LONERGAN WORKSHOP
Volume IV
I am pleased to introduce the rather disparate collection of articles that go to make up Lonergan Workshop 4.

Michael Vertin has spent several years teaching generalized empirical method by having his students identify the cognitional theories of authors from a wide variety of scholarly and scientific disciplines. One can get a taste of his procedure from his chapter, "Towards the Emergence of Foundational Questions," in Dialogues in Celebration (Thomas More Institute Papers/80). His contribution here shows what a delicately honed heuristic structure for cognitional theoretic diagnosis his years of labor have yielded.

Richard Cassidy had been interested in Lonergan before taking a pause from his pastoral duties to do the doctoral work at the Graduate Theological Union that resulted in the publication of his study on Luke, Jesus, Politics, and Society. In his paper, he tries to apply Lonergan's scheme of functional specialization to the issue of the possible validity of a pacifist orientation in Christian social ethics. Its point is suggestive—to make a start at envisaging what might be done in the field.

Robert Doran's pathfinding work in the field of psychic and affective conversion has been much praised by Fr. Lonergan and is well known to many of our readers. His paper's sketch of a prophetic vision of ministry marks a new departure in his writing to date.

Arthur Kennedy, who did his doctoral work on Paul Ricoeur, has been working on the writings of Flannery O'Connor for a number of years now. His nearly completed monograph on her will expose what she teaches us about 'foundational' reading. His paper here lays out some foundational categories for doing justice to her performance as an author and also provides a sample of his reading.

Sebastian Moore's ongoing quest to come to terms with the Crucified One has seen the light of day in two previous volumes of this journal, as well as in many books of which the most recent is The Inner Loneliness. Here he develops cognate issues in the zone of human sexuality.
William Reiser, SJ, Lonergan's assistant at Harvard in 1971-72, completed his doctorate at Vanderbilt. His paper delves into some of the quite practical and existential implications of Lonergan's mystical grounding of theology in *Method in Theology*.

Philip Boo Riley did his doctoral work in Toronto under Ben Meyer and George Grant, and so he has had a lot of first-hand exposure to discussions on the pluses and minuses of scholarship. He has been editing for publication Lonergan's series of lectures concerning the debates between theology and religious studies. His paper here contextualizes Lonergan's contribution to those debates.

Nancy Ring's paper in this volume brings to mind the 'generational' character of the Workshop down through the years: she did her doctoral work on Tillich and Lonergan with Matthew Lamb at Marquette. Her own feel for the implications of the symbolic dimension of language comes out in her many concrete apercu on the role of speech in non-privatized prayer.

Bernard Tyrrell, SJ, whose articles have appeared in every issue of *Lonergan Workshop* to date, prepared his paper just after having completed *Christotherapy II*. In a way that is clearly indebted both to Ignatian mysticism and to Lonergan's articulation of religious experience, Tyrrell too discusses praying in a personal and concrete fashion.

Fred Lawrence  
Boston College  
August, 1983
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DIALECTICALLY-OPPOSED PHENOMENOLOGIES OF KNOWING: A PEDAGOGICAL ELABORATION OF BASIC IDEAL-TYPES

Michael Vertin  
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I. INTRODUCTION

I should like to introduce this paper by first recounting briefly something of my own history as a student of human cognition and then specifying exactly, against that background, the enterprise to which the body of the paper is devoted.

A. The Background of this Paper

In the summer of 1973 I completed work on a doctoral dissertation entitled, "The Transcendental Vindication of the First Step in Realist Metaphysics, according to Joseph Maréchal" (Vertin, 1973). The project had grown out of my longstanding interest in what has come to be called the "critical" problem, that of establishing the real objectivity of human knowledge. How, if at all, can one ever be certain that what one concludes to be so is really so? How, if at all, can one escape the possibility that even one's most fully substantiated and seemingly incontrovertible judgments of real existence are finally not necessarily more than just subjective? I had been disturbed by this most basic of epistemological problems first during undergraduate work in physics and then, from a markedly different angle, during graduate work in theology. Subsequently, through a modest investigation (Vertin, 1967) carried out near the beginning of my graduate studies in philosophy and focussed on the writings of Bernard Lonergan up to that time, especially Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Lonergan, 1957), I had gained a more exact appreciation of the problem and learned of the "critical realist" proposal for solving (or, more accurately, dissolving) it. A certain personal uneasiness with that proposed solution had remained, however. Consequently, in an effort to lay to rest that residual uneasiness through a more extensive historical and philosophical investigation of critical realism as such, and encouraged by Lonergan's assurance to me that the work of Maréchal was very much to the point in this regard, I had undertaken the study of the Belgian Jesuit.
Maréchal's fundamental philosophical theme, already present in his early studies of the psychology of the mystics (Maréchal, 1924) /1/, and developed at great length in the five-volume work for which he is best known, *Le Point de départ de la métaphysique* (Maréchal, 1922-49) is the natural finality of the human intellect. Speaking now in metaphysical terms and now in phenomenological ones, Maréchal argues that human intellectual cognition is essentially a matter of identity and perfection, active, dynamic, and constructive, rather than a matter of duality and confrontation, passive, static, and receptive. And, most importantly, the judgment of real existence, the culminating moment of the cognitional process, is discursive or affirmation-al and not intuitive or perceptual. To judge is not intellectually to intuit, perceive, see, real existence in some concrete intelligible. On the contrary, to judge is to affirm of, assert of, attribute to, that concrete intelligible a relation to the ultimate objective term of intellectual finality, the ultimate cognitional goal which one anticipates a priori and which is the plenitude of what in fact one means, at least implicitly, by "real existence". For humans, to know a concrete intelligible as really existing is nothing other than to affirm that concrete intelligible as related to the ultimate objective term of intellectual dynamism. The critical problem, Maréchal claims, arises precisely insofar as one overlooks the discursive character of actual judgments, mistakenly asserts that an intuitive grasp of real existence is requisite for objective knowing, and then notes--correctly--that concretely the requisite intuition does not occur.

Maréchal's approach to the question of the real objectivity of human knowledge, then, is simply to argue that even at a very primitive level of awareness the human subject makes judgments that are indeed discursive or affirmation-al. On the basis of what purportedly is a transcendental analysis, Maréchal avers that a transcendental condition of one's having some concrete intelligible as phenomenally objective is that one affirm, at least implicitly, that concrete intelligible as fundamentally really objective, really existing, related to the ultimate objective term of intellectual finality. But it is undeniable that one frequently has concrete intelligibles as phenomenally objective. Consequently, says Maréchal, the real objectivity of human knowledge stands essentially vindicated, and the critical problem is dissolved.

After many months of studying the long and detailed historical and systematic argumentation by which Maréchal builds his case /2/, I concluded that his chief contentions, notwithstanding certain misleading expressions and dubious metaphysical conceptions that encumber them, are substantially correct. The basic (if seldom explicit) meaning of "real existence" is indeed "goal of intellectual finality"; one actually does know real existence via judgments that are discursive or affirmation-al in character; and the critical problem really is a false problem, one which arises because of the human
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propensity to suppose, in the absence of adequate concrete self-knowledge, that cognitional operations can achieve real objectivity only if they are intuitive, perceptual, at least analogous to ocular vision. I felt content with critical realism at last.

Nonetheless, a difficulty with Maréchal's account continued to nett me, a difficulty that was highlighted when I compared his account with that of Lonergan. Maréchal, in his analysis of judgment, clearly rejects the "cognitional myth" that holds "that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at" (Lonergan, 1972:238). Thus he has achieved what Lonergan by now is labelling "intellectual conversion" (Lonergan, 1972:238 et passim). On the other hand, the two thinkers differ significantly in their respective account of the primitive self-awareness of the subject in general and of the judging subject in particular. For Lonergan, the subject's primitive self-awareness is intrinsically non-reflexive; and the judging subject's primitive self-awareness is at best not just self-manifestive but rationally self-constitutive as well. Consequently, by discussing variations in the judging subject's commitment to, and skill at, rational self-constitution, Lonergan is able to provide a highly nuanced phenomenology of cognitional error (see, e.g., Lonergan, 1957:271-316). For Maréchal, by contrast, the subject's primitive self-awareness is intrinsically reflexive, albeit only "partially" or "incompletely" so; and the judging subject's primitive self-awareness does not constitute the self-as-judging but merely manifests it, reflectively, as already pre-reflectively or "naturally" constituted. Thus Maréchal cannot avoid maintaining that in their originating moments judgments, like other activities of the subject, proceed "sourdement et nécessairement" (Maréchal, 1922-49, V:404), a position that leads to what surely is one of the most striking deficiencies of Le Point de départ, namely, the absence of any account of cognitional error.

"Given that Maréchal is intellectually converted, why does he still retain the 'ocularist' position that primitive self-awareness is a kind of 'looking at self'?" "Does Maréchal's notion of primitive self-awareness, and his resultant inability to account for cognitional error, ultimately jeopardize his rejection of the 'ocularist' notion of knowing?" Bothered by questions such as these, but tentatively answering the latter in the negative, I consigned my discussion of the matter to the second of two appendices in my dissertation.

In the years since completing my doctoral dissertation I have continued to pursue my philosophical study of human cognition, proceeding mainly in two complementary ways.

First, in meeting my assigned responsibility to design and conduct a number of year-long advanced undergraduate courses under the titles, "Epistemology" and--later--"Metaphysics", I have had a splendid opportunity
to increase both the depth and the breadth of my acquaintance with basic philosophical issues as arising in the work of others, both past and present. After initially structuring these courses simply as interpretive thematizations of the history of philosophy, thematizations (with a distinctly Maréchallian flavor!) designed to illustrate the relatively small number of possible positions on basic philosophical issues, I soon began also to consider the relations between those basic position-sets and the current disputes over method in selected "trans-philosophical" disciplinary areas. I was greatly influenced throughout this enterprise by my continued reading and re-reading of both Maréchal and Lonergan; and the general pattern upon which I finally settled is exemplified by my description of a recent course entitled, "Metaphysics":

This course investigates two basic theses: (1) that any solution of the metaphysical problem of the one and the many presupposes at least implicitly solutions of the phenomenological problem of the one and the many and the epistemological problem of objectivity and subjectivity; and (2) that differences over the solutions of these philosophical problems constitute a fundamental, though often unnoticed, part of disputes over method within the various empirical disciplines. These theses are explored dialectically through reference to selected systematic controversies from the history of philosophy and selected methodological debates in current physics, historiography, literary criticism, and theology. A general orientation is provided by selections from the philosophical writings of Bernard Lonergan (Vertin, 1980:40).

Those familiar with the work of Lonergan will recognize, in the first part of this program, my attention to what he labels the basic issues of "knowing, objectivity, and reality" (see, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:20-21; et passim in Lonergan's later works). The major figures whose works I have usually employed to raise these issues dialectically are Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Lonergan. The disciplinary areas and figures upon which I have concentrated in the second part of this program have varied somewhat from year to year, in function of my own immediate interests. (Besides the areas noted above, I have also made forays with the students into psychology, sociology, and ethics.) In the most recent course, the persons whose works I used for dialectically illustrating the methodological issues were these: in physics, Israel Scheffler, Wilfrid Sellars, and Patrick Heelan; in historiography, Carl Hempel, R.G. Collingwood, and W.H. Walsh; in literary criticism, I.A. Richards, Northrop Frye, and H.-G. Gadamer; and in theology, Peter Berger, Paul Ricoeur, and Lonergan /6/.

The second way in which I have been able to extend my philosophical study of human cognition is through preparing a sequence of scholarly papers. Though having the usual variety of particular aims, collectively the papers have allowed me to articulate, consolidate, and implement certain advances that I have made in thinking about basic cognitional issues since completing my doctoral work /7/.
B. The Aim of this Paper

It will scarcely surprise the reader to learn that the effort to which the body of this paper is devoted flows from the prior work of my own that I have just discussed, work that in its theoretical aspect I now explicitly locate mainly in the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations and, more precisely, in the cognition-regarding (by contrast with the further, decision-regarding) parts of those two functional specialties /B/.

Specifically, then, the body of this paper is a pedagogical effort in the functional specialty of Dialectic and, more exactly, in that part of Dialectic concerned with the phenomenology of knowing. Let me expand this characterization, in six steps.

First, as located in, rather than beyond, the order of functional specialties, my effort here is concerned immediately with theory (including theory about praxis) and not immediately with praxis itself /9/.

Secondly, as in a fourth-level rather than a lower-level functional specialty, my effort is concerned with theory in its merely structural, simply heuristic, purely transcultural, strictly philosophical aspect /10/, by contrast with theory insofar as in addition it is content-inclusive, heuristically complemented, culturally conditioned, empirical /11/.

Thirdly, as in Dialectic rather than Foundations, my effort is simply to articulate something of the comprehensive set of those basic dialectically-differing integral supposition-sets (ultimately reflecting dialectical differences among theorists in their fundamental, if not always explicit, intellectual, moral, and religious outlooks) by virtue of which individual theories in any given area of inquiry may be opposed in their strictly philosophical aspects, without yet proclaiming which one of those supposition-sets I take to be correct /12/.

Fourthly, as in that part of Dialectic concerned with knowing rather than deciding, my effort is oriented, more narrowly, toward the supposition-sets from the aforementioned comprehensive set that regard cognitional acts (and, by inclusion, their contents) by contrast with decisional ones /13/.

Fifthly, as in that part of Dialectic concerned with the phenomenology rather than the epistemology or metaphysics of knowing, my effort is oriented, still more narrowly, toward the supposition-sets from the aforementioned comprehensive set that regard cognitional acts (and their contents) from the standpoint of description as distinct from both vindication and explanation /14/.
Sixthly, as pedagogical rather than originating, my present effort is to articulate something of the comprehensive set of dialectically-differing integral sets of basic phenomenological suppositions about cognition in such a way as to help the reader make progress toward adopting, as his own, the supposition-set that I take to be correct. The contrast is with my earlier work of spelling out dialectical alternatives for myself and deciding among them.

As a supplementary characterization, I should say that my aim in the body of this paper is to display, in a comprehensive schema, the basic theoretical correlates of both the concrete (and concretely implemented) self-knowledge that is the fundamental component of what Lonergan labels "intellectual conversion", and the varieties of that component's absence.

II. ELABORATION

A. The Phenomenology of Knowing: The Ten Basic Questions

Consider the collectivity of the basic descriptive philosophical--or basic phenomenological--suppositions regarding human knowing that either have been made explicitly by individual philosophers or are implicit in the work of individual philosophers and empirical theorists. So far as I can determine, this collectivity suggests that human cognitional acts may occur on any of as many as five distinct levels and may have as many as two distinct dimensions. While not yet assessing the accuracy of any supposition in that collectivity, I would claim that the collectivity itself can usefully be envisioned as a group of diverse responses to ten basic phenomenological questions about the occurrence, distinction, and characteristic structure of those five levels and two dimensions and, moreover, that no phenomenology of human knowing can be complete without addressing each of those ten basic questions.

The five supposed levels of cognitional acts are the sensory, the ideational, the judicative, the evaluative, and the fiducial levels. The supposed first, sensory, level is that whose characteristic contents include colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc. The supposed second, ideational, level is that whose characteristic contents include intelligibility, i.e., the intelligible unities that constitute things and the intelligible similarities that constitute properties. The supposed third, judicative, level is that whose characteristic contents include factuality, i.e., the existence and occurrence, beyond the mere intelligibility, of things and of properties. The supposed fourth, evaluative, level is that whose characteristic contents include value, i.e., the genuine goodness, beyond the mere factuality, of
things and of properties /24/. And the supposed fifth, fiducial, level is that whose characteristic contents include holiness, i.e., the redolence of unrestricted lovability, beyond the mere value, of things and of properties /25/. The two supposed dimensions of cognitional acts are the intentional dimension, the dimension in which sensible contents, intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness become cognitionally present to the knowing subject, and the conscious dimension, the dimension in which in utterly primitive fashion the cognitional acts themselves--and, underlying them, the cognitional actor, the knowing subject--are cognitionally self-present /26/.

The ten basic phenomenological questions, then, fall into two groups, five regarding cognitional intentionality and five regarding cognitional consciousness: In fact, do cognitional acts possess an intentional dimension on a sensory level, and, if so, precisely what is their structure in this regard? on an ideational level? on a judicative level? on an evaluative level? on a fiducial level? And, in fact, do cognitional acts possess a conscious dimension on a sensory level, and, if so, precisely what is their structure in this regard? on an ideational level? on a judicative level? on an evaluative level? on a fiducial level?

B. The Phenomenology of Knowing: Dialectically-Opposed Answers to the Five Basic Questions regarding Cognitional Intentionality

The collectivity of basic phenomenological suppositions regarding cognitional intentionality may be organized in terms of the five basic questions to which those suppositions constitute responses; and thus one has suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality, respectively. The collectivity may also be organized in terms of the dialectically-opposed kinds of responses that those suppositions constitute; and in that case one has absentialist, reductionist, immediate-receptionist, pure-productionist, and mediate-receptionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality /27/. I shall give priority to the latter organizing principle in the present section of this paper.

Absentialist suppositions about cognitional intentionality postulate in common that alleged cognitional acts in whose intentional dimension the contents in question become cognitionally present to the knowing subject do not occur at all, on any level. Thus, the absentialist supposition about sensory intentionality is that colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., are not to be found at all among the contents of human knowing. The absentialist supposition about ideational intentionality proposes the total cognitional absence of intelligibility. The absentialist supposition about judicative intentionality is that there is no cognitional achievement of factuality; about evaluative intentionality, of value; and about fiducial intentionality, of holiness /28/.
Reductionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality agree in hypothesizing that alleged cognitional acts in whose intentional dimension the contents in question become cognitively present to the knowing subject do indeed occur, but that they occur not on the level in question but rather on a different level—higher or lower, as the case may be—such that the contents in question are not these levels' characteristic intentional-dimension contents. Thus, for example, reductionist suppositions about sensory intentionality are that colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., are indeed among the contents of human knowing, but not as characteristic contents of a first, sensory, level. Instead, they are to be found on the second level, as aspects of intelligibility, or on the third level, as aspects of factuality, or on the fourth level, as aspects of value, or on the fifth level, as aspects of holiness. Or, again, reductionist suppositions about fiducial intentionality are that there is indeed a cognitional achievement of holiness—not, however, as the characteristic content of a fifth, fiducial, level of human knowing but only on the fourth level, as an aspect of value, or on the third level, as an aspect of factuality, or on the second level, as an aspect of intelligibility, or on the first level, as an aspect of sensible contents /29/.

Suppositions in the three remaining groups agree in theorizing that alleged cognitional acts in whose intentional dimension the contents in question (i.e., sensible contents, or intelligibility, or factuality, or value, or holiness) become cognitively present to the knowing subject both do occur, and occur precisely on the level in question (i.e., the sensory, or ideational, or judicative, or evaluative, or fiducial, respectively), with the contents in question as these levels' characteristic intentional-dimension contents. They differ in how they portray the intentional structure of these cognitional acts.

Immediate-receptionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality all propound that the intentional structure of the cognitional acts that they regard is immediately receptive. That is to say, the knowing subject—precisely as such—makes contents cognitively present to itself by acts which in their intentional dimension are acts of accepting contents as given to the subject-as-knower from beyond the subject-as-knower and, moreover, accepting them directly rather than through any intermediary contents /30/. Accordingly, the immediate-receptionist suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality are that sensible contents, intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness, respectively, become cognitively present through sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial acts that in their intentional dimension are acts of direct, unmediated acceptance /31/.

Pure-productionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality all suggest that the intentional structure of the cognitional acts that they regard
is simply productive. That is to say, the knowing subject—again, precisely as such—makes contents cognitively present to itself by acts which in their intentional dimension are acts of creating, fashioning, fabricating contents entirely out of the subject's own resources. Hence, the pure-productionist suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality are that sensible contents, intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness, respectively, become cognitively present through sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial acts that in their intentional dimension are acts of simple fabrication /32/.

Finally, mediate-receptionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality all speculate that the intentional structure of the cognitional acts that they regard is mediately receptive. That is to say, the knowing subject—once again, precisely as such—makes contents cognitively present to itself by acts which in their intentional dimension are acts of accepting contents as given to the subject-as-knower from beyond the subject-as-knower, but accepting them indirectly, through intermediary contents. There is a distinction, therefore, between the contents that are received and the contents in which they are received /33/. The former, the known contents, are fundamentally beyond the subject-as-knower /34/. The latter, the intermediary contents, are simply within the subject-as-knower; and they arise from the productive action of the subject upon contents received on the prior level(s) of knowing /35/. Thus, the mediate-receptionist suppositions about ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality are that intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness, respectively, become cognitively present through ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial acts that in their intentional dimension are acts of indirect, mediated acceptance, where the respective media are subject-produced concepts, judgments-of-factuality, judgments-of-value, and judgments-of-holiness /36/.

C. The Phenomenology of Knowing: Dialectically-Opposed Answers to the Five Basic Questions regarding Cognitional Consciousness

The collectivity of basic phenomenological suppositions regarding cognitional consciousness may be organized in terms of the five basic questions to which those suppositions constitute responses /37/; and thus one has suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial consciousness, respectively. The collectivity may also be organized in terms of the dialectically-opposed kinds of responses that those suppositions constitute; and in that case one has absentialist, reductionist, immediate-receptionist, and internal-presentialist suppositions /38/. I shall give priority to the latter organizing principle in the present section of this paper.
Absentialist suppositions about cognitional consciousness postulate in common that alleged cognitional acts possessing the conscious dimension—the utterly primitive cognitional self-presence—in question do not occur at all, on any level /39/. The premises of such suppositions can be that cognitional acts with the corresponding intentional dimension do not occur at all /40/, and that cognitional acts cannot occur with a conscious dimension unless they also occur with the corresponding intentional dimension /41/. Alternatively, the premises can be that cognitional self-presence is correlative with reflection: it occurs only insofar as the subject's acts, initially oriented toward contents distinct from themselves, return upon themselves, receiving themselves as their own contents /42/. But in any given instance such reflection either does not take place at all (in which case the acts are not cognitionally self-present at all), or else it takes place more or less completely (in which case the acts are cognitionally self-present more or less fully and not just in a primitive way) /43/. On one of these two sets of premises or the other, accordingly, the absentialist suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial consciousness are that there are no sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, or fiducial acts, respectively, that are cognitionally self-present simply in primitive fashion /44/.

Reductionist suppositions about cognitional consciousness all suggest that alleged cognitional acts possessing the consciousness in question do indeed occur, but that they occur not on the level in question but rather on a different level—higher or lower, as the case may be—such that the consciousness in question is not these levels' characteristic consciousness. Thus, for example, reductionist suppositions about sensory consciousness propose that there are indeed conscious acts in whose intentional dimension colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., become cognitionally present to the knowing subject; but that just as these acts' intentionality is not the characteristic intentionality of a first, sensory, level of knowing, so their consciousness is not the characteristic consciousness of a first, sensory, level. Rather, it is to be found on the second level, as but an aspect of ideational consciousness, or on the third level, as but an aspect of judicative consciousness, or on the fourth level, as but an aspect of fiducial consciousness /45/. Or, again, reductionist suppositions about fiducial consciousness propose that there are indeed conscious acts in whose intentional dimension there is a cognitional achievement of holiness; but that just as these acts' intentionality is not the characteristic intentionality of a fifth, fiducial level of knowing, so their consciousness is not the characteristic consciousness of a fifth, fiducial, level. Instead, that consciousness is on the fourth level, as but an aspect of evaluative consciousness, or on the third level, as but an aspect of judicative consciousness, or on the second level, as but an aspect of idea-
tional consciousness, or on the first level, as but an aspect of sensory consciousness /46/.

Suppositions in the two remaining groups agree in hypothesizing that alleged cognitional acts possessing the consciousness in question (i.e., the conscious dimension of acts whereby colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., or intelligibility, or factuality, or value, or holiness become cognitionally present) both do occur, and occur precisely on the level in question (i.e., the sensory, or ideational, or judicative, or evaluative, or fiducial, respectively), with the consciousness in question as these levels' characteristic consciousness. They differ in how they conceive the conscious structure of those acts.

Immediate-receptionist suppositions about cognitional consciousness all propound that the conscious structure of the cognitional acts that they regard is one of immediate receptivity. That is to say, cognitional self-presence is indeed correlative with reflection—the subject's acts returning upon themselves, receiving themselves as their own contents. But although a complete self-return, and thus full cognitional self-presence, either may or may not take place in any given instance, at least a partial and unmediated self-return, and thus primitive cognitional self-presence—consciousness—takes place in every instance. Hence, immediate-receptionist suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial consciousness are that sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial acts, respectively, are cognitionally self-present in utterly primitive fashion precisely because they are at least partially and immediately reflective /47/.

Internal-presentialist suppositions about cognitional consciousness all propose that the conscious structure of the cognitional acts that they regard is one of internal presence. That is to say, there are two distinct kinds of cognitional self-presence. There is the advanced cognitional self-presence that arises by virtue of the subject's reflective self-reception /48/. But there is also a prior, utterly primitive cognitional self-presence that is not reflective in any way. The former arises insofar as the subject's acts take themselves as their own external terms. The latter, by contrast, is originally and immediately given. It is the internal presence of the acts (and, underlying them, the actor), the presence to which all external terms—whether of non-reflective acts or of reflective acts—become cognitionally present. Accordingly, the internal-presentialist suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial consciousness are that the utterly primitive cognitional self-presence of sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial acts, respectively, is original, immediate, and non-reflective /49/.
D. The Phenomenology of Knowing: Dialectically-Opposed
Integral Sets of Answers to the Ten Basic Questions

My central claim thus far in the body of this paper has had two main parts.

First, I have argued that the collectivity of basic descriptive philosophical--or basic phenomenological--suppositions about human knowing that either have been made explicitly by individual philosophers or are implicit in the work of individual philosophers and empirical theorists may be construed as a group of diverse responses to ten basic phenomenological questions. These questions regard the occurrence, distinction, and characteristic structure of alleged cognitional acts that, taken collectively, go forward on five distinct levels (i.e., sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial) and, taken distributively, possess two distinct dimensions (i.e., intentional and conscious). A complete phenomenology of human knowing must address each of these ten basic questions; consequently, the number of basic phenomenological suppositions in an integral set is ten.

Secondly, I have sketched what I take to be the fundamental dialectically-opposed kinds of basic phenomenological suppositions that are suggested by the aforementioned collectivity. I have argued that any given theorist's suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality inevitably are either absentialist, or reductionist, or immediate-receptionist, or pure-productionist, or mediate-receptionist in character, though not necessarily the same about each; and, moreover, that any given theorist's suppositions about sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, or fiducial consciousness inevitably are either absentialist, or reductionist, or immediate-receptionist, or internal-presentialist in character, though--once again--not necessarily the same about each.

Let me now define dialectically-opposed integral sets of basic phenomenological suppositions as those integral sets possessing suppositions that address at least one of the ten basic phenomenological questions in dialectically-opposed ways. The comprehensive set of such dialectically-opposed integral sets may be made explicit by first articulating one integral set, then replacing one of its suppositions by that supposition's series of dialectical opposites to give a series of further integral sets, then replacing a second of its suppositions by that supposition's series of dialectical opposites to give a second series of integral sets, etc., until all of the possible internally-consistent integral sets have been spelled out.

I shall not speculate on how many of these possible dialectically-opposed integral sets of basic phenomenological suppositions about human knowing have actually been maintained in the history of thought to date, except to say that the number of theorists who have explicitly and consistently addressed all ten issues would seem to be rather small. However,
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insofar as the patterned set of dialectically-opposed integral sets that may be made explicit by the procedure that I have just outlined is in fact both correct and comprehensive, it constitutes a heuristic framework within which can be located any basic phenomenology of knowing (or, indeed, any element thereof) that any theorist ever has maintained or ever could maintain /56/.

III. CONCLUSION

A. The Personal Assessment

My effort in the body of this paper has been simply to articulate something of the comprehensive set of basic dialectically-opposed integral phenomenological theories about human knowing. Even if the success of that effort were wholly unchallengeable, however, the reader would still be left with nothing more than a very large number of mere theories; and he might fairly be expected to ask, "Which of those theories is the correct one?"

Should that question be asked, the appropriate initial response to it would be, or course, not substantive but procedural: "You must determine that for yourself!" For to verify one phenomenological theory of knowing and falsify the others is ultimately nothing other than to grasp the former as the uniquely adequate theoretical account of the only concrete knowing of which one is directly aware, namely one's own /57/.

Assuming that the reader recognizes the ultimately personal character of phenomenological verification, however, I should like to offer--in three main points--my own substantive response to the foregoing question, in the hope of facilitating the reader's performance of his personal verificational task. This response is ultimately based, of course, upon my own concrete knowledge of myself as a knower; and my articulation of that concrete self-knowledge carries me beyond the functional speciality of Dialectic and into that of Foundations /58/.

First, then, the ten suppositions that constitute the correct basic integral phenomenology of knowing are the following: regarding sensory intentionality, the appropriate immediate-receptionist supposition; regarding ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial intentionality, the respective mediate-receptionist suppositions; and regarding sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial consciousness, the respective internal-presensational suppositions. That is to say, there are indeed cognitional acts that, taken collectively, go forward on sensory, ideational, judicative, evaluative, and fiducial levels and, taken distributively, have intentional and conscious dimensions. The knowing subject makes colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., cognitionally present to himself by sensory-level acts that in their intentional dimension are acts of direct, unmediated acceptance. He makes intelligibility,
factuality, value, and holiness cognitionally present to himself by ideational-level, judicative-level, evaluative-level, and fiducial-level acts, respectively, that in their intentional dimension are acts of indirect, mediated acceptance, where the respective media are subject-produced concepts, judgments-of-factuality, judgments-of-value, and judgments-of-holiness. And the utterly primitive cognitional self-presence of all of these acts is original, immediate, and non-reflective /59/.

Secondly, in one's concrete cognitional performance the activities terminating in the concepts, judgments-of-factuality, judgments-of-value, and judgments-of-holiness whereby one knows intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness respectively are not activities that are mechanical, unwitting, purely other-determined, simply other-constituted. Quite to the contrary, they are activities that pre-eminently are self-determining, self-constituting. That is to say, there is the (at best) intelligent self-constituting that characterizes one's acts of inquiring, having direct insights, and formulating concepts; there is the (at best) rational self-constituting that distinguishes one's acts of reflecting, achieving reflective insights, and making judgments-of-factuality; there is the (at best) responsible self-constituting that marks one's acts of ethical deliberating, having apprehensions-of-value, and making judgments-of-value; and there is the (at best) unrestrictedly loving self-constituting that typifies one's acts of agapic deliberating, having apprehensions-of-holiness, and making judgments-of-holiness /60/. But cognitional self-constituting presupposes non-reflective cognitional self-presence; for there could be no cognitional self-constituting where there was not even cognitional self-presence, and acts that became self-present only through reflection would lack self-presence in the moment of their original, pre-reflective, constitution /61/. Thus, in one's actual knowing of intelligibility, factuality, value, and holiness, the non-reflective conscious dimension of one's cognitional activities has a certain methodical priority over the intentional dimension; and, correlative, within the correct integral supposition-set the internal-presentialist suppositions regarding consciousness are methodologically more basic than the mediate-receptionist suppositions regarding intentionality /62/.

