations between these, Schleiermacher’s account of Historical Theology is manifestly undifferentiated. Although he subdivides it into exegetical theology, church history, and ‘historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity’ (further subdivided into dogmatics and ‘church statistics’), these divisions are not really functionally conceived. Again, including dogmatic theology within this historical division blurs the distinction Lonergan maintains between indirect and direct discourse, ‘mediating’ and ‘mediated’ phases of theology, in a way that is symptomatic of Schleiermacher’s inability to settle clearly and precisely the relative functional (as contrasted with logical) priorities of his Philosophical and Historical Theology.

It remains, all that being said, that Schleiermacher was on to something. His conceptions of religion, of Christianity, and of

18How important this inclusion is will become clearer, I hope, in Part III below. To restate it the other way round, the only parts of Insight that do not enter the general categories are chapter XIX, which Lonergan would later link with Systematics rather than Foundations, and the section on faith in chapter XX, which is sublated by Method’s ‘background’ chapter on religion with its distinction between faith and belief.

19They seem to represent instead what Lonergan would call field specialization (1972: 125). For example: “The whole of historical theology is included within these three divisions: the knowledge of primitive Christianity, the knowledge of the total career of Christianity, and the knowledge of the state of Christianity at the present time” (§85; KD, 36 = BO, 45). The name ‘exegetical’ referred to above is thus something of a misnomer, since all three subdivisions depend on exegesis. It is justified only in the sense that ‘knowledge of primitive Christianity’ depends almost entirely on documents that correspond—more or less—with the New Testament canon (§88; KD, 38 = BO, 46; see also §§103-107; KD, 43-45 = BO, 50-51).
theology are all of a piece; they reflect a genuine effort to take
due account of the early modern 'turn to the subject' and the
concomitant rise of historical mindedness; and while it could no
doubt be argued that Lonergan has done a better job all round,
there has not yet appeared any insurmountable difference that
would rule out looking to the properly 'dogmatic' parts of *The
Christian Faith*, as distinct from its methodological *Einleitung*,
for a treatment of the major Christian doctrines that theologians
eager to put *Method in Theology* into practice can study with
profit.

II

**FOREGROUND: SCHLEIERMACHER ON THE PERSON AND
WORK OF CHRIST**

I have been arguing for a kind of antecedent probability of
finding in Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* hints about the
content of a truly methodical Christian dogmatics and
systematics. But of course it cannot be ruled out that what seem
to be real and significant parallels between Schleiermacher's
thought and the 'background' chapters of *Method in Theology*
are merely coincidental. Indeed, they might turn out to be a
confirmation of Aristotle's saying: that is falsest which
approximates. For it is quite possible that Schleiermacher's line
of thinking, extended and applied to particular expressions of
Christian meaning, diverges so far from Lonergan's as to
delineate a completely different horizon. The tree *looks* sound,
to change the metaphor, but only by its fruit can a reasonable
judgment be rendered.

To the fruit that *The Christian Faith* bears this second
part of my investigation will turn. But whereas Part I presented
something like a *videtur quod*, this part will be in effect my *sed
contra*: Lonergan is not a Schleiermacher for our time. Why he
is not, I hope to suggest in Part III. Here, for purposes of
comparison with Lonergan, I shall concentrate on Christology,
and that for three reasons: first and least important, because
Christology is topical, although some forecasters have recently detected a change in the direction theological winds are blowing; second, because there is reason to think that on this topic the position Lonergan took after writing Method in Theology, although different from the one that had appeared earlier in his Latin treatises De Verbo Incarnato and De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, is in the most important respects continuous and compatible with those textbooks; and third, because Christology is also, in a way that I hope to suggest, at the center of The Christian Faith, making it all the more suitable as a testing ground for the similarities in approach as between Lonergan and Schleiermacher that have been outlined above. By way of introducing my examination of Schleiermacher's Christ, however, I shall begin at the end of The Christian Faith.

5. Schleiermacher on the Trinity

5.1 Appendix or coping stone?

It is well known if not notorious that the doctrine which might be regarded as most characteristically Christian and the one to which Lonergan devoted the most extensive of his Latin treatises—the doctrine of the Trinity—appears in The Christian Faith as a kind of appendix comprising merely the last three of its 172 sections. True, Schleiermacher himself calls it the coping stone (Schlußstein) of Christian doctrine. But by this he means that everything essential for explicating the experiential fact of Christian religious feeling, 'utter dependence' as determined by the antithesis of sin and grace, is "also posited in what is essential in the doctrine of the Trinity" (§170; CG, II: 458 = CF, 738). The meaning of this somewhat guarded statement depends in turn on Schleiermacher's estimate of

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20Notably in "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections" (Lonergan, 1985: 74-99), on which an earlier article of mine in this journal (Hefling, 1985a) is a kind of commentary; but also, if somewhat telegraphically, in other papers reprinted in Lonergan's Second and Third Collection.
what is 'essential,' and here, at least from Lonergan's viewpoint, problems arise.

What is essential in the Second Part of The Christian Faith, and what Schleiermacher thus claims to find expressed in the Trinitarian articles of the church's traditional creeds, is the affirmation of two unions of the divine essence with human nature, one occurring in Christ and the other in the 'common Spirit' of the church. "Therewith the whole view of Christianity set forth in our church teaching stands or falls," he declares, for without these unions redemption could neither be centered in the Person of Christ nor borne and perpetuated by Christian community. Moreover, to interpret the doctrine of the Trinity in this fashion is to interpret it in continuity with Christian tradition, for according to Schleiermacher it was precisely in order to "equate as definitively as possible the Divine Essence as thus united to human nature with the Divine Essence in itself" that Trinitarian doctrine arose in the first place (§170.1; CG. II: 459 = CF. 739). In fact, reverence for this equation's venerable origin would appear to be more important, as reason for admitting a doctrine of the Trinity into his own system, than any inherent aptness such a doctrine may have for expressing the essence of Christianity. For, considered solely on its own merits, traditional Trinitarian doctrine has two strikes against it.

The first is its failure to conform with Schleiermacher's definition of Christian doctrines as "accounts of the Christian religious attitudes or states of mind (frommen Gemütszustände) set forth in speech" (§15; CG. I: 105 = CF. 76);²¹ it is not even a logically necessary combination of such utterances (§170.3; CG. II: 461 = CF. 740). The second is that the doctrine of the Trinity in its received, 'ecclesiastical' shape is unintelligible. It asserts a relationship between the one Essence and the three Persons of God for which "we have no closer analogy, on which to form our thought of it, than that of the conception of a species with the individual members it contains." Any such analogy,

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²¹I have altered the standard English translation, which reads "accounts of the Christian religious affections." Niebuhr suggests "religious soul-states" (1964: 141).
however, inevitably leads either to asserting the reality of divine unicity at the expense of removing the distinction of Persons, or else to asserting the reality of divine triplicity at the expense of falling into polytheism; and there is no third possibility (§171.3; CG, II: 465-466 = CF, 744-745).

Schleiermacher has exactly the same kind of objection to make about Chalcedon's Christological definition, as I shall discuss in the next section. What may be noted here is that both objections raise a large and basic question of theological method. Christian doctrines, we have seen, are mediated historically by Christian tradition and within Christian community. But this pedigree, it now begins to appear, is no guarantee that any doctrine will go on being mediated, at least not without meeting further criteria. What, then, are the grounds on which a given doctrine is to be accepted, modified, or rejected today? Schleiermacher has two criteria. One of them, evident in his first objection to the doctrine of the Trinity, is that a dogmatic proposition must have an 'ecclesiastical value,' which "consists in its reference to the religious emotions (frommen Gemütserregungen) themselves" (§17.1; CG, I: 113 = CF, 83). The second criterion similarly corresponds with his second objection: the wissenschaftlich or 'scientific' value of a dogmatic proposition consists in "the definiteness of the concepts which appear in it, and of their connection with each other" (§17.2; CG, I: 114 = CF, 84). Since Trinitarian doctrine, as received, falls on both counts, there is no need to ask which criterion takes priority. But one might still ask how the 'ecclesiastical' and 'scientific' value of a doctrine are related, and the question is the more interesting in that these two seem to correspond, very roughly, to the functional specialties Foundations and Systematics. Lonergan would deny, of course, that the intelligibility of a doctrine can be a criterion for accepting it; Systematics seeks an always imperfectly-grasped intelligibility in the judgments of fact and value which Doctrines articulates and which have been accepted on the quite different grounds thematized in Foundations. Thus Schleiermacher's pair of criteria might lead one to look for something in between, functioning as Doctrines does in Method by mediating between
foundational judgments of value and systematic intelligibility. In fact, however—and it is a fact of crucial importance for assessing his difference from Lonergan—it remains ambiguous throughout the dogmatic sections of *The Christian Faith* whether Schleiermacher is concerned with Doctrines or Systematics in Lonergan's sense.

More on that later. To return to Schleiermacher on the Trinity: it is fortunate, from his point of view, that the traditional doctrine did not receive any fresh treatment at the time of the Reformation, because its continued development within protestant theology is therefore possible and indeed likely. What Schleiermacher has in mind, however, seems to be more of an undevelopment than a further differentiation. The conceptual problem he points to, centered as it is on the difficulty of conceiving a relation between unity of Essence and trinity of Persons, presumes "the original and eternal existence of distinctions within the Divine Essence" (§172.3; CG, II: 472 = CF, 750). But Schleiermacher hints broadly that since the New Testament presumes nothing of the kind, subsequent theological tradition must have gone astray. This, interestingly enough, amounts to a flat contradiction of one of his own methodological canons, which prescribes an appeal to scripture only in default of confessional documents (§27; CG, I: 148 = CF, 112). Be that as it may, his suggestion is that a line of doctrinal development abandoned in the third century, the Sabellian view of the Trinity, will turn out to be superior to, or at least on a par with, the Athanasian view which was eventually accorded general ecclesiastical approval.

The final edition of *The Christian Faith* leaves it an open question whether theology ought to look to Sabellius for help in resolving the dilemma presented by Trinitarian orthodoxy. But the matter is not really in doubt so far as Schleiermacher's own opinion is concerned. The edition of 1822 lays out in considerably greater detail the problem as he sees it and outlines steps towards the kind of solution it demands, adding that the necessary investigations do not properly belong to a *Glaubenslehre*. In the same year, however, Schleiermacher published separately his own critical and historical analysis of
the patristic development of Trinitarian doctrine in a lengthy article which makes it clear that—and why—he would side with Sabellius. This effort at rehabilitation, much more outspoken that the somewhat muted (not to say disingenuous) recommendations offered in the second or even the first edition of The Christian Faith, is worth further discussion.

5.2 In defense of Sabellius

The usual view—tacitly accepted, more or less, by Lonergan in The Way to Nicea—is that as a 'modal monarchian' Sabellius upheld the divinity of Christ while denying, as destructive of biblical monotheism, any personal distinctions in God. The first part of this characterization Schleiermacher grants; the second he subjects to a lengthy scrutiny which is all the more interesting in that it seeks to understand Sabellius's statements as answers to questions that arose in an intelligible sequence within an ongoing debate. It would perhaps be going too far to see in this approach a harbinger of the dialectical history that Lonergan proposes in Method and practices in The Way to Nicea, but the similarities are nevertheless striking. And certainly Schleiermacher is adhering to his own views about the theologian's need to purify and build on previous theology rather than attempt to begin ab ovo. Thus at the beginning of his investigation he writes:

If what is unsatisfactory and obscure in our creeds, with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, was occasioned by going too far in opposition to Sabellianism, the points of difference and opposition between the two systems [that is, the Sabellian and the Alexandrian or Athanasian] must

be distinctly understood and duly appreciated, before our Symbols can be safely corrected (Trinity, 65).

And, having disentangled Sabellius's own views from the polemical use made of them by his opponents in controversy, Schleiermacher concludes that unlike the Patripassians, with whose position Sabellianism is customarily linked, Sabellius himself did not hold that 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Spirit' are mere attributes of the one God. Rather, he held that one and the same Godhead unites with what is not God—with the world, with the human nature of the Redeemer, and with the church—and by acting on these 'develops' himself (or itself) in three ways:

Sabellius maintained the Trinity to exist, as such, only in relation to the various methods and spheres of action belonging to the Godhead. In governing the world in all its various operations on finite beings, the Godhead is Father. As redeeming, by special operations in the person of Christ and through him, it is Son. As sanctifying, and in all its operations on the community of believers, and as a Unity in the same, the Godhead is Spirit (Trinity, 158).

Such a doctrine, in Schleiermacher's view, achieves what the accepted doctrines do not, namely a real equality between the three Persons, even though it also denies what those doctrines maintain, namely that there is in God a Trinity which is purely 'immanent' in the sense that God is Father, Son, and Spirit irrespective of the economy of creation and redemption. Sabellius, in sum, can be termed 'modal,' inasmuch as each member of his Trinity exists only as a mode of divine revelation, but not 'monarchian' in the usual sense, since what divine revelation reveals is not deity "as it is in itself, but [only] as it is developed in the persons" (Trinity, 149). In particular, to anticipate later discussion here, the Person of the Son is not 'eternally begotten of the Father' but began to exist at the time of Christ's Incarnation.

I have referred to Schleiermacher's contention that there is no way of conceiving the 'ecclesiastical' doctrine of the Trinity except as analogous to a species with individuals, and that he (quite rightly) finds this analogy unacceptable. The Christian Faith offers no alternative analogy, but the essay on Sabellius
If the Trinity is constituted by God's unions with something else, then "each member of the Trinity stands related to unity, as that which is external stands related to that which is internal." For the Godhead per se, Sabellius's Monas, Schleiermacher can think of no symbol other than a point, which "cannot be apprehended in its simple state as it is in itself." For the divine Persons, the same analogy holds inasmuch as a point 'develops' only through extension, that is, by presenting some sort of surface without which it could not be apprehended at all. Thus the term prosōpon, Schleiermacher continues, "signifies, as it were, countenance or visage presented to our apprehension" (Trinity, 154).

Theologically speaking, then, what is most significant about Schleiermacher's neo-Sabellian Trinity is that it is not constituted by relations of origin. It is wholly 'economic' rather than 'immanent' or, better, wholly constituted by relations quoad nos. Apart from creation there is no Father; apart from the Incarnation, no Son; apart from the church, no Spirit. "The Trinity, therefore, is God revealed; and each member of the same, is a peculiar mode of this revelation. The Godhead, however, ... is never revealed to us as it is in itself, but only as it is developed in the persons of the Trinity" (Trinity, 149). To use Kantian terms, which for reasons yet to be discussed are probably apt, the Trinitarian Persons are the phenomena of that unknown and unknowable noumenon which is the divine Being itself. Thus Schleiermacher's theological position is bound up with an epistemological one. For purposes of understanding the relation of Trinity to Unity in God he favors an analogy that is manifestly visual: a polyhedron with three faces, so to say, each of which 'extends' into the phenomenal realm the same interior point, itself imperceptible as such. Such a quasi-geometrical image is easier to comprehend than, say, the psychological analogy as Thomas Aquinas expounds it. But while it does avoid the problems inherent in a genus-and-species analogy, it raises others that seem insurmountable.

To mention only the most obvious objection that might be raised, it is difficult to see how Schleiermacher can adhere to his point-and-surface analogy and yet maintain that "we must not
in any way represent the Most High as a *mutable* being" (*Trinity*, 11). Just as the church, for example, although it may be destined by God to exist always, nevertheless had a beginning in time, so too had the Spirit, who therefore is not eternal but mutable. From this it would seem to follow either that the Spirit is not God or that God is mutable; *mutatis mutandis* the same reasoning applies to the Son. Hence it would seem to be very much in order to ask whether the understanding of the Trinity that Schleiermacher evidently favors is in any significant sense an improvement on Tertullian's, which is likewise founded on a visual metaphor and leads, for precisely that reason, to the same logical impasse (see Lonergan, 1976: 43-55, esp. 47-48).

From his own point of view, however, Schleiermacher's way of surmounting what he takes to be the conceptual difficulty inherent in the traditional Trinitarian doctrines also goes some way towards solving the other difficulty he raises: neither directly nor indirectly but necessarily is it possible to derive an 'immanent' Trinity from Christian religious feeling. Indeed, to return to a question touched on earlier, it might be argued that this, his 'ecclesiastical' criterion, is in the long run more fundamental than the 'scientific' criterion of conceivability—or rather, as it now seems appropriate to say, imaginability. Yet it may also be that the two sorts of validity that a dogmatic }

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23Here Stuart is translating §190 of the 1822 edition of *The Christian Faith*. Although there is no corresponding statement in the final edition, it is clear that Schleiermacher did not think it necessary to recant on the doctrine of God's immutability; see for example §§53; *CG*, I: 272-278 = *CF*, 206-211. As I shall point out later, at least one interpreter has concluded that the conception towards which Schleiermacher was moving, perhaps without realizing it, is that of a mutable God. Far from being a precursor of Lonergan, Schleiermacher turns out on this reading to be a process theologian born too early.

The issue at stake will be familiar, to those who know Lonergan's work, as the problem of 'contingent predication'—how effects that are themselves conditioned by space and time, creation for instance, can be attributed to a cause that is eternal (see Lonergan, 1957: 661-662).

24See §6.1 below. It does not, perhaps, apply to the Father: that depends on whether creation itself is the result of a temporal change. Schleiermacher's doctrine of creation is subtle, and to explicate it would be to make this essay even longer than it is. I shall, however, return to a related issue, Schleiermacher's alleged pantheism, in §9.3 below.
proposition can possess need not be weighed one against the other: appealing to visual imagination and appealing to religious emotions may come down to the same thing. Certainly the essay I have been discussing gives Sabellius high marks for maintaining what in Schleiermacher's estimation was and is the essence of Christian piety—the ascription of that piety itself to Jesus Christ—as well as for steering clear of a subordination of the Son to the Father, not all that different from Arianism itself, that Schleiermacher detects, remarkably enough, in the characteristic procedures of the Alexandrian theologians (Trinity, 160-167).

There is ample evidence, I think, for conjecturing at least the main lines of the Trinitarian doctrine that Schleiermacher calls for but declines to elaborate on in The Christian Faith. Even were there not, however, it ought to be clear that a consistent rehabilitation of Sabellius as regards the theology of the Trinity must affect the theology of Christ as well. And whereas The Christian Faith has not much to say about the Trinity, its treatment of Christology and soteriology is quite extensive.

6. The Christology of 'The Christian Faith' (1)

Given his views on the Trinity it is no surprise to find that Schleiermacher regards with suspicion what is now called 'Christology from above.' In the received doctrine, as contrasted with Sabellius's, "it is asserted that Christ did not become a Person only through the union of the two natures, but [instead that] the Son of God only took up human nature into his Person." Later theologians thus found it necessary to defend the indefensible by using the traditional formulas in a merely negative way, namely for testing whether "in homiletical diction ... elements may not have been introduced which transgress the prescribed limits" (§96.1-96.2; CG, II: 55-56 = CF, 395-396; emphasis added). It is interesting to note that just such a regulative function is the one assigned to the Chalcedonian definition by Lindbeck, whose quarrel with Method in Theology
does not extend to Lonergan's interpretation of the early conciliar dogmas as second-order discourse.\textsuperscript{25} Schleiermacher, however, prefers to undo the original mistake. It is "much safer," he writes, "as it is also analogous to the origin and development of faith, to establish the doctrine of Christ independently of that doctrine of the Trinity," the doctrine, that is, which as a matter of history eclipsed Sabellianism (§97.2; CG, II: 60 = CF, 400).

### 6.1 The Person of Christ

Nevertheless, the first 'theorem' of his Christology has quite a traditional ring: "In Jesus Christ divine nature and human nature were combined (verknüpft) in one person" (§96; CG, II: 49 = CF, 391). The usual catena of quotations from ancient and modern credal formulas follows; then comes a maneuver that Schleiermacher performs rather frequently in The Christian Faith: as in his treatment of the Trinity, he takes back with one hand what he has just given with the other.

In the first place, it cannot be said that there is, properly speaking, a divine 'nature.' That word applies only to finite existence as such or else, more narrowly, to corporeal as contrasted with 'spiritual,' geistlich existence—that is, to the historical world. Either way, the very idea of a nature implies limitation, and its applicability to God is therefore doubtful at best. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, Schleiermacher finds in classic Christological doctrine a problem of intelligibility much like the one that crops up in the received doctrine of the Trinity: "it is impossible to construct a figure (eine Figur konstruieren)" by which to understand a duality of natures together with a unity of person (§96.1; CG, II: 53 = CF, 393). But fortunately there is a further parallel with Trinitarian formulas: the protestant churches did nothing to revise the credal articles about Christ, which, like those on the Trinity,

\textsuperscript{25}On the relations—similarity, difference, and derivation—between this aspect of Lindbeck's argument and what I believe to be Lonergan's consistent position, see Hefling, 1985b: 57-60.
need "to be subjected to continual criticism" (§95; CG, II: 48 = CF, 389).

So far none of this is any more constructive than the Trinitarian appendix to The Christian Faith, with which it has a marked affinity. Schleiermacher does however go on to offer, by way of reformulating the traditional doctrine, his own definition of the mutual relations of what is human and what is divine in Christ, a definition from which, as might be expected, the terms 'divine nature' and 'duality of natures in the same Person'—"which, to say the least, are exceedingly inconvenient"—are both absent (§96.3; CG, II: 57 = CF, 397). The groundwork for such a revision is laid in §94, which states: "The Redeemer, then, is like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by the constant powerfulness of his God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in him" (CG, II: 43 = CF, 385).26 For reasons that I hope will become clear in the third part of this essay, I have so far avoided all reference to 'God-consciousness,' Gottesbewusstsein. Schleiermacher himself declares it to be synonymous with 'feeling of utter dependence,' but why and how far this is so needs careful consideration. For the moment, suffice it to say that an awareness of God continually and exclusively determined every moment of Jesus' existence, holding everything else together in a single story and giving direction to his other feelings. This, and this only, was 'a veritable existence of God in him' as contrasted with all other men and women, whose affective relation to God, according to Schleiermacher, is never constant but always wavering, never exclusive but always in competition with other affections, never the sole focus of life but at most a dominant focus.

Today, a century and a half after Schleiermacher's death, no one is likely to find in such statements much that is novel or striking. That Christ is the best, indeed the perfect instance of human subjectivity, and more especially of human being in its

26In German the operative phrase reads: durch die stetige Kräftigkeit seines Gottesbewusstseins, welche ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in thm war.
relation to God, is something that has been said many times since *The Christian Faith* said it. Whether there is more to be said is a question worth asking, but here a different inquiry is in order. How is this basic Christological affirmation grounded? What justification is there for identifying, as Schleiermacher does, such a state of awareness and feeling as he professes to find in Christ, with the existence of God in him?

The first elements of an answer appear in Schleiermacher’s equation of God’s being with his activity, more specifically with the activity of creating, and most specifically—most divinely, one might say—with ‘person-forming’ activity, *personbildende Tätigkeit*. Indeed, Christ is for Schleiermacher the climax of God’s activity in creating human nature (§97.4; *CG*, II: 74 = *CF*, 411) and thus, as it were, the first truly complete human nature. Because divine activity is as such eternal, Christ is part of God’s eternal decree and the formation of his person is in some sense coeval with the creation, which is also the preservation, of the universe (§97.2; *CG*, II: 63 = *CF*, 401-402); yet there is, in another sense, something new, and it is here that *The Christian Faith* echoes Schleiermacher’s reading of Sabellius: “the Person of Christ began only when he became man” (§105 postscript; *CG*, II: 145 = *CF*, 473), that is, when human nature, itself altogether passive, was formed into the sinless, perfect personality of Jesus Christ by the uniting with it of divine activity.

Such, then, was the Incarnation: “divine influence upon human nature is at one and the same time the incarnation of God in human consciousness and the formation of the human nature into the personality of Christ” (§97.2; *CG*, II 64 = *CF*, 402). Regarded from one point of view, it was an entirely ‘supernatural’ event; otherwise human nature could never have

27“[W]e know of no divine activity except that of creation, which includes that of preservation, or, conversely, that of preservation, which includes that of creation” (§100.2; *CG*, II: 91 = *CF*, 426); Christ’s “human nature can have been assumed by the divine only as engaged in a person-forming activity” (§97.2; *CG*, II: 61 = *CF*, 400).

28In Schleiermacher’s sense of that word, for which see §13; *CG*, I: 86-94 = *CF*, 62-68.
produced anything but an ordinary human person. Yet it was the act, not of a divine Person, but of both the divine and the human nature; an act that constituted a "perfectly human person" in the sense of a continuous unity of self-consciousness (§97.2; CG, II: 60-61 = CF, 399-400; §123.3; CG, II: 263 = CF, 573).

To the sinlessness of Christ, which is as it were the locus of the Incarnation, I shall return. Already it may be evident that Schleiermacher exemplifies one of the most consistent and characteristic tendencies of modern Christology: the tendency to take what for older theology was a consequence of the Incarnation (considered as a unique hypostatic union) and to make this constitutive of the Incarnation as such. Thomas for example, followed here by Lonergan (1964b: 332-415), holds that Christ as man enjoyed the 'beatific vision' of God because his Person is eternally the second Person of the Trinity, whereas Schleiermacher holds the reverse: Christ was divine because he enjoyed a uniquely powerful awareness of God. Again, for Schleiermacher it is the same thing to affirm such an awareness in Christ and to affirm his sinlessness, whereas for Thomas, again followed by Lonergan (1964b: 416-426), Christ's sinlessness as man is a consequence of the divinity of his Person. In brief, what one finds in The Christian Faith is an excellent specimen, well thought out, of 'Christology from below.' Not that Schleiermacher can be accused of adoptionism. At least, he does maintain that Jesus of Nazareth was Christ from the first moment of his existence, and not that he somehow 'became' Christ; on the contrary, what he became was a first-century, rural, Jewish rabbi (§93.3; CG, II: 38-39 = CF, 381-382). On the other hand, however, and in line with what I have already said about Schleiermacher's neo-Sabellian leanings, the 'miraculous' beginning and subsequent historical development of the personality of Jesus were ipso facto the beginning and development of God the Son.

In other words, Jesus did not become the Son of God—God did.

To ask whether all of this amounts to saying that Christ differs from the rest of the human race only in degree and not in kind would be to pose a question that Schleiermacher would
probably, and with good reason, regard as simplistic. Yet the intention of such a question, if not its formulation, is valid, and I shall have occasion to return to it in a later section. At present it seems best to complement my brief overview of Christology in *The Christian Faith* with an equally cursory account of its soteriology.

### 6.2 The work of Christ

It has often been said that any given view of who Christ is both implies and is implicit in a corresponding view of his redeeming work. Schleiermacher is no exception. In some sense the whole of his *Christian Faith* is about soteriology; “only in Christianity,” he writes, “has redemption become the central point of religion.” It follows that “within Christianity these two tendencies always rise and fall together: the tendency to give pre-eminence to the redeeming work of Christ, and the tendency to ascribe great value to the distinctive and peculiar element in Christian piety” (§11.4; *CG*, I: 80 = *CF*, 57). I have already pointed out how much emphasis *The Christian Faith* places on the social and historical mediation of this ‘distinctive and particular element.’ Of that mediation the church is the proximate vehicle, but its initiator was Jesus of Nazareth. And as the previous subsection may already have suggested, it is the existence of God as creator—that is, as God—which Christ mediates in virtue of God’s ‘veritable existence’ in him as his own “peculiar being and his inmost self” (§94.2; *CG*, II: 46 = *CF*, 388).

Basically, then, the work of Christ continues God’s activity of forming persons, which is itself the activity out of which the Person of Christ arose (§100.2; *CG*, II: 92 = *CF*, 427). It is the work of bringing about a “new corporate life,” a “vital fellowship,” a “corporate blessedness” (§101.2; *CG*, II: 98-99 = *CF*, 432-433), in which human beings are made persons in the fullest sense of being related both to each other and to God, through receiving an ‘impression’ (*Eindruck*), mediated by the church, of the blessedness of Christ as a human person in whom
there is no spiritual conflict. Thus, as I noted earlier, it is in and through Christian community that the original destiny of the human race is in process of achievement (§101.4; CG, II: 102 = CF, 436; §93.4; CG, II: 41 = CF, 383).

Given Schleiermacher's place in the movement known to English-speakers as the quest for the historical Jesus, it is not surprising to find that the 'impression' which can bring all this to pass is one which in the first instance regards not the death of Christ but his life, considered as the life of a human person—perfect, sinless, yet fully human—apart from any supposedly miraculous episodes. The miracle for our time, Schleiermacher writes, can be found in "our historical knowledge of the character, as well as of the scope and the duration, of Christ's spiritual achievements" (§103.4; CG, II: 116 = CF, 448). As for the doctrine of his resurrection and ascension, it neither does nor can count for much.

For if the redeeming efficacy of Christ depends upon the being of God in him, and faith in him is grounded upon the impression that such a being of God indwells him, then it is impossible to prove any immediate connection between these facts and that doctrine. The disciples recognized in him the Son of God without having the faintest premonition of his resurrection and ascension, and we too may say the same of ourselves (§99.1; CG, II: 82 = CF, 418).

So much for redemption with respect to the Redeemer. With respect to the redeemed, redemption is to be thought of as a 'mystical' occurrence. By using this term, with which he is not altogether comfortable, Schleiermacher means to take a middle position between a 'magical' and an 'empirical' soteriology. The first of these would attribute redemption to Christ as an immediate influence upon individuals, independent of his having founded the community of which they are members; the second would attribute redemption to him merely as a teacher and exemplar, thereby reducing it to a mere growth in perfection indistinguishable from the effect produced by sages, prophets, and heroes. Either way, there is really no need for the Incarnation to have occurred. On the 'magical' view Christ might just as well exert a redemptive influence as a heavenly
person, bypassing any earthly presence, while on the 'empirical' view the same influence that Christ exerts might just as well be found elsewhere (§100.3; CG, II: 95-97 = CF, 429-431).

So far so good. But since Schleiermacher so consistently argues for a 'Christology from below' it might be asked how he manages to distinguish his own soteriology from what he calls the 'empirical' view. His argument runs as follows. Conceiving redemption 'empirically,' as increasing perfection, is the chief source of claims that religious faith is no more than a transitional stage on the way to philosophy, and what such claims omit, consistently and conveniently, is sin: Christ as teacher is not the Christ who mediates forgiveness, whereas for Schleiermacher the antithesis of sin and grace is the very thing that differentiates Christian piety from the generic feeling of utter dependence. This antithesis never vanishes—Christ alone is sinless—but the awareness of deserving punishment does (§101.2; CG, II: 99 = CF, 433) and its vanishing is the essence of being forgiven. Of this forgiveness, as experienced, I have indicated that the principal cause is the communication to sinners of an impression of Christ's sinlessness in general. But an all but universal tradition had linked forgiveness of sin with the passion of Christ in particular, and while Schleiermacher could safely afford to play down the significance of miracle, it would hardly do to treat the atonement in similar fashion. Accordingly he proposes that

in his suffering unto death, occasioned by his steadfastness, there is manifested to us an absolutely self-denying love; and in this there is represented to us with perfect vividness the way in which God was in him to reconcile the world to himself, just as it is in his suffering that we feel most perfectly how imperturbable was his blessedness. Hence it may be said that the conviction both of his holiness and of his blessedness

\[29\] It will be remembered that from 1818 to his death in 1831 Hegel was Schleiermacher's colleague at the newly founded University of Berlin.

\[30\] For Schleiermacher, Strafwürdigkeit, translated 'awareness of deserving punishment,' is the 'ethical' element in sinfulness, which contrasts with a merely 'sensuous' element, the expectation of punishment.
always comes to us primarily as we lose ourselves in the thought of his suffering (§104.4; CG, II: 127-128 = CF, 458-459).

This may or may not be 'empirical' soteriology; it is, roughly speaking, Abelard's view of atonement rather than Anselm's. But there is this difference: for Abelard it was the love of God which has been revealed in the passion and death of Christ, and which continues to kindle human hearts into charity, whereas there is at least a question whether that is what the eloquent passage just quoted is really getting at—whether one is truly freed from sin, even in Schleiermacher's somewhat mellowed sense, through being convinced that the crucified Jesus was imperturbably holy.

In any case, Schleiermacher is not altogether averse from the Anselmian doctrine of atonement, to which he endeavors to bring a more affective meaning. Even the troublesome phrase 'vicarious satisfaction' (stellvertretende Genugtuung) can be allowed to stand, although Schleiermacher would much prefer to separate its components, invert each, and recombine them so as to refer to Christ as 'satisfying representative' (genugtuende Stellvertreter): 'satisfying,' in that his passion focuses an orientation towards God so strong and complete as to make possible a universal fellowship of redemption; 'representative,' by reason both of his sympathy with sin and of the incorporation of believers into that fellowship (§104.4; CG, II: 131 = CF, 461).

7. Interlude: are there parallels?

It would take a much longer exposition than I have presented in the preceding section to do justice to Schleiermacher's views on Christ. Of The Christian Faith he wrote to a friend: "I would have wished to construct the work so that at every point the reader would be made aware that the verse John 1:14[31] is the basic text for all dogmatics" (Letters, 59). How well he succeeded in doing just that has been admirably shown by Richard R. Niebuhr, who refers to

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31*And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father.*
Schleiermacher’s as a ‘Christo-morphic’ theology (1964: 210-259). This very aptly chosen term should not, as Niebuhr rightly warns (215-216), be taken as implying that the idea of Christ can simply be ‘read off’ religious experience as such. Nor is the existence of a sinless redeemer in any sense a postulate in The Christian Faith—although on the other hand neither is there any question of proving somehow that Jesus of Nazareth was what Schleiermacher takes him to have been. Historical scholarship, including the quest for the historical Jesus, though certainly not that alone, is indispensable to Christology as it is to theology in general. By no means, however, is it the sole or even the most important component.

What matters is rather that a real change takes place in persons by reason of their participation in the community which ascribes to Jesus Christ the origin of all that is constitutive of its common life as distinct from that of other communities. In that regard Schleiermacher remains true to his methodological stand, discussed in §1 above, on theology as both an empirical and a historical discipline. At the same time, however, because that which so constitutes specifically Christian praxis depends neither on Christ’s miracles nor on his ipsissima verba, the shifting verdicts of scholarly historians and exegetes on these aspects of the gospel narrative do not affect the Christian’s faith. Nor, therefore, do they affect theology, except very indirectly. Certainly the gospels are normative, “but only insofar as they are held capable of contributing to the original ... representation of Christianity”; and they can be so regarded, in the first place, because they “concern the action and effect of Christ both on and with his disciples” (§§103, 105; KD, 43-44 = BO, 50). Moreover, Christ’s effectiveness is continued in part by theology, which is itself an element in the process whereby Christians are given the ‘impression’ or ‘representation’ of Christ that determines their piety and renders it Christo-morphic. And since doctrine is thus part of Christian formation, the theologian who would set out doctrines for the present must be attentive to the doctrines that have informed Christian living in the past. When all is said and done, historical theologians in general and exegetical theologians in particular are theologians only by
reason of their relation to Christian religion. They are citizens of Jerusalem, not Athens.

Some account has been given of how Schleiermacher exercises his own citizenship as regards redemption and the Redeemer. In his approach, as in Abelard's, reconciliation with God through a change of heart is the principal theme. There is nothing of Christ's having died in order to satisfy divine justice, much less to placate an angry God; no connotation of commercial transaction remains in the way 'redemption' is interpreted. Nor, on the other hand, is Christ's effect on the Christian—forgiveness of sin and a new, corporate life of blessedness—reducible to generic, immediate feeling. Indeed "it is only from the absolute sinlessness of the Redeemer that we gain the full knowledge of sin" as a derangement of human nature from which we could not have saved ourselves (§68.3; CG, I: 365 = CF, 279).32

On many of the points just mentioned there are passages in Lonergan's more recent works that suggest a measure of agreement. Most importantly, perhaps, he holds that the specifically Christian component of Christian religious experience is an intersubjective event, an encounter with Christ that is historically mediated by the body of which he is the head, and that stands to religious experience per se as an avowal of love stands to being in love (1973: 20). Again, the encounter is in the first instance affective; Christ "became flesh to suffer and die and thereby touch our hard hearts" (1985: 198), and "[i]n the paschal mystery the love [of God] that is given inwardly is focused and inflamed, and that focusing unites Christians not only with Christ but also with one another" (1973: 10). In such phrases, as also though more cautiously in the theses on

32 Thus original sin is a specifically Christian doctrine: "The more definitely and vividly anyone sets the Redeemer before him, the more he realizes that he is at no moment free from sin. He knows this, however, not simply from his own personal idiosyncracy, but in a universal way, e.g., inasmuch as he is a constituent portion of humanity as a whole; Le. he knows it ... [to be] true of others as well as of himself" (§73.1; CG, I: 399 = CF 305).
redemption in *De Verbo Incarnato*. Lonergan’s language suggests that the effectiveness of Christ’s passion is in the first and fundamental instance personal and ‘existential.’ To it, questions about the historical Jesus are subordinate and subsequent; more generally, the ‘Christ of faith’ is not known as such by scholarship alone but by discerning, in the light of religious conversion, the evidence sufficient for judgments of belief (1985: 85-89), judgments involving a ‘yes’ that is “regarded by religious people as firmer than any other” (1972: 349).

These similarities, which I believe could be greatly multiplied, are not unimportant. The question of how, as Lonergan puts it, the ‘inner word’ of religious experience is differentiated as well as ‘focused and inflamed’ by the ‘outer word’ of the gospel is, I would say, as important and pressing as any of the many questions pertaining to Foundations that need to be taken up by those who consider themselves Lonergan’s followers, and more important, perhaps, than most. It is also a question on which Schleiermacher can shed not a little light. That being said, it remains that on the different question of understanding the Christ who is the source and content of Christianity’s distinctive outer word Schleiermacher and Lonergan appear to be hopelessly at odds.

To take only the obvious point, there is no getting round Schleiermacher’s rejection of both the Nicene and the Chalcedonian dogmas, which Lonergan took such great pains to explain and transpose. In response to another, more recent critic of the conciliar formulas, Lonergan sets out in trenchant language a question that might also be put to Schleiermacher: “Today many perhaps will be little moved by the question whether we have been saved by a creature or by God himself. But the issue may be put differently. One can ask whether God revealed his love for us by having a man die the death of

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33See especially Thesis 16 (1964b: 486-551), where Lonergan offers his own reinterpretation of the difficult idea that Christ ‘satisfied’ or ‘made satisfaction’ for human sins. Some of the groundwork of this thesis can also be found in his lecture on “The Redemption” (Lonergan, 1975).
scourging and crucifixion” (1985: 198). The sense in which Schleiermacher holds that Christ is, even as Son of God, a ‘creature’ has been outlined, as has the argument he offers for dropping the ‘two natures in one (divine) person’ formula. Its unintelligibility is his stated reason; unstated, however, but not unimportant, is a further reason that Schleiermacher cannot but have been aware of: Christ as defined by the early councils, even when the definitions are interpreted as minimally and heuristically as Lonergan interprets them, simply would not fit into the overall pattern of *The Christian Faith*.

8. The Christology of ‘The Christian Faith’ (2): sin and grace

Take, for instance, the much debated question whether the Incarnation would have occurred had there been no Fall. Estimable theologians from Bonaventure to Rahner have answered that it would, the Incarnation being in their view intrinsic to God’s ways with the human race, irrespective of sin. How would Schleiermacher respond? On the one hand, we have seen that his Christology revolves around Christ as the completion of human nature, inseparable as such from God’s eternal *creative* decree, which would seem to incline him towards the Bonaventurean opinion, while on the other hand he also seems to hold, with Thomas Aquinas, that the reason for the Incarnation is to be found in its having provided a remedy for human sin. Schleiermacher can have it both ways, however, because the question as posed does not arise at all within the horizon of *The Christian Faith*. For, to put it bluntly, there has been no Fall.

More exactly, he objects to the image of the Fall in so far as it expresses “the contrast between an original nature and a changed nature.” The significance of the Genesis narrative for Schleiermacher is rather that “it sets before us in general how outside the sphere of redemption the good develops only alongside what is bad” and how “from the concomitance and development of the two there could issue no active righteousness properly so called, but at best a vacillation
between vitiated spiritual efforts and increasing and fully matured sin" (§72.5. 6; CG, I: 396-397 = CF, 303). From this universal, timeless coexistence of sin and righteousness it follows that 'absolute' sin, by which Schleiermacher means a complete 'hardening' of heart or cessation of the disposition to religious affections, can only be a limiting case: it cannot occur in fact, because such a disposition belongs irremovably to human nature as such (§70.2; CG, I: 371 = CF, 283). Moreover, only of an 'absolute' sin in this sense could it be said that God is not its author. Of both original and actual sin (though Schleiermacher is not happy with the traditional distinction) this can, and must, be said (§79.1; CG, I: 424-425 = CF, 325); otherwise divine causality would be limited by some non-divine causality—by human freedom, conceived in a Pelagian way, or else by a Manichæan anti-God (§80.4; CG, I: 429 = CF, 329; §81.3; CG, I: 437-439 = CF, 335-336). Not that God is the author of sin in the same sense that he is author of redemption. Schleiermacher is aware of the incoherence to which such a view inevitably leads. Nevertheless, inasmuch as he holds, against Pelagius, that God ordains and alone accomplishes redemption, and inasmuch as redemption is always conditioned by the sin it redeems, Schleiermacher can find no alternative to ascribing sin itself to the divine causality, if only in a derivative way.

The treatment of this complex set of questions in *The Christian Faith* is more subtle than the foregoing précis is apt to have made it appear. In any case, the upshot of this line of reasoning is what I am interested in at present. For the concluding subsection of Schleiermacher's argument presents as complete a rejection as might be imagined of Thomas's solution to the problem as Lonergan recovers it in *Grace and Freedom*; of the Law of the Cross as Lonergan sets it out in *De Verbo Incarnato*; and, though only implicitly, of the stunning fifth corollary that Lonergan draws 'in the eighteenth place' of his development of the notion of God in chapter XIX of *Insight*.

As to the first of these, Schleiermacher contends that a 'three-lane highway' such as Lonergan finds in Thomas—"what God wills to happen, what He wills not to happen, and what He permits to happen" (Lonergan, 1971: 110)—can be admitted
"only in a sphere of divided causation," whereas "eternal causality is like no other, and all temporal causality," including the explanation for the existence of sin, "must be uniformly related to it." As to the second, the Law of the Cross, he writes:

More confusing still than the idea of permission ... is the hypothesis that, though God may have ordained sin, He ordained it only as an indispensable means to wider ends of high moment, making the evils consequent upon sin a source of more than countervailing gain ... But ... we could not well imagine a more fallacious way of presenting Christianity than to say that Christ came only to make good the mischief arising from sin, while God, looking to the manifold gains to come thereby, could not dispense with sin itself (§81.4; CG, I: 440 = CF, 338).

The third item that Schleiermacher rejects is the most basic. Lonergan's point in the corollary mentioned above is to the effect that God knows the four previous corollaries: he knows not only every possible world order but also "exactly what every free will would choose in each successive set of circumstances contained in each possible world order" (1957: 662), and knows all this whether or not he wills any particular world order to exist. If God does choose some particular world order, then ipso facto it exists and its non-existence is impossible. Yet this divine efficacy imposes no necessity on its consequents; in the world order that actually exists, contingency and freedom are both real; hence God's knowledge that free human wills are going to sin does not cause them to sin. Indeed, sin for Lonergan has no cause, since it has no intrinsic intelligibility. "What is basic sin? It is the irrational. Why does it occur? If there were a reason, it would not be sin" (1957: 667). At present, however, the point to be emphasized is that Schleiermacher's rejection of divine permission in respect of sin would seem to imply as well a rejection of any such scientia media as Lonergan's fifth corollary affirms: God cannot know a contingent event, sin for example, without in Schleiermacher's view causing its occurrence. And in fact this more fundamental point of disagreement does appear explicitly when Schleiermacher concludes, earlier in The Christian Faith, that
God has no 'mediate knowledge' of what is possible but not real (§55.2; CG, I: 294-295 = CF, 224).

