EDITOR'S NOTES

In Lonergan Workshop 5 we are not only publishing papers from the June, 1983 Workshop, but also practicing with a vengeance the already occasionally adopted policy of including papers not yet published from past summer workshops. We also welcome a lot of fresh and exciting new talent to these pages.

Actually, it is astonishing how fresh and exciting Frederick E. Crowe keeps on managing to be. His paper raises rather revolutionary questions about the perennial imbalance that has traditionally marked the Christian communities' attentiveness to the mission of the Word in comparison to its attention to the mission of the Spirit.

The paper of Robert Doran clarifies a distinction absolutely crucial both to his past work and to his current writing in the area of foundations and systematics—namely, that between primary and secondary processes in human development and decline. The papers by newcomers Thomas Dunne, James Price, and William Mathews underline and illustrate the stress Doran places upon locating the empirical referents of secondary formulations within the data of primary psychological practice. Thus, Dunne's paper transposes the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love into the context of consciously elicited acts and attitudes. Jamie Price's demonstrates the advantages resident in Lonergan's third-stage foundations for adequately thematizing traditional mystical phenomena. And William Mathews's lets us sense what vistas are opened up for education in science by setting scientific achievement pedagogically back into the "pulsing flow" of what Doran calls primary process.

Charles Hefling's paper stands alone. It tries the unusual (but, one hopes, soon to be more common) experiment of understanding and assessing one of Lonergan's own more significant essays (on Christology) in the light of Lonergan's standards as set in his most mature reflections on method in theology. Charles has learned, and we stand to learn a great deal from such experiments.

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Four of the papers may be said to move in the genre of political theology. Matthew Lamb's originated in a contribution to a Concilium conference held in Germany. It offers reflections on the current status questionis in theory-of-science debates in an attempt to situate theology's shift into a political paradigm. Somewhat in the same vein, that of another newcomer, Stephen Happel, treats the Christian sacraments in relation to transsubjective structures of society and culture in order to raise urgent questions about their role in promoting a critically mature Christian consciousness. My own paper explores the meaning of 'basic Christian community' in terms of Lonergan's foundations and theology. Further and more intimate implications of this 'putting on' Christ' are spelled out concretely by Sebastian Moore's paper.

Emil Piscitelli's paper also stands on its own. It comes from the summer workshop on liberal education; and it is an extended and detailed elaboration of dialectical options and tensions stemming from positions and counterpositions correlative to the levels of conscious intentionality.

In closing, a word of special gratitude to Julian Bull, Nancy Woodhouse, and Paul and Paulette Kidder for word-processing the contents of this journal; to Pat Byrne for his indefatigable work on keeping us up with the fluxus quo of computer technology as we try to produce print-ready copy for Scholars Press right here at Boston College; and finally to Charles Hefling for constant and seemingly endless orchestrating, checking, correcting, and word-processing. Without them, non.

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A remark of George Tyrrell's, in the work he completed just weeks before he died, will serve to introduce my topic. It has to do with the quest of the historical Jesus, as it came to be called, and specifically with what Harnack found as he joined in that quest: "The Christ that Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of Catholic darkness, is only the reflection of a Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well" (Tyrrell, 1963:49). Nearly three-quarters of a century have passed since Tyrrell's time to make us a sadder and a wiser race. We no longer quote his remark with the smugness we might once have felt. We know far too well by now that the general principle latent in this particular case could be directed against any one of us. Not only Harnack, not only Loisy whose Christ-figure seemed to Tyrrell more Catholic than that of Harnack, but all of us throughout our history, from the four evangelists down to the latest liberation theologian to claim Christ as a revolutionary—we have all tended to conceive a Jesus, if not after our own image and likeness, at least after the model we feel our times demand: the figure of one who will symbolize our deepest aspirations, illumine our self-understanding, inform our worldview, guide our deliberations, and in every way be our leader in the flux and chaos of our universe and our history.

With that introduction I proceed to develop my topic in three parts. First, I will briefly illustrate and analyze the tendency Tyrrell so unerringly disclosed in Harnack; then, I will describe the factors that at present call for and in some measure provide a new approach; finally, I will indicate the kind of systematic theology that might structure that new approach, and I will sketch the revised history that might be written in the light of that theology. For those who are wondering what this has to do with the Spirit who joins the Son in the
title of my paper, or with the redemptive tension which is the theme of this workshop, I may say in advance that neglect of the Spirit has been partly responsible for the distorted Christ-figures I have referred to, that this has resulted in a tension for us between the role of Son and that of Spirit, and that I hope in this paper to help overcome that tension through a better view of the unity in the two divine missions.

I

This first part of my paper is not so much a thesis as it is a simple list of samples to illustrate a thesis that is now a commonplace. To begin at the beginning, there is the commonplace that the New Testament itself reveals a considerable variety of Christologies. Scholars trace early forms in the sermons of Acts, and the Christ of Paul can be delineated from his letters. But my first samples will be the more familiar Christ-figures of the four evangelists, where we find the rather stern and Jewish Jesus of Matthew, the strong Son of God battling demonic powers in Mark, the more humanist Jesus of the apologist Luke, and the only Son of John's gospel, the one who came from above and moves with divine foreknowledge throughout his stay on earth. Are we dealing here with four writers who construct a Jesus somewhat according to the presuppositions of the author? We are not asking whether the picture drawn is false, but simply whether it is slanted by selection, or emphasis, or some such means. To answer an empirical yes or no to the question, we would need some independent source on the mind and religious situation of each writer, with which we might compare his Christ-figure. But I notice that scholars move readily in the reverse direction, that is, they construct the evangelist's character and situation out of his gospel, thereby granting implicitly and in principle the very link I am exemplifying.

More illuminating even than the gospels is the letter to the Hebrews, for here the creative work of the theologian-writer is very much in evidence as he shows us a Christ who is High Priest according to the order of Melchizedek. The evangelists based their Christ-figures more or less firmly on a narrative of the words and deeds of Jesus, but the letter to the Hebrews cannot do that for the priesthood of Christ.
Of course, the thesis is tied in a general way to the death on the cross and to certain facts in the life of Jesus; but it cannot be validated in the whole life of Jesus, for he did not belong to the Levitical tribe, nor did the early tradition coming down to our author make a theme of his priesthood. Hence the need, if one would have Christ be a priest, to make him a different kind of priest, and give his priesthood a different basis, through recourse to the figure of Melchizedek (Bowman, 1962:17-18).

Leaving the New Testament now, I propose to add a few soundings from later history, or, if "soundings" is pretentious, then a few headings that may recall a history you already know. There is, first, a group of Franciscans in Ockham's time who were deeply moved by the ideal of poverty set by their founder (as who is not?), but carried the enthusiasm to such an extreme as to assert that Christ, along with his apostles, exemplified the pinnacle of perfection by giving up "all dominion or ownership of property both 'singly and in common'" (Tekippe, 1983:147). Four centuries later we find a quite different Christ in a quite different setting, but those very differences bring out the uniformity of approach. We read that for the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, "The only true and sanctifying religion is that moral creed of which Christ was but the most eloquent preacher and most convincing witness" (de Grandmaison, 1932:283). Nearer our own times, I remember reading of some liberal theologian of a century ago, for whom Christ was "an enthusiast for humanity." I think also of the many books on spirituality of Archbishop Alban Goodier, whose Christ is such a lonely figure, opposed by his own people and those to whom he would bring his Father's work. Then there is Bonhoeffer's Christ, the Man for others, and the Teilhardian Christ, who is the Omega point, the fulfillment of natural evolution.

Enough of random samples. One may find a much longer and better documented list in Küng's On Being a Christian (Küng, 1977:126-144), but I have quite enough for a general picture. It is more important to examine the credentials of the various authors in question, and to that end I add two samples that are poles apart. At one pole we find Juan Mateos and his radical, not to say revolutionary, Christ, who "rejected all the Israelite institutions: temple, monarchy, and priesthood" (Mateos, 1977:12). Mateos is a biblical scholar of some note and, as
we would expect, documents his study rather carefully. At the other pole there is Thomas à Kempis and a Christ (I owe this idea to a lecture by Juan Luis Segundo) who is very much a medieval monk. And, of course, à Kempis, despite the scriptural text with which he starts The Following of Christ, provides nothing remotely resembling a documented case for his view.

Are we, then, to say that there was indeed a problem with the Christ-figure of earlier times but that now, with the advent of biblical scholarship, we may hope for the real Christ, described with greater objectivity? We may indeed so hope, and we may certainly not dispense with scholarship, but just as certainly scholarship is not enough. The simple fact appears from the contradictory conclusions reached by scholarship, as when one author devotes his talent and diligence to proving that Jesus was married, and another devotes equal talent and diligence to showing Jesus as the model for celibate religious orders. The general explanation of the fact is found in the current view that praxis is complementary to learning in determining religious doctrine, so that a medieval monk just might see what is hidden from the eyes of an exegete. More specifically, research, interpretation, and history—all, however objective their methods and techniques, are conducted by a subject with a particular horizon, and the results obtained by the researcher, interpreter, or historian, will correspond to that horizon. There is needed, then, a dialectic of horizons that goes beyond scholarship, and a foundation for one's position that lies deeper than the technical rules of the discipline in question. Further analysis may be found in a work familiar to those attending this workshop, Lonergan's Method in Theology (Lonergan, 1972:149-293), so I conclude here the first section of my paper.

II

If I say now that the times demand and present thinking makes possible a new approach, I wish also to be moderate in my claims. It was not from a perverse motivation that Christians of all times described such personal Christ-figures, but from a deeply felt need. We remember Bonhoeffer's question, "What is bothering me incessantly is the
question what Christianity really is, or indeed who Christ really is, for us today?" (Bonhoeffer, 1971:279 [letter of April 30, 1944]), and that phrase "for us today" brings home to us the need we have in Toronto or Boston today, for God among us, a need that is not satisfied by God in Palestine in biblical times. Nor is it an altogether perverse theology that makes of Jesus a chameleon to appear in various forms to suit the diversity of human cultures, for scripture proclaims his infinite resources: "all things are held together in him" (Col 1:17), and in him we are "brought to completion" (Col 2:9). Do not such resources argue an equally infinite adaptability, so that, wherever and whenever we live, under whatever conditions, we are to find in him "the way ... the truth ... and ... life" (Jn 14:6)?

I am not a radical, setting out in a new enlightenment to overturn the wisdom of centuries. But neither do I wish to be a reaction- ary, going through life with my back to the future. Our loyalty to the past involves understanding, testing, and evaluation, as well as acceptance; and, over and above that, we have a duty to the future, to add in the twentieth century our little increment to the wisdom of the previous nineteen. One thing this century has made clear is the pluralism and extreme variety of human meaning, human value, human ways and cultures. We have to ask how this affects our relation to Jesus of Nazareth, to whom we are drawn by the Father but in whom we find much that is strange to us; we have to distinguish in his words and deeds what was particular to his situation and what is valid for everyone, always and everywhere. Further, if his life on earth does not provide the detailed blueprint we think we need to lead our own, we must ask what other resources our religion provides to have God-with-us in our pilgrimage. These two headings will structure the second section of my paper.

The general thesis of the multiplicity of cultures, each with its own legitimacy, is well established, and it will be enough to quote a thematic statement of Lonergan on the matter. The thesis was not, of course, his discovery, but he contributes, in the way that is characteristic of his work, to its clarity, its generalization, its integration into a comprehensive view of what it is to be human. There is the further advantage of putting the case in terms that will be familiar to participants in this workshop. He tells us, then, in a paper entitled "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,"
that it is quite possible to view man as such, "and man as such, precisely because he is an abstraction, also is unchanging" (Lonergan, 1974:5). This is the "classicist" view, which has had so long a reign in our tradition. The reign, however, has come to an end, yielding now to another view.

On the other hand, one can apprehend mankind as a concrete aggregate developing over time, where the locus of development and, so to speak, the synthetic bond is the emergence, expansion, differentiation, dialectic of meaning and of meaningful performance. On this view intentionality, meaning, is a constitutive component of human living; moreover, this component is not fixed, static, immutable, but shifting, developing, going astray, capable of redemption; on this view there is in the historicity, which results from human nature, an exigence for changing forms, structures, methods; and it is on this level and through this medium of changing meaning that divine revelation has entered the world and that the Church's witness is given to it (Lonergan, 1974:5-6).

What we have in this passage is a sketch of a conceptual system for handling the phenomena of cultural change and for understanding how such change affects our relation to Jesus of Nazareth and to the scriptures that mediate him to us. Within this conceptual framework, then, let me insert a thesis from a famous essay of Rudolf Bultmann, on demythologizing the New Testament. His opening statement is: "The cosmology of the New Testament is essentially mythical in character" (Bultmann, 1953:1); and his first thematic question: "whether, when we preach the Gospel today, we expect our converts to accept not only the Gospel message, but also the mythical view of the world in which it is set" (3). His own answer is clear: "We no longer believe in the three-storied universe which the creeds take for granted" (4).

The critical part of Bultmann's essay was followed by his own constructive effort to maintain the New Testament kerygma: his highly controversial existential interpretation. That does not concern me here. I wish merely to note that his critical thesis, the program of demythologizing, in its general lines, has been so universally accepted today that the younger theologians in my audience would likely be puzzled by all the fuss made over this essay forty years ago. I spoke, however, of acceptance of the thesis in its general lines, for many have felt a deep reluctance to accept it in the particular case of our Lord Jesus Christ. It is all very well to
make the New Testament authors captives of their times and culture; but, as Matthew Arnold said of Shakespeare and as we, with far greater conviction, may say of Christ, "Others abide our question. Thou art free." Nevertheless, the corresponding point had been made, a generation before Bultmann, about Jesus too. Again, I find it useful to take a sample of that earlier writing, and so turn to *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, a work produced thirty-five years before Bultmann's essay.

The study of the Life of Jesus has had a curious history. It set out in quest of the historical Jesus, believing that when it had found Him it could bring Him straight into our time as a Teacher and Saviour. It loosed the bands by which He had been riveted for centuries to the stony rocks of ecclesiastical doctrine, and rejoiced to see life and movement coming into the figure once more, and the historical Jesus advancing, as it seemed, to meet it. But He does not stay; He passes by our time and returns to His own (Schweitzer, 1910:397).

The thesis, then, is the historicity of all things human, the multiplicity of human cultures, the strangeness of one culture for another, the strangeness for us of the culture Jesus knew, and, consequently, the difficulty of moving from his world into ours and the need of some mediating agent to effect the transition. It is not enough to say that he is God, the infinite source and therefore the exemplar of all that has been, is or will be. It is not to the divinity but to the humanity of Jesus that we look when we search for our way and our truth. Shall we then distinguish in the human Jesus what is permanent and what is time-conditioned? By all means. But what will be the criterion for the distinction? and what the principle for adapting his message from the conditions of his time to those of ours?

The tendency has been to find in Jesus himself whatever we need to effect the transition. Would I be a medieval monk? Then I will make Jesus a medieval monk, and perhaps quote scripture now and again to support my position. Or would I be an agent of social change? Then I will make Jesus an agent of social change, and perhaps do a rather careful study of the scriptures in support of the thesis. But that, I maintain, is to neglect half the resources God has given us for living in this world, and at the same time to overload and strain the other half. The images from mechanics are crude, so let me put it more directly: there are two divine missions, that of the Son with his role and func-
tion, and that of the Spirit with his role and function. The roles are not the same, and neither one is superfluous. If, therefore, we try to legitimate our monastic rule or our social involvement by a too exclusive recourse to the Son, we commit a double distortion: we demand of the Son more than one human life on earth, even the human life of the Son of God, can contribute; and all the while we have a principle of the monastic and every other rule, of social and all other involvement, namely, the Holy Spirit of God, whom we leave, or would be willing to leave, standing by—a third of the Trinitarian work-force unemployed. So I come to the second heading of the second section of my paper: the resources of God-with-us that we have in the Holy Spirit, and the means our times provide for discerning and receiving guidance from his presence in and among us.

We are dealing here with the correction of an imbalance, as may be seen from the following geometric image. Our religion began, in the only way probably it could begin, as a Christocentric religion. Now, if the center goes, in religious as in planetary systems, what principle will hold things together? That kind of fearful question gave Copernicus some trouble when he would displace the center of our cosmos. It gave Kant trouble too, in the philosophical counterpart of the Copernican move, when he would shift the center of our cognitional universe away from the object to the subject. There were really two questions involved here: the basic legitimacy of that turn to the subject, and the adequacy of Kant's conception of the new subject-center. But the questions were not always clearly distinguished, and so Scholasticism, unhappy in regard to the second, fought its long and losing battle in regard to the first.

Something a bit like that is happening in theology. Our religion cannot be Christocentric in quite the same way it was in the past, but we are troubled by the various efforts to conceive a new center. May I suggest that we discard the image itself of a center, and think rather of an ellipse with two foci? A circle, you know, is a special form of an ellipse, one in which the two foci coincide. Does that provide an image of our previous history in regard to Son and Spirit? I think so. The Spirit, instead of being allowed to be himself, functioning as a focus in Christian life, was brought into coincidence with the Son and so into a measure of oblivion (I remember a book called The Forgotten
In the image of an ellipse the two foci of Son and Spirit are distinct and complementary. Of course, our God is triune, and eventually we must find a place for the Father, but at least we have a first approximation on the way to a complete integration of the three Persons in the work of our redemption.

Further, the kairos has come for a shift from the Christocentric to the elliptical with the two foci of Son and Spirit. Once again, I repudiate any radical departure from our tradition. I am not saying that the Holy Spirit has only now come upon the scene, just in time to repair the damage done in the quest for the historical Jesus; the Holy Spirit was on the scene from the beginning—the real beginning, that of our first parents. I am not saying that the Holy Spirit is only now known to be on the scene; his presence was known to us from the early days of the gospel. But I am saying that our ancestors did not have a philosophy that would enable them to relate the roles of Son and Spirit in the fundamental way that is possible to us. Paul, Luke, and John each contributed something to the solution of the problem. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas organized things a bit with their doctrine of the visible and invisible missions. But it is only with the turn to the subject, with the emergence of a philosophy of interiority, with the replacement of causality by meaning as a basic category, that we have the conceptual system we need for an integrated theology of the roles of Son and Spirit in the world.

The philosophy of interiority is fundamental. But it has been a long time forming, and the measure of the difficulty in conceiving it is the continuing resistance among some philosophers to putting the data of consciousness on an equal footing with the data of sense, and so of developing a generalized empirical method. Then, over and above this initial difficulty, there is that of the full extension of interiority. For the full structure of knowing must be found. Then, affectivity has to be added to knowledge, and the two intelligibly related; thus, while Thomas could be said to have written a theologia mentis, his fellow Dominican, Contenson, felt constrained four centuries later to write a theologia mentis et cordis (Lozier, 1967:264). Again, I suppose there have been mystics from the beginning; but only with writers like Teresa of Ávila did we have the descriptive accounts that a theology of mystical interiority require. So now, with our philosophy worked out, with
the relevant religious phenomena described and catalogued, we are at last in a position to form a comprehensive theory of interiority.

If a philosophy of interiority is basic to a new theology of Son and Spirit, it is also true that the emergence of meaning to replace causality as a leading category provides an answer to a difficulty arising out of a more metaphysical way of thought. In this latter the Spirit, having no nature but the divine, can exercise no activity in the world that is proper to himself but only that which is common to the three Persons. As the Council of Florence said, "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium" (Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 1965: no. 1331). But this principle of metaphysical theology becomes secondary, even marginal, in a universe of discourse in which meaning, value, intentionality analysis, are basic. Now the Spirit has his distinct meaning, else he would not be himself. He brings his own meaning into the world with him, and meaning is constitutive of human and transcendent reality, so the world is affected by his presence. Finally, meaning is as much a source in intentionality analysis as efficient causality is in metaphysical thinking, so the Spirit can be a distinct source for theology without prejudice to the metaphysics of the divine operation. There should be no insuperable difficulty, then, in conceiving him as the principle of the indefinite adaptability which the historicity of man requires and the particularity of the God-Man does not readily furnish.

III

It is one thing to suggest the need and possibility of a new theology, as I have been doing, and quite another to make that theology actual. I cannot undertake that latter task here, but I feel I owe it to my audience to give some hints on how I think it might be formulated. Most of you will be familiar with the notion of theology as the unity of eight functional specialties, so you will realize how little I am attempting to do, when I touch on only two of them: I will sketch some parts of a new systematics, and, since a different systematics raises new questions and discloses new transitions in history, I will conclude my third section with some headings of a rewritten history.
The two objective poles of our theology are obviously God and humanity. God is a community of three Persons. Though the one divinity determines what all three are absolutely (eternal, omnipotent, etc.), their relationships to one another determine what each is as a Person, an individual Self. What each is in his eternal being, he also is in his temporal being, in his role and function in the created family of God. The New Testament most often related the first two as Father and Son, but this had two drawbacks: it did not provide for the Spirit (the fathers of the church had to deny that the Spirit was a grandson!), and the mode of human generation had to be utterly denied in thinking of God. Today there is a third drawback: "father" and "son" are male terms, the use of which is now seen as offensive to half our race. Happily, however, theologians came to think of the Son as the divine Word of truth and value, and of the Spirit as the Love that follows on that Word. Trinitarian theology, in this respect, was considerably in advance of other theology, using the categories of intentionality analysis, meaning and value, long before they became general in theology.

Our view of humanity will not have so ancient a pedigree as our rather traditional view of God. We may, however, lay an acceptable basis by saying with Thomas Aquinas that "homo maxime est mens hominis" (I-II q 29 a 4 c; 1950:140). Supposing, then, the physics, chemistry, and biology of the human, we turn at once to human consciousness. Here, Lonergan's philosophy of the human includes two main areas that must be sharply distinguished yet closely related to one another, the more so since, in our enthusiasm for the first, we tend to be vague about the second. There is the structure of consciousness, and there is the history of consciousness, and these relate to one another as the permanent and the variable factors in the human. Structurally, there are the four levels familiar to those attending this workshop, each level with its outer orientation and its inner experience. But historically, there is the development and/or aberration of consciousness, with its uncountable brands of common sense, with the differentiations that make one person an artist and another a theologian, with the stages of meaning and value that follow one another in something like a pattern through time, with the various conversions that locate us within a horizon of knowledge and interest, and finally—the most neglected area of all—the interaction of the two paths of development, the upward path of achievement from
experience through understanding and judgment to values, and the downward path of tradition handed on in values and beliefs that are accepted in trust till developing understanding and widening experience give them meaningful embodiment.

Against this background of what God is and what it is to be human, is to be sketched now the economy of Son and Spirit in the world. If, then, God is to communicate himself in a way that corresponds to his own being and to the human orientation to the outer and the objective, the one to be sent for this purpose will be the one who is already God's objectified understanding and so can become, in a "natural" prolongation, the outer Word the human race needs. And if God is also to communicate himself in a way that corresponds to human subjectivity, the one to be sent for this purpose will be the one who is divine subjectivity surging up in the infinite Love that responds to the infinite Word. We may still speak of visible and invisible missions, and always of the biblical Son and Spirit, but we will have a new understanding of the one as sent into the world we meet through outer, objective data, and the other as sent into the world of interior, subjective data.

Further, to speak of those sent is to acknowledge a Sender, from whose viewpoint we must try to understand both missions. Lonergan's basic analogy for such understanding seems to be the love of man and woman for each other.

When a man and a woman love each other but do not avow their love, they are not yet in love. Their very silence means that their love has not reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation. It is the love that each freely and fully reveals to the other that brings about the radically new situation of being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications (Lonergan, 1972:112-113).

I hope all of us are able, in some way and in some degree, to appreciate the profound truth of this passage, whether through experience of a love avowed and fully bestowed, or through experience of a love that cannot be avowed and so must remain something less than a full self-surrender, or, if neither of these, then through the notional apprehension (Newman, 1930: especially chs. 1 to 4) that gives an indirect and imperfect appreciation. In any case, if I understand Lonergan, this analogy "explains" the ways of God in sending his Son and his Spirit. For, on
this conceptual basis, he would "interpret the religions of mankind, in their positive moment, as the fruit of the gift of the Spirit" (Lonergan, 1974:174). It is God's love not yet fully avowed, for "there is a notable anonymity to this gift of the Spirit ... What removes this obscurity and anonymity is the fact that the Father has spoken to us of old through the prophets and in this final age through the Son" (174-175). And this is God's full avowal of his love; as Paul says, "Christ died for us while we were yet sinners, and that is God's own proof of his love towards us" (Rom 5:8); and John, "For God is love; and his love was disclosed to us in this, that he sent his only Son into the world to bring us life" (1 Jn 4:8-9). Our view, then, is linked with the New Testament and traditional theology, but does give us a new perspective, from which the members of the great world religions are not so much anonymous Christians as they are anonymous Spiritans.

Again, if the one sent as outer Word is not to communicate merely through an It (a burning bush or the like), but as a Thou and a Self, and if that Self is not to be the self of an angel or prophet but a Self of God, then the Person sent will become flesh and dwell among us. That means he will be made Man in a particular time and place, under the particular conditions that human historicity makes inevitable. He will indeed be the center of history; he will be a focal point for our orientation, not only toward God, but also toward community in the human world. But the very historicity to which, in the completeness of his kenosis, he has subjected himself, will automatically prevent his becoming an immediate model for the whole human race in all its variety. But the Person who does not take flesh and dwell in our outer world, the one who is sent into our hearts, sent also as a divine Thou and Self, but only as divine, untrammeled by the kenosis of human historicity, the one moreover who floods our hearts with the love that makes us spiritual and so able to "judge the worth of everything" (1 Cor 2:15), he will be the interior focal point for the creation of all conceivable human-divine meaning and all possible human-divine value, the one who will enable us to adapt to every changing condition while remaining true to the outer center of our history—a little like Wordsworth's skylark, "True to the kindred points of Heaven and Home!"

In this view the economy of Son and Spirit in the world is set up in unity. Any tension that develops will be due, not to the Father's...
purpose, but to our failure to keep the two foci as clearly distinct as the Son and the Spirit are themselves distinct, and as clearly related in equality and complementarity as they are themselves related to one another in their divine being and their temporal mission. Such failure is, no doubt, part of the human condition, giving rise to apparent tensions, as one or other of the two foci is made into a single center. But that only means that we have a permanent task of maintaining in our theology the two-in-oneness of the Father's redemptive idea, a task then of continually re-reading our past to guide our future.

So we come to the second heading of our third section: the re-reading of history. The need for such a re-reading will be clear to those who agree with Lonergan that the history of a science cannot be written by one who does not know the science itself.

One would ever tend to overlook significant events and to set great store by minor matters. One's language would be inaccurate or out of date, one's emphases mistaken, one's perspectives distorted, one's omissions intolerable. ... It is a commonplace today that to understand a doctrine one had best study its history. It is no less true that to write the history one has to understand the doctrine (Lonergan, 1972:143-144).

It follows that, when the science takes a forward step, the history has to be rewritten. Thus, with every new understanding of the roles of Son and Spirit in the world, we will need a new history, both of their complementarity in the redemptive economy and of the church's understanding at different times of those roles. I have to confine my brief remarks to the latter: how, from the present perspective, I see the history of the Church's thinking on the relation of Son and Spirit in the economy.

The divine rationale, God's fundamental idea for the redemptive economy, the "secret kept in silence for long ages," is now disclosed, Paul says (Rom 16:26). But we will not expect it to be disclosed in the order in which God conceived it before those long ages; on the contrary, according to the principle that what is first in itself will not be first for us, we will expect our learning to be the inverse of God's planning. That is, God, "falling in love" with the human race, will also be drawn to "avow" his love. The "falling" is the gift of the Spirit, actually given from the beginning; the "avowal" took place at a particular time and place, when "the angel Gabriel was sent ... with a
message for a girl ... the girl's name was Mary" (Lk 1:26-27). But it is the avowal that we come to know first, just as it is the Son who is proclaimed and not the Spirit. Only slowly do we come to realize that the Spirit was long before given incognito, and continues to be given, even to those who have never heard of the Son or the gospel.

Further, the New Testament writers, understanding the relevance of Jesus to themselves, but rather innocent of the cultural pluralism of God's creation, will naturally tend to attribute to the words and deeds of Jesus, and to every detail of those words and deeds, a permanent validity and immediate relevance to all times and all places. There will be no sharp distinction between the universal aspect and the particular, between the permanent and the passing; on the contrary there will be a stress on Jesus as "the same yesterday, today, and for ever" (Heb 13:8).

But let us not exaggerate; in fact, already in New Testament times, adaptation is taking place in the presentation of the gospel. Thus, we find Luke relating a variety of approaches, depending on whether Paul is talking to fellow Jews at Pisidian Antioch (Ac 13:16-41), to simple pagans at Lystra (Ac 14:15-17), or to sophisticated pagans at Athens (Ac 17:22-31). Moreover, our own question of the relation between the roles of Son and Spirit is on the verge of being articulated in Paul's letters. It is surely a marginal topic in one who could write: "I resolved that while I was with you I would think of nothing but Jesus Christ—Christ nailed to the cross" (1 Cor 2:2). But it does begin to emerge when Paul writes that God sent his Son, as it were, to make it right and proper for him to adopt us, to receive as sons those whom his own Son took as his brothers; and then God sent his Spirit that we might know experientially our new status, aware of the ability we now have through the indwelling Spirit to call God our Father, Papa, the way a child does (Gal 4:4-6).

Luke considered the matter more directly, and made it almost thematic, as the very structure of his two-volumed work suggests: one volume is a gospel of the Son and the other has been called a gospel of the Spirit. So the first volume ends, as the second begins, with instructions to the apostles to stay in Jerusalem till they receive the promised Power: "I am sending upon you my Father's promised gift; so stay here in this city until you are armed with the power from above"
(Lk 24:49; see Ac 1:4, 8). But it is John who has given the matter the most thematic and concentrated treatment. True to his established pattern, he has a sign and its expository discourse, with the difference that here the discourse precedes the sign (Dodd, 1968:290-291). The exposition is found in the farewell discourses, and the sign in the whole narrative of the death and resurrection. But there may be a special correlation—Dodd is not sure (428; see 223, 442)—between Jesus' breathing his last on the cross (Jn 19:30) and his breathing "holy spirit" on the disciples after his resurrection (Jn 20:22). In any case, five great passages in the farewell discourses promise the Holy Spirit and describe in some detail the relation of his work to that of the Son.

Paul introduced our question almost in passing, while busy with his own question of law and freedom. Luke's concern is much more direct and closer to being thematic, but perhaps he has not yet posed the question in stark clarity: what is the relation of Son and Spirit? John, I venture to suggest, has done just that. Again, Paul's "explanation" is in terms of our sonship through the Son and our knowledge through the Spirit of our sonship. Luke's is in terms of what happened in the Son, and the power we have through the Spirit to witness to what happened (Ac 1:8; see Lk 24:48-49). But John's explanation is directly in terms of the relation between Son and Spirit. There is close unity, and there is even dependence of the Spirit's role on that of the Son (Jn 16:12-15). But it is clear also that the Spirit is sent in some sense to replace the Son: the disciples are not to be left orphans, they will receive another Advocate (Jn 14:15-18). Indeed, the new Advocate will be in some way better for them: "it is for your good that I am leaving you. If I do not go, your Advocate will not come, whereas if I go, I will send him to you" (Jn 16:7).

One can, then, trace a trajectory from Paul through Luke to John. The unifying factor is the emerging question of the relation of Son and Spirit. The differences are found in the obscurity/clarity with which the question is thematized, and in the variety of the proposed solutions. Now those very differences suggest the possibility of further understanding, and so of prolonging the trajectory into post-biblical times. But the work of prolongation, I would say, still awaits the worker. The next nineteen centuries show, in fact, a persistent reluc-
tance to accept responsibility for the work; worse, they show a sort of suppression of the religious experience that fills the New Testament. I think of the difference between the direct guidance the Spirit gave the church in the years covered by the Acts of the Apostles and the merely "negative assistance" that theologians would allow him to exercise at ecumenical councils. More fundamentally, I think of the way we tacitly downgrade the reality of his presence among us. It is as if we took over and gratefully applied the behaviorism of positivist psychology: the Son is really real, the Spirit not quite so really real; the Son was really sent into the world and was really here—after all, he took flesh and dwell among us; the Spirit was not quite so really sent and is not quite so really present—after all, his presence is wholly interior, and the data that manifest his presence are only data of consciousness. The "only" is the operative and revealing word.

IV

I wish, in these concluding paragraphs, to say something on the tasks we now face if the preceding analysis and history have any validity. Let us first review the situation. It shows a twofold distortion. There is the stubborn effort I described earlier to find in Jesus himself, in his words and deeds, a sanction for our own way in the world, a model for every vocation under the sun, a guide in every situation. Suppose we have to take an attitude toward the government of El Salvador, or to judge when a baby is a baby in the womb of its mother, or to decide whether we should sell our stocks in Nestlé, or to find ways for a priest to relate to his parishioners—what do we do as if by instinct? We turn to the scriptures to see what Jesus did in parallel situations. Rightly enough too, but we are too ready to find parallels, too dependent on those we do find, too little concerned that we ask of Jesus what, in the Father's total plan, is not his to give. And there is the second distortion: not only do we require of Jesus what the kenosis of human historicity leaves him unable to provide, but we at the same time fail to draw on those resources which the Father gave us for precisely the need we experience, namely, the real, the really real, presence of the Holy Spirit within us. We allow the focus which should be distinct-
ly his in the ellipse of the divine missions, to vanish, to merge with
that of the Son in a Christocentric religion, and so lose its proper
identity. Of course, it is difficult to determine what the Spirit is
saying. Diggings in Palestine, dictionaries of Aramaic, the comforting
feel of a holy book—all the data that make the mission of the Son so
really real—they tell us nothing of what the Spirit is saying to us
here and now. It is only through study of our interiority, shared with
others in whom also the Spirit is present, that we can discern what he
is saying.

The twofold distortion sets a twofold task for us: a reassessment
of the roles of both Son and Spirit. The latter is going forward in the
now well-established discipline of the discernment of spirits and of the
Spirit; it will make its way, if only slowly against stubborn resis-
tance, and its progress is not likely to need, or be much helped by,
anything I may say here. But we have hardly begun the former task,
which involves a study of the horizons of Jesus, of the differentiations
of consciousness that apply to him, even of the role of conversion in
his life, and so finally of what in his words and deeds is permanently
and universally valid, and what is particular and time-conditioned.

True, we are more familiar now, thanks to biblical scholarship,
with the particular coloring of Jesus' thought and speech and action, as
it was influenced by his upbringing twenty centuries ago in Palestine—
what Lonergan would call his brand of common sense, which differed from
the Roman brand, say, and certainly from ours. But what I am calling
for goes beyond such a study. Brands of common sense all pertain to
undifferentiated consciousness, and what we must add are the differenti-
ations: most obviously, religious differentiation, but others too, like
the differentiation of a word-artist. We would ask about his horizon in
the sense of Lonergan's dialectic, which means asking about his conver-
sions—intellectual, moral, religious—asking with appropriate care to
distinguish the reversal of direction in a normal conversion from the
positive forward momentum it supplies, but asking nevertheless. We
would ask too about his interiority, and so about the distinction
between his praxis—more directly a function of interiority and more
likely to reveal the universal—between his praxis and his poiesis,
which is more a function of external conduct and more likely to pertain
to a particular time and place and people.
I conclude my paper with more diffidence than I have so far shown. There are evident dangers to the thesis I propose, and I fear them. I fear disloyalty to him "who loved me and sacrificed himself for me" (Gal 2:20). I fear diminishing the power of that meditation on the words and deeds of Jesus which has nourished thousands of saints and millions of sinners, notably through the Spiritual Exercises of my own Ignatius of Loyola. I fear belittling the present role of Jesus, as he reigns in heaven, "able to save absolutely those who approach God through him ... always living to plead on their behalf" (Heb 7:25). I fear doing injustice to the institutional church, whose authorities are sinful human beings like me but do represent the Mother who gave me my Catholic parents, the mass, the sacraments, the scriptures, my tradition, the saints whom I admire from far off. I fear these things all the more because I think the changes rocking the church these twenty years are not the aftershocks of a cultural earthquake that has occurred but the foreshocks of one that is still to come; that is, the changes are only beginning, and if there is to be any effect of an effort like mine to provide a rationale for change, it will be to accelerate the process.

Nevertheless, there is one danger that is also a temptation, and in that sense greater than any of these: to close our eyes to what is going on, to bury our heads in the well-known sands of irresponsibility. And there is a hope that is greater by far than any danger which will ever threaten the hope "that we shall enter upon our heritage, when God has redeemed what is his own" (Eph 1:14), that through Christ we "have access to the Father in the one Spirit" (Eph 2:18); in this hope we have assurance, not only that the Spirit will guide us but also that having recognized the strangeness of a Jesus who "passes by our time and returns to His own," we may follow and see where he is staying (Jn 1:39), and thereby discover "who Christ really is, for us today."
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This paper presents some terminological suggestions that go beyond my earlier formulations of psychic conversion. Although these earlier articulations are all included in an integrated and systematic fashion in Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations (Doran, 1981), this paper is primarily concerned with the same reorientation of depth psychology that was the focus of these earlier reflections.

The terminological suggestions I wish to make have to do with a reconstruction of the Freudian notions of primary and secondary process (Freud, 1958: chapter 7) and of the notion of a 'spiritual unconscious' developed by a Jungian, Roger Woolger (1973). I will treat first the Freudian categories; second, the meaning of Woolger's 'spiritual unconscious'; and I conclude with an account of the sense in which this dimension can be called 'unconscious,' indicating briefly the manner in which its retrieval might affect two ways of understanding another dimension of the 'unconscious' or the psychic: those of Ernest Becker and Carl Jung.

I

PRIMARY PROCESS AND SECONDARY PROCESS

There is a paradoxical feature in the structure of reductionist theories. We will witness one instance of it in discussing Freud. While it is true that reductionist accounts have the character of describing 'higher' activities as 'nothing but' more basic activities or their 'reflexes,' the basic level itself is conceived too narrowly. For example, the Marxist notion of the base and superstructure of society not only has the superstructure become 'nothing but' a reflex of the base; also, not enough is included in the base itself. Thus pri-
mordial intersubjectivity is more or less overlooked, and both the political dimension of society and also the commonsense level of cultural values are projected into the superstructure, when in fact they belong to the base. As a result, what does belong in the superstructure—namely, scientific, scholarly, artistic, philosophic, and theological objectifications—is deprived of its autonomy and denied its place as a significant contributor to the integrity or distortion of the base.

An analogous difficulty can be found in Freudian psychoanalytic theory. In the present essay I will limit discussion of this difficulty to Freud's notions of primary and secondary process. I was led to a reorientation of these notions by reflecting on several phrases in the introduction to Bernard Lonergan's Insight. There we are told that the effort of the book is to attain "greater concreteness on the side of the subject" (1957:xxv). The reader is invited to locate "in the pulsing flow of life" (xix) the various elements discovered by a careful reading of the book. This 'pulsing flow of life' includes such elements as insight, reflective understanding and judgment, existential freedom culminating in decisions, and even the supernatural life of grace. None of these elements (only some of which would be admitted by Freud even to exist) is to be excluded from primary process and relegated to a secondary process that develops only because the aims of the primordial desires are inevitably frustrated. The basic question regards what one will include among the primordial desires. If the desire to understand correctly, or, more compactly, the desire to find and hold what Eric Voegelin has called the direction that can be found in the movement of life (Voegelin, 1971) is to be included in the primary process of the pulsing flow, then the categories that to date have served as the basic terms and relations of depth psychology, including Freud's primary and secondary process, have been incorrect. No depth psychology, including those less reductionistic than Freud's, adequately accounts for the relation to the sensitive flow of the psyche on the part of the elements of intentionality that Lonergan would have us discover. I suggest that we reconceive 'primary process' as the pulsing flow of life in which we can find not only the dynamics uncovered by Freud and others but also the operations whose self-appropriation is the aim of Insight; and that we reconceive 'secondary process' as all more or less successful scientific and commonsense attempts to articulate primary process: all attempts (to adapt Lonergan's terms) to bring the operations of com-
conscious intentionality as intentional to bear upon both the operations and the states of conscious intentionality (Lonergan, 1972:14). Thus 'secondary process' would be a category applicable to Freudian psychoanalytic theory as well as to Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Both have disengaged something of the truth about primary process. A higher synthesis would integrate these discoveries with one another. But what I am emphasizing at the moment is that what Lonergan has disengaged belongs as much to primary process as what Freud discovered, and that a recognition of this fact would alter the significance and structure of psychoanalytic theory. In Lonergan's own words:

On the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous sensitivity; it is intelligible only in the sense that it can be understood. But with inquiry the intelligent subject emerges, and process becomes intelligent; it is not merely an intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative of intelligibility, the intelligence that intelligently seeks understanding, comes to understand, and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term, or an impasse, intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as critically reflective, the subject stands in conscious relation to an absolute—the absolute that makes us regard the positive content of the sciences not as true and certain but only as probable. Finally, the rational subject, having achieved knowledge of what is and could be, rationally gives way to conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility (1972:16; emphasis added).

To the preceding affirmations, moreover, we must add the important assertion that 'secondary-process' articulations of primary process, whether scientific or commonsense and whether more or less successful, reverberate back upon primary process, influence it, and either distort or facilitate it. This assertion not only explains the frequently remarked phenomenon that patients in Freudian analysis will tend to have Freudian dreams; those undergoing Jungian analysis, archetypal dreams; and so forth. It also throws into relief the extreme importance of getting things right when it comes to self-understanding. Primary process in its totality may be understood with Voegelin as the search for direction in the movement of life. The normative order of that search is unpacked in Lonergan's intentionality analysis. When secondary-process apprehensions of primary process in its twofold intentional and psychic constitution are correct, the self as it is and the self as it is understood to be "are operating from the same base along the same route to the same goal."
of primary process are mistaken, the self as it is and the self as it is understood to be "to a greater or less extent, are operating at cross-purposes. Such a conflict is inimical to the development" of the person (Lonergan, 1957:475).

Personal development, moreover, is a dialectical process that affects the level of primary process itself. There is a dialectic of the subject whose basic terms and relations constitute the transactions between neural demands for conscious representation and psychic integration, on the one hand, and the repressive or constructive censorship of dramatically patterned intentionality, on the other hand (Lonergan, 1957: chapter 6). This dialectic is one instance of the general law of limitation and transcendence that constitutes all development in the concrete universe of proportionate being (Lonergan, 1957:472-79). Mistaken apprehensions of primary process will distort that dialectical process by displacing in one direction or another the tension, the poised equilibrium, the taut balance of limitation and transcendence. The pulsing flow of life, the search for direction in the movement of life, primary process, is a duality. In Insight we are afforded an opportunity to "unravel an ambiguity and to eliminate an ambivalence" (Lonergan, 1957:xx) that affects our cognitive activity. But we are also invited to understand the duality of our knowing as a manifestation or instance of a more wide-ranging and inclusive tension that informs our living in its entirety: the heightened tension that, on the side of the object, is the opposition between the world of sense and the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value; and, on the side of the subject, is the opposition between a center in the world of sense and an entry into the universe of being (Lonergan, 1957:473-74). This tension constitutes the pulsing flow of life; it constitutes the very structure of primary process. But its integrity depends on the accuracy of those acts of self-understanding constitutive of secondary process.

The duality of primary process is ontologically grounded in a threefold constitution of the person. The person or 'self' in its entirety is a unity of living organism, sensitive psyche, and spiritual intention of the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good. Consciousness is a duality, but no ontological dualism underlies this duality; but dualist ontological conceptions of the human person typically fail to recognize the distinct function of the sensitive psyche. As we will see later, even such a sensitive and perceptive reorientation
of the psychoanalytic tradition as Ernest Becker's falls down on this point; whereas one of the distinct merits of Jungian insight, at least at one point of its development, is its insistence on the threefold constitution of the human person (Jung, 1946)—even though Jung did not yet draw these distinctions precisely enough.

The sensitive psyche participates in both organic process and spiritual activity, and mediates the tension of the two. Neural process receives a higher and conscious integration at the level of the psyche. But the same psyche is constellated into a variety of patterns of experience (Lonergan, 1957:181-89) correlative to a variety of realms of meaning (Lonergan, 1972:81-85), which are the objectives of spiritual intentionality. The tension of primary process is thus experienced at the level of the sensitive psyche. Precisely as sensitive, psychic experience is bounded both by the dynamics of what Heidegger has disclosed as the dimensions of primordial time (1972), and by the ecology of human spatiality. The psyche also participates in the operations of the conscious intentionality, since in those operations every act of inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, deliberation, decision is accompanied by corresponding sensitive and affective elements. But the objectives of conscious intentionality are not restricted by time and space. The latter are within, but not exclusive of, the objectives of human cognitional and existential praxis, the real and the good (Lonergan, 1957:379-80).

The tension experienced by the psyche is an opposition between being at home in a habitat and being at home in being. The opposition cannot be eradicated by choosing either alternative over the other. Genuineness lies in admitting the tension itself into consciousness and self-understanding (Lonergan, 1957:475-79), so that one lives out of the balance of limitation and transcendence rather than by displacing the balance to one pole or the other. Psychologically, opting to dissolve

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1. For all the wealth of his disclosure of the dimensions of time, Heidegger is not correct in affirming time as the horizon of Being. "Interpretations of being ... in terms of space and time are mere intrusions of imagination" (Lonergan, 1957:379). Thus it is not surprising that Heidegger grounds the primordial time that for him is the horizon of Being in the transcendental imagination he retrieves from the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Heidegger, 1962).
the tension in favor of a habitat is to invite the dynamics of depression; and choosing to flee the limitations of a habitat is to soar into schizophrenic fantasy (Becker, 1973: chapter 10). All one can do is admit the tension in its fullness into one's development (primary process) and into one's understanding of one's development (secondary process), to admit it precisely as a dialectic, and as that kind of dialectic in which the linked but opposed principles of change "are modified [not eliminated] by the changes that successively result from them" (Lonergan, 1957:217). We might call this a dialectic of contraries, as opposed to a dialectic of contradictories. In the latter the issue at stake is one of choice between two mutually exclusive opposites (for instance, the true and the false, the good and the evil). But both poles of a dialectic of contraries are to be affirmed, each in its proper relation to the other. In this instance, any genuine dialectic of contradictories would involve the choice of either the balanced development of the dialectic of contraries or the distortion of the poised equilibrium of limitation and transcendence.

In the terms being suggested here, any attempts to continue to unfold the implications of the notion of a generalized empirical method are secondary-process efforts at articulating the dynamics of the pulsing flow of primary process. Fred Lawrence has specified the core genuineness of secondary process: "The key to method is ... the subject as subject. ... To do 'method' calls ... for a release from all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself" (1972:203). Lawrence's 'key to method' explains perhaps why method so conceived was for so long such an improbable emergence in the development of human consciousness. To abide at the level of the presence of the subject to himself or herself, to abide beyond all representation, is a rare achievement. And to represent what is experienced in that abiding, and to do so not just descriptively but with explanatory precision is the kind of differentiation that, borrowing Eric Voegelin's terms, we might describe as a 'leap in being' (Voegelin, 1956:10). Confronted with the question of the probability of the step by step, question by question, implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being (Lonergan, 1957:391), my own option has been the dialectical integration into 'method' of the findings of those who have specialized in exploring the psychic rather than intentional
dimensions of primary process. Isn't it the next step in attempting to augment the probability of survival of 'interiorly differentiated consciousness,' which is a distinctly secondary-process achievement?

This integration, however, must be critical and dialectical, because I am convinced that in the last analysis an adequate science of psychic depths is dependent on a correct analysis of human intentionality. If the major representatives of depth psychology to date have not been equipped with such an analysis, then at one point or another their apprehensions are mistaken and their psychologies become, in Voegelin's terms, psychologies of passional motivation, the psychologies of pneumopathological subjects, rather than psychologies of orientations (1952:184-87). In contrast, a psychology of orientations would start by elucidating the participation of the sensitive psyche in the intentionality of the human spirit, on the one hand; and mistaken apprehensions will reverberate back upon primary process to distort it by displacing the integral tension of limitation and transcendence in one direction or another, on the other hand. Most of the remainder of this paper will be devoted to analyzing some instances of such misapprehension and to reflecting on their implications.

Before I proceed to this analysis and reflection, though, let me make one comment: what has been said thus far is significant for understanding the four conversions—religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic—that constitute the foundational dimensions which can be explicated as a result of abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself or herself. In the third stage of meaning, intellectual and psychic conversion refer both to the integrity of cognitional and psychic process (primary process) and to the self-appropriation of cognitional and psychic process (secondary process), but I contend that they affect secondary process most immediately; whereas religious and moral conversion (along with pre-philosophic instances of cognitive integrity and constructive censorship regarding neural demands) affect primary process most immediately.
II

THE SPIRITUAL UNCONSCIOUS

I turn next to the category of the spiritual unconscious. The term, spiritual unconscious, appears in a paper by Roger Woolger that attempts to come to terms with the anti-imaginal mysticism of Simone Weil from a Jungian perspective (Woolger, 1973). Woolger adopts the term from Roberto Assagioli's Psychosynthesis, and integrates it into Jungian thought by suggesting that the mundus imaginalis called the collective unconscious by Jung should be understood as "that region of the soul where psychic contents become contaminated and transformed by the spirit to take on the primordial and numinous character of the archetypes" (267). Woolger's model is obviously influenced by Jung's programmatic essay, "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1946), where the psyche's archetypal images are distinguished from the 'psychoid' (that is, to be understood by analogy with the psyche) archetypes-as-such. The latter belong to the 'spirit factor' in its tense interplay with the instinctual factor. The spirit releases the images as a result of a tension constellated between itself and its polar opposite but equally 'psychoid' dimension, instinctive process. For Woolger instinct maps out the Freudian psychoanalytic path when it is considered independently of its tension with the spirit factor.

From what Woolger says expressly, I infer that when the psychoanalytic path is regarded as the exclusive explanatory principle for understanding primary process, it is an abstraction, a substitution of a part for a whole, a contraction of reality into a framework that cannot contain it, a distortion not only of the whole but also of the part that is supposed to include the whole. Jungians in general, and Woolger in particular, will acknowledge that there is more to primary process than what Freud and his followers will admit. Included in this 'more' is Jung's 'spirit factor' or what Woolger calls 'the spiritual unconscious.' What is most important about Woolger's essay as written by a Jungian is that he correlates this factor neither with the psychoanalytic path nor with the Jungian archetypal path, but with the mystical purification of the dark night of the soul. Here "the capacity to produce or meditate upon images appears to have irrevocably dried
up." Woolger's critique of available psychologies thus extends even to Jungian formulations, where the dark night is frequently understood as an archetypal process. A Jungian explanation, says Woolger, would grant to archetypal images "wider explanatory power than they warrant." The dark night is more adequately understood as "a state which may include visionary experience but which is not to be exclusively identified with it" nor to be understood in the archetypal terms that do go a long way in elucidating visionary events. Even the Jungian designation 'psychoid' for this factor, Woolger says correctly, betrays "an insufficient distinction between the psychological and the spiritual" (265). The confusion to which Woolger is pointing haunts and plagues practically all Jungian writing on spirituality and religion.

Woolger's paper is most significant coming from a Jungian. As might be expected from one with such commitments, it would (and quite correctly, I believe) point out to theologians and spiritual directors with apophatic inclinations that the archetypal world is a terrain to be explored and transformed if spiritual development is not to risk becoming schizoid. "Not for nothing is the traditional antidote for spiritual pride, humility—the practice of being grounded in one's humus" (268). But the paper also represents an admission that, while Jung correctly locates more in 'primary process' than Freud does, he still does not acknowledge enough, at least in a sufficiently differentiated fashion. The archetypal mundus imaginalis is not an ultimate resting place in interior development.

Thus Woolger suggests the potential contributions of the Jungian archetypal path to the recovery of the spirit: "Unless the spirit enters into the psyche to transform mundane imagination into vision or numinous dreams, spirit remains unknowable or unconscious in a more absolute sense than our unconsciousness of personal memories [the psychoanalytic path], and even of archetypal images [the Jungian path]" (270). In Lonergan's terms, the Jungian archetypal path is one road towards a recovery of the subject, in precisely the fullness of the dimension Lonergan has disclosed, from neglect and truncation (1968). Archetypal experience is a road toward entrance into the universe of being intended by the human spirit. It presents data for questions that, if pursued, would reveal the subject to himself or herself as a pure question for complete intelligibility, unconditioned truth, and unqualified goodness: these data, precisely as psychological, display the intermediate status
of the psyche in the human constitution, the openness of the psyche to the spirit, the participation of the psyche in more than sensitive process, the tension of limitation and transcendence.

In the present essay I am attempting to affirm that intentionality analysis is needed to ground an adequate psychological analysis; more existentially, that pneumopathyology is in the last analysis the ground of psychopathology. To this point, Woolger also maintains that whether or not one is going to be able to transcend the Jungian mundus imaginalis into the mystical detachment from inner states and images and from outer objects "may ... depend on whichever philosophies we adopt consciously or unconsciously from our cultural heritage" (270; emphasis added). That is to say, the spiritual effect (primary process) of an exploration (secondary process) of psychic process is intimately dependent upon one's implicit or explicit philosophical position (secondary process) regarding the intentional objectives of the human spirit (primary process). Primary process depends on secondary process. The self as it is depends on the self as it is understood to be. Secondary process reverberates upon primary process, for better or for worse. Woolger does not say but does imply that one difficulty with the Jungian school is the lack of an adequate philosophy to ground and properly locate the further contributions to secondary process that Jungian analysis potentially provides.

In several other writings I have made much of a dream that Jung relates in his autobiography (1961:217-21). He had this dream just before writing Answer to Job, which is perhaps his most controversial work and definitely the work that reveals most clearly Jung's own inability to transcend the mundus imaginalis of the archetypal psyche to the universe of being that is unrestricted by the dimensions of time and space. In the dream Jung refuses to follow his father's counsel to touch his forehead to the ground in adoration of the highest presence beyond the mandala-shaped temple of his own psyche. It indicates both the inability and its pneumopathological roots in as graphic and direct a manner as one could possibly conceive. The point that I want to make here is that the philosophical heritage that was available to Jung—Kantian in epistemology and German-idealistic in metaphysics—is intimately related to this supremely existential, primary-process inability and refusal. Without accurate philosophy the Jungian path does not and cannot cross the threshold between the psychological and the spiritual.
Such confusion and inaccurate secondary-process objectification of what one is doing and where one is heading when one is travelling the archetypal path through the *mundus imaginalis* distorts the journey itself, and ultimately the primary process of life. Without a therapy of pneumopathology, psychopathology cannot be healed. It is simply redistributed over and over again, as a result of variations on the pneumopathological theme.

As an ultimate issue, the secondary-process element caught in a vicious circle with the aberrations of primary process becomes the final product of unchecked counterpositional affirmations: the problem to be remedied becomes the course of action to be recommended (Lonergan, 1957:213-32). In this case, incredible as it may appear, psychopathology is lionized in further developments of Jungian thought into a condition to be indulged in (Hillman, 1975).2

The roots of the affirmation in pneumopathology can be seen, I believe, in the casual acceptance of epistemological and moral relativism, and in the recommendation now found in some Jungian literature of a new polytheism as the appropriate mythoreligious sensibility for postmodern humanity (Miller). The intention of integration which is still clear in Jung's own writings and which remains the potential key within the Jungian corpus for unlocking the door of Jung's psychic cul-

2. Pertinent to Hillman, though without mentioning his work, are the following comments from Ann and Barry Ulanov (1975):

We can find symbolic meaning in almost anything—without committing ourselves to anything. By that failure of commitment we incline too much toward the nonego side. There is no concrete living in history: rather, history functions only to occasion the uncovering and investigation of new fantasy wrappings. We may feel in some way reconnected to religious symbols through the discovery of parallels between them and personal psychological experience, but no bridge is built that way between individual meaning and collective tradition. The result is that we feel both psychologically and spiritually lonely, set apart from others and our inner selves. And too much spiritual isolation of this sort leads to madness.

Unbalanced emphasis on the symbolic approach leads to a rootlessness of the ego in the nonego realm. Nowhere is one decisively committed, for better or for worse; ... the individual person [is] divested of his or her concrete self. Personal problems then cease to lead to new perceptions and transformations of personality, pleasurable or painful. Instead, we come to view even out most intimate problems and possibilities as new "manifestations" of the psyche's life. ... Individuality has come to be seen as merely a thin layer wrapped around a core of psychic meaning (113).

Hillman's position is a function of his otherwise valuable clarification of the notion of *anima*, a distinct advance upon Jung (1973, 1974).
de-sac (however inadequately its real exigencies and roots may have been articulated by Jung himself), is now being abandoned by some of Jung's followers who would maintain that it is the one mistake Jung made. It is true that one cannot both remain on the way to the integration of self-transcendent subjectivity and follow Jung into the prison-house of the self explicitly chosen as the alternative to vertical transcendence. But, while this choice is Exhibit A of pneumopathyology, it should not be viewed as discrediting the very intention of integration. It only manifests one of the possible derailments of this intention, and perhaps the source of all the others. I would argue that Jung's dream was telling him precisely this, but he, the great interpreter, could not see it. Instead he wrote Answer to Job, a great affirmation of pneumopathyology.

Now I want to reinterpret what Woolger calls the spiritual unconscious more precisely as the conscious but unobjectified (primary process) exigencies of human intentionality for the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good, which have been forgotten and repressed because of the inherited philosophies of our day (secondary process). A correct secondary-process understanding of the mundus imaginalis and of the journey through and beyond it—an accurate science of depth psychology—is dependent on a critical retrieval of that conscious but unobjectified intentionality. As Woolger's essay suggests, the dependence is mutual to a certain extent. The retrieval of intentionality can also be aided by a journey through the mundus imaginalis, especially in the sense that the latter has the dramatic potential of providing a defensive circle around both the secondary-process events of authentic cognitive and existential praxis. But it has this potential only when the archetypal events are acknowledged as data to be understood correctly and to be brought to bear upon the decisions leading to existential praxis only through this correct understanding.

Consequently, what Woolger calls the spiritual unconscious is in fact human consciousness itself: not of course in the Jungian sense, where consciousness is ego-perception, but in Lonergan's sense of consciousness as experience, consciousness as structured into empirical, intelligent, rational, existential, and religious dimensions, each of them permeated by the strictly psychological components of inner sensitivity. These strictly psychological components are determined as to their quality by the dialectics of the subject and of community (Lonergan, 1957: chapters 6 and 7) whose explanatory principle lies ultimately
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in the minor and major unauthenticity (Lonergan, 1972:79-80) of the intentional levels of consciousness. Kierkegaard understood this issue of authenticity better than most twentieth-century psychologists (but more compactly than we are now prepared to do under Lonergan's tutelage): spirit posits the synthesis of the psyche and the body; that is, spirit determines in large measure what the relation of the psyche will be both to the body and to itself (1944). Moving beyond Kierkegaard, spirit is not only radical existential freedom and its dread-filled vocation to determine the synthesis of the psychic and the bodily and the synthesis of the temporal and the eternal; spirit is also inquiry, insight, conceptualization, formulation, reflection, grasp of the virtually unconditioned, affirmation and negation; and existential freedom itself is historical responsibility for both short-range and long-range cycles in the dialectic of community (Lonergan, 1957:222-42).

It is very important to grasp this relation of spirit to psyche, especially in any attempts to come to grips with both the contributions and the possible derailments of contemporary depth psychology. One's experience of the mundus imaginalis is not a matter of fatalistic destiny or even of what Woolger calls 'our individual destinies' (270); instead, it is a function of and cipher for the appropriation of spiritual authenticity or inauthenticity. A dream such as Jung's to which I referred earlier does not have to be an overwhelming experience that propels with deterministic necessity an Answer to Job that simply objectifies religious pathology. Such a dream provides data for the questions that in virtue of understanding will ultimately lead to a decision as to whether or not this state of affairs is what one wants to accept as the truth about oneself. Such a decision could alter the mundus imaginalis, and the change would be reflected in subsequent dreams. That is to say, the experience of the mundus imaginalis is a function of the spiritual authenticity or inauthenticity of the five-storeyed intentionality of the human subject as the subject responds in one way or another to the transcendental exigencies of consciousness in their dramatic exchanges with neural demands. Jung's spirit factor as transforming the contents of the mundus imaginalis really consists precisely in the exigencies of the levels of conscious intentionality explicated by Lonergan; and in the dialectic of grace and sin that con-
stitutes the ultimate drama of the operations at each level of conscious intentionality. Whether one remains stuck in the mundus imaginalis, as Jung's dream tells us he did, or transcends it through the release of the psyche's potential wisdom toward a mystical union with the complete intelligibility, absolutely unconditioned being and truth, and unqualified goodness of God, is not to be accounted for by some Jungian heimarmene. Contrary to Jung's dream and Jung's personal myth, spiritual destiny is not determined by constant rotation within the order of nature. The Jungian doctrine of the coincidentia oppositorum conflates the contraries of consciousness and the unconscious, masculine and feminine, and so on (where the doctrine is correct) with the contradictories of good and evil, by subsuming the latter into the former. This confusion reveals that the choice (conceived of as ultimate) of the realm of rotary, cyclical, quadripartite symbols, which is precisely what is reflected in Jung's dream, is actually the choice of the demonic (see Frye, 1957:161-62). But our argument on the relations of primary and secondary process leads us to affirm this: whether implicitly or explicitly one remains in or transcends the bondage of the spirit to the demonic is in large part a function of "whatever philosophies we adopt consciously or unconsciously from our cultural heritage" (Woolger:270). "The hopeless tangle ... of the endlessly multiplied philosophies, is not merely a cul-de-sac for human progress; it also is a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness; and men are its slaves" (Lonergan, 1957:692).

Let me conclude this section by making it clear that I am not challenging Jung's clarification of rotary and quadripartite symbols such as the mandala precisely as symbols of integration. In Lonergan's terms, I am challenging the Jungian preference for the self as integrator over the self as operator. In addition to the symbols of the self as integrator there are symbols of the self as operator. For example, in Jung's dream, the father, his words and actions in adoration of the highest presence, and the small opening to the beyond guarded by the innocent victim of human sin (Uriah the Hittite) are symbols of the self (and of more than the self) as operator. In this case the quadripartite symbols of the integration of a previous stage of development are to be dissolved in favor of new differentiations that will lead, through the tension of limitation and transcendence, to more expansive but still temporary plateaus of well-rounded integration. "One and the same reality is both integrator and operator; but the operator is
relentless in transforming the integrator" (Lonergan, 1957:476). "The higher integration is not only an integrator but also an operator" (532). And how can it be otherwise, if "everyone by the dynamic structure of his being is oriented into ... the sphere of the ulterior unknown, of the unexplored and strange, of the undefined surplus of significance and meaning" (532) that constitutes the permanent, because unrestricted, primary field for the affect-laden images that result from the penetration of sensitivity by the operator? To insist on the self as integrator at the expense of the self as operator is not only to displace the tension of limitation and transcendence in the direction of limitation (with corresponding distortions of the transcendence-pole). More ultimately, it may at times be a choice of a humanism in revolt against the preferred supernatural solution to the problem of evil (Lonergan, 1957:728). While no one may dare judge another or even oneself on this point, it is penetrantly clear that the symbols of Jung's dream and the terms of his argument in Answer to Job revolve around precisely this question. In Lonergan's words:

the heightened tension, which would result from a supernatural solution, would not lack its objectification in the dialectical succession of human situations. Hitherto, the dialectic has been conceived to rest on a bipolar conjunction and opposition. Within each man there are both the attachment and interestedness of sensitivity and intersubjectivity and, on the other hand, the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to know. From this conjunction of opposites there follow

(1) the interference of the lower level with the unfolding of inquiry and reflection, of deliberation and decision,
(2) the consequent unintelligibility of situations, and
(3) the increasing irrelevance of intelligence and reasonableness to the real problem of human living.

But when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself (1957:728).
Despite the fact that what Woolger is calling the spiritual unconscious is in fact unconsciousness itself in its native orientation toward the intelligible, the true and real, and the good, there is some warrant in the contemporary situation for referring to this orientation as unconscious. More precise, of course, are Lonergan’s descriptions of the neglected, truncated, immanentist, and alienated subject (1968). For just as what depth psychology contributes to elucidating is in large part not strictly speaking unconscious but unobjectified, so too what Lonergan has succeeded in clarifying is the previously unobjectified or inadequately objectified structure of intentional consciousness itself. But in present parlance, the term, the unconscious, refers, for better or for worse, to the forgotten and repressed dimensions of the human subject. The point I would make in retaining the term, the spiritual unconscious, is just that spirituality has been forgotten and repressed and that the distinction between the psyche and the spirit has been relegated to oblivion, largely though not exclusively through the ministrations of depth psychologists. The full dimensions of spirituality are overlooked even by many theologians who write books and teach courses on ‘Christian spirituality.’ How often, for instance, do these books and courses mention understanding and judgment, let alone unpack their dynamics, when speaking of spirituality? Let us, then, grant a certain descriptive usefulness to the term, the spiritual unconscious, even if it is not a precise expression from a strictly technical point of view.

Jung has written that the self is the reality that it is most important for ‘modern man’ to understand (1951:266). One can agree with him on this point, and even with many of the specific reasons that he offers for this conviction, and still argue, as I am doing here, that the self, even in its archetypal manifestations, cannot be correctly understood from the standpoint of an uncriticized Jungian psychology. As we argued above, even the properly psychological dimensions of the self, both as data and as understood, depend on an analysis of cognitive
and existential intentionality. Without this critical foundation, such an understanding as Jung would offer, despite its genuine contributions to the full position on the subject, will eventually be submerged in an immanentism whose very sophistication constitutes a high potentiality for self-destructiveness and historical irresponsibility.