Thirdly, the inadequacies which can arise in one's phenomenology of knowing (and thence negatively influence one's epistemology and metaphysics) are of two main types: mere deficiencies and outright errors. The deficiencies arise from insufficient (or insufficiently implemented) concrete knowledge of one's own cognitional acts (and their contents). The errors (other than mere inconsistencies) arise from insufficient (or insufficiently implemented) concrete knowledge of one's own cognitional acts (and their contents), together with the application--permitted by the absence of such self-knowledge--of some mistaken cognitional principle that itself is finally nothing else
than an unwarranted generalization of some cognitional feature that concretely one does know. Thus, absentialist suppositions of all kinds are utterly deficient, reflecting the theorist's failure to grasp concretely even the occurrence of those of his cognitional acts (and contents) that the suppositions regard. Reductionist suppositions of all kinds represent some advance but are still greatly deficient. They manifest that the theorist has grasped concretely the occurrence of those of his cognitional acts (and contents) that the suppositions regard, but not yet their distinction from other acts (and contents). Immediate-receptionist and pure-productionist suppositions are even less deficient, but, on the other hand, they are positively erroneous. They reveal that the theorist has grasped concretely both the occurrence of those of his cognitional acts (and contents) in question and their distinction from other acts (and contents) but that he has misunderstood their structure in some way. Immediate-receptionist suppositions regarding the upper four levels of cognitional intentionality and/or any of the five levels of cognitional consciousness show that the theorist, influenced by the mistaken principle that all human knowing is fundamentally like the intentional dimension of sensory knowing, has concretely attributed an immediacy to the intentional dimension of his knowing and/or a receptivity to its conscious dimension that those dimensions on the levels in question simply do not possess. And pure-productionist suppositions regarding any of the five levels of cognitional intentionality indicate that the theorist, influenced by the mistaken principle that the intentionality of human knowing is purely constructive, has concretely attributed a self-sufficiency to the intentional dimension of his knowing that it just does not have.

B. This Paper and the Work of Lonergan

In working, during the past several years, toward the conclusions that I have set forth in this paper, I did not bind myself in advance to making my results harmonize with the work of Bernard Lonergan. Nonetheless, I would contend that as a matter of fact my conclusions here not only harmonize with Lonergan's work but finally do little more than differentiate and bring together certain fundamental elements that are already present, though as compact or unintegrated, within that work itself. While not attempting to document this contention here, I should like at least to amplify it slightly by suggesting that my schema adds both generality and detail to what Lonergan has said about the radical personal advance that he calls "intellectual conversion" and about its absence.

For Lonergan, the fundamental component of "intellectual conversion" is an adequate (and effectively implemented) concrete knowledge of oneself as a knower; and the theoretical expression of that component is the basic
cognitional phenomenology that itself is adequate or "positional". Again, the absence of the fundamental component of "intellectual conversion" is nothing other than an inadequate (or ineffectively implemented) concrete knowledge of oneself as a knower; and the theoretical expression of that absence is a basic cognitional phenomenology that itself is inadequate or "counter-positional" /67/.

Now, I am claiming that my schema makes explicit that the "positional" phenomenology (1) regards no fewer than two dimensions of cognitional acts on no fewer than five levels; (2) reflects the theorist's concrete grasp of the occurrence, distinction, and characteristic structure of each of those dimensions on each of those levels; and, more fully, (3) manifests the theorist's concrete recognition that (i) in their intentional dimension cognitional acts (a) on the first level are immediately receptive and (b) on the second, third, fourth, and fifth levels are mediately receptive, and (ii) in their conscious dimension cognitional acts on all five levels are internally self-present /68/.

Again, I am claiming that my schema makes explicit that (1) phenomenologies can be "counter-positional" either through mere deficiency or through outright error; (2) the deficiencies mirror the theorist's failure concretely either to grasp even the occurrence of both dimensions of cognitional acts on all five levels or to grasp at least their mutual distinction; and (3) the errors arise because concretely the theorist mistakenly takes the cognitional acts (i) in their intentional dimension (a) on the second, third, fourth and/or fifth levels to be immediately receptive and/or (b) on any of the five levels to be simply productive, and/or (ii) in their conscious dimension on any of the five levels to be immediately receptive /69/.

More simply, I am claiming that my schema makes explicit that in its fundamental moment the radical personal advance labelled "intellectual conversion" (1) must, if it is to be complete, regard not just one but rather two dimensions of cognitional acts on not just three but rather five levels; (2) consists not just in eliminating one's incorrect concrete understanding of oneself as a knower but also, and initially, in overcoming one's inadequate concrete attention to oneself as a knower; and (3) eliminates not just the error that "all knowing is looking" but also the error that "all (intentional-dimension) knowing is making" /70/.

I conclude with a terminology suggestion. Since what we have been discussing is a radical advance in one's concrete grasp not simply of one's "intellectual" knowing, the knowing that culminates on the third level of conscious intentionality, but also of one's "moral" and "religious" knowing within the total sequences of operations on the fourth and fifth levels respectively, I propose that in the interest of clarity this radical advance be called not "intellectual" conversion but, more broadly, "cognitional" conversion /71/.
NOTES

/1/ The first edition of the first volume appeared as early as 1922, while a revised edition of the fifth appeared, posthumously, as late as 1949. (For the details of each volume's publication-history, see Milet, 1950:49-53; cf. Vertin, 1973:327-28.)

/2/ The first four volumes of Le Point de départ provide an interpretive thematization of the history of philosophy. Maréchal, proceeding in a manner not unlike that of Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics or Gilson in his Unity of Philosophical Experience, claims that the history of philosophy, when studied as a whole, illustrates the ultimate inevitability of the basic position-set that on independent grounds he maintains to be the correct one. The fifth volume then presents the argument for that basic position-set in more strictly systematic terms.

/3/ The rejection of the principle that knowing is like looking is of course one of the more prominent features of Lonergan's work in general, beginning well prior to 1972.


/5/ PHI 352Y (1972-77), PHI 330Y (1977-78), and PHI 331Y (1979-81), at St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto.

/6/ I think it safe to say that these courses have been very well received. They have had memberships of about fifteen students, on the average, usually with delightfully diverse academic backgrounds and personal interests. Titles of some of the major second-term essays, on which a large part of the final grade depends, have been these: "Skinner and Rogers: Contrasting Foundations in the Development of Modern Psychology"; "The Nature of the Real in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens"; "Diverse Understandings of the Self-Knowledge of Jesus Christ"; "The Presentation of the Real in Financial Accounting: A Cognitional Evaluation of the 'Current Value' vs. 'Historical Cost' Accounting Controversy"; "Discontinuous Knowing: Some Epistemic Notions in Quantum Mechanics"; "Methodological Presuppositions and the Concept of Form in the Novel: A Brief Comparison of Henry James, D.H. Lawrence, and Virginia Woolf"; "The Explicit and Implicit Philosophy of Sociological Theory"; "Differing Epistemological Criteria within the Canadian Labour Movement"; "Methodological Presuppositions of the Progressivist and Traditionalist Educational Movements"; "The Meaning of Ballet"; "Karl Rahner and Giles Milhaven on 'Natural Law'"; "The Possibility of Objective News Journalism"; "Towards and Appreciation of Architecture: An Essay in Methodology"; "The Phenomenology of Humor"; "Analytic and Primal Therapy: The Methodological Underpinnings of Two Different Psychotherapeutical Approaches"; and "Television and the Knowing Subject: A Comparison of 'Sesame Street' and 'Mister-Rogers' Neighborhood'."

/7/ The papers in this group that have been published are Vertin, 1978, 1979, and 1981.

/8/ Although the present paper obviously is heavily influenced by Lonergan's writings, its primary concern is not to study them but rather to advance further, even if only minimally, along the path on which Lonergan himself originally set out. Consequently, the numerous references to those writings that I shall make in my footnotes are generally intended to illuminate my own contentions rather than to claim agreement with his. Nonetheless, I
shall eventually claim that my most important contentions here are already intimated in Lonergan's writings in some way. (See above, pp. 16-17.)

/9/ Just as a functionally-specialized theology aims immediately at conceptually thematizing and expressing the concrete religious living that it both presupposes and ultimately is measured by, so--on my understanding--functionally-specialized operations in general aim immediately at conceptually articulating and spelling out the concrete performances (and contents) that those operations both presuppose and ultimately are measured by. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:135, 138-40.)

/10/ I use the word "philosophical" in the "newer" sense wherein it refers to the structure (1) not merely of objects but also, and more fundamentally, of the conscious subject and, moreover, (2) of the conscious subject not just as intellectual but also as moral and religious. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1973:13. Cf. 1972:337-40. Also see below, n. 25.)

/11/ See Lonergan, 1972:128-32, 235-93. Putting the point in slightly different terms, we may say that fourth-level functional specialties regard pure models, ideal-types that are utterly general, "upper blades" that categorically are wholly indeterminate. (Cf. 1957:312-13, 461, 522-23, 577-78, 580-81, 586-87.)

/12/ See Lonergan 1972:128-30, 235-66. Differences may be complementary or genetic or dialectical. With complementary differences, the differing elements are mutually compatible and mutually completing. With genetic differences, the later elements subsume and transform the earlier. With dialectical differences, the differing elements are radically and unalterably incompatible. (See, e.g., 1972:236-37.) Though the body of this paper stands within Dialectic, the conclusion extends into Foundations. (See above, pp. 14-16.)

/13/ The distinction between cognitional and decisional operations is less prominent in Lonergan's later writings than the distinction among intellectual, moral, and religious levels of operations. (See, e.g., 1972:120-22, 316-17, 340; 1973:38, 52-55. Cf. below, n. 25.) In these later writings Lonergan ordinarily is more concerned to compare and contrast the entire sequence of (states and) operations on one of these levels with the entire sequence on another, and less concerned to treat in detail the cognitional as distinct from the decisional operations on the latter two levels.

/14/ It remains, of course, that the phenomenology prefigures the epistemology and the metaphysics. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:20-21; cf. 25, 83, 261, 297, 316.)

/15/ Although I enthusiastically support the women's movement, in this particular paper I do not use such expressions as "her/his", in order to avoid further complicating a text that already has its share of neologisms and difficult constructions.

/16/ The sequence of steps in one's originating or genetic work and the sequence in one's pedagogical or expository work are, of course, not necessarily the same. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:345-46.) On another point, I might note that by "basic" phenomenological suppositions I mean those that set the essential lines of a phenomenological theory but do not necessarily develop it in all significant details.

/17/ Technically speaking, "intellectual conversion" comprises phenomenological, epistemological, and metaphysical stances. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:238.) In this paper I am expressly concerned only with the first of these components (and the varieties of its absence), the one that is fundamental. (Cf. above, n. 14.)
What is at issue here is the collectivity not of every single basic phenomenological supposition ever made but rather of the principal classes of such suppositions, classes distinguished in terms both of (1) what the suppositions regard and (2) how they regard it.

This claim regarding both the variety of questions and the diversity of responses to each, a claim that I say is suggested and illustrated by the study of history, is not established (or, for that matter, disestablished) by the study of history. For it is a philosophical claim, not an empirical one; and, like every philosophical claim, the evidence to which it makes appeal is ultimately personal. (Cf. above, pp. 14-16.) Note that throughout this paper I am using the word "cognitional" (and its cognates) in the sense of "elementary cognitional" and not "compound cognitional", i.e., in the sense wherein it denotes any cognitional act or content and not only the unitary syntheses of elementary cognitional acts or contents. (See Lonergan 1972: 12.) Again, to speak of "levels" and dimensions" is, of course, to use spatial metaphors for what is not fundamentally spatial at all.

My aim in choosing these particular labels for the five levels in question was to get terms that would be both (1) sufficiently narrow to focus attention on the cognitional (and not also decisional) acts (and not merely contents) that distinguish those levels and (2) sufficiently broad to avoid seeming to exclude non-Lonerganian accounts of the structures of those acts. (Cf., e.g., Lonergan, 1972:9.)

Derivatively, the characteristic sensory-level contents include remembered and imagined colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., as well. (Cf., e.g., Lonergan, 1957:181-206.)

On intelligibility as subdistinguished in this way, cf., e.g., Lonergan, 1957:245-50. Further subdistinctions of intelligibility, not required for the purposes of the present paper but crucial in a more detailed account, are the following: in terms of viewpoint, descriptive intelligibility and explanatory intelligibility; and in terms of realm, positive intelligibility and hermeneutic intelligibility, and, again, secular intelligibility and transcendent intelligibility. These further subdistinctions, in turn, require corresponding additional subdistinctions of factuality, value, and holiness.

I should like to add three points, by way of amplification. First, some of Lonergan's writings since Method in Theology, though not that book itself, provide a precedent for my speaking of a level of operations, bound up with religious experience, that is distinct from the fourth level and beyond it. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1973:38, 52-55. Cf. 1972:101-24.) Second, in speaking of "holiness" as a cognitional content on this, the fifth level, I am referring not to the "content without a known object" that is religious experience itself (1973:38) but rather to an aspect of categorically determinate things and properties that is grasped in the light of religious experience. (See e.g., 1972:115-17.) Thirdly, the prior point manifests my understanding that religious experience, though indeed a (radically fulfilling but categorically indeterminate) content in relation to the pure structure of the subject, is a constitutive element of the augmented structure via which the subject knows (and decides with regard to) categorically determinate contents. (Cf. 1972:105-107; 1973:38-39, 50-52.)

Thus the characteristic contents of any given cognitional level are both (1) the intentional-dimension contents, namely, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, etc., or intelligibility, or factuality, or value, or holiness, and (2) the conscious-dimension contents, namely, the primitively self-present acts by which those respective intentional-dimension contents are made cog-
nitionally present. Presumably these conscious-dimension contents can in turn become intentional-dimension contents of the subject's reflective cognitive acts. Again, note that by speaking of consciousness simply as "utterly primitive" cognitive self-presence I am leaving open the question of its precise structure. I.e., by "consciousness" I do not necessarily mean--as Lonergan ordinarily does mean--"wholly non-reflective cognitive self-presence". (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1957:320-28; 1972:7-20.)

/27/ These terms are mine. I have found the terms that are already in common usage ("empiricist", "rationalist", "realist", "idealist", etc.) to be multiple in their accepted phenomenological sense, laden with epistemological and/or metaphysical overtones, and insufficient in any case for my purposes; and thus I have decided, though not without a certain reluctance, to introduce my own. Again, in order to keep this paper within its assigned limits, I shall refrain throughout from referring to specific historical figures whose work clearly illustrates, in my view, certain of the basic phenomenological suppositions about cognitive intentionality and/or consciousness. (I make an exception in the case of Lonergan. See above, n. 8.) Nonetheless, the well-informed reader will no doubt be able to discern examples of the several of these basic phenomenological suppositions as explicit or at least implicit in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Hegel, etc., not to mention other important figures in the history of philosophy and other disciplines.

/28/ It is, of course, highly unlikely that any theorist would simultaneously make absentialist suppositions about all five levels of cognitive intentionality!

/29/ Note that no fewer than four different reductionist suppositions about any given level of cognitive intentionality are theoretically possible. Note also that no theorist could simultaneously make reductionist suppositions about all five levels of cognitive intentionality, save at the price of inconsistency.

/30/ The word "beyond" here does not necessarily have more than just phenomenological import. I.e., what is phenomenologically "beyond" may, on occasion, be metaphysically "within". The point is simply that from the phenomenological standpoint the subject-as-knower is receptive, not productive, of its cognitive contents.

/31/ Thus, if one grants that immediacy and receptivity are paradigmatically the characteristics of visual cognition, one may express the general form of immediate-receptionist suppositions as "knowing is looking". To give an example, I would claim that the immediate-receptionist supposition about ideational intentionality is one key phenomenological element of the basic philosophical position-set that Lonergan labels "naive realism". (See, e.g., 1972:263-65.)

/32/ Thus one may express the general form of pure-productionist suppositions as "knowing is making". To give an example, I would claim that the pure-productionist supposition about ideational intentionality is one key phenomenological element of those basic philosophical position-sets that Lonergan labels "idealism". (See, e.g., 1972:238-39, 264-65.)

/33/ Cf., e.g., Lonergan 1967a:141-81, esp. 165-68; and 1967b:160-63.

/34/ See above, n. 30.

/35/ These media themselves may in turn become contents that are received, if and when the subject-as-knower engages in cognitive activity that is reflective.

/36/ To give an example, I would claim that the mediate-receptionist suppositions about ideational and judicative intentionality are key phenomenological elements of the basic philosophical position-set that Lonergan labels
"critical realism". (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:238-40, 263-65.) Note that since mediately receptive cognitional acts presuppose the contents on the prior cognitional level, a theorist cannot make the mediate-receptionist supposition about sensory intentionality.

/37/ See above, p. 8.

/38/ These terms are mine. (Cf. above, n. 27.)

/39/ Recall that the sense in which I use the word "consciousness" is broader than the sense in which Lonergan customarily uses it. (See above, n. 26.)

/40/ Recall the absentialist suppositions about cognitional intentionality, above, p. 8.

/41/ For my own stand on the relative methodical priority of cognitional intentionality and cognitional consciousness, see above, pp. 14-16.

/42/ Lonergan calls this notion of cognitional self-presence the "conscientia-perceptio" notion. (See Lonergan, 1956:130-34. Cf. 1967b:175-87.)

/43/ I would call this view, in which—with cognitional self-presence correlative with reflection—all reflection is more or less complete and all cognitional self-presence thus is more or less full, the "strong version" of the "conscientia-perceptio" notion of cognitional self-presence.

/44/ Note that unless a theorist makes explicit the particular grounds upon which it is based, his absentialist supposition about a given level of cognitional consciousness implies the absence only of utterly primitive cognitional self-presence, not necessarily of all cognitional self-presence, on that level.

/45/ Thus in this case and in all the others as well, reductionist suppositions about cognitional consciousness are correlative with the corresponding reductionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality.

/46/ The scope and limits of possibility for reductionist suppositions about cognitional consciousness are the same as those for reductionist suppositions about cognitional intentionality. (See above, n. 29.)

/47/ Alternatively, I would call this view, in which—with cognitional self-presence correlative with reflection—reflection can be partial and not just more or less complete and cognitional self-presence thus can be primitive and not just more or less full, the "weak version" of the "conscientia-perceptio" notion of cognitional self-presence. (Cf. above, nn. 42-43.)

/48/ In Lonergan's terms advanced reflective cognitional self-presence is "self-knowledge". (See, e.g., 1957:319-28; 1967b:224-27.)

/49/ It is this notion of primitive cognitional self-presence that Lonergan calls the "conscientia-experientia" notion. (See 1956:130-34; cf. 1967b:175-87.) In Lonergan's usual terms primitive cognitional self-presence, conceived as non-reflective, is "consciousness". (See, e.g., 1957:320-28; 1967b:224-27; 1972:7-20.)

/50/ The reader will recall that I envisage both parts of this twofold claim as philosophical rather than empirical in character, although suggested and illustrated by the study of history. (See above, n. 19.)

/51/ Except that there can be no mediate-receptionist supposition about sensory intentionality. (See above, n. 36.)
This definition makes dialectical differences among integral sets a matter of degree. Two integral sets may differ dialectically in as many as ten suppositions or as few as one.

E.g., a theorist could not consistently make the absentialist supposition about ideational intentionality and the ideational reductionist supposition about some other level of cognitional intentionality. (Also, see above, nn. 29, 36, 44, 45, 46.)

By my reckoning, the total number of internally-consistent integral sets that are theoretically possible is well over a million.

Moreover, the number of theoretically possible integral sets considerably exceeds the number of theoretically probable ones. Though not impossible, it is highly improbable, for example, that a theorist would simultaneously make the pure-productionist supposition about ideational intentionality and the mediate-receptionist supposition about judicative intentionality, or, again, the immediate-receptionist supposition about ideational consciousness and the internal-presentialist supposition about judicative consciousness.

This claim, seemingly presumptuous at first glance, merely reflects the nature of the enterprise that I have undertaken here. (Cf. above, nn. 19, 50).

Cf., e.g., Lonergan, 1957:xviii-xix; 1972:xii.

Recall above, n. 12.

To the best of my knowledge, these conclusions match the conclusions to which Lonergan comes on as many of these issues as he explicitly addresses.

Cf., e.g., Lonergan, 1957:323-24; 1972:9-10, 15-20. My terminology here in regard to the fourth and fifth levels, slightly different from that of Lonergan, reflects my effort to distinguish and internally to differentiate the cognitional processes on those levels more fully than he does. (Recall above, nn. 13, 25.)

For a fuller elaboration of this point, see Lonergan, 1956:130-34; 1967b:175-87; and Vertin, 1981, esp. 419-22.

Among other things, this implies that, as a matter of fact, the second appendix of my doctoral dissertation is methodologically more basic than the body! (Recall above, pp. 3-4.)

This exaggeration of the immediacy and/or receptivity of human knowing overestimates the passivity and underestimates the spontaneity of the knowing subject.

This exaggeration of the constructivity of human knowing overestimates the spontaneity and underestimates the passivity of the knowing subject.

Such an advance-commitment not only would have undermined the philosophical (and thus ultimately personal) character of my work, but it would even have contravened Lonergan's own frequent advice against substituting "fidelity to the Lonergan school" for personal effort. I am reminded, in this connection, of his parting remark to those attending the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College in 1974: "Good-bye, and be good non-disciples!"

The references to Lonergan's writings that I have made in the footnotes of this paper provide some indication of the texts to which I would make appeal. (Cf. above, n. 8.)

Lonergan in his writings clearly envisages cognitional acts as possessing a distinct conscious as well as an intentional dimension, and as going forward on four or even five distinct levels. He cannot but presuppose that the correct structural account of these two dimensions and five levels first recognizes their occurrence and distinction. And he regularly argues that achieving the correct structural account comes about through displacing mistaken ones. (See, e.g., 1957:271-78, 319-28, et passim; and 1972:6-25, et passim. Also see above, n. 25.) Nonetheless, when speaking explicitly of "intellectual conversion" and the "positional" cognitional phenomenology that expresses its fundamental component, Lonergan ordinarily does not expressly mention knowledge of the conscious as distinct from the intentional dimension of one's knowing, or knowledge of its fourth and fifth as distinct from its first three levels. He does not expressly distinguish one's recognition of the occurrence and distinction of the dimensions and levels from one's recognition of their structure. And in seeking to articulate the general form of mistaken structural accounts, he highlights the "ocular" myth, which I would argue to be the more important but not unique general form, while he does not note the "volitional" myth, which I would argue to be a distinct though less important general form. (See, e.g., 1972:238-43, 249-53. Also see above, n. 13.)

What I have said about Lonergan's remarks on "intellectual conversion", I would apply—mutatis mutandis—to his remarks on the varieties of its absence. (See above, n. 68.)

I must indicate at this point my recognition and acceptance of Lonergan's claim that one's affective states have a certain causal influence upon one's cognitional (and, a fortiori, decisional) acts. (See, e.g., Lonergan, 1972:37-40, 115-19, 240-43, 289.) I also accept this claim's implication that an essential part of a fully adequate phenomenology of knowing is a phenomenology of affectivity, something from which I have prescinded in the present paper. Finally, I underline for the reader an implication of the claim that human cognition goes forward on five levels, namely, that to know any thing or property fully is to grasp not just its sensible or conscious features, intelligibility, and factuality, but also its value and holiness.

Then, with a great gain in clarity and precision, "cognitional" conversion could be subdivided into its ten moments: "sensory-intentional" and "sensory-conscious", "ideational-intentional" and "ideational-conscious", "judicative-intentional" and "judicative-conscious", "evaluative-intentional" and "evaluative-conscious", and "fiducial-intentional" and "fiducial-conscious".
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In what follows my purpose is to discuss the possibility of a Christ-centered ethics which pays proper attention to the biblical descriptions concerning Jesus' ethical stance. I then propose to treat a contemporary moral question by following a Christ-centered approach that attempts to utilize Lonergan's functional specialties.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF JESUS' ETHICAL STANCE

In Jesus, Politics, and Society: A Study of Luke's Gospel, I concentrated upon the social and political stance that Luke attributes to Jesus, and it seems advisable to begin this discussion by summarizing some of the findings that emerged in that work. In much of what follows, when I use the term, "the ethics of Jesus," I am primarily concerned with the social and political dimensions of Jesus' teachings and ministry /1/. Thus, some indication of the principal elements present in the stance that Luke attributes to Jesus is desirable at the outset.

Those familiar with historical-critical procedures will already have a sense of the hermeneutical problems that need to be taken account of in working with Luke's gospel, but permit me to cite one or two of them for purposes of illustration. One leading problem was that of reconstructing the social and political conditions that were in existence at the time of Jesus. For many pertinent subjects, e.g., taxation, the Zealot movement, the available data is sparse. There was also the problem of radically conflicting interpretations arising from different sources, e.g., the different portrayal of the Pharisees given by Rabbinic literature, the writings of Josephus, and the New Testament (Appendices I, II, III).

An equally important set of problems concerned the relationships between Luke as the final author of the gospel and the traditional sources that he utilized. To what degree did Luke's supposed use of Mark's gospel and his supposed use of the Q material influence the presentation that he
gave? To what degree did his description of Jesus reflect his own personal sensitivities and sensibilities /2/?

At the conclusion of the study, I felt reasonably confident that these and other obstacles had been surmounted and that I had made a satisfactory determination of the principal element in Jesus' social and political stance. To be sure, just as fresh data had helped my own investigations, new data regarding the various Jewish groups and regarding Roman legal procedures, regarding Luke's theology, etc., might give rise to new questions and necessitate modifications. However, for the time being, I was content to rest with the outcome.

In brief I found that, within Luke's gospel, Jesus is pictured as a person having compassion and concern for the sick, for the poor, for women, and for Gentiles. Secondly, Luke's Jesus urges that material goods be shared and criticizes the accumulation of surplus possessions. Thirdly, he advocates service and humility as the basis for interpersonal and social relations. Fourthly, his approach toward the existing religious and political leaders is best described as "evaluative." Fifthly, although he speaks and acts aggressively upon occasion, Luke's Jesus does so within the context of an emphasis upon forgiveness and the love of one's enemies. Even in his demonstration at the temple, he does not engage in physical violence against his opponents. Finally, throughout the gospel, Jesus is portrayed as a person with a deep faith that all of life and all of human endeavor take place under God. He prays frequently and continually adverts to God's lordship over all of creation /3/.

There are other social and political currents running through Luke's gospel in addition to those which I have just listed. Perhaps a word or two is in order regarding Luke's account of Jesus' last days in Jerusalem. It is particularly interesting to notice the ways in which Luke highlights the role of the chief priests in bringing about Jesus' death.

Jesus' demonstration at the temple apparently motivates the chief priests to initiate a plot against him. His subsequent success in parrying several of their attempts to entrap him and the severe criticism that he mounts against them in the parable of the unjust tenants further inflame the situation. As a result, when Judas offers to betray him, the chief priests eagerly seize the opportunity. They convene a meeting of the Sanhedrin and then proceed to Pilate. Once there, they prefer three politically oriented charges against him, "We found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding us to give tribute to Caesar, and saying that he himself is Christ a king" (Luke 23:2). In a complicated series of steps, Pilate questions Jesus, receives a terse, non-committal answer, pronounces him innocent, sends him to Herod Antipas for further interrogation, and again pronounces him in-
At every stage of these proceedings, the chief priests are shown to be relentless in their effort to have Jesus condemned, and eventually they are successful. Pilate bows to their pressure and gives sentence that their demand should be granted. Jesus is then crucified under the inscription, "This is the King of the Jews" (Luke 23:38), a charge that portrayed him as someone as dangerous to Roman rule.

If the analysis that I have made establishes the principal features of Jesus' social stance in Luke's gospel, it is important to note that several major questions still need to be addressed. If Luke's description of Jesus' stance embodies the above-mentioned elements and the above-mentioned emphases, what can be said of the descriptions given by Mark, Matthew, and John? Clearly, one of the principal insights of redaction criticism and the other New Testament disciplines associated with it is that the individuality of each New Testament author needs to be appreciated and respected. Thus separate studies will have to be made in the other three gospels to determine what elements and emphases characterize their respective descriptions of Jesus' social and political stance.

Secondly, after this preliminary task has been completed, the question of the reliability of the gospel accounts will have to be raised anew. If it should be the case that all four gospel writers agree that the stance of Jesus embodies a commitment to such a value as non-violent love, may it be taken as secure that Jesus himself actually espoused this approach? My own view, an underlying premise for section three of this paper, is that this is the case.

II. CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF JESUS

In light of the fairly numerous gospel passages which portray Jesus teaching or acting in response to various social conditions and various political realities, it is something of a surprise to find leading Christian ethicists either passing over these descriptions or else interpreting them without drawing upon reliable exegetical tools and techniques. My concern is to argue for a Christ-centered approach that takes full account of the biblical data pertaining to Jesus' ethical stance. However, before elaborating the various elements that such an approach might involve, it is well to make a brief survey of the existing approaches.

Bernard Haring's The Law of Christ serves as only one example of how leading moral theologians have failed to address themselves to the ethical stance of Jesus. Even though such a work represents a significant advance over the approach followed in the traditional manuals, it still falls short of
giving a truly Christ-centered orientation. Throughout his work, Härting affirms that the norm and center of Christian moral theology is Christ, but he does not ground his recommendations in an analysis of how the gospels show Jesus responding to the social and political conditions of his day. Consequently, when he makes specific recommendations, e.g., regarding the Christian's political responsibilities, they do not flow from any sustained investigation of the relevant gospel passages.

Similar to Härting in this respect, Josef Fuchs also emphasizes the centrality of Christ for Christian morality without presenting a systematic description of the ethical stance of Jesus. "The Person of Christ as Pattern and Law" and "The Law of Christ as Grace and Challenge" are typical of many of the section headings in Fuchs's work Human Values and Christian Morality. However, within these sections, there is little to indicate just how Jesus' attitude toward material possessions or his approach to the political authorities of his day might serve as "the pattern and law" for contemporary Christians.

Nearly a decade after his death, Reinhold Niebuhr continues to exercise a considerable influence over much of Liberal Protestant thinking on ethics. As a "prophet to politicians" and as an exponent of "Christian Realism," Niebuhr wrote extensively on a variety of social issues and questions. Drawing heavily upon neo-Orthodox insights regarding human fallibility and the centrality of grace, he made numerous recommendations regarding the social policies and approaches that Christians ought to support. His "realism" cautioned him against expecting that significant gains could be made, but he continued to emphasize that a Christian faith commitment called Christian men and women to adopt certain approaches and to follow certain courses of action.

Given his call for Christian discernment and involvement in social and political matters, Niebuhr's readers and hearers might have expected him to make an interpretation of Jesus a part of his writing on Christian ethics. Such is not the case, at least not to any significant degree. In An Interpretation of Christian Ethics and in other places, Niebuhr does treat specific gospel passages for the purpose of establishing that Jesus taught an "impossible ideal." However, he does not provide any sustained, systematic description of Jesus' interactions with the social groups, institutions, and patterns of the day.