The ground of this conclusion is that God knows two sorts of possibilities, those which have or will become real and those which have not and will not. If the non-existence of the latter is not to be attributed to divine arbitrariness, then it must be attributed instead to the impossibility of its existing along with what does exist, which is the same as its being self-contradictory and as such unknowable by God or anyone else. Schleiermacher is no voluntarist, however; arbitrariness would be a limitation in God. And he agrees with Lonergan to this extent, that "everything exists by reason of God's speaking or thinking it." Yet, given that something does exist, "there is nothing left in the divine knowledge to which there is no correlative in existence" (§55.1; CG, I: 293 = CF, 221-222). God is like a "perfect artist, who in a state of inspired discovery thinks of nothing else, ... save what he actually produces" (§55.2; CG, I 297 = CF, 225).

This may sound like Lonergan's conception of God as an unrestricted act of insight, "the eternal rapture glimpsed in every Archimedean cry of Eureka" (1957: 684). But it is no such thing. Schleiermacher is working out of a very different epistemology, which I hope by the end of this paper to have shown lies at the root not only of his views on sin and redemption, and hence on soteriology and Christology, but also of his theology as a whole. To remain, however, with the more specific point: sin does exist—not in the way it does for Lonergan, as a 'false fact' or radically unintelligible surd, but rather, for Schleiermacher, in the same way that finitude itself exists; that is, as a blend of being and non-being (Sein und Nichtsein: §81.1; CG, I: 432 = CF, 331). Hence it can just as well be attributed to God's creative thought as every other case of finite being can, provided one adds that God ordains sin only together with the redemption that remedies it. In turn, the fact that Schleiermacher finds himself constrained to credit God with the existence of sin helps to clarify how he conceives the work and person(ality) of Christ in relation to each other.
Christ as Redeemer, I have said, initiated a corporate activity that parallels the active being of God in him; for Schleiermacher, "Incarnation is to the species what regeneration is to the individual" (Williams, 1978: 134). But God is primarily the creator and hence, as I have also discussed, the work of Christ completes the divine work of creating humankind. So conceived, redemption does not imply any recreation (Umschaffung; §11.2; CG, I: 77 = CF, 54). Throughout The Christian Faith the emphasis always falls on continuity—between nature and grace, creation and redemption, human and divine. In particular, Schleiermacher writes that the assumption of persons into vital fellowship with Christ "is simply a continuation of the same creative act which first manifested itself in time by the formation of Christ's Person"; likewise "each increase in the intensity of this new life relatively to the disappearing corporate life of sinfulness is also such a continuation"; but "in this new life man achieves the destiny originally appointed for him, and ... nothing beyond this can be conceived or attempted for a nature such as ours" (§101.4; CG, II: 104 = CF, 437). In brief, catholic Christianity's assertion that *gratia perfectit naturam* is affirmed by Schleiermacher in something like the second sense mentioned in the epilogue of Insight—the sense that grace enables nature to attain its own perfection—but not in the first sense, "that it adds a perfection beyond nature" (1957: 746). The Christian Faith denies not only an absolute incapacity in human nature for receiving grace but also that grace itself is absolutely supernatural: there is no disproportion or discontinuity between the old life of sin and the new life in Christ, no conversion in the sense of a *volte face*; nor, on the other hand, is there any unintelligibility in sin, which turns out at length to belong to finite, created human nature as such, Christ alone excepted.

And Christ must be excepted because it is only in Christ that we see humanity displayed as such: that is what his 'dignity'

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In support of this excellent summary, Williams refers to §§113.4, 116.2, 118.1, 120.2, and 97.4 of The Christian Faith.
consists in, and what makes his redeeming work possible. For, unlike other kinds of creatures, whose "concept is perfectly realized in the totality of individuals," the human species is self-developing—self-constituting, it could almost be said. Such a species might therefore be thought of as indefinitely perfectible, especially in respect of its highest capacity, which for Schleiermacher is that of relatedness to God through the feeling of utter dependence. Were this the case, however, "the perfection of an essential vital function," namely piety, would be "posited in the concept but actually found in no individual," and Schleiermacher takes it to be "the conviction common to all Christians" that no more perfect form of religion than their own lies in store for the human race. This is as much as to say that in the source of Christian piety the concept of the human has been perfectly realized, or in other words that in Christ "the exemplar (das Urbildliche) must have become completely historical" (§93.1, 2; CG, II: 34-36 = CF, 377-379).

What does all of this amount to? In one of his last essays Lonergan speaks of an "incipient new Christology" that would understand Jesus not as the Son of God made man but "more simply as the true, the exemplary, the new man." But this Christology turns out to be 'new' not at all and 'incipient' only in Roman Catholic thought. It had appeared in all its essentials in The Christian Faith. Long before Schoonenberg, whose view Lonergan more than once criticized in print, Schleiermacher had already announced that the Christology of the councils must give way to "that of God's complete presence in the human person Jesus Christ" (Lonergan, 1985: 75).

III.

OBSERVATIONS IN AID OF AN EXPLANATION

The phrase that might summarize my investigation up to this point would be 'so near and yet so far.' The gap that separates Lonergan from Schleiermacher may not be wide—but it is very deep. I have tried to show that, upon closer examination,
what seem to be remarkably similar approaches to theology eventually lead in quite different directions. Such parallels as can be drawn in the specific area of Christology are for the most part too general to be instructive, and in any event they are overshadowed by disparities none of which could be resolved, I am convinced, without undermining the very foundations of The Christian Faith.

Yet it was in respect of foundations, using the word broadly, that in Part I above it seemed there might be real and important, even if only coincidental, agreements between The Christian Faith and the Brief Outline on one hand and Method in Theology on the other. It would therefore be unsatisfactory simply to note that what Schleiermacher builds on his foundations is quite a different edifice from any that Lonergan can be conceived of as building on his. There is a further question: why so? What explains the difference? It is an interesting question in itself—at least it is to me—but answering it might also help to throw some light on Lonergan. If, as I hope now seems at least provisionally true, he cannot be dubbed 'a Schleiermacher for our time' except in a sense so vague as to be seriously misleading, a specification of the reasons why he cannot might help to dispel whatever misunderstandings have led to the idea that he can.

Most of the elements of an answer, the reader will be glad to know, have appeared already. There remains only to gather them into some more or less coherent explanation of the differences that have cropped up at various points in Part II above. It will be helpful, however, to begin where that part of my investigation left off, that is, with Schleiermacher's understanding of the Person of Christ.

9. Schleiermacher's analogy for incarnation and for the Incarnation

Systematic theology, in Lonergan's functionally specialized sense, "aims at an understanding of the truths of faith, a Glaubensverst" and for the Incarnation{(1972: 350)}, and while it "wants its
understanding to be true," such a Systematics "is fully aware that its understanding is bound to be imperfect, merely analogous, commonly no more than probable" (349). Schleiermacher's is a Glaubenslehre, not a Glaubensverständnis; as I have mentioned and will discuss further below, it combined functions that Lonergan would distinguish and distribute between Doctrines and Systematics. Still, to the extent that its purpose is to understand Christian doctrines as well as to affirm them, Schleiermacher is aware that the understanding his theology can arrive at will be analogical. So much is evident especially in his treatment of the attributes of God. But in his Christology too, as he notes midway through his discussion of this doctrine, there is "an analogy which, even if not clearly expressed, runs through the whole foregoing presentation of the subject" (§97.4: CG, II: 74 = CF, 411). Bringing this analogy to light will lead to what I believe to be the root of the difference between Lonergan's position and Schleiermacher's (counter)position.

9.1 Body and soul

The distinctiveness of Christ, I have said, lies in 'that which is innermost in him,' namely the 'veritable being of God.' The analogy Schleiermacher employs in expounding this assertion can best be shown by setting out an extended proportion.

(1) The indwelling of God in Christ

stands to

the whole human nature, which in Christ is created for the first time, in the sense that its capacity for relation to God is fully realized

as
(2) that which previously 
was 'innermost' 
*stands to* 
the whole human organism 
*as*

(3) that fundamental power 
(Grundkraft) in Christ 
"from which every 
activity proceeds and 
which holds every 
element (alle Momente) 
together" 
*stands to* 
"the organism for this 
fundamental power," which 
is "the system that receives 
and represents it" 
*as*

(4) the 'Word,' the activity of 
God expressed in the 
form of consciousness 
*stands to* 
'flesh' as a general 
designation for the organic 
*as*

(5) intelligence 
*stands to* 
all other powers 
in human beings 
*as*

(6) soul 
*stands to* 
body, in the sense of flesh, 
"precisely as in the Symbol[um] 
Quic[unque vult]"
as, finally,

(7) active stands to passive.\(^{35}\)

The gist of this sevenfold proportion is fairly clear. Christ's 'God-consciousness' constitutes a new principle which activates him as a human person: his flesh or organism is informed by what is geistlich or spiritual, and more especially by the highest, that is, the religious level of the spirit. Hence, although Schleiermacher could scarcely have approved of the rest of the Quicunque vult or 'Athanasian' creed, he does endorse one clause: for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and Man is one Christ. This, significantly, is also the clause that has proved most embarrassing for other theologians, precisely because it can be construed as Schleiermacher evidently does construe it: God is the form of the body of Christ. Thomas, for example, makes a point of rejecting this way of understanding the Incarnation, on the ground that the divine nature cannot be the form of a body, or indeed of anything else. No cause, he argues, is at the same time a component; but form is reckoned a component, albeit a primary one, whereas God is the First Cause of all that is; ergo there is no analogy.\(^{36}\)

Now Schleiermacher's metaphysics, in so far as he has one, is Platonic rather than Aristotelian.\(^{37}\) In that regard it

\(^{35}\)Everything in these seven items will be found in §§96.3 and 97; CG, II: 57-58 = CF, 397-98.

\(^{36}\)Thomas rejects the soul-body analogy of 'Athanasius' in Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2, referring there to a previous argument (I, q. 3, a. 8) that the divine nature cannot be the form of any body.

\(^{37}\)It is worth recalling not only that in his day Schleiermacher was the translator and perhaps the outstanding scholar of Plato but also that the gospel with which he felt most at home was the gospel of John, which, with its divine Word suffusing the universe through Christ and the church, has always been congenial to Christian theologians who also lean towards some type of Platonism. Williams has a somewhat eclectic chapter on "The Platonic Background of Schleiermacher's Thought" (1978: 57-73), but there appears to
comes as no surprise that he should have singled out, in an otherwise very 'Alexandrian' creed, a comparison that derives (at several removes) from Plato. But quite apart from the source of the analogy Schleiermacher employs, it is fairly clear that he is not concerned to avoid the very implication of it which Thomas finds unacceptable.

9.2 Implications of the analogy

If God is somehow the soul or animating principle of Christ's bodily organism, it would follow that the divine essence—not the divine nature, since in *The Christian Faith* God neither is nor has a nature—has become one constituent of a human person. But, all things considered, that is what Schleiermacher's Christology amounts to. The Christ of *The Christian Faith* stands at one extreme of a continuum, as the historically actualized 'ideal' or exemplar to whom all other persons are, or are to be, approximations. He stands alone, to be sure; not in virtue of anything absolutely supernatural, however, but "in virtue of a creative divine act in which, as an absolute maximum, the conception (Begriff) of man as the subject of God-consciousness comes to completion" (§93.3; *CG*, II: 38 = *CF*, 381). Thus, in what seems to be at least a quasi-Platonic move, Schleiermacher presents the Incarnation, the coming-to-be of the human person who was Jesus Christ, as the determination of a limit through the imposition or introduction of a form or concept or ideal into what had previously been the (relatively) indeterminate matter of human nature. Schleiermacher calls this a divine act. But if that means an 'act of God,' it would have to be the act of the very form which is introduced; the act, in other words of God-consciousness, which would therefore have to be equated with the consciousness of God, that is, with God

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be no scholarly consensus as yet about the extent of Plato's influence on Schleiermacher, much of which will surely have been indirect.

38On the relation of this point to Plato's ontology, see Williams, 1978: 61.
himself. Such a conclusion, in turn, would imply that there is no real distinction but rather a continuity between human nature, which is intrinsically capable of God-consciousness and never entirely without it, and the God of whom not only Christ himself but also, if imperfectly, all other human beings are conscious in the same way. Otherwise stated, the man Jesus Christ stands at the limit of a continuum of which the divine essence is the limit.

That is why the term 'Christo-morphic' is so appropriate. As Niebuhr puts it, Schleiermacher's theology

is Christo-morphic in two senses. First of all, it asserts that Jesus of Nazareth objectively exhibits what human nature ideally is ... In this sense, then, the redeemer is the measure of human nature. And, in the second place, the redeemer is the historical person whose presence mediated through Scriptures, preaching and the Holy Spirit becomes the abiding occasion for the reorganization and clarifying of the Christian's consciousness of his absolute dependence, of his identity in the world, and of his appropriate actions toward and responses to others (1964: 212-213).

So construed, Christ is certainly Mediator between God and humankind. The question remains whether that which he mediates, the morphē which can render human nature Christo-morphic, is itself human or divine or, somehow, both.

The conjecture I have just presented is borne out, I believe, by the evidence of The Christian Faith. I should not however want to rest my case with it, for two reasons: first, because although Schleiermacher is not explicitly against metaphysical philosophy, Platonic or otherwise, neither does he explicitly make use of it; secondly, because I hope to show that much the same conclusion about the relation between the world and the 'divine essence' can be arrived at by a different route. For the present, then, I would add only that a conception of the divine essence as the form of Christ's 'matter' fits very well with Schleiermacher's neo-Sabellian opinions on the Trinity. The Godhead, which as such remains noumenal and unknowable save

39Recall that total 'hardening,' sin in the absolute sense, never occurs.
through a *Grenzbegriff*, has nevertheless united itself with human nature, forming and indeed informing it and thereby becoming together with it the Person of Christ.

By parity of reasoning, however, it could also be argued that the divine essence as united with Christians—that is, as the Spirit—is the form of the church, while united with sub-human or other-than-spiritual nature it is the form or soul of the world, that is, the Father. In other words, Schleiermacher's Christology would seem to go hand in hand with something like a pantheistic doctrine of creation. And there is reason to think that this suspicion can be supported on independent grounds.

### 9.3 Conclusion: pantheism?

Schleiermacher vigorously and repeatedly insisted that not even in his *Speeches on Religion*, much less in *The Christian Faith*, had he ever adopted a pantheistic stance, although it is in that direction that the notion he borrows from Sabellius of the 'development' of the Father, if not of the other two Persons as well, seems obviously to lead. Despite such demurrers, however, not a few interpreters have concluded (though not, to my knowledge, on quite the grounds I have just proposed) that Schleiermacher was indeed a pantheist, and there is at least one place in *The Christian Faith* itself which suggests that he would not disown this impeachement altogether.

In the postscript to §8, which presents his argument for (mono)theism as the highest kind of piety, Schleiermacher declares he has no hesitation in admitting that pantheism—provided the word is "taken as expressing some variety or form of theism" rather than as "a disguise for a materialistic negation of theism"—is quite compatible with theistic religious affections. Indeed, if the usual formula for pantheism, "One and All," is kept, "then God and the world will remain distinct at least as regards function," and one might feel oneself, while belonging to the All of the world, utterly dependent none the less on "the corresponding One"—a case scarcely distinguishable from monotheistic piety (CG, I: 58 = CF, 39).
Whether Schleiermacher was or was not a pantheist is not the question here; I mention this passage only by way of confirming what I have hinted in the present section and will elaborate on in the next two: that he does not and probably cannot distinguish—supposing, which is doubtful, that he wanted to distinguish—between God and the world, Creator and creature; at least, not in a way that Lonergan would find acceptable. In order to specify this further, though, it will be necessary to leave theology for philosophy.

10. Schleiermacher's epistemology: basic categories

On Lonergan's position, philosophy as the 'basic science' comprises not only metaphysics but also and more fundamentally epistemology and, most fundamental of all, cognitional theory. That familiar triad, in the order I have just stated, has been providing the framework for this third part of my investigation. Something has been said in §9 above about the metaphysics that arguably though far from certainly forms the background of Schleiermacher's Christology. As to epistemology he is somewhat more explicit. Although The Christian Faith is a system of theological, not philosophical doctrine; although it announces the coming of a day when "so extraordinary a question as whether the same proposition can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology, and vice versa, will no longer be asked" (§16 postscript; CG, I: 112 = CF, 83); although it sharply separates religion from knowing in a way that I will discuss presently—although this is all true, there remain more places than one at which Schleiermacher finds it necessary to take some kind of stand on what it is to know. But if I am right in discerning in his amalgamation of form, concept, and 'ideal' a tendency towards Platonism of some variety, and if Lonergan is right in tracing to Plato and Aristotle respectively the "two radically opposed views of knowing," knowing as confrontation on the one hand and knowing as "perfection, act, identity" on the other (1967: 183-184), then one would expect to find that such evidence for Schleiermacher's epistemology as there is in The Christian Faith favors Plato's confrontational view.
Interestingly enough, the clearest fulfillment of this expectation shows up in Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of 'the original perfection of the world.' He presents at the outset a series of basic contrasts that resemble the couplets listed in §9.1 above: between the self and the 'given' (zwischen dem Selbst und dem diesem gegebenen Sein); between active (Tätigen) and passive; between spirit, defined as self-active being (Selbsttätiges), and body, characterized as that which mediates to spirit the stimulating influences (die reizenden Einwirkungen) of the world. The world which delivers these stimuli or impressions is 'perfect,' Schleiermacher quite remarkably continues, in the sense that it is knowable, by which he means that "in it there is given for the spirit such an organism as the human body ... which brings the spirit into contact with the rest of existence."

Admittedly, by using 'contact' the English translation puts this in a way that lends support to my thesis in a more obvious way than does Schleiermacher's German, where the final clause reads: welche ihm alles übrige Sein zuleitet. Still, the verb zuleiten, with its connotations of a pipeline, does suggest that a duality of knower and known, spirit and world, is primordial, and that knowing consists in an additional movement connecting the two. Hence "the knowability of existence (Erkennbarkeit des Seins) is the ideal side of the original perfection of the world, and the natural subsistence (naturgemäße Bestehen) of the human organism is the real side of the same perfection as directly related to human receptivity (Empfänglichkeit)" (§59.1; CG, I: 313-315 = CF, 238-239). Notice that Schleiermacher wants to have it both ways: in one sense spirit seems to be the active party to the confrontation, while the rest of existence is passive; but in another sense spirit is on the receiving end and the world acts by stimulating and impressing itself upon it. There is no need to choose, however; Schleiermacher makes it clear that what he has in mind is a graduated scale or continuum, almost certainly the same continuum discussed above in connection with his Christological analogy, in which pure, active form or spirit—God—is the upper
limit and the lower limit is (presumably; he never says so in as many words) utterly passive, unorganized or unformed 'matter.'

The epistemological counterpart of this spectrum appears again in Schleiermacher's treatment of divine omniscience, which includes the statement that in every finite instance of spirit, "here ... denoted by the function of knowing," an intermixture of receptivity and passivity is always found in some degree, so that "to define the similarity between God and the spiritual in a finite sense is certainly a problem only to be solved by endless approximation" (§55.1; CG, I: 289-290 = CF, 219-220). The phrase 'endless approximation' is worth noting. Its echo of Kant's discussion in the first Critique of the 'ontological' proof that God exists is probably not coincidental. Schleiermacher is not, of course, out to prove anything; he is considering how best to characterize the God in whom belief has already been established otherwise, namely through religious experience. Be that as it may, 'endless approximation' to an ideal limit is consistent not only with what I have already suggested about the function of 'God' as a Grenzbegriff in Schleiermacher's theology, but also, from quite a different point of view, with a Platonic ascent of the mind from corporeal to spiritual reality.

My concern, however, is with finite spirit in so far as it is constituted as such by its knowing. I have mentioned that for Schleiermacher God knows no possibilities except those which have become real, or will. Even in the human case, though, such knowledge is impoverished or incomplete, because "the indefinite idea of what is simply possible must have an immediate sense-impression added to it if it is to pass over into the consciousness of an object as real," and "in all cases perceptual knowledge is richer in content than pure thought (since the former has a real existence corresponding to it and the latter has not)" (§55.2; CG, I: 295-296 = CF, 224).40

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40 Schleiermacher’s German had better be quoted in full: ‘zu der unbestimmten Vorstellung eines bloß Möglichen der unmittelbare Sinneseindruck hinzukommen muß, wenn jene in das Bewußtsein des Gegenstandes als eines wirklich übergehen soll” and “die anschauliche Erkenntnis [ist] eine
The evidence I have laid out is not great, quantitatively speaking; what is significant about it is that it all points the same way: for Schleiermacher knowledge of what is real involves ideas or concepts or thinking as well as perceptions or sense-impressions, but it is by the latter that 'real existence,' \textit{Sein}, is immediately known; and the knowing is a confrontation that brings together subject and object, knower and known, the spirit and the natural world. The language of activity and receptivity that runs through Schleiermacher's Christology, indeed through his whole theology, harbors a presumption that physical interaction—pushing and being pushed—is the basic relation between existing realities, including subjects and the objects they know.

This explains, among other things, why \textit{The Christian Faith}, which is nothing if not self-consistent, never speaks either of knowing God or of God as real: there are no 'immediate sense-impressions' of the divine that could combine with human thinking so as to allow it to 'pass over into the consciousness of an object as real.' Schleiermacher does speak of a consciousness of God, however, or rather of God-consciousness, and that on nearly every page. To avoid this term altogether has not been possible here, and had it been possible it would have been misleading. But I have tried to use it sparingly and have deliberately postponed any explication of it. This lacuna must now be filled.

11. \textit{Consciousness and God-consciousness}

Schleiermacher wanted \textit{The Christian Faith} to be judged as a whole, not simply by the introductory sections: "since the preliminary process of defining a science cannot belong to the science itself," he writes, "none of the propositions which will appear in this part can themselves have a dogmatic character"
But as Karl Barth observes in his early lectures on Schleiermacher, "the whole of the 19th century" perceived, and in Barth's estimation rightly perceived, that despite Schleiermacher's protests the first thirty-one sections do set out "the true content of dogmatics." Borrowing Emil Brunner's image, Barth insists that "the thought-warriors are here received under the cover of night into the roomy body of the Trojan horse, so that when the horse has crossed the bridge into the holy city (if we may expand the metaphor) ... they may emerge from it in battle array" (Barth, 1982: 211).

Whether everything else in *The Christian Faith* should be regarded as no more than analysis *ex post facto*, as Barth goes on to argue it must, is a question that need not be addressed directly here. What will be clear enough in any case is that the introductory sections are not so ancillary as Schleiermacher insisted. Their propositions are 'borrowed,' to be sure, from other disciplines— from 'ethics,' the 'philosophy of religion,' and 'apologetics'— in the way prescribed in the *Brief Outline*. But for just that reason, as I suggested in Part I above, these propositions are 'foundational' in the sense that they supply Schleiermacher with basic categories he uses later in the properly dogmatic sections. And in so far as 'consciousness' is the most basic of these categories, the introductory sections of *The Christian Faith*, which present what might be called Schleiermacher's intentionality analysis, do at least condition everything that follows them even if they do not determine it so completely as Barth makes out.

That being so, Schleiermacher's whole theology will belong to quite another horizon of meaning than the one envisioned in *Method in Theology*, to the same extent that what he holds about consciousness rests on a counterposition. In that regard Brunner's image is apt: the warriors are already inside the Trojan horse when dogmatics as such begins in the First Part of *The Christian Faith*. Certainly their presence is obvious in its Second Part. Schleiermacher's Christology and his

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41 Barth's editor supplies a citation to Brunner's *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 66.
soteriology alike pivot on his understanding of religious affections as an aspect or level or dimension of consciousness: in Christ it is the absolute powerfulness of this 'God-consciousness' that constitutes him as Redeemer and Son of God, while it is his historically-mediated effect on the God-consciousness of Christians that constitutes them as redeemed. And none of this can really be understood apart from the definitions offered in *The Christian Faith*’s first five sections.

11.1 *Consciousness as perception?*

Schleiermacher entitles the first of his two introductory chapters "The Definition of Dogmatics" and the first of its four subdivisions "The Conception of the Church: Propositions Borrowed from Ethics." The main lines of his reasoning were discussed in Part I above: dogmatics is an 'in-house' project of the Christian community, part of what Lonergan would call its *Selbstvollzug*, and this community is distinguished from others in that it exists for the sake of piety, *Frömmigkeit*. Piety, however, must be understood in relation to other psychological facts, and accordingly the first section of the first subdivision of the first chapter sets out his famous definition of piety as, "considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing (Wissen) nor a Doing (Tun), but a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness" (§3; *CG*, I: 14 = *CF*, 5).

Formally speaking, and putting it in the best light, the discussion that follows can be regarded as an exercise in *die Wendung zur Idee*. It represents an effort on Schleiermacher's part to move from the descriptive and rhetorical account of religious experience presented in his *Speeches on Religion*, especially the second one, to something like an explanatory account in which that experience is set in relation to other things. The point is worth underscoring, I think, because even if Schleiermacher's explanation should turn out to be less than adequate, his *Speeches* remain, as description, a masterpiece superior in many respects even to Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, on which their influence is patent.
That is by the way. The important thing about §3 of *The Christian Faith* is its equation of feeling with immediate self-consciousness. In a way, the word 'immediate' gives the show away, so far as a comparison with Lonergan is concerned. Schleiermacher is in some sense attempting to rescue religion from the rather forlorn position Kant left it in, by introducing a 'faculty' other and more primordial than either theoretical or practical reason. By calling it 'immediate' he means that in the self-consciousness of which piety is a modification there is no representation, no *Vorstellung*: the self is in no way objectified. But what is implicit here, and increasingly evident as Schleiermacher's introduction unfolds, is that *non*-immediate self-consciousness, self-consciousness which does include objectification and representation, is none the less consciousness. Thus, whereas Lonergan reserves 'consciousness' for designating a quality of cognitional acts and states, namely the awareness immanent in those acts (1957: 322), Schleiermacher remains within the early modern and basically Kantian tradition for which *Bewuβtsein* already involves what is *bewuβt*, known, and hence in some way objectified.

In spite of the attempt to break free of that tradition evident in the way he stresses the immediacy of *Gefühl* and its difference from *Wissen* as such, what I have already said about Schleiermacher's view of knowing is confirmed when he presents again the blend of passivity and activity discussed above, this time in terms of 'abiding in self' (*Insichbleiben*) and 'passing-beyond self' (*Aussichheraustreten*). Applying these categories to consciousness, Schleiermacher proposes that 'doing' is entirely, and 'knowing' at least partially, a passing-beyond-self.

As regards Feeling, on the other hand, it is not only in its duration as a result of stimulation that it is an abiding-in-self: even as the process of being stimulated it is not effected by the subject, but simply takes place in the subject, and thus, since it belongs altogether to the realm of receptivity (*Empfänglichkeit*), it is entirely an abiding-in-self (§3.3; *CG*, I: 18 = *CF*, 8).
There are two points to be noted here. One will perhaps be obvious already: the inside-outside metaphor, with its underlying presumption that subject and object are already distinct. The other harks back to a comment made in §2 above, where it was suggested that Schleiermacher might agree with Lonergan on the intentionality of feeling. It now appears that this suggestion must be qualified: abiding-in-self, if it is spatially construed, can be compared only very loosely with what Lonergan means by self-transcendence.

This difference between Lonergan's views on consciousness and Schleiermacher's becomes clearer in the next section of The Christian Faith, as Schleiermacher explains what he means by a determination or specification of feeling and goes on to introduce the particular determination which is the feeling of utter dependence. His position is not, superficially regarded, all that dissimilar to Lonergan's. As was said at the beginning of this paper, consciousness for Schleiermacher is always intentional, always a consciousness of, as it is for Lonergan. Again, just as my consciousness, on Lonergan's view, is my presence to myself-as-present-to-world, a presence that is patterned in the various ways discussed in chapter VI of Insight—biological, aesthetic, and dramatic as well as intellectual—so too in the fourth section of his Introduction Schleiermacher states that my immediate self-consciousness is my presence to myself as existing for myself and as coexisting with an 'other.' But the similarity that this last sentence indicates is not so great as it might seem.

In fact, the same difference noted above in relation to Schleiermacher's epistemology reappears here, as what Lonergan in De constitutione Christi calls the difference between consciousness as experience and consciousness as perception (1964a: 130-134; cp. 1967: 175-177). The first is the broader view: that which consciousness is consciousness of may be any operation whatever, regardless of its object. As for the second view, however, "if consciousness is conceived as the perception of the self on the side of the object, then there is no consciousness except in those operations in which the object is the operating subject" (1964a: 131). The first view, which is
rooted in identity, is of course Lonergan's; the consequence he draws from the second view, which is founded in duality, shows up nicely in §4 of The Christian Faith.

Immediate self-consciousness in Schleiermacher's sense is wholly an 'abiding-in-self'; what consciousness is consciousness of is only the operations of the self, specifically activity and passivity, the self's self-causedness (Sichselbstsetzen) and non-self-causedness (Sichselbstnichtsogesetzhaben), its being and its having-by-some-means-come-to-be (Irgendwiegewordensein), its freedom and its dependence. In brief, self-consciousness is a sort of self-confrontation. When Schleiermacher concludes the section by commenting that his views can hardly be denied by anyone who is capable of a little introspection (Selbstbeobachtung), it can reasonably be inferred that he means taking a good inward look, mightily though he strives to isolate immediate self-consciousness from perception and from any such objectification of the self as might be mediated by self-contemplation (Betrachtung; §3.2; CG, I: 17 = CF, 6). Introspection as Lonergan uses the term—"the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness" (1972: 8) or in other words self-appropriation—is ruled out in favor of that "exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth" (1972: 238) which all of Lonergan's work is in some sense aimed at exploding.

11.3 Utter dependence as 'Gottesbewußtsein'

Little need be added in order to bring this section back around to the point at which I began in Part I above. If Gefühl in the quasi-explanatory sense Schleiermacher gives it is identical with the 'immediate self-consciousness' I have just examined, then clearly it is not identical with—on the contrary it is quite different from—'feeling' as the word is used in Method in Theology. Still, it may be worthwhile to round off my discussion of consciousness, if only for the sake of completeness, with a sketch of the steps by which Schleiermacher arrives at specifically religious Gefühl.
The non-self-caused element in immediate self-consciousness, then, presupposes "another factor besides the Ego (Ich), a factor which is the source of the particular determination, and without which the self-consciousness would not be precisely what it is" (§4.1; CG, I: 24 = CF, 13). The totality of all such 'factors,' none of which is objectively presented (gegenständlich vorgestellt), Schleiermacher terms a world. In relation to this world there is always a feeling of freedom or forthgoing activity. This feeling, however, is never without a corresponding feeling of receptivity or dependence, while on the other hand it can never be entirely negated either by the world or by any part of the world. How Schleiermacher, given this basis, can go on to claim there is any feeling of utter dependence is a very good question indeed. What he says, making as Barth puts it 'an unheard-of leap,' is that

the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since that is never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from ourselves (§4.3; CG, I: 28 = CF, 16).

The rest can be stated quite briefly. This feeling of utter dependence "constitutes the highest grade of human self-consciousness; but in its actual occurrence it is never separated from the lower" (§5; CG, I: 30 = CF, 18). To be freed from "an obstruction or arrest of the higher self-consciousness" is to be redeemed (§11.2; CG, I: 77 = CF, 54), and this redemption is what Christ, in virtue of his 'ideality' or absolutely potent God-consciousness, has accomplished and what the church mediates by passing on the 'impression' of Christ.

That there are grave difficulties here, even if the truth of all that precedes the 'unheard-of leap' quoted above were to be granted, has been recognized by readers of The Christian Faith ever since it was published. Religious feeling, as immediate self-consciousness, is a totally receptive remaining of the self within itself, to be contrasted as such with 'doing.' Yet it is not purely
passive but always active as well. Yet, again, it is a feeling of utter dependence. Moreover, it is a consciousness of God, who as the co-determinant (Mitbestimmende) of this feeling is given (gegeben) in it in an original way. And yet to God, Schleiermacher insists a few lines later, any givenness (Gegebensein) must be altogether denied, since on God—this he states without argument—we cannot exercise any active influence.

The point of these confusing twists and turns may be that there is no point; that there is nothing in them to be understood. At all events they do lend support to the Barthian critique of Schleiermacher, which is to the effect that The Christian Faith is not a theology but an anthropology: it does not 'speak of God' at all but only of man.

We note with astonishment and concern that Schleiermacher tries to describe the determination of the self-consciousness as pietly wholly within the schema of cause and effect. ... We suddenly hear the word “God” pronounced, but the content of the word, and the relation to man, are wholly impersonal. We are told that this God is co-posed in the self-consciousness and we are plunged into despair by the fact that either this vessel makes these contents impossible or these contents make this vessel impossible (Barth, 1982: 218).

So far as it goes, this is a fair if somewhat flamboyantly phrased assessment. It would be more charitable, however, and perhaps more accurate also, to say that on Schleiermacher’s terms the vessel and the contents are quite well suited to one another and that he speaks of both God and man, though in an insufficiently differentiated way that accounts for the frequent allegations of pantheism.

Such a reading of Schleiermacher’s position is confirmed malgré lui by Robert Williams, who in a study referred to already makes a noble effort at overturning Barth’s objections,42 but in so doing concludes that the trajectory of Schleiermacher’s thought can be extrapolated only in the direction of a process theology complete with a mutable, ‘bipolar’ God and a

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42See especially pp. 165-168.
theological method of correlation. Nor is this kinship implausible, given the pantheistic (or anyhow panentheistic) leanings of most process theologians and the reliance all of them put, directly or indirectly, on the complicated perceptualism of 'the last of the Platonists,' Alfred North Whitehead.

Williams's extension of Schleiermacher's thought, which by his own admission involves tugging and coaxing it a bit (186), may or may not be enough to prove Barth wrong. There is no need to decide the point here. In any case, as it stands or as fortified with more recent philosophical developments, The Christian Faith still raises the question that Frederick Lawrence has posed with respect to the whole company of theologians who follow Schleiermacher to the extent of regarding theology as, at bottom, a matter of expressing some type of experience:

Do these various attempts ... offer an adequate account of divine transcendence? If they don't, then their intention of doing justice to the "folly of the cross" has to shatter. ... If they don't, then the symbolic power for resisting evil or for absorbing the effects of evil in the world would be illusory; and so the basis in reality for anything like Metz's mystical and political discipleship would be lost. For theological virtue presupposes a transcendent objective: a hope beyond hope, a faith that is "the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things unseen," (Heb. 11.1) and a being in love with an otherworldly as well as a terrestrial term (Lawrence, 1981: 96).

That Schleiermacher does not in fact have an adequate account of divine transcendence, and that his very real intention of doing justice to the 'folly of the cross' falls short of its goal, I have tried in these pages to argue in sufficient detail to make a convincing case. From it there is a moral to be drawn.

12. Conclusion: on the need for (cognitive) judgment

What is missing from The Christian Faith, as indeed from modern theology in general, is judgment. Schleiermacher's inability to found theological discourse elsewhere than on 'immediate utterances' of feeling; his refusal to consider either Christ or the Trinity quoad se; his conceptualist account of
finitude as a mixture of being and non-being; his reduction, in the long run, of the cognitive meaning of Christian doctrines to their constitutive meaning or what he calls their 'ecclesiastical value'; his failure to separate direct from indirect discourse and, as a result of this, his placement of dogmatics within the oratio obliqua of historical theology; his less than satisfactory distinctions between sin and finitude, between essential and effective freedom, between the creation of the human race and its redemption in Christ, between locomotion and causation, truth and intelligibility, the real and the imaginable, natural and supernatural, human and divine, the Christian and God—all of this stems directly or indirectly from his lack of any clear notion of judgment, either as constitutive of knowing rather than merely regulative, or as distinct from understanding. Not without reason must the reader of Insight work through more than two hundred pages before 'things' are explained, another sixty or so before reaching the first judgment in the book, I am a knower, and yet another sixty before the notion of objectivity has been fully expounded. For Schleiermacher, by contrast, and as I have noted more than once, subject and object are primordial notions, assumed without explication almost from the first page of The Christian Faith, a book prevented by its author's (largely implicit) positions on knowing, being, and the real from ever making the seemingly simple but really quite difficult judgment: I am, God is, and I am not God.

It is because judgment has no part to play in his theology—as well as because he follows Kant in regarding concepts as prior to understanding, understanding as a matter of combining concepts with percepts, and perception as the basic and confrontational relation between the subject as knower and objects as to be known—that Schleiermacher conflates the affirmation of Christian meanings with understanding them or, in terms of Method's functional specialties, Doctrines with Systematics. I have tried to show how, in his treatment both of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, Schleiermacher makes intelligibility the standard according to which a decision is made whether the traditional doctrines will be admitted into his Glaubenslehre. And I have tried to show that although he
prescribes and in some measure utilizes a historical theology as one essential element in understanding the emergence and development of those doctrines, applying his criterion of intelligibility to them almost amounts at times to asking whether they can be pictured—whether, as he puts it in the case of the Incarnation, the doctrine in question can be thought of by 'constructing a figure.' No doubt it is easier to imagine than to understand. But as the quotation at the end of the last section above suggests, it is at least a serious question whether doctrines which are intelligible only in the sense that their meaning can be visualized are in the long run doctrines worth living by and living for.

By way of tempering these criticisms, it should be remembered that Schleiermacher was, after all, the first important theologian to take Kant's 'Copernican revolution' seriously: in so far as he helped to correct the problem of the 'neglected subject,' as Lonergan calls it, there is reason for admiration and even gratitude. Nor is there serious doubt about The Christian Faith's superiority to much of what theologians have been writing since the second world war, which might be characterized as Schleiermacher and water. Yet it remains that Schleiermacher's own Copernican revolution—for so he thought of it himself—was, like Kant's, a half-hearted affair. Besides the horizon of the neglected subject there is the horizon of the immanentist subject, with its less than adequate notion of objectivity; and if Schleiermacher does go some way beyond the one he nevertheless remains within the other.

From that horizon to self-appropriation the transition, to conclude in Lonergan's words, "is not a simple matter. It is not just a matter of finding out and assenting to a number of true propositions. More basically, it is a matter of conversion, of a personal philosophic experience, of moving out of a world of sense and of arriving, dazed and disoriented for a while, into a universe of being" (1974: 79). If my investigation here has done nothing more than sharpen the urgency of those words, it will have been worth while.
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BERGER, Peter


BYRNE, Patrick H.


CROWE, Frederick E.


HEFLING, Charles C.


LAWRENCE, Frederick


LINDBECK, George A.


LOEWE, William P.


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**NIEBUHR, Richard R.**


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HAMLET
AND THE AFFECTIVE ROOTS OF DECISION

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Lonergan's intentionality analysis allows us to understand the unity and coherence of human subjectivity in a way that faculty psychology does not. The classical tripartation of the mind into intellect, passions, and will, while serviceable, cannot achieve, because of its descriptive segregation of these three components, a fully satisfactory account of the fundamental oneness of the thrust of rational consciousness toward its proper fulfillment (Lonergan, 1974: 79, 170, 222-223). Faculty psychology still carries a counterpositional element, its terms associating the reality of the powers of the soul with something like an "already in here now" (Lonergan, 1978: 387-390). Lonergan's outline of the structure of conscious intentionality, and especially his transposition of the phenomenon of will into the context of a fourth operation in the dynamic unfolding of rational consciousness, is a revolutionary framework for interpreting human activity. It is revolutionary in explaining how the soul's powers operate under the design of a single principle whose vector is the desire to know and love, and whose major levels or operations are specified by the subsidiary principles that are the elemental types of question into which that desire refracts (Lonergan, 1973: 6-13, 104-105). Experience is organized by answers to questions for intelligence, which in turn reach their term as increments of knowledge when they are sublated by questions for reflection and correctly answered; further, as knowing is for the sake of doing, so judgments of fact give way to questions for deliberation, to evaluation and decision, the stage of intentionality whose term is responsible action in which the self consciously constitutes
itself. Finally, the comprehensive principle urges self-transcendence beyond even the righteousness of responsible decision and action, to the life of self-sacrificing love (55, 113). This is the trajectory of human becoming, in its normative development.

Questions for reflection are answered correctly by correct judgments of fact. These judgments give us knowledge of what really is the case. Questions for deliberation—What should I do?—presuppose this knowledge of facts; they are the further questions that ask, What is worth doing, given these facts? Thus they are questions of value, of the subject's response to value; and the initial apprehensions of value are given in feelings, feelings that respond to beauty, to virtue, to noble deeds, to truth (36-38). It is feelings that open the door to moral self-transcendence. They make possible judgments of value, answers to the question, "Is this really good?" "Is this really worthwhile?"; but still these judgments are themselves only the first stage in achieving moral self-transcendence. Judgments of value are a matter of knowing, not yet of doing. Only doing makes actual the good decided upon, the course of action known as worthwhile. But doing good does not issue automatically from knowing good (37). Indeed, this is the very area where the upward movement of the human spirit notoriously hesitates; and this is largely due to the fact that it is here that the role of affectivity becomes crucial. Judgments of value and responsible decisions cannot move into action without the current of affectivity to support them. It is feelings that give, as Lonergan has it, the "mass, momentum, drive, power" to our knowing and our deciding (30-31). Without the feelings to support decision, our intentions have little or no chance of becoming the concrete reality of deeds, much less habitual virtue (Lonergan, 1978: 547). Feelings may be lacking, or again they may be in direct conflict with those feelings that apprehend true values. There is the possibility of affective dissonance in our efforts to grow and choose and become. Without coherent and collaborative affectivity, our lives at the level of self-constitutive action become a tangle of conflicts through which we must painfully negotiate a passage. And then, what has traditionally been called the will
may be stymied, checked, made impotent—which is no less than the impeding of the natural unfolding of the desire to know and love.

Now, affectivity is carried by images (Lonergan, 1973: 64-67). The imaginal life of the individual, therefore, is crucial, since the pull of affect-laden images is the source of one's ability to apprehend true values, and more importantly, to bring into action the decisions of one's struggle for growth. It is the role of affectivity, and of affect-laden images, in the process of deliberating, deciding and acting, as outlined in Lonergan's cognitional schema, that we will examine here.

I

We shall be considering the transition from the second to the third and fourth levels of intentional consciousness, the transition from intelligent hypothesis to judgment and decision. Using the character of Hamlet, we shall show how, when the imaginal demands of this transition are not met, the subject unravels the whole process of knowing, and reverts to doubting what has already been established as true.

In the treatment of this transition Lonergan is rather brief and schematic on the role of feeling. The one thing that stands out, as we proceed from Insight to Method, is that at the fourth level feeling is vital (30-41). In saying this, Lonergan staked out the essential terrain for understanding the passage from judgment to decision and action. And because he knew that the exploring of this terrain would involve the discipline of psychotherapy, in which he was not well versed, he left his treatment schematic, going out of his way on many occasions to point to the work of Robert Doran as important in this regard to the Lonergan enterprise (see Doran, 1980).

