LONERGAN WORKSHOP
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edited by Fred Lawrence
EDITOR'S NOTES

Not long before the summer Workshop a couple of years ago, I asked Patrick Byrne of Boston College's department of philosophy if he would give a talk that would meet a recurrent need expressed each summer: an introduction to Lonergan's work for those who may have an interest in but no prior familiarity with his thought. So brilliantly did Pat come through in such short order, and so successful was his lecture, that we asked him to write it down for publication. The result, considerably expanded, leads off Lonergan Workshop 6. It is rare that anyone should have so helpful a grasp of the range of Lonergan's oeuvre from the theory of grace to economic theory. It is a real privilege and pleasure for us to be able to share Pat's introduction with the wider community.

Robert Doran's paper describes the motivations behind his shift from concern with the implications of psychic conversion for individuals and his transposition of Jungian therapy, to his present attention to the social and the cultural dialectic. Here we get a foretaste of Bob's monograph, forthcoming as a supplemental issue of Lonergan Workshop.

Toby Foshay's essay was presented some years ago. It represents our desire to have papers from people outside philosophy and theology. His piece brings aspects of Lonergan's interpretation theory to bear in literary criticism of Joyce.

My own paper hovers on the borderline between general and special categories in Foundations and Systematics. It suggests links between the human good as conversational, and contributions made by Lonergan at the end of De Deo Trino about the transformation of the human good through personal relations with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

If Philip McShane is correct, Lonergan's notion of the specialty Communications is much more ambitious and exacting than most of his followers have yet dreamed. McShane's amplification of the meaning of Systematics, brought about by relating Insight's canons of empirical method both to its canons of interpretation and to the sketch of theo-
logical tasks in the Epilogue, has a startling strangeness about it which is suggestive, not just for theology, but also for literary theory as initiated by Poshay.

The papers by the two philosophers in this volume fill the need for Lonergan's thought to be brought into contact with the conversation going on outside Lonergan circles. Hugo Meynell's piece seeks to redress the onesidedness of much European anti-Cartesianism by sharing the benefits of his own reflections on works of art and literature. Mark Morelli takes up the challenge of dialogue and dialectic not just by discussing the topics, but by performing them. In doing so, he ventures into conversation with authors rarely, if ever, taken seriously by people interested in Lonergan. He listens to what they have to say about what Lonergan calls 'reversing counter-positions' and makes the best of what they mean in the light of appropriation and interiority.

John Navone's paper tells us about the direction in which he has been led to carry forward what he has understood from Lonergan—one of the timeliest and most fruitful veins being explored by theology today: narrative theology.

Bernard Tyrrell continues to probe the area of psychic healing. His paper shares with us his personal struggles in making Lonergan's breakthrough into a thematic treatment of feelings his own.

Once again I want to acknowledge my heartfelt thanks to Charles Hefling, our manuscript editor, who (with the help of Pat Byrne's expertise in computer technology) handles and supervises everything from typescripts to print-ready text; to Pat, our business manager; to Nancy Woodhouse and Linda Yood for word-processing; and to Joe Flanagan for his unflagging support. I am especially grateful to Charles and Pat, because without their zeal I would hardly have had a sabbatical; and this volume would certainly not have come about.

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THE FABRIC OF LONERGAN'S THOUGHT

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In past years, people who've come from around the world to the "Lonergan Workshops" held each June at Boston College have at various times expressed a desire for some sort of general overview of the late Rev. Bernard Lonergan, S.J. as a thinker. His work has spawned unusual reflections on such a wide and diverse range of topics as relativity physics and self-appropriation through literature, political theology and psychic conversion, macroeconomics and spirituality. It is hard to conceive that there is a unifying thread in all this diversity. Because of the profusion topics covered in his own writings as well as those of scholars influenced by his thought, it can be difficult to retain the perspective of the forest amidst the wonderment of all the trees.

A couple of years ago, Fred Lawrence asked me to prepare a talk which would respond to the recurrent request for an overview. Because that talk was found to be of help to some, I have expanded it into the present article. Those who were present for the talk will find the first two sections of the present article familiar. In the remaining sections, I have undertaken to integrate Lonergan's five major works into the perspective laid out in these first two sections. It is my hope that each of those last five sections could be read somewhat independently, serving the purpose of outlining the main threads of works which many, including myself, have found difficult to unravel. Because of the obvious limitations both of space and the level of my own understanding, this overview can be no more than a point of departure, and should not substitute for reading Lonergan's works themselves. This article should not be regarded as a comprehensive study of Lonergan's work. Its sole value consists in the extent to which it can
provide the reader a helpful orientation to Lonergan's writings. Hence, the reader is invited to add his or her own insights to expand and correct the points set forth here.

In a sense, it is more difficult for someone like me to present you an idea of what Lonergan has accomplished, because I was not educated in the style of thought out of which Fr. Lonergan's ideas emerged. Many of Lonergan's other students were. I only know of that style of thought by having read and heard about it. Yet, to understand what Fr. Lonergan has achieved, I think it is important to know something about that style of thought. So I'd like to begin with an account of that style of thought in terms of two phrases Fr. Lonergan has used to characterize it—"conceptualism" and "the classicist notion of culture." Having done this, I shall discuss the ways in which he advanced beyond that style in his major published works: Grace and Freedom, Verbum, Insight, Method in Theology, and An Essay in Circulation Analysis. Accordingly, this essay will be divided into seven sections: "Conceptualism," "The Transition from Classicist Culture," and one section devoted to each of the five major works.

I. CONCEPTUALISM

Lonergan frequently referred to the limitations of the older style of thought from which he emerged as "conceptualism." By "conceptualism," Lonergan meant the position that real knowledge of anything is had only in the grasp of the concepts under which it falls. Concepts are formed by abstracting the universal from the particular matter, so that conceptual knowledge consists in knowledge of the universal. Furthermore, such knowledge is knowledge of the eternal, universal, necessary, and unchanging.

For universals do not change; they are just what they are defined to be; and to introduce a new definition is, not to

1. "[The] conceptualist knows human intellect only by what it does [i.e., by what it produces, concepts], but the intellectualist knows and analyses not only what intelligence in act does but also what it is" (Lonergan, 1967: 186-87). For a summary of Lonergan's criticisms of conceptualism, see 1967: 185-188, 211-213.
change the old universal, but to place another universal beside the old one (1966: 3).

In short, there could be other types of knowledge, but the "right stuff" of knowing was knowing the eternal verities through abstraction of concepts.

This quality of concepts stands in sharp contrast with the changeableness of the world of particular circumstances. Thus the universal and the concrete were considered to be radically separated. One could not derive scientific, ethical, or theological norms from the concrete order because of its changeableness; one couldn't have changing concepts without losing normativity, without sacrificing firm foundations. This position, taken to its logical conclusions as it frequently was, has several unfortunate ramifications.

First, any kind of knowledge of the concrete, the changeable, or the particular becomes denigrated to a status of less than full knowledge. It is knowledge, not of "the substantial," but of the "merely accidental." Thus the knowledge of an artisan, a professional and ultimately of an empirical scientist could be granted, at best, a merely practical utilitarian value. Only the knowledge of the metaphysician would be considered to rise to a level of abstraction possessing sufficient universality to be genuinely "true" knowledge.

Second, in the moral sphere, only conceptual knowledge of universal imperatives would be capable of providing non-arbitrary norms for human living, because only such conceptualistic norms are free from the

2. As I will be using the term, "normativity," with some frequency in this article, I had best give a definition. "Normative" here will be taken to mean "according to a standard." In the phrase, "classicism culture conceived itself normatively," the standard in question is classicist culture: every other way of life is judged according to the extent to which it deviates from that standard. Lonergan's own use of the term "normativity" is whatever meets the exigences of human consciousness—whatever is attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. However, as the precise meanings of these terms themselves presuppose a considerable feat of self-appropriation, for the present I offer a preliminary negative definition of "normativity" as that which is opposed to the merely arbitrary. That is, "normativity" is opposed to statements such as "If you believe it's true or good, then it is." or "If things are done that way in that culture or historical period, then that's sensible and good to them."
vicissitudes of changing circumstances and from the pressures to go along with the crowd.

Third, because concepts are supposed to be unchanging, there is a temptation to assume that the concept must always and everywhere mean what I take it to mean. Hence, a blindness to the possibility of a variety of meanings develops and the complexities associated with the problem of interpretation are obscured. If one happens to run up against someone whose recalcitrant use of the term cannot be forced to square with my own, then the fellow is just plain ignorant and certainly not worthy of serious consideration.

Fourth, this same blindness tends to lead to an overestimation of the adequacy of one's current inventory of concepts as being completely adequate for the task of explaining any phenomenon, solving any problem, overcoming any moral dilemma.

Fifth, for the same reasons conceptualism in the sphere of morality leads to an adherence to pious moral idealism which prescinds from the complex and real ethical demands of the concrete situation.

Sixth, when theology is done in a conceptualist context, there arises the tendency to believe that, since one is using known, true, universal concepts, that one is indeed explaining the mysteries of God's being and gracious saving activity (1970: 8; see also 1967: 211). Hence, any one who fails to grasp the truth of it all is not only an infidel but a fool.

2. THE TRANSITION FROM CLASSICIST CULTURE

The other pole from which one can gain a view of the style of thought out of which Lonergan emerged is what he referred to as the "classicist notion of culture." It is a notion closely allied with conceptualism and like conceptualism, it is not simply one idea or set of ideas, but a total mentality.

In a series of lectures and articles (1966, 1968a, 1968b, 1968c, 1968d, 1969a and 1969b) prepared between 1966 and 1969, Lonergan repeatedly characterized the challenge which must be faced by contemporary theology as that posed by the transition from classicist to modern culture. Since this was the period in which Lonergan was thinking out
Method in Theology, an account of what he meant by this shift will prove important to an overview of his work.

2.1. The Notion of Culture in General

In order to understand what Lonergan meant by this cultural transition, it is first necessary to grasp what he meant by "culture" itself. According to him, "culture" is the complex web of meanings and values which make a way of life worth living, and a society worth belonging to. As such, "culture" is distinguished from "the social," that is, the ways groups of people get things done (1968c: 90-91; 1968d: 101-102). Hence "the social" includes the kinds of institutions and patterns of human interaction which are responsible for cooperative production and distribution of goods, services, information, and learning. It also includes the conventions and techniques by means of which groups of people arrive at common decisions. Accordingly, Lonergan wrote:

The social is conceived of as a way of life, a way in which men live together in some orderly and predictable fashion. Such orderliness is to be observed in the family and in manners, in society with its classes and elites, in education, in the state and its laws, in the economy and technology, in the churches and sects (1968d: 102).

If "the social" is the predictability which gives order to human interactions, "the cultural" is that which keeps the regularity of order from collapsing into onerous, meaningless routine. But besides a way of living, the social, there is also the cultural, and by the "cultural" I would denote the meaning we find in our present way of life, the value we place upon it, or again, the things we find meaningless, stupid, wicked, horrid, atrocious, disastrous (1968c: 91).

So much for the distinction between "the social" and "the cultural." More important is the relationship between these two. This relationship comes into view when we reflect on the facts of social and cultural innovation. It is apparent to us today that people at differ-
ent times and places have different ways of getting things done. We are also familiar with the fact that innovations in institutions occur and are propagated to effect changes in "the social." For example, the guild's way of organizing production of goods has been almost completely replaced by assembly lines and managerial organization. Again, where once the father's decision was the family's decision, that is no longer so in many cases.

It is no less true that there are innovations in culture as well. One type of innovation is when a whole gamut of cultural meanings floods into a culture. At present large numbers of people in Third World countries are adopting not only Western and Soviet technological and organizational ideas, but are also embodying the meanings which constitute the ways of being a man or a woman found in those societies as well. To a lesser extent, Western youths are attracted to Eastern images and symbols about the meaning of life. Hence, one source of new cultural meanings can be a foreign culture. However, the more ordinary source of cultural innovations is to be found in a less dramatic and less sweeping process. Just as social innovations occur to a single person or group and catch on to successively transform patterns of social organization, so too cultural innovations start small and grow. New cultural meanings and values commonly emerge when someone finds a new way of expressing him or herself in their role—whether that role is of teacher, banker, priest, parent, or one of the boys hanging out at the local pub. This new way of performing or expressing may strike those who witness it as "elegant," "refined," "stylish," "witty," "neat," "cool," or "awesome." Such appraisals of these new ways do not arise primarily through rational reflection, but rather through the immediacy of feelings.

In its immediacy the cultural is the meaning already present in the dream before it is interpreted, the meaning in a work of art before it is articulated by the critic, the endless shades of meaning in everyday speech, the intersubjective meanings of smile and frown, tone and gestures, evasion and silence, the passionate meanings of love and hatred, of high achievement and wrathful destruction (1968c: 91).

When these felt apprehensions of new ways become the basis for group emulation, a new cultural pattern is born. It spreads to the extent that more and more individuals share the felt appraisal and emulation.
The most obvious examples are to be found in the origination of slang expressions and fads among young people. Less obvious but more fundamental illustrations are to be found in the exhortations to new ways of living implicit in the works of musicians, artists, philosophers, or the quality of religious and political leaders which Max Weber called "charisma."

However, such felt apprehensions of something as being worthy of emulation are remarkably unreliable and subject to distortion. If patience and tolerance attract the feelings of some, many more feel that cruel put-downs are the way to go. More poignantly, the travesties of twentieth-century totalitarianisms could not have occurred without successful appeal to feelings as the criterion for altered ways of behaving.

2.2. The Higher Level in Culture

Because of such dangers, there is a real need of some basis for accepting and rejecting cultural meanings which is more normative than merely felt apprehensions. As Lonergan put it, when a people has worked out techniques for reflecting on and evaluating cultural innovations, it has a "higher level" in the cultural. To put the matter schematically, social innovations are most frequently evaluated from the viewpoint of the "immediacy of culture"; but cultural innovations of this sort themselves are evaluated by a "higher level" of culture.

But besides the meaning and value immediately intuited, felt, spoken, acted out, there is to any advanced culture a superstructure... Besides the meanings and values immanent in everyday living there is an enormous process in which meanings are elaborated and values are discerned in a far more reflective, deliberate, critical fashion (1968c: 91).

Lonergan nuanced his discussion of the cultural by saying that, when a culture has a higher level, this higher level elaborates and explicates the meanings and values implicit in expressions and deeds, and it scrutinizes, criticizes, evaluates, and ultimately accepts or rejects them (1968d: 102-103). The question, of course, is, On what basis is all this elaboration, evaluation and pronouncement done? What
justifies the procedures used in criticizing cultural innovations? There are three distinct types of answers to this question, three distinct types of control of cultural meanings: traditional, classicist and modern.

2.2.1. Traditional Control of Meaning

When the higher level of culture is not yet differentiated from the immediate, felt apprehension which is immanent in daily living, one has a "traditional" culture. Prior to the emergence of this distinct, higher level, traditional controls of cultural meaning operate through memory and example. A person hunts, builds, marries, gives birth, or buries one's dead in a particular way because one's ancestors did it that way. These ways are handed down from parent to child and preserved in the cultural memories of rituals, stories, legends, myths, and epics. The examples of the great heroes and the deeds of the gods are recalled through public enactment and private recitation. These rituals and narratives carry the symbols which mold the affective responses of the people. Acceptable deviations from these exemplars are rare and minimal.

2.2.2. The Classicist Notion of Culture

The transition from traditional to classical culture is Lonergan's way of characterizing what German existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers called the "axial period" in human history, and what Eric Voegelin has called "the leap in being." Voegelin has noted the

3. Voegelin, 1957: 1ff. A clarification is called for here. Strictly speaking, Voegelin's "leap in being" corresponds to what Lonergan meant in writing: "meaning is the stuff of man's making of man. So it is that a divine revelation is God's entry and his taking part in man's making of man" (1968b: 62). "The leap in being," therefore, is the historical movement wherein humans reach an awareness about the constitutive function of their own meaning which is sufficient for them to begin to discern God's activity in that realm. Prior to this point, according to Voegelin, awareness of the divine is limited to cosmological symbolism, to the experiences evoked by the cosmos as independent of constitutive meaning. Now the emergent awareness of God as cooperating in the realm of constitutive meaning brings about a radical disruption in cosmological cultural controls of meaning, and some sort of new control of meaning is needed. For Lonergan,
decline in Hellenic culture which resulted from its reliance on memory of the myths and correlative lack of this higher level. He has traced the gradual and difficult emergence of the higher level in Hellenic culture from Hesiod's critique of Homeric myth, through the tragedians' exploration of the soul, to its fullness in philosophy. His analysis of an address by Pericles to the Athenians draws one's attention to an especially poignant piece of evidence of a transitional stage between traditional and classicist culture. Voegelin quotes Thucydides' account of that speech as follows:

Our public men have, besides politics, their affairs to attend to; and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with their business, are still fair judges of public matters. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. We do not consider discussion an impediment to action, but rather the indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. ... I would have you day by day fix your eyes on the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with love for her (1957: 370-371).

The relatively new mode of control of meaning which emerged in Athens was the public discussion. This meant that the various points of view on an issue would be aired and hashed out through face-to-face debate in the presence of assembled citizens. Yet the ultimate criterion for judging the relative merit of conflicting viewpoints remained an unreflected appeal to the values immanent in the aesthetic experience of Athens. And if Pericles could be presumed to apprehend only the good and noble in the feelings underpinning his aesthetic vision, the same could not be said for his listeners. Nor was there as yet broadly available any alternative better under control.

that is the classicist control. Thus, while the "leap in being" is primarily God's effective entry into constitutive meaning, it has the immediate secondary consequence of giving rise to the need for a new control of meaning, one of which was the "classicist notion of culture." These remarks leave the problem of trying to understand whether the occurrence of the "leap in being" in Hellenic and other non-Hebrew cultures can be properly distinguished from "revelation" properly so-called in Hebrew culture.
The discovery, elaboration and communication of that better criterion, according to Voegelin, was the monumental achievement of Plato and Aristotle. They provided the foundations for what became the classical tradition in Western civilization. Let us briefly consider how Lonergan reflected on those foundations under the rubric of "the classicist notion of culture."

First, that notion is not simply an idea or a set of ideas. It is a whole mindset, a context, a horizon (1966: 2; 1968b: 56). To understand it, therefore, requires a grasp of several interrelated components. Lonergan identified five such components: logic, science, soul, nature and first principles (1968a: 50).

Second, at the heart of this complex of interrelated issues stands the classicist notion of "science." Among the factors contributing to the fourth century B.C. decline in Hellenic civilization was a massive infusion into Athens of new forms of thought. These new forms made their entry through itinerant foreign teachers, the "sophists" (Voegelin, 1957: 267-331). The new forms of thought were referred to as "sophia" (wisdom) and "episteme" (science, knowledge). These new forms grew out of the major breakthroughs in mathematics and were extended into speculations on the heavens, nature ("that which grows") and eventually into human affairs. In particular, the sciences of the sophists became highly regarded for their analyses of politics (270-273) and their practical efficacy in matters of persuasion, an art so central to the Athenian way of practicing politics. The authority of these new scientific speculations competed successfully with the authority of tradition, and challenged the traditional opinions of Athenian culture. After all, "real knowledge" (science) was obviously a far better basis for cultural discernment than "mere opinion" particularly as found in legend and myth. As these teachings began to proliferate, so too did their influence upon the "sound judgment" of the citizens involved in the public discussion (the judgment Pericles had praised so highly).

But were these new sciences and teachings really knowledge, or just sophisticated, dangerous opinion?4 A new basis for controlling

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4. While it is true, as Voegelin has shown, that the decadence in fourth century Hellenic culture cannot be exclusively laid at the feet of the new learning, it was nonetheless a significant contributing factor.
cultural meanings was needed, and this basis could go to the heart of the matter only insofar as it clarified the meaning of "science." In his dialogues, Plato repeatedly drew upon his controlled distinction between "doxa" (belief, opinion) and "episteme" (science, knowledge) in order to undermine the disordered, sophist positions articulated by his interlocutors. Aristotle devoted his *Posterior Analytics* to a precise examination of what science really was. In this way, both Plato and Aristotle took control of the meaning of "science," real knowledge, which would stand as a bulwark against the pretensions to science espoused by sophistry. From this effort there arose the centrality of the idea of science in the classicist notion of culture.

Under Aristotle's influence, that idea of science was characterized as (1968a: 47-48; 1968d: 103-104; 1969a: 139-40) necessary, true and certain knowledge of things through their ontological causes—in short, through universal, eternal, and unchanging concepts (1968a: 47; 1969a: 140). Hence, it was through this notion of science that the classicist notion of culture became vulnerable to the limitations of conceptualism. The classicist conception of science had the solicitous effect of eliminating the sophist appeal to differences among cultural practices in order to undermine the validity of any particular culture's practices. It had the less than happy result that, if taken to an extreme it will eliminate, demean, and make inconsequential the concreteness of particularities which make up anyone's way of living.

5. Voegelin's account of the classicist achievement does not correspond precisely to Lonergan's account of the "classicist notion of culture." The reasons, I think, are straightforward, if not simple. Voegelin was concerned to reconstruct an achievement in the purity of its origination; Lonergan was living at a time when that achievement had become decadent. Hence, If Lonergan's characterization of the classicist notion of culture fails to convey the sense of vitality, admiration and inspiration found in Voegelin's account, it is because the same decadence which had infected traditional Hellenic culture in the fourth century B.C. had permeated classicist Western culture by the early twentieth century A.D. Although neither Lonergan nor Voegelin does do so, one might draw a terminological distinction between "classical" and "classicist." "Classical" thinking would denote thinking vitiated by "conceptualism;" "classical" thinking would be free of that influence. Hence, one could conceive of a dynamic style of classical thought which adapted to change without loss of normativity.
Along with the Aristotelian idea of science, Lonergan identified four other components in the classicist notion of culture: the centrality of logic, the metaphysics of the soul, the specification of the meaning of humanity through the idea of nature, and the importance of first principles (1968a: 50). Nor were these wholly independent of one another. Each presupposes and complements the other. Rules of logic provided the norms for doing science.

[Logic] distinguished different meanings of the same term, and it defined each meaning. It reduced propositions to their presuppositions and worked out their implications. With meanings fixed by definitions, with presuppositions and implications fixed by the laws of logic, there resulted what used to be called the eternal verities but today are known as static abstractions (1968a: 47).

In turn, first principles—principles which themselves were universal, necessary and eternal—provided the basic presuppositions from which implications (real knowledge, scientific conclusions) were deduced. Chief among these first principles was that of human nature: a substance with its essence, potencies, habits, accidents, acts, and operations. The relations between this substantial human nature and its components were articulated in a metaphysical analysis of the soul, within the framework of an ontological causality: the potency of the soul to receive form was the ground of its perfection; forms already received were the ground of the soul's potency for external action, and so on.

This complex mindset was the basis for approaching cultural questions. What ways of living were to be judged appropriate? What parts of another culture's ways could be adopted? The answer was to be found in appealing to human nature. Human perfection and fullness was fixed by the potentialities of that nature. Human nature was always, eternally unchanging. Did this new way violate human nature? What were its presuppositions, its implications? Could they be logically reconciled with the metaphysically articulated ideas about human nature?

The problem with making a truly classicist concept of human nature normative was that it placed too much burden on the concept. The concept of human nature is remarkably minimal.

If one abstracts from all respects in which one man can differ from another, there is left a residue named human nature and the
truisms that human nature is always the same. ... It may be objected that substantially there are always the same things to be known and the same things to be done. But I am not sure that the word "substantially" means anything more than that things are the same insofar as you prescind from their differences (1966: 3-4).

Furthermore, in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, perfection of the potentialities for moral virtue depend on discernment by practical wisdom of the proportion which is "right for one's self," of feeling and doing "at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason and in the right manner" (Aristotle, 43). Any attempt to make the universality of human nature into the sole standard of human behavior, independently of practical wisdom's contribution, leads to one of two dangers. There will result either a casuist attempt to deduce particulars from universals or a surreptitious masquerading of cultural particularities as metaphysical universals. Both were done with all too much frequency.

Such was the manner in which the higher level in classicist culture operated. Its results are evident. Norms for ethical behavior were based upon the various ways in which the potentialities of universal, unchanging human nature could be perfected. Its standards in the eternal verities resulted in inviolable laws, virtues, and standards of taste. Clearly, with such a conception, classicist culture alone could be properly called "culture," since no other culture was based upon real knowledge of the right and the true. Classicist culture was Hellenic in its roots and conceived itself normatively; it alone was "culture" and all else was barbarism (1968c: 92). In its normativity lay both the greatest strength and the greatest defect of the classicist notion of culture. Its greatest strength was its insistence on something non-arbitrary as the basis for cultural judgments. Its greatest defect was its overestimate of its catalogue of precepts as truly universal. As Lonergan noted:

There was a further blind spot. I have already noted that the classicist conceives culture not empirically but normatively and that this approach leads him to exaggerate the stability and the universality of his culture. Now this exaggeration had the gravest of consequences for theology, for it precluded any proper sense of history (1968c: 96).
Classicist culture's role in Western civilization has a long and often noble history. Yet according to Lonergan, this classical higher level of control of meanings and values became troubled in two ways. First, the rigidity of conceptualism increasingly dominated its outlook. Second, historical advances called its very basis into question. These factors, according to Lonergan, brought about the need for a new kind of higher level in "the cultural."

2.3. The Transition to Modern Culture

Lonergan frequently spoke of classicist culture as a culture which no longer exists (1968d: 113). "Modern culture," he claimed, had taken its place and he spoke of how the chief elements of classicist culture had been replaced, point-by-point, by modern approaches:

[From logic to method; from science as conceived in the Posterior Analytics to science as it is conceived today; from the metaphysics of the soul to self-appropriation of the subject; from apprehension of man in terms of human nature to an apprehension of man through human history; and from first principles to transcendental method (1968a: 50).]

Now it is true enough that the classicist standard for evaluating and approving innovations has been displaced by something else. No major corporation, foundation, or government in the world today will undertake any project without a thorough study by a panel of experts in the modern scientific and scholarly fields. We live in a world overwhelmingly made over by the agency of new methods. But Lonergan's way of describing the situation can make it seem as though modern culture as a shift to a new higher level control is an achievement already in place. In fact, such was not his position for three reasons: first, this higher level represents a challenge, not a fait accompli; second, the "something else" which has displaced the classicist higher level is not free of its biases; third, Lonergan did not inherit this higher level—he created it.

In the first place, one should understand Lonergan's phrase, "the transition to modern culture" as denoting a problem, a challenge to be met, not an established situation to be analyzed. The challenge arose
because of two significant developments related to the higher level of culture: modern science, and modern historical awareness.

The first source of this challenge is a change in what it means to have "scientific" knowledge. The idea of science developed by Aristotle was primarily intended to bring normativity into a debate among opinions. It took opinions as its starting point, and introduced distinctions to bring clarity. The normativity of such distinctions rested on the idea of necessity. Modern science, on the other hand, takes sense data as its starting point. Especially in physics, it introduces mathematical structures which are bewildering to the realm of common sense and opinion. Moreover, the discovery of new kinds of numbers and geometries undercut the understanding of counting numbers and Euclidean geometry as "necessary." Whatever is true of our physical universe, physicists no longer think it necessarily had to be that way. The old idea of science is no longer able to distinguish normative scientific achievement from extra-scientific opinion masquerading as science. The loss of this central component in the classicist notion of culture is a grave one indeed, and lies at the heart of the challenge. Many attempts have been made to meet this issue by forceful reassertion of some updated idea of necessity (clothed, for example, in a sophisticated symbolic logic), by identifying normativity with the absoluteness of sense data, by locating it in the pragmatic criterion of biological or technological success, or by surrendering altogether to conventionalism, relativism or historicism. Is it any wonder, then, that Lonergan devoted so many chapters in so prominent a place in Insight to the discussion of modern science and mathematics?

The second source of challenge is modern historical consciousness. By modern historical consciousness I mean human awareness and adaptation to the fact of cumulative change. Humans have always been aware of the fact that things change, but the apprehension of such change has been in terms of the regular recurrent cycles of nature. The recognition that changes follow one another in an accumulating series—for better or worse—is very recent, and awareness of that type of change has been made more acute by scholarly studies of language, literature, and social organization and science itself as developing entities.
The problems posed by this new awareness, and in particular the problem of reconciling the use of historical methods and results with the objectives of theology, was Lonergan's central preoccupation throughout his career.

Since the beginning of the century theologians have been incorporating more and more historical study into their theology. The structures of the previous theology, designed by classicist mentality, here were quietly stretched and strained, there had to be broken and abandoned. But mere history is not theology, and the task of doing genuine history and on that basis proceeding to theology confronts contemporary Catholic theologians with the most basic and far-reaching problems, the problem of method in theology. Once some progress is made there, we can begin methodically to pick up the pieces and construct a contemporary theology (1968c: 96).

The old theology took scriptural statements and the authoritative pronouncements of tradition as premises from which to deduce conclusions, or as propositions in need of logical reconciliation. But did the authors of such expressions in fact mean what classicists took them to mean?

But [classicist theology's] scrutiny of the data presented by Scripture and tradition was quite insufficient. On the whole it was unaware of history: of the fact that every act of meaning is embedded in a context, and that over time contexts change subtly, slowly, surely. A contemporary theology must take and has taken the fact of history into account (1968a: 49).

It has been the role of the new historical and scholarly methods to comprehend, gradually and meticulously, the context and interpret the statements as a prelude to moving on to further considerations. The nineteenth century saw the birth of methods better adapted to the task of comprehending the details of change than was the method of deduction from necessary first principles. For what is necessary does not change; what can be rightfully deduced from the necessary is not the changeable but the eternal.

But if historical awareness came to stay in the nineteenth century, it has not done so without confusion. If the new methods focus on the changing, and if necessity can no longer be appealed to as the ground of their normativity, is there any normativity at all to histori-
cal method and the methods of the human sciences? More troublesome still is the challenge of "historicism." If everything is changing, and the scholarly methods are also changing, then are the results of the methods merely the product of the historical forces of their time? If their conclusions are not necessary deductions, how could they make claims to truth and value for times other than their own?

This is the other side to the challenge of developing a new "higher level" in culture—to meet the challenges posed by historical awareness. While Lonergan considered it explicitly as a problem to be faced by theology, it is a more general cultural problem. As such Lonergan's solution to a problem of theological method has consequences for non-theological fields. For example, Kant and Lessing, despite their positions in the later stages of modernity, remained classicist in their insistence that "Necessity cannot be derived from contingent fact." Hence, at a time of increasing historical awareness, their doctrine had the effect of forcing philosophy into abstract speculation. Nowhere was this effect felt more forcefully than in the construction of the logical-positivist philosophy of science at the beginning of this century. Study of actual processes of scientific discovery were ignored in favor of analysis of laws and theories into logical deductive structures. In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* undermined this project by appealing to researches in the history of science. But Kuhn had no better idea of a normativity compatible with the dynamics of historical change than did theologians. His book became the basis for the now widespread view that natural science, along with cultural norms and historical investigations, are nothing but a fashion of the day.

The difficulties associated with the transition from the idea of necessity to the idea of developmental change are to be found in other areas as well. In physics, dynamical methods were initially conceived of as treating a series of static states only infinitesimally different from one another. These methods remain limited by this restriction, and more complex dynamical changes continue to defy solution by means of these methods. Darwin adopted the point of view of dynamical physics in order to think out the dynamics of evolution as necessarily a "gradual" process. Debate between contemporary "gradualists" and "saltationists" rages today, and will continue to do so because the underlying issue is
methodological. Again, thought on economic justice lacks critical clarity for the same set of reasons. R. Bruce Douglas has put the problem succinctly in his discussion of the first draft of the American Bishops' Pastoral Letter, "Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy":

Economic efficiency has a certain theological dignity in Christian thought, but so, too, does living one's life in accord with the demands of piety and virtue (however defined). The common good tradition developed, in its economic aspect at least, precisely to meet this demand, and it prevailed as long as it did because it was reasonably successful in this regard. It was not, however, geared to economic growth. That ultimately proved to be its undoing (360).

Douglas goes on to indicate that an adequate replacement for the "common good" tradition has not yet been found. Clearly, then, the challenge of resolving the tensions between the normativity of classicist culture and the facticity of historical change is a major challenge.

In the second place, it is a challenge filled with pitfalls. Lonergan sees that challenge as similar to the one accepted by Aquinas who took up the task of sifting the undifferentiated whole of Greek and Arabic culture into its truths to be reconciled with Christian faith and its errors to be criticized (1968a: 44-47; 1970: 139ff). Just as then so now, along with profundity of ideas and judgments, there comes a profusion of biased opinion bolstered by the scientific and scholarly reputations of those expressing the pronouncements. More significantly, modern scholarship also bases its pronouncements on the rigors of its methods. Particularly in the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology, researchers must begin their reports by making explicit their methodologies. But are the methodologies themselves normative? On what basis is such a judgment to be made? Is there a method for treating such questions, and how is its normativity to be established?

If change is to be improvement, if new tasks are to be accomplished fruitfully, discernment is needed and discrimination. If we are to draw on contemporary psychology and sociology, if we are to profit from the modern science of religions, if we are to revise scholastic categories and make our own the concepts worked out in historicist, personalist, phenomenological or existentialist circles, then we must be able to distinguish tinsel and silver, gilt and gold. No less important than a
The Fabric of Lonergan's Thought

critique of notions and conclusions is a critique of methods (1968b: 63).

In the third place, human history has been assembling the exigencies of the challenge for several centuries. And although many have tried to do for the modern period what Plato and Aristotle did for theirs, the astonishing fact is that Lonergan alone succeeded—but it took him a lifetime to do so.

Lonergan's great achievement consists in this: he alone has discovered a basis for a higher level control of cultural meanings which can function in the context of modern scientific and historical awareness.

The remainder of this article will trace the emergence of that achievement in his major published works.

3. GRACE AND FREEDOM

In 1940 Fr. Lonergan completed his doctoral dissertation on the notion of "operative grace" in Aquinas' thought at the Gregorian University in Rome. In the normal course of events, he would have defended it at Rome as well, but the outbreak of the Second World War made it necessary for him to leave Italy before defending. The defense of his dissertation actually took place in 1943 at the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal. The substance of the dissertation was published in four installments between 1941 and 1942 by Theological Studies and later (1970) in book form under the title, Grace and Freedom.

3.1. The Banezian-Molinist Controversy

Lonergan got the idea for the dissertation from his advisor, Fr. Charles Boyer, S.J. The topic went right to the heart of the debate between the Banezians (Dominicans) and the Molinists (Jesuits) concern-
ing the causal manner of God's saving activity. The position of the Banezians implied so complete a determinism that human free will was eliminated and God would be ultimately responsible for sin. The Molinists, on the other hand, saved human freedom and God's goodness at the expense of God's transcendence. These differences led to a heated controversy, including mutual denunciations of each side by the other for having defended condemned propositions. The debate caused such a row that in 1607, after nine years of special assemblies at Rome, Pope Paul V solved it by forbidding either side from further discussing the matter.

Particularly important in the controversy was the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's writings on the matter. Fr. Boyer suggested to Lonergan that he look into Aquinas's treatment of the issue with the remark, "there's nothing of this Banezian premonitions in there." One passage in particular, "Whether grace is appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace?" (Question 111, Article 2 of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, Pars Prima secundae), was especially important. Perhaps it would be best to quote Aquinas's position in full:

I answer: as we said in Q. 110, Art. 2, grace may be understood in two ways, as the divine help by which God moves us to do and to will what is good, and as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. In either sense grace is appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace. An operation which is part of an effect is attributed to the mover, not to the thing moved. The operation is therefore attributed to God when God is the sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover. We then speak of "operative grace." But when the soul is not only moved but also a mover, the operation is attributed to the soul as well as to God. We then speak of "co-operative grace." In this case there is a twofold action within us. There is an inward action of the will, in which the will is moved and God is the mover, especially when a will which previously willed evil begins to will good. We therefore speak of "operative grace," since God moves the human mind to this action. But there is also an outward action, in which operation is attributed to the will, since an outward action is thereby commanded by the will, as we explained in Q. 17, Art. 9. We speak of "co-operative grace" in reference to actions of this kind, because God helps us even in outward actions, outwardly providing the capacity to act as well as inwardly strengthening the will to issue in act. Augustine accordingly adds, to the words quoted, "he operates to make us will, and when we will, he co-operates with us that we may be made perfect." Hence if grace is understood to mean the gracious moving by which God moves us to meritorious good, it is appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace.
If on the other hand, grace is understood to mean a habitual gift, there is then a twofold effect of grace, as there is of any other form. There is an effect of "being" and an effect of "operation." The operation of heat is to make a thing hot, and also to cause it to emit heat. So likewise, grace is called "operative" in so far as it heals the soul or makes it pleasing to God; and "co-operative" in so far as it is also the principle of meritorious action by the free will (Aquinas, 1954: 167-68).

The problem consists in how to properly understand the relationships between the "two-fold action within us" of which Aquinas speaks. Both the Banezians and the Molinists had approached this passage with classicist modes of thought. Both devised metaphysical systems which would reconcile concepts. The Molinists thought that Thomas couldn't mean what he said, for it would imply that God, not human free will, determined acts of the will. Hence Molina developed the idea of a scientia media, an "intermediate knowledge," whereby God knew not only possibility and the actual future, but also an "intermediate" reality—the "futurible"—whereby God foreknows what every person will choose in varying circumstances. The human will, not God, operates and determines itself. By moving the intellect to present objects of choice, God gives a final-causality or "moral premotion" to the will; but the efficient cause of the will's act is the will itself, according to the Molinists. In this way, the scientia media preserves God's omniscience, while the distinction of final and efficient cause preserves human liberty.

Unfortunately, God's omnipotence is not preserved, for even when the will does good, it is not the instrument of God's will; the Molinist scheme provides no account of how God can be the cause of the will's causing, even when the will's operations are inspired by grace. Báñez was quick to recognize this failure. The cornerstone of the Banezian metaphysical scheme was the addition of the concept of a praemotio physica—"physical premotion"—to the "moral premotion." Because God's causality could not pass outside of God—otherwise God would be mutable—a problem arises as to how God can be the efficient cause of every action. The solution proposed by Báñez was that, primary among

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6. In a later modification, the term was changed to praedeterminatio physica. However, for purposes of simplicity I shall maintain use of the earlier phrase throughout.
God's effects (creations) is a "physical premotion"—a sort of spiritual, metaphysical aether—which "pre-moves" the potency of each agent to a kind of metaphysical "readiness" for its every act. How else could God be the cause of the causes effected by creaturely agents—as when I cause the words of this article to be written? The "physical premotion" causes the causing of each and every agent on each and every occasion. This "pre-motion" provides the basis for the Baezian interpretation of the first, inward action of the will "when God is the sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover." While this scheme appears to preserve divine omnipotence, it eliminates human freedom of will, and makes God, if not the cause of, at least responsible for each and every act of willing, including sinful acts. In their turn, the Molinists denounced this implication of the Baezian scheme.

3.2. The Thomist Synthesis

The Baezian-Molinist controversy is a classic case of the limitations of classicism. The mutual denunciations focused on particular statements. (In this they followed the long-established ecclesiastical procedure of condemning propositions rather than meanings.) But the fact that the meanings of those statements depended on their contexts (proximately, the contexts of Baez and Molina, but more profoundly, Aquinas's original context) was ignored. Neither Baez nor Molina was a heretic; neither had the "speculative acumen" (144) to adequately articulate his faith in a theoretical systematic context; neither they nor their followers were aware of the limitations of their own context for interpreting the statements of the other, or those of Aquinas himself. Hence, both overestimated the accuracy of their readings of statements and the "heretical" consequences they saw to follow therefrom.

Most importantly, according to Lonergan, neither the Molinists nor the Baezians were cognizant of the intricate "synthesis" (1970: 143) underpinning Aquinas's statements, so that their debate was in fact a disintegration of Aquinas's solution into "irreconcilable alternatives" (144). What was most impressive about the synthesis was that Aquinas finally reached clarity about grace by not focusing on it. As Lonergan said, Aquinas was concerned with the vast task of "thinking out
the Christian universe" (84) and dealt with the questions of grace from that broader viewpoint. To meet the challenge of thinking out the Christian universe, Aquinas developed an overall synthesis of a wide range of issues which was grounded in his sophisticated understanding of the "law of universal instrumentality"—God's way of "applying each agent to its end." Within the context of that law of universal instrumentality, Aquinas developed a theory of the human will. Finally, Aquinas analyzed the acts of will inspired by grace within the broader context supplied by these two theories.

Lonergan was obviously impressed with Aquinas's ability to understand the concreteness of particular acts of human willing in terms of this theoretical synthesis when he wrote:

Everyone is familiar with the common notion of going faster. Few understand what you mean when you explain that an acceleration is the second derivative of a continuous function of distance and time. To apprehend going faster one has only to drop from a sufficient height. To apprehend acceleration one has to master the somewhat difficult notions underlying the differential calculus. Both going faster and acceleration apprehend the same fact, but the former merely apprehends, while the latter adds to apprehension acts of analysis and generalization, of deduction and systematic correlation. For acceleration is going faster, but analyzed as \( \frac{d^2s}{dt^2} \), generalized to include going slower, enriched with all the implications of the second derivative of a function, and given a significant place in systematic thought on quantitative motion.

Now in the writings of St. Albert or St. Thomas, the supernatural is a scientific theorem; it has an exact philosophic definition; its implications are worked out and faced; and this set of correlations gives the mere apprehension a significant, indeed a fundamental, position in an explanatory account of the nature of grace. But just as one can apprehend going faster without understanding the calculus, so also the theologians of the twelfth century and earlier could apprehend globally the supernatural character of grace without suspecting the theorem that regards the relations of nature and grace (13-14).

This fact of synthesis cannot perhaps be expressed, for synthesis in a field of data is like the soul in the body, everywhere at once, totally in each part and yet distinct from every part. But to be certain of the fact of synthesis is as easy as to be certain of the fact of the soul. One has only to remove this or that vital organ and watch the whole structure crumble into ruin; the old unity and harmony will disappear, and in its place will arise the irreconcilable opposition of a multiplicity. Thus, to St. Thomas cooperation was a theorem, something to be known by understanding the data already apprehended and not something known by adding a new datum to the apprehen-
sion, something like the principle of work and not something like another lever, something like the discovery of gravitation and not something like the discovery of America (143).

In other words, Aquinas's synthesis, in all its intricacy, was present in every statement in the Prima secundae, and proper interpretation of his statements demands mastery of that intricacy. This is not, of course, to say that Aquinas always thought out of the context of this synthesis, the achievement of his late work. That is clearly impossible. If one focuses solely upon the context of this later achievement, with all Aquinas's "exact philosophic definitions," his distinctions, his theorems, his reconciling and working out of implications, he may sound like a static classicist. And indeed he was a classicist. But he was an extraordinary representative of dynamic classicism at its best. He was acutely aware that his apprehension of "first principles" was not absolute, nor were they ever to be regarded as permanently fixed, except perhaps in the mind of God. What Lonergan discovered, instead, was that Aquinas's thought developed because the complexity of the problem forced him to gradually change his mind on a whole range of issues, including operations, habits, freedom of the will, divine transcendence and causality. Aquinas was constantly revising his base of operations, finding new principles, applications, combinations, and so forth, until he had reached a viewpoint within which he could flexibly approach the whole range of issues before his mind. And what if he encountered new issues? The whole process was set in motion once more, until a new synthesis was reached.

The relevance of this point pertains to the problem of interpreting Aquinas. Over and again we find Lonergan stressing that it is imperative to grasp the historical developments underlying Aquinas's thought in order to understand the final position (1970: 2, 5, 16, 19, 61, 63, 76). Lonergan recognized that a synthesis of this magnitude had to be understood, not in some abstract, conceptual fashion, but in relationship to the problems which it rose in response to. Hence, Lonergan sought to win access to the context of Aquinas's synthesis, to "reach up to the mind of Aquinas" in its most mature stages, by following the trail of problems and lesser syntheses which led up to it. Lonergan was able to comprehend this synthesis because he found it as the term of a developmental series of syntheses, some being earlier stages in
Aquinas's thought, some being the stages which preceded Aquinas and set him his problems. Thus, Lonergan was able to achieve what neither the Banexians nor the Molinists could, and was able to resolve a 350-year-old dispute by employing historical methods.

3.3. The Historical Development of the Thomist Synthesis

If I may dare the outrageous comparison, Grace and Freedom has the structure of the mystery novels Lonergan would later come to love. At its beginning, the reader finds him or herself surrounded by a welter of facts. The facts gradually coalesce into identifiable groupings, which in turn become puzzling. Slowly pieces of the puzzle begin to fall into place, but still one lacks the overall view which the protagonist hit upon fifty pages earlier. It is only at the climax that the "synthesis" emerges in all its unity. It must have pleased Lonergan no end that the genre of the mystery novel and the history of speculative theology had so much in common.

Just as in a mystery novel, where there is no substitute for reading the unfolding plot, so also no summary of mine can substitute for reading Grace and Freedom. There is a wealth of discussion on liberty, sin, and redemption which defies adequate summary. However, as Grace and Freedom can be a difficult book to read, a few remarks may aid in orienting the reader.

3.4. Sources of the Puzzle: A Welter of Facts

Let me first provide a sampling of the "welter of facts" with which Lonergan's study deals. The question of "operative grace" originated in the Pelagian controversy. The Pelagians contended in various ways that grace was not necessary for salvation, and that good performance meriting salvation was possible without God's grace. To their

7. Lonergan repeatedly cited his indebtedness to historical studies of pre-Thomist thought on grace and liberty by Schupp, Doms and Lottin (1970: 1, et passim).
assertion that any graces granted were given according to the previous merit of good will, St. Augustine countered that by divine gratuitous operation God makes the will good, and by cooperation God gives it good performance (2-3). But this insistence, without higher level control, was taken to imply that God’s operation eliminated free will (5) on the one hand, and raised the problem of explaining “why everything was not grace; after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God?” (14). Aquinas inherited a seminal resolution of these issues from Philip the Chancellor in the form of the theorem which articulated the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Even still, the exact listing of graces was fluid. Discussion between Peter Lombard and St. Albert the Great introduced the Greek notions of “virtue” and “habit” as the fundamental concepts for analyzing grace (13ff). In addition there were the problems of the sources of sin, God’s knowledge of the future, and the reconciliation of God’s infallibility with human freedom. Add to this the massive infusion into Western medieval culture of Aristotelian ethics, cosmology, theory of causes, and metaphysics, and you have some idea of “scene of the crime” into which Aquinas entered.

8. It should be noted how both the Banezian-Molinist controversy and its more modern variants are permeated by spatial (“inside/outside”) and temporal (“foreknowledge/predestined”) language. One upshot of Loner- gan’s analysis is a methodological principle parallel to that of the “principle of equivalence” in General Relativity. Just as the “principle of equivalence” requires that no physical law be expressed in a way which depends on an observer’s spatio-temporal reference frame, so also we may suggest a “principle of divine transcendence” which requires that every general theological statement about God’s being, knowing and acting be expressed only in the present tense, and be free of any spatial connotation. Again, just as in General Relativity manifestations of general laws can be applied to events related to particular observer’s reference frames without eliminating their “co-variance,” so also statements about the relationships between God and particular places and times can be made (“God brought the Hebrews out of Egypt”) without undermining the transcendent eternality of God. This “principle of divine transcendence” would not be easy to follow, but then neither is the “principle of equivalence.” The consequences of employing such a principle, however, would be at least as salutary as the modifications of physics which Einstein brought about.
3.5. The Climax of the Puzzle: The Synthesis

At the other end, there is the climax of the "mystery story."

Thus, fully to understand Prima secundae, q. 111, a.2, one must grasp that the new wine of speculative theology is bursting the old bottles of Pelagian controversy. ... The exigences of the controversy made St. Augustine model his divine operation and cooperation into a point-for-point refutation of Pelagian error. But St. Thomas was engaged in the far vaster task of working out the intelligible unity of all dogmatic data. ... Hence ... [he] has to take a broader view to consider the beginnings of spiritual life not as unique but as a single instance of a more general law (136-37).

The explication of the full-blown synthesis of Aquinas's late work comes as the climax to Lonergan's study. As that synthesis consists of a nesting of three ever more specific contexts, these will be summarized in succession.

3.5.1. The General Context: The Law of Universal Instrumentality

The "more general law" referred to in the previously quoted passage is that of universal instrumentality. By this phrase, Lonergan understood Aquinas's adaptation of the Aristotelian theory of the cosmos. In that theory, Aristotle dealt with the problem of how the unmoved mover effected all natural motions through the mediation of a cosmic hierarchy, from the motion of the outermost celestial sphere downward. The need of such a mediation was due to the difficulty posed by the obvious facts that (a) God's operation is eternal, and (b) nevertheless a rather large number of God's effects are not always, simultaneously, and constantly occurring at each and every moment. As Lonergan put it:

A cause that acts in time, acts at a given time, neither sooner nor later. We have to discover why it does not act sooner and what makes it act when it does. (70)

The Aristotelian answer came with the recognition that the mere existence of mover and moved (of cause and receptive agent) alone were
not sufficient for the occurrence of the causing. In addition, mover and moved must also be in the "right mutual relation, disposition, proximity" (71, 76, 84), and this right relation itself is brought about by a distinct, prior motion. The chief illustration is the melting of an iceberg, where a prior motion of the pre-existing iceberg or sun or both bring them into the proper spatial relationship so that the motion (melting) may occur. This "Aristotelian premotion" is different from the Banezian praemotio physica whose sole role is to effect a new metaphysical state only in the mover (that is, giving a special metaphysical "readiness" or actuation of its ability to be a mover), but not in the moved. For Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, the "pre-motion" brings about "not some special participation of absolute being but ... some relation, disposition, proximity that enables the mover to act upon the moved" (71). When that relation becomes right, the motion occurs automatically without any further special metaphysical alteration.

Clearly, if one takes a broader view, there is a series of such Aristotelian premotions. The prior motion (for example, the wind which moved the iceberg into the right relation with the sun) itself operated only after its prior conditions had been moved into place, and so on. In this broader view, the series of premotions constitutes "the dynamic pattern of such relations—the pattern through which the design of the divine artisan unfolds in natural and human history" (84).