The personal, immanently generated affirmation of the spiritual as distinctly real demands not only a fairly high degree of philosophical sophistication but also a *periagoge*, a conversion, that is appropriately called intellectual. The same affirmation, though not always immanently generated, however, was a constituent element of the Western cultural heritage until modern times, as a result of belief in the classic philosophical tradition rooted in the Platonic and Aristotelian conversions. In Roman Catholic circles, that effective history continued well into modern times, but at the expense of explicit relation to the specific intellectual, political, and historical problems of modernity. At the present time, neither a fidelity to the classical breakthrough nor a responsible negotiation of the contemporary problems is particularly obvious. If anything, the spirituality of personhood is at a further remove for Catholics today than it was several decades ago when they were assured the opportunity to affirm at least the values resident in a quite specific intellectual tradition, if not what they had immanently grasped as virtually unconditioned. The prospects for a reversal of the neglect, truncation, immanentization, and alienation of the subject are not particularly encouraging, when religious communities and educational institutions that still claim nominal allegiance to a particular tradition have in fact succumbed to the major surrender of intelligence—the factor most responsible for the acceleration of decline. Are we perhaps even further removed today from any responsible participation in history than the earlier recipients of an indoctrination into a culturally outmoded formulation of a basically quite worthy tradition?

Be that as it may, for many of us the work of Bernard Lonergan has succeeded in helping us begin to retrieve in a contemporary fashion what Voegelin would call the engendering experiences of that tradition. Much of my own work has been devoted to trying to bring Lonergan's achievement to bear on one of the principal and uniquely modern sources of data on the subject, the science of depth psychology, and this paper has been arguing that in order to do this effectively one must insist on
an objectification of a forgotten dimension of subjectivity quite analogous to depth psychology's objectification of what it calls the unconscious. A mere turning to the psyche's mundus imaginalis is not sufficient for that understanding of the self which would begin to reverse the cycle of decline. In fact, as Voegelin has grasped better perhaps than any depth psychologist, the mundus imaginalis, the myth, is itself dependent on the extent to which consciousness has been differentiated. A differentiated consciousness will have a quite different mundus imaginalis to which to turn from that of an undifferentiated consciousness. It is not sufficient to affirm that there is needed a psychic conversion, a conversio ad phantasma, through which the symbolic can be appropriated. It is just as important to articulate that conversion correctly. For that conversion to proceed from and contribute to an accurate understanding of the self, in fact for it to be a genuine conversion at the secondary-process level, there is required a knowledge of the realities of intelligence, rationality, and moral responsibility. Much of what Polanyi called the tacit dimension and which he seems to have claimed must always remain tacit (Apczynski) has in fact been objectified, and we need no longer remain silent about it. The role of spirituality in the pulsing flow of life, and so as a constitutive dimension of primary process, has been demonstrated. It can now be brought to bear upon the rest of primary process in an endeavor to re-orient the findings of depth psychology. As I have argued elsewhere, the full disclosure resulting from this recovery of the subject who has been neglected, truncated, immanentized, and alienated by 'enlightenment' rationality would constitute what we may call, borrowing a term from Paul Ricoeur, a semantics of human desire (Ricoeur, 1970:5-7).

The intentional dimensions of consciousness, of course, are not the only elements of the subject that have been rendered 'unconscious' by that instrumentalization of reason in the service of power which constitutes modern culture. Depth psychology has begun the task of retrieving dimension such as the realm of the archaic that enlightened moderns would claim has been eliminated, but in fact has only been differently distributed (Hardwick: 521). Depth psychology has exposed as an illusion the belief that the archaic has been eliminated. I conclude by examining briefly how the recovery of the 'spiritual unconscious' would affect two different depth-psychological approaches to exposing this illusion.
For Ernest Becker (1973), the illusion is a denial of the contingency of the death-doomed animal body and a flight into cultural lies that we create in order to proclaim our self-sufficiency. For Jung, the illusion is a neglect of the compensating factors of the multiform psychic unconscious on the part of the hypertrophied ego and persona of culturally normal consciousness; these factors, when either attended to and appropriated (the personal unconscious) or negotiated in their autonomy (the collective unconscious) promote a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of opposites heading toward a condition of personal wholeness; and as one moves toward psychic wholeness, the archaic, precisely because it has once again been acknowledged, is transformed, redistributed, and reoriented.

As I said earlier, Jung's approach has a distinct advantage over Becker's in that it begins to transcend the radical dualism that for Becker still remains the lesson that psychoanalysis has to teach us. For Jung the psyche begins to be articulated as a factor distinct from the body and the spirit and mediating these 'psychoid' opposites; whereas for Becker, the person is conceived as a duality of body and 'self,' due in part to a misunderstanding of Kierkegaard.

On the other hand, Becker's reconstruction of depth psychology has an advantage over Jung's approach. Becker says what almost every depth psychologist either neglected or refused to say: in the last analysis, religious faith is the only possible operator of whatever authenticity we are able to achieve. I have already called attention to the theoretic ambiguities of Jung's position regarding vertical transcendence, and, more pointedly, to his autobiographical revelation of a possible existential refusal of such transcendence. Answer to Job, the least ambiguous of Jung's pronouncements, is in fact a reflection of the primordial temptation, You shall be as gods—in some respects, even superior to God! And this temptation is precisely what Becker labels the multiform causa sui project which is the source of our cultural lies and the springboard of our destructiveness.

What I want to do now is to see what happens to Becker's position and then to Jung's, if we accept the basic thesis of this paper: that the spiritual exigencies of conscious intentionality are as much a constituent dimension of primary process as is 'the archaic.' Becker's thesis is that the repressed fear of death is the main-spring of human activity, "activity designed largely to avoid the
fatality of death" (ix). This thesis determines all of Becker's principal contentions. From it he derives an understanding, among other things, of the almost universally false or cheap heroics of humanity, of our hopeless self-absorption, of the pathetic means we employ to secure our self-esteem, of culture as a system of false heroics, of our evasion of the intensity of personhood (an evasion that we call 'character'), of schizophrenia as an inability to lie, and of depression as a bogging-down in character defenses. The root of the malaise is not psychological but ontological: the human person is a mixture of the irreconcilable opposites of an animal body and a symbolic self-consciousness. "The two dimensions of human existence—the body and the self—can never be reconciled seamlessly" (29). The child experiences the impossibility of identifying exclusively with either dimension, and emerges from the earliest years with "a face that one sets to the world," but that "hides an inner defeat" (29). And "there is no real difference between a childish impossibility and an adult one; the only thing that the person achieves is a practiced self-deceit—what we call the 'mature' character" (46). The main task of most lives becomes the denial of one's bodily-based contingency while maintaining the illusion that one is creating one's own existence. This task shows itself in many forms: our yearning for freedom from contradictions and ambiguities; our buying into the artificial certainties of our culture; our difficulty with sexual differentiation; our misuse of religion as a support for our personal and cultural lies; our slavishness to other persons; our impossible attempts at romantic and creative denials of our unsurpassable dependency on the rest of reality; the dynamics of neurosis, psychosis, and perversion.

The figure who seems to Becker to have come closest to understanding the only possible resolution of the duality is Kierkegaard, who, in his portrayal of the knight of faith, comprehends clearly what an existence disciplined in the school of anxiety would be. But—and here is the rub for Becker—such faith is not our own doing; moreover, there probably is no superiority to be discerned if we place Kierkegaard's life as a believing Christian over against Freud's as an agnostic (258). Neither escaped the character lie of the causa sui project, even though Kierkegaard saw correctly that one must abandon this project completely, give the meaning of one's life over to God, and live "centered on the energies of his Maker" (257), while Freud never
was able to analyze away his own bondage to the dimensions of the visible world and his attempts to deny that bondage through the drivenness of his dedication to his own cause.

Despite my admiration for the courage that Becker displays in an 'enlightenment' academic milieu, by insisting on the complementarity of religious insight with the discoveries of the most penetrating human scientists of our day, and despite the fact that one cannot help but be moved profoundly by his prophetic denunciations of what we are doing to earn self-esteem ("everything painful and sobering in what psychoanalytic genius and religious genius have discovered about man resolves around the terror of admitting what one is doing to earn his self-esteem" [6]), Becker's basic thesis still represents something of the pneumopathological narrowing of modern perspectives that it is attacking. Voegelin (1952: chapters 5 and 6) argues that the fear of death is, in fact, not repressed by modernity, but cultivated by the imperial entrepreneurs of Leviathan in order to win submission from their subjects. Elsewhere Voegelin insists that the anxiety of existence is more profoundly a horror of losing attunement with the silent voices of conscience and grace than it is a fear of biological extinction. The deliberate elevation of the fear of death into an absolute is in fact one way of obliterating these other voices from persons, culture, and society. What is required is attunement to their differentiated nuances. For then it will be apparent that what has really been repressed and to this extent rendered 'unconscious' is the very question that was rationally differentiated in classical Greece, and that enabled the effective proclamation of the Gospel in Hellenistic culture and continues to enable that proclamation wherever the question remains alive: the experience of life as a movement with a direction that can be found or missed (Voegelin, 1971). The modern forgetfulness is radically the forgetfulness of the question of attunement, a question which, while spiritual, is responsible for the unrest in the psychic dimensions of the pulsing flow of life, in living energy to become psychic and human and so requiring a higher systematization and integration in the explicit reachings of conscious intentionality for proportion with the measure disclosed in the never strident voices of conscience and grace. Ultimately Becker cannot arrive at such a position because he does not distinguish—and on this, he misinterprets
Kierkegaard—between this psychic unrest and the intentional or spiritual question in which it participates.

Jung does acknowledge, at least incipiently, the threefold—organic, psychic, and spiritual—constitution of human primary process. Precisely because he does so, he is able to reformulate 'the archaic' in the more appropriate terms of the primordial and the numinous. Still, as we have seen, his understanding does not reach adequate differentiation. His retrieval of the relationship between experiencing and symbolization is an immanentization of the cosmological horizon, a horizon whose problems are carefully pinned down by Voegelin:

Acts of symbolization are still badly handicapped by the bewildering multitude of unexplored facts and unsolved problems. Not much is really clear beyond the experience of participation and the quaternion structure of the field of being, and such partial clearness tends to generate confusion rather than order, as is bound to happen when variegated materials are classified under too few heads (1956:3).

The recovery of what, for better or worse, I have here called the spiritual unconscious will enable us to complement Jungian psychology with the distinction offered by Northrop Frye in a different context between the archetypal and the anagogic (Frye, 1957:95-128). The imagination participates in nature and imitates it (archetypal). But because it participates as well in a spiritual intention of an objective that is not restricted by space and time, it is able to contain the whole of nature and in fact the whole of proportionate being in the symbols that "make sensible to human sensitivity what human intelligence reaches for or grasps" (Lonergan, 1957:548), in "the image that symbolizes man's orientation into the known unknown," in the "symbols that unlock [sensitivty's] transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity" (1957:723). No depth-psychological semantics of desire will be adequate if it cannot account for such realities. As Jung recognized the reality of dimensions of elemental symbolization that could not in principle be accounted for in Freudian terms, and as he had the courage in his own situation to develop an alternative psychology to account for these dimensions, so now we must acknowledge
the reality of dimensions that cannot in principle be accounted for in Jungian terms. The terms in which they can be understood are provided by Lonergan's recovery of the 'spiritual unconscious,' and we must now accept the challenge of developing an alternative psychology that moves toward the understanding and therapeutic transcendence of psychopathology on the basis of the understanding and healing of pneumopathology.
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Woolger, Roger
Like many others, I read Method in Theology before reading Insight. It was a delight to read: challenging but so clear on fundamental issues that I had the sense that theological mountains were flattened and philosophical valleys were filled. My optimism has since become somewhat tempered, partly by having trudged through Insight, but like many others I at least understand now why I was so excited then. In Method, I had understood all the words, most of the sentences, many of the paragraphs, some of the sections, few of the chapters, and none of the book.

You may have had the same experience. Most of us can name a single chapter or a single issue that allowed us to leave behind our own world-view and enter the world-view of Method. For me, it was chapters seven and twenty of Insight, on the tension and redemption of community. Since our theme this year is redemptive tension, I am happy to have the chance of offering a few reflections on what for me was the door to the whole book.

In particular, I would like to explore the meaning of faith, charity, and hope as elements within Lonergan's theological foundations. In Insight, he named this triad as among the necessary elements in any redemption of the tension and dialectic of community. By the time he wrote Method, he acknowledged that Insight had not been sufficiently free of a faculty psychology, and he redefined faith within a psychology of self-transcending operations. But he did not thoroughly redefine charity or hope. In Method and a number of recent articles he simply repeats the functional view from Insight, namely that charity halts the

cycle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and that hope enables us to withstand the pressures of a culture in decline. He does not link either of them to any specific process in consciousness. So the interiority analysis begun in Method begs the kind of implicit definition that locates charity and hope in consciousness.

Before offering my definitions of charity and hope, I would like to clarify a common misunderstanding of Lonergan's view in Insight. Because he gave a merely heuristic understanding of the needed forms of redemption, we can get the impression that faith, charity, and hope are elements which most cultures have to wait for, and that only Christianity or the highest religions enjoy such divine gifts. But Lonergan has always compared this analysis to the method of successive approximations by which empirical scientists determine the actual state of affairs. In other words, faith, charity, and hope already exist in human consciousness. The task is not to put them there. Rather the task is to discover where they are and to cooperate with them intelligently.

So we are invited to examine our own spirits to see whether there are indeed three distinguishable movements aptly called faith, charity, and hope. Eric Voegelin has noted that Heraclitus had done exactly this:

Historically considered, the reality of participating knowledge manifests itself as a fulness so rich that it goes far beyond ratio alone. I am thinking particularly about the experience of faith, hope and love, which Heraclitus had already recognized and distinguished as sources of knowledge. One may therefore speak not only of a cognitionis rationis, but also of cognitiones fidelis, amoris, et spes. Furthermore, the cognitionis in the reality of knowledge are woven together into a complex that is knowledge only as a whole. Neither is there a ratio independent of the other modes of knowledge nor can they be independent of it.

Enough of preliminaries. Lonergan, as you know, now defines faith as the knowledge born of religious love. If we are to define charity and hope within this perspective, we first have to understand very clearly what religious love is.

2. This translation is given by Webb (1981:115). See also Horvath (1977:286), for the place of faith, charity, and hope in scripture.
LOVING

First, then, let us speak of loving. What do we do when we love? Two features appear immediately. For one, we feel benevolent. That is, we feel ready to give to someone else, or we really desire someone else’s welfare. This benevolence lies behind concrete acts of charity—and any act that might appear to be “caring” would not be love unless it had sprung from interior benevolence.

The second feature is appreciation. It differs from benevolence in so far as it does not focus on what good can be done, but rather on the good that the person actually is. Appreciation is welcoming; it is happy with; it is content.

Notice that benevolence and appreciation alternate. We provide care for someone until we are content with how things stand for that person. But while we may rest in appreciating how things stand, we never rest for long. Benevolence wants more to appreciate and makes the moves to bring it about. So benevolence and appreciation are the right and left steps of a journey. These two forms of love continually replace one another as love seeks ever more value to appreciate.

This movement of love is itself a third kind of love that forms the backbone of appreciation and benevolence. Let us call it “transcendent love.” It corresponds, I believe, to what Lonergan calls “being in love with God” (1972:105-107). It is a dynamic which, although it may center on this or that person, still is on the lookout for more goodness, more beauty, other persons. Transcendent love is not merely an emotion, although it can express itself through emotions. It is the movement we experience within us that seeks ever more significance and value for real men and women. It is the dynamism, the motor, that stirs our curiosity, incites our intelligence, rouses our feeling and moves us into action for somebody's sake.

This pull of transcendent love tugs against a counterpull. The very meaning of self-transcendence is that we commit ourselves to becoming different selves from the selves we are. This commitment can take the form of a moral conversion in which we dedicate ourselves to a life of authenticity rather than inauthenticity. It can deepen through an intellectual conversion—either explicit or implicit—which clarifies the difference between a major authenticity that relies on the transcen-
dental precepts and a minor authenticity that relies on transcendental achievements. It can deepen further through a religious conversion that recognizes divine movements in the soul that heal (from above downwards) what the soul's creative movements (from below upwards) cannot successfully create. Such a many-levelled tension can and does generate the biases of neurosis, egoism, group selfishness, and short-sightedness. But the tensions are also the sole concrete possibility and power behind every transcendent achievement.

So far we have tried to establish that "loving" refers to the experiences we call benevolence and appreciation, and more basically to the experience of a dynamism that transcends each of the particular objects of our attention, intelligence, reason, responsibility, and love. We Judeo-Christians think of this transcendent object as a "person," and we call this one "God."

BEING LOVED

So much for our loving. What about being loved? How do we tell whether or not someone loves us? It is not merely a matter of whether or not others tell us that they love us—they may be either lying or mistaken about what love really is. We still have to make our own judgment about the truth of the matter.

What do we go by when we make such a judgment? By the evidence of their kindness, partly, but such acts of caring do not necessarily mean benevolence. We depend partly too on our own feelings, but all too easily our desire to be loved sees love where there is none.

There is one great clue about how we tell whether we are loved. Surprisingly it is found whenever we doubt that we are truly loved. What do we do when we doubt another's love? We hear words of love, but we tell ourselves that the other person does not know the "real" us. We think that if he or she knew us as we really are, we probably could not be truly loved.

The enormous mistake here is the presumption that we know ourselves better than anyone else. Or, to put it more precisely, we think we know what is truly valuable in ourselves better than anyone else ever could.
Obviously we do know more facts about ourselves than others do. But it is not the number of facts but rather their significance and worth that we think we know when we doubt another's love. However, there is a great deal of testimony available from people in love that the opposite is true—that someone who loves us has a better, a more accurate judgment of value on our regard than we do ourselves.

The upshot of this is that when we come to know that we are loved, we do not depend exclusively on evidence—the evidence of kind deeds and loving words. Somewhere in the process we have to make a decision. The decision is about whether or not to believe this person. It is a risk. We may decide to believe that he or she truly loves us and discover later that this was a mistake. And yet this is no warrant for not believing anybody. There simply is no knowing whether or not we are loved that can skirt the act of deciding to believe, in spite of the risk. We cannot prove it to ourselves. We can only commit ourselves to believing it.

So the act of decision is an integral part of letting oneself be loved. Without it, love remains unrequited.

This is fairly clear in the acts of love we have called appreciation and benevolence. We make a decision to trust the other person's words and acts of love. But what about transcendent love? What about the dynamism of pull against counterpull that we constantly suffer? Once we realize that this force is a basic instance of loving, we are naturally drawn to the question of whether that which we love loves us in return. After all, love always seeks to know the beloved in an ultimate way. Does what I love (under the aspects of goodness, beauty, truth, intelligibility, personhood) love me?

We can expect that in pursuing this question philosophically we will find some evidence to support the judgment that we are loved, but we can also expect that we must come to the juncture of decision—that we will have to decide to believe whether we are loved or not.

What evidence, then, have we that the transcendent object of all our human intending (all our wondering, questioning, appreciating, and so on) is also in love with us? There is the evidence of the universe, of course, the order and beauty of creation. But, like the classic arguments of Thomas Aquinas, the evidence and the explanation do not form compelling proofs. We could go on and look at the many incidents in our lives that have been evidence for us that we are loved by a
transcendent Thou. Each of us would have his or her own story. But besides these stories, we share a common gift that is a persistently nagging evidence that we are loved. The gift is simply the fact that we love. That is, this transcendent dynamism which underlies all our appreciation and benevolence might itself be a gift. It is not something we created. It was there before we knew it. It is the source of the questions whose answers brought us to knowing it.

So here we find ourselves, stricken with the relentless tension of a transcendental love. It came as a gift and as a challenge. It is a principle of our lives. We did not create it nor did we choose it. We cannot even successfully reject it. Our loving itself may be the gift of a lover.

**BEING IN LOVE WITH GOD**

Will we believe it? The answer to the question whether or not we are loved by the object of our transcendent love does not require our decision if we are to know we are loved.

If we decide to believe, then we usually learn that this lover is unlike any earthly lover. I might love you with all my heart, but you did not give me my love. This lover comes to us by giving us our power to love, and nobody on earth ever did that quite so absolutely.

For this reason, we cannot find an apt comparison to express the love we are caught up in. It is not a friendship. It is not a king-servant relationship. Nor is it well represented by metaphors of thunder or whisper. Scripture uses these and many other comparisons because it is searching and not finding. The sheer plurality of metaphors for the dealings between Divinity and Flesh should convince us that they are incomprehensible. Better than metaphors are stories—accounts of divine action in human history. These do not explain much in a theoretical mode, but they do bear the elements of transcendent love in a compact, symbolic, and forceful manner.

Unfortunately, while stories and myths have the power to maintain our hope within a godless world, they do not function critically to help us sort out what is actually going on when we love in this way. They

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3. Here I am following the provocative lead given by Lonergan (1972:109).
may help our conviction, but they do not directly help our understanding.

To meet this need for a critically grounded understanding of God's love, Lonergan has suggested that the expression "love of God" refers exactly to the pull of transcendent love and to nothing else (1972:341). That is, our experience of raising questions, of wondering, of appreciating, and preeminently of our longing, is our love for God—and at the same time it is also God's loving gift to us. It is God's way of giving the divine self to us. The very word "God" cannot have any meaning to real people outside of their experience of this transcendent tug. All our data on the one we call "God" lies in this ever-widening yet increasingly urgent search.

Now, not everyone recognizes that their own longing is a transcendent love. There are the self-styled secularists who take their stand on honesty or realism or responsibility. But what a pity that so many of them avoid anything smacking of religion for no other reason than their own fidelity to this inner drive towards honesty, realism, and responsibility. Likewise even many self-styled religionists, who profess a love for "God," somehow manage to suppress their wonder, curiosity, and natural awe, replacing them with narrow opinions, dogmatic pronouncements, and high-minded moralizing. In reality, we believe, it is the humble who shall see God, the meek who shall inherit the Kingdom—which is the same as saying it is those who trust that their inner makeup is tailor-made for God who find the real God.

We have been talking in psychological and existential terms about what our tradition has called sanctifying grace and our scripture has called living in Christ Jesus by the Holy Spirit. We are now in a position to move on the first fruits of transcendent love—the gifts of faith, charity, and hope. Remember that we intend to define them implicitly, that is, in reference to transcendent love and to one another, so that we can expand upon Lonergan's foundational model of religious subjectivity in a way that is open to verification by each one of us.

Let me briefly describe these three virtues, just to help us locate the kind of "knowledge" we possess that does not emerge from the upward deployment of attention, intelligence, reason, and responsibility—which we usually refer to as "rational"—but which emerges from transcendent love directly.
Faith is knowing where real good lies. It recognizes a value in creation, in other persons, and in God, even though it cannot explain how. When we look for guidance in pursuing the transcendent Mystery behind all earthly things, faith is that sensibility to value which knows which people are worth listening to, which authors are worth reading, which movies are worth seeing.

Charity is loving other persons. At least as Paul uses the term in his triad, charity is not the direct transcendent love for the divine; it is interpersonal love of neighbor. But when we fall in love, we sense a value in other persons that we can never exhaustively explain rationally. And as we grow in love, we learn, like Flannery O'Connor, to be touched by even the most grotesque human beings and to let ourselves be enveloped by Mystery there.

Hope looks to the future, to the unknown, and remains steadfast in confident expectation even though by any rational analysis the odds may seem insuperable. We cannot explain why we hope, but we do, without even insisting that the good for which we long arrives before we die.

So the transcendent love we bear for Mystery is a fruitful love. We touch this Mystery consciously when we find ourselves with more faith, charity, and hope than we thought were in us. They blend, particularly when we fall in love or are confronted with human tragedy and find that we trust reality, we count on one another, and we hope in historical process far beyond what common sense warrants. So the precise meanings of these virtues usually seem to overlap. But there are differences between them, and if we can spell them out we will be better able to understand how divine love penetrates human consciousness and redeems human wreckage.

FAITH

First of all, let us look more closely at faith. Lonergan defines faith as the judgments of value born of religious love, and he describes it as the "eye of love" (1972:115-118). In this definition, the old Catholic emphasis on the statements of what we believe would not

4. Paul rarely talks about our love for God. Exceptions: Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 8:3; 2 Thess 3:5.
properly be called faith, nor would the old Protestant emphasis on trust in God. Faith is the prior act of appreciation that discerns and welcomes God as the transcendent Thou in both nature and history. It can gaze on the stars with gratitude. It can welcome the stories of what God has done for humanity. It can discern concrete proposals (such as turning the other cheek and walking the second mile) as worth committing oneself to. It discerns what to believe in a religious tradition. It has the power to discern the relative importance of, say, Jesus' resurrection and the miracles he performed, or the relative importance of various ecclesiastical pronouncements. Faith discerns the transcendent value of everyday activities too. Far from excluding "good works," faith does not live except by discerning which works are good. All these concrete objects of faith are seen in the light of a single question: of what transcendent value are they?

In this view, our faith is not different in structure from the way our human loving guides our commitments. Ordinary falling in love gives a new appreciation of the value of other persons—not for what they can do or for how attractive they look, but for the simple value of their persons. It is in light of their value as persons that we are concerned about them and care for them. In human friendship, love as appreciation naturally overflows into love as benevolence, care, and concern. It is in this same light that we see the value of believing in the love they profess for us.

Still, religious faith goes beyond friendship and family love. Religious faith originates in a pull we experience before we know God, while the eye of friendly love originates in the love that follows after we know a friend. Faith regards even human love from the vantage point of transcendent love—for example, when we desire a good beyond criticism for our friend, or when we revere in our friend that same orientation to absolute Mystery.

Faith works not only in the realm of common sense, giving us the practical discernments of value and truth we need every day. It also works in the realm of theory, revealing values and truths fundamental enough to be the ground on which stand a psychology, a sociology, an economics, or a political theory.

Take economics, for example. Marxist economics is built on the proposition that human consciousness is shaped primarily by how we gear our economy and our personal lives to produce material goods. Western
liberal economics is built on the proposition that all human wants are legitimate; only those need to be held in check which interfere unfairly with the wants of others. Religious faith denies the validity of both these propositions. It sees human consciousness as shaped primarily by self-transcending love, not by the material forces of production, and it holds a critical, not a liberal, attitude towards human wants and desires because it regards some desires as sinful.

Similar examples could be given for the other human sciences, but our point is that faith not only can but actually does work on the theoretical level. It gives believers the convictions about human nature which not only run counter to the fundamental convictions in other, more secular theories, but can serve as foundations for workable theories themselves.

CHARITY

We turn now to charity. By charity we mean our experience of active love for a known person or community. We do not mean transcendent love in its primary sense; that love seeks long before it knows its beloved. Charity, along with faith and hope, is an overflow of transcendent love by which we are stunned by the presence of Mystery in some known flesh-and-blood human beings and are impelled to act on their behalf.

If faith is constituted by the judgments of value flowing from religious or transcendent love, charity is the decision to act on those judgments. Religious love not only reveals value where biased intelligence and reason fail to see them. It also motivates a response to other persons which attention, intelligence, reason, and responsibility alone could not motivate. For in concrete cases, as we grow from childhood to adulthood, we depend on the self-correcting process of learning, and while we are in the process of learning to love ourselves, motivation to love others is always under a shadow. But the fifth transcendent precept, "Be in love," means "Act on the value judgments that flow from transcendent love."

We sense this Mystery in passing flashes of love for people around us. We also sense it when we reflect on the dedication made by parents for their children—how children seldom learn the half of the
sacrifices their parents have made for them; how no child could ever "return the favor" of being brought to birth, reared, and then let go; and how parents are nevertheless eager to spend their sustenance and livelihood for these children's sake. We sense the Mystery in a citizen's love of country, a soldier's willingness to die for the freedoms of others, and in the quiet dedication of those people in schools, hospitals, and the like who clean the offices, type the letters, mind the boilers—the people who give an institution "soul."

To act on such value judgments means to participate in the active movement of divine Mystery. Such action may be appreciative praise and welcome or it may be benevolent care and concern. It may even be the interior action of just suppressing the old habits and errant feelings that pull against the tide of charity. But in every case, the heart of charity lies in faith's decision to act.

Lonergan has given a dialectical analysis of how charity reverses the cycle of decline by absorbing evil, by refusing to take an eye for an eye. But prior to what charity can undo through healing dialectics, we can envision what charity can do through creative, genetic strength. By creative acts of appreciation and benevolence, we learn to commit our lives to sharing life with others. Indeed, without a life committed to sharing, a culture drifts towards individual and communal self-centeredness where charity appears as the exception to the norm of living for one's own sake alone.

Our present dilemma over the morality of nuclear weapons is a good example. All sides talk of peace. But few envision anything but the absence of war by the term. A more substantive theory would find true peace only in the sharing of life through charity. It would envision peaceful times as marked by an ethos of international sharing at all levels—economic, technological, informational, and cultural. And it would certainly regard a policy of nuclear deterrence through arms build-up not as preserving peace—as its advocates claim it is doing—but as already destroying a peace conceived as the sharing of life and all its resources.

However, for the greater part of our lives we forget what a miracle a person or a community of persons really is. Familiarity may not always breed contempt, but it does breed a spiritual drowsiness. We grow accustomed to the wonders of human intelligence, realism and commitment—or perhaps just disappointed that they fail to reach the
profundities they seem destined for. And the drowsier we grow, the less astonishment we inspire in others, so that a family, a staff, a city, an entire culture can find its wonder smothered by routinized relationships, by the drudgery of hard work, and by thought-stifling propaganda and advertising. But then along comes an Anne Frank, who gazes at a small square of blue sky from her sequestered window and learns again that people are miracles. Charity keeps breaking through the routines of our affections and we find ourselves unexplainably enamored of the strangest people.

HOPE

Finally we are in a position to tackle hope. We said that we are drawn towards divine Mystery by the transcendent love that is in us. By our faith, we discover where that Mystery has penetrated the human sphere. By our charity we love and care for that Mystery as it is embodied uniquely in individual persons and specific communities. Yet the story goes on; the end is not yet in sight. And so we hope.

But what is hope? Following the pattern of Lonergan's definition of faith, I propose the following definition: hope is a confident desire born of religious, that is, transcendent, love.

As desire, hope longs for the fullest good and the unadulterated truth. It pines for a glorious outcome to human history. It wants to see the face of the Mystery that incessantly draws it. Hope thereby complements natural desire—the pure desire to know and the pure desire for good that belong to our natural capacities—by unabashedly hoping for what is absolutely best.

Hope's desire is confident because of faith. Faith gives the judgment of fact that there is a way out of our difficulties, and so hesitant desire is rendered confident even though outcomes remain obscure.

The carriers of hope are not the carriers of faith. Faith—value judgments born of religious love—is fundamentally constituted by cool judgment and is expressed in firm canons. So we support faith by meditating on the objective values of the Beatitudes and on the objective truths of our creeds. In difficult times we fall back on our store of personal wisdom and fundamental beliefs concerning what life is all
about. Hope, in contrast, is more emphatically carried by imagination and affectivity. We support hope by affective contemplation on the coming of the Kingdom, by liturgical rite, song, incense, art, and architecture. Hope dips into the world of images to produce the anagogic symbols that alone can represent the mysterious work of our mysterious God. It is through anagogic symbols that hope also resists the vast pressures of social decay and the gnostic, absolutizing instinct of humanity of all ages.

Now some people might wince at the suggestion that we should identify faith with cool reason and hope with warm feeling. But there is a very good reason for making the distinction. Have we not found that common sense is very prone to using feelings as the litmus paper for faith? And is it not correct that when a person is battered by the winds of many feelings, the best spiritual directors emphasize the raw truth, the plain facts, the hard reality of God's love? No doubt, faith is supported by feelings, but we must not think that faith is primarily feelings. Faith is judgment. It is by judgment that we reach the real world. Hope first supports faith by giving the initial affective movements towards value judgments and then it consolidates faith by the felt expectations of a confident desire embodied in anagogic symbols. In brief, then, the necessity for distinguishing and relating faith and hope is nothing more than the necessity for distinguishing and relating judgments and feelings.

So hope is about felt expectations. But hope does not have as its object the positive realities that faith and charity reach. Rather hope regards the negative aspects of what is yet to be reached. Now, our religious lives are negative experiences in two basic respects. There is the negative reality of Mystery, the Cloud of Unknowing, the apophatic way of prayer, the hiddenness of God. And then there is the negative reality of sin, the absurdity of suppressing the transcendental love within us and the unintelligible situations that result. We fail to comprehend Mystery because it simply has more meaning than we could ever handle. And we fail to comprehend sin because it lacks meaning altogether.

But in the concrete, God actually lets us get away with murder. We are allowed to inflict such atrocities on ourselves that sin begins to look like a part of Mystery—a positive power with a trans-historical will of its own which no human being could ever fathom. Likewise, the
mystery we call "God" can begin to look like sin during those dark hours when we share in Christ's Gethsemane of being abandoned by God. At any given moment, we cannot be absolutely certain whether our terror is an ordered response of a creature to its creator or a disordered response of our biases and illusions. Hope enables us to carry on without having that certitude about the present. It gives rather an assurance about the future. Hope may not eliminate fear, but it does give us some distance on our fears by believing that there is a difference between fearful darkness of sin and the fearful darkness of divine Mystery. Hope enables us to expect an eschatological day when we will see God face to face, and when the darkness of sin is entirely banished.

Sin does have immense force in the world. It can take on a powerful cultural sway when a civilization is in decline. So, to keep our hopes up, we tell one another the stories of God's work in our lives. We enhance our worship with songs, art, incense, drama, procession, and ceremony. The liturgies that really work are always those whose tone or feeling bring hope—not, as many planners seem to think, those whose theme or thoughts are most clearly articulated. The themes and thoughts may give liturgy a direction, and, God knows, we need direction. But it is tone and feeling that give the affective power we need to love in a culture laced with secularism.

Hope counters sin not only at the level of our culture but within the most recondite of individual temptations as well. We should recall our own experience. Is it not true that when we suffer temptation, we do suffer? We endure, at least for a while, the counterpull towards what we know is wrong. Then, like a second surge of doom, we begin to wonder how long we can endure. Little by little we suspect that we are going to give in anyway. At this point temptation has firmly lodged itself as a felt expectation. We expect to give in, and, often enough, we do. But hope is a felt expectation too, in the direction opposite sin. Hope resists the expectation that we will give in to temptation by envisioning the victory of Mystery over sin. It garners feelings of assurance against the feelings of doom. And the richer the eschatological symbols we have available in our tradition, the more we will be able to desire with confidence that the Kingdom will come, the heavenly banquet will begin, Jesus will come again upon the clouds to judge the living and the dead, and so on.
FAITH, CHARITY, AND HOPE AS FOUNDATIONAL STRUCTURES

Now, as we have been describing them, faith, charity, and hope originate in transcendent love. Their most obvious appearance, however, occurs on the level where we weigh concrete alternatives and commit ourselves to responsible courses of action. Our faith reveals what those valuable courses of action are and which persons will be good guides and good company. Charity moves us to appreciation and benevolence towards people we know. Hope inspires affective reliance on specific people and institutions to bring about what the heart longs for. In other words, faith, charity, and hope have concrete, known objects.

But they also have a very concrete object that transcends the known. It is not "known" except as the obscure term of transcendent love. Here we can discern the more hidden but more fundamental workings of faith, charity, and hope. Faith is also valuing the term of the orientation. By faith we regard the whereunto of our consciousness as more important than anything else. Charity is actively moving towards this term, this whereunto, in praise, thanksgiving, and wonder. Charity loves this one as a Thou. Hope is depending on the term to be also the source of everything good we can long for. It expects to encounter its transcendent Thou in a manner that will satisfy the soul's deepest longings.

Now, because faith, charity, and hope have a transcendent term as well as known objects in our world, we experience religious love as a permanent tension. Being in love means that we simultaneously experience the divine Mystery as close and far, intimate and remote, immanent in consciousness and yet transcending all known objects. Religious consciousness sustains this tension with great difficulty. Recall, for example, the Corinthians' monument inscribed "To the Unknown God" and recall their scorn at Paul's preaching that we now know this God. They comfortably fell on the side of God's transcendence. In contrast, the Pharisees emphasized a divine righteousness based on the Law so much that they could hardly hear of a divine reality unpredictably at work in Jesus. They comfortably fell on the side of God's

5. Here I am extending to charity and hope Lonergan's distinction between the absolute and relative aspects of faith. See 1972:116.
immanence. We can see a similar one-sidedness in Arianism. Apparently Arius and his followers felt forced to call Christ a creature, made by God, because of their keen awareness of God's transcendence. And, falling on the other side, we see gnostic groups all over the ancient Near East clinging to a secret knowledge bringing God within the firm grasp of human minds. So while transcendent love does bind us to God in a profound way, it also reveals to us more clearly what a profound difference remains between God and ourselves. Unless both this closeness and this distance are present in the religious sensibilities of believers, we can suspect that their religion has found the illusory peace that will not admit a divine tension in consciousness.

Now these movements in consciousness are not altogether indistinguishable from movements towards a false self-transcendence. Our tradition of discerning the spirits gives clear evidence that people regularly test these movements. Let me give an example. A few years ago I spent four weeks teaching summer school at a university far away from my home. By the end of the summer session, as often happens, I was aware of the many shortcomings of the institution and of some of the people I had worked with. I felt frustration and was anxious to get out of there. At the same time, I had met some wonderful people with whom I had tasted some of life's mysteries. It is no oversimplification to say that I had two contrary feelings about the time I had spent there. Resentment pulled in one direction and gratitude in another. And I had two stories to choose from—either "The summer was a drag" or "The summer was a grace." The truth of that summer, like the truth of any human situation, was not some fixed set of outer data that just waits for somebody's correct perception. The truth was a struggle of movements within me between two interpretations of the same data.

What I am getting at is this. The traditional Christian practice of discerning the spirits is fundamentally a matter of distinguishing the movements of faith, charity, and hope from movements which, however logical in themselves, however honest and good they appear, pull in an opposing direction.

I could give further examples of how the practice of discerning the spirits also helps those who love God make concrete decisions in their lives. There is abundant evidence that the religiously converted do experience two pulls in opposite directions. They do regularly try to sort out which is inspired by transcendent love and which is not.
They do know that such discernment gives a vision of where grace is at work in the world, and a diviner's rod for knowing where to commit themselves to action. In any such case, we can readily see the workings of transcendent love bringing forth value judgments (faith), decisions to act for others (charity), and a transformed, confident desire (hope).

We have been speaking so far of the structure of religious consciousness. But while we have argued that this structure belongs to all human consciousness, we must also acknowledge that not everyone realizes it, let alone cooperates with it. In other words, there is a difference between religious persons and non-religious persons. Non-religious persons may well experience faith, charity, and hope towards known objects, and many will cooperate, more or less, with these virtues during their lives, yet without letting them find also a transcendent Thou on the level of transcendent love. Still, for the non-religious, the movement of faith, charity, and hope leads in many cases to the quiet discovery of a transcendent, loving, mysterious Thou, and thus they can become religious. For the religious, the same movement then normally returns them to the known world as the field upon which they must surrender to transcendent, loving Mystery, because they then learn that the divine Thou wills the good of the world and wills their cooperation and participation in that work, that labor of divine love.

Also, I have been speaking of faith, charity, and hope as theological categories. The test of such categories lies not merely in whether they make sense of each person's experience but also in whether they are useful in formulating doctrine. So, if you will allow me one important example, I would like to express in these terms what it is that makes Christianity unique—how it differs from other religions. By understanding Christianity precisely as an expression of something common to all human consciousness, we will be able to root our own spirituality in the soil of the general spirituality of the human species. To put it in a nutshell, what makes Christianity unique is that Christians have experienced an absolute faith, charity, and hope towards Jesus of Nazareth.

By faith, we recognize a value in Jesus which cannot be surpassed, not even by a divine Thou, because that Thou, we recognize, is Jesus. By charity we love the person of Jesus not merely with the appreciation and benevolence one gives to a neighbor but with the same absolute charity one owes to the transcendent Thou. By hope we put our
stock in the community begun by Jesus and confidently desire an eschatological day when Jesus will “come again” to subject all history and nature to himself and submit them to the divine Thou.

Eventually the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon established that whatever is true of the “Father” is also true of the “Son” except Fatherhood. This proposition has become solidified—we might say rigidified—into the proposition that Jesus is not only human but also divine. Yet what is this affirmation but a judgment of fact proceeding from an involvement with divine Mystery in the person of Jesus of Nazareth? It is the spelling out in cognitive terms of the experience of absolute faith in this Jew, absolute love for this man, absolute hope in the future of this crucified preacher.

The proposition that the human Jesus is also divine is a true proposition. But we do not grasp the meaning of this truth unless we repeat the inner experience of those who first formulated it. As many commentators point out, this orthodox dogma was the inevitable implication of two practices merging in the early Church. Christians were giving Jesus the same glory and worship which they knew belonged to the all-transcendent God (lex orandi, lex credendi). And they also turned to Jesus as the only person in whom “salvation” from the power of sin could be found—again, a salvation which they believed came from God alone. To express the same movements in terms of the structure of consciousness, we can say that the early Christians turned to Jesus with the same faith, charity, and hope that belong to God alone, and that by doing so, they believed they were “saved” by the whereunto of their transcendental love. That is what Jesus’ divinity actually meant to believers. What it means in itself, of course, is as opaque to human insight as the utter transcendence of God itself.

We Christians therefore know ourselves as moved by God, through the gifts of faith, charity, and hope, to recognize the absolute value of Jesus. So we know divine Mystery to be not only (1) the transcendent term of an orientation, and (2) the inner love that stalks divine Mystery, but also (3) a known person in history. Mystery remains hidden in a cloud, but that same Mystery gives itself to human history in the mysterious person of Christ Jesus, just as it gives itself to human

consciousness in the mysterious gift of transcendent love which overflows in faith, charity, and hope.

Christians, therefore, know God as giving the divine self in two manners. This has an immediate relevance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Christian finds "God" (1) in the person of Christ Jesus, (2) in the inner impulses of transcendent love (called by expectant Jews the "Holy Breath"), and (3) in the term towards which that love seems to head (called by Jesus "Father"). The Christian does not think that Christ Jesus is identical either with the Holy Breath or with the Father. Jesus worshiped the Father and, like us, was moved by transcendent love to do so. Therefore, without necessarily giving it much thought, our spiritual ancestors have always known God as doubly self-giving. They counted on the person of Christ Jesus and on the inner movements of this "Holy Breath" to bring them into union with the God they loved.

We can sum this up in a formula: the Christian religious experience is the experience of the theological virtues springing from the transcendent love of God from within and directed outwards towards Jesus of Nazareth. It is this experience of a double self-gift that eventually leads to the Christian rule of faith about speaking of God as "three." But as we can plainly see, simply calling God "three" can easily trivialize the experience. Perhaps something like "doubly self-giving" or "doubly assuring" would help to keep the Christian religious experience at the heart of Trinitarian doctrine—where it belongs.  

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7. This is the gist of my short book on prayer, written from a perspective much influenced by Lonergan's work. See Dunne, 1981.
Let me finish this brief essay by locating the theological virtues within this year's Lonergan Workshop theme, "The Redemptive Tension." I believe that we can envisage the redemptive tension as five successively sublating tensions of consciousness:

1. The tension between authenticity and inauthenticity and its resolution through moral conversion.

2. The tension between major authenticity and minor authenticity and its resolution through intellectual conversion.

3. The tension between the healing movement and the creative movement and its resolution through the ministries of faith, charity, and hope.

4. The tension between the absolute, obscure term of faith, charity, and hope and their relative, known objects and its resolution through the mission of Christ Jesus in history.

5. There remains a fifth tension in consciousness which, although it sublates the other four, is unresolved as long as history continues. It is the tension between our absolute faith, charity, and hope towards Christ Jesus and our absolute faith, charity, and hope towards the divine term of our dynamic orientation.
FIVE REDEMPTIVE TENSIONS

- Transcendent term
  - Known word

- Religious commitment
  - Absolute faith, charity, hope
    - Faith
    - Charity
  - Relative faith, charity, hope
    - Hope

- Religious love producing faith, charity, hope
  - Healing
  - Creating

- Religious love producing faith, charity, hope
  - Responsible
    - Reasonable
      - Intelligent
        - Attentive

- Responsible
  - Reasonable
    - Intelligent
      - Attentive

- Unauthenticity
  - Authenticity
  - Minor authenticity
    - Major authenticity

- Responsible
  - Reasonable
    - Intelligent
      - Attentive

- Responsible
  - Reasonable
    - Intelligent
      - Attentive

- Responsible
  - Reasonable
    - Intelligent
      - Attentive

- Responsible
  - Reasonable
    - Intelligent
      - Attentive
WORKS CONSULTED

Dunne, Tad  
1981  

Horvath, Tibor  
1977  

Lonergan, Bernard  
1972  

Voegelin, Eric  
1978  

Webb, Eugene  
1981  

Wiles, Maurice  
1967  
THE DIALECTICS OF THEORY AND PRAXIS
WITHIN PARADIGM ANALYSIS

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The rather problematic task of relating paradigm analysis to the concerns with praxis among contemporary philosophers of science and theologians involves shifting from hermeneutics to dialectics and the critique of ideology, and from the primarily interpretative concerns of historical consciousness to the primarily social and emancipatory concerns of dialectical consciousness.

The problematic is complicated by just what is meant by ideology. This term tends to function among dialectical thinkers with all the protean indefiniteness that is reserved for the term myth among hermeneutical thinkers. Philosophers of science strongly influenced by Karl Popper, for example, tend to see in the very applicability of paradigm analysis to theology evidence of the "ideological" or "irrational" character of Thomas Kuhn's discoveries (see Agassi, 1981:457ff; Lakatos, 1970:91-3, 1978:241; Popper, 1970:57; Watkins, 1970:31-7, 1978:344). Indeed, Kuhn himself was "puzzled" by the wide applicability of paradigm analysis to fields other than natural science history (1970a:208). And Richard Bernstein wonders whether Kuhn's work really aids in distinguishing scientific paradigms from ideological paradigms (1976:105).

For their part, theologians interested in relating philosophies of science to theological methods tend either to complement paradigm analysis with philosophical hermeneutics (for example, W. Pannenberg, D. Tracy), or to sublate theories of science into theories of communicative interaction which are then intensified to the limit questions of anamnestic solidarity with the victims of history (for example, H. Peukert, M. Lamb). Such theologians might well ponder who is being "ideological" when they see so distinguished a philosopher of science as the late Imre Lakatos state that in his view "science, as such, has no social responsibility" and that the defense of liberty requires "maintaining the high
Although liberation theologians have not yet related their concerns to Anglo-American philosophies of science, one can suspect that they would raise questions about how science and technology can function as ideology, not just in a Popperian "Third World," but in the very real economic and political controls First and Second World countries exercise over Third World countries. Such questions evoke memories of *The German Ideology* of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which over a hundred years ago satirized the "unparalleled revolutions" occurring in the realm of "pure philosophy" beside which political revolutions seemed no more than "child's play." Such questions concerning the supposed primacy of science in modern liberal societies are beginning to occasion, as Langdon Gilkey points out, a new "nervousness and uncertainty" in scientific establishments (1981:75-89).

My task is to present an all too brief overview of the status quaestionis tracing the dialectic of theory and praxis within the contemporary post-empiricist philosophies of science after paradigm analysis, and to indicate how this might shed some light on possibly analogous developments in the shifts to praxis and dialectics in contemporary theology.

The first section attempts an admittedly incomplete overview of the turn to praxis and dialectics in "the new paradigm." I judged it important to hazard an overview because, although Kuhn definitively introduced historical consciousness into the philosophy of science, it is only by tracing the further developments that I could indicate how the dialectics of theory and praxis are operative in the field. Kuhn's hermeneutic breakthrough has to be complemented by the efforts of Continental and Anglo-American philosophers of science, if one is to appreciate the intensifications of his achievements in the increasing attention accorded praxis and the critique of ideology. These developments call into question the fundamental self-understanding of modernity with its illusory dichotomy between science and ideology. They do not, however, lead to the epistemological anarchy propounded by Paul Feyerabend.

The second section then traces analogous developments in contemporary theology. Neither the hermeneutical theologies nor the political and liberation theologies can in any way be adequately understood as
long as one remains fixated upon the typically modern dichotomy between conservative and liberal theological orientations. Hermeneutical and dialectical theologies are moving beyond the basic assumptions of modernity too. Dialectical criticisms by political and liberation theologians of the distortions argue that in both the historical traditions of Christianity and in so much of contemporary human experience, any symbol-system or idea-system may become ideological to the degree it legitimates dominative power.

I

THE TURN TO PRAXIS
AND DIALECTICS IN THE NEW PARADIGM

A central feature of the new paradigm in theology is paradigm analysis itself. In articulating analogies between paradigm or disciplinary matrix shifts in the natural sciences and in theology, paradigm analysis is more than just a descriptive enterprise, even when employed for historical interpretations. As Thomas Kuhn came to realize, paradigm analysis is not a value-free exercise but involves mediations of objectivity and subjectivity through judgments of value which heuristically anticipate criteria of adequacy in the choice of theories (1977:320-39). These criteria Kuhn describes as "accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness." Like Michael Polanyi (1962), Kuhn rejects any wooden application of such criteria, as though they were logical techniques which could be applied in a purely formalistic manner. Instead, they are invariant only in their heuristic (Polanyi's term) anticipations of meaningful intelligibilities; historically they vary greatly (1977:325). Thus Kuhn rejects the criticisms that paradigm analysis must succumb to a complete relativism. Rather he sees it as involving an ongoing interplay between subjective and objective components in which the judgments of fact and of value are continually called to account by the ongoing dialogue of questions and answers in which "scientists may always be asked to explain their choices, to exhibit the bases for their judgments. Such judgments are eminently discussable, and the man who refuses to discuss his own cannot expect to be taken seriously" (1977:337)
Kuhn therefore admits that "hermeneutic method" profoundly influenced his views on normal and extraordinary science (1977:xiii). His views on how to relate histories of science (with their descriptive concerns) to philosophies of science (with their normative concerns) are admittedly tentative. In addressing this he recognizes the need "to bridge the long-standing divide between Continental and English-language philosophical traditions" (1977:xv).

Now such bridge-building efforts have been going forward from both sides of the "divide." But I should like to call attention to another divide or fundamental dichotomy cutting across language differences and apparently affecting all modern highly industrialized societies: as it impinges upon the debates in the philosophy of science, the dichotomy might be designated as a conception of value-free scientific rationality, on the one hand, and a conception of value decisions as basically prerational, arational, or irrational on the other hand. This dichotomy has deep roots. It survived the by now widely recognized demise of both the positivism of the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricism of the Received View (for example, Carnap, Hempel, Nagel). Thus when Kuhn, Polanyi, and Toulmin proposed their respective views on paradigm analysis, the tacit dimensions of knowledge, and the ecological analysis of scientific praxis, they found their views criticized from two apparently contradictory directions. From the side of Karl Popper and scholars strongly influenced by him (sometimes referred to as Critical Rationalists) their concerns with the philosophical importance of history, value commitments, and the praxis of science were criticized for being "irrational," "woolly and confused," supportive of "mob rule," and so on (see Lakatos, 1978:107ff, 224ff). From the side of Paul Feyerabend's (Critical Anarchist) position, their views were criticized for being too "rationalist" and still too supportive of "elitism" and a false "absolutism" (see 1981:24ff, 131ff).

Both these apparently contradictory sets of criticisms can be traced to a common acceptance of the fundamental dichotomy. Popper admits that the decision to be rational is a moral or value decision and so may be "described ... as an irrational faith in reason" (1962:231). Feyerabend rejects moral evaluations regarding all traditions, including science, and thus rejects as well what he considers the unfounded "moralizing" about supposed "irrationality"—the basic principle of his epistemological anarchism is "anything goes!" (1975; 1978; 1981:21ff, 131ff).
By failing to advert to their common acceptance of the fundamental dichotomy both Critical Rationalism and Critical Anarchism commit what Karl-Otto Apel terms the "conventionalist-liberalistic fallacy of confusing freedom of moral conscience with private arbitrariness of decision" (1979:312).

The contemporary crisis in Wissenschtftstheorie occasioned by paradigm analysis—concern for the tacit dimension of value commitments, or attention to the historical praxis of science—consists in how these movements or trends simply go beyond or transcend the fundamental dichotomy. As Apel and Jürgen Habermas (1981:25-71, 504ff) indicate, the dichotomy between conceptions of value-free scientific rationality and irrational value decisions is deeply rooted in the modern dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity. Ordinary discourse tends to ascribe objectivity to such generalities as reason, truth, criticism, science, while subjectivity is ascribed to such generalities as myth, opinion, dogma, religion. Philosophically, the dichotomy could be traced from the Cartesian res extensa and res cogitans through the Kantian separation of phenomenal and noumenal, to many general trends which, even in their very diverse efforts to overcome the dichotomy between object and subject, still can be represented as generically exemplifying it: empiricism versus idealism, naturalism versus pragmatism, logical or linguistic analyticism versus existentialism, structuralism versus phenomenology, scientific marxism versus critical marxism, and so on. Trends in the human sciences also bear the traces of the dichotomy in such generic oppositions as behaviorism versus humanism, functionalism versus symbolic interactionism, sociobiologism versus anthropologism, and so on. More specifically, as Anthony Giddens (1977:29-134; 1979:145ff) and others indicate, Max Weber replicated the dichotomy in his analysis of social action, where Zweckrationalität had primacy in defining rationality so that Wertrationalität could be viewed as irrational, and in his analysis of authority as either bureaucratic (rational) or charismatic (arational).

An underlying presupposition which fostered this dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, was the desire to reconstruct the methods of the natural sciences into formally logical, ahistorical procedures of "pure objectivity" or "pure reason" cut off from any trace of subjectivity. After the collapse of positivism and logical empiricism, Popper's "cognitiveal theory without a knowing subject" was the latest
effort to retrieve elements of this presupposition (1973). Yet even here the presupposition is in retreat. For Popper himself attempted to give extensive reasons for his supposedly irrational faith in reason (1962:231-80), and so had to admit decisions could be rational (1962:380). Feyerabend's strictures against reason and method are admittedly directed against what he considers the too objectivistic conceptions of reason and method in Popper and Lakatos (1975:165-294), and by his own admission his very own cognitive performance passes moral judgments on certain traditions (1978:13-31, 154ff).

Within the extensive debates and disagreements among philosophers of science, there is an emerging consensus about the illusory character of this underlying presupposition of a logically pure objectivism in natural science. Both the positivism of the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricism of the Received View are now generally recognized as dead-ends (see F. Suppe, 1977:6-118, 617-730). The question is no longer how to modify the scientistic objectivism of positivism or logical empiricism, but what paradigms will eventually take their place. Given the pervasive influence of scientistic objectivism and the consequent dichotomies in philosophy and culture, it is not surprising that it is difficult to delineate just how the philosophy of science will develop (see Habermas, 1981:504; and especially, Toulmin, 1977:600-14).

Nevertheless, there seem to be two generally accepted judgments on the direction of such developments: (1) rationality can no longer be defined solely with reference to the procedures of mathematics, logics, or the natural sciences; and (2) even in these domains—and a fortiori in others—attention is shifting from theories of theories to the heuristic performance or praxis of theorizing. The deductivist ideals of the coherent and complete criteria for rationality provided by theory qua theory are gone, even in mathematics. Theories as formally logical systems are, to paraphrase Kurt Gödel, either incomplete and consistent or complete and inconsistent. Rationality cannot be identified with ideals appealing to non-existently and impossibly complete and consistent foundations in theory qua theory. There is a shift from scientistic objectivism to the questioning procedures or praxis of communities of inquirers.

This shift is clearly visible in Kuhn and Toulmin. Kuhn transforms Polanyi's concerns with the tacit dimensions in personal knowledge into an analysis of the communal and historical processes by which
scientists acquire and augment knowledge. Kuhn indicates how, despite Popper's criticisms, both he and Popper are more concerned "with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific research" (1977:267). Similarly, Toulmin takes issue with the a priori conceptualism of Kant and emphasizes how reason is not yet ever fully realized (1972:370ff, 412ff). He is able to pin down how both relativism and absolutism ignore the ongoing praxis of raising ever further relevant questions and, instead, mistakenly presuppose that "rationality is a sub-species of logicality" (1972:486). Relative to Popper, Kuhn indicates how his own position on the historiography of science can account for objectivity and the uses of logic without falling into the false objectivism of Popper's naive falsificationism (1977:268-92). Relative to Lakatos, Toulmin uncovers the ambiguity of Lakatos's theory of methodology in the atemporal conception of Popper's "third world." "But, once procedures and other elements of praxis are allowed into the 'third world,' its temporal or historical character can no longer be concealed" (1976:674) Indeed, Toulmin's attention to the linguistic and non-linguistic praxis of science undermines the dichotomy Popper set up between objectivity (World One of physical objects and World Three of cultural products) and subjectivity (World Two of mental states and acts; see Toulmin, 1976:655-75, 1976a).

The shift from objectivism to the questioning praxis of communities of inquirers can also be substantiated among the critics of Kuhn, Polanyi, and Toulmin. Popper's naive falsificationism or fallibilism rests upon his distinctions between physical objects (World One), mental states and acts (World Two), and the products or objectifications of the latter in cultural and linguistic objects (World Three). Where he initially treated these as "worlds," he now understands them as dimensions of one world. Moreover, where he until recently tended to define "reality" only in reference to World One—"I propose to say that something exists, or is real, if and only if it can interact with ... hard physical bodies" (1973:23)—he now admits that reality and objectivity are also the result of interaction between World Two and World Three (see Popper and Eccles, 1981:47ff, 451ff). If World Two is real and, as Popper admits, in interaction with World Three, the source of ongoing questions and criticisms, then why not follow the suggestions of Toulmin regarding the "linguistic and non-linguistic praxis" of knowing and
acting? I. C. Jarvie's "hidden structures of logic" (he does not tell us where they are hidden) might well be hidden in such linguistic and non-linguistic praxis and hence can scarcely be used to impinge Toulmin's account (Jarvie, 1976:311-33). Otherwise, as Habermas points out in regard to both Popper and Jarvie, there is no possibility of distinguishing adequately between unthematic praxis of questioning and evaluating, so essential to ongoing criticism, and the already thematized and institutionalized World Three products (1981:114-26).

Similarly, Lakatos's sophisticated methodological fallibilism rejects objectivism in favor of the praxis of ever further relevant questioning. In dealing with the problem of infinite regress and the foundations of mathematics, he reviews the efforts to stop infinite regress by logical empirical and meta-theoretical means only to conclude that if there are any foundations they are "admittedly subjective." There are no foundations of knowledge if by that one intends theoretical proofs or definitions. Lakatos replaces the infinite regress of proofs and definitions with one of guesses: "There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of guesses" (1978:3-23). The only way to avoid the skeptical and dogmatist horns of this dilemma is to recognize how guesses are conjectures responding to ever further relevant questions. This is also brought out in Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes. Central features of his methodology are the negative and positive heuristics. The negative heuristics are the "hard cores" of the programmes articulated in the basic laws or intelligible correlations constituting the method of the specific research programme. The positive heuristics are "partially articulated" sets "of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the 'refutable variants' of the research programme" (1978a:50). In so far as these heuristics are only "partially articulated," the methodology of such research programmes implies an interaction between World Two and World Three; the hints and suggestions, that is, are responding to ever further relevant questions. In so far as the progressive theoretical shifts involve "more empirical content," the methodology implies that the questions are about World One. Lakatos developed the methodology of scientific research programmes in order to take account of the insights of Kuhn and Polanyi in a critical fashion, so it is not surprising to see Lakatos's demarcation theory of rationality refer to "the basic value judgments of scientific communities," and to at least admit that his methodology of research
programmes would also apply to the normative aspects of ethics or aesthetics (1978a:139-67). The recognition of positive heuristics subverts the artificial dichotomies erected in the philosophy of science between objectivity (World One and World Three) and subjectivity (World Two), with the consequence that scientific judgments are no longer so seriously dichotomized in terms of contexts of discovery versus contexts of justification (see Wartofsky, 1980:1-20; Nickles, 1977, 1980).

The shift from scientific objectivism to the questioning praxis of scientific communities among Anglo-American philosophers of science finds many parallels among Continental colleagues with their shifts from theories of science to theories of communicative action (Apel, Habermas, Peukert). Yet Anglo-American philosophers of science are not as burdened as are their Continental counterparts with the legacies of transcendental idealism and its philosophical objectivism, whereby any "turn to the subject" is immediately objectivized into conceptualist "conditions of the possibility" (Kant), "mediations of absolute knowledge" (Hegel), or infinitely regressive reflections of the ego (Fichte). Where Continental philosophers of science tend to overload any discussion of rationality as praxis with such philosophical objectivism or conceptualism (see Apel, 1979; Habermas, 1981:518-34; Heinrich, 1976; Tugendhat, 1979), their Anglo-American colleagues tend to display much greater flexibility in the interplay between conscious praxis and thematized knowledge. This flexible interplay between praxis and theory is evident in the mutual interactions between the three dimensions of Popper's World, in Polanyi's tacit dimensions, in Kuhn's hermeneutical criteria for paradigms, in Lakatos's partially articulated positive heuristics, in Toulmin's attention to linguistic and non-linguistic praxis of science, in Bernard Lonergan's notion of generalized empirical method (1977, 1978), in Marx Wartofsky's ongoing representations of human cognitive praxis and metaphysics as heuristic for science (1979).

As a result, Anglo-American philosophers of science are by and large not so ready to understand the natural sciences as necessarily informed by "quasi-transcendental interests in technical control" (Habermas) or by "transcendental-pragmatic rationality as instrumental and manipulative" (Apel). This concedes far too much to positivism and logical empiricism, tending to lock the natural sciences and technology into the economic and cultural deformations attendant upon the modern dichotomies between objectivity and subjectivity, whereby the natural
sciences and technologies are pressed into the service of monopolies and nation-states to exploit nature and increase the domimative power of militarism (see Capra, 1982; Noble, 1977). Thus the post-empiricists criticize Continental philosophers of science for being too caught up in false dichotomies between "Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften" (Anthony Giddens, 1977:148ff; Mary Hesse, 1980:167-86). These Anglo-Americans are more inclined to understand the rationality operative in the natural sciences as disciplinary matrices where intersubjective communities of investigators pose questions to nature through the observational procedures of experimental measurements. The heuristic and asymptotic advances toward agreement about the explanatory results of the empirical knowledge so gained are mediated by the praxis of argumentative discourse among the investigators. Thus objectivity is attained neither through observational techniques per se (contra positivism and logical empiricism), nor through successful manipulation or control (contra Apel and Habermas), but through ongoing networks (see Hesse, 1974) of disciplined questioning and discourse which are the foundations or principles in praxis generating and selecting all empirically verifiable or falsifiable intelligibilities or laws in nature (see Patrick Byrne, 1981; Patrick Heelan, 1965, 1977, 1979). By calling attention to the dialogic relations between science and nature (science does not command so much as listen), and by beginning to envisage technologies informed by the mimetic values of praxis-poiesis (Gabor, 1970; Ihde, 1979; Wartofsky, 1979:338-69), such an understanding of natural sciences and technology offers ways out of the alienated and alienating domimative uses to which they are put in modern societies, with the consequent ecological destruction and militarism.

Hermeneutics, therefore, is intrinsic to the natural sciences in so far as they pose questions to nature (Heelan, 1977), and a significant portion of the impact of Kuhn's paradigm analysis is attributable to its initial establishment of this. As an historian of natural science, Kuhn's analysis of paradigms brings out both the interplay between the observational measurement-languages and the explanatory theoretical languages, as well as the succeeding interpretations of this interplay in the various scientific paradigms. The referent of natural scientific methods (that is, ways of posing questions) is nature, no matter how theory-laden the data are because of the observational measuring procedures mediating those methods. As an historian of
natural science, however, the primary referent of Kuhn's paradigm analysis is not nature or the theory-laden data per se, but the succession of descriptive or explanatory theories interpreting the variations in data. In this respect Kuhn's paradigm analysis shares in what Giddens terms the "double hermeneutics" operative in the human sciences and scholarly disciplines (1976:158). That is, as historical, paradigm analysis is posing questions to "pre-interpreted meaning-frames." This distinction, it seems to me, helps clarify the misunderstandings between the so-called Critical Rationalists (Popper, Lakatos, and so on) and such philosophers of science as Kuhn, Polanyi, or Toulmin; it also explains why paradigm analysis has proved so protean in so many other disciplines besides the history of natural science.

When the referent of inquiry is not nature or theory-laden empirical data, but the historical traditions of pre-interpreted meaning-frames, the distinctions between 'internalist' and 'externalist' histories of science, that is, between the internal theoretical developments of sciences and the external socio-economic or cultural or psychological influences on the developments of research, become less relevant (see Toulmin, 1972:300-18, 504ff). Indeed, as I. Grattan-Guinness points out, this applies also to the history of mathematical analysis (1970:ix-xi). For the historical developments of knowledge do not occur in some Platonic realm of "pure ideas" or "pure objectivity" or "pure reason." They are human achievements and, as such, are never beyond question or criticism.