In this paper we are using a dramatic instance to flesh out Lonergan's treatment. The reason why feeling is essential if a person is to move from judgment to decision to action has to do with images. Just as the reaching of a judgment of fact requires
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a return to the relevant external image or images that released the insight, choice and decision send a person deep into the world of internal images. Images must now be negotiated on their native soil, as bearers of feeling. It is as carried by appropriate images that the energy of feeling becomes available to an otherwise inefficacious decision, so that what we have is that "amour voulu," or "desire decided for," on which Rosemary Haughton places such emphasis in her book *The Passionate God* (Haughton, 1981). Thus the *advance* of the person from judgment through decision to action involves a *descent* of the person into the world of feeling.

Now the images in which feeling is stored are not simply private. On the contrary, a person's images and dreams reflect the person's connections with family, with culture, with race, with earth, with God. Thus there is able to be, and there is, a science of what is called the unconscious. And the images that are liable to present themselves when a time for crucial decision is approaching will reflect one's relationships with mother and father and other archetypal presences. From them must be released the flood of psychic energy needed.

The approach we are taking to the understanding of the movement from judgment through decision to action insists, then, on the relevance of psychological insight to intentionality-analysis. By "psychological insight" we don't mean insight into the explanatory structure of cognitional operations; we mean dramatic and aesthetic insight into a "forest of symbols." We cannot, as thinkers, ignore our fantasies and dreams. We must appreciate their intentional status.

Why do certain dream images recur? Why do certain women, certain men, always provoke the same reactions? Why do some forms of work allure us, others leave us indifferent, others repel us? Once curiosity awakens here, one feels in a more commanding way the desire to choose the self that one is. This is the curiosity that, once the desire for self-knowledge through images has been aroused, fastens upon dreams and all the many indications of the way in which feeling moves and works in one. This curiosity is not idle curiosity. In the considering of a dream, in the retrospective look at one's
fantasies, there can arise a curiosity that is an instinct for freedom, an obscure sense that the heart of erotic darkness is an immense energy. This curiosity is the desire to know experienced as vibrant with the total intentional thrust of conscious being toward its fulfillment. For it is the desire of the dreaming heart, of the extravagantly imaging self, to reach that lucidity which is the final and indispensable permission to love.

As one recalls dreams and fantasies, and tries to see them collectively, the desire to know tingles with its deepest, most far-reaching intention. It is desire instinct with a dream of extraordinary freedom. To this freedom, a great and copious mystical tradition has pointed. Another, complementary signpost appeared when the archeology of the unconscious self began to be uncovered by Freud. His thematizing of the intentional status of dreams began a turn to the investigation of the overwhelming importance of the imaginal and the affective, especially in their dark and repelling aspects, to moral and spiritual growth. It is in the world of primal images, those in which the whole of our affect as parented and related beings is stored, that our emergence into a full selfhood is permitted or continually frustrated.

Let us now explore the coming-into-consciousness of these primal images—but putting emphasis on their power to hold us captive, to block our development, and on the need in such cases for transformation.

Human consciousness begins as a sense of separateness from the mother. Now insofar as this sense of separateness fails to develop, the self feels infinite. Not feeling its boundaries, it throbs with the unlimited life with which it continues to identify. This is the oceanic sense to which Freud refers. This mother-dependent self, though lacking a secure sense of identity, paradoxically feels boundless in self-confidence, because it is consistently smothering the pain of finitude. The phenomenon of the gifted child, to which Alice Miller has devoted important research, is most instructive here (Miller, 1981). The gifted child tends to get the message "I am valued for my cleverness," not "I am valued for myself." This translates as encouragement to develop my skills and to throw everything
into this development, because this is what pleases the parents. But the more I follow this course, the more I am implementing my identity with them as opposed to developing my own identity. I come to experience myself, not as this limited being, but as the embodiment of limitless expectations. This means that I am continuing psychologically, continuing as a personal history, that original oneness with the unlimited that I started off with.

It is precisely because the gifted child feels, through this delayed separation from mother, enormously creative, that it is appallingly difficult, later in life, to break away and enter on the real growth process. It is hard to realize that the option to stay in one's infinity is a choice against freedom, since freedom is impossible without a strong sense of separate existence in finitude and faced with death. This infinity feels like freedom—only it is the systemic mother in disguise.

Now if we translate this phenomenon into cognitional theory, what is going on here is an enormous development of, and a tendency to be arrested at, the first two levels of mind-process, the levels where images suggest infinite possibility which intelligence endlessly exploits. This entails a habitual inability to judge, to decide, to act—or rather, a failure to perform these as moments of personal commitment, or personal becoming, the becoming of this self in its finite, determinate character. This dimension of personal commitment is unavailable because the images and affects that nourish a substantive sense of self are lacking at the core of identity. As such an individual grows older, he increasingly discovers an inability to respond in a normative way—that is, knowingly and lovingly—when life demands of him autonomous and responsible decisions and actions. And when the decision called for is one of those rare ones in which he must choose his very self into freedom, then the image-complex he will have to face will be the very image of his arrested feeling. He will have to enter within, to feel under his hands, the very walls of his captivity. Thus as Hamlet, our primary image for this paper, inches up to the real source of his inability to decide or to act, images come of sexual intimacy unaccountably loathsome, images evoked by the
marriage between his mother and his father's brother who has won her affection. This is an intolerable place for Hamlet. It is the source of the bad dreams of which he complains. It is what holds him back from avenging his murdered father. The closer Hamlet comes to the breakout self-constitutive action of killing Claudius, the closer he comes to what is really impeding it. The action in prospect, the killing of the King, is dreadful to him. Why? In answering this in some detail, we will be using Hamlet himself as an image that has impressed itself on our culture. We could not wish for a more powerful image for conveying all that we have to say about how judgment and decision can be undone, lost in a maze of self-contradicting images and self-contradicting feelings.

II

Hamlet is a play about a young man who cannot bring himself to carry out an action which he wishes to perform with all his conscious soul, for which he has clear opportunity, and towards which combined forces of personal, social, and moral obligation energetically thrust him. If we ask what keeps Hamlet from killing Claudius, the answer will vary according to whether we view the situation through Hamlet's eyes, or from a distance and with the tool of psychological analysis. From Hamlet's perspective, new obstacles keep arising to prevent his killing the king. First, he needs more proof that his father's ghost was the authentic article; next, he has to consider whether he is not too cowardly to perform the deed; next, he must decide whether suicide is not a more reasonable course of action; next, he doesn't want to kill Claudius at his prayers; and so on. That these "obstacles" are in fact pretexts for inaction gradually becomes obvious, not only to the audience, but to Hamlet himself. Thus we witness prolonged episodes of rationalized delay interrupted by outbursts of self-loathing and remorse over his inability to act, outbursts in which Hamlet is finally forced to admit to himself the most painful fact of all, that he doesn't
know why he can’t act. Hamlet is an intellectual; and as we
know, nothing is more infuriating to an intellectual than a
problem the scrutiny of which will not yield up even one
convincing hypothesis.

While it is accurate to say that Hamlet fails to come up
with one convincing reason for not acting, it would be too much
to claim that he doesn’t find plausible reasons. Hamlet’s
hesitation always makes sense; the problem is that reflection
seems always to be able to discover further reasons for engaging
in further reflection. Hamlet doesn’t lack motives for delay; he
lacks the will to disengage himself from further speculation, to
put an end to reflection. When his father’s ghost first confronts
him with his duty, he is ready and resolute. Of the circumstance
of the murder, he demands of the ghost:

Haste me to know’t, that I, with wings as swift
As meditation or the thoughts of love,
May sweep to my revenge (I, v).

But immediately upon the ghost’s departure, reflection begins to
marshall forth possibilities: maybe it would be better to put “an
antic disposition on,” in order to assess the situation; maybe it
would be better to doublecheck the ghost’s authenticity by
seeing how Claudius reacts to a play in which his crime is
pantomimed. So Hamlet entertains these possibilities, though a
part of him condemns himself for doing so. He is a man in love
with philosophy and theater, with imagination and possibility,
which is well and good as long as he’s a student at Wittenberg;
but when action—and not just any action, but the central action
of his life—is called for, action that must firmly and irrevocably
establish him as an autonomous, self-originating source of values,
then it is not so good to dally in the realm of the imaginative and
the possible. As the days grind on, Hamlet has more and more
opportunity to appreciate his paralysis and its effects on his soul.
He is introspective to a fault, and therefore by virtue of
Shakespeare’s eloquence we get Hamlet’s brilliant, if often
indirect, diagnosis of his own condition, that of a man frozen in
reflective hysteria, unable to penetrate to the source of the
aboutia, the failure of determination, that is keeping him from becoming himself.

What does the diagnosis reveal? That Hamlet cannot resist the endless shadow-play of the possible; that he treasures, above all his other capacities, his highly developed powers of speculation. “There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so,” he tells us, a moment later adding: “O God, I could be bounded in a nut-shell and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams” (II, ii). Hamlet is king of the infinite, for possibility is infinite; his bad dreams we will examine in a moment, along with the fact—which escapes Hamlet—that it is his love of the infinite that gives him bad dreams. Hamlet is variable, changeable: he appears as now this, now that; it seems to be part of his character to assure others that they cannot count on him to be consistent of character. He sees Alexander the Great in a bit of grave dust, a future adulteress in an honest young woman, myriad shapes in a single cloud, both persuasive proofs and dissuasive evidence for any single conclusion. “How fares our cousin Hamlet?” asks Claudius. Revealingly he replies, “‘Of the chameleon’s dish: I eat the air, promise-crammed” (III, iii). Hamlet’s world is chock-full of promise, both for good and for evil; he is possibility’s spy.

But as far as killing Claudius goes, Hamlet has no real need to reflect further. He knows all he needs to know. Here, his loyalty to possibility is a mockery of truth, and his imaginative reflection mere indecisiveness. “The indecisive man,” writes Lonergan, “continues to suspect that deeper depths of shadowy possibilities threaten to invalidate what he knows quite well” (1978: 287). Now, Hamlet rises above mere indecision, to the knowledge that he is being indecisive, and he struggles to discover why. But his search is futile; he never finds the cause of his aboutia, and never can find it, because it is a truth about himself that he cannot admit into consciousness. It is a truth that, psychologically speaking, is unbearable. Every step toward killing Claudius sweeps that truth toward consciousness, and it is precisely his inability to accept that truth that diverts him again and again from his duty.
It should be pointed out that Hamlet is not a character who habitually cannot make up his mind in order to act. His use of the travelling players, the stabbing of Polonius, his betrayal of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, his willingness to duel with Laertes, all bespeak a tendency toward rash decision, not indecision. Such rashness often accompanies introversion and a reflective temperament. When thought's habitual function is identified with the endless proliferation of possibilities, action tends to become the prerogative of the passionate moment. At any rate, we know that Hamlet can act cleverly and quickly in important and dangerous situations; revenging his father is a case of \textit{specific aboulia} occasioned by psychological self-defense.

What is the truth about himself that Hamlet can't accept? Apparently, it is the truth of the terrifying, repressed emotions at the heart of the person we may call the Oedipal child. We all know that the mythical Oedipus killed his father and married his mother, and that Freud found this myth to express a universal truth about every child’s wish, early in development, both to possess the mother and to destroy the rival father. The importance and universality that Freud attributed to this emotional syndrome has been criticized, revised, and occasionally reviled, but there is no question that the theory has proven illuminating for understanding the emotional fabric of the early years of psychic growth, and that it bears a special explanatory power for certain types of neurosis. Freud's comments on Hamlet in \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams} (Freud, 163-164), and much more extensively Ernest Jones's book on \textit{Hamlet and Oedipus} (Jones, 1976), focus the origin of Hamlet's \textit{aboulia} in his distorted relationship with Gertrude. Prescinding from further judgments on Freud or his theory of the "Oedipal crisis," it is clear, at least, from Hamlet's words and actions that he is trapped in an emotional morass that fits the specifications of an "Oedipal" neurosis: his sexual-romantic imagination is dominated by Gertrude—the play's text is especially rich on this point—who must therefore have acted toward the child Hamlet in such a way that it set the stage for making him the victim of the psychological complex that the Oedipal story makes dramatically, symbolically explicit. We will take this idea for
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granted, and spell out a few of its implications. This will entail taking what may seem to be extraordinary liberties with the text as it stands, by filling in unstated and intimate facts about the relationships in the earlier life of the royal family. We claim only that our hypothetical portrait is consistent with what is revealed in the text itself.

Hamlet must be called a momma's boy. Gertrude, a powerfully sexual woman, has always adored Hamlet (as Claudius remarks, she "lives almost by his looks"); therefore Hamlet feels deeply betrayed by his mother's remarriage. But his possessive attitude toward Gertrude is only acceptable to him in the form of a loyal defense of his father's honor—a father who had been supplemented, if not replaced, by the young Hamlet early on as a primary object of Gertrude's affection. These facts are strongly attested to both by the extreme rapidity of Gertrude's remarriage, and by how it triggers in Hamlet deeply personal feelings of rejection.

Now the Oedipal son, in responding to his mother's excessive devotion, a devotion in which her possessiveness of and dependence on him play major roles, develops a strong, undifferentiated attraction and need for his mother, which is accompanied, however, by a sense that he is complicitous with her in shutting out or denying her husband, his father. In being led to rely on and want his mother's primary affection, the Oedipal son participates in the psychological "killing" of his father, and in wanting this "death." At the same time, he is aware that the father emotionally devalued by his mother is who he himself must grow up to be—and so, in addition to loving his mother, he hates her, resenting both the dismissal of his father and the too-strong binding of his own identity to hers. Idealization of the father then follows naturally, since the son must cover up the father's weakness in being dismissed by the mother, in order to have an image of strength to strive toward in his own becoming. But the deeper knowledge of his father's weakness—(that is, his being rejected)—keeps him tied to the mother-identity ever more firmly, the whole pattern leading to unresolved feelings of love, need and hatred toward both parents.
To return to Hamlet's situation in the play: his uncle has just killed his father and married his mother, thus performing in the world of action exactly what Hamlet has been performing in the world of emotion and fantasy—though not self-knowingly—since infancy. Claudius is Hamlet's shadow. To kill Claudius would be to kill himself; and to kill himself would be to face himself. The closer he gets to the act, the more the repressed and inadmissible facts about himself surge toward consciousness—and so he hesitates, and manically diverts his energies. He feels, moreover, a murderous hatred toward his mother, the intensity of which baffles him. His disgust and hatred for her are, as T. S. Eliot noted, much in excess of the facts (Eliot, 1932: 125); and the reason is not hard to identify. Hamlet thinks he hates her for the contemptuous way she has treated his father's memory. In fact, his hatred stems primarily from his own feelings of betrayal. He, the son, not the elder Hamlet, is most significantly being replaced by Claudius. He, whose sense of identity is still so confused with his mother's affection and expectations, feels the dreadful inrush of vacancy and panic when her womanhood turns in full passion toward Claudius. Hamlet's thoughts of matricide, so wildly out of proportion to any wrong on Gertrude's part, reflect Hamlet's history of excessive emotional dependence, and presuppose his fundamental insecurity in his identity both as male and as autonomous. Now he is being commanded to break from that dependence in the most radical way possible: by killing his mother's husband, the focus of her sexual desire. To stand forth in his total separateness, killing and thus facing his secret self in the form of his psychological representative Claudius, all in one action—this is too much for Hamlet.

In fuller appreciation now of those forces keeping Hamlet from revenging his father, we should look more closely at the competing forces that are driving him on to the act. We can only fathom Hamlet's suffering by respecting how fully he identifies with his father's cause, how passionately he wants to prove his loyalty. It does not tarnish Hamlet's integrity to admit that it is loyalty to a highly idealized father. This is not to imply that the picture the play gives us of the former king as noble, capable and
brave is a false one. The idealization on Hamlet's part is of a
different order of truth than the fact of his father's real virtues;
it springs from psychological circumstances operating quite
independently of these, namely, Hamlet's shame and
resentment at his father's being supplanted in Gertrude's favor
by himself, his own feelings of guilt about participating in
displacing him, and his unacknowledged rage at his father's
"weakness" in being rejected and displaced. And this is not to
imply either that Hamlet's duty to the ghost is not real, or that
his passion for revenge is not normal. But it is important to see
that the burden of moral obligation Hamlet feels, and that the
fiery hatred he has for Claudius, are conditioned by Hamlet's
need to expand his father's image into an almost godlike
perfection, with the result that the imperative of the ghost's
command is absorbed by Hamlet as the very substance of his own
virtue and identity.

This brings us to the heart of the play's conflict. Killing
Claudius is more than an act of revenge for Hamlet; it is the
proof of his being, the seal of his identity. Unless he kills
Claudius, he is not himself; the ghost's command has placed him
in the crucible whereby he shall win or lose himself by acting or
not acting. Furious emotions, which he does not understand and
cannot control, prevent his acting, so that he cannot become
himself. The special universality of his story, which so many
critics have tried to explain, lies above all in this: that it is not so
much about a character who must suffer the consequences of
who he is, as about a character who must suffer the
consequences of not being able to become who he is. In addition
to being the tragedy of the particular individual Hamlet, it is the
tragedy of the structure of human existence itself as self-
constituting, when the dynamism of self-constitution shatters
against intransigent circumstance.

Hamlet's situation exemplifies a heightened state of what
we have called affective dissonance, a situation where the
conflict is not simply between—as moral tradition would have it—a
principle of obligation and strong feelings, but between strong
feelings and other feelings. On the one hand, there are the
feelings that aim at the rational freedom that principles of
obligation describe, the feelings that apprehend true values and head toward their realization; and on the other hand, there are the equally strong feelings that hold on for dear life to the only identity known to the narcissistic self. Hamlet is not a man who is kept from exercising some distinct function of moral will because of alien and incorrect desires. He is a man whose strong affective drive toward rational liberation in moral self-transcendence if obstructed by an affective counterpull.

As we have remarked, Hamlet regularly and spontaneously stirs up and delights in the whirlwind of possibility. This is associated with his affective captivity in the mother-image, his lacking sufficient autonomy to habitually make self-constitutive decisions that would follow from his judgments of fact and judgments of value, decisions for finitude, that would concretely establish the real and the good through acts of self-determination. These traits in him, relatively unsevere and innocuous up to the time of the play, become the occasion of a nightmare existence when they cancel out in the incapacity to obey the ghost's command. Habitual refusal of limitation now becomes a sorcerer's apprentice, unable to will otherwise, in the service of a tyranical and unconscious motive to remain in the realm of indecision. A result of this enforced inability to decide and act, this curse sprouted from the roots of temperament, is the exacerbated presence of the "bad dreams" of which Hamlet complains (II, ii). The content of these bad dreams, these images that haunt and torment him, are indicated in the twin obsessions of Hamlet's imagination: gross sexuality and meaningless death.

The language Hamlet uses in his crucial encounters both with Ophelia (in the "Get thee to a nunnery" scene, III, i) and with Gertrude (in the bedroom scene, III, iv) reveal a profound sexual loathing.

Nay, but to live
In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed,
Stewed in corruption, honeying and making love
Over the nasty sty ... (III, iv).

These are images of sexuality at its most bestial, not that of the innocent beast who cannot be bestial but only natural, but of the
human in whom the spirit with its transfigurative powers can become split off from, and ineffectual toward, the passions and urges of the animal nature in which it is incarnate. It is a language that bespeaks, again, a failure of integration between the finite and infinite components in the self, between the bodily-sensitive and the ideal-reflective. When the decision for finitude has not been able to penetrate the psyche and integrate its finite and infinite elements, the self in its identification with infinite possibility sees in the essential determinants of finitude an enemy, an alien power that debunks and humiliates the aspirations of spirit. These essential determinants are concentrated in sexuality and death. Therefore Hamlet rails against female beauty and virtue as dissembling masks, hideously covering up the truth of bestial sexuality that gives the lie to love and romance. Listen to how he speaks to Ophelia:

... the power of beauty will sooner transform honesty from what it is into a bawd than the force of honesty can transform beauty into his likeness...wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them...I have heard of your paintings, too, well enough; God hath given you one face, and you make yourselves another: you jig, you amble, and you lisp, and nick-name God's creatures, and make your wantonness your ignorance. Go to, I'll no more on't; it hath made me mad. I say, we will have no more marriages ... (III, i).

The key to understanding Hamlet's fury at the astonished, undeserving Ophelia in this scene, is to realize that it is really Gertrude at whom he is raging in bewildered anger and disgust. His mother—who has "posted with such dexterity to incestuous sheets," at whose age "the hey-day in the blood" should be tame, according to him, but is not, whose self-admittedly "o'erhasty marriage" tells a tale of lust overpowering reason—his mother has arisen like Grendel from the depths of his psyche as a sexual monster, the devouring woman, who still consumes his own identity and now, abandoning him and his reflexive need, turns to destroy another, just as she has destroyed his father and now himself. This portrait of Hamlet's feelings explains why, in the bedroom scene, he can straightforwardly accuse Gertrude of murdering her husband:
Hughes and Moore

A bloody deed! Almost as bad, good mother,
As kill a king, and marry with his brother.
As kill a king!

Ay, lady, 'twas my word (III, iv).

It is obvious to Hamlet that Gertrude is innocent of the actual crime; but he cannot help speaking what is psychologically true for him.

Hamlet's misogyny, his agonized rejection of romance as a deceit, and his sexual repulsion, are part of a larger affective horizon in which sex and death are the hidden partners that betray all beauty and meaning. Bestial sex is the moving image of death. Behind the mask of beauty lies not only perverse wantonness but, even deeper, the skull. "Now get you to my lady's bedchamber," Hamlet says to Yorick's skull at graveside, "and tell her, let her paint an inch thick, to this favour she must come; make her laugh at that" (V, i). Death for Hamlet is the jester who mocks all aspiration. Together, death and lewdness render action pointless, ambition futile, turn the earth into a sterile promontory, the air into a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors, turn man himself—infinitesimal in faculty, in apprehension like a god—into meaningless dust. Death is without question the king of the land where Hamlet is prince, and his morbid preoccupation with it loyalty to its dominion, the dominion of meaninglessness.

Your worm is your only emperor for diet: we fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots: your fat king and your lean beggar is but variable service, two dishes, but to one table: that's the end (IV, iii).

Does Hamlet believe this, that the grave is the end? It is a tricky question to answer; for it is certainly true that he feels this, and his melancholy and depression have indeed made all the uses of this world seem weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable. But he knows another truth, a truth of spiritual destiny and personal immortality. As he follows the beckoning ghost—an immortal spirit, mind you—he tells the fearful Horatio,

... for my soul, what can it do to that,
Being a thing immortal as itself? (I, iv).
Hamlet's brooding on death, then, involves a radical conflict between feeling and knowing—or more precisely, between submerged, irrational feeling and feeling effective in the light of knowing—just as does his procrastination. And both make for the same problem: Hamlet's inability to choose himself in his concrete, determinate, finite being, and his delay in the realm of the seductive infinite. This connection, between the self enchanted by possibility, and its melancholic vision of death, needs some further explanation.

The self who identifies with limitless possibility feels godlike, and fears going beyond this stage, since it is a step into finitude, which means death. Death forms the boundary or limit of this self and its world, its fixed horizon. This lends a sweet morbidity to life, a life where death is honored as the ultimate power, and makes an ironic jest out of all human effort. Hamlet's attitude throughout the play is steeped in this irony, and in the despairing vision at its core. Death is treated as external, a threat to the individual; it has not been appropriated and transcended through the acceptance of finitude in self-constitutive action. Because the self has not conquered death by embracing it in the form of its own limited actuality, death continues to conquer the self by draining value and purpose from life. Death as the spectre of meaninglessness rules over the kingdom of infinite possibility. T. S. Eliot, in "The Hollow Man," describes the will in this state, paralyzed between the possible and the actual:

    Between the idea
    And the reality
    Between the motion
    And the act
    Falls the Shadow

    Between the conception
    And the creation
    Between the emotion
    And the response ...
Between the potency
And the existence ...
Falls the Shadow

In the same poem he describes this realm where the Shadow falls as "death’s dream kingdom" (Eliot, 1962: 56-59). It is the land of death-in-life, where life and death are both dreams: the first played out in a mirage of possibilities not chosen, the second a substanceless power that enchants and annihilates. For Hamlet Denmark is the prison of death’s dream kingdom, where he is both prince and prisoner.

Now let us not forget that Hamlet knows that death is not the final end, as well as he knows that Gertrude did not kill his father, and that the ghost is genuine. But for what we know to become the basis for what we do, feeling is needed to support judgment. Hamlet’s feelings contradict his judgments, and he is, in this sense, passion’s slave; and he knows he is, but he can’t do anything about it. Aware of the contradiction between what he knows of immortal spirit and how death still overpowers him—aware, that is, that his present life is a death-in-life, a hesitation in the Shadow—he does find one alternative agreeable to his sense of honor: suicide. If there is the ersatz death of the inability to act, there is also the authenticity of crossing over into "death’s other kingdom."

It is in the context of the demand for authenticity that the great soliloquy on suicide (III, i) must be heard. It is a most extraordinary moment. Reflection, reflecting on its present impotence to become action, considers whether suicide might be nobler than paralysis. But in so considering, reflection discovers reasons to avoid that decision: and so witnesses itself enbalming itself in the impotent despair from which it had hoped to escape. Active self-destruction, a nobler version of the failure to become oneself, is teased from actuality by those powers of reflective imagination that it was meant to conquer once and for all. The despair of a reflection that judges and condemns itself to death, despairs even of carrying out its own sentence. We should recognize the tremendous irony in the fact that the present resolution whose native hue has been sicklied
o'er with the pale cast of thought, losing the name of action, is the resolution to do away with any possibility of action. In death's dream kingdom, even death is a dream of action.

Are the reasons that reflection gives in this speech for withdrawing from suicide not to be taken at face value, then? We suggest that they are not. Hamlet is not overly frightened by the thought of what awaits him after death. He is much more frightened by the realization that suicide is no solution to the problem of being true to himself. The death that Hamlet truly wants is to be found in the decisions and actions that finally will create the unwritten poem of his existence. What he truly wants is to die to possibility, not through negation, but through positive action. Suicide is only the mirror-image, in death's dream kingdom, of dying into the finite, into the freedom of finite actuality.

And Hamlet is granted what he truly wants, but he does not win it for himself. Hamlet does kill Claudius; the spell is broken; he acts. How? Through being told by Laertes that he is mortally poisoned, that he doesn't have half an hour to live. This is his tragedy: Hamlet can only act once he knows he has been killed. This knowledge breaks his hysteria, and acceptance of his situation permeates his life. His consciousness is suddenly released into the concrete, the historical, the determinative dimension of itself, dissolving the seductive presence of infinite possibility. The moment is his transition from death's dream kingdom to true life, which, paradoxically, is only made true by its being penetrated by consciousness of death, of finitude. Who can miss, inside the sorrow and the surprise, the relief in Hamlet's "I am dead, Horatio"? The agony subsides in Hamlet's final moments, as he enters his fading self.

If Hamlet had been able to act through self-discovery and self-conquest, without dying, we would have a revenge-play, a melodrama, not a tragedy. But he never achieves the requisite self-knowledge, never does take his destiny into his own hands, never learns why he hasn't been able to act. He dies ignorant of why he has littered the court with corpses. But he is transformed, nonetheless, during the time between the ghost's command and the fight with Laertes. When we listen to him
with Horatio just before the duel (V, ii), we find a remarkably calm and self-possessed Hamlet, one who is no longer cursing his birth and tormenting himself, but is accepting a “special providence” even “in the fall of a sparrow.” What is the secret of this change?

It must be that Hamlet has seized the only victory offered him by the circumstances: that of resolutely accepting his inability to overcome his *aboulia*. In other words, he has chosen himself in his very incapacity to become himself: cheated of action, he wins, through accepting what he cannot alter, through resignation to his fate, the victory of dignity. A tragic hero must have greatness, and Hamlet’s greatness of soul is proven, if not by the intensity of his struggle, then by his readiness to face what must be. Of his death, of the coming to pass of his fate, he tells Horatio:

> If it be now, ’tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come: the readiness is all ...
> Let be (V, ii).

In this “Let be,” this affirmation of his character and destiny, we are given the definitive answer to the question, “To be or not to be?” It is an answer not encompassed in the original question, a third alternative that transcends the bitter debate over whether to struggle for the self as it wishes to be, or to destroy the self as it is: it is the choice that hallows and accepts the self as it is, not in despair, but in resoluteness, prepared to achieve what it can. This “Let be” of Hamlet’s on the brink of the duel is repeated a few moments later, when he is dying:

> —O, I could tell you—
> But let it be. Horatio, I am dead!

Hamlet is released, at the end, from his love of ideas and words, from the theater of his quick and ironic imagination—released into the welcome, liberating silence of *these* actions, *this* story.
III

It has been said that all of us see ourselves in Hamlet. Using him as a dramatic specification of affectivity's role in decision and action enables us to see why. Hamlet is each of us, insofar as our images and affects impede the critical decisions of our lives. But he is also, we would like to suggest, a powerful image of our culture in its mounting crisis of endlessly prolonged technical brilliance and postponed decision.

Our culture speaks to us constantly of scientific miracles, of our power to save ourselves through ingenuity. This, we are told, is our freedom. Actually it is that sense of boundless possibility that characterizes the mother-systemic child. Our denial and hatred of death, our dismissal of the elderly and our adoration of adolescence, are indicative of our fear of finitude, our refusal to accept mortality. And our wildly confused attitudes toward sexuality betray the loss of our feeling of finitude, of our fulfillment in fully conscious loving, the loving that Gloria Steinem has called a state of passionate curiosity. It is a culture that resembles in many ways the gifted child, whose grandiose and narcissistic expectations are unknowingly sustained by a refusal to separate from its oceanic source.

Once the analogy between an arrested culture and an arrested child is grasped, we are in a position to get behind the cover-story of the culture of modernity. For the cover-story capitalizes on the felt identity between infinity and freedom. It says that with modernity we "came of age," no longer seeing ourselves as creatures of God but coming into our own. It roundly states that freedom and creaturehood are alternatives. That this is not so can doubtless be shown in a metaphysical way, but it is far more to the point to observe that the freedom claimed is a disguised dependence, analogous to the brilliant child-adult's disguised dependence on the parents; that the claims made by our hubris are a failure to break with an original dependence on our source for identity; that our freedom, with our acknowledged creaturehood, still awaits us; that finitude and death are not properly the theme of bad dreams but the very habitat of our freedom; that, far from "coming of age," we are
resolutely refusing to come of age, to constitute ourselves on the open-eyed choice of our finitude, of our reality.

In terms of intentionality-analysis, our culture is defined by a relentless collapsing of the third and fourth levels of consciousness into the second. The result is truth reduced to shimmering significance, and morality reduced to whatever seems good at the time. The result is also a culture in love with infinite possibility. And it is precisely because our culture, arrested where the mind enjoys the sense of its infinity, has been so rich in creativity and technical achievement, that it is so difficult for it to progress beyond the stage of brilliance. Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, and the rest were the early priests of an essentially incestuous cult, a culture that claims infinite power over nature and proclaims the technological imperative—"If it can be done, it should be done"—in daily contempt of death.

Hamlet is freed from the enchantment of infinitude, and liberated for action, by being mortally wounded. What breaks the spell is not physical death, but the consciousness of death it forces him to accept. Likewise, it is the collective acceptance of our mortality and responsibility as created beings that will break the spell of our self-adoration. Must we go the way of Hamlet? Must the sword of Laertes strike us in the shape of nuclear war?

We have been speaking about affectivity and images as the root of authentic decision and action. What these seek is conscious union, in knowledge and love, with the source of our begetting. Insofar as Hamlet is the exemplar of a humanity absorbed in its infinitude, he is a paradigmatic image of strangled affectivity. But insofar as he ultimately embraces his fate, embraces his failures, his ignorance and his pain, and responds with the definitively affirmative “Let be” to the mystery of the trial of his existence, he gives us also the image of another way, leads us to another paradigm. There is the way of the crucified, the exemplar of an affective embrace of finitude, that can address as Abba the mystery that broods in silence over concentration camps and the horrors that have filled our century.
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Bernard Lonergan’s rich “Dimensions of Meaning” is his most concentrated expression of a broad, philosophically-informed perspective about the actual course of historical events. Of all his shorter writings we may perhaps regard this one as a minor classic, an inexhaustible source of inquiry and meditative reflection (Lonergan, 1972: 161-162). Here Lonergan, in succinct but bold strokes, portrays the epochal transformations of consciousness and issues a forceful challenge to apply the Socratic enterprise of controlling meaning to the concrete circumstances of an age sensitive to the heuristics of scientific method and to the responsibilities of historical existence. Inevitably these observations point back to the precision of Lonergan’s cognitional theory in *Insight* and forward to his concept of stages of meaning in *Method in Theology*. Indeed they also stimulate wide-ranging inquiry into the philosophy of history as they provide a springboard to all of Lonergan’s works dealing with the topic of historical existence.

Our concern in this paper is to illuminate the nature, limits, and efficacy of a philosophical history as Lonergan views it in “Dimensions of Meaning” and other key works. If the hermeneutical circle pertains to history, then we cannot know the whole of history without knowing the parts and we cannot know the parts without knowing the whole. But clearly there are enormous, insurmountable obstacles to knowing the whole. History, of course, has not ended, whatever that would mean. In addition, vast stretches of data about the past are missing. And even if, miraculously, we could see all of history from the beginning to the end (which may be the beginning), even if we could gather all the data, we would still be faced with the
Herculean task of interpreting it. This burden would be even more prodigious if historical existence were not a purely world-immanent process but were rather situated at the intersection of time and the timeless. Indeed in our venture to grasp the whole of history we are confronted with irreducible mystery (toward the upper limit of the continuum of meaning and mystery). Thus, as Lonergan puts it, general history—the total view of history—is just an ideal (1972: 128). Nevertheless, do we not have the exigency to comprehend the whole as much as is reasonably possible, within the boundaries established above, to illuminate the parts? This project of navigating between obscurantism and gnosticism invariably entails philosophical considerations and, consequently, opens up the prospect of a philosophical history. If we are careful to purge the term of any association with gnostic construction on the meaning of history, we may hesitantly call such a philosophical history a 'speculative philosophy of history.' Still, how can we unite the seemingly antithetical: philosophical “speculation” and empirical historical inquiry? It is the contention of this paper that the methodology of Bernard Lonergan offers the most substantive philosophical foundation for such an endeavor.

Let us first, however briefly, locate Lonergan's speculative philosophy of history within the discernible topography of his philosophy of history as a whole. Historical existence, we can say, following the lead of Lonergan, is the drama of the search for meaning and the quest for value. It is a journey with both movement and countermovement. The drama extends from the unconscious depths of matter to the spiritual heights of the cloud of unknowing. It includes the bright prominence, sinking into unfathomable depths, of the spiritual, moral, and intellectual drama of each person: as actor and critic, performing and interpreting; as limited by biological, psychic, geographical, social, and historical conditions, while, simultaneously, self transcending, responding to the challenges of the environment and of the past; as living the tension of limitation and transcendence faithfully or unfaithfully, accepting or fleeing the call of the desire to know and the intention of the good; as performing the drama before the self, others, and the
Wholly Other. There is, then, to this drama the movement of authenticity and the countermovement of inauthenticity: the gaining and the losing of the direction of life. The drama also embraces a creative minority of prophets, saints, sages, philosophers, and statesmen as well as the mystery of destiny—the collective drama of a community, of a civilization, of the human race which cannot simply be reduced to an aggregate of individual wills (1959: 313-314). And the drama likewise witnesses, individually and collectively, the human response of inquiry to the abiding presence of the nothingness and mystery of unrestricted, divine love. Hence, extrapolating from Lonergan's writings, we can fashion an ontological philosophy of history, a systematic reflection on the intrinsically historical character of human being.

Still, do not the immanent norms of lived history, the imperatives inherent in the directional tendency of the odyssey of existence, command that, under appropriate historical conditions, a philosophically perceptive and historically-minded cultural superstructure foster a more decisive assumption of historical responsibility? At least this seems to be the ultimate implication of the Socratic enterprise from the hindsight of more than two millennia. Critical historical scholarship would participate in the drama of history itself by entering into the dynamics of performance and interpretation. And thus an ontological philosophy of history necessarily passes over to an epistemological philosophy of history.

Lonergan's distinction of hermeneutics, explanatory history, and evaluative history—as the functional specialties, respectively, of interpretation, history, and dialectics—must therefore be viewed in this light. He has remarked that "it is the nemesis of all specializations to fail to see the woods for the trees, to evolve ad hoc solutions that are indeed specious yet profoundly miss the mark for the very reason that they aim too intently on a limited goal" (1971: 139-140). Lonergan's notion of the functional correlation of scholarship, philosophy, theology, and social policy is aimed precisely at that nemesis. What ties together the various functional specialties is, in fact, the historicity of the cultural superstructure itself. For Lonergan is
simply explicating how these specialties cooperate in an ongoing appropriation of tradition, which is a threefold critical venture of encounter with the past, search for philosophical foundations in the present, and development of salient themes to meet the challenge of the future. At the same time, we would suggest, Lonergan's nuanced study of the human mind establishes the rudiments of a methodological cooperation among distinct fields in the history of thought. Psychohistory, cultural history, the history of ideas, intellectual history, and the history of philosophy all can constitute a partnership in the critique of meaning because they all consider, along a continuum ranging from the incipient to the explicit, the philosophical assumptions that inform human living.

But, as the content of "Dimensions of Meaning" illustrates, collaboration toward a wider goal can also be achieved in a material, and not just formal, manner through a world history of thought. The growing awareness of historicity is itself a major theme in the drama of history. Still, do we dare utter this without conjuring up the ghosts of Hegel and his like haunting the groves of academe?

I. THE HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Yet if the historian of thought is to be faithful to the task of explaining major historical developments in human thinking, then he or she must consider those monumental developments that are truly transformations of the most fundamental assumptions regarding reality and what it means to be human. To be sure, the magnitude of such a study of the world history of thought is awesome. In addition to the problem of scarcity of evidence for the pre-modern period there is the difficulty of digesting the sources that are available. And is not this difficulty largely a matter of arriving at a proper philosophical framework to interpret the data?

For philosophical issues inevitably intrude upon this type of historiography. They are particularly decisive in meeting the
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problem of defining an epoch, an ever-present problem confronting the historian, but one that takes on staggering proportions when he is attempting to delineate the great epochs in the history of thought. What is consciousness? What is myth? What are the interrelationships among different modes of understanding? Does science completely replace philosophy? Does philosophy (or science) absolutely render myth obsolete? It is precisely because such philosophical questions necessarily inform investigations of the epochal changes in the history of thought that we must, in this unique case, speak of a philosophical history. We enter here the terrain of a speculative philosophy of history in the specific sense mentioned earlier.

A speculative philosophy of history, as argued above, need not be a universal history that purports to explain, in actual historical detail, the true meaning, the essence of history. Nor, according to Lonergan, ought it to be. The drama of history is a venture into the known unknown. In our search for meaning and quest for value we know we have a role, the role of inquirer—inquiry precisely about the role itself. And no self-luminous jump in comprehension of the role ends the mystery of the play. Generic insights can spawn differences in the history of self-interpretation, leaps in self-understanding, but they do not eliminate the identity amid difference: the identity of the search and the quest. Moreover, authenticity demands that at every point of historical life openness to transcendent mystery be preserved. The in-between character of history suggests, as Voegelin has come to articulate it, that there are lines of meaning 'in history' that are not temporal (1956-74, IV: 2ff.); they exhibit what Lonergan calls 'vertical finality' (1967a: 18-22). So we hear the echoes of Ranke's famous dictum that every age is equal before God. The 'meaning of history,' then, cannot be captured in a timeline leading up to the self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit, as Hegel formulated it in his speculative system, or as Marx reformulated it in his materialist inversion of Hegel's dialectical philosophy of history. Nor can it be reduced to an ascending spiral of spiritual progress, as in the Liberal Anglican interpretation. Nor can its meaning be fixed by sets of scientific
laws explaining the course of civilization, as in the Victorian history of Thomas Buckle.

Lonergan's ontological philosophy of history, therefore, precludes a speculative philosophy of history that would aspire to a description of historical reality *a priori*. But Lonergan's critique of historical reason does not view a philosophically grounded explanatory framework as necessarily antithetical to the aims of open-minded scientific history, any more than it views an evaluative philosophically-inspired historical analysis as running counter to the requirements of historical objectivity. A properly validated philosophical theory—one, that is, rooted in self-appropriation and expressed as critical realism—can even broaden historical knowledge and facilitate its development. Indeed a philosophical theory about the course of actual historical events can possess at least the utility of a grand-scale ideal-type (Lonergan, 1972: 228-229). The legitimate function of such a restricted speculative philosophy of history would be to guide historical research rather than to describe historical reality. In so doing it would be faithful to the important criterion spelled out by W. H. Walsh for preserving historical objectivity: such a philosophical theory of history would not predetermine the data, preestablishing *what* we see; it would instead assist us to interpret the data serving to predispose *how* we would see things (Walsh, 78).

Granted, then, the legitimacy, and the imperative, for a speculative philosophy of history, in this restricted sense, and granted the exigency, from Lonergan's perspective, that the philosophical framework be in accord with the positions of critical realism, still what is the exact model that would direct historians? And what is the relation of the model to historical research, historical explanation, and historical narration?

Three contenders for such a model are hinted at by Lonergan (1960: 7-8). The first is Arnold Toynbee, whose *A Study of History* is an erudite source book of grand-scale ideal-types with a narrative, chronological focus. Toynbee's explanatory categories define civilizations as the basic units of history, trace their patterns of origin, development, breakdown, decline, and decay, and elucidate their most significant types of
contacts with each other in space and time. He identifies religion as the main carrier of human aspiration beyond the rise and fall of civilizations. A central category of his—the very dynamism behind the rise and fall of civilizations—is the process of challenge and response, discussion of which is augmented by a set of humanistic categories drawn from Greek tragedy, the Bible, Shakespeare, and Goethe (Lonergan, 1959: 61-62; 1960: 7-8; 1972: 228; 1985: 10, 103, 214; Toynbee, 1972). While Toynbee has an 'intellectual evasiveness,' as Voegelin characterizes it, about the criteria for evaluating the religious carriers of higher human striving, his ideal-type of challenge and response, amid the potpourri of his humanistic descriptions, remains a powerful heuristic tool, which ties in brilliantly with Lonergan's theory of progress and decline (Voegelin, 1956-74, III: 19-23; 1961: 183-198). But Toynbee offers no adequate foundation for a speculative philosophy of history that would differentiate the salient epochs of the history of thought.

Another candidate is Pitirim Sorokin in his Social and Cultural Dynamics. If Toynbee has implicitly located the desire to know, the élan of cognitional process, as the substance of progress, Sorokin has implicitly recognized levels of cognitional structure as the key to cultural advance (Sorokin, 1937-41; 1974). He holds, for instance, that the senses and reason (as well as moral and religious "intuition") are legitimate and necessary avenues to truth (1941: 105). Sorokin's vast work, stressing architecture, painting, and poetry, but embracing all fields of culture, depicts cycles in Western civilization from the Greeks to the contemporary age. Although they are devoid of any analogy with the necessary life-phases of a biological organism, these cycles consist of oscillating phases of three basic types of culture: 'sensate,' 'ideational,' and 'idealistic,' to use his terms (Lonergan, 1959: 49-50; 1960: 7; 1980: 273).  