This notion of a dynamic pattern or order, then, is Lonergan's way of characterizing the Aristotelian backbone of Aquinas's "law of universal instrumentality." But as Lonergan went on to show, Aquinas needed to adapt this Aristotelian backbone, because he undertook "the vast task of thinking out the Christian universe" (84). The principal need for modification came from the divergence between the conceptions of God held by Aristotle and Aquinas, respectively. In order to pre-

9. Lonergan indicates that Aquinas did not employ this term (70).

10. It should be noted that by means of this phrase, "dynamic pattern of such relations," Lonergan succeeded in generalizing the heart of the matter independently of the Aristotelian and Thomist acceptance of the hierarchy of celestial spheres, and so made it available for incorporation into a twentieth century cosmology. This he did explicitly in Insight, chapter 4. See (Byrne, 1982).
serve the eternality of God as he conceived it, Aristotle needed the
mediation of celestial spheres capable of being moved by desire alone.
But in order to incorporate the Judeo-Christian tradition on God's
transcendent omnipotence, Aquinas made the order of events itself the
creation of God's efficient causality. That order of events—at least
in the terrestrial realm—was *per accidens*, that is, unintelligible to
Aristotelian science (human "knowledge"). But Aquinas added that the
transcendence of the unrestricted act of divine intellect insured the
ultimately intelligibility of this order and grounded the possibility of a
divine efficient causation of that order without eliminating its empiri-
cally residual unintelligibility for finite human intelligence (79, 84,
113-114). In retrospect, this adaptation seems amazingly simple!

From this adapted Aristotelian backbone follows the "law of univer-
sal instrumentality," namely, that universally every created moved
mover is the instrument of God's providence. The reason is simple.
Since no mover can move a moved unless they are in the right relation or
disposition, either the mover or the moved needs to be provided that
right relation from beyond the mover itself in order to act. Again, the
"dynamic order" of right relations is caused to be by God, so that every
causing is itself caused by God. Hence, each "caused causing" particip-
ates in God's providence, not through some special intervention in each
and every action, but through the created wholeness of the dynamic order
of the universe (76-77).

3.5.2. The Intermediate Context: The Theory of the Will

So much for the general context supplied by the "law of universal
instrumentality." The next concern is the theory of how human free will
operates a universe under the sway of this universal law.

According to Lonergan, there were four basic elements in
Aquinas's mature theory of free will:

A free act has four presuppositions: (A) a field of action in
which more than one course of action is possible; (B) an intel-
lect that is able to work out more than one course of action;
(C) a will that is not automatically determined by the first
course of action that occurs to the intellect; and since this
condition is only a condition, securing indeterminacy without
telling what does in fact determine, (D) a will that moves
itself (95).
These four elements emerged gradually as Aquinas dealt with various problems. The first elements, (A) and (B), are earliest in Aquinas's writings, and fit nicely into the cosmic order of universal instrumentality derived from Aristotle. But the emergence of the later elements—especially (D)—arose in response to the determinism of the Parisian Averroists (95), and required a modification of the Aristotelian theory of the relationship between intellect and will as that of a mover and a "passive potency." In its place Aquinas affirmed a complex relationship between intellect and will:

[A] distinction is drawn between two lines of causation that converge in effecting the act of choice in the will: there is the line of causation quoad specificationem actus; and there is another line quoad exercitium actus. Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means. Thus the rejection of the Aristotelian passivity of the will eliminates the old position that the intellect is first mover; now there are two first movers (101).

Diagramatically, the shift in relationship between intellect and will would look like this:

11. In the Aristotelian theory, the will's act of "rational appetition" is a passive act which is moved by the object of choice as first apprehended by the intellect. The importance of Aristotle's theory of virtues becomes clear against this intellectual background: unless the desires and intellect are properly and habitually ordered, they will continually feed the will with bad objects, and it will have no option but to succumb to them. From this it follows that a person without virtues is "incontinent," "weak-willed," and without any real freedom.
Old Aristotelian Theory

WILL

Act of Choice

Object

INTELLECT

New Thomist Theory

WILL

Choice-of-Means

End-as-Object $\rightarrow$ Choice-of-End + Means-as-Object

INTELLECT

Aquinas's innovation that the will itself is a principle of action—that it is indeed the radical and sole instance of a self-moving mover in the created order—is a fundamental element of Christian faith. Yet it reached this radical degree of clarity only when Aquinas undertook the massive, systematic task of "thinking out the Christian universe"; that is, only in the systematic context of his great synthesis. In this radical apprehension of human freedom is one of the great legacies of the Christian tradition to Western culture. Upon it were later erected, with greater or lesser degrees of coherence, the philosophies of liberalism and existentialism.

Yet those later philosophies also represent disintegrations of the synthesis, for both modern liberalism and existentialism were worked out in large measure with a conception of human freedom as completely independent of God. The reasons for this are manifold, but key among them is the difficulty of conceiving of God as First Cause in such a way as to avoid determinism. In this the moderns either failed as miserably as did the Molinists and Banezians, or they gave up. But Aquinas, as

12. Voegelin has gone so far as to characterize these modern movements as "rebellions" against the order of being, in which both God and the free human being participate.
retrieved by Lonergan's analysis, stands beyond these difficulties. Both "lines of causation" mentioned above have God as their first cause: through the "dynamic order" of right relation, God creates human wills which have the radical power of self-movement; through that same order God provides the intellect situations in which the intellect discerns possible objects of the will's actuation of that power, not only for right choice but for human perfection as well. Yet because the sequence of relations in the "dynamic order" is per accidens (merely coincidental, irregular, from the viewpoint of human scientia), neither line interferes with the radical autonomy of the will. As Lonergan put it:

As is apparent, the theory of liberty we have outlined had the singular merit of making possible a theory of operative grace; for on this theory, as opposed to that of Scotus, the free act emerges from, and is conditioned by, created antecedents over which it has no direct control. It follows that it is possible for God to manipulate these antecedents and through such manipulation to exercise a control over free acts themselves. ... Indeed, both above and below, both right and left, the free choice has determinants over which it has no control. God directly controls the orientation of the will to ends; indirectly He controls the situations which intellect apprehends and in which it has to choose; indirectly He also controls both the higher determinations of intellectual attitude or mental pattern and the lower determinants of mood and temperament; finally, each free choice is only hic et nunc, for no man can decide today what he is to will tomorrow. There is no end of room for God to work on free choice without violating it, to govern above its self-governance, to set the stage and guide the reactions and give each character its personal role in the drama of life.

Still, none of these created antecedents can be rigorous determinants of the free choice ... the consequent act may be good or it may be sinful: if it is good, all the credit is God's, and the creature is only His instrument; but if it is evil, then inasmuch as it is sin as such, it is a surd (preceded, indeed, by a divine permission which is infallible without being a cause or a non-cause), and so in the causal order a first for which the sinner alone is responsible (115-116).

13. It should be noted that I am only affirming that within the limitations of the strictly natural order there is an essential possibility of right action and human perfection. The doctrine of original sin means that this essential possibility has no effective actuality independently of the supernatural activity of grace. Clearly grace is required for the supernatural perfections which transcend natural ends.
3.5.3. The Specific Context: Grace and the Acts of Willing

Aquinas's formulation of the law of universal instrumentality made possible a theory of human liberty and, in turn, the theory of liberty made possible a theory of operative grace. Let us, therefore, briefly summarize Lonergan's recovery of Aquinas's account of how the will, inspired by grace, operates and cooperates.

First, Aquinas subsumed his predecessors' accounts of habitual grace, and divided habitual grace into operative and cooperative. Yet this task was performed not all at once, but in a series of stages (60-61). Only the final stage is presented here. Habitual grace consists in "infused supernatural habits" such as charity, hope and faith. These habits are "cooperative graces" insofar as they incline one toward, or make spontaneous, good and even saintly, heroic actions. They are regarded as "operative graces" because their presence has effected a metaphysical change in subject: one is saved, justified, redeemed because one is now fully human, a "new man or woman in Christ." Clearly such graces are instances of the Aristotelian premotion, for they bring about a "right relation, disposition" in the will so that the subsequent actual acts of willing may respond to situations justly.

Second, Aquinas had to invent anew the theory of operative and cooperative actual grace. By operative actual grace God moves the will to decisions for ends beyond its merely natural reach, decisions which change or transform the will itself. This includes the decisions by which the habitual graces are accepted (put in the heart of flesh) (55, 58), as well as decisions preparatory to such decisions of conversion (pluck out the heart of stone), and various further inspired decisions subsequent to conversion. These movements of the will do not violate the natural freedom of the will, for the ends or objects of such decisions are beyond its natural capacity. One might ask, "But what if a person doesn't want to be converted?" The reply is that the objection is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because by nature all humans desire to do what is good, even though sin has made attachment

14. This is the basic meaning of phrases such as the desire to "be obedient to God," "please God," or "follow God's law."
to more restricted desires overpowering. It is irrelevant because while
the desire for such decisions may be humanly natural, the requisite
willing itself cannot arise from human nature for the simple reason that
human intellect does not understand the content (form) of a supernatural
habit like charity: to understand it would not only require an under-
standing of love in all its sweep and depth, the way God knows it, but
also to have figured it out by oneself merely from the data of human
interactions.

Actual grace is cooperative insofar as the gifted decision in
favor of an end motivates further decisions for means and bodily execu-
tions (132-37). This is the way Lonergan interprets Aquinas's much
misunderstood distinction between the "inward and outward actions of the
will." The inward action is the operative actual grace which moves the
will to decide upon an end, especially "new life"; the outward action
includes both acts which choose means and bodily executions which
realize the chosen end. Notice that given Aquinas's mature theory of
the will, God does not have to intervene in each and every choice of
means and bodily execution for them to be graced; the gift of a resolute
choice of the end itself is sufficient motivation for those subsequent
choices. Lonergan contrasts his interpretation with that of his prede-
cessors:

The Benezian has ... [a] speculative blind spot: because he cannot
grasp that the will is truly an instrument by the mere fact that
God causes the will of the [supernatural] end, he goes on to assert
that God also brings in a praemotio to predetermine the [natural]
choice of means [thereby undermining human freedom and implying
God's responsibility for sin] (144). 15

In order to establish the veracity of this interpretation of "inward and
outward acts," Lonergan devoted nine pages to an exhaustive comparison
of several distinct texts treating a variety of related matters. The
creativity of Lonergan's use of historical methods in establishing this
interpretation of Aquinas's distinction between "inward and outward"
acts are among the most impressive parts of Grace and Freedom.

15. The Benezian position interpreted all acts of will—whether choices
of means or ends—as "inward" and only bodily executions as
"outward." See also p. 88.
3.6. Practical Importance

What does all this scholarly analysis, however impressive, have to do with practical matters? After all, the challenge of the need for a transition from classicist to modern culture most concretely concerns practical, not merely speculative, affairs. The answer, of course, is that Lonergan's scholarly analysis has a great deal to do with practical affairs. The fact is, the retrieval and transposition of Aquinas's synthesis have profound practical consequences, although these consequences do not meet the criteria of commonsense practicality. The practical consequences of Aquinas's synthesis are not immediate for the very simple reason that one has to first understand his synthesis before figuring out its consequences. And the task of understanding that synthesis takes one out of the world of common sense. For the present, two very brief indications of how an historical understanding of the synthesis concerns practical matters will be suggested.

The first concerns a problem of "communications" regarding the topic of "merit and divine acceptance" of the sinner. Especially in the wake of the Reformation, the question "How do I merit God's acceptance?" became an urgent one. How is one to walk the thin line between a quasi-Pelagian "good works earning a place in Heaven" towards which Catholic practice (though not doctrine) has sometimes drifted, and either fatalistic acquiescence or anxiety-ridden striving to prove self-worth, towards which a quasi-Calvinist predestination inclines? The ways Aquinas himself changed his mind on this topic could, I think, prove helpful to pastoral practice.

The many graces [in De Veritate] ... are characterized none too happily as the effects of the gratuitous divine will by which God accepts us into his kingdom. In the Contra Gentiles the division will be given a new basis; divine acceptance will give way to the divine aid necessary for man to attain transcendent finality. And in the Summa theologiae synthesis appears: grace denotes the special love God has for those whom he is leading to eternal life; it denotes this love in itself, as when we speak of the grace of predestination; or it denotes this love in its effects, as when we speak of supernatural entities in the soul—motions or habits—fitting man for his last end (34).
The earliest *(De Veritate, 1256-1259)* discussion is perhaps closest to the ordinary-language, commonsense usage of the terms, "acceptance" and "merit"; and it can seem that God's acceptance is based upon an arbitrary and even capricious granting of grace in order that God can then bring the divine self to stoop to accepting the repentant sinner. Later (1259-1264) in the *Contra Gentiles*, grace was systematically related to the extraordinarily difficult task of human self-realization, and the tinge of arbitrariness overcome. Finally in the still broader context of the *Summa's Prima secundae* (circa 1269), "aid" becomes the transformations of the subject resulting from God's unrestricted loving. In light of this higher synthesis, "merit" is what is known in God's judgment of fact and value: "By your faith, born of my love for you, you have been saved," or "Now you are fully human in Christ." "Acceptance" divides into two parts: God's unceasing, unconditional, accepting loving of each and every human, no matter what they've done; and the accepting acknowledgement of the fact that a person has been so transformed through that loving that he or she is no longer alienated from self or from God. In this perspective, the phrase, "God's judgment," loses all connotation of an extrinsic final blow; rather, it is an affirmation of fact and value caressed within the unrestricted act of sympathetic understanding which is God's loving being.

I would suggest that the divisive disputes over "justification" and "merit" can be traced, not to a lack of moral or religious conversion on the part of one of the disputants, as the accusations often flow, but to the lack of intellectual conversion and adequate development into something like Aquinas's synthesis. I believe that a study of the ongoing history of this dispute, using the tools Lonergan has put at our disposal, would look for the intellectual roots of the conflict as the ground upon which change and reconciliation could begin. No little amount of healing will occur in the spirits who hear the doctrine preached along such lines.

A second practical issue is best approached negatively. What would be the practical consequences for a world which lacked adequate understanding of the great synthesis of Aquinas? Lonergan has made his own views eminently clear:

The medieval synthesis through the conflict of Church and State shattered into the several religions of the reformation. The
wars of religion provided the evidence that man has to live not by revelation but by reason. The disagreement of reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he also must practise the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role of a complete and exhaustive viewpoint (231).

If Lonergan is right about the impact of this loss upon our own historical existence, then recovery of that synthesis is of vital importance. For our age, such a recovery must be done in a way which respects the exigences of historical awareness. Lonergan's own contribution to this task in *Grace and Freedom* is a breathtaking achievement.

4. **VERBUM**

Lonergan's use of historical methods to retrieve Aquinas's achievement is indeed impressive. But others before Lonergan and since have read the same texts, quoted passages and yet arrived at quite different, even opposing, interpretations of Aquinas. One can ask, therefore, what guarantees the normativity, the objectivity, of Lonergan's account of the historical emergence and development of a systematic synthesis for meeting an historical crisis?

The question goes deeper than it might seem, for at its root this is the question about the objectivity of historical methods. Modern critical historical methods originated in the nineteenth century, and from their applications came the awareness of the massive differences between nineteenth century modes of thought and those of earlier eras. Was not historical method itself merely the product of its age? An affirmative answer amounts to what is commonly called "historicism." And while many historians resign themselves to the nihilistic implications of such a position in an easy-going fashion, the best historians have remained unwilling to do so. Various attempts have been made to refute historicism by accounting for the objectivity of modern methods. Hegel attempted to make critical history objective by developing a "science" of history: that is, history is the dialectical manifestation
of Reason Itself, the Absolute Spirit, and critical history is objective insofar as it uncovers that dialectic. Unfortunately, Hegel's theory of history had the disquieting feature of making the modern liberal state, and the mind of Hegel, into the terminus of all historical process. This Hegelian account shared with all too many historical studies an anti-traditional ideology with liberal axes to grind (Stern: 18-20). Marx and Nietzsche quickly recognized this and embarked upon their own attempts at remedy, which are none too happy. Reaction to all such defects gave rise to a "positivist" theory of history: history is objective insofar as it sticks to the facts. Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and all the rest made the mistake of introducing interpretations. Avoid interpretations and stick only to the facts. Unfortunately, if this positivistic prescription is taken seriously, it reduces every historian to a scribe who can do nothing but copy historical source data, letter by letter and artifact by artifact.

Clearly the preceding is not an adequate account of the history of the problem of historical method.\(^{16}\) It is meant only to indicate the nature of the problem which Lonergan faced. If the transition to a modern culture characterized by historical awareness is to be made in a normative, non-arbitrary fashion, this question must be answered. And it was with the researches into Aquinas’s theory of *verb*um that Lonergan discovered the foundations upon which an answer would be erected.\(^{17}\)

That Lonergan’s *Verb*um researches have the quality of a self-grounding historical study (albeit in a seminal and somewhat compact form) is evident from what Lonergan claimed about this study, from the structure in which he elected to present his findings, and from the subject matter of his investigation.

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16. For examples of fuller treatments, see Stern: 11-32, and the sources cited in Lonergan, 1972a: 197-234. There does exist, however, a certain problem of how an objective history of the problem of historical methods can be written in the absence of a solution to the problem of the objectivity of historical method itself.

4.1. Historical Foundations: The Claim

First, it is evident from what he wrote:

Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts, can one hope to attain such a development of one's own understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant. Such is the method I have employed and it has been on the chance that others also might wish to employ it that these articles have been written.

The significance of this method is that it unites the ideals of the old-style manual written *ad mentem Divi Thomae* and, on the other hand, the ideal of contemporary historical study. ... However, one cannot unite apparently opposed ideals without eliminating their really opposed defects. Method is a means to an end; it sets forth two sets of rules—rules that facilitate collaboration and continuity of effort, and rules that guide the effort itself. The latter aim at understanding, but, since we cannot understand at will, they amount to rules for using chance to defeat mere chance. Still if method is essential for the development of understanding, it is no less true that method is mere superstition when the aim of understanding is excluded. Such exclusion is the historian's temptation to positivism. On the other hand, the temptation of the manual writer is to yield to the conceptualist illusion; to think that to interpret Aquinas he has merely to quote then argue; to forget that there does exist an initial and enormous problem of developing one's understanding; to overlook the fact that, if he is content with the understanding he has and the concepts it utters, then all he can do is express his own incomprehension in the words but without the meaning uttered by the understanding of Aquinas (216-217).

Since the texts under discussion pertain precisely to what Aquinas meant by "understanding," it is clear that Lonergan recognized that he was engaged in the task of trying to understand that act which was the very foundation of his own historical method.

4.2 The Structure

Second, Lonergan's concern with the historical problem in *Verbum* is evident from the structure in which Lonergan published his
researches. The subject matter of *Verbum* is Aquinas's Trinitarian analogy as presented in *Summa Theologicae, Pars prima*, QQ. 27 and 93. Following the example of *Grace and Freedom*, one might expect to see Lonergan structure his study along lines similar to that earlier work—namely, a narrative of the developing stages leading up to this masterpiece of Thomist thought, beginning with developments Aquinas inherited from councils, church fathers, and other thinkers, and then the successive stages of his own thought. But such is not the case. Unlike the thorough and meticulous narration of the developing stages of Aquinas's thought on grace, *Verbum* contains precious little account of the actual development of Aquinas thought on the Trinity.  

Although Lonergan repeatedly tells us that this is an "historical study," it is only toward the very end of the last chapter that he briefly, though impressively, traces the gradual emergence of insights which formed the bits and pieces of St. Thomas's Trinitarian analogy (213-14).

Instead of a detailed narrative of these developments, Lonergan organized his study in five parts. He devoted the first two chapters to a review of the "core of psychological fact" (xiv), the "introspective data" (47), to which Aquinas's analyses of the human mind refer. The third chapter is an assembly of the "lexicographical notes" (217) on Aquinas's uses of metaphysical terms which Lonergan composed for himself while doing the research. The fourth chapter treats the problem of abstraction where metaphysical and psychological issues become unavoidably intertwined. Finally, the fifth takes up the task of interpreting the Trinitarian analogy of QQ. 27 and 93 itself. Whereas Lonergan related the final achievement in *Grace and Freedom* to a series of prior, ever more comprehensive stages, in *Verbum* he related the final achievement back through a "terminological jungle" to psychological fact.

Why did Lonergan choose to structure his presentation in this way? He made the reason for this decision abundantly clear:

18. There are a few minor exceptions which are peripheral to the main exposition. See, for example, 1967: 6 n 11, 11 n 48, 35 n 160, 36, 139, 189.

19. While this review is written more or less in Lonergan's own words, ample citations of relevant texts from Aquinas's corpus are provided.
I have begun, not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect: logic might favor the opposite procedure but, after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it unmanageable (45-46).

No doubt, as expressed by Aquinas, these psychological facts are embedded in metaphysical categories and theorems. But without first grasping in some detail the empirical content so embedded, one risks, if not emptying the categories and theorems of all content, at least interpreting them with an impoverished generality that cannot bear the weight of the mighty superstructure of trinitarian theory (95).

Hence, Lonergan devoted over 200 pages to the tasks of clarifying the psychological facts underlying St. Thomas's analogy and demonstrating the consistency of his interpretation with Aquinas's terminology, while devoting only two pages to the historical development for the very obvious reason that the latter presupposed clarity about foundations, which the former provided.

4.3. The Subject Matter

Third, while the historical study of Grace and Freedom could exploit understanding without explicitly adverting to the question, "What is understanding?" such was not possible in the case of Verbum. For the object of this study, Aquinas's Trinitarian theory, uses the analogue of the procession of the human inner word from human understanding as the basis for analogical understanding of the procession of the divine Word within the divine understanding of God. And as Lonergan had said, interpreting Aquinas on this issue, without understanding the conscious act of understanding, is doomed to failure. Hence, the subject matter of Verbum itself demanded an appropriation of the act which not only provides the analogy for the Trinity, but which identically is the indispensable act in historical thinking.

The central problematic here is the question of what kind of knowledge humans might have of the Divine Trinity. Since the doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery, human understanding is at best capable of an analogical understanding of it. Historically, many analogues for the Trinity have been offered. Perhaps the most famous is that which legend has attributed to St. Patrick: the shamrock has three leaves, but is one
plant (or has one stem). Aquinas, however, inherited from Augustine a profound discourse (De Trinitate) whose central affirmation was that the human mind is the most perfect of all created analogues of the Uncreated Trinity. At the heart of this affirmation was the radically original Augustinian analysis of a "true" or "inner word" anterior to any sonorous or ideographic expression of that word, a word which as such is "closest" to the reality which it knows.

4.3.1. The Analogy: From Augustine up to Aquinas

In his "Introduction" to Verbum (1967: x), Lonergan quotes a passage from Augustine which gives the flavor of this radically original approach:

The human mind, therefore, knows all these things which it has acquired through itself, through the senses of its body, and through the testimonies of others, and keeps them in the treasure house of its memory; and from them a true word is begotten when we say what we know, but the word that is anterior to every sound and to every thought of sound. For then the word is most like the thing known. ... This is the true word that belongs to no language, the true word about a true thing, having nothing from itself, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born (Augustine, 483).

Let us reflect for a moment upon this text from Augustine. It comes toward the end of the last (fifteenth) book of De Trinitate. The structure of that work is an ascensional: it begins with a review of the scriptural and dogmatic data on the Trinity, moves on to criticize "corporeal" images of the Trinity, turns to an inward reflection on the movements or "processions" of the human mind as the most perfect created image, and concludes in a prayer of adoration to the Trinity. From the dogmatic data that there are three distinct persons which proceed one from the other, and which are nevertheless of one identical "substance" or "essence" (that is, all three are identically God), there emerges the puzzle, the "mystery," of how this could be the case. (Faith motivates the believer to seek understanding.) The mystery is not answered directly (for there is no finite answer to that question), but prompts an exploration of the human mind culminating in the statement just quoted. Here one observes the discovery of a pre-linguistic word behind linguis-
tic expressions, and still more primordial, the "knowings" from which these inner words are born. Most importantly, the inner word has "nothing from itself," but is born of the self-knowing of that prior knowing. Augustine did not arrive at these positions by arguing from necessary principles to first conclusions; his analysis "has no parallel in the history of Patristic literature" (Augustine, x). He came to these positions by means of "introspective" skill (Lonergan, 1967: ix, xiii) probing what his mind was actually did, in a pivotal act of self-knowledge. That knowledge ascends to a more profound faith and adoration of the Trinity, expressed in the concluding prayer.

Aquinas's task was to fit this "original Augustinian creation into an Aristotelian framework" (vii). Now this task was doubly complicated. First, the superiority of Aristotle's analysis of the mind lay in its account of the emergence of the primordial "knowings," but he was silent on the procession of the inner word; Augustine, on the other hand, was most perceptive regarding the latter, but was inadequate in his treatment of the former. Second, if Aquinas's theological treatment was to be "scientific" in the Aristotelian sense, then he had to find or invent the correct terms to characterize something Aristotle himself had virtually ignored. But, since Aristotle's treatment of the human soul (anima) was within the broader context of the general science of all animated beings (biology), which in turn stood within the contexts of all moved beings (physics) and all beings (metaphysics), the goal of a scientific treatment of the analogy of the inner word was a complex one indeed. This conveys something of the difficulty involved in trying to interpret Aquinas on the Trinity. As Lonergan put it, "it is necessary to explore separately the several hermeneutical circles that in cumulative fashion are relevant to an interpretation" (xiii).

In the ensuing discussion of Lonergan's interpretation, it will be helpful for the reader to refer to two texts from the Summa as illustrative of Aquinas's remarks. They are:

If then we are to observe an image of the divine Trinity in the soul, it must be referred principally at the point where the soul approaches most closely, in so far as this is possible at all, to a portrayal of the divine persons in kind. Now the divine processions are distinguished from each other in terms of the procession of a word from its utterer and of a love connecting them both. But as Augustine says, there can be no word in our souls without actual thinking. And so an image of the
Trinity is to be looked for in the mind first and foremost in terms of activity, in so far as out of the awareness we have to form an internal word by thinking [prout scilicet ex noticia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus] and from this burst out into actual love (1a, Q. 93, a. 7; Aquinas, 1964–75, 13: 72–73).

And again,

Now every procession corresponds to some sort of activity; and as corresponding to activity directed towards something external there is an outward procession, so with an activity that remains within the agent we observe an inward procession. The best example of this appears in the intellect where the action of understanding remains in him who understands. Whenever anyone understands because of his very act of understanding, something comes forth within him, which is the concept of the known thing proceeding from his awareness of it [rei intellectae ex ejus noticia procedens]. It is this concept which an utterance signifies; we call it "the word in the heart," signified by the spoken word.

Now since he is above things, when we say things of God we should not understand them to be like lowly creatures, namely bodies, but like the highest creatures, namely spiritual beings, although even the likeness taken from them falls short as an illustration of divine things. That is why procession should not be taken as it is in corporeal realities, as a movement in space or as an action of a cause producing an external effect, as when heat passes from a heater to a thing heated. No, it should be taken like an issuing in the mind [emanationem intelligibilis], for instance like an idea [verbi intelligibilis] which stays inside oneself [ipso] (1a, Q. 27, a. 1; Aquinas, 1964–75, 6: 6–7).

In contrast to Duns Scotus and his followers, Lonergan wished to emphasize that Aquinas's insistence on the quality of the procession as an emanatio intelligibilis is absolutely crucial, both in the Trinity itself and in its created analogue, the human mind. Lonergan therefore set himself the task of understanding exactly what Aquinas was getting at by way of this insistence. I shall briefly summarize his results under the headings: "The Priority of Intelligere"; "Emanatio Intelligibilis" itself; "Self-knowledge Immanent in Judgment of Fact"; and finally "Aquinas's Analogy."

20. Lonergan records this last line as: "Secundum emanationem intelligibilis, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente" (1967: 33 n 158).
4.3.2. The Priority of *Intelligere*

First, there is an act of intelligence, *intelligere*, which Lonergan interchangably translates as "insight" or "understanding." Now a difficulty arises in interpreting Aquinas on this issue, for he "did not employ the term *intelligere* exclusively in the sense of understanding" (34). And to find out the principal meaning of the term, one has to know something about the methodological principles of Aristotle's biology. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle tells us that scientific knowledge of different types of animate beings is had through knowledge of their souls. But, Scotus to the contrary, human knowing does not rise to such knowledge through some sort of immediate, intuitive spiritual peek into the inner soul of such beings. Rather, as any biologist knows, one begins from how the animal or plant behaves toward a variety of objects (for instance, other animals). These objects provide the basis for specifying the different acts in the organism's repertoire: various animals provide the occasion for hunting, fleeing, mating, or competing for mates. Different acts correspond to different potencies, and souls (essences) are distinguished by these potencies. While some of the terminology is a little unfamiliar to the modern ear, Aristotle's extremely generic way of characterizing biological method still fits the biology of today.

Now there are two different kinds of objects of acts of souls, moving objects and terminal objects. In the former case, the object produces the act, a passive or receptive act; in the latter, the act produces the object. Now it is possible for one and the same act to be analyzed from both points of view, and this is exactly the case with *intelligere*. As "insight" or "understanding," *intelligere* is a passive act moved by its object, namely phantasm (image) illuminated by the agent intellect (the desire to know, questioning). As "conceiving" or "expressing," *intelligere* expresses itself once insight has occurred in an inner word, the terminal object of this mode of acting. Although Aquinas occasionally used the term, *dicere*, to distinguish this second mode of acting, and *intelligere* to denote the first mode (127), he was not always precise. This fact, and several related terminological prob-
lems, led commentators to assume that one act, intelligere, had to have but one mode of acting. Allegedly that mode of acting had to be a "cognizance" or thinking with regard to the one and only (terminal) object, namely the product, the universal concept. The concept itself was not the result of a conscious act—emanatio intelligibilis—but was already in the mind prior to thought, produced unconsciously by the metaphysical machinery of that great "black box," the human mind. The act of thinking only adverted to that presence in a conscious fashion.

Neglect of the fundamental importance of Aristotle's biological method to Aquinas's thought squeezed out the opportunity for a proper understanding of intelligere. It led, in short, to the position Lonergan called "conceptualism." But more is needed to translate intelligere as "insight": one must turn from the terminology to the reality of one's own mind to find out exactly what act emerges from problematic images, and this is exactly what Lonergan did. The warrant for his interpretation of Aquinas's intelligere is nothing other than Lonergan's understanding of his own understanding in Aquinas's words. We have already seen Lonergan emphasize the indispensability of this act.

4.3.3. Emanatio Intelligibilis

According to Aquinas the emanatio intelligibilis in human thought provides the analogue for the procession of the divine Word.

21. Included here are: (1) two parallel meanings of the term, "potentia activa"; (2) the Aristotelian distinction between scientific argument and common or descriptive knowing (ST, Ia, Q. 87, a. 1). Failure to recognize this distinction has led a great many (Donceel, 218-220; Marechal, 213; and implicitly, Maritain, 116-117) to assume that the agent intellect must be unconscious, must operate unconsciously according to some metaphysical mechanism. The assumption seems to be that Aquinas would not have provided an argument for the existence of the agent intellect in ST Ia, Q. 79, a. 3 if he could have known it from conscious experience. Of course Aquinas does advert to conscious experience of the agent intellect in the very next article, Q. 79, a. 4. (3) the use of "species" to denote both the content of an act of sense as well as the very different, non-representable, content of intelligence. (This led to the identification of the universal concept with the "impoverished replica of sense"; Lonergan, 1958: 88).
But what exactly is this human *emanatio intelligibilis*? Lonergan recognized that a preliminary clarification of its source (*intelligere*, understanding, insight) was absolutely essential to a proper understanding of the procession itself. Having described the act, verified its actuality, and established that such was indeed what Aquinas was talking about, he could proceed to discuss the nature of the *emanatio intelligibilis* from *intelligere*.

The key to *emanatio intelligibilis* is self-understanding. Aquinas adhered to Aristotle's position that human intelligence does not know itself "by a direct grasp of its own essence" (76). Rather, it knows itself only through a *species* (intelligibility) of what it understands, of something other than itself. The reasons for this are: (a) understanding only understands what is in act; (b) human intelligence is largely in potency (that is, at any given moment we do not understand all that we are capable of, all that we have the potential for, understanding); (c) our understanding comes to act only when we understand something other than ourselves (a phantasm). Since that act of understanding is passive, it is a receiving of something—a *species* (intelligibility).

Now unique to Aristotelian-Aquinas epistemology, according to Lonergan, is the claim that knowing is by identity. The "act of the thing as sensible is the act of sensation; the act of the thing as intelligible is the act of understanding" (71, emphasis added; see also 72-73, 147-149, 184-187). At first this seems to contradict what has just been said. But in fact it is consistent with the position that every thing, and every property of every thing, and every occurrence of every relationship among things, is composed of potencies, intelligible forms and acts. The *species* received in the passive act of understanding is one and the same as the intelligible form of the understood. We understand by becoming one with the understood.

A police detective is at one with the serial killer when she grasps his *modus operandi*. Kepler was at one with the orbit of Mars when understood that it was elliptical. Watson and Crick were one with the process of DNA replication when they understood how DNA was structured. Jane Goodall was at one with her monkeys when they treated their young as they did. The psychotherapist is at one with the patient when he understands the patient's problem. Jane Jacobs is at one with her
neighborhood when she understands how it functions. The "Eureka!" of understanding is not only the joy of becoming what one could be, but is also the ecstasy of union.

Now the average reader will be inclined to object that Jane Goodall never turned into a monkey. But the obvious truth of this objection obscures the profundity of its warrants, and basically there are two. First, even someone who devotes a lifetime trying to study one type of thing never fully understands everything there is to be understood about that kind of thing. Hence, there is some intelligible part of the studied thing which is not yet identical with anyone's human understanding. Second, even though the identity of intelligibility and intelligence is real when understanding occurs, this does not insure identity of the potencies. In general the potency of human intelligence is not identical with the potency of what is understood.

However, this distinction between potencies is not immediately grasped by insight itself. Insight is, so to speak, like a young lover—so caught up in the union that it does not attend to the difference. It is in conceiving that this difference of potency is grasped. This act of conceiving is the act of understanding, not of the illuminated phantasm, but of itself. It is the act of understanding expressing itself precisely as such. Insight understands a species (form, intelligibility); it understands that species is related in some way to the problem-atic phantasm which motivates the insight. Insight also, therefore, understands itself because it is that species. But we now need to shift from clarificatory language to exact language. It is more precise to say the converse: insight grasps the species of the phantasm because of what it has become. It has become an intelligent actuation of that species. But when it attends to itself as intelligent—which it does in trying to express what it understands itself to be—it recognizes that there is so much more to being intelligent than what it has achieved in this one act (73-75; see also Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q. 77, a. 4). In conceiving itself, understanding recognizes that there are conditions to the actual intelligibility of the species which it does not yet understand. It recognizes that these conditions are in fact supplied in its

22. The fullness of actual intelligence, ipsum intelligere, is the unrestricted act of understanding which is God.
own intelligence, because understanding in act understands that it understands (that is, understands that its actuation of this intelligibility is actual). On the basis of this self-understanding, it articulates what those conditions are—which aspects or parts of the phantasm conditioned the understanding, and which are extraneous. So, when understanding expresses itself by articulating its understanding of the conditions of its understanding, it is understanding as conceiving (intelligere as dicere). What it generates is an inner word, a concept, a definition (verbum). This is a process which absolutely cannot take place without consciously understanding, by some unconscious metaphysical mechanism. It is an emanatio intelligibilis.

4.3.4. Self-knowledge Immanent in Judgment of Fact

By a masterful phenomenological hermeneutic, Lonergan discovered that in Aquinas one must distinguish and relate two types of processes, which provide the ground for parallel distinctions between two types of intelligere and two types of verbum—concept and judgment. In some ways, Lonergan's discovery of this distinction and relation is even more important than his discovery of the act of insight itself.

The discovery was not easy, for Aquinas spoke of the second kind of inner word as a compositio vel divisio (composition or distinction), a phrase he used in several different ways. In sorting out these linguistic uses, Lonergan began by noting the obvious conjunction and distinction of written and spoken words used to express judgments. (For example, "All ostriches are vertebrates"; "emu are not ostriches.") From this fact it has been customary to assume that individual linguistic words correspond to single inner words, and hence it would seem that the inner word of judgment is the act of synthesising or distinguishing inner words. Such a position has underpinned Western culture from Duns Scotus to Kant and beyond. Lonergan undertook to show both that the position was false through a phenomenological scrutiny of the conscious act of judging, and that Aquinas never held such a position.

Lonergan approached the phenomenological issue of the inner word of judgment on two fronts. First, he noted that the primary concern of the act of judgment is the truth of the compositio vel divisio, and its truth has to do not with the relationships among the words, but with the
relationships between the synthesised inner words and the compound realities they denote (50–51). In other words, the object of judgment is not the mental synthesis or distinction, but something else which presupposes the mental synthesis as already accomplished. The object of judgment is not the synthesis as synthesis, but the veracity of the synthesis. Second, Lonergan followed sound phenomenological method, moving from the linguistic compositio vel divisio back to the grounding intentional acts. There he pointed out that linguistic compounds express not only judgments, but non-judgmental syntheses such as hypotheses or questions (49). The upshot of all this is that the inner word of the act of judging is not, properly speaking, a compositio vel divisio. The compositio vel divisio is the judgment's "direct borrowed content," not its "proper content" (1958: 275).

Lonergan repeatedly acknowledged that his path to this interpretation of Aquinas was prepared by Fr. Peter Hoenen's articles "which brought to light both the necessity of some intellectual apprehension of nexus in phantasm and, as well the recognition of this fact by Aristotle and by Aquinas" (1967: 218; see also 25, 52, 97; and 1972b: 266–67). In other words, insight grasps in illuminated images the kind of intelligible species associated with ordinary language, and expresses itself in inner words. It may also grasp "on the level of direct [as contrasted with reflective] understanding" the intelligible species of relationship (nexus) or distinction among these ordinary, descriptive species in the same images, "in the development of insights into higher unities" (59). Then it can employ the previous inner words as means to express this developed understanding of relationship or distinction.

From this follows one of the most important points of Lonergan's position: the intelligible species is not only distinguishable from the sensible or imaginable species; it is totally unlike the sensible or imaginable species, because its content is completely insensible, unimaginable, unpicturable, unrepresentable. While one may be seduced into thinking that what one understands by such "universal concepts" as 'red,' 'circle,' or 'mass' is an imagined red patch, or an imagined black circular curve, or an imagined lump, there can be no such corresponding image associated with the relationship (nexus) of identity expressed in the Pythagorean theorem. The theorem states that relationship as "the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares
on the legs of a right triangle." Construct all the images you like; you'll find no picture of that relationship, "is equal to." That is something purely understood.

The composition vel divisio itself is the "direct borrowed content of a judgment; its "proper content" (1958: 275) is the positing, the uttering of the composition vel divisio as affirmed or denied, as known to be true or false. But what is the source of this "knowing" to be true or false? That is its "indirect borrowed content," the second kind of intelligere which Lonergan called "reflective understanding."

The qualifier, "reflective," is significant not only in cognitive theory, but in Trinitarian theory as well. This term goes right to the heart of self-knowing. When one bounces a beam of light off a mirror in order to illuminate something, this reflecting involves the use of one object as a means to another. 23 Again, when one's appearance is reflected in a mirror, there is a reproduction of the appearance. Both of these aspects—means and reproduction—come together in the act of reflective understanding.

The direct intelligere expressing itself in an inner word understands the conditionality of its understanding because it has a kind of understanding of intelligence itself (ipsum intelligere) by being intelligent. This means that it understands the difference between its own act and what the fullness of intelligence would be like. In virtue of this consciousness, it recognizes that the conditions for its own actuation of the intelligible species are not the same as the conditions intelligence would require for the objective reality of the species it has understood. So there emerges in consciousness a question about the understood species. The question is not, "Do I understand the species?" for that is already known in understanding. Rather, the question about the species is "Is it really so?" or, more properly, "Is the intelligible species I have understood indeed the intelligible form of the sensible image I originally puzzled about?"

At this point the phenomenon "reflection" commences. The insight and inner word begin to be drawn upon as means to something beyond them—

23. Similar examples can be had by thinking about "combination shots" in billiards, and the methods employed by elementary particle physicists and physical chemists.
selves. Reflection draws upon their understanding of the finite conditionality of their act, and their awareness of unrestricted intelligence in order to work out what conditions (in sense) would be needed to satisfy full intelligence's demand for intelligible unconditionality. Reflection also uses sense as means as it seeks to determine whether those conditions are presently given, are available in accurate memory, or can be coaxed out of the world (for example, through experimentation).

This process of reflection is also a self-reproduction through a thorough self-knowing. Conceiving reproduces the act of understanding as such. But a human being—unlike God and angels—is not merely his or her intelligence; human beings are unities of body and intelligence. Reflection unites in an act of reflective understanding the body (acts of sensing) and spirit (acts of understanding). When an act of positing, judging, produces an affirmation or denial known to be true because of the self-knowing, it is not merely of an act of understanding, but of the whole being. Reflective understanding grasps the whole human being (63) as one who knows this understanding to be "like unto" the unconditioned—virtually unconditioned. This is why Lonergan calls it a "personal act" \(^{24}\) (1967: 61; 1958: 272).

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24. The whole-self-knowledge of reflection is not "knowledge in the full sense" that comes with the thematized self-affirmation of Lonergan's work. It is the kind of knowing that comes by the experience of doing. "I had explained that consciousness is knowledge of the subject sub ratione experti (under the formal aspect of "the experienced") ..." (Lonergan, 1959: 179-80). For full discussion, see 175-81; also, 1964: 225-227.) One knows one is conscious by being conscious; one knows one is understanding in the deed of understanding; one knows oneself as whole in the doing of judging. But this experiencing-through-doing is not knowledge in the "proper sense" (1964: 227). Hence, Lonergan wrote: "Not in every judgment do we reflect to the point of knowing our own essence and from that conclude our capacity to know truth. Rather, in this passage Aquinas subscribed, not obscurely, to the program of critical thought: to know truth we have to know ourselves and the nature of our knowledge, and the method to be employed is reflection" (1967: 75). I submit that there is a performative knowing of truth which could not give self-expression to how or why doing that is knowing truth; that there is a performative knowing of intelligence itself which cannot express the "whatness" of what it experiences. It is only in the "re-duplication" (1964: 224) of the structure as experienced-in-performance by the structure as knowing that self-knowledge in the full, critical sense emerges.
While Aquinas speaks compactly of both types of intelligere (direct and reflective acts of understanding), both types of processions and types of products as "ratio" ("reason"), the distinction Lonergan uncovered led him to differentiate a second level of consciousness (intelligence) from a third level (reason).

4.3.5. Aquinas's Analogy

Finally, there is the application of the foregoing analyses of human consciousness to the task of analogically comprehending the divine processions. First, God is known as analogous to the human act of intelligere itself. The act of analogizing consists in extrapolating from a self-knowledge which knows the difference between its own act and the potentialities of intelligence, to an act which knows the identity of its act with all that intelligence can be. Underscoring this point, toward the end of his study Lonergan wrote:

When Aquinas spoke of God as ipsum intelligere, did he mean that God was a pure act of understanding? To that conclusion we have been working through four articles (190).

All that has been said so far can be reduced to a single proposition that, when Aquinas used the term, intelligible, his primary meaning was not whatever can be conceived, such as matter, nothing and sin, but whatever can be known by understanding (180).

Second, Aquinas drew the analogy from the procession of the human inner word from human intelligere, to the procession of the divine Word from the Unrestricted Act of Understanding which is God. But, as we have seen, there are two such processions, and each one allows a certain kind of emphasis. The procession of the inner word which expresses the direct act of understanding stresses that there is nothing in the word which is not in the understanding, that it is because of the understanding's understanding, and that the relation is thoroughly intelligent. But because human understanding is not the fullness of understanding, there is a distinction between what is expressed in the human inner word and the person expressing it. Humans are not identical with their understanding. But God is, and the process of analogy prescinds from this human limitation in its effort to mean "the Word proceeded
from God." The procession of the inner word of judgment which expresses the reflective act of understanding emphasises the wholeness of self-knowing, and the wholeness of the reproduction (generation) of self-knowing. But because any act of human reflective understanding has to appeal to what it understands to be given (in sensing) without knowing why it is given, whereas in God there is nothing given without understanding, the analogizing prescinds from this limitation. Finally, while neither Aquinas nor Lonergan say so in so many words, there is one particular instance of the procession of human *verbum* from human *intelligere* which is especially to be regarded as the most perfect of all created analogues of the Divine procession, and that is the procession of the judgment of self-affirmation from the reflective understanding which grasps the sufficiency of that judgment. Only here is the *verbum* fully identical with the human self uttering that judgment (74-75).

Third, the preceding interpretation laid the groundwork for an understanding of Aquinas's writings on the procession of the Holy Spirit. But Lonergan treated this procession in a cursory manner because, as he wrote, "the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit [has been] wrapped in deepest obscurity. It seemed possible to eliminate the obscurity connected with the second procession by eliminating the superficiality connected with opinions on the first" (183; see also 204). Since his treatment of the second procession is brief, perhaps it is best to simply quote him.

First, it is shown that since God understands, He must have a will; further, this will cannot be really distinct from either the divine substance or the divine intellect. Secondly, the will of God cannot be mere potency or mere habit; it must be in act; and since the basic act of will is love, it must be actually loving. Thirdly, the proper object of divine love is the divine goodness which is identical with God; but love is dynamic presence; therefore the love of God for God involves the dynamic presence of God in God. Moreover, since divine loving, divine willing, divine being are identical, it follows that the dynamic presence of God in God is not mere dynamic presence, but God. Just as God's thought [conceiving of the Word] of God is not mere thought but God, so God's love of God is not mere accidental act but God. Fourthly, the origin of divine love is treated. There cannot be the dynamic presence of the beloved [God] in the lover's [Spirit's] will, unless there first is intellectual conception. Further, it is not the concept [Word] but the conceived [God] that is loved; hence divine love is related both to the Word and to God from whom the Word proceeds (203-204).
Fourth, nowhere here have we mentioned the "Father"—only God, Word (Son), and Holy Spirit. The reasons for this are central to Aquinas's way of proceeding. He does not conceive the Word as proceeding from the Father, but within the unrestricted act of understanding and loving which is God, the "substance" or "essence" of God, the Unity of the Three Persons. And "the processions are in God prior"; that is, the processions within the Unrestricted Act of Understanding and Loving constitute the persons, hard as this might be to grasp for someone who has not understood understanding. Hence, the First Person (Father) of the divine Trinity is defined implicitly (Lonergan, 1958: 12-13): that person from whom the Word is generated and from whom, along with the word, the Holy Spirit is generated (206-215).

Finally, the ascensional dimension found in Augustine was not lost, either by Aquinas or Lonergan.

As long as our concepts are in development, the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery. In other words, the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated in its full intelligibility; grasping properly quid sit Deus is the beatific vision (208).

4.4. Conclusion

In Lonergan's analysis of Aquinas's analogy, we again find some of the same things which characterized Grace and Freedom. As there, Lonergan stresses that he is using historical methods to retrieve Aquinas's meanings.25 Again, there is the careful reconstruction of the various systematic contexts in which Aquinas's statements about the inner word are situated. There is the insightful penetration of the

25. Particularly striking here was his realization that, if one wanted to know what Aquinas meant by "inner word" one had best attend neither to his Trinitarian writings, nor his treatises on the human mind, but rather to the texts devoted to the plurality of divine ideas (6).
terminological "jungle" where different terms have the same meaning and the same term different meanings in various contexts. And there is the flexibility with which Lonergan moves around the uses Aquinas makes of metaphysical terms, always aware that "potency," "matter," "active," "passive," and the like, never denote absolutes, but relationships among acts which will shift when a different issue is being addressed.

But there is also something new in Verbum, and that newness is forced by the subject matter. It is the same thing which gave Augustine the normativity of his exploration of the created analogue. That is, while the normativity of Augustine's acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity rested in his faith, the normativity of his exploration of that created analogue—the human mind—and his assertion that it is the most perfect analogue rested in his mind itself. In exactly the same way, the authenticity of Lonergan's interpretations and historical analyses, what justified them despite the fact that no one before him had ever analyzed things in the ways he did, rested in his own mind.

In Verbum the performative normativity of Lonergan's thought came to self-appropriation; that self-appropriation was explicitly recognized as the only adequate foundation for understanding these great thinkers who were thinking about their own thinking. While Insight would explore the methodological consequences of this appropriation of one's mind, it remains that the original acts of self-appropriation were done in researching Verbum. Verbum is the original chapter 11 of Insight.

5. INSIGHT

In Verbum Lonergan claimed that Augustine, Aristotle, and Aquinas all employed "introspective techniques" (ix) in reaching their claims regarding the operations of the human mind. Yet Lonergan also remarked:

But if Aristotle and Aquinas used introspection and did so brilliantly, it remains that they did not thematize their use, did not elevate it into a reflectively elaborated technique, did not work out a proper method for psychology [cognitive theory], and thereby lay the groundwork for the contemporary distinctions between nature and spirit and between the natural and human sciences (ix-x).
The achievement of introspective self-appropriation came amidst the researching of Verbum. There it was grasped as the key to interpreting Aquinas; there it was recognized as the essential breakthrough for normativity in historical thinking. But it was left to the writing of Insight to work out the methodological implications of that self-appropriation. Hence in this section we shall explore how Lonergan worked out those methodological implications in Insight, and shall adopt Lonergan's own terms for doing so. Thus, we shall discuss Insight from the viewpoint of the shifts from classicist to modern culture as follows: "From First Principles to Transcendental Method"; "From Aristotelian to Modern Science"; "From Logic to Method"; "From Soul to Subject and from Nature to History."

5.1. From First Principles to Transcendental Method

In the "Preface" to Insight, Lonergan wrote that "the philosophy and metaphysics that result from insight into insight will be verifiable" (xi). The mere conjunction of the words, "verifiable" and "metaphysics" strikes the modern ear as strange. Thinkers from Hegel to Whitehead have conceived of metaphysics as a purely speculative discipline. Analytic philosophy made its citadel around the position that metaphysics is intrinsically unverifiable. Heidegger and subsequent phenomenologists have undertaken the programme of the destruction of metaphysics because of the way its language "concealed" the "unconcealed" (alethea, truth, that which verification makes manifest).

26. Later, Lonergan tended to wary of the term, "introspection," since it contained connotations to which he was vehemently opposed—particularly regarding the nature of consciousness and of the way in which the acts of consciousness are known (1972a: 8-9). Since "intro-spec-tion" literally means "looking inside" and carries the Scotist implication of an inner intuition by means of which one grasps one's essence, or runs into the criticisms of Hume, Kant, and Sartre, Lonergan increasingly spoke of "intentionality analysis" or, occasionally, "phenomenology" in its place. In any case, what he always meant was heightened attention to the data of consciousness, to the experiences of acting consciously, followed by questions and answers that arose from such heightened awareness.
What was Lonergan getting at in going against this contemporary trend? He was proposing that he had solved a problem which traces back to the classicist conception of metaphysics. In that conception, metaphysics is the science of first principles, and moreover, those principles are conceived as propositional syntheses of concepts, following conceptualist criteria. On this account, all of being can be scientifically deduced from first principles. But how does one arrive at first principles themselves? The answers varied (Lonergan, 1958: 402-423) but the notion of "necessity" was key in most attempts. Figure out propositions which necessarily had to be true, and you'd be home free. However, necessity came to include such concepts as Euclidean geometrical properties and the view of decency propagated by the English "public school" system. Hence, "necessity" all too often amounted to "whatever I cannot conceive of or imagine to be different." It was little wonder that scorn was cast upon a science of first principles in such an atmosphere.