It is not too difficult to understand why the introduction of hermeneutics with its historical consciousness into the philosophy of science by the post-empiricists has occasioned such sharp debates and misunderstandings. The first phase of the Enlightenment separated itself from the religious and metaphysical traditions of the past by emphasizing how positive sciences offer true knowledge as distinct from false ideologies. In August Comte's positivism this separation of science from ideology was complete. So deeply did this penetrate into the self-understanding of modernity that subsequent forms of positivism and logical empiricism still viewed science and technology as paradigms of ideology-free objectivity. This process was part of the ongoing dichotomies between subjectivity and objectivity in modern cultures and societies. Traces of this separation of science from ideology can still
be found in those Critical Rationalists who criticize paradigm analysis for confusing science and theology.

While hermeneutics exposes this Enlightenment "prejudice against all prejudice," it does not fall into an historicist relativism which would compromise the quest for truth. Analogous to the trends in post-empiricist philosophies of science, hermeneutics shifts our understanding of the criteria for objectivity and truth from deductivist ideals of theories qua theories to the ongoing traditions or contexts of praxis raising ever further relevant questions. Traditions as ongoing contexts of praxis, with their continual intersubjective dialogues of questions and answers and more questions, are indicative of how the hermeneutic dimensions of rationality are operative in all realms of discourse both in the "life-worlds" of everyday living and in the more theoretical worlds of scientific and scholarly reflection. Far from being abandoned, the objectivity of truth is appropriated within the ongoing "logics" and "dialectics" of human knowing and of acting subjects genuinely engaged in the constant exchange of questions and answers (Gadamer, 1981:44-8).

As Alasdair MacIntyre has shown, the hermeneutic emphasis upon tradition and narrative is central to the philosophy of science now cognizant of the false dichotomies engendered by the Enlightenment (1980:54-74; 1981). As sciences and technologies arise out of and return to the life-worlds of everyday living, so the logical and theoretical methods of argumentative discourse arise out of and return to the participatory "fusions of horizons" in the "mutual agreements" of historical narrative praxis (Gadamer, 1981:69-138). However, the hermeneutical and historical dimensions of rationality are not sufficient to answer all the further relevant questions posed within them. There is a series of analogies or sublations here. Just as it is important, in order to do justice to the praxis of reason operative in the empirical sciences, to complement their observational and explanatory heuristics with hermeneutical and historical analyses, so it is important, in order to do justice to the praxis of reason operative in exegetical and reconstructive disciplinary matrices of hermeneutics and of history, to complement their interpretative and reconstructive heuristics with dialectics.

The praxis of reason is an ongoing series of human achievements constituted by the raising of ever further relevant questions. As such
it is always bounded or limited and so also open to further relevant questions and criticisms. The tension between limitation and openness means that the praxis of reason is not an automatically guaranteed process. Truth and freedom are both intrinsic to rational praxis: truth in so far as all further questions and criticisms are relevant to, or raised in regard to, what is known; freedom in so far as what is known is continually related to the far vaster unknown constitutive of ever further questions. The praxis of reason is always threatened by what might be termed tempting myths of success. Whether in the everyday life-world of social interaction, or in the theoretic realms of cultural and scientific or scholarly reflections, successful life-forms or traditions or paradigms become established, only to succumb too often to the tendency to be evaluated as powerful enough to answer adequately all further relevant questions or criticisms. Particular successes become ideologically universalized.

Kuhn's paradigm analysis has begun to expose this process in regard to the history of the natural sciences in his notions of normal scientific paradigms and revolutionary paradigm shifts. Within the perspectives of the empirical sciences, which question empirical data via observational and explanatory methods, and the hermeneutical or historical disciplines, which question texts and other expressions of historical traditions via interpretative and reconstructive methods, it could be argued that often successive paradigms are incommensurable (Kuhn, 1970:92-173, 198ff; 1970a:259-77; 1977:206ff). This has led to a host of criticisms and allegations of irrationalism and relativism (see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970; Suppe, 1977). Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism relentlessly complicates such criticisms by indicating what he considers empirical and historical incommensurabilities, and concluding that the "authority of reason" and the "greatness of science" have to be radically criticized and relativized (1975, 1978, 1981).

In so far as hermeneutics presupposes praxis "as conducting oneself and acting in solidarity" (Gadamer, 1981:87) and "contexts of mutual agreement" (137), it also requires a shift beyond hermeneutics to dialectics. Richard Rorty's recent work indicates how a self-enclosed hermeneutical philosophy, which identifies foundational or epistemological questions (wrongly) with transcendental-idealistic conceptualisms, can issue only in a hermeneutical fideism sustained by an admittedly "Whiggish hope and belief" that the "conversation of the West" will continue
(1979). It is true that dialectics without hermeneutics can be (and too often has been) seduced by the myths of success into universalizing or totalizing particular life-forms or traditions as the answer to all questions (see Enrique Düssel, 1974: Toulmin, 1972:328-40). But hermeneutics without dialectics cannot engage in the heuristic questioning of latent value-conflicts and power-complexes whereby the very raising of further relevant questions itself is individually and socially repressed or oppressed. As a result, hermeneutics can only raise the "ideals" of "free and leisured conversation" in the face of oppression and repression (see Rorty, 1979:388ff).

Continental philosophers of science who do attend to dialectics, but do so in terms of either modifications of transcendental-idealistic reflection on the conditions of possibility, or suppositions about science and technology that totally objectify by manipulative methods whatever they investigate, do not get much further. For instance Apel's ethic of the "ideal communication communities" as only a "regulative idea" is at best a more formalized version of Gadamer's "dialectic of question and answer" (Apel, 1979:329-40; and Gadamer's queries, 348ff). Similarly, despite insightful explorations into Kohlberg, Mead, Durkheim, and Piaget, Habermas's brilliant efforts to distinguish the Zweckrationalität of empirically scientific and technological orientations from that of communicative action structures still remains captive to the basic dichotomies of Weber's theory of rationality. Thus the various "resistance movements" are interpreted as divergent critical reactions to "the inner colonization of the life-world" by elitist cultural experts and forms of economic and administrative rationality (see 1981a:447-593, esp. 488, 518-47, 587ff). Habermas's critique of functionalist reason still concedes far too much to Weber's Zweckrationalität with the result that Habermas's interpretation of modernity and post- or anti-modernity movements has many shades of Weber's charismatic or traditional or affective value-options versus the irresistible advance of monetary-bureaucratic institutionalization. Giddens's criticism of Habermas's earlier work, that it provides "no general mode of connection between social transformation and power" (1977:161), is further extended by Seyla Benhabib's insights into how Weber's theory of rationality has tended to derail Habermas's critical theory, imbuing it with a conceptualism in which no "concrete dialectics" between emancipatory ideals and liberating praxis of social subjects is articulated.
As Benhabib concludes: "It is not clear why a new socialization of the individual beyond the patriarchal family, school and culture, and a new mode of material interaction with nature, beyond the industrial mode of production, would be impossible. No theory can define the limits of future possibility, although it can enlighten us about it. For this possibility is posterior and not prior to actuality—as Aristotle long ago said of praxis" (1981:59).

If, as suggested above, the Anglo-American post-empiricist philosophers of science provide perspectives on the empirical and historical praxis of science which go beyond positivist and instrumentalist-functionalist prejudgments, nevertheless these perspectives are still fragmentary. As with hermeneutics (as indeed with positivism, logical empiricism, and linguistic analysis in former decades!), so the development of a more adequate dialectics is going to require extensive dialogue and debate with Continental philosophers of science, such as, among many others, Apel and Habermas. The call, for example, by Abner Shimony for a "dialectics" open to the full range of "the a priori and the a posteriori" in the evaluation of science (1976:584ff), finds a much fuller articulation in Apel's efforts to explicate the latent self-differentiation of reason from natural science to ethics (1979, 1980).

Marx Wartofsky's outlines for "a critique of impure reason" (1978, 1980) emphasize the importance of engaging in dialogue and debate with Continental traditions. In these exchanges, as Wartofsky indicates, the Anglo-American post-empiricists should insist that "[n]either the hermeneutic school nor the critical theorists have come to grips with the natural sciences in any serious way, tending to lump them in some caricature of 'positivism.'" (1980:18).

The difference both a debate with Continental traditions and a recognition of their limitations regarding natural sciences makes in relation to the social sciences and social theory is clearly seen in the work of the English theorist of the social sciences, Anthony Giddens. Similar to Habermas, Giddens works away at a broad retrieval of all the major figures in social theory, with special attention to Marx and Weber, for the sake of both (1) a "hermeneutic explication and mediation of divergent forms of life within descriptive metalanguages of social science," and (2) a dialectical "explication of the production and reproduction of society as the accomplished outcome of human agency" (1976:162). But where Habermas has not taken with sufficient serious-
ness the radical critiques of positivism offered by the post-empiricists, and so tends to remain locked within the dichotomies underlying Weber's theories of bureaucratic rationality, Giddens has seen the significance of the former (1977), and so provides a radical critique of both the functionalist deformations of reason and Weberian notions of Zweckrationalität (1977, 1979), and draws the consequences of this for a dialectical critique of historical materialism (1981).

Central to Giddens's analysis are his notions of agency and structuration. Agency is prior to the subject/object split (1979:92), thereby sublating the alternatives of intentionality analysis and structural analysis. The production and reproduction of societies is constituted "by the active doings of subjects" whose agency as skilled performance is also bounded within structures. "To enquire into the structuration of social practices is to seek to explain how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally" (1976:160f). This means that there is a dialectical "duality of structure," participating in both subjects-actors and objects-societies (1979:70), so that social integration and system integration provide resources and sanctions for interactive power-complexes which are either dominative or transformative (76-95). Institutional reproduction through the modes of signification, domination, and legitimation has to be freed "from the subject/object dualisms that ... have dogged most areas of the social sciences" (96-130). Contradictions, therefore, are embedded in power and domination whereby it is impossible fully to negate subjects as knowers and actors. Bureaucracy and autonomy cannot be counterposed in the way that Weberian theories maintain for, as empirical studies on bureaucracy and social action are uncovering, there is a "dialectic of control" whereby the dominative power of bureaucratization, or objectivistic one-dimensionality, is distanced and delegitimated by active social subjects (131-64). Neither late Capitalism nor state Socialism is as pessimistically under the sway of bureaucratic rationality or functionalist reason as Weberian theory would suppose (146ff; 1982).

Thus the contradictions which Habermas sees between social systems of rationality and the value-orientations of everyday life-worlds are to be located not only at such "seams between system and life-world" but also within the very systems of rationality themselves. If the post-empiricists are uncovering structure and agency in the
praxis of the natural sciences and technology, theorists like Giddens are articulating them in the hermeneutics and dialectics of the social sciences. As Giddens indicates, causal regularities are latently operative in human social activity in ways often neglected by hermeneutic philosophies (1979:196). The dialectical duality of structure and human agency emphasizes the ongoing interplay between the known cognitive performance of social subjects and the limitations or "bounds" of that performance in unconscious elements and unintended consequences of actions (250). Dialectics, therefore, must complement hermeneutics with the explication of causal regularities in human action provided by psychotherapeutic questioning of latent value-conflicts and the critique of ideologically distorted power-complexes. Giddens's notions of structuration and agency would also allow Habermas's incorporation of Piaget's genetic epistemology and Kohlberg's stages of moral development to articulate the normative interaction of subjects in ways that would subvert the Weberian illusions of objectivistic rationality.

The dichotomies between "traditional societies" and "industrialized societies" which have dominated social theory until recently are now being radically revised. Giddens analyzes how this correlates with the dichotomy between science and ideology originating in Comtean "laws of the three stages" and was carried on right into the by now dismantled "orthodox consensus" in social theory (234ff). Parallels between the latter and the Received View in the philosophy of science could easily be drawn (238). If Giddens, therefore, would criticize a tendency in Habermas to identify religion with traditional societies, Giddens takes elements from Marx and Habermas in his revision of the notion of ideology. Any symbol-system or idea-system may become ideological, including science and technology, inasmuch as "structures of significature are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups" whereby "domination is concealed as domination" (184-93). This occurs mainly in three ways: (1) by representing sectional interests as though they were universal, (2) by techniques of denying or transmuting contradictions, and (3) by reifying mutable, historical conditions as though they were embedded in nature (193-97).

Such a critique of ideology can resolve the issues raised by Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism. He recognized how post-empiricist philosophies of science are definitively dismantling the science/ideology dichotomy and drew the conclusion that since all interests are
sectional, including the interest in reason, any universalization must be ideological. I believe this is the thrust of his "Critique of Scientific Reason" (1981:202-30). Such anarchist relativism, however, is not radical enough. It fails to criticize the ideological reifications whereby incommensurable paradigms (structures) are identified with rational agency itself, as though the "nature" of scientific reason was fully embedded in paradigmatic structures. Refute them and you refute reason. Against this, Giddens's dialectics of structure and agency establish ongoing ideology-critiques in which the opposites are not absolutism versus anarchism, but both of these alternatives and a dialectics of theory and praxis which transcends the subject/object dualisms that have so bedeviled modernity.

The dialectics of theory and praxis within post-empiricist philosophies of science are extending the frontiers of metascience far beyond the false securities of positivisms and idealisms with their variant distortions of the sectional interests of scientific communities. Reason is constituted by the praxis of raising ever further relevant questions, so that reason itself demands a responsibility for reason which cannot be ideologically projected away from the concretely existing communities of inquirers into either observational techniques or theories qua theories. Any idea-system and symbol-system may become ideological. If the present nuclear age does have a future, there are rather massive judgments of ideological distortions to be passed upon its science and technology. As Wartofsky points out, the last illusions of scientific innocence were blown away in the radioactive winds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1980:5). The philosophy of science, or metascience, is confronted with the immense tasks of fostering the collaborative praxis of communicative interaction between not only all the sciences and scholarly disciplines, but also between these and all other forms of rational praxis operative in the human life-worlds. "No reconstruction of contemporary scientific rationality can be adequate if it fails to take the facts and structures of contemporary scientific practice and its social applications into account," including the political and economic corporate contexts funding and directing scientific research programmes (1980:21).

Intellectual disciplines and professions (Toulmin, 1972) are continually exposed to ideological distortions by the value-conflicts and power-complexes which repress or oppress very relevant further
questions. Paradigm analysis and post-empiricist philosophies of science are themselves increasingly demanding a "conversion" or "gestalt-switch" whereby the ideological distortions resulting from subject/object dualisms can be unmasked for what they are. Evolutionary adaptation alone is scarcely adequate to articulate this dialectical praxis of reason (see Giddens, 1981:20-4, 90-1). The very power delivered by contemporary sciences and technologies is pressing metascience to move from the latent "cunning of reason" in human history (Toulmin 1972:478ff) into ever more explicit collaborative commitments attuned to the heuristic structures and agencies capable of mediating between our socio-cultural matrices and the significance or role of the sciences in those matrices (see Lamb, 1978:195ff; Lonergan 1978:530-633; Wartofsky, 1979:40-89, 119-39; 1980).

This incomplete overview of the status quaestionis regarding paradigm analysis and post-empiricist philosophies of science has three major conclusions:

1. This reflection excludes the possibility of arriving at a complete and coherent theoretical articulation of "the new paradigm" as though it could be a monistic absolute, deductively or inductively articulating rationality fully.

2. Also excluded is inference from this radical incompleteness that "the new paradigm" heads toward the incoherence of an arational or irrational relativism or anarchism, since such an inference is premised on the mistaken assumption that if rationality exists it must be capable of complete and coherent metatheoretic articulation.

3. Instead, this reflection attends to the praxis of theorizing within communities engaged in empirical, hermeneutical, and/or dialectical inquiry in order to articulate coherently—yet always incompletely—both the heuristic relationships within or among these communities of inquiry, and also the relations between these and all other forms of rational praxis (for example, commonsense, aesthetic, moral, religious).

In so far as "the new paradigm" attends to the fundamental importance of praxis, it is becoming plausible to suppose that the crises attendant
upon the pluralism of reason are actually crises of the subjects and institutions of reason. To the degree that these subjects and institutions do not facilitate the praxis of reason as the raising of ever further relevant questions regarding either normal or extraordinary research programmes, they are caught in the ideological distortions fostered by the dichotomies between objectivity and subjectivity, system and life-world, bureaucracy and autonomy, analysis and narrative, technology and art, industry and environment, science and morality, truth and freedom.

II
RELIGIOUS PRAXIS AND THEOLOGICAL DIALECTICS
IN THE NEW PARADIGM

Many parallels could be drawn between developments in the philosophies of science and those in modern and contemporary theologies. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* tended to focus their unease with the types of reflection dependent upon classical positivism and the logical empiricism of the Received View. However tentatively, it articulated the fundamental import of history for the philosophy of science. The walls which positivism and logical empiricism had erected between subject and object, history and logic, value and fact, ideology and science, and so on, began to crumble at an increasing rate. With this collapse of the "orthodox consensus" emerged the series of orientations leading toward the more dialectical concerns with the heuristics of value-conflicts and power-complexes as they impinge upon the historical praxis of science.

This has many parallels in modern and contemporary developments within theology attempting to cope with the fundamental import of historical and other empirically-oriented disciplines (for example, psychology of religion, sociology of religion, comparative histories of religion) on the interactions between *fides* and *ratio*, or between Christian religious traditions and human experience. These latter are heuristic 'constants' in so far as they are neither reducible to nor separable from one another, but implicitly relational in ongoing matrices verifiable in history. I shall concentrate on the more praxis-oriented and dialectical dimensions of these interactions.
"The much discussed identity-crisis of Christianity is not primarily a crisis of its message, but a crisis of its subjects and institutions"—this judgment of Johann B. Metz (1977:xii) is central to the project of political theology. It appears to contradict the massive hermeneutics of suspicion in modernity (Marx, Freud, Nietzsche) based upon the dichotomy of science and ideology. Similarly, the emancipatory praxis grounding the many forms of liberation theology whereby the poor, oppressed, and victimized "non-persons" appropriate the Christian message in order to transformatively struggle against their oppression seems to contradict modernity with its claims that emancipation is inseparable bound to processes of secularization (Comte, Mill, Marx). These religious and theological movements do indeed contradict much of modernity, but they do so dialectically—or "analectically" if one understands dialectics as no more than closed, totalizing techniques (see E. Dussel, 1974; J. C. Scannone, 1977). These developments do not "fall behind" the advances in critical reflection and political freedoms initiated in the Enlightenment, as though they promoted utopian or fideistic collapses of reason into religious witness (see H. Maier, 1972; S. Ogden, 1979). The very relevant further questions these movements pose to both the Christian traditions and forms of contemporary human experience involve them in what might be called a "double dialectic." In very radical ways, political and liberation theologians recognize how any symbol-, idea-, or social-system may become ideological. Hence they are developing genuine (versus closed) dialectical critiques of both the ideological distortions of modernity. Our sketch of developments in the turn to praxis and dialectics in post-empiricist philosophies of science suggests how these theological developments intensify the concerns for reason as reason yet to be realized more fully in history and society. Note that in order to articulate this intensification of rational praxis to the point of analectic solidarity with the victims of history, Helmut Peukert had to push critical reflection far beyond the Weberian dichotomies still present in Habermas and correlate the insights of both the more classic representatives of the Frankfurt School and Anglo-American developments in theories of science (1978:248-310).

Political and liberation theologies reap the benefits of the largely unintended consequences of modern historical criticism and empirical studies of religion, as well as of the more contemporary
hermeneutical reflections on science and life-world. The former—from the German historical school to the works of Marx and Freud—were largely undertaken under the aegis of the science/ideology dichotomy. Studies have poured forth on all aspects of Christian traditions, often demonstrating just how Christian symbol and other systems were distorted into ideological legitimations of dominative clerical and/or political elites as Christianity became Christendom. This sacralism, as ideological distortion, was criticized in historical, sociological, and psychological studies. It also influenced Northern industrialized societies and cultures, leading to a secularism in which religion was either privatized or declared a leftover of pre-historical traditional societies (when history is dated from the revolution).

In this situation, theologians tended to face the dichotomy of either a conservative preservation of orthodoxy, by leaning toward an identification of the Christian faith with past forms of its articulation (for example, Catholic and Protestant orthodoxies and scholasticism), or a liberal embrace of modernity, by leaning toward an identification of the faith with the moral and cultural values of secular societies (for example, Protestant liberalism, Catholic modernism). In response to modern charges of unscientific ideology, conservatives emphasized the primacy of logic and logically derived metaphysics in articulating the intelligibility of faith traditions (for example, the manualist theologies). While this sometimes led to efforts at reconciling modern science and the primacy of theory in the past, as in Jacques Maritain's hierarchical degrees of knowledge, it produced more lasting benefits by stimulating serious historical studies which undermined manualist pretensions by demonstrating the rich pluralism of medieval theologies. Liberal responses to modern charges of unscientific ideology tended to repudiate the past (often deformed) logical and metaphysical conceptualities in favor of showing the relevance of Christian faith to modern aspirations for meaning and value by forging new hermeneutical and ethical frameworks for interpreting the sources of tradition (for example, F. Schleiermacher, the Ritschlians). These frameworks, together with the scholarship they promoted, contributed enormously to modern knowledge of Christian origins and history. In so far as liberal scholarship emphasized those meanings and values accentuating the primacy of pure practical reason, not surprisingly it seemed sometimes to identify the meanings and values of the manifold expres-
sions of traditions with the cultural matrices in which they emerged (for example, the "hellenization" of Christianity in Harnack); or to project meanings and values the investigators cherished back into the past (for example, reconstructions of the historical Jesus or early Christianity with heavy Kantian or Hegelian hues). There was E. Troeltsch's socio-historical reconstruction of history which exemplified the church/sect dichotomies in ways perhaps too dependent upon Weberian dichotomies of bureaucratic/charismatic. Or, there was the Social Gospel effort to develop ethical complementarity between the churches and middleclass reformism, between theology and modern social science (see J. Fishburn, 1981). Liberal theologies have not only set the agenda for modern theology, but also supported historical research programmes and methods of ethical reflection which could correct any one-sided emphasis through their ongoing self-correcting processes of research and learning.

Events of the twentieth century have begun to dismantle confidence in the inevitability of scientific and technological progress. The science versus ideology dichotomy began to crumble as world wars and ever more refined techniques of manipulation and control showed how the sciences and technologies themselves could ideologically conceal domination. Psychological studies began to uncover how religious symbol-systems could promote psychic integration, they need not serve only ideologically distorted neurotic functions legitimating latent value-conflicts (for example, Adler, Jung, Frankl, Fromm). Sociological studies began to unmask the distorted interests in domination embedded within the subject/object dualisms of modernity, and to articulate elements of communicative interaction (G. H. Mead) capable of exposing the power-complexes distorting modern industrialized societies (E. A. Ross, T. Veblen, M. Horkheimer, K. Mannheim, C. W. Mills). Dialectical methods were gradually assembled which, in conjunction with more radical hermeneutical critiques of subject/object dualisms, began to break objectivistic illusions regarding ideology. If any symbol-system may become ideological, then the dehumanizing tendencies to domination cannot be met by replacing one system judged ideological by another. This had been the fault underlying the transitions from feudal-sacralist-hierarchically authoritarian systems to modern-secularist-bureaucratically authoritarian systems. Systems cannot be understood or adequately exist apart from the practices of the human subjects repro-
ducing the systems (Giddens, 1979:49-130). If both science and religion can be ideologically distorted, and if secularism is as rife with de-humanizing domination as sacralism, then truly radical critiques of ideology have to differentiate sacred and secular in terms of the contradictions between genuine (as opposed to dominative) interactions of institutions and subjects within both religious and scientific systems (Giddens, 1971:205-42; Gilkey, 1981).

Developments analogous to the increasing acknowledgment by post-empiricist philosophies of science that complete and coherent metatheoretical mediations of rational praxis are illusions can be found in theology. Søren Kierkegaard's explorations of Christian subjectivity were critical of both sacralist Christendom and secularist scientism. John Henry Newman's descriptions of cognitive and religious judgments and decisions provided very fruitful alternatives to the sterile logicism of neo-scholastic manualist theologies. These theologians were not heard in their own times; but the First World War and its aftermath began to awaken theological communities from their conservative-dogmatic and liberal-progressive slumbers.

The Krisistheologie of Karl Barth was able to draw upon the recovery of eschatology in the New Testament studies (for example, J. Weiss, A. Schweitzer) in order to emphasize the transcendence of the Word of God. Barth's Neoorthodoxy went beyond the conservative versus liberal dichotomy, because Barth's thematization of God's transcendence highlighted the paradoxical non-identity of Christian faith in relation to human, historical experience, criticizing both conservative and liberal trends for identifying the Christian message with either past or present cultural meanings and values. History and common human experience records the meaningless succession of domination and exploitation of the lowly by the powerful. The revelation of God in the Old and New Testaments is the revelation of God's taking sides with the poor and lowly: "God is indeed a God of the Jews and the heathen, but not a God of the exalted and the lowly. He is one-sidedly a God of the lowly ... Where idols are worshiped, I am not allowed to take part. Rather, against all those who want to be great in this world, I must espouse the standpoint of those little people with whom God makes his beginning" (1919:366; G. Hunsinger, 1976).

There are curious parallels between Barth's faith orientation and Popper's critical rationalist orientation. For Popper also saw the
meaninglessness of history: there is no "history of mankind" but only the "history of power politics" which "is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder." Concretely, the history of mankind is made up of histories of suffering: "The life of the forgotten, of the unknown individual man; his sorrows and joys, his suffering and death, this is the real content of human experience down the ages." Popper referred to Kierkegaard and Barth, pointing out how their understandings of Christian faith were congruent with his view of history (1966:269-76). If sacralist and secularist ideologies of political power "idolize" the successes and rewards of the "heroes on the Stage of History," if "history has no meaning, we can give it meaning" by promoting forms of education and ethical action that foster freedom and responsibility so that "one day perhaps we may succeed in getting power under control." History, Popper acknowledged, "badly needs a justification" (1966:276-280). While Barth would agree that human beings in history need justification, for him the only meaning which can truly redeem the countless dead and forgotten, and those living and struggling, is in the gift of God's Word and Spirit calling us to faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus. The early Barth's "dialectic" was really more paradoxical than dialectical, inasmuch as the totally other God only tangentially touches the world of history in Christ. But his articulation of the reality of God and divine revelation still posed two major sets of issues for contemporary (as distinct from modern, conservative versus liberal) theologians.

The first major set of issues is hermeneutical: if the gift of religious faith transcends the achievements of human reason in history, is faith in the redemptive revelation of Divine Mystery, with its narrative manifestations and proclamations, extrinsic or intrinsic to the human quest for meaning and for realizing reason in history? The second major set of issues is dialectical: the very posing of the hermeneutical issues acknowledges the impossibility of complete and coherent meta-theoretical mediations of faith and reason, since only the transcendental Divine Mystery has that completeness and coherence. But the importance of the turn to praxis is recognized inasmuch as the meanings and values of God's revelation in history are incarnated dialectically in discipleship, whereby the subjects and institutions mediating faith turn away continually from the ideological distortions of dominant
power and towards solidarity with the poor and lowly victims of history whom God has revealed as chosen.

The hermeneutical sets of issues have been addressed by a whole series of theologies committed to articulating the complementarities and conflicts of interpretation between the heuristic 'constants' of the Christian traditions and contemporary human experiences. These are hermeneutical or mediational theologies to the extent that they not only accept the transcendent non-identity of Christian faith and love (emphasized by such theologians as Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar) but also see the importance of mediating this non-identity within the cultural matrices of ongoing human experiences. Thus by several creative adaptations from Hermann, the law-gospel distinctions, and Heideggerian categories, Rudolf Bultmann sought the complementarity of the historical-critical methods of interpretation with the existential demands of decision-in-faith. Paul Tillich sought critically to correlate Christianity and contemporary culture through an ontology of human finitude that is open to the question of God and capable of overcoming the dichotomies between heteronomous and autonomous reasons through the appropriation of the theonomous dimensions of reason-as-questioning answered symbolically through the narratives and events of Christian revelation. Karl Rahner assayed the quasi-Heideggerian transcendental retrieval of Thomas Aquinas which, in opposition to the idealism of Kant and Hegel, ontologically mediates primordially originating experience and conceptualization through an existential thematization of the prior unthematic existential of transcending experience; thereby he was able to range over the manifold questions confronting contemporary Christianity, shifting the status quaestionis from the ontic categories of a cosmological metaphysics to the ontological categories of cognitive metaphysics. P. Teilhard de Chardin and process theologians sought metaphorical and metaphysical correlations between the advances in the sciences and the symbols of Christian revelation. The achievements of the Niebuhrs, Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, Gerhard Ebeling, and so on, also contribute to the project of articulating the hermeneutical and historical unity-in-difference of the meanings of Christian faith with ongoing human experience in history.

These hermeneutical and mediational efforts of contemporary theologies sought to overcome the subject/object dualisms threatening modernity, and they moved beyond the typical modern conservative versus
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liberal tendencies. Nevertheless, these achievements did not get fully carried out in the post-systematic communications and interactions of ecclesial and cultural life-worlds, as becomes clear in the typical conservative versus liberal reactions to these hermeneutical and mediational theologies. On the side of conservative reactions are the Kein Anderes Evangelium Bewegung, such papal encyclicals as Humani Generis and Humanae Vitae, or the harassments of E. Schillebeeckx and H. Küng. Liberal reactions can be found in some aspects of secularization theologies and the death of God theologies. In so far as both these types of reaction tend to fall back into the modern oppositions between the meanings of faith in Christian traditions and the meanings relevant to contemporary human experience, it is not surprising that contemporary hermeneutical or mediational theologians emphasize the sources of Christian faith transform the meanings and questions raised within contemporary human experience by greater attention to the subjects and institutions mediating faith. Thus Wolfhart Pannenberg and Ian Barbour engage in detailed dialogues with contemporary philosophies of science in order to explicate more exactly the hermeneutical Wissenschaftslichkeit or scholarly heuristics of theology. Eberhart Jüngel recovers and advances Dietrich Bonhoeffer's faith mediation of the death of God by differentiating the modern metaphysical context from the biblical and reformation contexts which interpret the death of God in the sufferings and pains of the Crucified who, as the coming God manifested in the resurrection, calls us through the negativities of reason to faith in the Three-in-One Mystery of God as a knowledge born of love. Hans Küng indicates how the atheistic masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud, Nietzsche) and their more contemporary counterparts tend to identify rejection of religion with rejection of its institutions, rejection of Christianity with rejection of Christendom, rejection of God with rejection of the churches, so that an adequate response to their critiques can only occur in acknowledging the distortions of the institutions and subjects they uncovered and actively engaging in transforming those institutions and subjects in the light of the gospel. Langdon Gilkey retrieves the symbols of providence, Christology, and eschatology in order to articulate an interpretative unity of theory and praxis wherein history is understood and creatively realized in relation to God. Edward Schillebeeckx has massively integrated the results of exegetical and historical research into a Christology which indicates how the
pluralism within the sources of Christian faith leads not to anarchism but to the challenge of discipleship. David Tracy elaborates complementarities and conflicts among theologies engaged in trajectories of manifestation, proclamation, and praxis in order to spell out how the very real differences do not support claims that pluralism is, or leads to, a complacent relativism or anarchism.

The very important differences and conflicts of interpretation among these and other theologians engaged in hermeneutical mediations of faith and contemporary human experience cannot be adequately situated within the framework of modern conservative or liberal dichotomies. The hermeneutical turn in the post-empiricist philosophies of science indicated how the ongoing projects of science imply a dialectics of questions and answers where the heuristics of research programmes encourage pluralism without falling into epistemological anarchism. Analogously, the pluralistic orientations of these post-modern hermeneutical theologies refute the attempts like Peter Berger's to force their results into the typically modern dichotomy between either resisting conservatively or capitulating liberally (1977; and the responses of Ogden, Gilkey, Tracy, 1978). These theologians are attuned to how both faith and science may become ideologically distorted, but this does not mean total rejection of either faith or science in order to find some other "pure" realm of meaning, nor does it imply lapsing into anarchistic incoherence; instead it demands dialectical criticism of interpretive heuristics.

Such dialectical criticism is being addressed by political and liberation theologies, which articulate most emphatically the limits to pluralism. As Barth puts it, God is the God of the Jews and of the heathen, but not the God of the exalted and of the lowly. The revelation of God's "taking sides" with the suffering victims of history in the events and narratives of the Passover-Exodus and the death and resurrection of Jesus is a summons to faith as conversion, whereby the dominative histories of political powers are "interrupted" and judged by the crucified and risen Lord of history. As Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, Dorothee Sölle, Gustavo Gutierrez, Jon Sobrino, and Leonardo Boff all indicate in various ways, this revelation of the lordship of Christ redemptively transcends and transforms all the ways in which humans lord it over one another. Instead of coercing human freedom, divine lordship liberates that freedom by revealing the dead-ends of
dominative power and beckoning humankind to love and worship Divine Mystery freely, in and through love for the least of the sisters and brothers. The histories of the Old and New Covenants, as well as the ongoing histories of the Jewish and Christian peoples, are replete with ideological distortions in which their religious symbol-systems were twisted into legitimations of dominative powers. Covenants were broken, sinned against; religious conversions have never been pure and automatically guaranteed events. Far from revealing the best of all possible worlds, the kingdom of God announced, in God's option for the poor and powerless, the need for metanoia as the continual praxis of repenting for sin by withdrawing from the alienations wrought by the dominative failures to love.

Political and liberation theologians are no illusions that faith reveals some realm of "pure religion" within history. If one reads the various Black, Feminist, Latin American, African, Asian, or Native American liberation theologians, one finds an acute dialectical awareness of how Christianity was time and again distorted into ideologies of oppression and exploitation. Why not simply identify the distortions with the message and reject Christian traditions? Because, as these theologians clearly recognize, the institutions and subjects of faith are not locked into objectivistic structures of domination and control: they unfold what Giddens refers to as the dialectical interactions of subjects and structures, in which the call to ever more genuine religious solidarity with the poor and the lowly in the mystery of Christ needs continually to be realized. The option of fleeing the impurity of religion for the supposedly pure realm of reason or theory is illusory, since any idea-system or symbol-system can become ideological. If, as Moltmann shows, "the truth of freedom is love" (1981) and, as Lonergan explicates, genuine faith "is a knowledge born of love" (1972), then these theologians are facing the post-modern tasks of dialectically discerning the latent and manifest value-conflicts and power-complexes which historically and personally thwart that love and distort the knowledge it can generate. As Metz shows, this means encouraging new subject-empowering ways of doing theology attentive to both the subversive memories informing past traditions and the apocalyptic hopes for God's reign of justice and love which interrupt all efforts to identify the gospel with conservative-paternalistic or liberal-bourgeois mediations (1977).
The narrative praxis-orientations of political and liberation theologies, as Metz (1977), Peukert (1978), and Clodovis Boff (1978) have demonstrated, are efforts to understand how faith as narrative knowledge born of love reveals the Divine anamnestic solidarity with all the lowly and redeems human reason and experience from the irreationalities of instrumentalist and other deformations of reason. (The latter have distorted praxis into the modern forms of scientism, where knowledge becomes dominative power generated by fear.) Alasdair MacIntyre has sketched how the incommensurability of successive paradigms in science is overcome in narrative praxis—all scientific theories are embedded within ongoing historical narratives which relate narratives and traditions with theories and methods (1980). Similarly, Juan C. Scannone and others draw upon categories (of Paul Ricoeur, Emanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, Karl Rahner, as well as of Enrique Dussel and Paolo Freire) to articulate how the mediations of theory and praxis can move, via the critique of ideology, beyond elitist uses of theories to manipulate the masses from above, by integrating scientific and scholarly pursuits with the many values informing the narratives and traditions—the popular wisdom—of the poor in Latin America (Scannone, 1976, 1977).

In addition, the new directions now emerging in social-critical reconstructive interpretations of the biblical narratives in the works of such scholars as N. Gottwald, J. Elliott, E. Schüssler Fiorenza, G. Theissen, and P. Trible are proleptic. Interpretations have to move beyond either romanticist reductions of textual meanings to the author's intentions or the more liberal techniques of totally dispensing with intentionality by reducing meaning to synchronic objectivist traces. Like Ricoeur, Giddens articulates "a recovery of the subject without subjectivism" by adverting to how texts are embedded within ongoing social practices of cultural production and reproduction and enable distanciated interaction. The meanings and values are not 'contained' in the texts (marks on paper), but enmeshed in ongoing histories of social praxis in the shape of communicative interactions constituted by both intended and unintended significations (1979:9-48, 198-233). By turning their attention to the dialectics of value-conflicts and power-complexes that influence processes of domination and liberation, biblical scholars are sublating the liberal projects of historical criticism. Their more dialectical and social-critical methods of interpretation do
not simply reduce the meanings of texts to the plausibility structures of the cultures in which the texts were produced; instead, they go on to articulate the conflicts within and against which the faith communities produced and reproduced biblical narratives. As Enrique Dussel mentions, these methods have to be refined and extended to our reconstructions of church history and doctrines as well (1981:3-20; also Lamb, 1982:134-42).

Political and liberation theologians are involved in mutually critical collaboration with those seeking to understand and overcome alienations and ideological distortions in widely differing social, academic, and ecclesial contexts. The differences between political and liberation theologies stem from their different cultural matrices and also from their diverse originating contexts. In recent years it is generally recognized that the differences are complementary rather than contradictory. Thus Latin American and Black liberation theologies originated as critical reflection on and engagement in those ecclesial communities committed to religious and moral struggles against classism and racism, and then began to collaborate critically with complementary perspectives and values in social and academic contexts (see S. Torres, 1981; R. Gibellini, 1979; J. Cone, 1979). Again, feminist and ecological liberation theologies originated as efforts to mediate transformative values to ecclesial and academic contexts the within the social struggles against sexism and androcentricism. In doing this they engaged in re-evaluations of both Christian traditions and contemporary experiences (see R. Ruether, 1979, 1981; J. Cobb, 1981, 1982). European and North American political theologies emerged within primarily academic contexts in order to articulate the dialectical and critical potential of social, moral, religious, and intellectual contradictions increasingly being uncovered by empirical, hermeneutical, historical, and philosophical investigations of both ongoing Christian traditions and modern histories of freedom and suffering. These academic theologians realized, however, the fundamental importance of both initiating new forms of interdisciplinary collaboration within those contexts (see Metz, 1971; Peukert, 1978; Lamb, 1978), and collaborating with a wide variety of ecclesial and social movements committed to the transformative values of humanization and evangelization (see G. Baum, 1979, 1980, 1982; J. Coleman, 1982; L. Cormie, 1978, 1980; F. Schüssler-

On account of these ongoing developments within liberation and political theologies, they are in a position to harvest the results of continuing empirical, hermeneutical, and historical methods of inquiry. Their concerns with value-conflicts and power-complexes are oriented toward critically thematizing the dialectical differences at the roots of divergent and often contradictory historical reconstructions, hermeneutical interpretations, and empirical research programmes (see Lonergan, 1972:128-130, 235-66). Such post-modern dialectical tasks, like the hermeneutical ones mentioned above, are not exempt from modern conservative and liberal misunderstandings. Indeed, the conservative and the liberal are unmasked as identity-systems committed to preserving the modern status quo. For instance, the "neo-conservative" and the historical-materialist criticism of political and liberation theologies have tended to argue for the identification of Christian faith with the modern science/ideology dichotomy. The neo-conservatives argue for the importance of Christianity in supporting and legitimating late capitalist science and social organization (for example, Edward Norman, 1979; Michael Novak, 1982), and criticize political and liberation theologies for "de-spiritualizing" the faith in the direction of state socialism. In contrast, the historical-materialists argue for the importance of faith's legitimating Marxist science—if not state socialist practice—and criticize political and liberation theologians for "de-materializing" the values of solidarity with the poor and oppressed victims (see Alfredo Fierro, 1977). Such conservative and liberal criticisms find parallels in the press releases of the superpowers. Thus, the media in the United States tend to praise the critical influence of the churches in the Soviet block countries, while they excoriate the critical influences of the churches in Latin America, whereas the media in the U.S.S.R. simply reverse the praise and blame.

These criticisms and rhetoric overlook how political and liberation theologies radically transcend both the sacralist dichotomy of faith/ideology and the secularist dichotomy of science/ideology. As the institutions and subjects of faith enter into both the histories of freedom and the histories of suffering, they provide possibilities of solidarity and collaboration within social, ecclesial, and academic contexts which go beyond the the sacralist-hierarchic and the secu-
larist-bureaucratic forms of domination and control. Like Karl Barth, they do tend to appropriate these values in socialist traditions of solidarity with the victims of exploitation; but they are keenly aware of how those values have been betrayed by precisely those forms of control: late capitalism is an ideological materialization of idealism, whereas state socialism is an ideological idealization of materialism. By engaging in dialectical struggles against racism, sexism, economic exploitation, militarism, and environmental pollution, political and liberation theologians are committed by their faith, as a knowledge born of love, to criticize radically the social, ecclesial, and academic alienations generated by fear and domination.

Within the ecclesial context, many basic communities developing throughout the world are initiating what Metz calls a second Reformation. These liberating basic communities can transcend the alienations of conservative-paternalistic and liberal-bourgeois ways of bureaucratically institutionalizing the subjects of faith. Moreover, this new ecumenical movement "from below" provides paradigms for collaborative dialogues and actions both within Christianity and among the world religions, by renouncing the use of dominative power which has so deeply alienated Christians from one another and from their brothers and sisters in other religious traditions. Such renunciation requires within all religious institutions and subjects profound conversions from the idols of power to which countless humans have been sacrificed, and toward the divine mystery.

Within the academic context, the many post-modern efforts to overcome the subject/object dichotomies which have artificially severed tradition and innovation, science and morality, theory and narrative, order and autonomy, technology and art, industry and environment, economic accumulation and social distribution, systems and life-worlds have to be encouraged. Only such processes of intellectual transformation and conversion can overcome these dichotomies to reveal the differentiated interactions which are the foundations of intersubjective creativity in the communal quests for truth and freedom. Thus, the vital importance of post-empiricist shifts toward praxis and dialectics to complementary shifts in theology, and vice versa. Paradigm analysis in both metascience and theology exposes the illusions of both monistic absolutism and anarchy.
The new paradigm-analysis in theology, with its dialectics of theory and praxis, is not meant to be an esoteric exercise. Present human history is clouded by very real threats to what Moltmann describes as "freedom toward the future." For the first time in world history, we can envisage the possibility—some would say the probability—of a self-inflicted nuclear end of the human drama as we have known it until now. Until now, it has been rent by wars and conflicts in which some emerged as victors and most were destroyed or enslaved as victims, and so the human drama has been marked by pell-mell successions of roles which could be designated as winners versus losers, victors versus victims, masters versus slaves, empires versus colonies, superpowers versus underdeveloped countries. The nuclear arms race, ironically, discloses the lethal potential of dominative power as death. If science and technology are ever to escape subjugation to the dominating superpowers of history, and if the drama is to be "interrupted" redemptively rather than destructively, then Christian theology (which has itself been enticed time and again to legitimate dominative power) can contribute to that future by dialectically mediating to the present the subversive memories of God's identification, in the mystery and message of Jesus Christ, with the struggles of victims everywhere.
The Dialectics of Theory and Praxis

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One of the central goals of education, Plato insisted, is meta-strophe or periagoge, a process of turning around, or as we might call it, conversion. Its task was to awaken individuals from a dream world and make them alert to reality. In his diagnosis of the human situation he asserts that the minds of individuals are in bondage (Cushman, 1957: 139-140). In his theory of education, presented mainly in book VII of the Republic, the liberation from such bondage is assigned a central role. Such liberation will require a complete turning around of the soul or personality. In contrast with Bacon, for whom the value of science was simply its utility, the power it gave us to dominate the world of nature, Plato considered that the experience of science could constitute an aid to the awakening he required. Despite his emphasis on the importance of periagoge, of conversion, it cannot be claimed that current educators in general or science educators in particular are very much interested in the topic, in appreciating what sort of a process it might be, or in alerting their students to it. T. S. Kuhn remarked that it came as a surprise to him to discover that science in its history had undergone a succession of fairly major conceptual revolutions (Kuhn, 1970:v-vi). There have been many responses of one kind or another to his consequent book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but few if any have adverted to his somewhat surprising assertion:

The conversion experience that I have likened to a gestalt switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revolutionary process. Good reasons for choice provide motives for conversion and a climate in which it is more likely to occur. ... But neither good
reasons nor translation constitute conversion, and it is that process we must explicate in order to understand an essential sort of scientific change (204).

Many, upset by the mystical or religious connotations of the term, have reduced the matter to a gestalt shift. But Kuhn does not identify the process with a gestalt shift. It is in fact much more complex. Again, neither Kuhn nor Plato is talking about religious conversion. For conversion can occur in the realms of science, philosophy, politics, social living, as well as in religion. And, Kuhn asserts, if we are to understand certain transformations of the scientific community in history we must understand that process. Unless the scientific educators have experienced and are familiar with certain liberations of their wonder, they might, in their educating, be tacitly contributing to the bondage of the minds of their students. Through the education process they will form a community who share their mental bondage. Conversion would then appear an important topic, a topic which stands in need of some demythologizing. What is needed initially is to build up a kind of heuristic portrait or profile of the process.

Conversion could then be defined as a radical change of mind and heart, of psychic orientation or direction,¹ which occurs in an individual and through which his relationship with either himself or his world changes radically. Although the actual moment of transformation, of reorientation of his psychic direction, can in many instances be dramatic and unusual, William James has written convincingly to the effect that there is usually a long period of incubation which precedes it, and which, at the periphery of consciousness, is preparing the individual for the reorientation (1979 [1901]:214-215). Again, conversion is now considered to be a living process rather than a finished state. Because of this it finds its objectification basically in the autobiographical narrative. The reorientation, which can be more or less dramatic, is only a point of entry, a beginning. From it there can be built up an ever greater familiarity with the geography of the new relationship with the world. Although the causes of conversion seem highly disputable, perhaps it can be suggested that a central element is the opening up or awakening of wonder, usually by anomalies.

¹. On this, see William James, 1979 [1901]:198-199, 232; on the principles of direction, Progoff, 1963: chapter 3.
Conversions can be divided, most basically, into those which bring about a radical change in the individual as related to the world, and those which involve a radical change in his understanding of, and relation to, himself. The first of these is of interest to T. S. Kuhn; the second, to Plato, Augustine, and Lonergan. It will help to fill out the profile or portrait of the process by considering each of these types.

Kuhn draws our attention to significant periods in the history of the scientific community when the need for a form of conversion was great, in the transitions from pre- to post-Copernican astronomy, from pre- to post-Darwinian biology, and from pre- to post-Einsteinian notions of space and time. In each of these periods of transition it is not this or that specific scientific law that is disputed but rather the whole conceptual framework of the science itself. It is not a matter of revising or replacing this or that topic within the framework, but rather of revising the whole framework or replacing it with something new. Some features of the reorientation involved are worth noting.

First, pre- and post-Copernican astronomers can refer to the same empirical experiences such as the rising and the setting of the sun. Pre- and post-Darwinian biologists can refer to the same biological organisms, pre- and post-Einsteinian physicists can talk about the velocity of light. Yet the framework or context within which such experiences are understood has utterly changed. Equally, experiences or objects which previously were unacknowledged, ignored, denied, even ridiculed or feared, are now acknowledged as centrally important. A whole range of phenomena which, previously, either had no significance, or had only marginal significance, or were ignored, can now become established on the center stage. It is not a matter of adding new theorems or laws to the first framework. The awakening of wonder to the new elements might require a kind of 'unlearning' of the old framework and a new learning process by means of which the individual and group feel at home in the new context. Such an awakening of wonder is highly intelli-

2. Kuhn, 1970: chapters 7 through 9; on Darwinism, see Francis Darwin (1958).
gent and thus rational. But it can also constitute a leap that cannot be accommodated by logic and argument. All of this perhaps explains why intellectual conversion is so much more difficult for the mentally formed than it is for the new generation of students.

Secondly, conversion can be resisted, and through resistance there results division, hostility, antagonism, even the ruin of careers, within the scientific community. Initially the evidence in favor of one framework or other will be inconclusive and individuals from the older tradition will labor, sincerely up to a point, to preserve it. But, it can be asked, is there not a point at which the resistance becomes culpable? It follows that although conversion is obviously a change in the individual scientist, it is not something totally inner and private. Through it he enters into a new relationship, not with something in himself, but rather with the empirical and given world. Again, it has a public dimension in that he associates with groups of like-minded people.

Thirdly, the experience of the demand for conversion, and the process of working through it, both individually and socially, can be extremely disturbing and unsettling. The memory of the experience can be vivid and it could be journalled. If no such memory exists, the chances are that one has not had the experience. Usually within a generation or two the process has run its course in the scientific community. The emerging generation of science students take easily to the new system and eventually the older one can become an object of ridicule. Significantly, the nature of the conversion experience will be lost or hidden from those students whose complete education has come from well-ordered systematic texts of the current normal science. Should major innovations emerge, a generation who have been so educated will be quite unprepared for it. Only those who have an adequate historical perspective on science will be able to interpret the signs of the times.

3. This I believe to be a key issue which must be taken into account in debates concerning the rationality or irrationality of theory or paradigm choice. For a discussion of the problem see Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970:260-261; also 55-57, for remarks by Popper on conversion and paradigm choice.
A contrasting kind of conversion is explored by Plato, Augustine, and Lonergan—one that is concerned specifically with a change in one's understanding of oneself. It is concerned specifically with a change in one's understanding of what it is that one is doing when one is coming to know the world. For most, knowing something is a matter of taking a good look at it. For what else could it involve? What else might we do when we know something, other than look at it, touch it, hear it, imagine or picture it?

Throughout the centuries there has rested upon Plato a heavy burden of proof. Most men presume they are wide awake to the realities of their world. For them, seeing is believing. But Socrates' teaching concerning the psyche had loosed Plato forever from the tyranny of the obvious. For him there is an "organ or knowledge the value of which outweighs ten thousand eyes," because only by it is true Being discerned. He knew that those who shared his viewpoint would agree, but he was fully aware, as he stated in the Republic (527e), that those who had no first-hand acquaintance with the powers of nous would necessarily regard his sketch of reality as incredible. Plato's task, therefore, was that of bringing men to the point of acknowledging that they were, in fact, asleep to the real nature of their world (Cushmann, 1957:44).

Lonergan puts forward similar sentiments:

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what there is to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at (1972:238).

That human knowing is a matter of looking, of attempting to imagine or picture things, whatever they might be—atoms, elements, organisms, or the functional relations or probability distributions studied in mathematics—is an epistemological position which is deeply ingrained in the minds of perhaps the vast majority of scientists. Consider in this context the remarks made by Brian Magee when talking about elementary particles:

Subatomic particles are bits of material, bits of stuff. It so happens—perhaps because of the accident of our optical appa-
ratus—that they are too small for us to see, but if we had supermicroscopic eyes perhaps we could see them; and if we had different kinds of fingers perhaps we could pick them up (BBC, 1978:176).

This remark is not an isolated one. In one form or another it can be located in scientific thinking about, for instance, the properties of matter at least since Newton. It is present in Dalton; later, in Thomson, Rutherford, and Bohr. Newton and Dalton pictured matter in terms of billiard balls. Bohr employed a planetary image. Common to all was that they attempted to picture atoms and considered knowing them was a matter of getting the 'right picture.' Such approaches ran into serious difficulties with the introduction of matrix mechanics by Heisenberg, and of wave mechanics by deBroglie. It is important to appreciate that the discovery of the limitation of the notion of knowing something as picturing a thing or relation should not result in the equally untenable position that looking or picturing play no part at all in knowing something. Rather the suggestion will be that knowing something involves mental activities over and above looking or picturing that are qualitatively utterly different from such activities. They make present to us attributes of the knowable object quite different from what can be pictured.

To rise to such a viewpoint is to undergo a conversion. Although differing in content, the structure and course of such a conversion will be parallel to those discussed by Kuhn. Mental activities differ from non-mental in that they are conscious. Consciousness is an attribute of such activities. Certain mental activities such as perceiving—seeing, hearing, touching, and so on; imagining—and their corresponding conscious attributes, which previously were thought to be the sole constituents of knowing, now cease to enjoy this dominant position. Their significance will be displaced by the progressive recognition of other mental activities, such as wondering, suddenly understanding, thinking, and judging, and their conscious attributes. Having insights is a very common human experience. Very few human beings are, however, interested in the experience, or attribute any significance or importance to it. Even fewer have any grasp of what happens when they have an insight. What is unchanging then is our performance as knowers. What changes is our apprehension of that performance. There results a radical shift in
an individual's understanding of what one is, in one's anthropological stance; and, as we shall see, in one's understanding of the world one knows. To change one's position on knowing, from considering it a form of looking to considering it as constituted by activities such as wondering, understanding, and judging, is to change utterly one's understanding of oneself. In so doing, crude materialistic interpretations of the human have to be discarded. Because of this revision in one's conception of oneself, the present kind of conversion can be resisted, even dreaded, in every generation, and is not inevitable. Accordingly, there will be permanent divisions, antagonisms, and hostilities in the philosophical community as the struggle to liberate the mind from its bondage is accepted or rejected.

As knowing is knowing the world, a change in one's understanding of what knowing is involves a corresponding change in one's understanding of the known world. Quine sets forth an ontology, a position on the nature of the known world that is consistent with the empiricist position that knowing is a matter of looking:

As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter into our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience (1963:44).

For Quine it would seem that entities such as individuals—atoms, elements, plants, animals, humans—relationships, probabilities, evolutionary trends, and other notions which emerge in the history of science, have no ontological status. They do not refer to real attributes of the world of our experience. For all we experience is a flux of perceptions and sensations, and there is no possible link between such experiences and the above notions. It follows that they must be mental constructs or cultural deposits. But Quine does not seem to have
come to grips with this issue: precisely what sort of mental activities are involved in his own coming to know the world? Might not some of them, understanding and judging, be quite other than looking? If one ignores this issue then one can only be totally skeptical of the present position, namely that correct understanding makes known relations, probability distributions, evolutionary trends, developmental stages, and individuals, not as cultural posits, but rather as real attributes of the world.

To effect the transition from an empiricist to the present critical realist position involves a painful undoing of a whole world view on oneself as a knower and on the known world. That process finds its objectification, not in arguments or syllogisms, but rather in a biographical narrative. The prime mover of the process is one's wonder awakening to experiences of mental activity previously ignored. Through it there is established a world view in which the premises of certain arguments make sense. A familiarity with the history of biology will reveal that pre- and post-Darwinians can use the same biological terms, genera and species, for instance, but they don't mean the same thing by them. They stand in quite different relations with the data of the biological sciences. In an analogous manner empiricists and critical realists can both use the same cognitive and ontological terms, 'knowing,' 'reality,' and 'world' but they don't mean the same thing by them. Equally they stand in quite different relations with the data of cognitional theory—the conscious dimension of mental activity, and the known world. Because of this those two groups of philosophers will also employ scientific notions such as individual, relations, probabilities, and evolutionary trends, and again mean quite distinct things by them.

The question of the validity of the distinctive philosophical horizons on knowing and the known world cannot be considered in this short presentation. It would require an analysis of the notion of a

4. Because of space limitations the present article concentrates on the distinction between looking and imagining, on the one hand, and understanding on the other. But the existence of correct and incorrect understanding requires an analysis of the activity of judging, which, in turn, differs from both experiencing and understanding. For an account of this activity and its distinctiveness, see Lonergan, 1957: chapters 9 and 10. The contents of those chapters must be borne in mind throughout the whole of the present article.
crucial experiment in order to separate them out. It can, however, be stated that the goal of the conversion process is not simply to move from one world to another, but rather to enter at a much deeper level into a correct relationship with both oneself and the world. The process changes the reality neither of our knowing or of the known world. But our relationship with them can change radically. The critical realist stands in a relationship with aspects of herself and the world to which the empiricist is asleep.

Some elements of a profile or heuristic portrait of the process of conversion have been set forth. That process finds its objectification in the autobiographical narrative. A reading of Augustine's account in his Confessions of his effort to shake off the notion that knowing is a matter of perceiving, and that the object of knowledge was a body will further clarify the process.5

There is occurring in our own times a recent and post-Newtonian scientific revolution and it is precipitating a profound crisis of realism concerning the nature of scientific knowledge and of the world that becomes known through it. It is a crisis of growth whose resolution is not unrelated to the issues raised in the previous section. Three major dimensions of the crisis can be identified and will be briefly elaborated. A first can be traced to the emergence of a multiplicity of scientific methods or types of inquiry and of related types of scientific law or explanation. This has confounded an earlier mentality which conceived the method of science as unitary. A second dimension can be traced to the widespread existence of a naive reductionism which holds that all fields of scientific inquiry are ultimately reducible to one, that of physics. Its credibility is being challenged by the sheer complexity of the possibly irreducible fields of the natural, life, behavioral, and the human and hermeneutic sciences. Thirdly, in the work of T. S. Kuhn and others there has emerged an interpretation of science as the activity of a community in history. This poses the question—can science as a community activity be explained simply as an ideology, or is it concerned with attaining objective knowledge of the world?

5. This is a recurring theme throughout the whole of Confessions but some of the major passages occur in book seven, particularly in chapters I and XVII.
First, then, let us consider the issue of the multiplication of scientific methods or modes of questioning and explanation. In the period roughly from Copernicus to Newton and mainly in Newton's work a view of scientific method and explanation was formed which was to dominate subsequent generations, reaching its peak in the late nineteenth century. This despite the fact that in that century in the work of Darwin on evolution, and of the statisticians, quite alternative views were forming which are currently overthrowing the older one. Max Born sums up that scientific world view admirably:

Newtonian mechanics is deterministic in the following sense: If the initial state (positions and velocities of all particles) of a system is accurately given, then the state at any other time (earlier or later) can be calculated from the laws of mechanics. All the other branches of classical physics have been built up according to this model. Mechanism gradually became an article of faith: the world as machine, an automaton. As far as I can see, this idea had no forerunners in ancient and medieval philosophy. The idea is the product of the immense success of Newtonian mechanics, particularly in astronomy. In the nineteenth century it became a basic principle for the whole of exact science. I asked myself whether this was really justified (1964:264).

This view of science implies that world order is analogous to the ordering of the numbers in a systematic mathematical series. There is, accordingly, only a single method or type of scientific inquiry whose task is, so to speak, to determine the 'rule' of the world-mathematical series, the structural or functional relations constitutive of world order. Once determined, the task of science will move from exploration to application. In such a world view there is no place for randomness, chance, development, or evolution, and accordingly, for further scientific methods. It is a framework to the perfection of which Einstein devoted most of his life. For Einstein, to acknowledge statistical modes of inquiry was to acknowledge chance and randomness in the world. From this it would follow that the world is unlawful for how could you possibly have laws of chance? Is not the statement a contradiction in terms? All of which led to his famous remark in the debate with Born:

In our scientific expectations we have grown antipodes. You believe in a dice-playing God and I in perfect laws in the world of things existing as real objects, which I try to grasp in a wildly speculative way (Bernstein, 1973:177).
What Einstein did not seem to recognize is that chance and randomness might be elements of a very differently ordered world which, while characterized by system in certain aspects, might also obey quite different kinds of laws, the statistical, developmental, and evolutionary, for instance. In the debate about the nature of evolution it has been asserted by Sewall Wright:

The Darwinian process of a continuous interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determinism, but in its consequences qualitatively utterly different from either (Evolution, 9).

—a remark which strongly supports the present suggestion.

What is slowly being recognized is that just as the questioning of statistical science differs from classical, so also the evolutionary type, though not unrelated to the others, is irreducibly distinct. Popper's assertion that there are no evolutionary laws but only trends can be reinterpreted as stating that there are no evolutionary laws of the determinist or classical type. But it can only be asserted that there are no evolutionary laws if one restricts one's concept of scientific law to those of the classical type. Clearly, this is unacceptable. Perhaps the trend is becoming clear. There is emerging in the historical development of science a multiplicity of related but irreducible types of scientific inquiry. Classical questioning is concerned with determining structural or functional relations, statistical questioning with determining probability distributions, developmental questioning with stages of growth, evolutionary questioning with determining relations between successive populations of things or events, and hermeneutical questioning with the interpretation of meanings. The irreducible problems faced, for instance, by Darwin and Freud grounded the emergence of evolutionary and hermeneutical modes of inquiry and explanation. It is, however, one thing for those methods to emerge in the practice of science, it is quite another for them to be objectified, communicated, and accepted by the community. It is a further step to the discovery that scientific method is grounded, not in human looking, but rather in human wonder, with all that that implies. Accordingly, various combinations of division, opposition, resistance, intolerance,
of openness, cooperation, toleration, and so forth, can be identified in the scientific community. Each of these possible combinations will have their representatives among the educators in the universities. To the extent that each establishes his own scientific empire, a philosophical concern with methodology and overviews will seem an irrelevance. It will follow that the confusion resulting from the multiplication of scientific methods will grow.

A second area of major confusion in the current scientific revolution is that of the problem of the distinctiveness or not of the various fields over which the methods of inquiry can range. Thus physics takes as its field the study of elementary particles, of mass and energy, and of space-time. Chemistry takes as its field of inquiry the study of the chemical elements and compounds, biology is concerned with the study of living organisms, behavioral psychology is concerned with the analysis of animal and human behavior. The human sciences take as their field of study human meaning and meaningful behavior. But the question arises, are the fields really distinct at all, and if so what are the criteria for distinguishing them? Many physicists will simply not acknowledge that there is involved in the study of chemical elements anything that is not accounted for in the field of physics. Equally, many chemists and physicists hold that the field of biology, the study of living organisms, is really only the study of complex chemical compounds:

I am a collection of water, calcium and organic molecules called Carl Sagan. You are a collection of almost identical molecules with a different collective label. But is that all? Is there nothing in here but molecules? Some people find this idea somehow demeaning to human dignity. For myself, I find it elevating that our universe permits the evolution of molecular machines as intricate and subtle as we are (1980:62).

Many biologists do in fact hold that the study of conscious animal behavior, or even human meaningful behavior is really only a study of complex molecules. There results a thorough going and naive reductionism, a world view that is quite compatible with the position that knowing is a matter of taking a good look. The so-called higher fields are really only 'complexifications' of the smallest and simplest things, things which our eyes are not strong enough to see.
Reductionism has not, however, gone unchallenged. There are those who hold for a hierarchical universe in which a higher field such as the field of living organisms, for instance, while completely obeying all the laws of the lower fields, physics and chemistry, does in fact contain irreducible elements. Those laws or levels of organization cannot be internally deduced from the laws of the lower levels any more than one can get to bridge from playing chess. The emerging problem of realism posed by a hierarchical world view has been posed as follows:

Beyond the question of definition and classification, several basic problems concerning hierarchical structures were raised: Do some or all of the hierarchies we discern in nature possess objective reality or are they subjective patterns derivative from the human mode of perception and conception; if levels are structural realities, can the origin of inorganic hierarchies be explained in terms of known physical laws without improbable ad hoc initial conditions; can a reductionist explanation be found for levels of biographical organisation? (Whyte et al, 1969:vii-viii).

Despite the attractiveness of the reductionist position to the simple-minded, many consider that there is a dimension of organisation in the living or organic field that is lacking in the chemical. But how could it be proved that that level of organisation is irreducibly unique to biology? One will certainly have difficulty if one's epistemological position is that knowing is a matter of taking a good look. But if one holds that knowing involves the distinctive activity of understanding then it becomes possible that that activity might grasp related but irreducible levels of organisation in the world. But such a move will require a conversion.

A third dimension of the contemporary crisis of realism in science has been provoked by T. S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). It is a work that contains many valuable insights, for instance that science is the name of a community, that the community is characterized by periods of normal and revolutionary science, and that the transition from one to the other involves conversion. But many have concluded that because science is the name of a community, scientific knowledge is an ideology, that it is relative to the social context of the community, and that questions about truth and objectivity are senseless. Space does not allow an adequate treatment of these
topics. Two questions can, however, be posed in response. Firstly, in a revolution in science does 'the world' change as Kuhn seems to imply or is all the change in the relation of the community to the world? Secondly, is scientific questioning concerned with inventing or discovering the world?

The threefold crisis of realism is a crisis of growth. It is a challenge to the contemporary scientific community to shake off an ingrained and childish realism concerning the nature of scientific knowing and of the known world. It is an invitation to discover and accept the varied complexity of the real world too few at the moment have the inclination or courage to accept.

III

Of necessity the greater portion of science education is textbook education and it forms a community by developing in people certain problem-solving skills. This is a basic and necessary educational task, but as education it must be considered seriously incomplete. Because it presents a view of science as coherent, systematic, and deductive, it does not prepare science students for the shock of a possible scientific revolution. It totally ignores the process of discovery, usually dismissing it as some form of poetry of metaphysics, and concentrates on what is discovered and objectified in theoretical systems. By taking the student's attention completely off their own mental activities it does much to reinforce in them the naive view that 'knowing' in science is a matter of looking. The fact that the question, 'what is the nature of discovery?' has profound implications is completely obscured.

How then can we discern in science and in its progress, which is after all a supreme exercise of intelligence, elements which might contribute to the overthrow of the naive and ingrained opinion that knowing the world is a matter of picturing or looking? A suggested answer comes from turning attention from textbooks to autobiographical and biographical accounts of the experience of doing science, of making scientific discoveries. For scientific autobiographies and biographies of, for instance, Kepler, Darwin, Einstein, or the story of the dis-
covery of the structure of DNA,⁶ can draw our attention to elements in the process of discovery that are quite other than looking or picturing. In this manner they could become a catalyst in awakening us from taking our mental activity and the manner in which it makes the attributes of the world present to us, for granted.