1 In the case of Western civilization Sorokin (1941: 104) sees two cycles of the series (sensate-ideational-idealistic) until the modern phase, which appears to be starting a third cycle:

1. Sensate (Minoan-Mycenaean)
   Ideational (archaic Greece)
   Idealistic (fifth-century Greece)
'Sensate' culture he defines as one in which the fundamental criterion of truth is sensation. 'Ideational' culture is one in which the ultimate authority of truth is religious experience, inspiration, or revelation. 'Idealistic' culture is one in which the emphasis falls on reason as the arbiter of truth, operating with respect to both sensation and faith. If Sorokin’s schema of 'sensate,' 'idealistic,' and 'ideational' types bears a rough similarity to Kierkegaard’s three spheres of existential subjectivity—respectively, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—then, Lonergan maintains, they can also be correlated with personal self-appropriation of the cognitional levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging (1959: 49-50; 1960: 7; 1980: 273).² By using Sorokin’s material, Lonergan suggests, one can prolong personal appropriation qua experiencing, qua understanding, and qua judging into a study of the development of culture (1980: 273). In fact, the typology adds considerable precision to the store of ideal-types at the disposal of a speculative philosophy of history. Sorokin himself proposes that his typology carries much greater explanatory clout than what he regards as Toynbee’s somewhat dilettantish and even inconsistent discussion of the growth and the decline of civilizations (Sorokin, 1949: 95, 107, 110, 112-113).³ Sorokin, for example, finds that the traits Toynbee ascribes to civilizations in their phase of growth are those most associated

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2. Sensate (Hellenistic-Roman)  
   Ideational (A.D. fourth century to thirteenth century)  
   Idealistic (thirteenth century)  
3. Sensate (sixteenth century to present)  

But ought the sensate type to be considered the beginning or the end of a cultural cycle?  

²Sorokin seems to equate 'idealistic' with the levels of both understanding and judging since he identifies it with the creative operations of understanding and the normative procedures of reason. The 'idealistic' type seems to involve the differentiation and flowering of what Lonergan calls the cultural superstructure. And is the 'ideational' type to be linked with the level of judging, as Lonergan suggests? Or rather with the fourth, existential level of consciousness?  

³Toynbee’s reply (1961: 288) to Sorokin is that he sees the ties between different relational strands of a civilization as 'meaningful' but not 'causal,' because "human relations take the form of free response to challenges."
with the spiritual ideational 'supersystem' of the civilization, while many of those traits Toynbee attributes to a civilization in decline are those of a civilization either dominated by its empiricist and hedonist sensate 'supersystem' or in transition from such domination (125). Again, however, we must conclude: whatever promise Sorokin's ideal-types may hold for a critical history of culture, they do not suffice in and of themselves to account for radical horizon shifts whose significance extends to more than one culture. They must be incorporated within some larger theoretical context that would serve as the adequate foundation for a speculative philosophy of history, although such a larger context would be all the richer and efficacious for having these ideal-types at its command.

The closest approximation to the model we are seeking is Voegelin's prodigious Order and History, which, backed up by an impressive array of primary and secondary sources and attentive to concrete historical detail abundantly spread over diverse civilizations and millennia, introduces the key concept of a movement from compactness to differentiation (Lonergan, 1960: 8; 1985: 221). The constant structure of experience permeating the historical field analyzed by Voegelin is 'the Question,' the process of inquiry whose objectives are the true, the good, the divine, not a set of 'objects' in the 'external world' (Voegelin, 1956-74, IV: 316, 326). The experience of questioning is itself the true "constituent of humanity" (IV: 362); and "the range of human experience is always present in the fullness of its dimensions" (I: 60). The identity in history is the structure of experience, the process of questioning (1970: 215-34). Yet there is a significant, epochal variation effected by the Question itself, an existential breakthrough, a veritable "leap in being," which nevertheless does not, and cannot, eliminate the Question: namely, differentiating insights into the increasingly self-luminous structure of the Question by representative prophets, philosophers, and saints (1956-74, II: Introduction; IV: 316-330). Voegelin's history of symbols with its principle of 'differentiation of consciousness' not only provides a striking illustration of a model for a speculative philosophy of history, thereby addressing our first query, but it likewise sheds light on
the topic of the second question, which regards the connection between the model and ordinary historical research, explanation, and narration. For, above all else, Voegelin in his evaluative history mediates his philosophical analysis by judicious selection of relevant sources and by intense concern for historical accuracy. Winding his way through Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Israelite, Hellenic, Chinese, and Roman civilizations he is keenly sensitive to concrete historical detail and to developing situations. As he encounters the myths of the Paleo-Oriental societies, the prophets of Israel, the apostles and saints of Christianity, the sages of China, and the philosophers of Hellas he is scrupulous in focusing on the primary texts. He cultivates in the first three volumes a dramatic narrative style suitable to telling the tale of the two major differentiations of consciousness, 'noetic' (the symbolic form of Philosophy) and 'pneumatic' (the symbolic form of Revelation). And when new questions, new evidence, or new interpretations arise, he is resolute in revising, in correcting, and in expanding his study (1956-74, IV: 1ff.).

The example of Voegelin's *magnum opus*, then, highlights two components of a speculative philosophy of history. We are reminded here of Max Weber's division of historical analysis into, first, a 'developmental level' of long-term trends concerned with explicating the genesis and course of historical configurations formulated as ideal-types, and, secondly, a "situational level" devoted to explaining events by virtue of concrete circumstances and contingencies (Roth, 306-318). Lonergan speaks of an 'upper blade' and of a 'lower blade' of interpretation, corresponding, respectively, with Weber's 'developmental level' and his 'situational level.' Both components are essential for a legitimate and objective speculative philosophy of history.

The 'upper blade' of the speculative philosophy of history is a philosophical framework that generates, inspires, guides, revises, and synthesizes grand-scale historical interpretations. Derived from models of the structures of consciousness fashioned by Lonergan's ontological philosophy of history, its ultimate origin is the personal act of self-appropriation, the root
of all legitimate species of the philosophy of history. Its status, as determined by a critique of historical reason, is that of a unique ideal-type, a set of generalities demanding specific determination, with the actual determination to be worked out by existing methods of scholarship (Lonergan, 1958: 577). Hence it is not a positivist technique geared toward arriving at abstractions that would mutilate the individuality and the uniqueness of historical events. It is a developmental theory, a grand-scale ideal-type, expressing transcultural configurations of human living (1972: 285). While the ultimate source of the theory is self-appropriation, its basic terms and relations are evidenced in the expansive panorama of history; they are not artificial constructions pulled out of a hat, since, as Lonergan remarks, "there has been for millennia a vast multitude of individuals in whom such basic nests of terms and relations can be verified" (286). The theory links together transcultural configurations and patterns of human living by tracing a temporal sequence among them, a general tendency of development. Indeed, although Lonergan does not employ the name, we can designate the developmental aspect of his speculative philosophy of history, properly speaking, as the 'history of consciousness.'

For the key to the developmental theory is the notion of differentiation of consciousness (81-99, 172-173, 257-262, 284-287, 302-312, 314-318). The orientation of the stream of consciousness specifies the objects of consciousness, with different orientations constituting diverse patterns of experience, corresponding realms of meaning, and parallel modes of expression. All the while, however, the intentionality of consciousness also specifies the total range of meaningful objects (the world) and the horizon of a person or of a community; thus a radical alteration in the orientation of consciousness inaugurates a profound change in the understanding of the world and in the horizon or perspective through which a person or a community apprehends reality. Radical horizon shifts can likewise entail fundamental transformations of self-interpretation, of understanding basic horizon, and of grasping human historicity. Now such horizon
shifts revolve around differentiations of consciousness, watershed marks in the differentiation of patterns of experience attended by differentiation of correlative realms of meaning and modes of expression. Lonergan posits two epochal horizon shifts. The first involves the emergence of distinct patterns of experience out of a relative homogeneous unity: the coming of age of the pure intellectual pattern differentiates the theoretical realm of meaning and its technical language, while a heightened intensity of religious consciousness differentiates the realm of transcendence and scriptural, theological, or mystical language. The second great transformation in the history of consciousness witnesses methodical self-reflection, disclosing the realm of interiority and spawning a language expressive of the appropriation of subjectivity and historicity. The three ages delimited by these epochal breakthroughs, we must caution, do not exhaust or reveal the meaning of history; the veil of the mystery of existence is not torn asunder by these models of the history of consciousness; and hence the history of consciousness must not be confused with neo-gnostic constructions of three stages of history, whether Joachite, Positivist, Idealist, or Marxist.

Nor is the developmental theory even sufficient to explain the history of consciousness. The 'upper blade' of interpretation must be fused with a 'lower blade' cutting into the fabrics of history, anthropology, archeology, philology, and related fields to account for concrete details, unique events, representative persons, and contingent circumstances. Scholarly disciplines must supply the data of the history of consciousness, and the data must be interpreted within the methodological framework of the developmental theory. Just as the laws of physics are the fruit of an interaction between mathematics and data, so the history of consciousness must be an ongoing process with "one foot in a transcendental base and the other on an increasingly organized data" (Lonergan, 1972: 293). Neither purely a priori nor purely a posteriori, the history of consciousness is nourished by the constant cross-fertilization, correction, and refinement of the theoretical construct, and the construct, in turn, facilitates selection, exploring, and understanding the data (284-285,
While it is thus dependent on other historical fields, the history of consciousness can, at the same time, stimulate them to pose new questions as they view historical trends anew from the perspective of substantive transformations of basic cultural and intellectual assumptions.

Insofar as the history of consciousness could avoid narrow overspecialization, the bane and curse of academic pedantry, as well as the intoxication of a gnostic universal history, it would, we propose, be a legitimate discipline in its own right. And through the ongoing collaboration of specialists the brilliant pioneering enterprise of a Voegelin could be supplemented by a permanent program of serious, if less magisterial, efforts.

Form is illustrated by content to a unique degree in an historical discipline that is a speculative philosophy of history. Our present task must be to illustrate more amply the nature, scope, and context of the history of consciousness and the utility of Lonergan's categories (Klein, ch. 5; Flanagan, ch. 7; Lamb, 271-281). We can only accomplish this—and here we plough new ground in the treatment of Lonergan's reflection on the history of thought—if we gather together in some coherent historical portrait Lonergan's discussion of the material content of the history of consciousness, supplementing his ideas with historical analyses we judge to be consonant with his approach and demonstrative of the fecundity of his models.

II. THE AGE OF MYTH

The Age of Myth is an age of undifferentiated or compact or homogeneous consciousness, where neither self and community, nor subject and object, nor discrete modes of understanding (subjective pole), nor various elements of reality (objective pole), nor forms of expression tend to be distinguished (Lonergan, 1972: 84).

In undifferentiated consciousness the sense of community seems more dominant than the awareness of self as a center of psychic activity. Lacking personal differentiation, an 'emotional
identification'—Lonergan uses Scheler's term here (57-58; Frings, 56-57)—of the individual with the collectivity is pervasive, and affective appreciation of self is almost exclusively in terms of participation in group life. We can plausibly infer that intersubjective communication of feeling will have a greater intensity than in more differentiated societies. And we can reasonably inquire whether many symbols, which in the modern world are restricted to dreams, will appear in the waking consciousness of primitives (Neumann, 1962: 1). Moreover, images pertaining to what modern secular culture regards, perhaps with some confusion, as the 'psychological sphere,' we must assume, will blend indiscriminately with aesthetic and religious motifs and with symbolic expressions representing the mystery of the human condition.

Let us now consider the subjective pole of what we can postulate as 'pure' undifferentiated consciousness.

In the subjective pole patterns of experience blend and mix, none attaining a relative autonomy and sharp distinctness from the others. As Gerhardus van der Leeuw alleges, for the 'primitive mind' there are indeed various motives and criteria but they are not purposely differentiated (Van der Leeuw, 12). Art, for example, cannot be separated from religion and practical concerns (Lonergan, 1972: 273, 275-276). So Jacquetta Hawkes, commenting on the dispute over whether the Stone Age cave paintings exhibited a purely aesthetic, a religious, or a magico-practical interest, can remark that "in primitive societies, where there is no conscious division between intellectual, aesthetic, practical, and religious activities, art belongs to them all and is simply a part of everyday life. To try to separate it out only reveals the folly of the over-analytical and unimaginative mind" (33). Van der Leeuw argues that the arts in primitive cultures radiate around the dance as their unifying center; so much so, in fact, that, as he phrases it, prehistory is mostly dance history (13). Lonergan hints at the significance of dance in undifferentiated culture when he mentions the expressive function of mimesis: insight can use the pattern discerned in a schematic image to guide bodily movements, and hence bodily movements can signify other movements (1972:...
Religion penetrates all aspects of life in undifferentiated consciousness (Lonergan, 1974a: 19; Eliade, 1959: 27-28). Precisely because of this fact it does not clearly delineate and map out its own distinct realm (Lonergan, 1972: 108, 257, 273, 276, 306). Undifferentiated consciousness, according to Lonergan, "is only puzzled or amused by the oracles of religiously differentiated consciousness" (276). Lonergan, however, seems to admit an exception to the rule in the figure of the shaman, who, specializing in "archaic techniques of ecstasy," can attain a rudimentary state of mystical awareness (273; cites Eliade, 1964). Still, the role of the shaman in primitive societies is not purely religious, for it has unmistakable magical, social, and political overtones.

To say that a culture is undifferentiated is not to say that its mentality is prelogical. Practical intelligence is obviously operative when 'primitives' acquire, as they do, a thorough understanding of the practical tasks of daily life in their own society (Lonergan, 1967a: 257; 1972: 89; cites Malinowski, 17ff.). It is highly visible in the discoveries of the Neolithic Revolution and even more so in the sophisticated and dazzling inventiveness of the Urban Revolution, which established 'civilization,' a civil order with a significant differentiation of social roles and tasks and the formation of distinct social communities, challenging the spontaneity of intersubjectivity (Lonergan, 1972: 89-90, 257-258). To be sure, with the Neolithic Revolution and the Urban Revolution practical intelligence seemed to have come into its own, revealing a substantial differentiation of the practical pattern of experience, but, in both cases, Lonergan thinks, the basic orientation remained on balance still undifferentiated:

Moreover it is the development of practical understanding that takes men beyond fruit-collecting, hunting, fishing, gardening to large-scale agriculture with the social organization of the temple states and later of the empires and the ancient high civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Crete, the valleys of the Indus and the Huang-ho, Mexico, and Peru. There emerged great works of irrigation, vast structures of stone or brick,
armies and navies, complicated processes of book-keeping, the beginning of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy. But if the poverty and weakness of the primitive were replaced by the wealth and power of great states, if the area over which man exercised practical intelligence increased enormously, the whole achievement stood upon the cosmological myth that depicted as continuous and solidary the order of society, the order of the cosmos, and the divine being (89-90; cites Voegelin, 1956-74, I).

Nor is there completely lacking a theoretical or speculative concern. Lonergan would seem to have no quarrel with the contention, advanced by Paul Radin and others, that primitive man could grasp abstract ideas and concepts (Radin). Lonergan, for example, recognizes that primitives can devise elaborate classification systems (1972: 11; cites Levi-Strauss). Nevertheless, this is not to argue that theoretic intelligence has attained hegemony in its own distinct realm. Thus Lonergan describes primitive apprehension of meaning as 'rudimentary' and its expression of theoretic meaning as 'vague' (1972: 273). The person with undifferentiated consciousness "does not," in Lonergan's words,

formulate a theoretical ideal in terms of knowledge, truth, reality, causality. He does not formulate linguistically a set of norms for the pursuit of that ideal goal. He does not initiate a distinct economic and social and cultural context within which the pursuit of the ideal goal could be carried out by human animals (93).

The objective pole of the horizon of undifferentiated consciousness is similarly compact. As we might anticipate, realms of meaning (the aesthetic, the practical, the religious, the scientific, the philosophical, the symbolic, the psychological) overlap. But the compactness extends to the perception of the components of reality. Such scholars as Voegelin, Henri Frankfort, and John Wilson have pointed out how, for archaic man, reality is composed of four "elements": the sacred, the world, society, and man (Voegelin, 1956-74, I; Frankfort, 1948; Frankfort et al., 1949; Wilson, 1949: ch. 2-3; Wilson, 1951; Clark). And while these elements are in one sense apprehended as distinct, being graded in a hierarchy according to their
durability and lastingness (with the sacred ranking highest to be followed, in descending order, by the world, society, and man), they are in another crucial sense not differentiated (Voegelin, 1956-74, I: 3-4). The Egyptologist, Wilson, has coined the term 'consubstantiality' to refer to the Egyptian view of the universe as composed of a continuing substance diffused throughout "a spectrum in which one colour blends off into another without line of demarcation, in which, indeed, one colour may become another under alternating conditions" (Wilson, 1949: 71-72). Voegelin has vividly captured in his moving and telling description the essentials of the worldview of undifferentiated consciousness:

The community of being is experienced with such intimacy that the consubstantiality of the partners will override the separateness of substances. We move in a charmed community where everything that meets us has force and will and feelings, where animals and plants can be men and gods, where men can be divine and gods are kings, where the feathery morning star is the falcon Horus and the Sun and the Moon are his eyes, where the underground sameness of being is a conductor for magic currents of good and evil forces that will subterraneously reach the superficially unreachable partner, where things are the same and not the same, and can change into each other (1956-74, I: 3).

In the archaic worldview the ordering force of cosmic-divine substance is infused into social and individual life through the mediation of a shaman, a king, or a pharaoh.

The expression of meaning is likewise compact. Meaning is communicated through intersubjectivity, mimesis, art, ritual, symbol—all of these falling within the covering framework of ordinary, commonsense language (Lonergan, 1972: 87, 276, 306). Thus Lonergan can maintain that undifferentiated consciousness develops in the manner of common sense (81, 85, 257, 272). Now "the realm of common sense is the realm of persons and things in their relation to us" (81). This means that the language of undifferentiated consciousness expresses insights that are closely tied to human sentiments, attitudes, interests, concerns, and feelings and to gestures, percepts, and images; indeed they are so intimately connected with elementary experience that early language can, as a general rule,
express only what can be pointed to, perceived, or imagined; in particular, therefore, it has serious problems in expressing the generic, the temporal, the subjective, the divine (87). Homer, Lonergan observes, has no generic word for seeing but only words for such specific activities as glancing, peering, and staring (87; cites Russo and Simon, 484). Some American Indian languages have no generic word for sickness (87; cites Cassirer, 1955, I: 199ff.). Again, time, which involves a synthesis that orders all events into a single continuum of earlier and later, cannot be directly perceived; it can be represented only by a highly sophisticated geometrical image; and the expression of such an image, Lonergan argues, strains the capacity of the language of undifferentiated consciousness. Accordingly, many primitive languages have tenses that express kinds or modes of action rather than a synthesis of temporal relationships (88; cites Cassirer 1955, I: 215ff.). Lonergan also cites abundant evidence of how early language stumbles in representing subjectivity: possessive pronouns, for instance, develop before personal pronouns (88); Homer portrays inner mental processes as personified interchanges (88; cites Russo and Simon: 487); the Hebrews experience moral defect as defilement and later as the people's violation of the covenant with God (88; cites Ricoeur, 1969). Finally, undifferentiated consciousness regales in hierophanies. This it can do, explains Lonergan, by associating the divine with the objects, events, rituals, or recitations that occasion religious experience, even though the divine, the object of transcendental intentionality, strictly speaking, can neither be perceived nor imagined (88, 108).4

Because the insights conveyed by ordinary language are intimately bound up with images and feelings, undifferentiated common sense is also enveloped by symbols (images tinged with affects). And, if we mean by myth, the complex of symbols and their associations of speech, song, and ritual, then surely the age of undifferentiated consciousness is an age dominated by myth. The apprehension of human beings and their world is laden with

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4For the exceptions to the ideal type of 'early language,' see Radin's criticism of Cassirer (Radin).
symbols “expressed in myth, saga, legend, magic, cosmogony, apocalypse, typology” (306). Ideas are principally communicated through “rituals, narrative forms, titles, parables, metaphors” (276).

This domination of undifferentiated consciousness by image, symbol, and myth has its truly salutary aspects. For we are not using “myth” here in an essentially pejorative sense. Myth represents the unity of reality—of man, society, world, and transcendent mystery. Hence undifferentiated consciousness is present to the full range of human experience; while lacking the depth of differentiated consciousness, it is not saddled with the temptation of reductionism, either spiritualist or materialist; and it is thereby less in danger of losing a comprehensive view of existence (Voegelin, 1956-74, I: 60, 84; Van der Leeuw, 32-34).

We must be careful not to restrict myth and undifferentiated consciousness to the Age of Myth. Myth does not cease to have a legitimate truth function after the advent of philosophy and science, for it is a representation of the paradoxical known unknown. Thus it is imperative for scholars to ascertain the exact status of myth and symbolic consciousness throughout the history of consciousness. At a minimum, we would suggest, they must distinguish among myths (a) in the period of pure undifferentiated consciousness, (b) after the Neolithic Revolution, (c) after the Urban Revolution, when literature became differentiated (Lonergan, 1972: 258), (d) during the state of proto-philosophical speculation (the Memphite Theology, Hesiod, Hebrew Wisdom Literature (275), (e) after the emergence of philosophy, and (f) after the shift to modern science, historical consciousness, and interiority. Moreover, undifferentiated consciousness does not disappear from history after the arrival of differentiated consciousness, since large segments of a culture may have undifferentiated consciousness although the creative edge of the culture has reached a stage of differentiated consciousness (85). It will prove helpful, then, to distinguish undifferentiated consciousness (a) in a pure state, (b) after the Neolithic Revolution, (c) after the Urban Revolution, (d) during the stage of proto-philosophical speculation, (e) after the emergence of
philosophy, and (f) after the shift to modern science, historical consciousness, and interiority (303-305). We must conclude that there will be a tension, an antagonism, between undifferentiated and differentiated consciousness when the Age of Myth comes to an end for a given culture.

The domination of undifferentiated consciousness by image, symbol, and myth indeed has severe drawbacks (1958: 536-542; 1967a: 258; 1972: 89). The most fundamental and pervasive problem is minimal self-knowledge. How can this be avoided if human beings, untutored by philosophy or by higher spirituality, do not adequately differentiate themselves from society, the world, and the sacred? They interpret themselves solely as a known unknown (Barden, 9, 13, 21-22). Consequently, awareness of the capacity of the mind and of human responsibility is restricted. Basic horizon is understood entirely through the obscurity of symbols, rites, and mythical narration. Recognition of human historicity is only implicit, subliminal, subsidiary, incipient. Neither temporality nor subjectivity nor transcendence can be represented adequately. Interior experience must be transferred onto the field of the perceived or the imagined to make rudimentary insight into such experience possible. So noetic process and religious experience are "projected" onto the canvas of the world as they are pictured by undifferentiated consciousness (Lonergan, 1972: 88, n. 34). Perhaps 'projection' is not the most judicious term to employ since it stems from the vocabulary of naive realism (108). It might be more accurate to say, as Dennis Klein suggests, that subjective and objective poles are not differentiated (Klein, 321).

Inadequate self-knowledge generates, in turn, native bewilderment about the criteria of truth, reality, objectivity, and causality (Lonergan, 1972: 93). Undifferentiated consciousness lacks "the techniques of mastery and control that the study of grammar imparts to the use of words and the study of logic to the communication of thought" (1958: 541). When the

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5Voegelin (1956-74, IV: ch. 1) has detected a compact form of historical speculation, which he terms 'historiogenesis.'
distinction among words, the meaning of words, and the reality meant by words is blurred, confusion is legion (1972: 92-93; cites Cassirer, 1955, II: 36, 40-41): the real attains the stability of reality only by being imagined or by being named (1958: 538); differences in image and in name can result in an acknowledgment of different realities (1958: 542; 1972: 89); the power to name things implies the power to control things, a misconception of causality bred through the uncritical admixture of practical insights, linguistic expressions of those insights, and the practical results effected by decisions, which confusion engenders the magical conceit that words produce their own results by a power of their own which myth explains (1958: 538). The criterion of objectivity becomes simply "a sufficiently integrated and a sufficiently intense flow of sensitive representations, feelings, words, and actions" (538). Experiencing, understanding, and judging, of course, occur—primitives are not inherently stupid—but there is no distinction among these levels of consciousness (541). Not only is adequate self-understanding precluded for the primitive, but the difficulty of accurately discriminating between experiencing and understanding means that he is "fettered by his inability to conceive other men with a mentality different from his own" (1974a: 15). Deformed myth and magic can spread from cultural attitudes to social practices, opening religions, for instance, "to palpable idolatry and superstition, to orgiastic and cruel cults, even to the ritual murder of human sacrifice" (1958: 540).

Usually in the more sophisticated, but still relatively undifferentiated, early societies additional distorted interpretations of causality arise. The alchemist, for example, fails to distinguish between description and explanation, sustaining the belief that the properties of things are sensible qualities which can be detached and reassembled to transform elements (540). So, too, an anthropomorphic view of causality can inspire the astrologer:

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6Similarly, the constitutive function of meaning intrudes into the field of the cognitive function (1972: 89).
Causality cannot be merely an intelligible relation of dependence; it has to be explained and the explanation is reached by an appeal to the sensation of muscular effort and to the image of the transmission of effort through contact. So universal causality is a pervasive fate linking all things at once, keeping the wandering stars to their strange courses and, by the same stroke, settling for astrologers the destiny of men (541-542; see Jonas).

Nevertheless magic and the deformation of myth into explanations are not phenomena confined to the Age of Myth. As we have observed above, undifferentiated consciousness accompanies differentiated consciousness in its various stages throughout history. There is no guarantee either that the cultural superstructure will successfully beckon undifferentiated consciousness away from its aberrations or that the cultural superstructure itself will be potent enough to withstand the fascination and temptation of magic. The gnostic illustrates the latter case. Gnosticism, which was born in the Hellenistic period after the development of philosophical speculation, mistakes heuristic anticipations, questions about the nature of an x, for actual insights into the x (Lonergan, 1958: 541-542).

Indeed the very differentiation of explanation in theoretic culture can create its own form of magic and deformation of myth. Speaking of deformed myth, Lonergan warns that “the elimination of one myth tends to coincide with the genesis of another and the advance of science and philosophy implies merely that the later myths will be complemented and defended by appropriate philosophies and made effective through the discoveries of science and the inventions of technology” (549). Are not modern political ideologies and speculative philosophies of history, we may ask, neo-gnostic deformations of myth with strains of magic, alchemy, and hermeticism?7 Do not modern totalitarian movements float on the tides of deformed myths and magic (Cassirer, 1946: ch. 18)? Do not modern electronic media and mass education spawn their own versions of

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7Voegelin associates the magic he discerns in Hegel’s philosophy with the neo-Platonism of the fifteenth century (Voegelin, 1975: 768-769, 771; Yates; Ellade, 1971).
degenerate mythologies (Ellul)? "Never," Lonergan remarks, "has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater" (Lonergan, 1972: 99).

Lonergan, then, indulges neither in a rationalist assault upon the Age of Myth nor in a romantic glorification of it. His philosophy precludes such simplistic evaluations: refusing to assess the meaning of historical events in terms of the meaning of some immanent historical process, it denies the legitimacy of rendering world-historical judgments about the absolute superiority of any one age over any other. The transcendent mystery of the drama of history must be preserved; the balance of the principles of immanence and transcendence must be upheld. The subject matter of history is not just the person, nor civilizations, nor mankind at large; it is the process of inquiry. And each civilization, each age of the history of consciousness, participates in the drama of inquiry. Historiography must address each historical period, each civilization, to raise its questions, to learn from its encounter with being. Thus historiography cannot reduce an age or a civilization to a mere historical stepping-stone. Egyptian civilization is not a mere precursor to Israel or Hellas; Hellenic philosophy is not a mere herald to Scholasticism, which is not a mere prelude to modern science. While the Age of Myth, as we have seen, is without an effective critique of meaning, it does not have as pronounced a tendency toward a fragmentation of meaning. While, in its relative poverty and stagnation, it lacks the power for good that flows from modern science and technology, it likewise lacks the power for evil that comes from the same spring. And while later ages can view its subjection to magic and superstition as illustrative of the imperative for a critique of meaning, they can also look to its myths, which represent the intention of truth and its object, the known unknown, as fitting subject matter for an anamnetic venture to recover proper openness to the mystery of the human condition (1958: 542).
III. THE AGE OF THEORY

Plato has pictured persons living in the Age of Myth as dwelling in a milieu conducive to the virtues of simplicity, honesty, and trust (Statesman 272A-B; Laws 678-679). What, however, is often overlooked by interpreters of Plato is that he sees the 'golden age' of undifferentiated consciousness as marred by one glaring defect: the absence of philosophy (Statesman 272B-D). Would the denizens of the Golden Age have been any more receptive to Socrates' project of inquiry than were the Athenians of his day? But what is the enduring value of the Socratic enterprise (Lonergan, 1967a: 258)? For Lonergan, the answer is quite simple: the differentiation of philosophy allows for the possibility of criticizing or controlling the spontaneous meaning of the cultural infrastructure, and, hence, of correcting the propensity of the human mind, against which the Age of Myth has no effective defense, to trap itself in its own phantasmagoric creations (1972: 82). Or, to use a slightly different metaphor:

Just as the earth, left to itself, can put forth creepers and shrubs, bushes and trees with such excessive abundance that there results an impenetrable jungle, so too the human mind, led by imagination and affect and uncontrolled by any reflexive technique, luxuriates in a world of myth with its glories to be achieved and its evils banished by the charms of magic (1967a: 258).

One might say that the intention of truth, as manifested in mythic consciousness, by its own immanent necessity eventually turns on itself as an object of reflection and criticizes itself (Barden, 16). Alphabets, grammars, dictionaries, logics, theories of rhetoric, and metaphysics all contribute to the critical apparatus emergent with theoretical self-interpretation (Lonergan, 1972: 92). The maturation of this systematic exigence is part of what has been characterized by Karl Jaspers, Lewis Mumford, and John Cobb as the 'Axial Period' of history, by Bergson as the 'open society,' and by Voegelin as a 'leap in being' (Jaspers, 1-60; Mumford, 57-80; Cobb, 52-59; Bergson;
Voegelin, 1957-74, I: 10; II: Introduction, esp. 19-24). The maturation, in Lonergan's judgment, achieved its most developed form in Greek philosophy, which thereby became the paradigm of the Age of Theory. Lonergan consequently restricts his own ideal-types of the Age of Theory and of the subsequent Age of Interiority to Western history (1972: 85). Whether Lonergan's ideal-type of the Age of Theory may be too restrictive and may do an injustice to the richness and complexity of his philosophy of history is a topic we shall have to broach shortly. First we must locate what Lonergan identifies as the birth of theoretical culture.

Theoretical culture reached its fullest stature in the 'Greek discovery of the mind,' an intellectual trend riding on the increasing capacity of "linguistic explanations and statements to provide the sensible presentations for the insights that effect further development of thought and language" (92). This is to suggest that before the Greeks could set up a metaphysical account of the mind they had to bring about a literary, rhetorical, and argumentative development of language (97, 261). They had to carry further the literary achievements of the Paleo-Oriental civilizations (for instance, the Epic of Gilgamesh). Thus a series of brilliant accomplishments in Greek literature laid the linguistic foundations for the philosophical objectification of the mind: the Homeric similes, which illuminated, objectified, and distinguished the varied springs of action in the epic heroes; the lyric poems, which worked out expressions of personal human feeling; and the great tragedies, which exhibited human decisions, their conflicts and interplay, and their consequences (90; cites Snell: ch. 1, 3, 5, 9; see Van der Leeuw, 91, 129, 170; Onians).

Lonergan traces the actual Greek discovery of the mind through a number of milestones (1972: 90-92). Hesiod

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8Voegelin (1957-74, IV: 2-6) has qualified the validity of Jaspers's notion of an Axial Period by arguing that there are important lines of meaning in history which do not run along lines of time. For instance, neither the epiphany of Christ nor that of Mohammed fits within the time-framework of Jaspers's 'axial period.' Lonergan refers to Jaspers's idea of the 'axial period' (1967a: 258), but he maintains that the modern shift to interiority can also be considered as an 'axial period' (1974b: 226-227).
discerned false myths. Xenophanes and Hecataeus presented a bold critique of myths as such. Herodotus, the physicians, and the physicists displayed an empirical bent. Heraclitus explored the logos. Parmenides differentiated between sensation and understanding (90-92; cites Copleston, I: ch. 6; see Jaeger, 1947: ch. 6; Voegelin, 1957-74, II: ch. 8). The process of discovery reached its culmination and climax in the towering efforts of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In contrast to the compact mode of expression found in the Age of Myth, a specialized technical language had now entered the cultural horizon, the language of theoretically differentiated consciousness (Lonergan, 1972: 258).

But the birth of philosophy was paralleled by the differentiation of religious consciousness in Zoroastrianism, the Hebrew prophets, the mystery cults, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and Islam. The birth of philosophy itself was contingent upon the religious experiences of such mystic philosophers as Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle (Voegelin, 1952: 24, 67ff.; 1956-74, II: ch. 8-9; III; IV: 183-192, 218-238; Lonergan, 1985: 189-192, 219-221). Indeed, reflecting upon the most prominent characteristics of religious consciousness as Lonergan conceives of it, we have to conclude that philosophy is a variety of religious experience. Hence Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers adapted philosophy to the context of their religious experiences, perspectives, and heritages, fueling their concern to renounce aberration and to accept the purification wrought by the critical flames of theory. Although there was only a 'slight tincture' of theory in the Greek councils of the church, theologians in the Western middle ages undertook a concerted, systematic appropriation of Greek theory. This monumental task of Scholasticism started out with the speculation of Anselm to issue forth into the questio, books of the sentences, commentaries, and summae, aiming at a

9On the religious roots of theoros, see Gadamer, 111; Jaeger, II: 235-260; Navone, 103-109; and Koller. On the religious roots of nous (reason), see Voegelin, 1978: 5; Frame.
comprehensive, coherent system or *Begrifflichkeit* (Lonergan, 1971; 1972: 278-279, 308-310; Tracy, 33-39).

Perhaps surprisingly, Lonergan accords little significance to religious differentiation in his ideal-type. And yet the pull of the sacred is at the core of the drama of history. It is a pull, a presence, that Lonergan finds a constant amid the pluralism of religious interpretations, including those of the differentiated, higher religions mentioned in the paragraph above. (We can, of course, ponder whether the quality of differentiation may not have something to do with the quality of experience, albeit within a certain constant historical range.) Must not the ideal-type of the Age of Theory be cognizant of religious differentiation? Even were we to expand the ideal-type, however, to make it more reflective of religious differentiation, Lonergan’s paradigm of Western development might still hold as a norm if by the Age of Theory we mean a fusion of both theoretical differentiation and religious differentiation. The West (Greco-Roman civilization and European, or Western, civilization), we could argue, shows, along with other civilizations, religious differentiation, but it proves to be the fullest, or most sustained, instance of theoretical differentiation. This argument, though, cannot discount the imprint of such philosophical geniuses as Avicenna and Averroes on Islamic civilization. On the other hand, it is perhaps easier to judge Byzantine, Indian, and Chinese civilizations as less theoretically differentiated than that of the West. Byzantine intellectuals, while impressive as carriers of Greek scholarship and Biblical exegesis, were traditionalists who eschewed systematic formulations and tended to look askance at speculative thought. ‘Philosophy’ in Indian civilization, in spite of its obviously penetrating insights in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and other fields, is possibly a misnomer because the spirit of Indian higher culture is the desire for *moksha*, liberation, rather than the Hellenic love of wisdom. Chinese civilization boasts its countless schools of philosophy, but, if we are to accept Voegelin’s careful assessment, its mode of differentiation was subdued and muted; neither the Confucian nor the Taoist sage was able to break away completely from the older, more compact cosmological order as
both sought, in their different ways, attunement with (relatively) undifferentiated cosmic order (Voegelin, 1956-74, I: 62; IV: ch. 6; cites Weber-Schaefer).

Taking the Western case—from the Hellenic origins through the Middle Ages—as exemplary, then, what were the salient features of its theoretical differentiation? Lonergan proposes that the differentiation of theoretical consciousness tended to forge a bifurcation of the world into the unfamiliar realm of theory and the everyday, commonsense realm of things as related to human perception, feelings, concerns, and interests. Plato talked about the world of eternal forms and the transient world of appearance, and Aristotle distinguished and correlated what is first absolutely, the priora quod se, and what is first for us, the priora quoad nos (Lonergan, 1972: 95, 258).

We can try to pursue the direction of Lonergan's analysis here to suggest that the 'elements' of reality in the worldview of archaic man (the sacred, the world, society, and man) were differentiated. The Hebrews came to worship a world-transcendent deity; Solon, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle purged the divine, the 'unseen measure,' of anthropomorphic trappings. The Ionians (Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) studied the world as a reality with its own immanent laws. Solon was perhaps the first to conceive of society along analogous lines as, in the words of Cornelius Loew, "a more or less autonomous realm in which men are directly, genuinely responsible for order or disorder, and in which what happens can be analyzed as a chain of cause and effect" (Loew, 208; Jaeger, 1943-45, I: 142). The lyric poets, Parmenides, Heraclitus, the Pythagorians, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all participated in the discovery of true humanity as centering in the order of the human soul (Snell; Jaeger, 1943-45, I-III; 1947; Voegelin, 1956-74, II-III; Guthrie; Cornford). Now once the elements of reality became differentiated, questions inevitably arose about the nature of each element and about its integrity. Is any given element a true reality or is it mere appearance, an epiphenomenon? Reductionism insinuated its ugly tentacles, the most dangerous extremes being, on the one hand, a radical acosmic otherworldly religion (to reach its
peak in the ancient gnostic movement) and, on the other hand, a crude materialism. The relationship among elements therefore became problematic. Is the sacred, nature, society, or the self the highest and most real element, if any? The question of the relation among the elements forced into the open the issue of suitable criteria for dealing with such problems, leading to the concern of Plato and of Aristotle with epistemology and metaphysics. The Platonic and Aristotelian reconstruction of the old mythic hierarchy of being placed the philosopher (in the classical Greek sense of the person with a well-ordered psyche) as the mediator between the overarching order of being and right order in human society.

The Age of Theory achieved a revolutionary new understanding of basic horizon. The discovery of the human as a noetic and spiritual center implied human responsibility for the creation and maintenance of civilization; the differentiation of both theoretical and religious consciousness stressed individual responsibility and, within that context, emphasized a new, positive ideal of freedom (Lonergan, 1974b: 226; Jaeger, 1943-45, II: 357). Furthermore, as we might expect, there was an appreciation of human historicity. Plato was certainly cognizant of the epochal nature of Greek philosophy, the existence of a decisive historical transformation with a 'before' and an 'after' (Statesman 269-74; Laws bk. 3 and 713C-714B; Voegelin, 1956-74, III: 151-157; IV: 218-227). In a tour de force of existential analysis he brilliantly delineated and described the sources of order and disorder in society—in effect, explicating the sources of what Lonergan calls progress and decline in history (Republic bk. 8 and 571-580; Charmides 156D-157D). It is this treatment of the dynamic forces of order and disorder in history, and not a theory of cycles nor a theory of regress, that constitutes the substance of Plato’s philosophy of history. Plato wrote about cycles of political forms on the analogy of cosmic cycles, but his framework of the account was a myth expressing the mystery of human existence.

A number of factors, however, blunted the edge of a theoretical control of meaning so as to obscure the understanding of basic horizon and preclude satisfactory
awareness of human historicity. In the first place, according to Lonergan, the humanist tradition of Isocrates, repelled by the technical achievements of philosophy, stepped in and obliterated the difference between the world of common sense and the world of theory. This strand of humanism, spreading from Greece to Rome and from antiquity to the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, marveled at the fact of language and traced all aspects of culture to man's power of speech and persuasion. Being educated linguistically and becoming human it considered as interchangeable (Lonergan, 1967a: 226; 1972: 97).

Secondly—and this we must extrapolate from Lonergan—thinkers in the Age of Theory, who labored under a Greek conception of the physical universe that either attributed mind to the cosmos as a whole or at least held the beings of the celestial realm to be more intelligent than humans, tended, conversely, to ascribe to human history the qualities of a natural process (1958: 129). A distinction between nature and history was not sufficiently articulated. This is not to argue that the Greeks, for example, had no awareness of the temporality of human existence, for, in truth, they were painfully aware of the transience of things human (1967a: 260; Collingwood, 21-25). Nor is it to deny categorically that the ancients had a notion of progress; they surely had a greater historical bent and optimistic spirit than is customarily granted them.¹⁰ Nor is it to suggest that there were no insights into the historical nature of man's being. But it is to challenge the depth of their understanding of human historicity and how pervasive in ancient culture were the ideas of human temporality and progress. Having already alluded to the richness of Plato's conception of history, we can hardly maintain, though, that most intellectuals in the Age of Theory were as sensitive as was Plato to human historicity. The philosophy of history in antiquity, we can tentatively conclude, failed to appreciate adequately the radically temporal dimension

¹⁰Eric Havelock (1964) argues that the Sophists propounded a theory of history as progress. On the other hand, Ludwig Edelstein (1967) insists that Plato and Aristotle were the 'progressivists.'
of human existence, while medieval theologies of history tended to regard Providence too much as a kind of natural force.

Thirdly—a point Lonergan stresses forcefully—the very advance of theoretical understanding also bred an excessive fascination with concepts, with logic, with the necessary, the immutable, the certain, with the end products of thought. Overlooked were the dynamism of the mind, the subjectivity and the historicity of human knowing, and, indeed, the subjectivity and the historicity of human living. This ominous philosophical development deserves further comment.

Lonergan perceives two sides of Aristotle in tension with each other. On the one hand, there was his focus on insights as the ground of concepts. This tied in with his empiricism in ethics, which concentrated on the ethical reality of good men, who, guided by the virtue of prudence, navigate the chartless sea of contingency. On the other hand, he treated psychology in a metaphysical framework and formulated a scientific ideal, propounded chiefly in the *Posterior Analytics*, which was modelled after geometry (Lonergan, 1967b: viii-ix, 13-14; 1958: 406-407; 1967a: 259-260; 1972: 95-96, 279-280, 310-311; 1974b: 72-73, 139-140, 201, 235-236). Aristotle conceived of the sciences “as prolongations of philosophy and as further determinations of the basic concepts philosophy provides” (1972: 95; *Metaphysics* 1048a25ff.). Physical statements were determinations added to metaphysical statements, biological statements were determinations added to metaphysical and physical statements, and, finally, psychological statements were determinations added to metaphysical, physical, and biological statements. The upshot of this method was the failure to distinguish sharply between biology and psychology, and a consequent neglect of the properly historical realm (1967b: vi-viii). Thus Aristotle defined a soul as ‘the first act of an organic body,’ whether of a plant, an animal, or a human (1972: 95-96; *De Anima* 412b4ff.). He differentiated souls by their potencies; potencies were known by their acts; acts were specified by their objects; and objects were defined in terms, not of intentionality, but of efficient or final causes (1967b: viii; 1972: 96; *De Anima*
Clearly by the soul Aristotle did not mean the subject, the agent that makes history.

Aristotle's scientific ideal discovered its true paradigm in Greek geometry: it seeks true, certain knowledge of causal necessity (1967a: 259; 1974b: 139-140; Posterior Analytics 71b10-12, 71b25, 72a37ff.). It demands not only conclusions that follow necessarily from premises but also premises that are necessary truths (1974b: 201). It is opposed to the contingent, the merely factual, the existential. It sets up a split world. For genuine science (episteme) understands the necessary, the ultimate, the changeless. Mere opinion (doxa) must grapple with the ever elusive, the contingent, the fluctuating, the variable (1967a: 260; Posterior Analytics 88b30ff; Nicomachean Ethics 1140a24ff.). Aristotle, Lonergan concludes, confused the bifurcation of theory and common sense with the bifurcation of the necessary and the contingent. Theories do not possess the immutability Aristotle ascribed to them, and Aristotle's emphasis on logic prevented him from anticipating a method that could envisage an ongoing succession of systems, each with less than geometrical certitude (1972: 310). His object of theoretical contemplation, "an eternal heaven ... and eternal cyclical recurrence," does not square with the modern scientific worldview of emergent probability (1958: 129-130). The Aristotelian corpus, then, does not provide "either guidance for historical research or an understanding of the historicity of human reality" (1972: 280).