James Gustafson's work, Christ and the Moral Life, provides an extremely helpful assessment of the different ways in which leading theologians claim, explicitly or implicitly, that Christ is significant for the moral life. At the conclusion of his survey, Gustafson makes a brief presentation of his own position regarding the ways in which Christ is relevant for Christian living. He affirms that Christ provides the basic perspective for the Christian's moral
life and that the Christian's sense of loyalty to Christ exercises an important influence upon the intentions that guide specific actions. He also affirms Christ's normativeness for the Christian moral life, arguing that the figure of Christ in the New Testament and the teachings attributed to him constitute a paradigm that Christians turn to as a source of light for what they ought to be and do (265).

Gustafson's highly nuanced study effectively situates the type of Christ-centered approach followed by Härting and Fuchs within a broader context. It also serves to indicate the great variety of ways in which Christ can be understood to be normative for Christian morality. Nevertheless, like the authors previously considered, Gustafson fails to include any systematic analysis of the descriptions that the gospels give concerning Jesus' teachings and conduct. In several places he indicates his own view that the New Testament figure of Christ should serve as paradigm; but he never reaches the point of indicating his own understanding of exactly how the gospels portray Jesus in terms of the persons, groups, and issues of the day.

Although a systematic description of Jesus' teachings and conduct does not find place in the approaches followed by Härting, Fuchs, Niebuhr, and Gustafson, such analysis is not completely absent from the traditions of Christian ethical thought. Although their efforts have frequently been halting or incomplete, there have been Christian ethical thinkers who have attempted systematic statements. Such systematic elaborations have not been a leading emphasis within Christian ethical thought, but there are examples of it in earlier periods as well as in our own.

Because of his prominent role within the Social Gospel movement, Walter Rauschenbusch's attempt to provide a systematic description of Jesus' social stance is of considerable importance. Two of his works, Christianity and the Social Crisis and The Social Principles of Jesus, stand in witness to Rauschenbusch's concern in this regard. In these works Rauschenbusch sought to determine Jesus' basic approach with respect to such things as wealth and equality. He attempted to position Jesus in relation to the other social groupings of the day and he asked how appropriately such categories as "social reformer" or "religious initiator" described Jesus' basic mission.

In some respects there are affinities between liberation theologians, such as Gustavo Gutiérrez, and Rauschenbusch. A Theology of Liberation, Gutiérrez's principal work, does not have a well developed presentation on the ethics of Jesus, but Gutiérrez does try to demonstrate the appropriateness of viewing Jesus' ministry as a ministry of liberation. Similarly, in an abbreviated fashion, he also attempts brief analyses of Jesus' attitude towards the Zealot movement, his attitude towards Jewish leaders, and his death at the hands of the political authorities.
One additional example of a Christian ethicist concerned with the ethical stance of Jesus brings us into contact with an ongoing tradition of such concern. The ethicist in question is John Howard Yoder and the tradition that he represents in the Anabaptist tradition.

In *The Politics of Jesus*, Yoder argues that the ethical stance of Jesus has direct relevance for today's Christians and then proceeds to examine various New Testament texts in an effort to provide a detailed description of Jesus' approach. He relies chiefly on Luke's gospel, but also turns to various Pauline texts in an effort to shed additional light on the "revolutionary subordination" approach that he judges Jesus to have followed (190).

While Yoder can be faulted for deficiencies on the level of hermeneutics and for his exegesis of particular passages, his basic orientation is healthy. He attempts a description of the leading elements in Jesus' stance and then proceeds to contrast Jesus' general approach with those followed by the Romans and Zealots. While other biblical scholars and ethicists may disagree with Yoder's specific findings and reach general conclusions that are different from his, the basic approach that he follows, as well as many of his interpretations, can serve them as valuable indicators of direction.

As a conclusion to the present section, it should be noted that the hermeneutical factors discussed in the preceding section do not usually receive explicit recognition or treatment from any of the ethicists we have been considering. As we have seen, Härting, Fuchs, Niebuhr, and Gustafson do not attempt to provide a systematic description of Jesus' social stance. In their own respective ways, Rauschenbusch, Gutiérrez, and Yoder do; however they do so on the basis of a literate, but not critical, analysis of the gospels.

If done in a careful fashion, accompanied by a concern to provide space for all of the relevant passages and for all of the nuances, such a literate reading can yield valuable insights. However, unless it is augmented by research designed to uncover the social and political conditions of Jesus' day, important dimensions of meaning will be neglected. Similarly, unless it is able to draw upon the techniques developed by historical-critical scholarship, still further dimensions of meaning will be neglected.

The consequence of this demand for increased proficiency in interpreting the scriptures does not mean that all Christian ethicists need to become fully proficient biblical scholars. However, it will be necessary for them to explicitly describe the approach that they intend to follow with regard to the scriptural data. They may decide to accept the findings of various biblical scholars and present these findings in summary form at the outset of their own studies. Or they may elect to take the specific findings and use them to derive their own general understanding of Jesus' stance.
In either case, at the outset of a work on Christian ethics, we might expect to find a more or less detailed description of Jesus' ethical stance as well as a brief description of the hermeneutical approach or biblical scholars that the ethicist was going to rely upon.

III. CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN A CHRIST-CENTERED METHODICAL APPROACH

Given the complex economic, social, and political conditions of contemporary living and the innumerable decisions that Christians are regularly faced with, my proposal for a biblically-grounded, Christ-centered approach to ethics may seem impossible of realization. It may be asserted that the conditions of Jesus' day are so different from our own that it is unfeasible to attempt to base our contemporary conduct on his time-bound teachings. Or it may be argued that only the general thrust of his ethical stance, his emphasis upon agapic love, can be carried forward into our own setting.

My own position is that several specific elements as well as the broad agapic thrust of Jesus' ethical stance have relevance for our own day. The gospels definitely show Jesus rejecting the use of violence against persons and calling for simplicity in living and the sharing of surplus possessions. Further, these and other elements of his general ethical stance are capable of speaking powerfully to our own situation. Admittedly, there are ethical questions, e.g., abortion, for which direct reference points in the gospels are lacking. However, modern circumstances notwithstanding, there still will be many areas in which direct gospel correlations can be fruitfully explored.

There is some reason to believe that this emphasis upon a Christ-centered Christian ethics would find Lonergan's method congenial. In Chapter 18 of Insight, Lonergan describes an ethics grounded in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness. After treating various related subjects such as freedom and responsibility, he concludes to the possibility of ethics under certain conditions. He stresses the problems which arise from the human incapacity for sustained development. These problems arise from the presence of evil in the world and that evil constitutes an almost overwhelming obstacle to the development of an ethics. Nevertheless a solution for the problem does exist and in Chapter 20 on special transcendent knowledge, Lonergan outlines the heuristic structure of the solution, stressing that it is a supernatural solution whose primary realization and development is the work of God.

The supernatural character of the solution to the problem of evil favors a redemption-oriented, Christ-centered approach to ethics. Although Lonergan has not explicitly addressed himself to this point, it would seem
consonant with his analysis of ethics in *Insight* and with his treatment of the redemption in his Christological writings. Assuming that a Christ-centered approach to ethics would fit into Lonergan's general approach, I will try to suggest how the functional specialties developed in *Method in Theology* might help Christian ethicists in moving from gospel statements about Jesus' stance to specific recommendations regarding issues in contemporary Christian living. For purposes of illustration, I propose to utilize Lonergan's eight specialties in order to specify methodically the sort of collaboration which would be involved in addressing the question: Should the Christian bear arms and engage in war?

**Research.** From those involved with the functional specialty, research, the Christian ethicist or moral theologian would expect studies that sifted and correlated the data which pertained to arms and warfare during New Testament times. Data relevant to an understanding of the Roman attitude toward violence would be compiled and similarly data pertaining to the use of violence by various Jewish groups, particularly the Zealots. Similarly, ethicists would also look for works that established the validity and accuracy of the various gospel texts that have a bearing upon Jesus' approach to violence. They would appreciate any background studies that would contribute to the subsequent task of interpretation.

**Interpretation.** From the stage of interpretation, Christian ethicists would be interested in studies that sought to determine the meaning of passages which bore upon the general question of Jesus' approach to violence. Precisely what did the evangelists mean in giving the descriptions that they gave? Do they show Jesus teaching and acting in a consistent way? Do his teachings regarding love for one's enemies and a willingness to suffer injury find an echo in his actions? Is the interpretation that Jesus rejected the use of violence against persons correct in light of passages which indicate that he sometimes spoke and acted aggressively? These are examples of the findings that Christian ethicists would expect from specialists working in interpretation.

**History.** Since the approaches followed by Christians during the intervening centuries have relevance for the ethicists faced with the task of advising contemporary Christians regarding arms and war, the contributions arising out of the functional specialty of history will be important. Lonergan distinguishes basic, special, and general history; and, since the area covered by each is vast, more extensive collaboration will be required. What was the stance of the early Christians toward service in the Roman armies? What approaches were followed after Christianity became a *religio licita* (Bainton)? What transpired during the "Peace of God" and the "Truce of God"
movements in Western Europe during the 11th century (Cowdrey:1970a)? What approach toward violence did Urban II adopt in proclaiming the initial crusade (Cowdrey:1970b)? These and many additional subjects would appropriately receive treatment from those engaged in the third functional specialty.

Dialectic. In Lonergan's view the material for dialectic is conflicting Christian movements and the aim of dialectic is an understanding of the opposing viewpoints and interpretations which are embodied in the various conflicting groups. In terms of our present example, Christian ethicists might expect dialecticians to present studies of the conflicting movements respectively associated with the "just war" and "Christian pacifist" approaches. The dialecticians would have the difficult tasks of trying to sort through all of the elements and interpretations involved with each approach and of trying to distinguish position from counter-position.

Foundations. With the functional specialty of foundations, the reality of Christian conversions and the horizons and categories proper to authentic conversion enter upon the scene. Once the dialecticians have differentiated the conflicting Christian movements, the Christian ethicist now comes face to face with the personal horizon that he or she is maintaining. Is that horizon consistent with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion? Furthermore, to what degree were those who proposed and elaborated the conflicting positions proceeding on the basis of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion?

In terms of our example concerning arms and war, the question now facing the ethicists might revolve around whether or how consistent the Christian pacifist positions are with conversion. The Christian ethicist's ability to operate fruitfully with respect to the remaining functional specialties will be conditioned by the degree to which the authentic conversion required by the fourth functional specialty has taken place in him or her.

Doctrines. Lonergan distinguishes several varieties of doctrines and elaborates upon each variety at some length. He is principally concerned with the theological doctrines that theologians will find themselves concentrating on as a result of the conclusions reached in the foundations. He also indicates that attention will necessarily be given to the doctrines propounded in church documents.

In terms of our example, we might expect to find Christian ethicists seeking a clearer understanding of the realities affirmed in the Christian pacifist position. They would also be concerned with the affirmations relating to Christian pacifism and Christian peace-making that are contained in church documents. Documents such as Pacem in Terris and Gaudium et Spes would be investigated from the perspective of a Christian pacifist position.
Systematics. Working in the seventh specialty, systematics, the Christian ethicist will seek to clarify and elaborate the implications of the Christian pacifist position affirmed at the level of doctrine. What are the specific implications of the Christian pacifist position for various choices facing the contemporary Christian with respect to arms and war? Does Christian pacifism speak to the related question of implicit or tacit co-operation with those who propose to raise arms and engage in war? What are the fuller implications of the Christian pacifist position given the multiple gradations of preparations for war that exist in many contemporary societies?

Communications. In our example those engaged in the functional specialty of communications would carry forward into the larger Christian and secular communities the findings which had resulted from the preceding investigations. Given a situation in which the Christian pacifism had emerged as the authentic Christian position, the role of those involved in communications would be to publicize and promote the acceptance of this position. In doing so they would find themselves drawing upon art, literature, the communications media, the natural and human sciences and other resources. They would find themselves operating within a complex network of social, political and ecclesial relationships.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In selecting the question, should the Christian bear arms and engage in war? I chose a question for which the New Testament data is relatively abundant. As I previously observed, there are other areas of contemporary living for which the biblical correlations are not as rich or fruitful. In approaching such questions, Lonergan's functional specialties could still be profitably employed, but the enterprise would have a somewhat different color and character.

In my own view, whatever the specific moral questions they are investigating, Christian ethicists should present at least a brief interpretation of Jesus' general ethical approach at the outset of their studies. Thus, even though the gospels record no direct teachings of Jesus on the subject of abortion, it would still be well for the ethicist to make an assessment of the biblical passages which bear upon related themes such as Jesus' general reverence for life and his rejection of violence against persons.

One final observation concerns the relationship between Christian ethics and Christian praxis. It is the role of Christian ethicists to make recommendations regarding Christian conduct; but Christian conduct, the actual putting into practice of Christian decisions, is something that goes considerably beyond the formulation of recommendations. Thus, it is impor-
tant that Christian ethicists themselves be committed to the practical living-out of their own recommendations and that they be committed to learning from their own resultant experiences and from the experiences of others. This point has been stressed by liberation theology (Gutiérrez:6-15, 272-285, Segundo:69-96) and it is one that has the highest relevance for a Christ-centered, methodical approach to ethics.
NOTES

/1/ Any effort to distinguish between what is "personal" and what is "social and political" in a person's stance is always a difficult endeavor. While personal in their thrust, Jesus' teachings about hypocrisy and deception also have social and political implications. In what follows I am primarily concerned with the teachings and activities of Jesus that might have constituted a threat to the existing social and political order.

/2/ Many Lucan commentators maintain that Luke was concerned to make a "political apologistic" in the gospel itself and also in Acts. In my own view, such an interpretation is seriously mistaken (Cassidy:8-9, 127-130).

/3/ My general conclusions and many of my specific conclusions regarding the social and political stance of Luke's Jesus contrast sharply with the interpretations that have been made by other commentators (Cullman, Hengel, Richardson, Schnackenburg, Cassidy:82-84).

/4/ Luke's passion narrative embraces many dimensions in addition to the political dimension, but the political dimension is clearly present. Jesus is brought before Pilate on political charges and Pilate must decide whether Jesus does, in fact, constitute a threat to Roman rule.

/5/ Oscar Cullman, Martin Hengel and Alan Richardson draw upon all four gospels and present a "synthesized" description of Jesus' stance. Their respective findings with regard to Jesus' rejection of violence receive corroboration from my own analysis of Luke's account. It is probably safe to say that the vast majority of the New Testament commentators who take a position on the question believe that Jesus followed a non-violent approach. For an opposing view, see Brandon.

/6/ Bainton's is a valuable general work, but thin in several important areas, e.g., the development of the just war theory in the Middle Ages.

/7/ Frederick H. Russell makes a thought-provoking presentation of Augustine's view that love for one's enemies did not preclude taking up arms against them (16-39).
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This paper is an expanded and revised version of a class lecture that I was invited to give to Jesuit students preparing for presbyterial ordination at Regis College in Toronto. In this lecture I was to speak to the question: how to relate the social justice-cultural mission of the priest to the priest's cultic-theological role. I decided from the outset that in place of the expression, cultic-theological role, I would speak of the priest's prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral ministry. My decision was based on two considerations. First, there is no intrinsic theological role for the priest. There is, to be sure, a religious role, conferred by the sacrament of orders. But theology and religion are distinct, and while one may be called by God to be a theologian, no sacrament confirms or confers such a call. Second, there is an ambiguity to the conception of the priest's cultic role which I was determined to clarify in the course of the lecture. I regarded the clarification as of great importance, because I was and remain convinced that many students preparing for presbyterial ministry today are responding to the crisis in the priesthood by taking cover behind a hieratic persona that has been transcended once and for all not only in the sacrifice of Jesus but even in Israelite revelation itself, in the vision of the Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 42:1-9; 49:1-6; 50:4-11; 52:13-53:12). My decision to speak of the prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral ministry of the priest was confirmed by the discovery that the Second Vatican Council has deliberately chosen a consistent way of speaking of the ministry of the Church and of episcopal and presbyteral service: the Council speaks of the threefold ministry of teaching (prophetic), sanctifying (sacramental), and shepherding (pastoral).

I chose, moreover, to address the topic from the standpoint of a systematic theologian. That is to say, I chose to relate theologically the social justice-cultural mission of the priest and the priest's prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral role. The alternative would have been a more immediately practical presentation that would have treated specific instances and problems: questions of running for political office, for example, or of active participation in armed revolutionary struggles, or of civil disobedience, etc., etc., etc. I reasoned that, while such questions may be foremost in many people's minds and may even have been what the students had in mind when asking me to address the topic, the primary question in this regard at the present
time is one of the appropriate mentality. Until that mentality becomes a part of the sensus fidelium—and it surely is not that yet—these more practical questions cannot be treated in more than a coincidental and usually inconsistent fashion. We can be intelligently practical only if we know what our goals are, then determine general policies, and finally devise and implement procedures in concrete situations. When the requisite mentality has not yet been appropriated, a community will generally tend to fasten upon procedural questions, and so will act more on expediency or impulse than on the basis of what it has consciously chosen. It should come as no surprise that the appropriate mentality is not part of the sensus fidelium. To my knowledge, the document, Justice in the World, prepared by the 1971 Synod of Bishops, is the first official Roman declaration to affirm that the promotion of justice is a constitutive element in evangelization: not a byproduct, not a happy result, but an intrinsic formal component, so that there is no authentic evangelization process that is not dynamically structured in such a way as to foster the transformation of unjust social structures and distorted cultural values. Quite simply, it takes more than eleven years for the Church to assimilate such an insight in such a way that the relevant patterns of proceeding are inscribed not only in the minds and hearts but also in the bones and molecules of those responsible for ministry. In such a situation it is the theologian's responsibility to offer what he or she judges to be requisite constitutive dimensions in the mentality that has yet to emerge in a consolidated public fashion in the Church.

Two elements of the work that I am presently engaged in are here offered as such constitutive dimensions. The first has to do with the model of the Church as the Community of the Suffering Servant in history. With reference to the concrete question of presbyteral ministry, those ordained to such ministry, as they enter ever more deeply into the mystery of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh as this vision of the prophet that we call Deutero-Isaiah is fulfilled and transcended in Christ crucified and raised, will find the unity of the social justice-cultural mission of the priest and the priest's prophetic-sacramental-pastoral role emerging as the fruit of their growth in Christ. But the second element is equally important from both a theological and a ministerial point of view. What is it concretely to exercise the ministry of the Suffering Servant in history? It is to work for the establishment of the integral scale of values or, what comes to the same thing, establishment of the appropriate relation between the social infrastructure and the cultural superstructure of society. My paper, then, is divided into two parts: first, Church and priest as servant; and second, the social and cultural situation of ecclesial ministry in general and of presbyteral ministry in particular. From a methodological point of view, the paper may be regarded as an exercise, first, in foundations, in so far as the two parts are involved in generating,
respectively, special and general categories; and second, in systematics, in so far as these categories are employed in the theoretical work of understanding ecclesial and presbyteral ministry.

I. THE COMMUNITY OF THE SUFFERING SERVANT

We do not know what the future will bring: culturally, politically, economically, technologically, socially, religiously. We know what some of the horrible possibilities are, and we even feel that some of them might be imminent. Our sense of apprehension is supported by the analyses of numerous experts. Among these possibilities are total war, worldwide economic depression, increasing violations of the most basic human rights, the casting into oblivion of the cultural and civilizational achievements of various groups of men and women, the competition of escalating imperialistic systems that always border on totalitarianism, the anarchy of sensitive spontaneity unable to tolerate totalitarian control, or perhaps simply the abiding absurdity of a global situation whose clearest and maybe sole intelligible feature lies in "an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers" (Lonergan, 1957:229).

In the face of such a situation at least two things are required. In Hannah Arendt’s words, we must "discover the hidden mechanics by which all traditional elements of our political and spiritual world were dissolved into a conglomeration where everything seems to have lost specific value, and has become unrecognizable for human comprehension, unusable for human purpose" (Arendt:viii). And we must "develop a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities" (Arendt:ix). The first of these tasks must be performed both historically and structurally. My effort will be structural, because that is where I judge that I may be capable of making some contribution, and also because such an approach may enable us to understand as well something of what a new guarantee, a new political principle, a new law on earth might be. Ultimately, it can be only the Law of the Cross (Lonergan, 1964:552-593), but only as this Law is realized in the concrete mission of establishing the integral scale of values in human relations.

In my most recent work I have been principally engaged in elaborating a structural understanding of the situation that is addressed by a contemporary Christian systematic theology. I find that situation to be global, since almost every regional cultural matrix is principally defined by the planetary structural conditions of our time. Moreover, I start from the fact that the
world is torn and broken by the ambitions of competing and escalating imperialistic systems that border always on becoming or promoting totalitarianisms and counter-totalitarianisms. And I propose that a theology that mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of the Christian religion within that matrix not only addresses one situation but also evokes another one, in and through its mediating task. Such a theology evokes proximately the community of the Church, which is to serve as the catalytic agent for an alternative situation in the world. And remotely such a theology evokes that alternative world-situation as well, through the prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral ministry of the Church. The theologian's ultimate interest lies in the alternative situation in the world, but his or her proximate attention is to the Church as catalytic agent of that alternative world-situation: the Church that cooperates with God in working out His solution to the problem of evil.

The alternative situation in the world I imagine and envision as consisting in a global network of communities living in accord with another scale of values than that which has given rise to the imperialistic systems. The mission of the Church is to be a catalytic agent for the formation of a global network of human communities living in accord with an integral hierarchy of values. And the mission of the presbyter, through prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral ministry, is to lead the Church in being a leaven for this new law on earth, this new political principle of limited power and newly defined territorial entities. The Church has a ministry to the world, a mission to serve the emergence of a new law, and the presbyteral office has the mission of leading the Church in the exercise of this ministry to the world. The Church will be the catalytic agent of a world-cultural humanity by itself becoming a global network of communities of Christian witness, Christian fellowship, and Christian service in the constitution of a renewed and transformed global community. Its catalytic agency will be sacramental, in that the Church is to be the sign and instrument both of the reconciling and healing grace of Christ and of the unity of humankind in its catholicity and cultural diversity. The Church is to be the incarnational sacrament of Christ, and the eschatological sacrament of the world, neither wavering nor being crushed until true justice is established on earth (Isaiah 42:4).

The more I reflect on the sacramental-catalytic agency of the Church in our world, the more the paradigm of the Church as the Community of the Suffering Servant becomes for me the dominant model. The Church is to be the Body of the Christ who fulfills and transcends the vision of Deutero-Isaiah regarding the Servant of Yahweh. It is to be the Incarnational sacrament of Christ to and for the world, by embodying in its members and communities and ministries the pattern of the Servant's redemptive and representative suffering. And it is to be the eschatological sacrament of the world by
being the catalytic agent of integrity among the nations. Its agency consists in nothing more nor less than its fidelity to the integral scale of values. The Church is to be a global network of communities of witness, fellowship, and service, embodying the vocation of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh, in accord with the "just and mysterious Law of the Cross," filling up in the bodies of its members what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ, until the islands have received and rejoiced in His law. And the presbyteral ministry is conferred by ordination as an office of prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral leadership vis-a-vis the sacramental-catalytic mission and ministry of the Church to the world.

Why have I focussed on the paradigm of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh in order to understand the Church and especially the presbyteral ministry? We know that the sacrifice of Christ fulfills and transcends all the priesthoods and ritual sacrifices of the Old Testament and of paganism. But the Old Testament also transcends its own notions of priesthood in the Exodus of Israel from Israel (Voegelin:491) symbolized in the vision of the suffering Servant. The Old Testament understanding of priesthood is brought to fulfillment in the Songs of the Servant of Yahweh. The history of Israel contains and exhibits several modalities of priesthood. Moses exercised a priestly office when he offered sacrifices to God in the name of the whole people. The heads of families and of tribes exercised similar functions which later developed into the priesthood of the King. The Levites, of whom we usually think when we consider priesthood in the Old Testament, served the cult and the Law in an official capacity within the Israelite community. But with the prophets, with their recognition of the universality and enormity of sin, the awareness developed that perfect worship would be brought about only in the last days, when through God's own agency full glory would be given to God and full access had to God on the part of the people. The cultic, ritual, and sacrificial priesthood of the Levites is recognized by the prophets as insufficient. It cannot do what it set out to do; it cannot open access to God, nor achieve expiation for sin, nor deliver reconciliation between God and the community. Jeremiah and Ezekiel show some awareness that in their own personhood and in its historical agency they are themselves taking on the sin of the people, voluntarily accepting it and suffering it, and that through this suffering fidelity they are anticipating a new covenant. But in Deutero-Isaiah we are provided with the vision of the sole just one, the innocent one who takes on himself the iniquities of all and wins healing for all precisely by doing so. The Servant is exercising a priestly ministry in a way that succeeds. "Ours were the sufferings he bore, ours the sorrows he carried. . . . He was pierced through for our faults, crushed for our sins. On him lies a punishment that brings us peace, and through his wounds we are healed" (Isaiah 53:4-5). Redemption comes to the people, not
through the cultic, ritual sacrifices of the Levites, but through the historical suffering of the just one who voluntarily accepts the pain and suffering accruing from the vicissitudes of history and offers himself as a sacrifice for sin. The priestly ministry is brought to its fulfillment in his historically imposed and voluntarily accepted suffering.

The New Testament acknowledges Jesus as the fulfillment of the vision of the Suffering Servant. It is not through ritual and cultic action, but through His suffering in history, that the sole Just One opens access to God. The ritual, liturgical, and cultic element of Old Testament priesthood is transformed by, included in, and transcended by the vision of the Servant even in the Old Testament itself; but in the one New Testament writing that focusses explicitly on Christ's priesthood, the Letter to the Hebrews, this priesthood is understood as the fulfillment in history of the redemptive mission of the Servant. Only in this writing is hierarch used of Christ, but even so His priesthood is understood in terms not of the Levitical priesthood, but of the offering of the Suffering Servant. "This is what he said, on coming into the world: You who wanted no sacrifice or oblation, prepared a body for me. You took no pleasure in holocausts or sacrifices for sin; then I said, just as I was commanded in the scroll of the book, 'God, here I am! I am coming to obey your will.'" Notice that he says first: You did not want what the Law lays down as the things to be offered, that is: the sacrifices, the oblations, the holocausts and the sacrifices for sin, and you took no pleasure in them; and then he says: Here I am! I am coming to obey your will. He is abolishing the first sort to replace it with the second. And this will was for us to be made holy by the offering of his body made once and for all by Jesus Christ (Hebrews 10:5-10). Immediately prior to this passage is a quotation from the fourth Servant Song: "So Christ, too, offers himself only once to take the faults of many on himself" (Hebrews 9:28).

It is in line with such an understanding of Christ's priesthood that we must understand the priesthood of the Church and of the presbyter within the Church. The Church is a priestly people in that it fills up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ, offering itself together with Christ in the midst of the pain and suffering of the world, voluntarily taking upon itself this suffering so as to cooperate with God's work in Jesus for the redemption of the world. And the presbyter, through the prophetic, sacramental, and pastoral ministry, is to lead and guide the Church precisely in this priestly ministry, so that the Church can truly be the leaven for the new law on earth by its own participation in the mystery of Christ, the Suffering Servant of Yahweh.

I said earlier that I was convinced that as those ordained to the presbyteral ministry within the Church enter ever more deeply into the mystery of the Servant as this vision is fulfilled and transcended in Christ
crucified and raised, they will find the unity of the social justice-cultural mission of the priest and the priest's prophetic-sacramental-pastoral role emerging as the fruit of their growth in Christ. The social and cultural meaning of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh, his role in bringing, if you want, a new political principle, a new law, whose validity is global and whose power is limited because rooted in and controlled by territorial entities other than nations, states, and empires, is suggested by Eric Voegelin's interpretation of the significance of the Servant Songs. For Voegelin the vision of the Suffering Servant is at once the culmination of Old Testament revelation and the completion of the transimperial form of existence that this revelation introduces into history. His interpretation is suggestive of the profound political implications of a model of ecclesial and presbyteral ministry based on the Servant Songs.

Voegelin summarizes the main points in his *Israel and Revelation* in the following words:

> From the imperial order in cosmological form emerged, through the Mosaic leap in being, the Chosen People in historical form. The meaning of existence in the present under God was differentiated from the rhythmic attunement to divine-cosmic order through the cult of the empire. The theopolity, supplemented by kingship for survival in pragmatic history, however, still suffered under the compactness of its order. The order of the spirit had not yet differentiated from the order of the people's institutions and mores. First, in his attempt to clarify the mystery of the tension, Isaiah split the time of history into the compactly unregenerate present, and a quite as compactly transfigured future, of the concrete society. Through Jeremiah this unregenerate present then gained its existential meaning, in as much as the prophet's participation in divine suffering became the omphalos of Israelite order beyond the concrete society. And through Deutero-Isaiah, finally, there emerged from existential suffering the experience of redemption in the present, right here and now. The movement that we called the Exodus of Israel from itself, the movement from the order of the concrete society toward the order of redemption was thus completed. The term "completion" must be properly understood. It means that the order of being has revealed its mystery of redemption as the flower of suffering. It does not mean, however, that the vision of the mystery is the reality of redemption in history: The participation of man in divine suffering has yet to encounter the participation of God in human suffering (Voegelin:501).

The prophets, from the middle of the eighth century B.C.E. to the fall of Jerusalem in 586, attempted to come to grips with Israel’s defection from the true order disclosed in the Sinaitic revelation. They expected disaster as punishment for this defection, and they called for a return to the Law of God. But as the disaster drew closer, their expectation that the institutions and mores of the concrete society would and could be reformed gave way to a belief in a total transformation of order that would occur after the present concrete society had been swallowed up by a catastrophe. Isaiah responded to this new expectation by forming his own group of disciples as
the remnant of Israel beyond the present concrete society, entrusting to them
the secret of true order that was to be publicly revealed only in the indeter-
minate future when Yahweh's spirit would descend on the remnant's ruler. A
century later, Jeremiah became aware that existence in society under God,
which was the whole point of the Sinaicic revelation, was not to assume the
concrete form of a small Israelite theopolity surrounded by mighty empires.
Jeremiah expanded his prophetic concern beyond Israel to include the whole
Near Eastern world. Israel remained the holy center, but the society under
God was to embrace the nations. Since both Israel and the nations were in a
state of disorder, the center of order contracted into the person of the
prophet, Jeremiah. Both Isaiah and Jeremiah depart from a vision of the
order of the concrete Israelite society toward an indeterminate goal. Isaiah's
departure is temporal, Jeremiah's spatial. In either case one can no longer
say of which concrete society the prophets are speaking when they imagine
the carrier of true order, or just what kind of order the society will have
when it is transfigured by the new covenant written on hearts of flesh. The
terminus ad quem of the prophetic vision is no longer a concrete society with
a clearly recognizable order, for there are problems of order that extend
beyond the existence of a concrete society and its institutions, and there will
always be a gulf between true order and the order realized concretely by any
society. The existence of a concrete society in a definite form will not re-
solve the question of order in history. No Chosen People in any concrete
historical form can ever be the ultimate center of the true order of human-
kind.