A first element other than looking which the biographical dimension of science draws to our attention is that of wonder or curiosity. It is to be found as a central theme in most scientific autobiographies. Through a study of such works we learn that Kepler became obsessed with questions such as—'why are there six planets?,' or, 'what is the nature of the orbit of Mars?—an obsession that continued for some eight years of his life. Darwin was brought up a biblical fundamentalist on the nature of the origin of species, but his experience in the Galapagos Islands awakened his wonder about such origins in a manner that was to haunt him for years. The whole of Einstein's life is characterized by a holy curiosity and he has declared that he came to make his discovery of the theory of special relativity by asking questions about space and time that only children ask.⁷ Parallel with our growing familiarity with the questioning of such scientists there can occur a growth in our familiarity with our own questioning. A teacher spent many years teaching students the elementary addition tables, +1, +2, +3, etc. One year, as usual, he asked his class if there were any questions. One of the class put up his hand and asked, "Why is the figure three shaped the way it is?" The teacher was taken aback for although he had been teaching the tables for many years his wonder had never been awoken to that possible question. He had a heightened experience of what it was like to question. We find that in the biographical and this account that questioning is an ecstatic activity. It takes us out of ourselves and brings about a transformation of our life-orientation with respect to such experiences as the movements of the planets, biological species, space-time, and the shapes of the numbers.


As our familiarity with these accounts, and to an equal extent with our own capacity to question grows we can be led to inquire, what sort of a human attribute is wonder, curiosity, our disposition to question? As a human attribute, to what extent is it the same or different from our ability to see, hear, imagine, touch? Is it simply an attentive form of looking or listening? Is there nothing involved in it other than looking or listening? The manner in which the emergence of wonder radically reorientates such human activities seems to render such positions implausible.

Scientific biographies reveal that basic questions such as those of Kepler, Darwin, or Einstein were not mastered overnight. Rather there has to occur an awakening of wonder. During the early stages one is very much at sea about the direction the investigation might take. This is usually followed by a long middle stage in which there is mastered, not the solution, but rather the problem as problem. In this stage all the sub-plots in the investigation emerge and are identified. Only after this slow build-up of wonder does the final solution emerge. The awakening, apprenticeship, and resolution are moments in the unfolding of our wonder. Keynes has expressed it:

Anyone who has ever attempted pure scientific or philosophical thought knows how one can hold a problem momentarily in one's mind and apply all one's powers of concentration to piercing through it, and how it will dissolve and escape and you find that you are surveying a blank. I believe that Newton could hold a problem in his mind for hours and days and weeks until it surrendered to him its secret (Bernstein, 1973:137-8).

Wonder, once awakened, can be a dominant characteristic of the life of a creative scientist. There results a habitual and periodic return to one and the same problem. Such periods are not characterized by smooth, uniform, and automatic progress. Rather they are characterized by much trial and error, false starts, periods of groping, periods when the relevant sub-questions or sub-plots of the problem pour forth, of being stuck, in the dark, of the building up of a complete portrait of the problem, and eventual resolution. Popper has remarked:

So we learn to understand a problem by trying to solve it, and by failing. And when we have failed a hundred times, we may even become experts with respect to this particular problem.
That is, if anybody proposes a solution, we may see at once whether there is any prospect of success for this proposal, or whether the proposal will fail because of the difficulties which we know too well from our past failure (1972:181).

As familiarity with wonder grows it becomes obvious that it is an anticipation of something. Before the anticipations are made present one is stuck, one cannot go on. One can now be led to reflect, what might wonder be an anticipation of—some attribute of the world? If an attribute of the world, how might it be made present to us—through looking? Or might it be made present through an accumulation of acts of understanding, the final one of which, through the manner in which it hits the bulleye, deserves the name of discovery?

Although the matter is not at all uncontroversial, it will be the present position that the anticipations of questioning are made present, not by looking or imaging, but rather through an act or an accumulation of acts of understanding. They are made present in 'moments of insight,' moments when suddenly it clicks, all falls into place. Everybody has the experience of having an insight but few recognize that they have them and grasp their great significance. In the words of T. S. Eliot, they are experiences whose meaning is missed. Very, very few have any idea of what happens when they have an insight, when they suddenly understand something. If the topic is raised in discussion, it is usually dismissed as the heresy of psychologism or it is explained in terms of a simple visual gestalt shift. To effect a transition from such positions to the present one will require something of a conversion. A first step might be to familiarize oneself with accounts of moments of insight in the lives of great scientists. Once these have been located it will not be so simple to reject the topic.

In Chapter VI of The Art of Scientific Investigation, Beveridge documents a great number of moments of insights in the lives of creative scientists. Darwin, for instance, recalled that he was greatly


9. Beveridge (1950, 1974) uses the term intuition rather than insight. His summary on pp. 80-81 of the conditions conducive to the occurrence of insight is most useful as is his chapter on the role of chance in discovery.
puzzled concerning modifications in organic beings descended from the same stock. Of the consequent moment of insight which resolved his puzzlement he remarked:

I can remember the very spot in the road, whilst in my carriage when to my joy the solution occurred to me (Beveridge, 1950:69).

The mathematician William Hamilton was puzzled for years by the problem of multiplying triplets, numbers of three components. It is very simple to add or subtract them; one simply adds the corresponding components. But how could you possibly multiply them? He has described in vivid detail his moment of insight:

In October 1843 ... the desire to discover the laws of the multiplication of triplets regained with me a certain strength and earnestness ... Every morning your brother William Edwin and yourself used to ask me, "Well, Papa, can you multiply triplets?" whereto I was always obliged to reply, with a sad shake of the head, "No, I can only add and subtract them." But on the 16th day of the same month, ... and your mother was walking with me along the Royal Canal ... and although she talked with me now and then, yet an under-current of thought was going on in my mind, which at last gave a result, whereof it is not too much to say I felt the importance. An electric circuit seemed to close; and a spark flashed forth, the herald (as I foresaw immediately) of many long years to come of definitely directed work. I pulled out on the spot a pocket-book, which still exists, and made an entry on the spot. Nor could I resist the impulse ... to cut with a knife of a stone of Brougham Bridge, as we passed it, the fundamental formula with the symbols $i;j;k$:

$$i^2 = j^2 = k^2 = ijk = -1$$

which contains the solution of the problem (1944-5: 85-86).

On the basis of descriptions such as this and the ones documented by Beveridge it is simply obscurantism to rule such experiences out of court. More generally Beveridge has described the moment of discovery or insight as:

a sudden enlightenment or comprehension of a situation, a clarifying idea which springs into consciousness, often, though not necessarily, when one is not consciously thinking of the subject (Beveridge 1960, 1974:69).
Despite these objectifications the curious fact remains that although everyone has moments of insights, very, very few have any grasp at all of their significance. There is need for an awakening of interest, of a conversion, of a coming alive to a basic experience with respect to which most are dead.

Unfortunately, much modern philosophical analysis hinders rather than helps the required awakening. Popper is positively hostile to the suggestion that we should take the discovery process seriously. Laws and theories are for him "free creations of the human mind, the result of an almost poetic intuition" (1963:155, 117). The task of philosophy of science is to criticize such laws and theories, not to be concerned with their genesis. The limitations of his position will perhaps become clear in the next section. Again, although the matter is not totally clear, Wittgenstein and his students seem to maintain that understanding is a skill, and that in different instances of discovery there is no common mental activity, understanding, involved, enjoying similar structural features. 10 Acknowledging that the present position is in opposition to such strong currents the reader will have to make up his own mind as to whether he should take the matter of his ability to have insights seriously or not. Might it be suggested that what is involved is not a trivial puzzle but a profound problem with enormous implications for what it is to be human.

IV

Having established that there is in fact such a mental activity as wondering and that its anticipations are made present through the enigmatic event of having an insight, a crucial question now emerges. For wonder is not something merely inward. It is a desire not to invent but rather to discover the attributes of the world. What then does

10. Wittgenstein (1953), paragraphs 151f, Kenny (1973) 142, and Garth Hallett (1977) 31-3 et al, all give the impression that (i) there is no common activity or performance which can be named understanding or knowing, and that (ii) it is useless in the analysis of understanding to attempt to isolate 'a mental experience' such as accompanies a moment of insight. All that is relevant is the skill.
wonder anticipate about the world? If those anticipations are made present in moments of insight, precisely what attributes of the world are so made present? I am claiming that wondering and understanding, or more generally, all mental activities are intentional; they have objects. They establish a relation between an agent and the world that is the same for all agents and in a precise sense independent of their particular psychic histories. It is this fact that makes the present considerations immune to the accusation of psychologism. Thus when we see, we see the colors and shapes of things. When we hear, we hear the sounds of things. When we imagine, we imaginatively recall what we can see, hear, touch, and so forth. We never see or hear or imagine nothing. Equally, understanding is an intentional activity. We never understand nothing. Commonly, when we understand something we say "it clicked", or "it fell into place". What exactly clicked? And where did it all fall into place? Somewhere in one's mind? Or, in such moments of insight are not some possible attributes or relations constitutive of the world suddenly made present to the agent? The question now arises, "what precisely might be the objects of understanding?" Where might they be? How big are they? What are their colors? Can they be pointed at, located at a place and time, or at a point in space and time? What exactly might be right and wrong with these questions? Again, if understanding does not make the colors and shapes and sounds of things present to us, what else might remain for it to do?

A proper resolution of these questions would require a detailed analysis of the activity of understanding. In the present instance it will be simply suggested that in the realm of science understanding takes as its objects entities such as structural or functional relations, probability distributions, evolutionary trends, and individu-
ality. An adequate grasp of what a functional relation, a probability distribution, or an individual, etc. are, will require an appreciation of how such entities are objects of understanding. It will also invite a break with the naive realist position that knowing is simply a matter of taking a good look at what is out there to be seen. Through offering a series of illustrative problems perhaps some clarification can be reached of what is involved in the problem of breaking with the naive realist position.

Understanding, then, makes present the anticipations of questioning. One modern type of scientific questioning can be cast in the form,
'why is this strip of space-time an X?', where for X various substitutions can be made. We can wonder, why are these spatial shapes some geometrical object, an ellipse for instance, or some chemical atom or compound, or some plant or animal species? Equally, we could inquire why this spatio-temporally extended given is a Xerox machine, a computer, watch, or television? Such questions anticipate the discovery, not of colors or shapes or sounds, but rather of some set of structural or functional relations of varying degrees of complexity. The structural or functional relations constitutive of a plant, animal, human knowing, an economic or theological community, will obviously be extremely complex. Such are living structures, structures whose 'parts' are in fact living activities which can be assembled over time. Accordingly, complex time relationships will be involved in the structure.

Breaking out of the naive realist position will involve arriving at a clear understanding of what a structural or functional relation is. Consider, for simplicity, a series of spatial shapes such as an ellipse or hyperbola. It can be asked—'why is this given, supposed, or imagined shape an ellipse rather than something else?' A partial answer, which is arrived at through understanding a set of attributes and relations in a diagram could be stated as: 'because it is a co-planar curve such that for any point on the circumference the sum of the distances to two fixed internal points, the foci, is always a constant.' Most overlook the fact that that answer cannot be reached without an insight or act of understanding. For the geometrical shape there could be substituted a gas, a movement, a crystal of a molecule, and it could be asked, 'why is it a gas or a movement or a crystal of a given type rather than something else?' In response to the question in each instance understanding will grasp in the data, or in simplified images that are in a certain sense isomorphic with aspects of the data, or in tables of measurements derived from establishing certain series of relations in the data, a set of terms and relations or structure, PV = kNT, f = ma, V = RI, and so forth. Similarly understanding a machine such as a Xerox, computer, watch, or whatever, will involve a process of identifying the relevant parts, of drawing simplified diagrams involving them, and finally of suddenly understanding in the given and the diagram the functional interdependence of the parts, their interrelationship. Such functional relations can be simple or complex.
The question now arises, what precisely are structural or functional relations? Many would answer at this stage, the spatial relations between the circumference, foci, and radii of an ellipse or geometrical object, $PV = kNT$, $V = RI$, $f = ma$, and so forth, are all examples of functional relations. It is, however, one thing to understand such specific functional relations, and quite another to understand what sort of an entity a functional relation is. The naive realists among the scientists will be forced to admit that they are some kind of picture of the object. The idealists, who live in a world of phenomena and thought categories, will hold that they are categories of thought invented in order to deal with the flux of experience. For them they are certainly not attributes of the world. Neither of these groups acknowledge the occurrence of acts of insight and the related problem of identifying their objects in the world. Thus, although scientists can deal with functional relations in great depth there is always some uncertainty about precisely what sort of an entity such relations are. The present position must be that as long as the activity of understanding and the kinds of objects it can embrace is overlooked the precise status of such entities will always remain problematic. The present position will be that functional relations are actual attributes of the world which are made present to us through and in so far as acts of understanding are correct.

Where, then, it can be asked, are the relations between such attributes as pressure, volume, and temperature, or force and acceleration, present in the given data of the problem? Are the relations between the circumference, foci, and radii, constitutive of an ellipse present somewhere inside the boundary in an analogous manner to the way in which money is inside the safe? Can the relations constitutive of a gas or machine be located at a point, or by breaking them up into little bits of basically identical building blocks as the reductionists would have us suppose? Or, on the other hand, might the relations be co-extensive with the data, present in the totality of the given, an attribute of the whole rather than of the parts? There arises here a highly complex question concerning the meaning of the phrase 'insight into phantasm.' Understanding is unavoidably tied up with the given and images. So the question arises, what exactly does understanding grasp

11. On this see Lonergan (1957), 8f, 17f, 19.
in the given or diagram and in what sense is what is grasped present in, or an attribute of, what is presented to sense and imagination? To the extent that this has become a living question, to that extent an individual has ceased to be a naive realist. In order to master what a functional relation is one must become familiar with one's understanding and with what it makes present to us in givens of a scientific problem. To move onto this level will head toward a conversion after which understanding and its objects cease to be habitually overlooked.

The same problem of realism arises with respect to the objects anticipated by statistical and evolutionary questioning. Statistical questioning takes as its given a random aggregate of events or population of individuals. That given is made present to the questioner through his senses. The statistical type of scientific questioning can be cast in the form, 'what is the normative frequency of occurrence or probability of particular classes of events in the random aggregate or of individuals in the population? Through statistical sampling a table of actual frequencies of occurrence can be drawn up. In that table there can be understood the probabilities or normative frequencies of occurrence of the classes of events or individuals (Nagle 1939:26-7). It is a relatively simple matter to discover in this way that the probability of heads or tails in a random sequence of tosses is (1/2 , 1/2). Statisticians explore and understand extremely complex probability distributions in great depth. They are obviously objects of understanding. But again the question, 'what exactly is a probability distribution?' raises difficulties. Is it a picture, a thought category, or an attribute of the object of statistical questioning that is made present to us, not by our senses, but rather by our understanding? The statisticians' hesitation in these matters arises due to the fact that although they are good at understanding probability distributions, they tend to overlook their understanding and the peculiar manner in which its object is present in the given data. A probability distribution as an attribute is present in, stands in the same relation to an empirically given random aggregate or population as the attributes and relations of a structure are present in or stand to the proportionate data of the structure that is given to our senses.

A final illustration of the problem of clarifying the intentional object of the activity of understanding can be provided from the realm of individuals or things. Just as without adverting to understanding
and its objects we can understand functional relations and probabil-
ties, so also we can understand individuality. We become familiar with
the fact that although plants, animals, atoms, and so forth are consti-
tuted by structural relations and obey probability and evolutionary
laws, their individuality is a basic attribute. None the less, the
question, 'what is an individual?' raises difficulties. Is individu-
ality simply a picture, a thought category, of an attribute of entities
in the world? If a real attribute, where is it? Is it somewhere
'inside' the parts? Or does correct understanding make present to us
in the given empirical data an intelligible unity?

Intellectual conversion involves a break with the naive and
childish view that knowing something is a matter of taking a good look
at it. The third section of the article suggested that an essential
step in that process is taking one's own wonder and understanding
seriously. The previous section has taken it a stage further. It has
drawn attention to the fact that the object of correct understanding is
some attribute of the world. Attributes such as individuality,
functional relations and probability distributions cannot be seen or
imagined, they are made present to us by understanding. The extent to
which one is becoming familiar with such non-imaginary attributes will
be a measure of one's progress out of naive realism. There is involved
a process of purification in which there is progressively shaken off an
entrenched empiricism. The difficulty of the task and the manner in
which it involves life long perseverance and determination must be
clearly acknowledged. If anyone is going to build a castle he must be
quite clear about the work involved in it. In another context Mary
Craig has made some remarks which are not out of place here:

One way or another, being broken up and put together again is
the universal experience, the never ending central drama of
life. ('Man is born broken', wrote Eugene O'Neill, 'he lives by
mending; the grace of God is glue.') No one can talk his way
out of that basic fact of life, no one can offer once-for-all-
solutions. There aren't any (1979:134).

Awakening to and becoming adequately familiar with one's own activities
such as wondering and understanding can be a most bewildering
experience. Equally, coming to grips with the manner in which those
activities anticipate and make known to us such attributes of the world
as functional or structural relations, individuals, probability distributions, and evolutionary trends is an equally bewildering process. It does not happen once and for all or overnight. It is not the conclusion of an argument but rather a process in which one whole framework of premises is rejected and replaced by another. Our own personal growth out of empiricist and reductionist world views and into an intellectual and critical realist one which truly acknowledges wonder and insights as well as perceptual activities, must pass through a series of periods of painful growth. Footholds are established which give way eventually to plateaus, each in turn being broken up and giving way to deeper footholds and wider plateaus. Such is the experience of trying to master Lonergan's Insight and the possibilities are that if one has no clear memory of such an experience then he or she missed the point. For conversion is a living process and to resist its inherent living nature, to build up a familiarity with the language rather than the experiences referred to by the language, to rest with word familiarity, is to die to it. In a Kierkegaardian sense commitment to and growth in the project has to be repeated.\(^\text{12}\)

Great stress has been laid on intellectual conversion as a life project. Many will ask, why bother? What could be the products or rewards of such a demanding project, one which by and large seems to be running counter to all the dominant intellectual currents of our time? Fundamentally, the project brings about a basic healing. But it also results in a restoration of direction in life. Individuals who are not in touch with the reality of either themselves or of the world are in a pathological state. The epistemological position advocated by Magee and the anthropological stance of Sagan are diseased. Fundamentally, the goal of intellectual conversion is a self-knowledge and self-clarification from which stems a most basic and necessary self-acceptance, in the sense of John Haught (1976). The fundamental liberation will be from materialistic and atheistic philosophies of men and of the world. For materialism and atheism are alien to being human. They are not consistent with an adequate acknowledgement of the nature and significance of

\(^{12}\) For an analysis of such repetition see Dunne (1967), 57–69. Through the kind of repetition Dunne has in mind the life project is driven forward in a manner analogous to that in which the car is driven forward by the turning of the wheel.
the human attributes of wonder and insight. As they miss the significance of wonder, they also fail to recognize that it is only in the vision of God that such attributes find their rest, a point clearly recognized by Augustine. For many the alienation is simply unrecognized. Equally many, however, have no wish to be awakened from their ignorance. They dread, resist, and even resent the suggested awakening. The difficulty of the liberation is great, but it is avoided only at the cost of profound alienation and darkness about the most basic and profound truths about oneself.

The resulting purification is not only therapeutic but directive. It brings about a basic redirection and reorientation with respect both to oneself and one's world. Through establishing such a new direction or orientation that the crisis of realism in current science sketched briefly in section II of the present paper will be negotiated. The alternative is a growth in confusion. Such a reorientation will not be instantaneous or overnight. Rather it will be somewhat like the growth of a mustard seed. The materialist and empiricist lives in a world of sensations and percepts, of elemental bits of matter out-there-now-real. The idealist adds to them the categories of understanding. But the world remains a world of empirical experiences linked to the categories of thought by sensible intuition. The world of the critical realist is a world of real individuals characterized by structural relations, obeying probability distributions and evolutionary schemes, and so forth. The word 'world' can then mean very different things to the materialist, empiricist, idealist, and critical realist. The critical realist position will not allow one to lapse into an easy, and mentally lazy relativism on the matter. The task of individuals is to live in the real world. On the present position, Quine's ontology and 'world' avoids the issue of reality. So the invitation is to move beyond Quine's view, into a deeper and correct relation with reality. In this context it is interesting to consider a remark by Quine:

How the world began is a problem for the physicist and the astronomer, and of course there have been conjectures from that quarter. How life began is a problem for the biologist, on which he's made notable progress in recent years. Why the world began, or why life began—on the other hand—I think are pseudo-questions—because I can't imagine what an answer would look like (BBC, 1978:171).
Because Quine's meaning of the term 'world' is confined to an empiricist horizon in which wonder and insight and their intentional objects have no ontological status, the further questions he poses seem senseless for him. Within a critical realist horizon, however, it is simply obscurantism to brush aside the problem of explaining the existence of a world characterized by such attributes as individuals defined by relations and obeying probability laws and evolutionary trends. Those various attributes are in each instance made present, not by looking, but only by correct understanding. The reorientation of science within a critical realist horizon endows it with a significance over and above that expressed by Plato or Bacon. The world comes to be understood, not as something arbitrary but rather as a cosmic word or communication, and science becomes an exploration of such a communication. Within this horizon disputes between science and religion will be recognized as ill-founded on both sides, but not by scientists and religious people who have failed to move adequately into that horizon.

To conclude, the essay has illustrated some of the implications of the presence and absence of intellectual conversion, of slowly recognizing the existence and significance of acts of insight, of understanding or discovery, and of the corresponding attributes of the world which they make present, in science education. In the absence of intellectual conversion, particularly among educators in science, there will result permanent confusion in the scientific community about what sort of beings scientists are and about the world in which they live. Its presence and growth, even among a small group, will contribute greatly to the task of directing the scientific community through its present crisis.
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Boston College

I
THE GROUND OF DESIRE

I shall start with a question that has helped me greatly in the understanding of God in human life. What is it in us that makes us want there to be God? Feuerbach made a powerful case for saying that belief in God is wishful thinking, and for Marx Feuerbach was gospel. Neither they, nor their multiple intellectual progeny, spotted the logical fallacy in saying that because we want there to be a God there cannot be a God, God being the product of wishful thinking. Indeed, a God who met the implied Feuerbachian criterion for real existence and was not desired to exist would be a monster alike for the intelligence and for the heart.

And how important it is to understand that our primary connection with God is desire! To believe that God is, is to trust our desire that God be. It is the most adventurous act of trust that we ever make in ourselves, our feelings, our hopes, our dreams.

But why do we wish God to Be? This is my opening question. For answer I make a disjunction. The desire for there to be God does not spring from a sense of weakness or worthlessness. It is not the pathetic cry of an animal endowed with mind but crushed by mortality. It is not the need to be affirmed, valued, made to feel significant. The desire for there to be God springs not from our weakness but from our strength, not from a sense of worthlessness but from a passionate sense of our worth, not from our subjection to death but from our sense of transcending death. The remainder of this opening section will consist in unfolding this idea.

Consciousness desires, demands, to grow. And its growth is toward a goal, a perfecting. But to understand what this perfection of
consciousness might be, we have to ask what consciousness is. Con-
ssciousness, I shall attempt to show, is not what I know but what, who,
and how I am. The perfection of consciousness, then, will be the
actualization of what, who, and how I am; that is, my creation.

It follows from this that the more intensely conscious I am, the
more I feel the pull of this final perfection. And thus the more
valuable and significant my experience is to me, the more I feel the
desire for the perfection of consciousness. And thus the desire that
there be this perfecting, that there be God, increases with the sense of
my life as significant and desirable. It is this rooting of the desire
for God in self-belief, not in self-disbelief, that is required if our
theology of transformation and rebirth is to be valid.

The desire for God is the desire of our growing consciousness to
grow all the way, for there to be an "all the way" for it.

What is consciousness? Lonergan was once asked, in learned
company, "What is this difference you are always insisting on, between
consciousness and knowledge?" His reply was, "That's the one that
separates the men from the boys!" Consciousness is not what you know
but how you know. It is not what you know but you knowing, or you
loving, or you suffering, or you angry, and so on. Consciousness, then,
is a far more radical concept than knowledge. Lonergan calls it a
"primitive" notion, meaning absolutely primary, something one either
understands or one does not, and if one does one knows it is inexplic-
able in terms of anything else, for there is nothing else about us that
is more primary, that is "before" consciousness.

Thus growth in consciousness is not the same thing as growth in
knowledge. The growth in consciousness does not consist in knowing more
and more, but in being more and more. What does this mean? The ques-
tion is best answered by contrasting my consciousness when I understand
something for the first time with my consciousness when I decide to give
my life to another in marriage. There is incomparably more of myself in
this latter event. More of myself is conscious. Decision is a presence
of the self to itself far more vivid than takes place, for instance, in
a moment of understanding. Thus the growth in consciousness is progres-
sively fuller presence of the self to itself.

Once again, how vastly different this notion of increasing
consciousness is from that of an increase in knowledge! Implicit in the
confusion of the two is a notion of consciousness as consisting in
having myself as object of knowledge. The increase would then consist in seeing myself more and more clearly. Instead, it is being myself more and more fully.

Christianity and the other world religions insist that our perfection is not in knowing but in loving, so that to reverse this priority is heresy—the gnostic heresy. But to say that our perfection is in the full development of consciousness is not this heresy; it is only to reiterate the central religious axiom in more analytical language. By our prophets and wise persons and saints, and preeminently by Jesus, we are urged to let ourselves go to that fulness of conscious existence which is had only in loving.

Now if being more conscious is being more, is there a "being most"? It seems clear that the growth in consciousness is not the kind of growth that could go on indefinitely without ever reaching a goal. For it is a structured, an ordered growth, a descent from level to level of consciousness. So it is not like a house you simply add to. It is the kind of growth that is toward totality, completeness, perfection. So it seems that there is a "being most," a fulness of conscious existence.

What then is to be said of this fulness of consciousness? How is it effected? What brings it about? To answer this question, we have to reiterate once again the Lonergan disjunction: consciousness is not what you know, it is how you are. So the full actualization of my consciousness is the full actualization of my being.

And what is the full actualization of my being? It is the mystery of my existence no longer opaque or ambiguous but pervaded by the meaning. It is my creation. The actualization of my consciousness is the actuation of my being, which is my creation.

I remember now the statement of a close friend whose insight marries my own: "Salvation is creation!" The exploration of consciousness, as Eliot discovered, joins the end with the beginning. "In my end is my beginning." My completion is my creating.

A friend with whom I shared this thought commented: "There's no word, is there, for what you're talking about, what you call consciousness. It's not only who I am, it's where, when, how, why, what I am." No wonder academics don't catch onto it. They are hounds, their noses trained to follow the particular trails of who or what or why or where or when. "And where," my friend continued, "did we learn about this
priceless all-round self-awareness? Who planted the seed? Our mothers! Socrates said 'Know thyself!' but Mother said 'Be self-aware!'' And St. Teresa took I forget how many years to discover a theologian who agreed with her absolute certainty, obtained in prayer, that understanding and thinking are not the same. What she called understanding is what I am calling consciousness. And she is one of the only two women to be doctors of the church. Which is what is wrong with the church.

Eliot's "Four Quartets" are a sustained attempt to get you to be conscious, to be still, and to learn to reconcile this stillness with the particular scents that the hound has to follow:

Time past and time future
Allow but a little consciousness,
To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden,
The moment in the arbour where the rain beat,
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall
Be remembered; involved with past and future
Only through time time is conquered.

Perhaps all this creates a fuller context for hearing the deceptively simple injunction of the psalm:

Be still, and know that I am God (Ps 46:10).

In short. Consciousness is being. Thus the perfecting of consciousness is the actuation of being, or creation, and to be perfected in consciousness is to be created. "Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the earth." How often we mumbled those words into folded arms, in anticipation of another boring retreat conference. Sticks of dynamite, used to prop up an old floor. This is the ultimate love affair, the total orgasmic penetration: to be created eternally.

However, a great deal has to be said about the steps that lead to the perfection of consciousness. To this we must now proceed.

The most important single fact about the whole knowing process is that it starts with, and cannot start without, the forming of an image, in which one grasps a pattern, a structure, a gestalt. Aristotle

grasped this. He said that the image was the gateway into limitless intellectual power. Aquinas developed the notion. Bernard Lonergan wrote one of the great books of the present century around it. Maria Montessori made it the basis of the most creative educational psychology of our age. And of Anna, the child mystic genius, Fynn wrote:

Certainly Anna had a gift, but it turned out to be nothing spooky, nothing out of this world. In a very deep sense it was at once as mysterious as it was simple. She had an immediate grasp of pattern, of structure, of the way that bits and pieces were organized into a whole. Unexplainable as this gift might be, it was always well and truly earthed in the nature of things. As simple and mysterious as a spider's web, as ordinary as a spiral seashell. Anna could see pattern where others just saw muddles, and this was Anna's gift.

Once the image has yielded its pattern, the mind can soar. All Newton actually saw was an apple falling. But in the fall of the apple, scientific genius got the idea for a totally new way of thinking about the universe.

The next stage is: perhaps we could systematize this new idea by creating concepts like gravity, mass, distance. Eventually we might form a hypothesis—for example, that all bodies everywhere are attracted to each other with a force that varies in proportion to their mass and distance.

The next stage is to ask whether there any experiments I could carry out, such that if a given body was seen to behave in a certain way, the hypothesis would be correct, and I would be able to say "Yes, this is the way the universe is organized as far as the interaction of bodies is concerned. Yes, my initial insight was correct." I don't remember what Newton's experiments were, but Galileo found that heavy objects fall no faster than light, and thus we got beyond the old commonsense notion that things fall "by their own weight," into a beautiful sophisticated universe of bodies attracting each other—the apple attracting the earth as surely as the earth attracting the apple.

Now it has taken me over thirty years to see the significance of all this. It is, that the process moves from the directly perceived.

Via a creative sweep of intelligence that leaves the perceived—the falling apple—far behind, to an eventual return to the perceived,

2. Mr. God, This is Anna, p. 62.
seeing it now in a new way: as the evidence for something dreamed-up, then thought out, by the mind. From the falling apple to the falling apple via a revolution in scientific thinking. The process begins with sense and ends with sense. It is cyclic. It is beautiful. It is infinitely various. It varies from the genius of a Newton or an Einstein to the genius shown by a tiny child on recognizing, in that round red sweet experience, an apple that doesn't have to be red but can be a Golden Delicious. The latest theories suggest that all our perceptions of things, even the simplest and most seemingly innocent, are in fact verifications of hypotheses.

I represent this beautiful cycle by an image: the Alpha-Omega sign. The horizontal feet of the Omega represent the basic level of sense. We get from sense to sense via the stabbing brilliance of the Alpha within the smooth cyclic movement of the Omega.

Now things don't, of course, stop there. The more I discover, by the above process, what is going on, the more the question comes up: what is to be done? "Good Lord! Don't you see, that kid's not fooling around in the water: he's drowning!"

One of the discoveries made by modern philosophy, and always referred to when one tries to talk of conscience as a rational activity, is that we cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is." There's no logical step from saying what is the case to saying that we ought to do something like this. We are breathing entities. The drowning child needs to breathe and cannot, so obviously the person at hand facilitates this by fishing the child out of the water. But what this account fails to account for is the feeling we have that a person who failed to go after the drowning child would be failing in a most radical way, in another order altogether than the order we make mistakes in. What the "no ought from an is" people are saying is that we can't deduce things in that order from the order where we simply ask "Is this the case?" and often make mistakes. So the question is: whence comes the special feeling, the distinct feeling, that I should go after that child? What converts a purely practical, utilitarian notion that breathers must be enabled to continue breathing, into something uniquely felt? Once we see that this is the question, the great "discovery" that we can't deduce "ought" from "is" begins to look rather silly. I mean "silly obvious." Of course we can't! How could a feeling be deduced?
But if this feeling cannot be logically deduced, how can it be said to be rational? How can it arise out of the rationally grasped situation, as we clearly experience it as doing? How can the rational process lead to feeling of a very special and often intense kind?

The answer begins to show itself when we recall what I have at last learned to be the most important fact about cognitional process: that it moves from sense to sense via intelligence. For if the knowing process, as it approaches completion, returns to sense for evidence of its hypothesis, we should expect the fuller process, of which the knowing process is only a part or a segment, to return further in the direction of the sensed. The judgment that something is the case requires, for its evidential base, a return to the direct sensing of the object. The judgment that something needs to be done requires, for its base, not just the world of sensation, in which not so much of myself is involved (involved in which I am not so conscious) but the world of feeling, in which the whole of myself is involved, which is the whole of myself becoming aware. So while the cognitive part of the process moves from the sensed apple to the sensed apple via a sweep of intelligence, the full process moves from the primitive feeling of being alive with the desire to live more fully, via the whole process of learning what is going on in the world, to that direction of this feeling to the needs of the world which we know by the noble name of conscience. Conscience, then, is consciousness at a new level of intensity.

The lives of the saints give wonderfully clear examples of this larger sweep. I think of Francis, starting as a handsome feisty medieval lover, discovering the appalling conditions in his father's factory, and awakening to his true being as God's lover in this world.

In short, it is of the utmost importance to understand that feeling is the heart of conscience. Feeling is the heart of conscience, as sensation is basic to understanding, providing both the image whence it springs and the evidence whereby its hypotheses are confirmed. Conscience is not a stand taken over-against feeling, but is feeling's finest flowering. I have not sufficiently studied Pope John Paul's philosophy, but I suspect that it sets conscientious decision—on which John Paul rightly sets the highest store—over-against that refinement of feeling which he learned from Max Scheler, whose philosophy he finally turned away from in a moralistic, Kantian direction.
Thus the thrust of consciousness toward its perfection stems from a total and totally undifferentiated feeling, the desire of consciousness to realize itself to the full. This desire will encounter every sort of hazard. But when, through the multiple influences of grace, it finds its way to that deeper level of consciousness where joy is in self-gift, it is this original, protean desire that has been the motive force. And since the perfection of consciousness toward which this desire thrusts is that actuation of our being which is our creation, it follows that the original protean desire is the hunger for the Creator.

The desire that animates consciousness, then, is the desire of being to be all of itself. We are at the antipodes here of a desire whose motivation would be a sense of emptiness, of worthlessness. The motive of the desire we are considering is, on the contrary, a sense of being worthful, great, special, unique. It is this wholly positive sense of ourselves that motivates our desire which stretches to receive, in awesome joy, the creative act in which all being takes its origin.

But can more be said of the actual receiving of the creative act? A few short reflections on this must conclude the first section.

To be conscious is to be. To be more conscious is to be more. To be most conscious is to be totally. And what makes me to be totally but that which makes me to be? So to be most conscious is to be, consciously, created. And when am I most myself? When I love. So love is the form or level of consciousness at which I am, consciously, created. Love is the point of conscious contact with the one that causes me to be.

Thus what differentiates the love of God (or love with God) from all other loves is that the love of God is love as the place of reception of the creative act. The love of God is differentiated from all other loves not by having a different object (God) but by the fact that other loves are specified by the object, the love of God by the condition of the subject. Thus the love of God includes and embraces all other loves. It is distinguished from them only as the whole is from the part. The love of God is love, experienced in its full reality as passivity to the creative act.

All the mistakes in the matter of loving God and loving neighbor consist in thinking of God and neighbor as alternative objects of love.

Now we simply don't have an adequate expression for this experience of receiving identity from the Creator. A mistaken interpre-
tation of Paul's "I live now, not I, but Christ lives in me" understands this as a displacement of my identity by a divine identity. It is not a displacement of my identity, but an intensification of it to the point where it wholly and only expresses the Creator as Logos, as Christ, to the point where I am the idea of God. Paul's statement only works for Paul's "Christ," not for Paul's "God." I have my identity from "God" the Creator-arché, as God's Logos or order or idea. And I have this identity, as has been shown, in love. The structure of our eternal identity is trinitarian.

The movement of love without an object is the self-revelation of the subject. It is the direct, as opposed to the implicit realization of the deepest level of consciousness where decision is made, where love is. Love is desire decided for. When I love another person, this level is implicitly realized. When there is no specific object, this level shows itself simply, directly. Now at this level, thus actual, I most fully am. This movement of love is the actualizing of my being. And what is the actualizing of my being, but my creation? The Creator is known in the movement of love without an object, which is the same as what Ignatius calls "consolation without a cause."

I love. Therefore I am. Love is being in movement, being as movement. And do not say "The wave is in the sea" but "The sea is in the wave." Love is being as movement, being as known, being as act. For being is not inert, and it is as love that we experience our being as not inert, as act.

Progress in praying, then, consists in coming ever closer to that in me which does love God, which receives from moment to moment the act of existence. The reason why the conviction grows, with spiritual growth, that meaning and being are one (as Needleman says) is that at the core of my being the movement of love, which is my meaning, is passive to the act that gives me being. Away from that center, people try to find their lives meaningful, but never being quite in touch with their lives they don't know where to attach the meaning. There is no meaningfulness but the movement of the heart: and the movement of the heart is its being, receptive of being.

Finally, is there a moment of experiencing the self as loving nothing in particular and feeling consequently grateful and celebratory, that could happen long before someone has arrived, through continual
prayer and searching, at any constancy or directiveness of that moment? To go by a recent survey taken in this country, about thirty percent of the adult population have had such an experience.

II
THE WEAKENING OF DESIRE

The story of the Fall is the story of the coming of self-awareness. In becoming self-aware, the animal pulls away from its animality and begins to stand over-against its animality. The tension between self and bodiliness is beginning, and will mark the whole subsequent history.

Now the most important consequence of this pull-away from the former spontaneous animal existence is the weakened sense of being desirable. The reason why this follows is that the source of our sense of being desirable is in our animal spontaneity, in an original innocent hedonism still observable in small children. As I pull away from that, I feel lonely, problematic, free, and I lack the joyous abandon of the earlier condition that I shall call "symbiosis." I feel less confidently desirable.

Feeling less desirable, I both relate less confidently to others and lack that yearning for God which, we have seen, stems from our sense of our goodness and beauty. This is the "original Sin" condition in its root form. I have coined a name for this complaint: erosthenia, weakness in desire. It's the root of all our trouble.

As well as this weakened sense of being desirable, there is the attempt to grab all the pleasure and power of our earlier animality for the newly emerged self, as a manipulation of others and of the world to its insatiable demands. Sin is adult childishness.

Having got this clear, we can be more specific. That symbiotic sense of being desirable comes, in the male, from being in touch with the woman in him, to whom he feels desirable, and vice versa. So in pulling away from my earlier symbiotic existence, I am pulling away from the woman within me, and the woman, in pulling away from the man within her. No longer, then, does the woman appear to me as "bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh". No longer does my "dream woman" invade waking consciousness and make me tender to the real woman before me. And vice
versa. We have awakened from the dream of symbiosis into self-awareness. The story reflects this change. No longer is the woman "bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh." She is "that woman you gave me as a mate." Nakedness is no longer an invitation to simple delight in each other, but rather provokes sexual shame, which is deeply woven into all cultures.

In pulling away from his symbiotic wholeness, the male pulls away with his gender. When two things that were closely bound together pull apart, each takes with it some of the other. And so the man's maleness ceases to be simply a function of uniting, and becomes his, becomes his badge, his identity-mark, his signature. The penis becomes the phallus, symbol of life and power. There is a high-pressure fusion of gender with self-awareness. That is why all cultures put a great deal more energy into making boys boys, girls girls, than in fostering feeling between the sexes.

Now what we learn from all this is that the emerging self-awareness exists in a highly problematic relationship with the symbiosis whence it is emerging, a relationship which finds expression in all the complexities of sexual, economic, and mortal existence, which initiates the estrangement between the sexes and the perverse tendency of the male to dominate (it being easier for men to "pull away" than for women), leading to the massive misshaping of society.

But to repeat, the most important result of this complex relationship with symbiosis is that since it is our sense of being desirable that makes us desire God, the breach with symbiosis will cause a weakening of the desire for God. And this has awesome implications. For once an animal has become conscious, it has to be directed by consciousness where it was directed by instinct. And consciousness, as we have seen, yearns of its nature for its perfection in God. Any impeding of this yearning, therefore, deprives this new animal of its own directing principle.

And this is the human condition. The human animal lacks taste for what is its only real nourishment. Lacking the lead of a strong desire for the perfection of its consciousness, the human animal chases the most bizarre illusions.

There are various creative versions of this extraordinary predicament. There is Loren Eiseley's "cosmic orphan." A much more ambitious version is Teilhard's. With the self-awareness breakthrough,
the whole direction of the evolutionary process becomes conscious, and consciously gropes for the consciousness out of which it is created. I am the universe becoming conscious and yearning for consciousness—itslf. But because this yearning is so weak, I am bogged down in the ambiguities of sexual, economic and mortal existence. And conversely, because I am bogged down in these ambiguities, my yearning is weak. It doesn't go straight to the mark. This is the huge paradox of the self-aware animal. Once the animal is conscious, absolute consciousness is drawing it, and nothing else can. Its only "instinct" now is "consciousness in search of its perfection." But I am out of touch with this essential movement of myself. And if I am out of touch with the one desire that makes my life work properly, then I am a bewildered, lost, and puzzled being. And this is the human predicament. All things live by their desire. That is the universal fact. But the human's desire is "on the blink." Only in the exceptionally mature does it "connect." All animals are inner-directed. Few humans are inner-directed—meaning by "inner-directed" "led by desire to live successfibly." Michelangelo put all this into his painting of the creation of Adam. It portrays the limpness and ambivalence of the primordial desire for the Creator.

I need to explore this concept of "erosthenia" further, to show how it contrasts with the way we generally think about sin.

In a classic phrase Ernest Becker says "We are hopelessly absorbed with ourselves." When self-awareness came into the evolutionary process and we got homo sapiens, it seems self-absorption came with it.

But why? The obvious answer seems to be that the self naturally diverts to itself the attention that the innocent animal gives to its surroundings. But his explanation will not do, for the following reason. The coming of the self is not the introduction of a fresh object into the animal's consciousness, but an enormous heightening of that consciousness through its not having a subject. The new, self-aware animal is much more, not less, alive to the world.

So it is not self-awareness that is the cause of the trouble. On the contrary, self-awareness is being become conscious, is yearning for the fulness of being, is beauty seeking beauty itself, is consciousness seeking consciousness itself. Self-awareness is the elan vital of all the universes become praise of its creator.
The New Life

The cause of all the trouble is that we have not come enough into this self-awareness that is the priesthood of all being. Our trouble is not self-awareness but the shortage of it. We only half-came into the new condition of what Hopkins calls nature's "clearest-selved spar, man." And thus, not loving ourselves and our life enough to reach beyond ourselves into the infinite and everlasting embrace, we fell back into ourselves and became absorbed with ourselves in that strange relationship that the unselfknowing call self-love but the selfknowing self-hate.

Thus it is a mistake to regard our desire as drawn by our self and thus distracted from its wider possibility. Our desire is weak in respect of its wider possibility, its full range, and thus falls back on the self. Thus Lonergan says that alienation is through lack of self-transcendence, lack of élan. If we are "hopelessly absorbed with ourselves," this is not because we find ourselves interesting, but because, finding ourselves uninteresting, we are weak in interest in that which lies beyond ourselves. We are fallen into ourselves. Lacking heaven, we fall into the hell of our separateness.

It is not self-awareness that is the cause of the trouble. It is the separateness that self-awareness brought with it. That first flash of self-awareness separated us from the innocent animal, in other words from that very élan vital to which it was meant to bring the enhancement of "selfing"; and to which, in a new world, a third age, it will be rejoined. For Christ is our Orpheus, uniting the beast with the spirit "on the fields of praise." An image that brings home to me more than any other that the development of nuclear weaponry indicates a dedication to the Evil One, is the report of a witness to that bomb test out in the Pacific. Forty miles from the place of the explosion, albatrosses caught fire and plunged into the ocean. That says it all.

The following piece of theological shorthand may serve to bring this section to a close.

To be grateful for existence is to be grateful to a mind so original and beyond our understanding that it invents existence on which all our understanding depends
To be grateful for existence, I must exist.
Most of us, most of the time, hardly exist.
This condition, of a bare and ungrateful existence,
is what is traditionally called the state of Original Sin.

How beautiful is one who invents existence,
of whom being is the idea,
the impossibly original of all that can be conceived,
the inconceivable concealer of being
which is eaten up with love for its inward minding.

How starved is one who is not so consumed
and cares for everything but himself in his inventing,
never feeling the throb of being itself
which is pure gratefulness
to the terrible beauty itself, inventor of being.

We do not see the love affair of the animals,
having mind enough not to be animal
but not enough to know their ecstasy.

III
THE LIBERATION OF DESIRE

The consciousness that we have now, what might be called Adamic
consciousness, is only the beginning of consciousness. The you that is
now is only the beginning of you. If I try to describe myself, I find
myself saying what I am not. I am not my body. I am not other people.
I am not the world. I am not the universe.

What then am I? What is this reality that I call "I"? I cannot
say. And the reason I cannot say lies in all those things I have had to
separate myself from in order to begin to be myself. For the separate
self is only half a self. The other half is my body, the others, is
the world, is the universe.

To be rejoined to that other half is the state that is sometimes
called cosmic consciousness. People who have had an inkling of this
condition speak of an abrupt ending of the sense of self as isolated, as
a citadel, as an enclosure; instead, the person feels identified with
the whole pulsating energy of the cosmos. And this is not a loss of
identity, but a finding of an identity hitherto lost in isolation. For
how can I be said to lose identity when I feel identical with all there
is?
When Jesus said we must lose ourselves in order to find ourselves, what he is saying we have to lose is the self we have come to think of as separate from the whole because it had to start separate from the whole. I mean, just because we start being selves by separation, we assume that that is how we are to stay being ourselves. And it is not. The self is a destiny whose completion is cosmic. Of course it is! Do you really think that sunset over the mountains which filled you with peace was meant to be only a view? No, it was a premonition of your true home, which is the whole universe.

In that home, I am one with my body, with all humankind, with all the universe. And thus identified, I experience the hunger of being for the inventor of being. Consciousness, spilling over its temporary citadel into all the universe, stretches ecstatically toward absolute consciousness.

So instead of thinking, as the catechism got us thinking, of the soul as all wound up with the body in this life and getting at last free of the body at death, we should think almost the exact opposite. In this life, we are separated from our bodiliness. In death, we are reunited with our bodiliness and with the whole universe of which it is a part.

This too is how we should think of beloved relatives and friends who have died. How did that ridiculous notion grow up of the heavenly condition: sitting on a damp cloud playing a harp? The answer is clear. Unable to think beyond the present, temporal, and temporarily separated self, we mentally plunk it down "on the other side" and find it something to do.

We need to think cosmic consciousness, as our destiny and as the life into which our loved ones are being drawn. And consciousness is not what we know: it is how we know. A distorted consciousness knows badly. As free consciousness knows well. It takes cosmic consciousness to know God, to experience in its full force the love that God is. Cosmic consciousness is the liberation of desire for the perfection of consciousness. And so our final question is: how, in the Christian dispensation, do we enter cosmic consciousness? To this question we now proceed.

Desire is all. We can have anything we want, if we want it enough. The epistle of James says that often our prayers are not granted because we do not pray singlemindedly. And Mark's gospel has
the fascinating saying, "Whatever you ask for in prayer, believe that you will receive it, and it will come to you." Often the people who advocate prayer for peace aren't really working for it. Praying for something, if it is authentic, means wanting it with every nerve in your body. And where we most often fall down is in not really deciding what we want, indeed not really deciding that we want what we think we want. The reason for this is, that to decide that I want something is to deprive myself of the alternatives. It is not for nothing that the word "decide" has the same root as "suicide," "genocide," and the like—the Latin caedo, to kill, to cut off. To decide is to kill other alternatives. But the liberation of desire is, as they say, something else again.

The liberation of desire happens when a desire I did not know I had breaks in on me and is immediately recognized as "the only thing I ever really wanted." This is the conversion experience, whether the conversion be religious, moral, political, aesthetic—and there surely are other categories.

Let me now concentrate on a liberation of desire that includes and goes beyond all the others. It is the moment when a person knows, in the depths of him— or herself, a movement to the unknown that is, indistinguishably, a movement by the unknown; a response that is identical with a call, a response that is a call. In this moment, a person receives a name from the meaning without which there would be no meaning. This is the liberation of desire; when a person can at last say: for this was I born, for this I have come into the world.

What is happening when desire is thus liberated is, that our belief in ourselves, which normally is dormant, is awakened by and to the Spirit. The belief in ourselves is the faint spark that the Spirit will blow into the fire of an infinite love.

When desire is thus liberated, it leaps beyond our present way of being in the world, it seeks its cosmic place. But to secure this movement beyond our present world, something else is necessary.

What that other thing is we have already touched on when we looked at decision. For with all decision, I have to deprive myself of alternatives, and so with the movement of the heart that concerns us now there goes a deprivation. It is a deprivation as sweeping as the movement itself is far-reaching. For since this movement of desire goes
Beyond our present way of being in the world, we must, for its completion, be deprived of our present way of being in the world.

This deprivation is beyond our power to bring upon ourselves. In it, we find ourselves deprived, we are passive to the deprivation. Of this deprivation, then, the prime exemplar is death.

Now there is another dimension to the liberation of desire. It is social. We do it for each other. It is something instilled in a group of people by a leader in whom it is charismatically apparent. It is a contagion that is caught from such a person. One thinks of a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King, persons who awoke in millions a desire, a hope, a possibility, that they had forgotten they ever had.

Now this desire, this visionary hope, awakened in people by the leader, is far too big for them to handle without the leader. They have to invest it in him or her. This means that the leader finds him or herself acting as a "conductor" for the myriad energies he has released. The strain of this is nearly unbearable, and we should not be surprised at the irregular sexual morality sometimes triumphantly discovered in the leader by enemies. It has always seemed to me that the action of the Irish clergy in turning against Parnell because of his divorce is one of the meanest and most despicable acts in our history. This consideration points us, with awe, at the figure of Jesus, whom not even the bitterest enemies manage to fault in any way.

Now putting all this together, we have: a desire awakened in people that leaps beyond our present way of being in the world, that requires for its realization that we be deprived of our present way of being in the world, and that has to be "carried" for us by the one who has awakened it in us.

The most mysterious, yet universal, fact in this affair is that these two requirements of awakened desire—the requirement of deprivation and the requirement of being carried by the leader—are most intimately connected. They combine, in an explosive chemistry, into the premonition that the leader must be killed. Here is the combination, in slow motion. The desire that the leader has awakened in his followers is vulnerable twice over. It is vulnerable in that they cannot handle it by themselves, they can handle it only through the leader. And this investing of their desire outside themselves and in the leader makes them vulnerable to the most radical deprivation. For when the leader is killed, their desire goes with him beyond this world and is emptied in
the total way that death effects. The very act of putting their desire into the leader puts it at total, mortal risk. And those who are closest to the leader and have made the greatest commitment will have to undergo, while still alive, that undoing of all worldly desire that only the dying normally undergo.

It is this prospect, of entering while still alive the awful void, that haunts the Women of Canterbury in Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral," as they contemplate Thomas, their hero, stepping up to his fate and praying to his good angel to "hover over the swords' points." They imply that it is worse for them than for him. And in one sense it is. We fear death less than we fear the final demand, from the unseen, to drop everything in sight; that is, the live entry into the void. Their chorus accompanying the murder makes this very clear.

And thus at last we have told the story of Jesus: a story of the stretching of desire—the life and ministry; of the deprivation of desire—the crucifixion and death; of the invading bliss of heaven—the encounter with Jesus risen from the dead. The story throws a definitive light on our relationship with those beloved ones whom we have had to let go into the night. Our desire, stretched by their life, has been emptied by their death, and learned in this process some resonance of eternity. And our desire, thus touched with eternity, reaches out to them in a very sure fellowship.

The transformative experience of discipleship, then, may be expressed thus:

We feel, in the envisioned bloodshed, the emptying out of desire, making space for the peace that passes all understanding.

I am struck with how close the Christian experience, expressed in this way, comes to the Buddhist. It is the Buddhist experience, but socially, historically, and sacramentally enfleshed—which makes all the difference.
A FUTURE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY

Harvey Egan is the most recent of a growing number of thinkers who have discerned in the writings of Bernard Lonergan the basis for what Egan calls "a future mystical theology" (Egan, 1982:109-116). According to Egan, if this promise for the future is to become a reality in the present, there are two needs which must be met (115). First, there is a need for what might be called a new mystical cartography. That is to say, there is a need for individuals who are not only sufficiently adept at traveling the mystical paths traveled by St. John of the Cross and others, but who are also, in Lonergan's terms, intellectually converted critical realists who know precisely what it is they do when they know. Such individuals could provide the needed mystical charts. Second, there is a need to transpose what Egan refers to as the old mystical theology. That is to say, there is a need for theologians who can transpose the classicist presuppositions and principally metaphysical and theoretical categories of the old mystical theology into a new mystical theology based on what Lonergan calls the categories of


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interiority (Lonergan, 1972:316, 327-28). With this transposition mystical theology would be rendered fully critical and brought into the modern, cross-cultural context. The first task I must leave to a contemporary Ruysbroeck or Teresa of Ávila. To the second I will in this paper contribute what I can.

Before any transposition of "the old mystical theology" is attempted, it is necessary both to clarify the meaning of "mystical theology," and to indicate how Lonergan's thought relates to that task. As to the first, mystical theology has been understood in several ways. Traditionally, it was understood as the equivalent of what is now referred to as mystical experience. Thus Symeon, the eleventh-century Byzantine mystic, received the name "New Theologian" not because he wrote a systematic treatise on the Trinity, but because he had mystically contemplated it. Similarly, Bonaventure defined mystical theology as "the raising of the mind to God through the desire of love."

A second and relatively more recent understanding of mystical theology invokes the distinction between mystical experience on the one hand, and its description and interpretation on the other. Thus, William Johnston defines mystical theology as "reflection on mystical experience" (Johnston, 1978:43). This is the general sense in which mystical theology will be used in this paper, though here too a further distinction is necessary, for reflection on mystical experience can typically receive one of two emphases.

First, there is a strand of mystical theology which is primarily descriptive and phenomenological in its intent. Cuthbert Butler, for instance, when undertaking to survey twenty-five years of "controversy on mystical theology," uses the term to refer to an extended controversy concerning "the nature of Contemplation and the Mystical Experience in itself" (Butler, 1927:x1). Typical issues in mystical theology, so conceived, concern isolating the point of transition between acquired

3. For an English translation of Symeon's mystical poetry see St. Symeon the New Theologian, Hymns of Divine Love, with an introduction and translation by George A. Maloney (Denville, New Jersey: Dimension Books, n.d.)

and infused contemplation, and specifying the nature of experiential contact with the divine. Second, there is a strand of mystical theology concerned not so much with the phenomenology of mystical experience as with its relationship to Christian doctrine. Vladimir Lossky, for instance, defines mystical theology as "a spirituality which expresses a doctrinal attitude" (Lossky, 1957:7). His exposition of mystical theology is concerned with clarifying the mystical basis of major doctrinal themes and he argues that doctrinal controversies are at base theological struggles aimed at preserving authentic Christian mystical experience (10-11). Ultimately, of course, the distinction between these two strands breaks down, for the difference is one of emphasis. Christian mystical experience is reciprocally related to Christian doctrine, and both strands of mystical theology either implicitly or explicitly acknowledge as much.

What, then, is the relationship of Lonergan's thought to mystical theology and how might it provide the foundations for a new mystical theology? As anyone familiar with Lonergan's work in theological method is aware, his principal effort is directed at grounding the basic terms and relations of theology in the structure of human consciousness. This involves the transposition of an older theology grounded not in human consciousness, but in the terms and relations of metaphysics and theory. The result of this transposition is an empirically based critical control over one's metaphysics and theory. As Lonergan explains, "for every term and relation [in metaphysics or theory] there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. Accordingly, empty or misleading terms and relations can be eliminated, while valid ones can be elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived" (Lonergan, 1972:343). Such critical control also provides a basis for constructive interreligious and cross-cultural dialogue (282-283). To develop the terms and relations of human consciousness within the discipline of theology is chiefly to develop what Lonergan calls "general theological categories" (285-289).

The relationship of this effort to the development of a new mystical theology pertains to what Lonergan calls "special theological categories" (288-291). These are categories which are based not merely in human consciousness in general, but specifically in religious and mystical consciousness. The theological task of developing them, however, involves transposing the older, metaphysically and dogmatically
based mystical theology in such a way as to ground religious and mystical experience in the structure of human consciousness. The aim is still critical control over terms and relations and the establishment of a potentially fruitful basis for interreligious and cross-cultural dialogue.

Such, then, in broad strokes, is the nature of Lonergan's potential contribution to the development of a contemporary mystical theology. However, the reason Egan refers to this contribution as grounding a "future" rather than a "contemporary" mystical theology is that Lonergan himself has not been particularly concerned with mystical theology. Nowhere in his writings, for example, does he offer a sustained, systematic reflection on mystical theology. Indeed, rather than expatiating on the subject of mysticism, he frequently directs the reader to secondary sources (e.g., 1972:342 n. 7). In addition, he repeatedly states that he is a methodologist, and that as such his task is to point to the function of, and the need for, general and special theological categories, and not to develop the special categories into a mystical theology—a task which falls to the foundational theologian (282, 285, 291).

Consequently, this paper should be regarded principally as a contribution to the fifth functional specialty, Foundations; and, as such, its emphasis will be more consonant with the phenomenological strand of mystical theology represented by Butler than with the doctrinal strand found in the work of Lossky, whose particular emphasis is related more directly to the functional specialties Doctrines and Systematics. Inasmuch as it is an analysis of Lonergan's thought, the paper also involves work in the second functional specialty, Interpretation. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that Lonergan's thought in this area should require clarification and further development, since he has not expressly concerned himself with mystical theology.

One area in which clarification is needed involves the language Lonergan uses to refer to religious and mystical experience. Although his general project is to transpose the older dogmatic and metaphysically-based theology into the categories of interiority, Lonergan often refers to religious and mystical experience in the older, dogmatic language. For example, he typically uses the phrases "being in love with God" and "God's gift of his love" as a kind of shorthand to refer to religious and mystical experience. As expressions, these are
clearly derived from Christian doctrine, not from the categories of interiority (Lonergan, 1972:282-283).

This, of course, is not to say that there is anything wrong either with Lonergan's locutions or with the Christian doctrines they reflect. The point is, as Lonergan himself has indicated, that when one's goal is to enter into an explicitly pluralistic and cross-cultural context, with critical control over the terms and relations of one's mystical theology, then doctrinally based language, if it is regarded as basic rather than derivative, will be a hindrance rather than a help. The specific concern here is that because Lonergan has not consistently transposed his own language on religious and mystical experience into the categories of interiority, his writings will be open to misinterpretation and the importance of his contribution to a contemporary mystical theology liable to be obscured. A major task of this paper, therefore, will be to transpose explicitly Lonergan's language on mystical and religious experience into the categories of interiority.

Before this can be accomplished, however, a preliminary clarification is necessary. For even apart from any transposition into categories of interiority, there is an ambiguity in Lonergan's language about religious and mystical experience. To be specific, within Lonergan's general treatment of what he refers to as religious experience, two discrete moments of religious experience are discernible. Lonergan refers to them as (a) the gift of God's love and (b) being in love with God, that is, the human response to this gift. The ambiguity arises because Lonergan does not always express clearly the distinction between the two; there is a tendency among interpreters to confuse and collapse them into one. As will become clear in what follows here, the two are complementary, intrinsically related, and thus not ultimately separable. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the distinction between them should not be blurred, for it is only in terms of this distinction that Lonergan's larger position and his scattered references to mystical experience become fully intelligible. Thus, before Lonergan's language concerning religious and mystical experience can be transposed into the categories of interiority, it is necessary first to clarify his position on those experiences. And only after these tasks have been accomplished will it be possible to deal with such properly foundational issues as

the nature of mystical knowing and the cross-cultural basis for a contemporary mystical theology. The overall goal of this paper is to clarify the basic terms and relations of a contemporary mystical theology so as to make them available for use in the functional specialty Dialectic and for the development of a mediated mystical theology which not merely awaits the future, but confronts it.\textsuperscript{6}

II

LONERGAN ON RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS
AND MYSTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

At the outset it is important to make two clarifications regarding terminology. First, in this paper the term "religious consciousness" will be used although Lonergan himself usually employs the term "religious experience." Experience, for Lonergan, is a technical term which refers to operations of empirical awareness and the data of sense and of consciousness. And since Lonergan locates religious experience among the data of consciousness, it may therefore also, and with accuracy, be referred to as religious consciousness. The precise nature of religious consciousness will be explained below; the reason for the terminological shift is precision. "Religious experience" is in general such an ambiguous term that Lonergan's technical usage of it can be easily lost among the other, less precise meanings commonly associated with the term. "Religious consciousness" as a technical term is less subject to this difficulty. In addition, it also enables one to move directly into Lonergan's equally precise analysis of "consciousness," a move that is the key to drawing out the implications of Lonergan's position on mystical consciousness.

This brings us to the second clarification, the distinction between religious consciousness and mystical consciousness. This distinction is directly related to the two discrete though related types of religious consciousness discernible in Lonergan's writings. Lonergan does not explicitly distinguish religious from mystical consciousness,

\textsuperscript{6} See Lonergan, 1972:144-145 for his technical distinction between mediating and mediated theology.
but in what follows I want to suggest that what he is expressing with the phrase "God's gift of his love" is aptly referred to as "mystical consciousness" and that what he is expressing with "being in love with God" is aptly rendered "religious consciousness." These two types of consciousness will first be distinguished and then related. It will also bear repeating that the intention in this section is to clarify Lonergan's position on religious and mystical consciousness, a task which for the most part must be done in the doctrinally rooted language Lonergan uses. The transposition of Lonergan's language into the categories of interiority is the task of section III.

Lonergan describes religious consciousness as a "conscious, dynamic state," which he identifies as a feeling of "being in love with God" (1972:105-07). For Lonergan, this is a specific type of consciousness. It is not the consciousness that accompanies seeing, hearing, and the other forms of sensing; nor is it the consciousness which accompanies the intellectual activities of either understanding and hypothesizing or making reflective judgments. Rather, "it is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely" (107). Moreover, just as religious consciousness is a specific type of consciousness, so it is a particular instance of this type. Clearly, a consciousness of value entailing decision, choice, and purpose need not be a consciousness of religious value; and if the value is less than ultimate, the feeling evoked by that value will not be a religious feeling. Nevertheless, if the value apprehended is the ultimate value—if it is God—then, for Lonergan, the dynamic and intentional state in which one deliberates, decides, and acts is religious.

Mystical consciousness is different. It is not the intentional response to ultimate value which Lonergan describes as being in love with God. Rather, it is consciousness of the gift of God's love itself (1972:107). Lonergan identifies it as a type of intersubjective consciousness (1972:105) and equates it with the experience Paul was trying to express in Romans 5:5, "God's love flooding our hearts through the holy spirit which is given to us" (1972:119). The technical distinction that can be made between the two is that, whereas religious
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consciousness is intentional, mystical consciousness is vital. That is to say, whereas religious consciousness intends an object, that which it values ultimately, mystical consciousness does not. It is a consciousness of vital, intersubjective union quite different from the intentional subject-subject or subject-object relation of religious consciousness. This can be clarified by a brief consideration of what Lonergan means by intersubjectivity.

For Lonergan, intersubjectivity refers to that realm of consciousness which discloses the inherent relatedness of one person to another, and in the case of mystical consciousness the inherent relatedness of the human and the divine. Following Max Scheler, Lonergan distinguishes four ways that intersubjectivity can be communicated. Relevant here is the fourth way, referred to as "emotional identification" (1972:57), and Lonergan identifies two types. There is, on the one hand, the emotional identification that is prior to personal differentiation, as in the relationship of a mother and an infant prior to the child's individuation. On the other hand, there is the emotional identification that is "a retreat from personal differentiation to vital unity" (1972:58). Retreat from personal differentiation in which two or more subjects become as one can occur in connection with hypnosis, sex, and team sports, and for Lonergan, it also occurs in mystical consciousness. In a state of vital unity one is not a separate subject; one is in a state of union with the no-longer-other.

Such is the understanding that informs Lonergan's scattered references to mystical consciousness, which he describes as a withdrawal from personal differentiation (1972:58, 76-77). The mystic, according to Lonergan, "withdraws from objectification" (77) and from "the world mediated by meaning" (273). He "drops the construct of culture" (29) and "withdraws ... towards a world of immediacy in which image and symbol, thought and word, lose their relevance and even disappear".

7. Two additional points should be noted. First, this distinction is in fact the same distinction as the one Lonergan makes between the vertical and horizontal shifts within conversion (1972:40) and between operative and cooperative grace (1972:107, 241, 288-289). Second, it parallels the distinction between "complacency" and "concern" brought to light by Frederick Crowe in his series of articles analyzing the relationship of love and will in Aquinas (Crowe, 1959).
This is a withdrawal into vital unity with God: "one's prayer [can] consist in letting lapse all images and thoughts so as to permit God's gift of his love to absorb one" (1972: 342). The mystic, for Lonergan, experiences an intersubjective, emotional identification with the divine. It is an "all-absorbing self-surrender" (1972:273) into God's love which Lonergan also refers to as the "cloud of unknowing" and the "ultima solitudo" (1972:29). In sum, mystical consciousness entails an absorption into the gift of God's love. The mystic consciously and explicitly experiences a vital, intersubjective union of emotional identification with the divine.