The breakthrough for Lonergan seems to have come with the discovery that in Aquinas, and Aristotle as well, first principles of knowledge were not limited to propositional syntheses of concepts. Lonergan articulated this discovery in his treatment of the central epistemological conundrum: how do we know if things really are the way we know them to be? This is the question of the standard for assessing knowledge.

Such reflection presents a familiar puzzle. To judge that my knowing is similar to the known involves a comparison between the knowing and its standard; but either the standard is known or it is not known; if it is known, then really the comparison is between these two items of knowledge, and one might better maintain that we know directly without any comparing; on the other hand, if the standard is not known, there cannot be any comparison. .... [Aquinas] admitted the necessity of a standard in judgment, .... [but] he does not seem to have considered as standard either of the alternatives against which the above dilemma is operative; for his standard was neither the thing-in-itself as thing-in-itself and so as unknown, nor was it some second inner representation of the thing-in-itself coming to the aid of the first in a futile and superfluous effort to be helpful. The Thomist standard lay in the principles of the intellect itself: "The term mind (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare). For a thing of any genus is measured by what is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics [1052b24, 34]. So, the word mind is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows
about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles" (1969: 59-60).\footnote{27}

Now Aquinas used the phrase, resolutio in principiis (resolution to principles), to discuss the cause of certitude. A proposition—the example given is that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (62)—is known with certitude once it is resolved to its first principles. That is, one knows this geometrical truth once one obtains a demonstration of the conclusion from first principles. It would seem, then, that Aquinas had this sort of "principle" in mind when he spoke of the "principles of intellect."

However, as Lonergan showed, Aquinas was not content merely to point out that one knows certitude of propositions in such a resolution to principles; he also went on to point out why such a resolution brings certitude. It is because "the mind is coerced by its own natural acceptance of the principles to accept the conclusions as well" (63). In other words, there are "natural" first principles which ground the acceptance of "propositional" first principles. And on these prior principles of intellect rests the whole issue of certitude all along the line.

Thus, what is meant by "intellect measuring things by its own principles" turns out to be what has been discussed above: the way in which the consciousness of intellect itself, present in every act of understanding and every movement of reflecting, determines what is required to satisfy intellect's demand for unconditioned understanding. What Lonergan discovered was that Aquinas's reference to "the principles of intellect" is not in any way a reference to propositions stating the rules or essence of intellect itself; that would be an impossibility, given the fact that for Aquinas intellect itself is utterly transcendent. Rather, the principles of intellect only occur and are only known performatively, that is, in the concrete, intelligently acting subject (human or divine).

\footnote{27} Lonergan's actual text quotes Aquinas's Latin: "nomen mentis dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitio nes de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua principia." Above I have substituted an expanded passage from De Veritatae, Q. 9, a. 1. as translated in Aquinas, 1953, 2: 5.
While Aquinas was clearly aware that certitude had its foundation in the concrete subject, it remains that by and large he tended to use this as a kind of "bootstrap" to guarantee the certitude of propositional first principles, and then proceed in a classicist fashion, using the propositional first principles to ground everything else. The intellectual situation had changed drastically by Lonergan's time. Aquinas could operate effectively in his day with a limited stock of propositional first principles. But from the twelfth to the twentieth century the fundamental character of the sciences was their developmental nature. New sciences, and new versions of old sciences arose generation after generation. Indeed in the mathematical fields, it seemed that one could have several sciences with contradictory first principles (for example, Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries). Moreover, if these new sciences indeed possessed first principles—which many present day classicists still doubt—modern thinkers had long since given up the bother of attempting a coherent articulation of them.

Lonergan, therefore, saw the need for something which would do for the contemporary scene what "first principles" did for Aquinas: provide a basis for integrating what was true and good in the culture, and for reversing what was false and pernicious. And to accomplish it, he followed Aquinas's clue: a resolution to the principles of intellect. Lonergan would seek to show that "just as every statement in theoretical science can be shown to imply statements regarding sensible fact, so every statement in philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional fact" (1958: xi). Thus, metaphysical statements—and those of ethics and theology as well (387)—could be resolved to cognitional statements; cognitional statements could be found either to square or be at variance with the "principles of intellect"—the self-appropriated structure of human consciousness. Where the cognitional statement squared with self-affirmation, it would be verified; where it varied, the metaphysical position would be falsified. This is the fundamental meaning of a "verifiable metaphysics." In other words, the explicitly articulated understanding of understanding which oriented his interpretation of Aquinas in Verbum would become the new foundation for critical reflection on science and culture.

In order to provide a more focused idea of the need and necessity of such a procedure, let me advert to a problem in the exposition in
section 4.3.4 of this essay. Following Aquinas, and for purposes of pedagogical clarity, I there spoke of human understanding's "awareness of intelligence itself (ipsum intelligere)." In that context I could say that human intelligence, in self-reflection, has a knowledge of the conditions intelligence requires for the objective reality of something. This is because for Aquinas, intelligence itself is God, the Unrestricted Act of Understanding which grasps everything about everything, grasps the conditionality of everything upon itself, and grasps the mediated conditionality of everything upon the conditions which God causes to be its conditions. This all makes sense for Aquinas because of the way he proceeds—particularly in the Summa. First, he demonstrates that there is a God (Ia, Q.2.); then he takes up the characteristics of God (QQ. 3-11), especially the unrestrictedness of divine understanding (QQ. 14-17); subsequently he moves on to the will and power of God (QQ. 19-26), the exercise of that power in creation (QQ. 44-49), the creation of the material universe (QQ. 65-75), the nature of human beings (QQ. 75-78) and their knowing (QQ. 79-81, 89-89).28 Thus when Aquinas got around to a "science" of how humans attain certitude, he could draw upon what he had established earlier on about ipsum intelligere.

Much, therefore, depends upon the first demonstration in the "first science," namely, the proof for the existence of God. And as any beginning student in philosophy can tell you, everything there depends on the denial of an infinite sequence of causes. But just what is wrong with an infinite sequence of causes? As Aristotle went to great pains to show, the notion is unthinkable—it is both unimaginable and unintelligible. But, who says the universe is intelligible? This is a question both Aristotle and Aquinas knew to have an affirmative answer, but neither took it up explicitly. In the contemporary period, ideas such as "Existence is absurd" or "All meaning is devoid of objective reference, and is to be de-constructed into an arbitrary, playful structure of associations" are all the rage. If Lonergan would do for our period

28. The creation of humans seems to come a little out of temporal sequence (QQ. 90-94), so that, in good scientific fashion, the general, human nature, is treated before the particular, Adam and Eve. Somewhat parallel sequences are also to be found in the Contra Gentiles and De Veritate.
what Aquinas did for his, he would have to explicitly answer this question without appealing to the existence of God (which would be a petitio principii). Rather, he would have to do so by resolving such an issue to the known structure of human knowing.

In outline form, here's what he did. Self-affirmation reveals that human knowing is a structure of intentional acts, related by questions. Questions for intelligence arise from experiencing and lead to understanding and conception. Questions for reflection are put about one's understanding and lead to reflective understanding and judgment (1958: 319-336; 1964: 221-227). The source of all such questions, and therefore all finite intentional acts—is the pure unrestricted desire to know.

By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and reflection. ... It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge (1958: 348).

This desire is the concrete, introspectively identifiable and affirmable experience I previously referred to as "a kind of awareness of intelligence itself."

If one now turns to work out the "methodological implications" of these "introspective" conclusions, one finds, first, that what this desire intends is properly called "being." In fact, being can be defined in terms of this self-known desire as "its objective." Why? Oddly enough, Lonergan never gets around to saying why, in so many words, in chapter 12 of Insight. Yet it isn't too difficult to work out the answer. Since the desire is a desire for the answer to all questions which is to be had only in the "complete context of correct judgments," it is clearly a desire for the answer to every "Is it so?" question. In other words, its objective is "all that is," which is simply another way of saying "being." I wish to stress that the statement, "Being is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know," follows neither from some intuition of being, or of necessity, nor by convention. It proceeds methodologically, from an analysis of the self-appropriated structure of consciousness. It is because "Is it so?" questions are intrinsic to that process, and because that process is intrinsically unrestricted, that one can render this correct definition.
This "second order" (350, 360-61) definition is the first of the methodological consequences of self-appropriation. Others follow. One is the account of the objectivity of human knowing. In another, Lonergan proceeds from the self-appropriated structure of human knowing to work out the heuristic structure of the reality of the material universe ("proportionate being"; 431-451). He goes on to indicate how that structure forms the backbone of a "method in metaphysics" which would "underlie, penetrate, transform, and unify" (390) the achievements of the multiplicity of sciences and human cultures ("common senses"). "Underlie and penetrate" means to put these achievements explicitly in touch with their foundations by a resolution to the structure of consciousness ("principles of intelligence"); "transform" means to criticize the inadequacies of the formulations of results via those foundations; "unify" means to provide a basis for interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collaboration (385-401).

But for present purposes, I wish to dwell upon only one of the further implications, namely, the manner in which it is possible to establish that reality is "completely intelligible" (672-73). Again, this consists in a "resolution" to the self-affirmed facts of human consciousness. The being of being is grasped in judgments which respond to "Is?" But "Is?" questions are always about intelligible contents grasped by prior acts of direct understanding. Hence, every human knowing of being has an intrinsically intelligible component. Moreover, since human knowing intends the totality of being in precisely this manner, nothing which "is" would be lacking in intelligibility. Precisely what that intelligibility might be can be difficult, obscure and even mysterious; but from the nature of human knowing, one can work out the methodological conclusion that reality is completely intelligible. This opens the way for a discussion of the unintelligibility of evil, and a discussion of God. Unlike Aquinas, these issues come at the end, rather than the beginning of Lonergan's work.

This, I hope, gives some idea of how Lonergan set about substituting "transcendental method" for "first principles." Transcendental method begins with the "reduplication" (1964: 224) of the structure of knowing as experienced-in performance into that structure as explicitly understood, verified and embraced. It moves on to discover and articulate the consequences which follow from that known structure as
such, independently of whatever the particular contents one's acts of experiencing, understanding, expressing, judging, valuing or deciding might be.

5.2. From Logic to Method

Western thought has paid homage to logic for over two millennia, frequently in a slavish way, even more frequently without understanding just what logic is. The term, "logical," is most frequently used to denote whatever I happen to believe in a particularly strong way. (In graduate school we used to play a board game called "Risk!" and the department's resident professor of logic joined in. He dutifully and earnestly instructed the other players as to what the "most logical" move for them was, which oddly always happened to favor his advantage.) Under a better control of the meaning of the term, "logic," refers to relations among propositions—which propositions do and do not provide sufficient conditions for the affirmation of other propositions. Distinctions within this treatment of "logic" include major versus minor logic, formal versus informal logic, traditional versus symbolic logic, deontic and many-valued logics, study of typical fallacies, and so on. The equation of "the logical" and "the reasonable" is probably to be traced to Scotus (Lonergan, 1967: 25 n 122), who overlooked insight and made all operations of the human mind like unto deductive syllogizing.

People also speak of "inductive logic" and "logic of discovery," two topics which have been hotly debated ever since they were first introduced. As far as I am able to tell, both phrases consist in efforts to cast the facts of insight and reflective understanding into the mold of deductive relationships among propositions. As such, they are doomed from birth, for as Lonergan says, the remarkable fact about direct and reflective understanding is that they can "make use of elements in the cognitional process" which are "more rudimentary" than propositions (1958: 281).

There is a kind of static mentality which comes with excessive reliance on logic. It tends to think that all possible conclusions from premises must have already been worked out in a given text. Aristotle, Euclid and Aquinas have all been treated in this way. But modern
thinkers have successfully found ways to use those "more rudimentary" elements in cognition to think thoughts and solve problems which classicist thinkers never attempted. This has led to an incredible flexibility and diversity in thinking. By appropriating the structure of the relations among those more rudimentary elements of human cognition, and by identifying the role of logic in it (1958: 276-77; see also 1957) Lonergan provided a normative way of retaining what was good in the classicist adherence to logic, and yet going beyond its limitations to incorporate what was good in new methods.

5.3. From Aristotelian to Modern Science

Most people who've read Insight remember awaking from the nightmare of the first five chapters on science to the breath of fresh air of chapters 6 and 7 on "Common Sense." If, as Lonergan claimed, "more than all else, the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act" of self-appropriation, why, then, did he write the book in such an impenetrable way? He himself gave three reasons: first, the developmental character of understanding is clearest in the advance of scientific understanding, as guided by scientific method (33). Common sense develops in a somewhat eclectic fashion, and it is not always the case that additions to it build upon previous contributions. Second, because of the biases, the common body of opinions we refer to as common sense is actually an admixture of understanding and misunderstanding, whereas the methods of modern science progressively minimize, if not eliminate, the acceptance of misunderstanding (1958: 267, 297, 505). Third, the crucial fact of the unpicturability, the unimaginability, of the intelligible content of acts of understanding became unavoidable only with the achievements of scientific method in the twentieth century (xx-xxi). The immediacy of common sense misleads one's introspective attempts into equating the intelligible contents of commons sense terms with the images of the immediate occasions of their origins or applications (296). We may also include a fourth issue mentioned earlier: the shift in the understanding of "science" is the most fundamental cultural innovation of our era. Clearly, then, Lonergan held that familiarity with scientific understanding and method was an important step in the project of self-appropriation.
But there is another, inverse objective operative in Lonergan's chapters on modern scientific method. Not only was Lonergan drawing attention to scientific understanding to aid the reader in appropriating his or her own understanding; he was also drawing on his own self-appropriation to provide an account of why modern scientific methods work, why they are about objective reality, why they follow the rules they do, and what the implications of such procedures were. With this he became the first thinker to truly articulate the foundations of modern science. He succeeded where all before him had failed by being concrete. He penetrated to the heart of the performances of modern scientists, in what can properly be called a "phenomenology" of natural science, and discovered acts and relations among those acts which had been overlooked for centuries. I have elsewhere summarized his phenomenology of modern science (Byrne, 1981a, 1981b), so here I will merely summarize a few crucial results.

First, a "method is a set of directives that serve to guide a process toward a result" (Lonergan, 1958: 396). But what result does modern science seek? It will not come as too much of a surprise to learn that the result modern science seeks is verified understanding. It is in stressing the centrality of understanding—not just its verification—that the originality of Lonergan's contribution lies. So, modern scientific method, according to Lonergan, has as its end acts of verification of acts of understanding of sense experiencing. It should be noted, however, that this is a compound result—the end is not just experiencing, or understanding, or verifying, but all three in combination. A "heuristic" or anticipatory notion is consciousness guiding itself toward a result which is a specific act (understanding, conceiving, judging); but a compound result needs an "ordered set" or compound "structure" of such "notions"—a heuristic structure—which can intelligently and reasonably guide its procedures (392). The entirety of chapter 3 of Insight is devoted to showing how the presence of insights and other "rudimentary elements" in scientific practice "explains the rules or canons" of scientific method (70).

What I have said thus far about Lonergan's analysis of modern science has not provided a criterion by means of which science can be differentiated from any other field of human knowing. Where Lonergan made his most truly unique contribution was in identifying the kinds of
acts of understanding which distinguish modern science from all other forms of understanding, past and present. Modern science seeks "explanatory" acts of understanding. Now the word, "explanation" is hardly new, but Lonergan's meaning of that term is original with him. He elaborated that meaning by way of a contrast with another term, "description": "Description deals with things as related to us. Explanation with the same things as related among themselves" (291). Intelligence's anticipation of acts of understanding which will grasp the purely intelligible relationship of things to one another is responsible for the use of procedures which are part of what Lonergan dubbed "classical method." Classical understanding seeks not to "describe" but to "explain," and therefore methodically proceeds from the relationships of those things to particular points of view and moments of experiencing. Lonergan showed how the use of functions (expressions of purely intelligible relationship), differential equations, principles of invariance, and neglect of certain aspects of data are all procedures guided by intelligence's self-issued directives guiding toward this result (33-44).

But in addition to classical understanding, Lonergan identified two other kinds of explanatory understanding operating in modern science: statistical and genetic understanding. Underlying the various procedures of statistical method (counting, histogram graphing, random and representative sampling) is to be found an "inverse insight" which grasps that certain elements of data may lack classical intelligibility, and yet exhibit a normativity grasped by another kind of insight which is called "probability" (53-62). Statistical procedures, therefore, are assembled to understand probability, and verify that it is the correct probability. But these procedures need to be coupled with classical procedures in order to secure the explanatory status of probabilities. Probabilities need to be put into "schedules" (lists) according to the kinds of events they pertain to. Furthermore, the events need to be categorized according to explanatory relationships grasped through classical method. Otherwise one engages in the absurdity of "determining the frequency of red hair in trombone players" (108) into which all too much social science has fallen.

In his analysis of the third kind of explanatory endeavor, Lonergan showed how the procedures used in embryology and other genetic
studies all impinge upon grasping the intelligibility in the developmental sequence of an organism's functioning (463-467), and how this method could be broadened to other fields of investigations (467-475). While the principle objective of these procedures is an understanding of how later forms of functioning are emergently related to earlier, Lonergan again showed that genetic method must also draw upon classical understanding of relationships in order to attain this result.

One further methodological implication must be mentioned, namely, "emergent probability." As part of his analysis of the foundations of modern science, Lonergan developed a compound structure through which a vast range of empirical questions can be approached (122-124). This structure has the character of a "world view" in which new kinds and species of things and occurrences are conditioned by their predecessors, and condition their novel successors. In the early chapters Lonergan merely showed that commitment to contemporary scientific methods commit one to such a world-view (115-128, 259-267); but later in the book he showed that, in its essentials, the same emergent world view is an implication of self-appropriation itself (431-451).

5.4. From Soul to Subject and from Nature to History

We have already seen Lonergan's insistence on "intelligence in act"—that is, someone actually understanding—is the only adequate basis for a new cultural control of meaning. Mere conceptual, universal precepts will not do. What people conceive as the universal human nature depends upon their act of understanding; either that act is identical with itself (self-appropriation) or it is not. If it is, then this is what Lonergan is talking about. If not, and this has historically been the case, then their conception of human nature will fall short of the full potentiality of being human. This is the fundamental meaning of the shift from soul to subject.

But Lonergan also exploited the implications of this shift in insight to go beyond scientific and philosophical thought to explore the richness of insights which constitute the concrete subjectivity of ordinary people in their daily living. In particular, his phenomenological discovery of the role played by insight in the constitution of
the feelings which make up the "dramatic pattern of experience" was remarkable (187-206). Moreover, he went on to discern the role played by the "rudimentary elements of cognition" in the constitution of the social world and history—"common sense as object" (207-244). There he not only showed the pivotal role played by insight in the constitution of human institutions and historical forces, but also the destructive effects of the "biases" which cause human history to deviate from intelligible progress into "cycles" of compound progress and decline. One and the same structure of consciousness, he concluded, underlies both common living and scientific method. Hence, his "method in metaphysics" also could provide the foundation for historical thinking (562-594).

A great deal more could be said about the shift from "soul to subject" and "nature to history" in Insight itself. But this is the area in which Lonergan's subsequent thought exhibited the greatest growth. Therefore, I will relegate further discussion on this topic to section 7 of this essay.

6. EXCURSUS: TWO APPLICATIONS

A prominent American theologian once complained that "Lonergan is always sharpening his knife, but never cutting anything with it." This has always struck me a little like blaming the developers of CAT Scan devices for not curing epilepsy surgically. In this section I would like to briefly point out some of the problems to which Lonergan brought his method to bear.

We have already seen one such application—namely, the use of self-appropriation as method for interpretation in the case of Verbum. Others are to be found in two essays—"A Note on Geometrical Possibility" (1949) and "The Assumption and Theology" (1948)—written during the period Lonergan was thinking out Insight. Precisely because their topics are so different I feel they give a fair indication of the comprehensiveness of Lonergan's turn to transcendental method.

Lonergan was motivated to write "A Note on Geometrical Possibility" because of a comment by Peter Hoenen, S.J. that only Euclidean geometry is "known as possible." Nor was the man whom Lonergan so esteemed alone in this opinion. The first person to develop a set of
non-Euclidean geometrical axioms, Geronimo Saccheri, did so inadvertently, trying to show its impossibility, and never really believed his own discovery was free of some hidden contradiction. The great geometer, Henri Poincare, argued strongly that only Euclidean geometry could have meaningful application to the sensible world. Contemporary Aristotelian scholar Hippocrates Apostle still argues that non-Euclidean geometries involve equivocations of concepts.

Lonergan, of course, held a different position, and argued it on the basis of self-appropriation. Lonergan used that method to point out, first, that definitions are acts of conceiving, and as such are intrinsically related to their sources, acts of understanding (1949: 98). He then indicated that mathematical definitions always contain some denomination of a "residual common matter" because acts of understanding themselves presuppose "empirical knowledge" (that is, acts of experiencing) (1949: 99). He used these distinctions to clarify the meaning of an "essential definition" which expresses the understanding, and "nominal definition" denoting the "common matter." that is, the empirical elements unified by the understanding. He then went on to claim that all but one of Euclid's definitions is nominal, particularly those of the "straight line" and the "plane." Euclid's parallel presupposes both of these definitions and stands to them as does "formal cause" (understanding) to "common matter" (experiencing). This allowed Lonergan to reformulate the question of possibility as follows: "The issue is whether or not the (nominally) defined plane surface is an essence with the parallel postulate as its consequent property" (106). The answer, he shows, is negative.

It follows that the nominally defined plane surface stands to the properties Euclid establishes concerning plane surfaces, not as essence to its properties, but as common matter to properties that accrue only when a form is added to the common matter to constitute the relevant essence (106-7).

Hence, it is possible to "subsume" the matter of the nominally defined plane under any other intelligible relations of the parts of a plane, nominally defined lines, which differ from but perform the same functions as Euclid's fifth postulate (107).
Because I have vastly abbreviated Lonergan's treatment, the foregoing may seem a bit abstract to the reader. The same thing can be had by an introspective experiment. Imagine two parallel lines in the same plane, crossed by a third line, so that the interior angles add up to two right angles—the image behind Euclid's fifth postulate. How do you know the two lines are parallel? Because they never cross each other, as they do the third line. How do you know they do not cross? If you are being concrete at this point, you don't. Your imagination cannot picture the lines as infinitely extended. You have to go beyond this image in one of two ways: imaginatively or hypothetically. Imaginatively, you can "pan" as a movie camera does and follow the course of the two lines. After a while, the third, cutting line is no longer in the picture. How do you connect this new picture with the old? You cannot do it imaginatively. You need some sort of rule or formula, and this is what Lonergan is getting at. Or, you can go beyond the original image hypothetically and say "I know the two lines do not intersect because the interior angles are equal to two right angles" (Euclid's parallel condition). But now you have not so much discerned non-intersection, as stipulated one possible way of extending the image by "panning": whatever you do, make sure those lines don't touch. The original image itself does not necessitate this.

So Lonergan solved a disputed issue in philosophy of mathematics by his transcendental method. He also solved one in theology in a similar manner. The theological problem he addressed in "The Assumption and Theology" was the nature of the definition of the assumption of Mary as a matter of faith. Since it is nowhere mentioned in scripture, "the predominant view among theologians at present is that the assumption was revealed not explicitly but implicitly" (70). But what does the word, "implicitly," mean in this context? Lonergan suggests that the "Road to Emmaus" story in Luke 24:13-32 provides a clue.

As [Jesus] spoke, the faith of the faltering disciples was enkindled anew, their hearts burned within them, and the eyes of their understanding were opened; they began to see in divine revelation what had been there all along, even though they had not previously seen it. We have, then, in this story an

29. This is a somewhat stylized version of Lonergan, 1967: 41 n 191.
instance of scriptural implication. The mystery of the redemption through the suffering and death of our Lord is contained in the Old Testament. But still that mystery does not lie on the surface. To grasp it one must, as we say, put two and two together; one must begin, as did our Lord with the disciples, from Moses and then proceed through all the prophets; but Moses and the prophets treated of very many things, and so from them one must select just the right passages; finally, one has to piece together these many passages into a single intelligible pattern. By this selection and piecing together there is effected a development of understanding, an opening of the eyes of faith, upon what had been long revealed but what had not, from lack of understanding been apprehended (1948: 72; emphasis added).

Lonergan went on to select and piece together the scriptural sources related to the doctrine of the assumption, and so to build an "intelligible pattern" which is not an explanation of the mystery, but an intelligible correlation of it with other mysteries (73-75).

But what I wish to point out here is that Lonergan has used his phenomenological discernment of the development of understanding as the relevant meaning of the term, "implicit." This enabled him to cut through a debate as to whether "formally implicit revelation" was a necessary condition for this dogmatic definition (77-80). By "formally implicit revelation" was meant something like "formal implication" in logic, where one or more premises are drawn from scripture. In other words, is it required to construct something like an air-tight, syllogistic argument, with the proposed dogma as conclusion? By now, I hope it will be apparent to the reader that understanding does not develop according to syllogistic rules, as well as why that is so. Hence, the proper ground "implication" of the dogma is an act of understanding which can be expressed, not a "formal implication."

There is at least one other clear illustration of the application of Lonergan's methodological approach to problems which may be added to Verbum and the two mentioned here, namely, The Way to Nicea (1976). However an understanding of this last example requires familiarity with the post-Insight developments in Lonergan's reflections on methodology.

Clearly Lonergan did apply his method, though people may not have always understood just what he was doing. I hope for the present section has shed some light on that issue.
With Tad Dunne (1985: 49) I can publicly confess to having read Method in Theology several times and having understood many of the parts, but "none of the book." Fortunately, I was aided by Charles Hefling. For reasons which are now hard for me to grasp, he asked me to be a reader of his doctoral dissertation, "Lonergan on Development: The Way to Nicea in the Light of his more Recent Methodology" (1982). It was only in reading his dissertation, especially chapters 2-6, that I came to grasp what Method in Theology is all about. It is the best thing I have ever read on Method in Theology, and I strongly recommend it to the reader. What I have to say here is almost entirely drawn from Hefling's dissertation.

Lonergan once wrote that his teaching appointment to the Gregorian University in Rome required him to "round off" a longer study he had been working on into the "little book" we now know as Insight. He went on to say that he originally conceived of that longer study as a general exploration of methods as a preparation for the study of the method of theology (1972b: 268). The last two chapters of Insight, and its "Epilogue," reveal the sort of thing Lonergan had in mind at that time concerning "method in theology."

It was however providential that Lonergan set the fuller elaboration aside in 1953, for between 1957 and 1968 his thought on this issue matured enormously. I think one might say that he discovered he had still not completely broken from certain limitations of classicist modes of thinking. To anticipate, he had begun the shift from propositional first principles to the "principles of intellect" but had not completely effected the transition from soul to subject. That is to say, Insight was worked out in fidelity to the de facto structure of the human subject's consciousness, and especially to the unrestricted desire which underpinned that existential structure. But Lonergan had not yet made the most concrete feature of his own subjectivity—his own graced conversion—foundational for approaching the problems of our time. If Insight moved from first principles to the concreteness of the acting subject's unrestricted desire, Method in Theology completed the movement by going from the unrestricted desire to conversion as foundational.
Why was this necessary? The problem was basically this: in *Insight*, Lonergan approached the methods of historical and hermeneutical scholarship in terms of what he called a "universal viewpoint" (564ff). By "universal viewpoint," Lonergan meant a heuristic structure for all possible acts of meaning proportionate to human experiencing. But if historical methods are to be theological, then the theologian's interpretation of scriptural, patristic, and counciliar expressions of meaning must not only be scientifically accurate, but also doctrinally correct. Just how is the meaning of a 1600-year-old doctrine to be determined? And how is one to discover just what truth was being affirmed? For the classicist there is no great problem. The doctrine means what it says, and it says it by using universal, unchanging concepts.

But for Lonergan the issue is not so simple. In the context of *Insight* the solution to this problem is had by means of a "theologically transformed universal viewpoint" (740) wherein the range of possible meanings proportionate to human experience are supplemented by the anticipation of meanings that pertain to God's gracious activity—that is, meanings which pertain to God's solution to the problem of human evil, and the bestowal of other gifts which transcend the acts or structures of consciousness mentioned thus far. Within the context of *Insight*, this theological transformation presupposes a kind of knowing which transcends human experiencing—a "general transcendent knowledge" of God's existence and an analogical knowledge of some of God's attributes. The sections of *Insight* devoted to this issue therefore function as "fundamental theology," as the basis for historical theology. This is to say that "general transcendent knowledge" functions, so to speak, as the propositional first principles upon which the theologically transformed universal viewpoint, the method of historical theology, can be erected.

Now Hefling makes a point about chapter 19 that I wish to endorse emphatically: there is nothing logically wrong with Lonergan's proof for the existence of God, nor with his analogical extrapolation of God's attributes. But there is a problem with where the proof comes in the

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30. Several commentators have cited "Insight Revisited," saying that Lonergan retracted his proof as fallacious. He did not. To quote him precisely:
book, and this Lonergan himself acknowledged several times. To quote Hefling,

[I]n Insight, "illumination of method by faith" consists not so much in transforming a methodological viewpoint [of the previous seventeen chapters] as in grafting an older and largely pre-methodical conception of theology onto that viewpoint. For one thing, there is no transformation of the subject (126).

As we have seen, Lonergan's transcendental method consisted in a turn to the concreteness of the subject as subject, to the "principles of intellect" (structure of consciousness). But this subject is, so to speak, the "natural subject," and "supernatural meanings" are beyond its natural attainment. The traditional understanding of "faith," on the other hand, is of a gift which makes it possible for humans to know just such meanings. But if this is so, then faith involves a radical change, a "conversion," a "transformation" in the faithful subject. To follow the line of development we have been tracing up to now, therefore, the heuristic structure which adequately anticipates divine meanings must have its foundation in something even more fundamental and concrete than the subject as constituted by an "unrestricted desire." Only a different kind of subject, a "transformed" subject, could be the adequate ground for the interpretation of divine meanings.

Again, in Insight the treatment of God's existence and nature, while developed along the lines of the book, nonetheless failed to provide the explicit context towards which the book was moving. In Method the question of God is considered more important than the precise manner in which the answer is formulated, and our basic awareness of God comes to us not through our arguments or choices but primarily through God's gift of his love (1972b: 277).

Now to say that he had "failed to provide the explicit context," is not the same thing as denying the validity of the proof. Neither does the acknowledgement that "our basic awareness of God comes to us not through our arguments" amount to saying that the argument is incorrect, or that it has absolutely no role to play in our overall awareness of God. I submit that such commentators found in Lonergan's words what they wanted to find there.
Now it took Lonergan considerable effort and about ten years to wrestle out of this problem. How he did so is the subject matter of Hefling's dissertation. I wish only to briefly advert to the solution as we find it in *Method in Theology*.

First, the conscious subject is treated in an even more concrete fashion than in *Insight*. The account of the "natural subject" is amplified by the phenomenological discernment of a fourth level of consciousness, constituted by a distinct transcendental notion of value (1972a: 9-19, 34-41). This serves as the basis for a considerable elaboration of the "natural universal viewpoint" by means of the distinctions among carriers of meaning (57-73), "differentiations of consciousness," realms and stages of meaning (81-99). Second, the "transformed" (religiously converted) subject is characterized. The fundamental meaning of religion is interpreted as an act of "unrestricted being in love," conscious-as-experiencing on the fourth level of consciousness (105-7). Moreover, Lonergan recognized that the act of self-appropriation of Verbum and *Insight* itself has a transformative character. He thereby acknowledged an "intellectual," and a parallel "moral" conversion (240). The concreteness of the subject, then, consists (a) in the structure of consciousness itself, (b) as it operates in one or another differentiation of consciousness (c) as transformed or not transformed by one or more of the conversions.

Against this background of the concreteness of the subject, "fundamental theology"—especially the "first principle," the affirmed proposition, "God exists"—is transformed into the functional specialty, "Foundations." The foundational reality which forms the ground of this specialty, in turn, is not the affirmed proposition, but the actual subject (theologian) as converted. The reality of conversion is not abstract or universal, but the concrete, conscious living, converted human being.

In turn, the first four functional specialties, "Research," "Interpretation," "History," and "Dialectics," use the resources of the subject to "mediate" past expressions of meaning. The "resources of the subject" here can mean just the natural structure of consciousness, or

31. Lonergan later tentatively suggested that this was in fact the gift of an act on an equally gratuitously bestowed fifth level of consciousness.
that structure as aided by methodically differentiated modes of operating, or finally those modes of operating as transformed by the conversions. In particular, the differentiated and intellectually converted subject will have the advantage of the heuristic structure of the "universal viewpoint" in its search for meanings; if the subject is also religiously converted, he or she will be sensitive to meanings and developments indicating where and how God may have been communicating God's saving grace to the world. It is the role of "Dialectics" to attempt to distinguish past meanings according to these criteria.

But "Dialectics" need not have an accurate or articulate elaboration of just what these distinctions are. That is the work of "Foundations." Thus, "Foundations" elaborates a "sensitivity" into a methodically "converted universal viewpoint" which in its turn serves as the basis for "Doctrines"—judging which meanings truly interpret God's meaning. Systematics attempts to formulate "possibly relevant" analogical understandings which deepen the apprehension of the meanings. "Communications" uses the culturally invariant formulations of "Systematics" as the basis for its mission to "teach all nations" the meanings which have been made available as the basis for fulfilled human living.

These last four functional specialties move from the effort of ascertaining what past meanings were, to the work of evaluating, accepting or rejecting and developing the "cultural innovations" of past meanings. In other words, they take over the active work of the higher level of cultural control of meaning, and do so in a way which consciously and deliberately accepts the responsibility for living in a world of cumulative, historical change. The last four functional specialties are normative in two ways: first, their point of departure is past meanings, whose normativities are partially distinguished from their arbitrarinesses by "Dialectics." Second, "Foundations," "Doctrines," "Systematics," and "Communications" are grounded both in the normativity of the converted subject, and in the normativity of the natural structure of consciousness. In this fashion, Lonergan finally achieved more or less fully articulated methodological standards not only for criticizing and evaluating cultures from an open and developing—but non-arbitrary—viewpoint, but he also set forth the standards for transforming cultures.
8. CIRCULATION ANALYSIS

In his last work, *An Essay on Circulation Analysis*, Lonergan was still concerned with the problem of historical thinking. He was fond of citing Joseph Schumpeter to the effect that economic theory had not yet "crossed the Rubicon" into a theory of economic "dynamics" (Schumpeter, 1160). Now it might seem silly for someone to claim that there is no theory of economic dynamics when the most obvious fact of any economy, especially modern ones, is its movements. Products are moving from place to place; workers go and come; money is paid out and received back. But by "dynamics," both Schumpeter and Lonergan meant a quite specific type of movement. They meant cumulative, accelerated movement—"growth." And Schumpeter pointed out that macro-economic theory was based in an "equilibrium" analysis, which could only treat dynamic growth as a sequence of equilibria, and could in no way account for why this equilibrium should follow that.

Although Lonergan did not originally think of it in these terms, his goal was precisely to provide an explanation—"a set of terms and relations"—which would allow for an understanding of economic growth. In brief, the salient details of his work are as follows.

First, an economy is constituted by human acts of meaning, just as is any other human institution. Most notable among the intentional acts grounding these meanings are the acts of decision. Second, if an economy is to be just (normative) and not random, arbitrary, domineering and violent, there is a basic need for intelligible correlation among the decisions which constitute its functioning. Third, the basic difficulty posed for learning how to make such a coordination intelligible is posed by growth itself. To analyze this growth, Lonergan developed an explanatory distinction between a "surplus" (producers' goods) and a "basic" (consumer goods) sector in the economy; he worked out the dynamic relationships between them; and discovered the mutual dependencies among the demands for money by these sectors.

Against the background of this explanatory set of terms and relations, Lonergan was able to show what decisions would be required to allow the surplus sector to grow and what decisions would be needed for
an "egalitarian shift" to a growth in the basic sector. He then went on
to analyze the various ways in which modern economies have attempted to
avoid such decisions, and the economic collapses that have resulted from
them.32

More than one person has asked, "What was a theologian doing
messing around with economics?" Lonergan had his own reply. He simply
said, "Well, the Dialectic, you know!" I think what he meant by this
cryptic statement is suggested by the Parable of the Sower (Luke 8:4–
15). The dysfunctions of contemporary economic structures have so trod-
den the spirits of human beings that the Word of God has great diffi-
culty finding root in our hearts, let alone bearing fruit a hundredfold.
Inversely, it is only those in whom the Word of God has taken substanc-
tial root who recognize the urgency for removing this impediment, not
solely for the sake of justice, but for the sake of the Kingdom of God
as well. There is, then, an urgent need for innovation. But all of
us—including the economic theorist as well as the entrepreneur and the
labor union member—live in a context in which our thoughts and values
regarding economic life are given an orientation by our culture. That
culture has many good ideas, but many bad ones as well. The relevant
innovations must build upon the good, reverse the bad, and add novelty
where lack of understanding has previously dominated the field.

Above all else, Lonergan stressed that the prevailing techniques
for avoiding economic dysfunctions—such as socialistic central
planning, manipulation of interest rates, deficit "pump-priming," the
militarization of the economy, and multi-national corporations—fail to
meet the problem at its root, because they do not understand the funda-
mental role of understanding and misunderstanding in the constitution of
economic institutions and trends. In place of the prevailing tech-
niques, Lonergan repeatedly emphasised that the solution would only come
from understanding born of proper education. The education he had in
mind was one for and of a culture oriented by the normativity of the
self-appropriated subject.

32. A more involved discussion of the details of Lonergan's theory can
be found in his manuscript itself (1983), or in several essays
(McShane, 1980, 1981, 1985; Matthews, 1985; DeNeeve, 1985; Gibbons,
I have already cited Bruce Douglas's comment regarding the need to synthesize Catholic common good tradition with the modern fact of economic growth. Lonergan's work in this field holds out the promise of accomplishing this and thereby putting teeth into the abstractions of Catholic social teachings. Exhortations to entrepreneurs, for example, to pay a "just family wage" or guarantee "minimum standards of participation" without either defining such terms functionally, or explaining how these goals could be achieved without leading to bankruptcy, need a deeper context. It is a testament to the concreteness of Lonergan's vision, and the depth of his awareness of the challenges of historical thinking, that he entered into this field as a prolongation of his work in theology.
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FROM PSYCHIC CONVERSION TO THE DIALECTIC OF COMMUNITY

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This paper is based on the first of four lectures that I delivered at Boston College in March of 1985 during the spring 'mini-session' of the Lonergan Workshop. In this lecture I set forth in autobiographical fashion some of the factors that led me to move from earlier reflections on the psyche and on Lonergan's significance for the reorientation of the science of depth psychology to more recent work on society and culture. It seems that some have asked whether there is not some discontinuity in my work, and I would like to take this opportunity to show that there is not, that the development is consistent, and that the movement was demanded by the very logic of the ulterior purpose that I had in mind all along, namely, to begin work on the development of a contemporary Christian systematic theology. From the dialogue that transpired during the March Workshop itself, which I found very helpful, I have learned to regard the work that I am about in the book on which I was lecturing, not yet as Systematics itself, but still as Foundations, and more precisely as that dimension of Foundations devoted to the derivation of some of the principal categories that will be employed when I do get around to doing Systematics. One must "grow into" Systematics. One must not try to hasten the process. One must be patient. As a result of the insights gained during the Workshop, I have decided as to adopt a more modest title for the book on which I was speaking. I had intended to entitle it, A Theology for a World-Cultural Humanity, Volume One: The Situation. I now will call it, The Analogy of Dialectic: Categories for a Systematic Theology. The systematic theology that I am anticipating in the book is to be a theology of history, through and through. This means that the realities named by the special categories will have to be understood in relation to history, or, better, as they affect history. And so a preliminary task consists in working out a
theory of history. The Analogy of Dialectic offers the principal categories of that theory. When the book is completed, it will be clear that I have not left behind the earlier work on the psyche, but have rather tried to integrate it, under the rubric of the dialectic of the subject, into a more complete synthesis.

The question of culture and society is not a new interest of mine; in fact it precedes in many ways my interest in psychology, at least in the technical sense in which I have tried to do psychology over the past twelve years or so, in explicit dependence on Lonergan's thought. Strictly speaking my interest in psychology goes back to a time prior to my encounter with Lonergan, back to my days as a Jesuit novice in the mid-1950s. It was then that I was introduced to the spiritual life. Our novitiate was a relatively rare phenomenon in those days, in the sense that it was comparatively sane. In particular, there was some encouragement to face both existentially and somewhat theoretically such questions as those about the right way to live, the flourishing of persons in community, the development of an affective relationship to the living person of Jesus, and the primacy of an unfeigned charity in the Christian life. We had a Director of Novices who, though not a professional theologian and certainly not a budding methodologist, would have had no difficulty with the proposition that Romans 5:5 more or less does name the ultimate foundation of all else, and who, on the basis of that conviction, was able quite deftly to give us some working knowledge of how to sort out intentional affective responses to genuine values from either intentional affective responses to mere satisfactions or such aberrations of feeling as resentment and lesser perversions which can do and have done so much to give religion a bad name. From my late teens and early twenties then, I had developed a very serious interest, both practical and theoretical, in the relationship of psychology to the Christian life, to grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and I did make, I believe, an early commitment to devoting a good deal of time and energy to working this out with some precision.

Nevertheless, in terms of the framework provided by Lonergan, and of the horizon shift that his work effects, it was chapter seven, not chapter six, of Insight that got me started, and it will be in terms of what he says there that my own proposals about culture and society will have to be judged. I had finally got this far in Insight in the summer
of 1967. And I believed then, as I still do today, that chapter seven was the most important piece of literature that I had ever read; that it was the product not only of philosophic genius, which I already knew from earlier chapters, indeed from the first page of the preface, but also of prophetic vision, and so of grace, of a certain holiness, and no doubt a good deal of suffering. The call to conversion that is at the heart of all of Lonergan’s writings began to make its singular impact on me in the reading of this chapter. I can recall reading and rereading portions of this chapter scores of times over the course of that summer, and being stirred as I never had been before to a profound sense of what it would be worth while to devote my life to. For the first time, I think, I had found concretely something of which I could say, This is worth a lifetime.

The time was ripe, of course, for a person of my age to be affected in this way by what Lonergan was saying in this chapter, and if I had read it a few years earlier it might not have meant as much. Who knows? At any rate, 1967 was a time of profound social change, unrest, upheaval, confusion, and also grace-inspired stirrings for far-reaching structural transformations in society, semantic transformations in culture, personal transformations in subjects, and religious transformations in the life and ministry of the church. Lonergan, for me, spoke to those coincidental manifolds in history calling for higher integration in a way and to a depth that nobody else did. And he also impressed upon me the fact that meeting the problems of our latter day at their roots in general bias would be a slow and laborious process demanding nothing short of what he calls, elsewhere in the book, the reorientation and integration of the sciences and the reorientation and integration of the myriad instances of common sense. In a globally generic way I was ready to throw myself into this task, but the concrete specifics of how and in what order were not yet clear.

I was ordained a priest in 1969, and a year later was asked whether I would interrupt my doctoral studies for a couple of years to assume the responsibility of organizing and launching a new program of campus ministry at Marquette University. Shortly after I had agreed to do so and had assembled a staff of people to help me, but before we had officially begun to operate, the Vietnam war spread to Cambodia and several students were killed in protests at Kent State University. Campuses around the country were in turmoil, and Marquette was no excep-
tion. Although we had as yet no official position in the University, we found ourselves challenged by both external events and inner promptings to assume some role not only among the students but also with the faculty and administration in responding to the crisis. For the first time in my life I found myself not an observer but a participant in a situation where contrary ideologies and their accompanying emotions were the major components of the spiritual air that we breathed.

I was to find myself in such straits a few times too often in the course of my two years in campus ministry, over issues not only political but also pastoral, ecclesial, and Jesuit. And I realize, as I look back on this time now, that perhaps I was too young and inexperienced to be put in the middle of such an unsettled environment and asked to assume some institutional responsibility for a genuinely pastoral and fundamentally intelligent, non-opiate, religious response. I was only incipiently equipped with the power of that psychically transformative "mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended" (Lonergan, 1978: 723-24). At any rate we did what we could, and no major disasters occurred. But at the end of this time I knew that there were dimensions of myself that I needed to come to know better and to negotiate more calmly if I was to be able to live an adult life in the latter third of the twentieth century, responding with at least some integrity as a person, a theologian, a priest, a Christian to the situation in which we all participate for better or for worse.

Before moving to a more or less full-time dedication to attempting to understand that situation itself, I had other business to attend to, and began to spend a period of some eighteen months, about two or three times a month, being introduced to my own sensitive psyche, my feelings and my dreams, with the help of a Christian psychologist of basically—though, thank God, not dogmatically—Jungian persuasion: a man who gave similar assistance, by the way, to a number of persons interested in Lonergan's work at that time in Milwaukee, and who also got a basic introduction to Lonergan as a result! It was an exciting time at Marquette, as a number of us in close contact with each other shared in a community of discourse on the common grounds of Lonergan,
our introduction to depth psychology, and our cultural, political, and social questions: no doubt the most closely knit and intellectually fertile community I have ever experienced, and the one that has contributed most to my own development.

It was out of this environment and the living questions that sustained it that I arrived at the notion of psychic conversion. I had returned to doctoral studies, and I was working on a paper on Heidegger's influence on Bultmann. I was reading and rereading Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, taking extensive notes, and was keenly aware that some insight was emerging, when suddenly it began to come together: there is another dimension of interiority besides the intentional operations that Lonergan discloses in Insight and Method in Theology; it may at times and in some people require a change that bears the features of what Lonergan calls a conversion, if they are to be able to bring their intentional operations to bear upon it, understanding it correctly and negotiating it responsibly. A conversion is "an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth" (Lonergan, 1972: 237-8). It is "a transformation of the subject and his world," a "change of course and direction. It is as if one's eyes were opened and one's former world faded and fell away. There emerges something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments on all levels and in all departments of human living" (130). These descriptions seemed to fit what I was undergoing, and so it seemed that I could call it a conversion. Yet it was not exactly religious or moral or intellectual, even if closely related to all of these. Eventually I called it psychic, and I spent the greater part of the next decade in attempts, some successful and some not, to conceptualize and articulate it.

The first relatively successful attempt came in Zürich in the late fall of 1974 while I was working on my dissertation. I had distributed a paper the previous summer at the Lonergan Workshop which had not hit things off correctly, and I had to write to Fred Lawrence from Zürich and ask that, if publication plans on that Workshop were going ahead, this paper be withheld from publication. For until later in 1974 I had not yet accurately grasped and articulated the relation of the psyche to the intentionality that Lonergan discloses, and on that insight and articulation everything else depends. I had had previous
indications that my observations were still coincidental. For instance, when I shared my work with Lonergan in late 1973, he asked (rhetorically, I now think) whether it manifested the same position on feelings and symbols that he had expressed in Method. I answered "Yes," of course, but I had not yet worked out how this was the case; I knew only that it did not conflict with his position. Then the following summer at the Workshop, Fred Lawrence said something to the effect that the difficulty he had with my paper was with the place of the question in the whole picture: I had seemed, in my haste and enthusiasm to sponsor and promote the psyche and its symbols, to shortchange the crucial and transformative role of intelligent inquiry, critical reflection, and moral deliberation. I can recall now how I went through at least four or five more months of such conceptual muddle and maybe even existential capitulation to the rhythms and processes of the psyche until I finally began to get it straight. I have told the story before of the dream that I had in Zürich of meeting Lonergan on the stairs. I was going down, and he was coming up. We met between first and second floor, and so at that point where empirical consciousness gives way to intelligent consciousness. I was intending to go down to the basement—that is, to muddle some more among the images and archetypes—, and Lonergan, knowing my intentions, said to me, "If you really want to see some images, come with me!" He took me to the top floor of the house, where we entered a large room, sat down, and began to watch a movie. Fourth-level consciousness, and the aesthetic detachment that it entails from the psychic basement, was the place from which to negotiate the kaleidoscope of symbols emerging from the neural depths. From there I was able to go on to articulate the basic position of Subject and Psyche (1977), linking what Lonergan says about feelings and valued in chapter two of Method in Theology with what he says about feelings and symbols in chapter three, and so articulating at least a first approximation to an adequate theory of the psyche within the overall framework provided by intentionality analysis.

I was occupied for the next few years in trying to articulate this basic point more clearly, and to bring my position more fully to bear on Jungian psychology, where, I had become convinced in Zürich, the position on intentionality was lacking, and the lack was responsible not only for a kind of epistemological idealism, half Kantian and half Hegelian, but also, and more seriously, for a somewhat Nietzschean and
thoroughly disastrous moral relativism. These efforts led to what I felt were clearer expositions, both of what I meant by psychic conversion, through a clarification by contrast or what Philip McShane calls random dialectic, and also of its relation to religious, moral, and intellectual conversion; and they led as well to a more explicit effort at linking my work not only with Method in Theology as I had done earlier, but also with Insight.

Through this latter work I came to what is perhaps the clearest definition of psychic conversion that I have been able to arrive at: psychic conversion is the transformation of what Lonergan (following Freud but with a somewhat different meaning) calls the censor, from a repressive to a constructive intrasubjective agency in personal development. In this sense, it is a key to the integrity of what in Insight Lonergan calls the dialectic of the dramatic subject, where the linked but opposed principles of change are neural demand functions and the orientation of intelligence as the latter in collaboration with imagination preconsciously exercises a censorship over the former. Dramatically patterned intelligence excludes certain elements of the neural undertow from emerging in consciousness in the form of images and concomitant affects coherent with the images. Images, of course, are for the sake of insight. A constructive censor will exclude psychic materials that are irrelevant to the insight that one wants. It is an instrument of character, in Philip Rieff's sense of the restrictive shaping of possibilities. Such censorship selects and arranges materials that emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to an insight; this positive activity has by implication a negative aspect, for other materials are left behind and other perspectives are not brought to light; still, this negative aspect of positive activity does not introduce any arrangement or perspective into the unconscious demand functions of neural patterns and processes (Lonergan, 1978: 192).

Unfortunately, however, "just as insight can be desired, so too it can be unwanted. Besides the love of light, there can be a love of darkness" (191), and besides the constructive activity of the censor, there can be a repressive activity.
Its positive activity is to prevent the emergence into consciousness of perspectives that would give rise to unwanted insights; it introduces, so to speak, the exclusion of arrangements into the field of the unconscious; it dictates the manner in which neural demand functions are not to be met; and the negative aspect of its positive activity is the admission to consciousness of any materials in any other arrangement or perspective (192-93).

Psychic conversion, again, is a conversion of the censor from a represive to a constructive agency in one's personal development. As such it is obviously dependent on other dimensions of a full conversion process: proximately, perhaps, on a prethematic intellectual conversion to the desire for insight and truth; and, with successive degrees of remoteness, on a moral conversion that shifts the criterion of what one wants from satisfactions to values, among which is truth, including the truth about oneself; and on a religious conversion that is the ultimate ground of sustained moral living. And its articulation is dependent on a quite thematic intellectual conversion as the latter promotes the self-appropriation of intentional operations.