Deutero-Isaiah is the prophet who lived through the anguished antici-
pation of Israel's final Exodus: now an Exodus not of migration from Chaldean
civilization nor from Egyptian bondage, but from Israel itself as a society
organized for national purposes under God in the midst of other imperial
civilizations. Each Exodus represents a step in the movement away from
cosmological imperial civilization to society in history under God. In the
writing of Deutero-Isaiah, Voegelin discovers a progression of experience and
symbolization from the expectation of a concrete order of an Israel restored
by Cyrus to the mystery of the Exodus from concrete order itself that is
symbolized by the Suffering Servant. The original message of Deutero-
Isaiah, building upon the heritage left him by his predecessors, emphasizes
salvation in a manner that no longer hinges on the fulfillment of the Law, and
so that no longer views salvation as the alternative to suffering. Neither
salvation nor suffering has disappeared from the message, but they are no
longer alternatives. God is now revealing Himself as the Redeemer, and the
appeal of the prophet is simply that the people accept Him as such. Israel
has been forgiven, and so in a definite way the question of conduct is now in
the past. The concern now is not with the order of life under the covenant
of the Law, but with the order under the Redeemer God. The Servant embodies that order, and so is the covenant to the people, the light to the nations. Redemption is revealed as the fruit of suffering, right here and now. This is the new dispensation. Even the Exodus from Egypt is unimportant in comparison with the "new things" that God is doing.

Concretely the "new" consists proximately in the liberation from the Babylonian exile. But these events of power politics are understood as a revelational epoch, because in them the reality of God and of His power over the flesh are being revealed in a way that brings redemption from the false gods of empire. Above the vicissitudes of empire "the word of our God shall stand forever" (Isaiah 40:8). With this insight Yahweh is revealed as the God of all humankind. And since Israel as a concrete society has perished with the empires, "the Israel that rises from the storm that has blown over all of mankind is no longer the self-contained Chosen People but the people to whom the revelation has come first to be communicated to the nations. It has to emigrate from its own concrete order just as the empire peoples had to emigrate from theirs. The new Israel is the covenant and light to the nations (42:6), the Servant of Yahweh through whom God will make his salvation reach to the end of the earth (49:6)" (Voegelin:506).

The Servant's task is to spread the news of redemption from Israel to the nations. His task is to be carried out not under the conditions of a complete dissolution of the empires in which man apes God, but under those of a succession of concretely realized imperial ambitions. The task "will bring ridicule, humiliation, persecution, and suffering to the men who undertake it under such unauspicious circumstances" (507). The Servant becomes "a new type in the history of order, a type created by the prophet in Israel and for Israel, to be figurated by others until the task is accomplished" (507). His task will be completed only when everyone becomes a disciple of God, as the Servant is. He will execute his mission by obedience in adversity, not rebelling or turning back, nor being confounded by ill-treatment of his person. "Trusting in God will he continue to speak with a disciple's tongue what he has been taught by God" (512). And finally the people will come to believe the unbelievable tale of representative suffering, and when they do so they will know the completion of liberation from the order of empire. "The Servant who suffers many a death to live, who is humiliated to be exalted, who bears the guilt of many to see them saved as his offspring, is the King above the kings, the representative of divine above imperial order. And the history of Israel as the people under God is consummated in the vision of the unknown genius, for as the representative sufferer Israel has gone beyond itself and become the light of salvation to mankind" (515). An abiding preoccupation with the Servant is manifest in Acts 8. "The Ethiopian eunuch of the queen, sitting on his cart and reading Isaiah, ponders on the passage: 'Like a sheep
he was led away to the slaughter.' He inquires of Philip: 'Tell me, of whom is the prophet speaking? of himself, or of someone else?' Then Philip began, reports the historian of the Apostles, and starting from this passage he told him the good news about Jesus" (§15).

Our vision of the Church in the midst of the vicissitudes of empire in our own day is one of a global network of communities of Christian witness, Christian fellowship, and Christian service to humanity that would embody under any possible, probable, or actual conditions of the present and future the vocation of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh in accord with the just and mysterious Law of the Cross. Such a network of communities is informed by the divinely originated solution to the mystery of evil, the solution that "will be not only a renovation of will that matches intellectual detachment and aspiration, not only a new and higher collaboration of intellects through faith in God, but also a mystery that is at once symbol of the comprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended" (Lonergan, 1957:723-24). To mediate this solution theologically with our contemporary global cultural matrix is simultaneously to evoke an alternative situation: the liberation of humanity from the vicissitudes of imperial order and disorder, through fidelity to the integral scale of values through which a new law is brought to the earth, a law whose validity extends to everybody, whose power is strictly limited, and whose concrete embodiment consists in newly defined territorial entities in the constant process of renovation and revitalization through the outpouring of the Spirit of God upon all flesh.

II. CULTURE AND SOCIETY

What concretely does it mean for the Church to exercise the ministry of the Suffering Servant in our day? What does it mean for the presbyter to lead the Church in this mission through prophetic word, sacramental action, and pastoral care?

A. The Dimensions of Society

The question is social and cultural. It addresses the structure of disintegration and evokes the structure of integrity. It asks about the structural mechanics of dissolution and it anticipates the organic structure of a socially redemptive process.

I will use the word, society, according to the convention employed by David Tracy, for whom it is a broad generic term that encompasses several
more specific dimensions. Tracy lists three such components: the techno-economic order, the polity, and culture (Tracy:6-14). While we do indeed speak of a technoeconomic order that is concerned with the organization and allocation of goods and services and the occupational and stratificational systems of the society, we have learned from Karl Marx that technological institutions (the "forces of production") should be differentiated from the economic system (the "relations of production"). Moreover, it seems that we should add one further dimension, one to which Marx was not sufficiently sensitive and whose neglect decisively amputates his understanding of the structure of society: intersubjective spontaneity, primordial human intersubjectivity. This dimension will never be comprehended by understanding the relations established among technology, economic systems, politics, and cultural meanings and values. It is the primordial base of human community. When understood in general terms it seems, as Lonergan says, almost "too obvious to be discussed or criticized, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them." Lonergan describes it as follows:

The bond of mother and child, man and wife, father and son, reaches into a past of ancestors to give meaning and cohesion to the clan or tribe or nation. A sense of belonging together provides the dynamic premise for common enterprise, for mutual aid and succour, for the sympathy that augments joys and divides sorrows. Even after civilization is attained, intersubjective community survives in the family with its circle of relatives and its accretion of friends, in customs and folk-ways, in basic arts and crafts and skills, in language and song and dance, and most concretely of all in the inner psychology and radiating influence of women. Nor is the abiding significance and efficacy of the intersubjective overlooked, when motley states name themselves nations, when constitutions are attributed to founding fathers, when image and symbol, anthem and assembly, emotion and sentiment are invoked to impart an elemental vigour and pitch to the vast and cold, technological, economic, and political structures of human invention and convention. Finally, as intersubjective community precedes civilization and underpins it, so also it remains when civilization suffers disintegration and decay (1957:2).

When intersubjectivity is understood in less general terms, however, we can see quite clearly its importance for the structure of society. For it is the cohesive bond of groups that are formed on the basis of common interests, convictions, tasks, problems. It binds one group together and divides it from another group. It is the most basic of all societal dimensions.

Society, then, is composed of five elements: intersubjective spontaneity, technological institutions, the economic system, the political order, and culture. We have just discussed intersubjective spontaneity. Technology is rooted in the insight that the recurrent desires of individuals and groups can be met in a recurrent way through the formation of capital. Technology at its roots, I believe, is the system and set of instruments, including human
labor power, involved in the formation of capital, for the sake of meeting in a recurrent fashion the recurrent desires for consumer goods on the part of the intersubjective groups of a society. The economic system is "some procedure that sets the balance between the production of consumer goods and new capital formation, some method that settles what quantities of what goods and services are to be supplied, some device for assigning tasks to individuals and for distributing among them the common product" (Lonergan, 1957:208).

The political order meets problems that arise because of the difficulty of achieving effective agreement among the various intersubjective groups regarding the allocation and distribution of the products of the economic system and the technological institutions. It is a public bond that extends beyond family and intimate associations, and so beyond intersubjective spontaneity, through which a society forms and implements its notions of justice and legitimate power (Tracy:7). Culture is the operative set of meanings and values that govern a society's way of life. In Clifford Geertz's words, it is "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (Geertz:89). Culture is the clue to the ethos (tone, character, quality of life, style) of a society, and to its comprehensive ideas of order or its worldview. It sets the horizon within which the specific problems of political agreement are to be resolved.

The more complex a society, the more differentiated these dimensions will and must be. But the essential question about any concrete contemporary society has to do with how these five elements are related to one another in that society. And an even more basic question is: is there a general or heuristic formula that specifies how these elements should be related to one another? If there is, we can provide a structural analysis of the mechanics of disintegration and a structural formula for the new law on earth that, given the fact that there will always be a gulf between true order and the order realized concretely by any society, it is the mission of the Community of the Suffering Servant perseveringly to mediate to the nations.

B. Some Principles of Social and Cultural Analysis

1. The Individual and Society. I begin with two assumptions that emerged in the course of my psychological work, but that have proven to be equally determinative of my emerging position on social and cultural issues.

First, the deepest desire of the human person is so to forge the materials of his or her own life as to make of one's world, one's relations with others, and concomitantly of oneself, a work of art.
Second, this desire is fulfilled to the extent that persons discover and follow, step by step, the direction that is to be found, but that also can be missed, in the movement of life.

These basic assumptions mean that the health or distortion of a society is to be weighed against the measure of human dramatic artistry in community. The process of the development or maldevelopment of the person as a dramatic artist and that of the progress or decline of a society are to be understood mutually. The key to dramatic artistry lies in what Lonergan refers to as "the challenge of history," that is, "progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice" (1957:228). In this regard Lonergan's understanding of individual and social process coincides with that of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, for whom liberation is primarily deliverance from fatalism. By "chance or fate or destiny" Lonergan is referring to the psychological and social determinisms that, as he says elsewhere (1975), can be broken only by the conviction of faith, the power of hope, and the joy and sacrifice of love. In Method in Theology, the equivalent condition is one of participating freely in a process that is at once individual and social, and that consists in the making of humanity: in its advance in authenticity, in the flowering of human affectivity, and in the direction of human labor to ends that are really worth while.

Against this background, we may state the relation of personal and social development as follows:

first, the desire to make of one's life a work of art by discovering and following the direction to be found in the movement of life is facilitated to the extent that the social conditions that stimulate personal change allow for and foster the use of one's understanding and the exercise of one's freedom so that one participates in the process of the human good; and this desire is impeded to the extent that these factors of understanding and freedom are restricted by the mechanisms of psychological conditioning, social absurdity, and in the limit totalitarian control;

second, these societies will successfully meet the challenge of history, avoiding and overcoming the grip of conditioning, bias, and control, to the extent that the persons who compose them are exercising intelligence and freedom in genuinely forging a work of art as they constitute their world, their relations with others, and concomitantly themselves;

third, this is not a vicious circle, for the process of society has a certain dominance over that of the individual, who is born into and raised in and stimulated by the already given social situation; the situations that stimulate and condition the factors within the person that are responsible for his
or her development are constituted by the culture, the polity, the economic system, the technological institutions, and the habits of sensitive spontaneity that prevail in the person's society, whether these be in the process of progress or of decline (Lonergan, 1957:218);

and fourth, conditions of cultural, political, and general social decline pose a special problem: how is the decline to be reversed if the development of individuals is so intimately conditioned by the situations of the society? Revolution is no automatic guarantee, for perhaps the problem is not simply one of an unjust economic and political system. Perhaps these are symptoms of a miscarriage of the relations that should obtain among all five of the elements constitutive of society. Perhaps the revolutionaries are themselves the victims of this more inclusive miscarriage. Perhaps the problem lies deeper than can be met by a revolution: in general rather than group bias. Moreover, it is not sufficient, though it is true, to say that social conditioning does not necessarily mean social determinism. This is too easy a way out of the problem, one employed by reactionaries as they offer their bromides to the poor, counselling them to raise themselves out of poverty by industry and initiative. The advice overlooks the problem of statistical probabilities: as social situations deteriorate, the probability rises that persons will not be provided the atmosphere in which they will even be stimulated to authentic development. In the limit we may envision, as Lewis Mumford does, a post-historic situation in which the probabilities of development in genuine dramatic artistry are so infinitesimally low that, for all practical purposes, history has come to an end, and human beings become as programmed by social and neural patterns as a colony of ants (1956:120-36). Thus Hannah Arendt can speak of our uncertainty of "what will happen once the authentic mass man takes over. . . . He will have more in common with the meticulous, calculated correctness of Himmler than with the hysterical fanaticism of Hitler" (327): of Himmler, who once spoke of "the new type of man who under no circumstances will ever do 'a thing for its own sake'" (322).

The problem of decline can be reversed only by the formation of an "internal proletariat" (Toynbee) or "creative minority" (Lonergan) within the society in question: a minority which grasps what is going forward, understands its roots, anticipates its ever more disastrous consequences, and decides both to resist it and to offer an alternative to it.

2. Practicality and artistry. One of the principles of the reversal, of resistance and of the alternative way of life, is that practicality in originating and developing capital and technology, the economy and the state, must be subordinated to the construction of the human world, of human relations, and of human subjects as works of art. This subordination takes place through bringing human practicality into a taut balance with the demands of primordial
intersubjectivity. The delicately nuanced process emanating from these two factors, which will always be in tension with one another, constitutes human artistry in the social forging of the human world. If either of these principles plays too dominant a role, out of balance with the other, the society suffers decline. When practicality is exercised without concern for spontaneous community, the intersubjective base of the community is destroyed and people become literally rootless. When the intersubjective base is overly emphasized, particularly in its group ethos, those practical insights that might indeed be conducive to meeting a society's real problems but that call for the sacrifice of narrow group or class interests are neglected. Social progress is, in part, the harmonious unfolding of the changes that result from each of these linked but opposed principles of change: the taut balance of practicality and spontaneity. This is one constituent element of dramatic artistry on the social scene.

3. The scale of values. The balance of practicality and artistry has to do primarily with the exercise of human intelligence, which must be stretched beyond the confines of practical common sense and become alert to other considerations as well. But meeting the challenge of history demands not only the exercise of intelligence but also an orientation of human freedom, without which even the proper exercise of intelligence is impossible. Let us consider the following passage from Machiavelli's The Prince, a passage employed several years ago in a paper by Fred Lawrence on political theology. Let us use it as a point of departure for treating the question of the appropriate orientation of human freedom.

Many have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it according to the necessity of the case (quoted in Lawrence:239).

Until the final sentence of this passage, Machiavelli and the Suffering Servant would be in agreement. But at this point the Servant would say: therefore it is necessary for one who no longer cares whether he can maintain himself to learn how to be good in everything and to use this knowledge in every case.

The passage from Machiavelli recommends the sacrifice of integrity for expediency. And the point of the required orientation of freedom that we envision is precisely that one must take one's stand, not on expediency but on integrity. What does this mean? By answering this question I believe that we can understand the appropriate relations among the five elements of
I have been greatly helped in this regard by reflecting on the implications of what Lonergan has called the hierarchy of values, and by trying to disengaged the relations that obtain among the various levels of this scale.

We may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world (Lonergan, 1972: 31-32).

a. Infrastructure and superstructure. I want to begin my comments on the scale of values by addressing a problem originally introduced by Marx. It has to do with the infrastructure and the superstructure of a society.

With Marx I will hold that any concrete society is composed of an infrastructure of concrete everyday transactions and a superstructure of meanings and values that govern these transactions or that reflect them. For Marx, the infrastructure is constituted by the forces and relations of production; that is, by technology and the economic system, as these provide the material frames of reference that confine our powers of projective consciousness. Forces of production fall into the two classes of labor-power and the "objective" means of production. These are the material foundation of all human existence and expression. The economic relations of production distort these forces and render them destructive by stipulating the material use-values that it is their function to make—those that sustain or increase profits for the ruling class—and the mode of operation of the productive forces themselves—riveted division of labor, exhaustion of natural resources, inefficient use of productive forces. These relations of production are the proprietary connections between the forces of production and their owners. The essential and defining principle of the economic structure is the law of surplus labor: the few extract payment from the many in the form of surplus labor in exchange for the means of subsistence. The infrastructure is constituted by a complex relation between forces and relations of production: the economic structure fetters the forces of production until these are ready to burst the bonds, at which point the conditions for revolution have been
For Marx the superstructure is constituted by the legal and political institutions of society, by ideology, and by the forms of social consciousness. Law and politics are a sanctioned and coercive regulator of the economic relations of production, a conscious construction that arises upon already existing antagonisms between the ruling class and the workers and that regulates these antagonisms in the interests of the ruling class. They are a reflex of the economic base, an indispensable defense mechanism that provides a mask covering over the real situation of the relations of production and that enforces this situation by any means found necessary. Ideology consists of the various articulated forms of social self-understanding whereby society formulates publicly effective conceptions that influence people's apprehension of themselves. Most ideology employs empty generalities rather than determinate categories, endows its principal illusory categories with self-subsisting powers of motion, validates the established social order and invalidates what challenges it, is tied to the past in its language and referents, and clothes existing economic relations in an illusorily attractive guise. Its whole purpose is to conceal the real relations of production, class divisions, and laws of exchange prevailing in the society and to rationalize the legal and political aspect of the superstructure, thus ensuring society's inaction with regard to changing the underlying economic base. And forms of social consciousness are the presupposed principles behind ideological formulations, governing them much in the same way as Kant's a priori forms are said to govern determinate categories, though unlike Kantian forms these are socially acquired.

Infrastructure and superstructure for Marx are related by the laws of economic and technological determinism. The economic base determines the superstructure in so far as it imposes work- and leisure-constraints on individuals, selects out all superstructural phenomena that do not comply with the economic structure, and introduces the content of the economic structure into superstructural phenomena, as in ideology and the forms of social consciousness. Technological determinism, however, necessitates that the economic order so correspond with the stage of development of the productive forces that a certain level of this development will impel the class struggle that, through superstructural changes, will burst the economic structure asunder. The forces of production may be fettered by the economic structure, but only so long as such fettering does not involve relinquishing or forfeiting an established productive stage in a permanent and qualitatively significant way /

My evaluation of Marx's position, if I have correctly understood it, is that he presents an analysis of what in fact can happen when individual, group, and general bias hold sway, but that he has fallen victim to general bias in elevating these facts into laws; that, because his analysis is based on
an artificial intersubjective ground, it displaces the tension of limitation and transcendence (Lonergan, 1957:472-75); and that this displacement is only accentuated in the dominant Marxist tradition of state socialism. The fact that an identical structural deviation occurs in both capitalism and state socialism—and John McMurtry has argued this to my satisfaction (171-87)—is an argument for an identical root, one that lies in neither economic system as such but in the general bias that allowed both systems to emerge. As Alvin W. Gouldner has argued, Marx focussed on the defective consciousness of bourgeois society and on the transformation of the capitalist infrastrucutre that determines bourgeois consciousness, but he did not analyze with sufficient clarity the kind of society that would strengthen and extend the role of consciousness and reason in life (Gouldner:15-16).

An alternative position on the infrastructure and superstructure of society might help to delineate such a society, and to give flesh and bone to our earlier employment of the special categories derived from the Isaianic vision of the Suffering Servant and his mission in the world. What would it be to bring a new law on earth in our time, what would it be neither to waver nor be crushed until true justice is established on the earth? Perhaps we can answer these questions by presenting, with the help of Lonergan's hierarchy of values, an alternative to the Marxist position on the infrastructure and superstructure of society.

I will maintain, then, that an integral society's infrastructure would be constituted by the dialectical unfolding of the tension of spontaneous intersubjectivity (the principle of limitation) with the technological, economic, and legal-political institutions of the society. Note that the legal and political institutions are an element of the infrastructure of an integral society, not of the superstructure. The latter is the realm of the determinants of publicly shared and effective meanings and values, and so of culture, of the operative assumptions of meaning and value informing the way of life of the infrastructure. The infrastructure, moreover, will be healthy or diseased depending on whether the tension of the process emergent from the two principles of social change—intersubjective spontaneity and social order—is preserved in a state of taut balance or whether one or other of these principles has gotten the upper hand in determining the course of social process.

Let us relate these considerations of infrastructure and superstructure to the levels of value given by Lonergan. The infrastructure of any concrete society is constituted by the concrete realization of vital and social values in that society, whether that realization be healthy or diseased. The values that constitute culture, again whether healthy or diseased, make up the superstructure.

What about personal and religious values? They lie beyond the three levels of value that constitute the public formation of the superstructure and
infrastructure of the society, in the realm of personal decision and orientation. As Voegelin said when discussing the Servant, there are problems of order that extend beyond the existence of a concrete society and its institutions. But these values do not constitute a merely private realm of existence without relevance to the cultural superstructure and the social and vital infrastructure of the society. Quite to the contrary, they are the ultimate determinants of cultural integrity, or social progress, of the appropriate relation among the five elements that constitute society, and so of the equitable distribution of vital goods. And the relations among the five levels of value help us to see how this is the case.

b. Healing and creating in history: a new application. In discussing these relations, let us begin with the level of personal values. The person as a self-transcendent originator of values in self and world, the person in his or her integrity, does not exist, is in fact an impossibility, without the gift of God's grace. Thus religious values are the condition of the possibility of personal integrity. Moving next to the level of cultural values, genuine cultural values arise from the pursuit of the beautiful in story and song, ritual and dance, literature and art; from the pursuit of the intelligible in science and scholarship and reflection on life; and from the pursuit of the true in philosophy and theology. Now these pursuits are integral only to the extent that they are carried on by persons of moral and intellectual integrity. Thus personal values are the condition of the possibility of the actual and recurrent functioning of genuine cultural values as the public determinants of meaning and value in a society. Next let us move to the values of the social order, to political organization, economic relations, and technological developments. These are good to the extent that they are formed and implemented in dialectical tension with the legitimate demands of spontaneous intersubjectivity. To that extent they will embody genuine cultural values: values emergent from the pursuit of the beautiful, the intelligible, and the true. Cultural values, through which the meanings that we live by are discovered, expressed, validated, criticized, developed, and improved, are thus the condition of the possibility of a social order that is really worth while. Finally, vital values are available to the community only to the extent that the social order is just, and so a just social order is the condition of the possibility of the equitable distribution of vital values.

Notice what has happened in this analysis. The higher reaches of the scale of values determine the realization of the more basic levels: no personal integrity without divine grace; no cultural values without personal integrity; no just social order without genuine cultural values; and no vital values for the whole community without a just social order.
Is there also a relation that obtains the other way around, from below upwards? While the movement from above downwards is the movement of conditioning, or even of healing, that from below upwards is the movement of differentiation and so of creativity. The basic principle here is the following: problems in the effective and recurrent realization of more basic levels of value, especially when they reach the point of the breakdown of previously functioning schemes, can be solved only by a new differentiation of higher levels of value. The newly differentiated higher-level values will in turn determine the effective realization of the more basic levels.

Thus: problems in the effective distribution of vital values to the whole community can be solved by new technological developments, new economic relations, and new forms of political organization at the level of social values. But such new social relations can become effectively recurrent only if a change occurs in the cultural values that determine the community's way of life. This change must be commensurate with the demands of the social order. The differentiation of more inclusive and refined cultural sensitivities, however, calls for a deepening perception, and perhaps a conversion, of persons in their constitution of the world, their relations with one another, and themselves as works of art. And a more sustained pursuit of self-transcendent living is impossible without the continuing transformation of the person that is the work of God's grace at the core of one's being, and so without the ever further refinement of religiously differentiated consciousness.

These points enable us to say something further about the relations that prevail among the elements that constitute the infrastructure itself: intersubjective spontaneity, technology, the economy, and politics. We have already said that the infrastructure is constituted by the tension of spontaneous intersubjectivity with the technological, economic, and political institutions of a society. So our main question now is about the relations among technology, the economy, and politics. What will that relation be when the cultural and social orders are healthy /2/?

The key to answering this question, it seems to me, has to do with the function of politics. When the integral scale of values is overruled, legal and political institutions become the lowest rung of a mendacious superstructure erected for the preservation of a distorted economic infrastructure, whether capitalistic or socialistic. The integral scale of values is neglected when integrity in the creation of a work of dramatic art gives way to practical expediency. Then egoistic and group interests predominate in determining the relation of the levels of value and the relation of the five elements constitutive of society. The first level of value to suffer, the first element of society to disintegrate, is culture. The public determinants of meaning and value that would arise from the pursuit of the beautiful, the intelligible,
and the true are evacuated from the social scene. They retreat into the margins of society, or become the tools of economic interests. Legal and political institutions take the place of culture as the sources of the public meanings and values governing the society's way of life. And these institutions are themselves now determined by economic interests, so that the meanings and values that govern the way of the society become ultimately economic. Legal and political institutions should be devised to bring about the effective unfolding of a social process arising from the tension of intersubjective groups with technological and economic institutions. Instead these institutions become the instruments of economic interests and bias the process of society in accord with those interests. The function of politics is twisted into an ideological defense mechanism for the interests of social groups. What it should be is the institution whereby the whole society can be persuaded by rational arguments and symbolic example to exist and change in the tension of vital spontaneity and social organization. But when the tension is upset by the predominance of economic expediency, the political slips out of the infrastructure and begins to usurp more and more the functions of culture, becoming a mendacious but quite public determinant of the meanings and values informing the way of life to the society. Then the social order becomes less and less the product of people who have been educated in the pursuit of beauty, intelligibility, and truth; it is the product of a distorted aesthetic consciousness, a perverted intelligence, and an uncritical rationality. Morality and religion follow suit, retreating into the margins of society and becoming merely private concerns. As personal values are thus amputated, the good is rendered inefficacious in the structuring of the cultural and social order. And religious values are either explicitly denied and even forbidden in the public cultural domain, or they are twisted into perverse supports for the distorted culture and society, as in American civil religion.

The key to avoiding these distortions is the reverence that is to be paid to culture that keeps it from becoming proximately practical and expedient. The art and the literature, the narrative and song, the ritual and dance, the science and scholarship, the philosophy and theology, the theater and broadcasting, the journalism and history, the school and university, the personal depth and public opinion (Lonergan, 1957:241) that take their stand on integrity and so that generate meanings and values to inform the society's way of life as emergent from the integral pursuit of the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good: these are the proximate sources of infrastructural and general societal flourishing. Genuine politics would mediate cultural values to the social infrastructure. It would persuade the infrastructure to a balance of spontaneity and order in keeping with genuine cultural values.
c. Imperialism. We said earlier that the actual situation addressed by a contemporary systematic theology is characterized primarily by competing imperialistic systems always bordering on the brink of totalitarianism. The root of imperialism lies in the subordination of the political to economic interests. Yet the first to formulate such a distorted relation between economics and politics, Marx, did not speak of imperialism; and the capitalism of his day was not imperialistic. Hannah Arendt dates the beginning of economic imperialism in the mid-1880s. It is characterized by an economic reality that Marx's theory neither accounts for nor anticipates. Marx anticipated that technological institutions, including human labor power, would become too large and complex and differentiated for economic units of ownership to control. At this point, the conditions for revolution prevail, and economic ownership of the forces of production can slip into new hands that are more complex and organized and that can control the complexity of the forces of production. It can move from private to public ownership. What Marx did not anticipate is that economic units of ownership could become too large and too complex to correspond in a rational fashion with technological institutions, including human labor power, and with the tension between the social order and the intersubjective spontaneity of the groups constituting the society. What happens when that becomes the case, of course, is not revolution, but economic imperialism: the extension of the power of economic ownership beyond the society in which it originated, and the exploitation of the forces of production of other societies for the sake of meeting one's own economic interests. Such is the core of imperialism, which is at its roots an economic phenomenon.

d. Global cultural values. Two final points must be made with regard to the scale of values. They follow quite smoothly out of what we have already seen.

First, we must address the global nature of the distortions that constitute the situation of the world today. The disease in the relations of the levels of value and in the relations of the elements of society is not confined to a given society. It is global, primarily because of imperialism and its effects. The disease is planetary, and the remedy lies in a properly conceived and responsibly implemented world-cultural alternative. We are already intuitively aware of the global dimensions of the problem. What I want to do is to ground that intuition in the scale of values.

As we have seen, the effective realization of the higher levels of value is the condition of the possibility of the recurrent realization of the more basic levels. But there is also the relation from below upwards, the relation of differentiation and creativity. The maldistribution of particular goods raises the question that will lead to a more differentiated articulation
and even a dramatic transformation of technological, economic, and political institutions. The need for such a transformation raises the question of a change in the operative meanings and values that determine the society's way of life. This change may demand a transformation of persons to a more comprehensive integrity. And this moral and intellectual conversion may depend for its stability on a deeper religious life.

In our contemporary situation, the problem of the equitable distribution of particular goods, of the recurrent realization of the most vital human values meeting the most vital human needs, is clearly global. Facing the problem demands that we work out and implement a global economic order enabling the operation of technological institutions on a more regional level to meet the demands of vital spontaneity; and that we effect globally effective political institutions embodying the conceptions and exercising the power implied in our notions of global justice. We will not be able or willing to create globally effective technological, economic, and political institutions unless we differentiate public determinants of meaning and value that regard primarily not the way of life of our regionally defined and circumscribed societies but the global community of men and women, and so unless our cultural values are themselves somehow cross-cultural. Next, we cannot meet the challenge of generating cross-cultural meanings and values without doing violence to our own cultural roots, unless we differentiate the cross-cultural constituents of human integrity through a new science of human interiority. Generating this science takes a certain kind of moral commitment to the future of humanity that demands the sacrifice of more immediate satisfactions. And living from and on the basis of such a commitment calls for a deepening of the religious lives of the men and women called to that enterprise.

Again: The breakdown of the distribution of particular goods evokes the question that enables and demands a new differentiation of the social order and so of technology and economics. Today this new order must be global, for the breakdown is global. The breakdown of the good of order evokes the questions that call forth a more differentiated set of cultural meanings and values. Today these must emerge from cross-cultural communication and development if they are to effect the global social institutions that are needed to meet the global problem of vital values. Problems regarding the cross-cultural integration of previously more regional cultural values evoke the questions that force more exacting discussion of personal integrity and its cross-cultural constituents. And the recurring sense of our own incapacity for sustained autonomous integrity, which is only heightened by such explorations as these, sets in motion the pure question that is in effect our supplication for an ever more refined and purified religious orientation. This religious orientation will ground the personal integrity needed for the collaboration that will establish genuine cultural values for a global human
community. These values will affect the infrastructure through the political specialization of common sense, whose function it is to persuade the community to the needed economic and technological changes that can meet the demands of the intersubjective groups of a global humanity for the satisfaction of their most vital needs.

e. The preferential option for the poor. My final point has to do with the same structure, and unfolds another implication of it. My argument in effect constitutes a defense, perhaps even a grounding, from the standpoint of a transcendental anthropology, for the insight of liberation theologians regarding the hermeneutically privileged position for theology of the most grievously oppressed peoples of our globe, and regarding the preferential option for the poor that must govern the Church's exercise of all of her ministry. The situation that I have attempted to portray is one affected by the distortions of the integral scale of values, disrupting the relation between the social infrastructure and the cultural superstructure that would obtain if subjects in community were faithful to the task of dramatic artistry. Culture has either retreated into an ivory tower or has been made proximately practical. The political takes the place of culture in the superstructure, becoming the principal conscious determinant of the public meanings and values of the society. Politics is diverted from its authentic task of mediating cultural values to the economic and technological structures so as to forge them in line with the demands of dramatically artistic living. The economic system has been diverted from its proper task of regulating technological structures so as recurrently to provide the whole community with the materials to be forged into a work of art. The economic system has become instead the preserve of the advantaged. The consequence is a massive oppression of the disadvantaged that has become global, just as the reach of economic imperialism has become global. From below upwards, then, it is global injustice that most basically structures the situation in which we find ourselves, and that provides the final criterion for the adequacy of any alternative. Consequently if the new cultural values that are generated are not endowed with the capacity for evoking a global horizon for economic justice, they are not the cultural values demanded by the situation that confronts us today.