Further clarification is in order here, for it is important not to misunderstand what Lonergan means by a union in which the mystic is absorbed into the gift of God's love. Such language could suggest a monistic unity characteristic of Eastern religions, but Lonergan has identified his position with the main lines of the Christian mystical tradition: genuine union with the divine occurs in which the distinction between human and divine is nevertheless maintained. As might be expected, Lonergan has not specifically addressed the problem of explaining mystical union, but it is possible to do so by drawing on the notion of objectivity that he develops in Insight. I propose to contrast the intersubjective vital unity of mystical consciousness with the more familiar experience of the world as made up of discrete subjects and objects. This contrast will also further clarify the difference between mystical and religious consciousness.

As Lonergan points out, the "objectivity" of someone as "other," is not immediately given in experience. It is actually the result of a pattern of three distinct judgments: first, the judgment "I am"; second, the judgment "you are"; third, the judgment "I am not you." Only after these three judgments have been made can the "objective" world of distinct subjects be said to be known (1957:375-377). The pattern that characterizes the vital unity of mystical consciousness, however, is different. In this pattern, the first two judgments, "I am" and "you are," are the same as in the attainment of the "objective" distinction. With the third judgment that the difference emerges, for in a state of vital unity the subject does not make the judgment "I am not you," a judgment which would affirm an objective distinction between discrete subjects. Instead, the subject makes the judgment "I am you" (or perhaps better, "I am we"), and by so doing affirms the vital unity of itself with the other.
The first pattern of judgments (I am; you are; I am not you) arises from a consciousness of discrete subjects and corresponds to the intentional nature of religious consciousness. The second pattern of judgments (I am; you are; I am we) arises from a consciousness of vital unity and corresponds to the intersubjective nature of mystical consciousness. Unlike religious consciousness, the vital unity of mystical consciousness originally does not intend some "object." Strictly speaking, mystical conscious does not apprehend something distinct, "out there," which "I am not," either as a subject or an object, but direct, vital unity with God. The intersubjective identification, however, is not total. The first judgments in the pattern (I am; you are) reveal the union without dissolution characteristic of the Christian mystical tradition.

Now that religious and mystical consciousness have been distinguished, the task is to relate them. It is a task that will involve extending the implications of the foregoing analysis, for just as Lonergan has not fully elaborated the distinction between religious and mystical consciousness, neither has he fully elaborated their relationship. This task can be done best, I think, in terms of two parallel and interlocking distinctions. This will not only provide the most accurate elaboration of Lonergan's position on the relationship of religious and mystical consciousness; it will also reveal the implications of his position for mystical theology, both as a critique of past efforts and as pointing the way toward future ones.

The first distinction is between description and explanation. With it, Lonergan clarifies the two basic perspectives from which any phenomenon, religious and mystical consciousness included, may be examined. First, then, I can describe a phenomenon. I can give an account of it as it actually appears to me. Consequently, if what I wish to describe is part of the physical world, its description will be based on the reports of my senses. The sun, for instance, is appropriately described as rising in the east and setting in the west. But I am not restricted to describing things as they appear to me. I can also give an explanatory account of the phenomenon. That is, I can give an account of it as it is in itself, and as abstracted from the way it appears to me. Of course, to explain something, I must first have experienced and described it. An explanation, however, is not formulated in terms of sensory reports, but in terms of an intellectual
grasp of the thing in itself. Thus, Copernicus was moving toward an explanation of what Ptolemy had described. Considered in itself, the relationship between the earth and the sun is not what it appears to be to the eye of one located at some terrestrial point. From an explanatory perspective, the earth circles the sun, not the reverse (1972:81-82; 1957:174, 295-297, 417-421).

In the same way, the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness can be both described and explained. An important difference, of course, is that we are not dealing with a sensory phenomenon, but with a phenomenon of consciousness; and for this reason a second of Lonergan's distinctions becomes important, namely the distinction between consciousness and attention. This second distinction not only will clarify the difference between a descriptive and an explanatory account of the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness, but bring out the importance of that difference as well.

Lonergan insists that while both religious and mystical consciousness are conscious experiences, they are not experiences which necessarily receive explicit attention. Both can be, and often are, overlooked. In the case of religious consciousness, when it is attended to, one is aware of being in love with God. When it is not attended to, then for Lonergan it "remains within subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness" (1972:113; cp 240). The important point is that for Lonergan, religious consciousness is a fact of consciousness whether or not it receives explicit attention. The same is true of mystical consciousness.

In general it is assumed that mystical consciousness is impossible to ignore. It is often associated with raptures and ecstasies of various sorts, and Lonergan himself acknowledges that one's attention can be riveted by intersubjective encounter with the divine. It can "come as a thunderclap as when in Ezekiel's words God plucks out the heart of stone and replaces it with a heart of flesh" (1972:245). On the other hand, and for Lonergan this is typically the case, one can be inattentive to one's consciousness of vital unity with the divine. Borrowing a metaphor from Oliver Rabut, Lonergan describes the situation as follows: "It is as though a room were filled with music though one can have no sure knowledge of its source. There is in the world, as it were, a charged field of love and meaning; here and there it reaches a
notable intensity; but it is ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join" (1972:290). For Lonergan, mystical consciousness is a fact of consciousness and whether it remains hidden and unobtrusive or reaches a notable intensity is a function of heightened attention.

We are now in a position to interlock our two distinctions. First, a descriptive account of the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness will now be recognized as one which deals with that relationship as it appears to the mystic, an account which is a function of the mystic's own attentiveness or lack of it. Second, an explanatory account will now be recognized as one which deals with religious and mystical consciousness in themselves, and as abstracted from the mystic's personal point of view and level of attention.

It is to be noted that both descriptive and explanatory accounts of the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness are useful. A descriptive account is indispensable as a guide along the spiritual way. An explanatory account is indispensable for an adequate mystical theology. My concern here, however, is not so much with the relative usefulness of each as it is with the conceptual difficulties that ensue if one fails to distinguish the two. More specifically, my concern is with the oversights that result if one fails to recognize the limits of a descriptive account, and instead misconstrues it as an explanatory account. Such oversights would parallel the oversights that ensued for astronomy during the period in which Ptolemy's descriptive account of the universe was misconstrued as an explanatory account. Such a misconstrual in the realm of religious and mystical consciousness would lead not only to a misinterpretation of Lonergan's explanatory position, but would also have far-reaching (and, I would contend, wrong-headed) implications for the subsequent elaboration of one's mystical theology. In order to substantiate and clarify this rather sweeping claim, I will examine in turn both the descriptive and the explanatory accounts of the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness as they emerge in Lonergan's writings.

From a descriptive point of view, the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness appears to be sequential. Mystics typically describe the mystical life as unfolding in several basic stages, and they typically use such metaphors as the ladder and the path to express it. The point here is that several of Lonergan's references to the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness reflect
the descriptive point of view and suggest a descriptive model consisting in three basic stages. The first stage is marked by the gift of God's love, an intersubjective encounter which calls for the second stage, the conscious response of falling in love with God. As Lonergan puts it, "the dynamic state of being in love [second stage] has the character of a response. It is an answer to a divine initiative [first stage]" (1972:119). The individual, in other words, attends to a call from God and responds with a life characterized by prayer, self-discipline, and service to his or her neighbor. If diligently pursued, this in turn can lead to a third stage, that is, to an explicit awareness of mystical encounter with the divine, an awareness which culminates in the withdrawal into the cloud of unknowing (1974:273; cp 29, 118). From a descriptive point of view, a moment's reflection reveals that in reaching the third stage the mystic will have come "full circle." In the third stage, the mystic becomes explicitly aware of intersubjective union with the divine, a union sought through the prayer and self-discipline of the second stage, a seeking inspired by the taste of union experienced as the call in the first stage.

As a descriptive account, this model extrapolated from Lonergan's writings is both plausible and consistent with the descriptive reports of the mystics themselves. As noted, conceptual difficulties arise when a descriptive account such as the one adduced from Lonergan is taken for an explanatory account. The descriptive account would give rise to a set of systematically distorted insights about the relationship of religious and mystical consciousness in itself. One would be led to conclude, for instance, that mystical consciousness is an advanced stage in the religious life which follows upon a prior, non-mystical, and perhaps ascetical stage. From this one would be led to distinguish infused from acquired contemplation, and to speculate upon the point at which the one left off and the other began. One would begin to speak of special graces, to conclude that some individuals were called to the mystical life while others were not. In reaction, an opposing school would develop, contending rather that all, not a few, are called to the mystical life. A vast literature would be generated. Definitions of the mystical would both proliferate and degenerate to the point that a major scholar would feel constrained to defend Meister Eckhardt's inclusion among the ranks of the mystics (McGinn, 1981:15-19). One
would be led, in short, to the state of mystical theology in which we find it today.

The revolutionary importance of Lonergan's contribution to mystical theology can perhaps now be glimpsed, along with the importance of his distinction between description and explanation. For Lonergan, it is only from a descriptive point of view that the initial gift of God's love is intermittent, that it disappears only to reappear at a later sage, that it is not offered to all. From an explanatory perspective, Lonergan compares God's love to an ever-present music, to which one either attends or not. It is the subject's attention, not God's love, that is intermittent, and the goal of a mystical life that is available to everyone is to become progressively more attentive to what has in fact been going on all along.

Likewise, it is only from a descriptive point of view that religious consciousness can be regarded as one stage among several. From an explanatory perspective, religious consciousness is also to be regarded as an ongoing feature of human consciousness. To be sure, early in one's religious development it is typically more prominent, more easily attended to, than mystical consciousness is; but it does not disappear when attention begins to turn to mystical consciousness. From an explanatory perspective, the relationship between religious and mystical consciousness is not sequential, but concomitant and reciprocal. If religious and mystical consciousness, regarded in themselves, are held to be mutually related and simultaneously present within consciousness, the task which follows is to indicate how the varying degrees of human attention and inattention can be integrated into this explanatory perspective. A way of doing this is to identify what Lonergan calls distinct "differentiations of consciousness."

To take mystical consciousness as an example, while Lonergan consistently maintains that the intersubjective experience of vital union with the divine is a gift, he is also clear that it is a type of consciousness that can be cultivated (1972:266). Speaking in general terms, he points out that different experiences and circumstances in

8. This interpretation, of course, even if it accurately spells out Lonergan's position, needs to be checked against the testimony of the mystics. If such a check were attempted, I am confident that the basic lines of Lonergan's position would be confirmed.
life call for correspondingly different skills and patterns of thought, for different "modes of consciousness" (1972:81). The subsequent development of one or a number of these sets of skills and thought-patterns results in what Lonergan calls a "differentiation of consciousness" (1972:326). To live well in the day-to-day world, for example, requires savvy and common sense. Quite different is the competence in dealing with theory required for being at home in the world of natural science. Different again are the skills and patterns of thought required to cultivate a sense of taste and an appreciation for art and beauty. The situation is also the same in the realm of religion. Lonergan maintains that a "differentiation of consciousness" must take place if one is to enter fully into any of these dimensions (1972:326; cp 257-267, 303-305). The goal of a differentiation of consciousness is "to deal expertly" with some particular realm (326), a goal that takes time to acquire, requires a process of learning, and admits of different degrees of development (81, 79). Thus the goal of a specifically religious differentiation of consciousness is to deal expertly with what Lonergan calls the "realm of transcendence" (251). Such expertise, for Lonergan, "is approached by the ascetic and reached by the mystic" (273), and when it is attained, there occurs "the emergence of the gift of God's love as itself a differentiated realm" (266).

Precisely in what such a differentiation would consist will be addressed below. For the present it is sufficient to point out, first, that like mystical consciousness, religious consciousness would also admit of a differentiation; and, second, that Lonergan's "realm of transcendence" would include both differentiations. I must leave it to others to spell out in detail the relationship between these two differentiations at the various levels of expertise, although fully expert differentiations of both religious and mystical consciousness would be characterized by a constant and heightened level of attention to both one's intersubjective union with the divine and one's truly unrestricted love for God. It seems to me that this can be corroborated without difficulty from the accounts of the mystics themselves. The descriptive counterparts to this explanatory account are the traditional mystical categories of spiritual marriage, unceasing prayer, and the indwelling of the Trinity.
Having completed an admittedly rather lengthy clarification and elaboration of Lonergan's position on religious and mystical consciousness, it is possible now to move closer to the subject of mystical theology by turning to the task of transposing Lonergan's position into the categories of interiority. For what was remarked earlier will now have become evident: Lonergan's description and analysis of religious and mystical consciousness is articulated primarily in Christian theological language. And if Lonergan's analysis is to be useful in transposing the old mystical theology into a new, fully critical, and explicitly cross-cultural mystical theology, then it is important that it be expressed in the categories of interiority. Thus, since these categories are based on Lonergan's phenomenological analysis of human consciousness, it is necessary to correlate his analysis of religious and mystical consciousness with his analysis of the general structure of human consciousness. Religious consciousness will be treated first.

For Lonergan the same general structure of intentional consciousness is shared by all human beings. As such, and in contrast to any particular content of that consciousness, it crosses all particular cultures and times. That is to say, while the specific "objects" of intentional consciousness, the specific what that is known and valued, will vary from culture to culture, the act or the performance of knowing and valuing itself will not vary. Eskimos may know and value snow; Seminole Indians may know and value the everglades, but the performance of knowing and valuing will be the same in both cultures. Indeed, even if the cognitional theories which articulate the performance of knowing and valuing vary from culture to culture, for Lonergan the reality of the performance itself will not vary, and it can be empirically checked by attending to the performance itself (1972:18-20).

As is well known, Lonergan describes the structure of intentional consciousness in terms of a number of discrete levels of consciousness,
each of which can in principle be attended to and verified as operative within the consciousness of any individual. "Self-appropriation" is what Lonergan calls this effort of attention and verification, and it is the empirical cornerstone of all his work in theological method (1972:18-20, 83-85). It is the rock, as it were, of a fully critical, cross-culturally oriented theological enterprise, for the structure of human consciousness provides a common basis from which any individual from any cultural or religious tradition can initiate conversation.

Typically, Lonergan speaks about four levels of consciousness: empirical consciousness, through which we sense, imagine, feel, and move; intellectual consciousness, through which we question, gain understanding and express our understanding; rational consciousness through which we weigh evidence and assess the truth, falsity, and probability of our understandings; and responsible consciousness through which we deliberate, evaluate, decide and act (1972:9). These are the levels of conscious that make up ordinary waking consciousness. Sometimes Lonergan speaks of a "fifth level of consciousness," the level of mystical consciousness (1974:38). On other occasions he also refers to at least two additional levels—dreamless and dreaming sleep, both, of course, operative prior to the levels of waking consciousness.

Lonergan also points out that all of these levels of consciousness, if operating normally, are intrinsically linked to each other. Thus, to illustrate from an example within waking consciousness, the sighting of a rather large, indeterminate shape is a conscious activity on the empirical level. This operation naturally and spontaneously leads to the second level, an operation of intellectual consciousness. That is, it leads beyond mere sensation to a quest to understand and

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9. The level of consciousness with which Lonergan identifies religious consciousness is ambiguous. Sometimes he identifies it with the fourth level, sometimes with a fifth. If, however, the distinction between religious and mystical consciousness is made, then it becomes clear that religious consciousness is the fourth level and mystical consciousness is the fifth. See 1972:105, 107, 109.

10. Lonergan, 1974:73, 80. He also distinguishes the levels of "night dreams" and "morning dreams" within the level of dreaming sleep (1974:166).
identify what has been seen. This quest often takes the form of an explicitly formulated question, such as, What is that? A moving car? This in turn, again quite spontaneously and without coercion, leads to an operation of rational consciousness. That is, it leads beyond simple understanding to an effort to ascertain whether or not this understanding is correct. Such an effort typically culminates with a judgment such as, Yes, it is a car coming this way. Once such a determination is made, another operation of consciousness arises spontaneously to inquire what, if anything, is to be done in response to this knowledge. Should I keep walking as I am or had I better get out of the way quickly? This is an operation on the level of responsible consciousness. This level of consciousness, as noted in the discussion of religious consciousness, is characterized by the entry of feeling. It is obvious that a strong affective response will inform deliberations over what to do about the perils of a fast-approaching car.

As Lonergan expresses it, these levels are linked together along a spectrum of expanding "subjectivity," or to put it another way, along a spectrum of expanding functioning of a drive toward knowledge, value and self-transcendence (see Lonergan, 1974:69-86). Lonergan points out that this drive can be further specified by attending to and verifying a norm operative on and inherent within each level. On the level of empirical consciousness, the norm is "Be attentive!"; for intellectual consciousness, "Be intelligent!"; for rational consciousness, "Be critical!"; for responsible consciousness, "Be responsible!" And as will become apparent, the norm for religious consciousness is "Be loving!" (1972:53).

Such, then, are the fundamentals of Lonergan's analysis of intentional consciousness. It fixes the basic categories of interiority (1972:3-25), and as noted, just as the discrete levels of consciousness can be personally appropriated, so too can its inherent dynamism, the interrelationships of the various levels and the norms operative within them. The issue at hand, however, is to correlate Lonergan's analysis of religious and mystical consciousness with this analysis of the general structure of human consciousness.

Turning first to religious consciousness, it will be recalled that Lonergan typically refers to it as the experience of being in love with God. In terms of the categories of interiority, however, he notes that religious consciousness is coincidental with "the basic fulfillment
of our conscious intentionality" (1972:105). Religious consciousness, in other words, coincides with the fulfillment of both the drive toward knowledge and value and the unrestricted capacity for self-transcendence inherent in human consciousness (1974:129). What is this basic fulfillment? In what sense is it religious? These questions bear further elucidation.

Lonergan is suggesting that there is a religious dimension within human interiority itself. As illustrated above, the drive toward knowledge and value is operative through the various levels of consciousness, and its dynamism is most clearly manifested in our propensity to wonder and to ask questions. Lonergan's point is that, once we have begun to attend specifically to the realm of our subjectivity, we can go on to attend to the fact that it operates within a larger horizon. We can note that implicit within the human propensity to question there is a set of larger questions: How do I account for the fact of human questioning? What is the source of my drive to know? Is my drive toward intelligibility an aberration in an absurd universe, or is the drive itself ultimately intelligible? Is it worthwhile? These are limit questions. They ask about the ultimate grounding and meaningfulness of the intentionality of human consciousness. As such, these questions are religious. They refer, in Lonergan's terms, to the basic fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of that drive. To be sure, to ask questions about the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality is not the same as finding answers; to ask is to advert to a horizon of ultimacy. Nevertheless, should one find an affirmative answer, one has found what Lonergan calls the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality. Moreover, to have found this fulfillment is to be religiously conscious; it is to be oriented toward a value which in some way grounds the meaningfulness of human consciousness itself.

It is important to point out here that just as one can distinguish mystical consciousness from religious consciousness, so one can (and must) distinguish two types of fulfillment. On the one hand, there is fulfillment in the sense of being complete or whole, of coming to rest. Associated with it is the fundamental well-being of having arrived. This, I will suggest later on, is the type of fulfillment

11. Lonergan refers to these questions as the question of God (1972:101-103). They are also religious, in the third stage of meaning.
associated with mystical consciousness. On the other hand, there is a fulfillment associated with the sense of having realized a capacity or achieved a potential, as for instance when the leg muscles of a runner are operating effortlessly and at peak efficiency. Associated with fulfillment of this type is the fundamental joy of performing at the fullest level of one's ability. This is the type of fulfillment associated with religious consciousness.

To repeat, then, religious consciousness involves the basic fulfillment of having received an affirmative answer to the larger questions implicit within the drive toward knowledge and value. It is to find oneself affirming, "Yes, there is an intelligibility and a value to the universe, which grounds my own drive for intelligibility and value." If this is not to be misunderstood, however, two points must be kept in mind. First, it must be recalled that the actual moment of receiving the answer, the actual moment of saying "yes" (whether or not one can isolate that moment precisely in one's past) involves the intersubjective experience of vital union that we have identified as mystical consciousness. In Lonergan's doctrinal language, it is the gift of God's love. The intentional response that proceeds from the "yes" is religious consciousness. It is being in love with God. Second, it is also important to remember that the affirmation of and the response to ultimate intelligibility and value is not fundamentally a matter of philosophical reflection. Such reflection is primarily a matter of intellectual and rational consciousness. Religious consciousness, in contrast, is on the level of responsible consciousness. It is a consciousness of value characterized by an intentional response to that value. The value in question is the recognized intelligibility and worth of the universe and one's place in it. Thus, to be religiously conscious in this sense is to find oneself drawn toward ultimate intelligibility and value, to find oneself persistently seeking to know what is true and to choose what is good. This is the fulfillment of one's intentional consciousness. It is not a state of completion, in which all answers have been found, but rather a state of ever-fuller activation in which the answer is being ever more fully sought and one's life is being ever more fully lived in accord with the answer as it is emerging. Optimally, in other words, religious consciousness is the full activation of the norms inherent within human consciousness.  

12. This is not to deny that the development of religious consciousness is dialectical; see Lonergan, 1972:110-112.
being fully attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible; it is, to
put it in another phrase characteristic of Lonergan, "being in love
without restriction" (1972:106).

Obviously, the question that immediately arises is, "What is this
intelligibility toward which one is drawn?" "What answer has been
found?" To ask this is to ask the question of religious knowledge, to
inquire as to the content of one's religious consciousness. This
question must be postponed until after our consideration of mystical
consciousness. For the present, it may be helpful to consolidate the
findings up to this point. The foregoing has been an attempt to draw
attention, not to the object of religious affirmation, but to the
dynamics of religious consciousness as Lonergan understands it. Beyond
this, it has been an attempt to correlate that understanding with
Lonergan's analysis of the dynamics of human consciousness in general.
Thus, the focus has been the dynamics of religious consciousness, pre-
scinding from any particular content of that consciousness. Religious
consciousness, then—what Lonergan calls "being in love with God"—can
now be understood in general terms as a type of consciousness on the
level of responsibility. As such, it is an intentional response to the
apprehension of the transcendent grounding of one's own intentionality,
a response which entails not only affective commitment to that value but
also an experience of progressively fuller activation of one's drive
toward truth, value and self-transcendence.

As noted, there is a twofold advantage to an analysis which
critically grounds religious consciousness in the dynamics of human
consciousness. On the one hand, one gains critical control over the
terms and relations associated with religious consciousness. On the
other, it opens up the possibility of fruitful interreligious and cross-
cultural dialog. Without the full transposition of Lonergan's analysis
of religious consciousness into the categories of interiority, not only
is it not entirely clear what the phrase "being in love with God" might
mean, but also, in dialogue with a member of another religious tradition
one might be tempted to ask, as an opening question, "Are you in love
with God?" (or alternatively, "Are you saved?" or "Have you met the
Lord?"). The problems associated with formulating the question in this
way are obvious. As an initial question it would probably forestall, if
not preclude, constructive discussion with atheists, Buddhists, and
certain Hindus, to mention only a few. The impediment here, of course,
is not only the imprecision of the words used in the question, but their
culture-bound and tradition-specific meanings as well.

On the other hand, to ask the same question in the categories of
interiority is to ask "Are you aware, within yourself, of the persist-
tence of a drive to know?" or "Are you conscious of yourself as consis-
tently oriented toward value and self-transcendence?" No doubt a more
adequate formulation of these questions would be necessary, but inasmuch
as they appeal to the dynamics of consciousness shared by all human
beings, the meaning of the questions can be made explicit. And, once
this clarity has been achieved, discussion can move to a specifically
doctrinal level: then one can speak of grace, of gift, of being in love
with God, of meeting the Lord. One can discuss the meaning and
relative adequacy of this and other formulations of the religious
dynamics of human consciousness. But to speak of religious conscious-
ness is not yet to enter the realm of mystical theology. That pertains
to mystical consciousness, to the intersubjective moment of emotional
identification which Lonergan refers to as the gift of God's love.

IV
TRANSPOSITION: MYSTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LANGUAGE
OF INTERIORITY

Since Lonergan's treatment of mystical consciousness is less
developed than his treatment of religious consciousness, what follows is
an attempt to render explicit what is implicit in that treatment. The
overall goal, however, remains the same. It is to gain critical control
over the language of mystical consciousness by transposing it from
Lonergan's basically doctrinal and metaphysical formulations into the
language of interiority, a transposition which correlates mystical
consciousness with the general structure of human consciousness. This
transposition will require three steps. First, it is necessary to
attend to a distinction that has not yet been explicitly drawn. It is
the distinction Lonergan makes between consciousness and intellectual
inquiry, or again between the subject-as-subject and the subject-as-
object (1972:8). This distinction leads, second, to a general consi-
deration of the relationship between consciousness and intersubjective consciousness; and that, third, leads in turn to the more specific question of the nature of intersubjective union with the divine.

As to the first step, Lonergan points out that the operations of the various levels of human consciousness are both intentional and conscious (1972:7-8, 14-16, 286). On the one hand, human consciousness is intentional. In the process of intellectual inquiry it naturally intends objects; it spontaneously seeks out the intelligibility and value of what is given to it in experience through the operations of understanding, judging, and valuing. On the other hand, human consciousness is conscious. Consciousness-as-conscious is the awareness which attends intellectual inquiry in its various operations. It differs, however, in that consciousness is not seeing, but an awareness of sight. It is not understanding, but an awareness of intelligence. It is not the act of judging or valuing, but an awareness of both. Lonergan expresses this difference by defining consciousness as "an internal experience of one's self and one's acts," and he uses the word "subject" to refer to an individual who, on some level, is operating consciously (1972:7).

The distinction between consciousness and intellectual inquiry is further clarified by Lonergan's distinction between the "subject-as-object" and the "subject-as-subject." On the one hand, consciousness can itself become an object intended by intellectual inquiry. It can be understood, known and valued through a process which Lonergan refers to as inquiring into the "subject-as-object." On the other hand, consciousness does not become aware of itself in the same way that objects are known through intellectual inquiry. Nor can it be fully known in this way. Strictly speaking, we become aware of our consciousness, not by getting outside of it, but by intensifying it. We become aware of it by attending to our immersion within it. This direct, immediate awareness, is a datum which enters explicit awareness through heightened attention, an act that Lonergan refers to as attending to the subject-as-subject. As noted, an awareness of one's subjectivity can then be mediated to intentional consciousness as an "object," but it can never be fully known this way; or, perhaps more accurately, it can never be fully included within the known-as-object, for conscious subjectivity itself is required to know the subject-as-object.
The task of self-appropriation, therefore, can be regarded as twofold. It includes the appropriation not only of one's intentional operations (subject-as-object) but also of oneself as conscious (subject-as-subject). This is an important point. Since Lonergan's understanding of religious and mystical consciousness is grounded in the realm of interiority, one must have undergone the self-appropriation Lonergan calls the intellectual conversion, if his position is to be clearly understood (1972:238). The preceding paragraph itself can be fully understood only within that horizon.

Be that as it may, the appropriation of oneself as conscious is the first step toward the critical understanding of Lonergan's position on mystical consciousness. For mystical consciousness is a consciousness of vital intersubjectivity, and if one can appreciate the subject-as-subject, one is in a position to move to the second step, an appreciation of subjects-as-vitally-intersubjective. It will be recalled in this regard that Lonergan distinguishes intentional intersubjectivity from vital intersubjectivity. In the former, two subjects are united in their response to a common object. In vital intersubjectivity, there is no object; the union is one of two subjects-as-subjects. It is not by sharing a common object, but by sharing a common consciousness, that the two become one. Before turning to mystical intersubjectivity, however, a brief reflection upon intersubjectivity in general is in order.

Happily, the terms and distinctions introduced in the preceding discussion of consciousness are also applicable to intersubjective consciousness. For instance, as in the case of consciousness itself, one becomes aware of intersubjective consciousness by heightening or intensifying one's attention to it. One attends, as it were, to the subject-as-intersubjective. This is attentiveness to what Lonergan contends is a spontaneous, immediate experience of connectedness, of relationship (1967:212; 1972:57; 1975:31).

It is not primarily a matter of two or more individuals regarded as "objects" and related by proximity in space. It is a matter of shared or interconnected consciousness. Again, it is not a matter of sharing the content of one's consciousness (common thoughts, values). It is being vitally linked by consciousness itself. Once attended to, intersubjectivity can then become the object of intentional inquiry (intersubjectivity-as-object).
Since intersubjectivity is the lynchpin in the position on mystical consciousness being developed here, it seems important to me to clarify one point in Lonergan's treatment of intersubjectivity that is potentially ambiguous, if not misleading. The possibility of misunderstanding centers on his use of the phenomenology of a smile to illustrate intersubjectivity as a carrier of meaning (1972:59-61; 1975:31-32). Lonergan refers to the smile as "spontaneous," as "natural," as the "immediate" revelation of a relationship (1972:60). From his use of these terms it could easily be concluded that Lonergan is equating the intersubjectivity revealed in a smile with the vital intersubjectivity discussed here in the preceding paragraph. This is not the case. In the discussions of the smile, Lonergan is trying to distinguish intersubjective bearers of meaning (such as the smile) from other bearers of meaning, such as words and symbols. Implicit in his discussion is the distinction between intersubjectivity as immediate, and intersubjectivity as mediated by meaning. This is the distinction between intersubjectivity as the spontaneous, vital interconnection of consciousness discussed above, and intersubjectivity as communicated or expressed through smiles, vocal tones, posture, and so forth (1972:61). Typically we focus on the mediation of intersubjectivity, on the frowns, the caresses, the wide range of emotions triggered within us by another person. Careful attention, however, reveals that behind, or mediated by, these looks and touches and feelings is a relationship given directly to consciousness-as-consciousness. Here again, Lonergan's distinction between consciousness and attention is important. The degree of one's openness and attentiveness to one's conscious connection with another will vary. One may, for example, be in love (or out of love) with someone for some time before a belated attentiveness brings it into awareness.

Turning now from intersubjectivity in general to our third step, the intersubjectivity of mystical consciousness in particular, it is to be hoped that the foregoing discussion has put us in a position to gain critical control over what Lonergan means by "the gift of God's love." Several points can be noted. First, like other experiences of vital intersubjectivity, mystical consciousness is not the intentional awareness of an object, but an interconnection of consciousnesses. But this,

second, does not mean that it is an experience totally like that of human intersubjectivity. Mystical intersubjectivity is an experience of vital union with a consciousness the nature of which radically transcends the human. Human intersubjectivity as vital is at best an analogy for the vital intersubjectivity of mystical consciousness. It is important not to think of mystical intersubjectivity as similar to human intersubjectivity, only bigger—that is, as a matter of quantitative difference. The difference is qualitative. Recall that the religious horizon of human subjectivity comes into focus when one asks the larger question, Is there a ground to my own quest for truth and value? Mystical consciousness, which is the intersubjective union with that ground, provides the affirmative answer to this question. No human subject grounds either its own subjectivity or its own intersubjectivity. The subjectivity which grounds them both is qualitatively other, by the very fact of being their ground. With the difference between human intersubjectivity and mystical intersubjectivity in mind, we are now in a position, third, to understand mystical consciousness as the basic fulfillment of human consciousness as conscious. This is fulfillment in the sense of completion, of being grounded, of resting in the good. Of course, it is only the fully differentiated mystic who approaches fulfillment in this sense, and that only insofar as it is possible in this life.

"God's gift of his love," then, when transposed into the categories of interiority and correlated with the structures of human consciousness, refers not to the experience of an object, but to the vital union of an individual's consciousness-as-conscious with its conscious ground. And the affective and intentional counterpart of mystical consciousness is the unrestricted desire of religious consciousness to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and in love.

Such a transposition gives one critical control over the language of mystical consciousness and opens up the possibility of genuine interreligious and cross-cultural dialogue. This point can be illustrated with reference to Lonergan himself. For while Lonergan regularly claims "that the gift of God's love is transcultural" (1972:282-283), as long as he uses "God" language to make this claim, it will, by that very fact, be denied by a non-theistic tradition such as Buddhism. Furthermore, as long as Lonergan uses a Christian doctrine of grace as the
principle warrant for that claim, it will be denied by all non-
Christians (1972:283). However, if the language of Christian doctrine
is not employed as the basic medium of interreligious dialogue, but is
instead recognized as a derived language which can be correlated with
the structure of human consciousness, then dialogue is possible with
anyone, from any culture, who is willing to attend to the dynamics of
consciousness. 14

Now, once the critical bases for interreligious dialogue have
been worked out within the categories of interiority, there are two
levels on which this dialogue can take place. It is in considering the
first level that my personal limitations become most evident and the
need for new mystical cartographers most obvious. For the transposition
that has been presented is merely the broad theoretical outline of the
nature of mystical consciousness. It needs to be descriptively checked,
corroborated, extended, and modified by the accounts of mystical
consciousness that emerge not only from within Christianity but outside
as well. As I said at the outset, this task I leave to a contemporary
Teresa of Ávila.

On a second level, however, for theologians such as myself who
are unable personally to provide new mystical charts, there remains the
important task of critically analyzing and comparing the mystical
accounts and analyses that are already available. This is the task of
Dialectic, and on this level, to have critical control over the language
of mystical consciousness opens up many avenues of potentially fruitful
dialogue, not only outside one's own tradition but also within it. This
task of course is vast, and from the perspective of a contemporary
mystical theology it has yet to be begun. Before it can effectively
begin, however, there is an additional foundational category that must
be clarified, namely the nature of religious and mystical knowledge.
This issue is basic, of course, for the cognitional task of accurately
specifying what mystics do when they know is no less crucial for
mystical theology, cartography, and analysis, than it is for any philo-

14. It is instructive to note the different arguments Lonergan gives for
the transcultural nature of transcendental method as contrasted with
the transcultural nature of God's gift of his love. The former is
based on interiority; the latter on doctrine. See Lonergan,
sophical or theological endeavor. There will, in addition, be the added benefit of clarifying Lonergan's position on religious and mystical knowing.

RELIGIOUS AND MYSTICAL KNOWING

We are now in a position to inquire into the knowing that attends religious and mystical consciousness. And there is, as might be expected, a mode of knowing that corresponds to each. Since, however, both these modes, properly speaking, centrally entail a "knowledge of value," what Lonergan means by knowledge of fact can therefore be used to provide a contrast to both religious and mystical knowing.

It is in his distinction between knowledge of fact and knowledge of value that Lonergan may distinguish religious knowing from factual knowing. As illustrated earlier in the example of the approaching car, a judgment of fact is the culmination of the first three levels of intentional consciousness. One experiences the moving shape, understands it to be an approaching car, and through judgment affirms that this understanding is correct. This judgment, if correct, issues in a knowledge of fact. And even if the judgment is incorrect, the benighted knower still assumes is a fact. The assertion of fact is then followed by a judgment of value which takes place on the fourth level of intentional consciousness. It is a judgment regarding the significance of the fact just discerned and the action that is appropriate in response to it (1972:30-31). The judgment of value entails what Lonergan calls "further knowledge" because it functions as a selective principle, a principle which establishes one's orientation to knowledge of fact. As Lonergan puts the matter, "it is by appealing to value or values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove others, that we praise or blame human persons as good or evil and their actions as right or wrong" (1974:81).

Religious knowledge, as operative within religious consciousness, is chiefly just such a further knowledge (1972:11). For, inasmuch as
religious consciousness is a religious judgment of value (that is, an intentional response to ultimate value which Lonergan names being in love with God), then it too functions as a principle of one's orientation to the world. In a language of interiority, religious knowing is mainly the "knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love." In the traditional language of theology, the knowing that attends the second moment of religious consciousness is the knowledge of faith. "Faith," for Lonergan, "is the knowledge born of religious love" (1972:122).

There is however a significant difference between the judgment of religious value called faith and other, more ordinary judgments of value. For whereas ordinary judgments of value often depend on a prior knowledge of fact, faith, according to Lonergan, entails no such prior knowledge. He points out that in ordinary circumstances knowledge precedes love, adding, however, that "the major exception ... is God's gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love. But who it is we love is neither given nor as yet understood" (1972:122). Thus, rather than the judgment of fact which occasions ordinary judgments of value, it is the gift of God's love which occasions faith. (Lonergan also concedes that this occurs in other instances of loving—say, of intimacy or of one's country—as well.)

Indeed, as we have seen, at the outset the gift of God's love in mystical consciousness is not known either previously or initially through a judgment of fact, that is, as an object intended by intellectual inquiry. Instead, it is "known" at first through heightened awareness of an experience of intersubjective consciousness. This explains Lonergan's comment that "who we love is neither given nor as yet understood," for those determinations are a matter of intellectual inquiry.

What kind of knowing then is mystical knowing? Several points must be made. First, as noted earlier, the initial experience of mystical consciousness parallels what Lonergan calls one's experience of oneself as subject, of the subject-as-subject, except that in mystical consciousness the experience is one of the subject as transcendentally intersubjective. The experience therefore is not one's ordinary awareness of consciousness as an unrestricted drive toward knowledge and value. Rather, one becomes aware of the fulfillment of that drive. This is to say, in Lonergan's words, that one becomes conscious of "a
clouded revelation of absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness" (1972:116). There is here no intending of an object; Lonergan is describing a heightened awareness of intersubjective union. It is consciousness, not knowledge, and as such is the experience of mystery (1972:106).

That is not to say, however, that mystical intersubjectivity cannot become an object of intellectual inquiry. For, as Lonergan himself says, "from an experience of love focused on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge" (1972:109), and as an individual becomes mystically differentiated, intellectual inquiry becomes operative within mystical consciousness. One can advance toward a knowledge which parallels the more common inquiry into the subject-as-object, although in this case, of course, the inquiry is into the mystically-intersubjective-subject-as-object. It is at this point, perhaps, that Christian mystics make their claims for having contemplated the Trinity.

Now it must be noted that in both of these cases, the concern of mystical knowing has been concerned with mystical consciousness itself: first simply as consciousness, and second as the object of inquiry. There has been no concern with the content of mystical consciousness. The distinction between consciousness and its intentional contents is important, for it is the structure and dynamics of human consciousness that is itself transcultural and not the content of that consciousness. Content by itself may be particular and tradition-bound. If this distinction is either blurred or lost, valid cross-cultural analysis is jeopardized.

This is not to say, of course, that there is no content known within mystical consciousness. The testimony of the mystics would indicate that there is indeed an intentional knowing within mystical consciousness. It can be aptly regarded as paralleling what Lonergan calls knowledge of an object-as-object. Hence, from within mystical consciousness, the Buddha claimed to have understood all of his past lives, Teresa of Ávila claimed to have had a treasure chest of knowledge open to her, and Patanjali claimed to have a knowledge of all things.

The advantage of the foregoing analysis of mystical knowing is that it provides a critically grounded set of terms and relations which can be used by the theologian operating in the functional specialty Dialectic. It is a set that can be used in many ways, and which then can be corrected and expanded. Several examples will illustrate.
First, it can be used to guide the analysis of mystical texts. It can be used, for instance, as a tool for discerning and objectifying the performance of mystical knowing for which there is evidence in the writings of the mystics. This is to be distinguished from the mystics' own accounts of what they do when they know, for they are often no more accurate in objectifying their performance of mystical knowing than philosophers and theologians are in objectifying their own performances of knowing. Typically, mystics understand mystical knowing on the analogy of intuitive vision, according to which mystical knowing is like taking a mystical look. The doctrine of spiritual sense has evolved in connection with this theory of mystical cognition. The analysis of mystical consciousness developed here would indicate that both of these traditional notions need to be re-evaluated.

Second, this set of terms and relations can also be employed in a dialectical critique of philosophical analyses of mystical consciousness. For, insofar as such analyses misconstrue the process of mystical cognition, their positions on the objectivity of mystical knowing and the nature of mystically apprehended reality will be misguided.15

Third, this set of terms and relations can be used to illumine traditional mystical doctrines. For instance, the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of mystical union with the uncreated energies of God can perhaps be illumined by analyzing those energies in terms of mystical intersubjectivity. In this way centuries-old theological conflicts between Eastern and Western Christianity can be resolved.

Fourth, this set of terms and relations can be employed fruitfully, for instance, to effect a cross-cultural comparison with Buddhist mysticism. Buddhism has an ancient tradition of mystical psychology and has since its inception made fundamental correlations between mystical knowing and the functions of mystical consciousness.

Clearly, there is much to be done in the development and elaboration of contemporary mystical theology. But Lonergan has provided the fundamental conceptual tools for effecting one, and there is no need for a mystical theology to be a theology of the future.

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Christians pay religious and intellectual lip service to a doctrinal principle that maintains that the celebrated sacraments cause God's grace. Though we quickly censor any residual magic in this language, we find ourselves nonetheless pressed when trying to explain the efficacy of gestures, words, and things upon God as well as upon ourselves.

The following essay continues my attempts to rethink the classical notions of instrumental causality (Happel, 1980, 1981). The language of Thomas Aquinas concerning this topic uses Aristotelian metaphysical categories to discuss the effective interchanges which occur between the divine and the human and among believers. Can these categories or the questions upon which they are based be transposed into the new key of historical consciousness? Is this possible without losing the precisely religious meaning they were meant to convey? Can we move from the scientific theory of the medieval world into a language of interiority without destroying the independent action of divinity upon us?

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1. *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, qq 60-65, especially q 64.
The answers to such questions are of wider importance than they might seem. Can divine presence be mediated through the historical, cultural artifacts which we have constructed? Can a sacrament, of whose complex history we are well aware, actually effect a religious change in us? And in what would that religious change consist? To answer such questions adequately will require considerable scholarly effort: the study of medieval and modern notions of causal efficacy, the shifting analysis of cultural communities in empirical and historical terms, analyses of the relationship between individual and communal constitution through actions and words, and so on. In describing the historical activity of communities and their attempts to know divine presence, one would need to speak of the effective change in communal living which occurs through sacramental celebrations and how this experience mediates God. And finally, because no community's celebrations exist in a vacuum, we must ask how participation in Christian sacraments actually effects a form of life, or point of view, or both, which can authentically transform society.

But all these questions must wait. In this context, I think it useful to clarify only a few points in the larger project. We need to make the point that images, not just concepts, bring us closer to ultimate mystery. I will do so by outlining Bernard Lonergan's understanding of image and its cognates as agents in the service of God. These images, for Lonergan, are not purely private endeavors; they function in the service of societal transformation. To supplement what Lonergan says in this regard, we will look at some thoughts of Marxist art critics who are committed to the social effectiveness of cultural artifacts. Finally, we will make some observations on the social way in which images function effects our relationship with God.

This may sound no less grand than all my other proposals. And I am aware that I cannot accomplish an elaborated dialectic in Lonergan's sense of the term. First, Lonergan's reflections upon art, image, and symbol do not provide us with voluminous material though there are helpful comments. Secondly, the constantly shifting schools of Marxist aesthetics make it difficult for me to register all the nuances necessary for full comprehension. But a conversation between Lonergan and Marxist aesthetics on the topic of the social image is useful because both take seriously the public responsibility and capabilities
of the artist and the art work. Lonergan investigates the constitutive power of image and gesture; and through this cognitional framework, it is possible to overcome reductionist theories of art which either privatize its role in society or limit its meaning to the expression of class warfare. Images can grip a society; common rituals define communities; and gestures of defiance or comfort can overturn and found governments. Kant's "disinterested" critic, facing an ahistorical art, simply does not exist:

Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty, in which the least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgment of taste. We must not be in the least prejudiced in favor of the existence of the things, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge in things of taste.

The sacraments of the Christian church use images, gestures, and symbols as the medium of change in the lives of congregations. Like a non-Kantian notion of art, they too are "interested," concerned to effect a difference in the lives of believers. How do these changes occur without being manipulative or creating a 'herd mentality'? Are the sacraments propaganda? Can communities give themselves to them with uncritical naiveté?

I

IMAGE AS AGENT IN LONERGAN'S NOTION OF MYSTERY

In the interpretation of Lonergan which follows, I shall focus upon the role of image and its cognates in the public, social sphere. But it is helpful to begin by locating his discussion against a wider philosophical horizon, so that it is possible to see that his interpretation clarifies a complex history of thought. G. W. F. Hegel's understanding of the difference between Bild and Vorstellung permits us to

see that Lonergan's interpretation of image is part of a larger philosophical issue.\(^3\)

*Bild*, for Hegel, is the naive "holding" of perceptual images; *Vorstellung* is their re-presentation in consciousness. In the first, mind is passive, achieving only the differentiations relating to figural presence. Pictures flow through consciousness without particular fixation of form. Representation, on the other hand, is more universal because it contains an element of reflection. Consciousness holds or retains the image for its inner meaning, thus moving away from the sensuous flow and reaching toward abstract thought. *Vorstellung* holds a mediating role in human knowing. It is *Vorstellung* that the artist engages when reshaping the sensuous flow to convey some element of his or her own interiority.

Representation is the proper language for religion to speak, though it is not the ultimate form that thinking (*Denken*) can assume. In its sensuous, empirical form, that of image, symbol, narrative and ritual, representation provides the proper and true content of our knowledge of the world and ultimate reality (*Geist*), but not the true shape. Only philosophy can accomplish the ultimate reflection upon knowing as knowing.

Nonetheless, figurative re-presentations are crucial to religion since they provide the possibility of remembrance and interiorization of the originating experience and message. Oscillating between the absolutely concrete sensuous image and the abstract explicitation of reason by itself, *Vorstellung* pivots between a "romanticist appeal to the inarticulate and the abysmal" and any dogmatic claims for "fixed symbolism" (Ricoeur, 1980:14).\(^4\) Without image as representation, we would not be

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4. Ricoeur sees the originality of Hegel's hermeneutic in its positng of a prior immediacy, a non-hermeneutical "same-ness" between Absolute and immediacy coupled with its individuation in Jesus from
human. The authentic ambiguity or amphiboly of re-presentation, whether
in art (its preeminent example) or in the ongoing process of knowing,
provides the proper crossroads, the rhetorical agora between the ideolo-
gies of mass feeling and instinct and the technologies of totalitarian
 technological advance. One escapes re-presentation only at the expense
of becoming an unthinking plotless flow or a thoughtless clone of some-
one else's alienated vocabulary.

Lonergan's description of the difference between the images of
immediacy and those of mediation parallels this interpretation of Hegel
difference between perceptual flow and art, between imagination as an
ordinary operator within consciousness and the creativity of the artist.
Lonergan rediscovery Coleridge's differentiation between the primary
imagination (the "living power and prime agent of all human perception")
and the secondary imagination (the ability to "dissolve, diffuse, dissi-
pate, in order to recreate, to idealize and unify").

For Lonergan, images are necessary at all levels of conscious-
ness. Thus he distinguishes between (1) image as image, which is the
"sensible content as operative on the sensitive level," (2) image as
symbol, which stands in correspondence with activities or elements on
the intellectual levels, a factor in discerning the known unknown; and
(3) image as sign or signal, in which there is some abstracting attempt
to "indicate the import of the image" (Lonergan, 1957:533).

At all levels (the perceptual, the symbolic, and the signifi-
catory), images cannot ultimately be transcended. "Some sensitive
awareness and response, symbolic of the known unknown, must be regarded
as a generally and permanently recurring feature of human living"
(1957:533; see also 1980:180; 1972:86; 1957:440, 458). Images at the
level of perception are immanently produced. When we say we are
imagining something, we are generating interior images. But this
intentional character of image has only a limited object, confined to a

which the process of figurative thought is generated in the community
of believers (p. 14).

5. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (Oxford: Oxford
Images, however, can also be an apprehension of the possible, heuristic in their intent (1980:179; 1957:18, 439, 534). In this images are recognized not as part of a flow, but as potential for insight. Without imagination, we cannot have the stuff from which insights take their particulars; without insights, which reach beyond the level of imagination, we would not have intelligence (1957:10, 16, 34-35; 1980:39, 49; 1967:101). Insights focus the particular way of "holding" the image: must things be this way? Or can they be another? (1980:30). In this mode, images do not disappear from consciousness, but they remain present as explained, not as described, sensed, or imagined (1957:512-13).

Though Lonergan often stresses the ways in which stenosymbols6 can be of use in moving to higher viewpoints in knowledge, thus focusing upon the character of image as signal (1980:99; 1967:4-5; 1972:187), he also knows the more complex ways in which images carry the anticipations of intelligence into mystery (1980:368; 1957:547). Here images encourage either myth or mystery (1957:548). Mystery is image on the way to self-integration; myth is the use of images in a non-heuristic fashion, as an end-product of human self-knowledge (1957:538). Myth confuses the intensity of image with the virtually unconditioned criteria for truth or falsity. Myth is image become motionless idol.

Images, however, can also be part of the continuing emergence of self-understanding as symbol. There are no neutral images. We either become conscious of how our images function in experience, or we are manipulated by them. Thus from Insight through later work, Lonergan describes the unique and characteristic logic of images: their polysemantic force, their ability to carry all levels of understanding, and the fact that they do not operate under the law of contradiction (1980:268). Images function as a principle of continuity in the mobility of self-understanding, and as a principle of efficacy (1980:269). It is important to link our feelings, our actions, and our thinking to their originating and expressive images. It is in this way that imagination enables self-appropriation (1980:270).

This sort of image is not so much a signal of something intellectual as a way of patterning the world (1972:61). It is the way of the

6. The vocabulary is Philip Wheelwright's; see 1968:3-17.
Whether Sacraments Liberate Communities

artist. The artist re-presents, "holds" his or her images in a non-conceptual, particularizing expression (1980:43-44). Following Eliade, Lonergan asserts that images remain powerfully present, if debased, in our society (1980:266). They are a transcultural, fundamental communication, independent of words. Artistic images are "the conscious performing of a transformed subject in his transformed world" (1972:61). Artistic representation permits an exit from the everyday world and entry into that of irreplaceable freedom. The same factors by which an artist produces an artistic representation—psychic distance from the field of feelings, embodiment in a commanding form, idealizing the original experiential pattern—invite the new viewer, listener, to participate in the image. Artistic appreciation is validated in the new participant's recovery of the originating experience traced in the work of art itself. The conditions of an image's authenticity are the "repetition," the enactment in the viewer or listener of the possibilities of the work. What was creative activation in image for one becomes the potential and real enactment for another.

Images function in the affective development of individuals (1972:65). They are symbolic of real or imaginary objects that evoke or are evoked by feeling. But as images in the psyche, they function by the same logic as image at all levels of consciousness: through polysemy, coincidence of opposites, and representation. If such symbols' self-presentation becomes affectively fixated, refusing to allow the person to develop into an adult, then the transvaluing operations in self-appropriation have not occurred.

Images can also function publicly in the achievement of a community's freedom. The basic problem, Lonergan says, is "to discover the dynamic images that both correspond to intellectual contents, orientations and determinations yet also possess in the sensitive field the power to issue forth not only in word but also into deeds" (1957:561). Reason and intelligence will only be effective if they have made use of the "symbols and signs by which they translate their directives to human sensibility" (1957:562). Only through simultaneous affective and cognitive reformulations of culture will the longer cycle of decline be challenged (1957:236).

Such cultural images will not be a matter of force or propaganda (images used as tools of sheer will or reason); they will offer possible
appropriation of the truth, refusing forgetfulness of past failures. They will encourage a heightened grasp of a community's historical origins and responsibilities. They will function within the established routines of the human will, human sensitivity and intersubjectivity (1957:691). They will be related to art and literature, theatre and broadcasting, journalism and history, academy and university, and a breadth of public opinion (1957:236-241). They will operate as a common field of experience (potential) for human development, a common understanding (formal), with areas of common agreement (actual) and common dedication (effective) (1967:245; 1972:79).

What this interpretation of Lonergan has outlined is the basic structure of a rhetoric: a grammar of persuasion through image and its cognates which functions at the personal and communal levels, notices the differences between what is the authentic and inauthentic "instrumentality" of images, and encourages the development of a public vocabulary that hopes to interpret the world and change it. Instrumental change has shifted from metaphysical categories to those which operate in cognitional theory and an incipient social understanding. Such a symbolic rhetoric is, for Lonergan, part of the process of overcoming evil in the world (1957:723; 1980:329).

II

THE SOCIAL EFFICACY OF ART: SOME MARXIST REMARKS

To extend Lonergan's approach to images, we will investigate the way in which some thinkers approach the social role of art. Committed to the causal character of art in society, certain marxist interpreters can offer an amplification of Lonergan's social thought which remains undeveloped. As part of the ultimate goal of this paper, these literary and social critics contribute further arguments for the concretization of historical causality. Their arguments against the privatization of art in nineteenth-century middle-class culture permit an analogous critique to be made of some religious interpretations of the sacraments.

The romantic revolt against-eighteenth century Enlightenment discourse has been reabsorbed into our intellectual climate through an
avowal of spontaneity against the techniques of instrumental reason (Jameson, 1981:232; Eagleton, 1967:205). The eruptions of the 1960s, both in Europe and in the United States experienced symbolic, non-verbal language as subversive of institutional manipulations. Popular art became a way to reject oppressive authority. Images functioned at a public level for the good or ill of the commonwealth. This was true in religion as in politics, as the post-Vatican II experience of Roman Catholics has made clear. Anyone who has tried to change long-standing statuary in a church sanctuary knows the public, emotional strength of images in defining the ethos of a community.

The commitment to affective expression, especially in non-verbal forms has often led into blind alleys: the privatization of symbolic or artistic artifacts, an obscurantism which refused criticism, and mystifying ways of validating the voices of culture. The attempt to understand the social role of image and its cognates hopes to guide us through the labyrinth. The appeal to image and art as a foundational expression of religion and politics is not a repeal of reason or an invitation to fanatic mystification. On the other hand, the post-Enlightenment belief that symbols are simply residual magical thinking will not be overcome by an announcement that they are 'really' founded in the crypto-authoritative weight of universal archetypes, as in some uses of Northrop Frye and Carl Jung. Images are not private biography, but they are historical. Validation of the social, public function of images will require the difficult work of understanding their constitutive efficacy in the progress and decline of communal enterprises. This is true in both religion and politics.

The analysis which follows, therefore, begins this process by outlining some marxist work on the way in which image forms or deforms communal enterprises. Art has been privatized, marginalized, and limited in its scope of endeavor (Tracy, 1981:99-153). It is in need of redesrciption and revitalization as much as sacrament. The marxist interpretations of art, though they sometimes reduce art to its infrastructures (the modes of production, class oppositions, and so on), or turn artistic products into dutiful propaganda for current party policy (Laing, 1978), do have the advantage of being committed to the public, transformational character of art in our society. In this, there appear to be important congruities between a committed marxism and Christi-
anity. By rereading the metaphysical categories of the sacraments through a modified historical causality of marxist aesthetics, we gain a new concreteness for the Christian message.

Both Christians and marxists are convinced that we live in an alienated world (McCabe, 1976:95-96). Both believe that we must be pried loose from our own bonding to the sometimes surreptitious, though always self-defeating, delights which enslave us. Because marxist analysis does not admit non-human agents into the needed transformation of the world, it interprets the mechanisms and constitution of inner-worldly mediations. It always envisions art as a societal rhetoric—a discourse directed from concrete subjects in particular places and times to other subjects in similar or different situations. In this sense, marxist analysis of art recognizes the intersubjective matrix of symbol in a way that much contemporary aesthetics does not. This makes it particularly useful to someone looking for insight into the actual work of social and cultural causalities.

Artistic mediations are never abstract. They have their origins in particular modes of production (ecological, demographic, economic, class) and "cash out" in specific historical effects (Jameson, 1981:17-102). Yet because of the way art functions through formalization of ordinary languages and gesture (for example, poetry contrasted with prose, dance as a reshaping of common movement), there always appears a distanced dislocation between the artistic product and society. The reason for this is not that the artist is especially genial or that the artifact is peculiarly immune to bourgeois influences (that is, no supposed elitism of either producer or product). Art discloses the fissures in social process because it focuses the political unconscious (Jameson, 1981:78). "The symbolic act therefore begins by generating and producing its own context in the same moment of emergence in which it steps back from it, taking its measure with a view toward its own projects of transformation" (Jameson, 1981:81). Both the figural presence of an artifact and its societal ground appear simultaneously. The formalizing gesture measures the environment.

There is really no neutral art; no art, that is, which operates on its own, for its own sake, outside social origin or need. Art (or image, to use our earlier vocabulary) is either on the way toward freedom or supportive of repression. Art for art's sake is a parasitic
excrescence, encouraged by the oppression of those who support middle-class culture (Wolsterstorff, 1984:265-267). As an individualist's disease, this aesthetics meets that other illness, psychoanalysis, which is a sign of the dissolution of the unity of the bourgeois subject (Jameson, 1981:125). The post-enlightenment revolution which freed middle-class individuals for a comfortable ease in their work and romantic egoism for love disintegrated in the late nineteenth century. Psychoanalysis has risen to assist the individual in reduction of the conflicts which were produced by much larger social alienations. Art for art's sake rose to comfort the social psyche's fragmentation in work; artistic play becomes the anesthetic entertainment of communities. Just as marxist analysis rejects classical psychoanalysis as a means of curing societal ills, so it stresses, not art's private dimensions, but its ongoing, public transformation of desire (Jameson, 1977; Brenkman, 1977).

The concretization of artistic "causality" in social terms understands all the temporal contexts of the art object as part of a continuing process of change (Brinkman, 1973). We will look at the way marxist analysis studies the origins of a work, its future possibilities, and its present operation.

The past origins of a work of art record the empirical defects which governed a given social context. We can see who won and who lost; who could afford 'high' art and who could not; who were the crafting agents and who the users, and so on. The stories of heroes and heroines are ordinarily the biographies of the successful; the teller of tales is often the itinerant wanderer, singing the tunes of others' glory. The texts proclaimed record the suppressed voices of those who have been marginalized by the narrative itself (Jameson, 1981:85). Lodged in the various strata of a work of art are the losers, those who build the building for others to inhabit.

The future appears in a work of art, not as nostalgia for some lost power nor as alienation from social desires which can never emerge (Jameson, 1981:205), but as a genuine utopian possibility, whose eventuality is dependent upon the present participant's choices (Happe, 1979:95-97). Ernst Bloch sees this as the ultimate open-endedness of a work of art, "a state in which its self-identity is not yet manifest" (E. Bloch, 1970:96). "Action will release available transitional ten-
Tendencies into active freedom only if the utopian goal is clearly visible, unadulterated and unrenounced" (92). Thinkers argue that, although Marx's primary contribution to hermeneutics is the suspicion which focused upon the non-identities in values and attitudes within present and past social expressions, the extension of this hermeneutic requires an appeal to the "utopian power" which will form collective unity (Jameson, 1981:281, 291).

Jameson, in The Political Unconscious, describes the present activity of art in transformation as "collective dynamics" (1981:294), whose categories have not first been derived from individual experience. This present emancipatory praxis would name the elements, forms, and objects of action which transform human community. Considered through human intelligence, formed by human choice, this praxis would become spontaneous. Actions like this would "cost," of course; there would be an invited or required investment which would move society beyond its present alienations (Laing, 1978:108). It would be a praxis that is not auto-referential, turning in upon itself in purely formal meaning (Eagleton, 1966:78). It would redirect our common desire, translating us from the imaginary to the symbolic (Laing, 1978:116; Jameson, 1977: 356-358). Still trailing the subversive memories of the past, anticipating the utopian emergences of the future, such praxis would emancipate us for the enjoyment of work and appropriation of love. In this sense, nature and history, necessity and freedom, would coincide.

In a society in which the mass culture of the western world stresses passivity and narcissism, the emancipatory praxis which Jameson proposes must avoid either of two alienated stances of the spectator: the sport of ironic distance which does not engage in a future or the fusion with the hero or heroine which separates the subject from his or her own active participation in the world's present (Althusser, 1969: 148). One overdistances the artistic experience; the second underdistances it. Neither permits the authentic activity of free individuals in common endeavor. If artists stand too far from popular culture, they risk separation from the society they hope to transform (Eagleton, 1966:13). Incentives which seduce the public into authentic adherence must be traced in the artistic work itself. The appeal to utopian values must encode the possible experiences which will change an alienated society.
This rather summary description of how a marxist aesthetics can treat the operative structures of art permits us to make some comparisons with Lonergan's notion of image in its social dynamics. Both assert that images operate either for good or evil in social experience. The marxist analysis describes a helpful scheme for understanding the way in which the concrete temporality of a work of art contributes to the transformation of societies. Whether by registering in their performance the subversive stories of past conflicts or by proposing heuristic possibilities for the future, images contribute to the shifts which confront evil and overturn it. Lonergan's emphasis upon the cognitive middle ground which image occupies clarifies both the cognitive and affective dimensions of the images of common desire. Existential engagement in art is critical to both interpretations; no one is a spectator in a society immersed in images. Narcissist passivity is as much a choice to maintain the status quo as radical politics is the zealous will to change it.

Yet where Jameson stresses the past and the future and locates the present in decision, Lonergan emphasizes the present operation of image as symbol in the ongoing anticipation of the goal: the overcoming of evil in the world. The world patterning which occurs in art holds the universal goal in a particular fashion. The enactment in participants is the concrete heuristic form of the future made present. Lonergan's remarks locate the "transitional tendencies" in the work itself whose appropriation by the community encourages partial, though real, identification with the ultimate utopian goal. For Lonergan, both the affective experience and the cognitive values that are inscribed in the work of art contribute to our present emancipation.

The analysis of social aspects of image and art fits the grammar, sometimes even the vocabulary of Christian sacraments. Jameson denies that religion can contribute to contemporary emancipatory dynamics. Religious symbols and rituals are nostalgia for the imaginary (Jameson, 1981:292). The imaginary life of the child, where pure relationships of struggle, violence, and antagonism operate, is a world in which the subject takes no position, but 'stands outside' all roles, taking all positions simultaneously (Jameson, 1977:356). Religious practice is a mystifying oceanic ideology which represses the authentic enactment of desire (377). Religion only re-presents the inauthentic polar opposites of good over evil, master over slave.
To argue against Jameson's critique of religion is not possible here. What might be useful, however, is to see how sacrament, as a form of ritual communication, fulfills many of the criteria for authentic praxis which Jameson and Lonergan believe to be the role of social image (see Frykman, 1979). The remainder of this essay will turn to this issue. However, the remarks should at least indicate that the Christian sacraments need not be experienced as a contribution to alienated technique, hegemonic mystification, or social repression.

III

SACRAMENT AS THE IMAGINATIVE REDIRECTION
OF COMMON DESIRE

Desire is not to be "confused either with animal impulse or with egoistic scheming" (Lonergan, 1957:212). Desire is the practical artistry through which we ultimately obtain the various goods which animate our lives. Implicit in desire is a dynamic unfolding of aversions as well as attractions (1957:596). Religious desire is the sublation of all our desires (vital, social, personal) in love of a God who continues to transform individuals and communities (1972:47-52, 105). Being in love with God in an unrestricted fashion fulfills all our conscious intentionalities. The past embodiments of desire can be seen to reflect the previous successes and failures in our quest for self-transcendence into God. Certain images will present the symbolic hopes of the future, contingent upon the factual choices of the present (1957:702). The ability of image to direct and redirect our desire to know and to love is operative in the present as well. It is this aspect which has occupied our attention. In the section which follows, I will offer some reflections upon the way in which the sacraments as images reshape our common desire in the present.

I have argued elsewhere (Happel, 1981) that the primary expression of conversion, of falling-in-love-with-God in an unrestricted fashion, is sacramental prayer as a fundamentally intersubjective experience. The sacraments are the orthopraxis which define our ways with one another as we attempt to achieve authenticity. Sacramental
Whether Sacraments Liberate Communities

life within the church provides the potential structures and partial actuality of our performance as religious beings. Yet the sacraments are not cartoons to make us know truth; nor are they propaganda for some already constituted doctrine, making us feel guilty for not having attained an absent ideal. What do the genres of sacramental expression themselves tell us about their efficacy? Can we speak of the way sacraments effect a common freedom?

The primary genre in ritual communication is actually a distanti- ation or distortion in relationship to ordinary language (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:54-55, 91; Ricoeur, 1977c, 134-172). Ritual language changes interpersonal conversation, limiting its open-ended range, requiring an ascesis (M. Bloch, 1974; Goffman, 1981). Is this abandonment of the potential freedoms of natural speech a destruction or an enablement of human freedom? What does it mean for individuals to vest their religious speech in another so that that other can authentically say "we" to God? The heart, in other words, of the historical causality operative in sacramental ritual is the establishment of human collaboration in the common project of conversion toward God.

When the participants in ritual share this common language, they address God. This discourse of gestures and words is not some other kind of speech than the dialogue offered to one another; it is precisely within this conversation that the disclosure of God's address to the community and the community's response is made (Eagleton, 1966:168-169). Just as the dialogue of free people with one another is an invitation, not a coercion, so speech with God is persuasion, not force. It is in the interaction that takes place here that language discloses that all human striving is first of all "to have been addressed" by God.7 "This is what love is: it is not that we have loved God, but that he loved us

7. I am fully aware that this set of assertions does not answer one of my first questions about the effects of sacramental life upon God. But I would point out that Thomas Aquinas first outlines the efficacy of petitionary prayer in the context of divine providence and the options of human freedom (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q 83 a 4). Hoping to establish the real though partial efficacy of prayer, he describes how address to God contributes to the effective love which God has for the world. The descriptions and explanations in this essay which indicate how prayer 'works' as an interaction contributes to the concretization of prayer's effective action within the community. This is a medium of divine presence.
and sent his Son to be the means by which our sins are forgiven" (1 Jn 4:10). This manifestation of antecedent divine care for the world, the discovery that in liturgical speech we are not so much wrestling words from silence as allowing the Silence to speak, distinguishes Christianity from the marxist interpretations of historical causality. (Occasionally, however, one gets the impression that the "cunning of history" in its inexorable fatedness toward the future classless state has perversely replaced the freedom which operates in relation to divine providence.)