If Aristotle's scientific ideal were to be accepted as the supreme measure of truth—with a corresponding de-emphasis on the process of understanding and of existential ethics—then the dialectic of philosophical positions and counter-positions would obtain. A growing gap would prevail between that scientific ideal and the actual performance of knowers; a pronounced contradiction would appear between the insistence on true and certain knowledge and the historicity of truth. Rather than fostering a critique of meaning, this brand of Aristotelianism would contribute to cultural decline. This is precisely what happened in the late Middle Ages after Aquinas's massive synthesis of Aristotelian thought into the context of
Christian theology. Aquinas himself, Lonergan maintains, was as little influenced by the ideal of necessity as was Aristotle in the totality of his worldview: "his familiarity with the whole of Aristotle protected him from any illusions that might be generated by the *Posterior Analytics*" (1973: 30; 1967b; 1971; 1979: 14-23). Accordingly, Aquinas's "commentaries *quaestiones disputatae, summae*, fall under the description of research followed by a search for understanding" (1972: 280). But in the wake of the ensuing acrimonious and dogmatic Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy Duns Scotus and William of Ockham devoted almost exclusive attention to Aristotle's logical works, thus taking the *Posterior Analytics* at face value (1972: 280, 297; 1973: 30). To be sure, the clarity and rigor of logical demonstration, although it conveyed little understanding, held great advantages in debate (1973: 31). In time the vocabulary of Scotus dominated all schools of Scholasticism, including that of Thomism (31). The net result was the burst of skepticism and the philosophical decadence of late Scholasticism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (1972: 280, 311). We must note that the debate of dogmatism versus skepticism was carried on within the ground rules supplied by the confrontation theory of truth, a debate and its ground rules that have been the legacy of late medieval philosophy to modern intellectual history.

A fourth factor limiting the effectiveness of the Age of Theory in executing a critique of meaning, and one which reinforced its anti-historical immobilism, was the nature of post-theoretical, or post-systematic culture, the culture of what Lonergan names the 'classicist mentality.' While the differentiated consciousness of the great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, enriched a later philosophical humanism, this humanism lost "the cutting edge of genuine theory" (275). Indeed, the educated classes accepted the critique by philosophy of earlier common sense, literature, and religions; they had among their sources of education the works of authentic philosophers; and they might on occasion employ this or that technical term or logical technique. Still, their predominant mode of thought was that of common sense and undifferentiated consciousness. The insights of philosophers
became encased in dogmas in the process of *la haute vulgarisation* (98, 276-277, 304; Klein, 411-412).

Philosophical humanism became intertwined with the humanism of Isocrates and the ideal of *philanthropia*, the respect and devotion to man as man, particularly as suffering man, to generate the "classicist mentality" (1972: 97-98). Classicist culture, according to Lonergan, "stemmed out of Greek *paideia* and Roman *doctrinae studium atque humanitatis*, out of the exuberance of the Renaissance and its pruning in the Counter-Reformation schools of the Jesuits" (1974b: 101, 182). In practice classicism, by its transformation of philosophical insights into dogmas, accepted the Aristotelian ideal of necessity and geometrical certitude. It interpreted culture in a normative sense and considered itself to be the culture, which, if rejected, made one into a barbarian (1974b: 101, 182; 1972: xi). It fell into an anti-historical immobilism, believing that it could encapsulate culture in the universal, the normative, the ideal, and the immutable (1974b: 112). It spoke in terms of "models to be imitated or ideal characters to be emulated, of eternal verities and universally valid laws" (101). It regarded classicist philosophy as the one perennial philosophy, classicist art as the set of immortal classics, and classicist laws and structures as the deposit of the wisdom and prudence of mankind (182). So was created a somewhat arbitrary, if refined, standardization of man (1967a: 262).

The stupendous achievement of the Age of Theory, the differentiation of the mind, was marred by classicist culture. This, we can judge, was the inherent weakness of the Age of Theory, that classicist culture concentrated on, glorified, the end-products of conscious operations: concepts, moral laws, models of behavior. The Age of Theory, we can say, could not adequately integrate theory (or vulgarized theory) and common sense; it could tie together neither concept and image nor logic and the spontaneous, affective, and unconscious sides of human living. Classicist culture transmitted technical statements, protected good manners, and supported good morals. Do we not see here the source that only aggravated the perennial conflict between the cultural infrastructure and the cultural
superstructure, with the incomprehension of the average person in the face of higher culture now heightened by the narrowness, the rigidity, and the repressive nature of the latter (1972: 272)? Perhaps it is this very inflexibility that has contributed so mightily to the saga of continuing cultural strife Friedrich Heer has perceived in Western intellectual history:

There has always been a struggle between 'above' and 'below' in Europe's inner history. The 'upper' culture of Christianity, educated humanism and rationalism has struggled against a 'lower' culture of the masses. This cultural 'underground' included both the deeper levels of the individual personality and the customs, manners and faith of the people (xi). 11

Erich Neumann has spoken of the psychological damage done to the average man who could not live up to the standardized models and ideals and concepts of classicist culture (Neumann, 1969). Can we conclude that in the past two centuries the West has witnessed, in the victory of the neo-gnostic ideologies and revolutionary movements over traditional higher culture and the Old Regime, the rising up, in diabolical form, of a repressed dimension of human existence, a dimension that could not be properly integrated into the cultural horizon of the Age of Theory?

IV. THE AGE OF INTERIORITY

Lonergan's third age in the history of consciousness must not be confused with a gnostic third—and final—realm of history. Although proclaimed by him as a Second Axial Period, it is nonetheless simply a working out of implications of the first breakthrough, promoting further differentiations of consciousness. The Age of Theory, we have submitted, found its most articulate form in the West. The succeeding age, too, has witnessed its impetus from Western sources. But with steady contacts between Western and non-Western civilizations and

11 Lonergan's analysis of scotosis would seem to be applicable here.
with the faint outlines of an incipient global civilization flickering on the horizon we might anticipate that the phenomena to be discussed below will henceforth assume a more global character and that the Western differentiations might be enriched by older, non-Western traditions as they are fertilized by Western influences. If the Age of Theory centered upon the 'discovery of the mind,' the Age of Interiority revolves around the 'discovery of the subject.' The latter discovery entails three basic differentiations of consciousness that go beyond the horizons of ancient Greece and medieval Europe: the branching out of classical theory into both modern science and critical philosophy and the birth of a modern scholarship informed by historicity (Lonergan, 1972: 317).

Modern science has matured in explicit opposition to Aristotelian philosophy, but by the end of the eighteenth century it had successfully asserted its autonomy from philosophy as such. Implicit in modern scientific method is an ideal that is radically opposed to the Aristotelian goal of true, certain knowledge of causal necessity. As Lonergan declares:

But modern science is not true; it is only on the way towards truth. It is not certain; for its positive affirmations it claims no more than probability. It is not knowledge but hypothesis, theory, system, the best available scientific opinion of the day. Its object is not necessity but verified possibility...Finally, while modern science speaks of causes,...its ultimate objective is to reach a complete explanation of all phenomena, and by such explanation is meant the determination of the terms and intelligible relationships that account for the data (1967a: 259-260; 1974b: 103-104; Tracy, 84-91).

Modern science is not essentialist but empirical. It has shifted emphasis from logic to method, from systems to heuristic structures that ground ongoing successions of logical systems (1972: 94, 310). It demands the farflung collaboration of a community of researchers (1974b: 140). The modern scientific ideal was, of course, implicit in scientific practice, and yet it was clearly recognized only after the discovery and acceptance of non-Euclidean geometry brought mathematicians to acknowledge that their postulates or axioms were not necessary
truths and after Quantum Mechanics and Keynesian economics led scientists to cease talking about necessary laws of nature and iron laws of economics (1972: 280, 315).

As modern science aims at an explanation of all data in terms of laws and routines, so modern scholarship sets as its goal “the historical reconstruction of the constructions of mankind” (310, 315). “While elements of modern scholarship may be found here and there down the ages,” writes Lonergan, “its massive development was the work of the German Historical School of the nineteenth century” (315). In conflict with Hegel’s a priori theory of the meaning of history and in contrast to the empiricism of the natural sciences the German School employed the category of Verstehen; the principles of hermeneutics worked out by F. Wolf and F. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) were extended by their pupil, August Boeck (1785-1867), to the whole range of the philological sciences and by Droysen to the entire field of historical investigation (1972: 209-210, 310, 315; 1974b: 183, 194-195; Gadamer, 153-192; Palmer, 81, 97; Gooch, 28-32; Cassirer, 1950: 217-325).

Both the method and the results of modern historiography run counter to the purposes and assumptions of scholarship in the Age of Theory. Classicist scholarship aimed at the lofty heights of humanistic eloquence, but modern scholarship seeks a comprehensive understanding of all the human past (Lonergan, 1972: 315). Classicist scholarship, not pondering the possibility of its own demise, assumed that it was the only culture, but modern scholarship discovers a vast array of cultures in human history (1974b: 183-184). In contrast to the necessary and logically certain definitions of classicism, modern scholarship discerns a historical sequence of different definitions. In contrast to the immutable doctrines of classicism, modern scholarship studies the histories of doctrines, “the moment of their births, the course of their development, their interweaving, their moments of high synthesis, their periods of stagnation, decline, dissolution” (1967a: 265). In brief, the differentiation of scholarly consciousness has assaulted the stubborn old normative idea of a culture and replaced it with a fluid awareness of cultural pluralism (1974b: 184).
The scientific and scholarly differentiations of consciousness together effected a momentous transformation from a cosmocentric to an anthropocentric view of the world, which placed in question the previous understanding of philosophy, of morals, and of religion (1974b: 104-110, 161; 1972: 317). This, in turn, spawned a new direction in philosophy itself, an explicit methodical differentiation of critical consciousness.

The enormousness of this epochal movement, from Lonergan's standpoint—for it is the essential animating principle of his work to thematize the existential, intentional, and structural foundations of philosophy in light of the new critical exigency—impels us to explore briefly the salient currents of the movement. We must have recourse here to Lonergan's direct statements, to clues from his approach, and to supplementary ideas.

The Scientific Revolution, we can postulate, destroyed the Greek idea of the cosmos and, with it, its hylozoism and its hierarchical order. Human beings, for example, no longer found themselves lower than the celestial beings in intelligence. Nor did they observe any more a hierarchy of qualitative distinctions in the cosmos as an analogue for a hierarchy in the social world. As Collingwood has argued, the true significance of Copernicus's astronomical discovery "consists not so much in displacing the world's center from the earth to the sun as in implicitly denying that the world has a center at all" (97). When the universe was conceived in modern scientific, rather than in commonsense, terms, we would suggest, the old symbolic relation to the cosmos was severely challenged. A host of decisive questions would ultimately force themselves on the shaken intellectual horizon. Was not an adjustment of symbolic consciousness required? Do we still live in the cosmos of myth and symbol—as well as in the universe of physics? What is the cognitive status of myth and of science? Are they both valid forms of understanding? Can either myth or science properly reflect on these issues? The Scientific Revolution seared the skin of the Age of Theory. Science replaced theory. Could science replace philosophy? Old truths and distinctions had to be rediscovered
and reappropriated in the new context. Neglected issues came to the fore. In antiquity and the Middle Ages the educated classes could respond to the cosmos in a manner that allowed a certain play for mythic consciousness. Side by side with the great edifice of Scholasticism was the medieval ‘symbolist attitude’ as portrayed by Huizinga: “The world unfolds itself like a vast whole of symbols, like a cathedral of ideas. It is the most richly rhythmical conception of the world, a polyphonic expression of eternal harmony” (202). But this integration of theory and symbol was too uncritical. Plato’s insights into the linkage between the distinct spheres of noetic consciousness and mythic consciousness had all but been lost, only slowly to be recovered through a process that eventually tapped the energies of Schelling, the Symbolists, and twentieth-century anthropologists, historians, and phenomenologists. Nor was Plato’s differentiation of the world of theory from the world of common sense properly understood by most educated persons in the Age of Theory, who would tend to conceive of Plato’s idea of theory from the horizon of a reified and otherworldly neo-Platonism. The Scientific Revolution forced people to take notice of the sharp division between the world of theory and the world of common sense, whether between Galileo’s primary and secondary qualities, or between Eddington’s two tables, one mostly empty space with a chaos of vibrating unimaginable ‘wavicles,’ the other bulky, solid, and colored (Lonergan, 1972: 84, 258, 274; Eddington, xiv). The relation between the world of theory and the world of common sense became a philosophical problem of the first magnitude. And lurking in the background was the issue of the nature and function of myth.

The Enlightenment tried to replace classicist culture with a scientific culture by grounding the validity of social and moral order in the laws of nature. The Enlightenment—or as Lonergan came to call it, following Frederick Lawrence, the ‘First Enlightenment’ (1985: 63; Lawrence, 1981)—ultimately failed in its ambitious task, since it was mistaken in the hope that it could derive values from the facts that modern empirical science (as it was conventionally interpreted) ascertained, thereby committing the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ Although scientism,
naturalism, positivism, and behaviorism still remain powerful intellectual forces in the contemporary world, from Lonergan's perspective, they have no substantive authority. No scientific theory can be a substitute for philosophy.

By creating a cleft between theory and common sense the modern view of the universe, we would urge, opened the path for a clearer distinction to be drawn between nature and history than had been possible in the Age of Theory. The intense focus on the differentiated realm of nature also, by contrast, drew more lucidly the lines of the historical world. Furthermore, the Scientific Revolution, the nascent Industrial Revolution, and the French Revolution all supported the strong conviction of participating in an epoch of history. Modern human beings became aware that persons collectively are responsible for the world in which they lead their lives (Lonergan, 1974b: 93, 115). It was therefore to history that intellectuals turned as they searched for the meaning that had eluded the grasp of the Enlightenment, which clung to the laws of nature. Certain strands of thought in the Enlightenment itself were fundamental to the nineteenth-century effort to establish philosophical, moral, and spiritual truth by an appeal to history, for it is in history that one can study the genesis of ideas and values. Nevertheless, as the fin de siècle crisis of historicism demonstrated, simply recording the historical origins of ideas and values cannot, in itself, validate or invalidate those ideas and values, and, in entertaining such a hope, historicism committed the 'genetic fallacy.' It left in its train the specter of relativism and nihilism. An earlier void, created by a blistering assault on both Christianity and classicist culture, inspired also an interest in historical consciousness as a substitute for the lost verities. Into this vacuum stepped the dazzling neo-gnostic systems of speculation (German Idealism) and the more mundane neo-gnostic revolutionary movements, which saw meaning in the process of history. As we have already contended, however, these philosophies of history and these ideologies have been basically intellectual constructions attached to deformed myths that desperately try to explain away the known unknown of the human condition.
Neither the Enlightenment, which opted for its version of theory, nor historicism, which opted for a kind of common sense, could establish a modern critique of meaning. Neither, that is, could provide an integration of the world of theory and the world of common sense. On top of this the development of modern technology and rational bureaucracy has ushered in a new variation of the old antagonism of theory and common sense: the opposition of technocrats, advocating social engineering, and romanticists, desiring to escape from the prison of modern society. The modern bureaucratic apparatus has initiated a frontal assault on common sense itself; it forsakes equity, stifles the creativity of the person on the spot, and provides ample room for the exercise of the poisonous will to power (Lonergan, 1958: xiv, 231-232, 235, 237, 420, 528-529, 534, 549; 1972: 98-99; 1974b: 115, 186). The person on the spot may rebel against such constraints, but who can truly become familiar enough with the relevant fields of everyday living in modern society? An integration of these two components of social engineering and romanticism was accomplished in the twentieth century by totalitarian practicality, which combined technological domination with the irrationalism of deformed myth and magic (and in the case of totalitarianism of the right with the added spice of nihilism), achieving, according to its own nightmare vision, a unity of 'theory' and 'practice.'

Surely in the face of positivism, naturalism, behaviorism, social engineering, thought-control by the mass media, romanticist escapism, historical relativism, totalitarian myth, and revolutionary magic there can be no illusion that Lonergan's third stage in the history of consciousness is the culmination of world history (1958: 528-529; 1972: 365; 1985: 65). Yet Lonergan does not despair over the possibility of a philosophical culture that could forge a more humane use of science and a wiser control over technology (1958: 234-235; 1985: 63). What is called for is a Second Enlightenment with both a cultural and a social task, a task that must address precisely the issues posed by modern science and by modern historical scholarship. There
can be no easy return to the halcyon days of the philosophies of yesteryear.

Neither science, which has taken the place of classical theory, nor scholarship, nor neo-gnostic revolutionary practice can assume the function of true philosophy. But what then is philosophy in the modern world—an authentic, modern philosophy capable of meeting the historical challenges in this period after the Age of Theory? Lonergan's answer is that a third differentiation of consciousness has indeed emerged to complement and to guide the scientific and the scholarly differentiations, namely, a shift to subjectivity and interiority in modern consciousness, with its growing focus on the cognitional, moral, and spiritual performance of the concrete, historically situated person. Lonergan's own philosophy obviously is a comprehensive endeavor to realize the program of this critical philosophy. We must now recount Lonergan's summary of the historical genesis of the critical philosophical horizon and his observations on its prospects. Five points can be emphasized here.

First, critical philosophy had its stage of literary preparation. Just as advances in Greek literature, as we have seen, were a necessary step in the 'discovery of the mind,' so the capacities of ordinary language had to be expanded to deal with subjectivity. Lonergan suggests that among the writings that paved the way toward a critical philosophical appropriation of interiority were Augustine's 'penetrating reflections on knowledge and consciousness,' Descartes's Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Pascal's Pensees, and Newman's Grammar of Assent (1972: 261).

Secondly, the dialectic of philosophical horizons over a span of centuries revealed the woeful inadequacy of the myriad historical formulations of the confrontation theory of truth; at the same time, the gradual revision of these counterpositions reinforced the exigency to lay the foundations of epistemology in personal knowledge. Lonergan's sketch of this trend commences with Descartes, who 'explicitly envisaged and vigorously explored' the problem of philosophical method (1958: 3, 411, 527-528, 530). It was this bold project of Descartes that
was to inaugurate the development in modern thought climaxing in 'the discovery of the subject.' The dubious status of the confrontation theory of truth, which had ruled philosophy since the later Middle Ages, sparked the epistemological concern of Descartes, and later of Hume and Kant. Meanwhile, the problematic nature of the relation between the world of theory and the world of common sense showed itself in the juxtaposition of Galileo's primary and secondary qualities, in Descartes' mind in a machine, in Spinoza's two known attributes, and in Kant's *a priori* forms and *a posteriori* filling of the sensibility; this modern preoccupation with dualism also exhibited itself in the writings of Hobbes, Malebranche, the Cambridge Platonists, and Berkeley (1958: 386, 413-414; 1972: 96, 263-264). The struggles of modern philosophers over epistemological questions invariably clarified the problems, but they also indicated that no satisfactory resolution of them could come by concentrating on the objective pole of horizons. "Kant's Copernican Revolution marks a dividing line" (1972: 96). Thereafter Fichte and Hegel entered the uncharted regions of the dynamism of the mind. Indeed Hegel in his exploration of realms of meaning and in his challenge of every formulated scientific ideal made his dramatic turn 'from substance to subject' (1958: 341, 530; 1972: 96, 264; 1980: 11, 13; Tracy, 91-96). Later Husserl refined intentionality analysis as a means of understanding subjectivity. This became a crucial philosophical reorientation for the twentieth-century attempt to comprehend interiority since it erected a method explicitly to study the data of consciousness (1972: 96, 264).

Thirdly, phenomenological description and transcendental analysis of the consciousness of the subject have been spurred by the rich background provided by sophisticated developments in mathematics, science, historical scholarship, and depth psychology. The cognitional practice in these specialized and sophisticated disciplines supplies data to complement the abundant evidence of commonsense intelligence. Furthermore, the self-appropriation of one's interiority—what Lonergan means by self-knowledge—does not yield an horizon fragmented by totally incompatible methods of science, scholarship, and
common sense; rather, it uncovers the intelligent subjectivity that constitutes, and hence unifies, the realms of science, scholarship, and common sense; and it similarly shows that authentic subjectivity is the anchor and ground of objectivity in all fields of knowing (83). The objectification of the basic method of human consciousness establishes, on a critical foundation, the relations among the methods of science, scholarship, and common sense (83).

Fourthly, within the past two centuries leading thinkers have broadened the philosophical horizon by locating the epistemological considerations adumbrated above within the larger, sublating framework of existential concerns. Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Blondel, the pragmatists, and the existentialists have stressed will and decision, action and results, moral commitment and religious consciousness (96, 264, 316). The dynamic conscious orientation of the person, then, opens out not only to common sense, science, and scholarship but also to art, myth, and religion. The Age of Interiority, it would seem, has a firmer basis than did the Age of Theory to inspire an harmonious integration of the diverse realms and dimensions of human living.12 It can resolutely refuse to posit an essential conflict between subjectivity and objectivity. It can rediscover the philosophical significance of myth as it comes to recognize that the unrestricted intentionality which underpins cognition and moral life is directed to the mystery of the known unknown born of a desire for the absolute. It can distinguish between authenticity and inauthenticity in human living and discern their fruits in the patterns of progress and decline throughout history. In short, it can replace the classicist notion of one culture valid for all time with the idea of a dialectic of basic horizon and relative horizons.

Fifthly, Lonergan does not pretend to be a prophet. The fusion of epistemological critique with intense awareness of

12We can suggest that the Age of Myth centered on the image, the Age of Theory on the concept, and the Age of Interiority on insight, which is precisely the pivot between image and concept.
historicity, which he espouses and has sought to accomplish, can, he believes, nurture a Second Enlightenment equipped to guide modern civilization to meet the challenge of historical responsibility. But what are its prospects? Undoubtedly some intellectuals will cling to the outmoded ideals of the classicist mentality. Others will reject classicism and dogmatism but in an uncritical and hasty manner, desperately grasping for new straws. But still others will be patient, sturdy pathfinders in the relatively unexplored forest of interiority:

There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait (Lonergan, 1967a: 266-267)

Lonergan would number himself among the members of the 'not numerous center.' They would not be inherently associated with any identifiable class, any particular academy, or any recognizable institution (1958: 241). They would participate in a new dimension of consciousness, these modern theorists on their voyages of inquiry, with all the attendant exhilarations, discoveries, dangers, and sufferings (241). They would constitute the nucleus of a creative minority whose destiny in the drama of history remains yet an unknown (1985: 102-104, 108).

V. ASSESSMENT

Lonergan's achievement with respect to a speculative philosophy of history, we can judge, is considerable, both methodologically and substantively.

Methodologically, Lonergan's presentation argues forcefully for acceptance of the history of consciousness as a distinct field of historical inquiry, more comprehensive in scope
than psychology, cultural history, history of ideas, intellectual history, and history of philosophy. His powerful ideal-types furnish a needed stimulus and guide for research in the history of consciousness and allied fields in the history of thought. The foundation for the whole enterprise is Lonergan's sophisticated appropriation of the structure of conscious and intentional operations. While the foundation is theoretical, the base is decidedly empirical: Lonergan's theory of consciousness is rooted in experience itself, and hence it is verifiable. Indeed Lonergan invites further investigations of the theoretical issues with which he has wrestled. Criticism and correction can come through philosophical self-scrutiny. Moreover, Lonergan urges that his ideal-types be tightened and revised through the rigors of historical studies and the advances of the human sciences. Thus Lonergan's theoretical constructs for the history of consciousness can promise a unique degree of utility not had by more deductivist or intuitionist approaches.

Substantively, although Lonergan refuses to succumb to the lure of universal history, either of the old theological variety, culminating in that of Bossuet, or of the modernist variety of nineteenth-century idealists, materialists, or progressivists, he nevertheless paints the history of consciousness with a sweeping brush. We need only summarize here how his division of the history of consciousness into the Age of Myth, the Age of Theory, and the Age of Interiority renders intelligible radical horizon shifts in the history of human self-interpretation. Lonergan's analysis explains the phenomenon of myth and its deformation in the period of undifferentiated consciousness while clarifying the status of myth in subsequent eras. It traces the differentiation of the intellectual pattern of experience to illuminate the historical significance and critical task of philosophy, the birth of the distinct intellectual class, and the inevitable tension between the spontaneity of the cultural infrastructure and the reflective distance of higher culture. It is nuanced enough to discern the radical cleft between a genuine systematic exigency and various forms of conceptualism, reification, and objectivism. It distinguishes between classicist culture and modern culture, shows the philosophical import of
modern science and of modern scholarship, and indicates the historical meaning of the 'rise of subjectivity.'

Of the further questions, both methodological and substantive, that we might pose, in the spirit of Lonergan's plea for continued investigation, the following five would seem most pressing.

First, Lonergan's modified speculative philosophy of history is incomplete. The task remains to generate a speculative philosophy of history on the grand scale by combining the history of consciousness with a viable theory of progress and decline. Lonergan is fascinated by Toynbee's sweeping study of patterns of civilizations and, we would urge, rightly applauds his overall ambitious enterprise. But Toynbee's ideal types, including those of the creative minority and of challenge and response, must be filled in, adjusted, and made more explanatory. Lonergan similarly admires Sorokin's schema of the sequence of 'idealational' (creative spiritual inspiration), 'idealistic' (mature reasoned synthesis), and 'sensate' (hedonistic) cultures in the life of a society. Franz Borkenau, whose recently published essays display a family resemblance to the monumental historical works of Toynbee and Sorokin, devotes considerably more time and skill to discovering historical connections among civilizations than do the latter (Toynbee, 1972; Sorokin, 1937-41; Borkenau). Borkenau, who frequently mentions Toynbee, though most often with a critical intent, portrays the creative fusion of barbarian traditions with those of adjacent receding civilizations in the forge of dreadful Dark Ages. The net result, argues Borkenau, is usually the creation of a new, socially effective myth of a new civilization, which ultimately revolves around a stance towards death. When the social efficacy of the myth eventually wanes, the civilization fragments. How might we correlate Toynbee's ideal-types of the creative minority and of challenge and response, Sorokin's sequences of ideational, idealistic, and sensate cultures, and Borkenau's observations on barbarians, Dark Ages, and myths with Lonergan's theory of progress and decline and his idea of differentiations of consciousness?
Informed by this problematic, a grand-scale speculative philosophy of history, such as we envision it here, might address the following kinds of open questions. Who are the creative minorities? When do they arrive at the historical scene? Why? Where? Is Sorokin's 'ideational' phase an era when a creative minority, at the crossroads of different cultures, spins the great myths of an incipient civilization? Does this period typically, as Borkenau maintains, commence in a Dark Age, involving confused, but vigorous, barbarians in contact with the residues and wreckage of a fading civilization? Do we see here a creative response to a crisis-situation (dramatically showing human finitude) permeated by dread? Does dread reveal its positive, spiritual side as cultural energy bursts forth to expand horizons and spur progress? In Sorokin's 'idealistic' phase do we witness a careful and sober integration of the growing traditions? If fifth-century Athens and thirteenth-century Europe are most exemplary of an 'idealistic' synthesis of faith and reason, as Sorokin alleges, do we nonetheless find more compact versions in societies during the Age of Myth? Is the 'idealistic' phase, as Sorokin describes it, more applicable to societies in the Age of Theory? Is the earlier 'ideational' phase to be associated with Lonergan's existential level of consciousness (issuing foundational value-judgments), while the 'ideational' phase is to be tied as well to the culturally differentiated levels of judgment and understanding (engaged in the refining of doctrines and in systematic reflection)? If the 'idealistic' outlook is hamstrung by the classicist mentality, does this curtail the flexibility of the engendering myths of the civilization? Is it always the inevitable censorship attached to public myths that invites decline? Why is Sorokin's 'sensate' phase a period of decline? Is there a loss of faith? Is the period of decline always one of hedonism, or can institutions simply become frozen and attitudes become polluted by magic, as in ancient Egypt of the first (and perhaps second) millennium? Does the very success of a civilization foster hubris and cultivate the sickness unto death? Do challenges become overwhelming? Integration impossible? Dread negative? Is the hedonism of 'sensate' culture tied to divertissements and to ressentiment? If the malady of decline is a perpetual threat,
still is the cycle of progress and decline inevitable? Does the Age of Interiority offer any corrective to the cycle of progress and decline? Can critical appropriation of historical tradition contribute to reconstructing a society in decline? Can an aesthetically sensitive critical culture renew the core myths, tell a new story? This list of questions, preliminary as it is, is merely suggestive of the kind of inquiry that must carry forward the legitimate project of a substantive speculative philosophy of history of the sort Lonergan seems to advocate.

Secondly—to initiate a series of questions about the subject matter of the history of consciousness—it is crucial for the history of consciousness to ascertain the exact cognitive and existential status of myth. Surely the positive and enduring contribution of myth to human understanding and human living needs elucidation beyond the tantalizing remarks of Lonergan about mystery, symbols, and the \textit{élan vital}. Such a comprehensive treatment of mythopoesis would include the following topics: its origins in the dynamics of the sensitive psyche (as Robert Doran has emphasized), the heuristic nature of authentic mythic understanding, the narrative quality of human existence, the imprint of scientific cosmology on myth, the complex relation between myth and differentiated consciousness, and the historicity of myth itself (Doran 1978; 1979). In addition, there looms the problematic of the deformation of myth. Lonergan has penetrating observations about the myriad distortions of thinking to which untutored myth is prone (1958: 536-549; 1972: 89). But the existential roots of mythic deformation need also to be uncovered. We are reminded of Auden’s warning about the ‘enchantment’ of the false sacred (Webb, ch. 8). We can heed the relevance of Kierkegaard’s analysis of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious spheres of existence (Kierkegaard, 1941; 1944). We can enter here the magical terrain where anxious flight from reality, bearing an infinite craving, parades under the banner of the sacred and hails the apotheosis of a group or movement or civilization. We enter here the land of dread and concupiscence.

Thirdly, Lonergan’s ideal-type of the Age of Theory, as we have suggested, may be strained. To be sure, an ideal-type, by
definition, is not an exact description of historical reality but only an approximation through the model of an intelligible pattern. The fundamental issue is always its utility. We can, in fact, mount arguments pro and con about the utility of the ideal-type of the Age of Theory, and it will prove fruitful to present them briefly, even if ultimately we shall render a favorable verdict.

There is no doubt, on the one hand, either that around 500 BC what Lonergan calls a cultural superstructure was born, or that Socrates sought universal definitions, or that Greek thinkers began systematic investigation of topics. This ideal-type is not impugned by the fact that the carriers of differentiated consciousness were an elite or that it reached its most concentrated form in Hellas and the Western tradition and not elsewhere in the globe. The breakthrough of a creative minority or of advanced communities has often delineated time-periods, as we see, for example, in the cases of the Enlightenment, the Romantic Era, the Agricultural Age, or the Iron Age. We should note that in the Age of Theory there seems to be a quaternary pattern, which is repeated twice. A creative surge is followed by stale dogmatism, and the dogmatism then evokes a skeptical reaction that, outside of more radical philosophical spokesmen, engenders a humanistic tradition devoid of a solid philosophical orientation. So the insights of Plato and Aristotle were watered down by the Academy and the Peripatetics. The Platonic and Aristotelian schools and the Hellenistic philosophies of conduct increasingly avoided genuinely systematic and open discussions of basic philosophical issues. One response to this dogmatic atmosphere was skepticism, and the sting of skepticism only enhanced the appeal of rhetoric, which looked askance at theory. The school of Isocrates won out over the school of Plato in the battle of these two forms of humanism that, according to Werner Jaeger, ran "like a leitmotiv throughout the history of ancient civilization" (1943-45, III: 46). Lonergan considers the theology of the early church and of the Patres as an educated kind of common sense, often employing theoretical terms only in a metaphorical sense. In Lonergan's judgment, even the brilliance
of Augustine was expressed primarily in a commonsense mode (1967b: xii-xiii; 1972: 261, 277-278; 1974b: 22-23, 212, 245-259; 1976). It was the Scholastic movement that reintroduced an authentic theoretical impulse. But the acrimonious debates among medieval Schoolmen, starting in the generation after Aquinas, ushered in a new era of dogmatism only to invite another wave of skepticism in the nominalist movement. And in the early modern period a classicist culture with its rigid standards and humanistic canons of literature attempted to salvage a frozen residue of the creativity of earlier periods. We can conclude that the ideal-type of the Age of Theory does not lose its efficacy because of these—perhaps inevitable—fluctuations.

On the other hand, we must ask whether prior to the modern period the differentiation of theoretical culture was the sole development worthy of note in the history of consciousness. Had not human self-interpretation reached a major watershed, a decisive transformation, with the spiritual differentiation of the higher religions? And to what degree was the turn to interiority present in the Age of Theory? The Socratic enterprise certainly included decidedly religious and existential overtones, for the effort to control meaning was also the way of life of the lover of wisdom. Lonergan himself admits that Plato's dialogues were "suggestive of the subject" (1967b: viii). Aristotle and Aquinas, he remarks, "used introspection and did it brilliantly" (ix). Aristotle, as we have seen, was aware of the norms ingredient in the process of inquiry, particularly in his ethical writings. Aquinas viewed his works in terms of research and the search for understanding. Nevertheless, Lonergan contends that none of these towering figures objectified cognitional process as structure nor transposed introspection into a reflectively elaborated technique (ix-x). Would this judgment also obtain with respect to Chinese philosophy and Indian philosophy? While Eastern thought did not attain the same measure of theoretical differentiation as did Greek philosophy in the West, it did focus on dimensions of subjectivity in its mysticism, its psychology, and its ethics. Missing, however, from traditional
Eastern thought was the context of critical philosophy, empirical science, and a notion of historicity.

Yet is the objectification of cognitional process as structure the single determinant of the Age of Interiority? Has any reflective technique ever surpassed the dramatic artistry of the Platonic dialogues in objectifying cognition precisely as process and highlighting the guiding role of existential consciousness? This would seem to be a supreme example of what Kierkegaard called "indirect communication," that mode of expression most appropriate to explicate existential subjectivity (Kierkegaard, 1941: 68, 74, 246-247, 319-321). If Lonergan's methodology is the most comprehensive objectification of conscious and intentional operations, and if his sophisticated methodology is the most effectual manner to objectify cognitional structure, is it not true that something like Kierkegaard's indirect communication is the most efficacious way to engage subjectivity? Must not methodology, then, be tied to existential explication? And can the latter project reside exclusively in Lonergan's functional specialty of communications (correlative, as it is, to the level of experiencing)? Or is it, precisely as concerned with existential issues, equally a dialectical and foundational project? Indeed, it would seem that the Kierkegaardian type of existential explication is a font of inspiration and fertile ground of insight for methodological reflection, just as methodological reflection is a necessary source of clarification of the structure of existential consciousness for existential explication. Or, to put it another way, are not the Platonic dialogues and Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works the equivalent, on the existential level, of Lonergan's cognitional exercises in *Insight*? If Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works belong to the Age of Interiority, as Lonergan intimates, then do not the Platonic dialogues belong there as well? This is not to say that Plato's exploration of subjectivity was exhaustive, for he seemed to equate authentic subjectivity with the religious calling of the philosopher. But this is to say that the exploration of subjectivity was a salient theme in his writings.

Fourthly, the foregoing considerations lead us to ponder to what extent the Age of Theory and the Age of Interiority are
integral parts of one great movement of differentiation. The time-span of two thousand years between the Greek Enlightenment and the modern Enlightenment may seem forbidding. But from the perspective of a history of consciousness it is a relatively brief episode in the drama of history. Indeed we could look at the past ten thousand years as one major trend: the Agricultural Revolution and the Urban Revolution, separated from each other by about five thousand years, established the technological a priori for the cultural superstructure; the destruction of Bronze Age civilizations about 1200 BC, with the attendant ‘times of troubles,’ challenged, for some, the validity of the myth that tied order in human society to cosmic-divine order, thereby provoking an intellectual crisis to which the Greek theoroi responded; the Greek achievement ran through the pre-Socratic discovery of the mind, to the cultural crisis of the Greek Enlightenment during the age of the Sophists, and to the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian climax with its somewhat ambiguous concern for theory and interiority; the theoretical life then underwent the fluctuations alluded to above until the Scientific Revolution and the modern Enlightenment brought it to the threshold of the unambiguous discovery of the subject. This scenario does not necessarily assault the utility of Lonergan’s ideal-types, but it does warn us not to apply Lonergan’s constructs dogmatically. They are heuristic tools, devices to foster continuous inquiry into the complicated fabric of historical life. And their utility, in part, is gauged by how well they permit us to pinpoint more accurately the most significant exceptions, departures, and disparities.

Fifthly, does the history of consciousness end with Lonergan? We must take this question seriously. Is Lonergan’s scheme of the Age of Interiority just another of what Voegelin has called the ‘stop history’ programs of the modern age and its deculturation (1956-74, IV: 64-67, 260-266, 329)? Lonergan, of course, did not think so. He saw his effort as a beginning, an invitation to collaboration, revision, criticism. For those of us, however, who agree with Lonergan that his cognitional theory is not radically revisable and who would insist that his methodology is the most comprehensive framework for understanding
subjectivity, we must be careful not to become so entranced with his genius as a polymath and with the awesome edifice of his philosophy that we fail to place his endeavor in its proper historical perspective. We must not do for Lonergan what Theophrastus did for Aristotle (apparently with the latter’s blessing), namely, make his work into the logical culmination of the entire history of philosophy. The age of Interiority is not simply encapsuled in Lonergan. There have been other laborers in the vineyard—Polanyi, Voegelin, and Gadamer come readily to mind—and there will be more.

This caveat is linked to a more general concern to which we must return by way of conclusion. The history of consciousness, as we have been portraying it, is the story of significant differentiations of consciousness amid the human search for meaning. Such contemporary commentators on the speculative philosophy of history as Bruce Mazlish, Frank Manuel, and Hayden White have recoiled against *a priori* systems and gnostic tendencies (Mazlish; Manuel; White). Their caution has dictated, for them, a skeptical stance. Following Lonergan, however, we need not succumb to skepticism as an alternative to *gnosis* for along with meaning—and indeed intrinsically bound up with it—there is mystery. The field of meaning is surrounded by the field of mystery. History is a project revolving around a dialectic of performance and interpretation within the transcendental horizon of the process of inquiry, whose goal can be directly represented only through the obscurity of symbols welling up luminous with heuristic insight from the depths of the psyche and its generic wonder. The inquiry at the core of the drama of history—through all the differentiations of consciousness—opens to the known unknown, and this orientation is expressed through, and guided by, symbols, myths, and narratives, that is, by elemental, or compact, meanings, which nonetheless have a cognitive dimension. And yet the point around which the drama of history revolves is ultimately the still point. Axial developments in history do not form an axis of history definitively revealing the essence of history (Löwith). There are lines of meaning in history that do not run along lines of time (Voegelin, 1956-74, IV: 2-6).
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Meaning, Mystery, and the History of Consciousness

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Meaning, Mystery, and the History of Consciousness

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SOROKIN, Piritim


TOYNBEE, Arnold


TRACY, David


VAN DER LEEUW, Gerardus


VOEGELIN, Eric


WALSH, W. H.


WEBB, Eugene


WEBER-SCHAEFER, Peter


WHITE, Hayden


WILSON, John


YATES, Frances A.

To ask about the relationship between ethics and history is to raise a cluster of questions involving a wide range of disciplines and a variety of distinct concerns. In one quarter the epistemologist or the cognitional theorist would ask about the structure of knowing in ethics and in historiography and about the role of historical knowledge in ethical decision making. In another quarter the evolutionary theorist inquires into the distinctive characteristics of human history as part of wider evolutionary processes and about the significance of the emergence of mind onto the scene of world process. The philosopher, the sociologist, the psychologist, and the anthropologist carry the evolutionary theorist’s concern forward to ask about the relationship between human freedom and the determining constraints of social, historical, psychological, economic laws. In another quarter the questions concern the possibility of conceiving history as the activity of mind when historical processes seem to exhibit the characteristics of wider schemes and structures which were the products of no person’s mind. The ethicist and the political scientist are preoccupied with the relationship between individual moral action and this overarching course of history and society; does good action bring about historical progress or is morality irrelevant to history? And all of these questions force an entirely new set of constraints and exigences upon the ethicist in search of foundations for verification of judgments on alternative courses of action. Were the political, economic, and social events of the contemporary world less threatening in their promises of nuclear holocaust, ecological pollution, resource depletion, economic disparities, and social, cultural breakdown, the cluster
of questions on ethics of history would appear less burning and less perplexing. As it stands we would seem to have little time to solve a huge array of problems that are as baffling at the level of theory as they are at the level of practical, political action.

Those who have studied the work of Bernard Lonergan know that in his own style Lonergan approached all of these sets of questions at once with a method of empirical inquiry which addresses the one point of contact unifying all of these diverse fields of concerns, the subject's acts of inquiry, understanding, and responsible action. However, in my own studies of Lonergan's work it has become apparent that just as significant as Lonergan's method of inquiry is his heuristic structure of anticipations, outlined in the first five chapters of *Insight*, as the generalized world view, emergent probability. While Lonergan's cognitional theory and his activity of self-appropriation have received wide attention in secondary literature, his emergent probability has received considerably less. As I read through the sections on "common sense," on "genetic method in metaphysics," on "ethics," on "special transcendent knowledge" in *Insight*, and on "skills and the human good," on "sublation and the functional specialties," on "history," and on "conversions" in *Method in Theology*, it becomes clear that emergent probability has set the heuristic framework in which Lonergan worked out his insights in three sets of texts. In addition, the economic manuscript "Circulation Analysis" shows considerable evidence, both explicit and implicit, of emergent probability. Consequently I am led to suppose that his generalized heuristic pervades all of his writing. And one need only to venture quite tentatively into the field of literature on any one of these contemporary global dilemmas, armed with the heuristic structure of emergent probability, to catch a glimpse of its power in reformulating questions, in revealing clues and pointing out new lines of data and inquiry towards potentially revolutionary breakthroughs, to understand why emergent probability might have occupied such a central place in Lonergan's thought.

My goal in this study will have to remain modest. I will address myself to two clusters of questions, dealing with the
relationship between ethics and history, which concerned Lonergan explicitly in *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. I will attempt to show how emergent probability set the structure within which Lonergan worked out his answers to questions in these areas. And I will introduce some insights from the work of Gibson Winter to show how emergent probability can carry forward the work done explicitly by Lonergan, towards more comprehensive answers to burning questions, and towards bridging Lonergan's work with that done in other schools of thought.

The first cluster of questions concerns the relationship between practical, responsible action of individual human subjects and the social, psychological, economic, political, and historical determinants which seem to shape and condition individual acts of intelligence and responsibility. Within this cluster stand the concerns, introduced to us originally by Freud and Marx, over the very possibility of freedom and moral responsibility, the concern as to whether social, economic, psychological "laws" are operative so pervasively and so ineluctably that freedom remains an illusion. Linked to these concerns are the questions as to whether history can, in any way, be shaped by individual moral responsibility. In contemporary debates these questions are raised by the philosophers and the ethicists who champion the role of affective-psychological, political-social, or linguistic-narrative determinants in shaping the course both of moral action and historical processes.