III. CONCLUSION

Much could and eventually must be said about the constitution of the needed cultural values. Space permits me only to refer the reader to the suggestions that I have previously made regarding the integration of the cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological insights of various human
cultures of the past (Doran:116-21). Let me conclude with the simple reminder that the Church, commissioned as it is to be the bearer of soteriological truth, will be faithful to its commission only to the extent that it embodies in its members, its communities, and its ministries the Law of the Cross through which the Servant of Yahweh fills up in his own body what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ, neither wavering nor being crushed until true justice is established on the earth. Such is the priestly vocation of the Church, and such alone is the fulfillment of authentic presbyteral ministry. The divine and only solution to the mystery of evil will never cease to encounter "men clear-sighted enough to grasp that the issue is between God and man, logical enough to grant that intelligence and reason are orientated towards God, ruthless enough to summon to their aid the dark forces of passion and violence" (Lonergan, 1957:729).

By force and by law he was taken; would anyone plead his cause? Yes, he was torn away from the land of the living; for our faults struck down in death. They gave him a grave with the wicked, a tomb with the rich, though he had done no wrong and there had been no perjury in his mouth. Yahweh has been pleased to crush him with suffering. If he offers his life in atonement, he shall see his heirs, he shall have a long life, and through him what Yahweh wishes will be done. His soul's anguish over, he shall see the light and be content. By his sufferings shall my servant justify many, taking their faults on himself. Hence I will grant whole hordes for his tribute, he shall divide the spoil with the mighty, for surrendering himself to death and letting himself be taken for a sinner, while he was bearing the faults of many and praying all the time for sinners (Isaiah 53:8-12).
NOTES

/1/ My understanding of Marx has been greatly influenced by John McMurtry: 1978.

/2/ Note the importance of putting the question this way. When one starts with diseased entities, one risks erecting facts into laws, as Marx did with society and Freud with the psyche.
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It is with certain reservations that I comment on the work of Flannery O'Connor when I am still struggling toward a full grasp of its implications, when I read the innumerable interpretations of her writings, when I recognize my severe limits as a literary critic and speak from the side of a theological hermeneutic, when I recall O'Connor's reflection on how some clergy are best at "delivering a sermon on literature" (O'Connor, 1979:179) or remember her concern over certain "Reverends" who, in their editing, reverse the meaning of her work (211-213).

As the title of my paper suggests, my project is large, but it is also quite specific. It is to raise the issue at a variety of levels, of the transformations, the process of transformation, the new reality that results from this process in O'Connor's art of story-telling; to indicate, along the way, how O'Connor reflected on her own art; and finally to suggest that her work as storyteller and interpreter invites nothing less than an act of self-appropriation in the reader. Indeed, I want to argue that her stories unveil the hope of transformation in the audience and that they offer the specific transformation which is a redemption of the act of reading. Having this as my project, I will not trace O'Connor's historical development, nor analyze her appropriation of other authors. I intend to relate my project to the story, "A Good Man Is Hard To Find," which I take to be, in some measure, paradigmatic of her vision.

My central question is, what does an O'Connor story offer to the reader in the experience of enjoying or disliking it? My understanding of her stories is that they invite a transformation, in the reading, of the reader and that they provoke a new awareness of the reality which any reader is or can become.

Originally, I had considered entitling this essay, "Starting Life with an Inauspicious Appearance," which is O'Connor's observation on the manner in which peacocks begin their progression toward the construction of beauty.
At the very moment the peacock's work is completed, O'Connor remarks, "not every part of the peacock is striking to look at," and "with his tail folded, I find the parts incommensurate with the whole" (O'Connor, 1970:9). When the tail is spread, he often turns away from you and will grace you only when it suits him; "this is the moment when most people are silent" (10). Peacocks are of no use on a farm; they consume grain, fruit, peanuts and vegetables; they eat flowers in a systematic manner; they create dust storms, dusting holes in sundry places, and a bedlam of noise. They get ill, are hunted, shed feathers; they "seem impossible to destroy, except by violence" (19); "they taste no better than any other chicken" (20), but "in the end, the last word will be theirs" (21). Yet, this is the process that advances them through their inauspicious appearance until they emerge as "The King of the Birds."

For the peacock, transformation proceeds in a genetic scheme by which it advances along the surface, moving from its inauspicious start to an apparently begrudging revelation in "a galaxy of gazing, haloed suns" (10). In one's observation of human transformation one can easily recognize the unfolding of the genetic schemes that carry one from infant to adult, but it is quite another matter to identify the emergence and growth of the inner Subject. The difficulties here are manifold, for that emergence is revealed in the same surface that carried the natural schemes, and it is not unusual for us to identify ourselves at that immediate, natural level. Furthermore, the inner Subject, or the interiority of the self, even when it reaches beyond that immediate natural level, can find itself only in careful attention to the differences that the surface reveals: that feelings emerge and change, that understanding is frustrated or grows, that judgments are made and corrected, that decisions are executed and revised, that people love, hate and sacrifice for others. These levels of the inner self can be ignored; they can be collapsed into one another; they can be easily misunderstood.

O'Connor attends to every level of human interiority; she refuses any reduction of one level to another; she not only shows them as they appear on the surface, but she recognizes the difficulty of their specialized transformation and their dialectical mode of integration. Indeed, for O'Connor, a story is a complete and complex naming of humanity as it struggles through its often grotesque efforts to establish the meanings that make it what it is. Her stories present the surface actions of characters who in encountering one another are changed; the process of the surface reveals that these encounters invite and demand metamorphoses in the interiority of the characters, and that violent reactions often ensue when such change is evoked. Transformations are recognized by O'Connor as desired and feared, accepted and refused, demanded, misunderstood and startling. It is especially when her characters respond to the invitations to change, that they begin, as she
It has often been noted that O'Connor's stories are ironic. As such they are subversive in the way parables are subversive. This adds a new manifold of complexity to the stories that reflects a turn in the self's effort to live meaningfully, for it reveals that, on the one hand, transformation is a spontaneous desire and a spontaneous activity of self-making, one which is often frustrated with its own achievements; and that, on the other hand, a hidden gift of meaning is offered into the self's very desire to "count." This gift carries two demands: that the self sacrifice its own projected goal and motivation of self-constitution, and that it accept a new foundation that demands even more involvement in collaborating with the gift's power in one's own interiority, fostering the very acts that it has subverted, promoting growth in feeling and imagination, in understanding, affirmation, choosing and loving, all of which now become vehicles of an ultimate meaning, of a mystery, buried within the very inauspicious start itself.

My reading of O'Connor in this manner—to which she herself might have objected as being dangerously close to a psychologistic reduction, but which, I would want to maintain, transcends that reduction, by attending to the anthropological foundations and to the realities they reach and are in themselves—depends on the clarification of the differentiated acts of human consciousness affirmed as the reality of interiority and expressed in the acts we perform and the world we create, as developed in the theological synthesis of Bernard Lonergan (1972, 1974, 1975). I accept, with others, that Lonergan's invitation to self-discovery and to the appropriation of the reality of one's own interiority is the ground for a cognitive synthesis of the human and divine which O'Connor herself saw as necessary for uncovering the complicated reality of the human community dwelling in grace and evil, and for locating the multiple mediations of that reality in the ordinary, indeed empirical, world of human living. It is precisely in his articulation of the "general empirical method," the critical objectification of the acts of consciousness and their relationship to transcendent mystery, that Lonergan speaks to the problems in Catholic theology which O'Connor, in a letter to "A" dated 22 November 1958, addresses in these words: "This is not an age of great Catholic Theology. We are living on our capital and it is past time for a new synthesis. What St. Thomas did for the learning of the 13th century we are in bad need of some one to do for the 20th" (O'Connor, 1970:40).

What O'Connor recognized in her own keen observation of human affairs was the poverty and wealth of all levels of human interiority; she recognized how the struggle away from the inadequate beginnings toward fulfillment and the affirmation that we "count," always contains within its
struggles the original initiation; she recognized the ease with which confusion and misinterpretation accompany the longing to find the realities that will fulfill us; and she recognized that our desire to be gifted with love is simultaneously met with a fear of its consequences. In other words, she found how all the acts of human interiority constitute a dialectical tension between, on the one hand, the self that spontaneously sets for itself the projects of wanting to be valued and, on the other hand, the mystery that proclaims what the self wants to hear, while demanding that the project be totally revamped. And it is because of this, I believe, that the overarching symbol of violence permeates her work.

Before pursuing this idea, however, allow me to say what I understand by symbol, for I use it in the light of Paul Ricoeur's affirmation and apothegm, that "the symbol is food for thought." The symbol is a way of naming and recognizing the reality of human interiority as it is experienced in the surface of literal existence; indeed, it operates by unveiling a level of meaning below the surface and one which is easily ignored; it unifies the surface appearance with interiority in a pre-cognitive manner, and so it opens up the depths of consciousness, giving a new direction to the self while the symbol itself remains opaque.

Ricoeur notes the strange power of the symbol to accept the literal and advance through it; "the symbol is the very movement of the primary [literal] meaning which makes us share the hidden meaning and thus assimilates us to the thing symbolized, without being able to get hold of the similarity intellectually" (Ricoeur, 1960:200). Furthermore, for Ricoeur, the symbol works so as to make one aware of the things that are absent and yet it is able "to render present that which is absent" (201). Finally, in their dynamics the panoply of symbols of human interiority are "mutually iconoclastic" and so reveal the tension of human interiority to itself.

Now, I would want to claim that for O'Connor violence is a symbol of the complex transformations of human interiority, as both the source of the multi-faceted human project to make a self and also the place of visitation. (The grotesque is also an overarching symbol, but I cannot treat that here.) It seems to me that many interpreters who focus on violence (and the grotesque) as the foundation of her stories miss the source of violence in the depth of conscious interiority and the struggles to shake off its own inauspicious start; and hence, they do not recognize the complete humanness that O'Connor uncovers in her stories.

Literally, violence is an act of force, an aggression that attempts to control by power what it cannot change. It is often an act of frustration, striking out against what it experiences as a threat to those realities it has affirmed as true and right. Symbolically, it is an effort to establish order, to make things fit in to my world view; it is an act by which I try to control
the inner by controlling the outer. Violence points to the dialectical reality that human consciousness is, in its many levels of demanding and refusing transformation as both project and gift. When there is an encounter with this reality in the social sphere, the results can be startling. It is to this inner commotion that O'Connor refers when she says that any writer who values both the concrete and the mystery, the visible and the invisible, "will use the concrete in a more drastic way. It is not necessary to point out that the look of this fiction is going to be wild, that it is almost of necessity going to be violent and comic, because of the discrepancies that it seeks to combine" (O'Connor, 1970:43).

Let me add here that O'Connor's recognition of the need to hold to the full double meaning of the symbol in its first (literal) and second (properly symbolic) levels is what allows her symbols to give "food for thought" and to stand up against all efforts to allegorize them. What I mean is that O'Connor is absolutely faithful to the literal, that she never recedes from the surface; rather, her task is one of proper and adequate rendering of the surface so as to illumine what is not seen, but is just as real. The meaning of the Sacred, or transformation as grace and gift, or Redemption, makes sense only in the face of all the levels of the self that attempt to confront it and to reshape it in their own image.

It should be noted that O'Connor is no less aware that many who accept the mystery of Redemption reduce the significance of the ordinary project of self-transcendence by trying to reach the Sacred directly. Some attempt to eliminate the ordinary with its authentic demands and stages and, in effect, misinterpret Christian Redemption; rather they preach a "Church without Christ." In meeting this issue, O'Connor attempted to mediate the ordinary and the divine in the full and rich, painful and demanding dimensions of living. In her essay "The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant South," she noted: "Fiction is the most impure and the most modest and the most human of arts. It is closest to man in his sin and his suffering and his hope, and it is often rejected by Catholics for the very reasons that make it what it is" (O'Connor, 1970:192).

Her critique of theologians, philosophers and preachers in the Catholic tradition is equally perceptive, for she recognized that a large number of them catapult over the empirical struggles of the human subject, "the good under construction," and use abstraction in a way that systematically refuses to recognize faith within the fullness of human interiority or grace within the ordinary. In one of her letters she explicitly names the destitution of this false apologetic which some critics aimed at her fictions; "I know that the writer does call up the general and maybe the essential through the particular, but this general and essential is still embedded deeply in mystery. It is not answerable to any formulas. It doesn't rest finally in
Our Catholic mentality is great in paraphrase, logic, formula, instant and correct answers. We judge before our experience and never trust faith to be subjected to reality, because it is not strong enough. And maybe in this we are wise. I think the spirit is changing because of the council, but the changes will take a long time to soak through" (O'Connor, 1979:516-17).

Because O'Connor recognizes the fulness of human interiority, she is able to write stories that offer in symbolic mode both the full range of human struggle and the transcendent gift as the redemption of that reality: from peabird to "The King of the Birds." In her writing, the symbols work in a series of increasing complexity. The story "A Good Man Is Hard To Find" reveals the range of her vision and talent. Literally, it contains two journeys, one from home and the other from prison. That which begins from home is presented in convoluted stages toward the place where it encounters the second traveller, while the second journey, from prison, is not known at all; it is a mystery. Symbolically, we have, on the one side, a quest for the meaning of what has been done with a life, a quest for what has gone wrong for the grandmother and her world; on the other side, we have a break from confinement to freedom-as-utter-lawlessness.

The first journey unveils a series of transformations as it moves away from home, to an imagined plantation that holds a hidden wealth, to the woods. While I cannot deal with all the symbols that operate in this first journey, I wish to select some of those which emerge around the struggle of interiority with itself, and to hold, for perhaps another time, those that tie interiority to the natural environment. This journey is initiated with different apperceptions: the grandmother notices in the newspaper the story of an escaped killer, her son reads the sports page, oblivious to what might be the more powerful force in shaping his world, and the children read the funnies. Because of her personal desires and her perception, the grandmother struggles to control the destination of a family vacation away from the house and away from the escaped convict. Her habitual effort at control is met with derision by the grandchildren and is unanswered by her son. John Wesley, a child, indicates that he would deal with the killer by "a smack in the face." Without understanding or love in her family, the old lady's affection is turned to what is left for her, "Pitty Sing," her cat.

Here, then, is the inauspicious start, and symbolically it reveals enormous naiveté in attention, desires, knowledge, values, and love. Home has not offered much depth; indeed John Wesley, against the grandmother's warning, wants to go through Georgia "fast so we don't have to look at it much." This attitude toward the place of one's origin and source reminds the old lady that all about her is deterioration, and in the revelation of her own "manners" through her remarks about "the cute little pickaninny," we know
that grandmother herself has not escaped that deterioration. Her attention to
the infant, a new source of promise, is interrupted by the bickering of the
children over the rules of their game, and this confusion evokes from her a
story--literally, for the purpose of keeping them quiet. Symbolically, how-
ever, the story is that of the old lady's fall, of why things are not good
now, of how she misinterpreted the intentions of a former suitor; it is a story
of how misunderstood and unrealized love--which she still misconstrues as
material success--led to her present pain and frustration; it is a story of her
fall, but it is a genteel fall; after all, Mr. Teagarden, her suitor, was a
gentleman.

The first stop is at "The Tower," literally a filling station, restaurant
and dance hall; symbolically, a place of nourishment for vehicle, stomach and
soul. Expected to be an oasis of human achievement and community, it is
found to be a zoo and a place of babel; indeed, the little nourishment found
there for interiority serves only as a reminder that, outside the garden,
chaos reigns. As Red Sammy Butts asserts, "you can't win," and it is he
who jogs grandmother's memory of the escaped convict, the Misfit, when he
suggests that it is impossible to correctly estimate whom to trust, and then
tells her of his own mistake. Undeterred by his admission, she pronounces
him to be a "good man." Clearly she must be thinking of something other
than being good at interpreting his customers; rather she seems to find that
it is good that he tries to trust others. At any rate, "he is struck" by his
own answer, "yes'm, I suppose so," as if that didn't matter, or as if he
hadn't thought about it, or as if, in fact, he isn't good and she is wrong.
At the symbolic level, the quest has moved subtly from the personal to the
social, from immediate dissatisfaction to a desire to find its source, and at
this point the source is found, naively, to be in others. "Everything is
getting terrible," Red Sammy pronounces.

As the journey proceeds, the search for the source of dissatisfaction
moves to a deeper level as sleep descends and, in sleep, a dream that excites
the grandmother's memory and imagination of an old plantation which had
survived the attack of Sherman, and which, the old lady said, knowing
otherwise, had a hidden wealth, the family silver. Symbolically, this is a
major transformation, for in order to return to a place of meaning, a Para-
dise, she must translate her notion of treasure or value into a material wealth
that will appeal to her obtuse family. The naive John Wesley intends to find
this wealth and to possess it by destroying its embodiment, much as he was
going to confront the killer: "we'll poke all the woodwork." To quell the
ungodly screaming, announcing the demands and desires of his children, the
father turns the car around and takes a dirt road to which he is directed.
In a moment of embarrassment (symbolically, self-awareness) grandmother
recognizes her own misunderstanding of her surroundings, a mistake that she
has no time to correct, a mistake that was evoked by her longing for a place of solace. She has no time, for they have an accident; the vehicle directed by misunderstood good intentions has brought them into the woods.

The journeys are now joined. The Misfit, with his disciples, approaches, checking on the invaders of his world, and grandmother, ever faithful to her own fitful interiority, recognizes him. In the scholarly-looking Misfit, grandmother's naive interpretations of goodness and of religious meaning are radically and consistently rejected. Still, it is only the grandmother who is able to recognize what is at hand, and she alone who, with her weak but struggling interiority, is able to attempt the liberation of those who have no search, no true quest. Only those who seek know the woods. But the Misfit also has his quest, which is to explain the injustice of his being victimized and he resolves it by making everyone else a loser like himself. As the old lady asserts his goodness, the self-named Misfit retrieves his own pain and restlessness and offers it as the reason for his present state. He unwittingly names as the source of evil the enlightened who have contributed to his pain: "It was the head-doctor at the penitentiary said what I had done was kill my daddy but I known that for a lie."

Nonetheless, the Misfit's ruthless demand on the old lady's naive bargaining and piety continues to the point where, in a last desperate plea for release, she offers all her material treasure. As the offers are refused and refused, there begins a discussion about Jesus, of whom the Misfit has obviously thought carefully, who is also embraced in his rationalized scheme and who is rejected for upsetting the balance and for being a historical scandal: "if I had of been there I would of known and I wouldn't be like I am now." The old lady remains silent; she can't explain. But the desire and the quest, not to be "like I am now"—that indeed is her quest too. As his voice cracks and her head clears the grandmother surrenders beyond the "scholarly" rationalism, and in a moment of second recognition, she gently yields in the murmur, "Why you're one of my babies": he is, indeed, her own blood. In the dark wood, with the mysterious self-liberator, the communion is completed—the communion of seeker and achiever, seeker and gift—and she falls victim, reaching out to recognize the goodness buried in his unredeemed pain. Like Red Sammy, the Misfit is struck "as if bitten by a snake": his violence is his only way of recognizing the violence of the transformation of the old lady, the transformation of faith which accepts the promise of the resurrection and which turns the victim into the winner. No one had helped her to see before, not her family, not Red Sammy, not even herself. But does he see too? Does he recognize her as he takes off his silver-rimmed spectacles? Does he recognize how he fits? What can it mean, when your victim refuses all of your justifications and reaches out to touch you?
With this reading of O'Connor's symbols in mind, I want to turn to a second exercise, so as to do three things: to examine how O'Connor uses the four-fold level of meaning drawn from medieval theology; to indicate her expansion of this scheme through her development of symbol and the ironic trope; and to point to the concrete expression of all this in our story.

The clarification of the four levels of meaning of a text was critically achieved by Aquinas in his own interpretation of Scripture and in dialectic with Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. It was executed through his analysis both of ordinary human knowing and of the ability for humans to know the supernatural /1/. His attention was focussed on the importance of the literal as the necessary starting point for reaching the spiritual meaning. This latter meaning was reached in three forms of interpretation that built on the literal, namely, the allegorical, the moral (tropological), and the anagogic (the mystery in itself).

In O'Connor's story one finds these different levels in the surface story of the journey of a family. The allegorical is present in the character of grandmother, who fits uncomfortably into a family, who accepts the cultural definitions of good, and who is dismayed that they are no longer able to hold at bay the encroaching decay. The allegorical is also found in the Misfit, who interprets himself as a victim of injustice in his own rationalization of self. But, as I have noted above, and I shall return to this point below, it is at this allegorical level that O'Connor introduces a radical transformation of symbol, which opens up a new power in her work and which suggests a new meaning of story-telling for the reader.

At the moral or tropological level, the consciousness and the meanings of both the grandmother and the Misfit are turned to the reader for identification, estimation, and appropriation. Because of her use of an ironic trope in the story and because of the flow of the symbols, O'Connor reaches out to the "near-blind" and in the encounter of a negative dialectic, she is involved in subverting the structure of our assumptions about reality, the way we define or accept good, self-knowledge, love and evil. The anagogic, and fourth level, is that of the final and foundational, redemptive meaning of a text, a life, a social and cultural world /2/. It is here that all other transformation finds its proper level. For O'Connor, it is the anagogic, mediated by the symbolic and the ironic, that unveils the ultimate resolutions present in the literal; it is here that the literal is fully transformed, that the inauspicious beginning in its ugliness and pretense is graced and redeemed.

There are two shifts in O'Connor's writings that invite an expansion in these levels and in the response of the reader. In the first place, the allegorical level is encompassed by a use of the symbol that more profoundly
reveals what is in the literal as it expands the literal from within its own surface. Ricoeur, much like O'Connor, has continually shown the need to save the symbolic from being overwhelmed by the allegorical. He notes that the difficulty with allegory in its relation to symbol is that it offers an immediate translation, and "Once the translation is made you can let the symbol fall by the way since it has become useless" (Ricoeur, 1960:100). In this mode of reading the literal dimension of the symbol, the "interpretation means tearing off the disguise and by that very fact rendering it useless" (100). Ricoeur then, finds the allegory is already a way of interpreting, whereas symbol is always prior to all interpretation, and "the symbol makes its meaning become transparent in quite another fashion than by translation. I should rather say it evokes, it suggests; ... the symbol yields its meaning in enigma" (202). One can recognize, then, that the symbol demands much more from the reader than paraphrase.

In the second place O'Connor offers an expansion of the third level of meaning, the moral or tropological, which opens a new depth in the reader's own interiority. This is executed when the reader turns to a demanding, self-conscious activity in the story itself, namely, that of interpreting through the ironic trope. Most simply, irony is the ability both to use language to say one thing while meaning something else and to focus attention on the process of moving through the literal to a second meaning. Irony gives greater power to O'Connor's symbols, with their attention on what is absent and their ability to make what is absent, present, for it suggests something about the relation of the reader and a text when the text is saying one thing and meaning another.

The ironic trope is basically dialectical in that it is a self-conscious negation by means of a verbal self-negation. As such the dialectic is negative and offers second thoughts about one's own estimation or judgment, imagination or investment; it introduces into one's total belief the hint of doubt. To affirm the negative of what one is offering positively in the literal, presupposes a self-recognition of the previously unquestioned assumptions in one's own interiority. In its most radical form, the irony questions not only one's beliefs, but the very ability to have a language mean anything. Hayden White speaks of it as "in one sense metatropological for it is deployed in the self-conscious awareness of the misuse of (other) figurative language" (White:37). Since it stands in an almost violent opposition to naive literalism, it unveils and demands growth in thought that forces questions to a level of critical self-consciousness.

The process of the ironic is that of a negative dialectic somewhat in the frame that Mary Gerhart suggests in her analysis of the ironic in Heinrich Boll's Group Portrait With Lady (Gerhart:188). She speaks of a "dialectic of immediacy" and a "dialectic of reflection," but in O'Connor it would seem that
one needs to add a further moment. If there is the naive dialectic of desire and genteel hostility, which irony confronts with subversion through a dialectic of reflection, there remains a third dialectic back to the level of immediacy, though, now, it is a second naiveté or a critical immediacy, which is a negation of the first negation—a negation of the adequacy of reasonable reflection to provide the meaning of the quest. The key to transformation is found in a critical retrieval of the symbols after one has gone through the moment of doubt that the second dialectic demands /3/. Through symbol and the ironic, the paradox as enigma is restored at a new level of determination. Without this moment of critical self-consciousness, one remains in some naiveté about the power of one's own thought to control all meaning.

The first part of O'Connor's story manifests the dialectic of first naiveté, the manipulation of others wherein one confronts opposition but still ironically: grandmother's effort at control brings forth varying confrontations with the family that reveal its emptiness and its hostilities, hostilities which are aimed ultimately at the whole social order. The move out of this first moment is in the awakening consciousness revealed in the symbols of story and daydream, and in the effort to find the source of the experienced conflict. But this moment is then joined by a "scholarly" dialectic of negations that the Misfit relentlessly offers both to himself and to the grandmother. This second moment is reversed, however, by a further turn that reaches through this negation to an authentic, purified love that, transcending the moment of doubt, strikes down the repudiations of the "scholarly" moment "like a serpent" and leaves us with the enigma of our own response to a love that is no longer naive, nor satisfied with its own explanations of the source of infection. This second move of negative dialectics restores one to a new immediacy in a love—shown in the human act of reaching that faces itself and finds the Misfit—that now subverts the power against it because it is a more than human love. One reaches the anagogic, then, through the mediations of symbol and irony which allow this mystery to manifest itself in the surface, in gestures and simple words, as irony questions language itself.

Writing to Cecil Dawkins, O'Connor speaks of these dialectical relations more prosaically. "It is what is invisible that God sees and the Christian must look for. Because he knows the consequences of sin, he knows how deep in you have to go to find love. We have our responsibility for not being 'little ones' too long, for not being scandalized. By being scandalized too long, you will scandalize others and the guilt for that will belong to you." At the close of the letter she attends to the second reversal: "You don't serve God by saying: the Church is ineffective. I'll have none of it. Your pain at its lack of effectiveness is a sign of your nearness to God. We help overcome this lack of effectiveness simply by suffering on account of it" (O'Connor, 1979:308).
I reach my third and final section on how the stories of transformation offer a hope of redemption of the act of reading, and, through the symbol which the story itself is, the possibility of a fully critical self-appropriation.

If O'Connor was a keen observer of human living, she was fully aware of the blinding literalism and positivism that any reader would have imbibed through the present culture, and she knew that a secular positivism had a corresponding moment in a religiously naive appropriation of Scriptural symbols, and a theologically naive dogmatism. Thus, it is clear and explicit with her that she needs to offer something that can lift the blinders--take off the glasses and clean them--and so to enable one to try again.

In the first place O'Connor's stories share with all other stories the invitation to interpretation, but because of her own understandings, they demand interpretation which allows one to become a keen observer of all that is, including the act of interpretation that engages the reader with O'Connor's text. Because of the complex action of the symbols and the irony, there is the possibility of knowing how they are engaging the reader's own consciousness. As the symbols immediately pull one below the surface of the story, so the irony works to invite the reader to the critical task of finding himself in the story, so as to find the story as a certain naming of one's own existence. In other words, O'Connor brings one to surface (reading), to symbol (interpretation), to irony (self-conscious interpretation of text and self), to the anagogic level (appropriation of the story of transformation as both self-transformation and as Redemption).

In following these four stages, one can recognize that reading is a first act of disruption whereby I move from the immediacy of my world, from positivism and literal being-in-the-world, to a new immediacy of the story and its characters. Within this new immediacy of story and reading, the symbols offer themselves as "food" for an act of understanding, by suggesting a new meaning that distances me from the immediate story and my reading, by presenting a new demand on my own consciousness; for as, in the act of reading, one spirals down through the interiority of the characters, so one is already spiralling into one's own subjectivity. It is a new direction of awareness.

As the symbol initiates the first displacement of the literal from within the text, so the irony extends the displacement by subverting the positivist, literal meaning and reading, in a radical demand not only for a new direction, but for a new level of awareness. Here the very ground on which we had settled, so as to begin following the symbol, is itself shattered in the negative dialectics. In this regard, it is not unimportant to note, as O'Conner
herself did, how differently people have identified with the characters in "A Good Man Is Hard To Find." Many professors have expressed bafflement that students should have identified with the grandmother, while some of the professors themselves have identified with the Misfit. It is only by means of negative dialectic, in the full irony, that all the characters are in some sense "us." We are Bailey, mother, children, grandmother and Misfit, and it is by allowing the literal text to move us by what it offers in the dynamic symbol and irony that we come to a moment of self-recognition.

Finally, then, the literal offers, through appropriation, what we are ourselves. As Ricoeur notes, "Appropriation remains the concept for the actualization of the meaning addressed to somebody ... Interpretation is completed in the appropriation when reading yields something like an event. As appropriation, interpretation becomes event" (Ricoeur, 1976:92). Again, in Gadamer's expression, appropriation is the fusion of horizons: "the world horizon of the reader is fused in the world horizon of the writer" (94). In accepting the felicitous formulation of Ricoeur I would want to underscore that "event" includes here not only self-understanding but also judgment on one's world, one's self, and the text. This final moment of judgment in appropriation is demanded by the ironic and its subversion, as in the subversion that ends O'Connor's story, which leaves one with the symbol of gestures of hope at second naiveté, and which can be critically understood and affirmed, yet remains opaque. The importance of this final hidden meaning is in its invitation to decision, the invitation that it offers to the reader to seek for the treasure that matters after this critical knowledge has occurred. Thus, in one of her own interpretations of this story O'Connor remarks how grace--the infinite gift of meaning bestowed in redeeming love--is offered by the old lady in her recognition of the Misfit as her child, as she, in turn, "has been touched by the grace that comes through his particular suffering. His shooting is a recoil, a horror at her humanness, but after he has done it and cleaned his glasses, the grace has worked in him and he pronounces his judgment; she would have been a good woman if he had been there every moment of her life. True enough" (O'Connor, 1979:389). The key to the appropriation is in the final two words, and in all that they say about the need, finally, to reach the limits of knowledge and to choose the authentic treasure.