But, however much it is a function of these other and in a sense more radical transformations, it also is something distinct from them. It is a conversion that affects the first level of consciousness, the dramatically patterned experiential flow itself, whereas intellectual conversion affects the second and third levels of consciousness, the levels of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection; moral conversion affects the fourth level of consciousness; and religious conversion affects or perhaps even creates (in the sense of created grace) a fifth level of consciousness. This is not to say, however, that psychic conversion cannot also have its effects on these other dimensions of conversion, strengthening and confirming one in the general orientation of converted living, and functioning, as it were, as a defensive circle around the other conversions. The gift of grace that is responsible for the whole thing is rooted, as Thomas Aquinas knew, in the spiritual dimension of the person, and only from there does it extend its influence to the sensitive desires. But that extension consolidates a habituation in the orientation of converted living, until in the saint there is realized the more or less complete coincidence of satisfaction with an ordered and at times differentiated hierarchy of values, and one
can truly love God and do what one wills, and even, for the most part, what one desires. This is the height of the affective conversion of which Lonergan spoke in some of his late papers (see Lonergan, 1985a). Psychic conversion is related to affective conversion in that it renders available for conscious negotiation some of the materials with which one must work as one moves toward the threefold permanent commitment to love in the family, love in the community, and the love of God above all else that constitutes affective conversion.

I began to work out some of these refinements in *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations* (1981), employing the basic framework of Lonergan's "Healing and Creating in History" (1985b). And as I did so, the earlier themes of history itself, of society, culture, and politics, which had been placed on the back burner, began to return, and I began to deal with the question of the relation between what I had been doing on the subject and the whole realm of cultural and social values. Obviously, the scale of values presented on pages 31-32 of *Method in Theology* was pertinent here, and I began to unpack the scale of values in the same book, viewing the penultimate and ultimate phases of the longer cycle—liberalism and totalitarianism—as a function of the collapse of the whole scale of values to the two most basic levels, and insisting that the causation of this general cultural derailment was to be located not only in general bias but also in a concomitant neglect of the sensitive psyche characteristic of modernity. This position implied, and in fact was rooted in, a more basic position on the role of the sensitive psyche vis-à-vis intentionality. In expounding this more basic position I drew on Eric Voegelin's articulation in "The Gospel and Culture" (1971) of the experience of life as a movement with a direction to be found or missed. I related this articulation of what might be called the "original experience" to Lonergan's attempt in *Insight* to bring his readers to locate insight and judgment in "the pulsing flow of life" itself. For me, Lonergan had disengaged the normative order of the search for direction in the movement of life, and what in a sense remained to be done, and could be done by what I was calling psychic conversion, was the disengagement of the movement of life itself in which the direction is to be found.

The movement of life changes with, and is dependent on, the performance of the operations constitutive of the normative order of
inquiry. Sensitive consciousness is transformed as one moves through the tension of inquiry to insight, and it changes again as reflection arises only to give way to reasonable judgment. Most obvious are the changes that occur in sensitive consciousness in the course of existential deliberation and decision. It is precisely about these changes that Ignatius wrote in his rules for discernment and his counsels about the three times for election. In a couple of courses at Regis College on psychology and spirituality I engaged in an interpretation of the rules for discernment in terms of these changes in the sensitive psyche. I employed as a basic grid Lonergan's articulation in chapter fifteen of *Insight* of the conscious tension of limitation and transcendence. I identified the tension of limitation and transcendence in the sensitive psyche's experience to the movement of life with the condition of equanimity in which, Ignatius says, decisions can be made by a rational weighing of the pros and cons of the various alternatives. Because we are not always in this condition of creative tension when we have to make decisions, other rules are provided to help us determine the movements of consolation and desolation, where consolation is a movement that would lead us to a creative tension of limitation and transcendence, desolation a movement that would skew the balance in the direction of limitation, and false consolation a movement that would distort the same balance in the direction of transcendence.

The tension of limitation and transcendence is rooted ontologically in the disproportion of the schemes of recurrence of the bodily organism, on the one hand, and of intentionality with its unrestricted objective, on the other hand. The psyche participates in both schemes of recurrence, and experiences their tension. Psychic vitality is a matter of remaining in the tension of limitation and transcendence, in such a manner that the orientation is always toward the transformation of the self as integrator by the self as operator, through the emergence of further questions. It is a delicate negotiation. The displacement of the psychic tension in the direction of limitation heads in the limit to depression; the displacement in the direction of transcendence to schizophrenia. Most human beings settle for a slight displacement in the direction of depression: Kierkegaard's "too little possibility" (Becker, ch. 5). But it is easy to slip over as well to a displacement toward "too much possibility," to lose the ground under one's feet, to dispense with the roots in bodily existence, and to soar
into schizophrenic fantasy. The creative tension of limitation and transcendence is experienced by the sensitive psyche, as are its displacements in one direction or the other. The tension itself is the key to discernment: when one is abiding in the tension itself, the way to proceed in making decisions is by the rational weighing of the pros and cons of the various alternatives; when one is not so abiding, but is being moved by the various pulls and counterpulls in different directions, one is to choose the way that leads to the establishment of the tension itself of limitation and transcendence.

The changes in the sensitive psyche as the normative order of inquiry either is or is not followed faithfully can be found as well even in our dreams. Lonergan speaks in *Method* of "a transvaluation and transformation of symbols" and relates these to "affective development, or aberration." "What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions. ... Inversely, symbols that do not submit to transvaluation and transformation seem to point to a block in development" (1972: 66). My point goes a bit further than what is explicitly stated by Lonergan, though it is implicit in the connection of what I have just quoted with his mention of what is "most significant from a basic viewpoint" about the dream, namely "the existential approach that thinks of the dream, not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world" (69). It is that the dream life can be a source of data on the transvaluation and transformation, or lack of these, in the symbols that awaken determinate affects and the feelings that evoke symbolic images. Certain significant dream symbols will undergo transformation as a result of the subject's conscious performance in waking life of the operations constitutive of the normative order of the search for the direction to be found in the movement of life. These successive transformations are data on, and offered by, the very movement of life itself, indicating what is happening to it under the influence of the operations of the creative vector of intentional consciousness.

The same existential approach establishes the link between these reflections on the subject and the questions of society and culture that I try to treat in my work on the situation of a contemporary Christian systematic theology. In the remainder of the present paper, I will
relate the several steps that led me into direct confrontation with some of the problems of social, political, and cultural theory.

The first step, and the one to which I will devote the greatest attention here, was to think through the statement in *Insight* about the relation between the dialectic of the dramatic subject and the dialectic of community. Let me quote in full what Lonergan says there about this issue:

In two manners [the] dialectic of community differs from the dialectic of the dramatic subject. First, there is a difference in extent, for the dialectic of community regards the history of human relationships, while the inner dialectic of the subject regards the biography of an individual. Secondly, there is a difference in the level of activity, for the dialectic of community is concerned with the interplay of more or less conscious intelligence and more or less conscious spontaneity in an aggregate of individuals, while the dialectic of the subject is concerned with the entry of neural demands into consciousness. Accordingly, one might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual dialectics. In this relationship, the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship. Still, as is clear, one must not suppose this dominance to be absolute, for both covertly and overtly, neural demands conspire with an obnubilation of intelligence, and what happens in isolated individuals tends to bring them together and so to provide a focal point from which aberrant social attitudes originate.

This raises the basic question of a bias in common sense (218).

This passage was to be the basis from which I was able to move from prolonged reflection on the dialectic of the subject to an attempt to understand the other dialectical processes constitutive of the historical process. The dialectic of the subject, I found, may be rearticulated as the dialectic of the movement of life with the normative order of the search for direction in that movement. Human interiority is twofold. There are the operations of conscious intentionality, and there are the affective compositions and distortions of sensitively conscious energy that constitute what we usually call the psyche. There is the search for direction in the movement of life, and there is the movement itself in which direction is found or missed or lost. Changes in the movement provide the required indications as to whether we are
succeeding or not in finding the direction. Intentionality analysis would articulate the search, psychic analysis the movement. Together they would constitute interiorly differentiated consciousness.

Ira Progoff and Ernest Becker have documented a progressive realization in the great architects of depth psychology, from Freud through Adler and Jung to Ranke, of the relations that obtain between these two dimensions of interiority, a progressive movement toward what Eric Voegelin, writing in a quite different context, calls a psychology of orientations as contrasted with a psychology of passional motivations (Progoff; Becker; Voegelin, 1952: 186). The latter, Voegelin says, is descriptive only of a certain pneumopathological type of person. It is as a function of the operations of the spirit that the sensitive psychic experience of the movement of life changes. The psyche permeates, participates in, and is affected by, these operations, but the capacity to question is not a function of the sensitive psyche, but of conscious intentionality.

Depth psychology did not begin with such a distinction, and so has been lacking a precise objectification of what precisely it is that makes people well. Its insights into psychic well-being are often genuine, but remain for the most part coincidental and, as I found with Jung, subject to derailment when the issues to be confronted are distinctly spiritual, such as the question of good and evil. An intentionality analysis is required for a psychology of orientations.

The passage I have quoted from Lonergan, however, provides a framework for understanding better why the human spirit itself sometimes goes astray, why we miss the mark. Ontologically, as both Lonergan and Ricoeur argue, the condition of the possibility of sin lies in the very constitution of the triple compound of bodily organism, sensitive psyche, and spiritual intentionality that is the human person, and more specifically in the disproportion of intentionality and the complex of body and psyche. But if this is the formal cause of fallibility, there is also a historical course of events in which sin occurs, the social situation becomes absurd, and the distorted dialectic of community exercises a certain dominance over the dialectic of the subject. That dominance, again, gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship. The relation of the subject to society can begin to be understood precisely in terms of these relations between the
distorted dialectic of community and the distortions that occur in the unfolding dialectic of the subject. Let us try to understand some of these relations.

First, then, there is a derailment that is specifically psychic. The sensitive psyche must be free to cooperate in the search for direction in the movement of life; it must be endowed with an affective self-transcendence that matches the self-transcendence of the operations of the creative vector. As Lonergan remarks in the lectures on the philosophy of education, as one moves into a practical pattern of experience, one can preserve the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire only by reason of the gift of charity, of what in Insight he calls universal willingness. One source of derailment lies in the affective blockages that will not submit to transformation, that resist insight, judgment, decision. These affective obstructions are among the compositions of sensitively psychic energy that Jung called complexes. Complexes support the creative vector when they provide us with the images needed for insight, or when they offer us memories that help us discover ways of responding to new situations, or when they spontaneously acquiesce to the process of reflection that anticipates judgement, or when, through their agency, we apprehend genuine values in an affectively charged manner that leads to action consonant with the values so apprehended. But our psychic energy can be blocked, fixed in inflexible patterns, driven by compulsions, plagued by obsessions, weighted down by general anxiety or specific fears, resistant to insight, true judgment, responsible action. Then we are derailed from the integral performance of the operations that constitute the normative order of the search for direction in the movement of life.

Second, then, genuine psychotherapy is a dissolving of the energetic complexes that often are responsible for the derailment. And third, the first step in the dissolution is the recognition that autonomous negative complexes are always victimized compositions of energy formed as the consequence of our inevitable participation in the distortions at work in one's community and one's culture. The violence done to one's psyche may be the issue of one's own self-destructiveness, of course. But it may issue as well from one's social environment or from the cultural values of one's milieu. It is in fact more often than not the complex function of social, cultural, and personal factors. But the point is that psychic spontaneity as such is never morally responsible
for its own disorder. The psyche's order and disorder are caused by action affecting it from beyond itself. Disordered complexes are always the victims of human history: of significant others, of social situations emergent from the distortions in one's community, of derailed cultural values, of one's own freedom, or of some combination of these various sources. The complex itself is the victim. It is not responsible for the genesis of its own disorder. The various compositions and distributions of our energetic effectiveness begin to be set for us, without our personal choice, from very early on in life. We may even speak of a certain generational bondage, through which a family can be affected over generations by the same psychic pattern. One's psychic complexes are always in part set by the agenda operative in the community and the culture, and that agenda will always be more or less distorted. Psychic disorder usually reaches back into areas of our experience that we cannot even remember (though the question, "What is your earliest memory?" may well be very illuminating), or that we have blocked from recall. And it is usually reinforced by our acquiescence to patterns established without our self-constitutive contribution.

The fourth step in understanding the relations of the dialectic of the subject to the wider community is to find some way of determining the extent to which a subject's total derailment from the direction to be found in the movement of life is a function of these social factors beyond his or her control and the extent to which it is a function of freedom as freedom contributes to psychic disorder. Psychic disorder in itself, remember, is always a function of victimization. But the source of the victimization may be more or less resident in the dominant dialectic of community or more or less a default for which one's conscious intentionality and its orientations are responsible. Lonergan's discussion of the various biases is helpful in providing some better understanding of the various sources of psychic disorder.

Lonergan distinguishes four varieties of bias: a general bias of ordinary common sense against theoretical questions, the individual bias of the egoist, the group bias of the clique or class or nation, and the dramatic bias of the neurotic. First, we can see rather easily, I think, that there is an increasing dominance of psychic as opposed to spiritual features involved in the genesis and functioning of the bias as one moves from general bias through individual and then group bias to dramatic bias. Dramatic bias is the effect of autonomous complexes
beyond the reach of immediate self-determination. The functioning of the psychic factor of spontaneous intersubjectivity is quite predominant in group bias. But psychic factors become less important and spiritual factors more important in the individual bias of the egoist (quite distinct from the dramatic bias of the narcissist, by the way), and they are least significant in the general bias of common sense, which clearly is a function more of intellectual than of psychological truncation.

The causation of the biases follows this same sequential analysis. Dramatic bias is most affected by autonomous psychic complexes victimized originally by factors beyond one's control, and frequently associated with obstacles to sexual development through a disorientation of one's relationship to one's body. Group bias is more a blend of psychic disorder with character disorder; character disorder is the dominant feature in individual bias; and general bias requires a conversion that is specifically intellectual or theoretic if it is to be transcended. As we move from dramatic through group and then individual to general bias, we are moving from psychopathology to what Voegelin called pneumopathology, from a sickness of the psyche to a sickness of the spirit. The element of personal default increases. It is least operative in dramatic bias, whose causation often lies in part in events that precede even our earliest memories. It is more operative in group bias, where there is a capitulation of personal responsibility to the interests of a narrowly defined group bent on its own advantage. It is more dominant still in the egoist's choice of his or her own advantage over the common good and even over one's spontaneous involvement in normal intersubjective communicative action. It is most dominant when general bias instrumentalizes intelligence and reason so as to pervert the disinterested inquiry of the search for direction through the arbitrary brushing aside of relevant but difficult, ultimate, long-range, theoretical, disturbing questions.

In general, the more dominant the psychic factor in the bias, the more is its ultimate source to be located in the community and the culture rather than in the pneumopathological exercise of one's own freedom. This at least is a general rule of thumb. Dramatic bias is more a function of energetic disturbances due to the victimization of the psyche by others or by distorted social and cultural situations beyond the control of the individual. Group bias entails a capitulation of the ego to, or an overwhelming of the ego by, spontaneous and psychically rooted
intersubjective connections. It results in a subordination of personal responsibility to the interests of a narrowly conceived group bent on its own advantage. Its genesis and functioning are more a blend of psychopathology and pneumopathology. Individual bias is a function of an erroneous negotiation of the emergence of the individual ego from the systematic relations that inform the group. Its genesis may involve a desperate reaction-formation vis-à-vis intersubjective connections that seem to threaten the individual. One is confused in one's negotiation of these connections because of the powerful psychic factors involved in spontaneous intersubjectivity. Yet to name a bias egoistic is also to impute responsibility and guilt, and so to assign to the formation and functioning of the bias a certain degree of self-victimization. But the pneumopathological element is most pronounced in general bias, which is a function of a personal default of intelligence and freedom for which one is to be held accountable in a more pronounced way, an instrumentalization of reason that perverts the disinterested inquiry through which direction can be found by the arbitrary brushing aside of relevant and ultimate but difficult questions.

In fact to discuss the various forms of bias separately is by and large to engage in abstractions. Thus the discussion must move on to the recognition that victimization by others and self-victimization usually conspire with one another in the cumulative production of personal and, through personal, historical disorder. To give one example, a person may be dramatically predisposed to egoism by a narcissistic disorder whose origin and genesis lay beyond that person's control. But the person may still be capable of assuming responsibility for the redirection of the energies locked up in narcissistic complexes. If not, it is a mistake to regard the person as an egoist, a term which implies personal responsibility and freedom.

Now, to the extent that one can assume such responsibility, pneumotherapy, a healing and conversion of the spirit, will be the more radical requirement before psychotherapy can have any effect in the healing of the disorder. Egoism is an unwillingness; narcissism is an inability. To the extent that they are distinct factors conspiring to distort personal integrity, the establishment of integrity will involve the conversion of unwillingness into willingness as a constitutive element in and precondition of the treatment of narcissistic energetic complexes. On the other hand, to the extent that the person's derail-
ment from the direction that can be found in the movement of life cannot be understood either in its genesis or in its reinforcement as the product of self-victimization for which the person is held accountable, psychotherapy will be the condition of the possibility of pneumotherapy. The underlying psychic inability will have to be radically affected before the appropriate willingness to cooperate with the process of further healing can emerge. Again, in either instance, psychic disorder as such is not responsible for its own genesis. I may be responsible for a good deal of my own affective disorder, but only in so far as I am capable of intelligent, reasonable, and responsible operations in its regard and fail or refuse to exercise such care. The constitution and causation of affective disorder will vary from one person to another. No general, exhaustive, or exclusive mode or causation may be assigned. All that can be said is that the causation is always a matter of victimization.

Fifth, some insight is thus gained regarding the relation of the psyche to moral impotence. Lonergan's treatment of moral impotence is from the viewpoint of the incompleteness of intellectual and volitional development. As the reflections summarized above would suggest, his understanding can be complemented by a consideration of the incompleteness of psychic development. The victimized psyche lives in what John Dunne has called the hell of the night of private suffering. This is distinct from the night of the suffering of compassion and forgiveness. Between the two one has experienced the bliss of a day that overcomes the hell of the night of private suffering and that cannot be overcome by the night of the suffering of compassion and forgiveness (Dunne, 49-62). But how does one emerge in to that day that divides the two nights? The question can be put in another way. There are three ways to negotiate psychic darkness. In the hell of the night of private suffering, though, only two of them are available to us: repression, and moral renunciation. Neither of these work, nor does either of them represent an intelligent way of proceeding. The third manner of negotiating psychic disturbance, compassionate negotiation of what has been victimized, is intelligent, reasonable, responsible; but this is precisely what we cannot be because of the psychic darkness. How do we gain that capacity for compassionate negotiation of our own darkness? We must be met by love, if we are to move from the hell of the night of private suffering to the capacity for the suffering of compassion and
forgiveness. And, I submit, the compassion begins with regard to our own victimized darkness, and the forgiveness with regard to the factors that have caused it. The love that must meet us can be mediated by others, but only if they are beyond getting caught in the darkness, only if they are capable of suffering from the darkness without being trapped by it into the hell of the night of their own private suffering, only if they are themselves capable of the suffering of compassion and forgiveness. And one will know oneself to be healed, to be beyond the hell of the first night and capable of the suffering of the second night, only when one can suffer precisely the same injury that brought about the first night without being driven again into the hell of private suffering. Then one can oneself be a medium of healing for others, for one has moved beyond the first night and into the second, and is on the way to the agapic charity of the affectively converted "suffering servant" whose catalytic agency is the goal and summit of the development of the person.

Perhaps I have said enough to indicate the manner in which reflection on psychic conversion leads through the process of further questions to a concern both for the structures of culture and society that are involved in some psychic victimization, and also for those structures that promote psychic well-being. Since I am concerned only to indicate how my own interests moved from the psychic to the social, I will not pursue the present line of investigation further here. I want rather to indicate a few other connections between my earlier work on the psychological dimensions of theological foundations and the present work moving toward a systematic theology of history, culture, and society.

The first factor has to do with a satisfactory strategy for reversing the social and cultural decline responsible for, among other things, psychic disorder on such a massive scale. I stated a position in Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations that finds further support in the book I am working on now, to the effect that an adequate doctrine of praxis includes, in a quite central fashion, an emphasis on superstructural interdisciplinary collaboration intent on the reorientation of the human sciences. This position, of course, is dependent on Lonergan's prophetic insistence—I think it is no overstatement to call it that—on the influence of the cultural superstructure on the social infrastructure; or, negatively put, on the deleterious effect vis-à-vis
the social good of order of a major surrender of intelligence at the superstructural level. In this sense I came to understand Lonergan's own life's work, as well as the psychological work I had been engaged in on the basis of Lonergan's achievement, as themselves social praxis in the strictest possible sense of that term. Moreover, the human sciences are to be reoriented precisely on the basis of the interiorly differentiated consciousness that Lonergan's work makes possible, and on no other basis. And if that is the case, the science of depth psychology should be the first to undergo the purification and transformation that Lonergan's work makes possible, since it is itself concerned with the self-appropriation of one dimension of interiority. A reoriented depth psychology would thus be a dimension of the foundations of the reorientation of the other human sciences. But from there one must move to the cultural and political and social sciences, and begin to exercise an analogous critical, dialectical, and normative intelligence in their regard. There is, then, a quite spontaneous and natural movement from the suggestion of a reorientation of depth psychology to the task of providing some of the fairly basic categories for understanding culture, the political specialization of common sense, and the elements and structures of society.

Second, besides the reorientation and integration of the sciences, there is the reorientation and integration of the myriad instances of common sense. This, too, is social praxis. And a reoriented depth psychology is not without its implications for what I like to call a post-interiority mentality at the level of common sense, analogous to the post-systematic, post-scientific, and post-scholarly mentalities that Lonergan speaks of in *Method in Theology* as transformations of common sense consequent upon superstructural transformations in the differentiation of consciousness. From the time that I prepared to teach an undergraduate course at Marquette University on religion and culture, I have been convinced of the transcultural implications both of Lonergan's own work, and also of a reoriented Jungian approach to the psyche. No small part of the motivation behind my attempts both to understand and, where necessary, correct Jung, and to integrate a reoriented Jungianism with Lonergan's intentionality analysis, have been in the interests of specifying the major constituents of a world-cultural mentality at the level of common sense, a mentality that flows from successful communication to the wider culture on the
part of the specialists in interiorly differentiated consciousness. What is required in our situation is a global alternative to present distortions in the dialectic of community. Such an alternative is dependent on transformations at the level of culture, in the generation of cultural values that are capable of informing the way of life of a global network of alternative communities intent on a different way to live. Those cultural values are themselves a function of the self-appropriation of the transcultural constituents of personal integrity. And to that self-appropriation both intentionality analysis and reoriented psychic analysis have constitutive contributions to make.

The contributions of intentionality analysis are clear to any who have followed Lonergan in his relentless search for a transcultural base for the general and special categories. The contributions of psychic analysis are clear to any who have discovered that Jung, however deficient may have been his articulation, was not entirely wrong in insisting that the psyche's symbols include a crosscultural archetypal dimension that simply cannot be accounted for within the narrow confines of Freudian dogmatics. The link to culture and society became more clear to me as I reflected on Eric Voegelin's discussion of anthropological and cosmological symbolizations of the direction to be found in the movement of life. From this reflection, I went on to posit a dialectic of culture at the level of cultural values, analogous to the dialectic of the subject at the level of personal value, and to the dialectic of community at the level of social value: hence, "the analogy of dialectic."

Two final sources of influence should be mentioned. One of them lies in the discussions at several Lonergan Workshops between Fred Lawrence and Matthew Lamb regarding political philosophy. I tried to find in the scale of values a way to contribute to that discussion, and perhaps to mediate a resolution of it that might be acceptable to both by honoring the emphases of each. A second lies in reflection on the option of the Society of Jesus at its 32nd General Congregation to define its mission today in terms of the service of faith and the promotion of justice. Again, the scale of values was to prove helpful. Faith is a religious value, justice as understood in this option a social value; and intermediate between religious and social values are personal and cultural values. The connections, I am convinced, have to be made explicit and operative if the Society's option is to bear fruit
that will last. At the moment the option is leading, I am afraid, to a gradual abandonment of the Society's intellectual and educational apostolates, and to a process of training for younger Jesuits that is not governed by a consistent set of objectives that can inspire a clear-headed commitment to long-range goals and consequent strategies. There is at present a sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses; and this is the characteristic, not of progress but of major decline. Reversal of decline is the function of culture, and the integrity of culture is a function of a creative minority of authentic persons. Such practical problems, very close to home, have certainly been a further source of the movement of my own reflection beyond the realm of psychological considerations to the arena of the cultural and the social.
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BERNARD LONERGAN AND JAMES JOYCE:
LITERATURE AS DE-CONVERSION

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Nineteen eighty-two is the centenary of the birth of James Joyce, and it seemed to me fortuitous that the Lonergan Workshop should this year address the question of the imagination. But it is more than a happy coincidence which brings Lonergan and Joyce together in the present paper. I choose Joyce as a text for a discussion of the relation of Lonergan's work to literary criticism not merely as a convenient example, but because something of special importance for literature and thought occurs in the course of Joyce's artistic development. Further, my discussion will not only be directed toward an application of Lonergan's methodology in a field of literature, as merely one example of an exploration of Lonergan's general aesthetic theory. Lonergan's treatment of literature points up an ambiguity in his aesthetic which has larger than aesthetic significance. It raises problems concerning the role of language in Lonergan's thought, which in turn raise questions about cognitive, intentional and sensitive self-appropriation. What I will attempt here is a raising of central questions which must be considered in the relation of Lonergan's methodology to literary criticism and theory.

I

Both in Insight and in Method in Theology, Lonergan's aesthetic is everywhere acknowledged to have its source in S. K. Langer's Feeling and Form. From this it can be inferred that aesthetics is peripheral to Lonergan's vital interests, insofar as he is content to rest to a large extent on an authority in the field. In looking at what Lonergan says about art in both of these works, however, aesthetics is revealed as
peripheral to his concern with cognitional and intentionality analysis because it is held to be altogether subordinate. In Insight, in the sixth chapter on common sense, in the section on the aesthetic pattern of experience, Lonergan says the following:

Art, then, becomes symbolic, but what is symbolized is obscure. It is an expression of the human subject outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation or appraisal. It seeks to mean, to impart, to convey something that is to be reached, not through science or philosophy ... Pre-scientific and pre-philosophic, it may strain for truth and value without defining them (Lonergan, 1957: 185).

Lonergan maintains, then, that both artistic creation and its interpretation are pre-cognitive, as he says, "outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation or appraisal."

In Method, Lonergan explains in similar terms the experience, for example, of an appreciator of a painting:

He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom (Lonergan, 1972: 63).

Art, then, is a return to a kind of undifferentiated, ecstatic immediacy, a dissolution of the divided consciousness of subject and object. There is no question of an objectification of self-consciousness which Lonergan describes as cognitive and intentional self-appropriation, and which his work is dedicated to furthering in its readers.

That this is not a minor lacuna, inessential to the radical issues of intellectual and existential self-appropriation, appears, I think, in Lonergan's treatment of literary language, later in Method in the same chapter on meaning. Lonergan distinguishes ordinary, technical and literary uses of language. Of literary language, he says:

While ordinary language is transient, literary is permanent: it is the vehicle of a work, a poem, to be learnt by heart or to be written out. While ordinary language is elliptical, content to supplement the common understanding and common feeling already guiding common living, literary language not only aims at fuller statement but also attempts to make up for the lack of mutual presence. It would have the listener or reader not only
understand but also feel. So where the technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float somewhere in between logic and symbol (1972: 72).

The ambiguity of Lonergan's view of literature here is precisely expressed by the metaphor of 'floating between logic and symbol.' Lonergan himself is floating between literature's ability to make us "not only understand but also feel" and its inability to make us understand in any precise or philosophically acceptable way.

An ambiguity lies, I think, in Lonergan's use of the distinction between meaning and expression. Meaning is conditioned by the mediation of the conscious intentionality of the subject. Expression is the adjustment of meaning to the conditions of meaning of intersubjective practice.\(^1\) To the extent that art is mediated by conscious subjectivity, it has meaning, but that meaning is limited to a pre-scientific, pre-philosophic level that is never able to rise above common sense experience to be formulated as art on the level of scientific and philosophical cognition. As Lonergan says: "It is possible to set within the conceptual field this elemental meaning of the transformed subject [of art] in his transformed world. But this procedure reflects without reproducing elemental meaning" (1972: 63). Art remains at the level of an elemental, uncritical practice to which consciousness returns in a necessary ecstatic liberation of the critical powers.

It is significant, further, that an ambiguity in Lonergan's aesthetic views should appear in the context of a discussion of language. In this section, literary language is treated in the third place after ordinary and technical language, yet it merely "floats in between" the differentiated logic of technical thought and the affectivity of undifferentiated ordinary or common sense language. But language cannot be considered, as Lonergan seems to do here, as merely the circumstance within which technique emerges from common sense. It is rather the agent or condition of a culture which can so differentiate itself. Language is a response to the experience of difference between individuals at the practical, common sense level. It is a response to

\(^1\) See Lonergan's treatment of principal and practical insight: "Expression is a verbal flow governed by a practical insight ... that depends on a principal insight" (1957: 562-64).
the condition of difference not only in relation to objects necessary to material survival, but also in relation to the subjects with whom the struggle of survival is necessarily carried on. Language then is the necessary response to the emergence of subjectivity into consciousness, and its necessary attempted mediation. The greater social control and differentiation made possible by language is the condition of the emergence of specialized activity which requires the refined knowledge of technique, for which in turn a more refined language must emerge (and also a mediation of common sense and technical speaking by priest and scribes). The literary language of practical, common sense culture would necessarily be oral. Oral literature is an immediate, inspired art, ecstatic and momentary, but its lack of practicality is a ritual reflection on the subjectivity to which language itself is a response. It is a reflective act of a consciousness which realizes its subjectivity, by performing the mediation of subjectivity in language for its own sake. That is, literature is in itself the performance of a subjectivity reflecting on itself precisely as subjectivity.

The differentiation of technical culture signals, not only a new moment in culture, but a new moment in consciousness, in language, and, consequently, in literature. The objectification of language in writing is the form of the emergence of technique within the field of language. The technical transformation of oral literature into written literature involves an enhanced objectification of the consciousness of subjectivity which is proper to literature. In Lonergan's treatment of the technical use of language, he refers to the process of objectification which occurs as words take on specific, technical meaning. He says:

This process [of the technicization of language] is carried much further, when human intelligence shifts from commonsense to theoretical development, when inquiry is pursued for its own sake, when logic and methods are formulated, when a tradition of learning is established (1972: 72).

This axial shift into what Lonergan elsewhere calls the second stage of meaning is a quantum leap in the range of linguistic expression and the capacity of conscious differentiation it opens up. The ritual reflection on and performance of subjectivity which was characteristic of oral literature is necessarily objectified in the written literature of the technical stage of culture. The revolution within technical language
which saw the emergence of the theoretical dimension of meaning can be seen in its concrete context in the written objectification of self-consciousness in the literature of the technical stage of culture. The historical shape of this movement is the emergence of cosmological poetry from mythological epic. Pre-Socratic cosmological thought was not philosophy in poetic vesture. It was the emerging objectification of theoretical consciousness within a literature already objectified by the writing of the technical stage of culture.

As quoted earlier, Lonergan says of literary language that it "not only aims at a fuller statement, but also attempts to make up for the lack of mutual presence." He implies here that literary language has always been written, overlooking both its historical development from an oral state, and the necessary historical role that literature played in the conditions of emergence of theory itself. This also allows Lonergan to overlook the cognitive implications of the impact on literature of the emergence of the theoretical dimension of meaning from within literary discourse itself. This results in Lonergan's "floating" view of literary language, its non-specific, non-historical status, which as language must involve at least common sense "understanding," but as art it is necessarily in the service of pre-cognitive feeling.

What I am attempting to point up here, in this too-abbreviated treatment, is, firstly, a concession to intelligibility in art in Lonergan's treatment of literature, attributable to a certain view of language in relation to thought, and, secondly, a corollary lack of historicality in his treatment of the relation between literature and the emergence of logical, scientific thought as the type of thought properly so-called. Insofar as literature as language is an historical moment in the emergence of classical science and philosophy, Lonergan recognizes the incipient understanding which is more than a symbolic representation, but less than the systematic technique of language which is logic and theory. But surely the technical literature of cosmological poetry was the ground within which the objectification of logic was enabled to take place. The technique of a written, as opposed to an oral literature, involved a concrete, material objectification of the self-consciousness proper to literature at the oral stage. The ritual dwelling on language as the mediation of subjectivity proper to oral literature is radically transformed by the technique of writing, which removes language from its immediate intersubjective context, and objec-
tifies, externalises and therefore makes possible a conceptualization of
the language user's relation to his own subjectivity. The technicization
of language in writing is the condition of the emergence of
technical understanding of language which is grammar, which, in turn, as
Lonergan points out, is the condition and foundation of logic:

Grammar almost gives us Aristotle's categories of substance,
quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time,
purpose, habit, while Aristotle's logic and theory of science
are deeply rooted in the grammatical function of predication
(1972: 71).

The material role which literature played in this crucial objec-
tivization of language, in the axial emergence of the theoretical stage
of meaning, is not analyzed by Lonergan, and literature is left to float
in an unspecified pre-logical void of non-history. Surely Lonergan is
not alone here, but repeating the traditional exile of poetry from the
philosophical republic begun with Plato. The emergence of thought in
the objectivization of logic seeks to consolidate and extend that con-
trol and consciousness, and to be as free as possible from the self-
reflecting subjectivity from which it emerged and which now functions,
with the increasing inner refinement of predication, as an objectively-
unknowable subjective ground. An unresolvable dialectic is enshrined in
the discourse of the Western tradition between the self-conscious
language of the object of science and philosophy and the reflective
language of the subject, which is literature.

II

Lonergan's immense contribution to the philosophical tradition
centers on this very problem of the objectivization of thought in logic
and its ability to think it subjective ground. By dissolving the depend-
dence of epistemology on the visual metaphor of knowing as "taking a
look," he points up the possibility of knowing subjectivity in the very
structure of the knowing act. Rather than through the metaphoric vision
of an "introspection," cognition can grasp itself, according to Lon-
ergan, in the invariant pattern of its operations. Cognition confirms and
appropriates itself in the presence of the cognitional operations in the
very pursuit of a cognition of cognition. On this self-verifying cognitive theory, Lonergan builds an epistemology and a metaphysics that explore the structure of proportionate being in its necessary isomorphism with the structures of the knowing act, the means by which anything which can be said to be known must necessarily be appropriated.

What appeared as an unresolvable dialectic between the discourse of object and subject on the level of theory is sublated by Lonergan in an axial shift of meaning from theory to the consolidation of thought on its own interior ground. Lonergan proceeds, from *Insight to Method in Theology*, to further differentiate the interior stage of meaning by the integration of the unrestricted eros of the human spirit in the desire of the good and the desire of love. In a recent article, entitled "Reality, Myth, Symbol," Lonergan acknowledges a further advance of his thought in the work of Robert Doran, who further differentiates and integrates a fourth level of sensitive psyche. Lonergan says:

[I]t is in the realm of symbols and stories, of what he terms the imaginal, that Professor Doran finds a deficiency in my work. With me he would ask: "Why?" "Is it so?" "Is it worthwhile?" But to these he would add a fourth. It is Heidegger's Befindlichkeit taken as the existential question: "How do I feel?" (Lonergan, 1980: 37).

In Doran's fascinating and supple exploration of what he calls psychic or aesthetic conversion, we would appear to have travelled full circle in the sublation of the dialectic of subject and object consolidated in Lonergan's work. Doran extends the differentiation of interiority to the level of psychic sensitivity, of affect and symbolization, which characterizes the higher reaches of immediate experience known as the imagination. Doran presents an integration of the self-appropriation of interiority in what he terms a second immediacy of consciously and cognitively differentiated spontaneity. As he describes it, aesthetic or psychic conversion provides the kind of clarity about the duality of one's being that enables one to name with precision not only what one is doing when one is knowing, but what one is doing each time one is knowing, each time one is evaluating courses of action, each time that one is relating to the transcendent mystery, each time that one is seeking to respond appropriately in a dramatic, intersubjective situation (Doran, 1981: 186).
Further, Doran claims not only an extension of Lonergan's position but also a correction in the relation between the levels of consciousness—intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic—which undergo the sublation to the higher immediacy of self-appropriation by means of conversion. He says:

Lonergan's acknowledgement of the primacy of existential intentionality entails a sublation of the intellectual pattern of experience by the dramatic pattern. The intellectually patterned sequence of psychic conjugates that subjects the sensitive stream to the organizing control of a concern for explanatory understanding cannot be granted primacy in the relation among the various patterns of experience. If the existential sublates intelligence and rationality, the dramatic pattern of experience sublates the intellectual pattern of experience. The latter is at the service of the construction of the human world as a work of art (166).

Doran's sublation of the intelligent pattern of experience by the dramatic is properly expressed he says in the form of narrative, a telling the story of one's own dramatic, artistic appropriation of one's sensitive subjectivity. This retrieval of narrative in the service of self-appropriating interiority is to be achieved, says Doran, through the science of depth psychology, a critical appropriation of the process of symbolization at the unconscious level. Doran sees dreams as an open and blunt communication between the conscious and unconscious levels of the psyche.

For all his persuasiveness with respect to the sublation of intelligent by dramatic experience on the ground of third-stage interiority, and his designation of aesthetic conversion as a personal art of living, Doran does not address the question of the integration of the properly aesthetic, artistic pattern of experience, which, as we have described earlier, is a reflective consciousness of subjectivity in its necessary mediation of itself in language. Doran, rather, employs a revised version of Jungian psychology which offers an objectivized structure of the symbolizing process. The mediation of this theoretical stage conceptualization of subjectivity accomplishes a transparency of the symbolizing function of psyche which bypasses the question of the complex interdependence of language and symbolization. This becomes
evident, I suggest, in Doran's notion of the role of language in the subject's appropriation of symbolic consciousness.

Doran claims that the objectification of sensitive psyche will take place through an explanatory narrative, a story of the struggle for artistic unity and harmony in one's own living. However, since depth psychology is to form the conceptual system by which this tale is told, it is very difficult to see this narrative as anything but a history. Such a history could explain the conceptual structure of dramatic consciousness in linear, cause and effect terms, but it could in no way mediate the drama of living in the spontaneity which Doran claims for it. The structuration of the symbolic process which such a narrative performs already presupposes a distinction between the logical, cause and effect component of symbolization and its affectivity. Since the subject is narrating his own psychic history in a discourse whose very structure abstracts subjectivity, the dramatic usefulness of this self-explanation to the subject will be limited. It becomes even less communicative intersubjectively, since another person will have no sense of the precise content of the affective dimension which surrounds but is not containable in such a narrative. The Jungian theory of universal, archetypal symbolic structure still leaves the affective dimension of such a structure as a conceptual proposition, and is affectively incommunicative.

Most importantly, however, and as suggested already, the history of drama of sensitive subjectivity will be a narrative form which will efface its own mediating status. The differentiation introduced into subjectivity by the self-explanatory act will remain unexamined in the narrative, and the subject will always be explaining a subjectivity that has ceased to be present by reason of the differentiation of narrativity itself. That is, the narrative will be a history, a story of one's psychic past. The act of such self-understanding will be a process of explaining oneself away.

III

As observed earlier, in looking at the place of literary language in Lonergan's thought, it is the peculiar role of the artistic function of language in literature to dramatize or ritually enact the differenti-
ation of consciousness into self and other, for which language is itself an attempted mediation. Pre-philosophical literature understood itself as such a ritual enactment which made present, by oral performance, the events it narrated. The stage of technical culture introduced writing, which enabled the divorce of literature from the ecstatic presentation of content, and introduced a distanciation of expression, which facilitated in turn the emergence of a permanent theoretical content of thought, abstracted from its linguistic expression. Conceptual thought, in fact, could be seen as the attempt to overcome the dawning realization, which accompanied technical culture and writing, that language, in the very act of mediating subjectivity, performed an externalization of thought which intensified the distance between subject and object. Conceptual thought is the attempt to overcome the spatio-temporal externalization of consciousness, which becomes materially explicit in written language.

After the consolidation of meaning in theory as independent of expression, literary language was subordinated because of its specific attentiveness to language as the enactment of a dividedness of subject and object in language. This experience of dividedness is the very substance of subjectivity as limitation, isolation, and vulnerability, and has its overwhelming threat in the fear of the permanent nothingness of death. Aristotle designates the whole range of affectivity to be proper to literature in his definition of tragedy as the highest literary mode: "A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; ... with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions" (1449b 24-28). After the emergence of philosophy, literature has become the very scene of the recognition of non-presence and temporality which rules the contingency of the material, while philosophy has consolidated itself on the inner ground of a logic secure from time, change and the dividedness of subject and object. It is the experience of the difference and alienation of non-identity which philosophy and theology sublate in a higher, onto-theo-logical unity of identical self-presence. As Lonergan demonstrates so powerfully, the very structure of logic intends a Being whose thought and existence are

one, identical and present to itself as an identity in difference, above
the alienation of material, spatio-temporal, subject/object distanciation.

It is in such context of argument that a discussion of James
Joyce takes on something like worthwhile significance. As the premiere
literary modernist, Joyce is the most instructive example of the impact
of the theoretical dimension of meaning on the practice of literature.
We can, in fact, see in his development the dawning recognition from the
point of view of literature, of the implications of the axial turn from
common sense to theoretical consciousness, from classical to modern
common sense and theoretical meaning.

In Joyce's first published novel, *A Portrait of the Artist as a
Young Man*, the main character, Stephen Dedalus, undergoes what can be
described, in the terminology of Lonergan and Doran, as an aesthetic
conversion on the common sense level of experience. Joyce, in setting
his novel in the Dublin of his youth, is not concerned to disguise the
necessary relation of his art to his own experience. There is, then,
embedded in this strategy a declaration of the inability to draw abso-
lute distinctions between an author and his characters, fiction and so-
called reality.

In the fourth of the book's five chapters, Stephen encounters a
girl while walking on the seashore. The prior context to this trans-
forming encounter is Stephen's adolescent experimentation with prosti-
tutes, followed by a period of intense Catholic penitence and piety.
Offered a place in the Jesuit order, Stephen refuses, and is waiting to
hear about acceptance into the university. As Stephen approaches her
along the beach, the girl appears to him as "touched with the wonder of
mortal beauty." She suffers his gaze "without shame or wantonness, ...
Her image ... passed into his soul for ever and no word had broken the
holy silence of his ecstasy" (Joyce, 1964: 171-72). Immediately after,
Stephen experiences the secular equivalent of a vision of the mystical
rose. The parallel with Dante's *Divina Commedia* is deliberate on
Joyce's part. From the hell of his youthful sins of the flesh, Stephen
had passed to a purgatorial religious phase. The young woman is a
Beatrice figure, who passes into his mind as archetype of beauty in the
manner of Beatrice's giving way to the Blessed Virgin in the *Paradiso*,
and Stephen passes on to a visionary ecstasy whose analogy is Dante's
direct experience of the godhead.
The emphasis throughout is on the mortality and materiality of Stephen's experience of the girl, and its analogical relation to a supernatural vision. It is a modern artistic experience essentially in the Romantic tradition. Coleridge described the Romantic understanding of the artistic imagination as "the repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I Am" (Coleridge, 164), and Joyce presents Stephen as the secular artistic priest of mortal beauty, "a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life" (1964: 221).

In the final section of the novel, Stephen differentiates his artistic creed in its intellectual and moral implications. Much of the section is devoted to the expounding of an aesthetic theory which defines the dramatic mode as the highest medium of self-objectification. At the end, he is poised to depart for the Continent to take up his artistic vocation. The passage is presented as a diary, in which Stephen writes: "I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race" (253). At the end of the novel, then, Stephen is presented as writing in the narrative a portrait of himself as young artist, so that the distinction between author, narrator and character is subsumed in an interpenetration and sublation of identities.

This novel seems the very type of a psychic conversion narrative that sublates not only the dramatic, but the intellectual, artistic, and moral/religious patterns of experience as well. If we were content to merely extend Doran's narrative appropriation to include the artistic pattern, Joyce's first novel would seem to be the paradigm of a narrative of a properly aesthetic conversion on the common sense level of experience. Stephen experiences a dramatic artistic transcendence within which intellectual and moral dimensions are differentiated ("to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race"). Although religious conversion is not realized, everything occurs under its analogical aegis. A Portrait seems the very type of what Doran means by the narrative of soul-making (see Doran, 1981: 159-160). A Portrait is, I think, in its romanticism, an artistic transformation of modern common sense experience. The concern for the materiality of

3. I assume here that, in the light of Method, Lonergan would include this in a list of patterns of experience.
experience and its transformation by an artistic imagination is a subjective correlative of eighteenth-century, neo-classical reason and natural science.

The quantum leap which Joyce made from A Portrait to his second novel, Ulysses, parallels that from common sense to theory. From the silent mediation of immediacy of the image of the girl in A Portrait ("Her image passes into his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy"), Joyce passes to a consciousness of the implications of the material mediation of experience by the word, and the word specifically as written. The harrowing subjective implications of this consciousness confront the reader in the opening pages of Ulysses. Stephen Dedalus has been called back to Dublin from Paris, to the deathbed of his mother. A mere shadow of the youthful artist of A Portrait, he is the poet manqué who has written nothing and ekes out a minimal, debt-ridden existence as a schoolteacher.

Stephen's character appears in its full complexity in the "Scylla and Charybdis" episode which closes the first half of the novel. In the vein of then current theories about the relation of Hamlet to Shakespeare's actual life, Stephen expounds an opposing view, which sees Shakespeare as using his art to compensate for the psychological ravages of an unhappy marriage. The romantic view of Shakespeare is that he is in Hamlet, "reading the book of himself" (Joyce, 1960: 252), that he is the supreme creative artist: "Next to God, Shakespeare created most" (273). But Stephen maintains that Shakespeare is merely trying to forget his betrayal by his adulterous wife, using creativity in art to disguise his lack of procreative, sexual identity: "because loss is [Shakespeare's] gain, he passes on toward eternity in undiminished personality, untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws he has revealed" (252).

4. "Joyce wrote in the Linati schema that the central point or umbilicus of Ulysses is between this episode and the next. Stephen is now fully grown" (Ellmann, 88).

This is, of course, Oedipal sour grapes on Stephen's part, whose artistic impotency is betrayed by his very penchant for theorizing as a substitute for actual creative productivity. Joyce presents Stephen as falling prey to the aridity and bitterness which accompany in his view Romantic artistic exaltation of the type of Stephen in A Portrait. But he is also dramatizing the solipsism of an excessively subjectivist, introspective artistic practice which sees in its own experience the whole material of art. Of course, Joyce's irony extends to the practice of genetic and intentional criticism, in which interpretation assumes an immediate correlation between what is knowable of the artist biographically and the supposed "meaning" of his work, between the "intention" of the artist and the actual text which he produces.

The failed creative solipsism of Stephen is balanced by Joyce with the failed procreative onanism of the other main male character, Leopold Bloom. Joyce presents these two as the biological and intellectual poles of the male concern for creative self-identity and its disastrous psychological, moral and intellectual consequences. Stephen and Bloom are two halves of a divided male self. The irreconcilable duality of subject and object, mind and body, which they represent reaches final confrontation in the penultimate "Ithaca" episode, where Bloom's wife Molly hovers, as an invisible mediating presence, over the friendly confrontation of the irreducible difference of body and spirit represented by Bloom and Stephen. In the final "Penelope" episode, the narrative is turned over to Molly in a forty-page flow of unpunctuated, largely erotic language. Clearly, we are tempted to see Molly's earthy musings as the sublation of the body/mind duality in a symbolic earthmother figure. But Joyce confronts the reader with the impossibility of this symbolic, "literary" transcendence of difference.

The crucial turning-point of the monologue occurs when Molly begins a furious menstruation aggravated by her adulterous romp with Blazes Boylan earlier in the day:

0 patience above its pouring out of me like the sea anyhow he didnt make me pregnant as big as he is ... 0 Jamesy let up out of this pooh sweets of sin whoever suggested that business for women what between clothes and cooking and children this damned old bed too jingling like the dickens (914).
Molly's menstruation is her bodily act of rejection of the unfertilized egg, the sign of her lack of subjection to the male objective of procreative identity. Further, her disclaimer "O Jamesy let me up out of this" is her notice of refusal to permit "Jamesy" Joyce to father upon her as passive symbol his authorial creative identity. Coupled with this refusal of passivity is her rejection of the roles assigned to women by the patriarchal tradition, by a masculine control of women which subjects them to service in the cause of a god-like, masculine creativity.

Joyce deconstructs his own role as hidden author and creative principle by having his character unmask her status as language in "Jamesy's" text. Far from establishing an "identity" for Joyce, he allows his text to point to its essential difference from its producer. The act of writing in fact introduces a difference in Joyce's subjectivity between the Joyce who conceived Ulysses, the "Jamesy" who now exists as a narrative product of his text, and the self that reads the undecidable relation between the two. Molly's final "yes," the last word of the text, is the affirmation of an undecidable dialectic of male and female, sexuality and love, body and spirit, character and author, meaning and expression. It is this difference which Joyce affirms by allowing his (female) character to affirm it for him. It is both Joyce and Molly, and yet neither that speaks. Language is permitted to affirm its own structure of difference between subject and object in the process of expression.

CONCLUSION

Joyce's development from A Portrait through Ulysses can, as I have suggested, be seen, in light of the work of Lonergan and Doran, as the subjective correlative of the axial shift in the modern period from a commonsense aesthetic romanticism to the critical stance of modernism. If this is the case, then Joyce's last novel, Finnegans Wake, could be anticipated as the equivalent in the subjective mode of literature, of the axial shift to the stage of interiority which Lonergan describes conceptually. However, we have insisted throughout, literature is by its very condition a reflective, self-conscious act by virtue of its dwelling on itself as the emergence in language of the difference of
subject and object. The differentiation of discourses from within the ground of literary self-consciousness is a refinement and extension of the penetration of subjectivity proper to literature. Despite the repression of the difference of subjectivity in literature by the objectifying sublation of philosophy and theology, literature demonstrates a structured self-appropriation of at least equal refinement and importance to the on-going affirmation of woman/man in our tradition. Literature, as well as philosophy, is a self-v(a)erifying affirmation of cognitional structure. The reflection in literature on the difference of subject and object participates in that difference, reduplicating and extending it in a manner which yields cumulative and progressive results. The method of literature is an undecidable dialectic which performs and appropriates itself precisely as such, subjecting philosophy in turn to an undecidability, \(^6\) removing sublation and conversion beyond the reach of the unavoidable materiality of discourse. Between philosophy and literature I do not myself decide; \(^7\) but am content to affirm difference in recognizing both; to write and to speak of Lonergan and Joyce at this point is to participate in a dialectic which always already defers conversion.