From prayer, from this sometimes wordless, but never gestureless dialogue with God and with one another, emerges narrative. The shock of recognition which releases the self and the other in conversation permits remembering (Ricoeur, 1977a:190). We choose to formulate our own stories through the announcement of the story of another, in this case, through the words of Jesus' story in the scriptures. This is not an alienation from self, but an appropriation of self, through the discoveries of love in another. But besides the content of Judeo-Christian stories in worship, there is also the very narrative structure of the sacraments themselves. Through our antecedent willingness to enter the prayer, our faithful suspension of our ordinary disbelief, we gain an authentic ritual knowledge.

Theodore Jennings has described this "leading" structure of worship as both heuristic and pedagogic, mirroring our own analysis of Lonergan on image. Through corporeal participation, worshippers not only cognitively recall certain past freeing moments, but they also liminally explore them. Through patterns of enacted praxis, the known becomes the basis for an anticipated unknown—just as surely as questions in certain ways will only invite particular answers.

Jennings argues that we learn a number of important things when we engage in Christian worship. (1) We gain a knowledge of the ritual-action itself, a reasonably obvious skill at appropriating the mechanisms of interaction. (2) We learn how this action fits into non-ritualized contexts, much as we assume and then test the operation of important conversations (I love you; I promise you) in ordinary speech. And (3) we gain (what Jennings calls) an "ontological praxis." "To participate in a ritual is to know how the world acts, how it 'comes to be.'" (Jennings, 1982:111-127; Searle, 1982; Hefling, 1979). Participa-
tion in ritual permits entry into the world as event, as existence, rather than as thing to be manipulated. In ritual enactment, the rhythm of reality is disclosed. Jennings quotes van der Leeuw who cites Lucian: "He who does not dance does not know what will happen" (Jennings, 1982:121). As a paradigm for behavior, therefore, ritual encourages a wide range of roles and corresponding styles outside worship. Reflective knowledge and inquiry are an extension of a more fundamental knowing that is available in the performance of worship. The validation of that knowledge entails criteria of consistency within its own ritual self-definition and fittingness or adequacy to the world. An important pragmatic test is ritual's continual engagement of responsible participants in and for the world.

Two further genres of image and symbol are significant in this context: prophecy and prescription (Ricoeur, 1977c). From the worshipping experience, both derive a mode of normative discourse for living. The prophet speaks in the name of God for the sake of the transformation of a world; the lawmaker or moral individual clarifies the ethical component in human actions and requires compliance for authenticity. In both cases, the rhetorical dialogue within homiletic discourse has been distinguished from within the ritual grammar and has been intensified to promote moral responsibility.

IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, I have (1) outlined the validity of image as an effective mode within human consciousness; (2) provided further social context for this notion of the transformational power of image by outlining some pertinent aspects of Marxist hermeneutics of art; and (3) indicated briefly how ritual as image, symbol, story, and dialogue fulfills some of the aspects of the communal redirection of desire. This is an all too brief beginning. The forms of worshipful rhetoric which I have outlined here are the linguistic, historical "causes" which render less abstract the effective character of Christian conversion. They recur repeatedly because the freedom which they continue to promote
is an ever precarious authenticity, requiring criticism by Christian stories (weakness produces strength) and the confrontation with the suppressed victims of human sin (McCabe, 1976:102; Lamb, 1982).

The sacraments do have an instrumental causality, as the ancient and medieval theologians concurred; but the explanation of this notion must be extricated from both its abstract Aristotelian metaphysics, where that is authentically operative, and its too regularly superstitious usage, particularly when that alienates Christian people from the very events their participation defines. This move from classicist to historical consciousness is never simply accomplished. Part of the assistance which marxist aesthetics can offer is to demonstrate where past and present alienated social understandings complicate the shift. 8

The renewed study of sacramental efficacy will not only require the phenomenological description of historical ritual development and its culturally transformative action, but also the projection of utopian possibilities for the future. Though Christians may not have a blueprint for the future, they are not thereby without tentative plans. Indeed, if my argument has been even minimally correct, sacraments themselves contribute partially, though really, to the achievement of that common future. The orthopraxis of sacraments, which slowly change the church through their call and claims, recalls the past, redirects the present desires of the community, and promotes the possibility of an authentic future. But because they always remain invitation, not coercion, they permit the same reply the Athenians gave Paul on the Agora: "We will hear you on this subject another time" (Ac 17:32). 9

8. So for example, the meaning of the 1614 Catholic Ritual or the 1969 Roman Missal can usefully be understood in terms of the modes of production, the class-relationships, the cultural origins and the places or congregations of reception. Or the ethical, affective, and cognitive effects of the ritual language in Anglo-Saxon England might be studied.

9. I am indebted for the reformulation of this essay to comments made during the June, 1983 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College; and to a close reading of an earlier version by my colleagues William Loewe and Joseph Komonchak in the Department of Religion and Religious Education at the Catholic University of America.
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Because in Him the Word is united to the Flesh without loss of perfection, Reason is redeemed from incestuous fixation on her own Logic ... Because in Him abstraction finds a passionate For-The-Sake-Of, by Him is the continuous development of Science assured.

W. H. AUDEN

PREFLUE

Christian theology as Lonergan conceives it in his more recent writings is "die Wendung zur Idee, the shift towards system, occurring within Christianity. It makes thematic what already is a part of Christian living"—namely, meaning (1972c:144). But Christian living itself goes on within the larger context of human history; within that history there can be distinguished the successive styles or ways or manners of meaning that Lonergan refers to as stages (1972:85-99); and it is into the third of these, the methodological stage of meaning, that he proposes to guide Christianity's shift towards system. In so far as this proposal is acted on, the enterprise of 'making Christian meaning thematic' becomes, as Fred Lawrence emphasizes (Lawrence, 1981), a hermeneutical one, an enterprise of understanding the past in order to confront the future—or, perhaps better, one of guiding the future by loving the past.

The hard question is what all of this amounts to in concrete terms. Hungry for a theological feast, many have complained that what Lonergan gives them is a tour of the kitchen. Their complaint is not groundless. The best way to show that something can be done is to do it, but Lonergan, it seems, has done no such thing; indeed, has delib-
ately refrained from doing it. There are, to be sure, the four major Latin treatises that Lonergan wrote between 1956 and 1964, some fourteen hundred pages in all, but their status is somewhat peculiar. For one thing, they are textbooks, 'practical chores' that went along with teaching under the 'impossible conditions' of a system now demolished (Lonergan, 1973:15; 1974:211-212). For another, they belong to the 'prior phase' of Lonergan's thinking.\(^1\) Even the relatively short section of De Deo Trino that has been translated as *The Way to Nicea* was written before he had worked out a scheme of functional specialization capable of effecting transposition into a fully methodological context.\(^2\) As for the handful of essays written since that breakthrough, none of them is in any straightforward sense an application of the method of Method. One of them, however, in twenty tersely-worded pages, does much to illuminate the frequently canvassed question of Lonergan the methodologist versus Lonergan the theologian. Although "Christology Today," as its subtitle indicates, is mainly concerned with methodological reflections, it also brings forward, into the context of Lonergan's more recent work, theological questions he had treated in his prior phase. Moreover, it addresses new questions that arise when the procedures of modern historical scholarship are applied to Christianity's 'outer world.'

From these two sets of questions my paper takes its bearings. Part One examines Lonergan's transposition of the doctrine of the Incarnation; more specifically, his treatment of the one, divine person of Christ. Part Two takes up the issue of how this transposition fares if the New Testament, as well as the decrees of the early Christological councils, is treated as a consistently empirical method must treat it: not, in the first instance, as revealed truth but simply as data.

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1. This phrase is borrowed from Frederick Crowe, who locates the term of Lonergan's 'prior phase' in *De Deo Trino* (Crowe, 1971:24). Joseph Komonchak makes much the same point (Komonchak:11). For a discussion of the watershed of 1964-65, see Ryan and Tyrrell.

2. Lonergan himself has said that the idea of functional specialization first occurred to him in February, 1965—that is, after the final version of *De Deo Trino* had appeared. *The Way to Nicea* is a translation of the most 'advanced' section, the praemittenda of the first volume (Pars dogmatica). See also note 7 below.
Redemption and Intellectual Conversion

Both of these issues reflect the larger concern that gives my paper its title. Perhaps the most obvious indication of a shift in Lonergan's thinking since Insight is the central role Method assigns to the 'existential' dimension of human intentionality in general and on religious conversion in particular, as contrasted with Insight's invitation to intellectual conversion with its emphasis on truth and judgments of fact. Yet this contrast can be, and has been, overdrawn. Fully human behavior is intelligent and reasonable as well as responsible; and if 'the love of God poured into our hearts' is really the fulfillment of human self-transcendence, it is the principle of cognitional as well as moral and religious authenticity. Religious conversion, that is, 'sublates' intellectual conversion, but what it sublates is intellectual conversion, not something else; and it does not become something else by being sublated. In Method Lonergan approaches in a new way what he speaks of in Insight as the endeavor "to establish the synthesis of the objects and the symbiosis of the principles of reason and faith." But there is no essential change, still less abandonment, of that goal. Even "arriving on the scene a little breathlessly and a little late" (1957:733) is preferable to running in some other direction altogether.

PART ONE: CHALCEDON TRANSPOSED

1.1 Background to the problem

"Christology Today" is best understood in the ongoing context of Lonergan's thought, beginning with his studies of Thomas Aquinas's theory of understanding (Lonergan, 1967b, originally published 1946-1949). A brief sketch of subsequent developments in his position will serve to introduce the problem of transposition and the content of what he aims to transpose.

The Verbum articles, together with Insight, led Lonergan to certain conclusions about the 'difficult, recent, and primitive' notion of the human subject (1967a:173). These conclusions are applied in Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica, which is Lonergan's own systematic treatment of the theological topic he had examined in the work of Thomas, and which would eventually become the second volume of De Deo.
But the notion of the human subject is relevant to the theology of the Incarnation as well as to the psychological analogy for understanding the persons of the Trinity. In the last two of six sections comprised in *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica*, a shorter treatise that first appeared in 1956, Lonergan argues that a psychological account of Christ's person is not only permitted but in some sense demanded by the *Definitio Fidelis* of the council of Chalcedon: if Christ is truly human as well as truly divine, the task of understanding the Incarnation has both an anthropological and a theological dimension. It follows that theology, as *fides quaerens intellectum*, ought to take into account what contemporary human sciences, psychology in particular, have to say about personality.

Lonergan refers to this, his earliest treatment of Christ's consciousness, as 'speculative,' which is not to say there is no real question to be addressed. On the contrary, at issue are weighty objections to classical Christology, first raised by German scholars in the nineteenth century and now taken seriously by theologians of every confessional allegiance. J. S. Lawton, in a fine historical study to which Lonergan refers (Lonergan, 1964c:15), suggests that modern dissatisfaction with the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation rests on two basic postulates. One is that "in order for the Person of Christ to be studied at all intelligibly as an historic figure—and studied as such he must be—his person, his personality, must be a psychological unity, like the being of all other men." Secondly, if Christ is to be understood at all, "he must have been first and foremost a human being ... whose nature was not vitiated by the intrusion of incompatible attributes." In sum, "Christ must be truly one, and truly human" (Lawton:23-24). But such a conclusion cannot be reconciled, at least *prima facie*, with what was laid down in 451 at Chalcedon. For while the Chalcedonian definition, with its repeated 'one and the same,' explicitly affirms that Christ is one person, it also implies what the third

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3. The rather complicated chronology of the two volumes of *De Deo Trino* is given in O'Donovan:xvi-xvii. For a somewhat fuller account of 'what was going forward' in Lonergan's methodological thought, as reflected in the successive versions of this treatise, see Hefling, 1982:23-70, which owes much to the suggestions of Crowe (1980:18-23).
council of Constantinople would later state outright: this one person is
a divine person, 'one of the holy, consubstantial, life-giving Trinity.'

So long as it was understood in a systematic framework of metaphysics, the doctrine that in Christ there is no human person presented
no insurmountable difficulties. The psychological aspect of his human
nature could be handled by adding to the Aristotelian definition of a
human soul such perfections as were thought to befit a divine person
(Lonergan, 1976a:47, 52). But scholastic theology's synthesis has at
length succumbed to the combined force of the three revolutions that
mark the end of classicist culture in general (1972:317-318). The first
assault, as Lawton points out, was philosophical—the Enlightenment's
rejection of metaphysics itself. A second followed when the New Testa-
ment began to be studied historically and attention was drawn to what
seemed to be large discrepancies between its portrayal of Jesus and the
Christ of the classic church doctrines. Most recent and most specific
has been the advent of psychology as a science in its own right. It has
given to the word 'person,' even in commonsense usage, a meaning quite
different from its meaning in earlier theology. Today, 'person' refers
to the psychological subject of interpersonal relations, and it is not
infrequently argued that Jesus Christ cannot be understood as 'like us
in all respects apart from sin' unless he is understood as a human
person in this modern sense (1967a:47-48).

Such is the problem. Lonergan's treatment of the psychology of
Christ acknowledges that it is a valid problem. What he denies is that
in order to address the problem theologians must reject outright the
whole tradition that has been based on the definition of Chalcedon, and
in "Christology Today" he sketches a solution that recontextualizes the
one that he had set out at length in De Constitutione Christi twenty
years before. The summary below draws on both of these, as well as on a
few occasional papers that clarify particular points. It does not,
however, conform verbally with any of these. The aim of the next sec-
tion is to present the intelligible unity of 'what was going forward'
between 1956 and 1976, and in that sense something 'better than the

4. In particular, I will (at the outset) deliberately use the ambiguous
word 'self,' rather than 'person' (which is the bone of contention)
or 'subject' (which Lonergan uses in a technical way that will, I
hope, become clear in due course).
In short, the following is a piece of dialectical history.

1.2 Lonergan's proposal: a brief analysis

For present purposes, Lonergan's transposition of the doctrine of the Incarnation can be treated in four steps.

Step one. The modern difficulties mentioned in the preceding section revolve around the phrase 'one person.' It is therefore relevant to ask what was meant by 'person' in the context in which the doctrine was framed. Here The Way to Nicea is indispensable. In Lonergan's estimation the council of Nicea, without intending to set a precedent, set one that was followed at Chalcedon in 451, when technical, non-scriptural terminology became an issue for the first time since the introduction of homoousios in 325 (see 1972:313-314). Everyone agrees that the second paragraph of the Chalcedonian definition departs from both the scriptural and the previous patristic usages of 'person' and 'nature.' What these novel meanings were, however, is disputed. Lonergan holds that they are quite clear, in the same way and for the same reasons that homoousios is clear. 'Person' and 'nature' simply summarize what the first paragraph of the definition says when it first asserts that one and the same Lord Jesus Christ is perfect in divinity and in humanity, and then goes on to list attributes proper to each of these. In other words, the second paragraph's 'one person' refers back to the first paragraph's repeated 'one and the same,' while 'two natures' refers to the two sets of predications, divine and human. And from this it follows that the definition is implicit, logical, explanatory, heuristic, static, and minimal—

- implicit, in that it states the meaning of 'person' and nature,' not in more primitive terms, but simply in relation to one another. 'Person' means what there is one of in the Incarnation, uniting two natures; 'nature' means what there are two of, united in one and the same person.
Redemption and Intellectual Conversion

- **logical**, in that this meaning can be expressed (as I have expressed it above) in propositions about propositions. As Athanasius expounded Nicea's homoousios in his 'rule,' the second-order proposition that whatever is said of the Father is said of the Son except for the name 'Father,' so too the rule of thumb for interpreting Chalcedon's teaching is the second-order proposition called the communicatio idiomatum (1972:308; 1974:251; cp 1957:502-503, 577).

- **explanatory**, in that the two terms which implicitly define each other are both fixed, not by mere insight into how language works, but by insight into what language refers to, namely the Christ mediated by the Christian message (cp 1957:10-11).

- **heuristic**, in that it lays down nothing about how 'person' and 'nature' are to be conceived but only that, however they are conceived, a determinate relationship is to be maintained between them (1974:23).

- **static**, in that "as long as the definition is retained, the meaning remains the same" (1977b:4). But only in that sense. Since the propositions whose meaning the bishops at Chalcedon aimed at regu-

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5. Does the 'modern' Christian believer, Lonergan asks, "accept the positive part of the Nicene decree, in which neither the term 'hypostasis' nor the term 'nature' occurs? If so, in the part about Jesus Christ, does he observe two sections, a first containing divine predicates, and a second containing human predicates? Next, to put the question put by Cyril to Nestorius, does he accept the two series of predicates as attributes of one and the same Jesus Christ? If he does, he acknowledges what is meant by one hypostasis ... Again, does he acknowledge in the one and the same Jesus Christ both divine attributes and human attributes? If he acknowledges both, he accepts what is meant by two natures" (1974:26).

6. In its full-fledged form, the communicatio idiomatum is a rule governing affirmative statements about Christ: any sentence in which both subject and predicate refer to the unique person of Christ, or which can be reduced to such a sentence, is correct. It had not assumed this generalized form at the time of the council of Chalcedon, although Cyril of Alexandria taught the underlying notion, and later fathers used it for particular instances.
lating are propositions contained in the Christian message, not some philosophy, the definition arrived at no more leads to a static approach to Christian meaning than does the New Testament.

minimal, in that while the early Greek councils were undoubtedly involved in hellenizing Christianity, what they adopted from the Greek 'discovery of mind' was a logical technique, the second-order proposition, which unlike Greek metaphysics remains very much a part of today's culture—at least, Lonergan drily observes, for those who have the competence of a normal twelve-year-old (1974: 24).

Step Two. So much for 'person.' In the context of Method, the first step just outlined rests on the four 'mediating' functional specialties that encounter the past. A second step begins the transposition of that past, and it relies on Foundations. Attention shifts from 'person' to the other word of the problematic phrase: 'one.' In order to go beyond Chalcedon's purely heuristic concept of person, and at the same time meet both the systematic and the critical exigences of meaning, what is needed is a Begrifflichkeit, a substructure or conceptuality, whose terms and relations are derived from self-appropriation (1972:285–293, esp. 288). Lonergan accordingly distinguishes three meanings of 'one,' corresponding to the first three levels of intentional consciousness:

- one on the level of presentations, that is, one as an instance, as counted but nothing more, as the difference between (say) two and three;

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7. That this is how Lonergan himself might have put the matter, even though some of the sources I have drawn on belong to his 'prior phase,' is suggested by the brief foreword he wrote for The Way to Nicea. It explicitly describes his study of the ante-Nicene movement in terms of the functional specialty Dialectic. This is no doubt what is most important about the praemittenda of De Deo Trino, and thus explains why Lonergan has allowed them, alone of his Latin writings, to be translated. It is not, however, the only thing that is going on. The Way to Nicea also relies on what Lonergan would now call Foundations, and they are not entirely the sort of foundations he proposes in Method. See Hefling, 1982:182–252.
Redemption and Intellectual Conversion

one the level of understanding, where it refers to unity, that is, to the composite oneness of intelligibility that each and every act of insight grasps, and

one in the sense of identity, of one and the same, of this one and no other, which corresponds to the level of judgment where the unity of an instance is posited and where, by implication, other unities are excluded (1976a:61).

Step Three. Once the foregoing terms have been derived systematically, they can be used to ground further distinctions relevant to such a contemporary account of personality and subjectivity as the one Lonergan himself proposes. His analysis of the dynamism of self-transcendence recognizes that something changes: selfhood is realized by degrees; it grows and matures. At the same time, something remains the same: by becoming oneself, one does not become someone else. Selfhood as an ongoing process of conscious acts over a lifetime, then, is not the same as the selfhood that distinguishes one self from another (1976a:63, n 40), and both of these go beyond a merely biological definition according to genus and species. All three can be distinguished and related by correlating them with the three meanings of 'one' mentioned above. For a human being is one—

- as an instance of humankind, a man or a woman, not an aardvark or an angel;

- as a unity of one self-realization, as what Lonergan calls his or her subjectivity; and

- as an identity, as himself or herself and nobody else, as one and the same, as what he calls one subject (1976a:62-63).

8. On unity and intelligibility, see Lonergan, 1957:510, 596. That there are different kinds of unity grasped in the same kind of conscious act is important, but not directly relevant here.
Step Four. Finally, Lonergan suggests that these distinctions can be used to show that classical Christology's insistence on the divinity of the one person of Christ need not be understood as vitiating anything that more recent Christology has emphasized, quite appropriately, about the humanity of Jesus. Everything meant by saying that Jesus Christ was 'like us in all respects' can be included under the first two meanings of 'one human being' listed above. To say that Jesus Christ was a man is certainly to say that he was an instance of the human species; to say that he was a man would also mean that his life was a unity of fully human consciousness, of learning and growing and also of suffering physical, mental, and emotional pain. At the same time, Chalcedon's heuristic definition of 'person' is preserved by saying in addition that his identity, his being 'one and the same Lord Jesus Christ,' himself and no other, is not the identity of a human subject but the identity of the Son of God.

In sum, Lonergan's transposition of the Chalcedonian formula runs as follows: the Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same subject, without division and without separation, recognized in two subjectivities, without confusion and without modification (1976a:64; cp 1967a:196). Lest this appear to be just verbal legerdemain, a mere substitution of 'subject' and 'subjectivity' for 'person' and 'nature,' four observations are in order.

1. The transposition is only a beginning. As the scholastic theologians placed the heuristic meaning of 'person' within a metaphysical context that raised questions beyond those the council of Chalcedon saw fit to address, so Lonergan introduces the same meaning into a context in which still further and quite different questions arise. The doctrine of the Incarnation in its transposed form rests on two conditions: that while the divine Son's identity excludes his being either the Father or the Spirit, it need not exclude his being a man; and conversely, that a man can have his identity not in himself but in another—indeed, in God. To affirm the Incarnation is implicitly to say that both of these conditions have been fulfilled (1974:259). To ask what either of them might mean is to move from assertion to understanding, from Doctrines to Systematics. Lonergan himself proposes that
they can be understood, fruitfully though imperfectly, as analogous to the fulfillment by supernatural grace of the natural, 'vertical' finality of human self-transcendence (1976a:58; cp 1976b). 9

2. It is true that in De constitutione Christi the treatment of Christ's psychology tends to be a pendant to the longer and more traditional treatment of his ontological constitution, whereas some of Lonergan's more recent statements seem to bypass metaphysics altogether, so that "the doctrine of one person with two natures transposes quite neatly"—and directly—"into a recognition of a single subject of both a divine and a human consciousness" (1974:25). Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that the scholastic theologians' achievement is no longer important. Step Two of my summary shows how Lonergan grounds the three senses of 'one' in the same way that the more general metaphysical elements, potency, form, and act, are grounded in Insight. Thus subject and subjectivity do not replace the person (in the metaphysical sense) and soul; they add a dynamic and historical dimension that is almost though not quite absent from, for example, Thomas's treatment of the topic. 10

9. Terms and relations verified in self-appropriated operations of interiority would also be needed in order to answer such questions as how God can be said to be conscious, how divine consciousness is shared by the persons of the Trinity, whether Jesus was conscious of his identity as Son of God, and whether his self-emptying of kenosis (Phil 2:7) involved his consciousness; see 1964a:100-145. This whole section of De constitutione Christi follows the same dogmatic-thesis format found in the other Latin treatises; much of the terminology is that of traditional scholasticism. Yet ultimately the main issue behind the various questions Lonergan deals with is whether consciousness is to be understood (as in Insight) as experience, or instead as perception. The latter leads not only to epistemological but also to theological counterpositions. For a brief treatment, see Lonergan, 1967a:175-187.

10. For example, see the question about Christ's growth in acquired or experiential knowledge (Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q 12 a 3), where Thomas, reversing his own former position, allows that there was a real development as Christ grew older. Even so, the argument rests a priori on a metaphysical anthropology. On this whole question, see Crowe, 1971b.
3. Lonergan points out that no sense can be made of Athanasius's 'rule' if it is considered on its own, apart from "the whole genetic process from the images to the terminal notion of consubstantiality" laid out in The Way to Nicea (1976c:174). Still less can his own transposition of classical Christology be understood ahistorically, as though it had issued from "the merely verbal intelligence that it seems, an electronic calculator successfully simulates" (1967a:174). On the contrary, that transposition presupposes a historical and dialectical retrieval of the shift towards system that began at Nicea; of the resulting logical context of meaning, which for Christology had reached a 'static equilibrium' by the time of the third council of Constantinople; and, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of the metaphysical context into which the conciliar doctrines were introduced in the middle ages. In a word, Lonergan acknowledges the whole second stage of meaning, in so far as it pertains to the person of Christ. No doubt it might be argued that De constitutione Christi still belongs to that stage. But even there Lonergan is pushing towards the more basic, methodological control of meaning that would appear full-blown in Method as the ongoing heuristic structure of the functional specialty Foundations.11 Hence his consistent aim has been to carry forward a development—not a product, the present state of what has been developing, but a process, the developing itself. Carrying forward a development in this sense is anything but a wholesale transfer of everything said about Christ's person since 451; it is rather a purification of that tradition through sifting, evaluating, selecting, and finally transposing what can be transposed. To put this more positively, Lonergan recovers and retains what is transculturally valid—not words but meanings, namely the heuristic concepts of the early councils and Thomas's grasp of interiority.

11. And in light of the interpenetration of Foundations with Dialectic, it is not surprising to find that Lonergan gives considerable attention to what he regards as counterpositions on the nature of consciousness (see 1964a: 128-145). For Lonergan's assessment of the congruity between his position and defined teaching, see 1964a:147; see also the important paper on "The Subject," 1974:69-86, esp. 72-79.
4. Finally, it should be noted that the meaning which Lonergan is endeavoring to mediate, systematically and in a new context, is cognitive meaning, what was and is believed to be true about Jesus Christ. As the early councils prescinded from 'all the other riches' contained in the word of God (1976c:8), so the transposition I have summarized prescinds from the communicative, effective, and constitutive functions of meaning. Yet to prescind from the transformative aspect of Christological doctrine, rightly emphasized in different ways by Matthew Lamb and Sebastian Moore (Lamb:109-112, 136-138; Moore, 1980:94-96, 151-158), is not to deny it. What is so startlingly strange, in view of the conclusions reached by other theologians who want to take seriously the modern revolutions in science, philosophy, and scholarship, is Lonergan's tenet that Christian doctrine is transformative because it is true.

INTERLUDE: FURTHER QUESTIONS

This last sentence leads to a knot of questions far too intricate to be untangled here. In Part Two I will pursue only a single strand, which can be located as follows.

The second, 'mediated' or 'revealed' phase of the method Lonergan proposes depends largely on the first, the 'mediating' or 'revealing' phase of hearkening to the outer word of tradition. Now, as Step One of my summary suggests, Lonergan has hearkened, appreciatively but not uncritically, to the development of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine both before and after it turned the decisive corner at Nicea. What seems to be missing is any consideration of the starting point of that development—the 'original message' (Lonergan, 1972:295). The Way to Nicea draws freely on a number of modern historical studies of the ante-Nicene fathers, but when it comes to the New Testament, Lonergan simply says, emphatically and repeatedly, "pay attention to the word as true" (1976c:8-11). For the sake of discussion, let it be granted that the early fathers, implicitly at least, understood the Christian message as true in a cognitive sense; that the Nicene notion of dogma rests on a 'dogmatic realism,' less than philosophical yet more than naïve, which maintains the realism implicit in scripture without going beyond it; and
that the 'rule' of Athanasius, precisely because it is a second-order proposition, presupposes the truth of the first-order propositions of scripture whose meaning it controls and mediates. Even if all this is correct, though, it remains (as Lonergan would later acknowledge) that whereas the fathers regarded the New Testament as a message normative for all ages, the aim of exegetes today is to propound its proper meaning as a record of the faith of the early church, by examining the various contexts of the several writers (1974:198). But just this very considerable difference between patristic classicism and modern recognition of the Bible's 'pastness' is what lies behind most of the changes that have been rung on the theme of setting aside conciliar dogmas in favor of a Christology new-minted from scriptural metal. By contrast, Lonergan seems to take for granted the authoritativeness of the council of Chalcedon, whose definition he transposes; he likewise takes the fathers' acknowledgment of 'the word as true' for granted in his study of how the council of Nicea laid a foundation on which "of its own accord, as it were" (1976c:137), the Chalcedonian definition arose. What then of scripture itself?

This is not the place to consider in detail why it is that Lonergan in his prior phase, including The Way to Nicea, takes what certainly appears to be a classicist stand on 'the word as true.' Suffice it to say that this is partly a reflection of official attitudes towards modern biblical scholarship, and partly a consequence of the theological method hinted at in the epilogue of Insight, where acceptance of a divine revelation as true seems to be a de jure condition of properly theological understanding. It is possible—just barely—to

12. As I suggested in note 7 above, the issue is foundations. The most explicit sources for Lonergan's views at this time are the essay "Theology and Understanding" (1967a:121-141) and the epilogue of Insight. But both of these rest on the overall argument of Insight (which was in fact written, though not yet published, when "Theology and Understanding" first appeared), and especially on the place in that argument of the much-debated nineteenth chapter, the proof of God's existence. That, as I have tried to show (Hefling, 1982:71-131) is what effects the movement to a "firmer and broader base" for theological interpretation, the "theologically transformed universal viewpoint" (1957:740), from which alone 'revealed' theology can take its bearings. Note, however, that this issue is not whether God can be proved to exist—Lonergan has never backed down on that score. It is a question of the role of such a proof in a fully methodical theology. The matter is discussed at some length in Lonergan, 1973.
construe the epilogue so as to soothe the ruffled feathers of biblical scholars (see Quesnell:162-193), but in any case Lonergan's more recent work puts the whole matter in quite a different light. Meaning in its third stage is controlled and mediated by a method whose foundations are neither in 'the word as true' nor in any other doctrine, but in conversion.

Foundations, moreover, is not the first of Method's functional specialties but the fifth. It presupposes and complements four others, of which Research is the first, and Research deals with data. Lonergan has been reticent when it comes to specifying exactly which data are relevant to theology in this new context, that being a theological rather than a methodological question. But it is fairly clear that for Christian theology data on what he calls the original message—data nearly all of which are to be found in the New Testament—will occupy an important place (1972:295, 313). And "Christology Today," alone of his publications since Method, gives some indication of how Lonergan himself would answer a number of questions that arise once scripture has been assigned to the status of data—'highly privileged' data, perhaps, but data none the less. Besides carrying forward his earlier transposition of a doctrine formulated in answer to further questions about the decision taken at Nicea, "Christology Today" also serves as a kind of missing link between the New Testament and the Christian community's dialectical movement towards intellectual conversion.

PART TWO: THE NEW TESTAMENT AND METHODICAL THEOLOGY

2.1 Fourth-level correlation: kerygma and response

Lonergan begins "Christology Today" with a brief announcement that the method he is about to use proceeds simultaneously on two fronts: "both man as attentive, as intelligent, as reasonable, as responsible, and the human world as given and as structured by intelligence, by reasonable judgment, by decision and action" (1976a:52). Of this (as he says of the longer but still highly compressed statement of transcendental method in the first chapter of Method in Theology) everything else is a prolongation. As given, then, the data that Christians
call the New Testament are simply elements in the world mediated by linguistic meaning. They are susceptible of scholarly research, interpretation, exegesis, and different styles of historical investigation. How these data will be structured or construed in acts of cognitive, constitutive, or effective meaning depends on the inquiring subject with whom they are correlated. More particularly, it depends on the level of intentionality to which his or her inquiring is primarily directed.

So far, only a moderate acquaintance with the 'foreground' chapters of Method would be needed in order to forecast Lonergan's remarks. His next move is perhaps surprising. He does not put the data through their paces in the eight functional specialties; rather, in the same way that the 'background' chapter on religion in Method is prior to the very notion of functional specialization, still more to the specialties themselves, "Christology Today" gives priority to the New Testament as a religious document, part of the 'outer word' of a religious tradition. Otherwise stated, these data are correlated in the first instance not with the cognitive subject but with the existential subject who is a responsible doer as well as a knower. Lonergan thus acknowledges at the outset something akin to the powerful and personal address, the Krisis, that Barth expatiates on in his commentary on Romans. And, like Barth, he correlates the New Testament as kerygma with the response it elicits. In this response of action or religious living (1976a:54), meaning and meant are identical, not because the subject has understood or reached a judgment, but because he or she is a 'doer of the word.' Already there are two points worth noting.

1. The meaning of scripture in this first and fundamental correlation can be appropriated by the slightly differentiated consciousness for which "coming to know does not occur apart from acting," and there is no obligation to attain any further differentiation (1972:328, 330).

13. It should be noted that Lonergan does not mean the 'voluntary' subject or the 'practical' subject; see 1974:79-84.
2. At the same time, obviously, academic inquiries are not precluded. If these inquiries are to be theological, however, they will be reflections on religion. As such they will seek to differentiate, but not ignore, the effective and existential meaning of the kerygma. Here Lonergan is touching on one aspect of the question, What makes the New Testament 'scripture,' rather than just a collection of ancient texts? The answer lies in the functional relation of these texts to religious living.  

Turning now to the objective pole, there is a correspondence between this functional relation, as it occurs in the present, and what the New Testament itself narrates about the effect of Jesus' message. In the earliest gospel, for instance, the response of the first disciples to Jesus' first words, "Follow me," is one of immediate action (Mk 1:17). But meaning and meant begin to be distinguished when the answering action takes the form of a question, 'What are we to do?' or 'Where are we to go?' Responsive action may also take the form of a declaration addressed to Jesus personally, as it does in Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi (Mk 8:29). Finally, since Jesus calls for commitment to himself, "ineluctably there arises the question, Who is this Jesus?" (1976a:54). Here it will be appropriate to pause again and look more closely at what Lonergan has done.

1. His choice of biblical data is significant. Having pointed out a few of the passages that illustrate the Christian message's existential character, Lonergan refers in footnotes to nine more—all of them questions. An element of cognitional theory, the priority of questions to answer, has guided his structuring of the data. This clearly suggests that what it is important to look for in scripture, where Christology is concerned, is not so much what Jesus says about

14. Relevant here is David Kelsey's heuristic and functional definition of scripture as those texts which, in the context of the common life of the Christian community, shape the identities of persons so decisively as to transform them (Kelsey: 90-91). Logically speaking, that is, scripture and the church define each other. Unfortunately, Kelsey remains within a logical and conceptualist framework throughout his book; he has next to nothing to say about the historical Selbstvollzug of the church in relation to scripture.
himself as what his effect was, what response he elicited, and more especially what questions he raised.  

2. The sequence of the responses, which I have kept in the summary above, is a further and equally deliberate part of Lonergan's initial structuring. That sequence is: action, followed by a moral question about action; statement of what is so, followed by a question about what is so. In brief, it is formally the beginning of an inverse enumeration of the levels of self-transcendence.

In view of what was said in Part One above, it should be noted that this is the core of Lonergan's rejoinder to the now familiar claim that theology in general and Christology in particular can no longer presume to work 'from above' but must instead be developed 'from below.' If this means only that Christology is the work of human minds, it is a truism. What is usually meant, though, is that Christology can only begin from Jesus of Nazareth as the gospels portray him—not from the doctrine of the Trinity. But to this demand that "theological thought must obey the traffic laws of a one-way street" (1976a:50), Lonergan replies by appropriating the spatial metaphor for a rather different proposal: questions and answers about Jesus can and should be thought of as proceeding 'from above downwards' if this phrase bears the sense he gives it in relation to threefold conversion (1976a:48). A 'downward' movement occurs because the gift of unrestricted love, conscious at the fourth, existential level, discloses values before one knows, or even asks, who one is in love with. Again, there is knowledge 'born' of such transforming love; not infrequently, one affirms that something is so (third level) before understanding why it is so (second level) (1972: 115, 122). On the objective side, the same demythologized meaning of 'from above downwards' applies to the development of Christology within the gospel narrative.

Thus another of Lonergan's essays mentions with approval the distinction between revelation and information that Eric Voegelin draws, referring to Matthew's version of the episode at Caesarea Philippi. Jesus is there reported as saying that a declaration of fact, 'You are

15. Frederick Crowe has pursued this idea; see Crowe, 1965:546-571 and 1980:79-80.
the Christ,' is not the result of the sociology of knowledge (as it were) but of his Father's behest. Voegelin's distinction is congruent with the correlation outlined in "Christology Today," and also with Lonergan's suggestion that revelation is God's entry into the world mediated by meaning—cognitive meaning as well as constitutive and effective (1974:97,260). So understood, revelation has both a subjective component, the Father's 'drawing' through the gift of the Spirit, and a component of intersubjectivity through encounter with Jesus. The response to this double gift is faith, expressed initially in action and subsequently in judgments of belief (1977b:9). Moreover, such an account of revelation would tally with Lonergan's remark, which he makes almost in passing, that from the standpoint of methodical theology "scripture as inspired is mainly evidence in the faith of the early church" (1976a:51). The implications of this will be treated below, but one of them can be noted already. There is no necessary contradiction between the New Testament as scripture, the inspired witness to revelation, and the New Testament as data for scholarly research, interpretation, and factual history. On one hand, what the first Christian communities believed can only be established by starting from the evidence as it now stands; but on the other, scholars who seek to establish it are not, as scholars, called upon to establish further that what these communities believed pertains to the redemption of the human race or that it was thus "specific meaning, the word of God himself" (1972:119).

2.2 Third-level correlation: belief

But there is more to be said. Lonergan considers that writing a scholarly history of acts of believing, a merely factual history, would be a feasible project, a worthy project, even an essential project—but not a specifically theological project. Having argued that the fourth—

16. Crowe has developed this point too, especially in the final chapters of his Theology of the Christian Word (1978). It involves Lonergan's distinction between the 'inner' and 'outer' words of religion, which in a Christian context correspond, respectively, to the 'missions' of the Spirit and the Son.

17. Emphasis added.
level response to Jesus' message, as narrated in the gospels, is isomorphic with the response that the New Testament as kerygma can elicit today, Lonergan continues his correlation at the third level of consciousness, moving 'downwards' from effective meaning to cognitive, from deliberation to judgments of belief. The New Testament, he notes, mediates its fourth-level meaning in virtue of being a story about matters pertaining to salvation, or what Voegelin calls a Saving Tale. It belongs to the genre Heilsgeschichte; as such it speaks from faith to faith. Yet it also leaves no doubt that the New Testament writers, in light of their faith, believed certain things to be so. The story they wrote "purports to deal with persons that really existed and with events that really occurred" (1976a:57). Only if the isomorphism continues to hold—if acts of belief, corresponding in some measure to what was believed in the communities that produced the New Testament, occur in the present—can these data be construed theologically as well as historically. This very important point warrants four comments.

1. Some clarification is to be had by drawing a contrast with what appears to be Bultmann's position. Lonergan is quite willing to grant priority to the existential impact that Bultmann, like the early Barth, emphasizes. For Bultmann, however, the response elicited by the kerygma can have no 'objectifiable' content. Belief, in the sense of holding that something 'objective' is true, is assimilated into faith, which he considers to be wholly an act of personal decision and commitment. His exegesis, however questionable on other grounds, is quite consistent with such a view—Jesus as the revealer of God reveals only that he is the revealer, the Easter faith is faith in faith, and so on (Bultmann, 1951:300,305; 1955:57,66). But the fundamental point of difference lies in Bultmann's insistence that any statement of faith referring to historical events can be scrutinized, and will almost certainly be exploded, by 'scientific' investigators.

By contrast, Lonergan would submit that historians, however 'scientific' they may aspire to be, do their knowing within horizons; that a radical change in self-understanding is not, as Bultmann holds, the only result of religious conversion; that other things, indeed all things, come to be transvalued, and therefore understood more
adequately, in the light of faith; and that within the horizon of religious authenticity it is possible to discern the evidence that supports factual judgments (1972:222-223, 318). Not that he questions Bultmann's own religious and moral conversion. What is lacking is the intellectual conversion that would pull Bultmann's (basically Kantian) view of knowing up by its roots in cognitional myth.  

2. Except for insisting on actual events and persons, thereby excluding such a one-sided existentialism as Bultmann's, Lonergan does not specify what 'the faith of the early church' was. That his own answer would be anything but simplistic is suggested by a footnote in "Christology Today," which like similar comments in Method should be taken as pointing out an avenue of investigation and not, or not necessarily, as a considered judgment. The reference is to Alan Richardson's argument that the New Testament affirmation of Christ's resurrection is best understood as a hypothesis to account for certain observable 'perturbations' in the stream of historical events, and that such an extrapolation from factual history can still be the basis of affirming the resurrection today (Richardson:212). Lonergan himself has somewhat similarly located the 'Christian hypothesis' in the fourth gospel's merger of crucifixion and resurrection, pointing out its if-then form:

"And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw everyone to myself"  

18. This point needs to be stressed, because of a potentially misleading sentence in Method: "In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion" (1972:318). That the words 'as well as' ought to be glossed as 'in addition to,' not as 'and also,' is made clear by the parallel passage in Doctrinal Pluralism, where Lonergan writes that Barth and Bultmann "took their stand on moral and religious conversion. But they did not advert to the fact that besides moral and religious conversion there is also intellectual conversion. Accordingly, they were incapable of effecting any serious criticism of the philosophic presuppositions of the historicism in vogue at the beginning of this century" (1971b:71).

19. The most interesting example is Lonergan's studiously non-committal reference, at the end of the section on doctrinal development, to the opinion that the two recent Marian dogmas, unlike dogmas defined at the councils, are 'cultural' (1972:320). His point is that the 'ongoing discovery of mind' is by no means the only way in which developing doctrines are to be understood; the development of feelings may account for other developments. See also Hefling, 1982: 239-243.
(Jn 12:32). In this sense, the exaltation of Christ is still being verified, inasmuch as men and women, their communities and institutions, are still being drawn to him. Since Lonergan suggests that the experiential component of revelation is what the same gospel calls the Father's drawing, without which no one can come to Jesus (Jn 6:44), the intersubjective component might be found in the drawing by which persons do come.

Were this correlation to be pursued, it would lead eventually to the 'just and mysterious Law of the Cross,' the principle on which evil, bias, the global decline of the human race, are converted into 'a certain highest good' (1964c:552). But that conversion, once again, is intellectual as well as moral and religious, for what the Law of the Cross discloses is the immanent intelligibility of the 'divine solution' heuristically anticipated in chapter 20 of Insight (see Lonergan, 1974:8-9, and Loewe:162-174).

3. Returning to methodology, some account should be taken of a different objection to Lonergan's third-level correlation, seemingly the opposite of the Bultmannian objection but in fact rooted in the same cognitional counterposition. If one holds that to be objective is to eliminate subjectivity and attend to what is 'over against' the subject, then one will very likely protest that by dragging in 'spiritual discernment' Lonergan is just warping scholarly disinterestedness and prejudicing the results of scientific exegesis. Now Lonergan does identify objectivity with authentic subjectivity. And he does hold that unrestricted love is the goal and fulfillment of that self-transcending dynamism. So it does follow, in the long run, that only a religiously converted person can be objective about the Bible. But only in the long run. In a methodical theology that is being worked out slowly, collaboratively, and imperfectly, there are no static or uniform first principles. Agreement with what the New Testament writers believed is not, from a methodological standpoint, a requirement de jure—though it may be one from the standpoint of ecclesiastical authority. Lonergan's position comes down to this: In so far as one does not limit oneself to factual history but instead goes on to further questions, one is in agreement de facto. Pascal's remark, which Lonergan quotes from time to time, applies here: "you would not be seeking me if you had not already found me" (1972:341n6; 1973:10,20).
This third comment is important for two reasons. In the first place, whatever may be true of The Way to Nicea or the epilogue of Insight, it cannot be said that "Christology Today" makes the acceptance of any particular doctrine a methodological prerequisite. Whereas the ghost of classicist theology's 'foundations in the simple manner' (1972:270) still seems to haunt Lonergan's writing as late as 1964, Method explicitly exorcises it; and "Christology Today" goes on from there, to show how two doctrines that were 'fundamental' for older theology, revelation and inspiration, might be developed, not prior to but in tandem with a basically empirical approach to the New Testament data. In the second place, then, this procedure is in effect the transposition into a methodological context of The Way to Nicea's precept, 'pay attention to the word as true.' In "Christology Today," this precept takes a form applicable to any judgment of truth— with one addition. Lonergan does not say, 'Judge according to what you have already decided is, or could be, true.' He says, 'Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. Also, be in love.'

4. Other counterpositions, as Lonergan would deem them, would no doubt give rise to still further objections to his correlation of early Christian belief with the beliefs of the theologian today. From a different point of view, however, this correlation palliates the vexatious problem of the historical Jesus. Lonergan proposes that Christology should start from first-hand evidence; he recognizes that there is such evidence only for the beliefs of the primitive church; yet he does not think it necessary to call a moratorium on the second, mediated phase of theology while biblical scholars probe behind the evidence in order to resolve the issues summed up in the question of how the Proclaimer became the Proclaimed. This is not because he supposes that these issues have been resolved already, or that they will be resolved easily or in the near future, or that resolving them is of no importance. His point is simply that what was going forward between the Jesus of history and the Christ of the New Testament kerygma is something that can only be inferred. This has two methodological corollaries.

One is that reconstructions of the historical Jesus, because they are historical inferences, open as such to revision and reversal, offer
no solid ground for systematic theology to stand on. The other is that every such reconstruction will reflect the reconstructor's viewpoint and ultimately his or her cognitonal, moral, and religious horizon. Notwithstanding the elaborate strictures that the 'new questers' impose on themselves, it remains that in any attempt to distinguish what the historical Jesus did and said from such embroiderings as may have been introduced later, one of the criteria will be what Jesus the Proclaimer could, in a given historian's judgment, have done and said. For the inference involves some such reasoning as this: if the New Testament as it stands is the end-point of such-and-such a historical process, then the starting-point, the historical Jesus, must have been so-and-so. Put it this way, and the difficulty is patent: a conclusion, a hypothesis about the Jesus of history, has been made to rest on a premise which is itself a hypothesis and which, in default of first-hand evidence for what might be called the ante-New Testament development of Christology, can be nothing else. There is more to 'reconstructing the constructions of the human spirit' than just logic, of course, but nevertheless any historian who embarks on the quest for the historical Jesus is involved malgré lui in much the same decision as the one Lonergan places at the beginning of the third level of his methodical Christology—the question of whether, or how far, to believe what the New Testament writers believed about Jesus.

2.3 Understanding the data on Jesus as Son of God

Important though they are, Lonergan's correlations of New Testament data with the existential subject and the believing subject are preliminary to his main purpose in "Christology Today," which is to reach some insight into the immanent structure and intelligibility of

20. The logic of reconstruction might also be, and very often is: if the historical Jesus was such-and-such, and if the development of early Christian belief was such-and-such, then the result would have been the New Testament as it now stands. But this more plausible form of the argument has just the same logical problems as the one in the text. Either way, it is usual to resort to argument from analogy, for example by postulating similarity between early Christianity and hellenistic mystery religions (see Hengel: 17-56). This, of course, is still another hypothesis. For an extremely lucid discussion of the whole question, see Palmer.
the first-hand evidence for early Christian belief about Jesus as Son of God. In order to investigate this intelligibility, he joins specific data with a specific second-level question, Who is this Jesus? Not unexpectedly, the answer is to be reached by using a heuristic method, the scissors-like interaction of the inquiring subject with the relevant data.

The first step is naming the unknown; naming, that is, whatever will be known when the intelligibility of the data has been grasped. The methodical investigator will then work out the properties of this unknown, use them to guide further inquiry, entertain answers as long as they seem to account for all the relevant data, and dismiss answers that do not. In "Christology Today" Lonergan gives his favorite illustration of heuristic structuring, three successive answers to the question, What is the nature of fire?21

It cannot be said too often, however, that he does not conceive theological method on the analogy of method in the natural sciences. Nor can a Christological heuristic structure be developed by using his example of fire extrinsically, as though it were a template. Mathematics and the natural sciences are important simply because they provide clear and relatively uncomplicated examples of cumulative insight, of the difference between description and explanation, and of the 'shift towards system.' At most, an isomorphism will hold between the ongoing process of natural-scientific inquiry, and that of coming to understand the vastly more intricate realities of human living, including its religious dimension. Moreover, because those realities are not only mediated but also constituted by acts of meaning, the pertinent data are themselves meanings, not merely data of sense as in

21. Aristotle held that fire is an irreducible substance, one of the four 'elements'; by the eighteenth century it was no longer thought to be an element but was still a substance, phlogiston, given off by bodies when they burn; finally, according to Lavoisier combustion is one instance of a more general process he named oxidization. It ought to be noted that Lonergan's stock example is itself a piece of dialectical history—not unlike The Way to Nicea in this respect. A comparison of his schematic outline with Butterfield's account of what was going forward (Butterfield:204-208) shows the extent of Lonergan's selectivity: he picks out key issues. The same comparison shows, though, that on the question of which issues are indeed the key issues, there is almost complete agreement between Lonergan and Butterfield.
natural science. One of the pitfalls waiting for those who attempt to grasp the relevance to theology of the three explanations of fire is the fact that the sensible data on burning can be experienced today, for it is easy to suppose that this experience, alone, is what has always been meant by the name 'fire.' But what is the same for Aristotle and for Lavoisier is not fire as the object of experience; it is the object of understanding, the object to be explained. That is what was "conceived uniformly as 'the nature of' a familiar phenomenon" (1957:737). To use the terminology of Method, Lonergan is directly concerned with 'what was going forward' in the explanation of fire, and only indirectly with the phenomena that raised the question of explanation; thus the data that are relevant to his stock example are historical expressions—Aristotle's meaning, Lavoisier's meaning, and so forth.

The data relevant to Christological inquiry are likewise instrumental acts of meaning, expressions of the insights, judgments, and decisions of the early church. But the inquiry Lonergan proposes is not simply a history of Christology. His interest is Christology today. Consequently, just as the initial question 'Who is this Jesus?' is prompted by existential encounter with the New Testament as Heilsgeschichte, so also selecting the data that are to be structured heuristically is not simply a matter of inquisitive intelligence. It is necessary to 'discern' which data are pertinent, and as I suggested above, by discernment Lonergan means insight illuminated 'from above downwards' by religious and moral authenticity. Because 'Who is this Jesus?' is a large question, he concentrates on a single title, Son of God, and adduces three groups of data that must be quoted in full:

1) that Jesus is named time and again from different viewpoints and in different contexts the son of God;

2) that we through faith are sons of God and by baptism are one in Christ (Gal 3,26-8), that God sent his only Son that we might acquire the status of sons as is proved to us by the sending of the Spirit of Christ crying in our hearts "Abba! Father!" (Gal 4,3-7; Rom 8,14-17); and

22. Thus Lonergan writes that one discerns in facts and moral actions what it is that pertains to salvation (1976a:53); that the Christ of faith is discerned by religious persons, and by historians inasmuch as they are also religiously committed (54-55); and that Heilsgeschichte is "a history of what happened on the evidence believers discern in the light of faith" (57).
3) that the Spirit we have received from God knows all and has been given us that we may know all that God of his own grace gives us (1 Cor 2, 10-16; Jn 14, 16.17.26) (1976a:58).

This selection repays close scrutiny. At present there are three points worth noting.

1. Clearly, Lonergan is not going to take what Austin Farrer chidingly calls "the new scholastic way, the method of the research-degree thesis" that starts from statistics and lexicography (Farrer:44). In the first place, the data listed above include a mere fraction of the New Testament occurrences of 'Son of God'; in the second, there are also data on

(a) the sending of the Son;
(b) the sending of the Spirit;
(c) the adoptive sonship of Christians in solidarity with Christ, which is the experiential consequence of (a); and
(d) testimony to (c) and discernment of both (a) and (b), all of which are experiential consequences of (b) itself.

In this interweaving of Christology with both Trinitarian and soteriological meanings, there is thus an interlocking set of five terms and five relations—that is, something that approaches an implicit definition of them all.

2. The sequence of the three groups of data quoted above is, formally, the same as that of other heuristic structures. First there are data on Jesus as Son of God. These are to be understood. Secondly there are other data that relate Jesus' Sonship to other instrumental acts of meaning. This corresponds to 'working out the properties' of his Sonship. Some of these properties are experiential; all of them are to be used in guiding the inquiry. Thirdly, however, there are data on the inquiry itself. They suggest that grasping the immanent intelli-
bility of the whole assembly of data involves discernment as well as intelligence, as does the selection of the data in the first place. This is in full accord with Lonergan's own understanding of theological method, since he maintains that while the gift of God's Spirit is not only an efficacious ground for the pursuit of cognitive truth, it is that too (1972:241-242).

3. It may also be noted, without mounting an argument from silence, that the data Lonergan presents have no direct bearing on the debate about what Jesus did and did not say about himself. With one exception, the texts come from three of the four great Pauline letters whose date and authorship no one questions, and which form the earliest stratum of the Christian tradition.23

So much for the data. How are they to be understood? The key to Lonergan's procedure in "Christology Today" is the way he connects the Incarnation with redemption from the first. His selection and arrangement of texts implies that the intelligibility of the title 'Son of God' lies partly in its relation to data on adoptive sonship. And while both, as given, are only expressions of meaning, the early Christian expressions concerning Christ's Sonship mediate what cannot be known in any other way, whereas the data on adoptive sonship mediate that which can also be immediate—specifically Christian religious experience.24

23. The exception, Jn 14:16ff, is part of a dominical discourse, but its substance is already in 1 Cor 2:10-16, which Lonergan also includes among his data. And irrespective of whether the Johannine text records Jesus' ipsissima verba, it represents the belief of a Christian community in earliest times, and in that sense it can be taken as 'inspired.' The problem of developments within Christian belief of the New Testament period will be discussed presently.

24. On the mediation of immediacy, see Lonergan, 1972:77; on objectification of religious experience as one aspect of the 'outer word' of religion, see 1972:112 together with the caveat on p. 119. The question whether there is something specific about the religious experience of Christians is a theological rather than a methodological question, which for the most part is therefore bracketed in Method in Theology. Elsewhere, however, Lonergan makes it clear that in his view (1) there is indeed a specific difference, (2) it is a matter of intersubjectivity, and (3) it is to be identified with the mediation of divine love through Christ. See 1974:156 and 1973:10, 67.
Not only do the data themselves need to be understood, therefore; so does the subject who would understand them. Corresponding to the data, Lonergan writes, there arises in the subject a heuristic structure, and it presents this multiple question: "How are we in our own minds to understand Jesus as Son of God?" (1976a:58). But the 'we' in this question is not an abstract we-in-general. Given the fourth-level considerations discussed earlier in "Christology Today," the concrete meaning of 'we' can only be 'we, who as existential subjects have been addressed by the New Testament as a word that pertains to salvation, and who, as part of our response to its message as message-for-us, are now inquiring about the one whom the New Testament portrays as the source of its message.'

The important thing about this paraphrase (which could no doubt be improved on) is what it means in relation to the second group of data quoted above—'that we through faith are sons of God' and so on. For the question of Christology today is not simply whether we can say about Christ what the New Testament says; it is whether we can mean what the New Testament means. And the condition of this latter possibility is that both the realities referred to in the thematization that Lonergan calls transcendental method and the reality he refers to as the gift of God's love, are transculturally invariant (see 1972:282-285).

2.4 Beyond the individual heuristic structure

In the sections of "Christology Today" that I have been examining here, Lonergan's stated purpose is to address "the problem of uniting the concern of the inquiring subject with the objective wealth of scriptural scholarship" (1976a:55). This inquiring subject, presumably, is not a methodical theologian. In order to carry out fully the investigation Lonergan initiates, though, it would be necessary to perform operations that pertain to all eight of Method's functional specialties.

On one hand, Lonergan sets out a kind of mediated phase in nuce in his approach 'from above downwards' to the heuristics of Christology. The question of grasping the intelligibility of the three groups of data belongs to the kind of inquiry proper to Systematics. Earlier, as I have noted, he considers the decision whether to believe what the New Testament writers believed. Such a judgment corresponds to Doctrines; the motivation for it would be objectified in Foundations.
On the other hand, it seems clear that 'the objective wealth of scriptural scholarship' raises further questions that one inquiring subject would find it hard to answer. For instance, Lonergan's heuristic structure has for its object the intelligibility of what is essentially a Pauline Christology. But there are others. A multiplicity of early Christologies is now taken almost for granted by biblical scholars, many of whom go on to assert that there are as many Christs in the New Testament as there were authors. To this conclusion, however, the same answer can be given as would apply to the nature of fire. "Attention to the manner leads to an affirmation of conceptual variation; but attention to the function leads to an affirmation of conceptual constancy" (1957:787). In this case, attention to the function would be concerned with whether the several New Testament writers and their communities were endeavoring to answer the same question, or the same set of questions.

It is unlikely that such a refinement of Lonergan's original heuristic structure would occur to an individual inquirer, but it will be instructive to follow it through. Both the subjective and the objective sides of the correlation set out in "Christology Today" would have to be differentiated.

The objective side. Since the books of the New Testament, as they stand, present early Christian belief from different viewpoints, it can be asked whether the differences are the result of development, and, if they are, how the change or changes should be understood. Just as Lonergan's original selection of data places the title 'Son of God' in a context of data on God's saving action and its fruit in religious experience, so too an investigation of change, conducted on the same lines, would aim at understanding this title in relation to what was going forward in early Christian soteriology, Trinitarian theology, and pneumatology, between (say) the Pauline and deutero-Pauline letters, or between the earliest gospel and the later ones. 25 The goal, not quite the same as that of 'redaction criticism,' would be to understand how a

25. Note that this is still a question about the New Testament as first-hand evidence; it depends on historical inference as regards the dating of the various books, but not on hypothetical sources, such as Q, that no longer exist (if ever they did).
question, 'Who is this Jesus?', was refined (or, perhaps, distorted) over time.

The subjective side. Christian discernment, the criterion that Lonergan includes in his heuristic structure, would be employed differently according as there is differentiation in the way the evidence is being construed. Discernment will be needed, not only in selecting data relevant to each New Testament Christology considered in itself, but also in evaluating such changes as come to light through comparing different selections of data. In other words, the heuristic structure outlined in "Christology Today" contains the seeds of the functional specialties History and Dialectic as well as of Foundations—which is just what it should contain. On one hand, Foundations is "concerned largely with the origins, the genesis, the present state ... of the categories in which Christians understand themselves"; on the other, those categories which are specifically theological are derived only through interaction with data that have been dialectically evaluated (1972:293). It is significant, therefore, though not surprising, that the categories referring to the source of Christian religious experience, as Lonergan lists them in Method (1972:291), resemble closely the second group of data in "Christology Today."26

If Lonergan's original heuristic structure were refined further, so as to address further questions of the sort that modern biblical scholarship raises, it seems likely that procedures belonging to all of Method's functional specialties would eventually emerge. But the way he conjoins data with an operative criterion in "Christology Today" raises another, rather different question, which I want to pursue here instead. Could a determinate meaning of the title 'Son of God' be reached by starting from one inquiring subject's anticipation of intelligibility? To ask this another way, would something like the self-correcting process of learning (see 1957:286-287) reach a correct interpretation, a point beyond which there were no further relevant questions about the meaning of this title? Suppose a religiously converted subject supplied

26. Joseph Komonchak has called attention to the Trinitarian structure of these special theological categories (Komonchak:44, n 12).
with unlimited time, extraordinary patience, a copy of the New Testament—and the desire to know. Suppose this desire is focussed in the question 'Who is Jesus?' It seems reasonable to conjecture that such an individual would formulate possible answers, entertain them as long as they appeared to cover the relevant data, and abandon them when further questions led to new insights and new insights to more adequate answers.

My question, then, is whether this process would go on indefinitely. Is there a truly decisive question, one that could only be answered by choosing between alternatives that exclude each other? Such a question, I suggest, might arise in connection with the passion narratives. My imaginary inquirer would have to ask whether the death by crucifixion of the man whom the New Testament names 'Son of God' is really a disclosure of divine love; whether the pivot on which the Christian message turns makes sense, or whether the cross is an unintelligible surd, an 'utterly incommensurable factor in the revelation of God' (Moltmann:36).

If that is a meaningful question, so is the question that was raised at Nicea, for at bottom, as Lonergan points out, they are the same. The real import of the Arian crisis was "whether we have been saved by a creature or by God himself," and that is equivalent to asking whether or not it was a divine person who moves human hearts by his disturbing death (Lonergan, 1977:16). What both of these questions intend is 'the nature of' Christ, the savior, as Son of God; to that extent there is conceptual constancy.

Hitting on the right question, however, is not yet answering it clearly and unambiguously. My conjectural investigator set out to discover what the New Testament's richly symbolic presentations of Christ are getting at. But to recognize symbols as symbols is one thing; to know precisely what the difference is between symbolic meaning and literal meaning is another. To hold that symbolic language can and does express judgments about what is so is one thing; to know how true assertions can mean what they mean is another. To conclude that Christ's divinity is the same as his Father's is one thing; to know just what is meant by divinity is another, and by no means the least.

27. Elsewhere I have elaborated this thought-experiment in a commonsense way; see Hefling, 1984:157-162.
important (see Lawrence:96). And so on. 'Who is Jesus' leads to some basic philosophical questions. Thus, once the meaningfulness of the issue at Nicea has been acknowledged—but perhaps not until then—it can be recognized that an account of the ante-Nicene movement does have the pedagogical value that Lonergan attributes to it in The Way to Nicea:

> those who have not been sufficiently helped by philosophical studies to develop, to purify, and to perfect their own capacity for understanding, can be helped by a concrete historical investigation, that not only shows how dogmas, in their original emergence, came to be properly understood, but also suggests the manner in which one can come to understand them properly today (1976c:17).

They can be so helped because the early fathers, in their direct effort to understand Christ, were indirectly engaged with questions of hermeneutics, epistemology, and the philosophy of God—to use modern terms (1976c:110-127). Nor are these merely antiquarian problems. All of them are entailed in what Lonergan calls intellectual conversion and the theoretical differentiation of consciousness.

It is along these lines that one of the more cryptic remarks in Method can be understood—the statement that religious tradition "holds the seeds of intellectual conversion" (1972:243). In the case of Christianity, it was nearly three hundred years before the seeds bore fruit in the Nicene homoousios. They did so because what Lonergan calls the implicit dogmatic realism of the Christian message could not finally be squared with Tertullian's naive Stoic realism, and not even with Origen's more sophisticated Platonistic idealism. Such a realism, however, was consistent with, and is indeed presupposed by, Athanasius's interpretation of homoousios as shorthand for a second-order proposition (see 1974:22-23), and using this technique to counter the formally impeccable logic of the Arians was, in effect, acknowledging that cognitive meaning is mediated by true propositions. As Lonergan understands it, then, three things happened at Nicea: a particular dogma was framed; a notion of dogma emerged that would later inform the Chalcedonian definition; and a small but genuine and transculturally valid differentiation entered into Christian consciousness.

All of these, but especially the last, bear directly on the thought-experiment I have been conducting. My religiously converted
interpreter, having taken up a position that proved in the long run to be incompatible with the notion that knowing is basically the same as looking, arrived at a question functionally equivalent to Nicea's. Could he or she go on to achieve the 'slight tincture' of theoretically differentiated consciousness exhibited in the decisions of the early councils (1972:278), and by so doing come up with an equally differentiated answer?

There would seem to be no reason why not—only it would be a feat comparable to re-inventing the wheel. My investigator, on learning some early Christian history, would discover that the Nicene bishops, mirabile dictu, had got the answer already. That, of course, is the obvious flaw in the way I have conjecturally extended the heuristic structure sketched in "Christology Today." My imaginary interpreter is thoroughly imaginary—less a subject in Lonergan's sense of the word than a splendidly isolated Enlightenment individual who comes to religious and philosophical questions untainted by prejudice—and no such individual exists. Even if Lonergan had not mentioned with approval Hans-Georg Gadamer's rehabilitation of tradition as the condition of the possibility of interpretation (1972:182, n 5: cp 209-211 and 1977a:343), everything in Method's chapters on interpretation, history, and historians militates against supposing that one can somehow climb out of one's cultural heritage so completely as to be able to pass judgment on it from an autonomous, suprahistorical platform. It is true that the proximate source of interpretation is the interpreter, and that the meaning of a text is not located in its spatially arranged marks, which, as experienced, are only potentially meaningful (1957:579-586). But it is also true that interpreters use minds and that minds enter the world mediated by meaning, including the meaning of the texts they are used to interpret, only by communicating, drawing on a common fund, taking part in the group enterprise of coming to know.
POSTLUDE

Thus the two related topics which this paper set out to examine, although fairly restricted in themselves, lead to much larger ones—understanding what it is to understand, knowing what it is to know, loving what it is to love. But they also have a bearing on more specific issues, not the least the one that Lonergan chooses to raise on the last page of Method. It is not to be forgotten, he writes, that division in the church as it actually exists “resides mainly in the cognitive meaning of the Christian message” (1972:368). On the view that the Christian message has no cognitive meaning, this ecumenical problem obviously does not arise. That view itself knows no confessional boundaries; Bultmann shares it with Leslie Dewart, whose position Lonergan dismantles in a rather scathing review (1974:11-32). But if it is granted that the gospel does fulfill all the functions proper to meaning (cp 1972:298), what I said at the end of Part One above has some consequences that it may be worthwhile to note briefly. For if it is also the case that coming to know is a group enterprise, then community and tradition will have a bearing on New Testament interpretation—not because of Lonergan's "quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines" (1972:332) but because of his stand on the human, and therefore philosophical, question of cognitional theory.28

It is of some interest in this regard to read John Courtney Murray's discussion of the ante-Nicene movement in The Problem of God, since it is essentially a digest of the same section of De Deo Trino

28. Thus at the International Lonergan Congress in 1970 George Lindbeck, having examined from a confessional standpoint the cognitional and metaphysical grounds of Lonergan's method as they pertain to the question of dogmatic development, pronounced them 'theologically neutral.' With this conclusion Lonergan concurred—adding, however, that his method "is not philosophically neutral for it evaporates into thin air when rather firm positions on cognitional and moral operations, on their objectivity, and on the corresponding reality either are not grasped or are abandoned" (Lonergan, 1971a:233). There is more to this addendum than might be supposed, for it is the 'general theological categories' that theology shares with other disciplines, rather than the specific' categories that radiate from religious conversion, in which Lonergan frames his assessment of the development leading to the Nicene and Chalcedonian dogmas.
that was later translated as The Way to Nicea. Towards the end, having stated his conviction that "the parting of the ways between the two Christian communities takes place on the issue of doctrinal development," Murray adds provocatively:

I do not think that the first ecumenical question is, what think ye of the Church? or even, what think ye of Christ? The dialogue would rise out of the current confusion if the first question raised were, what think ye of the Nicene homoousion? (Murray:53)

No doubt this is an important question. But in light of Lonergan's more recent work it is really only a specification of a broader question: what think ye of the ongoing discovery of mind; of the systematic control of meaning made possible by the slight but real differentiation of consciousness that occurred when the Christian community turned the corner into the second stage of meaning? Except in theology, that stage has been closing for more than four hundred years; like it or no, Christianity's involvement in systematic meaning has been undercut, and there arises "the dilemma of reverting to an antenicene Christology or of advancing to a thoroughly modern position" (1972:319).