To be clear on one matter here, I want to add that appropriation is not a new control of the text. The final irony and symbol still demand ongoing interpretation, and so they hold, still, a hidden treasure, a hope that one can share and become, yet one that remains intrinsically beyond one's own unaided power. Here what is offered, is what Ricoeur calls "a mode of being in the world that the text opens up in front of itself ... interpretation is the process by which disclosure of the new modes of being gives to the
subject a new capacity for knowing himself" (Ricoeur, 1976:94). It is in this way that O'Connor's story is itself a symbol, a symbol of what it means to live relentlessly for what will finally and completely nourish the soul, a symbol of gift accepted.

Writing about theological classics, David Tracy has suggested that "a classic may be defined as any text, event or person which unites particularity of origin and expression with a disclosure of meaning and truth available, in principle, to all human beings" (Tracy:349). In that sense O'Connor's work may well be on the way to becoming a classic; I would certainly argue for it. For the present, I want to claim that through her art, which she saw as a vocation, O'Connor offers the reader Redemption as transformation through the "hope embodied in story." That, it would seem, is no mean achievement, for a good story is hard to find. Consider the peacock.
NOTES

/1/ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 10, 10; Ia-IIae, q. 106, 1 ad 1; Quodlibet VII, 6, 2 and ad 5.


/3/ This entrance into a negative dialectics and the advance beyond that into a negation of the first negation is how I understand Paul Ricoeur's formulation of the move from a "hermeneutics of suspicion" to "second naïveté."
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1975
Perhaps the greatest, and the most generic need in theology today is for an account of the universal condition known traditionally as original sin, an account that is at once faithful to the tradition and drawn up in terms of our best contemporary psychological and anthropological insights.

The condition of original sin, to begin with, looks back to an original event. But let us try to think of that original event not as a sinful choice on the part of our first parents. It was what I am calling the consciousness explosion. In the most dramatic of all the events of an evolving cosmos, the animals of one species became self-aware and broke into that most mysterious thing denotative speech, whose mystery is celebrated inimitably by Walker Percy in "The Message in the Bottle".

To call the condition thus originated "original sin" may seem pessimistic, to say the least. Actually, it is only to take with full seriousness the event nature of our birth into self-awareness: that is, to consider it fully in relation to its past, when we were not self-aware. In that past, our psychology was constituted by total participation in the cosmic system. A remnant of this earlier condition is found in the "participation mystique" noted by Lévy-Bruhl as characteristic of primitive peoples.

Now with the birth of self-awareness, what happens to this early condition of total participation? Three things, I think. First, it ceases to be the sole principle of the animal's behaviour; for it has been displaced by a new principle, namely self-awareness with its cognate exercise, the making of choices. But secondly, self-awareness confers on the sense of being a participant in the whole a quality that that sense could not have had for the animal. A quality of awe. The whole no longer inserts its demands easily and unconsciously into the animal's organism and psychism: it stands over and all around the bewildered animal, full of threat and promise. Thirdly, the whole, thus newly experienced as other, itself undergoes a momentous change in significance. For now it is obscurely perceived as a willed whole, an intended world. We have the first realization, as old as self-awareness itself, of a power beyond this world, by which this world is. If we have to
wait for Israel to see this distinction clearly affirmed, it is nevertheless given
with the beginning of self-awareness—else what was it that Israel discovered?
The emergent self not only alters the whole configuration of nature for its
animal possessor, thus giving the fantastic complexities of human sexuality; it
perforce finds its own quality of consciousness and intention in the circumam-
bient mystery that once lapped the unselfaware animal all about. The tempta-
tion to think we invented God owes its vigour and perennial allure to the
immediacy with which the newly emergent self-awareness gets projected onto
the enclosing mystery. Not to attribute self-awareness to the mystery is to
be less than self-aware. There is, in other words, the wisdom of the primit-
tive. It was not possible to break out of the whole into consciousness
without sensing consciousness in the whole. And the subsequent differ-
etiation between God and the whole, attained by Israel, did not consist in
saying "God is not the whole" but "the whole is not God". It was all this
world that was peeled off from the original sense of God, not God that was as
it were steamed off from this world.

It seems to me that an understanding of this original God-conscious-
ness must be normative for the whole critique of religion. It is said for
instance that faith in a God who transcends the world is what underlies our
western exploitation of nature, which now brings us the the brink of nuclear
annihilation. But it is as intending this world, it is as personifying
the circumambient mystery, that God originally and normatively comes upon us.
A world-exploiting faith in the transcendent distorts our original religious-
ness. James Watt for example.

The story of the Fall is the statement of the price of self-awareness,
of the loneliness, tensions, and alienation of the animal, once self-awareness
has exploded upon it. Kierkegaard has the best metaphor for this new cre-
ation. He calls it the awakening from a dream. If "I dreamt I dwelt in marble
halls", I don't wake up to a marble hall, but to an untidy bedroom. The
consciousness explosion is our emergence from the participation mystique of
the tribe to the loneliness of being an "I", knowing that there is good and
evil, having to choose; and choice is a lonely thing.

The myth makes a necessary simplification in the interests of its
story-form. We could not have chosen to be self-aware, to awake from the
tribal dream. I cannot have chosen to be an "I". But the myth has Adam
and Eve choose enlightenment against God's will, and pay the price in aliena-
tion of the sexes, economic anxiety, and the dread of death.

I have found helpful, for understanding this awesome awakening to
the world that was previously the whole life of the animal, the trauma
suffered by a small child when, long before he/she is able to handle the
experience, he/she is brought face-to-face with a total breakdown in the
parental order that but lately gave all security and meaning. One of the
most unforgettable scenes in modern literature is a Robertson Davies novel. The small boy finds the bathroom full of people standing around a bath full of bloody water—scene of his mother's attempted suicide. In Eliot's play "The Family Reunion", the effect of the trauma is spelt out. Harry is learning from Agatha that, while he was still in the womb, his father fell in love with Agatha and sought to kill his wife. Harry now recalls how "that night, when she kissed me, I felt the trap close." He remembers "the day on which he died—I mean, I suppose, the day on which the news arrived", a day of "silences filled by the whispering of triumphant aunts". Now what really happens in this play is that little Harry, traumatized by a breakdown of the family order, is jolted into "the other world", "the world around the corner", the elemental world, spiritual, timeless, natural, promising, threatening. This is perhaps the most economical parable we have in modern literature for that "jolting" into the cosmic, nonhuman world, which took place when we left participation in that world for exposure to it. The animal breaks out of its cosmic psychic womb to find him/herself surrounded by spirits friendly and malevolent.

With the moral development of this new animal, the enclosing whole is increasingly sensed to have behind it a will: conscience develops. With the mystical development, there comes to be a sense of the undifferentiated all as calling, inviting, drawing. The mystical is the clearest inking we have of a condition beyond original sin, in which, in and through our self-awareness with its sense of the whole as other, a person can feel drawn by the whole.

But if we consider, not these two leadings beyond our condition but the condition itself; and if we recall that even mystics and men and women of conscience have to live in this world, we have to say that the self-awareness explosion has inaugurated a condition for which the primordial sense for the whole has been displaced by self-awareness which can only proceed by making choices, that can only be among particulars, and that thus cannot connect us with the whole. Self-awareness displaces the whole, displaces God, into the ambivalent region of the dream.

The condition of original sin, then, is: undifferentiated union with the whole, displaced into the dreamworld, into the world called "religion", by self-awareness. Self-awareness lives in the particular, and demands that I make choices. It is "the knowledge of good and evil", the knowledge that there is good and evil, that choice has to be made, and choice is lonely. The generic sinfulness of this condition consists in the inability of choice to actualize the undifferentiated union with the whole that we yet crave for.

Generic or original sinfulness, then, is not primarily a bias toward evil. It is an inability for the enormous good that draws, and therefore a tendency to evil. It is an ineptitude produced by the enormous mystery into which the consciousness explosion is our first step. It is a languor engen-
dered by a too-bracing climate. It is a sickness whose measure is a divine wholeness.

We have, alas, been profoundly influenced by a theology of original sin that fails to interpret, in any serious sense, the story of the Fall. Instead of seeing the story as our primary myth, describing the birth of self-awareness with its attendant trauma, traditional theology has taken the story literally in the important and fatal particular that before the crucial event, the couple are self-aware and God-conscious beings. Thus the way was effectively blocked against seeing the Fall as the birth of our consciousness and the beginning of our God-awareness as we lost the preconscious, primordial union, to which we are now drawn as conscious beings. In other words, the revelatory mirror to our condition was rendered opaque by monkish thinkers. And it has taken the eventful century since Darwin for us to realize that not to believe in original sin is not to believe in evolution: for it is never to have appropriated emotionally the traumatic implications of apes becoming self-aware. Similarly I would say that to find it easy to say that we invented God, is not to believe in evolution: for it is to own no part in that first moment when we stood out of our animality and first looked with awe upon the mystery that had lapped us all around. Similarly, to say that angels and devils are mere projections of our sense of Good and Evil, is not to believe in evolution: for it is to forget that it is we who are projected out of animal consciousness into a threatening and promising spiritual world. In short, we awoke from animal consciousness into an awful loneliness for which the ultimate reality is a dream. The dream-character of the really real is the condition of generic or original sin.

Admittedly this raises the question: Has God, then, chosen to grow us through sin? I am convinced that this problem is soluble. It seems so clear that original or generic sin consists in a defective perception of God. Original sin is disconnectedness.

The boldness with which the Christian tradition calls this condition "sinful", and has "the scripture conclude all under sin", comes from a divinely inspired nostalgia for the whole in which a mysterious love conceived us, out of which and to which it awoke us, in which complex condition it continually calls upon us to venture further. The doctrine of original sin states the infinity of the reality in whose presence the spiritual being lives, and refuses to judge that being by a closer-to-it standard than the infinite. We are stumbling after union with a dreamed and unknown God: that is our greatness and our wretchedness.

But if the union lost through self-awareness constitutes us in a radical state of generic sin, much more does it constitute us in a state of desire. If the lost union broods over us and judges our trivial way of thinking and living, our Alltäglichkeit as Heidegger calls it, much more does
it entice us beyond it. The condition of self-awareness feels at once judged and drawn. We desire to be united, in the selfhood whereby we lost the whole, with the whole. We desire to be one, in consciousness, as once we were in the preconscious condition.

We also know that this state of unity cannot be through a return to the pre-self-aware condition. And for this reason, those of our contemporary spiritual movements that seek the dissolution of the ego are unfaithful to our experience.

The persistence of the image of union, combined with the realization that there is no going back must turn our attention to what lies at the end: death. As the point of convergence of desire with no-return, death shows its character as the dissolution of our present mode of self-awareness: and its similarity, perspicuous to the spirit, with our original preconscious simplicity, suggests that it is the gateway to the final state of union. We live between two oceans of mysteriousness, as Eliot understood so well when he spoke of "the dreamcrossed twilight between birth and dying".

But how is death to be for us, in the total truth of a committed faith, this gateway? Only if we have been, first, awakened to the full reality of our "fallen" condition and of the lost and haunting union, and secondly, thus awakened, have tasted the death in which alone it is to be entered.

This I believe was the condition of the disciples of Jesus, the paradigm of Christian experience. Awakened by him, the new man free of the old sinfulness, for whom God was no dream, and necessarily experiencing this dangerous new awakeness as focused in and dependent on him, they were thrown, by his death, into that final darkness wherein alone--all of our psyche and all of its myths are telling us--the eternal light can shine upon us.

It has become increasingly clear to me that this "eternal light" could only be Jesus himself, encountered after his death in a way that could persuade the human spirit in its ultimate stubbornness that heaven was and had arrived, had come out of the closet of the dream. The criterion of the realism of our resurrection doctrine lies precisely in saying: that it was real enough to conquer this final stubbornness of originally sinful man; and that there is nothing more real than this.

II

SEX AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLOSION

First, very briefly. In any friendship, both the friends are psychologically present to each friend. I feel myself, and I feel your feeling for myself. There is thus an elliptical movement of eros. Now between man and
woman, the ellipse of eros moves around the psychic presence of both sexes in each sex. I feel myself, as male, and I feel the woman's feeling of me. I desire, and I feel desired. But this balance is difficult of attainment. For originally, with the consciousness explosion, the newly emerged self grabs all it can of my natural being and calls it my sex. There is a high-pressure fusion of self with gender, giving sexual identity. This in turn involves a splitting-off of my other-sex-feeling or soul, its relegation—with God, see §1—to the dream; whence it is only recalled with difficulty and much counter-cultural initiative. Society throws far more energy into making boys boys and girls girls than it does into promoting understanding between the sexes. Now let's put this into the dirt and grow it!

Much of what follows is told from a male point of view. I hope, however, that I am touching the deeper level where "it works both ways". There are two ingredients in a strong sexual attraction. We are so used to experiencing them together that we do not observe how dramatically they differ. The first is the arousal of desire. While this is of course awakened by the other person, there is something profoundly self-centered, indeed narcissistic in it. There is intense physical pleasure, and this pleasure is very much involved—another thing that is not attended to—with the kind of pleasure we experience when someone pays us a compliment. It is in the pathology of the "flasher" that we see, dramatically, the identity between the desire for sexual stimulation and the desire for attention. Further, it is not just the self that draws sexual pleasure into its own intense desire for attention, wholly shaping the pleasure to the attention-loving: it is the self as male or as female. In sexual attraction a man is in love with his maleness, exults in its rising up in him, in its tidalelan. He struts. Literature and drama is full of the grandiose posturings of the horny.

The other ingredient? Although it comes together with the experience of arousal, it is summoned from a different quarter. It rises from the world of dreams. It is centered on something as passionately myself as is the arousal, but what a different part of myself! Deep within me, and sometimes clothing my feeling of her in a dream, there is "the partner". She is of my very substance. She is me but a "me" I hardly dare to avow. At the thought of her I feel something like guilt, the guilt of "having it both ways": for she is both myself and another. She is a mirror to myself, but not a straight, prosaic mirror like the one I shave in front of, but one of deep mystery in which I can appear wonderful to myself.

Now both ingredients come into play together, but as soon as the game starts, the difference between them is vividly felt. The other who has aroused me soon refuses the role of representing the inner partner. And of course it's quite right that she should. "I'm not your anima or deeper life. I'm me!"
But the inner partner, we have seen, is not there so that I may worship myself in a woman. She is there so that through her I can experience the woman’s desire for me and so enlarge my feeling for her. The intentionality of the inner partner is not narcissistic but relational. Through the inner partner or soul, we have an absolutely overmastering desire to live both our desire for the other and the other’s desire for us. A friend told me once how she and a priest found themselves to be in love. Standing on deck on an ocean liner, the following dialogue took place:

She: I, Mary, take you John.
He: No, I, Mary, take you, John.

Now this cannot happen perfectly. And the reason for this is clear. My inner partner does not fully represent the woman I am relating to. They are not the same. Nevertheless we want the thing to work "perfectly". We crave for the perfect union. And so we crave for a state of affairs in which there would be this sameness between the woman and my inner partner. I cannot know a woman through my own interior woman unless the woman "comes out of" me and I out of her. Now this is precisely what the Genesis story depicts: God makes the man and the woman out of each other. And this makes for the perfect or impossible union for which we crave. "Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh!"

Paradisal sex, then, is incestuous! The reason why the incest tabu is the strongest of all tabus is that the gate of Paradise is closed to us, and guarded by the angel with the flaming sword. And indeed the incest tabu, the forbidding of the "royal union", the separating of the two centers of sexual joy within the person, is a wounding. Robert Stein speaks of "the incest wound" in all of us, meaning the trauma we bear of having been forbidden the impossible paradisal union. The incest tabu is the continuation of the expulsion from Paradise. Freud’s contention that the most passionate love affair we ever had was the forgotten passion for the parent begins to make a new kind of sense. And why does the Song of Songs, the most passionate love-song there is, have the man cry out "my sister, my bride!"? What, for that matter, makes Hegel say that the brother-sister relationship is the most significant? So much begins to make sense when we call into awareness those two centers of passion, recognize their difference, the turbulent history of their interaction, and the myth of their original oneness in a now impossible paradisal union. The English novelist Alan Sharp depicts a very passionate brother-sister love in "A Green Tree in Gedde". It's a bit of a curiosity, because most authors don't dare this area. What I remember of his description of their sexual encounters is that they know each other physically in the way that one only really knows oneself. There is a strange absence of that strangeness that is always present to some extent between a man and a woman. Another literary clue is provided by a brilliant but irresponsible
author, Malachi Martin. In "Hostage to the Devil", he describes a case of
demonic possession into which a young man is lured by the desire to ex-
perience both sexes in himself.

In the "fallen" condition that is ours, the life of the other sex in a
person belongs (with God) to the world of the dream. This lowlighting of the
"other" is the price of self-awareness, of the highlighting of the self. It is
because of this strangeness to me of the woman-life in myself that the woman,
out there, has a certain strangeness for me. If, on the contrary, I were as
vividly in touch with the woman-life in myself as I am with my male desire, I
would not see "a stranger" in the woman I encounter. She would appear to
me as my very own life, as "bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh". The
powerful attraction of incest for the primitive is that the partner, being of
his own flesh, represents the life in himself, the woman of himself with whom
he is in love as with life itself. And vice versa.

This is the pull of the paradisal condition. It is the attempt to
re-enter Paradise, to get past that angel with the flaming sword. The reason
why there is no way back, the reason the myth wisely places that angel
there, is that this would involve the loss of self-awareness, of the high-
lighting and consequent lowlighting. "I" would be lost in that sea of seeming
bliss that the paradisal union with my own life in the other suggests. Incest
is the way back, and it means oblivion and so is barred.

If the self-aware animal is to come to the bliss of union with his or
her own life in the other, this must be through going forward, not back.
and the way forward does in fact head toward a condition of "losing oneself
in the whole", that resembles that (now impossible) plunge back of the self-
aware self into the sea of life: namely death. It is only through undergoing
death that the animal who has come to self-awareness can come to that bliss
of union with his or her own life in the other that the paradise myth
suggests but can only suggest. The estrangement between man and woman--
which really precontains all our estrangements and conflicts--looks for its
resolution to the experience of death.

This cannot mean, however, that the healing is only "on the other
side", in a world after death. To believe in God is to believe in one who can
transform this life of ours, this society we form. A God who offers bliss
only after death is no God, for he does not come out of the dream into the
real world. Thus there has to be a tasting of death by people in this life
and in this world, brought about by the God who alone can perform this
miracle. This is precisely what God has done and is forever doing, in the
drama of Jesus in us. And that is why Paul sees the new life in Christ as,
precisely, a life without estrangement, in which "there is no more male or
female, slave or free, Greek or Jew, but only, and in all, Christ." The very
concrete way in which Paul sees us as members of the new body, the body of
Christ, makes new sense in this context.
In sum, we cannot feel each other's desire as our own. If we did, we could not feel our own in the way that self-aware animals must. Primitives are closer than we to feeling each other's desire. It is self-awareness that demotes "the other within" to being a dream figure, as it demotes God. And primitives, be it noted, do not have our sharp distinction between dream and waking.

A very helpful idea for pulling all this together is the following. Most psychologists agree that all the characters in a dream are facets of the dreamer's personality. So the woman in my dream is myself as soul. Now suppose you had a society where they didn't really distinguish between dream and waking consciousness, a society where people "dream each other" as they meet. In that society, sexual partners would experience each other as part of themselves. Their concourse would be "incestuous". Now it seems that primitive societies do not in fact make a sharp distinction between dream and waking consciousness. This is the meaning of "participation mystique". One sees, then, the profundity of Kierkegaard's comparison of the Fall with the awakening from a dream. The awakening from the dream, the highlighting of self and lowlighting of other-within, the extolling of sexual identity over other-sex-feeling, the expulsion from Paradise, the breaking of the incestuous union, are all ways of describing the same momentous event: what I am calling the consciousness explosion. A diagram may help.

**MALE PSYCHE BEFORE AND AFTER**

(switch gender for female)

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**THE PARADISAL CONDITION OF PARTICIPATION MYSTIQUE**

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**THE CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLOSION POWERFULLY FUSES SELF WITH GENDER thus weakening soul-sense of the other sex**

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"Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh."

(part of self because dream and waking are one)

(real woman)

(dream partner)

(real woman)

(dream partner)

(flaming sword of consciousness inflicts "incest wound")

(not part of self because dream and waking not one)
III
HE IS RISEN INDEED

The central belief of Christianity, which holds all the others together, is that Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead and now is forever alive.

What do we mean, "rose from the dead"? The obvious meaning, that occurs to most people and is, perforce, what artists have portrayed, is that he came to life in the tomb and left it. Now although it is highly likely that this happened, and although the empty tomb is an integral part of the gospel message and cannot be ignored, this meaning leaves unanswered all the important questions, like "Where is he now?", "What is his status or condition now?", in short "What did he rise to? What is the life he now enjoys?" Very simply: "What is he doing?" (not in the sense of "What is the Government doing?" but in the way we ask about something whose place in the scheme of things we do not understand). Only if we can answer these questions can we say what "He rose from the dead" means.

As central to Christianity as the belief that Jesus rose is the belief that he alone, of all who have lived, rose. Now this makes it difficult to answer the above questions. There is no category into which we can fit the resurrection of Jesus. It is its own category. So how can we answer the question "What sort of life does he now have?" Sorts are categories, and we don't have one.

How then are we to set about asking the question, crucial to the meaning of Christian belief, "To what did Jesus rise? What did Jesus, rising, become?" For we cannot describe or define the risen life of Jesus as we describe or define anything else, that is, as an objective reality irrespective of how it affects us.

What is left? Only one way. We have to consider the risen life of Jesus as it affects us. Is it perhaps possible by considering the risen life as an influence, in its effect, to show at once its power and beauty and divinity, and its uniqueness?

And here we seem to be on solid ground. For it was precisely as an influence, as a force, as a power at work on people, that the risen Jesus was first encountered and proclaimed.

Now to explore the risen life as an influence or power over people, is to ask the following questions: What condition were people in, before the force hit them? What did it do to them and for them? And what was their condition as a result of this encounter? And--most important--can we give answers to these questions that would not be appropriate answers to these same questions asked about any other people undergoing a profound experience involving one who had died?
My answer to the first question is as follows. To come under the influence of a charismatic leader is to undergo a certain simplification of desire. This is an awakening of the haunting sense humanity bears of a lost paradise, of a wholeness of life and union felt to have been ruptured by the consciousness explosion—and of course rendered desirable by it alone. The leader evokes this lost wholeness. This is the importance of utopianism in all significant revolutions. But so long as the leader is there as a particular focus of the awakened desire, the latter's simplification is arrested. Only with the leader’s death is the process carried through. The followers then can come into a condition that anticipates death, brings their life, their desire, their hope, into that "condition of complete simplicity" (Eliot) which we shall enter when we die but do not normally enter now. So doing, they "outgrow" the leader, become more mature and self-directed persons. But in the case of Jesus, the "new man" free of the old sin, the awakening is incomparably more powerful, is in fact a realization of Paradise: of that Paradise whose conscious possession in this life, whose possession with self-awareness, seems impossible.

With the death of this leader, it is no mere hint of our desire for Paradise that is brought into the simplicity of death: it is the desire itself, as awakened to the new man. It is the original desire breaking through the original sin in which it has been, as it were, incubated. This is an anticipation of death that can hardly be called metaphorical. You have people for whom there is nothing more in this life. All that makes life significant has been brought to consciousness and then brought to death.

The vital question then is: Since they are still alive, since they are not disappearing into the all-engulfing mystery that we shall enter at death, how can they experience what follows death, that condition where the ultimate reality of our life, and of all life, and of all that is, shows itself?

It is as the answer to this question that the risen Jesus is to be understood. It is as ultimate truth breaking in on those who, while yet living, are dead to all this world, that the new condition of Jesus is to be understood. It is as completing, perfecting, enspiriting those whom a divine mission has brought to this threshold, that the risen Jesus is to be understood. It is from this awesome context of the divine transformation of the human through the awakening of original desire from original sin and the consequent anticipation of death with the loss of the awakener, and from this context alone, that the life-giving condition of Jesus then and for all time draws its intelligibility for those whom a theological mind compels to seek it.

The presence of the risen Jesus, then, is not the presence of the living to the living, such as we have to each other. Nor is it the presence, sometimes vivid, of the dead to the living. It is the presence of the living to the dead, inviting them into eternal life.
And now that we've cleared this vital meaning of Jesus' risenness, we see how traditional it is. The notion of the sight of the risen Jesus as a foretaste of heaven is implied in all the resurrection proclamation, and comes closest to my understanding of the matter in the Pauline statement: "For you have died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. Your real life is Christ and when he appears, then you too will appear with him and share his glory" (Col 3:3).

I suspect that the difficulty many modern theologians have with the resurrection is really a difficulty with heaven. When did you last hear a sermon about heaven? The very reason people give for not thinking about heaven—that it means "a pie in the sky when you die" and has nothing to do with reality—indicates that they are not thinking of heaven as the totality of the real which is now held in check by the relative unreality of our lives but which will burst forth in "the life to come". As Eliot says:

Yet the enchainment of past and future
Woven in the weakness of the changing body,
Protects mankind from heaven and damnation
Which flesh cannot endure.

Burnt Norton

It has been suggested to me that the disciples did not really experience their death till they saw the risen one. That seems to me profoundly correct. An experience of God is so far beyond us that it has to create its own immediate past as it comes upon us. Jesus lives. Gently, through the persuasion of the Spirit, he brings us the living to death, and there lives for us bringing us ever more fully into the life beyond death.

The animal coming into self-awareness loses perforce its oneness with the cosmos: loses it in two directions—to the dream whence our great myths come, and to death, in whose dissolving of us we intuitively foresee some recovered oneness with the all.

So we are in-between people, strangely bounded by the memory of a oneness lost and the forecast of a oneness reasserted in death. Our present life is held back by self-awareness from some totality of union, some "inapprehensible Zero summer" (Eliot, Little Gidding) of which we dream. For us it is written "No one can see me and live."

Now I believe that it is only in this strange time of axial shift that we are able to sense, deeply within ourselves and our experience of each other, this "in-betweenness", what Eliot calls "the dreamcrossed twilight between birth and dying". And this means that we are able to hear the story of the Fall and hear something different from what our forebears heard. They heard that we started in Paradise where once we lived, as the self-
aware beings we now are, and lost it by sin. What we hear, with a more inward ear, is that it is self-awareness that brings us out of Paradise, makes of it a dream.

But then, far more urgently than for our ancestors, the question arises: What is the ultimate ontological status of this paradisal or oneness condition, that tantalizingly beckons to our waking life from "death's dream kingdom" and from "death's other kingdom"--and isn't Eliot truly amazing? And so for us, far more powerfully than for our ancestors, the risen Jesus can appear, as the answer to this new question about the ontological reality of a consciousness beyond our time-bound existence. Not a theoretical answer, but an existential one; namely a spiritual enablement to anticipate death and taste that state of union that is beyond our reach as "in-between people".

The old axiom "No one can see me and live" is stretched to breaking-point by the risen Jesus, to see whom is to be dead yet still living and therefore sent as the Son is sent, into a world new to our eyes.

For the risen Jesus to "work" for his disciples, his presence has to be in this world with the same force that the Good Friday desolation pushes them beyond this world. The "in" and the "beyond" are the coordinates of the risen life.

Thus to know Christ Jesus is to outgrow an earlier relationship to the myth of the Fall. For our forebears, it was "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained". For us it is "Paradise lost to the dream; Paradise thrust into waking by the Son: Paradise realized with the Son in the Spirit of sanctification through the resurrection from the dead."

This means that we are no longer defined by the myth, compelled to live in it as characters in its drama. We measure it by ourselves awakened to the limitless dimensions of the risen Christ; it, and all the other myths. I am reading the storm of criticism that greeted "The Waste Land". That poem was doing something terribly threatening: it was marking a watershed in consciousness, in which the myths in which we have lived, from the vegetation gods to the Christ story itself, are become mirrors to our tragic and bewildered self-awareness. There is no way back from "such knowledge". But the way on is an encounter with the risen one which foretastes as never before the age come.

IV
TRINITY

The Trinity is the order of God's becoming known: that is, the order of our being revealed to ourselves as of God. We, all existence, existence itself, is from the Father through the Son in the Spirit. "From"
points to an incomprehensible originating infinity. "Through" contracts this infinity, focusing on the particular of existence. "In" indicates the superabundant consciousness into which we are drawn, in which the infinite and the particular are one life of God in us.

There is no unfolding of the Trinity that is not its unfolding in us and our being revealed as of the Godhead. It is only in us that Godhead goes through the process of total incomprehensibility, total particularity, and fullness of life in which the former two are one.

That is why all attempts to explain the Spirit as the love between the Father and the Son, prescinding from "God in us", must fail. This "love" cannot be understood except as God's completing of his self-disclosure in us. It is as otherwise contradictory for us—the infinite versus the particular—that the Father and the Son are one in the Spirit.

That is why the "original" theology, the theology that still tastes what it expounds, never speaks of the Spirit as the depth of the Godhead without referring to the completion of us, the "anointing" of us, the working of a new and mysteriously discerning taste in us. A robust early terminology speaks of the human being as composed of body, soul, and Holy Spirit.

In other words, the completion of the Godhead is the completion of us. The Spirit completes the Godhead in us. And what is the completing of us? It is our becoming one. It is the realization, embracing at last all the tensions and achievements of self-awareness, of that one life in us all whose first realization was the participation mystique, the socialized dream, the Paradise out of which we awoke into self-awareness, the knowledge of good and evil, the long and stony way.

Thus the Spirit is primarily known as "making us one". This simple phrase describes the end: the end of the journey in the ending of God.

Nor can we dissociate the "long and stony way" from the Way of the Cross, the way of all historical humanity as it approaches its teleiosis in the Spirit of God.

Finally, I have come to see that it is misleading to speak, as we always do, of "the Trinity and the Incarnation". For this insinuates a certain order of thought: first the three persons are spelt out, and then the second one is considered as incarnate. It would be much better to speak of "the Incarnation and the Trinity". Until the Godhead has been broken-out for us with the Son as flesh and all flesh in the Son, there does not exist that huge apparent contradiction of the incomprehensible and the particular which finds its resolution in the Holy Spirit, the wholeness of God's life in us which is God's life in itself.
THE PRIMACY OF SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE
IN THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

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One word that has acquired considerable theological currency in recent years is experience. It can be argued that doing theology belongs to the pastoral mission of the Church, that theological reflection is initiated within the setting of the Church's pastoral life, and therefore that ideally every theological effort is oriented to assisting the Church's pastoral concern that men and women should experience the saving grace of Christ.

Experience lies at the heart of the major renewal efforts of our time. The charismatic movement, spiritual direction, directed retreats, marriage encounter, the curtillo—-all of these represent a turn to the faith-experience of believers and a desire on the part of many people to acquire an experiential knowledge of God. For it is through the ordinary experiences of life that God speaks to and encounters his people. Through the careful art of discernment believers are made sensitive to the distortions which can distance them from the wider communion of faith and love that is the Church; they learn to steer clear of an idiosyncratic appropriation of the Gospel. But discernment also attends to the importance of one's personal experience of God, since in the long run a spiritual life actually familiar with the ways of God will prove more rewarding, more convincing, and more faithful to the movements of the Spirit than a spiritual life which is for the most part unexamined.