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6. Philip McShane asks: "[I]s Insight perhaps, ... allegorical?" (McShane, 64; emphasis added).

7. In "An Interview with Jacques Derrida," Derrida responds to a question about the relativist and pluralist implications of his thought by saying: "I am not a pluralist and I would never say that every interpretation is equal but I do not select. The interpretations select themselves ... The hierarchy is between forces and not between true and false" (Derrida, 1980). I take this opportunity to acknowledge my very great debt in this paper to the work of Derrida, particularly to Of Grammatology (1974) and Writing and Difference (1978).
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ELEMENTS OF BASIC COMMUNICATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper has to be read in the context of my papers for the last two Lonergan Workshops. In "Basic Christian Community: An Issue of 'Mind and the Mystery of Christ,'" I suggested a normative formulation of basic community in terms of a divinely promoted transition from the prior to the later time of the subject by means of a conversation that embraces human formation, deformation, and transformation. The later time of the subject issues from a person's successful negotiation of the critical point in human development through appropriation of her or his rational self-consciousness. In "The Human Good and Christian Conversation," I contended that to make our own Lonergan's language in his formulation of the structure of the human good would entail our explicit entry into conversation with the persons of the divine Trinity, which epitomizes Basic Community. In other words, foundational practice happens in the context of Basic Communication. This sketch of elements inquires into basic communication in relation to its lack or negation, namely, the experience of human loneliness. We need to make our own the reality of basic communication in overcoming loneliness that it has come to dominate not just our lives but the second-order reflection upon our spontaneous living achieved by contemporary Western culture.

II. THE PROBLEM OF LONELINESS

A. Loneliness and Solitude

In Philip McShane's book Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, if I have not misunderstood, the term loneliness has been used to name two
quite distinct realities: the basic human condition of dynamic finitude, and sin. I would like to keep the two distinct as solitude (with positive connotations) and loneliness (with negative ones). Thus, solitude is an ineluctable moment of all human questing and searching and longing; it is a dimension of genuine development whose partial fulfillment is being-in-love with other human beings and whose complete fulfillment is being-in-love with God. So by solitude I mean the heart of what McShane calls a "lower ground of loneliness" where by loneliness he intends chiefly the lack within us that is isomorphic with being and that specifies us as intellectual potencies gradually actuated through embodied desire. McShane's "infinite loneliness" I would refer to as the solitude of embodied desire as botanical, zoological, psychological, and understanding-and-love-in-potency. In contrast, loneliness involves the deformation of original solitude by sin, deprivation, loss, alienation.

B. Loneliness as Lived

We experience loneliness whenever we are abandoned by friends or family; when we feel the absence of supporting community in experiences of homelessness and rootlessness. We experience loneliness in the "tragic anguish" which McShane speaks of as besetting all our projects and which culminates, in both biblical and secular terms, in death. If we seek the ground of this experience, we are led back to Pogo's famous line: "We have met the enemy, and they is us!" Our loneliness is rooted in ourselves, in our habitual inability to be in conversation with ourselves, with other people, and with God.

Alasdair MacIntyre has aptly singled out three representative 'sponsors of loneliness' in our culture. In his descriptions of the aesthete, the bureaucratic manager, and the therapist we may discern not merely the prototypes of our society's socially dominant individuals, but dimensions of ourselves as well. Thus MacIntyre cites to great effect Henry James's depictions of aesthetes "whose interest is to feed off the kind of boredom that is so characteristic of modern leisure by contriving behaviour in others that will be responsive to their wishes, that will feed their sated appetites ... who pursue the fulfillment of their desires without a concern for any good but their own ... a whole milieu in which moral instrumentalism has triumphed" (23). He is no
less trenchant on the bureaucratic manager who is so single-mindedly intent upon the efficient use of power that he or she recurrently refuses to raise questions about higher or even alternative ends and so renders impossible the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative behavior. Finally he portrays the therapist devoted to adjusting people to the objective situation of loneliness enough to keep them 'productive.'

This kind of culture of loneliness does not simply arise spontaneously. It is not just spawned by life; but it is elicited and imposed by deformation in the reflection upon the meaning of life expressed in the culture's cover stories which are generated by the typical ideologies of modernity.

C. Loneliness as Ideology

Human development, unlike that of animals, is a function of images and ideas of what it means to be human. There was plenty of loneliness and alienation in ancient cultures, to be sure; but this loneliness was interpreted by both biblical and classical pagan streams of thought as a deviation, a derailment, or a fall. These traditions apprehended human life as an ascent in which great longings called forth great sacrifices and risks for the sake of great and noble ends shared in friendship. Whether those ends be the honor and glory prized by heroic societies, or the knowledge and wisdom sought by a noetically differentiated culture, or the holiness idealized by the pneumatically differentiated cultures, in principle if not in fact, premodern Western cultures commonly shared notions of justice and nobility as normative. Modernity originated in a moral revolt from these normative standards. Machiavelli subordinated wisdom and holiness to the quest for glory, thus initiating the trend toward the lowering of standards. Hobbes was only being more coherently Machiavellian when he set human togetherness on the still lower, though perhaps more solid, basis of self-preservation. From Hobbes's perspective, Machiavellian virtù sheds its association with nobility: power is sheerly a means for the satisfaction of the lower passions' desires. This lowered tone is carried over into Locke's more moderate orientation toward comfortable self-preservation, as bour-
geois philistinism defines success exclusively in terms of bodily health and wealth.

Consequently, modernity installs economics at the center both of politics overall and of practical reason. For modernity, natural freedom comes to mean acting in accord with one's own inclinations without concern for others, and the status of reason in the human animal becomes exclusively instrumental. As a result, public and private life both get dissociated from higher aspirations to the good life and to eternal life. Human life increasingly loses its character of ascent; and the price of our freedom of opportunity is loneliness.

Perhaps no one has felt more sensibly the cleavage between the higher things in life we have come to associate with the word culture and a society based on commerce and the low selfishness of natural inclination and natural freedom than Rousseau. In *Emile* Rousseau introduced the (for modernity) novel criteria of compassion and love in order to transform mercenary morality into citizenship under the general will. He replaced the inculcation of Christian virtue by the manipulation of passion and eros for the sake of making people good for consumer society. That his solution is synthetic and unsatisfactory is clear in *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* in which he argues that solitariness (not solitude in the sense mentioned above!) can solve modern alienation. One is to escape the sordidness of social conventions and relationships by striving to be alone with unspoiled nature and recovering the sense of one's own existence. This sense of one's own existence at the heart of Rousseau's vision of solitariness is neither the transformed interiority of the wise man nor that of the mystic; rather it is the elementary awareness of the amiable half-brute in the original state of nature.

Rousseau established the problematic of modern education in terms of overcoming alienation. It was taken up in differing ways by Kant, Schiller, Hegel, and Marx. I wish to stress that the concept of self at the center of Rousseau's analysis of alienation, with its key distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour propre*, probably provides the basis for the notion of self dominant in modern culture today. According to Rousseau, the heart of alienation is the way one's sense of one's own worth (*amour de soi*) depends on the estimation of others (*amour propre*). Hobbes had said that a man's worth is his price; but Rousseau realized how alienating that is for us long before Marx did. If we notice care-
fully, this modern self, so vulnerable to alienation in this sense, corresponds with sociology's apprehension of self as the locus of any given society's available roles.

The master of suspicion *par excellence*—Nietzsche—is also not surprisingly the master of alienation as well. Rousseau's socio-psycho-logical self as dependent on others for its sense of itself still may believe the correctness of others' judgments, no matter what roles and tasks they assign one, or however they assess one's worth. But Nietzsche battled his way outside the reach of social control by coming to grips with the realization that there is no objective standard of value at all. What realization could be more alienating than this? By plumbing the depths of modern alienation, Nietzsche captures the other major components in modernity's idea of the self: if there are no objective values, then the self must itself become the producer of values. Out of its own chaos, the self musters a 'culture' or set of values that may be either impoverished and diminishing or rich and satisfying.

In MacIntyre's account of modernity's social morality, Erving Goffman is cast as the protagonist of the Rousseauan 'other-directed' self; and Jean Paul Sartre (of the earlier writings) is cast as the protagonist of the Nietzschean self in rebellion against all externally imposed roles. But both of these selves are really different facets of the polymorphic subject in its contemporary state of disorientation and bewilderment. This self lacks criteria for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, good and bad, limit as intelligible and limit as absurd. We may think of such a self as protean in the sense of the demonic, or simply in the sense of vulgar enslavement to the consumption of pleasure, managerial control, and therapy. Such a self is inter-changable in our culture. As collective it has been at work constructing ideologies and regimes of loneliness. The kind of community that comes about among such selves promotes flight from self-consciousness, fosters self-deception in individuals and rationalization in groups, and brings about increasing moral renunciation.
III. THE HUMAN GOOD AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF

A. From Below Upwards

A normative account of the human good and human development has to be set in the context of what Lonergan first called vertical finality in "Finality, Love, Marriage" (1943). Accordingly, the entire universe of being has the character of quest, yearning, ascent: from relationships between subatomic particles to interpersonal relationships, all of finite reality is caught up into the sweep of a universal and absolutely transcendent finality.

For human beings the proximate context for this ascent into mystery is what Lonergan calls the human good. This idea underwent a fair amount of development in the course of Lonergan's life. Here I want to dwell on features brought out in the final edition of De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica in 1964. At this point in his evolving understanding of the human good, Lonergan tended to think of the human good chiefly in terms of intelligible order, with the overwhelming emphasis being laid on the good of order. In De Deo Trino the treatment of the human good sets forth what in Method are called general categories in preparation for the elaboration of special categories to be deployed in a systematic grasp of the divine missions of Word and Spirit.

We human beings become aware only gradually of the components making up the good of order, as we grow older and grow up. So little kids fight over particular goods, which are the immediate objects of their desires. But as they grow up, they become increasingly aware of these goods as coming in successive series, and they start to realize the need to acquire the habits of knowledge and desire along with the skills required to keep the particular goods coming.

As adolescents, young people normally become sensitive in a new way to the efficacy of cooperation and teamwork; and they are eager to enter new personal relationships connected with their specific fields of interest. As adolescents pass into young adulthood, they start to become resourceful at figuring out new schemes of recurrence and alternative ways of satisfying desires and needs; they may start working for reform, and so forth. According Lonergan, the philosopher who is capa-
able of appreciating the good of order in terms of its intelligibility and as a participation in the divine good reaches full maturity. The philosophically converted person follows the dictates of intelligence and chooses the good of order even when it satisfies the desires and needs of others, and not one's own.

In carrying this natural analogy further, we grasp that the 'disinterested' choice of the mature person in the sense just described fulfills the conditions of an act of love in the classical sense of *velle bonum alicui*. Notice, too, that the complete apprehension of the complex intelligibility of the human good is the culmination of a process of ascent from the self-centered animal of ordinary childhood to the mature adulthood of the philosophically converted.

Similarly, the structure of the human good itself has this modality of ascending intelligibility: from the objects of desire, through intelligible orders that embrace interlocking schemes of recurrence, to values in Lonergan's almost unique understanding of that term. Every Nietzschean or nihilist trait is excluded from Lonergan's conception of value as an order (with all its concrete content) precisely as the object of *reasonable* choice. But, by the same token, everything positive uncovered by Nietzsche's soundings is included in Lonergan's grasp of value as not just terminal, but origi native. Directly and explicitly, or indirectly and implicitly, our choices affect our habitual willingness, our effective orientation in life, our contribution to progress or decline. Hence, the movement from the level of good of order to that of values is coordinate with the movement in our minds and hearts from intelligent and rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness. It is identical with the movement to the topmost level of human consciousness at which, Lonergan tells us, the subject "is practical and existential: practical inasmuch as control includes self-control, and the possibility of self-control involves responsibility for the effects of his actions on others and, more basically, on himself. The topmost level of human consciousness is conscience" (1974: 168).

This passage from intelligent and rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness as enacting the transition from envisaging the human good on the two levels of objects of desire and of the good of order to judgments about the human good on the level of value is overwhelmingly connected with the passage from the prior to the later sub-
ject mentioned in the introduction. Let us dwell on it for a few
moments.

The context of the passage to the fourth level subject as respons-
sible and existential is our awareness of existing in what Lonergan
later on in an unpublished paper called "ethical space." Here we are
responsible for ourselves, for others, and for the world in which we
live. In ethical space we have to make judgments about intelligible
orders that are either genuine or grounded in scotosis or one or another
of the biases. Spontaneously there arises an exigence within us for our
judgments in ethical space to be penetrating, honest, and to have the
consistency which would match the demands of the detached, disinter-
ested, and unrestricted desire to know. In other words, our prospective
judgments of value are related (implicitly or explicitly) by our con-
scious dynamisms to the universe of being in such a way that, as Loner-
gan put it, "there is no room for choosing the part and repudiating the
whole, for choosing the conditioned and repudiating the condition, for
choosing the antecedent and repudiating the consequent" (1978: 602).
Professor Gadamer always stresses that everyone as moral subject needs
to be his own philosopher, I believe, on account of Ethls relat-
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Another way of expressing the momentousness of this passage to
rational self-consciousness in our involvement with the human good is to
say that we move from being premoral to being moral with the enactment
of that transition. Premorally, any set of particular goods we may
happen to be after is related to any good of order by which we happen to
seek intelligently to realize that set as the end is related to its
means. Almost all modern discourse about the means/end relationship can
probably be correctly analyzed in this manner. As Max Weber put it, the
means/ends relationship is a purposively rational one; and its basic
criterion is efficiency or expediency. Such a perspective is also
simply technical or instrumental, and thus premoral. The means/ends
relationship only actually gets promoted to the level of morality when
it is brought into the purview of the self as originating value. In
other words, moral (as opposed to premoral) judgment regards the rela-
tionship of particular goods to the good of order in view of the overall
or comprehensive meaning of one's life as human.

Since the judgment of value will not be genuine unless it is
grounded in relation to the totality of the real, awareness of ourselves
as potentially rational doers is at least implicitly always also awareness of the order of the universe. So long as it is not frustrated or rationalized away, the innate desire of our hearts is to be in active and actual correspondence with the real across the board, so that if we choose the conditioned, we also choose the condition; if the part, then the whole; if the particular good, then not to the detriment of other and higher goods. The self is structured by nature as an unrestricted desire, and this structured longing is the capacity to transcend any limited horizon inasmuch as we therefore can place any prospective judgment of value (or course of action) within the perspective of an unrestricted horizon. The self is spontaneously oriented toward the absolute, both as virtually unconditioned (i.e., any finite fact or good) and as formally unconditioned (i.e., God as the only reality capable of completely fulfilling our infinite desire). Acting out of this orientation in making our finite choices is what grounds choices as moral and morally good. In other words, our spontaneous orientation towards the absolute is enacted inasmuch as we bring the relational aspects of the good (i.e. as good for someone and for some end) into the context of our envisagement of the universe of being, which is a context of absoluteness. This means bringing the aspects of the particular good or good of order in question into relationship with other goods in their concrete relationships and finalities within a hierarchical order of values as vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious.

In making a genuine judgment of value, therefore, we are taking a stand on the nature both of the self and of the universe. This is what leads me to suggest that the passage to rational self-consciousness as genuine has to do with negotiating the "critical point." That is to say, we have to pass from our native self-presence to an ever more explicit awareness of its ownmost character as a formally dynamic consciousness oriented towards the unconditioned. The question about the foundations of my own life is the question whether I am to become what I should in accord with the inbuilt normativeness and exigencies of the spirit.

Consequently, the questions, What should I do? Should I do it? Is it worthwhile? also involve questions about the foundations of our own actions. They open onto questions about the reality of the self as spiritual, on the one hand; and about the intrinsic merit of the being of any possible object of choice, on the other.
What is at stake either in our attainment of full rational self-consciousness entailed here or in our passage from the prior to the later subject which is also involved is the emergence of our full personhood. Anyone whose range of choiceworthy ends is circumscribed by pre- or sub-rational criteria as based on individual, class, or national selfishness is like an animal in its habitat, no matter how cleverly devised are his or her schemes for the realization of the particular goods envisaged. On the other hand, for Lonergan the emergence of the person in human society depends on the realization of the capacity for self-transcendence in genuine benevolence towards others, in real collaboration for the good. This is the real self-transcendence Thomas Aquinas called honestum; and Lonergan, thinking explicitly within the trajectory of ascent inscribed in the universe by its vertical finality, calls it holy.

B. From above downwards

If we pause to consider seriously the topmost level of human consciousness, we are coming to grips with what Lonergan (in the wake of Augustine and Aquinas) has claimed to be the privileged instance of finite activity that provides the best analogue for the processes of origin within God. Indeed, the more we are able to appreciate our presence to God and others as well as the totality of the created universe within ethical space, the more we can appreciate the relations of origin or processes in God. At the same time this would also enable us to comprehend why, after listing and discussing the above-mentioned components in the human good in Thesis 30 [i.e. many persons (1), habits of apprehension and appetite (2), coordinated operations (3), successive series of particular goods (4), and interpersonal relationships (5)], Lonergan goes on to affirm that, among all the elements listed, the fifth "has a certain priority." He reasons that love effects a union between or among persons; it produces a mutual inherence in one another. From this flows—from above downwards, that is—a will to communicate good things with one another, to cooperate together, and to acquire needed skills, and to disdain defects and incompetencies. In short, love in interpersonal relationships generates all the components in the concrete good of order.
Lonergan proceeds to explain how all interpersonal relationships are a matter of personal presence. Being a person, he reminds us, specifies the contrast of our being over against the animal's as having an intellectual nature, which is actuated and unfolded in knowing and loving. Knowing brings about our intentional presence to each other; loving establishes a relationship of mutual self-mediation between one another. This implies then that personal presence is achieved through a process of ascent: we begin from merely physical presence to each other in the same places at the same times; but a presence beyond spatio-temporal juxtaposition is wrought when two or more psyches begin to adapt to one another. Shared memories of the past and imaginings of the future constitute a reciprocal presence among rational beings at a still higher level. At the highest level, however, is the achievement of reciprocity in which mutual personal presence simultaneously realizes the good of order. Lonergan portrays this accomplishment as "the mutual indwelling of persons pursuing the common good of order in such a way that the one known is in the knower and the beloved one is in the lover."

It should be clear by this point, first, that raising the questions proper to rational self-consciousness—the questions in which the comprehensive meaning of life, of the universe of being, of reality as a whole are at stake—constitutes the very heart of the question of value as regarding the good of order. But, secondly, the condition for any even vaguely adequate answering of these questions is the achievement of interpersonal relations. More concretely, these interpersonal relations would include—if only in an incognito manner—relationships with the Word and the Spirit as sent to us and with the Father who sends them. To put it in a nutshell, in order for us human beings to realize ourselves as persons from our starting point of solitude and alienating loneliness, we have to enter into basic communication with God.

Once basic communication starts to become concretely and consciously effective in our asking and answering of the questions proper to rational self-consciousness, it could happen that we are able to double back upon our experience of basic communication in order to appropriate that asking and answering as the analogy for the Basic Community in the Trinity. From the Infinite Act of Loving Understanding there proceeds the Judgment of the Infinite Meaning and Value of Loving Understanding (the Word); and from both the Infinite Act of Loving
Understanding and the Infinite Word proceeds the Infinitely Loving Response to the Meaning and Value of Infinite Loving Understanding (the Holy Spirit). These intelligibly emanating processions ground the three subsistent relations or Persons whom Christian scripture names Father, Son, and Spirit. And as Lonergan points out, the mutual entailment of interpersonal relations and the good of order are realized with infinite concreteness in these Three.

God as agape overflows into loving even us. God wants to fill our original solitude by communicating the divine goodness itself to us by immediate vision. God wants us to enter by our acts of knowing and loving into a supernatural sharing in that infinite realization of interpersonal relationships as a divine good of order. To accomplish this, God also has to heal our loneliness, to transform and integrate the human good of order into a finite yet supernatural good of order, too. The Word and Holy Spirit are sent for these purposes.

In terms of the temporal or historical realization of the divine missions, as both McShane and Crowe have stressed repeatedly, the Spirit as the Gift of Love is sent first incognito; the hand of God is then manifested in the lines of revelation that culminate in the mission of the Divine Word in whom human people can have faith; and after Pentecost our acceptance of Love and Faith engenders hope in that eschatological relatedness to the Father as fulfilled in the Beatific Vision. But this historical economy is grounded ontologically in the trinitarian ordering of created participations in that supernatural order of interpersonal relations of Father to Son (grace of union), of Father and Son to Spirit (sanctifying grace), of Spirit to Father and Son (habit of charity), and of Son to Father (beatific vision).

As Lonergan has helped us to understand, the order of grace becomes linked directly with the elements of the human good through interpersonal relations. On account of the divine missions of Word and Spirit, we human beings are not simply loved in a generic manner in accord with the perfection of our created natures, but specially and particularly. The love of the Father for the Son, which is the Holy Spirit, becomes the Love of the Father for the Son as human in virtue of the Incarnation. The Beloved Son as human loves all of us human beings humanly. As Lonergan once wrote so beautifully:
It is the love of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the love of a human will, motivated by a human mind, operating through human senses, resonating through human emotions and feelings and sentiments, implemented by a human body with its structure of bones and muscles, flesh, its mobile features, its terrible capacities for pleasure and pain, for joy and sorrow, for rapture and agony. It is the love of the Good Shepherd, knowing its own, known by its own, and ready to lose his life for them: Greater love than this no man hath, than to lay down his life for his friend (1951).

Through the mediation and reconciliation wrought by the Son, the love of the Father for his Son as divine and human is extended to us human beings—the saving and elevating love of the Spirit poured out in our hearts. Finally, and on account of all these relations of love, there is our loving response of charity for the Father and the Son.

But our entry into this life of response gets integrated into our development as humans through a process of ascent, too. The outpouring of the Spirit in our hearts does not abolish the stages in the achievement of personal presence to the Incarnate Word, Jesus. We must move through physical presence, psychic adaptation, memory of the past (Metz's idea of "dangerous memory") and imagination of the future, and finally into a phase of mutual self-mediation, mutual indwelling, in which the known inhabits the knower intentionally and the beloved dwells in the lover really. Then the response of the Christian is perfect.

Basic communication in this explicitly trinitarian sense lends a real urgency to the call (which no one has been more insistent about for decades now than the impish Philip McShane) for us to envisage all the concrete conditions that need to be realized in order for human beings to bring forth in their minds and hearts the acts of meaning and value that can proceed not simply from religiously, morally, and intellectually converted but from manifoldly differentiated consciousnesses. In the light of this hypothesis of basic communication, theology enters into a clearer collaborative relationship with those religiously converted persons of all faiths in whom the divine processions may be truly operative, but who are at most inchoately differentiated: in order to serve these people, theology has to learn to listen to them as well as to speak to them. All are working to promote practice rooted in basic communication. In the light of basic communication, moreover, research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications move beyond the pale of professional criteria as
determined by the academy. Functionally specialized study and teaching are consciously and really created participations in the missions of Word and Spirit in a manner irreducible to juridical ascriptions on the part of institutional religion. This is the ground of the healing and creative role it should play in the academy, the churches, and the world.
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MacIntyre, Alasdair
<table>
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"Successive contexts have been formed only to provide the base and the need for forming a further, fuller context; and as is clear from our final chapter, even several hundred pages have not brought us to the end of the process" (Lonergan, 1957b: 731).

The present essay points towards contexts, specifically the upper open blade of an actual context of adequate theology in future millennia. The essay stands in genetic continuity with a previous Festschrift essay: not an appendix, then, but rather a tale wagging the dog. Where the previous essay centrally drew attention to the challenge of the achievement of the forty-eight year old Lonergan who wrote the initial quotation, the present essay moves that challenge from the seemingly only personal challenge of Circulation Analysis and Insight to an historic role-full humdrum challenge of the vortex of functional specialization, a vortex which will impishly wag the sluggish individual quest.

In that same page of the work Insight Lonergan remarks on "the inception of a far larger one." I suspect that none of us has real intimations of the lonely sick heroic climb of Lonergan to the mprints of the short work, Method in Theology. It certainly was the inception of a far larger one, and it is only by sifting through unpublished lectures, notes, scribbles, that one can come to sense the dimensions of his reach for a methodical redemption, under grace, of history. I would hope to intimate a growing structured sense of that reach in a later book (McShane, 1989): here I can only express clues, suspicions, map-readings. There are four sections to follow. A first section gives some indication of my deep respect for, and long struggle

1. See the concluding page of McShane, 1975.
with, Bernard Lonergan's meaning. It should be useful for young people who constantly feel pressured towards a mythic speedy growth in understanding. The second section is substantially my panel presentation on economics for the Santa Clara Symposium. This section places "the actual context of economics" (McShane, 1981: 543-71) in a new context. The third section here both enlarges that new context and fits genetically into the discussion of bridges of meaning that forms the first part of the article just referred to. The fourth section places the clues to the enterprize of methodical redemption in the larger context of that vein of the Cosmic Word which is modernity's\(^2\) genesis of an ongoing genesis of scientific humility and method.

I

I have had the privilege of writing in honor of Bernard Lonergan in various Festschriften since 1964, and in this essay, paying homage to him in his eightieth year, I find it difficult to know what further to say. I have, on occasion, compared Lonergan to Beethoven, Rembrandt, Galileo, Mendeleev, Joyce. Perhaps I might recall here the initial quotation of my contribution to Creativity and Method, regarding Joyce keeping "the scholars busy for 300 years, so that anyone who has been working on Finnegans Wake for the past 20 years, still has 280 to go. Not every Wake commentator has accepted the full measure of the dedication, apparently, for some have paused for long respite along the way" (Benstock, 237). Lonergan's cultural profoundity, in fact, goes far beyond the great men to which I have compared him. I have taken little respite along the way in reaching for his meaning and "that reaching has changed me profoundly" (Lonergan, 1957b: 748). But unlike Lonergan with Aquinas, I am no first rate mind chasing after another. So perhaps here I may write for lesser minds like my own in an honest biographic sense so that they may be less discouraged by "the murderous grotesque of our time" (Voegelin, 1974b: 251), as it effects the academy, from slowly stumbling round and up the mountain of meaning.

2. For the meaning of "modernity" see the preface and chapter 1 of Searching for Cultural Foundations (McShane, 1984).
I was fortunate to discover both Insight and the Verbum articles in the late fifties. I had just come through four years of mathematics and mathematical physics and still regard it as a major turning point that I learned to read by struggling through such works as Whittaker and Watson, A Course of Modern Analysis. In that particular work the chapters were short, but each ended with a substantial collection of problems. A first reading left one blank before the problems. Only after weeks of laboring through the problems did one arrive at the state that Lonergan describes in another context: "one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning will follow." (1967b: 219). I mention this experience here because I see as central to present confusion in philosophy and theology the problem Lonergan points to in remarking that present culture does not teach people how to read. And of course one may take 'read' in a larger sense: reading houses, attics, nests, and so on, with Bachelard (see 1969: 14, 21, 39, 47, 83); or with Don Quixote and Lonergan, "reading the book of himself" (Joyce, 175).

My first impression of Lonergan's achievement was of a massive paradigm shift, something like a shift from pre-Lavoisier chemistry to the context of the periodic table. This became painfully evident when I began to study theology in 1960 and found not a queen but a confused commonsense eclecticism. The discovery forced me to express my early enthusiasm in such articles as "The Contemporary Thomism of Bernard Lonergan" (McShane, 1962a) "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God" (1962b).

That early enthusiasm and respect has not dwindled but grown over the years. I find, even after almost three decades, that I have only begun to glimpse the remote subtlety of Lonergan's discovery of subject and object, and in this I seem to be at odds with many of his disciples. Yet I am not more than averagely slow-witted. That problem was ever present to me as I edited the Florida conference papers and I expressed it briefly in the preface to volume 2: "And so, while it is true that the verbal expressions of the minds of great men shorten our labours, that like pygmies we stand on their shoulders, there can be an element of illusion regarding just how much shorter our labours are to be, just how authentic we stand" (McShane, 1972: 11).

3. I take the opportunity to note that the first two lines of p. 549 of this article should be omitted.
Here I think it useful to illustrate the problem of reading Lonergan from personal experience. I recall three clear instances. The first instance comes from the book *Insight*. By 1963 I had some suspicion of what the book was initiating but I was acutely aware of being bogged down in chapter 8, which deals with the heuristic notion of the notion of thing. That chapter was my central preoccupation through the winter of 1963-64, and only in the spring was I satisfied that I had the beginning of an appropriation of the spontaneous notion. And certainly my experience leaves me out of sympathy with David Tracy's view on the distinction between 'things' and 'bodies': "The distinction (perhaps his best known one) is easy enough to grasp if the previous chapters have been understood" (Tracy, 121-22).

A second instance regards Lonergan's economics. In the late sixties he sent me the manuscript which had remained in his files since 1944. It was only in the seventies that I came to attempt a serious reading. After five years of persistent re-reading it became clear to me that Lonergan had done for dynamic economics something equivalent to a jump in astronomy from Tycho Brahe to Laplace. The meaning of Lonergan's economics is part of foundational theology. Yet that meaning is quite beyond the present perspective either of political theology or of standard economics. Its discontinuity with thinking in these areas warrants fresh starts free from comparisons either with contemporary faulty revisions in economic theory or with the hazy reflections of political theology in these past decades. One must read Lonergan's political economics over against the actual object—which centrally is subjects—of which he has conceived the normative heuristic.

A third instance of personal difficulty is a present one. I find the eighth functional specialty as elusive in *Method in Theology* as I found the eighth chapter in *Insight* twenty years ago. The following sections represent present gropings. What, for instance, is meant by the brief initial section of chapter 14, the ninety-second of *Method in Theology*, the 199th of *Insight* and *Method* combined, entitled "Meaning and Ontology"? Could it be read profitably under an alternate title such as "passionate subjectivity in the lucid closed options of the

4. The word "notion," which occurs regularly in headings and texts in *Insight*, has layers of meanings, paralleling the variety of ways of being "at home in transcendental method" (Lonergan, 1972: 14).
finality of implementation"? Is it pointing towards what I will conclude to at the end of section III below, the mutual self-mediation of the actual contexts of mindful theology and meaningful history? What I write here will help, I hope, towards a communal search for the meaning of the executive reflection that crowns theology's withdrawal. What I write, then, is not summary but rather tentative pointers, map-readings, suggested directions for climbing.

As I grow older I believe less and less in summary expression, even when one has reached a worthwhile perspective. Too many people seem willing to attempt for Lonergan what Fichte attempted for Kant, or what De Quincey attempted for Ricardo. I have little faith in such attempts, particularly if they have no content driving rhythmically from below upwards towards morning dreams and images. In their clarity they belong largely to undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages of meaning. They had no place in compact consciousness. They will, one hopes, dwindle as we come to the end of the horrors of modernity, the age of garrulousness, during the next millennium.

The fundamental issue is hierarchically-harmonious adult growth, particularly in that displacement towards heuristic system which is the foundational enterprise.

We live between the passionate passivity of the empirical residue and the dynamic passion of infinite Persons. What is primary in history, even without sin, is silent darkness. Even late in life, or in history, there cannot be more than illusory twilight, and the founda-


8. One must sublate, through Lonergan's view on emergent probability, inverse insight and mystery, what Voegelin has to say of history: "history is discovered as the process in which reality becomes luminous for the movement beyond its own structure; the structure of history is eschatological" (Voegelin, 1974a: 304).
tional search is an endless metempirical asking for greater depth in the same questions. It is a struggle against the terror of biography which parallels what Eliade names the terror of history (1955: 139-62).

I have written biographically here, and while the writing may seem mainly descriptive it expresses a fundamental foundational stand. When I was forty-five years old I wrote in agreement with Husserl, without foundational misery, "How I would like to live on the heights. For this is all my thinking craves for. But shall I ever work my way upwards, if only for a little, so that I can gain something of a free distant view? I am now forty-five years old, and I am still a miserable beginner." I would hope, in the future, to remain in agreement with Bachelard: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house" (Bachelard, 61).

Burl Ives, at seventy-four, spoke of his endless struggle against deficiencies in his voice: he was still, at that age, devoting two hours each day to singing scales. The theologian and the philosopher, indeed the academic who would face the challenge of generalized empirical method in history, must endlessly return to the scales in a contemporary context, to the ABC of the reality of the self, the historic world, the Absolute, all revealed only within the self in solitary quest.


11. I think of the triangle ABC of Insight (27, 504), as well as the "Transcendent Triangle" advancing as lover (see note 7 above). There are the scales, too, of poetry, and the risks of integral presence of finitude (see McShane, 1984: 145, n60).
II

My primary intention, in this brief panel presentation, is to give some indication of the complexity of a new systematics of economics as a functional specialty. Secondarily, I wish to indicate the larger significance of the foundational conception of this systematics by relating the heuristic both to the last functional specialty and to the general task of theology. I will pass over Lonergan's contribution to the foundations and systematics of economics, the history of that contribution and its relation to other views: sufficient indications are already available (McShane, 1980: chapters 6-8; 1981: 556-71).

The conventional view of Systematic Theology is the one which contrasts a via systematica with a via analytica, best illustrated perhaps by the Trinitarian theology of Aquinas sublated by Lonergan's treatises of the 1960s. What I am suggesting as a possible third-stage heuristics of a New Systematics comes from Lonergan, but clues to it come from the modern sciences that deal with genetic development—growth of plants and animals, and studies which deal with the dialectic development of humans. Sources in Lonergan for the notion are mainly two: Lonergan’s discussion of systematic understanding in De Intellectu et Methodo, and his own efforts during the past decade culminating in the 1982-83 version of his economics. A useful and available context for theologians is Caput Primum of Lonergan’s Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica (1957a) and its revised version in De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica (1964c).

A brief panel presentation is not the place to try to detail the novel heuristic structure in itself and in its relation to the other functional specialties. I will attempt, rather, to give clues, analogies, and random illustrations that will open the discussion towards later comprehension and functional specialist collaboration.

A first aid to the notion of the new systematics comes from reflection on the heuristics of the study of a growing plant or animal—

Insight's discussion is relevant (Lonergan, 1957b: 444-83). The understanding of such realities involves a seeking of the form of a sequence of integrations of varying lower manifolds. One may next complexify this notion by envisaging human development which adds a dialectic factor. Next, it is perhaps helpful to consider the difference between a reflective diary of such a development and a completed biography which, among many other things may add the tonality of destiny, or "just right" ... making the life "better than it was" (Lonergan, 1972: 251).

Next, a shift from the individual to history, indeed specifically to a fourfold history: the history of economic fact, the history of economic theory (see, for example, Schumpeter), the history of economic policy, and the more-recently-emerged contrafactual economic history (see Pishlow). I would note here that these histories will be slowly and remarkably transposed by "the use of the general categories in all specialties" (Lonergan, 1972: 292), categories which will include the culture-invariant general economic analysis of Lonergan meshed into a heuristics of schemes of recurrence. So, for instance, a restructuring of research by the functional distinctions of the productive process will throw up new patterns of statistics: again, the same distinctions will ground fresh patterns of the rhythms of nineteenth-century British, or twentieth-century Soviet, economics. This shift from individual to history brings us closer to an appreciation of the two struggles of Lonergan: his struggle in De Intellectu et Methodo to link history and systematics in a manner that, so to speak, would carry history forward "with minimal loss," his struggle in this past decade, working with Schumpeter and a few other books, to apparently "supplement, illustrate, etc.," his own basic systematics with insights and even rescued oversights, with the labors of economic innovators and 'oddballs' alike. A key issue here is the task of 'reversing the counter-positions' so as to carry forward into the genetic systematics any understanding possibly contributory to the practical understanding of some economic situation in some culture somewhere.

A secondary and quite different issue is the extent to which Lonergan's recent work was dominated by a praxis heuristics of such a genetic systematics. Certainly, he sought such a notion in the late fifties; also, early in his 1982-83 manuscript he takes a stand with Schumpeter: "Scientific analysis is not simply a logically consistent
process that starts with some primitive notions and then adds to the stock in a straight-line fashion ... Rather it is an incessant struggle with creations of our own and our predecessors' minds" (Schumpeter, 4). At least one can say that, just as in Insight Lonergan was doing generalized empirical method not in the way he defined that method in Insight (1957b: 72) but in the way he later defined it (see McShane, 1981: 545-56), so in recent years he operated spontaneously towards the transposition of the content of a complex systematics in a way that brings together his pre-functional specialty reflections on systematics and the differentiation of his consciousness into functional specialist operations. Finally, I would suggest that a closer reading of the chapters on the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh specialties in Method in Theology—from the perspective, one might say, of the general categories of pages 286-87—would reveal a drive of the "universal viewpoint" (see 1957b: 564ff and 1972: 153) towards the present view of systematics.

Let us return to a final clue to the nature of the new systematics, reached by relating it to the eighth specialty which I here presume to call Executive Reflection. For simplicity, consider the new systematics to yield a related genetic sequence of empirically-grounded understandings simply symbolized by $S(U_{i,j})$. The subscripts $i$ and $j$ indicate the looseness of relation: unlike the connectivity of the sequence of 'form and matter' in a plant, the 'form' of an economic theory or policy of one time or place may have its 'proper matter' at another time elsewhere. Executive reflection mediates between this complex ever-growing systematics and the varieties of disciplines, cultures, and media of present and later times and places (see Lonergan, 1972: 132f and McShane, 1984). Clues to the particular praxis-relevance of $U_p$ can come from the $i$ or the $j$ or the position in the sequence: one might reflect on the Rostow school on 'take-offs' for illustrations. So, French agriculture-based theory-policy of an earlier century, transposed by general functional economic categories, might be found relevant to a culture-sensitive economic transformation of a twenty-first century Indian province.

Theologians may note the manner in which, in their own field, such a "transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing, dynamic process" (Lonergan, 1972: 304) would meet the challenge of providing "an understanding of the realities affirmed by doctrines (349),
of being "at home in modern sciences, modern scholarship, and modern philosophy" (350), and of providing a systematic objectification of religious interiority that is "historical, phenomenological, psychological, sociological" (290), thus becoming adequate to the threefold task of communications. The pressure for such a demanding enlargement of systematic theology will come from the cultural matrix: so, to take an example other than economics, a systematics of anxiety is called for in present psychology, that, contextualized by the transcultural base of general categories, would bring into illuminating genetic coherence such apparently unrelated searchings as the description of anxietas in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and the definition of anxiety in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Horney, 1937).

Returning to economics, I would note that Lonergan's contribution of an invariant component to economic dynamics, within its context of general and special categories, is profoundly discontinuous with present economics and present methodologies and philosophies of economics. Moreover, as Alfred Eichner points out, present economics departments mainly represent not a science but a social system (Eichner, 1982; see also Rosenberg). Eichner, himself, represents a minority group with a different but still deeply limited perspective (see Eichner, 1979).

A useful strategy in coming to some appreciation of the discontinuity of Lonergan's view with present work is to venture into the history of theories of distribution. Maurice Dobb's Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith (Dobb, 1973) is a convenient initial text. Theories of distribution, right down to current debate, are bogged down in the príora quoad illos vel hos (Lonergan, 1964c: 44ff) of varieties of prices, and succeed only in generating incoherencies regularly regarding immeasurables (Dobb, 1973: 247ff). Lonergan, in contrast, through a long struggle witnessed to by discarded manuscripts of the thirties, succeeded in thoroughly removing prices, and so on, from the príora quoad se through a theory of distribution and redistribution

13. See, for example, Fred Lawrence on Christian success in "The Human Good and Christian Conversation" (Lawrence, 1984).

which compares to current theory as does question 27 of the *Summa Theologicae* to Tertullian's Trinity. It is a startling illustration of what Lonergan calls "the displacement towards system" (1964b: 10, n10). It leaves Lonergan's meaning of prices, profits, and so on incomparable with current confused meanings.

There are, however, some, of more open perspective, that are not mainstream economists. So, for example, Jane Jacobs, in her new book, insightfully pinpoints the positively significant features of intercity economic activity and the varieties of transactions of decline—military production, welfare programs, transplant investment, advanced-backward trade, VAT ... —in a manner that solidly contributes to a new systematics. She recognizes "patterns in economic history as so repetitious as to suggest that they are almost laws" (Jacobs, 1984: 206). What she puts forward as a "radical intervention or discontinuity other than transactions of decline" (214) is a relevant dismantling of sovereignty and empire (see McShane, 1980: 196). She considers this only as a "theoretic possibility" (Jacobs, 1984: 214). However, if her reflections are sublated into the actual context of functional distinctions in economics (McShane, 1981: 556-71), microautonomy and lucidity of characters of intentionality (McShane, 1978: 53, 93; Rosenberg, 1983), then her theoretic possibility falls within the schedules of probability to be envisaged by the normative science, however inoperative (Lonergan, 1957b: 223) it may be in the present slums of mind (1972: 39f, 99).

Again, J. J. van Duijn's *The Long Wave in Economic Life* points to a large-scale genetic systematics of the life cycles of innovation and infrastructural investment beyond politics: "policy makers are oriented toward directly-observable short-term fluctuations" (1983: 14). But what he remarks of other approaches (28) is true of his own: there is a tendency in him to lump together varieties of industries, remediable only by precisely and spontaneously operative functional distinctions.15 Like the biologist at the zoo (Lonergan, 1972: 83), the economist must "see another manner" in which goods and money flow.

Causing in the economic community the horizon-shift necessary to see thus in another manner is the massive task of education of which

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Lonergan has written: "coming to grasp what serious education realizes, and, nonetheless, coming to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest challenge to the modern economy." The genuinely contemporary theologian has the uncomfortable task of becoming educated in the relevant invariant macrodynamic heuristic if he or she, in any functional specialty (1972: 292), is to contribute to the mediation of that transposition of economic culture. He and she "have to take a professional interest in the human sciences and make a positive contribution to their methodology" (1957b: 743).

III

For further clues regarding the structure of the enterprise of systematics and communications we turn to the foundations specified by Insight and Method in Theology. It is perhaps necessary to draw attention to the fact that these writings are substantially Lonergan's contribution to the fifth functional specialty, to which may be added certain sections of his Latin works. So, in Insight, there is a drive towards what are later called categories, and while the book was written prior to the differentiation of consciousness which is functional specialization it both provided Lonergan with data of consciousness for that distinction, and is transposable without major change into the oratio recta of the fifth specialty. The changes are minor: so, for example, clarifications by contrast reach a new precision through the operation of counterposition-reversal, implementation as a character of metaphysics becomes distributed over different specialties, and chapter 17 in particular calls for refinements and enlargements in ways that we will touch on presently.

I vividly recall Lonergan expressing a certain frustration, in the mid-sixties, regarding the beginning of Method in Theology: what was he to do? He couldn't repeat all of Insight in the first chapter. As

16. Lonergan, unpublished manuscript of the late 1970s.

17. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Nicholas Graham of Toronto, who provided me with his texts of Lonergan's lectures of the past decade, kept me informed on current literature, and put me in touch with Jane Jacobs while she was completing her recent book.
an examination of Method shows, what he eventually did was to build the achievement Insight into the task of Method in a uncomfortably unsubtle fashion. This is perhaps best noted through a careful reading of his sketch of the general categories on pages 286-88. So, one may note a complexification of the basic heuristic resulting from an enlargement of the contribution of chapter 6 of Insight under (2), while (1) and (3) place chapter 1 of Method in that larger context; (4) and (5) point to an inclusion of the heuristics of chapters 2 and 3 of Method: (6) through (9) add the massive post-modern perspective of Insight to the foreground of Method. And at this stage one is normatively in a position to provide "a developed account of" chapters 2 to 4 of Method. What is this developed account? It is the account that, for example, transposes the heuristic diagram of page 48 of Method into a properly explanatory heuristic, so that the theologian be no longer "arriving on the scene a little breathlessly and a little late" (Lonergan, 1957b: 733), in present times. Two examples may help. One may consider foundationally, in the context of the eighteen terms, the good of order. Since "what is good, always is concrete" (1972 27), that good has the complexity of an economic order. Again, one may consider, in a theology of hope, the capacity and need for hope. But what does one mean by 'hope'? As there is a physics, chemistry, and biology of aggression, powerfully pushed towards explanation and implementation by the needs of war, so there is an explanatory perspective on hope. Can the theologian rest content with a vague descriptive specification either of the economy or of hope?

The description of the general categories moves on to note the possible models of change, drawing extensively on Insight to lead the reader to the challenge of reaching towards a universal viewpoint. Here I recall an early point, that Method in its entirety is foundational. So, the fundamental models of change remain to be more fully determined by the discussions of contexts that occur further on, especially in chapter 12.

One senses, then, a powerful heuristic basis, "a central nucleus that somehow could retain its identity yet undergo all the modifications and enrichments that could be poured into its capacious frame from specialized investigations" (Lonergan, 1985a: 6), normative of the actual context of future theological enquiry, grounding a genetico-
dialectic collaboration within each specialty and between specialties much as the periodic table grounds chemists' painstaking collaboration or an adequate evolutionary hypothesis would unify detailed biological enquiry.

"Changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs of human history" (Lonergan, 1967a: 256), and this generalized data-based vortex control of mediating meaning opens towards an encirclement and confinement (1957b: 484, 521f, 570f) in the finality of being that goes beyond the optimism of Insight to a patient reverence for large numbers and long intervals of time. So, the universal viewpoint is to be reached slowly by the larger community of second-, third-, and fourth-rate minds by a liberating entrapment in the cycles of functional specialization, and general categories can emerge in the minds of regular theologians not by reading Method but by the manifestation of the need for the use of such categories in all specialties (1972: 350f). Thus, instead of present attempts to "apply functional specialization" that are analogous to phlogiston enthusiasts dividing the periodic table in eight after Mendeleev, there will emerge the elite homeliness (1972: 14, 350f) of small controlled contributions to a respected science of theology.

In chapter 17 of Insight Lonergan remarks: "one may grant readily enough that meanings form a genetically and dialectically related sequence of unknowns and that expressions develop from the undifferentiated to the specialized. The two basic assertions are sound but where do they lead? Though the actual implementation of a method cannot be tucked into the corner of a chapter on a more general topic, still some sketch seems desirable" (1957b: 579).

The structure of an implementation based on a transposition of that sketch and the related canons, into functional specialization, certainly cannot be tucked into a short article. It seems important, however, to share clues that may carry forward Lonergan's foundational enterprise.

I have already spoken of Lonergan's struggle in the sixties, and I would add here three further points preliminary to touching on aspects of the required transposition.

First I would note the relevance of Lonergan's Latin works for an initial reaching towards components of the sixth and seventh functional
specialty. Secondly, there are not only sets of unpublished lectures on method such as those referred to in section II above, but also a substantial collection of handwritten notes of the period which remain to be investigated. Thirdly, there are sets of texts of Method both from Lonergan's summer courses through the sixties and from his attempts to bring the book to completion. Of these texts, including Method itself, I would note first that the full richness of his unpublished searchings and contributions within his Latin treatises did not find their way into them; secondly, that the last two specialties in particular suffer from late condensed expression. 18

So, from struggling with unpublished handwritten notes, I have been led to a notion of the eight specialties as a staircase climb of increasingly enriched contexts and to a conviction that I, and perhaps others, was misled by a more familiar image of oratio recta as a descent from Foundations. In these notes one finds such remarks as "synthesis is a doctrine about history" in relation to doctrinal theology, and in relation to systematic theology, "synthesis is a theory of history." 19

One gets a sense of the reach towards an adequate basis of pastoral theology from notes like the following: "understanding yields, not just one set of concepts, relations, but any variation for any purpose"; "... theology 1) not a Platonic Idea 2) but the many species (not individuals, except as types, as dominating personalities) 3) in a genetically and dialectically differentiated genus."

The increasing complexity parallels, I suspect, that required for economic executive reflection that I noted in section II.

Lonergan's summary indication of general categories ends with the statement, "the problems of interpretation bring to light the notion of a potential universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression" (1957b: 288). One reaches basic clues to the use of this component of general categories in the last three functional

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18. I am indebted here to work done by Nicholas Graham on the evolution of Method in Theology through various manuscripts and institutes.

19. The quotations in this paragraph are from unpublished handwritten notes of Lonergan from the early sixties, Batch B, 8, 6, V. The notes were given by Lonergan to Frederick Crowe in June 1972, and catalogued by McShane. They remain in the Toronto Lonergan Center, as yet not publicly available.
specialties by bringing together, in a larger personal actual context, Insight's discussion of pure formulations and Method's later indications of contexts: ongoing, prior, subsequent, derivative, interacting, and so on.

The brief treatment of pure formulations, and related hypothetical expressions, emerges from the posing of a problem of interpretation that transposes partly into problems of oratio obliqua but primarily into problems relating directly to Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications. 20 The transposition of pure formulation would seem to lie within a theory of history, grounded fully in the explanatory context of emergent probability, 21 in mutual self-mediation both with Doctrines and Communications. 22 There are the actual expressions, high points of doctrinal development, that mediate the systematic quest. But there is also the genesis of hypothetical expressions within a systematic reach that home in, through probabilities and possibilities, on actual expressions in Doctrines. Further, there is the genetic relation of Systematics to Communications in a reach for hypothetical expression that could become relevantly actual, in tune with the expression of the finality of being in particular cultures. Finally, the collaborative operation of the mutual self-mediation of theologians of oratio recta has a set of normative controls briefly indicated by Lonergan in the sketch of interpretation and in the related canons. To the powerful threefold controls indicated in the sketch (1957b: 580f) there are added the demands of the canons for a withdrawal in systematics from description into differentiations of the protean notion of being and for the operation of four principles of criticism that would shift positively the statistics of the ongoing process of listening and speaking of theologians. Systematics becomes transcultural, even if still perspectival, 23

20. The reference is to Insight, 580, but one should add the context of Insight, 738-42.


22. On mutual self-mediation, see Lonergan, 1984: 12-14. I am indebted throughout this section to discussions with Sinead Breathnach, who is writing a thesis on "Communication and Communications" at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.

looking back to the Hebrew/Christian expression and meaning in its world context, looking back and forward to the benign communication of the saving message to all people of all times.  \(^{24}\)

In the final section, some indications will be given of natural analogies for this quest from such fields as biology and medicine. It is useful to conclude the present section, however, with familiar illustrations.

Consider the first five theses of Lonergan's De Verbo Incarnato (1961). \(^{25}\) A close analysis of these theses would yield illuminating contributions to the specialties of oratio recta. So, for example, the discussion of schemata in thesis one not only relates back to New Testament interpretation but relates forward through the analytik \(^{26}\) of immanent sources of meaning (1957b: 580) to pastorally relevant differentiations under the canon of relevance (587). Again, reflections on deviant viewpoints have the colour of counterposition-reversal: thus, attention is drawn not just to the error but to the significance of Apollinaris (1961: 109f). But, above all, there is a recurrent reaching for pure formulations not just for themselves but for controlled mutual self-mediation of doctrines and systematics: "ex reali difficilate ad difficultatem terminologicam fere a priori concluditur" (108), and indeed vice versa.