The second cluster of questions concerns the relationship between individual originating acts of meaning and the wider sets of social, political, and economic schemes which seem to arise apart from any person's originating act of meaning, and which seem to have a shape and a structure of their own. If it can be determined that responsible freedom exists and operates to some degree, that social determinants are not so pervasive as to rule out all moral responsibility for history, and that the distinctly human characteristic of history can be understood to be the constitutive and mediating role of individual acts of meaning, still the fact remains that history and society show
overwhelming evidence of structures, patterns, trends, and dialectics which were the product of no person's mind, yet function on the level of meaning with individual acts of meaning as their constitutive elements. How can history be conceived, in any way, after Collingwood, Dilthey, and Vico, as distinctively constituted by originating acts of mind, when even mind seems to operate socially and intersubjectively in accordance with structures which no person originated? Again the relationship between personal moral responsibility and the overarching course of history is challenged.

Since the focus of my attention is upon the role of the heuristic, emergent probability in charting the route towards solutions to the problems in these two sets of fields, my discussions will begin with a few remarks on emergent probability. In my view there a few central insights which are essential to understanding why emergent probability can operate so powerfully as an explanatory heuristic in a wide range of fields. Beyond the discussion of these few insights the reader is directed to the work of Lonergan as well as to the work of Philip McShane and Patrick Byrne, and to my own text on emergent probability, for further details.

EMERGENT PROBABILITY

Emergent probability is Lonergan's attempt to formulate an integrated heuristic appropriate for explanation of world processes which display characteristics both of classical laws and of random or coincidentally interacting sets of events and laws. Lonergan's contribution was to understand how classical science has moved beyond chains of causes to the anticipation of systematically linked circles of fulfilling conditions, and how statistical science has moved beyond pure indeterminacy to the anticipation of events resulting from coincidentally interacting sets of classical laws. Lonergan wed these two heuristic structures together by differentiating systematically recurring sets of events and relations from the environmental conditions
necessary for the emergence and survival of such sets (environmental conditions which are fulfilled, not in accordance with classical laws, but in accordance with statistical probabilities). However, the most extraordinary aspect of emergent probability, in my view, is its ability to explain how the presence of randomness can be understood as the condition for the emergence of new being onto the scene of world process—new being which cannot be deduced from the first premisses of a syllogism; which cannot be reduced to molecules, atoms, electrons, or quarks; which includes the "invisible" being of human mind, human spirit; and which can be understood to exist and operate on different "levels" of world process.

At the core of emergent probability is the distinction between the direct insight which grasps a unified intelligibility which (when v-probably correct) is constitutive of reality, and the inverse insight which grasps the absence of such an intelligibility. It is interesting to note that there is an inverse act of intelligence which is correlative with every direct insight. For the direct insight not only grasps the relevant terms in their patterns of interrelations, it also rejects that which is irrelevant to the questions and to the appropriate experimental field. What Lonergan has done is to bring to light this inverse act of intelligence which is part and parcel of every insight, to recognize that this inverse act rejects the irrelevant precisely because the systematic unity under scrutiny is in fact not related systematically to the irrelevant, and to understand that this absence of systematic relation is a constitutive part of the structure of world processes. Consequently the inverse insight can function not simply as the silent partner to the direct insight; rather it can function on its own to understand the presence of randomness, the absence of systematically recurring pattern in successions of clusters of systematic processes. It is the presence of randomness which opens the possibility for a statistical science to contribute towards a real explanation of world processes.

The curious feature of non-systematic processes is not simply that large sets of systematic laws and processes can converge in a temporally, spatially restricted region, interacting
in accordance with continually shifting patterns, exhibiting virtually infinite diversity and subtlety. Rather what is even more remarkable is that when the actual set of coincidentally interacting systematic processes is relatively stable, and when the boundary conditions limiting the aggregate to a temporally and spatially restricted region are themselves relatively stable, then the manifold can condition the occurrence and reoccurrence of classifiable events resulting from non-systematically recurring patterns of interactions among the systematic processes of the manifold. Since the manifold is, in fact, a coincidentally aggregated manifold these events will not occur in accordance with systematic recurrence patterns but in accordance with probabilities (f-probabilities) or stable mean frequencies from which individual instances will diverge non-systematically. But if the number of kinds of events in the manifold diversifies sufficiently, and if the kinds or classes of events are such that some can constitute the fulfilling conditions for the systematic recurrence of others, then spontaneous structurations or schematic links among sets of events can arise and function quite independent from the antecedent governance of systematic law.

The key to Lonergan’s approach to understanding scientific explanation lies in the recognition that science is not so much interested in explaining occurrence as it is in explaining recurrence. It is the stable, reliable, foreseeable recurrence of events of classes that interests the classical scientist. What explains recurrence in classical science is not the universe of conditions or the virtually endless chains of causes which bear remotely on the events, but the proximate fulfilling conditions which, all “environmental” factors remaining equal, are interrelated systematically, in an intelligibly recurrent pattern, to the events’ recurrence. In fact the entire host of conditions required for the events’ recurring constitutes the entire universe of being. However, intelligence is capable of distinguishing different kinds of relations linking conditions with recurrence. On the one hand there is the background of the environmental “scene,” the stage of world process in which the event is permitted to emerge, that stable set of recurrences
that fulfills the proviso "other things being equal." On the other hand there is the foreground of events that stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the recurrence of the event and which need to assemble in a particular pattern of interrelationships in order to condition the recurrence of the event.

While classical science studies this foreground it is statistical science which is preoccupied with the background. Statistical science discovers that events do not only recur as a result of the operation of systematically interrelated events and laws. Rather there are environmental scenarios in which patterns of interrelated conditions are unstable, in which sets of events and processes interact in continually shifting patterns, in which some sort of turbulence is the norm. Within this maelstrom or manifold there can be discerned events of clearly distinguishable classes. But, unlike classical science, statistical science can discern no set of conditions which are interrelated in a stable pattern and which stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the recurrence of these events. The recurrence of the event is as unstable as is the environmental maelstrom. But over long periods of time, and over relatively great distances, the classifiable events, while unstable in their individuality, can recur with relative stability in the aggregate, giving rise to a population of events of different classes, each class recurring with a relatively stable statistical norm. Shifts in these environmental conditions can change these f-probabilities, they can give rise to the occurrence and f-probable recurrence of new classes of events, and they can result in the extinction of other types of events. But while a huge number of classical laws may be operative in the environment, and while a huge number of systematically recurring schemes may constitute the specific characteristics of the maelstrom, these laws and schemes do not interact repeatedly in an intelligibly stable pattern corresponding to individual occurrences of events of classes.

However, it is possible and probable that such intelligibly stable patterns can arise spontaneously and survive in a manifold of environmental conditions. And when they do the classical scientist can anticipate the regular recurrence of events, and a routine correlation of a circle or cluster of fulfilling conditions
with the events' recurrence. In such a case the statistical scientist can examine the shifts in the probabilities associated with the recurrence of the environmental conditions which resulted in the emergence of the scheme linking the events and their fulfilling conditions. And the statistical scientist can also help to anticipate how long "all things will remain equal." But this background will remain distinguishable from the foreground in which the event is "defined implicitly" in a particular pattern of relations with the other events which constitute the fulfilling conditions for its regular recurrence. The "conversion" of the pattern relating events in the manifold from a statistical aggregate to a systematically structured unity marks the presence of emergent intelligibility within the scene of world process. And just as sets of events can structure spontaneously into an integrated unity in a temporally or spatially distributed recurrence-scheme, so too large numbers of sets of such schemes can themselves arrange in integrally unified series achieving some remarkable stability. In both cases the events of the manifold come under the control of the scheme or the seriation which constitutes the "higher-order integrator." In this way the explanation of world processes can include the differentiation of orders or levels of explanation corresponding to the presence of higher-order integrators controlling the recurrence of events in what is otherwise a coincidental manifold of randomly or non-systematically recurring processes.

There remains one more insight which Lonergan hit upon in his attempt to formulate an integrated explanatory heuristic appropriate to the study of dynamically shifting world processes. With the functioning of higher-order integrators in a manifold, the occurrence and recurrence of an event need not await the coincidental convergence of conditions on the lower level. For the functioning of the integrating scheme or series insures the systematic recurrence of the event's conditions as long as the wider environmental conditions for the schematic integrator remain fulfilled. However, such integrators can themselves undergo subtle changes and alterations in the patterns of relations in which they define implicitly their constitutive terms (their events and schemes) or in their member terms
themselves. In some cases these alterations are drastic, in some cases they are fatal, and in some cases they ensure stable survival. However, in some cases the integrator is sufficiently flexible to allow a succession of such changes. And in some cases the normal functioning of the integrator is such that it brings upon itself a succession of alterations in the pattern of relations implicitly defining the terms or in the elemental terms themselves. In some cases it is as if the normal functioning of the integrator has the effect of changing its own “form.” When an integrator undergoes a relatively stable, recurring pattern of changes or transformations over time, this pattern of interrelated “stages” implicitly defining the succession of transformations of the integrator is called an “operator.” And in Lonergan’s view the understanding of the relevant operator is the key to genetic method in metaphysics and the key to understanding patterns of growth, development, and decline in botany, zoology, human psychology, cognitional theory, and in history.

ETHICS AND HISTORY: THE INTERSUBJECTIVE STRUCTURE OF PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

It is in terms of this set of insights that Lonergan sets about sketching a route towards understanding the structure of “common sense,” practical intelligence in Insight (chapters 6 and 15) and Method (chapter 2) and the structure of responsible historically transformative freedom in Insight (chapters 7 and 18) and Method (chapter 2). At the center of his account stands his view of the human subject, linked to the entire universe of being through the operation of a bewildering array of recurring schemes and series, cycling “materials” from the “outer” to the “inner” environment of the human organism via a vast network of conditioned correspondences. With the emergence of the complex central nervous system with its subtly flowing ocean or manifold of neural events, this vast set of cycling schemes can effect patterns of changes in this neural environment, changes
which can stand in some isomorphic relationship with the immanently constitutive structure of the events in the "outer" environment which conditioned their occurrence. Given the subject's wide array of digestive, perceptual schemes and series, and given the flexibility with which the neural manifold allows, and indeed forces, the blending and mingling of the neural events, the individual events themselves can arrange together in spontaneous emergent structures giving rise to intentional and cognitional unities. But when this neural manifold is also linked to the complex system of muscles which control and coordinate the spatial and temporal disposition of the sensory organs, then correspondences and integrations in the manifold can arise, not simply out of the passive reception of "data," but more significantly, out of the development and exercise of "skills."

The distinctive characteristic of practical intelligence is this ordering or constituting function which the exercise of skills can effect. In the animal world there is a significant degree to which the organism's actions are ordered in accordance with an immanently generated pattern of motor skills, a pattern which seems to be extremely flexible in its possibilities for variation and adaptation. However, what distinguishes the human's capacities for ordering native skills from those of an animal is the mediating effect of one distinct type of skill, that skill which can control the occurrence and recurrence of a range of types of cognitionally integrative unities, and which consequently can order and reorder patterns in all the other skills in accordance with these cognitional unities. What Lonergan has done in his emergent probability explanation of intelligently mediated skills has been to understand intelligence as performing a mediating or coordinating function within clusters and chains of affective, vegetative, aesthetic, motor, and psychological events. As a mediator, intelligence in its various types of acts, in its various types of experimental patterns, and with its various types of intentional objects depends upon the materials of feeling, of sense, of the depth psyche, of society, economy, and history; and it seeks to order these materials in accordance with their own immanent exigences, on the one hand, and in accordance with the
sedimented products of intelligence's own heritage of successful achievements, on the other. Furthermore, in its practical or responsible experimental pattern intelligence is not concerned, finally, with cognitional integrations as ends in themselves but as steps along the road towards constituting the organism in new, more favorable relationships to its environment. Rather than functioning as the domineering bully, imposing its own demands upon the organism, practical intelligence is more like a thin, small voice, monitoring in a cybernetic-like fashion the "internal" and "external" environments of the organism and coordinating the cacaphony of perceptual, nutritive, psychological, motor skills of the organism towards some ever-refining notion of well-being.

The basic structure of practical, responsible action is rooted in this emergent probability structure of mediating intelligence. While throughout Insight Lonergan held on to the faculty psychology terminology of intellect and will, it is clear that his emergent probability structure has already outgrown this older conceptual and heuristic apparatus. Instead of conceiving intellect and will as two coplanar faculties, both distinct from a third, vegetative faculty, Lonergan conceived the biological schemes as mediating a host of events of classes to the neural manifold, and conceived cognitional or intentional acts as higher-order integrations or structurations in and of this manifold. When cognitional integrations become successful in coordinating motor as well as other cognitional events and skills, cognitional acts of different types can themselves begin to interlock schematically to yield circles of questions, images, memories, intentionally-focused perceptual acts, motor-coordinated acts of data gathering, and graphically or linguistically controlled representational images. The effect of this temporally distributed, flexibly operative scheme of acts is to shift the f-probabilities associated with more and more complex, cognitionally integrative unities or insights in and of the neural manifold. In addition, the control over motor and imaginative skills in focusing the subject's attention on specific questions or appetites, and on specific bodies of experimental "data," has the effect of shifting the f-probabilities of insights
corresponding to the intentional thrust of questions and satisfying the immanent exigences of the experimental data of the manifold. Finally, when such insights are practical courses of action—answers to the question "What shall we do?"—then the implementation of the practical insights to effect or constitute a pattern in a subject's or a group of subjects' relations to each other and to their environment begins to function less randomly and more f-probably in service of their adaptation to the exigences of their place and time in world process.

It is at this point that Lonergan's extraordinary distinction between integrators and operators comes into play, for each and every cognitional integration of the neural manifold is in fact a more or less dramatic structuration or restructuration of the entire human subject in his or her entire affectivity. Although it would seem that intellectual and practical insights have only the minor effect of making present to the subject their intelligible contents, the major and much more profound and pervasive effect of insights and intelligently mediated courses of action seems to be the subtle, ensuing restructuring of the affectivity of the subject him- or herself and the ripple effect upon the subject's "external" environment which follows upon the newly constituted act's collision with other events of the "inner" and "outer" environments. The action is not only a change by the subject. It is also a change in and of the subject. It is also a change in and of the subject's "outer" environment—that source of materials for the schemes which cycle between the "inner" and "outer" subjective environments. Consequently the remediation of the "outer" to the "inner" gives rise to a second change in and of the subject, a change whose form has been shaped not simply by the structure of the subject's acts, but also by the endless modifications and transformations resulting from the acts' encounters with the universe.

The orientation of the exercise of practical intelligence heads, in the short run, towards a consolidation, an integration, a stable correspondence between two principles: the currently operative, intelligently mediated anticipations and appetites of the subject, and the interrelated exigences of the materials of the "inner" and "outer" environments. However, the long-range
impact of the reflexively self-transforming structure of practical intelligence is to create a new opposition, a new instability, a new set of tensions. Consequently the unfolding of the exercise of practical intelligence is dialectical. With the achievement of some measure of intelligently integrative correspondence there follow more or less subtle changes in the subject's intelligently mediated appetites, inclinations, and feelings, as well as a more or less subtle set of changes in the events of the "outer" environment. These changes continually shape anew the tools and concerns with which the subject greets his or her daily life and the events of his or her life themselves which are still rebounding from yesterday's initiatives. This dialectically operative succession of oscillations between consolidation and instability sets the subject him- or herself in a sustained pattern of transformations. And this pattern manifests a discernible dynamic structure, the operator of growth or development towards wider flexibility or adaptability, towards an ever-fuller becoming. As long as this operator continues to function in the lives of individual subjects there will arise a corresponding aggregated set of transformations in the social, communal environments of groups of subjects. For the effects of individual initiatives will interact randomly to force ever new instabilities as well as novel convergences upon the routines of communally ratified practice.

Clearly, then, Lonergan's emergent probability view of the subjective performance of mediating acts of practical intelligence understands the subject to be an ineluctibly social, irreducibly historical subject, linked to other subjects and to the universe of being through this vast array of recurrence schemes, acting upon his or her environment vita systematically constituted and non-systematically interacting acts of practical intelligence. However, there is a distinctively human dimension to sociality and historicity towards which Lonergan points in Insight and Method but whose dynamic structure can be understood more fully by introducing some insights adapted from George Herbert Mead by Gibson Winter in Elements for a Social Ethics. Naturally Winter has not cast his reconstruction of Mead in the terms and relations of emergent probability.
However, I think I can show how the introduction of emergent probability into Winter's account of Mead's threefold structure of sociality constitutes an enriching rather than an impoverishing abstraction.

The question which we are seeking to answer here concerns the way in which the subject's exercise of the acts and skills of practical intelligence can be understood to operate in relation to those of another subject such that the subjects deal with each other as subjects, such that individuals pick up and appropriate the sedimented products of society and culture, and such that bonds emerge and function to link subjects together on a multiplicity of levels, in common patterns of action, inertial over time. Winter knew that any explanation of this socialization of the subject would have to embrace some locus for personal, creative initiative. George Herbert Mead's original insight was to explain the socialization process wherein one subject responds to the gesture of another by role-taking—placing him- or herself in the "shoes" of the other, so to speak. Mead observed that in the act of role-taking, when we see how others respond to our own gestures, we seem to appropriate, almost wholesale, the other's sense of our identity, and generally we take on this image of ourselves as our own sense of identity. Mead concludes that this socialization of our own sense of identity was the most basic, most common route towards the constitution of all sense of personal identity. But while Winter recognized the truth of Mead's discovery he also sought to find, within Mead's explanatory structure, some place for the person's own creative self-constitution in identity formation.

What Winter did was to expand Mead's structure into a wider triad of acts, an interlocked, flexibly operating set of gestures and responses which fits Lonergan's definition of a recurrence-scheme. The initial gesturing is followed by a response in which the second party interprets both the meaning of the gesture and the personality or the identity of the gesturer. This response is coupled to a role-taking action in which the gesturer "sees" him- or herself "through the eyes" of the respondent and takes on, as his or her own, both the
interpreted meaning of the gesture and, more importantly, the respondent's sense of the gesturer's own identity. However, while Mead tends to place most of his emphasis upon this socializing effect of the role-taking, Winter added a third moment in which the gesturer is able to appeal both to his or her original creative intent in the gesture, and also to a more basic "we-relation" of shared experience, either to reject the respondent's interpretations, to modify them, to add to them, or even to accept them, in a subsequent conversation of gestures and responses. This third moment, the drive to unification, seeks a resolution in any apparent discrepancy between what the gesturer intended and what the responder interpreted. And while the most obvious issue at hand is usually the content of an act of meaning, the more basic and significant upshot of the (more or less successful) drive to unification is the mutual and communal constitution and transformation of both parties' sense of self.

Within Lonergan's emergent probability structure of practical intelligence, outlined above, this socializing recurrence-scheme neither short-circuits the subject's dialectically operative exercise of the skills of the practical intelligence, nor places the socialization process within the full, deliberate control of the subject's initiative. Rather, the curious capability of the subject to appropriate, virtually wholesale, unified sets of meanings and skills, as they are presented in the gesturing and responding of another subject, functions as an extremely powerful condition to shift the f-probabilities associated with the emergence of particular sets of socially available intentional integrations in the neural manifold. In point of fact the occurrence of any intentional integration is always an f-probable emergence, whose probabilities can be increased dramatically with the schematic linking of cognitional skills, but whose original occurrence is never systematized completely. Even when the intellectual and practical skills are mastered so thoroughly in a specific area that insights occur as a matter of course, the systematization operates on a higher level as a set of schematic links among the temporally distributed acts in the skill, and not on the lower level linking the converging events of
the manifold to their cycling, perceptual, appetitive recurrence-schemes. Consequently just as the mastery of skills of inquiry functions to increase the f-probabilities associated with more or less abstract explanatory insights, so too the socializing effect of the role-taking moment in Winter's threefold scheme functions to increase the f-probable recurrence of commonly held and practiced commonsense insights and skills. It is as if the entrance of another person into my experimental horizon operates as a distant integrating principle, operative within the dialectical structure of my own practical intelligence, to shift the probable frequency of my becoming in accordance with the patterns of meaning which mediate the life of the other.

I would suggest that the role-taking moment in the threefold intersubjective scheme outlined above has the effect of transforming the dialectical structure of practical intelligence into a double dialectic. While the presence of another person within my experimental horizon does not change the dialectical linkage and tension operative between the subject's intelligent anticipations and his or her experimental manifold, it does function as a distant and massively operating principle of integration, shifting the recurring integrative patterns towards those of the currently operative trends of social and cultural praxis. Since the spontaneous orientation of the role-taking moment is towards unification with another subject, the effort of intelligence to effect its integrative patterns will frequently be aided and abetted by this socializing function. For intelligence does not need to stumble upon a solution which is made available through the example of another. However, since this drive to unification has a power of its own, socialization will also present another relatively undifferentiated appetite which intelligence will have to harness and coordinate. And so the dialectic will be double, embracing what amounts to three principles, heading towards the two goals of intelligent integration and the unification of two or more subjects in mutual care.

What is significant about the socializing or role-taking moment in the scheme is that the gesturer not only appropriates the interpreted meaning of the gesture but also the other's interpretation of who I am, what I stand for, and what I
am worth. When this interpretation is favorable to the gesturer there results a bonding of the two subjects in some measure of mutual affirmation as subjects. When it is unfavorable in the gesturer's eyes, however, the drive to unification amounts to a drive towards some sort of reconciliation. The point here is that what is at stake in the role-taking moment is the mutual affirmation of the two parties in affirmation, care, and love as subjects. This is so because the content of an act of meaning is essentially self-constituting and so the affirmation of the content of an act of meaning of another amounts to the other's participation in this subjective self-constitution. Consequently when another is seen to misinterpret, to reinterpret, or to repudiate the intended meaning of the gesture, this response amounts to a rupture in this participatory action and a challenge to the intrinsic worth of the gesturer's self-constituting activity. What is severed is the bond of mutuality linking the two subjects in mutual self-constitution and so what is sought in the drive to unification is not only the truth of the meaning of the gesture (the intelligible content of the act of meaning) but also the restoration or the forging of this bond of mutuality. When despair over the possibilities of such an intelligently mediated unification arises, the one subject must either repudiate the other as a legitimate subjective agent, capitulate to the other's interpretation and let go of some trust in one's own capacities as an intelligent, responsible agent, or attempt to repudiate the drive towards mutuality itself. However, when some success in reconciliation is seen to be possible then the drive towards mutuality is taken up actively as a goal in life. The bonds linking subjects both on the level of shared meaning and in the more fundamental and powerful mutuality of shared approval become the links that schematize the recurrence of socialized patterns of action in groups. Consequently the twofold dialectic of socially, historically operative practical intelligence can be seen to head towards two goals or intentional terms: the emergence, verification, and actuation of the program of action towards the good, and the unification of the two subjects in mutual action and care. When this goal of mutuality functions so powerfully as
to override the norms and exigences of practical intelligence, there arises what Lonergan calls the "group bias."

One significant consequence of the operation of this doubly dialectical threefold scheme is the phenomenon of cooperation. Responses do not only restate the interpreted meaning of gestures; they also take them forward and complement them with subsequent gestures which, together with the first gesture, constitute practical solutions to problems of living which none could have achieved on their own. When the acts are those of practical, intelligently mediated skills, and when the explicit intentional focus of the subjects is concentrated less on the pole of shared mutuality and more on the practical problem at hand, then the fumbling randomness of trial-and-error assimilation (Piaget) can stumble upon coordinated collaboration and eventually systematize a pattern of actions (adjustment) in which together the pair or group solves a previously insoluble problem. This systematization can occur as a result of the involved parties' grasping the immanent structure of the collaborative scheme. But the systematization can also occur as a result of each party's making a stably recurring contribution to a wider emergent social scheme or series in which all participate but which none has understood in toto. For, as is the case on all levels of the evolutionary world process, sufficient randomness, boundary conditions, and appropriate fulfilling conditions can condition the emergence of schemes without any antecedent governance of systematic law.

Lonergan's notion of "the good of order," I would suggest, embraces and anticipates these consequences of the scheme of sociality. Fundamentally the good of order is the basic worth of collaboration towards hitherto unknown goods. And since the exercise of socially collaborative practical intelligence is both conditioned by the drive towards mutuality and also constitutive of this mutuality, the bonds unifying subjects in a social group are continually forged and reforged through the group's participation in the collaborative schemes. When the social schemes function as a matter of course, the good of order remains operative but hidden. But when social schemes start to break down as a result of the dialectical dynamics of
consolidation and instability, then the good of order must be pursued actively as an unknown good. Finally, when group bias is seen to prevail, the good of order must be sought as a set of meanings and schemes which transcend and unify diverse social groups to constitute new, larger, global communities.

THE RESPONSIBLE SUBJECT AND HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS

To return, then, to the first set of questions which animated this excursus: Lonergan's emergent probability structure of socially, historically operative practical intelligence must be examined in light of the host of objections leveled by those who champion the role of historical determinants in conditioning the exercise of responsible freedom. The massive truth which has been discovered in the last two centuries is that the individual's exercise of practical intelligence is shaped by the social, historical materials of experience which he or she shares as a citizen of a social group; by the socially learned meanings and skills which become the tools and anticipations of intelligence's habitual operation; by the patterns of feeling and appetite which go hand in hand with a socialized lifestyle; by the subtly and almost imperceptibly appropriated theories which were the discoveries of yesteryear and which function as the overarching vectors of today's intelligent activity; and by the almost insurmountable pressures towards stable, inertial, and invariant perpetuation of the inherited culture exercised by this socialization process. These conditioning forces operate on as many "levels" as can be discerned in the spectrum of human life-activities. And while the older trend was to argue that such determinants made of freedom an illusion, the current trend is to suggest that while some measure of freedom remains, nonetheless the conditioning function of such determinants must be the point of departure for any adequate explanation of history, society, and human responsibility. Indeed freedom is often defined as the subject's opening him- or herself to this
historically conditioning activity and being "grasped by the truth of being." In light of these claims it might seem that Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence, of skills, of group bias, of general bias, of theological method—indeed his whole enterprise, which centers almost exclusively upon the subject’s exercise of intelligence, rationality, and responsibility—has its point of focus in the wrong place.

In my view it is the emergent probability structure of Lonergan’s account of intelligence and responsibility which can be seen to a point a route through these objections. While historical determinants shape the exercise of practical intelligence these determinants do not function on the lower level as systematic links between the socialized meanings and skills and the cycling schemes which mediate materials from the “outer” to the “inner” environment. The fact is that the constitutive elements of society, history, culture, economy, and polity remain acts of meaning, cognitionally emergent integrations in and of the neural manifold of subjects. Acts of meaning and their correlative terms or objects do not exist apart from this higher-order integrating function of intelligence. And while society and texts certainly exercise a patterning effect on the imagination and affectivity of subjects, this effect operates by shaping the trends and flows in patterns of integrative acts or events. The socialization of the subject through the role-taking scheme does not supplant the probably emergent structure of practical intelligence. Rather the very possibility of any role-taking depends upon the possibility and the high probability of the subject effecting or experiencing such higher-order structurations in and of the manifold of experimental events mediated to the neural environment.

Lonergan’s distinction between essential and effective freedom was his attempt to reconcile this essentially self-constituting structure of practical intelligence with the overwhelming fact that this self-constituting activity usually operates within narrow ranges shaped by environmental, historical conditions and with tools forged by a common culture. Freedom does not mean “freedom from constraint.” Rather, freedom essentially consists in the fact that a course of actions of
a human subject can be constituted or ordered in accordance with a cognitionally emergent pattern. And this constituting or ordering remains self-constituting even when the action is a child's patterned response to a parent's example. For, unlike a photocopying machine or a tape recorder, the constitutive elements of the child's learned "gestalt" are not linked systematically, in a chain of one-to-one correspondences, to the perceptual schemes linking the parent to the child. Rather the role-taking has the effect of shifting the probability associated with a cognitionally mediated integration of the child (isomorphic with that exhibited by the parent) to a probability of emergence.

However, while Lonergan's account of practical intelligence is correct in centering upon the structure of cognitionally mediated, subjective acts, it also opens the way towards embracing the massive truth claimed by the critics for whom the evidence of socialization is overwhelming. The fact is that the immanent exigences of the subject's neural manifold are shaped in large measure by the patterns of meaning implicit in the gesturing and responding of the members of one's family, one's class, one's profession, one's circle of friends. And because the probabilities associated with the recurrence of socialized meanings is so high, the project of culture need not begin anew with every generation. For the achievements hard won by the previous generation are appropriated, often effortlessly, by the next. As the socially available meanings are "put on" again and again in the habitual routines of the subject, the reflexively operative, self-constituting feedback efforts of practical intelligence begin to show their consequences. And so, in addition to the more obvious patterns of common meanings and gestures shared by the members of a social group, there begin to function the much more subtle and powerful common patterns of feeling, affectivity, and anticipations, which arise as the meanings of a common culture begin to "work" upon its subjects, ordering their spontaneity according to their operative (but hardly ever known) exigences.

As with individual meanings and gestures, so too the schemes and series of acts of meaning constitutive of skills can
be learned through the shifts in probabilities associated with role-taking. However, with the learning of that curious scheme of acts linking inquiry, attention to data, searching for clues, trying hypotheses or practical possibilities, grasping (or being grasped by) insights, and seeking verification, there arise what amount to the possibilities and probabilities of both a systematized transformation in the meaning constitutive of a society, and a new recurrent structure in the patterns of transformations in societies. For with the cultivation of responsible skills the third stage in Winter's scheme of sociality begins to dominate. Because the social exercise of practical intelligence is doubly dialectical, the socialization resulting from the role-taking moment is never the whole story. Apart from the other's response to my gesture there also remain the immanent exigences of the experimental manifold at hand (what Winter calls the "we-relation") as well as the heritage of intelligent anticipations, hypotheses, and skills accumulated through one's life experience. And so the business of effecting practical solutions to the problems of living (or the business of celebrating the living itself) is never locked completely in the past. Because the ocean of neural events is a coincidental or random manifold there can occur structurations or "conversions" which break out of the limitations of traditional tools. And with the mastery of the cognitional, responsible skills the f-probabilities associated with such personal and social breakthroughs will result in some measure of social transformation precisely because the new generation will learn what is taught and not simply what is lived by the old. And the mastery of self-transformative skills will systematize a pattern in a succession of such transformations, giving rise to a higher-order operator in history.

The import of this emergent probability account is that subjective acts of meaning can be conceived as initiating or originating transformations in the subject's relationship to his or her environment, and that these originated acts can be understood at the same time to operate, socially and historically, to constitute patterns and trends in communal praxis and to generate non-systematic repercussions through the social,
historical "fabric." The measure of a subject's effective freedom can expand with the cultivation and mastery of skills in wider and wider environmental contexts. And this exercise of effective freedom will result in transforming history and society, (a) systematically, through the accomplishment of intended effects; (b) non-systematically, through the random interactions of the initiative with the events and initiatives of the social, political environment; and (c) systematically (but unforeseen), in accordance with wider operative communal, economic, social, historical structures which the subject has not understood at all.

HISTORY AS MEANING AND HISTORICAL STRUCTURES

While this account of history in terms of acts of meaning would seem to be reconcilable with an account of the determining constraints of social and historical conditions, there remains another objection to conceiving history in terms of acts of meaning. For, while history bears evidence of the ordering effects of meaning, it also bears evidence of wider structures, cycles, dialectics, and recurrence-schemes which have functioned through the ages apart from anyone's understanding their operative patterns. If meaning is transformed in accordance with such higher-order structures, can individual responsible action be the focal point for an explanation of historical humanization?

It should be clear by now how the introduction of Winter's threefold intersubjective scheme into Lonergan's emergent probability framework accounts for the emergence and survival of wider historical and social structures. Given the intersubjective role-taking scheme, links can form between and among acts of meaning as easily as they can on any level of world process. The fulfilling conditions for the systematization of the recurrent patterns are some bond or goal of mutuality linking the two subjects in a common project and the immanent complementarities of the gestures with respect to the intentionality of the project at hand. Whether or not the overall
structure of the scheme is understood, the successes and rewards following upon each turn of the scheme are sufficient to keep the scheme recurring. And when the intrinsic beauty of the scheme is apprehended and celebrated in the aesthetic pattern of experience and when the respective contributions to the scheme become the foundations for a liturgy of political "representation" (Voegelin), apprehended and celebrated in the religious pattern, then the sustained operation and survival of the scheme is virtually ensured.

However, it should also be clear by now that a truly "humanizing" social transformation is no longer the straightforward business of the cultivation of one's own individual virtues. For the humanization of history now requires not only a detailed, precise understanding of the dynamically operative structures of historical schemes, series, and dialectics; it also requires detailed understanding and effective action with respect to the recurrent successes and failures associated with other people's contributions to the schemes. For social and historical schemes depend upon all parties' participation. I would suggest that this discovery that individuals can participate unwittingly in sustaining and promoting macro-level historical schemes and series, whose constitutive events are acts of meaning and whose overall functioning can undo the work of culture as easily as it can promote the human good, was a key moment in Lonergan's appreciation of the role of theology in the business of the human sciences. For on the face of it this discovery would seem to be the occasion for despair, or for a misplaced utopian hope in some notion of automatic progress operative in and through these macro-structures (either as "invisible hand" or as the end of history in a revolutionary dialectics).

The details of Lonergan's account of the role of "special transcendent knowledge" in undoing the effects of this "general bias" (the simple fact that the business of living in history always precedes our knowing how to act responsibly) lies beyond the scope of this study. However, it should be clear by now that his notion of "conversion," worked out explicitly in Method, does not stand opposed to the general structure of practical
intelligence worked out in *Insight*. In essence the occurrence of any insight is a form of conversion in which an integrated pattern grasps a subject and "implicitly defines" the relevant elements of the experimental manifold with respect to the question. In fact, the more elemental intentional integrations which unify sets of perceptual events in unified experimental objects or terms have the same structure of an emergent conversion of a subject. What is distinctive about the empirical skills linking questions, hypotheses, experiments, and insights is the fact that the probabilities of recurrence of conversion-events can be raised significantly in fields of human experience where some mastery has been achieved. However, the major conversions relevant to the transformations of human history are major precisely because the relevant fields of human experience are those in which mastery is improbable. Consequently the difference between the conversions operative in most intelligent acts and the basic conversions foundational to theological method consists in the difference in the ways in which the probabilities associated with the recurrence of the two types are raised. I would suggest that, just as Lonergan saw the wider schemes and series of history as the obstacles to the sustained process of historical humanization, so too he saw the possibility of higher-order integrators and operators functioning as the fulfilling conditions for the shifts in probabilities associated with the recurrence of the basic conversions.

Clearly this discussion only begins to touch upon the basic questions concerning the role of religion and theology in historically transformative *praxis*. However, my goal has been only to introduce the heuristic structure of emergent probability into this field of questions. And I have tried to show how Lonergan's macro-level vision can operate to shape and reshape the patterns of anticipations towards new insights in this field. The most perplexing set of questions arises in extending emergent probability into the discussion of God's love transforming the hearts of human subjects. In *Insight* Lonergan tends to emphasize the continuity of the order of relative and absolute transcendence with the emergent probability structure of proportionate being. Since emergent probability is itself an
explanatory heuristic which embraces both the structures of continuity and discontinuity between "levels" of world process, the analogy of proportionate being would seem to be both an analogy in continuity and an analogy in discontinuity. Lonergan's shift in *Method* involved a recognition of the difference between a theology operative "from below," through the exercise of the empirical, cognitional skills, and a theology transformed "from above" through the conversions mediated to the subject through religious *praxis*, transforming the operative directions of the intelligent skills. However, I have indicated that the principal difference between these two "directions" lies not in the presence or absence of conversion but in the relevant types of conversions and in the conditions associated with their probably recurrent emergence. It would be fascinating to study the precise differences between the structure and functioning of the higher-order historical integrators anticipated by the liberal and Marxist utopian visions, and the relatively and absolutely transcendent integrators and operators which Lonergan touches upon in the last two chapters of *Insight*. I would suggest that emergent probability might provide some of the tools for understanding the essential differences between these alternatives. But this must be left to another study.
Lonergan's chapter on Interpretation in *Method in Theology* concludes with some modest suggestions for exegetes. He indicates a possible project for exegetes to put their hand to: to help people find elements of meaning in their own lives and relate these to ancient modes of meaning. If exegetes took the suggestion, their achievements would be better known and appreciated and theology as a whole would benefit enormously. "Might I suggest," he adds, "that the section on Stages of Meaning in Chapter Three offers a beginning?"

The dean of American exegetes, John L. McKenzie, in a review of *Method*, replied, with his own renowned modesty, somewhat as follows: "Might I suggest that before passing out so much advice to practitioners of another discipline, one spend a little more time finding out what they actually are doing? My whole life has been spent in helping people find elements in their own experience which they could relate to ancient modes

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1What is needed is not mere description but explanation. If people were shown how to find in their own experience elements of meaning, how these elements can be assembled into ancient modes of meaning, why in antiquity the elements were assembled in that manner, then they would find themselves in possession of a very precise tool, they would know it in all its suppositions and implications, they could form for themselves an exact notion, and they could check just how well it accounted for the foreign, strange, archaic things presented by the exegetes.

"Is this a possible project? Might I suggest that the section on stages of meaning in Chapter Three offers a beginning? If transcendent method coupled with a few books by Cassirer and Snell could make this beginning, why might not transcendent method coupled with the at once extensive and precise knowledge of many exegetes in many fields not yield far more? The benefits would be enormous; not only would the achievements of exegetes be better known and appreciated, but also theology as a whole would be rid of the occult entities generated by an inadequately methodical type of investigation and thought."
of meaning, and I have considerable reason for thinking that those efforts have frequently succeeded."

Has something been overlooked? Did McKenzie not get what Lonergan was proposing? Or did Lonergan not know the kind of work McKenzie and other exegetes had been doing all their lives? Perhaps a little of both. Let us look more closely at the 'possible project' Lonergan is proposing.

**THE CONTEXT**

The context of the proposal is the third of three basic exegetical operations: (1) understanding the text; (2) judging the correctness of one's understanding; (3) stating the meaning of the text. His possible project is a way of doing the third: stating the meaning of a text. But it is not stating the meaning for just anyone. Three audiences are distinguished in which the exegete *qua* exegete must state meaning: to one's fellow exegetes; to one's pupils; and to a third group. The third group is the one for which Lonergan suggests the possible project. That group is the theological community; that is, exegetes in other fields than one's own, and theologians engaged principally in other functional specialties (171).

On the other hand, the audience McKenzie refers to in his own defense is the Christian community at large. Lonergan does not mention that audience here. He reserves communication to the community at large for his eighth functional specialty. What he is proposing here is strictly for the exegete *qua* exegete, a phrase he repeats (167, 169). It has to do with stating the meaning of one's text as part of the work of exegesis, as one of the three basic exegetical operations, as actually a part of the pursuit of the meaning of the text. That is where he makes his proposal.

How can stating the meaning of the text be a *part* of the search for the meaning of the text? It can be and is because exegesis is an ongoing and collaborative project; because every step forward in understanding one or another individual text is
only a tiny step in the vast project of understanding the whole of the Scriptures; and because each contribution to further understanding of one part of the whole modifies the possible range of meanings available for all the other parts.  

THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSAL

So, Lonergan is making a proposal about how exegetes might state the meaning they discover in order to make it useful to others who want to get the message of the Bible. Those others include not only exegetes working in other areas of Scripture, but also all theologians, for whom, in the Catholic tradition as summed up in Vatican II, the scriptures are always the heart of all theology, the source of revelation.

Why is a new proposal needed? Was Lonergan somehow dissatisfied with what the exegetes had been handing theologians to work with? Yes, such dissatisfaction registers in almost every book he wrote, even though he was perfectly clear that much of what left him dissatisfied was unavoidable. It is unavoidable that exegetes should differ from one another, contradict one another, even about major issues. It is

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2Though Lonergan's hermeneutic, as sketched in Insight and other places, has a very wide scope, and even as sketched in Method is applicable to all kinds of interpretation, still, in Method at least, it is obvious that the model and the principal concern he has in mind is the exegesis of the Christian scriptures. This may seem a bit anomalous in the light of his overall intention to provide a method to assist theologians in any religious tradition and in the light of his clear statements elsewhere in Method that the scriptures as the word of God are a doctrine and cannot play the role of what he means by foundation.

It is also worth noting how classical this makes Lonergan's approach to hermeneutics. He insists that the basic assumption of hermeneutical analysis is always that, given sufficient care, it is possible for human beings to understand one another, even in writing. He is aware that not every modern hermeneutical theory accepts the assumption. Moreover, he quite classically takes it for granted that the meaning one is seeking is the mind of the author, even though, as he knew full well, that way of putting it is largely out of favor among modern theorists.

Even more in conflict with important modern theories is Lonergan's fundamental insistence that the content of human expressions is to be sought in acts of the mind rather than in social and linguistic factors. He faces those objections directly in 1972: 254-257.
unavoidable that exegesis, like other sciences, is always ready to be corrected by new evidence; that its conclusions are always tentative. And of course it is unavoidable that, as a positive science, exegesis works with data that cannot be judged by pure reason; one has to take such data as it comes, and the only way to judge securely its value and relevance is to become a master of the data in all its abundance and complexity yourself—which is a lot to ask of a theologian concentrating on some other theological specialty.3

These are not criticisms of individual exegetes; they are just unavoidable awkwardnesses about the field itself. He had other criticisms that did touch individual exegetes, but he avoided writing about them. Still, you can see in many passages of his writings that his students must have often confronted him with what they heard from the Scripture professors about dogmatic abuses of texts, about historical facts and literary authenticity and biblical categories, about the Hebrew mind and the corruptive influence of Hellenism.

THE PROPOSAL

So, concretely, what is his proposal for a way that exegetes can express the meanings they find so that other theologians can use those meanings and can pass some reasonable judgment on them, without simply being trapped between taking them on faith and mastering all the details of language, archaeology, and social and cultural history on which they are based?

What he wants from the exegetes is not description, but explanation. He wants to be furnished a very precise tool, by means of which he and other theologians can form for themselves an exact notion of what is being said and of how well

3 "While every theologian has to have some training in exegesis, he cannot become a specialist in all fields.... Unless oneself is a specialist in the field, one does not know how to qualify their generalities, to correct their simplifications, to avoid mistaken inferences" (1972: 172).
what is said accounts for the text at hand, and also accounts for the bewildering things being said by other less careful exegetes.  

What will that tool be? It will be something on the order of his section on stages of meaning. That section lays down ideal constructs with which to describe the development of the Western tradition. The stages are constructed by various combinations of common sense, theory and interiority—Lonergan's so-called "realms of meaning," described on pages 81 through 85. But these in turn characterize various modes of conscious and intentional operation. These modes of conscious and intentional operation are in turn defined in terms of fundamental data of consciousness: human acts of experiencing, understanding, judging, deliberating, and choosing, along with the dynamic relations among those acts in a dynamism incessantly provided by the eros of the mind, the pure desire to know.

In other words, something fairly complicated in appearance, the structure of stages of development of the Western mind, can be presented ultimately in terms which are precisely defined, each in terms of the other, so as to form a circle of terms and relations, and the definitions all are grounded in data of consciousness available to any sincere inquirer (and sound philosopher). This is Lonergan's 'positive project' for the exegetes. This is what he means when he says,

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4 "What is needed is not mere description but explanation. If people were shown...then they would find themselves in possession of a very precise tool, they would know it in all its suppositions and implications, they could form for themselves an exact notion and they could check just how well it accounted for the foreign, strange, archaic things presented by the exegetes" (1972: 172-173). Note that explanation, as opposed to description, uses explanatory or pure conjugates, not experiential conjugates; that is, it states the relations of things to one another, not their relation to the subject doing the investigating (1957: 79ff).