There is no doubt about which horn of the dilemma Lonergan himself prefers, and my purpose in this paper has been to collect and perhaps to clarify some of the elements of his own thoroughly modern position. Having tried to teach that position, however, I would say that the biggest obstacle to its credibility lies in the sheer numbers of highly respected theologians who opt for sitting on the other horn of the dilemma. Christology today is largely if not entirely a sort of neo-ante-Nicene rhetoric that takes its stand on imagination and affectivity, polyvalent symbolism and existential impact. Not that any of this is wrong per se. Communications, in Lonergan's functionally specialized sense, is that for which the rest of theology exists. The difficulty arises in so far as ante-Nicene Christologies raise Nicene questions—which they do, despite their tendency to short-circuit judgments of fact and judgments of value by attempting to move directly from something like interpretation to something like systematics. Nor can these further questions simply be ignored on the ground that they are pastorally irrelevant. So long as the problem of evil exists, its concrete manifestations are going to raise the question whether Chris-
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Christianity has anything to say about it; so long as Easter is celebrated, Christians are going to be reminded that the answer their tradition gives to the problem of evil is a cruciform answer; and so long as questions arise spontaneously, it is going to be asked whether that answer is real, and, if it is, how it can be.

But to ask that is to ask whether the Incarnation is, among other things, the eternal Word cooperating in 'man's making of man,' entering the world mediated by meaning, taking part in the division of labor by which we come to know (1974:62, 97, 260). One corollary of the flaw I have already pointed out in the thought-experiment above is the assumption that a judgment about the cognitive meaning of the Christian message is either in the minds of some fourth- and fifth-century bishops, or else in the mind of my imaginary interpreter. In fact, it is in the mind of a community—the mind, theologically speaking, of the whole Christ, Head and members (1972:135)—much as natural-scientific knowledge is in the scientific community. Every 'encounter with Christ' is an encounter mediated by the meaning of the gospel. But what the gospel means is what it has been meaning to the Christian community, a community that is not only constituted by the Christian message but also self-constituted by its own judgments about the meaning of the word it lives by. Whether those judgments have been correct depends on whether they were intellectually as well as religiously authentic, and this further, interpretive judgment depends on the interpreter's own authenticity. All of which is another way of saying that Christian theology is hermeneutical, through and through: "the coming to light of the tradition is one with the coming to light of the concrete self" (Lawrence:101).

Thus my paper has circled back to the first paragraph of Part One. On Lonergan's position, however, that need not be its downfall. Vicious circles, like other logical dragons, are a menace only in the static systems which are their habitat, because it is "only on the assumption that knowing is intrinsically a looking-at that the question of the a priori has any great significance" (Lonergan, 1980:197; but cp 1972:14 n4). By contrast, a methodical theology, without disparaging logic as such, "has one foot in a transcultural base and the other on increasingly organized data" (1972:293). The former includes the fact of unrestricted love; the latter, data on Christ, on the ante-Nicene
movement, on the definition of Chalcedon. How are they related? Solvitur ambulando. The question is answered by walking, on both feet.
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BASIC CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY: 
AN ISSUE OF 'MIND AND THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST'

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I

BASIC CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY: THE TOPIC

A key notion cropping up constantly in theology today is "basic community" (Basisgemeinschaft, comunidades de base). Its provenance is chiefly the Third World, its chief proponents, liberation and political theologians. The first time I recall its being mentioned with great emphasis was when I was a student in Basel and heard from a fellow doctoral student, a Mexican named Andres Ancona, reports of the meeting held in Brussels in honor of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Concilium. The central experience of participants at this meeting focused on the contrast between two styles of so-called progressive or critical theology: theology within and in great measure for the academy; and theological reflection that arose from one or another local and usually extra-institutional situation. It was in connection with the second group that the term comunidades de base was used prominently.

At the time of the Concilium meeting (late 1960s), Johann Baptist Metz, for instance, was a leading representative of the academic theologians. This was during the initial phase of his espousal of theology in a political mode, when he was dividing his time between lectures and seminars at the University of Munster and the work toward establishing an ecumenical and interdisciplinary university at Bielefeld. But in the seventies he began to speak of the contrast (so marked in his latest book, 1981) between church "from above" and "for" the people; and church "from below" and "of" (gen. subj.) the people. The central category in that contrast is Basisgemeinde: basic community.

Another witness to this reality with whom I have had contact is Rosemary Haughton. In a paper offered at Boston College she stresses
"the experience of communal ventures and of non-hierarchical models for decision-making" that have "no official denominational description, no overall institutional forms and [whose] groupings are not created in order to serve one purpose only, such as education or prayer or protest, or one social category, such as families or young workers" (1981:9). Haughton uses these ventures to highlight the difference between "the experience of being a church in the New Testament sense" and "the experience of belonging to a church."

I am not, of course, suggesting that there is anything radically novel about community as it is currently being experienced and described. To be sure, such an experience is an old theme of philosophic and social scientific reflection that received its perhaps most lapidary expression in Ferdinand Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* of 1887. Tönnies himself tells us that he "started from ... the philosophy on which the political theories of Hobbes and Spinoza were based, and had given careful attention to the later writers on natural law" (1974:171). Indeed, it seems to have required thinkers like Rousseau, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Burke, and Hegel to remind enlightened Westerners of the communal dimension of social dynamics which they might have already learned from Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. In short, neither the performance of community nor its thematization is a special preserve of our age. But as Gadamer has pointed out, when a word or expression becomes publicly modish, it is usually a sign of a lack that is being widely perceived with a greater intensity than normal in the given climate of opinion.

It was a merit of Tönnies, however, to have propounded with some clarity that "the existential reason (*Seinsgrund*) for every human relationship--and that means the subjective aspect in any such relationship, as the element which distinguishes human relationships from actual combinations and relations in a mere flock of animals--must be sought in the subjects' own volition, and hence in the thinking of human beings" (172). If we can read Tönnies's statement and free it from any connotation of voluntarism or rationalism, we are well on the way toward starting to apprehend the nexus between basic community and the Workshop theme, 'Mind and the Mystery of Christ.'
II

BASIC COMMUNITY: WHAT IS IT?

A: Introduction

At the heart of basic community is the conscious human subject operating in its constitutive and communicative functions of meaning (Lonergan, 1972:76-81; 1967b, 1967c). If we remain clear that consciousness as experience is not consciousness as perception (Lonergan, 1967a:175-192; 1967b:248-249; 1967d:226-227; 1956:83-99); and that the subject as subject is not the same as the subject as object (Lawrence, 1972, 1981); then we will realize that the subject to which I am referring is also not the neglected, truncated, immanentist, or alienated subject (Lonergan, 1974c); and that subject in this sense has nothing to do with the starting point of modern philosophies and of the ongoing controversy in the social sciences between the modern natural right orientation on the one hand and the sophisticated forms of relativism that have grown out of Rousseau and the later school of historical jurisprudence on the other (Lawrence, 1978b).

The conscious subject as becoming and being (that is, in its constitutive function of meaning) and as cooperating, sharing, and loving (in its communicative function of meaning) is the focal point of basic community. For I am thinking of community as a matter of common experiences, common understandings, common judgments, and common commitments and loves (Lonergan, 1967b:245-246; 1972:79). But we still have to ask, What makes such community "basic"?

In the face of the isolating and fragmenting effects of the objective surd—alienation modern style!—, one possible construal might be that "basic" refers to the sheer fact or existence or occurrence of community at all. But when we think of community in terms of shared meaning and value, this interpretation is not persuasive; because there can be community even in a situation characterized by profound alienation, in the sense that there can be sharing of absurd experiences, of oversights, of scotoses, of mistaken judgments, of derailed values. For example, there are communities of nihilists; and communities of terrorists who constitute their personal and shared identities by murder and devastation. Alienated and alienating communities are not rare. We
experience them all the time in our neighborhood, our places of work and leisure.

Again, the phrase *communidades de base* has to it the implication of "from below" or "grassroots." For Haughton it connotes existence "in the margins of society" (14); a community that is "small, personal, flexible, the opposite of the organizations which control and oppress." And for Metz it contrasts with either a "purely paternalistic church taking care of the people" or "the bourgeois services church" (104); in it people "are seeking from below, from the grass-roots level of church and society, to bind together mysticism and politics, religion and societal praxis, and to assimilate into their eucharistic table fellowship the fundamental social conflicts and suffering surrounding them" (63). It is clear then that the metaphors "from above" and "from below" point to a change in orientation and direction as regards our constitution and communication of self-meaning: from being objects administered over by church and society to "becoming the subjects of [our] own religious-political history" (Metz, 63).

B. From "Object" to "Subject"

1. The Critical Point

This community or communal transition from being as it were the object of one's own self-constitution to becoming its subject is redolent of a lot of contemporary talk about personal and social identity. For those familiar with Lonergan, that transition will probably call to mind that striking passage from *Existenz und Aggiornamento* in which he discusses the "critical point in the increasing autonomy of the subject" that is reached when the self-constitution of the subject becomes "open-eyed, deliberate", because he "finds out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself" (242). An important point here is that "the opposite to this open-eyed, deliberate self-control" is not the earlier time in the subject's life when one's doing, deciding, finding out for oneself were "busy with objects." Rather, it is "drifting"; or perhaps what Lonergan was later to speak of as "neurosis as cumulatively misinterpreted experience" in which "both the experience and the misinterpretation are conscious though not
averted to, identified, named, distinguished from other experience and interpretation" (1974f:271). What is at issue in "the critical point" of one's existence, therefore, is what we might speak of as true or authentic self-discovery.

2. The Times of the Subject

The manifold dimensions of this issue are laid out rather perspicuously by Lonergan in the Pars Systematica of De Deo Trino where he sets forth the analogy between eternal and temporal subjects. There one can find an explicit and relatively extensive treatment of what he would later express trenchantly in English:

From the "we" of the parents comes the symbiosis of mother and child. From the "we" of the parents and the symbiosis of mother and child comes the "we" of the family. Within the "we" of the family emerges the "I" of the child. In other words the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community through the intersubjective relations that are the life of community that there arises the differentiation of the individual person.

It follows that "person" is never a general term. It always denotes this or that person with all of his or her individual characteristics resulting from communities in which he has lived and through which he has been formed and has formed himself. The person is the resultant of the relationships he has had with others and of the capacities that have developed in him to relate to others (1973:58-59).

In his treatment of the temporal subject, Lonergan makes a distinction between two times of the subject which will recall the "before" and the "after" of what above was spoken of as "the critical point." During her prior time, the subject governs herself and her operations in a "spontaneous" unfolding of the intelligible light of mind and heart (1964a:199). The later time begins as soon as she by her own intention (propria intentione) becomes "the knowing and willing subject of her intellectual nature actuated already and to be actuated in the future" (199).

Here we must pause to stress a number of salient points. First, what chiefly differentiates the prior and later times of the subject is knowing and willing that issues from ("exact and difficult") "knowledge
of its intellectual nature in accord with its intrinsic norms and exigencies" (199). Second, this knowledge may be manifested either "concretely and symbolically" or "technically and exactly." Third, "the transition from the prior to the later time can scarcely ever occur except under the influence of other temporal subjects" (199). In other words, the community is a crucial mediator of the changes in the temporal subject (1967b:245-246). Fourth, as concrete and symbolic or as technical and exact and within an intersubjective framework, this knowledge may be acquired by means of one's own imminently generated knowing and choosing; by believing; or by way of the union of love (199).

In the light of Lonergan's delineation of the transition from a prior to a later time of the subject, let us attempt a possibly relevant construction of the meaning of community as basic. Community is basic insofar as it promotes the transition of temporal subjects from their prior to their later times. Hence, the common meaning at stake in basic community is self-discovery in either a concrete and symbolic or in a technical and exact mode. It embodies a breakthrough to "what," according to Lonergan, "regards the intimate nature of human being, one's duty in this life, and the meaning and goal of this life" (201). The key, then, is the symbolic or technical comprehension of "the intrinsic norms of intelligence," whether cognitive or affective (203).

3. Three Approximations

At a first approximation, therefore, we may say that community as basic fosters that transition from the prior to the later subject; or it promotes a resolution of "the critical point" never transcended in this life (1967b:243)—a resolution which Lonergan did not hesitate to call "conversion" in what must have been a quite generic sense of the word (1964a:202). This definition of community as basic is only a "first approximation" in the sense in which Lonergan used this phrase in "Insight Revisited," because the definition assumes "that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable" (1974f:272). It is open to but does not yet take explicitly into account "that men can be biased, and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions."
There is a need for a second approximation, because, as Lonergan phrased it in dealing with the times of the subject in De Deo Trino, "in the state of fallen nature, temporal subjects are greatly impeded from truly and honestly becoming persons of the later time" (200). On account of the many forms of bias (Lonergan 1957: chapters 6, 7), and of moral impotence (chapter 20), there arises an absurd situation in which communities of knowledge, belief, and love are themselves so ambivalent that "they more frequently draw back from what is truly intelligible and what is truly good and are conducive to a certain all-too-human mediocrity" (1964a:200). Consequently, just as open-eyed, deliberate self-constitution has its dialectical opposite in drifting and in massive misinterpretation of experience, so basic community has its opposite in forms of community based on a mistaken or false apprehension of what it means to be human. If basic community fosters life according to the immanent norms of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility, then communities opposed to basic community originate from the bias toward biological extroversion; from the failure of imagination to evolve in a properly humane fashion; from a sensitive life barely liberated from sheerly biological finalities; from the limitation of questioning and answering to the field of the useful and the comfortable. Not only is what it means to be human not properly manifested in such communities, but the believing and loving which engenders communities is deflected from the narrow gate toward the way that is wide (200-202). At a second approximation, therefore, basic community has to be grasped as concretely and dialectically related to the other forms of community where humanity is thwarted, stunted, extinguished.

Now these definitions of basic community and its sundry opposites are natural in the technical sense of maintaining the disproportion between nature and grace. They fall short of a further approximation apart from which basic community can usually only be apprehended by way of intimations of deprival. For what is overwhelmingly manifest to the observer of human affairs at any time is what Jurgen Habermas has termed "systematically distorted communication" and its resultant "heap of corpses" that, as Walter Benjamin has mentioned, we have been liable to call "progress."

The burden of the further approximation comes out in Rosemary Haughton's evocation of basic community as "the little churches of
Wisdom's planting ... the work of the Spirit" (14); as well as in Metz's "communities that are concentrated around the Lord's Supper" (64) made up of "a people' which becomes free, experiences itself as called forth and liberated to become the subject of its own history in the presence of its God" (57). Lonergan's sketch of the times of the subject articulates this dimension in terms of the need to have recourse "to the eternal and divine subjects themselves" (1964a:202). In the universe that actually exists, therefore, basic community exists or is realized when God, through the gift of his grace in the outpouring of the Spirit and through the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus, draws human subjects into the supernatural set of interpersonal relationships eternally constituted by the Holy Three.

Through the missions of Word and Spirit, the Infinite Act of Understanding Love both re-orient us toward himself and so transforms us "that, having been fashioned by divine intention on the image of God, we might live by a proper intention according to the image of God and hope to become citizens in the city of God, faithful in this life and blessed in the future" (202). In other words, in basic community, what Philip McShane has expressed so well in terms of the intrinsically conversational character of our nature as imago Dei comes into its own when integrated into the Basic Community of which our intellectual nature is the image. In our understanding, in our speech, and in our loving devotion we live conversationally and become principles of conversation or basic community in the universe (McShane, 1977).

I shall conclude this section of my paper by citing a passage from a later work by Lonergan in which he gives rather comprehensive yet concise expression to the meaning of basic community in this universe as grounded in "the threefold personal self-communication of divinity to humanity":

Experience of grace, then is as large as the Christian experience of life. It is the experience of man's capacity for self-transcendence, of his unrestricted openness to the intelligible, the true, the good. It is experience of a twofold frustration of that capacity; the objective frustration of life in a world distorted by sin; the subjective frustration of one's incapacity to break with one's own evil ways. It is experience of a transformation one did not bring about but rather underwent, as divine providence let evil take its course and vertical finality be heightened, as it let one's circumstances shift, one's dispositions change, new encounters occur, and—so gently and so
quietly—one's heart be touched. It is the experience of a new community, in which faith and hope and charity dissolve rationalizations, break determinisms, and reconcile the estranged and the alienated, and there is reaped the harvest of the Spirit that is "... love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control" (Gal 5:22) (1974/6:77).

III
BASIC COMMUNITY: CONVERSATION IN CHRIST JESUS

A. Being in Christ Jesus

To resume then, basic community is the divinely promoted transition from the prior to the later temporal subject which has an intrinsically conversational structure that involves a complex of formation, deformation, and transformation.

The principle of basic community can only be a being beyond necessity and contingency, that is, a strictly transcendent being who can freely will the formation, permit the deformation, and all the more lovingly choose the transformation of humankind. For Christians, this transcendent divinity is not some Aristotelian or Hegelian thought thinking itself but agape. As an Infinite Act of Understanding Love, God is intrinsically conversational. Simply by willing to create this universe, God has entered into conversation with human beings, because the universe in all the vastness of its shapes, numbers, times and in what seems to be "the buzzing, blooming confusion" of emergent probability, is a Cosmic Word whose addressees are finite human persons. Moreover, in Christ Jesus the unspeakable Tetragrammaton of the Old Testament is revealed as Abba: as a Father who is Love; as a Father who has sent us his Word incarnate as the definitive interpretation of that Love, and who, together with the Word, has poured out his Spirit in us as a basis for responding in thanksgiving and joy to that Word and to our Abba (Beer; Crowe, 1978:104-143).

As Lonergan once expressed these points:

In Christ Jesus we are not only referred to God, as to some omega point, but we are on our way to God. The fount of our living is not eros but agape, not desire of an end that uses means but love of an end that overflows. As God did not create the world to obtain something for himself, but rather overflowed from love of
the infinite to loving even the finite—Deus suam gloriām non quaerit propter se, sed propter nos (Sum. theol., 2-2, q. 132, a. 1, ad 1m): the glory of the Father is the excellence of the Son, and the excellence of the adoptive sons—as Christ in his humanity did not will means to reach an end, but possessed the end, the vision of God, and overflowed in love to loving us, so too those in Christ participate in the charity of Christ: they love God super omnia and so can love their neighbors as themselves; they participate in that charity because they are temples of Christ's Spirit, members of his body, adopted children of the Father whom Christ could name Abba; the risen Lord, the Kurios of things invisible and visible, has brought them at a great price; he possesses them; qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei (1967b:249).

B. Conflict of Christologies and/or Conflict of Communities?

I hope by this point it is already apparent that this interweaving of divine and human conversation constitutive of basic community implies no teaching that would not satisfy the exigencies of both the so-called "Christology from below" and "Christology from above." As regards the former, the humanity of Christ is given full sway and nothing is lost or not taken seriously of the moderate "implicit Christologies" revealed by middle-of-the-road New Testament exegesis (Brown, Rahner). As regards the latter, the Trinitarian and doctrinal implications of the conciliar and pre-modern Christology are taken for granted. Indeed, it seems to me that once the counterpositions involved in the false oppositions of "from above" versus "from below" approaches to Christology are cleared away (as I believe they shall be in the gradual unfolding of "the way down" sketched in Fred Crowe's strategy for education), then it becomes possible to focus upon an issue that might be one of the deeper reasons for all the heat and precious little light that surrounds the "from below/above" conflict.

1. Two Ways of Being in Christ Jesus

Something I think may underlie this debate is another contrast which Lonergan has put his finger on:

cluding, making resolutions, winning over our psyches, carrying out the
resolutions," and so on, are operations of conscious intentionality. At
the root of that lack is the issue of "the critical point" discussed
above; or of the transition to the later time of the subject. Then
being in Christ Jesus as substance would mean living as a Christian
while not having passed through or faced the critical point. The
subject in the first period habitually prescinds in his or her living
"from the difference between the opaque being that is merely substance
and the luminous being that is conscious." (Lonergan, 1967b:241). For
one who is in Christ Jesus as substance authentically this prescinding
would, I think, be less a consciously chosen act or a scotosis than
simply a habitual lack of what Lonergan has called "heightening of
awareness" or "of self-appropriation" (240). In Lonergan's usage, this
phrase refers to the application of operations as intentional to our
operations as conscious, a reduplication of the operations of conscious-
ness, at least on the level of attentiveness (Lonergan, 1967:224-231;
1972:14-18). Passing through the critical point and realizing "that
deeds, decisions, discoveries affect the subject more deeply than they
affect the objects with which they are concerned" (1967b:242) would seem
to require at least the minimal heightening of awareness entailed by
"experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding"
in a global and compact fashion.

2. Dialectic of Communities

The reason for emphasizing the lack in the being in Christ Jesus
as substance is that I want to indicate the great dangers to which this
shortcoming is particularly susceptible.

To begin with, what starts as a habitual yet innocent lack may
settle into an intransigent neglect of the subject. When the neglected
subject (Lonergan, 1974c:69-73) clings to the one thing most necessary,
he or she tends to do so with what Lonergan has so aptly called a "con-
gealed mind" (73-75). He or she does not have to become even a
truncated subject to change revelation into a mere inventory of informa-
tion (Lonergan, 1977:12-13). But when the neglected or truncated
subject becomes doctrinaire about his or her naive realism (Lonergan,
1957: Index under knowing and looking), a whole set of distorting trans-
But this being in Christ Jesus maybe the being of substance or of subject. Inasmuch as it is just the being of substance, it is known only through faith, through affirming true propositions, meditating on them, concluding from them, making resolutions on the basis of them, winning over our psyches, our sensitive souls, to carrying out the resolutions through the cultivation of pious imagination and pious affects, and multiplying individual effort and strength through liturgical union. Inasmuch as it is just the being of substance, it is being in love with God without awareness of being in love. Without any experience of just how and why, one is in the state of grace or one recovers it, one leaves all things to follow Christ, one binds oneself by vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, one gets through one's daily heavy dose of prayer, one longs for the priesthood and later lives by it. Quietly, imperceptibly there goes forward the transformation operated by the Kurios, but the delicacy, the gentleness, the deftness of his continual operation in us hides the operation from us (1967b:249-250).

But inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden. In ways you all have experienced, in ways some have experienced more frequently or more intensely than others, in ways you still have to experience, and in ways none of us in this life will ever experience, the substance in Christ Jesus becomes the subject in Christ Jesus. For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting, an experience as human love.

It is clear from these paragraphs that Lonergan is not denigrating being in Christ Jesus as substance, even though his language ("just the being of substance") makes clear his comparative judgment of value. So sympathetically and so beautifully is this way of being in Christ Jesus described here, that one is led to wonder if it is not at least partly an autobiographical portrayal. So too we can sympathize with the "high Christology" that would be correlative to being in Christ Jesus as substance. In authentic instances of such existence, we would find not only orthodoxy but orthopraxis as well.

And yet there is something obviously lacking from being in Christ Jesus as substance. What that is, of course, is very much to the point of the theme of our Workshop: Mind--ours, Jesus'--and the Mystery of Christ. At first we might suppose that the difference between substance and subject is nothing more than the element of awareness, as if there were nothing more involved than the sheer contrast between substance and subject, between soul and subject (Lonergan 1967e:ivii-xv). But this cannot be wholly true, since knowing "through faith, affirming, con-
positions (496) of Christian teachings are liable to emerge. For instance, there is the inability to distinguish between religion and theology that has led to ahistorical orthodoxy or fundamentalism. Incoherently enough, this can co-exist with a tendency to completely separate the spiritual life of the theologian from his professional activities on account of "the controversialist's need to claim total detachment" (Lonergan, 1977:14). In general, then, those who are in Christ Jesus as substance have a penchant (1) for adopting "criteria of objectivity such as necessity and self-evidence that seem to imply that our minds should work with an automatic infallibility" (14); (2) for adhering to "the wooden-headed interpretation of the correspondence view of truth" (1974a:15); and (3) for "so insisting on the objectivity of truth as to leave subjects and their needs out of account" (1974:71). When anyone concedes one or more of these distortions, he or she becomes insensible to the need for anything like discernment of spirits or real dialectic and dialogue.

Naturally, when an appreciable number of people in Christ Jesus as substance succumb to dangers of this kind, they become a scandal and a provocation to those feeling the call to pass through the critical point and to undertake that heightening of awareness to which modernity's "turn to the subject" challenges them. Simply in reaction to these extremes of those in Christ Jesus as substance, what many of those who consider themselves to be in the vanguard of progressivism actually succeed in doing will be less a matter of passing from the prior to the later time of the subject than of getting infected in different ways by the sorry climate of opinion that has been cumulatively brought about by the dominant truncated (Descartes, Bacon), immanentist (Rousseau, Kant, Hegel), and alienated (Nietzsche) subjects who have been symptomatic of the longer cycle of decline (Lawrence, 1978a). The effects of such infection are to be seen on every hand at the present time, not least in many manifestations of Christology "from below"—"from below downwards" as Philip McShane so well expressed it.

It can hardly be a surprise, then, that the struggle for basic Christian community is being carried out in the cross-fire between the different "doctrinaire carabiniere" (Lonergan, 1977:13) on the right and the no less offensive representatives of the would-be "benevolent" nihilists (relativists, historicists, liberal Christians) and of the out
and out "malicious" nihilists who have done their best to replace the ark of the covenant with the ark of self-hatred.

It should be expected as well that the dialectical development within basic Christian communities themselves should mirror the various counterpositions of left and right, since in this life the critical point is never transcended; or again that they themselves should be regarded by both extremes as representatives of the opposite poles.

3. Theology and Basic Christian Community

Basic Christian communities are comprised of those who (a) are continually negotiating the critical point; (b) have made the transition from the prior to the later time of the temporal subject; (c) are "in Christ Jesus as subject." It would be difficult to claim that they do not share common judgments and common commitments with those who are in Christ Jesus as substance. But they also possess a heightened awareness which keeps them from prescinding in their day-in and day-out living from the difference between substance and subject. This means they cannot help but feel challenged by those who do not understand themselves as "in Christ Jesus" at all but often seem to be authentically mediating the inauthenticity of truncated, immanentist, or alienated subjectivity. At the same time and in a very complicated way, they are not utterly blind to the defects of the modern climate of opinion, but still maintain a deep sympathy for positions held by those in Christ Jesus as substance, a sympathy that is all the more poignant because the latter often tend to accuse them of not being in communion with themselves. Yet in the midst of these tensions, those in basic Christian community possess a profound sense of "the immediacy of shared experience of conversion and of calling, of the presence of the Lord in power and intimacy" (Haughton:11). Indeed, this very sense of what Lonergan described as "being drawn by the Father, listening to him, learning from him; and being drawn by the Son, crucified, dead, and risen" (1977:13) results in a theology that heightens the tensions with those in Christ Jesus as substance as well as with those who do not understand themselves as in Christ Jesus.

On the one hand they will be far less liable to separate the scholarly, propositional, and theoretic dimensions of theology from the
spiritual and mystical knowledge by which they live their lives. Mysticism and the discernment of spirits become integral to the theology of those in Christ Jesus as subject (Lonergan, 1977:14).

On the other hand, if they do not habitually prescind from the difference between substance and subject, they will be integrally concerned with the interdependence of their religion and their culture. They will not be satisfied with drawing conclusions from what they already hold instead of deepening their understanding of what their convictions mean (12). Theological questions, as Lonergan wrote, "emerge concretely in one's concern, one's interests, one's hopes, one's plans, one's daring and timidity, one's taking risks and playing safe" (1967b:250). Those who are in Christ Jesus as subject, however, have a more vivid sense that as the questions "emerge concretely, so too they are resolved concretely." They realize that they may not be "solutions thought out in Christ Jesus for an archaic world that no longer exists or for a futurist world that never will exist"; nor may they "be thought out for the world that is now but only at the price of not being thought out in Christ Jesus". The solutions they are searching for have to "be thought out for the world that is now and thought out in Christ Jesus" (250-251).

4. Method and Basic Christian Community

Rosemary Haughton stated very simply and directly what I mean by the issue of method in theology when she wrote:

We have little excuse, at this point in history, for not understanding the need for an inner obedience, a truthfulness to oneself which becomes possible through learning to be in touch with the roots of personhood. This "intouchness" is the key to inner freedom and peace--freedom from false guilt and compulsions, from the fear and suspicion and insecurity which drive people to manipulate and oppress each other and themselves. This is the kind of freedom of which Paul speaks, springing from the deep awareness of being loved, the knowledge that the roots of the self grow from, and by, an impulse of love which is the dynamic of divine Wisdom. A person who is free to grow, to touch, to respond, to enjoy, to grieve, to speak out, really to love--this is a person who has touched the peace which is the sign of authenticity, the root of obedience to God.

This inner truthfulness is not discovered in solitude, it is the gift to each other of those who are aware of God's action in their lives. People give each other the support, the hope, the
encouragement which is necessary if anyone is to take the risk of faith: and this is not a once-for-all event but a progressively deeper uncovering, a clearing of obstacles to allow the shoots of Wisdom to appear. It is in the church, the little community gathered in Christ's name, that such risk-taking becomes possible, that love becomes possible (12-13).

I hope it does not sound strange to too many of you to hear that this shared yet ever so personal "intouchness," "inner truthfulness," may be understood to mean a heightened awareness of what it takes to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving; and that this in turn is what I take to be what Lonergan means by post-Kantian transcendental method.

I fear that the modern methodolatry spawned by the turn to the subject as truncated, immanentist, and alienated has pretty much lessened the chances of our getting at what Lonergan means by method or generalized empirical method. For it is simply mistaken to associate that meaning with the Cartesian and Baconian project of mastering and controlling human and subhuman nature. Instead, it is really a fundamental and existentially verifiable answer to the radical and originate question of philosophy: what is the right way to live? Surely I do not need to elaborate here upon how the quest of basic Christian communities to, in Haughton's words, "understand and share the experience of what God was doing in Christ, in their midst" (14) can only be truly serious in the measure that it is also trying to answer that question about how to live. In a world so gravely affected by the existence of differentiations of consciousness (1972:305-319), this is the question of method. By this point in the present paper, there should be a prima facie obviousness to the notion that for those in Christ Jesus as subject, that is, for those who are ever coming to terms with the critical point and those who have passed from the first to the second time of the subject, there is an elective affinity for a type of reflection (named method, transcendental method, or generalized empirical method by Lonergan) "that embraces in their complementarity both man as attentive, as intelligent, as reasonable, as responsible and the human world as given and as structured by intelligence, by reasonable judgment, by decision and action" (1975c:52).
Basic Christian Community

IV
BASIC CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND SYSTEMATIC ISSUES IN CHRISTOLOGY

In this final section I would like to deal in a rather rhapsodic fashion with certain links between central concerns of basic Christian community and facets of Lonergan's work in Christology.

A. Mutual Self-mediation as Mutual Self-meaning

We have seen that basic community is the divinely promoted transition from substance to subject, from the prior to the later time of the subject by means of a conversation that involves human formation, deformation, and transformation.

We can reformulate this now in terms of mediation and of religious development. Community as a shared discovery and living out of a concrete solution to the problem of living is at root a matter of a common asking of questions and a common living by the answers to those questions. Hence, it is a matter of shared or common cognitive and constitutive meaning and value. Such sharing or commonality involves mutual self-mediation: we would not be who we are if it were not for the network of interpersonal relations we have experienced.

But community as basic in the actual universe that is also entails consciously falling in love in an otherworldly and an unrestricted way. This falling in love is religious conversion. (Lonergan, 1972:101-107). It is affirmed by Christians to be a gift of the Father mediated by the inner Word of his Spirit and the outer Word of his incarnate Son together with the meaning and values originating and radiating out in history from him. In this way the Father draws us into mutual self-mediation with the Trinity. For Christians, then, the falling in love religiously effected by the gift of the Spirit usually coincides with falling in love with the human being, Jesus. As in any relationship of love, the beloved becomes a central feature of one's self-understanding; and the growth of that love is both caused by and yields an increasing resonance with (in this case) Jesus' values as disclosed in the Christian tradition. Our self-meaning comes to be ever more integrated into God's own self-meaning as we become more like Christ. For while the gift of the Spirit in its transformative imme-
diacy has to it an indescribable air, the human Jesus mediates the meaning and value of God's love poured out in our hearts in human terms.

B. Trinitarian Self-meaning as Ground of Human Self-meaning

Conversation, like human life itself, is constituted by meaning and value, and so it is quintessentially a matter of heart and mind. Heart and mind are compact expressions for the operations of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness. As far as I know, Lonergan is the only theologian of major stature today who not only affirms the centrality of the Trinity's three distinct and conscious subjects of divine consciousness, but who speaks intelligibly about them in terms of a psychological analogy which has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love (1972c:63). I will not here go into how crucial human heart and mind is to the conception and affirmation of a transcendent being not intrinsically conditioned by space and time and all that this implies for Lonergan's theology of God (1957: chapter 19; 1973). Nor can I explain the reasoning of the psychological analogy that moves from processions through relations to persons; or the reasoning that moves from the persons to the missions of Word and Spirit and that, in tandem with the analogy of contingent predictions, proposes a systematic apprehension of the basic components of the supernatural order of grace in terms of created participations in the divine relations (1964a). Suffice it to say that no other contemporary treatise betrays such a mutual illumination of mind and mystery as this one. I know of no other systematics that compares with Lonergan's in its capacity to ground the "we" of basic Christian community in the "We" of Basic Community.

C. Critical Realism and the Conditions of the Possibility of Incarnation

Christian revelation actuated in human history by the twofold pull of inner operative grace and the outer grace of the Christian tradition has mediated a thematization of the Word of God as true (Crowe, 1978:43-57; Lonergan, 1974g). This has conditioned the emer-
gence of a dogmatic realism in the Patristic era which eventually inspired the development of a critical metaphysics in the Middle Ages. This, in turn, gave rise to an explicit cognitional theory and epistemology as the core of a foundational methodology for doing theology in the context of modern psychology and modern history (Lonergan, 1974e). An outcome of these developments is Lonergan's technical explication of the transition from the prior to the later time of the subject. But this technical grasp has delivered a framework for specifying without mystification both the conditions of the possibility and the systematic meaning of the Incarnation—the pure instance of grace in the hypostatic union (1964b:105-310).

Besides this utterly critical retrieval of the metaphysics of the hypostatic union, however, Lonergan's technical thematization of the mind and heart of the later temporal subject permitted him to offer as well a most lucid presentation of Christology in terms of the dimensions of the world not only mediated but constituted by meaning. I will only select a couple of the more significant issues.

1. The Life of Jesus as Constituted by Meaning

The sensibility of basic Christian community calls for more than a metaphysical view of the person, of human perfection, and of the life of grace. For the viewpoint of metaphysics itself does not adequately differentiate substance from subject (Lonergan, 1967e:vi-ix; 1974b; 1974/6). So as Lonergan explains in his thesis on the knowledge of Christ, the medieval problematic investigated the perfection of knowledge in Jesus' intellect in terms of habits and possible acts, whereas contemporary theology focuses on his actually elicited acts of knowing and loving as constitutive of that individual life and of a portion of history (1964b:346).

Lonergan's way of tackling the contemporary problematic is precisely relevant to the theologial preoccupations of basic Christian communities. Jesus, the one divine person or identity, has two natures or subjectivities and so two consciousnesses, one divine and one human. Lonergan's thesis on Christ's knowledge provides a framework for understanding the theology of Jesus' human subjectivity. As gradually actuating the eternal Word's human subjectivity and consciousness, Jesus
Lawrence faces the task of translating into human flesh and blood, human deeds, gestures, and symbols, human life-toward-death, "the eternally true expression of the value that God as agape is" (1975c:64). As possessing the human consciousness of the eternal Word, Jesus already possesses from the outset of his life the goal of human aspiration and striving, the vision of the blessed. And yet, since the meaning of agape is a mystery in the strict sense and so disproportionate to the adequate range of human knowing, even Jesus does not start off knowing that meaning and value in human terms. As a result, his whole mission on earth is to be communicated to us by one who had to learn it as we do.

2. Basic Christian Community and Satisfaction

If Jesus' human subjectivity as constituted over space and time by elicited acts of meaning and value was for the sake of communication—since he "did not will means to reach an end, but possessed the end, the vision of God, and overflowed in love to loving us" (1967d:249)—, then we should expect Lonergan (again with Aquinas' aid) to bring the doctrine of the expiatory death of Jesus into the context of communication. It is difficult to understand how Jesus' death as an act of meaning and value is properly effective in our own ongoing metanoia, when it is explained solely in the context of quid pro quo justice. In Lonergan's treatment of satisfaction, however, we are led to appreciate both intellectually and affectively what it means that the Judge of our sins became precisely the one judged and condemned and victimized by sin. Satisfaction is not a salve for an angry God; but, under the influence of the grace of conversion, it effects the transformation in our attitude toward sin. Jesus "freed us from our sins by his blood" because he "loves us" (Rev 1:5). The transformation in attitude occurs in the context of our response to the one who "loved me and handed himself over for me" (Gal 2:20; Eph 5:2). Our entry into loving union with Jesus involves our becoming identified with his love for the Father and his hatred for sin. This is the key to the healing and liberating quality of basic Christian community.
3. Basic Christian Community and Law of the Cross

Most of us, in our hereditary and personal brokenness, are familiar with the all too human rationale for sin: "You have to live!" The meaning of life in this expression has, as we know, been enshrined in the philosophies of the successive waves of modernity that comprise the stages in the longer cycle of decline.

The best of premodern classical and Christian philosophy on natural law inculcated not so much a set of rules for living but a hierarchy of values or ends of which the highest and ultimate end—specifically from the standpoint of the Christian breakthrough to divine transcendence—imposes a standard upon human action that is not intrinsically conditioned by space and time. Taking such a standard seriously, as Augustine clearly saw, implied a radical dichotomy within possible human orientations: either one is caught up in a love of God even to the contempt of self or a love of self even to the contempt of God. Such an otherworldly standard defines human fulfillment in terms of radical self-transcendence.

But the modern theories of natural right, along with their relativist and historicist successors, reverse the classical and Christian hierarchy of ends. The lowest end, self-preservation of life in the biological sense, becomes the highest; the transcendent goal gets replaced by one or another this-worldly standard; within the successive lower viewpoints of the longer cycle, the worst that could happen to a person is that he or she should be unsuccessful or die. Death is simply the sumnum malum and so life becomes a restless quest for enough power to fend off for as long as possible the threat and fear of death. Modern ideologies are ideologies for winners: You have to live! And in order to live, you have to win at any cost!

Within the classical and Christian viewpoint, death was transvalued and was used as the touchstone for the distinction between mere life and the good life. But modern ideologies for winners eradicate the distinction between mere life and the good life in the classical and Christian sense by equating living well with being well off. It must not be forgotten, however, that the ideologies for winners had a humanitarian inspiration. There are various ways of coming to terms with the
fact that the normal processes of human formation are radically deformed. So why not bring theory into line with 'normal' practice, which is profoundly askew? Isn't that the practical thing to do?

From the Christian perspective, though, the concrete solution to the problem of living is not essentially man's at all but God's: the redemption. Lonergan's theses on the redemption (1964b: Theses 15-17, esp. 17) consider the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ in terms of the concrete intelligibility of this universe in which our conversation on earth is a matter of formation, deformation, transformation. We have already seen how the systematic account of satisfaction explains the transformative effects of falling in love with God whose love has the shape taken by John 3:16. We have not yet considered the intelligibility of God's solution to the problem of moral evil in the universe: namely, that he willed not to simply annihilate the evils befalling the human race but to convert these very evils into the highest good in accord with the law of the cross (Thesis 17). Whereas merely human solutions to the evils of deformation tend to move through sin to death (death being the inevitable end to be avoided, postponed, and--technological hope of hopes--overcome); in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, God's solution to the problem of human living in a deformed world is revealed to move from sin through death to life. According to the law of the cross, the evils resulting from the surd of sin, including death itself, have gotten divinely transformed into the means of growth in a new and higher life. Then, for example, the event of death itself shifts from being either the \textit{sumnum malum} of the vulgar and vicious, or the question-mark which Socrates showed it would be unreasonable to fear; and the moment of death can become instead the incarnate symbol of our self-donation to God, the authentic and definitive resolution of that critical point of the existence of those who are in Christ Jesus as subject.

V

CONCLUSION

This is no more than a sketch by which I have tried to indicate the virtualities in the thought of Lonergan both for understanding the
nature of basic community and for promoting the self-understanding of basic community. To adequately fill in such a sketch would require the collaborative effort of people in basic community incarnating and implementing the organon Lonergan has made available to them (Crowe, 1980).
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The most conspicuous and in practice the most often forgotten and least understood characteristic of human education is that it is something that happens between persons: between teachers and students. Other meanings of the term are derivatives of the basic acts of teaching and learning which are themselves conscious events that take place between persons. In our culture we emphasize the activity of the teacher and his relation to the student because we think of the teacher as originating and guiding the activities of learning. However a closer examination of teaching and learning shows them to be a continuous and unified activity. Teachers are not really teaching if no students are learning. Teachers may initiate, motivate, and guide the learning process, but the end or purpose of teaching is in the learning activities of the students. Anyone who has ever taught anything knows that they usually learn more by their teaching than their students learn from it. Similarly students often learn something quite different from what the teacher might think she is teaching them.

When I speak of education as an act of persons, by person I mean a conscious subject who is neither an unrelated individual nor merely a

1. By "foundational dialectics" I mean something somewhat different from what Lonergan means by Dialectics or Foundations taken discretely as they are in Method in Theology. For Lonergan, Dialectic and Foundations are understood "methodically" and that is essential to his project of differentiation. Our project requires us not only to differentiate (method), but also to interrelate (hermeneutics) and integrate (praxis). Thus in Lonergan's terms we are doing dialectics from a foundational viewpoint (see Lonergan, 1972:235-294). For the argument as to why this is possible and necessary see my dissertation (Piscitelli, 1977).
member of a society, though human persons are always both. We could say that the person lives at the intersection of the individual and the society. The person is an individual by virtue of the fact that to be a person is to be some thing in the world. The person is a member of a society by virtue of the fact that to be a person is to be a human being who shares his or her life with other human beings. All living things are more of less societal. But by society I do not mean community, for to be a person is the same thing as being-in-community. The reason for this is that persons are communities: the two notions are co-relative. Living things may be members of societies, but only human beings form communities.

To speak of persons-in-community or to speak of a community of persons is to speak of one's unique ability as a person to relate oneself to oneself in a conscious act of intending an object. The fundamental acts of persons are the intentional acts of knowing, speaking, hearing (in the sense of understanding), loving, deciding, and acting. For in those conscious and intentional acts one relates oneself to oneself. All of those acts presuppose that I can other myself in various more or less complex ways. To take a seemingly simple example, I cannot speak unless at the same time I as other can hear (understand) what I am saying. It is now recognized by psychologists that children cannot learn to think until they practice speaking to themselves. Similarly, as personal, teaching and learning are reflexive to activities: I can be said to teach myself something or learn something for myself. When this happens teaching and learning become one and the same intentional act. So this is a distinctive quality of human persons: the power to relate oneself to oneself by intending an object. This is an essential mark of our humanness. The self-relating activities of the human person are the foundation for human interiority (inwardness) and human intentionality (consciously to mean an object). They also are the condition for the possibility of human speech.

The subject of our inquiry is the meaning and value of a liberal education, the education of human persons to freedom. However, before we can speak of a liberal education, we must be clear about what is involved in any kind of human education. This means an understanding of the relations between teachers and students and these are fundamentally interpersonal relations. In cognitional terms the teacher is a knower
and the student is coming to know. In hermeneutic terms the teacher is the one who speaks from the vantage point of understanding of knowing while the student is the one who listens in order to understand or to know or to know how to act.

Teachers cannot teach a student what they, the teachers, have not already learned. Thus, mastery of the subject to be taught is a necessary condition or an essential quality of a teacher. Teachers who have not mastered their fields of inquiry must pretend to have mastery or they will lose the respect of their students. Discipline is the fundamental characteristic of the student. Here discipline means submitting oneself to the teacher for the sake of the thing to be learned. This is what it means to be a disciple. What corresponds, in the teachers, to the discipline of the student is the training they give the student. Similarly, what corresponds to mastery in teachers is the achievement of a competence in the students. If the conditions for teaching and learning are mastery and discipline respectively, then the acts of teaching and learning are knowledge necessary for the effective training of the student. In other words, without mastery teachers would not know either the proper prescriptions or the proper application of the prescriptions to be given to students to meet the demands of a particular set of activities to be learned. So mastery is more than competence; it is a whole set of competences that gives teachers control over the whole range of the subject to be learned as well as the ability to train students properly. Still training and discipline are for the sake of the competence to be acquired by the student. Learning in the student depends upon self-discipline and thus training from the teacher depends upon the teacher's own self-mastery.

Self-mastery and self-discipline are peculiar to human acts of teaching and learning. For unlike animals that are also capable of teaching and learning, human teaching and learning require an act of internalization if they are to be fully human. This act of internalization is, once again, a self-relating act. For example, it is for this reason that human beings are capable of competing with themselves while animals are not. Human competition in any field is really founded upon our ability to internalize an ideal which we try to realize just as we recognize the reality of an ideal behind any excellent human activity. The consequences for human teaching and learning should be obvious: the
teacher tries to get the students to internalize the ideal of the activities to be performed and to the extent that students do, they can be said to be more than merely trained; they can be said to be educated.

All human knowledge is the result of learning, but it is equally true that there is no learning without a teacher and no human learning without the internalization of an ideal. Moreover discipline and training can be oppressive if they are not for the sake of and intrinsically required by the thing to be learned or if they do not result in the internalization of an ideal. Finally, even mastery and competence can become insignificant pastimes if they are not directed to something worthwhile for its own sake. Thus we raise the question of the self-authenticating objectives of human teaching and learning and the commitment that should guide both the teacher and the student in the learning process.

Beyond the proximate objective of learning skills to produce goods or services for society there is the remote and more comprehensive objective of educating the human person. The real educator treats the person as always more than a natural, socio-economic, political, or even cultural resource. For to come to be a person requires more than discipline and competence or training and mastery; it fundamentally requires self-understanding, self-knowledge, self-possession, self-control, and self-respect. In a word, it requires moral excellence. In a really human education the relation between teacher and student which would tend to become that of master and slave would be sublated by the mutual commitment of both to the objectives of self-understanding, self-knowing, and moral excellence. Through the intention of these objectives, self-discipline and self-mastery are one and the same thing. Human education requires the mutual recognition of persons as persons and this begins when teachers invite students to understand themselves, to know themselves, and to be themselves by being morally excellent and when students recognize that a teacher listens to what they, the students, have to say.

Self-understanding, self-knowledge, and moral excellence are, then, the self-authenticating objectives of a human education. Each objective has its own specifying object. Thus the specifying object of understanding is meaning; that of knowing is the truth; and that of moral excellence is the good. To say the same thing in a more appro-
appropriate way, we could say that understanding intends meaning, knowing intends the truth, and moral excellence intends the good and by doing so makes real hope possible. It follows that the self-authenticating objectives of human education make the question of the fundamental attitudes and basic orientation of the person unavoidable.

Thus, I wish to argue that a good human education aims to achieve in oneself and in others the fundamental attitudes of openness to understanding, openness to knowing, and a real hope for the meaningful and true human good. But to understand these attitudes and objectives, to appropriate them for oneself, and to aid others in self-understanding and self-appropriation involves us in a self-conscious, dialectical process. This is another way of saying that these attitudes are the result of overcoming fundamental, inner human conflicts, for dialectic implies tensions or conflicts. Still I am using the notion of dialectic as strictly applicable only to the realm of persons and interpersonal relation or what might be called the realms of psyche, mind, or spirit.

Through my notion of dialectic we recognize that the person is a community of selves in conflict or tension. To be a human person in history is to be this community of selves as well as to be in a community of persons who themselves are caught up in the same tensions. Dialectic, dialogue, and conversation are three dimensions of the same human reality that we are as persons. "Dialectic," as I am using the term, refers to the structural dimension of the human reality; "dialogue" refers to the interpersonal dimension of the same reality; while the "conversation that we are" refers to the reality itself. Just as the notion of dialogue implies that there are characters speaking and the notion of conversation implies that some thing is being spoken about, so also then, dialectic is the structure of the conversation that we are as persons.

In other words, openness to understanding, openness to knowing, and hope for the meaningful and true human good as the fundamental attitudes and basic orientation of the authentic human person are part

2. To distinguish my sense of dialectic from Hegelian and other organismic forms I restrict it to the realm of interpersonal relations: the intentional realms of psyche (man's relation to nature other than strictly human nature), mind (man's relation to all human realms), and spirit (man's decisive relation to God). For Lonergan on Hegel's dialectic, see 1978:421-423.
of the dialectical structure that we are in tension with ourselves. These attitudes and orientations are the authentic selves that we are and are to become.

As a structure dialectic has four moments: an initial position, a counterposition, a false compromise between the two, and a higher viewpoint. The initial position is the least thought out position, the counterposition is a rejection of and reaction to the initial position, the false compromise is an attempt to "have it both ways," and the higher viewpoint is a true reconciliation of all the other positions. The higher viewpoint represents the attitudes of openness to understanding and knowing and a real human hope for what is truly worthwhile. From the higher viewpoint the truth and falsity of all the lower viewpoints can be known. The higher viewpoint reveals that what is true in the initial position is falsified in the counterposition and vice versa, while the compromising position preserves not only what is true about the initial position and counterposition but also what is false about both. The higher viewpoint alone preserves what is true about all the lower viewpoints, while eliminating what is false about all of them as well.

As dialogue dialectic is the structure of the conversation that we are. Since dialogue reveals the interpersonal dimension of the conversation that we are, in the conversation that is the human person or the human person in community, there are four characters or selves corresponding to the fourfold structure. Corresponding to the initial position there is the "Unthinker" that we are; corresponding to the counterposition there is the "Half-Baked Thinker" that we are; corresponding to the false compromise there is the "Commonsense Thinker" that we are or "The Great Compromiser" that we are; and finally, corresponding to the higher viewpoint there is the "Authentic Self" we are and can become.

As the conversation that we are, dialectic is the reality-intension that the lower viewpoints represent in relation to the higher

3. On the theme of the polymorphism of human consciousness and the four biases of common sense, see Lonergan, 1978:385-87, 399, 426-27; 191-203, 218-242. I am using the term "common sense" in the sense that is equivalent to "biased common sense" for Lonergan. The reason for this will become clear as the argument develops.
viewpoint. In other words the content of the conversation that we are is defined in relation to the objectives of meaning, truth, and worth and the lower viewpoints have their meaning, truth and worth in relation to the higher viewpoint. To be a human person is to live within the horizon-in-tension of meaning, truth, and worth.

To appropriate the attitudes of openness to understanding, openness to knowing, and hope along with the fundamental orientations to the meaningful, the true, and the good requires a foundational decision and commitment that can best be described as a conversion or a series of conversions because the higher viewpoint or the authentic self is always the result of a withdrawal from inauthenticity rather than a complete identification with the meaningful, the true, or the good. The reason for this is twofold: first, human beings will never be able to understand or know everything about everything or be involved with everything that is really worthwhile; and secondly, human persons are de facto a conscious reality in tension with their own radical inauthenticity. In short we are finite and alienated from ourselves, from others, from nature, and from God.

We will argue that the attitudes of openness and hope and the corresponding fundamental orientations to meaning, truth, and worth (as uncovered in an analysis of dialectic as described above) constitute the real aims of a truly human education; and that, to the extent that it is possible, such an analysis will promote a reflective appropriation of those attitudes and fundamental orientations. Philosophy has always been a dialectical enterprise in this sense. Thus dialectical philosophy is at the service of self-appropriation. This is the hermeneutic side of philosophy.

4. Human finitude is not yet fault, but the fault or culpability lies in the fact or "non-fact" of our moral impotence. (Lonergan, 1978:627-630).

5. The difference between Plato and Aristotle on the nature of dialectic is relevant to the issue here: for Plato dialectic is hermeneutical and foundational, but undifferentiated methodically; Aristotle's dialectic is methodically differentiated but pre-philosophical and, therefore, not foundational and hermeneutical. I mean to have a notion of dialectic that is both methodologically differentiated and foundational-hermeneutical. We shall see what this implies as the argument unfolds.
The first kind of openness at which a truly human education would aim is openness to understanding that intends meaning. However, it is easier to talk about the attitude of openness than it is to achieve it. Long ago, for example, the philosopher Heraclitus complained about a recalcitrant common sense that refused to open itself to what he called a universal logos that consistently overcomes the chaos of the world process. Or in a similar vein Plato became so enthralled by the power of ideas that he came to think of them as more real than the things of immediate experience. Or again, when discussing how induction is possible, at the end of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle described the discovery of meaningful patterns in experience in terms of a single soldier in a routed army taking up the standard and rallying his fellow comrades so that the army could slowly regroup and take a stand. In each instance these philosophers were referring to insight and openness to understanding. In each case what is at stake is a performance, a way of life, not simply another piece of information to be stored.

As Aristotle and many after him recognized, the attitude of openness to understanding and the basic orientation to meaning and intelligibility lies at the foundation of all philosophy and science and it is rooted in what he called wonder. This wonder, however, is always more than mere curiosity because it goes beyond the immediacy of interest through the mediation of questions that seek meaningful answers. Openness to understanding and our fundamental orientation to meaning has its roots in human spontaneity: spontaneously we wonder and ask questions, we are open to other persons and things in the world. This is openness as a fact of human existence; it is openness not as an achievement, but as its basis.

The roots of openness are to be found then in the human condition itself. Human infants are different from the young of every other animal species in that to accommodate the size of the brain they must literally be "born too soon." This means that the human infant is very vulnerable and, hence, requires tremendous care. Thus we are born too soon "for the sake of" intelligence and the result of this is that we do not survive, grow, and mature except as a result of someone's caring. So even human biology witnesses to the two essential constituents of our humanness: intelligence (understanding) and love.
Because of our initial vulnerability we need to rely on and trust others, especially those who care for us. This trust is a "natural" trust or belief and, therefore, it is neutral. Nevertheless, this natural trust or belief is for the sake of the development of our own intelligence and responsible autonomy. As we become capable of understanding more and taking more responsibility for ourselves, natural trust or belief must give way to intelligent trust or belief. Thus, those who are responsible for us must yield to this new situation and, reciprocally, we must identify with our own developing intelligence and capacity for autonomy. When this fails to happen, when we continue to rely upon others for the answers to questions we ourselves can have and/or when those who are responsible for us refuse to yield to the new situation of our developing intelligence and autonomy, we tend to fall into the initial position of the first dialectic: the attitude of naïveté, an unthinking and irresponsible trust or belief.

Human beings tend to become naïve because we need answers before we can understand the questions or because we speak before we can understand the meaning of what we are saying. "Natural belief" need not become naïve, but it is very likely to. Naïveté is the indiscriminate belief of someone who can intelligently discriminate for themselves but will not. Still, the naïve attitude is not taken without a pseudo-reason (I call it "pseudo" because it is a "reason" that contradicts reason). This pseudo-reason is the quest for security. The naïve person "thinks" he can gain security by depending upon another for answers he himself can discover. The paradox is, the more he depends upon another in this way, the more insecure he becomes. Security is for the sake of understanding and not vice versa and the more we understand, the more likely it will be that we will be secure. Security is never a terminal value, understanding always is. Questions make the naïve uncomfortable so that what they do understand tends to become a set of fixed answers rather than a motive for further understanding. The naïve bury their heads in the sands of a security that has forgotten the purpose of real security: understanding.

6. (Lonergan, 1972:51). Here I mean an authentic terminal value: a particular good as an end worthy of being an end for human life.
Very few persons have the luxury of being able to retreat from all real issues in the world and from other human beings in a crazy Howard Hughes style the naive attitude would suggest. In the long run, if not always in the short run, reality demands an intelligent response and people need understanding. Reality tends to catch up with most of us. The naive can discover that they cannot live in a world of their own making in which everyone agrees with their own view of things. An inevitable crisis can make the naive person reflective. It soon becomes clear that their unthought-out answers no longer work. They can become as uncomfortable about the answers they accepted from others as they were initially uncomfortable about real questions. They may come to think there are "no easy answers," and there are many contradictory ones, none of which seem to provide them with the kind of security they longed for initially. They come to trust the answers of others for security less and less and to "trust only themselves" more and more realizing, of course, that this gives them very little security. When this happens, the indiscriminate belief of the naive becomes the indiscriminate doubt of the sceptic. Scepticism is a reaction to the failure of the naive attitude. Every sceptic was first naive: scepticism is born of the failure of naiveté.

Thus, the counterposition in the dialectic of openness to understanding is scepticism. First the sceptic defines himself in opposition to the naive by refusing to believe anyone or anything. In its positive moment the attitude of scepticism is the power of questioning, for behind every doubt is a possible fruitful question; but the sceptic makes every question into a doubt and every doubt into a weapon of "self-defense." The sceptic finds an odd kind of security in the "idea" that there is no security, for he thinks there is no security in depending upon others so he must depend upon himself; but he also knows he cannot guarantee his own security because no one can. He finds "meaning-intelligibility" in the "idea" that there is no meaning in human experience or intelligibility in the world except the "meaning-intelligibility" he projects from his own vacuous self. So he thinks human experience and the intelligibility of the world collapse under the weight of all his doubts. He likes to claim that there is only one thing to be understood: that there is nothing to be understood. (Of course, if that can be understood, then there is reason to believe that
nothing else can.) If naivety leads to an impractical practicality, then scepticism leads to an anti-intellectual intellectualism. On reflection naivety turned out to be impossible from a practical standpoint; on the other hand, scepticism, which is possible only in reflection, seems to be "theoretically" possible. It seems more visible in thought because the illusion is a "self-fabrication." However, the no of scepticism requires the prior yes of naivety: the sceptic does not realize that without belief there is nothing to doubt; and without the possibility of real meaning in human experience and real intelligibility in the world, there is nothing to question.

Just as the naive person is left with the false security of an immediate outward experience of the world and an immediate, unthinking belief in others, so also the sceptical person is left with the false security of an immediate, inner, empty self and world. The sceptic defines himself as the "Unbeliever": and without realizing it, he depends upon the proposals (beliefs) of others for his doubt. The doubts of the sceptic are as indiscriminate and exclusive of human understanding as the naive person's beliefs. Inasmuch as both agree, as it were, to give up the quest for understanding that is the foundation of all art and theory, scepticism is no less aesthetically and theoretically self-contradictory than naivety, its polar opposite. They differ only on how and why the project of human understanding is impossible. Both seek security instead of understanding: naivety, the security of unexamined beliefs; scepticism, the "security" of empty self-reliance.

The opposition between naivety and scepticism is clearly dialectical in the sense described above. For naivety is the initial position (unthought-out) and scepticism is the counterposition (half-baked); neither can be maintained without self-contradiction; both are impossible for authentic human selfhood. Nevertheless the commonsense temptation is to find a compromise between the two. However, since neither is viable because both exclude the attitude of openness to understanding and contradict the fundamental human orientation to meaning, no really workable compromise is possible. In fact the commonsense "middle ground" is even more insidious to authentic practice than the initial, counterpositions because biased common sense (Lonergan, 1978:218-242) weaves a tangle of half-truths that resist every intelligent analysis.
Common sense likes to call attention to the so-called complexities of life and thought, not to understand and resolve them intelligently, but to hide behind them and avoid the real issues of thoughtful reflection and the meaningful life. Thus real openness to understanding does not lie anywhere between naïveté and scepticism in some commonsense compromise, but on an entirely different level, the level of a reflective commitment to understanding and meaning that transcends both naïveté and scepticism as well as the false commonsense compromise. Finally, such a level is not reached without a person undergoing a conversion or protrepsis (Lonergan, 1972:249-50, 267-69).

By transcending both naïveté and scepticism the really open person is able to preserve the truth of both as well as the truth of the inauthentic commonsense compromise while eliminating the falsities in all three lower viewpoints. By showing how this is done, the elements of the higher viewpoint of openness to understanding can be understood. Nevertheless, since such openness involves an intellectual and/or an aesthetic conversion, no analysis can substitute for the performance of a commitment to understanding in one's life. These conversions represent a withdrawal from inauthenticity; that is, by virtue of a commitment to understanding as a terminal value with which the subject identifies herself, the intellectually and/or aesthetically converted subject commits herself to the unlimited project of understanding in the realms of human meanings (art) or the realms of object-intelligibilities (science). Such a commitment or conversion never implies that a person has ever fully achieved the higher viewpoint, for to do so would mean that a human being could understand everything about everything. When the partial human achievement of such openness comes, it comes only with a lifetime struggle of trying to be true to the human intention of understanding and meaning, revealed in wonder and worked out in the concrete questions and answers in philosophy and the sciences or in the concrete attempts to express the meaning of the human self in its symbolic forms in art and literature.

We can understand what real openness to understanding is, then, by analyzing how it transcends the lower viewpoints. In other words we shall be answering the question, What does it mean to be intellectually and aesthetically converted? (Which is not the same thing as being intellectually and aesthetically converted.) A person who is truly open
to understanding and self-attuned to the fundamental orientation to 
meaning and intelligibility is one who recognizes that all human under-
standing begins from both one's own experience and beliefs from others. 
The problem, then, with the naive attitude is that it begins and ends 
with experience and belief: the immediacy of its own experience and the 
comfort of its own beliefs. But to be open to understanding and attuned 
to meaning and intelligibility is to act on the principle that all human 
understanding begins from experience and belief, but such a beginning is 
for the sake of understanding, not for the sake of security. So the 
truth of the naive attitude is its recognition of the only real starting 
point for human understanding; its falsity lies in its suppression of 
wonder and the intention of understanding that spontaneously and 
intelligently expresses itself in question and diligently articulates 
its symbols and concepts in the arts, the sciences, religion, 
theology, and philosophy.

The person who is really open to understanding and attuned to 
meaning and intelligibility recognizes the truth of scepticism: behind 
every doubt is a possibly fruitful question. Besides the "no" of 
scepticism, there is the "no" to scepticism that the open person must 
give. (So in openness there is a negative moment similar to the nega-
tivity of the sceptic, but it is a negation of all lower viewpoints for 
the sake of affirming what is only partially meaningful and true in 
each.) Thus the indiscriminate doubt of the sceptic is as unintelligent 
and stupid as the indiscriminate belief of the naive person though it 
often hides its stupidity behind a pseudo-intellectualist smoke-screen 
of "scientific," "philosophical," or "methodological" jargon. By turning 
every question into a destructive weapon of doubt for whatever supposed-
ly constructive purpose (self-defense?), the sceptic turns his own 
orientation to intelligibility and meaning (intellectual intentionality) 
into a self-destructive weapon. I think this is what Plato was talking 
about when he called the misologist a misanthropist. (He was speaking 
of the sceptical side of sophism.) The truth of scepticism, then, is 
that there are no answers without questions. (Recall that the naive 
person wanted answers without questions.) The sceptic says there are 
none and he is right. However, he also says there are no answers, and 
there he is not only wrong, but also contradicting himself because he 
cannot claim that it is meaningful to claim that there is no meaning in
human experience and belief without at the same time presupposing that there is. Unlike the sceptic, the person open to understanding questions his experience and beliefs in order to understand them (and doubts only when there is reason to doubt). So for him doubts are always discriminating and limited because they are raised to eliminate barriers to understanding.

The higher viewpoint of openness to understanding can be understood in relation to naiveté, scepticism and the commonsense compromise in terms of the meaning of aesthetic and intellectual conversion. For the naive person the real world is "the already out there now" (Loranger, 1978:154, 167, 160, 235, 251-52, 384, 388, 389, 412-15, 424-25, 499-500, 505): the real is the object of biological extroversion. The reality of the universe is unrelated to intelligibility. For the sceptic the real self is "the already in here now": the real is the object of psychological introversion. The reality of the self is unrelated to meaning. For common sense, reality is a combination of both: the real world is "the already out there now" and the real self is "the already in here now": neither is intrinsically related to intelligibility or meaning. In contrast, for the aesthetically converted subject the reality of the self is intrinsically related to meaning: the self is constituted and constitutes itself by meaning. Similarly, for the intellectually converted subject the reality of the world is intrinsically related to intelligibility: the real world is what can be understood and is to be understood, not merely what is out in front of your face. For both aesthetic and intellectual conversion the real is intrinsically related to meaning or intelligibility.