Right through these theses there is a the general categorial use of "the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a meta-

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24. One aspect of this, with emphasis on China, is treated in my "Middle Kingdom, Middle Man" (McShane, 1984: 1-43).

25. References will be to the 1961 edition (Rome: Gregorian University Press) which differs substantially from the 1964 edition only in later pages, due to changes in the thesis on the knowledge of Christ. The 1960 edition has differences in pagination due to changes of print size.

26. The proposed title of chapter one of the book referred to earlier (McShane, 1989) was "Procedural Analytiks," an attempt to twist words towards subjects in line with Method in Theology, 88, n34: "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feed-back, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective." An Analytik is a person just as an Actual Context is a person or group of persons. But one must, in fact, envisage a much more radical linguistic shift in the third stage of meaning.
physics" (1972: 287), qualified by a perspective on mystery, on contingent truths about God (see 1964a: 49-53), on the non-reductibility to the metaphysical elements of the reality of such truths (1957b: 734). As Lonergan pointed out in his reply to the second Florida volume, he can take his stand on such metaphysics (in McShane, 1972: 310-312). What was needed was the enterprize of Insight to ground it adequately, to sublate and extend it. The following five theses of De Verbo Incarnato move vigorously and comfortably in that actual context. Only then do issues of subjectivity emerge. There is a strategy here worth noting. I see no point in discussing God with Anthony Flew if he doesn't know what a dog is; I see little value in discussions about subjects with theologians like Schoonenberg (Lonergan, 1985b: 74-95) and Hamilton (Crowe, 1968) if they do not know what objects are.

My main wish here, however, was to draw attention to Lonergan's Latin works for light on oratio recta. I chose to emphasize De Verbo Incarnato over the more complex De Deo Trino because it more evidently leans on pure formulations within proportionate metaphysics, such as minor real distinctions that are culturally invariant in humans (Lonergan, 1957b: 490), that fruitfully illumine mysteries of an incarnate divinity, that provide a bridge to expressions of those mysteries suited to persons for whom Greek expressions of minimal systematic religious meaning may sound like alien profundities.

The bridge slowly to be provided is part of a complex network of salvific mediations finalized in a gentle providence (1957b: 665). Within that network it will invite, cajole, the monocultural mind, locked in some translation of Greek expressions and Hebrew morality, to a larger patience and tolerance. One may recall at this stage Lonerg-

27. See Lonergan, 1964a, thesis 5, particularly 274; see also Method in Theology, index under "Mystery."


29. For a complementing component see McShane, 1976, where Whitson's The Coming Convergence of World Religions (New York: Newman Press, 1971) is linked with the progress of science.

30. The cajoling of Insight (1957b: 398) is transposed by the slow rounding of the vortex of Method in Theology.
gan's comments on the Kimbanguist Church (1985b: 69f, 73) and perhaps find here a fuller context for those comments.

There are some six thousand independent African Christian churches (Barrett, 1968), not all, indeed, of the high religious tone of "The Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu." How is one to envisage the dynamic of their origin and growth through the mediation of functional specialization?

The integral pure formulation, a psychological presence of a contemporarily full theory of history, is crowned by the reach of Communications for historico-geographic sets of hypothetical expressions. The specialists in Communications must envisage, through the complex genetic perspective of the fuller actual context of systematics mediated by scholarly sensitivity to local cultures, the dynamics of nations, tribes, villages, to move towards reflective conditions of the cultivation of a symbiosis of faith and locally-grounded actual, probable, possible expressions.

One may view the crowning task of functional specialization in terms of a full notion of actual contexts.

There is the actual context that is the community of subjects having questions and answers within functional specialization, the community of those who have suffered "displacement towards system" (Lonergan, 1964b: 10, n10) for the sake of the salvation of history. Then there are the actual contexts that are the communities (1972: 78-81) of the globe in the actuality of their strange symbiotic quests. These

31. The basic text here is Method in Theology (1972: 177). For a fuller perspective see McShane, 1984: 147, n85.

32. Expressions are not limited to linguistic expressions. See Method in Theology, index under "Expression."

33. One must keep sensitive to quests in spatio-temporary discontinuity that are still symbiotic. "More than ever before, the present-day religions of Africa are an exercise in cultural encounter and mutual influence. In this regard, many scholars simply gloss the similarities in contemporary Afro-American and African religions. These similarities do not develop from a unidirectional cultural diffusion. Instead, similar processes of cultural change and contact within the respective societies have taken place simultaneously, and the influence of New World black churches on the new African religions is also felt. The parallel expressive forms in music, dance, and oratory represent creative combinations of indigenous cultural patterns with external media for representing them" (Jules-
latter contexts are overlapping, derivative, prior, and so on: one may think concretely of the role of Irish and English Jesuit communities in the Christianization of the complex set of communities of the two Rhodesias, remembering always that the eighth functional specialty involves a transposition of history carrying forward error, and indeed malice, salvifically (1972: 251; 1961: theses 15-17).

One can thus come to see the crowning task of theology as the mutual self-mediation of actual theological contexts and actual cultural contexts. So, we arrive, like Finnegans Wake, "by a commodius vicus of recirculation," back at the first sentence of Method in Theology: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."

The task envisaged is far from present possibilities: theologians scarcely glimpse, much less share, the actual context of the general categories; studies of religion are solidly truncated and regularly abstractive; actual evangelization remains substantially in the mode and haste of classical culture.

No doubt evangelization has come some distance from the arrogant colonialism recounted and expressed by Sir Harry Johnston, who concluded his classic history with the forecast that "the eventual outcome of the colonization of Africa by alien peoples will be a compromise—a dark-skinned race with a white man's features and a white man's brain."

But essays such as "The Resistance of the Nyaus Societies to the Roman Catholic Missions in Colonial Malawi" (Schoffeleers and Linden, 1972) bear witness to a continuity of mentality through this century.

Rosetta, 221-22). So, for example, in the case of Rhodesia mentioned in the text, two Irish Jesuits in the mid-century worked on the potential of African rhythms, but they, in fact, belonged to a wider musical context.

34. Recall, Method in Theology (1972: 48), and note the relation of our discussion to the "grasp of virtual resources" (362ff) of which Lonergan writes.


36. The first Roman Catholic black bishop, in the sixteenth century, was educated at Lisbon and Rome. The first Protestant black bishop, in
So, "the struggle at village level to maintain a socio-cultural identity against pressures from planter, administration and mission" (Schoffeleers and Linden, 252) continues. An evangelization mediated by a third-stage meaning scholarly differentiation of consciousness, "a sympathetic openness to the village strangeness of a universe of differentiated persons" (McShane, 1984: vi), sharing God's patience with history, remains remote.

Again, modern studies in the sociology and the history of religions are increasingly empirical and complex. But they have no basis in generalized empirical method. They may claim freedom from paradigm: "while there is no unified theoretical paradigm imposed upon each of these essays, they all employ original field research and a data-driven model for the development of theories of symbolism and collective behaviour" (Jules-Rosetta, 1). Yet throughout there is a massive, blind commitment to the paradigm of truncation. Furthermore, elements of the cultural matrix that are symbiotic with religious tradition and expression can be regularly bypassed. So, the editors of a book related to the Dar es Salaam conference of 1970 concede in their introduction that "[t]he Dar es Salaam Conference on the historical study of African religion was consciously taking part in an artificial, even a distorting enterprise. It separated the topic of African religion from the topics of African politics, economics and social institutions. And it separated the topic of African 'traditional' religion from those of African Islam and Christianity" (Ranger and Kimambo, 1). What is not only absent in the body of modern studies, but systematically excluded, is the open metaphysics of the actual context, deeply grounded in a subjectivity isomorphic with history and Mystery.

Finally, that actual context in its functional specialist perspective is not remotely constitutive of any present theological community. What, then, are the probabilities and possibilities of adequate theology in the twenty-first century?

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the nineteenth century, Samuel Crowther, "was an Egba slave-boy from Lagos, who by education acquired the intellect and outlook of a European" (Johnston, 243). Rome and cricket still remain significant.
This final short section parallels the first section in pointing up the need to overcome terror, or the inner monster,37 and where the first section focused on odyssey as against ontogenetic immaturity, this last touches on Iliad as against phylogenetic immaturity. The issue is a terror of history excluding a procedural revelation of finitude's evolution in triple darkness.

It seems that theology has something to learn from the analogy of nature that is the emergence, development and growing humility of natural science. The optimism of the nineteenth century is gone.38 Physics, dealing with a cluster of curiously named particles, is in its search for coherence, subtly trapped by a Euclidean imagination. Chemistry, despite Mendeleev and the emergence of quantum chemistry, still lacks a clear identity.39 The genetic and evolutionary sciences, to which we will return presently, are bogged down in a reductionist lack of aggreformic perspective yielding to the demands of their empirical object.

But yield they will under the pedagogic dynamics of history, with the slowness that is the character of history.

This is no place to attempt a procedural analysis of the history of sciences. What I wish to do is to focus briefly on one key and illuminating instance of the struggle of science, the area of the middle sciences that can be brought into isomorphism with Lonergan's analysis of genetic method.

The reason for this focus is perhaps already obvious. Attention was drawn at the beginning of section II to genetic method as a basic natural procedural analogue in searching for the methodology of an adequate systematic theology, and section III moved towards the notion that

37. "If a man is a hero, he is a hero because, in the first reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it not once but many times" (Jung, 173). There is a need for a heuristic transposition of metaphorical talk of terror and monsters into an explanatory perspective on adult repentance.

38. Science is not, of course, "pure knowledge"; nor is it only in supporting war that "scientists have known sin" (Oppenheimer, 88).

what the theological community must reach for in Communications is the integrated proximate grounds of the mediation of "the cumulative, historical process of development in a multiplicity and succession of individuals" (Lonergan, 1957b: 741), that successive multiplicity being normatively conceived explanatorily: "while common sense relates things to us, our account of common sense relates it to its neural basis and relates aggregates and successions of instances of common sense to one another" (244).

A central communal unknown of the total heuristic is clearly the meaning of development both in relation to a historic totality and to individual plants, animals, men. That development is thus an unknown may be glimpsed by reflecting on the section of *Insight* which starts with the words "study of an organism begins from the thing-for-us" (464). The organism is evidently developmental, and its study is presently trapped in various ways at this beginning. Newman's "common-sense contributions" (1972: 261) include a notion of development that is also opaquey present in the mind of the modern botanist or zoologist, and the situation is honestly summed up in the words of the biologist Paul Weiss: "Does not everybody have some notion of what development implies? Undoubtedly most of us have. But when it comes to formulating these notions they usually turn out to be vague" (Weiss, 1).

Moreover, this vague spontaneous notion is ground into irrelevance by a present reductionist culture in the middle sciences. This is massively evidenced, for instance, by the volumes of the Society for Developmental Biology, where the predominant tone through thirty years of work is that of a cybernetic mythmaking regarding information storage and sharing in and between molecules, cells, stages, and so on. Furthermore, this cybernetic tone regularly warps the reductionism into a microvitalism: truncated subjects are just as likely to overrate the cognitive performance of macromolecules as they are to exaggerate the intelligence embedded in a microchip. But what is fundamentally excluded is that transposition of Aristotle's view of potency to be found both in Lonergan's heuristics of finality and development (Lonergan, 1957b: 444ff) and in the objective correlative, the organism.

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40. There are twenty-five volumes and several supplements running through the years 1939-1968, brought out by the Society for Developmental Biology as the fruit of twenty-seven symposia, published under the general title *Developmental Biology*. 
Nor are there saving features in the broader ecological context of such studies. Whether one looks to studies internal to the field, or to broader works such as those originating from Bertalanffy (1968, 1973), one finds no grounding perspective for a coherent theory of the hierarchic structure of the object of the middle sciences that would contextualize developmental studies. "Whereas the inverse problem of analytic resolution of a system into subsystems is readily treated by such top-down approaches as deduction, and single level systems are amenable through induction or statistical procedures, there is no corresponding technique for vertical bottom-up organization. This lacuna is a task for a new epistemology" (Wilson, 125f). Lonergan's filling of the lacuna through aggreformic third-stage comprehension of the world of science, available for more than forty years, has had no impact on twentieth century science.

Now such a situation in that part of the Cosmic Word which is man's understanding of the genetic realities of the middle sciences is itself a revelation to the theologian.

In its broadest sense, the situation is continuous with, and contributory to, the complex providential warping of the fundamental questing that is human subjectivity. Meshing with the massive folly and malice of the drive of modernity towards empire and state, which blossoms in the neurotic control structures of modern government and business, is a pseudo-theoretic of microcontrol which seeds patterns of experimentation and implementation, of mindset and lifestyle, of research and relaxation, of farming and foodprocessing, that cuts man out of the genetic throbbing of history.

41. Such features are treated in McShane, 1971. On botany and zoology, see, respectively chapters 1 and 3 of McShane, 1976.

42. A recent effort is Allen and Starr, 1982. The book is of value, not for any positive advance, but for its explicitness regarding epistemological confusion (see 5-11; 37-46; 129-31), and in bringing the reader into the middle of the erudite muddle.

43. Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," Theological Studies 4 (1943): 477-510; reprinted in Lonergan, 1967a: 16-53. While Insight greatly enriches the perspective, both emergent probability and the underpinning aggreformism are already there: "A concrete plurality of lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form is educed or into which a subsistent form is infused" (1967: 20).
Generically, what is revealed is a phylogenetic immaturity of such pre-adolescent proportions that I am tempted to characterize modernity in its full sense as the Age of the Tadpole.

Present theology is part of this age. If the dreams of children can be warped by a brutalized culture (see Schachtel, 1947), the visions of theologians cannot be considered secure. Certainly, there is nothing mature about present erroneous and monocultural papal pronouncements on sexuality, no more than there is anything mature about present preaching of the Christian Trinity. Perhaps, as Joan Robinson said with regard to economics, "[i]t is time to go back to the beginning and start again" (Robinson and Eatwell, 51).

That beginning, I am convinced, lies in the discovery and expression by Lonergan of the eightfold empirical way, in so far as that discovery is operatively accepted in some suspicion of the lack of three basic differentiations in the theological community, all three being "quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval Europe" (Lonergan, 1972: 317). Nineteenth-century theologians may be partly forgiven for not noticing that the self-energy of God is more complex than the self-energy of the electron, that the development of daisies is simpler than the development of doctrines. Present times relentlessly reveal the density of the forms of electrons and daisies: do they not also reveal the remoteness of adequate theological meaning?

To the negative side, then, of present science's struggle with such realities as plant and animal growth, one must add a positive side. Whatever the muddles regarding the objects of inquiry, subjects in science are forced to humble, open particularity in their searchings. When one asks in that context, 'What is development?' one must answer in terms of this or that particular development. One struggles as best one can, in the absence of an adequate biological context, towards a verifiable perspective on such realities as "Nuclear and Cytoplasmic Control of Morphology in Neurospora," "Development and Control Processes in the

44. A main issue, of course, is that raised by the encyclical Humanae Vitae. Very simply, "the ordination of intercourse to conception is not a natural law" (Lonergan, 1967: 47, n79).

Basal Bodies and Flagella of Chlamydomonas reinhardtii. 46 So, in functional specialist theology, totalitarianism has to yield to a particular empiricism that still strives to remain open to the heuristics of subject and object. "What formerly was supposed to lie within the competence of a single dogmatic theologian, now can be undertaken only by a very large team" (1972: 315). The systematic theologian would aim, not at a total organism, but at the genesis of some relevant cell. And, as Galileo's seeding of empirical method brings forth in this century a shaky sappling, so generalized empirical method is now an acorn in search of air.

A more basic positive aspect of the evolution of science is that associated with the first Vatican council's pointing to the significance of analogies of nature (DS 3016), and indeed with Aquinas's frequent use of the word "sic ut." That aspect is laced through the present paper, but I would make two brief final points.

First, if it is to be an analogy relevant to an explanatory systematics, then it must be cast within an explanatory heuristic. So, one may draw analogies from studies of the foetal and infant eye, and from study of such studies, to further one's understanding of development of dogma, genetic systematics, growth-communications. But such analogies must sublate contemporary studies of the stages of normal and abnormal foetal and infant eye development so that, for example, strabismus is not just a described squint but a heuristically contextualized abnormality related both to the present lower molecularity of chromosome and muscle and to later higher patterns of the flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence of adult life. From such a perspective one can view specializations with regard to the developing eye in a manner that throws light from the middle sciences on the last three functional specialties. A developing eye can be studied to discover just what is there, in a manner that is not unrelated to finding "the meaning of the dogma in the context in which it was defined" (Lonergan, 1972: 325). The growing eye can be viewed from the fullest contemporary explanatory

46. Both these papers are in Developmental Biology 26 (1967). The first is the work of E. L. Tatum and D. J. L. Luck; the second involved a team: Sir John Randall, R. Cavalier-Smith, Anne McVittie, J. R. Warr, and J. M. Hopkins.
perspective to arrive at a transcultural understanding of its place in the actual, probable, possible schemes of biography and history. The (abnormally) growing eye can be envisaged in the cultural context of parents and kin in a sensitive therapeutic fashion: an envisagement analogous to that of Communications. Finally, I would note that this searching for the fullness of natural analogies not only is an internal fidelity in theology but also leads to the real possibility of cultivating in scientists "the high office of the scientific spirit" (1957b: 746).

Secondly, I would note that the analogies centrally relevant in the third stage of meaning are the procedural or methodological analogies, analogies that focus on the evolution of mind. Nor should this be surprising. The whole drive of Insight and Method is towards procedural lucidity, and this would seem to dovetail with a fundamental orientation of history to reveal, not content, but process.

In conclusion, I would note that an evident, highly visible, aspect of modern science is its tradition of journals and conferences remote from public discourse. A visit to a zoological library with adequate journal holdings would, I suspect, be a sobering experience for a theologian with the standard literary education. He or she is faced with a massive array of incomprehensible specialized efforts. In contrast, many theological journals offer general eclectic sweeps, regularly eminently readable for the wrong reasons. Again, one may contrast conferences of chemists—indeed, they are usually already specialists within the science—with conferences of theologians. Whatever the deficiencies of present chemical perspective, participants are expected to be comfortable in a contemporary actual context of Mendeleev's advance.

What will the actual context of theologians be, in a hundred years or so?

47. The genesis of an adequate actual context requires massive changes in the schemes of recurrence of present education. One may think, for instance, of the non-overlapping contexts of, on the one hand, a literate theological community talking vaguely of alienation, and, on the other, a business community hastening down blind alleys of high technology.
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A PSEUDO-PROBLEM
OF COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING

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Calgary University

Talk about 'pseudo-problems' is apt to be redolent of analytical philosophy at its worst—where the problem of the relation of the mind and body, say, or of the freedom of the will, or of the existence of God, is treated as simply a product of muddled speech or thinking. But I think there is a pseudo-problem of communication and understanding, which has to be coped with before the real problems can be profitably approached.

The basic puzzle about communication and understanding between persons is that the noises and gestures which, in the unlovely lingo of the behavioristic psychologists, we 'emit,' are one thing, the meaning which we convey by them somehow another. While I perceive the noises and the gestures of another in some direct way, I do not, at least in any equally direct way, perceive the meanings which she intends by them. One way of sweeping the problems aside is to say that all that is really there is gestures and noises, and the brain-states which cause them—thus the solution to the problem of the 'meaning' supposed to be somehow over and above or beyond these is simply that it does not exist. Such is the solution or pseudo-solution of behaviorism to this problem. On a practical level, whether one is a behaviorist or not, the problems are certainly very formidable. Mutual misunderstanding and advanced technology between them may put an abrupt end to the human race at any moment, after all. One is most preoccupied with communication and understanding when there is failure to communicate and understand, just as one thinks of justice most in connection with situations of injustice. Such lack of communication is notoriously rife even between persons who have known one another well for decades, like wives and husbands, or parents and grown-up children. And the problem of under
standing those who are far removed from us in time, space, language or culture is indefinitely greater.

So clearly I do not mean to imply that the practical problems of communication and understanding are easy, or that they can be removed by a little conceptual analysis; but I am going to argue that the theoretical questions as to their nature and possibility are not so much difficult in themselves as dogged by erroneous assumptions. The crucial wrong assumption, I believe, is that the problem of grasping meaning in data is unique—or rather, that it has uniqueness of one kind rather than another. The fact is that there are other things than meanings which exist somehow beyond or behind empirical data through which we somehow get at them or fail to do so. Two examples spring to mind: the theoretical entities of physics, and the things and events of the past. It is an instructive fact that there has been an influential movement in the theory of science which deals with, or perhaps rather refuses to deal with, the problem as it applies to physics, just as behaviorism deals with or fails to deal with the problem as it applies to psychology—'operationism.' We can no more perceive positrons than we can perceive meanings; it is concluded that neither are real, but are convenient conceptual devices for coping with things and events and people which are observable. To apply the principle consistently, you have to apply it to the events of the past—and here, surely, it does reach its reductio ad absurdum. A system of thought must indeed be determined and sure of its ground if it is content to construe George Washington or William Penn as merely convenient devices for anticipating marks on paper or noises emitted by American historians. But if in the case of history we are ready to admit that there are things and events which are to be known through the scrutiny of observable data, but which transcend these data, why should we not do so in the case both of physics and of psychology?

I have tried briefly to exhibit the problem of communication and understanding as of a piece with other problems, which have in common

1. "For my own part, I do not find anything excessively paradoxical in the view that propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those 'historical' experiences which are commonly said to verify them" (Ayer, 1958). I am inclined to wonder, if that is not paradoxical, what is?
with it that what can (at least at first sight) be known somehow lies
beyond or over and above what is (at least in any useful sense) per-
ceived or to be perceived. A follower of Lonergan has, of course, a
very simple and (in my view) entirely convincing solution to this
general problem. Behaviorism and operationism are merely logical con-
sequences of an erroneous theory of knowledge which identifies with
knowledge the perception which forms only the basis for it; assuming
that 'what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is' (Loner-
 gan, 1957: 416). There are two other components, understanding and
judgment, such that we know the real world in judgments based on under-
standing of experience; when these components are identified, and the
consequences of their identification followed through, behaviorism and
operationism emerge clearly as the errors that they are.

It is perhaps worth rehearsing at this point, in order to give
greater clarity to what follows, the correct theory of knowledge, as
conceived by those who follow Lonergan; and applying it to the other
types of example, and finally to interpretation. The real world is not
the perceived or even the to-be-perceived; it is the to-be-known as a
result of putting two kinds of questions to experience. The first kind
of question asks 'What?' or 'Why?' in relation to experience; the second
asks, in reference to the answer to the 'What?' or 'Why?', 'Does this
exist?' or 'Is that so?' Answers to questions of the first kind
propound hypotheses and envisage possibilities; answers to those of the
second kind affirm or deny that the hypothesis is correct, the possi-
bility realized. As the result of a vast amount of investigation of
observation and experiment, carried out over many generations in many
countries, physicists have envisaged and (provisionally) verified the
hypothesis that the real world consists of protons, electrons, neutrons,
positrons, neutrinos and the rest; similarly, historians have envisaged
and (provisionally) verified the proposition that the gospel of Mark in
something like its present form was used by the author of the final form
of the gospel of Luke. Neither (probable) fact is either perceived or
to be perceived, or in any sense a direct object of experience; but it
is to known through envisagement and testing of possible explanations or
experience. It is just the same with those meanings implicit in the
words, acts, writings, and artistic productions of people which are the
special concern of the interpreter, of the person preoccupied with the
nature of communication and understanding. These meanings are to be got
at by the envisagement and testing of hypotheses in relation to data—so far, there is no difference between the natural scientist on the one hand and the human or social scientist on the other. The crucial difference is that in the case of the human sciences the object as well as the subject of investigation enjoys experiences, asks questions, makes judgments, and so on, and is only properly to be understood as such. In appreciating the similarities between natural and human science you get over the pseudo-problems of communication and understanding—empiricism won't do for the natural sciences either, for there too the facts lie beyond the data. In recognizing the differences, one begins to approach the real problems.

The methodological parallel with natural science is worth stressing, I believe, not only for social science as such, but for ordinary human interactions. The conscientious scientific investigator doesn't just fix on the first explanation that comes into his head, or the one that suits his emotional prejudices best, and brush aside or laugh or sneer off any evidence to the contrary. He attends carefully to the relevant evidence, particularly so far as it appears to go against any explanation which he tends to favor; and makes his judgment both in the light of all the available evidence and of the competing hypotheses. Rather similarly, in human relations, I may wish a person with whom I am angry to mean something which I can contemptuously dismiss with a show of reason, or someone I respect to mean something which makes me comfortable or of which I can approve; so I may not take adequate care to attend to evidence or envisage hypotheses which tend in a different direction (Lonergan, 1972: 158). So a husband may engage, sometimes for years on end, in a 'flight from insight' (Lonergan, 1957: x-xi, 191, 199-203) into what his wife means; or a mother may behave in the same way in relation to her son (see Laing and Esterson). Analogous misunderstandings, obviously and notoriously, develop between races and classes. Of course, that aspect of natural science which is preoccupied with the domination of nature, as stressed at least since the time of Francis Bacon, and deplored by Martin Heidegger (see Knell, 302-304, 308, 391) and so many others in our time, is not altogether to be left out of account. But I think it is a serious mistake to regard this as too much of the essence of natural science. In the attitude of Albert Einstein to the basic structure of the universe, let alone of Konrad Lorenz (1971) to his geese and ducks and Nikolas Tinbergen to his
herring-gulls (1953), there seems to me much more of the sort of respectful openness to things of which one would expect Heidegger to approve than of the urge to dominate and control. And surely this respectful openness, involving a capacity to be shown in the wrong again and again but to continue to try out possibilities, at once is central to good science, and makes it strikingly analogous to good human relations.

In his great work, *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer has put into circulation the notion that there are not only prejudices in interpretation which are more or less inevitable, but that some such are actually to be welcomed (Gadamer, 238ff). On one possible interpretation, this view has general application to scientific inquiry; rather than timidly abiding by the empirical data, we should strike out boldly with our hypotheses, owning to our justified 'prejudice' that the truth tends to be arrived at by ruthless natural selection between such hypotheses. Another reading of the view is more specific to interpretation. All actions which are fully human, together with the traces which they leave in artifacts, literary works, institutions and so on, are to be understood as due to action deriving from some set of judgments of fact and value on the basis of some understanding of some sensory evidence. If the human mind were so indefinitely various that no assumptions of even such flexibility and breadth could be made about it, the quest for true interpretation would in many cases be doomed from the start.

Given that there is a good sort of 'prejudice' of the kind highlighted by Gadamer, how is it to be distinguished from the bad? An anti-Christian reviewer of a booklet on Christian apologetics came across the term 'mystery' employed by the author in reference to the central Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. He instantly concluded that by 'mystery' was meant what was unintelligible or self-contradictory; this provided him with the opportunity for some caustic comments about the thought-processes of the author and of religious believers in general. What the author in fact meant by 'mystery' was an alleged fact with puzzling but not contradictory features, which tended to fascinate and evoke wonder and awe in those who contemplated it. An attentive reading of the text would have made this clear to the reviewer, but would not have allowed him so easily to gratify his self-esteem and to indulge his resentful and aggressive feelings.
Presumably we have in the reviewer's attitude a paradigm case of 'prejudice' in the perjorative sense. The interpreter will be very likely to have made her own judgments about what is described in the text, and to have her own motives, whether acknowledged or not, for interpreting the author in such a way that what the author says agrees or disagrees with her own view. These are prejudices in a neutral sense; they are apt at once to provide useful hints as to what the author might mean, and distractions from other possibilities. But the more conscientious the interpreter is, the more she will be disposed to envisage both hypotheses (that the author does, and does not, agree with her), and to check them against the evidence provided by the text itself. Max Scheler's distinction, between 'the hermeneutics of suspicion' and 'the hermeneutics of recovery' is of profound importance in this connection. It is a handy rule of thumb, I suggest, deliberately to apply the hermeneutics of suspicion to texts by authors to whom one is apt to be well-disposed, the hermeneutics of recovery to those by authors towards whom one's first feelings are rather of dislike or contempt. For example, the conscientious interpreter who deplores Nazism will be on the look-out for evidence of intelligence, humanity, and sensitivity in work by a known Nazi sympathizer.

How is an objective interpretation possible (Gadamer, 273ff, 337ff, 358)? The basic problem here, very crudely expressed, is—I am in my skin, you are in yours, so how can I ever share what you think or feel? Two important misapprehensions which tend to underlie such a statement of the problem are, first, that what we come to know through judgment is not the real world; and, second, that the thoughts and feelings and meanings of others, as merely 'subjective,' are not part of that real world. There is a defective epistemological tradition which goes back to Kant, and which (so far as I can see) was only definitively corrected by Lonergan (1957, esp. 348-350), according to which we cannot know things in themselves, only appearances; not the world as it really is, but only the world-for-us. But according to the correct epistemology, as I have already briefly sketched it, the real world is what is to be known, knowledge is not a matter just of experience but of judgment in terms of understanding of experience, and the meanings of other human subjects are a part of the world thus to be known. From

A Pseudo-Problem of Communication and Understanding

this viewpoint, there seem roughly two equivalents of the 'fusion of horizons' which Gadamer rightly emphasizes as necessary for interpretation. One is exemplified by the case of the German twentieth-century historian who is so instinctively at home, through long study, in Julius Caesar's period and environment, that he is able without much reflection to say what Caesar or one of his officers, opponents, or whatever, would be likely to have thought, said, or done in a typical situation. This is not in itself scientific scholarship, but is one of its concomitants and virtual preconditions. The other equivalent is exemplified by the scholar who is able in principle to grasp both his own immediate view of the world and that of Julius Caesar within what Lonergan calls 'the universal viewpoint' (1957: xxiv, 564-568, 586f, 738f). Just as the method of natural science presupposes, whether individual scientists spell this out to themselves or not, that the whole natural world is to be known in a series of intelligible terms and relations (which of course are not yet specifically known in their entirety and probably never will actually be thus known), so a fully scientific interpretation presupposes that every human viewpoint expressed in any human speech, act, or artifact is a set of judgments based on some understanding of some experience. It is grasp and application of this very general principle which constitutes the universal viewpoint. The existence of the universal viewpoint is a corollary of the fact already noted, that in the human sciences as opposed to the natural sciences the object as well as the subject is capable of experience, understanding, and judgment, and is only properly to be understood as such. It may be concluded that there is an important difference between the kind of 'fusion of horizons' which enables one to make successful guesses about what someone of another period and culture than one's own was up to, and that which provides the backing for a methodically-justified account of this.

Such general considerations of method inevitably invite comparison with the work of Descartes. Now modern philosophers, both in the analytical and the hermeneutical traditions, have been apt to stress what are usually thought to be the defects of Descartes, like his obsession with finding grounds for knowledge in what is absolutely certain, and his detachment of the knowing subject from the world (Gadamer, 19, 59, 210f, 227, 239, 246-248, 417; cp Descartes). But I think that Descartes has the edge over many modern authorities, in his appreciation of the fact that the knowing subject must in a sense enjoy some detachment
from the rest of the world, and from his particular historical circumstances, for knowledge to be possible at all. Descartes, followed by the Enlightenment in general, perhaps went too far in stressing the capacity of the individual to transcend her tradition; our contemporaries rather emphasize the extent to which we cannot but be rooted in it. But the fact is that, when a historian tells me about the campaigns of Alexander the Great, I trust him to present me with the facts of the campaign as they were, not just with an extension of my own cultural perspective. The same applies to the information which a geologist may give me about erratic blocks, or the ornithologist about the differences in morphology and behavior between the various species of the family Anatidae. And even to talk significantly about my own embeddedness within a historical milieu, I must to that extent transcend it. (Presumably the truth that I am embedded within my historical milieu is supposed to be true absolutely, and not merely true from the perspective of my own historical milieu.)

What positively is to be learned from Descartes on general questions of epistemology? First, it appears to me that something like systematic doubt is wholly to be recommended to every educated person. No one would deny that some of the putative knowledge foisted on us by our environment is not really such, that some of what we have been told by our grandmothers, or even by our university professors, is false. The objection, that Cartesian certainty is an unreasonable demand, is now so fashionable that philosophers make it virtually in their sleep. But is it not necessary, if we are to be at all conscientious about sorting out the true information from the false, to have some certainty at least about the method by which we are to do this? It is worse than useless to reject opinions as unreliable, on the basis of principles which on our own showing are no more reliable. Lonergan's position, that there is a kind of certainty about the effectiveness of certain basic operations of our own minds in discovering the truth, since the judgment that they are ineffective is self-destructive, is rather a refinement of this ideal of Descartes than its out-and-out replacement.3

Secondly, Descartes's criterion of clear and distinct ideas for knowledge of the truth seems to me to require careful analysis and

application rather than complete rejection. It appears to operate in Descartes's work in two distinct ways at least—as offering a basis for reliable judgment of the truth, and as setting out terms in which are to be known things as they really are as opposed to things as they appear to our senses. The first way seems just as applicable in hermeneutics as elsewhere; if we want to get at the truth about anything, we ought to take time to arrive at a set of coherent and well-grounded propositions about it. The second way, which implies that nature as it really is is to be understood in mathematical terms (an idea too closely attached to sense-impressions is for Descartes not 'clear and distinct'), has been brilliantly vindicated by the development of the natural sciences; though as applied to the human sciences, at least as taken au pied de la lettre, it seems to do more harm than good, with its apparent corollary (avoided by Descartes at the cost of his notorious dualism) that all significant talk about human beings can be reduced to chemistry and physics. But Lonergan's conception of a 'universal viewpoint,' related to the human sciences as the overall ideal of intelligibility is related to the natural sciences, indicates how Descartes's ideal of 'clear and distinct ideas' in this second sense ought to be applied to the human sciences. One gets a 'clear and distinct idea' of the meaning of another, so far as one relates it to the universal viewpoint, envisaging it as a matter of partly reasonable, partly unreasonable judgments based on some combination of understanding and misunderstanding of some range of experience attended to in some degree.

Third, there is Descartes's dualism itself, which is of course to be repudiated so far as it implies a rupture of the intentional link between thought and reality emphasized by Lonergan in common with the medieval philosophical tradition. The fact is that we have no coherent notion of 'reality,' or of the 'matter' which is presumably an aspect of it, except as what we can come to know by the appropriate use of our minds.\(^4\) It is to be embraced, however, so far as it merely entails that there is an irreducible difference between entities which are only properly to be understood and judged of as themselves understanding, willing, and so on (persons), and entities to be understood and judged of as not so understanding and willing (things as opposed to persons).

\(^4\) For a clear description and assessment of Aquinas on intentionality, see Kenny, 79-81.
From a perspective consonant with Lonergan's, there is a great deal of what Lonergan would call 'the basic position' in Descartes, and the hostility to his philosophy which permeates so much both of the analytical and of the hermeneutical tradition in philosophy needs a substantial corrective.

What I have said so far is readily applicable to what one might call the simple case of interpretation, but not so readily to what might be called the complex case. I want to make this distinction in the following way. In the simple case, the subject herself is in each instance the authority on her meaning. Let us suppose that Granny writes a letter, in which she refers to 'the rudest man in Alberta,' and her correspondent is in the dark about whom she means; on this matter, Granny's own word is the final arbiter. In this case, of course, it is likely to be possible actually to ask Granny; but I mean the simple case to extend to instances where the subject is dead or otherwise unavailable. Let us suppose that a recently-deceased diarist has been referring to one of his acquaintances under the code-name 'Bloggs.' While it may in fact be impossible to ask him whom he means by 'Bloggs,' the fact remains that, if his view on the matter were available, it would effectively clinch the issue. But in typical cases of literature or the other arts, what is meant cannot even in principle so easily be settled. As T. S. Eliot remarked, the poet or novelist is only one of the critics of his own work, in no specially-privileged position with regard to its meaning or significance. This is what I want to call the complex case of interpretation—where even if one could get at the subject's own account of what he meant, this would by no means be the final word on the matter. In the complex case, when we are looking for meaning, there is something of a puzzle even about what it is that we are looking for. If we would not accept Shakespeare's word on the meaning of Macbeth or Jane Austen's on the meaning of Mansfield Park, what would we accept? Paul Valéry claimed that a poem meant anything


6. One can conceive of cases where it would not; say, if the subject were notorious for her lapses of memory, but her husband seemed to remember what she had been in the habit of saying at the relevant time. But these aberrant cases do not affect the fundamental point.
that happened to be attributed to it by any reader (Gadamer, 85). One feels that this, though an understandable reaction against excessively specific or dogmatic interpretative claims, is going much too far; King Lear cannot be about the tragedy of grow old, whoever says so. Yet unless we can assign some criteria for rightness and wrongness in interpretation, where it is agreed that the subject's own account of the matter is not even in principle at issue, is not this bizarre conclusion of Valery's virtually inescapable?

C. G. Jung and others have pointed to a parallel between the interpretation of literature and dream-interpretation by depth-psychologists (Jung, 1956: 110; 1961: 146); in both cases one is liable to be struck by an immediate impression of rightness or wrongness, while finding it difficult or impossible to give a justification of this. A few weeks ago a man dreamt that he was working on the side of a mountain with a crowbar, getting rocks off; a Freudian interpretation of that dream is not far to seek, and has an obvious prima facie rightness about it. At the other extreme, Freud himself, at one point in The Interpretation of Dreams, says that déjà vu dreams in general have a reference to one's mother's genitals, on the ground that one has been there before (Freud, 399). As with many of Freud's interpretations, readers are apt to find this as implausible as it is a credit to Freud's ingenuity. A collection of essays on Dickens (Dyson) includes two by J. Hillis Miller and Kathleen Tillotson, respectively on Martin Chuzzlewit and Dombey and Son. Both appear to me of very high quality, and both attribute a profound organic interconnectedness of meanings within the novels which they assess; but for my part I find the latter totally convincing, the former quite unconvincing. What justification can I give for this? Roughly, my own reading of Martin Chuzzlewit, in the light of what I have been told about the novel by other critics who have helped me in appreciating it, tends to confirm the view that it is a book which lives by particular characters such as Pecksniff and Mrs. Gamp; the story of Martin himself is of little intrinsic interest, a mere pretext for the introduction of such characters. This conception of the novel is incompatible with J. Hillis Miller's subtle and sophisticated account. On

7. "I have been here before" ... In this case the locality is always the genitals of the mother; of no other place can it be asserted with such certainty that one "has been there before"."
the other hand, my reading of *Dombey and Son*, again in the light of other critics, appears to corroborate Kathleen Tillotson's description of how all the characters and episodes in that book do work in relation to the central design, making a commentary on Dombey's destructive pride or contributing to the fate of himself or his family.

Can these rather loose criteria be further refined? Here I shall merely set out conclusions which I have no time to justify at length, but which I have arrived at by trying to generalize the principles employed, whether consciously or not, by reputable critics. A useful rule of thumb is what one might call the principle of critical charity defended by Northrop Frye (1957: 24-26): a work of art 'means' what it does most for the suitably cultivated reader or spectator if it 'means.' The novels of Walter Scott, for example, will yield little satisfaction if you look in them for the sort of 'meaning' which involves the elucidation of subjectivity to be got out of *Jane Eyre* or The Ordeal of Richard Feverel; but they may well satisfy deeply if envisaged as what one might call 'romances,' presupposing a certain kind of stylization in character and situation, rather than as 'novels' in a more restricted sense. With this in mind, I propose the following formula: a successful work of art is a structured artifact capable of yielding satisfaction to contemplation through the extending and clarifying of consciousness. In the case of the visual arts and literature, this extension and clarification is achieved at least partly by the presentation of imaginary things, persons, and situations.

I shall defend my formula by taking various elements of it in turn. Unsuccessful works of art are works of art so far as they are intended to do what successful works of art succeed in doing; in this respect they are more like bad knives and cars (knives and cars are essentially for cutting and transportation) than they are like bad horses (horses are no less horses for being bad at whatever horses are for). There is no space to go into the nature of the satisfaction to be obtained from good works of art here; but it is worth noting that aesthetic value is intrinsic rather than instrumental, in that so far as we value, for example, a novel or a symphony for imparting factual knowledge of the environment within which it was produced, or enabling

8. "If Scott has any claims to be a romancer, it is not good criticism to deal only with his defects as a novelist" (Frye, 1957: 305).
us to pass an examination, this is not the kind of thing for which works of art are valuable as such (a bad novel or symphony might do just as well as a good one in this respect). As to extending and clarifying consciousness, a good novel or play tends to succeed largely by bringing out what it would be to be a certain kind of person in a certain kind of situation; it is the worse for restricting the capacity for moral judgment or sympathy either by unadulterated satire or by sentimentality. (To satisfy by simultaneously stretching our capacity for both the one and the other, in regard to the same character, seems the special excellence of George Eliot as a novelist.) The structure of a novel or play is not merely a matter of plot and the development of character, but can extend to the detail of the language (in some of the late Dickens novels, the control of vocabulary and the details of imagery in relation to the whole has been compared with that of Shakespeare's poetic dramas).

Each type of art is a matter of manipulation of a medium (a) to provide a structure (b) which is a means to satisfaction through exercise and enlargement of consciousness. While this is by no means the only way by which such an end may be secured, it is at least very characteristic of literature and the visual arts that they exercise and enlarge consciousness through representation (c); and that such representation is more deeply satisfying when it involves a reference to what is of central importance for human life (d). And as a matter of fact one does find, when examining the criticism of novels, plays, and other works of literature, that such works are deemed to be of value in proportion to (a) the originality of their use of language and their treatment of plot, character, situation and so on; (b) their overall unity in variety of substance and effect; (c) their just representation of persons, things and circumstances and (d) their illustration and demonstration of what is of central importance for human life.9

9. I think the reader will find that almost any critic is putting down a novel or play so far as he says that language, plot, character or situation are merely conventional; that matter and manner, character and situation, language and mood, and so on, are inappropriate to one another; that 'life is never like that' (mutatis mutandis for fantasy, science fiction, and so on); that the ultimate issues touched on by the work in question are trivial. He will also, I believe, find that his own intuitions as to what is good, not so good, and bad, and why it is so, are confirmed by this. Some works
How does this general summary of what works of literature are and are for help us with the problem of their 'meaning' or 'interpretation'? I believe that the request for the 'meaning' of a work of art is very often an attempt to get at the overall structural principle by which it hangs together. In the case of a bit of abstract art, someone who was vainly seeking for 'meaning' might be helped by such a remark as, 'Don't you feel that shape balances that, and this volume corresponds with this?', or 'Isn't the color scheme redolent of joie de vivre?'; or 'While this does not represent any particular type of thing, it does suggest at once a guillotine, a gaol, a scaffold, and a cross.' What is being sought in such cases seems to be a way of approach from which the point of the whole thing, whether or not this is a 'meaning' in the more restricted sense, can dawn. In the case of a good or great novel or play, the structural principle by which it hangs together will tend to be an existentially important and more or less perennial facet of human life which it exposes, and to which its various elements can be seen to be related. Percy Lubbock writes that unless the basic subject of a novel can be expressed in a short phrase, it is not suitable for a novel (Lubbock, 240). To the question, 'Now what, really, is the meaning of this novel?', I could most appropriately respond by pointing to this central theme; and, when the question was pressed about some particular episode, image or character, by relating this central theme to it. Thus it has usefully been said by a critic, on the subject of the novels of Scott, that the Jacobite works convey the tension between 'loyalty to romantic lost causes' and 'prudent belief in bourgeois progress and enlightenment'; that the Cavalier-Puritan group sets out the issue of 'opposing fanaticism,' and 'the dilemma' of 'how to achieve humane reconciliation without losing prudence in cynicism or flexibility in relativism'; that the novels dealing with the Crusades, the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance highlight the problem of 'how to reconcile what is of timeless value in a decadent, quixotic chivalry with what is effective and humane in a new, sometimes flippant, sometimes selfish civility'; that those on the 'declines, falls, and sometimes the redemp-

make up on one criterion what they lose on another; no one would rate The Importance of Being Earnest very high in respect of (d), but its virtues in kind (a) ensure its status as a classic.
tion of great houses' play in yet another way on Scott's central concern with 'the problem of individual freedom and cultural continuity in historical change' (Hart, 12-13).

All of these themes seem fairly evidently central to human life and more or less perennial. (The 'more or less' leaves open the possibility, which I for one do not take very seriously, that in some future disposition of economic or social circumstances The Odyssey or The Tempest would simply lack point.) A great novel or play succeeds by showing as opposed to saying what is the nature of these important aspects of human life. Aesthetic satisfaction, on the account which I am giving, is derived very largely from the use of one's mental faculties is grasping 'meanings' in a wide sense, which would include any basis from which any work of art as a whole is intelligible; consequently it is apt to be spoil if the meaning is merely stated. A novel or play may fail to some extent either because the theme is existentially insignificant (one may compare the charge levelled against Thackeray, that for all his great skill as a writer his novels embody an essentially trivial attitude to life), or because the theme is rather stated than embodied (as when one feels of George Eliot or D. H. Lawrence at their worst that they are merely preaching). We tend to shy away from these matters which are the themes of great literature, because of their very nature they arouse pain and anxiety in us; I suppose this is roughly what Heidegger means by the 'forgetfulness of Being' from which great art can awaken us. Such art, as Lawrence put it in a memorable image, cuts great holes in the parasols which we are all usually busy constructing to shade ourselves from reality.

Bad or trivial art confirms the restrictions of our consciousness, adds an extra skin to the parasol, confirms our comfortable prejudices about the nature of good and evil, and makes the most important decisions of life seem less equivocal than they are through sentimentality ('poor little Dorothea Brooke, she was just a victim of circumstances') or through satire ('self-deceiving little bitch, marriage to Casaubon was just what she deserved'). Structurally speaking, the worse the novel, the more it is the case that, in regard to any element of form or content, 'the point,' in Lonergan's phrase, 'is that there is no point.' Suppose I am writing a novel set in medieval Europe, and intend to include a tournament. One good wrong answer to 'Why the tournament?' would be, 'Everyone has them in novels set in
medieval Europe.' One may compare the response of a young composer, who was asked by Richard Strauss why he used three trombones in a score—'Everyone uses them nowadays.'

I conclude that there is after all a basic method to be pursued in that attempt to know the meanings of others which is of the essence of the human sciences, and that this is analogous to that employed in the natural sciences. The work of Gadamer is a magnificent corrective to a too-literal application to the human sciences of methods supposed, to some extent wrongly, to belong to the natural sciences. After all, the natural sciences, no less than the human sciences, need imaginative flair in the formation of their hypotheses and theories. And in the case of the human sciences, no less than the natural, hypotheses and theories have to be tested rigorously in relation to empirical evidence and to their rivals. The Bildung emphasized by Gadamer in this connection, that extension of our sympathy and refinement of our sensibility which is the primary use of a humane education, seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for applying this method. What is meant by others is a part of the real world which exists prior to and independently of ourselves; as such, it is to be known both by the general method applicable to all that world, and by a specific method applicable specially to itself. There is to be distinguished a simple and a complex case of interpretation, in the former of which the subject who expresses the meaning is the ultimate authority on what it is, in the latter of which she is not, as is typically the case with works of art in relation to their authors. Here the criterion is that which is most

10. For a sympathetic account of this conception of Gadamer's, see R. Rorty, chapter 8.
satisfying, in the manner which I have tried to sketch in the later part of this paper. 11

11. A psychoanalytical interpretation, say of Granny's meaning in the example given above, would usually be an instance of the complex case of interpretation. An anthropologist's of the actions and institutions of a tribe he was studying would be simple so far as it was supposed to be verifiable by reference to explanations given by members of the tribe themselves, complex so far as it was not so. At that rate, Peter Winch's conception of the nature of anthropology would amount to the demand the anthropologist confine himself to the simple type of interpretation (Winch, 1958). But Alasdair MacIntyre is right, I believe, in maintaining that while the provision of a simple type of interpretation is a necessary condition of the fullfilment of the anthropologist's task, it is not a sufficient condition. See MacIntyre, 1970.

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INTRODUCTION

It has often been remarked that **Insight** reaches its radical turning-point in the chapter entitled "Self-Affirmation" where the normative facticity of the spontaneous inevitabilities of intellectual and rational consciousness is affirmed. In the earlier chapters Lonergan aimed to assemble the elements of the complex fact we are invited now to affirm, and the two chapters immediately following ("The Notion of Being" and the "Notion of Objectivity") are given over to unfolding the most basic, proximate implications of that normative fact. But in the very next chapter ("The Method of Metaphysics"), knowledge of normative fact is suddenly turned to account in a startlingly self-assured and incredibly abbreviated critique of deductivist, 'cartesian,' empiricist, commonsensical, 'dialectical,' and scientific methods of doing philosophy. We have pivoted, as it were, out of winter twilight and into the summer noonday sun (1958: xix); we have 'turned around,' almost recklessly it may seem, at the very edge of the abyss of incoherent self-negation, factless analyticity, truthless relativism. More directly, we have brought to a sudden close that long, largely internal dialogue of self-appropriative self-development only to initiate immediately a critical conversation with those philosophical contemporaries—rationalists, empiricists, common-sense and ordinary-language philosophers, Hegelians and Marxists, logical empiricists and die-hard positivists—who "set antitheses against the conclusions of the preceding three chapters" (385).

In "The Method of Metaphysics" Lonergan makes the final preparations—in no more than five pages—for critical implementation: consolidating distinctions are drawn between the basic position and basic
counter-positions, between positions and counter-positions (these differ from the basic forms; 387), between invitations to develop, extended in a peculiar way by positions, and invitations to reverse, extended in a still more peculiar way by counter-positions; a single, abbreviated illustration of a mixed philosophical doctrine (the Cartesian) is offered and dissected, its positional element is exposed and the possibilities of development are indicated, its counter-positional element is revealed and the possibilities of reversal are noted—all this in a single paragraph; and despair before "the welter of conflicting philosophic definitions" and "the Babel of endless philosophic arguments" is dismissed as a sceptical disregard of facts—the object of philosophy, says Lonergan, does exist, and it can be attained. There follows a schematic definition of metaphysics and a set of methodical canons aimed at facilitating "the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women" (401). The remaining thirty pages of the chapter are given over to the "dialectic of method" and the exhibition of the critical power of a philosophy that grounds itself upon the anticipations that are present and operative in intellectual and rational consciousness, upon the "one method that is not arbitrary" (402).