5 "Might I suggest that the section on stages of meaning in Chapter Three offers a beginning?" (1972: 173; compare 85-99).

6 "The stages in question are ideal constructs. ... In the main we have in mind the Western tradition ..." (1972: 85).

7 "Different exigences give rise to different modes of conscious and intentional operation, and different modes of such operation give rise to different realms of meaning" (1972: 81).
If people were shown how to find in their own experience elements of meaning, how these elements can be assembled into ancient modes of meaning, why in antiquity the elements were assembled in that manner, then they would find themselves in possession of a tool ... 

THE BASIS AND JUSTIFICATION

The 'elements of meaning' to be found in one's own experience are the basic acts of intentional consciousness with their underlying dynamism and the relations of exigence and fulfillment which prevail among these. These acts and their relationships define heuristically everything which can be known and so everything which can be meant, as in the famous motto of Insight, "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand and ... you [will] understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood ..." (1957: 30).

The notion of being is the core of all meaning (1957: 357). Everything that can be meant can be expressed in terms of being. But being is humanly known by a compound of experience, understanding, and judgment; and so being is always found to be a compound of potency, form, and act. By astute combinations of these basic elements, setting them in their living contexts, where they occur within one or the other of the many patterns to be found within 'the polymorphic consciousness of man,' one can envisage all possible kinds of meaning for any human statement or expression.

The basic norm is that any human statement will be the expression of one or more of the following: a human experience, an understanding or insight, a judgment, affirmation or negation, and a choice, a wish, a decision. Understandings will be insights into some experience or integration of experiences. Judgments will be affirmations or negations about one's own understandings, views, insights. Choices, decisions, options will be about reality, the truth, the world as one has judged it to be.

81972: 73; but much more clearly and coherently in Insight, 357 and 304-305.
Moreover, a statement can express any of the above or all of them. Moreover it can express any or all of them as they have occurred in any of the several patterns of experience which are the human condition. Lonergan lists at least seven: the biological or elementary pattern, the aesthetic, the artistic, the intellectual, the dramatic, the practical, the worshipful, the mystical. These are various ways in which every human being can be conscious, and in that consciousness can experience, understand, judge, choose. Therefore these are possible ranges of meaning which can be expressed.

Moreover, the expression represents a conscious act within any of what he calls the four stages of meaning—those of common sense, of theory, of interiority, and of the mystical—and will represent one of what he calls the different realms of meaning and so of the different worlds meant by the world of interiority and philosophy, the world of religion and theology. Even if, within the intellectual pattern of experience, the activity expressed by any sentence or paragraph may be going on within one of four basic heuristic structures and/or a fifth which embraces and integrates them all. It may represent then a mind that can or cannot distinguish the various forms, stages, realms, in which consciousness and meaning may be found; and finally it may represent one who is or is not intellectually, morally or religiously converted.

This same range of possibilities is summed up in another context in Method (1972: 286-287) as follows: the variables possible behind any statement are basically one of four levels of conscious act, each of which may be found in one or more of seven patterns of experience, of four kinds of consciousness, of four stages of meaning, of four realms of meaning, in one of four or five heuristic structures, either differentiated or undifferentiated, and converted or not converted in one of three ways.

Thus Method can list thirty-one different forms of differentiated consciousness (over and above the single undifferentiated consciousness), simply by counting the variant
possibilities of the different realms of meaning in which one can operate (1972: 272). But the total number of combining all the categories I have listed here would run to over 10,000. (Multiplying them out for a crude idea, one gets 13,440, but many of these would overlap in practice.) The point is that each one of these categorizations has a precise definition in relation to the four basic acts or levels of consciousness and the basic patterns of experience of the 'polymorphic consciousness of man.' Every one has a precise meaning, which any individual can check in personal conscious experience. And every one of the categorizations is related to every other.

Imagine then the possibilities. Lonergan's intention is to chart all the different ways that consciousness can come to expression and give rise to meaning. A basic hermeneutical device then in every scientific presentation of an interpretation would be to try to chart the meaning one proposes for the text one is dealing with, indicating where that meaning falls on this great table of possibilities. Such a visual location of the text on the chart would accompany any claim that the text means thus and so, and would in fact properly be a part of that claim. That is, a full statement of meaning will always be in the form: The text means thus and so, as an expression of I.A.2.b.iii, etc., specifying by the symbols which act in which pattern of experience at which state of or in which realm of differentiated or undifferentiated consciousness, to what extent converted.

The absolute heart of this account is the principle that every human expression is going to express some combination of experience, understanding, judgment, and choice or the failure of them; that the meaning of the expression or statement is the experience, understanding, judgment, or choice from which it took its rise, and which it seeks to embody; that interpreters understand meanings by recognizing the statements as expressions of human experiences which they have shared, human understandings which they too have attained, human judgments they too have made, human choices which are also their own or at least judgments and choices which they have considered or could consider, understandings they have or could entertain or like understandings, and so on, which they
themselves have or could have; and that interpreters could express this reality by labeling the meanings they find so as to place each one as carefully as possible on this great grid of possibilities.

OTHER USES OF THE SCHEME

1. In understanding the text.

This scheme is set out as one to be used for expressing one's interpretations in a form usable by other researchers. But obviously the very work of interpretation itself is much easier if one has such a scheme in mind when looking for meaning or trying to interpret, in the first place. It is with that purpose that Lonergan first introduced the proposal in *Insight* (1957: 567), and in other early writings about hermeneutics. There he used it to make somehow plausible one of his basic principles of interpretation; namely, that to find the correct meaning of any text, one must be able somehow to envision all possible meanings of that text. The only person who can expect to understand any text thoroughly is the person who already knows everything about everything. This principle is mentioned in *Method* too, but only touched on lightly. It is, however, fundamental, and the procedure I have just described is the way one formally brings under control all the possibilities of meaning.

9"[T]he whole exegetical task remains to be performed even though the exegete already knows all about the objects treated in a text. ... the more the exegete does know about such objects, the better. ... the greater the exegete's resources, the greater the likelihood that he will be able to enumerate all possible interpretations and assign to each its proper measure of probability ... the wider the interpreter's experience, the deeper and fuller the development of his understanding, the better balanced his judgment, the greater the likelihood that he will discover just what the author meant ... the greater the habitual knowledge one possesses, the greater the likelihood that one will be guided by the signs themselves and not by personal preferences and by guess-work" (1972: 156-158).
In those earlier, more detailed studies he also makes clear that accurate interpretation demands limiting one's objectives to what is possible. It is possible to understand the insights and judgments of another even at a great remove from ourselves. If they try to tell us something, there is hope that they can succeed, their message can be picked up. But it is much less certain that we can pick up, understand, appreciate their sensations, their moods, sensibilities, the overtones and connotations of their language, and the like. Those are indeed the stuff of poetry and much of literary criticism. They do fit into the grid he proposes, as does all being. But the empirical residue plays such a large role that it is questionable how accurately they can be seized and passed on. Nor would they normally be among the items about which theology inquires or on which theology would depend. He encourages rather dealing with the explicit or implicit affirmations in one's text, because affirmations are judgments, and judgments bring us to grips with being in a complete and definitive way. Therefore use of the technique we have been discussing should be prepared for by the practice of metaphysical equivalence. This means that affirmations not only have to be sought out; they have to be transposed into usable, discussable form. They have to be made concrete and explanatory, and phrased in terms not of logical subjects, but of real subjects. Use of this additional technique will mean that many things a sensitive reader of the Bible will pick up will simply be 'off the chart.' That is, there will be no secure, public way to analyze them and reach a certain judgment about them. But none of these involve the Yes and No of true affirmation, the divine witness which a theology expects from the Scriptures it doctrinally accepts. These things give life, color, and warmth to the prayerful, personal reading of the Bible by individuals or communities, and can be most effectively used by all theologians in communications. But they are not the

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10 See 1957: 502-509, especially 507-509 on metaphysical equivalence as "a critical technique for the precise control of meaning."

11 Lonergan uses them very effectively in great biblical prose poems in passages like *De Deo Trino* II (1964), pp. 240-259 or *De Verbo Incarnato* (1961), pp. 518-537.
work of the exegete *qua* exegete, engaged in pinning down the meaning.

2. *In judging the accuracy of one's understanding.*

This same chart will play a very important role in judging the accuracy of one's interpretation. Such a judgment has two main parts: realizing where your own interpretation falls short of the ideal; and deciding just how probable, possible, or certain your interpretation is. The great grid can make that possible. It enables you to envision what perfect interpretation would be; and therefore enables you to see exactly where your own still falls short. It raises essential questions about any interpretation, which otherwise could easily go ignored.

**IN FAVOR OF THE EXEGETES**

So far we have been considering what Lonergan's proposal really means, and therefore mostly considering things McKenzie perhaps overlooked when he first reacted to it. But are there perhaps some things which Lonergan overlooked in making the proposal? Without suggesting that, let us rather say that there are certain things he does not happen to mention and that some of his readers therefore might fail to remember.

First of all, he does not say how wildly impractical this proposal is going to seem to most people. He may have defined all these lovely categories, but who has ever heard of them in the world of actual practice of exegesis? Hegel did his own harmonious division and subdivision of all of being, but deduction alone cannot run the world. Moreover, what about Lonergan's own often enunciated principle that the actual work of scientific investigation, including the setting up of categories, has to be done by people actually engaged in the research, working day by day with the concrete material under investigation (1957: 393, 523, 577-578)?
If we suppose that he wrote in awareness of his own principle, then we should take a look at what exegetes actually do and check whether the proposal Lonergan makes is truly so remote from the reality of that work. Perhaps, like much else in Method, he is not so much inventing new practices as clarifying what was best in the old practices, and assigning deeply grounded reasons for them.

Practicing exegetes are deeply committed to the conservative principle that with work they can get to the meaning of a text, and that the texts they are trying to understand do have a meaning. They also pursue, in practice, the meaning of the author, though the definition of the author may be refined in varying circumstances.

Practicing exegetes do, when they are being careful and scientific, confine their statements to the relationships of their text to items outside their text, and do not speak about 'what the text means to me' or even 'to our generation.' Only when they write as theoreticians do they suggest the possibility of confining oneself to what the text itself says. In practice, they never base a scientific analysis on 'what the text says,' because of course the text in itself never really says anything. All knowledge is a matter of comparing the text with other texts. Every argument in scientific exegesis is an argument from relationships of object to object, text to object, or text to text. No monograph would dare plead with its readers: "Look at the text! Can't you see what it says?"

Moreover, practicing exegetes are aware that if one is to search for the meaning of the text, one must be able to envision all the possible meanings the text might conceivably have. That is why they spend their lives reading commentaries, monographs, and scholarly articles, which work over and over the same quite limited list of books of the Old and New

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12 See note 2.
13 See note 2.
14 See note 4.
Testament. They don't want to miss any new possibility of meaning thought up, discovered, or proposed by anyone.

True, if you ask the exegete, How do you know when you have considered all possible meanings?, he or she would have no answer, because typically exegetes never do know when they have considered them all. They know that a new discovery tomorrow might open a whole new realm of possibilities, even for texts they have long taken for granted. This is the excitement, of course, of new manuscript discoveries, and the fun of trying to create and popularize hoaxes: that as soon as one new ingredient is thrown into the scholarly mix, the position of everything else must shift in the light of the new arrival. The discovery of a new gospel would not mean just one new object to be studied. It would mean a change in the meaning to be recognized scientifically in all the existing four.

The exegete is already familiar with this idea and already classifies texts as a way of breaking down into manageable categories the great world of possible meanings. Exegetes carefully distinguish literary forms, for instance: song, poem, battlecry, lecture, prayer, letter, sermon, exhortation, dispute, novella, short story, epic, as well as dozens of subdivisions of many of these: psalms of thanksgiving, psalms of praise, of petition, enthronement, wisdom, judgment, and so on. Exegetes already try to distinguish whether the author is talking philosophically and scientifically, attempting through careful definitions and the like to reach a long-term universal audience; or is writing popularly, in terms of common, current conceptions; careless of distinctions and proof, intent on convincing a small number rather immediately envisioned. These points are perfectly familiar.

Exegetes also distinguish when they think a text is trying to portray experienced reality or merely imagined, possible or probable reality or probable, possible, or just adequate explanation, as opposed to causal analysis, exact report of eye-witness experience, and so on. They know philosophy from poetry, and popular wisdom from technical philosophy, and they point out the differences to their readers.
Lonergan's point, then, is not really that exegetes should begin to do a lot of different things they have never done, apply techniques they have never heard of. His point is rather that they may do what they are already doing more deliberately and may express it more systematically and should reflect more often upon the comprehensive pattern their work forms and presupposes.

For example, they use literary forms. But is the list of literary forms complete? If not, or if not certainly so, could it be made complete by a serious attempt to identify where the gaps are, what the known forms have in common, what specifically differentiates one from another? Could they possibly be made complete by a philosophic attempt to define each literary form in terms of the combination of transmission of experience, understanding, judgment and choice it represents and the pattern of consciousness which gives rise to it? That is where Lonergan's suggestion heads. By his own principles, frequently repeated elsewhere, it is only those versed in the field work itself who can follow through on the suggestion. Why not? Could an analysis of all literary forms be attempted, the results formalized and standardized, so that exegetes could someday refer to them and use them in a perfectly standard way? Is it not even probable that the range of possible recognized literary genres could be grounded in perfectly clear and adequately distinguished reasons?

Similarly, are such common divisions of possible hermeneutic fields as Sitz im Leben Jesu and Sitz im Leben der Kirche adequate, or could they be systematically expanded? Could the expansions be so defined and intellectually grounded as to make clear that they cover all the possibilities?

Again, interpreters commonly treat one set of texts as advanced, another as primitive, this as early and that as late. All Lonergan suggests is that such treatment be recognized as an intrinsic necessary element in any full analysis, and that it be standardized by adequate definitions. The stages of human development in the part of the world which produced the texts have to be worked out. To the extent that they are not worked out, perfect exegesis is not possible. It is important to call
attention to these stages at every opportunity, to remind people that writings from one stage may resemble those from another and yet bear quite a different meaning, and that so long as we interpret without envisioning all the possible and actual stages of development, our interpretation must suffer from every oversight and gap.

At the same time, Lonergan's 'stages of meaning' are ideal constructs (1972: 85), not chronological sequences of events. They do not tell when individual nations and much less individual persons arrived at one or another stage. But they do give a definable meaning to such arrival; a fixed and intelligible way of comparing one group or one person with another. This is not enough, but it is very useful, and it is far better than the continually varying estimates of chronological sequence without agreed upon definitions of what development and lack of development mean.

**CENTRALITY**

This great framework of possible meanings of which we have been speaking is no casual thing with Lonergan, slipped in as an afterthought, a mere supplement to a third subdivision of a third point in a hastily sketched chapter on interpretation. I mentioned above how it is the implementation of the slogan he sets down for *Insight*. On pages 285-288 of *Method*, he sketches the same kind of framework to explain general theological categories. In some of his writings on hermeneutics, he calls the structure we have been speaking of, entirely defined in terms of the acts of the mind within the patterns of human experience, the *basic context*\(^{15}\) of all pursuit of meaning. Everyone grants that meaning is always in context, and that it must be sought in context and expressed in context. Those who work with meaning soon discover that there simply is no such thing as meaning without context. But sentences, paragraphs,

\(^{15}\)De *Methodo Theologitae*, *Hermeneutics* July 20, 1962.
audiences, situations, languages, and cultures provide only limited and relative contexts; the basic context of every inquiry after meaning is the framework of the cognitional acts, their dynamic relationships and possible combinations of relations, along with all progressions and distortions thereof.

In other places, the term he uses for this is the comprehensive viewpoint. It is the one perspective on reality which includes all other viewpoints, not actually but potentially. In *Insight* it is the universal viewpoint (1957: 564-573), achieved when one grasps the dynamic pattern of operations in one's own knowing, with full realization of its importance and inevitability and its potential for including absolutely everything which will ever be actually filled in.

The final note of the centrality of this for Lonergan is that the description of entering into possession of the universal viewpoint is identical with his description in *Insight* of achieving the transition from implicit to explicit metaphysics.

All these schemes have a guiding function. They control meaning. That is, they give us a grasp on what things could possibly mean. They do not tell us what an individual event or text means, but they suggest the important questions to ask in order to find out. They show how our meanings all fit together. The scheme would look quite different if elaborated by an empiricist, an idealist, an existentialist, a phenomenologist, or a naive realist. But formulating it, working it out, would be equally valuable.

In the general Lonergan analysis of scientific achievement, these schemes constitute only a part of what he calls the upper blade. They have to be joined with the concrete results of grubbing around in the material object of the science in order to give any results. But that is all alluded to in *Method* (1972: 293) and explained in *Insight* (1957: 138, 312-313, 461, 586-587), so it can be omitted from this presentation.

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16For example, in explaining Dialectic, (1972: 129).
WORKS CONSULTED

LONERGAN, Bernard


THE CRISIS OF THE HUMAN GOOD

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My question here is simple: What does Lonergan say about the crisis of the human good? Or should I say, What would Lonergan say about the crisis of the human good, to underline the fact that any attempt is already an interpretation.

The procedure will follow Lonergan's own of a "moving viewpoint." Since Lonergan and Thomas Aquinas before him belong to an intellectual tradition, the problem will initially be posed as a difficulty seeking a solution: What is Lonergan's answer to the crisis of the human good? But the approach will be in the inverse order: first the good, then the human good, and finally the crisis of the human good.

I. THE GOOD

A. What is the Good?

Lonergan begins chapter 2 of Method by suggesting the good cannot be defined: the good is always concrete, but definitions are abstract (1972: 27). But this does not entirely

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1 An attempt has been made to keep the terminology and approach in this talk relatively simple, because many in the Lonergan workshop audience are beginners. Nevertheless, the article is not without its loftier ambitions: it attempts systematically to rework the intellectual journey of Insight in terms of "will" or "desire"; it explores the parallel between Lonergan's analysis of the good and analysis of evil; it proposes solution to the vexed question of the relation of "feeling" to "insight" in Lonergan; and it expands Lonergan's "moving viewpoint" to include an ultimate or eschatological moment.

2 See Lonergan 1957: xxiii, 731 and passim. The main sources for the present account of the good are 1957: chapter 18; 1972: chapter 2; 1959: early chapters; and "The Human Good" (1979).
stand up to scrutiny, if it is to be taken to mean there can be no general account of the good. If that is impossible, then the present essay becomes otiose. What must be admitted, however, is that the good is one of those very basic notions for which it is difficult, if not impossible, to find something more fundamental in terms of which to define them; and any definition given must be analogical, because the good is an analogical reality.

A good beginning may be found in the medieval commonplace, which Lonergan also cites: *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*, the good is what all things desire. This is particularly appropriate, since it is an operational definition, a definition from the side of the "subject." As Lonergan defines being as the object of the pure desire to know, so good is also defined as the object of a universal desire. But the range of such "desires" exhibits already the analogical nature of the good: as the rock, when dropped, "seeks" the ground, so the plant seeks the sun, the embryo desires its development, a man desires a woman, God wills the salvation of all.

**B. The Human Good: First Sense**

But the title above allows a strategic precision: at least as a beginning, the focus will be restricted to the human good, that which all men, or all human persons, desire. Take a simple example, which Lonergan also uses: breakfast. I wake up. I am hungry. I eat breakfast. Hunger is the desire; breakfast is the good that meets the desire. Once again, of course, a whole range of human desires appear: we want, besides food, drink, housing, clothing, sex, possessions, comfort, friends, entertainment. By definition, each of those is a good.

**C. The Good of Order**

One morning I went down to breakfast in the institution where I live. Only a couple of candles pierced the gloom of the kitchen. The electricity was off. Only cold cereal was to be had. I was jolted into a recognition of how complicated the seemingly
simple good of breakfast was. Illumination and fuel were supplied by the city power company. The cook had to be hired, with ramifications through administration and hospitalization insurance. The orange juice was grown in Florida or California, picked, squeezed, processed. The eggs would come from a country farm; the bacon perhaps from an Omaha meat packer. The grits were probably grown in the midwest, maybe barged down the Mississippi to New Orleans; the coffee perhaps from Brazil or Columbia. Between those points intervened a whole trucking and transportation industry; and all was undergirded by a banking system so the services could be contracted and paid for.

This complicated set of relationships is an instance of the good of order, a good to the second power, as it were, a good which is a system for delivering goods. But what Lonergan discerns here are not so much the products, the orange juice, bacon, and coffee; nor the farms on which they are grown; nor the trucks and ships to transport them; nor the money and checks to pay for them. No, what Lonergan envisions above all here is a good devised by intelligence: almost all of these contrivances are not natural, but are the devising of human, practical intelligence. As products of human intelligence, they can be studied, understood, improved upon. They may be further analyzed as a set of interlocking schemes of recurrence (see 1957: 117-120 and passim). They are also a good because, as Lonergan sagely observes, we want breakfast not just once, but every morning. A breakdown in that order reveals how much it is usually taken for granted, how far-flung and yet how delicate is ultimately its fabric.

At once a first approximation of a solution appears: the crisis of the human good could be met if sufficiently intelligent delivery systems could be devised to supply human beings with their needs. For example, the news this past year has been full of the famine in Africa; this problem could be solved by a good of order which would cultivate and deliver enough food to keep people from starving.
D. The Human Good: Second Sense

Until now the discussion has centered on goods external to the human person. But this is incomplete, and a second, more subtle sense of the "human good" must be discerned. Take once again the example of breakfast. It is not enough to have something to eat. I have to know how to use a knife and fork, how to hold a glass; I have to know that the food is to go into my mouth, and not be kneaded into my hair. That too is a good, because the object of desire—perhaps only the mother of a willful two-year-old knows how ardently that good is desired—is a good immanent within the human person, a skill that does not come not with nature, but must be learned. Brief reflection shows how much skills are an integral part of the good of order: the skills of the farmer, the butcher, the trucker, the electrician, the banker.

Again, a whole range of immanent goods stands revealed: the good of understanding—very practically, to know where the kitchen or breakfast nook is; the general good of freedom, the specific good of free choice by which one chooses to go down to breakfast; the good of virtue. Augustine has a definition of virtue as that which no one could use badly. That's a splendid notion: the moralists speak of the intrinsically evil, but Augustine is speaking of the intrinsically good, a reality so good it cannot be abused, a skill or habit which needs essentially and unerringly to the good. And since virtue is desirable, it is another instance of the particular good. Finally, the good of friendship may be cited: a good partially immanent, partially anchored in another or others.

E. Kinds of Desires

The good has been defined as the object of desire, but what is desire? A first step might be to identify it with feeling. Lonergan has a section on feelings in his chapter on the good in Method. Feelings of desire and hope, joy and enthusiasm do indeed link us to goods; they orient us, as Lonergan says,
"massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning" (1972: 31). But I find this account incomplete. In his later work Lonergan talks much about feelings; in the early much about insight. But the two are not adequately synthesized. Some feelings may be purely physical or bodily, or they may be abstractly considered that way: feeling as we have it in common with the animals. But I suggest that what is much more germane to the uniquely human composite is a feeling-toned insight, or an intellectually suffused feeling.

This notion is important to avoid the misconception that human feeling is a blind drive. Much more often, it is aware, open-eyed, intelligent, capable of high spiritual refinement and delicacy. But the notion is also important to properly situate insight. Only in the intellectual pattern of experience does insight tend to be bereft of feeling. Insight may be misleading on this account, as most of its examples are taken from the intellectual pattern of experience. But in every other pattern—biological, commonsense, aesthetic, mystical—insight is normally imbedded in a context of feelings.

F. Levels of Desire

Sheer animal desire, then, usually makes way for intelligent desires for the good, what might be called an "insight into value." But insight here as elsewhere leads to a question for reflection which, in this context, has its own special wording: is this good truly worth while? The evidence for an affirmative answer leads to the judgment of value. But the human good is not merely a matter for contemplation, but also for action, and so the world of knowing cedes to the world of doing, the judgment of value to the fourth level of decision: I will seek this good. I will accomplish it. I will bend my efforts to bringing it into being. So desire is finally revealed as will, the intelligent and free commitment to the good.

A key distinction must be made here between desires for satisfaction and desires for values. Satisfactions are located on the level of an organism: they are pleasures and pains, the level
distinguished above as "sheer animal feeling." Values, on the other hand, are intelligently conceived, rationally affirmed, and chosen by good will. For Lonergan, the distinction within the good between satisfaction and value is quite as important as the distinction within knowing between experience and judgment, between sense and critical realism. Here precisely is the criterion for moral conversion: is the person committed to living for satisfactions? Or for values?

This does not imply, however, that the hedonist, who lives for pleasure, and to avoid pain, is unintelligent. He may indeed devote great effort and shrewdness to cultivating his pleasures and warding off pain. But intelligence has become but an instrument of such hedonistic search, and is not allowed its full scope of questioning, to ask, against a horizon larger than the selfish and egoistic, Is this truly good? Is this truly worthwhile?

G. Conflicts of Desire

It is perhaps already becoming clear that the many levels of human desire may at times conflict with one another. Breakfast is a good. But dieting or fasting are also goods, and a person may at times choose to skip breakfast. More notably, the desire for satisfaction may conflict with the desire for value. At times the painful must be endured to attain a greater good; at other times a pleasure must be foregone to fulfill a commitment or avoid an evil. This leads to a higher conception of the immanent human good, the good of inner harmony, where satisfactions are subordinated to values, lesser values to greater values, and the whole undergirded by a development and refinement of feeling which makes choice of the truly good both instinctive and delightful. In various contexts we refer to this desirable inner harmony as maturity, authenticity, sanctity.

A second approximation to the crisis of the human good is revealed here. After all, the first solution, on the level of efficient delivery systems, was naive: the real problems of getting food to Africa are only partially technical, but much more deeply human and political. A more effective solution would be realized
if all those involved possessed that degree of authenticity or maturity which would allow them to grasp clearly the good of feeding the many starving people, and to commit themselves to doing their utmost toward this end. In such a context, the appropriate delivery systems might be devised with relative ease.

**H. The Good of Education**

The immanent goods of skills, knowledge, virtue are not ones persons have to discover all by themselves. Human beings are not monads; indeed, they could hardly survive in isolation. The vehicle by which they are socialized and learn the values of others can be globally termed education: it includes attitudes imbibed with a mother's milk, the manners and values absorbed in the family, the formal and informal learnings imparted by a school system, the dos and don'ts of fashion, entertainment and advertising.

This opens up a perspective on the good of order, not merely as geographical, linking distant parts of the globe, but also as historical. Education is an intelligent and intelligible set of schemes of recurrence by which the patrimony of the past, the treasures of skill, knowing, virtue, are passed on as the legacy of the present, and the foundation for future achievements. Instrumental to this process is belief, by which a person learns a skill, a body of knowledge and a mode of virtuous living from another, rather than discovering it all himself or herself. Needless to say, education is a highly desirable good in its realization. Finally, what a person learns is itself not mere uncoordinated pieces of information, but is organized within a world view which answers such questions as, What is the good? Should it be sought? How can it be accomplished? Not surprisingly, an accurate world view is also a highly valuable good.
II. EVIL: CRISIS OF THE HUMAN GOOD

Almost resolutely the question of evil has been avoided until now; but it cannot be left out since everything up to now to has been spoken from a very partial viewpoint indeed. The same ground needs to be re-viewed rather expeditiously.

A. Individual Evils

Suppose a woman decides to sleep late on a Saturday morning. But her neighbor starts up a power mower to cut his grass. Sleep is a good. Losing sleep on a given Saturday morning is a particular evil.

B. Evil Orders

But besides individual evils there can be envisioned also systems for delivering evil. Sometimes this happens accidentally. Recently a dairy in the midwest had raw milk diverted into a pipe containing pasteurized milk. Suddenly the dairy and its associated transportation and marketing facilities became a very efficient system for spreading botulism, which quickly showed up in four states. Sometimes the delivery of evils is deliberate. No doubt the most notorious example is the Holocaust in Nazi Germany where the ultimate vital evil of death was inflicted on millions of people because they were non-Aryan, by an order of evil almost diabolical in its cunning and efficiency.

Other orders deliberately deliver individual evils, but in view of the larger good. The penal system is an example. It deprives individuals of the good of liberty for the larger good of,

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3 "System" is not used here in the technical sense of "systematic process" (see 1957: 48). As was pointed out in the discussion following the talk, the systematic process of classical method is defined as insight or intelligibility; as such, it cannot be evil, since intelligibility and goodness are transcendentally convertible properties of being. "Evil system" is used here in a wider sense which includes both rationality and irrationality, as the examples make clear.
at best, and perhaps optimistically, rehabilitation, but at least of safeguarding society from criminals, and dissuading others from following their example. Other cases are more problematical: they may have been originally intended for a good end, but that end, or the means to reach it, has become questionable. The nuclear armaments of the Western and Eastern blocs are a terrifying example of systems for delivering evil on an unprecedented and unimaginable scale. Their original aim, however, was good: to preserve the peace and deter aggression. But do they serve that good? Or threaten it? Finally, the educational system may be considered. Education is a good, and a world view is a valuable good. But suppose the educational system is imparting a distorted world view, an inauthentic tradition, a mutilated patrimony? Then doesn't it become, like the midwest dairy, a very efficient process for spreading spiritual poison? When education is viewed broadly to include not only schools, but homes, business, marketplace and media, the question becomes doubly pressing.

C. Biases

The human good is not merely external to people, but immanent within them; the same is true for evil. To the good of skill corresponds incompetence, to knowledge ignorance, to virtue vice and vicious habit, to friendship hatred and prejudice. As goods immanent within persons are a part of a larger good of order, so too systems for delivering evil incorporate the evil within persons. But what Lonergan singles out particularly are the biases, by which intelligence itself is perverted to unworthy or partial goals. Individual bias exploits intelligence to serve a narrowly personal good in despite of the social good. Group bias abuses intelligence to further the interests of one's group against the common good. Common sense bias restricts intelligence to short-term analysis, to the detriment of theoretical issues and long-term considerations.

To reword that in terms of the good, the human composite is not a chaotic set of drives and impulses, but seeks
spontaneously a harmony of desire in which satisfaction is subordinated to value, and lower serve higher values. Given full and free rein, this “unrestricted desire for the good” would seek the common, long-term good. But this drive is short-circuited by the biases, which make paramount personal, group, or short-term goods.

**D. Dialectic**

The foregoing makes possible a critical analysis of the human situation. On the one hand, from the pure desire for the good flow individual goods and goods of order. But from disordered and truncated desire flow individual evils and evil delivery systems. This offers a universal criterion of discrimination within the whole sphere of human willing and human action: each situation is an expression of the pure desire, or of disordered desire, or some incoherent amalgam of the two. Then to be a person of good will, one would have to struggle to further the products of good desire and resist those of wayward desire.

Once more, the analysis must be pursued not only exteriorly, but immanently. Then each person will recognize that the criterion of discrimination runs through himself or herself. To have recognized the polymorphism of one’s own desires, to have traced good choices to their root in the pure desire for good, to have linked individual options for evil or an all-too-partial good to their basis in truncated desire, is to have attained a high degree of moral self-appropriation.

If everyone is to some extent involved in the incoherence of conflicting desires, then what is obviously needed is an agency within human history which stands above that welter of personal, group and short-term desires to champion the truly worthwhile, the common good, the long-term benefit. Such an agency would be too dedicated to the pure desire to be led astray, too perspicacious to be misled by short-term goals, too lofty to be forced, too im palpable to be bribed. In short, it would
be very much like that mysterious agency Lonergan terms "cosmopolis" in chapter 7 of *Insight*.

A third approximate solution to the crisis of the human good accordingly comes to light. The second solution is obviously now naive, because it left evil out of account. But a truly critical human science would distinguish between true goods and apparent goods, pure desire and its truncated and misdirected cousins; could discriminate goods of order from evil delivery systems by tracing them to their origins in the pure desire or truncated desires respectively; could separate with precision good from evil elements within an incoherent system, by the same criterion; and could finally distinguish individual goods from individual evils by tracing them back, once again, to their respective desires.

In light of such a science, everyone could be encouraged to pursue the good and struggle against evil; people could, once enlightened, quickly be led to an at least relative maturity and authenticity; and within that enlightened world, appropriate goods of order could easily be designed to deliver sufficient individual goods to everyone.

III. GOD'S ANSWER TO THE HUMAN DILEMMA

A. Levels of the Good

Before criticizing this third solution, it would be well to repeal the restriction to the human good, and return to the original, wider perspective of the good as such. As there are ordered levels of human desire, so there are ordered levels of human good: a man sleeps to be healthy; he wants to be healthy so he can work; he works so that he can support his family; he supports his family to express his love for them; he loves his wife for her becoming, his children so they can be educated. As there are ordered levels of human good, so there are ordered levels of good in the universe. Goods, like persons, are not isolated monads, but are for other goods. Modern science has
little use for the notion of finality, but it constitutes an indispensable ingredient of the Aristotelian-Thomistic world view. Last in execution, the final cause is for Aristotle first in intention. "Upwardly directed finality" runs through *Insight*, but Lonergan illuminates it best perhaps in his essay on "Finality, Love, Marriage" (1967). So the sub-atomic world exists as a potency for atoms; the atomic world finds its own good on the chemical and physical level. This in turn discovers a higher realization in the biological, which is again transcended in the sphere of animal psychology, only in turn to head for the higher good of human consciousness. The question naturally arises: is there any term to this "heading beyond"? In many ways the human person is a terminal value; yet it may still be queried, What is the human person for? What higher good does he or she seek?

The answer, to a theist, is God. No attempt will be made here to adduce the argument for God; chapter 19 of *Insight* may be consulted for that. Yet it seems appropriate to direct the reader to an exploration: do you notice that no individual good seems to suffice for long? Have you observed how intensely an absent good can be pursued, but how quickly it can pall, once attained? Is the "Is that all there is?" experience perhaps not accidental, but constitutive? Can you discern within yourself a still deeper desire, a hunger for good without limit, without spoilage, without ceasing? Can you locate in yourself that inquietude of which Augustine spoke, when he said that our hearts are restless, till they rest in God?

**B. Good as the Good**

If this answer is admitted, it immediately transforms the account of the good, and once again all the foregoing stands stark in its partiality. Before God, all other speech about the good appears mere chatter. As Jesus said, "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone" (Mk 10:18). If "What is the good?" means "What is the essence of the good?", then the only answer can be "God," for God alone is the Good by essence;
all creatures are mere participants in his goodness (see 1959: 35).

Again, from this higher viewpoint, the upwardly directed finality of good to good, of creature to creature, is found to be not accidental. For the goods of order of human devising are swept up into the far wider good of order which is the universe as a whole; a good of order known and willed by God. Upward finality does have an ultimate term; it is God, the final Good, the Final Cause of final causes. Lonergan holds that God applies each agent to his activity (1971: 72-80). It is equally true that God sets each creature toward its end, indeed inscribes that end in its immanent desires. The idea is similar to Whitehead's descriptive one that God provides the lure for every actual entity; except that Whitehead then leaves the creature in Pelagian freedom to its own response. Contrary to Luther, who tended to eliminate human freedom to safeguard God's glory, Lonergan insists that God creates not only freedom, but also every free choice, indeed every shred of good desire in the universe. While Whitehead's account of human freedom may be more appealing and superficially plausible, Lonergan's, I believe, is the only fully coherent one (see 1957: 665 and 1971: 93-109).

Again, this latest perspective allows a solution to a difficulty. Lonergan questions the original definition used here, that the good is what all things desire (1959: 33). The formula is only partial, he points out: for not only the objects desired, but the things desiring are good. In the divine perspective, that cavil may be answered. Who desires the desirers? God does. Nor is this captious; it points rather to the very basis of the creature's existence. Everything comes into being precisely because God desires, wills, loves it; and so everything is good. "God looked at everything he had made, and he found it very good" (Gn 1:31). But "Who desires God?" one might insist. God does. God in his infinite act of awareness knows utterly and loves completely his own Good in a simultaneous, beatific complacency.
C. The Impotence of Knowledge and Will

But it is time to return to the crisis of the human good. Perhaps the naiveté of the third approximate solution is already abundantly apparent. In the first place, what individual or group will be pure enough to embody the lofty vocation and austere function of cosmopolis? Who, aware that the criterion of authenticity is tainted by disordered desire, will presume to lay claim to the critical human science? “Who can ascend the mountain of the Lord? or who may stand in his holy place?” (Ps 24:3). In the second place, diagnosis is not cure. Even were such individuals to be found, their science ever so pure, their discrimination ever so precise, who could be persuaded to listen? Would not the voice of pure desire immediately be lost as but one among the clamoring thousands of voices of impure will and truncated desire?

Lonergan expresses the situation in some of the most poignant words he ever wrote:

So we are brought to the profound disillusionment of modern man and to the focal point of his horror. He had hoped through knowledge to ensure development that was always progress and never decline. He has discovered that the advance of human knowledge is ambivalent, that it places in man's hands stupendous power without necessarily adding proportionate wisdom and virtue, that the fact of advance and the evidence of power are not guarantees of truth, that myth is the permanent alternative to mystery and mystery is what his hybris rejected (1957: 549).

D. The Transcendent Answer

As the naive insufficiency of the three solutions is manifested, the need for an inverse insight becomes also clear. The problem has been conceived of as one for human intelligence to solve, but now it is patent that the difficulty overwhelms human intelligence, that humanism must somehow transcend itself.
The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigences of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself (1959: 728).

Briefly now and without the detail of Insight's chapter 20, we must look not to human beings but to God for the answer to the human crisis. That solution will be a new immanent good of knowing called faith, a sharing by belief in God's own knowledge that transcends the possibilities of native human intelligence; and a new immanent good of desire, named charity, a love the Spirit pours out in human hearts, a love that overcomes every pain and assists every good choice as it itself heads to a transcendent encounter with the very face of God. Thus the human good of order is swept up into a supernatural good of order, into which God personally and intimately enters. "Any man who loves me will be true to my word, and my Father will love him; we will come to him, and make our dwelling place with him" (Jn 14:23). Once again, this new, higher viewpoint relativizes the old, and exhibits its partiality. "Martha, Martha, you are anxious and upset about many things; one thing only is required" (Lk 10:14).

E. The Eschatological Answer

To complete this account of the good, it must be noted that even God's solution is not immediately and triumphantly efficacious. As it does not impose itself on human beings, but elicits their free cooperation, it makes its way but slowly against human hard-heartedness. Even faith and charity progress with difficulty against bias and truncated desire. Even a supernatural good of order is but one among a number of competing orders, as Lonergan observes.
There will be a humanism in revolt against the preferred supernatural solution. It will ignore the problem of evil; it will contest the fact of a solution; it will condemn mystery as myth; it will demand reason and exclude faith; it will repudiate hope and labour passionately to build the city of man with the hands of man; it will be ready to love God in song and dance, in human feasting and human sorrow, with human intelligence and human good will, but only so. For a time, it may base its case upon the shortcomings of those that profess the solution but live it imperfectly or intermittently or not at all. But this incidental argument sooner or later will give place to its real basis. For it rests on man's proud content to be just a man, and its tragedy is that, on the present supposition of a supernatural solution, to be just a man is what man cannot be. If he would be truly a man, he would submit to the unrestricted desire and discover the problem of evil and affirm the existence of a solution and accept the solution that exists. But if he would be only a man, he has to be less. He has to forsake the openness of the pure desire; he has to take refuge in the counter-positions; he has to develop what counter-philosophies he can to save his dwindling humanism from further losses; and there will not be lacking men clear-sighted enough to grasp that the issue is between God and man, logical enough to grant that intelligence and reason are oriented towards God, ruthless enough to summon to their aid the dark forces of passion and of violence (1957: 728-729).

So once again arises a human yearning for a deeper and wider good; once more the present supernatural solution must undergo the process of being "swept up" into a larger and more encompassing order, to enjoy an ultimate good. To that final order of good the Scriptures lisp haltingly of a new heaven and a new earth; they but intimate what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has ever entered into the human mind. Of that final process of "sweeping up" the present order into the new, Paul alludes when he says, "When, finally, all has been subjected to the Son, he will then subject himself to the One who made all things subject to him, so that God may be all in all" (1 Cor 15:28).
WORKS CONSULTED

LONERGAN, Bernard


FEELINGS AS APPREHENSIVE-INTENTIONAL RESPONSES TO VALUES

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The theme of this 1985 Lonergan Workshop is "The Crisis of the Human Good." This theme is massive in scope and central in importance. The topic of this paper is Lonergan's view of certain types of feelings as apprehensive-intentional responses to values. Lonergan's central discussion of feelings occurs in chapter 2 of Method in Theology (1972), which is entitled "The Human Good." In Lonergan's understanding, feelings play a crucial role in the formation of value judgments and the latter, in turn, are at the heart of the movements which today shake the world for good or ill and in large measure effect the development or decline of the human good. Thus, although the topic of this paper is quite narrow in comparison to the broad scope of the theme of this Workshop, it nonetheless touches upon an element which is vital to any adequate discussion of the human good whether it is in or out of crisis.

Before reflecting in some detail on the meaning and validity of Lonergan's view of certain feelings as apprehensions of and responses to values, some basic observations about his overall approach to the issue of feelings are in order.

First, as Frederick Crowe summarily noted at an earlier Lonergan Workshop (Crowe, 1982: 2-3), in the post-Insight period there is evident in Lonergan's writings a growing emphasis on love, values, and the affective in general. Lonergan refers more frequently to the Pauline text from Romans on the love of God flooding our hearts (Rom 5:5) than to the Thomist text on the natural desire of the mind to see God (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 3, a. 8). There is a greater leaning toward the Augustinian "restless heart" than to the "restless mind" of
Aquinas. Further, whereas in his account in *Insight* (1957) of a possible ethics Lonergan views feelings as of little importance except as a likely source of bias, in *Method* he defines certain feelings as intentional responses to values and then moves on to incorporate this new understanding of feelings into a theory of values.

Second, there is a striking difference between Lonergan's treatment of knowing in *Insight* and his exposition of the nature of feelings in *Method*. In *Insight* Lonergan seeks to aid the reader to arrive at a correct understanding of understanding by providing an illustrative set of examples or instances of insights from mathematics, science, and common sense. As Lonergan puts it at the beginning of chapter 1 of *Insight*, "our first task will be to attain familiarity with what is meant by insight, and the only way to achieve this end is, it seems, to attend very closely to a series of instances all of which are rather remarkable for their banality" (1957: 3). In his treatment of feelings in *Method*, however, Lonergan simply offers an interlocking set of explanations of various types of feelings but makes no attempt to provide either a strategically developed phenomenology of feelings or a series of examples which might aid the reader to understand and verify for himself or herself the adequacy of the explanations of feelings which he offers. Moreover, at the beginning of his discussion of feelings Lonergan acknowledges that he is drawing on the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand for certain key distinctions he makes regarding the basic types of feelings and their interrelationship, but he makes no attempt to show in what ways his own exposition of feelings goes beyond or differs from that of von Hildebrand. He finds it sufficient to remark in a footnote that "a wealth of analysis of feelings is to be had in Dietrich von Hildebrand's *Christian Ethics*" (1972: 31). This means that it is left up to the reader to return to the works of von Hildebrand to discover the context from which Lonergan draws his basic distinctions regarding feelings. It is likewise up to the reader to try to sort out any differences which exist between von Hildebrand's and Lonergan's accounts of the nature and forms of feeling and to weigh critically the respective merits of the two accounts. Lonergan also acknowledges a dependence
on the thought of Max Scheler, Suzanne Langer and others for his articulation of the nature and types of feelings. But it appears that the influence of von Hildebrand is most central in the treatment of feeling in *Method* as apprehensive-intentional responses to values. The influence of Scheler on Lonergan in the latter's reflection on feelings as intentionally related to values is mediated through Manfred Frings's book *Max Scheler* (1965) and through the work of von Hildebrand who was himself significantly influenced by Scheler.