In the higher viewpoint of openness to understanding, then, the truth of naiveté and scepticism is preserved while the falsity of both is eliminated. All understanding begins in experience and belief, but we must question (not necessarily doubt) for the sake of understanding. There is then a kind of circle of belief and understanding that has two distinct sides to it that constitute the two different ways of understand-

7. All the positions, counterpositions, and commonsense compromises are involved in performative self-contradictions. These are not merely logical contradictions in the meaning-content of a statement but contradictions between the performance and the self performing the meaning, or statement or action.
standing: the way of discovery and way of recovery (the methodic side and the hermeneutic side of the first dialectic respectively). In the way of discovery (science), the question is the pivot point in the circle of understanding and belief because the question mediates between experience and belief on the one hand and understanding for yourself and formulating your understanding (concept) on the other. Complementarily, in the way of recovery (humanities), the pivot point in the circle of understanding and belief is the act of understanding (interpreting) a text-history because that act mediates between the questions and expressions of an interpreter and the questions and expressions of an author. In real life, of course, there is no understanding without both ways, with each being subordinated to the other for different purposes. Nevertheless, the two ways are distinct and have different structures: the way of discovery has a Subject-Object-Object structure while the way of recovery has a Subject-Object-Subject (interpersonal) structure. The first we shall call the structure of the concept (explanation) and the second, the structure of the symbol (meaning exploration).

The analysis of the dialectic of the attitude of openness to understanding has two distinct sides. So the dialectic can be called a theoretical (science) one or an aesthetic (art) one. As theoretical the dialectic reveals the foundation of scientific inquiry, conceptual articulation, and theory formation. As aesthetic the dialectic reveals the foundation of artistic self-understanding, symbolic explorations of meaning, and artistic self-expression. Science "subjectifies" the world by creating worlds of theory, yielding explanatory, objective knowledge, while art "objectifies" the self yielding objective self-knowledge through symbolic self-understanding. By transcending both art and science, philosophy is able to bring a knowledge of both self and the world in their fundamental (transcendental) relations to both symbolic and conceptual expression. At the same time philosophy depends on the performance of both symbolic-artistic and conceptual-theoretical understanding. This complementarity between art and theory may help to explain why philosophy arose historically among the ancient Greeks who had a highly developed sense of theory formation and aesthetic imagination.
THEORETICAL-AESTHETIC DIALECTIC:
QUESTION: WHAT IS IT

The Dual Structure of Openness to Understanding

Way of Discovery

Object
Concept (theory)
Understanding

(Pivot) Question: What?

Experience-Belief
Subject

Way of Recovery

Subject (Speaker/Writer)
Experience-Belief
Questions: What?
Understanding

Symbol (Expression) Object

(Pivot)

Understanding

Question: What?

Experience-Belief
Subject

The foundation of art and science lies in the fact that we ask questions of the general type characterized by the universal form of the question: What is it? By that I mean questions of this type: How does it work? What does it mean? Why is this such and such? And so on. These questions are really all What-questions because they anticipate understanding and meaning as satisfying. Questions of the general type: What is it? anticipate meaning or intelligibility as their objective and understanding as the corresponding act of the subject. That we spontaneously and intelligently ask such questions is the factual foundation for human openness to understanding.

The aim of the education of human persons, then, is to establish the attitude of openness to understanding and the corresponding attunement to meaning (art) and intelligibility (science). Though it is true that such openness cannot be brought about independently of all content (philosophy presupposes the acts of understanding in the realms of common sense, art and science), and though it is true that it can hardly
be brought about by teachers who are not themselves open to understanding (conversion is always a precondition), still it remains true that such openness is never naiveté or scepticism or the commonsense compromise. Without a recognition of the unrestricted intention of human wonder, the act of appropriating such openness to understanding becomes a difficult if not even an impossible project. In addition, common sense is no solution because every position along the line between naiveté and scepticism contains not only truth but falsity, and so no commonsense compromise will be able to resolve the problem of appropriating real openness to understanding short of the commitment to the project of understanding as a terminal human value. This is the commitment common sense refuses to give. For the person to become an authentic self the person must identify herself with the desire to understand or the intentionality of meaning and commit herself to it. This is an infinite or unrestricted project, one that ultimately intends the infinite itself. Such a commitment to understanding and meaning is usually experienced as more of a passion (something I undergo) rather than an action (something I do). So like Plato we can speak of an eros of the mind and with him we would argue that such a passion for ideas (meaning-intelligibility) does not diminish human passion, but heightens it when human beings become aware that the fullest intention of their love is the intention of meaning-intelligibility through understanding: the human meanings expressed aesthetically and intelligibility of the world expressed in theory.

In addition to openness to understanding and our attunement to meaning, there is the demand for openness to knowing and our attunement with the truth. Besides the aesthetic-speculative dialectic, there is the critical-rhetorical dialectic or openness to the truth. Beyond our desire to understand that intends meaning and intelligibility, there is our desire to know that intends the truth and ultimately the real. The desire to know, rooted in wonder, expresses itself rationally and reasonably in the universal form of the question, Is it so? Notice that the answer to this question must take the form of a yes or a no. "Maybe" and "I don't know" simply postpone the question. Admissions of ignorance too are never satisfactory as answers to the question, Is it so? All human knowledge is expressed in the form of a judgment in which someone asserts or denies the truth or falsity of some proposition. Of
course, no one can reasonably answer the question, *Is it so?*, until they have first answered the question, *What is it?*, intelligently and satisfactorily. Hence openness to the truth depends for its proper functioning upon the prior openness to understanding and meaning. In other words the *it* in the question, *What is it?*, refers back to our immediate experience and/or beliefs, but the *it* in the question, *Is it so?*, refers back not only to our immediate experience and beliefs but also to the mediation of our experience in questions through understanding and its expression either in concepts (science) or in symbols (art).

This dialectic is called critical because it concerns the foundation of the act of knowing itself. There are two semantic correlations connected with the act of knowing: **knowing** makes no semantic sense unless it is the **truth** that is known; and knowing the truth makes no semantic sense unless it implies we have reached the **real**. In other words, we know the real by making true judgments and a true judgment is one that says of what is, that it is and of what is not, that it is not. Moreover, the intentional demand for the truth expressed by the question, *Is it so?*, is a demand for an unconditioned, a kind of absolute. An indication of this demand for an unconditioned is to be found in the form of the answer that is required to satisfy the question: there is an absolute distinction between the **yes** and the **no**. In other words, between **yes** and **no** there is no third possibility in terms of what the question demands. Isomorphically, there is no third possibility between existence and non-existence, and so the distinction is absolute. Although the question, *Is it so?*, demands an absolute or unconditioned, still no judgment we make is ever absolutely necessary or unconditioned in an unqualified sense; nor is there anything we experience that is completely unconditioned or absolute. In other words David Hume was at least partially correct in claiming that all our knowledge rests on matters of fact—in other words, on things that could have been otherwise or might not have been at all. Nevertheless, Hume was mistaken in overlooking the other fact of human knowing: that matters of fact themselves could not be recognized as **true** without the reasonable demand for the unconditioned intended in the question, *Is it so?* We cannot claim that something is a matter of **fact** without also claiming it is **true**. There is no such a thing as an untrue fact; only mistakes about what the true (real) facts are. Thus, to deny the human
Fundamental Attitudes of the Liberally Educated Person

intention of the truth, as Hume did, is at the same time to deny the truth of any matter of fact and to suppress the critical question for reflection. Is it so?

Thus a distinction must be made between a formally and a virtually unconditioned (Lonergan, 1978:280-81) if we are going to avoid the two fallacies of claiming either that human knowing grasps an unqualified absolute (Leibniz) or that human knowing does not intend an absolute (Hume). Thus, a formally unconditioned is a reality that has no conditions whatsoever (absolute, necessary being); while a virtually unconditioned is a reality that has conditions, but whose conditions happen to be fulfilled as a matter of fact. When we pay attention to our acts of knowing, we can understand what it entails.

This second dialectic is rhetorical as well as critical because it is not enough to know the truth through true judgments. As persons we must tell the truth. Plato was the first to warn of the dangers inherent in a rhetoric that cuts itself off from the demand to tell the truth. Truth-telling is ontologically prior to all ethical demands because it lies at the foundation of those demands. Hence, the desire to speak the truth is complementary to the desire to know the truth. Even though human speech as discourse is not identical with the truth, because it is not identical with reality, still there is no truth that cannot come through human speech as discourse.

The recognition that truth can come through human speech as discourse is implicit in every performance of speech or language to the extent that no one can speak/write without the hope of having something to say or without the hope that the listener will be able to understand what the speaker has to say as meaningful or true. The same is true in reverse for the listener vis-à-vis the speaker. We shall call this presupposition of the performance of speech "hermeneutic faith." Things do not deceive us, but rather show us what they are, provided we pay

8. Just as the human mind is potentially all things by virtue of the fact that our questions are unrestricted, so also human speech is potentially all things insofar as all meanings, truths, and values can be expressed in it, even though they never will be.

9. Nevertheless human speech will never contain all meaning, truth, or value any more than the human mind or human action will, because both are finite.
attention, understand, and respond to them. In one sense, then, truth is a response to things. Another indicator of our truth-reality orientation is the fact that children tend to say what is on their minds spontaneously and even adults must reflect self-consciously if they are going to perpetrate a lie; telling the truth usually takes no such effort. Hence, the rhetorical dimension of openness to the truth demands that we listen to what the other person has to say before we speak to them and in a similar way it requires that we listen for the truth of things before we speak.

To enter an analysis of the second dialectic (openness to the truth) required this preliminary discussion because, unlike the first, the second dialectic is reflective. In other words we are going to reflect on the performance of human reflectiveness. We are going to try to understand what it means to know and tell the truth and then to know ourselves as knowers and speakers of the truth just as in the first dialectic we tried to understand what it meant to understand and express ourselves meaningfully and then to understand ourselves as understanders and speakers-hearers. First, then, how does the second dialectic emerge?

Just as the spontaneous human openness to meaning-intelligibility tends to become the naiveté of a common sense that is common nonsense, so the spontaneous human openness to the truth (of things and persons) tends to become a pseudo-practical, commonsense dogmatism. Because wonder leads to wonder about wonder, human beings spontaneously at some point in their lives begin to reflect. Still prior to the emergence of spontaneous reflection there was the need for the results of such reflection; in short, human beings need to know the truth before they are capable of knowing it for themselves, just as they need to tell the truth before they are able to know the difference between telling the truth and expressing a wish. Once again "natural belief or trust" allows us access to the results of the reflection of others, but this is for the sake of the time when we will be able to reflect for ourselves. There is a kind of extension of natural belief into a natural "doctrinalism," but this is not yet dogmatism because it does not cut off the possibility of criticism.

The doctrinal wisdom of common sense teaches us that we must make judgments in order to live and that we must accept as true certain
propositions if we are going to participate in human life. To act requires judgment. However, this commonsense "doctrinal" wisdom can and easily does become dogmatic when reflective self-understanding becomes excluded from our judgments. Like the naive person, then, the dogmatist is looking for answers, but the dogmatic person recognizes that the answers must be not only meaningful or intelligible but also true. Like the naive person the dogmatist seeks a kind of security, but now it is a cognitional and/or a propositional security; the dogmatist identifies knowing what is true with certainty. Hence dogmatism is the classical case of closed-mindedness. The dogmatist tends to listen only to what he wants to hear. Thus he suppresses all objections to the positions he takes because they are not established by a prior commitment to a reasonable discussion or by meeting the demands of the reflective question, Is it so? Because the dogmatist "thinks he knows" that his positions are true, he cannot give a reasonable account of them. He is often good at offering objections to other positions but he is unwilling and unable to defend his own. So there is a false mysticism that results from dogmatism, a pseudo-mysticism that is identical with obscurantism (the suppression of authentic questions for reflection). This is not the true mysticism that recognizes the presence of Transcendent Mystery that can be overheard in the truth that comes through authentic human speech and heightens our intelligence and reflectiveness and promotes questions for understanding and reflection. Dogmatism is obviously an uncritical attitude, a non-self-transcending attitude closed in on itself.

From the standpoint of criticism (knowing), dogmatism is the refusal to make judgments based upon sufficient evidence: it is a refusal to take responsibility for one's own judgments. Since sufficient evidence can be achieved only by one who has made a prior commitment to reasonable discussion which would aim at the truth of judgments in human speech, the dogmatist can also be defined as one who refuses to make that prior commitment to reasonable discussion. Thus, dogmatism has a rhetorical as well as a critical dimension.

10. This is true only in the case of an intelligent dogmatist. There is no such thing as a reasonable dogmatist; for if he were reasonable, he would not be a dogmatist.
Dogmatists identify the human intention of (or orientation to) truth with their own apprehension of what they think is the truth: they falsely identify the requirement that true human judgments must express an unconditioned with a grasp of the formally unconditioned itself. (Human judgment grasps a virtually unconditioned that intends a formally unconditioned.) They identify the absolute expressed in true human discourse with the absolute truth intended by human discourse.

The more the dogmatist comes to understand, the more she enters into intelligent discussion with other intelligent persons, the less she will be able to maintain her dogmatic attitude and positions. In the face of an onslaught of intelligent objections from others, she can slowly come to realize that she cannot maintain her unthought-out, unevidenced dogmatic positions. As it becomes more and more impossible for her to maintain her dogmatism in intelligent discussion, so she will come to realize that she cannot preserve the absolute certainty her dogmatism was meant to defend. She comes to recognize that absolute certainty is a false ideal for human knowledge. However, the dogmatist's quest for certainty was originally a self-defence mechanism: the dogmatist feared being "wrong" just as the naive person feared being "mistaken." As she gives up the false ideal of certainty without giving up the fear of being wrong she begins to use a new defensive strategy: if she cannot preserve her certainty with her unthought-out, unevidenced judgments because one by one they are struck down by intelligent criticism, then the way she thinks she can protect herself from being wrong will be to suspend all judgments. If she refuses to make judgments, then she cannot be criticized for making false judgments. This "half-baked thinker" thinks she can avoid being wrong by claiming that the only thing that is certain is that nothing is certain. What she does not realize is that she might be able to protect herself from making false judgments by refusing to make any judgment, but by doing that she will also make it impossible to make any true judgments: she will make it impossible to be right. One by one, then, the dogmatist rejects her unreasonable judgments and begins to suspend all judgment on principle. When that happens, the dogmatist becomes a relativist; an unthinker becomes a half-baked thinker.

The counterposition to the attitude of dogmatism in the dialectic of openness to the truth, then, is relativism (the basic anti-philo-
In opposition to the dogmatist the relativist refuses to make any judgment until all the evidence is in. Until the relativist knows everything about everything, he denies that anyone can know anything about anything. Just as his counterpart, the dogmatist, is uncritical because she makes judgments without sufficient evidence, so also the relativist is uncritical because he refuses to make any judgment since he unreasonably refuses to recognize any evidence short of absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge would require an understanding of everything about everything which no finite human being could ever acquire.

The relativist attitude is regressive in the sense that it tends to reduce the question about the truth (Is it so?) to the question of understanding (What is it?). These questions obviously cannot be reduced to each other. It is true that all human understanding involves some relativity, since direct understanding involves a grasp either of things in relation to us (description) or of things in relation to one another (explanation) (Lonergan, 1978:291–92, 295–96), while reflective understanding involves a grasp of the relation between evidence and the fulfillment of the conditions in the virtually unconditioned—a relative absolute. Nevertheless, when we say that something is in fact the case, knowing always goes beyond the relativity of understanding and the conditions of the unconditioned. The truth of judgment includes but goes beyond meaning in verified meanings or theories. If the dogmatist suppressed the question for reflection (Is it so?), then the relativist ignores the reflective act of human understanding by demanding too much, namely, that human reflection must achieve an infinite act of understanding—which is, of course, impossible. On a deeper level, the relativist agrees with the dogmatist because he also confuses a genuinely self-transcending quest for the truth with a quest for certainty that is self-defensive and lacks all transcendence. The only difference between the dogmatist and the relativist is that the latter postpones his certainty into an undefinable future.

On its rhetorical side, relativism is no more capable of speaking or telling the truth than dogmatism. For the relativist must suspend every judgment for fear of being wrong, at the cost of never being right. However, all human knowledge of the truth comes through and is expressed in a judgment or series of judgments. Thus, relativism
Piscitelli subscribes to a kind of false cognitional "end-time." Just as the dogmatist falsely believes that his own human mind is already in possession of an absolute divine truth, so the relativist falsely thinks that a human mind cannot know anything that is true until it becomes an absolute divine mind which it can never become.

Between the position of dogmatism and the counterposition of relativism neither compromise nor oscillation really resolves our attunement to the truth. Between the attitudes of dogmatism and relativism there is not only something true but also something false in so far as the question for reflection (Is it so?) requires both reflective understanding (against dogmatism) and the judgment based upon sufficient, not exhaustive, evidence (against relativism); the question demands an unconditioned (against relativism) but one that is a possible achievement of finite minds (against dogmatism). Once again the commonsense compromise is really a self-delusion.

Unlike the commonsense compromise, real openness to the truth requires not only the preservation of what is true in the lower viewpoints but also the elimination of what is false. Hence the higher viewpoint is neither dogmatism, nor relativism, nor the commonsense compromise. It requires that we make judgments, expressing a virtually unconditioned, and based upon sufficient evidence known to be sufficient only after all relevant questions have been raised and answered satisfactorily. But how can we know whether all relevant questions have been raised, let alone answered satisfactorily? The answer to this question can be decided only in concrete cases, but the general rule is that we are to be governed by the "law of decreasing returns." This means that as long as our truth proposals continue to generate significant objections which demand intelligent, reasonable, and responsible revisions in order to maintain them, then all relevant questions have not yet been raised and answered satisfactorily. While questions recur, the question is still an open question. But that does not mean that a time will never come when they no longer recur (relativism) after significant revisions have been made to meet the real issues. When this happens, of course, new questions arise that demand further truth proposals. And so it goes.

Openness to the truth demands that we submit our proposals to all intelligent, reasonable, and responsible men and women in the human
community. This we do when we make our proposals public, express them in a reasonable account, and make such revisions of our proposals as are necessary to meet all intelligent, reasonable, and responsible objections. As rhetorical, the dialectic of openness to the truth requires a prior commitment to the truth as it comes through human speech (language). For all human speech guided by the intention of the truth is in the form of a dialogue-conversation insofar as the speaker or writer recognizes that there is no final expression of the truth in human speech. Still, at the same time, there is no truth that is unrelated to human speech because there is no truth without understanding. The dialectic of openness to the truth reveals that the aim of a liberal education is to create the conditions necessary for the human person to participate in the ongoing discussion and dialogue that applies the methods through which men and women come to know the truth that can be expressed in human speech and action, so that they will know how to live and act accordingly.

The critical-rhetorical dialectic of openness to the truth presupposes, complements, and goes beyond the aesthetic-rhetorical dialectic of openness to understanding. Since we cannot know what is true without first understanding, we cannot be open to the truth without first being open to understanding. There is no knowing without a reflective act of understanding that grasps the sufficiency of evidence expressed by a virtually unconditioned. So the requirements for real openness to the truth are cumulative. Although we are usually involved in either naiveté or scepticism, dogmatism or relativism, or the common-sense compromises, we cannot be open to understanding/intelligibility/meaning without also moving in the direction of being open to knowing/truth. Nor can we open to the truth without first being open to understanding.

The issues are a bit complex here. First, the meanings of common sense must be distinguished. The neutral meaning of common sense is that specialization of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to deal with the immediate practical problems of everyday life necessary for getting around in your world at a particular place and time. However, there is the other meaning of common sense as a way of life infected with the biases against intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility which seeks security, certainty, and success as the ultimate values of human life. This means that commonsense understanding without the development or aesthetic and scientific understanding cannot provide...
Though it is possible to be performatively open to understanding as a result of an intellectual and/or aesthetic conversion short of philosophical and rhetorical conversion, it is not possible to achieve an openness to the truth without the rhetorical conversion by which persons commit themselves to the project of the humanities and/or without a philosophical conversion by with persons intelligently and reasonably appropriate their own intelligence and reasonableness.\(^\text{12}\) In other words, a person can overcome naiveté and scepticism, in fact if not in principle, by entering into the project of theory-formation in the sciences or the project of the symbolic expression of the human possibilities of meaning in the world in the arts and humanities. However, a person cannot get beyond dogmatism, relativism, and the commonsense compromise of the dialectic of truth without a commitment to the truth of human existence as pursued in the humanities (rhetorical conversion) and without a reflective philosophical self-appropriation (philosophical conversion).\(^\text{13}\) In other words, rhetorical and philo-

\(^{12}\) Note that my notion of intellectual conversion differs in part from Lonergan's. Roughly speaking, what I call "philosophical" conversion Lonergan calls "intellectual." With a more differentiated notion of aesthetic conversion and rhetorical conversion (as hermeneutic conversions), I see no need for a "psychic" conversion. A so-called "psychic" conversion has no intrinsic relation to the meaningful, the true, the good, or the holy. The "need" for a "psychic" conversion can be filled by either aesthetic, rhetorical, or religious conversion, each of which is a foundationally hermeneutic notion. For example, philosophical conversion is the fundamental issue in Insight because it is the same thing as the reflective appropriation of one's own intelligence and reasonableness. Philosophical conversion is the self-appropriation of the knower, and this implies that the real is recognized as what we attentively and intelligently grasped, and reasonably affirmed.

\(^{13}\) In the world of human meaning, truth, and value, aesthetic and rhetorical conversion are required first. Since they are non-methodological conversions, they will not be able to differentiate or critically control meanings and affirmation-negations; they must await intellectual and philosophical conversion. So before there is a critical realism, there will be a doctrinal realism (Lonergan, 1974:244-61).
sophical conversion alone allow human persons to identify themselves as human insofar as they are speakers and hearers (origins of meaning, truth and worth) and intelligent, reasonable, and responsible knowers. Thus, art and science are not enough for a truly human education.

Moreover neither intellectual (science) nor aesthetic (art) conversion can be consolidated and made principles for the whole of human life without both rhetorical conversion (project of the humanities) and philosophical conversion (the critical project of philosophy). Without the humanities' commitment to the truth of our humanness and philosophy's commitment to the human project of knowing the truth, the best that can be hoped for is that the intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility of the person of common sense, the artist, or scientist will have an indirect influence on the whole of one's life.¹⁴ For this reason, the humanities and philosophy really comprehend and support the intention of both art and science by the self-appropriation of the more comprehensive commitment of the human intention of the truth that comes through human speech as conversation, dialogue, and discourse. An education that does not aim explicitly at philosophical and rhetorical conversion simply will not and cannot liberate human persons.

¹⁴ Aesthetic and intellectual conversion are both performances of subjects and have their meaning, truth, and value institutionalized in the procedures of the sciences (method) and in the apprenticeships of artists. These conversions are not self-reflective or based upon self-knowledge and so they are not directed to living human life well as such. They are concerned with knowing the world well and expressing oneself well respectively.
Beyond the question that underpins the aesthetic-intellectual dialectic of openness to understanding (What is it?) and beyond the question that underpins the rhetorical-critical dialectic of openness to the truth (Is it so?), there is the further question that carries us into the realm of values, the question, What am I to do? What is really worthwhile? Is this decision-action really worthwhile? This broaches the dialectic of hope for the meaningful and true human good. We can call this the existential-religious dialectic of the attitude of hope and our fundamental orientation toward the good. Just as the first two dialectics were rooted foundationally in spontaneous and reflective human wonder, so the dialectic of the moral and religious life is rooted foundationally in spontaneous and reflective human awe. Wonder takes us beyond ourselves so we can find our true selves; so awe takes us beyond the true self found to its foundations in the meaning, truth and value of other persons (moral life) and beyond that to the origin, end, and foundation of all meaning, truth, and value in a transcendently-other person who is also self-transcending (religious life).
THE GENESIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF OPENNESS TO KNOWING
THAT INTENDS THE TRUTH

Methodic Side
Subject as Knower
Wonder
Experience-Belief
Questions: What is it?
Act of Understanding
Concept
(scienfitic-theoretical)
Reflective Wonder
Questions for Reflection:
is it so?
Reflective Understanding:
virtually unconditioned
Judgment: Yes/No
Empirical Scientific
Knowledge
or
Theoretical Knowledge
in the
Human Sciences
Object as Known
Objectivity

Hermeneutic Side
Subject as Speaker
Wonder
Experience-Belief
Questions: What is it?
Act of Understanding
Symbol
(aesthetic-rhetorical)
Reflective Wonder
Questions for Reflection:
is it so?
Reflective Understanding:
virtually unconditioned
Judgment: Yes/No
Speech-Text as Realm of
TRUTH
Subject as Hearer
Judgment: Yes/No
on the Truth of Speech-Text
Reflective Self-Understanding
Question for Reflection: is it so?
Reflective Wonder
Symbol (aesthetic-rhetorical)
Acts of Understanding
Question: what is it?
Experience-Belief
Wonder
Subject as Hearer
Although these dialectics are the last in the order of our consideration because they presuppose, complement, and go beyond the first two, still they are first in the order of life because to live means to act and life demands that we act in order to live. These dialectics raise the question of praxis and human action. Now by praxis I simply mean the relationship between human understanding and knowing and human action. In terms of our analysis, I mean the relationship between the artistic/scientific life and the literary/philosophical life, on the one hand, and the moral/political and religious life, on the other. Not that aesthetic, scientific, literary, and philosophical life do not involve performance or practice; they are already practices. However, praxis does not become explicit as such until we raise the question of value or the question of what we as human persons are to be and become. Thus, we shall treat the question of praxis or action after meditating on the dialectics of value.

The overriding imperative of all human life is to live well as a human being. The desire for well-being (eudaimonia) and the desire to be involved with what is really worthwhile (moral excellence) are one and the same thing. Still, human life and action demand understanding before they can be humanly realized: recall the Socratic injunction that "the unexamined life is not worth living." To be involved in what is really worthwhile, we must know what is truly worthwhile; and to know what is truly worthwhile, we must understand what is meaningfully possible. The dialectic of value presupposes, complements, and goes beyond the first two dialectics. However Aristotle was right to say that all human beings desire happiness (eudaimonia) even before they know or understand what it is. The well-being of which Aristotle was speaking is not purely subjective: it is not mere contentment. It has objective conditions that are dependent upon the objective structures of authentic human existence.

This dialectic of hope for the human good is existential because it requires us to become the human persons we are to be, by a free and responsible act of decision. And yet the dialectic of hope is also religious because in its most foundational form it requires a recognition of a divine reality beyond the human. In other words, the question about the human good is inextricably bound up with the questions of ultimate meaning, truth, and worth. The religious dimen-
sion of hope for the ultimately worthwhile is the hermeneutic side of the dialectic of value. In other words religious discourse is constitutive of ultimate meaning, truth, and worth. Thus art, rhetoric, and religion have this hermeneutic dimension in common just as science, philosophy, and ethics/politics have a methodical dimension in common.

Though it is possible and even necessary first to differentiate (method) the aesthetic, intellectual, the rhetorical, the critical, the ethical, political, philosophical, and the religious dimensions of human life within the dialectics of the attitudes of openness and hope, still the aims of a liberal education (dialectical foundations) require their correlation/interrelation (foundational hermeneutics) and re-integration (foundational praxis) not only in thought but also in life. For a truly liberal education both enriches and liberates the whole human person and thereby builds up a more humane life within the communities of human beings with nature, with other human beings, and with God.

In its most basic form, then, the dialectics of hope regard our fundamental attitude towards human life itself. By human life I mean to include the whole gamut of living from biological existence to aesthetic, intellectual, moral, political and religious life. There is a spontaneous confidence in and affirmation of life at the heart of all human experience. This can be observed readily in young animals as well as in very young children. Human desire is a spontaneous reaching out for life. The dialectics of value make desire into a central theme. If to live is to desire to be, then to live humanly is to desire to be self-consciously, to be oneself. Our immediate desires can be frustrated: and when they are, we can come to feel that the world might be hostile towards us. However, even then we can experience and interpret the resistance that reality puts on our desires as a creative discipline that asks us to master our environment or to create a more human environment.

However, all human desires go beyond the immediacy of spontaneous desire: the desires to understand, to say, to know, and to be involved in what is really worthwhile, are all grounded in wonder and awe, mediated by questions, and potentially unrestricted in scope. For this reason, no finite object or objects can ever fully satisfy human passions. Human love is never less than and always more than immediate desire. It can be called the desire of desire. Greek philosophers like
Plato and Aristotle saw in this unquenchable human desire the cause of human self-destructiveness, a hubris, to be curbed by self-control (sophrosune). However, without degrading the need for self-control, later Christian philosophers and theologians saw in this unrestricted desire a passion for the divine Infinite, an unmediated, unredeemed desire for the love of a God who was infinite Love itself. In our own nihilistic epoch the fact of an unrestricted human passion remains unchallenged, but against the classical tradition the nihilistic self-understanding holds that human passion cannot be controlled without destroying our humanness and (against the Christian tradition) that the objective of such an unrestricted passion (a God of love) cannot exist. In other words nihilism holds man to be a self-contradictory reality: for man to exist in meaning and truth God must exist; but if man is to exist as a free agent, then God does not and cannot exist. Thus the ultimate self-interpretation of human passion and life lies squarely in the religious domain. Similarly the ultimate truth and worth of human life is religious. In a very serious way, then, the prior human quests for meaning, truth, and worth are permeated by, understood, known, and appropriated in terms of some religious vision of human existence, and of its ultimate meaningfulness, truth, and worth.

Contrary to the commonsense secularism of our times, there is no way for human persons to avoid ultimate, religious issues. In the strict sense there are no non-religious, secularist human beings because the question, not the answer, of the ultimate meaningfulness, truth and worth of human life constitutes the foundations of human religiousness. There are really only three options: suppress the authentic question of ultimacy in an obscurantist fashion (commonsense secularism), answer the question with a resounding no (nihilism), or face the question and recognize transcendence and the mystery of human existence in the world (religious conversion). The first option is radically inauthentic, the second is performatively self-contradictory, while the third alone is an authentic response to reality.15 In the end, there are no non-

15. It should be noted here we are speaking of the truth of a way of life as a result of a fundamental orientation to it. This kind of truth concerns praxis and the performative self-contradiction is in the living of the life itself. We shall see that either commonsense praxis, secularist or sacralist praxis, pessimistic or optimistic or nihilistic praxis all result in death rather than life. Herein lies
Fundamental Attitudes of the Liberally Educated Person

religious human persons—there are just those who have faced the life-and-death issues of human existence and those who have self-blindingly refused to do so. Facing up to these questions is no easy and simple matter. A good deal of what goes by the name of "practical" living (common sense) consists in the avoidance of these unavoidable questions. So a denial of death and human finitude is also a denial of life and human possibilities is also a denial of life and human possibilities for meaning, truth, and worth. The authentic self-appropriation of our humanness consists in the dialectical affirmation through negation of our quest for infinite meaning, truth, and worth and of the divine as the ultimate reality of infinite Love according to our Judeo-Christian tradition.

I recognize that much of what I have to say about the religious dialectic of hope for the ultimate human good is and must be influenced by my own commitment to the Christian vision of the ultimate meaning, truth, and worth of human existence in the world and history. This is unavoidable. I am neither apologizing for this vision nor claiming that it is the only way to eliminate the false and inauthentic attitudes that fall short of genuine human hope that liberates us. I am not saying, either, that the Christian vision is merely one way among other equally true ways (relativism) of living human life authentically. I am saying that I am committed to the meaning, truth, and worth of the Christian way of life; that there are other religious ways of life that allow human persons authentic lives each of which implicitly or explicitly claims to be true; and finally, that no philosophical reflection can either authenticate or invalidate any religious revelation as long as such revelation does not contradict the authentic structures of human existence or the conditions of reality as critically known.

16. There is a critical function of philosophy in relation to religion but it works within the limits of philosophical conversion. This is not much like the Kantian "philosophy within the limits of pure reason" because it is not based on an immanentist and secularist notion of "reason." Moreover authentic religious conversion sets up an exigence for philosophical conversion and so the religiously converted subject demands an authentic critique of religion from "more than, but never less than," a reasonable point of view.
The foundational dialectic of hope, then, must be read in two distinct but interrelated registers: the existential-ethical-moral (methodic) and the hermeneutic-religious. My procedure will be to give two distinct readings but preserve their mutual implications. The basic viewpoints that fall short of real hope in the existential and religious dimensions remain the same regardless of the different authentically religious visions that inform them. Finally, the assumption that Greek philosophy or any other kind of philosophy can occur in a religious or historic vacuum or can be applied in such a vacuum is fallacious and misleading. The notion that any philosophy or dialectical analysis can establish itself in a "methodologically neutral zone" is radically uncritical, for it would have to presuppose that the question of ultimate meaning, truth, and worth is an irrelevant question and this would amount to uncritical obscurantism as we have already argued. This does not imply, however, that there are no valid, significant, and indeed authentic methodological and philosophical issues that can be differentiated from moral and religious questions. There can be, there are, and there must be; and, moreover, we have already made such differentiations in this argument so far.

With this background analysis complete, we can begin our meditation on the first foundational dialectic of value: the existential, ethical, moral reading of the dialectic of hope for the meaningful and true human good.

Just as natural trust tends to become naïveté and the natural doctrinalism of common sense tends to become dogmatism, so the spontaneous hope and confidence in life tends to become optimism. Because of the natural vulnerability of human beings we know that at first others must be responsible for us, but their responsibility is for the sake of our responsibility, when we are and to the extent that we are capable of it. Those who have responsibility for us have to yield to our responsibility for ourselves as that becomes possible; we have to take responsibility for ourselves when we are able to, and not continue to rely on others for things we can and must do for ourselves such as understand ourselves for ourselves, know ourselves, and be involved in what is really and truly known to be worthwhile by ourselves. Taking responsibility for yourself means living a really worthwhile human life. The optimist tragically refuses to hear the call of the human vocation.
The optimists recognize the immediate goodness of life. For them the world is friendly to all human desires and needs. "God is in his heaven and all seems to be well with the world." Optimists come to think that no matter what they do everything will turn out well in the end. (The latter can be a working definition of the optimistic attitude.) For the optimists, human beings are basically good and when given the opportunity, they will always do what is right. The optimists tend to be naively confident and so they avoid decisions or, as they like to say, "allow the situation to make the decision for them." Since everything will turn out well in the end no matter what they do, optimists refuse to accept responsibility, not only for the conditions in which they find themselves, but also for their own lives. Thus, in its worst form, optimism leads to a paralysis of human action. It makes the person a spectator of life rather than an actor who shapes the destiny of life. So from an existential-moral perspective the optimists tend to become drifters. Rather than act responsibly in a crisis, they depend upon others for action or want to wait and see what will happen. They tend to walk away from failures when they occur and shift responsibility for decision and action onto a "system" or other people while claiming "success" as their own. In fact this is the real objective of optimism: the human good is identified with success; success is an end in itself, a terminal value (a false one) for the optimist.

The optimist's vision of the good human life tends to be both naive and dogmatic. (However, all combinations of the lower viewpoints are possible.) The meaning of values is not so much understood as blindly believed. The truth of values is not appropriated by his own intelligence and reasonableness, but is held to be absolutely certain and beyond all criticism. The optimist has what he calls his own personal "ideals," but they are pseudo-ideals because they are not based upon any serious understanding or knowledge of human existence in the world and history. He has his own "preferences" posing as value judgments, but they are not value judgments in so far as they are not based upon reflective deliberation and a knowledge of the true human good. Optimists tend to identify human freedom with immediate spontaneity. Thus freedom becomes an abstract value in political life and a nuisance in the cultural life of the community. In economic life they pay lip service to the value of "free enterprise" as if a capitalist economic
system were a mechanism that can automatically meet even the basic needs of persons no matter what the conditions. The optimist is a fine example of the commonsense wisdom that good intentions are not enough to lead the morally excellent human life. (Good people, not good managers or nice guys, make good leaders.)

A serious moral or political life-crisis that results in a failure which cannot be blamed on anyone else destroys the world of the optimist. Now success seems no longer guaranteed. It comes to seem to the optimist that success is not much more than survival. The optimist turns into a pessimist. The optimist has actually sown the seeds of her pessimism by her false vision of the human good and her corresponding refusal to take responsibility for her life. It does not take long for the unsheltered person to realize that the world and human history do not always conform to her immediate wishes. Whereas the optimist looked to the responsibility of others without taking responsibility for herself, the pessimist denies the responsibility of others and takes a pseudo-responsibility onto herself: she tries to guarantee her own survival. So the passivism of the optimist becomes the (false) activism of the pessimist. The soon-to-be frustrated desires that control the optimist become the soon-to-be self-destructive neurotic fears that control the pessimist. Therefore neither personality is free and both are compulsive because they are driven by polymorphic desire (optimist) or fear (pessimist).

The pessimist comes to view the world and history as hostile to all human concerns. He can come to view other people as potential or actual enemies of his own personal, group, national, or even human welfare and advancement. When this happens the passive, neurotic fear of the pessimist may become an active paranoia. The little that is left of a vision of the human good beyond the immediate self begins to fade and is replaced by the threat of the loss of the good already possessed. (Note the application to the present economic climate in the United States.) Reacting to the failure of decision in the optimist, the

17. We can understand the roots of psychological neurosis, paranoia, and schizophrenia in terms of the moral crisis of the post-modern world. Neurosis is rooted in the optimist's compulsive life of desire; paranoia is rooted in the pessimist's compulsive life of fear; and schizophrenia is rooted in the compulsive life of the commonsense compromise which is driven by both desire and fear.
pessimist puts all his effort into securing his own position: holding on to what he has got. He can become sceptical and even cynical about all human intentions. He comes to think all human actions are motivated solely by immediate self-interest just like his own. Soon human life will become the dreary project of keeping the wolf away from the door. If the optimist sought to maximize his immediate pleasures, then the pessimist seeks to minimize his immediate pains. Soon all human purposes are reduced to the sole purpose of survival. Survival is the "bottom line" and the pessimist "lives" by this bottom-line ethos. Human decision and effort become the sheer will-to-live or worse the sheer will-to-power. The overriding half-truth that pessimists recognize is the fact of their own death. The motto of pessimism is, "In the long run we are all dead." "And maybe even in the short run" is the first postulate. All human values begin to fade into insignificance and untruth in the face of this now fierce "reality" of death. The pessimist has come to rely on himself for a survival he knows he cannot guarantee. Nor would such a survival be human while it lasted. In the end pessimism is self-destructive in the sense that it destroys the humanness of the human person.

Just as the human intentionality (fundamental orientation to the human good) of the optimist is frustrated by the lack of thoughtful and responsible action, so the human intentionality of the pessimist is truncated by the narrow scope of an immediately self-interested and purely self-centered, irresponsible activity. If the optimist has a false, but positive, vision of the human good and is thereby paralyzed to act or decide, then the pessimist has no vision of the human good beyond the immediate good and, therefore, decides and acts only to avoid the loss of his present, individual good.

It should be quite clear from our meditation on optimism and pessimism that no convincing compromise between them is possible. Yet this is precisely what common sense tries to do. Both the optimist and the pessimist agree that the fundamental terminal value of human life is success; they only disagree on whether the success is guaranteed (optimism), or not guaranteed, though it ought to be (pessimism). Herein lies the basis of the false commonsense compromise: common sense too holds that success, like security (first dialectic) and certainty (second dialectic), is a terminal value. But the authentically terminal value
is human excellence or moral virtue and success is merely an accidental by-product or secondary result. Moreover, human excellence may and oftentimes does exist without recognition and the success that should follow it. Clearly human excellence and success are not the same thing. The former is a terminal value or end in itself; the latter is not—at best it is a means or pedagogical motivation. So real hope for the human good is neither optimism, nor pessimism, nor the commonsense compromise between them. For there is not only something true but also something false in all the lower viewpoints.

The higher viewpoint of hope for the meaningful and true human good preserves the truth and eliminates the falsity of all the lower viewpoints. The truth of optimism is that we need a vision of the human good before we can be really hopeful. However we need a meaningful and true vision of the human good, one that recognizes values must be understood, known, deliberately appropriated and acted upon or they will become empty, irrelevant, and false "ideals." The truth of pessimism is that we must make decisions and put forth effort if there is to be real hope. However those decisions and effort must be informed by thoughtful and deliberate reflection that results in a meaningful and true vision of the human good and in responsible action that goes beyond yet still includes what is really valuable in immediate self-interest. Thus, real hope alone can preserve what is true and eliminate what is false in optimism, pessimism, and the commonsense compromise.

Still, the realization of human hope is more than true knowledge (the good is always concrete), for it requires thoughtful and deliberate reflection, decision, and responsible action. Thus from an existential perspective the resolution of the dialectic of hope requires a moral conversion. Moral conversion goes beyond the false idealism of optimism, the pseudo-realism of pessimism, and the compulsive compromises of common sense to establish the inner principle of authentically human action on the ground of intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and freely chosen human values. Thus, the morally converted human person is the only truly free subject, for all the lower viewpoints are controlled by polymorphic desires or fears or both (common sense).

This notion of moral conversion as the true reconciliation of the existential dialectic of hope can shed light on the frequent criticism of Plato's Socrates. According to this criticism Socrates allegedly
subscribed to the idea that "knowledge is virtue." It is claimed that this means knowing what is right is tantamount to being morally excellent. However, I would like to give Plato the benefit of the doubt and interpret this paradoxical, and therefore probably ironic statement, as meaning two things: first, that a knowledge of true values tends to lead us intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, and freely to decide and act on those values; second, that only the person who has achieved some human or moral excellence really knows the truth of these self-authenticating values: the morally excellent person knows the truth worth knowing—the real meaning, truth, and worth of human life. So Plato is speaking from the higher viewpoint of the existential attitude of true hope for the human good. To speak from the horizon of moral conversion to a common sense biased towards security, certainty, and success requires an indirect symbolic language of myth or the indirect rhetorical language of irony. If a real knowledge of human excellence (virtue) comes only with the practice of it, then Aristotle was right when he makes the man of practical wisdom the true arbiter of what is and is not virtuous action in the concrete situation. Finally, we have forgotten what Plato knew, namely that moral paradigms are absolutely essential to any moral training, however short of the ideal of perfect virtue such human models might fall. We can learn more about the values of our society by paying attention to the models we recognize as good human beings which each of us emulate than by taking popular, sociological public polls. For the people we admire are not necessarily the people we say we admire. Where your treasure is there also is your heart! These models serve the ethical rhetoric of action in the human community. Until recently this has been a greatly neglected aspect of moral teaching in academic communities and in our society at large.

Thus the structure of hope for the meaningful and true human good recapitulates the structures of openness to understanding and knowing but goes beyond them. The following is a helpful schema:
Openness to Understanding  
Aesthetic-Intellectual Conversion  
What?

Openness to Knowing  
Rhetorical-Philosophical Conversion  
Is it so?

Hope for the Meaningful and True Human Good  
Moral Conversion  
Is it worthwhile?

Naïveté  Scepticism  
Commonsense  Security

Dogmatism  Relativism  
Commonsense  Certainty

Optimism  Pessimism  
Commonsense  Success

GENESIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF HOPE

Value as Meaning  
Symbol/Concept  
Act of Understanding  
Question: What is it?

Value as Truth  
Judgment of Value  
Reflective Self-Understanding  
Question: Is it so? (a real value?)

Value as Value  
DECISION  
Judgment of Value as Self-Constitutive  
Reflective Self-Deliberation  
Question: What should I do?

Experience/Belief  
Inner Experience/ Believed Truths

Wonder  
Reflective Wonder  
Reflective Awe

COLUMN I  COLUMN II  COLUMN III

Read column I, then column II, both from below up; then column III same.
Although the dialectic of value can be read in the existential-moral register, the question of value goes deeper to the religious dimension of the ultimate meaning, truth, and worth of human existence in the world and history. The religious question is whether human life and action are ultimately meaningful, capable of truth, and real worth. This question raises the issue of the totality of the meaning, truth, and worth, not only of human existence, but also of the world itself. So the religious question raises the issue of the ultimate foundation of all the previous dialectics of attitudes and fundamental human orientations. Hence it is crucial and unavoidable, if we are going to exclude all obscurantist evasions.

I propose to distinguish the existential optimist, pessimist, and commonsense compromise of the third dialectic (morality) from the religious optimist, pessimist, and common sense compromise of this fourth dialectic. I shall call religious optimism sacralism, religious pessimism secularism, and the common sense compromise the sacralist-secularist schizophrenia. These will be recognized as appropriate names when I have completed the analysis of and meditation on the fourth dialectic.¹⁸

Just as there was a natural trust that tended to become naiveté, a natural doctrinalism that tended to become dogmatism, and a spontaneous confidence that tended to become optimism, so there is also a natural awe at life that tends to become sacralism. For the sacralist the ultimate vision of the worth of human existence in history and the ultimate vision of the good of the universe itself is one in which life is better than death and love eliminates death. Human life is indeed a gift but it is a gift the sacralist wrests to himself with ingratitude because he refuses to recognize that the gift need not have been given. Moreover, for the sacralist love remains a desire unmediated by intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. As such it remains an empty joy that springs from the unrecognized giftedness of existence. The sacralist is a "believer" without faith, a domesticator of mystery. The sacralist lacks a faith that would listen and respond to the mystery of a divine all-giving love.

¹⁸ I am grateful to Michael O'Callaghan for suggesting that the lower viewpoints be named sacralism and secularism and for referring me to Lonergan's new work in this area.
The sacralist comes to think that everything good in life and in the world must be. He tends to absorb all contingency either into the supposed necessity of nature or into the necessity of the divine nature. He can become a romantic who hides himself from the radical seriousness of death and/or the destructiveness of human moral evil. He might persuade himself that his own death and the death of others is merely an insignificant natural event that some greater power will eliminate. He might go on to delude himself into thinking that moral evil is a "necessary moment" in the inevitable unfolding of the ultimate good or the "Absolute." The sacralist tends to rationalize human suffering as necessary for some supposed higher good or else, more usually, as the punishment for some terrible sin. So the sacralist trivializes the mystery of human suffering and death by postulating some divine plan that "believers" such as himself can subscribe to understandably as a "reasonable" justification. In the end the sacralist cannot disabuse himself of the notion that ultimately he is a deserving recipient of an infinite Love that must bring himself and the world from nothingness into existence and keep them there. Sacralism is a misplaced and therefore false recognition of mystery. It is a false mysticism that amounts to no more than ideology or obscurantism. It is another form of idolatry.

The sacralist cannot bear the Judeo-Christian notion of a God who faithfully, constantly, freely, and graciously creates us and the world from nothing because of infinite Love. He might pay lip service to the latter, but his attitudes and his life contradict it. He cannot bear the Christian notion that such a God could so identify with his creatures as to suffer and die at their hands. He cannot bear the Christian notion of a God who has handed the full responsibility for this world and for ourselves, both of which he created from infinite Love, over to us, in whom he wishes to realize the divine freedom of love. These mysteries must be watered down, soft-pedaled, and tamed for consumption by "civilized" men and women.

The sacralist wants to usurp the divine viewpoint; he wants a God who is in "complete control," but one whom he, then, can control (magic). He wants a God of "mystery" who is no mystery to himself. If he is a philosopher and tries to be consistent, the sacralist may come to recognize that a God of infinite Love is impossible; and then he
might come to think that the divine itself must be finite (process philosophy) if human understanding, human knowledge, and human existence itself is ultimately to be justified. For the reflective sacralist, the alternative is an arbitrary and capricious God.

The religious rhetoric of the sacralist is a rhetoric that identifies religious faith with some kind of special knowledge, an intuitionism (immediacy) that is no more or less than Gnosticism: the divine reality or divine love is somehow "immediately there" to be grasped by the illuminati but not properly by anyone else. Thus the sacralist's belief is not an authentic faith that comes through hearing the word of God in human speech, but a pseudo-faith or gnosis that comes from "loving" the kind of God he wants to "love." To the sacralist, "faith" is a blind leap into the dark, rather than a conversion or series of conversions (aesthetic-intellectual, rhetorical-philosophical, moral, and religious) that amount to an open-eyed leap into the light.

To the sacralist, Christian "faith" is an unthinking act of conformity to dogmas, rather than an intelligent and loving response to the call of a mysterious Word, fully incarnated in human flesh and now speaking through human speech. To the sacralist, Christian "hope" is the phony guarantee of a divine security, certainty, and success (triumphalism) now that the divine spirit is corralled into a sacralized ecclesiastical structure so that the divine spirit can no longer "blow where it wills." A sacralist theology would tend to dissolve theological concepts into the undifferentiated, mythic life from which they arise.** 19**

As with all lower viewpoints, there are many forms of sacralism. However, they all share one common characteristic: the inability or refusal to move beyond religious belief to authentic faith or religious conversion. They also share family resemblances with naivety and dogmatism, although all combinations of sacralism with lower viewpoints from the other dialectics are possible. The eschatology of a naive, dogmatic, optimistic, sacralism is just another variation on the optimist's theme that everything will turn out for the best in the end because God guarantees it. All human and divine risk is eliminated from history. The transcendent mystery of divine grace and human freedom is

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19. I do not mean to suggest that all ecclesiastical structures or institutions are spiritually inauthentic forms of Christian faith, but only that some are and that there is need for a critique.
dissolved into a comic charade on the grand scale of history in which a "God of infinite power" controls each and every event so that everything happens "according to a pre-established plan." History becomes a divine spectacle the vision of which is shared by the "true believer."

All combinations of sacralism with the lower viewpoints of the other dialectics are possible. To give just a few examples: the naive sacralist will replace the traditional gods with his own sacralist version of superstition; the dogmatic sacralist will rule out of court as heresy all religious questions that seem to challenge his own viewpoint; the naive-dogmatic-pessimistic-sacralist will put the fear of hellfire into all his friends; the sceptical, optimistic sacralist will use his doubt to hide from the terrors of death; the relativistic, optimistic sacralist will find consolation in an indefinitely postponed divine judgment. And so on.

Once again we find that the sacralist has sown the seeds of his own movement towards secularism. To the extent that the sacralist differentiates the issues involved in his false vision of Transcendence; to the extent that he comes to question, think understand, and reflect on the existential consequences of his notion of a "non-mysterious transcendence"; to the extent that he tries to live a human life based upon that false vision; to that extent will he be likely to experience a profound crisis of what he calls "belief." Slowly he will come to reject the sacralist notion of transcendence and of the ultimate meaning, truth, and worth of human existence and the world. Secularism need not be an explicit atheism, but it certainly tends in that direction. We must not confuse secularism, however, with secularity. Secularity is not a counterposition; rather it simply means the movement towards differentiation which is the basis of all learning. 20

From the secularist's point of view the god of sacralism is either a grand and meaningless illusion and/or a sado-masochistic, infinitely hostile, evil force. Like the sacralist, the secularist thinks she has an absolute right to existence; only she thinks

20. Secularity is a characteristic of all historically conscious religions. It can be identified as beginning with the prophetic differentiations of God from the world, traced through the Christian notion of God as self-transcending, to the medieval differentiation of theology, philosophy, and the sciences, and to the modern and post-modern differentiation of method itself.
"existence" has cheated her of this right. The secularist feels the absolute indignity of being born only to be destined to die and of desiring an unlimited life only to be infinitely frustrated. Ressentiment, then, is the pervasive mood of secularism. The chief concern of the secularist is the avoidance of a death she thinks she in no way deserves.

All combinations of secularism with the lower viewpoints of the other dialectics are possible. To give some common examples: the sceptical secularist will doubt that any form of religiousness can be anything but a con-game; the dogmatic secularist will rule out of court all religious questions as humbug; the relativistic secularist will reduce all questions of religious meaning and truth to symbols or concepts of man "projected" onto an illusory divine reality; the optimistic secularist will "believe" in the divine reality of humanity and the "unlimited progress of the human race"; the pessimistic secularist will take human life to be an unfortunate accident of nature that will ultimately dissolve itself in its own contradictions. And so it goes.

The commonsense compromise is no solution to the contradictory lives of the sacralist and the secularist. Nevertheless there is such a false compromise, which consists in dividing the world in a schizoid way between two worlds: the Sunday world of religious pietism (sacralism) and the week-day world of labor, profit, and loss (secularism), the "idealized world of religious life" and the "real world" of everyday life. The truth of religious life is that there is only one real world, and that is the one the God has given to us. The commonsense false compromise is the basis for a false religious, contemporary division and separation of the so-called "active" from the "contemplative" life. Still, this inauthentic commonsense compromise is what most people think is genuine "up-to-date" religiousness.

What is genuine and authentic religiousness? In other words, what is the higher viewpoint of the fourth dialectic of the ultimate meaning, truth, and worth of human existence and the world? This is the same as asking, What constitutes religious conversion? Religious conversion is the experience of being-in-love in an unrestricted way (Lonergan 1972:101-124). Authentic religious faith is a leap into the "light": just as aesthetic and intellectual conversion, rhetorical and philosophical conversion, as well as moral conversion were conscious
movements toward meaning, truth, and value, so also is religious faith. But it is a movement which is first experienced as, then—but not always—understood, known, and appreciated as, pure and radical gift, a movement that comes initially from above (transcendence) and is experienced as a pure passion on our part and an act of God on his.

The fundamental religious vision of human existence in the world is the recognition that life is a *mysterious gift* of a mysterious Giver. As a gift, human life is both freely given and undeserved. The religiously converted person (authentic faith)—unlike the sacralist, the secularist, and the common-sense sacralist-secularist—recognizes that we have no right-to-existence in relation to the mystery of existence itself. If life is a gift of transcendence, then it cannot be deserved. The sacralist thinks life is given but deserved; the secularist thinks life is deserved but not given, because there is no giver, no transcendence. (The secularist likes to pretend that human beings give themselves life.) Every authentic religious tradition has always recognized that human life is both given as a gift and undeserved. To-be-in-love in an unrestricted manner is the same as thankfully recognizing the undeserved, mysterious gift of existence. Still, the gift is truly *given to us*: we are the gift while the giving lasts. In other words, while the sacralist recognizes a magical sense of "mystery" because for him life is not given in the conditions of history (metastatic faith), the secularist recognizes "history" in a radically de-humanized form without mystery or Transcendence. Only the religiously converted person recognizes the meaning, truth, and worth of human life as both genuine and authentic mystery and history: we are the history in the mystery and God is the mystery in our history.

Religious conversion (faith) is itself experienced as a gift within, but beyond, the gift of existence. For it too is a passion, an unlimited passion, for the Infinite, a love of the Infinite who is

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21. See Voegelin, 452-54. From my dialectical analysis it should be clear that what Voegelin calls metastatic faith as a derailment of authentic prophecy in Israel can be understood as a failure to get beyond the sacralist-secularist position-counterposition. The remote roots of this failure are to be found in the lack of aesthetic-intellectual and rhetorical-philosophical conversions. Religious conversion sets up an existential exigence for the prior conversions.
infinite Love itself. Thus true mysticism is really an intensification of authentic faith or religious conversion. All human beings are called to be mystics in this sense. Nor is mysticism some form of obscurantist sacramalist propaganda; but then, neither is it some secularist evasion of the ultimate questions for understanding, knowing, and being involved in what is really and ultimately worthwhile. The love of transcendence is the final destiny and fulfillment of every human life. While the sacramalist seeks from his "god" a consolation for the vicissitudes of human existence, while the secularist makes accusations against the false idol-gods of the sacramalist, and while the commonsense sacramalist-secularist finds himself torn between both, the religiously converted person worships the true God of transcendent mystery in grace, truth, and love.

THE RELIGIOUS DIALECTIC OF HOPE FOR THE ULTIMATE MEANING, TRUTH, AND GOOD

THE FREE GIFT OF EXISTENCE RECEIVED IN GRATITUDE

Being-in-Love in an Unrestricted Way

Religious Conversion

Hope for the Ultimate Meaning, Truth, and Worth of Human Existence

Is it Ultimately Really Meaningful—True—and Worthwhile?

Sacralism
("gift" but deserved)

Secularism
("deserved" but no gift)

The Right to Existence

Commonsense Sacralist-Secularist Compromise
THE FOUNDATIONAL HERMENEUTIC OF RELIGIOUS HOPE

God's Love for Us: The Gift of Existence and the Gift of Love

The Divine Call: Revelation in History as God's Word

Our Response* Thanksgiving—No Thanksgiving

Decisions
Value Judgments
Questions of Value or Worth (Is it ultimately worthwhile?)

Judgments of Value
Moral Deliberation
Questions of Value (Is it really worthwhile?)

Judgments of Fact
Reflective Understanding
Questions for Reflection (Is it so?)

Mythic-Symbolic and Conceptual Speech
Aesthetic-Theoretical Understanding (What is it?)
Experience-Belief

Wonder and Awe

Subject-Person as Hearer of the Word of God

Now that I have identified, analyzed, and meditated upon the four dialectics that constitute the conversation that we are, the dialectical structure of that conversation, and the interpersonal relations in the dialogue in tension which is the human person, it is possible to ask, "Is there some way to show the relations between all the dialectics?" The answer is yes. For there is an overarching dialectic of praxis which concerns the underlying issue of the relations between the performance of understanding, reflection, deliberation, and love itself. The performances of intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love are constitutive of authentic human life. There are fundamentally three ways we can orient ourselves to these performances: doing them but neglecting to identify ourselves with them and commit ourselves to them (commonsense praxis); doing them but refusing to identify ourselves with them and self-consciously rejecting them as impossible (nihilistic praxis); and finally, doing them, trying to identify ourselves with
them, committing ourselves to them, and appropriating them as much as possible given our fallibility, moral impotence, and factual disorientation to the meaningful-intelligible, the true, the good, and the holy (converted praxis).

There is, in one sense, nothing new in this fifth dialectic, and yet because it introduces the new question of the interrelation of all the other dialectics, we can say the dialectic of praxis is the dialectic of dialectics. We have already seen the initial position in this dialectic: the commonsense compromise in the four dialectics constitutes what we call commonsense praxis. Commonsense praxis has as its terminal values a life of security, certainty, success, and ultimate self-justification. We have already shown that commonsense praxis is an inauthentic way of human life by our analysis of how it is a false compromise between naiveté and scepticism, dogmatism and relativism, optimism and pessimism, and sacralism and secularism. However, we have not yet shown the emergence of nihilism or nihilistic praxis, the ultimate counterposition. To that we shall now direct our meditation.

There is a self-reflective, pessimistic, secularism beyond all consolation (sacralism) and beyond all accusation (ordinary secularism) (Ricoeur). It is nihilism. Nihilism is first the rejection of commonsense praxis as a radically false and inauthentic way of life. For the nihilist human experience is just a testimony to human life's meaninglessness. Questions for understanding are just reminders of our own futile inadequacies. Human understanding is just the empty "projection" of futile human desires and fears onto the chaos of my experience and the opinions of others. The seeming order of existence (symbol/concept) is just an oppressive discipline of empty, ungrounded meanings. Questions for reflection are just symptoms of the contradiction which is human life: an animal who wills to be a god and has not the guts to be what he or she is—an animal. So reflective understanding just leads to the self-illusion that humans can know themselves and the world. Judgment is just the pitiful cry of human impotence in a world that is hostile to a being that is fundamentally at odds with itself.

22. Paul Ricoeur provides an excellent analysis of the post-modern religious situation. However, it is also a good example of a work that reveals aesthetic and rhetorical conversion with serious difficulties on the intellectual and philosophical levels. Ricoeur's work still remains methodologically undifferentiated as far as I know. He remains a neo-Kantian (Piscitelli, 1980).
For the nihilist the deliberative reflection of the existential subject is just the self-delusion that humanity can do anything about its tragic predicament. Religious love is just the self-destructive act of fools who live by a slave morality and cannot face the reality of the meaninglessness, untruth, and worthlessness of their own life and death. Nihilism can be atheism with a vengeance.

For the nihilist the world is too evil for a good God to exist. Things in the world are just opaque, unintelligible, nauseous reminders of the thing-like end of human existence: the corpse. Human suffering and death are too unbearable for love to be anything but a cruel joke. Other persons are living hell. The naiveté of others proves the futility of human experience and belief. The scepticism of others proves there is an emptiness at the center of the self. The dogmatism of others proves the foolishness and arrogance of human beings. The relativism of others proves the vacuity of all supposed knowledge. The optimism of others proves the ultimate futility of human existence. The pessimism of others proves the worthlessness of human life. Existentiually, nihilism is the reflective choice of self-destruction. It can lead to a pre-meditated suicide. For if death is coming anyway, why not have it in your control and bring it about yourself? Death becomes the only real liberation for the tortured self.

Religiously, nihilism means that the real answer to the question: Is life ultimately meaningful, in truth, and worthwhile? is no. Ethically, nihilism means the negation of all values and their criteria of objectivity. Politically, nihilism can lead to a terrorism that would "liberate" man by destroying all orders of human existence in the human community. Culturally, nihilism says the ultimate no to the human search for meaning, truth, and worth and its expression in human speech (and writing) because there is really only one human possibility: death. Philosophically, nihilism could empty all human speech of its intention and orientation to meaning, truth, and worth: first, human speech (language) would be reduced to a mere "representation" of dead things out there in the world (positivism-empiricism); later, it would be dissolved into purely subjective emotions and feelings (emotivism), and finally it would evaporate into the "projections" of human wishes or into an empty system of self-references which have nothing to do with either the person who speaks of the things spoken about or the community of discourse addressed or the intention of meaning, truth, or value.
Clearly there seems to be little common ground between nihilistic praxis and commonsense praxis. And yet they do have something in common: they both reject converted praxis; they both choose death rather than life. Common sense walks with closed eyes towards death and nihilism runs with open eyes into it. They both exclude the human possibility of the ultimate meaningfulness, truth, and the authentic liberation which comes from a real faith that puts its trust in an infinite Love and dwells in the loving discourse and faithful action of an intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving human community. The dialectic of praxis in a sense goes beyond yet includes the questions of meaning, truth, and value by going to their very foundations.

By converted praxis we mean the higher viewpoints of all the dialectics of openness and hope established in aesthetic and intellectual conversion; rhetorical and philosophical conversion; and moral and religious conversion. For us these conversions are withdrawals from inauthenticity: from misunderstanding, from untruth, from irresponsibility, and from a lack of love and the proper attunement to the Divine.

The issue of praxis is most intense on the religious level, for it is on this level that the question of foundations is crucial: the fundamental orientation of man's being in the world and history. That fundamental orientation affects our understanding of our own intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, our relations with others, and our actions in every dimension of life. Just as the only real reconciliation of the dialectic of hope on the religious level was a religious conversion in which persons recognized that their own existence and the existence of the world is to be in infinite Love, so also the only real reconciliation of the dialectic of praxis is in the living of the self-authenticating life of converted praxis or in the living of the self-falsifying and self-destructive lives of commonsense and nihilistic praxis. Still the recognition of infinite Love can come only by hearing the voice of God in human life history. The most we can say from a purely philosophical and dialectical point of view is that each of us must listen for that voice. We cannot make another person listen, nor can we make the transcendent speak. However the question of praxis cannot avoid the question of history because they are one and the same.
Both commonsense and nihilistic praxis assume that a human life of converted praxis is impossible. The reason the man of common sense thinks it impossible is that such life would be a divine life, which is impossible. The reason nihilism thinks it impossible is that nihilism denies the possibility of any divine life. The only real refutation of commonsense and nihilistic praxis would be an historic and actual human life of converted praxis. The historic Jesus is the refutation of both commonsense and nihilistic praxis.

For the Christian, Jesus is the reality of human converted praxis in history because he is the Speech of infinite Love in human life. To live in his Spirit is to live in the reality of infinite Love. The Speech of an infinite Love in human history would provide a more than human dimension to human experience, human understanding, human knowledge, human speech, human responsibility of the same freedom of love which could create the world and man from absolute nothingness. The hearing and heeding of this loving Word would constitute a liberation of man from his own finitude and contingency without denying or rejecting that finitude and contingency.

As a religious conversion, authentic Christian faith would be a movement beyond consolation and accusation (like nihilism) to a recognition of a fellowship, indeed a friendship, with a God of infinite compassion and Love. With the Christian we could hear in the farewell discourses in the gospel of John that God himself calls us to be his friends because we are already the brothers and sisters of Jesus. We could recognize that the true God would have emptied himself of all divine possessions and attributes to identify himself with us; he would have controlled an infinite power to be near us; and in Jesus he would have died an infinite death to be in us forever. If true, this would be a liberation that surpasses all human understanding, human reasonableness, and a merely human responsibility. However, at the same time it would heighten human understanding, reasonableness, and responsibility beyond the merely finite dimensions of human existence. The freedom that would come from such an infinitely loving, historic Word and his identification with us, though not of this world, would surely encompass the whole world and all of us. Human speech and history would become the place where transcendence itself speaks to us and human action would be God's own activity in us. Finally, the education of man to freedom
would include preaching and sacrament, catechesis and sacrifice. The moving force for such an education would include but go beyond training and competence, discipline and mastery, self-understanding, knowing, and even moral excellence, to a love of persons, self, and world for their own sakes. A Christian education would be not less, but more fully a human, liberal education.

### THE OVERARCHING DIALECTIC OF PRAXIS

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