To the judgment of self-affirmation, Lonergan wrote in his Introduction, all leads; from it, all follows (xviii). But what follows without a moment's delay upon that crucial 'turn' is an open-eyed implementation of normative self-understanding in self-assured engagement in the concrete dialogue that is ongoing, dramatico-intellectual philosophic life. As the opening words of Plato's Republic remind us—"I went down to the Piraeus ..." (Rep. 327; Voeglin, 1966: 68-69)—the Platonic peripagoge was not merely a personal enlightenment but also, inevitably, a pedagogical return to the troubled polypragmosyne. Similarly, self-affirmation elicits, inevitably, an interior experience akin to that described so powerfully by Nietzsche's Zarathustra:

> Behold, I am weary of my wisdom,  
like a bee that has gathered too much honey;  
I need hands outstretched to receive it.  
I would give away and distribute,  
until the wise among men find joy once again  
in their folly, and the poor in their riches.  
For that I must descend to the depths,  
as you do in the evening when you go behind  
the sea and still bring light to the underworld,  
you overrich star.  
Like you, I must go under—go down,  
as is said by man, to whom I want to descend (122).
It is in a similar spirit that, in *Insight*, we shift with such rapidity from the private domain of the crucial experiment in self-possession (xviii) to the public arena of critical philosophic dialogue. *Insight* is not only a study of human understanding, not only a limited unfolding of the philosophic implications of understanding, but also a campaign against the flight from understanding.

These three levels are *solidary*. Without the first there would be no base for the second and no precise meaning for the third. Without the second the first could not get beyond elementary statements and there could be no punch to the third. Without the third the second would be regarded as incredible and the first would be neglected (xii-xiii, emphasis added).

The task to which we are now called — as Lonergan's frequent use of dialogical allusions in chapter XIV suggests — is that of achieving influence in the darkest and in the brightest philosophic enclaves of cosmopolis (1967: 115). The method of metaphysics "is primarily pedagogical" (1958: 398); "Bluntly, the starting point of metaphysics is people as they are" (397); "there is no use addressing minds that could be or should be but in fact are not, if one would encourage the genesis of explicit metaphysics in the minds that are" (397). The task is one of *philosophic communication*, one to be carried out with a heightened consciousness of transcendental inevitabilities, with a heightened sensitivity to the inevitable philosophic component "immanent in formulation" (387), and with perspicuous attention to the range of meanings that may be assumed by the key philosophic variables—the notions of knowledge, of objectivity, and of being (427).

Considered as positive, the communicative task is development of the position; as critical, it is reversal of counter-positions. But, given the present state of philosophy, the task is first and foremost the critical task of reversal, as Lonergan's own emphasis in "The Method of Metaphysics" suggests. If it is clear that thorough appropriation of self-knowledge requires a communicative return to the market-place of philosophic ideas; if it is clear that the most powerful expression of that return, in the philosophic quarters of cosmopolis, is development of the position and reversal of counter-positions; still, it must not be forgotten that the present philosophic situation—with its constituents of logicism, relativism, scepticism, immanentism, and nihilism—demands
not a complacent, private exploitation of already-given preconditions of positional collaboration but, most especially, the critical reversal of counter-positions that contributes to the creation of the preconditions of true philosophic community (circa 1953: 6). It is the successful reversal that increases the population of the sunny enclaves; it is the successful reversal that brings philosophers into collaborative union, that counteracts the occlusion of the aim of philosophy and promotes the displacement of self-embalming logicism and self-corrupting scepticism by spirited inquiry.

It remains, however, that both development of the position and reversal of counter-positions, in Lonergan's view, are more purely dialogical engagements than those envisaged by Nietzsche and perhaps even by Plato. Lonergan's 'development of the position' resembles the Aristotelian 'dialectical argumentation' which is characterized by a shared spirit of inquiry; and his 'reversal of counter-positions,' while not as purely 'dialectical' in this ancient sense, is characterized neither by the aims, strategies, and tactics of the contentious mode of argumentation nor by the expository aim and organization of the didactic mode. The intent of reversal is neither instructional nor contentious nor purely 'dialectical.' Rather, as its stage is set by the occlusion of the spirit of inquiry by an interlocutor, by his attempt to replace intelligent inquiry and critical reflection with some 'surrogate' (1958: 394), so its governing motive is the institution or recovery of pure 'dialectic,' the initiation or renewal of collaborative inquiry.

Lonergan's use of 'horizontal' rather than 'vertical' imagery is illustrative of this point and of his respect generally for interlocutors that precludes any relapse into didacticism and sophistry. 'Horizontal' imagery calls to mind the presupposition of equality in pure 'dialectic,' whereas 'vertical' imagery exhibits more easily the factual or presumed inequalities of didactic and contentious argumentation. So it is, I think, that Lonergan does not employ the imagery of mountain-top and valley and übermensch and 'herd,' which is laden with the affects of condescending proclamation. Nor does Lonergan rely heavily upon the imagery of upper world and underworld and philosopher-king and hoi polloi, which evokes the feelings attendant upon befuddling inquisition and gnostic command. As has been frequently observed, Lonergan's is the 'horizontal' imagery of battlefield "forays," "preparatory maneuvers," and "assaults" (xxx), of "halfway houses" (xxviii), "out-
posts, "capitals," and "citadels" (xxx), of winter twilight and summer sun, of accepted or rejected "invitations" (xix, 398). The standpoint of reversal, like that of 'dialectic' and unlike that of didactic and contentious argumentation, includes no underestimation of the interlocutor who invites it. He is not some unwitting target of benevolently dispensed 'enlightenment'; he is not the mindless "drifter" carried by the 'herd.'

The flight from understanding will be seen to be anything but a peculiar aberration that afflicts only the unfortunate or the perverse. In its philosophic form (which is not to be confused with its psychiatric, moral, social, and cultural manifestations) it appears to result simply from an incomplete development in the intelligent and reasonable use of one's own intelligence and reasonableness. But though its origin is a mere absence of full development, its consequences are positive enough. For the flight from understanding blocks the occurrence of the insights that would upset its comfortable equilibrium. Nor is it content with a merely passive resistance. Though covert and devious, it is resourceful and inventive, effective and extraordinarily plausible. It admits a vast variety of forms and, when it finds some untenable, it can resort to others. If it never refuses to supply superficial minds with superficial positions, it is quite competent to work out a philosophy so acute and profound that the elect strive in vain and for centuries to lay bare its real inadequacies (xi-xii, emphasis added).

Theologians may be the first to point out that reversal of counter-positions may not be counted upon to expand cosmopolis and that the initiation or retrieval of pure 'dialectic,' moreover, cannot be achieved through any mode of philosophic argumentation. With Lonergan they may be inclined to ask, "How is one to be persuaded to genuineness and openness, when one is not yet open to persuasion?" (624). And like Lonergan himself they may remark that

the pronouncements of rational reflection are splendid, but they lack efficacy. In another universe things could be different, but in the existing universe man suffers from moral impotence (1967: 116).

The philosopher who has 'turned' will certainly agree, echoing the thought behind the practice of his earliest mentor and motivating symbol, Socrates: the result sought by reversal is a personal intellectual conversion; even if there were no problem of moral impotence, the most
reversal could do is to provide an occasion for an interlocutor to bridge for himself the "existential gap" (1957a: iv) by extending an invitation to conversion. But, while we may grant readily that humanly insurmountable problems attend the campaign against the flight from understanding, that "the human issues of the present order cannot be satisfactorily subordinated to philosophy" (1967: 139), we may still remark that intellectual conversions do sometimes occur when occasioned, that the grace required is given, and so, like St. Paul and St. Ignatius after him, we may suggest we undertake our communicative task, and preparatory reflection upon that task, as though the outcome of reversal depended entirely upon us, and then await the actual outcome as though it depended entirely upon God. In short, there are human issues whose philosophic clarification may contribute significantly to the efficacious occasioning of intellectual conversion, and to one of those issues I shall now turn.

The force of reversal is clearly evident in "Self-Affirmation." There, repeatedly, one is driven to the edge of logic and then confronted with his "pragmatic engagement" (332), the "contradiction of self-negation," the "non-plussing self-contradiction" (329), the absence of "a concrete choice" between rationality and irrationality (332), his falling victim to wonder (330). Anyone who has 'turned' at chapter XI (or at any other point in his reading of Insight) has felt its force and told the tale of emergence of his precarious self-possession. And many who have felt the compelling force of the reversal, I suspect, have attempted to occasion for another what was occasioned by Lonergan for them, have failed, and then have taken refuge in the broadened context of the problem of evil which unfolds in Insight's later chapters. Clearly, not everyone finds the reversal compelling. I have already acknowledged the 'Pauline context,' as it were, of its employment. But in our haste to come to grips with our failure of critical, philosophic communication, we must be wary of obscuring those causes of failure which are strictly philosophic and which may, if rooted out and clearly exposed, render our future occasioning still more efficacious.

I am thinking of one current philosophic tendency in particular—one with fairly deep and well-protected roots—which underlies and penetrates many an interlocutor's intelligent (if not critical) reservations about the soundness of the reversal. Almost without fail, this tendency effectively blunts the force of reversal, embarrasses its agent into
Reversing the Counter-Position

silence, and thoroughly spoils the 'occasion.' It is the tendency of the all-too-common interlocutor who has the courage to use his own reason, who borders indeed on foolhardiness in his use of it, who has taken the formal tour of modern logic from Port Royal to Kripke and learned the lessons it provides for the practitioner of philosophy. It is the tendency of the contemporary logical mind to identify the reversal with the most well-known of informal fallacies of relevance, the argumentum ad hominem.

The agent of reversal, who stands accused of committing what is certainly one of the most banal of fallacies, is virtually disarmed if he is unprepared in that moment of surprise to carefully, clearly, and effectively relativize the minor authenticity of his 'enlightened' interlocutor's conscious and deliberate adherence to the Logical Tradition. As reversal is an occasioning of intellectual conversion, so it invites the logical interlocutor to major authenticity with regard to his tradition; and its effectiveness presupposes the ability of the agent of reversal to implement the distinction between the minor authenticity of traditional adherence and the major authenticity of historical critique. But few of us, I fear, would be sufficiently prepared to juxtapose clearly the Logical Tradition with the underpinning 'Transcendental Tradition,' as it were, and so to recover our philosophical credibility from the poisoned well into which the traditional interlocutor may cast it. How is the agent of reversal to recover from the implicitly abusive ad hominem accusation of having committed explicitly the ad hominem fallacy? At least we may prepare ourselves for the virtually inevitable charge by undertaking ahead of time to understand its meaning, its roots, and its relation to Lonergan's reversal of counterpositions. If the uncritical, ahistorical reactions of a merely dominant Logical Tradition can bring philosophic dialogue to a sudden end, a few apposite, historically-conscious distinctions, ready to hand, may occasion its resurrection.
I
REVERSAL:
A MOMENT IN THE CONCRETE CAMPAIGN

Lonergan aimed in Insight to produce a "methodical, critical, and comprehensive" philosophy (xii). His pursuit of comprehensive enclosure of antithetical solutions to philosophic problems calls forth the need for critical discrimination between normative and aberrant products of philosophic activity, and this need in turn calls forth the methodical activity of transposing philosophic statements to their roots in normative or aberrant cognitional activity. As the laying bare of cognitional process, in both its normative and its aberrant unfolding, conditions the relatively private success of methodical transposition, so its public success is conditioned by a successful campaign against the flight from knowledge of "the basic polymorphic fact" (386). So it is that the campaign against the flight from understanding stands in solidarity with the study of human understanding and the unfolding of the philosophic implications of understanding. From the study of understanding the campaign receives "its precise meaning"; from the unfolding of the philosophic implications of understanding, it receives "its punch"; on the other hand, upon the successful campaign depend the credibility of the unfolded implications and the surmounting of neglect of the study of understanding (xii-xiii). Similarly, reversal receives its precise meaning from cognitional theory; but, in turn, reversal is the concrete, dialogical engagement which renders epistemological and metaphysical implications credible by promoting successfully an interlocutor's advertence to conscious data and, in that way, combatting his self-neglect.

The precisely philosophic dimensions of the self-neglect opposed by reversal are spelled out clearly by Lonergan:

People cannot avoid experience, cannot put off their intelligence, cannot renounce their reasonableness. But they may never have adverted to these concrete and factual inevitabilities. They may be unable to distinguish them sharply, or discern the immanent order that binds them together, or find in them the dynamic structure that has generated all their scientific knowledge and all their common sense, or acknowledge in that
dynamic structure a normative principle that governs the outcome of all inquiry, or discover in themselves other equally dynamic structures that can interfere with the detached and disinterested unfolding of the pure desire to know, or conclude to the polymorphism of their subjectivity and the untoward effect it can have upon their efforts to reach a unified view of the universe of proportionate being (397).

This complex failure to advert, to acknowledge, to discover in themselves, and to conclude—this neglect of polymorphic subjectivity—truncates the subject (1968: 18); and, although truncation is manifested in a multitude of proximate and remote, personal, social, and cultural consequences, its specifically philosophic form is the flight from self-knowledge and the resultant counter-position (1958: xi).

### A. Counter-Positions

A philosophy may be broken down into its basis, in a cognitional theory, and its expansion in pronouncements on epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues (387). The basis of a philosophy, its cognitional theory, is constituted (i) by an appeal to the data of consciousness and to the historical development of human knowledge, and (ii) by the taking of a stand on the basic issues of philosophy, viz., the real, self-knowledge, and objectivity (388). This stand is an "inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory" (387). As long as a stand is not taken, says Lonergan, the basis of a philosophy remains incomplete. Accordingly, chapters I through X of Insight, by this account, constitute the appeal to conscious data and to the historical development of human knowledge, and chapters XI through XIII—"Self-Affirmation" and the unfolding of its implications for our understanding of the real and objectivity—constitute an explicitation of the inevitable philosophic component, the stand on basic issues immanent in the formulation of chapters I through X. But, as Lonergan's sudden shift to dialectical criticism in chapter XIV illustrates, stands on the basic issues may vary and conflict. A "basic position" is either an implicit or an explicit identification of the real with the concrete universe of being, of the process of self-knowledge with intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation, of objectivity with the consequence of intelligent inquiry
and critical reflection (388). A "position" is any philosophical expansion that is coherent with the "basic position." On the other hand, a "basic counter-position" is either an implicit or an explicit identification of the real with the "already out there now," of self-knowledge with any type of mere self-presence, of objectivity with a property of vital anticipation, extroversion and satisfaction—or just one or two of these identifications. A "counter-position" is any philosophical expansion that is coherent with one or more of the "basic counter-positions" (388).

A basic counter-position, then, arises out of a double neglect. It results from the combined failure (i) to advert to oneself as originating meaning, and (ii) to advert to the historical development of human knowledge. Moreover, the counter-positions are simply coherent expansions from this truncated basis. In virtue of his self-ignorance, the truncated subject does not deliberately orientate himself towards truth, and so he distorts what he knows "by imposing upon it a mistaken notion of reality, a mistaken notion of objectivity, and a mistaken notion of knowledge" (559). Deliberate philosophic self-orientation requires a grasp of oneself as a concrete unity-in-tension, as the subject of a polymorphic consciousness whose flow is dominated now by the pure desire to know and at other times by conflicting 'existential' concerns (385). But it is this grasp that the counter-positional philosopher lacks, for he neglects the self-experience in which the understanding of his polymorphic facticity is to be attained. Consequently, he is incapable of mastering the polymorphic fact, and so he is mastered by it. The inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitonal theory, varies with the pattern of experience that happens to be dominant or recollected during the period of formulation. Desertion of the position and reversion to counter-positions, Lonergan remarks, "can take place inadvertently by a mere shift in the pattern of one's experience" (499-500).

B. Reversal of Counter-Positions

Counter-positional conceptual constructions may be internally coherent, and they may be coherent with one another; but counter-positional constructions are incoherent with the activity of proposing
and defending them (388). They are incoherent with the claim that they are grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably (738). It follows that they are incoherent with the basic position. This more fundamental incoherence of even those coherent counter-positional constructions "prompts" intelligence and reasonableness to introduce coherence by dismantling and then reconstructing positionally the conceptual construction. In this "prompting" the counter-position invites "the exploration of its presuppositions and implications and it leads to its own reversal" (419; 389). Indeed, as the unknown evokes the wonder and doubt which are the primordial forms of the "pure question" (9), so the radically incoherent counter-position "demands" reversal (587).

However, the required reversal is not the introduction of a merely logical coherence and consistency. It is a radically self-clarifying juxtaposition of the basic counter-positional stand and the basic position implicit even in that stand; it is the revelation of an inevitably conflicting performative commitment. Lonergan makes this point nicely in his brief analysis of the mixed Cartesian doctrine:

This counter-position [the affirmation of the res extensa] invites reversal, not merely in virtue of its conjunction with the other component in Cartesian thought [the "I think"], but even when posited by itself in anyone's thought (389; emphasis added).

Reversal is aimed at the incoherence of expression and the performance of which the expression purports to be an adequate formulation. For example, it does not address itself to the contradiction evident in the reflective statement, I am stating what really and truly is so when I state that we are under an illusion whenever we claim to know what really and truly is so; rather, it is addressed to the contradiction implicit in the unreflective statement, We are under an illusion when we claim to know what really is. The reflective statement adds to the content of the unreflective statement what is found only implicitly in the latter "not as content, but as performance" (1967: 207-208).

From the standpoint of one who elevates logic as a technique, rather than positional dialectic, to the status of sole non-arbitrary philosophic method, exploitation of the expression/performace contradiction is illegitimate. However, this is merely a sophisticated, contemporary expression of neglect of the subject. As modern logic's
prolonged struggle with the Liar Paradox amply illustrates (1957b: I, 3), "the dynamism of life and intelligence may be facts but the facts are not to be recognized" (1958: 591). Reversal would draw the attention of those entrapped in conceptual constructions to the facts of consciousness which generate from their sub-logical depths the internally coherent and incoherent counter-positions. It would foster in the interlocutor the "operator" of consciousness in an effort to offset the one-sided emphasis of the "integrator" (469). In short, it would promote transcendence of "the merely verbal intelligence that, it seems, an electronic calculator successfully simulates" (1967: 174, n11).

Reversal, then, is a methodical subversion of the hypostatization of the conceptual product of neglected and occluded intelligent and reasonable performance, an essentially coherent expression of the "operator" that would evoke the renewal of operation in an over-integrated interlocutor. It is the critical implement of a philosophy that has assimilated and adjusted to the cultural transposition from logic to method, from first principles to transcendental method, from metaphysical soul to psychological subject—in short, from classicism to modernity (1974: 43-54). In the modern context of philosophic dialogue, what is significant for the critical philosopher "lies not in the subject's formulation ... but in the subject's immediate grasp in himself of his preconceptual, prejudicial inability to get around the fact" of concrete inevitabilities in consciousness. As "the subject in his self-knowledge is the foundation of logic" (1957b: IV, 5; 1957a: 15; 1967: 214), so methodical philosophy sublates the logical ideal. In a rare prophecy Lonergan links the collapse of logic's hegemony in philosophy with the dissolution of philosophic difference which is the remote objective of the entire campaign against the flight from self-knowledge:

Eventually the age dominated by logic comes to a close, if not from the exhaustion of the opposing parties, at least from the ever-decreasing size and interest of their audience. Finally, there comes the "coup de grace" when logical operations are seen to be but a minor part within the larger whole of methodical operations. With that change there arises a totally new situation and the insoluble problem of apriorist but divergent philosophies may happily be forgotten (1976: 29).

The finishing stroke would be a community-wide re-opening of philosophic subjects to themselves, one prepared by the agent of reversal's
softening subversion of the community's logically-fortified self-neglect.

In his "Notes on Existentialism" Lonergan treats the conditions calling for reversal a bit differently, and he offers an appropriately altered analysis of reversal. A brief resume of this account may serve to round off my discussion of reversal as a moment in the concrete campaign against the flight from understanding.

A subject's own reality can be beyond the range of his knowledge and interests, beyond his own horizon, but he will nevertheless continue to manifest his reality. The difference between his horizon on himself and what he really is, is named by Lonergan "the existential gap" (1957a: iv). Reversal occasions a bridging of the gap by illuminating the incoherence of the subject's overt horizon with the covert manifestation of his reality. Such a gap "is not eliminated by affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false." Rather, inasmuch as the gap has been opened preconceptually, it is to be bridged or closed only by a conversion—"a new concept of oneself, new principles to guide one's thinking, judging, evaluating, all that concerns oneself" (10-11). The gap separating overt horizontal expression from covert manifestation is objectified in the concrete situation. The agent of reversal intervenes in the situation and "crystallizes" the objectification by making it articulate, expressing it, and so drawing attention to the heretofore unformulated disparity. Crystallizing intervention "constitutes the correction by communication" of the radical incoherence. Finally, although the existential gap is "obscurely evident to everyone," it is crystallized only by those by whom it is "effectively noticed" (13), and it is effectively noticed only by those who remain sensitive to the gap perduring in themselves.

Resolute and effective intervention presupposes subjects in which the existential gap has been, is being closed; else they will merely increase the confusion and accelerate the doom (13).

Let us turn now to a discussion of the charge of ad hominem fallacy that frequently confronts and disarms even the most authentic agent of reversal, even that agent attuned to hear the most softly whispered invitations from the most ingeniously camouflaged fissures and crevasses. Let us recall that it is this charge, emanating from an
interlocutor who has authentically appropriated the Logical Tradition, that dampens the critical philosopher's communicative spirit and, by replacing the 'dialectical' ideal of shared inquiry with the logical ideal of conceptual consistency and coherence, perpetuates the fragmentation of the philosophic community.

II

ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM

As neglect of the subject, his subsequent truncation and, in the limit, his self-allienation (1968) are the basic conditions underlying a counter-position's invitation to the agent of reversal, so the philosophic mentality that meets reversal with the charge of "to the man" fallacy is that of the interlocutor who has aligned himself, most often with the best of the available strong or moderate "principles of charity" (Thagard and Nisbett, 1983), with those brands of philosophy which systematically and vigilantly enforce the obnubilation of subjective performance. As counter-positions "admit a vast variety of forms," sometimes superficial and sometimes acute and profound (1958: xii), so there are many such brands. One may think of any type of 'objectivism' which so emphasizes the objectivity of truth as to believe it capable of getting along without minds, of any type of 'empiricism' which so emphasizes the immediacy of the real as to allot intelligence and reasonableness a merely instrumental function as superfluous adjuncts to experimental confrontation, of any type of post-Kantian logicism that so emphasizes the 'phenomenality' of experience as to elevate logic as a technique to the status of sole non-arbitrary philosophic method, of any type of commonsensism which so emphasizes the ubiquity of conventional language as to reduce philosophic activity to aimless analysis of the vague and the ambiguous.

Common to all of these types, despite their multitudinous doctrinal differences from one another, is their interest to enforce a conception of 'subject-free' rationality, to retain their already-won 'subject-free' objectivity, to maintain their already-out-there-now or in-here-now reality. Common to all as well are a multitude of radically incoherent relations of their conceptual constructions to their obscurely evident commitments to intelligence and reasonableness, and so even
the aforementioned shared, seemingly positive interest may be formulated only provisionally and tentatively. It is perhaps their shared lack of interest in subjectivity that best characterizes the range of philosophic types who wield the charge of ad hominem fallacy. Finally, while counter-positional orientation may be identified as the remote, fundamental ground out of which the charge arises, logicism seems to be the specific form, permeating many of the others, that is its proximate source. More than most counter-positional philosophers, the representative of the Logical Tradition is inclined by training, study, and practice to employ the charge of ad hominem fallacy in defense of 'subject-freedom.'

A. Legitimate Argumentum Ad Hominem

Interestingly enough, an investigation of early uses of "ad hominem" reveals that it has not always been associated with illegitimate argumentation and sophisms. It has been suggested that Aristotle introduced the term in his Sophistical Refutations and that he neither explicitly condoned nor explicitly condemned the type of argument to which it referred (Hamblin, 1970: 161). Users of this type of argument, says Aristotle, "direct their solutions against the man, not against the his argument," and he considered it "valid against the questioner, but not against his argument" (Aristotle, 178b17, 177b33). The origin of the English usage of the phrase "ad hominem" is attributed by the Oxford Dictionary to Locke's Essay where argumentum ad hominem is described this way:

To press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem (278ff).

Locke's distinction between ad hominem and ad judicium arguments strongly resembles Aristotle's distinction between 'dialectical' and 'demonstrative' arguments (Hamblin, 160; Woods and Walton, 2), and Locke makes no explicit link between ad hominem argument and his remarks elsewhere about error and the abuse of words and so shares apparently Aristotle's tendency to reserve judgment on its legitimacy. It is to be
noted, however, that the similarity of Locke's argument to Aristotle's 'dialectic' lies not so much in its receiving interior guidance from the "spirit of inquiry" but more in its directedness to the confronted interlocutor—"to the man" in this sense—as was customary in the context of Greek debate. Finally, advertence to a present opponent's premises, principles or concessions, which is common to Lockean *ad hominem* and Aristotelian 'dialectic,' serves to distinguish both from Lonergan's reversal which requires advertence, not to implicit or explicit premises, principles, or concessions in the conceptual field, but to the conscious operations which generate these. A usage of "*ad hominem*" by Galileo, with which Locke was probably familiar (Finocchiaro, 396-98), reveals clearly the infra-conceptual character of the appeal made by the user of the Lockean *ad hominem* (Galilei, 1966: 276-280; Finocchiaro, 397). By advertence to Aristotle's implicit premises and principles, and by pressing Aristotle with consequences drawn from them, Galileo undermines the Aristotelian theory of comets. Moreover, even more explicitly than either Aristotle or Locke, Galileo affirms the legitimacy of *argumentum ad hominem*. His explicit categorization of his anti-Aristotelian argument as *ad hominem* is intrinsic to his effort to defend it against objections from his critics (Finocchiaro, 397). In short, as Finocchiaro observes, when Galileo points out the *ad hominem* character of his own or another's argument, he is alerting critics to the fact "that it would be inappropriate to criticize the argument by objecting to the problematic premise, since the argument giver did not himself accept that premise" (401), and so Galileo is making what we might call a methodological point that takes for granted the legitimacy of *argumentum ad hominem*.

**B. The Occlusion of Legitimate *Ad Hominem***

The first insertion of *argumentum ad hominem*, under that name, into the grab-bag of informal fallacies or sophisms may be discovered in Whatley's "Tree of Fallacies." Whatley distinguished between logical and non-logical fallacies (Hamblin, 171), and among the non-logical fallacies of irrelevant conclusion (*ignoratio elenchi*) are the fallacies of appeal to the passions. Among fallacious appeals to the passions we find *argumentum ad hominem*, also called by Whatley the "personal argu-
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ment." Whatley further distinguishes between ad hominem and ad rem or ad judicium arguments:

The 'argumentum ad hominem', they say, 'is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the 'argumentum ad rem does'... It appears then (to speak rather more technically) that in the 'argumentum ad hominem' the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular; viz. not that 'such and such is the fact,' but that 'this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation, etc. (quoted by Hamblin, 174).

To be noted here is the breakdown of the connection, affirmed by Aristotle, Galileo, and Locke, of ad hominem argument with legitimate, truth-seeking 'dialectic,' the implied devaluation of the type of face-to-face argumentation that is determinately directed to the confronted interlocutor, and a reinterpretation of the ad judicium/ad hominem distinction that deprives ad hominem almost entirely of its connection to implicit or explicit conceptual premises and puts it on a par with the fallacies of "shifting ground to something wholly irrelevant" and "shifting ground from premise to premise alternately." The last-mentioned 'reinterpretation' is of special interest because it manifests clearly the logician's insistence upon a restriction of the range of legitimate argumentation—formal or informal—to implicit or explicit conceptual constructions, and so builds a wall between 'the man' who argues and his arguments.

In line with our present purposes, it is fair to consider Whatley's Tree of Fallacies as one offspring of the marriage of all 'Ad' arguments to the Port Royal account of the passions (Hamblin, 173). Arnauld's The Art of Thinking departs from the previously dominant conception of logic as instruction in how to discuss, argue or reason, and addresses itself to the question of how to think (148-58). It ventures to provide accounts not merely of formal-logical philosophical argumentation but also of philosophical argumentation outside formal logic. In this respect it stands poised at the border of methodological reflection upon subjective performance. Unfortunately, its treatment of epistemological issues owes much to Descartes's petrification of the Platonic
cleavage between different parts of the soul with different functions, especially to the isolation from one another of "action" and "passion" (155). To this account of the human mind—-itself an objectification of geometrical rationality—Arnauld appeals when he turns from a discussion of topics and fallacies, which supplements his formal treatment of syllogisms, to arguments 'Ad.' Here we find listed among the "Sophisms of Self-Love, of Interest, and of Passions" examples of those fallacies which, in contemporary compendia of informal errors, go by the name of ad hominem arguments. Here we witness the extraction of the "disembodied logical mind," to which Lonergan somewhere refers, from its affective context, its mood, its Befindlichkeit; but, more importantly, what we see occurring is the erection of the wall that will separate henceforth the concrete, existing logical thinker from the content of his thoughts—the loss of all memory, so to speak, of the face-to-face context of Greek debate, manifested clearly by Arnauld's virtual disregard of topics (150) where the context is always dialogical (Kneale, 34-35). In this respect, the Port Royal logic could nearly pass as a contemporary expression of the logical ideal of 'subject-free' rationality and debate. And, indeed, if Descartes idealized disembodied reason and will, Hume—to whom twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy owes its disdain for "mere subjectivity"—went still further by identifying will, too, with "direct passion" (Hume, I: 148).

C. Ad Hominem in Contemporary Handbooks

Whatever the logical light cast by Arnauld on the limitations of the earlier Scholastic logic (Kneale, 315ff), his uncritical epistemological commitments have cast a shadow upon subsequent accounts of informal reasoning. Contemporary treatments of informal fallacies are startlingly united in their adherence to the boundaries set by Arnauld. A single example will suffice to illustrate this traditional continuity. In With Good Reason (1982), S. Morris Engel distinguishes between abusive and non-abusive forms of the "fallacy of personal attack" (166-73). Abusive forms include the casting of aspersions upon the character of one's opponent in order to make him appear suspicious, ridiculous, or inconsistent, and "poisoning the well" in order to preclude discussion and thus to avoid opposition. Non-abusive or circumstantial forms, on
the other hand, are attempts to undercut an opponent's position by accusing him of self-interest, by condemning the source of his views, by accusing him of conduct inconsistent with his views. Common to all forms of fallacious ad hominem, Engel tells us, is "turning attention away from the facts in arguments to the people participating in them" rather than discussing the facts "soberly," "diverting attention away from the question being argued by focusing instead on those arguing it" (166). Engel remarks quite innocently that "consideration of those who hold a position or who originated a position or who are opposed to a position must be viewed as an irrelevance" (173). Engel's footnote on the meaning of the term argumentum ad hominem deserves to be quoted in full:

Argumentum ad hominem means in Latin, literally, "argument to the man." It is also translated as "against the man," a form emphasizing the fact that this fallacy shifts the attack away from the question and places it against the person who is making the argument. (In its sense of an argument to the man, the ad hominem argument has come to stand loosely for all fallacies of relevance that appeal to our emotional natures rather than our powers of reasoning) (166).

Here, illustrated clearly, is the Port Royal identification of subjectivity with reason-perverting passions, the total abandonment of the non-pejorative sense of ad hominem as a 'dialectical' engagement of the present interlocutor, Whatley's restriction of the range of legitimate argumentation to the conceptual field. Here, indeed, is 'normal' logic, so intent upon preserving itself 'as is' that it manages to read "to the man" as "against the man." Here too, of course, the question of an interlocutor's self-consistency is brushed aside as an implicit form of abuse.

As Engel himself points out, the standard distinction between abusive and circumstantial ad hominem arguments is imprecise (169; Hamblin, 42). Both forms appeal to the concrete circumstances of the interlocutor: in the abusive form, abuse is central; in the so-called non-abusive form, abuse is incidental. As I have already suggested, there is really only one general form of the ad hominem fallacy: the appeal to the circumstances from within which the interlocutor thinks and speaks. This notion of 'circumstances' suffers from a minor and a major ambiguity. The minor ambiguity is revealed by its usage to refer
indiscriminately to interests, motives, feelings, aims, affiliations, character traits, and past conduct. Where the word carries this load of meanings it is most often correct to deny legitimacy to the circumstantial ad hominem argument; for such circumstances usually have no direct bearing upon the truth or falsity of an interlocutor's assertion. All such circumstantial appeals in philosophy are, broadly speaking, reductionistic. On the other hand, a major ambiguity may be discerned in the notion of 'circumstances.' We may distinguish particular and contingent, factual circumstances which are known empirically from universal and necessary circumstances which are logically deduced preconditions of empirical knowledge; and we may distinguish further within factual circumstances between those which are variable and those which are invariant. This major ambiguity, like the logicist's appeal to Cartesian epistemology, has a direct and significant bearing upon the larger issue with which I have been concerned. It is an ambiguity that is recognized clearly only by one who has to some extent transcended the Logical Tradition and so crossed the border separating the conceptual field from the concept-generating performance of the concrete subject.

Let us consider first the distinction between particular and contingent, factual circumstances, on the one hand, and universal and necessary preconditions, which are named circumstances only by analogy, on the other. One is reminded of Kant's 'first critique,' of the distinction between the merely empirical ego and the "I think," and of Kant's denunciation of 'psychologism' and his related elevation of transcendental deduction. On the Kantian view, then, it is correct to deny legitimacy to the ad hominem argument when the 'circumstances' to which appeal is made are those pertaining to the empirical ego. But, perhaps surprisingly, neither is the ad hominem to be considered legitimate when the 'circumstances' appealed to are those pertaining to the "I think"; for, ad hominem appeals to the transcendental ego are impossible, inasmuch as it is not verifiable in experience but deduced (Lonergan, 1958: 341). On this reading of the major ambiguity, then, the Logical Tradition's prohibition against appeals to subjective performance is preserved.

Let us consider now the distinction within factual 'circumstances' between those which are variable and those which are invariant. Here we may bring to bear Lonergan's distinction between the invariant dynamic structure of intelligent and reasonable subjectivity and the
variable contents of that structure, on the one hand, and a related
distinction between the pure desire to know and other desires, or
between authentic philosophic subjectivity and unauthentic philosophic
subjectivity, on the other. On this view, the Kantian limitation of
self-presence to "inner sense" is transcended, the subject is found to
be accessible to himself not merely as empirically conscious but also as
intelligently and rationally conscious, and the Kantian charge of psy-
chologism is seen to be a petitio principii which begs the question of
conscious access and functions in philosophic dialogue to preserve the
disembodied isolation of the logical mind by restricting legitimate
evidence to definitions and relations within the conceptual field (339-
342). Accordingly, it is correct to deny legitimacy to the ad hominem
when the 'circumstances' to which appeal is made are those non-transcen-
dental, variable contents which have no bearing upon the truth or
falsity of the assertions made by an interlocutor. Moreover, appeals to
"other desires" are illegitimate, as are appeals to unauthentic subjec-
tivity or the external signs of it. But when the appeal that is made is
to the personal, transcendental 'circumstances' of this philosophical
interlocutor, constituted fundamentally by the spontaneous orientation
of intelligence and reasonableness, we have an instance of legitimate ad
hominem, or reversal. Finally, when appeal is made to variable contents
of the invariant dynamic structure, contents which do have some bearing
upon the truth or falsity of the assertions made, we do not have an ad
hominem argument at all but an ad rem argument which appeals to
premises, principles, and concessions explicitly or implicitly within
the conceptual field. No doubt a Kantian will insist that even these
so-called invariant 'circumstances,' if they do exist, are simply
matters of fact, not transcendental at all but merely phenomenal. In
that case, we can only observe that he has missed the point—a point
which, if grasped clearly, brings the attempt at reversal to fruition.
He simply exhibits in a more sophisticated manner that combined failure
which characterizes every counter-position: the failure to advert (i) to
oneself as subject and (ii) to the historical development of human
knowledge. It is difficult to determine, in this Kantian's case,
whether it is his blanket disregard for matters of concrete fact or his
document of contracted self-presence that does more to block his under-
standing. Lonergan's reversal, like Aristotle's "to the man" procedure
of getting the sceptic to talk, "derives its efficacy ... from the conditional necessity of contingent fact" and from "the nature, the natural spontaneities and natural inevitabilities, that go with that fact" (329).

III

CONTEMPORARY DEFENSES OF LEGITIMATE _AD HOMINEM_

The major ambiguity of 'circumstances' pervades contemporary discussions of informal fallacies. It is a function of the covert myth of mere subjectivity which appeared, in the modern Logical Tradition, in the Port Royal appropriation of Cartesian epistemology, underwent an expansion in the logical empiricist tradition, and exerts ongoing, occlusive influence through the peculiarly inconsistent preference of many contemporary philosophers for 'subject-freedom' in the performance of their dramatico-intellectual, cultural role. It is clear that this myth suffers repeated attacks from the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition (Radnitzky, 1970). However, it has also met indirect and direct, contemporary resistance from within the borders of the Logical Tradition. Familiarity with the salient features of this 'internal dissatisfaction' may serve the agent of reversal well in his encounters with 'the logical mind.' It is true that knowledge of the actual symptoms of recovery from this particular form of the flight from self-knowledge does not entail the discovery of a strategy that will be successful in every concrete case; but it may nevertheless enable the agent of reversal to proceed more deliberately and methodically in his concrete encounters. As a familiarity with the actual process of the subject's loss may prevent our being taken off guard and quickly disarmed, so a solid sense of the actual elements figuring in the process of the subject's self-retrieval may facilitate the invention of appropriate maneuvers in the shared 'here and now' of face-to-face dialogue.

Indirect resistance may be discerned in the retention, in this or that contemporary handbook, of a marginally legitimate, but commonly unexplored, form of _argumentum ad hominem_. Passmore and Black, for example, allude in their handbooks to the occasional legitimacy of some peculiar forms of the argument. Black remarks that the argument may be justifiably used against oneself to reveal "confusion of thought" and
against others to "shift the burden of proof" (1952: 237). Passmore dedicates an entire chapter to "self-refutation," discusses examples of the Lockean type of ad hominem, and makes mention of the "self-contradiction between asserting ... and what is asserted" (1961: 79-80). It is apparent that these legitimate forms are of only marginal interest, and one may attribute the peripheral nature of their treatment to the fact that a thorough exploration would eventually lead to the study of concrete dialogue and the resurrection of topics, and this would constitute a radical departure from the 'normal' habitat of formal logic. Renewed reflection upon 'argumentation' has also served to disrupt the studied isolation of the logical subject. Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation (Barth and Martens, 1982), for example, contains a series of enlightening studies of contentious dialogue, and many are filled with the same language of personal confrontation that vivifies Plato's "early dialogues." But the 'attacks' and 'defenses' are ad rem, and the dialogues under study are severely adumbrated sound-tracks; moreover, all but the most empirical of the studies takes for granted the uncritical aspiration to formalize the 'moves' and 'counter-moves' of face-to-face 'dialectic.' Hamblin's very useful Fallacies exhibits a similar defect inasmuch as it is an attempt to develop a logical formalization of fallacies in opposition to the standard procedure of mere classification. His reiterated complaint about the traditional treatment of fallacies is revealing:

One of the main reproaches that could be brought against the study of fallacies is that it has always remained an appendage, insecurely connected with the main part of Logic. A new classification of fallacies does nothing to remedy this; and, if the subject [that is, the study of fallacies] cannot be brought into closer relation with the rest of Logic, a radical reappraisal, either of the study of fallacies, or of the rest of Logic, is called for (191; italics added).

Besides these rather weak 'moves' against the logicist's commitment there are the efforts of C. I. Lewis and H. Johnstone, both of whom have pulled the fringe-commitment into the light of day and have tentatively relativized the logical ideal against a quasi-transcendental background. Lewis, via pragmatism's respect for binding and inescapable practical commitments, employs a notion of pragmatic inconsistency. Johnstone, by way of rhetorical studies and a quasi-Kierkegaardian con-
ception of the self, employs a notion of pragmatic contradiction. An obvious measure of the willingness of these two thinkers to break down the separation of concrete, existing thinkers from their thoughts is their unabashed use of the very name "ad hominem" to designate the most fundamental ethical (Lewis) and philosophical (Johnstone) arguments.

A. Ad Hominem in the Ethical Sphere: Lewis

Lewis's discussion of pragmatic inconsistency constitutes the critical cornerstone of his ethical reflections. When the notion arises, it does so in conjunction with allusions to the difficulties posed by sceptical and cynical challenges to the distinction between right and wrong. Lonergan's treatment of performative contradiction, on the other hand, emerges within the confines of epistemological and metaphysical reflection and then re-emerges in his discussion of the problem of ethical liberation. Nevertheless, Lewis's treatment is relevant to the topic at hand: he distinguishes clearly between logical and pragmatic inconsistency; he explicitly relativizes logic against a background we are inclined to call transcendental; he explores the effective limitations of his brand of ad hominem; and, finally, he betrays a continuing, problematic involvement with the Logical Tradition and its ideal of rigorous, clear, and precise techniques of dialogical implementation by reacting to the failure of his ad hominem with recurrent, albeit humorous, allusions to the need for something like a 'cosmopolitan police force.'

In Lewis's view, logical consistency is simply one species of practical consistency:

To be logically consistent is merely to be self-consistent in this practical matter of the taking or refusing of commitments to believe. To be consistent in concluding and believing is simply to avoid such active commitments which conflict (1969: 122).

Pragmatic inconsistency, on the other hand, is illustrated by the Liar Paradox on which modern logicians have cut their teeth.
Consider Epimenides the Cretan, who announced that all Cretans are liars. Various acute logicians have been busy over this paradox of the liar, trying to find the root of the matter. And none of them has produced a solution with which some others did not promptly find some fault. There is no logical contradiction in "I am a Cretan and all Cretans are liars." The contradiction in this historic form of the paradox lies in the act of Epimenides in asserting that all members of a class to which he admittedly belonged are unreliable in what they assert. That act of assertion falls into a pragmatic contradiction (1969: 124-125).

A pragmatic respect for concrete fact is evident in Lewis's attribution of significance to Epimenides' act, and so also is an implicit appreciation of the major ambiguity of the notion of 'circumstances' which is tied traditionally to the conception of ad hominem. Lewis explicitly places logic—and so also the conceptual field which is its domain of technical employment—within the broader field of action. Then, in a discussion of the type of argument which exploits pragmatic inconsistencies, he grants the field of action fundamental status:

This type of argument is ... an argumentum ad hominem, ad hominem in the sense in which 'hominem' may be spelled with a capital and means to denote the genus homo. It appeals to facts about the common nature of man which are open to all of us in a reflective examination of the kind of creatures that we are, and which I think that any such examination which is judicious must compel us to recognize as the truth about ourselves ... (1969: 79-80).

Again:

There is no final proof of the validity of any species of norms except by appeal to what is involved in being human, and an active, self-governing being (1969: 82).

However, while the pragmatic field is fundamental, and so sublates logical procedures, the logical interlocutor's attention is not easily drawn to it. How is one to bring about in the logical interlocutor the "judicious examination" which "compels self-recognition"? Lewis frankly admits that his ad hominem argument is also a petitio principii, and in doing so he anticipates the likely objection of the more flexible type of logician who might go so far as to acknowledge that the pragmatic ad
hominem is marginally interesting. After struggling for some time with the objection, however, he finally concludes that

no conclusion about the right ... can be drawn from premises which do not themselves explicitly or implicitly, say anything about the right ... In consequence, what is most general, most comprehensive in its scope, most nearly ultimate, concerning any topic, cannot be proved at all, unless by some form of observation or some reductio ad absurdum of denying it. And though it may not have been generally remarked, it is nevertheless the fact that even such proof by the method of reductio ad absurdum, when addressed to ultimates, must be, in a queer kind of way, a begging of the question (1969: 81-82).

Lewis apparently assumes that prior commitment to the conceptual field of logical argumentation not only militates against but in fact precludes the "form of observation" that would render his ad hominem successful; and this assumption reflects his own residual commitment to the agenda set by the Logical Tradition. He sees no prospect of effectively embarrassing, and so of successfully reversing, the logical interlocutor who is guilty of pragmatic inconsistency, and he advocates half-seriously the employment of the argumentum ad baculum:

One who argues that there are no binding imperatives of action intends an assertion, but vitiates any possible serious import of anything he says. He will be properly answered if we tell him we are not amused, or say to one another, "What was that noise; let us go find it and put a stop to it." If, for the moment, we should suppose he tells the truth in his own case, then we must find he has no business interrupting our serious and responsible search for truth. And he who repudiates all imperatives cannot, if the repudiation is genuine, be dealt with by arguing. He can but be persuaded with a club, since that may alter his emotions. When the appeal to reason has no effect, force is the only arbiter (1970: 227; see also 124).

We are reminded of Lonergan's allusions to the self-disqualification of inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, irresponsible somnambulists, to the self-amputation of transcendental subjectivity by psychopaths (1972: 17-18); and we may recall his suggestion that subjects so radically self-alienated are not only immune to argument but also to psychoanalytic therapy. However, inasmuch as our present concern is not the reversal of the flight from understanding in the full range of its manifestations and the humanly insurmountable problems that attend it but
the reversal of counter-positions in a strictly philosophic milieu, we are obliged to regard Lewis's proposed response to the proponent of an ethical counter-position as basically disingenuous. We suppose that the counter-positional interlocutor "tells the truth in his own case," we take him at his word, only in a desperate reaction to the dismal failure of earlier, dialogue-preserving 'moves.' Despite its humorous character, Lewis's response reflects the pervasive "general bias" that may infect even self-proclaimed agents of cosmopolis, that would make correct ideas operative either by enforcing agreement or by forcing those who disagree onto the fringes (Lonergan, 1958: 238-239). In the context of the problem of ethical liberation, Lonergan writes:

No doubt, if there is to be the appeal to force, then it is better that the force be directed by wisdom than by folly, by benevolence than by malevolence. But the appeal to force is a counsel of despair. So far from solving the problem, it regards the problem as insoluble (1958: 632).

Lewis has mounted an admirable campaign against the myth of mere subjectivity, as that myth functions in the excessive logicism of contemporary meta-ethical analysis, by introducing the notion of pragmatic inconsistency, by relativizing logical argumentation against a factual, quasi-transcendental background. But he has not overcome completely the Logical Tradition whose limits he manages to expose, and so he remains vulnerable, if not to the Lonerganian reversal, at least to the charge of not going far enough.

B. Ad Hominem in Philosophy: Johnstone

The nuanced position of H. Johnstone cannot be handled with complete fairness in any abbreviated discussion. Johnstone stands virtually alone among rhetorical theorists in focusing attention upon the rhetoric of philosophy. It is much more common nowadays to encounter the traditional emphasis of political and courtroom rhetoric (Johannesen, 1971), an emphasis which reflects the ancient distinction between the syllogistic argumentation appropriate to 'science' and the informal argumentation which permeates polis-life. Johnstone has virtually transcended this distinction, loosened his grip on the myth of mere
subjectivity, and reintroduced the philosophic subject into philosophic
dialogue. He opens The Problem of the Self, a quasi-positional expa-
sion of his philosophic stance, with an interesting recollection of his
'turn':

A long time ago I participated in an evening of philosophic
discussion in the home of a colleague. When the evening was
over, I came home in the company of two other colleagues who had
also been involved in the discussion. One of them turned to the
other and, referring to our erstwhile host, said, "He doesn't
see that the self is a problem." This remark puzzled me. I was
sure that my colleague did not mean merely that the self posed
a problem. He meant that the self was a problem—that its nature
was to be a problem. This book is an attempt to understand what
it could mean to call the self a problem in this sense. In the
course of writing it, I have come to agree with this charac-
terization of the self, although, if pressed, I might prefer to
identify the self as the acceptance of a problem. But in the
more trenchant if more cryptic language of my former colleague,
I would now wish to say that if there is a problem of the self,
its solution is that the self is a problem (1970: xi).

For our illustrative purposes, it will be sufficient to mention the
following aspects of Johnstone's position in their relations to the
Logical Tradition and its banishment of the legitimate ad hominem: his
notion of pragmatic contradiction; his relativization of conceptual
relations against a Kantian-type transcendental background with some
Kierkegaardian qualities; his insistence that Lockean ad hominem is the
only valid and the only effective argument in philosophy; his sensi-
tivity to a meta-argument ad hominem which may be employed legitimately
by a self-contradictory interlocutor; and, finally, his residual ten-
dency to think about philosophic dialogue in terms that reflect an
agenda set by the Logical Tradition.

The notion of contradiction, says Johnstone, "is not merely a
syntactical concept":

It is rather a pragmatic concept, one that refers to the action
of a person. It arises because a person not only can utter
expressions which syntactically are contradictions but also can
take deliberate steps toward justifying from one and the same
point of view, each side of such a contradiction (1970: 11).

Pragmatic contradictions, then, are revealed in the subject's relation
to his own syntactical contradictions; they are "brought about through
the action of a concrete person" (1970: 20). Moreover, while syntactical and logical contradictions are best eliminated, some types of pragmatic contradictions are uneliminable:

Consider the statement "I am responsible for that misunderstanding." This presupposes "If I had acted or spoken differently, that misunderstanding would not have occurred." This in turn ... presupposes "There could be someone the same as me except having acted or spoken differently on a certain occasion." This is a contradiction. I must accept it if I am to accept the statement about my responsibility. If I do not accept it, I shall be in the position of supposing that I could not have acted or spoken differently, so that the misunderstanding was unavoidable. But if it was unavoidable, I am not responsible (1970: 64).

It follows that it is not pragmatic contradiction per se that points up the need for a transcendental relativization of the logical field but logical contradiction; for even syntactical contradictions are conceived adequately only by recourse to the concept of the self. The inevitable pragmatic contradiction which underlies syntactical contradictions requires "a unity that is to be found only in the person":

The two concepts of person and contradiction are related in the indissolubly circular way that in philosophy is sometimes characterized as dialectical. Each presupposes the other (1970: 11).

Thus, Johnstone's appeal to the 'transcendental'—his implicit recognition of the major ambiguity of 'circumstances' which I have exposed—differs significantly from that of Lewis. The self is evoked, says Johnstone, by the recognition of syntactical inconsistency within a single conceptual system or, alternatively, by engagement in philosophic dialogue which requires that one function as a "partisan" of contradictory philosophic systems (1970: 11). The concept of the self, as a locus of the "tension" involved in "accepting a contradiction and acknowledging that it is a contradiction" (1970: 20, n3), arises as a logically necessary precondition of the recognition of syntactical contradictions. Johnstone's 'transcendental' background, then, more closely resembles the Kantian universal and necessary conditions of possibility than the factual, invariant preconditions of Lonergan; although his attribution of an essential "tension" to the self recalls Kierkegaard's self that is a relation which relates itself to its own
self and Lonergan's account of "genuineness" which is the admission of the tension of the existential gap into consciousness (Lonergan, 1958: 477).