Third, Jean Mouroux in *The Christian Experience* wrote that "feelings are as mysterious in their essence as they are easy to perceive in experience" (1954: 341). Psychologist Magda Arnold wrote of the "exceedingly complex field" which feelings and emotions represent but of the need for the "black box ... to be opened ... somehow" (1970: viii). The Lonergan scholar regrets that in *Method* Lonergan was not able to provide a phenomenology of feelings as a help in exploring the complex realm of affectivity. But *Method* is, after all, a book on method and not on feelings. Moreover, Lonergan does provide us with the key to the "black box" in his application of "intentionality analysis" (1974: 223) to the area of feelings and in the brief set of crucial distinctions regarding the nature and types of feelings which he lays out in *Method*.

Fourth, Lonergan distinguishes between feelings as conscious and feelings as "snapped off by repression to lead thereafter a subterranean life" (1972: 32). The focus in the present paper is on feelings insofar as they are conscious, apprehensive-intentional responses to values. Such feelings are "privileged data" in the same sense that they occur in consciousness, and any account of their nature can and indeed must be ultimately verified in the data of consciousness. The situation is quite different when we are dealing with so-called "repressed feelings" which are asserted to be "unconscious" in the strictest sense, that is, not available as data of consciousness. In the latter case any account of the nature of such feelings is subject to substantive revision since the account cannot appeal solely to the sphere of privileged data of consciousness for its verification.
Fifth, it is of interest to note the progression in Lonergan's discussion of feelings in *Method*. He begins his exposition of feelings in chapter 2 by offering a basic set of interlocked explanations of key classes of feelings based to a large extent on the terminology of von Hildebrand. He next considers the notion of value and then judgments of value and briefly comments on the role of feelings in arriving at value judgments. Lonergan's next major discussion of feelings occurs in the third chapter of *Method*, which deals with meaning. It is in this chapter that he discusses the nature of the symbol as “an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling” (64). Within the discussion of the symbol Lonergan refers to “the three original interpretative systems: the psychoanalysis of Freud, the individual psychology of Adler, the analytic psychology of Jung” (67). Lonergan's overall discussion of feeling in *Method* appears to move from the simple to the more complex, from the consideration of the basic types of feelings to reflection upon complex symbology, compound affects, and diverse psychological interpretative systems. The chief, though not exclusive, focus of this paper is on the significance and adequacy of Lonergan's characterization of certain types of feelings as intentional responses to values, rather than on his analyses of complex symbols, affects, and interpretative systems.

With these preliminary observations about Lonergan's overall approach to feelings as a background, I would like now to compare point by point von Hildebrand's and Lonergan's basic views of certain feelings as intentionally related to values.

First, von Hildebrand defines “intentional” as “any conscious, meaningful relationship to an object” (1953: 191). He uses the experience of joy as an example of a feeling which presupposes an intentional relationship to an object: “I am ... full of joy because of the arrival of my friend. So long as I do not know of my friend's arrival, it cannot motivate joy in my soul” (193). Lonergan in turn characterizes certain feelings as “intentional responses” which relate us “to an object” (1972: 39). He writes that “community of feeling would be illustrated by the sorrow felt by both parents for their dead child, but
fellow-feeling would be felt by a third party moved by their sorrow" (58).

It is very important for both von Hildebrand and Lonergan to distinguish between the intellectual activity that involves knowledge of a fact and the kind of "knowledge" that discerns value. Von Hildebrand insists that "all responses [this includes feeling responses] presuppose as their basis a cognitive act" but "the value response presupposes not only knowledge of the object to which it is directed, but also an awareness of its value" (1953: 229). Lonergan, in a similar vein, states that "besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and judgments of value of a person in love" (1972: 115). Von Hildebrand is writing largely within the framework of a faculty psychology which draws sharp distinctions between "the intellect, the will, and the heart" (1965: 88). This means that when von Hildebrand describes the type of intentional activity which perceives value he will locate this activity within the sphere of the intellect: "It is a cognitive act in which we grasp the object of our joy, our sorrow, our admiration, our love. Again, it is a cognitive act in which we grasp the value of the object" (1965: 70). In fidelity to his own phenomenological insights, however, von Hildebrand will insist that, while value perception is an authentic cognitive act, "we must understand that it is an original perception sui generis" (1953: 231). Because by the time he wrote Method Lonergan had cleanly broken free of the restrictive classifications of faculty psychology, he is able to affirm that "the apprehension of values ... is the task not of understanding but of [the] intentional response [of feeling]" (1972: 245). Like von Hildebrand, Lonergan acknowledges the uniqueness of the act through which values are grasped but, unlike von Hildebrand, he situates this unique act in the realm of "reasons of the heart": "Pascal remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know ... By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values" (1972: 115).

It is perhaps of some significance that, whereas von Hildebrand consistently speaks of "value perception" (1953:
Lonergan chooses to speak instead of the "apprehension of values" (1972: 245). Lonergan's use of the term *apprehension* rather than *perception* in reference to the grasp of values appears to be deliberate since von Hildebrand to my knowledge does not use the word *apprehension* anywhere in his discussion of values. Interestingly, Webster's primary definition of the noun "apprehension" is "the act or power of perceiving or comprehending" (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1980). Lonergan probably does not use the expression value-perception, among other reasons, because he wishes to avoid any suggestion that discerning values is a matter of "taking a good look at them." At the same time, by using the expression "apprehension of values," Lonergan does indicate that he understands the grasp of values to involve a certain "knowing of the heart," an activity that involves "discernment" and "recognition" (1972: 115).

There is a further complication regarding the relationship between von Hildebrand's "value perception" and Lonergan's "apprehension of value." Von Hildebrand distinguished sharply between factual knowledge, the knowledge that is the unique perception of value, and feelings as intentional responses to values. Lonergan, however, seems to use the expressions "apprehension of value" and "intentional response to value" interchangeably. The question thus arises: does Lonergan acknowledge any difference at all between an apprehension of value and a response to value? A close examination of Lonergan's writings does not provide any evidence for the view that he saw a real difference in meaning between the two expressions. In fact, I think that we are here touching upon a major difference between von Hildebrand and Lonergan in their basic understandings of the nature of feelings as intentional responses to values. For Lonergan there is no occurrence in consciousness of a cognitive "value-perception" which precedes the intentional response of feeling to value. For Lonergan it is the very intentional response itself which "greets" (1972: 223) the value as value. Thus, for example, the spontaneous delight of a person of refined aesthetic sensibility in the presence of a new work of art reveals the value, the intrinsic excellence of the work. Again,
the feelings of love, awe, and joy which the mother experiences the first time she holds her newborn infant reveal, respond to, the intrinsic worth, lovableness, value of the infant. In the light of these examples a key difference between von Hildebrand and Lonergan in their respective understanding of the intentional feeling-response to value comes down to this: for von Hildebrand the connoisseur and the mother first come to some factual knowledge about the "objects" of their respective interest; then they experience a cognitive, value perception regarding the "objects" in question; finally, they experience their respective feeling responses of aesthetic delight, and love, awe, and joy. For Lonergan the connoisseur and the mother first cognitively apprehend the respective "objects" of their attention and then they spontaneously respond with their respective feelings to the work of art and the infant. Von Hildebrand thus requires that a cognitive value-perception mediate between the initial factual knowledge and the feeling response, whereas Lonergan holds that feeling itself recognizes the value present in the object apprehended cognitively.

Von Hildebrand further distinguishes between "being affected" by values and the "affective response" to values (1953: 208). Both have an intentional character but they are quite distinct. Thus, for example, "in being touched by beautiful music we consciously experience that the beauty bestows this effect upon us, engenders it in us" (209). This shows that "being affected has, so to speak, a centripetal character" whereas an affective response has "a centrifugal one" (209). In the experience of being affected the "object bestows something on me" whereas in the affective response it is I who "impart something to the object" (209). There is, then, in the experience of being affected by an object a passive, receptive character whereas the affective response has a spontaneous, active, bestowing quality about it. Being affected usually but not always precedes the affective response. Von Hildebrand does acknowledge that there are many cases where it is difficult to distinguish between being affected by an object and the affective response to the object, for example, "the experience of being enchanted by a work of art and our enthusiasm over it" (210).
But he still insists on the distinct *sui generis* character of these two intentional affective events. Lonergan, however, does not adopt this distinction from von Hildebrand. Why not? It seems to me that the "intentional response to value" as Lonergan understands it involves both a receptive and an active dimension. As *apprehensive* the intentional response is receptive of value; it recognizes value. As a *response* it actively greets and discriminates values. From this perspective Lonergan's explanation of feelings as apprehensive, intentional responses to values encompasses both the intentional feeling of "being affected" and the intentional "affective response" of von Hildebrand. It is, of course, of value to elucidate phenomenologically the nuances of those intentional feelings in which the receptive dimension shines forth as well as the forms of feeling in which the dynamic, active element reveals itself. And von Hildebrand does this superbly. But I do not find that von Hildebrand's phenomenological descriptions of intentional feelings of "being affected" and of various intentional feelings of "affective response" require on the explanatory level the positing of a class of feelings distinct from the category of feelings characterized by Lonergan as apprehensive-intentional responses to value. Rather, von Hildebrand's two types of intentional feelings fit as subsets within the more general class of feelings explained as apprehensive-intentional responses to value.

Von Hildebrand further uses the adjective "spiritual" to describe intentional affective responses to true values (1953: 204). He contrasts spiritual affective responses with bodily feelings such as physical pains or pleasures (1965: 50); with psychic feelings such as "jolliness and depression" (1965: 53); with intentional affective responses which are motivated by the subjectively satisfying rather than by true values, for example "in my coveting a certain good food" (1953: 215). He stresses that there is a great gradation in the quality of spiritual affective responses (1953: 203) and that the quality of the individual affective response is in direct correspondence with the rank of the value to which one responds (239). Thus, for example, "our enthusiasm when confronted with a great work of art is
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qualitatively different from the enthusiasm with which we respond to an outstanding moral action" (237). For von Hildebrand there is a "hierarchy of values" (241), and "the higher the value and the more sublime its rank, the deeper the level to which appeals in our soul" (238). Thus the highest of spiritual values evokes the richest, deepest affective spiritual responses of holy love and holy joy. We "reach a peak of spirituality in holy joy (for example, the joy experienced by St. Simeon when he held the Infant Jesus)" (1965: 70).

Von Hildebrand is most emphatic in his view that "what matters is to see that there exist affective responses which are as spiritual as the highest intellectual and volitional acts" (1953: 203). He speaks of love as "the most total, central, and intimate of all values responses" (352). He sees as one of his main tasks the calling "to do justice to the dignity of the affective responses: love, joy, hope" (204). He wants to "grant the heart a status analogous to that of the intellect and the will" (1965: 27). He sees as perhaps the chief cause of the devaluation of the heart and of affectivity a reductionism which "identifies affectivity with the lowest type of affectivity" (27). The solution to the problem is "to distinguish things which must be distinguished in spite of their having some apparent or real affinity or analogy" (26-27).

Von Hildebrand seeks to do this, in part, by engaging in a phenomenological elucidation of the affinities and great differences which exist between bodily urges, bodily feelings, and psychic feelings, on the one hand, and "affective experiences such as value-responding joy, a deep love, a noble enthusiasm" (27), on the other.

What position does Lonergan take regarding the "spirituality" of certain intentional feeling responses to values? I am not aware of any text where he uses the adjective "spiritual" to describe certain intentional feeling responses to value. But, with von Hildebrand, Lonergan does distinguish between feelings that are intentional responses to what is agreeable and disagreeable, satisfying or dissatisfying, and feelings that are intentional responses to values. Again, with von Hildebrand, Lonergan acknowledges that feelings respond to values according to a scale of excellence. Thus, he speaks of
intentional feeling responses to vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values. Further, with von Hildebrand, Lonergan acknowledges the primacy of love in the realm of feeling and particularly the feeling state of being in love with God. Thus, he writes in *Method* that "there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong ... that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life" and he adds that "the supreme example is loving" (32). And, within the kingdom of the various forms of love, the highest is the conscious state of being in love with God. It is here that Lonergan speaks of the heart. He explains what he means by the heart in commenting on Pascal's famous saying that "the heart has reasons which reason does not understand" (115). For Lonergan "reason" is "the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging"; "the heart" is "the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love"; and the "reasons of the heart" are "feelings that are intentional responses to values" (115). Now what is, I think, self-evident, is that Lonergan's "heart with its reasons" is a spiritual reality in the deepest possible sense. And this highest reality is a reality of feeling: "being in love with God" is a conscious, dynamic feeling "state of love, joy, peace" (106) and faith, "the eye of love" (117), is a most sublime "reason of the heart" which as an apprehension of transcendent value "places all other values in the light and the shadow of transcendent value" (116). Like von Hildebrand, then, Lonergan draws sharp qualitative distinctions between various types of feelings, beginning with the elemental bodily and sensitive psychic feelings of pleasure and pain, desire and fear, and culminating in the spiritual feelings of peace, joy, and most centrally love. Thus, like von Hildebrand, Lonergan in his later writings proves himself to be an ardent exponent of the reality and uniqueness of spiritual feelings and a theologian of the heart *par excellence*.

The Thomist faculty psychology approach to the issue of spiritual feelings raises questions about the relationship of key spiritual feelings to the will and also about the qualitative difference between sensitive feelings and spiritual feelings.
Lonergan’s use of intentionality analysis in dealing with feelings gives rise to a distinct yet analogously related set of questions.

Jean Mouroux, von Hildebrand, and Frederick Crowe, each in his own creative fashion, in works spanning the 1950-1960 period, dealt with the problem of the relationship between the affective reality of love and the will. Jean Mouroux suggested that Thomas Aquinas did not distinguish between “affective and effective” love since for him “love was by its very nature an affective reality, being an inner act of will—a mixture of spiritual feeling and freedom” (1954: 265). Mouroux took the position that “freedom is animated and supported throughout its development by great spiritual feelings” (293-294); that “freedom is brought to life by ‘objects’ loaded with affective value, which release the feeling that provokes and orientates the choice” (294); that “the freedom of the just man is moved to generous effort by the gratitude he feels at the thought that he has been redeemed ... – in short, by love” (294). Von Hildebrand, writing at the same time as Mouroux, took great pains to show the distinction between the activity of the will and affective responses such as love. He argued that “we never can engender any affective response by a fiat, nor can we command it by our will ... Love, for instance, is always granted to us as a gift” (1953: 203). Frederick Crowe in his well-known articles entitled “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas” (1959) argued that “complacency” is a form of love distinct from both eros and agape. Unlike eros, which is the inclination, tendency, desire for the good to be possessed, and unlike agape, which is the diffusion or communication of the good possessed, “complacency” is that basic form of love, that fundamental, tranquil quiescence of the will in the good possessed (344-348).

What happens to the relationship of love to the will in Lonergan’s Method and his writings following Method? He no longer speaks of intellect and will in the metaphysical terms of faculty psychology. Indeed, he speaks of the three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging as constitutive of knowing in the strict sense, and of a fourth level of consciousness, the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision,
action; this is the level of responsibility, freedom, conscience. Lonergan also speaks of falling in love; he suggests that "the love into which we fall is not some single act of loving, not some series of acts, but a dynamic state that prompts and molds all our thoughts and feelings, all our judgments and decisions" (1974: 153). The highest form of falling in love is being in love with God. "Of it St. Paul wrote to the Romans (5:5): 'Through the Holy Spirit given to us, God's love has flooded our hearts'" (153). In Method God's flooding our hearts with his love effects a transformation of the fourth level of consciousness. Indeed, Lonergan suggested in an interview cited by Crowe that it is appropriate to "talk about the level of love as a fifth level" (1982: 6). As is clear, Lonergan's shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis puts the issue raised by Mouroux, von Hildebrand, and Crowe about the relationship between will and love in an entirely new perspective. Lonergan distinguishes between deliberation and decision, on the one hand, and being in love and acts of loving, on the other. He avows that being in love profoundly affects "one's decisions and deeds" (1972: 105). Here Lonergan agrees with Mouroux that a person's effective choices are profoundly influenced by his or her affectivity, by love. Again, he concurs with von Hildebrand about the importance of distinguishing between choosing (Lonergan uses the word "deciding") and love in its distinct affective reality as feeling. But, unlike Mouroux and von Hildebrand, Lonergan drops the whole language of faculty psychology and is hence freed from certain disputes which plagued the faculty psychology approach.

There remains the question of the relationship between Crowe's Thomist analysis of will in terms of eros, agape, and "complacency," and Lonergan's treatment of love in his intentionality analysis. Here I can only offer some tentative suggestions. Lonergan explicitly distinguishes only between the state of being in love, the value judgments of the person in love, and acts of loving. But it seems to me that his intentionality analysis is, in principle, open to acknowledging an intentional feeling response of love to a person whom one is beginning to find lovable as well as to a person with whom one is already in
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love. (I might add that by extension the intentional feeling response of love can be directed to qualities of persons, and so on.) Lonergan holds that “the love into which we fall is not some single act of loving, not some series of acts, but a dynamic state” (1972: 153). He explicitly speaks of a “single act of loving” and a “series of acts of loving.” If by an act or acts of loving Lonergan understands an affective, intentional feeling response of love, then it seems that this would most likely be quite similar to Crowe’s “complacency” or affective resting in the reality of the loved object. But, if by an act or acts of loving Lonergan refers to an agapic act, such as Crowe describes it, then I think that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis in the sphere of love needs to be complemented by the addition of the intentional feeling response of love or “complacency.” The expression “act of loving” is most commonly understood as a verbal or non-verbal expressing of one’s love to another or as engaging in some beneficent form of activity toward another. It is because of the diverse possible meanings of the expression “act of loving” that I have judged it necessary to raise the question about Lonergan’s precise understanding and use of this expression and to introduce the qualifications I have made. For it is one thing to experience an affective, intentional feeling response of love toward a person; it is a second thing to express one’s love for a person in some fashion; it is a third thing to be in love with someone; and it is a fourth thing to make a value judgment regarding the excellence and worth of the first three realities I just described. There is one final comparison I would like to make between Crowe’s “complacency” and an element in Lonergan’s discussion of love. Crowe describes complacency as a certain quiescence of the will in the good. Lonergan in describing the state of being in love with God speaks of it in one text in Augustinian terms as a “resting in God” which is not something “that we achieve, but that we accept, ratify” (1974: 153). There is a similarity between Crowe’s complacent quiescence of the will in the good and the “resting” in the good of God which Lonergan ascribes to the state of being in love with God. But Crowe’s complacency involves a receptive repose in the good of an object apprehended by intellect, whereas
Lonergan's state of being in love with God is not a response to what is first apprehended, known.

Thomist faculty psychology raised questions about the nature of the different types of feelings and tried to deal with these questions by engaging in a metaphysical analysis of sensitive and intellectual, apprehensive and appetitive potencies, forms (habits), and acts. Lonergan's intentionality analysis, as applied to the area of feelings, gives rise to a new set of questions which require answers in the psychological terms of intentionality analysis. Elizabeth Morelli in her excellent, challenging doctoral dissertation entitled Anxiety: A Study of the Affectivity of Moral Consciousness (1981) provides us with the best in-depth study to date of a particular affect viewed within the framework of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. She also raises a number of important questions about the relationship of certain forms of feeling to the different levels of consciousness outlined by Lonergan. I would like to consider some of her questions because they provide a stimulus for delving more deeply into the precise meaning of feelings as apprehensive-intentional responses to values. But it is first necessary to indicate in a very summary fashion the principal thesis of her work.

Basically, she argues that the affect anxiety in its highest non-pathological form is a "fundamental state immanently qualifying moral intentionality" (136); "it is the experience of the tension of the opposition between self-centeredness and real self-transcendence on the fourth level of conscious intentionality" (136); this fourth-level anxiety "arises ... in the face of possibility and freedom" (140); thus, "as morally conscious, one is free to conform or not to the intelligible order, and one confronts this possibility in freedom" (140-141). This anxiety can coexist with deep religious conviction. Morelli offers the example of Abraham who "approached Mount Moriah in fear and trembling"; of St. Theresa "who recounts her anxiety before the possibility of entering Christ's presence in prayer"; and of Christ himself who "felt great distress and fear in the garden of Gethsemane" (141). "The fact that one can have a profound religious orientation and yet be anxious suggests that the
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essential structure of conscious tension on the fourth level of conscious intentionality is not altered by religious conversion" (141-142). But it is possible that, if a person is willing "to confront anxiety," at times "one can even feel a kind of joy in knowing that one can appeal to one's anxiety as a teacher, a guide, a liberator. Heidegger writes of an 'unshakeable joy' which accompanies the anxiety that brings us face to face with our own possibilities" (162).

In the course of her analysis of anxiety Morelli observes that Lonergan "no longer relegates feelings to empirical consciousness but ... understands them to be an integral component of moral consciousness" (83). This and related insights lead her to propose certain questions—which she at times leaves unanswered—for consideration by Lonergan scholars. Thus, for example, she asks: "Are intentional responses to values restricted to the fourth and fifth levels?" (86). My own response is affirmative. (I will prescind for the moment from a discussion of the fifth level.) Feelings as intentional responses to values are "reasons of the heart" which is a fourth-level reality. As Lonergan puts it: "Mind is experience, understanding, judgment; and heart is what's beyond this on the level of feeling and 'is this worthwhile?'" (1974: 220). But the particular value to which one responds in feeling can be, for example, the value of understanding—a second-level activity—or the value of understanding correctly—a third-level reality. Each particular intentional feeling response to value flows then from the heart, but the value to which it responds can be a vital value, an aesthetic value, an intellectual value. A second question of Morelli's is: "Could one single feeling involve all of the levels of consciousness?" (1981: 87). Morelli proceeds to offer a phenomenology of grief over the death of a person as felt at different levels of consciousness:

On the level of empirical consciousness, images of death and decay may evoke fear and revulsion; one may experience sensations of being wrenched bodily from the departed. On the intellectual level, one may experience a certain perplexity in the face of mortality; one may be confronted with numerous bewildering questions concerning the meaning of life and death, and the possibility of immortality. With
rational consciousness one may feel doubt or conviction concerning answers to these questions; one may find oneself reviewing repeatedly the circumstances of the person's death as if to verify it, or in order to overcome the numbness insulating one from the realization. On the level of moral consciousness, one may feel a deepened appreciation of the value of this person ...; one may feel remorse for things said or unsaid (87).

Morelli concludes her reflection on grief by raising two more questions: "Is grief a complex of feelings rather than a single feeling? Do all fourth level feelings involve similar sublations of lower-level affects?" It seems to me that Morelli's own phenomenological analysis of the various possible components in the feeling response of grief makes it quite clear that grief can be a complex rather than simple affect, involving bodily and sensitive psychic elements as well as the intentional feeling responses of the heart. It also seems to me that in a healthy, holy, and enlightened individual the feeling responses of the heart, especially those of faith and love, sublate, transform, and integrate the total affectivity of the grieving individual. In Michelangelo's Pietà for example, the sensitive sorrow of the Virgin seems to be lifted into the realm of spirit. It is not negated as sensitive sorrow but it is spiritualized, transformed. If I may apply, by analogy, a comment of Lonergan about the sublation of the operations of intentionality analysis to sublations in the realm of feeling, I would say that higher-level affects can sublate lower-level affects: "They sublate the lower, preserving them indeed in their own proper perfection and significance, but also using them, endowing them with a new and fuller and higher significance, and so promoting them to ends beyond their proper scope" (1985: 30). It is also valid, however, to speak of a movement from above downwards, of a "redundantia," an overflow into the "stream" of the heart, moving down even into the depths of the unconscious. It is, above all, the fifth level of being in love with God, with its intentional affective responses to the Beloved and its acts of loving, that transforms all the lower levels of the human person. "If one loves God, one may do as one pleases ... Then affectivity is of a single piece" (1972: 39). I do think, then, that it is legitimate to speak by analogy of the
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sublation of lower-level affects by higher-level feelings. But I believe it is also important to utilize the analogy of an overflow from above, from the fountainhead of love, which waters the very roots of the sensitive psyche itself and aids the "quasi-operator that presides over the transition from the neural to the psychic ... [and] ushers into consciousness ... the demands of unconscious vitality" (1985: 29).

To provide evidence, however, for the affirmation that all fourth-level feelings involve sublations or transformations of lower-level affects is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, it is quite difficult to identify, distinguish, grasp spiritual feelings in themselves and in their sublating and transformative relation to other feeling responses. Thus, in speaking of spiritual feelings Mouroux correctly observes that "spiritual feelings have nothing like the same density as the emotions [sensible feelings] ... [and] being purely spiritual, they are difficult for the insufficiently purified to perceive or grasp" (1954: 294). Morelli too, in commenting on the anxiety of the fourth level of consciousness, acknowledges that "it is possible to be anxious and for that anxiety to be conscious and unavoidable, and yet know nothing of it" (1981: 145). She writes of the danger of a flight from cognitive recognition of anxiety and the need to reach a "real" rather than a merely "notional" knowledge of it. "One must be able to advert to one's own experience on the fourth level of conscious intentionality, one's own experience of the tension between self-centeredness and real self-transcendence, and identify what is grasped by insights into anxiety" (1981: 145). I should add that, although the task of appropriating the diverse spiritual states and feelings of the fourth and fifth levels of consciousness is awesome and must be approached with humility, reverence, and a sense of the limits of what is possible to achieve, nonetheless it is important to do what one can.

Lonergan remarks that "it seems a mistaken method to seek generalization before one has tried to understand the particular" (1985: 125). In the final segment of this paper I
would like to follow the advice of Lonergan and focus in some detail on one particular feeling response. I have chosen the intentional feeling response of gratitude because the analysis of it will help in a special way to bring together a number of key reflections about feeling at work in the earlier sections of this paper. I have also decided to look at the feeling response of gratitude because it is the type of affective response which forces us to consider very carefully the precise role of the cognitive in the process leading up to the emergence in consciousness of intentional feeling responses such as gratitude. I am most especially interested in the relationship of knowledge to intentional feeling responses to value since in my development of Christotherapy over the years I have been deeply influenced by cognitive therapists both in their theoretical reflections on the relationship between cognition and feeling and in the concrete methods they employ for facilitating the healing of affective disturbances. Finally, I should note in passing that there is no consensus among psychologists and philosophers regarding the technical meaning of the words feeling, passion, affect, and emotion. Thus, for example, Robert Solomon in The Passions (1976) speaks of gratitude as an emotion, but Balduin Schwarz in his beautiful study of gratitude (1960) for the most part calls it a feeling but at times also an emotion. When I am presenting my own views I will generally use the terminology of Lonergan, but I will let the authors I cite speak in their own terms.

It will be useful, I think, to preface our analysis of the feeling of gratitude with a citation of Robert Solomon's basic definition of gratitude and a brief summary of his overall theory of emotions. Solomon challenges dominant theories of the nature of emotion. He thus provides a unique catalyst for our specific reflections on gratitude and a help in situating Lonergan's approach to feelings within the spectrum of classical and contemporary discussions of feeling. Solomon opens his discussion of gratitude with the following definition: "Gratitude is an estimate of gain coupled with the judgment that someone else is responsible for that gain" (317). Solomon's definition of gratitude reflects his view that "an emotion is a 'judgment' (or a
set of judgments), something we do. An emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which constitute our world” (186-187). Thus, for example, “my embarrassment is my judgment to the effect that I am in an exceedingly awkward situation” (187). Again,

my sadness, my sorrow, and my grief are judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss. An emotion is an evaluative ... judgment about my situation, and about myself and/or about all other people (187).

Solomon acknowledges that his view of emotions is not the usual one. He says that “emotions are usually thought to be consequent to judgments ... but not the judgments themselves” (187). In fact, “even more usually, the notion of judgment is omitted altogether, and the emotion is said to follow— ... as a ‘reaction’ to— some incident before us” (187). Solomon contrasts his position with that of William James and with those of most motivational theorists, who hold that emotion is “the feeling that follows a perception of some disturbance in the ‘external world’.” He likewise shows the difference between his theory and that of most behaviorists, who, “if they recognize the category of emotion at all, hold that the emotion is nothing but a preparatory or avoidance reaction to a disturbing ‘stimulus’” (187). Solomon insists that “an incident or a perception of an incident alone is never sufficient for emotion, which always involves a personal evaluation of the significance of the incident” (187). Finally, I should note that Solomon’s theory also stands in a unique relationship to the views of Hume and Spinoza, who, as Jerome Neu suggests, “are the most systematic representatives of two opposing traditions of argument about the relationship of thought and feeling” (1977: 152). Thus, if “Humeans treat emotions as essentially feelings (impressions or affects) with thoughts incidentally attached ... [whereas] the Spinozists say roughly the reverse, treating emotions as essentially thoughts (‘ideas’ or ‘beliefs’) with feelings incidentally attached” (152), then Solomon appears to represent a viewpoint which leans toward the Spinoza position, but with a particular stress on the evaluative, judgmental character of emotion.
My initial analysis of gratitude involves a brief comparison of Solomon's position on gratitude with that of J. C. Gosling (1969), who enumerates three requirements for the occurrence of gratitude:

First, I cannot be grateful ... to no one for nothing; second, I cannot realize I feel grateful, but have no idea of to whom or for what; and third, if I feel grateful it must be for some reason, which it will be possible to give in a 'because clause,' and the reason cited be believed (499).

Solomon would agree with Gosling that gratitude is only directed to another person—"human or superhuman"; it is "outer directed." "One can also be grateful to an inferior ... as well as a superior." Again, Solomon would concur with Gosling that gratitude implies a gift, "though the gift itself might be anything whatever" (317). Solomon also clearly agrees with Gosling—for quite different reasons—that a person cannot realize that he or she feels grateful, but have no idea of to whom or for what. This is so because for Solomon the emotion of gratitude is itself an evaluative judgment and not a feeling which follows an evaluative judgment. This means that Solomon must also reject Gosling's third condition for the experience of gratitude. For, what precisely differentiates Solomon's theory from that of Gosling is that for Solomon the emotion of gratitude in itself is an evaluative judgment rather than a distinct feeling experience which depends on a prior belief in certain reasons for that gratitude, which are able to be expressed in a 'because' clause.

My next comparison is between Balduin Schwarz's analysis of the feeling of gratitude and that of Solomon. Schwarz argues that a phenomenological analysis of the feeling of gratitude is not enough. It is necessary to "place the results of phenomenological analysis into the total context of human existence" (1960: 170). With Solomon, Schwarz agrees that gratitude is possible only towards "persons, and persons other than myself"; he further concurs that "we find gratitude only in that interpersonal situation in which we believe another person has freely favored us" (170). Schwarz also stresses that the feeling of gratitude
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is based on a cognitive element and has the character of a response [and this is] tellingly apparent in the French expression 'etre reconnaissant.' I can be grateful only where I recognize (or think I do) that a person has favored me, has bestowed on me what I experience as 'a good for me' (170).

Schwarz gives an example: I drop a glove without noticing it. If I later find the glove myself I experience a certain joy at finding what was lost. But if someone else finds the glove and returns it to me, I experience joy but also an additional feeling of gratitude toward the person who returned the glove. My normal response is to thank the person for returning the glove. Solomon also remarks that gratitude leads to the desire to thank (1976: 318). Schwarz observes that a cognitive element intervenes between my experience of joy at the recovery of the glove and the "specific warm emotional feeling of gratitude" (171). As he puts it:

In a process quicker than thought I have asked myself questions and have answered them to my satisfaction. These questions were: "Has this just happened to me or has someone done it to me? And, if the latter, has he done so because it was good for me?" Only then, as a meaningful response to the conviction I have established, does gratitude as a feeling spontaneously arise (171-172).

Further, where there is gratitude for gifts received "as tokens of friendship, of parental or filial affection, of married love, we take cognizance of the very special 'yes' which the other says to our person" (177-178). It is essential that the receiver of this gift recognize the very special intention of the giver to affirm our person. It is also vital that the receiver recognize the graciousness of the giver, that the gift be freely given with no claim to it on the part of the receiver. Gratitude has an "opening-up power" (184). Solomon too views gratitude as "positive regarding the gift itself ...; positive without qualification ... regarding that act of giving" and "open regarding the giver" (1976: 184); and Solomon notes its "outer-directed" quality (317).

There is a further issue regarding the nature of gratitude which von Hildebrand raises. He understands gratitude to be a response to an objective good for the person. He distinguishes
the response of gratitude both from responses to the merely subjectively satisfying and from responses to value. "Gratitude implies specific reference to an objective good for us, either for our own person or for a beloved one with whom we have such solidarity that the favor conferred on this person presents itself as a benefit for us" (1953: 395). Von Hildebrand gives the example of someone who is saved from a danger threatening to his life. He says that what moves this person is gratitude for the gift of his life, for something which "has the character of an objective good for him" and that this object differs both from value or "the important-in-itself" and from "the merely subjectively satisfying" (50). Von Hildebrand does describe gratitude as "one of the basic moral attitudes" and as "always endowed with a high moral value" and he acknowledges that "the value response to the bounty of the donor is an indispensable ... element conditioning the moral value of gratitude," but at the time he insists that "gratitude essentially implies a response to the objective good for us" (395-396). As far as I have been able to research the issue, I find that von Hildebrand consistently distinguishes between, on the one hand, intentional affective responses to value, such as love and joy, and, on the other hand, the response of the objective good for the person, that is, to what is good for me or for what I care about. Lonergan does not adopt von Hildebrand's distinction between intentional responses to values and responses to "the objective good for the person." Was this a deliberate decision on his part? Lonergan does distinguish between "feelings that are self-regarding and feelings that are disinterested" (1985: 173). He states that "self-regarding feelings are pleasures and pains, desires and fears"; disinterested feelings, however, "recognize excellence" (173). Would Lonergan view gratitude as self-regarding? He would certainly not place it in the category of desires, fears, and the like. Would he regard gratitude as disinterested and as a response to value? I leave this issue for Lonergan scholars to puzzle over.

My own tentative hypothesis regarding the nature of gratitude is that it is proper to describe it as an intentional response to value, to excellence, to a good. Most certainly there
is a bipolar dimension to gratitude. Gratitude presupposes knowledge of a gift received and also knowledge of the unmerited bounty of the giver. But, as Balduin Schwarz points out, referring again to his example of the return of the lost glove, “I first feel the joy of receiving the glove back, then I look for the person responsible and recognize him as responsible and benevolent, and only then do I feel the gratitude well up in me” (1960: 187). This example shows that “the spontaneous joy about the good for me” (185), which I feel at the return of the lost glove, precedes the experience of the feeling of gratitude. The latter feeling response “only comes when I recognize the other as responsible. The cognitive element follows the joy but precedes the gratitude” (187). It seems clear from this example that, although a person experiences gratitude only when he or she receives an unmerited good of some kind from another, the feeling of gratitude itself is not most fundamentally self-regarding but rather a self-transcending response to the graciousness of the giver. As Schwarz puts it: “Gratitude is basically an experience in which I relate myself to something outside myself” (185). For this reason, I envisage gratitude as more disinterested than self-interested. Moreover, as an intentional feeling response it goes beyond the cognitive grounds which precede it and reveals the excellence of the value of graciousness, which is a moral quality of the giver. For it is possible to recognize the freely bestowed benevolent action of another and yet to say: “So what!” The cognitive grounds which precede the feeling response of gratitude are a necessary but not a sufficient cause for the gratitude. The intentional feeling response of gratitude is a new actuation of a capacity for response within the human person; and this response of gratitude unveils a new dimension of reality: the intrinsic excellence, the richness in itself of the value of liberality, munificence, graciousness. Finally, the other-oriented, self-transcending character of the feeling of gratitude is clearly revealed in the first fruit of gratitude, which is to give thanks to the giver.

Von Hildebrand puts a central emphasis in his writings on the importance of the pure value response, which is focused
exclusively on the value—what he terms “the important-in-itself.” He constantly warns against desecrating the pure value response by any backward look toward the self. I find his insight into the importance of surrendering oneself to the value-in-itself a very significant insight. But in reading him I also experience a tendency in myself to be discouraged at the seeming impossibility of realizing the kind of relentless pursuit of pure value perception he requires. I think that he shows too much suspicion and too little appreciation of legitimate self-love. I am not sure, but I suspect von Hildebrand’s spiritual idealism perhaps forced him into making the distinction between the value-in-itself and the objective good for the person. There may be a certain legitimacy in the distinction but I do not find that it provides sufficient grounds for refusing to grant to gratitude the quality of an intentional response to value.

At this point in the discussion I think it is time to face directly the issue of the uniqueness of apprehensive-intentional responses to value both in relationship to the knowledge which may precede them and to the judgments of value which may be consequent to them and, to an extent, dependent upon them. It is my conviction that intentional responses to value do reveal a new reality, a new dimension of the objects to which the feelings respond. Lonergan remarks that “in Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion ... It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience” (1974: 277). This means that it is on the level of intentional feeling responses to values that realities known through experiencing, understanding, and judging are apprehended as realities with value, that is, as values. It is, for example, in the event of the affective response of love to a person that the person is revealed as uniquely lovable. Love discerns, recognizes, reveals, responds to the personal value, which is the individual in his or her inner lovableness and goodness. As Lonergan puts it in discussing religious experience, “our perceiving is through our own loving” (1972: 290). Indeed, it is valid to affirm of every authentic feeling response that through it we discern, recognize, and
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apprehend a dimension of reality previously unknown to the knowledge of experiencing, understanding, and judging. The "heart" does have its "reasons" and these reasons include all intentional feeling responses to authentic values. Yet, in affirming the unique revelatory function of intentional feeling responses, I do not mean to degrade the importance of knowledge or to deny that intentional feeling responses presuppose a cognitive base. Feelings as apprehensions of value often do arise as responses to what is first cognitively "intended, apprehended, represented" (1972: 30), yet they go beyond what is cognitively intended, apprehended, represented to discern, recognize, reveal, and apprehend values. It is also true, however, that the intentional responses of feelings to values do not take the place of or eliminate the need for value judgments. The same transcendental notion or dynamism that awakens in us a desire to grasp meaning and then to know whether the meaning we grasp is true also gives rise to the question, is this truly worthwhile? And, as Lonergan observes:

In the judgment of value ... three components unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself (1972: 38).

It is significant that for Lonergan intentional responses to value do constitute a component in the process that leads to the value judgment. This shows the great importance Lonergan assigns to the role of intentional feeling responses to values in reaching correct value judgments. There is, I believe, a striking parallel between Lonergan's view of the vital role of feeling responses as components in the process leading up to the value judgment and Ignatius Loyola's stress on the very significant role of feelings in the discernment process, which culminates in decisions. I hope to pursue this topic in a book tentatively entitled Feelings of the Heart and Transformation in the Spirit.
In concluding this paper, I will offer a brief synthesis of Lonergan's key ideas regarding the nature of those feelings which are apprehensive, intentional responses to value. In presenting this synthesis, I will try to highlight the uniqueness of Lonergan's views by contrasting his ideas, when it seems useful, to other leading theorists.

In agreement with the cognitive theorists Lonergan maintains that some kind of "knowledge" of an object is required for an intentional feeling response to occur. "Intentional [feeling] responses ... answer to what is intended, apprehended, represented. The feeling relates us, not just to a cause or an end, but to an object" (1972: 30). This is true, not only of intentional feeling responses to what is agreeable or disagreeable, but also of intentional responses to values. Lonergan would not agree, however, with a theorist like Solomon, who holds that emotions—feelings in Lonergan's terminology—are evaluative judgments. Lonergan would also strongly disagree with a theorist like von Hildebrand who holds that a unique cognitive perception of value must precede the intentional feeling response to value. For Lonergan there is no "grasp" of the value of what is cognitively apprehended prior to the occurrence of the intentional feeling response to value. It is precisely in this latter response that an authentic value is discerned, recognized, and revealed.

Lonergan, then, is very far from the Spinozists who hold that emotions are essentially thoughts with some kind of affect incidentally attached. But Lonergan does use terms like "apprehend," "discern," "recognize," and "reveal" when he speaks of the function of feelings as intentional responses to values. For this reason—and others—the Humeans, who hold that emotions are basically feelings with thoughts incidentally appended, cannot claim Lonergan as one of their own. Lonergan, following Scheler, even speaks of feelings as responding to values "in accord with some scale of preference" (1972: 31). Lonergan acknowledges that there are feelings that basically respond to objects that are pleasurable or painful but that these kinds of feelings "do not discriminate between what is truly good and what is only apparently good" (223). On the
other hand, Lonergan avers that "there are feelings that are intentional responses and that do involve such a discrimination and put themselves in a hierarchy—and you have your vital values, social values, cultural values, religious values" (1974: 223). Here Lonergan is, indeed, far removed from any reductionist, sensist approach to feelings, which would view all feelings as mere blind, emotivist discharges or excitations. At the same time, he is equally distanced from any cognitive approach to feeling which would denigrate the uniqueness of feeling for the sake of exalting knowledge. For Lonergan, it is the feeling state of being in love, and above all the graced feeling state of being in love with God, that crowns human consciousness. Lonergan agrees with Scheler and von Hildebrand that "what really reveals values and lets you see them, is being in love" (1974: 223), and for Lonergan this means, above all, being in love with God. The person who is deeply in love with God possesses a faith—the eye of love—which in its reality as an apprehension of value places all other values in the light and the shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them (1972: 116).

Most certainly Lonergan acknowledges many types of feelings. But he places the highest forms of feeling—the state of being in love with God and the reasons of the heart—at the very apex of human consciousness. I agree with the suggestion of Frederick Crowe that the Lonergan of Method and his later writings is profoundly Augustinian. I believe that he does restore a role to feeling and the heart which is most appropriate and needed in this present era where the crisis of the human good requires, above all, the contributions of knowers who are deeply in love with God and with God's creatures—great and small.

My focus in most of my previous Lonergan Workshop papers and other writings has been on the development of a Christ-centered therapy for dealing with the many spiritual and psychological pathologies which exist in human beings. Most certainly, I also stressed in my writings the role of Christ as life-giver and principal agent of high level spiritual growth and
development. But the central intent of my works on Christotherapy has been therapeutic. More recently, I have shifted my attention from Christotherapy to Christo-integration, from a stress on therapy to an emphasis on maturation in Christ. This new focus has led me to discover riches in Lonergan's approach to feelings which I had previously overlooked. Abraham Low distinguishes between pure feeling responses and those neurotic feeling responses which are the results of various cognitive distortions in consciousness (1968: 115). I think that in dealing with psychological pathology it is most important to uncover and name the destructive mind-sets mediating the feeling responses of individuals. But I believe that it is most vital in dealing with the development and refinement of intentional feeling responses to values to fix attention on the various values within the hierarchy of values and to seek to respond directly to these values themselves. The most important avenue to the appreciation of the works of Mozart is to listen to these works. The most significant path to the discernment of spiritual values is to pray and attend reverently to the values revealed in Christ and to the values of the kingdom within. I can do no better than to conclude with Paul's wise observations that it is the spiritual person who alone discerns the spiritual gifts (1 Cor 2:15) and that, as persons who have been raised up with Christ, it is our most blessed calling to let our hearts dwell on spiritual values, on the treasures of the resurrected life we now live (Col 3:1-3), and, above all, "to seek after love" (1 Cor 14:1).
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