Johnstone's interest in contradiction and his attendant concept of self arise from his reflection upon the problem of communication posed by the existence of "incommensurable philosophical systems" (1970: 134):

It has often been held that between two rival philosophical systems there is at least sometimes a gulf which neither position can cross if it insists on pursuing the discussion in its own terms ... The partisan of each system is, in principle, incapable of conceiving the system espoused by the other ... Philosophical positions are not hypotheses. If one frames a hypothesis, one can regard a rival hypothesis as a possibility. But one does not take a philosophical position as the result of choosing among positions regarded as possible. The position one takes is really the only one that one sees as possible; and one sees one's rivals' positions, accordingly, as impossible. But one cannot conceive the impossible.

It is with this problem in mind that there arises Johnstone's claim that the ad hominem is the only valid and the only effective argument in philosophy (1978: 54):

What I am trying to develop at this point is an argument about arguments—a meta-argument. According to this meta-argument, if we assume that a philosophical position defines what it is to be a fact, and therefore cannot attack another position ad rem, then the only way in which it can engage in such an attack is ad hominem ... Only a nonfallacious appeal can be so used. Thus it must also be assumed that argumentum ad hominem is sometimes nonfallacious. It is so, according to the meta-argument, when it points to an actual inconsistency between the intentions of a thinker espousing the position under attack and that position itself (1978: 51).

As Johnstone's 'transcendental' background is not a dynamically invariant fact but a logically deduced precondition, so the "intentions" to be contrasted with the "espoused position" are not spontaneous, performative inevitabilities but implicit premises within a closed but inadequately analyzed conceptual field. His ad hominem is both "to the man" in the most general sense and in the Lockean sense of an appeal to this man's conceptual consistency (1978: 54). However, it is similar to Lonergan's reversal and Lewis's ad hominem; for, if it does not recog-
nize the concrete possibility of an interlocutor's advertence to his de facto subjectivity, it does promote the recognition by the inconsistent interlocutor of his inescapable pragmatic self-contradiction, and this in turn serves to relativize his conceptual field against the background of his problematic self, occasioning perhaps a change of mind.

Like Lewis, Johnstone acknowledges the existence of incorrigible and excessively resistant interlocutors. In this connection he introduces the notions of the "schizophrenic" and the "meta-argumentum ad hominem" (1970: 144-45). The "schizophrenic" is the interlocutor who "sometimes sees his opponent's view as logically possible and sometimes sees it as logically impossible, but sees no contradiction," and he can safely be ignored. The acutely resistant interlocutor, on the other hand, is to be respected, for he has at his disposal a legitimate meta-argument ad hominem that consists in pointing out that in order to use argumentum ad hominem one must stand both inside one's view and outside it. The price the philosophical critic must pay for his use of argumentum ad hominem is to be subject to this meta-argumentum ad hominem. If he refuses to pay this price his talk becomes mere schizophrenic babble. It takes a self to evoke a self.

The agent of ad hominem must stand both inside his own view and outside it, in explicitly recognized pragmatic contradiction, if he wishes to be successful in his attempt to bring about not merely a "correction of errors" but a similar "ecstasis" in his interlocutor (1970: 145).

Finally, Johnstone's rather one-sided emphasis of the notion of 'contradiction,' his Kantian interpretation of the major ambiguity of 'circumstances,' his notion of philosophical positions as closed conceptual systems, and his focusing of his ad hominem appeal upon variable contents within the conceptual field reflect a residual logicism that weakens his position. Indeed, in Johnstone's view, if Hume went too far in concluding that the self does not exist, he was right in asserting that it "does not exist as a bearer of subjectivity, a substance, a role, or a locus of freedom or identity" (1970: 41). On the other hand, Johnstone's resistance, whatever its ultimate limitations may turn out to be upon closer study, invites support and development. His own philosophic position, it appears, does not fit his own definition of philosophic positions: it is not a closed conceptual system but an open
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expectation of revision toward firmer grounding. Similarly, his own philosophic performance exhibits both the integrator's logic and the operator's system—transcending dialectic (Lonergan, 1958: 275).

I have attempted to bring to light the historical context into which Lonergan's agent of reversal must step, a context which hinders radically that agent's efforts to reverse counter-positions. The failure or refusal of the traditional interlocutor to acknowledge a deeper foundation than the conceptual field and a higher court of appeal than logical coherence and consistency—his traditional truncation—effectively blocks not only this or that effort at reversal but also the emergence of true philosophic community. It is this historical preference for conceptual integration that drove Hamblin, in his history of the treatment of informal fallacies, to the border of Transcendental Method; and it is this same preference which caused him to settle there, still dissatisfied. But if the logician's myth of mere subjectivity constitutes an objective limitation on the effectiveness of the agent of reversal, his effectiveness is still further limited by his own failure to do more than to establish temporary camps beyond the borders of the Logical Tradition and then to launch relatively sporadic and innocuous attacks. The lesson to be learned from our frequent failures, I think, is that we must reflectively depart from the Logical Tradition altogether, become fully at home in Transcendental Method (Lonergan, 1972: 14), and then 'return,' like Socrates to his own trial, as perplexingly familiar and well-informed 'barbarians' (Apology 17a-d) who obviously know our logical way around and so receive from our interlocutors a grudging respect for and attention to our foreign yet transcendental habits. The agent who wishes to increase as much as possible the effectiveness of his appeal to transcendental subjectivity would do well to take seriously Lonergan's advice:

Against the flight from understanding half measures are of no avail. Only a comprehensive strategy can be successful. To disregard any stronghold of the flight from understanding is to leave intact a base from which a counter-offensive promptly will be launched (1958: xiv).
About the Lonerganian reversal and its employment in any historical context much more could be said. But I shall restrict myself to an indication of directions for further study that the aspiring agent of reversal may find fruitful. Serious attention should be given, I think, to the comparison and contrast of the argumentative and dialogical contexts; to the precariousness of the agent's own self-knowledge and the legitimacy of Johnstone's meta-argument _ad hominem_; to the limits imposed upon attempts to conceive the process of reversal by cultural variations, the infinity of possible aberrations, and its concrete dramatic context; to the 'detached involvement,' as it were, of the agent of reversal and its distinction from the excessive detachment of the Medieval Obligation Game, for example, and from the excessive attachment of sophistical refutation; to the comparison and contrast of Lonergan's reversal with Habermas's "unmasking" and Kierkegaard's "indirect communication."
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THE PROMISE OF NARRATIVE THEOLOGY:
A STRATEGY OF COMMUNICATION

John Navone

What is narrative theology? In this lecture I shall attempt an answer that question based on my work in this field, beginning with Everyman's Odyssey: Seven Plays Seen as Modern Myths About Man's Quest for Personal Integrity (1974) and continuing through Towards a Theology of Story (1977), The Jesus Story: Our Life as Story in Christ (1979), Tellers of the Word, coauthored with Thomas Cooper (1981), to Gospel Love: A Narrative Theology (1984).

The appropriateness of this subject for a Lonergan Workshop stems from the influence that Bernard Lonergan has had on the development of narrative theology. "Narrative Theology: A Contribution to Fundamental Theology"—Robert Peevey’s successfully defended doctoral dissertation for the Theology Department of Gregorian University (1983)—traces the impact of Bernard Lonergan on for American narrative theologians: John Dunne, Michael Novak, John Haught, and myself.

There is more to story than just story; there is more to narrative theology than narratives. Narrative theology is not to be confused with the art of telling stories that one might acquire in a creative writing course for the preparation of homilies; rather, it is a Christian anthropology which is primarily concerned about our learning to know God, in the biblical sense of a covenant love relationship, through participation in the life of the crucified and risen Christ and his covenant community. If the Word of God incarnate is the life story of God, the narrative theologian will critically reflect on that story for learning to know God. The world of interiority, that realm of divine and human love at the integrating center of Jesus Christ’s interpersonal life with all divine and human others, his knowing God, is expressed and communicated in the gospel narratives which are basically stories told that we, too, might share that world and be fully transformed by it at the depths of our intra- and interpersonal and social lives. The narrative theologian critically reflects on the gospel narratives with all
the resources of his or her world of interiority, ever more fully to appropriate that of Jesus Christ for the achievement of human authenticity in the self-transcendence of Christian conversion both as event and as life-long process. The gospel narratives both express and address the world of conscious and intersubjective interiority for the radical transformation of human life at every level and in every dimension. This theologian employs the transcendental method and theory of both Bernard Lonergan and Karl Rahner to mediate his understanding of the world of interiority expressed and communicated in the gospel narratives. Even though there is no explicit reference made to them, their transcendental anthropology is operative throughout my narrative theology of the lex narrandi, lex credendi at the heart of our knowing the covenant-creating and the covenant-sustaining God of the historical Judeo-Christian revelation by freely and responsibly choosing to live covenant-creating and covenant-sustaining lives of unrestricted and self-transcending covenant love for all (as opposed to covenant-destructive lives). Their transcendental anthropology is especially operative in my interpretation of the transformational character of the gospel narratives as symbolizing four interrelated dimensions of human authenticity to be achieved in response to the grace and demand of God's unrestricted love and the realm of his transcendent love to which all humankind is constitutively oriented.

Some notions derived from Lonergan's work, which I shall not attempt here to explain, that are presuppositions for my narrative theology are the following. Human authenticity is achieved in self-transcendence; it is never a secure possession; it is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity. The prior and immediate word that is God's gift of his love and the outer word of scripture and our religious effort towards authenticity in fidelity to God himself, drawing us to the realm of his transcendent love in and through his word. Lonergan's understanding of religious and Christian conversion, his intentionality analysis, his notion of faith as the knowledge born of religious love—all are central presuppositions of my narrative theology.

Some Rahnerian notions that are presupposed in my narrative theology are the following. The categorical pertains to that dimension of human experience which is historically particular and concrete; the specific content of everyday knowledge and decision-making, as distinguished from its transcendental openness to the wholeness of being.
Transcendence in human experience is the characteristic dynamism of the human spirit, whether in knowledge or in love or in freedom, to move beyond any particular or finite being toward a context or horizon (ultimately, God) which gives it final coherence and value. Our life stories and their narrative expressions reflect the transcendental-categorical structure of human consciousness. Our transcendental awareness, the world of our interiority, seeks objectification in external interaction with other persons and with our environment, with the tendency to manifest itself in all the dimensions of our life story. There is no purely spiritual, individual, unhistorical human life story; for we are bodily, social, and historical. Our various objectifications in concept, language, symbol, action, and such can never exhaust this transcendental dimension; they reflect it and can modify and intensify it. Even our most spiritual knowledge involves the work of imagination; there is no purely transcendental knowing for there is no thought without image. Our categorical experience is structured by these images and by their employment in our narratives. Our human development is facilitated by an improved imaginative formulation of who we are in the symbols and narratives which help to structure our experience because they represent true understandings of our historical experience. We are symbolizers. We not only employ symbols to express and structure our world in our narratives, but we are symbolic in our very constitution (life-story ground for our narrative interpretation). The human body is the symbol of the human spirit and its world of interiority. We possess an essential orientation to absolute mystery which is always present whether we explicitly recognize it or not and whether we accept it or reject it. Our genuine transcendental awareness will always and necessarily objectify itself in various degrees ranging from our feelings through narrative, and external action. The narrative quality of our complex experience of the Mystery that both pervades and transcends our lives, whether rightly or wrongly interpreted, inescapably contains a religious dimension that grounds narrative theology.

Knowing God (in the biblical sense), for Rahner, always rests upon the order of our love or disorder. It is not as if we first of all knew God in a neutral fashion, subsequently considering whether to adopt a loving or hating attitude towards him. Such a neutral knowledge, such "objectivity," is an abstraction of the philosophers; for our concrete knowledge of God is always determined from the start by the way in which
we love and treasure the things presented to us, including ourselves. On the basis of the gospel truth Rahner affirms that in accepting ourselves, we also accept Jesus, because in Jesus God has accepted us. Furthermore, in loving our neighbor we fulfill the law, because God himself has become our neighbor, and so what is both nearest and transcendent at once is accepted and loved in every neighbor. Accepting responsibility for our neighbor and for ourselves before God evidences authentic covenant love and human maturity according to the spiritual pedagogy of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The stories of God of this tradition seek to inculcate and sustain such co-responsibility among the covenant people in order that they might truly learn to know God (in the biblical sense). "To be or not to be," in this tradition, is ultimately a question of knowing God in the community of his covenant-love. Telling the story of their lived experience of God's love is central to the liturgy of the covenant people, Jewish and Christian; they exist because God loves them; they have a life story whose origin, direction, and destiny is God himself. Hearing God's word of love in one's own life story entails hearing that same word in the lives of one's covenant brothers and sisters of both past and present generations and of looking forward to the fulfillment of its promise. Revealed and communicated in Jesus Christ and the gospel narratives is the God who is already and always, in the offer of his self-communication in the Holy Spirit of his love, in us as the question and the answer in one, even when they remain unspoken; therefore the proclamation of Jesus and the gospel tells only what we already are and what we are called to be under the sovereignty of God's unrestricted and universal law. As a narrative theologian, I am committed to a critical reflection on the interiority-objectivizing and interiority-communicating life story of Jesus Christ and his covenant brothers and sisters, expressed paradigmatically in the biblical narratives, with a view to knowing God (in the biblical sense) more deeply and having life most fully through the gift of his covenant-creating and covenant-sustaining love for all humankind.

The title of this book, Gospel Love, is inspired by a dictum of Wittgenstein, to the effect that if we claim to know something and cannot give a single example of it, perhaps we do not know what we are talking about. When the community of new covenant love claims to know God, it points to the Good News that is Jesus Christ, and affirms that "God is Love." This is what we mean by "love," human and divine; and we
judge the authenticity of our lives in the light of that love; for there is nothing authentically human or divine apart from that.

Narrative theology is the sustained reflection of the theologian on the way we react to and appropriate the story of Jesus into our own stories. The life of Jesus and his community of faith is a story, the universal story of all human persons, whether they know it or not. Narrative theology is about human and divine subjects who relate to each other through telling and listening to the stories that make up the world in which we live. "Silence is golden" when it enables us to attend to Someone who speaks. If all telling of and listening to stories is a matter of relating, then the greatest story will be the greatest relating; the story that undergrounds all other stories will be a story of universal and unrestricted love. Narrative theology attempts to underscore the self-investing love of God made manifest in Jesus, a love that creates, sustains, and brings to fulfillment all the partial, incomplete, and imperfect stories that we tell each other. When we withdraw completely from the world of loving relationships that make up a truly human life, we lapse into catatonia—a terrible, all-negating silence. In the gospel stories Jesus makes the devils speak as a prelude to their being cast out. The image of a total silence, a total absence of storytelling and storylistening, is an image of absolute evil, the total negation of God, who, through Jesus and in the Spirit, is a Word spoken and a Love shared.

Narrative theology excludes any modernist or reductionist interpretation of theological anthropology, which seems to suggest that theological doctrines are to be viewed as statements about merely human realities. Rather, it is based on the position that humankind is for God, that religion is intrinsic to authentic humanism, and that in theology the theocentric and the anthropocentric coincide; so it is that all theological statements are to be matched by statements of their meaning in human terms. Narrative theology employs the category of story to bring to life theological truth through a contemporary apprehension of personal and social reality in all its concreteness. It aims to provide a wealth of new insights into what it means to be human.

I have chosen to write a narrative theology because I am convinced that all human stories are implicitly meant to communicate loving and interpersonal and social relationships that ultimately are embraced by the value and mystery of a loving God. All human stories are meant
to be "theological." We need theological stories because we are fundamentally interpersonal and because, if the Christian God's promise is true, we are fundamentally related to God as person. Since story is the only means by which our interpersonal and social reality can be expressed in its cognitive and affective fullness and since our relationship to God is fundamentally interpersonal and social, it follows that storytelling and storylistening provide the most appropriate means of enabling us to live this relationship. The Christian story celebrates life, living in, and being lived in by, the author of life. Being religious is living in the friendship of God, and sensing the fullness of life in his love. The heart of the Christian life is to dwell in the creative and sustaining love of God, and we express this indwelling in no other way than in loving God and our neighbor. Christian conversion, both as event and life-long process, is a story of learning how to dwell in a loving God who loves all. More precisely, it is a story of learning how to let God be the loving God that he is by allowing him to dwell within and among us, to enable us to give ourselves to each other in his love.

Narrative theology helps to prevent agnostic interpretation of Christianity by reminding us that the Christian community originates with an historical revelation; that God reveals himself in human stories and transforms them through the grace and demand of his love. Four gospel narratives express how this transforming love, given to all humankind, can be effectively operative in our lives for the achievement of human authenticity. We shall know the indwelling Spirit of the Father and Son—the God who is Love—in our costly commitment to God through our service of others, whether they be within or outside the new covenant community. The family that works, works for others as well. The covenant community works when it communicates God's love for all, recognizing the drawing power of His love in the infinite desire and questioning of all.
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In 1974 I introduced the term "psychological conversion" in my Loneran Workshop paper entitled "On the Possibility and Desirability of a Christian Psychotherapy" (Tyrrell, 1978: 164). In Christotherapy II I attribute to certain forms of communication a special therapeutic role in effecting psychological conversion. In this 1984 Loneran Workshop paper I will first discuss some major aspects of psychological conversion and then consider certain key methods of healing which help to bring about psychological conversion. These methods of healing are either forms of communication or types of discerning understanding which are conveyed to others through specific modes of communication.

After my introduction of the notion of psychological conversion in my 1974 paper I continued to grow in my understanding of the phenomenon, and in Christotherapy II I defined it first in a general way as "a shift from a basically neurotic way of existing and functioning to a dominantly healthy state" (1982: 17). I then went on to define in precise terms what I understood by neurosis:

Neurotic deformation consists in either or both of the following states: (1) a person's deeply felt sense of being unlovable and worthless, and accompanying destructive, largely unrecognized attitudes and self-defeating strategies for dealing with this negative self-image; (2) severe repression in a person and/or other destructive effects and expressions of miseducation which cause great psychic discomfort, and impair the ability to function well in the give-and-take of everyday life (1982: 55).

As my definition of neurosis indicates, there are various forms of neurosis. It follows that since psychological conversion consists in the healing of neurosis there are also various forms of psychological
conversion. It is, for example, one thing to be healed of a deeply felt sense of being unlovable and a quite different thing to be healed of a severe repression. But in both instances a genuine form of psychological conversion is involved.

Psychological conversion in its various forms always involves a healing in the area of feelings. The healing in the feeling area can be accompanied by healing in the areas of self-image and self-concept, attitudes and beliefs, memories, decisions and behavior.

Since feelings play such a central role in psychological conversion it is important critically to understand and judge what it is we are doing when we feel. This attempt to achieve a correct, critical understanding of the nature of the feeling process is an extension of the self-appropriation process of transcendental method as articulated in Lonergan's *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. As a task it is quite distinct from the self-appropriation of feelings that takes place in therapy. In the latter case the concern is not with the structure of the feeling process as such but with the particular feelings and aberrations in feelings present in a specific individual. Of course, a correct understanding of the nature of the feeling process itself can be quite helpful for the facilitation of psychological conversion insofar as it involves the healing of feeling aberrations in the neurotic sufferer. For this reason I would like now to discuss the nature of feelings and the feeling process.

My attempt to understand and verify the nature of the feeling process had its roots in a special way in my reflections on psychotherapeutic processes I experienced. I began with the self-appropriation of my own feelings in therapy and, as healing occurred, I commenced to reflect on the nature of the feeling process itself. My first extremely brief written comments on the nature of the feeling process appeared in *Christotherapy*. In a series of subsequent articles I continued to reflect at greater length on the nature of the feeling process and I offered my most recent thoughts on the matter in *Christotherapy II*.

My views on the nature of feelings and on the dynamics of the feeling process are in basic harmony, I believe, with those of Bernard Lonergan, especially as developed in *Method in Theology* and subsequent articles. I do not wish to imply that my understanding of the feeling process is necessarily in conflict with Lonergan's view of feelings as
presented in *Insight*. But in my own systematic articulation of the nature of feeling I draw more on the Lonergan of Method than I do on the Lonergan of *Insight*. Most importantly, I find a number of Lonergan's more recent reflections on feelings particularly compatible (explicitly or implicitly) with some current interpretations of aspects of the feeling process which I consider especially insightful. In what immediately follows I would like to offer a summary explanation of the nature of feelings and the feeling process.

First, feelings can be divided into feeling states and feelings as intentional responses to what is intended, represented, apprehended. Fatigue and anxiety are examples of the former. An experience of joy at the sight of the beloved or of fear in the presence of the enemy are examples of the latter. Further, feelings as intentional responses are divided into those which regard objects that are satisfying or dissatisfying, pleasant or unpleasant, and those which regard values. In the latter case there is a hierarchy of values to which feelings respond. This hierarchy in ascending order includes vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values.

Second, feelings, although basically spontaneous, can be strengthened or weakened, encouraged or discouraged, by focusing on the objects that arouse them. An appreciative discerning and cherishing of the value of certain objects can bring about not only a deepening in feeling response but an actual modification in one's value preference. Likewise, a diagnostic discerning or negative aspects of certain objects can discourage a particular feeling response.

Third, attitudes play a vital role in the determination of feeling responses. Lonergan speaks, for example, of the need to pay attention to one's feelings, no matter how deplorable they may be, in order to "uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude" (Lonergan, 1972: 33). I believe that any attempt at an explanatory approach to the nature of feeling must take into account the rich contribution which the cognitive therapists have made regarding the role of attitudes in the generation, modification and education of feeling responses. If it is true that symbols evoke feelings and are evoked by feelings it is also true that attitudes can evoke feelings and be evoked by feelings. Of course, as Lonergan
reminds us in *Insight*, "nearly all we say is metaphor" (1957: 545), which suggests that there can at times be a profound intertwining of symbols and attitudes.

Fourth, feelings precisely as felt or merely experienced belong in the zone "of what is conscious but not objectified" (1972: 34). It is, in other words, one thing to experience a feeling and a quite distinct conscious reality to understand and judge the nature of a feeling. But for the realization of self-knowledge the process of objectifying a feeling is quite important. Besides feelings that are merely experienced and feelings that are objectified there are also feelings that "have been snapped off by repression to lead thereafter an unhappy subterranean life" (1972: 32).

Lonergan in *Method in Theology* and certain later writings in my opinion made an important breakthrough with his discovery that our only option is not between the strictly unconscious and the conscious. Under the influence of Karen Horney, Wilhelm Stekel, and others Lonergan concluded that there exist different levels of consciousness at which a feeling that is conscious but not objectified can exist. Lonergan cites Karen Horney who writes that

> there is not strict alternative between conscious and unconscious, but there are ... several levels of consciousness. Not only is the repressed impulse still effective—one of the basic discoveries of Freud—but also in a deeper level of consciousness the individual knows about its presence (1976: 73).

Lonergan also quotes Wilhelm Stekel who writes:

> Our thinking is a polyphony. There are always several thoughts working simultaneously, one of which is the bearer of the leading voice. The other thoughts represent the medium and low voices (1976: 73-74).

Lonergan's discovery that feelings and the images and thoughts which mediate these feelings can exist at various levels "in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified" (1972: 34) is corroborated by cognitive therapists such as Dr. Aaron Beck, who discovered in his patients the existence of thoughts and "internal signals in a linguistic or visual form" (1976: 37) to which the patient does not
ordinarily advert, perhaps because he of she is not fully conscious of them (1976: 34). Of course, for Lonergan, it is not enough simply to assert the occurrence of these various "thoughts" or "voices" within the twilight zone of consciousness. Rather, as he tersely observes, "in matters psychological what really cinches the issue is one's own personal experience" (1976: 74). In applying the transcendental method of self-appropriation to the area of feelings the ultimate test consists not only in experiencing the occurrence in the twilight zone of consciousness of feelings, thoughts and images, but also in understanding and verifying the reality of these occurrences.

With a basic understanding of the nature of the feeling process in mind we are in a better position to understand the nature of psychological conversion, since it always involves in its various forms a certain healing of neurotic disturbances in the area of feelings. To keep this paper within reasonable length I will limit myself to a consideration of the type of psychological conversion which involves the healing of a person's deeply felt sense of being unloveable and of the self-destructive attitudes and strategies for living which the person develops as a result of feeling unloveable and worthless.

Rejection or extrinsic valuation—being loved for what one can do or become rather than for oneself—are the principal causes of the neurotic deformation which consists in the existence in an individual of the basic state of feeling personally unloveable and worthless. Rejection or extrinsic valuation are also the root cause of the occurrence in the consciousness of the rejected or extrinsically valued individual of erroneous imaginings and thoughts about his or her multiple inadequacies. These imaginings, thoughts, attitudes—often occurring as "lower voices" in consciousness—evoke deep feelings of sadness, anger, fear, guilt, jealousy, envy, resentment. This turmoil of feelings in the twilight zone of consciousness in turn generates further imaginings, thoughts, attitudes regarding one's worthlessness, inadequacy, and failure as a person. And so the vicious cycle repeats itself in a downward spiral of ever intensifying misery. And also the gap continues to widen between the real truth about the person's worth and loveableness and the false imaginings and misconceptions of self which pervade the consciousness of the sufferer and create an ever more negative self-image and self-concept.
Unfortunately, those who reject or extrinsically value the person (most often a child) also generally provide him or her with inauthentic criteria for acceptance. Thus, for example, parents or parent-substitutes reward the child when he or she performs well and punish when the performance is poor. In this case the rejected individual can spend his or her life attempting to succeed at various endeavors in order to come at last to a state of feeling genuinely loveable and worthwhile. But the tragedy is that no amount of success can confer on an individual an authentic sense of being truly loveable and worthwhile. This means that the individual who endlessly strives for success after success as a means of arriving at a deep sense of being loveable will never experience this state of psychological fulfillment but will instead experience new and deeper frustrations. This can lead to more desperate searches for a sense of being loveable which express themselves in forms of behavior often at variance with the person's conscience. The "affection-hunters" (Evoy, 72), for example, will often tend to engage in manipulative forms of behavior and the end result will be deeper disappointment, rejection, and more tortuous experiences of guilt.

At the beginning of this paper I defined psychological conversion as a shift from a fundamentally neurotic way of existing and functioning to a dominantly healthy state. I next indicated that just as there are different forms of neurosis so there are diverse forms of psychological conversion. Since feeling disturbances are central to the various forms of neurosis I sought to explain in summary fashion the nature of feelings and the feeling process. Finally I described in some detail one specific form of neurosis which is to be healed through the process of psychological conversion appropriate to it.

The type of psychological conversion appropriate to the form of neurosis I have described above consists in the shift from a felt sense of being unloveable and worthless to a deeply felt sense of being loveable and worthwhile. It also involves the letting go of certain false attitudes, negative images, and concepts of the self; the embracing of authentic, life-giving attitudes; the development of a positive self-image and self-concept; and appropriate changes in behavior.

Lonergan remarks that as a result of misconceptions of what one spontaneously is and the adoption of misguided remedies there comes a point where "in desperation, the neurotic turns to the analyst or coun-
sellor" (1972: 34). Christotherapy as I have developed it is, in part, a form of counseling and, more specifically, a type of Christian counseling. The four basic methods of Christotherapy are existential loving, diagnostic discerning, appreciative discerning, and existential clarification. Existential loving and existential clarification are modes of communication. Diagnostic and appreciative discerning are forms of understanding which existential clarification necessarily presupposes, for one cannot clarify what one does not understand. In the remainder of this paper I will try to show how the Christotherapist seeks to facilitate—with God's help—the occurrence of the type of psychological conversion I described above through existential loving, discerning, and clarifying.

The existential methods of facilitating healing and growth which I have enumerated involve both psychological and spiritual (religious) dimensions. Thus existential loving is an exercise of natural human loving, but as sublated by the divine gift of charity it is also a spiritual (religious) activity. Again, existential discerning is an exercise of inquiring, understanding, evaluating, and judging; but as sublated by such divine gifts as faith, wisdom, knowledge it is also a spiritual (religious) activity. Finally, existential clarification involves the natural psychological activities of communicating insights and evaluations through the use of words, images, symbols, and actions; but as sublated by divine gifts of inspired teaching and prudence it too is a spiritual activity as well. In concert with Lonergan I am using the notion of sublation in Rahner's sense,

to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context (Lonergan, 1972: 241).

A principal method of the Christotherapist for facilitating with God's help the healing of a person's deeply felt sense of being unlovable and worthless is the method of existential loving. To love others existentially presupposes in the one who loves a deep, abiding feeling of being loved and valued for oneself rather than for what one can do or
become. In the Christotherapist the capacity to love existentially is immeasurably enriched through the faith experience of being a beloved child of God and one for whom Christ gave his life out of love.

To love another person existentially is to delight in the unique existence and worth of the person. This delight involves a certain complacentia (Crowe, 2-3) or affective repose in the unique personal value which the individual incarnates. There is also an intersubjective communication of existential love through the smile, the tone of voice, the touch. These intersubjective communications of love cause the person "to feel, sense and hear" (Baars, 23) that he or she is good, loveable, and worthwhile. Existential love is also expressed at times in such words as "I am glad that you exist." But these words, if they are to be truly effective, presuppose the affective intersubjective communications of love I just described. Further, what Dr. Conrad Baars says of the process of "affirmation" of another person is perfectly applicable to what I call "existential loving": "Affirmation is first of all affectivity, a matter of feeling. Only secondarily is it effectiveness, a matter of doing" (1975: 24). There is much more that could be said about existential loving, but I conclude by affirming that existential loving as practiced by the Christotherapist should above all be a Christly loving, a loving that is fully human but also energized by the divine gift of charity, the gift of Christ's own Holy Spirit.

The holy practice of existential loving can help an individual gradually to experience a shift from the state of feeling unloveable and worthless to the state of feeling loveable and of value. But rejected or extrinsically valued persons do not only experience themselves as basically unloveable and of little or no value. They also develop destructive, largely unrecognized attitudes (ways of thinking, judging and believing) and self-defeating strategies for dealing with their emotional pain, negative self-image, and life-problems. The Christotherapist through the use of diagnostic and appreciative discerning and of existential clarification seeks to help these suffering individuals to unmask and let go of their destructive attitudes and self-defeating strategies for living and to replace them with constructive, life-enriching attitudes and strategies.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines an "attitude" as "a mental position with regard to a fact or state" or "a feeling or emotion
toward a fact or state." I mean by an attitude a particular judgment or belief which a person entertains. The judgment or belief can be true or false. Attitudes can be developed on one's own or they can be based on the comments of others. Thus, for example, as a child a person may experience difficulties in doing mathematics. The child may rashly jump to the conclusion: "I cannot do mathematics." This judgment evokes strong negative feelings and is further bolstered as a result of these feelings. This attitude can also perdure into adulthood and may constitute a permanent, unnecessary block in the person's mathematical development. Again, for example, as a child a person may be told again and again in various ways that he or she is unattractive as a person, even though this is not in fact the case. But the child may come to form a firm belief, based on the testimony of others, that he or she is not attractive as a person, and this false belief can last into adulthood. This type of attitude is inevitably accompanied by strong negative feelings and is constantly more deeply confirmed by these feelings. These attitudes I have just described can exist at various levels of consciousness and can express themselves in various forms. Thus, for example, these attitudes can exist, as Wilhelm Stekel would put it, as dominant, medium, or low "voices" in the polyphony of consciousness. They can also embody themselves in imagistic or verbal forms. Thus, a person can form images of himself or herself as a dolt in mathematics or as ugly and unattractive. Further, the person can verbalize these attitudes either internally or externally in words such as the following: "I am really stupid" or "I am really ugly." These verbalizations evoke strong negative feelings and can in turn be evoked by strong negative feelings. Moreover, what is especially unfortunate is that attitudes such as these can exercise a powerfully negative effect in a person's daily living, despite the fact that they are objectively false. Further, when these erroneous judgments and beliefs exist in rejected or extrinsically valued individuals they tend to confirm the person's felt sense of being loveable and worthless and to deepen his or her negative self-image and self-concept. For an effective healing of these attitudes to take place, the Christotherapist must make use of the methods of diagnostic and appreciative discerning and existential clarification, along with ongoing existential loving.
In Christotherapy II I wrote chapters on the feelings of fear, anger, sadness, and guilt. In dealing with the healing of these feelings in their neurotic form I showed how the Christotherapist through diagnostic discerning gets at the destructive attitudes largely evoking these feelings, and likewise how the therapist through existential clarification helps the neurotic to unmask these attitudes, to see them as truly destructive, and to begin to let go of them. On the positive side, I showed how the Christotherapist through appreciative discernment discovers constructive attitudes which evoke healthy feeling responses, and likewise how the therapist through existential clarification helps the sufferer to discern these attitudes, to see them as life-enriching, and to begin to cultivate them in place of the destructive attitudes. In this paper I would like to consider the feelings of jealousy and envy and to indicate how the Christotherapist through diagnostic and appreciative discernment and existential clarification can facilitate the healing of jealousy and envy in their neurotic forms.

Dr. John Evoy in The Rejected observes that intense jealousy appears to be universally present in rejected individuals (1978: 71). Envy enjoys a close affinity with jealousy and is no doubt also intensely at work in rejected or extrinsically valued persons. Some authors tend to meld together jealousy and envy, but I think they are distinct feelings with differing characteristics.

Jealousy is radically interpersonal as an intentional feeling response. It "is a personal emotion directed to people about people" (Gaylin, 1979: 134). Jealousy "is always a three-party emotion" (Neu, 1980: 444). It arises when an individual suspects or fears the loss to a rival of the exclusive attention of the person who is the unique object of his or her affection. Jealousy includes a positive evaluation or, or attachment or commitment to, the person...one is jealous over or about. One can be jealous only of something that is highly valued (Neu, 1980: 454-55).

I agree with Leila Tov-Ruach that as a general rule

the explanation and analysis of the pathological forms of an emotion...should not import principles of a radically different character from the explanation of normal phenomena (1980: 475).
Neu lends support to Evoy's observation that intense jealousy is universally present in the rejected in his remark that "the person suffering from jealousy will typically have very low self-esteem" (1980: 463) and in his citation of the La Rouchefoucauld maxim that "in jealousy there is more self-love than love" (1980: 462). Now there are justifiable forms of jealousy. A husband or wife, for example, can experience a "righteous" type of jealousy when the special love to which he or she is alone entitled is given to another instead. There is also the holy jealousy of the apostle Paul: "I feel a divine jealousy for you, for I betrothed you to Christ to present you as a pure bride to her one husband" (2 Cor 11:2).

The feeling response of envy presupposes in the subject of the envy a sense of deprivation in some area (Gaylin, 1979: 135). Further, the envier is aware of another who possesses what he or she lacks and this comparative knowledge becomes a source of sorrow for the envier. In his discussion of envy in the Summa Theologicae Thomas Aquinas observes that there are different reasons why we may grieve over another's good. For example,

we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not; and this, properly speaking is zeal... And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy (II-II, q. 32, a. 2).

On the other hand,

we grieve over a man's good ... in so far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful ... to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, namely, over our neighbor's good.

This distinction of Aquinas is independently echoed by Robert Neu who speaks of the alternatives of "admir ing" and "malicious" envy (1980: 434). "In the case of admiring envy, one wishes to raise oneself—to become like the other" whereas in the case of malicious envy "one wants to lower the other—to one's own level or below" (1980: 434). Drs. Willard Gaylin (1979: 139-40) and Robert Solomon (1976: 308) both speak of envy as a feeling of marked impotence and inferiority in the face of
disparity. They also emphasize the bitterness and viciousness of malicious envy. Solomon, at the conclusion of his discussion of envy, asks:

Why, then, is envy a "sin," rather than pathos? Because it is not merely misfortune, not merely impotence, but self-imposed, self-indulgent, undeserving greed (1976: 308).

I must emphasize that envy as a spontaneous feeling response is not sinful, but it becomes sinful if in its malicious form it is freely and deliberately cultivated and wallowed in.

My concern here is with the healing of neurotic forms of jealousy and envy as they occur in rejected or extrinsically valued individuals. The Christotherapist employs diagnostic and appreciative discerning and existential clarification—communication—as principal means for facilitating the healing of neurotic jealousy and envy. Of course, the ongoing practice of existential loving is presupposed throughout the entire healing process, especially since jealousy in particular is most often present in individuals with little sense of self-worth.

The aim of diagnostic discerning in the present context is to seek through prayerful inquiring, understanding, and judging to unmask the destructive attitudes which are largely evoking the neurotic feeling responses of jealousy and envy. The Christotherapist, through carefully observing and listening well to the sufferer, most often discovers and verifies the destructive attitudes at work in the neurotic individual before the latter does. It then becomes the task of the Christotherapist to aid the sufferer through existential clarification to come to discover and verify for himself or herself the attitudes evoking his or her neurotic jealous and envious responses. The Christotherapist needs to make use of elemental logic—logic difficult to dodge—as well as graphic examples, humorous anecdotes, striking personal experiences, to help the sufferer to understand and verify at a "gut level" the destructiveness and irrationality of these attitudes and as a result to begin to let go of them. When I speak of understanding and verifying "at a gut level," I refer to the occurrence of insights and judgments which evoke strong feeling responses.

In what follows I would like to offer two examples of existential clarification flowing from diagnostic understanding. I will first offer
an example of my own and then seek to confirm the validity of my approach by citing an example from the works of Dr. Abraham Low, the founder of Recovery Incorporated.

First, the intense jealousy of rejected or extrinsically valued individuals is often rooted in part in the non-reflectively held attitude that if a person who has shown love for him or her begins to show love toward another this means that he or she has lost the love of this person. Thus, for example, a rejected person feels an intense surge of jealousy when an individual who has shown love or concern for him or her begins to manifest interest in or affection toward someone else. The neurotic sufferer immediately interprets this display of love or concern toward someone else as a rejection of him or her. As a means of facilitating the healing of this neurotic jealousy, the Christotherapist might pose the following question to the sufferer: are you able to love two people without loving the first person less when you come to love the second person? If the sufferer responds in the affirmative then the Christotherapist can pose a second question: since you are able to love two people without loving the first less when you come to love the second, how can you deny that others can do this also? Through the posing of these existential questions the Christotherapist seeks to help the sufferer to unmask the irrational attitude out of which he or she has been unconsciously operating, to grasp the stupidity of this attitude "at a gut-level," and as a result to begin to let go of it. As the sufferer proceeds to do this he or she will experience a diminishing of the jealousy. The healing is, of course, a gradual process and so when the sufferer again experiences an outbreak of jealousy he or she will have to reflect once again on the stupidity which lies at the origin of this jealousy. There are often a number of irrational attitudes unconsciously at work in rejected or extrinsically valued individual and so it will be up to the Christotherapist to seek again and again to clarify for the sufferer the "inattention, obtuseness, silliness" (Lorergan, 1972: 33), irrationality, and perhaps irresponsibility which may be at work in the formation of various attitudes which trigger his or her outbreaks of jealousy. This ongoing exercise of existential clarification should help the sufferer little by little to grasp "in a gut fashion" the irrationality of the attitudes which underlie his or her outbreaks of jealousy and to begin to let go of these attitudes.
Second, neurotically jealous individuals tend to be irrationally suspicious and mistrusting. They tend to fantasize the most improbable scenarios and to be mercilessly judgmental. Dr. Abraham Low gives an example of the healing of the jealousy of a patient named Florence (1950: 168-171). Florence experienced intense jealousy any time her husband showed the slightest attention to another woman, even when he was extending a simple courtesy to a church member. When Florence first joined Recovery Incorporated she felt she had the right to ask her husband not to pay any attention to another woman. Dr. Low gradually helped her to understand that she possessed a jealous temper and was constantly making rash judgments about her husband which had no objective basis in reality. As a result of this clarification of her situation Florence came to see that she should refrain from making judgments about her husband in this area if she was going to be fair to him and at peace within herself. She did so and the effect was a much happier marriage and relative freedom from all the miseries she experienced as a result of her jealousy.

For the healing of jealousy it is not enough for the Christotherapist to help the sufferer become free of destructive attitudes through the existential communication of diagnostic insights. It is equally necessary for the therapist to help the sufferer to replace the destructive attitudes with positive ones through the existential communication of an appreciative discernment of authentic attitudes. What Lonergan says about the conditions required of the authentic communicator of the Christian message applies equally to the Christotherapist as communicator of authentic attitudes.

To communicate the Christian message is to lead another to share in one's cognitive, constitutive, effective meaning. Those, then, that would communicate the cognitive meaning of the message, first of all, must know it ... Next, those that would communicate the constitutive meaning of the Christian message ... must live it ... [for] one cannot lead another to share what oneself does not possess ... Finally, those that communicate the effective meaning of the Christian message, must practice it. For actions speak louder than words (1972: 362).

The Christotherapist, accordingly, if he or she is to communicate effectively to the neurotic sufferer an authentic discernment of life-
giving attitudes, needs personally to appreciate these attitudes, to self-appropriate them concretely, and to live according to them.

What, then, are some of the positive attitudes which the Christo-therapist ought to try to communicate in an existential fashion to the neurotic sufferer? Most basically, the Christo-therapist needs to help the sufferer appreciatively discern that an attitude of "letting-be" in regard to one's friends is the best way to retain a friendship. Jealousy, most especially in rejected or extrinsically valued individuals, is born of a fear of loss of affection. What the jealous person must come to understand is that the individual who clings possessively to a friend is most likely to endanger that friendship whereas the person who is willing to let his or her friend be himself or herself and relate freely to others is most likely to retain and deepen that friendship. Also, instead of adopting an attitude of hostility and fear toward the friends of one's friend one should seek rather to develop an attitude of friendliness, openness, and acceptance—with no strings attached. Next, the Christo-therapist needs to help the sufferer develop an appreciative attitudinal conviction of the importance of developing a sense of personal autonomy and freedom. In fact, Leila Tov-Ruach remarks that "jealousy can be a great teacher" for "jealousy can lead to a person's having a better sense of what is central in his character structure, and developing a new form of autonomy" (1980: 478). At a more profound level the Christo-therapist should encourage the sufferer to seek through prayer to develop a Christly attitude both toward himself or herself and toward others. At the heart of Christianity is the belief that Christ values and loves each individual for himself or herself. The cultivation of this belief should lead the sufferer toward an authentic self-love and a proper sense of independence and freedom. The cultivation of this belief should also gradually free the sufferer to be more selfless in his or her response to others. Neurotic jealousy is self-referential and self-centered whereas Christly loving is other-oriented and self-transcending.

Although I have just presented in a basically optimistic way a few examples of potential attitudinal transformations in psychically wounded individuals, I do not wish to imply that the neurotically jealous individual will pass overnight from a fundamentally fearful, self-referential way of thinking and being in the world to a courageous,
self-transcending mode of thinking, imagining, desiring, and being. I must further caution that the practice of existential loving should accompany the practice of diagnostic and appreciative discerning and communicating if an authentic, lasting attitudinal transformation is to take place. It is for this reason that in my development of Christotherapy I have effected a marriage between the affirmation-oriented therapies and the cognitive and existential therapies. I have personally verified many times both in my own struggles and in my work with others the therapeutic power of attitudinal shifts as far as the healing of neurotic feeling disturbances is concerned. But I have also found that unless a rejected or extrinsically valued person passes from a state of feeling unloveable and worthless to a state of feeling loveable and worthwhile the effectiveness of the cognitive therapies in bringing about lasting attitudinal changes is considerably weakened.

To effect the healing of neurotic envy, especially in rejected or extrinsically valued individuals, the Christotherapist utilizes the same existential methods he or she employs in dealing with the healing of neurotic jealousy. Since I dealt with the healing of neurotic jealousy in a somewhat extensive fashion I can afford to be considerably briefer in my treatment of the healing of neurotic envy.

In the case of neurotic envy there is often present at some level of consciousness in the envier a certain constellation of destructive attitudes. It is up to the Christotherapist through diagnostic discerning and existential clarification to help the sufferer to unmask these attitudes one by one, to see them for what they really are, and to begin to let go of them. Perhaps the root attitude of the neurotic envier is the judgment: "I cannot be happy as long as I am deprived of this or that quality or object which a certain other person possesses." The problem is that authentic happiness does not consist in a possessivist acquiring of qualities or objects. Moreover, even if the envier does acquire a certain coveted quality, new objects of envy will present themselves, for the appetite of neurotic envy is never slaked. The envier needs to come to the diagnostic understanding that he or she has set up inauthentic conditions for the realization of true happiness and that to follow the path of envy is to doom oneself to perpetual unhappiness and frustration. A second attitude in the neurotic envier's constellation of attitudes is the judgment: "It is most unfortunate that
this other person possess what I lack." In point of fact, it is really this attitude which is most unfortunate, because it expresses an ugly sorrowing over the good fortune of another. This attitude is self-destructive because it is corrosive of the human spirit; it deprives the envier of internal peace and leaves him or her in a perpetual state of self-inflicted bitterness. As Solomon remarks, envy is "usually a harmless passion, except to oneself" (1976: 308). It would seem that an appeal to the envier's legitimate self-love should provide motive enough for the envier to let go of this attitude. A third attitude in the neurotic envier's cluster of attitudes is the judgment: "I cannot be happy until the person I envy is brought down to my own level of deprivation—or worse." Here the face of envy reveals its despicable, vicious, malicious features in an even sharper way. As an example of this dimension of envy Gaylin quotes an actress who once said to him, "In order for me to be happy it is not enough that I succeed. My friends have to fail" (1979: 140-141). The neurotic envier should attend closely to the "lower voices" in his or her consciousness to see if he or she cannot detect the presence of this third attitude, perhaps masked in some fashion. And if he or she manages to detect it the sheer monstrousness of the attitude should provide impetus enough for its renunciation. But if further motivation is needed the envier should realize that malicious envy virtually shuts out "all possibility of intimacy" (Solomon, 1976: 308), since the friends of the maliciously envious person have to fail. Finally, Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Paul's second letter to the Corinthians remarks that "he who refrains from obeying a precept because God forbids it is not free; but he who refrains from evil because it is evil-free" (Murphy-O'Connor, 1977: 116). What I have been doing here is communicating a diagnostic understanding of the truly evil nature of malicious envy by unmasking the attitudes which unconsciously mediate and evoke the feelings of malicious envy. That person is most truly free who refrains from indulging in malicious envying not simply because God forbids it but most profoundly because he or she possesses a diagnostic understanding of its truly evil nature.

For the healing of envy, as in the case of jealousy, it is not enough for the Christotherapist to help the sufferer unmask destructive attitudes and let go of them; the Christotherapist likewise needs to
help the sufferer discover positive attitudes to put in the place of the negative ones.

What, then, are some positive attitudes which the Christotherapist should help the neurotic envier to discern appreciatively and embrace? Initially, the neurotic envier should learn to ask two questions about what it is that he or she envies in terms of the qualities or possessions of another. First, is the desired quality or object of the envy something truly worthwhile or only apparently so? Second, is the desired quality or object something that the envier can realize or obtain through honest effort or is it basically unattainable for him or her? If the answer to the first question is that the desired quality or object is not truly worthwhile and life-enriching, then the envier should seek prayerfully to understand "in a gut fashion" that it is foolish to remain envious about it and then to act upon this understanding. If, however, the answer is that the desired object is truly worthwhile, then the second question comes into play, namely, is the desired quality or object something that the envier can honestly realize or obtain, though perhaps with some difficulty? If the answer to the second question is negative, then the envious person needs to pray for the serenity to accept the situation as it is and to learn to focus attention on some truly worthwhile quality or object which he or she can hope, though perhaps with some difficulty, to realize or obtain. If, however, the answer to the second question is affirmative then the neurotic envier should seek with God's help to transform his or her malicious envy into an admiring envy which seeks authentically to realize for oneself what one envies in another. Here there can be a case of a truly holy emulation.

At the deepest level the most powerful positive means for overcoming envy is love. Max Scheler quotes Goethe who said, "Against another's great merits, there is no remedy but love" (Gaylin, 1979: 146). In the doctrine of Paul all Christians are members of the one body of Christ and this means that far from being jealous or resentful or envious of others we should rejoice when good comes to any member of the body, for what belongs to one belongs to all. As envy separates us from one another, so loving identification with others joins us together. As Gaylin puts it:
Identification permits for the expansion of our achievements, our pleasures ... It is not necessary for us to have experienced every joy; we can share with those we love. My friends' victories are my victories, as are his joys ... (1979: 147).

I must conclude my remarks on envy, as I did on jealousy, with the caution that especially where the Christotherapist is dealing with neurotic envy in a rejected or extrinsically valued individual, the ongoing practice of existential loving must accompany the prayerful practices of diagnostic and appreciative discerning and existential communication if deep and lasting attitudinal transformation is to be realized.

In bringing this paper to a close I would like briefly to raise and discuss a few questions concerning the relationship of some key topics in this paper to Lonergan's transcendental method and the conversions of foundations.

First, are there elements in my work which contribute to the development of transcendental method? I would answer in the affirmative in so far as I provide insights into the nature of the feeling process which can be verified in consciousness. I think that my main contribution in this area consists in pointing out the role of attitudes in mediating feeling responses. Anyone who attends carefully to his or her feeling responses can identify attitudes expressed in interior verbalizations or imaginings which occur often in lightning-like fashion at some level of consciousness and evoke feeling responses. The point I would stress is that feelings as intentional responses to objects are mediated by attitudes expressed in verbal and imagistic forms. These attitudes can exist as medium or lower as well as dominant "voices" within the polyphony of "voices" in consciousness. It follows that if one is to understand correctly the nature of the feeling process it is essential that one experience, understand, and verify the essential role attitudes play in the structuring of feeling responses.

Second, is psychological conversion as I define it one of the foundational conversions? I do not have a clear-cut response to this question myself. I think an adequate answer to my question presupposes answers to certain other questions. As an example, is it necessary for a foundational conversion to be within the data of consciousness? If
the answer to this question is affirmative then either my theory of psychological conversion is in principle verifiable within the data of consciousness or else psychological conversion, as I conceive it, is not a foundational conversion. Further, is it possible for a conversion to be foundational if it can only occur in a limited segment of the population, that is, in those who are subject to neurosis? If the answer to this latter question is negative, then clearly psychological conversion is not a foundational conversion.

Third, is psychological conversion, as I conceive it, really distinct from intellectual, moral, and religious conversion? My initial response is that in so far as psychological conversion involves a shift from a psychological state of feeling unlovable and worthless to a psychological state of feeling loveable and worthwhile, I do not think that it is reducible to intellectual, moral, or religious conversion. For even in the case of religious conversion, where the love of God is poured forth into the heart, it is possible for the religiously converted individual to remain in a psychological state of feeling unlovable and worthless. Further, it is crucial to distinguish between the psychological conversional transformation itself and the means used to effect this conversion. Thus, it may be possible for a rejected or extrinsically valued individual to undergo a shift from a basic state of feeling unlovable to a state of feeling loveable through a faith-encounter with Jesus Christ. In this particular situation the conversional transformation is a psychological one, but it is brought about through religious means. In other words, what has happened is that an experience of some form of religious conversion has brought about a psychological conversion as well. The two conversions are most certainly closely interrelated, but they remain distinct realities. I must add that for the sake of brevity I have not dealt with psychological conversion here in all its dimensions or forms and so my argument is restricted in its application to the modality of psychological conversion which I have explicitly considered.
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