Theologically too, experience (and not only historical praxis) has become an increasingly important component in the Church's hearing and responding to the Gospel. In his book Ministry to Word and Sacrament (1976), Bernard Cooke suggested that the Church is above all an experiential reality; by being church we come to understand what Church is. The British scripture scholar James Dunn has argued impressively that religious experience of the Gospel held a certain priority over later conceptual explications of the Gospel's message, and that there was some diversity in the very experiences which lay behind the gospel (Dunn, 1977). David Tracy wrote of the critical correlation of Christian texts and common human experience in order to discover how theological reflection is funded (Tracy, 1975). Hans Küng's On Being a Christian (1976) is an attractive exposition of Christian faith against the background of western European cultural experience, while the
work of Latin American theologians like Jose Miranda, Jon Sobrino, and Juan
Luis Segundo, has arisen from the context of long-standing injustice and
oppression. Experience also keynotes the encounter of Christianity with
eastern religions. That dialogue has been conducted less through a com-
parison of theologies than by exploring the religious experience out of which
believers come to recognize that God’s presence has never been restricted to
any one religious tradition. 

Attending to the importance of experience in theological reflection is
hardly novel, of course; on what other basis would theologians reflect?
There comes a point, for example, when further explication of scriptural texts
is fruitless unless someone is preaching the biblical word. And preaching the
word of God supposes that we are interpreting how the word of God is meet-
ing us now. This involves a hermeneutical task; religiously speaking, it may
also require some prophetic insight. But however we explain it, preaching
(and thus the interpretation of biblical texts) occurs against the background
of ordinary human experience. Experience, it could be said, exercises a
certain priority over the conceptualization of experience, which simply re-
states the claim that theology is ultimately a pastoral enterprise, for it is
called to serve the pastoral mission of the Church.

Needless to say, merely juxtaposing experience and reflection would
be a terrible oversimplification. Experience and understanding penetrate each
other. The world in which human beings live is socially constituted, and
many factors determine the way we experience that world. Political, eco-
nomic, and cultural values sediment in our language and thought. Thus our
experience of God can be put into words, words express what is meant, and
meanings in turn structure the way we experience. The words and images we
employ only underscore the close relation between Being and Saying, as
Heidegger put it; Being shows itself in language.

But neither is the mutual influence of experience and language a
closed circle. Learning and inquiry are the dynamic activities through which
new meanings are generated and new ranges of experience become possible.
Finally, however, salvation depends on our experiencing the transforming
power of God’s presence and not so much on our being able to describe him.
The ingredients of ecclesial reality cannot be dispensed with; scripture,
sacrament, doctrine, tradition are required to mediate God’s presence. But
God meets people through the thoughts, feelings, and events of human life;
the reality which forms the stuff of religious life is constituted by people
actually in contact with God.

In an address to the Catholic Theological Society, Lonergan observed
that there may be "basic theological questions whose solution depends on the
personal development of the theologian" (Lonergan, 1977:2). He develops
that point at greater length in *Method in Theology* (1972) where the founda-
tions of theology appear to be the authentically converted theologian. It can
be shown that radical self-appropriation by way of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion transforms both the reality which the theologian is and the horizon within which he carries on his reflection. Lonergan wrote:

The functional specialty, foundations, will derive its first set of categories from religious experience. . . . There is needed in the theologian the spiritual development that will enable him both to enter into the experience of others and to frame the terms and relations that will express that experience (Lonergan, 1972:290).

Lonergan's position stands quite nicely alongside Anselm's "faith seeking understanding," for theological reflection in both instances presupposes that theologians have had some experience with the ways of God. Without faith theology is reduced to a formal and tasteless inquiry into the religious nature of human being. Without faith theological issues would have to be approached by appealing to worlds accessible to self-appropriated reason and will; but the world of religion would remain closed. In short, basic theological questions would be unanswerable.

To speak in this fashion, of course, is to phrase the matter in methodological terms. I could also have said that nothing can substitute for personal familiarity with God when serious theological reflection is called for, and that theology is influenced as much by the religious life of the theologian and his or her faith-community as it is by the historical-cultural setting to which the theologian belongs. Or again, if we agree with Lonergan that doctrines which are normative for belief are selected on the basis of foundations, then we are led to conclude that the process of selecting relies on a grasp of what Christian faith is all about. Foundational reality includes, after all, a horizon of faith. Theological process cuts then with two blades: while the lower blade is a theologian's technical mastery of a particular field, the upper blade is one's ongoing development by way of intellectual, moral and religious conversion.

There is an ecclesiological parallel. The Church stands always in need of being attuned to the Gospel, but attunement is not a once for all achievement. Now, learning how to listen to God's revelation puts the Church in touch with its foundation, namely, the mystery of Christ's saving death and resurrection. The active principle involved in correctly attending to the voice of God speaking through the Gospel is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the moment in which the Church interprets the Gospel afresh--together with all the preparation leading to that moment--is fundamentally charismatic /2/. In order to develop Lonergan's discussion of foundational reality and the theological task of interpreting doctrines, one has to consider the personal development of the theologian; and therefore theology needs to take seriously the current interest in religious experience and spiritual discernment. For it is on the concrete level with which spiritual direc-
tation deals that one starts to notice real illustrations of the methodological and hermeneutical discussion among theologians about foundational reality. On that level where faith is lived and practiced we find the warrants for claiming that the hermeneutical moment is basically charismatic, that is, directed by the Holy Spirit.

There are then two distinct but related issues. The first one is ecclesiological. It concerns how the Church itself comes to acknowledge the truth of the Gospel, either in the process of attempting to hear the good news afresh, or in considering how to proclaim the Gospel in contemporary terms, or when it is weighing the kind of witness and response which the word of God calls for. Ultimately, the truth of the Gospel is properly perceived only under the light of the Holy Spirit. Such discernment presupposes the fact that the Church stands under the word of God and is engaged in the ongoing task of conversion and renewal. It means that all the parties involved in this discernment—bishops, teachers, theologians, and the faithful—are sincerely trying to live in Christ Jesus. The phrase sensus fidelium, after all, would be rendered practically useless unless it refers to the mind of the faithful. One sign that such discernment is genuine, I suggest, is the consensus which results. By refusing to accept the decree Lumen Gentium until it was adequately understood and thus reflected a real union of hearts and minds, the bishops at Vatican II exemplified the fact that the Spirit characteristically moves believers towards greater unity; that, as Cyprian said, unanimity—being of one heart and mind—is the clear sign of Christ's presence and not the mere number of those who gather in his name.

The second issue concerns theologians. Our capacity to hear, understand, and articulate the Gospel is a function both of professional competence and of growth in faith. Our activity is bracketed within the ecclesial reality which we serve and which carries us also towards God. Taking seriously the role of the theologian's personal development as it bears on the theological dimension of church life, what realities play a significant role in our continuing religious conversion? What factors influence our understanding and judgment on the foundational level where God is not just known about, but is actually known?

Theological reflection takes place within a particular intellectual orientation and cast of mind. The way a theologian thinks, the manner in which he or she sizes up issues, evaluates and criticizes, depends on prior moral, intellectual, and religious determinations. Now while that religious determination can be reflected on and understood, it eludes a technical mastery of its movement and influence on us; it is alive and active. And the
reason why religion cannot finally be technically mastered is that religious people live within a prolonged, life-giving relation with God. This is the sort of claim that Heidegger made from the philosophical side when he pointed out that metaphysics needs to discover how Being gives itself to thought, for Being (despite the technological, scientific slant of Western thinking) cannot be manipulated or mastered by a system of ideas.

The conclusion is that "technical" knowledge of God is impossible. No matter how successful a theology of sacraments, an ecclesiology, or a christology proves to be, a technical exposition of sacrament, Church, or the person of Jesus Christ will only amount to more or less comprehensive ways of integrating our concepts and ideas, unless theologians are moved by a life-giving desire for God. In the biblical field, perhaps the difference could be demonstrated in terms of the personal move from being a scripture scholar to becoming a biblical theologian /3/.

The knowledge of God which becomes personally transformative of the theologian remains experiential. Not every issue which theologians consider requires the same degree of technical competence and personal growth. But the more specifically theological these issues are, the more one has to be familiar with the ways of God. Thus Karl Rahner writes in the Foundations of Christian Faith:

We can acquire in theology a very great skill in talking and perhaps not have really understood from the depths of our existence what we are talking about. To that extent reflection, conceptualization and language have a necessary orientation to that original knowledge, to that original experience in which what is meant and the experience of what is meant are still one. ... theological concepts do not make the reality itself present to man from outside him, but they are rather the expression of what has already been experienced and lived through more originally in the depths of existence (Rahner:16-17).

An appreciation of this fact is what appears to be missing, for example, in Gordon Kaufman's An Essay on Theological Method (1975). There Kaufman envisioned theology basically as the activity of constructing an adequate concept of God. For from the perspective of phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge, all reality is constructed, including the reality which we designate as God. However, Kaufman neglects, I think, the important question as to whether one can write about theological method as a Christian thinker without presupposing some theology of revelation /4/. Or, as Bernard Cooke observed in slightly different terms, what has been absent from theology at least since the Reformation is an account of the Spirit in the Church, an account which respects the fact of a presence to the Church which (however it is explained) is more than a theological construction or a religious postulate (Cooke:147).
Let me suggest three major ingredients in the personal development of the theologian. The first is one's own spiritual history. This history will exhibit the dialectical, uneven yet real growth in what it means to believe in God. The events of one's life can be reviewed merely as matters of fact, or they can be disclosive of the ways in which God speaks and acts through the ordinary happenings of life. Belief that God does actually draw people to himself, that basic to all human desiring is the desire for life, and that the desire for life is in fact the desire for God, serves as a foundation for a spiritual history. Yet this belief only becomes compelling and transformative when a theologian (or any person) learns, as Antony of the Desert did, the difference between desires that are life-giving and those which are not. It is to experience the desert existentially, something designated by the finger of God, as Thomas Merton commented, the place where one is given lessons in discerning the true and the false, reality and illusion, spirit and demon. The difference occurs in terms of what is life-giving, free, clear, and joyous, as opposed to what produces anxiety, doubt, confusion, and emptiness. In the settling out of competing desires, one notices that characteristically God sets us free as our desire and love more carefully attend to him. It is to experience salvation as concretely happening now, and it is to know that the change taking place in oneself happens in relation to a God who becomes present through faith.

Furthermore, the other side of our desiring God is God's love for us. And as experiences go, the experience of God's love, or at least the desire for this experience, is absolutely primary in initiating a spiritual history. In knowing a love that precedes our strivings and good intentions, and which is not conditional upon our merits, one experiences what in the phrasing of the Spiritual Exercises is called the grace of the first week. Such an experience will necessarily qualify all future theological reflection about God with varying intensity, depending on how deeply rooted and pervasive that grace becomes. Out of such experiences, I would think, the special theological category of redemption receives its primary meaning.

A second major ingredient within the reality which is a religiously converted theologian is the contemplative attitude. Essentially this consists of one's ability to notice and be aware of the presence of God in creation and in the circumstances of life. It is fostered by periodic, prayerful attention to interior facts such as thoughts, feelings, and moods, since through such movements as these God makes himself known. In short, the contemplative attitude is the fruit of contemplative prayer, which has been expressed in the Ignatian formula of "finding God in all things" (Connolly, 1975:113-120).

This attitude plays a crucial part in the overall success of theological ministry in the Church. It is a distinctive feature, I think, of good theologians inasmuch as it casts them first of all in the role of being listeners to
the voice of the Spirit. Anyone with intelligence can come up with some theologically bright ideas, but theology is better recommended when it proceeds from that docility and religious acumen which is won by patiently observing how the Spirit moves. This hardly denies that the constructive thinking of theologians is also an indication of the Spirit's movement; but such reflection is of the Spirit to the degree that it is authentic thinking, and authentic thinking, since it is based on conversion, is foundational. Again, with a bow to Heidegger, thinking is foundational as it thinks Being; theological reflection becomes foundational as it thinks God. And as thinking Being is more than conceptualization about beings, so theologizing is called to be more than a matter of clarifying our concepts about religious things.

In an article entitled "The Prior Experience of Spiritual Directors," William Barry discussed how much and what sort of experience was required before one could with reasonable confidence engage in giving spiritual direction (Barry:84-89). Turning his idea around somewhat, perhaps we could suggest that prerequisite to being a theologian is the prior experience of having been taught by God. It seems to me that this amounts to much more than an interesting use of words. "For the Lord taught us that no man is capable of knowing God unless he be taught of God; that is, God cannot be known without God," wrote St. Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. IV, 6, 4). If one is earnestly open to Jesus' saying only one among us is the teacher and all the rest are learners (Mt 23:10), then it is natural to ask in what way the Lord has been instructing us. This saying underlies and qualifies all magisterial activity in the Church, whether through bishops, pastors, theologians, or catechists. Such a question seems to be logically correlative to the Church's faith in the abiding and active presence of the Spirit. If one regards teaching as a ministry of setting minds and hearts free from ignorance, limitation, narrowness and fear of the unknown, and as replacing these with understanding, freedom, compassion, and confidence, then one mark of having been taught by the Spirit is a progressive liberation from personal and communal blindness, egoism, distrust, and unfamiliarity with God. The transformative experiences which make up that teaching are lessons which must not be forgotten if theologians hope to exercise a fruitful teaching ministry.

A third ingredient in the ongoing process of a theologian's conversion is lifestyle. While there are undoubtedly other factors which determine what theologians become, few can be so far-reaching in their consequences as the kind of Christian life theologians lead. Surely, lifestyle influences the way we think, the issues which are of concern to us, the kind of people we allow to become authoritative in our lives. Yet the importance of lifestyle lies not so much in its effect on the manner and content of theology as in the way it renders theologians open to experiencing a widening world of human concerns. Ideas have obvious consequences on the thinking and action of human
society, but perhaps the stronger influence is exercised by the kind of living which men and women have adopted.

Among the experiences which are personally transformative is that of powerlessness, particularly the kind of powerlessness that arises when one steps out of the world one knows best into cultures and concerns which are both challenging and disturbing to one's customary ways of thinking and living. Walking among the world's poor helps to adjust one's thinking and praying on the side of reality. Because it loosens a person from familiar sources of cultural and social identity, from personal and social forms of security, powerlessness is both painful and disorienting. It throws us back on our interior resources. If these too have been diminished, then one is forced into that open space where the creature stands finally before God: a situation which essentially defines human being but which is easily concealed beneath the socially constructed and secure fabric of the human world.

Lifestyle is critically ingredient to theological reflection. It determines whether or not individual theologians will be susceptible to the cares and concerns of the human family and the whole people of God. Since the Spirit of God lives and moves among the people, to be open to the more prominent stirrings and hopes of human beings, especially those marginal and powerless people who comprise the greater part of the human family, is to keep oneself attuned to the voice of the Spirit. When one resonates with their pursuit of justice and the deeper hungers of the human spirit, and when one is intensely convinced that ultimately only faith (and not sheer power, whether economic or political) will secure lasting justice, then I believe we have a confirming sign that religious conversion is taking place.

I have been discussing what I consider to be important dimensions in the theologian's personal development. They are features of the functional specialty, foundations, as it bears on the ongoing process of religious conversion. Some may want to add further features. But the three which I have described, namely, personal spiritual history, the contemplative attitude, and lifestyle, ought to prove sufficient for elaborating the contention that theological reflection is enlarged and deepened in proportion to the breadth and intensity of spiritual experience. This will only be the case, however, if theological activity is understood to be basically hermeneutical, that is, thinking God in terms of the situation of our time. There might be wide disagreement with this position if theological activity were regarded primarily as the clarification, co-ordination, and construction of concepts about God, the Church, sacraments, and so forth. Or to put the matter differently, I would anticipate some disagreement if theological activity were viewed as primarily hermeneutical but in the reverse direction of interpreting Christian doctrines and symbols to the modern world, the "signs of the times," to the contemporary Church. In the final section of this paper I should like to add a little more about the hermeneutical moment.
At the risk of repeating points which may already appear fairly obvious, let me make several observations about the triple conversion in order to show how this bears upon the hermeneutical moment in theology.

First, then, it may be helpful to note that truth and correctness are not exactly equivalent notions. Truth is objective, not in the sense that propositions stand as already-out-there-now statements which merely solicit our assent, but in the sense that the drive to know unfolds through the process of asking questions, having insights, and appropriating those insights through judgments, even if those insights already belong to common fund of knowledge. Correctness, on the other hand, is related to the correspondence between question and answer. Answers meet the conditions which are anticipated and expressed by means of our questioning. Since the knower sets the conditions, only the knower can recognize when the conditions have been filled. The norm of correctness, therefore, is located in the structural relationship between condition and unconditioned, between question and answer.

But truth is not just a matter of being correct. There is the further point of selecting which questions are worth raising, which forms of inquiry are misguided, which images and symbols need re-thinking, what lines of development should be followed. I prefer to regard truth in terms of that knowledge which is personally transformative, either because of an existential claim it lays upon one's response, or because the earnestness of one's commitment to intelligence and reasonableness influences the kind of person he or she becomes. This leads me to observe that some people can be correct without, as it were, standing in the truth; while others may be in the truth without necessarily being correct.

What Heidegger called "standing in the truth" and what Lonergan called a self-appropriation of what is meant by being a knower, designate a posture towards reality, a freely chosen orientation towards the world which grows out of the rich horizon possibilities constitutive of human being. Just because men and women can repeat verbally and even technically correct answers to doctrinal questions, for example, does not guarantee that they are living within that horizon possibility which is intellectual conversion, or as Heidegger termed it, that they are standing in the truth. And conversely, mistakes made by one whose habitual orientation is towards deeply understanding oneself and the world do not indicate that one has strayed from the truth. Being in the truth is a foundational change which is far more encompassing than isolated acts of understanding. So, while the notions of truth and correctness obviously interrelate, correctness seems to connote the technical achievement of getting the point, the fruit of common sense, acquiring the competence that makes one an expert; whereas truth looks more to
the personal achievement of consistently allowing oneself to be claimed by what is so.

A parallel observation applies to the level of performance. Good conduct may or may not be evidence of a basic commitment to a living which is informed by values. While an ethician might speak of an abstract standard of right or goodness, proximately and concretely the criterion of goodness is men and women who are becoming good because they live out certain values. This merely repeats the traditional discussion about growth in virtue or the modern discussion about fundamental option. My point is that neither truth nor goodness exists in the abstract; they exist only as concrete modifications and possibilities of human being.

Thirdly, religion exists in men and women. When religion is genuine, religious lifestyles and worship are manifestations of interior commitment and orientation towards goodness and truth. People who have been grasped by ultimate concern, or who have experienced the feeling of absolute dependence, or who know themselves to be loved sinners, or whose living embodies a pursuit of the four noble truths—these people are undergoing religious conversion.

In theology, we distinguish (1) its method, its areas of specialization, and the considerable technical development proper to any human science, and (2) the movement by which theology is carried forward. As a reflective discipline, theology does not exist apart from minds; as a science, its structure and development are dictated by the structure and advance of human understanding. Lonergan writes: "As the advance of science has a lower limit in the field of presentations, so also it has an upper limit in the basic structure of the human mind" (Lonergan, 1957:304). On an operational level, theology relies not only on its accumulated wisdom but also on men and women who are religiously formed. Since religion envisions a dipolar world in which people relate to God, a religious habit will not develop where God is absent; being religious depends on desiring God above all things.

Theologically unsophisticated people will not be able to answer technical theological questions, since such questions suppose a theoretically differentiated consciousness. But theologians will be able to handle these questions only if their consciousness is religiously differentiated. Religion makes it possible for us to consider serious theological issues, to determine which questions are worth asking, which concerns important, what directions are of greater moment. Religion is foundational in a way technical accomplishment by itself is not.

Therefore, it appears that two components are involved in these conversion processes. First, a structural level is presupposed as the condition of possibility. Its details are spelled out respectively by a cognitional theory, a philosophy of will, and a theological anthropology or, as some might
prefer, a metaphysics. Secondly, there is an operational level wherein we observe that intellectual, moral, and religious orientations, which have been built up through daily performance, qualitatively distinguish human living. Needless to say, these habits exhibit a concrete unity since they belong to and are integrated by individual persons.

In his book The Use and Abuse of the Bible (1976), Dennis Nineham illustrated how, in the history of biblical interpretation, the religious and cultural viewpoints of interpreters often unconsciously distorted their understanding of Scripture. Sometimes this invited grave oversights, as when theologians rejected evolution on the basis of the opening chapters of Genesis. Because of advances in the fields of history, language, comparative religion, and natural science, scholars today have generally accepted an evolutionary perspective and are comfortable with the fact that Genesis was more interested in religious meaning than natural science. The real problem in the history of this particular question, however, was not a scientific mistake but the way religious thinkers allowed their prej udgments to shorten their idea of God. The difficulty was not one of evolution versus immediate creation; the difficulty consisted in thinking that this was an important matter, whereas in fact it had little or no bearing on the religious transformation of believers. It lacked salvific value.

A later age milked the same story to support a doctrine of original sin. Again, the error lay not so much in addressing the wrong question to a biblical text; the mistake, I suggest, was allowing the doctrine of original sin to narrow rather than to illumine our understanding of God's redeeming action.

The controversy which surrounded On Being a Christian provides a further example. The concern had been voiced as to whether, on Küng's showing, Jesus is sufficiently divine. But the significant question is not so much "Is Jesus Christ God?" Rather, we should be asking, "What has Jesus done?" and "How do we experience, here and now, what Jesus did?" The matter of Jesus' divinity should never be approached apart from the experience of salvation which continues to occur in the Church. I am unable to see how a great deal of christological reflection has contributed to and clarified the Church's experience of being loved and redeemed by God. I do not wish to debate, for example, whether Jesus knew about his identity as God's Son, whether he had two wills, or whether he was virginally conceived, because I fail to see how such doctrinal issues significantly help the Church to mediate the experience of grace which is salvation and which is God's gift in Christ.

The Second Vatican Council's Decree on Ecumenism mentions a hierarchy of truths, which corresponds to Lumen Gentium's degrees of incorporation or communion in the Church. With these statements as points of departure, Avery Dulles proposed that we distinguish primary and secondary
truths (Dulles:55-62). What is crucial is not (at least initially) which truths are identified as primary or secondary, but what is going on inside the theologian who is making the determination. I suggest that doctrines which have power to change human beings at their center will be called primary. The more closely associated with God's redeeming love a doctrine is, the more important it becomes in the Church's proclamation of the Gospel.

Some years ago Hans Urs von Balthasar called attention to the connection between a theologian's personal holiness and a truly vibrant theology. Theological investigation, he said, "should breathe the atmosphere of prayer." "Christian dogmatics must express the fact that one whose thinking is dictated by faith is in a constant relationship of prayer with its object (von Balthasar:82). In drawing out why the theologian is the base upon which theological reflection turns, perhaps I have been simply elaborating von Balthasar's point. When theology genuinely expresses divine truth, it does so because theologians are people of truth.

There are basic facts that define Christian faith, and they are contained in church creeds, doctrines, piety, and sacred writings. In one sense, these facts correctly designate what Christian religion is all about; failure to include one or several of these facts in one's religious life invites an incorrect grasp of Christian faith. But such facts remain just external definitions, if you like, whose meaning needs continually to be retrieved. The retrieval of religious meaning is a hermeneutical moment which occurs properly when faith has transformed the interpreter. If this were not so, then theology would be deprived of its internal norm. The active presence of God in the horizon of the Church's faith would become irrelevant to the process of the Church's coming to truth. In a real sense, as Heidegger put it, this would amount to a denial of the historical nature of theology (Heidegger:13-15).

But, it might be asked, how does one come to stand in the truth? There are at least three components in the answer, intellectual, moral, and religious. Further, these components interact. While the contemplative attitude is associated with religion, it touches intelligence to the extent that thinking becomes non-violent and endeavors to free itself from every form of subjectivism by allowing reality to make its claim on the thinker. Again, the sense of what the term "reality" means is largely developed, I suspect, in learning how some ways of living are life-giving and freeing, while others are not. Thinking is described as barren when it separates itself from life, and actions which are at their root self-centered engender feelings of unreality because such actions are not liberating and life-giving. When faith shows God to be life-giving and perceives that all desires are in fact desires for life (which comes to mean desire for God), it becomes apparent that a sense of what is real is intimately bound up with the presence of God. In such a
view, reality is finally constituted by divine transcendence and faith directly conditions our ability to grasp what is real, true, and good. In brief, truth involves a personal transformation rather than a technical achievement: it makes brilliance a function of inner development. Only the wise person understands what is so.

Let me conclude by returning to the problem of differentiating primary and secondary truths. I would suggest that theologians will make such determinations on the basis of their personal spiritual experience and by their participation in the corporate experience of the Christian community. The issues which theologians address, the questions they raise, the images and symbols they challenge, the doctrines they re-think, are all functions of that reality which a theologian is. To the degree that theologians are claimed by truth, that they incarnate Christian values, that they listen to the living Spirit of God, and that they have been deeply touched by God's love, the theological enterprise has a secure foundation.
NOTES


/2/ The word "charismatic" can refer to a lot of different things. By charismatic I mean to describe an event (in this case, interpretation of the word of God precisely as God's word) which occurs primarily as an action enabled by the Spirit. That is to say, hearing God's word precisely as God's word, and (as Rahner says) proclaiming God's word precisely as his and not as words about God, requires a moment of grace. Simply, charismatic refers to an experience of grace. See Dunn:199-258.

/3/ This is admittedly a controversial point. In his entry "Biblical Theology, Contemporary" in the Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (Nashville: Abington Press, 1962), vol. I, 418-432, Krister Stendahl distinguished two functions in biblical theology, namely, the descriptive task of establishing what the texts meant in their original context(s) and the hermeneutical task (or the job of "translating" from an original idiom to the contemporary scene). The descriptive task, he maintained, is the core of all biblical theology. Preachers, Stendahl suggested, must be bilingual in that they need some measure of familiarity with the original meanings as well as a capacity of relating those meanings to present day believers. I do not dispute the fact and necessity of the two functions. Rather, I want to advert to the fact that scholars who also share biblical faith are inwardly transformed and at least to some degree are biblical theologians, that is, people for whom God is real. I fail to see how theologians, if we are people of faith, would not be affected by the subject matter of our work, or how theology could resist being informed by the faith with which theologians pursue their mission.

/4/ Kaufman's distinction between the real God and the available God strikes me as Kantian: God as he is in himself and the God who is known in and through a particular cultural history (see "Revelation and Cultural History" in God the Problem [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972]). The gap is unbridgeable. Every theology of revelation presupposes a notion of truth. Just as Kant's epistemology rests on a misapprehension of how knowing occurs, so too Kaufman's distinction misses the fact that human being and its spiritual experience can be disclosive of the "real" God.

/5/ I am indebted to the work of William J. Connolly, S.J. for many of these observations. See Connolly, 1975 and 1976.
WORKS CONSULTED


Bernard Lonergan's proposal for a historically-minded theology has received much attention, not all of it favorable. For example, David Tracy, whose recent The Analogical Imagination advocates the "public" character of theology, asked at the 1970 Lonergan Congress whether Lonergan's theology was actually critical--and therefore a viable modern alternative, or dogmatic--and therefore a leftover from a now fading classicist culture.

Is it mediated by dialectical reflection upon the results of earlier historical theology--thereby assuming (as a dogmatic affirmation) the truth-value of the data (presumably religious) interpreted and critically investigated by the historian? Or is it, too, to be critically mediated, thus transcendentally justifying the use of religious--in fact of a specific religious--God-language? If the former alone be the case then Lonergan's enterprise may be dialectically foundational for a collaborative methodological theological enterprise for all those theologians (of whatever tradition) who accept an authoritative (and, in that sense, dogmatic) grounding for all genuine theological work. But it will not be for those (viz., in the Liberal, Modernist or neo-Liberal traditions) who demand a critical dialectical mediation of religious and theological meaning and language (1971:210; see 211, 217, 220).

A perhaps lesser known critic, William Murnion, argued in his response to Lonergan's 1972 "Revolution in Catholic Theology" that what Lonergan perceived to be profound changes in theology, and particularly in the area of method, were in reality so many nails on the coffin of theology. Theology, argued Murnion, has been displaced by the newly emerging discipline of religious studies. "At the same time that theology, the first science ever to emerge, has been atrophying into the ideology of the Church, religious studies has been developing into the science of the ultimate meaning to human experience. I believe Father Lonergan is wrong, therefore, in predicting a restoration of theology ... " (1972:30-31).

Both these criticisms identify an issue I find central to Lonergan's recent work, viz., the nature of theology vis-à-vis the discipline of religious studies. Can the two be successfully integrated so that, in Lonergan's words, they "overlap and become easily interchangeable" (1976a:68)? Does it really make sense to propose, as Lonergan has, revisions in the method of theology to yield a contemporary theology that can assimilate the fruits of
religious studies and go on to "conceive itself as a particular type of religious studies" (1974b:139; see 111)?

This paper proposes an affirmative answer to these questions. Others have addressed this issue in Lonergan's work, a recent effort being Vernon Gregson's contribution to the Creativity and Method festschrift (1981:141-151; see 1978). The context of Gregson's approach is the functional specialty Dialectic, which he suggests provides an "evaluative" horizon that mediates the "descriptive" horizon of religious studies and the "normative" one of theology. This paper will address the issue in the context of Foundations, arguing that a distinction central to this functional specialty, that between faith and belief, yields the basis for Lonergan's proposed integration of religious studies and theology. Our reflections proceed in two stages. First, after a brief introductory remark, we draw on Lonergan's account of the shift from classicism to historical-mindedness to account for the separation of and to a degree antagonism between theology and religious studies. Then we move to a discussion of how this separation can be overcome. Drawing on his account of orthopraxis as the foundations for modern theology, we identify what may be the vital role of religious studies in this moment of the theological enterprise.

THE SCOPE OF LONERGAN'S OPTION

To readers of Lonergan's theology (and economics!) the question may arise, Has Lonergan significantly addressed the issue of theology and religious studies? We know, for example, that apart from references to Heilier's seven-fold account of religious experience and to the traditional approach to world religions in terms of universal grace, Lonergan is not much interested in a theology of religions à la Daniélou, Schlette or even Panikkar /1/. And some readers of his 1976 lectures on the topic, "Religious Studies and/or Theology", may find that title a bit deceiving, concluding that Lonergan, unlike his colleague Charles Davis from whom he drew his topic for the lectures, really has very little to say about the matter /2/. But I think this objection a bit hasty, that it misses the point of Lonergan's work. As Fred Crowe has succinctly argued in his The Lonergan Enterprise, Lonergan is not a "now" theologian, preoccupied with solutions to particular present problems; rather, Lonergan is out to develop an "organon of the incarnate spirit" which is not a program so much as a "programmatic", the "fertile and creative idea out of which programs will emerge" (1980:41, 76). Lonergan himself describes his contributions to the question of the relationship of theology to religious studies variously as a framework for ongoing collaboration and implementation, not a "synthesis" but "a set of suggestions that might facili-
tate reflections" (1980b:3); as "a construct, a model ... a set of related notions that may prove quite useful to have around when the time does come for forming hypotheses or describing realities" (1969:2; see 1970:47); and as the "exploration of a proposal" (1976a:2). These remarks suggest that Lonergan's contribution is on the level of method--not as in "a new method laundry system" to be applied to any and all problems, but in the sense of the categories of and the context for the collaboration he invites his readers to develop and flesh out. In terms of our question, then, we must examine what Lonergan's method contributes to what Paul Tillich identified twenty years ago as the crucial need for "a longer, more intense period of interpenetration of systematic theological study and religious historical studies" (1967:252).

THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES: SEPARATE (BUT EQUAL?)

In his lectures on "Religious Studies and/or Theology" Lonergan attributes the difference between the two disciplines to the former's reliance on the empirical method of modern science.

For religious studies leave to theology questions concerned with what is believed to be more than man, what is not of this world. They confine their attention, as does the whole of modern science, to what is within this world, to the things that man experiences, and even to human experiencing itself. Nor is there any doubt, in my opinion, about the general soundness of this restriction. For modern sciences are defined by their methods and their fields and, clearly enough, the same method cannot be employed both in investigating what lies within human experience and in investigating what lies beyond it (1976a:4-5; see 36-9; Q&A 1).

This account in many respects echoes the standard ones formulated by scholars of religion to justify their discipline and its autonomous existence in a non-confessional context: religious studies is descriptive, theology is normative; religious studies is neutral and theology in confessional with a priori truth commitments; religious studies examines symbols and their meaning, theology their truth. Joachim Wach, a key figure in the development of the academic study of religion in North America best sums up this line of argument when he writes that religious studies' concern is the description of all religions as opposed to theology's promulgation of one faith. "It does not ask the question, 'What must I believe?' but 'What is there that is believed?'' (1967:2).

While Wach as a scholar of religion finds such methodological distinctions adequate to differentiate his field from that of theology, theologians in the past have expressed suspicion over its adequacy. For instance, Harnack, in response to Ernst Troeltsch's appeal to begin theology from the broad base
of a general history and theory of religion, asserted in 1901 that "concern with Christianity was fully sufficient for the study of religion because Christianity was not one religion among others ... but religion itself" (cited in Pannenberg, 1976:317). Some twenty-five years later Karl Barth attacked the same issue, arguing that theology's proper norm and method is derived not from other intellectual disciplines but from obedience in faith to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. In his Church Dogmatics he argued that "the attempt to reconstitute theology as the science of religion was a disloyal act which provokes revulsion and wrath. What else does it mean, but that theology is letting itself be seduced by a grossly misunderstood instinct for self-preservation into methodically subordinating the reality of God to the reality of religions?" (cited in Pannenberg, 1976:317-18). For his part, Lonergan has studied the rejection of religious studies by theology in terms of the general cultural shift from classicism to historical-mindedness. Religious studies has its roots in the development of the Geisteswissenschaften in nineteenth-century Germany: and it accepts as its goal the "critique of our historicity" that includes the re-construction of the values and meanings constitutive of a people's living (see Lonergan, 1977b:13; 1980a:19, 1972b:310; 1976a:54). Such critical studies unearth the diversity of values, institutions, literatures, technologies, and religions created by humankind. The classicist sense of universality and normativeness cannot but soon give way to the modern realization that our culture is only one among many. When this critical spirit is applied in the area of religion, the consequences for the classicist theology are not less devastating. For scripture and tradition, taken as the foundational font of revealed truths from which theological principles and conclusions could be deduced, were removed to the history of religions to become mere data. In Lonergan's words, the new historically-minded studies of religion

find that the expressions of truth and the enunciations of principles are neither eternal nor immutable. They concentrate on the historical process in which these changes occur. They bring to light whole ranges of interesting facts and quite new types of problems. In brief, religious studies have stripped the old theology of its very sources in scripture, in patristic writings, in medieval and subsequent religious writers. They have done so by subjecting the sources to a fuller and more penetrating scrutiny than had been attempted to earlier methods (1974c:109).

It follows that the integration of theology and religious studies that Lonergan proposes requires a shift from the horizon of neo-orthodoxy (Barth) or classicism, where the two disciplines can only be separate, to a new horizon, perhaps of the type Lonergan has referred to as the "second enlightenment".
SECOND ENLIGHTENMENT STUDY OF RELIGION

In addition to changes in theological method, religious studies has also precipitated changes in modern religiosity. Sociologist Robert Bellah has recently characterized religious studies as a "second fall", one perhaps more devastating to humankind than the first. There is a tendency inherent in the scholarly study of religion, he suggests, towards "enlightenment fundamentalism" wherein the critical theories used to explain religion are taken to be truer than religion itself. "In this sense, what is really being taught in religious studies is often positivism or relativism or historicism" (1978:108). To counteract this tendency toward the enlightenment criticism of tradition, Bellah suggests that scholars of religion must become conscious of and develop new methods in light of the fact that "whatever fundamental stance one takes in teaching about religion is in itself a religious position" (1970c:4). This, he feels, would be a first step toward a "post-modern" study of religion that could help overcome the fragmentary state of modern culture to which earlier social scientific studies of religion had contributed (1974:5; 1970b:89). The method of such studies would incorporate what he terms "religious orthodoxy" and "enlightenment orthodoxy", forming a tertium quid he labels "symbolic realism". This third option weds the second's critical awareness of the pluralistic and subjective character of religion to the first's commitment to one true religion (1972:13-18). Such a method would be consonant with the emerging religious consciousness of our time. However, it would not be a new religion, but rather a "new way of being religious, a new way of appropriating the religious traditions of man" (1974:26). In this respect Bellah claims that the "symbolization of the ultimate conditions of human existence" that lies at the heart of all religion through the ages would be decidedly different in modern times than in the past.

Nevertheless, the fundamental symbolization of modern man and his situation is that of a dynamic multi-dimensional self capable, within limits, of remaking the world, including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it, even the forms that state the unalterable conditions of his own existence. ... I expect traditional religious symbolism to be maintained and developed in new directions, but with growing awareness that it is symbolism and that man in the last analysis is responsible for the choice of his symbolism (1970a:42).

In this new context the scientific study of religion will remain critical. However, it will not necessarily undermine religious faith; indeed, it "may actually help to make it possible" (1970b:114).

It seems that Bellah, like Lonergan, advocates a method for the study of religion that moves significantly beyond the context of the Enlightenment to a new, post-modern one. This method can be consonant with and is perhaps constitutive of what Lonergan, like Bellah, has recently identified as "the
emerging religious consciousness of our time" (1980b:3, 6). And instead of the criticism that does away with tradition, it may offer the means to recover tradition. Just what is this new context for the study of religion, what in Lonergan's terms may be called a second enlightenment; and what are the consequences of its emergence for the issue of theology and/or religious studies?

A first enlightenment, explains Lonergan, arose in the context of the systematic and critical exigencies of meaning: from the proclamation of science following Newton, from the appeal to reason initiated by Kant's Critiques, and from the effort to wipe out all prejudice that eventually turned into "the project of replacing traditional backwardness by the rule of pure reason" (1977a:140; see 1976a:48; 1980b:9-11)/4/. The enlightenment critique of tradition reached its term in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when, according to Joseph Geiselmann,

tradition completely lost its power. History now liberated itself from tradition and made itself independent; history took the place of tradition and, because free of it, became increasingly revolutionary and devoid of any generally recognized human content. The really existing world dissolved into purely subjective views of the world, so that in the end nothing objective would subsist and nihilism would be the final outcome, if modern man was rigorously logical (1966:109).

The recovery from the results of this loss of tradition has been the project of much of contemporary thought.

The second enlightenment, according to Lonergan, is rooted in the methodical exigence associated with profound changes in the fields of mathematics, the natural and human sciences, and philosophy: Euclidean geometry has been relativized; Einstein and Heisenberg have not only developed a new physics but a new notion of science as well; and modern philosophers like Nietzsche, Blondel, and more recently Ricoeur and Habermas have emphasized practical over pure reason, maintaining that man is known not only by what he is but by what he does, not only abstractly by nature but also concretely by history (1977a:140, 1980b:9-10; 1974c:242). So there emerges a new and distinct stage of meaning wherein the fourth level of intentional consciousness--the level of decision, evaluation, responsibility, where consciousness becomes conscience--becomes foundational for human knowing and doing (1972b:96). This shift to new foundations in the second enlightenment, Lonergan has recently suggested, signals the end of the "age of innocence"--an age confident in the possession of truth, as in the classicist assumptions of necessary and self-evident first principles, as in the naive realist's assumption that truth is reached simply by taking a look at the already out there now real, as in the assumption that the critical problem of subject and object could be finally resolved by the articulation of some new critical philosophy of the stature of Kant's (1976a:59-60). With the passing of this age
and its secure possession of truth there emerges the new academic discipline Lonergan terms praxis. Attention is now to be shifted to the dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity in both the past that is studied and in the subject doing the studying. For:

Praxis acknowledges the end of the age of innocence. It starts from the assumption that authenticity cannot be taken for granted. Its understanding, accordingly, will follow a hermeneutic of suspicion as well as a hermeneutic of recovery. Its judgement will discern between products of human authenticity and products of human inauthenticity. But the basic assumption, the twofold hermeneutic, the discernment between the authentic and the inauthentic set up a distinct method (1976a:64-5; see 1977b:2).

When attention is given to this twofold dialectic, religious traditions are approached in a new way. Unlike the first enlightenment, religion is criticized not to do away with it but to purge it of traces of both minor and major inauthenticity. In Ricoeur's words, the criticism is "restorative" as opposed to "reductive" (1967:350). There not only is the minor authenticity of the individual with respect to his tradition; there is the further and far more significant because harder to detect inauthenticity that emerges when such individuals distort, misunderstand and eventually transmit their tradition (1980a:15-16; 1972b:80-1, 162, 234-44, 299; 1977a:137ff). The need thus arises for the criticism of tradition that in Method Lonergan defines as its "purification". Essentially, this step requires one to distinguish a religion from the performance of its followers; to distinguish the Yes and No of doctrinal truth from the person who apprehends such truth and purports to embody it in his or her living; to distinguish belief from its foundations in the "ever illuminous inner light" (Voegelin) that Lonergan takes as faith; and following Kierkegaard, to ask whether or not one is really a Christian, a Buddhist, a Hindu, etc. (1970:53; 1977b:6-16; 1967a:12) /5/. For what is decisive in authentic religious living is conversion, not doctrine; and it is only in so far as the judgments of individual believers are rooted in the "eye of religious love" which is faith, that inauthenticity can be detected and rooted out (1972b:243, 245-56, 299).

Developments in the methods of empirical sciences elicit changes, sometimes revolutionary, in their content; and to this rule religious studies is no exception. The development, e.g., from the naive and reductionist evolutionary theories of religion promoted by Tylor and Spencer in the nineteenth century to the more adequate and promising ones of Geertz and Bellah in recent years was achieved not by an appeal to the truth of religion but by a more rigorous adherence to the canons of empirical method (1974a:14; 1976a: Q&A 2). In a similar vein, religious studies' participation in the second enlightenment will result in the heightening of the methodical consciousness which confronts "the student of religion with what a natural scientist would
call his personal equation" (1974a:10). Here Lonergan favorably cites Voegelin's claim that to understand the self-transcending dynamism of personal and communal living requires the student of religion to advert to that dynamism working in himself (1977b:13-14). And, he argues, as this discipline moves beyond the empirical methods of the natural sciences, beyond the analysis of meaning of the human sciences, to the foundational level of generalized empirical method, there will emerge a new way to study religion. For in generalized empirical method one becomes conscious of oneself not only as intelligent, reasonable and responsible, but finally as religious. Because it operates on both the data of consciousness and the data of sense, generalized empirical method "does not treat objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject" (1976a:39). As such, it serves not to weed out the personal dimension of religion, nor to leave one stranded in an undifferentiated and unobjectified subjective experience, but rather to enable one to appropriate one's consciousness at this level, to bring it to light and thematize it and so critically control its place in the understanding of one's own religion and the religion of another (1976a:58ff; 1980a:194; 1974a: 13-14; and 1972b:266).

If the foregoing account is correct, then it seems we need to revise Lonergan's differentiation of theology from religious studies in his 1976 lectures devoted to the question. It is true that the difference between the two is determined on the level of method; but to specify this by assigning religious studies to a non-committed view that prescinds from the religious dimensions of the data and theology to the examination of that dimension may not be adequate. Such a revision seems to be called for by Lonergan himself in those lectures. He notes that in spite of current and past practices, there may be emerging a new practice signalling the complementarity of theology and religious studies, a complementarity that invites "a methodologist to explore the foundations for an interdisciplinary approach to religious studies and theology" (1976a:2). In particular he cites the shift towards personalization of the study of religion in someone like W. C. Smith, and the development from dialectic of positions to dialogue of persons in individuals like Friedrich Heiler, Rodney Whitson and Raimundo Panikkar (1976a:67; 1980b: 11-14). If, as we noted earlier, this shift puts religious studies in the realm of method as praxis then a revision of its relationship to theology can be proposed along the following lines. Theology and religious studies are distinguished not so much by their respective fields--whereby the material object of religious studies is said to comprise a much larger field of data than that of theology; nor so much by their respective subjects--whereby the formal object of religious studies is said to be of human origin whereas theology's is of divine origin. In these two types religious studies remains separate from theology, at best an ancillary discipline to a theology that in drawing on its
results has the appearance of dogmatically (Tracy) applying already-known truths to the data investigated. Rather, the differentiation is one of function—whereby the methods of the two disciplines are related in light of their common foundation in generalized empirical method, and only then are their distinctive categories and determinations worked out (O’Callaghan, 1980: 338-40; Lonergan, 1972b:125-27, 150, 364-67; 1976a:46). While it strives for clarity and distinctions, functional specialization also stresses interdependence. This being the case, religious studies corresponds not only to the first phase specialties of "research, interpretation, history, with a bit of dialectic" (1974c:217); it is also constitutive of the fifth functional specialty, Foundations. This is so not only because method is a cumulative process, wherein each stage or specialty emerges from the prior one so that in a qualified sense Foundations partakes of the use of religious studies in the previous specialties. For beyond this there is the fact of the remarkable coincidence between the personalization in religious studies and theology, between the emphasis on dialectic and authenticity as basic in religious studies and theology, between the distinction of tradition from the way its adherents pass it on in religious studies and theology. The remainder of this paper documents and works out this suggestion by examining the way in which Lonergan uses the distinction between faith and belief in his account of the foundations for theology.

FOUNDATIONAL THEOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES

In the classicist horizon, where concern for the abstract and essential dominate, human nature is determined a priori to be unchanging. In Lonergan’s words,

One can apprehend man abstractly through a definition that applies omni et soli and through properties verifiable in every man. In this fashion one knows man as such, and man as such, precisely because he is an abstraction, also is unchanging (1974c:5; see 194).

In the modern horizon of historical-mindedness the a priori approach is dropped. With the existentialists, with Hegel, with Freud and others, one turns to the concrete, incarnate subject in studying the human. Lonergan illustrates the significance of this shift with reference to Vico.

To proclaim with Vico the priority of poetry is to ... open the way to setting aside the classical definition of man as a rational animal and, instead, defining man with the cultural phenomenologists as symbolic animal or with the personalists as an incarnate spirit (1967a:263; see 1972b:73; 1974c:69-73).
This shift to man the symbolic animal marks a stress on the constitutive role of meaning in human living (1974c:51, 72-3, 79, 161; 1967a:238, 242-44, 252-33; 1972b:74-78, 178, 180, 199, 211, 219, 358). And from this there follows a recognition of the struggle for authenticity that "is part and parcel of the human condition, of our being animals yet equipped to live not just by instinct but principally by the symbols by which we express our self-understanding and our commitments" (1976a:14).

The consequences for the study of religion of this shift to symbols and authenticity have already been noted. In keeping with the second enlightenment, the religious tradition and its doctrines are distinguished from its adherents and their apprehensions of it, and the issue of authentic praxis becomes a focal point. A foundational theology developed in this context will become existential. Its point of departure lies not in the doctrines of scripture and tradition, but in the prior "luminous experience out of which accounts of authentic and Christian experience come" and which is "the source from which there springs a genuine response to such accounts" (1973b:15-16). It is in this context that Lonergan suggests that "orthopraxis has a value beyond orthodoxy" (1974b:75; see 1973b:22) /6/.

The background to Lonergan's stress on orthopraxis over orthodoxy seems to lie in his acceptance of a faith/belief distinction in developing a foundational theology. In those lectures and essays on foundations, and particularly those related to theology and/or religious studies, written since 1969, Lonergan develops his ideas with reference to W. C. Smith, to an extent Eric Voegelin, and even to Raimundo Panikkar. In various ways these thinkers argue for the importance of the distinction between belief and faith for the contemporary study of religion. What is significant, moreover, is that none of them identify themselves as theologians engaged in the mediation of this or that tradition in the current cultural context. Rather, they see themselves as scholars of religion, devoted to an elucidation of something more fundamental—for example, the order and history that Voegelin now regards as "a mystery in process of revelation" (1974:6). Their work tends to be "post-Hegelian" in the sense Lonergan used that term in a 1980 address to the International Association for the History of Religions: it eschews Hegel's a priori approach to history and religion, replacing it with a historical and empirical method, and yet retains the comprehensiveness of his system, replacing dialectical logic with something along the lines of Lonergan's philosophic account of empirical method (1980a:179-180). An examination of what Lonergan draws from each, particularly in his notion of theology as praxis,
will help us better understand how he interrelates religious studies and theology.

The distinction between faith and belief receives the most extensive treatment in W. C. Smith's work. The context of that treatment is Smith's exploration in his classic *Meaning and End of Religion* of "the possibility of clearing the ground for a quite new attack on the problems [of religious studies] by revising the framework within which questions are asked" (1978: 12) /7/. Much of his exploration is devoted to a demonstration of the inappropriateness of the categories "religion" and "religions". He closes the historical documentation of this point with the claim that these categories lead one to (i) focus on externals, and thus to miss the vitality of faith's personal relation to the transcendent; and (ii) focus on the static, the unchanging, the reified, and thus to miss the vital historical dimension of religious living. To counter these defects of the category "religion" Smith develops a twofold scheme to use in its place: for the transcendent dimension he proposes the term "faith", and for the historical, "cumulative tradition" (or, for the sake of discussion, "belief" /8/). His proposal here is hardly modest; he claims that "by the use of these two notions it is possible to conceptualize and to describe anything that has ever happened in the religious life of mankind" (157).

Summarily, *cumulative tradition* refers to the overt historical data on a religious tradition's development--myths, scriptures, temples, etc. Smith argues that this notion does not "reduce" religions to historical processes; for on his definition "the traditions persist only in so far as they are refreshed, each generation anew, by the faith of each of the participants; and ... this faith, being personal, is not confined to what lies within history" (161). Faith, because rooted in the transcendent, cannot be reduced to a particular expression; and because personal, cannot be taken as some substratum or religious a priori common to all traditions. How then is the student of religion to apprehend it? By studying religious persons, in whom the two elements are linked. "Every religious person is the locus of an interaction between the transcendent, which is presumably the same for every man ... and the cumulative tradition, which is different for every man" (186; see 156). Since this dynamic is the way religion exists in history, it is to be the focus of all inquiry in religious studies.

At various points in his study Smith acknowledges that the distinction between faith and cumulative tradition may be seen to sacrifice the authoritative character of a tradition in order to gain historical intelligibility and personal immediacy. He says, for example, that Buddhists and Hindus may have little trouble with his position, but that Christians and Muslims most likely will. But he takes heart in this, suggesting that the use of his distinction by practitioners of these latter religions will provide a good test case for its usefulness.
If it proves ultimately possible to express within the terms of the intellectual framework that has been propounded here whatever a Christian or a Muslim wishes to say about his own faith, his own religious position, his own tradition, then certainly the theory will have demonstrated a rather considerable vitality (197).

That Lonergan's recent work takes up this call is indicated by the fact that he explicitly relates his own account of foundations to Smith's work. In his 1969 "Faith and Beliefs" Lonergan stated that "what profoundly interests Professor Smith as a student of comparative religion, also profoundly interests me as a theologian" (2). He dwells on Smith's emphasis on the personal element of religious symbolism, particularly the dimension of commitment "that may demand the totality of a person's response, that may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else; to himself, to his neighbor, and to the stars" (1969:1; 1980a:192). This special commitment, while it inspires and is inspired by beliefs, nonetheless remains distinct from them. The importance of this for theology is underscored by Lonergan as follows:

So conceived, I think, faith would not be the prerogative of some particular church or religion. It would not be merely ecumenical but universalist. It would be relevant to an understanding of any and every religion. Moreover, its relevance would be of the highest order; for unless one understands what personal involvement in religion is, one can hardly be expected to think or speak very intelligently of religiously committed persons (1969:1).

According to Lonergan this personal commitment emerges in the struggle towards authentic self-transcendence—a struggle that is promoted through religious conversion (1980a:184-185). Following through on Smith's proposals, Lonergan feels that religion must be investigated on the basis of the investigator's own self-transcendence; and so in Method we find that the theologian's praxis becomes an explicit and constitutive moment in theological reflection on religion.

In addition to W. C. Smith, Lonergan draws on Eric Voegelin, whose works he finds "raise a series of issues that continuously crop up in doing theology yet are resolved far less by objective rules than by existential decisions" (1977b:10). According to Lonergan, Voegelin has shown that the classical experience of reason was not the deductivist one found in medieval scholasticism, in Descartes and the rationalists, in the Absolute Idealists; rather it was moral and religious. He finds, therefore, that Greek philosophy and the New Testament share in common an effort to bring to light and symbolize what he identifies as the "in between" of existence—in between human and divine, life and death, question and answer, light and darkness, pull and counter-pull. The tension of the in-between constitutes the truth of existence; it is a "movement luminous with truth". Voegelin claims "there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the noetic consciousness in
which the movement becomes luminous to itself" (cited in Lonergan, 1980a: 195). He therefore criticizes the "doctrinalization" that cuts off symbols from their engendering noetic experience and thus obscures and diminishes the original tension. By what Lonergan calls a "brilliant extension", Voegelin moves on to distinguish revelation from information. The former is tendered, he claims, not through the informative statements of Jesus, "but through a man's response to the full presence in Jesus of the same Unknown God by whose presence he is inchoatively moved in his own existence" (cited in 1977b:9). Thus, for Voegelin, revelation is less a matter of doctrine or cognitive statement than it is a matter of adherence to the inner light of the in-between that is prior and foundational to such expressions. They can participate in the fundamental in-between of existence by bringing it more fully to light (1977b:12-14) but in no way can they exhaust or replace this reality.

Lonergan contends he has no problem with Voegelin's criticism of "doctrinalization", provided the theology he has in mind is not governed by a perceptualism that ignores the self-transcending and luminous inner light. But Lonergan chooses not to dwell on this issue, suggesting that Voegelin's real contribution is on the level of foundations. Lonergan concludes his discussion of Voegelin's in-between by arguing for a theology conceived as praxis. The theologian's spiritual life, religion in act so to speak, is distinct from his professional one, reflection on religion; but the two are not separate. And so in Method the importance of the former is not only recognized and made explicit but becomes a constitutive moment in the theological process (1977b:14-15).

Although he draws less on Panikkar, what Lonergan does with his suggestions for the study of religion is of much significance. In his recently published "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time" Lonergan finds Panikkar's call for a dialogical or diacritical theology particularly helpful in understanding our current religious situation. Panikkar argues that if the message of Christianity is to be relevant in today's pluralist world, it must meet its own exigence for universality. Fundamental theology should begin, therefore, not from a set of doctrines peculiar to one particular tradition, but from a broader base that allows for dialogue with members of all faiths. As one instance, Panikkar cites the need for recourse to the wordless prayer of the mystics, where one discerns those elements of interrelatedness that are distinct from the particular traditions in which they lived. As it develops, fundamental theology will become an "Exodus" theology, with relevance outside the culture and even the religion whence it begins. Panikkar therefore advocates a "metatheological" endeavor, "a total human attitude transcending, on the one hand, the intellectual elaborations on the message of different religions (theologies) and, on the other,
both the 'theos' as the subject matter of this attitude and the 'logos' as the instrument dealing with it" (1969:51-52). The "human primordial relatedness which occurs when dealing with ultimate problems" (52) that meta-theology brings to light is the source of the abiding and universal element of religion that Lonergan suggests other scholars are today uncovering. But what Panikkar stresses, like Smith, is that this element is not some abstraction reached by prescinding from individual persons; rather it is embodied in their authentic faiths. So, as Lonergan quotes him, Panikkar envisions "really open dialogue ... wherein the very intermingling of religious currents, ideas and beliefs, a more powerful stream of light, service, and better understanding will emerge" (cited in Lonergan, 1980b:13). Such a dialogue would itself be a religious act wherein confrontation and eventually dialogue with another leads to a deeper awareness of one's own faith horizon. When dialogue as lived religion becomes constitutive of theology's foundations, we again arrive at the notion of theology as essentially praxis (1973d:23).

Lonergan's account of foundational theology is developed within the context of the insights of these scholars of religion, within what we identified above as a second enlightenment study of religion. Unlike the classicist notion of foundations as doctrines on God, Church, ethics, etc., a methodical theology begins from the articulation of the conditions of the possibility of their acceptance. In Method Lonergan spells out this articulation with reference to the twofold basis of the theological categories that are the object of Foundations. First, there are the general theological categories providing the transcultural base necessary for reflection on a religious tradition developed through many times and cultures. They rest on the normative account of the invariant structures of one's conscious and intentional operations in transcultural method. However, beyond this anthropological base there is the specifically religious one of religious conversion. It too is transcultural, for its source, God's gift of his love, "is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather is the principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness into any culture" (1972b:283; see 267, 271-2, 282, 327, 352, 360, 367). It does not follow, however, that religious conversion is some ahistorical substratum, or some a priori structural feature of religion; rather it is "existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate" (130). It is "a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality that the theologian is" (270). Foundations thus requires not assent to given truths, but self-appropriation on the part of the subject doing theology.

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and, as well, as an a priori whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny (1972b:292; see 267; 1977b:14-15; 1974c:214-15).
Because it so obviously relates to the insights of Smith, Voegelin and Panikkar noted above, this notion that the categories secure an a priori whence religion can be understood should be underscored. Religious conversion constitutes what Lonergan calls the "infrastructure" of religion that is prior to and foundational for its expression in a "suprastructure". As an experience pertaining to the world of immediacy, it is "the dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, a conscious content without an apprehended object" (1980b:15; see 1972b:240-46). While Lonergan does not deny the possibility that such experience can be mediated in the world of meaning, he does deny that such mediation is foundational for theology conceived as reflection on religion. For to take the suprastructure as primary would be to lose the vital, personal and transcendent dimension of religion (Smith), the luminosity of the in-between (Voegelin), the universality of ultimate experiences (Panikkar) that Lonergan takes as the key to his methodical theology.

**SUBJECTIVIST FOUNDATIONS: A CRITICAL QUESTION**

At this point one may want to return to the question posed by Smith in reference to this faith/belief distinction: Has not Lonergan subordinated and even sacrificed the distinctively Christian element of theology, the truth of Christ's unique and definitive revelation, to a generalized religious consciousness /10/? Indeed, those who have read Lonergan's criticisms--made with, as he says of some of Rahner's criticisms, "customary, vehement explicitness" (1973c:14)--of Schoonenberg's infidelity to Chalcedon's christological doctrine, may wonder how he can at the same time insist that theology's foundations are not doctrinal. Again, they may follow Lonergan's own suggestion (1969:20; 1974c:148), and recall the Vatican's condemnation in 1908 as part of the "mother of all heresies" a view something like Lonergan's stress on experience over doctrine. This modernist position, according to the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis, was the unfortunate product of individuals under the sway of a blind and unchecked passion for novelty, thinking not at all of finding some solid foundation of truth, but despising the holy and apostolic traditions, [who] embrace other and vain, futile and uncertain doctrines, unapproved by the Church, on which, in the height of vanity, they think they can base and maintain truth itself (in Yzermans, 1954:96).

On what grounds can Lonergan respond to this charge?

First, we must note that Lonergan finds a precedent in Roman Catholic theology for his distinction between faith and belief. For although it did not distinguish faith and belief, the tradition has in the past distinguished
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"between fides quae creditur, the truths that are believed, and fides qua creditur, the infused habit by which they are believed." Moreover, in the past the tradition has also recognized "that prior to belief there are the iudicia credibilitatis et credentitatis." In Lonergan's mind there is no reason why, when in an ecumenical context, one cannot take these prior judgments as what is referred to when "we speak of the faith that grounds the fact that we believe" (1970:64).

Beyond this precedent, however, the distinction between faith and belief seems required when one moves from the realm of theory, in which the traditional position was articulated, to the realm of interiority. For in the latter orthopraxis sublates orthodoxy; and theology begins from religious experience in all its implications and only then moves to its objectification (1972b:120-22). This emphasis on religious experience does not leave one stranded in subjectivity, with homo religiosus, as it were, with no transcendent referent. For, following Voegelin, religious experience is neither merely human nor merely divine, but "in between." "As movement is from the mover but in what is moved, so the drawing is from the Father but in the suppliant. Again, because the drawing is from the Father, it bears the stamp of otherworldliness; it is not just me but from the 'Beyond'" (1977b:14). Nor does the emphasis leave one with an immanentist account, where adequate objectification is not possible (1980a:194). For on Lonergan's critical realist account, although the word of God is not restricted to religious experience (1976b:130), there nevertheless is the fact that like any judgment, doctrines are reached in the self-transcendence of correct judgment: veritas formaliter est in iudicio.

Intentionally [truth] goes completely beyond the subject, yet it does so only because ontologically the subject is capable of an intentional self-transcendence, of going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so. Moreover, before the subject can attain the self-transcendence of truth, there is the slow and laborious process of conception, gestation, parturition. But teaching and learning, investigating, coming to understand, marshalling and weighing the evidence, these are not independent of the subject, of times and places, of psychological, social, historical conditions. The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm (1974c:70-71; see 1976a:1-3; 1976b:61-63).

The point of stressing the experiential foundations of doctrine, therefore, is not to reduce it to mere subjectivity; rather, it is to ground it in the self-transcending dynamism of the subject that bears fruit in objective statements about what is so (see 1972b:338-39; 1974c:229).

Finally, the distinction between faith and belief follows from the second enlightenment study of religion. As we have already noted, in this
context the emphasis is placed on interiority, on the fides ex infusione, the revelation of God's love as it floods "our inmost hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us! (Rom 5,5)." However, in addition, there is the fides ex auditu, the expression of that love is the Son, so "that everyone who has faith in him may not die but have eternal life! (Jn 3,16)" (1973d:14; 1974b: 76-77). The two moments on the view we are presenting are not separated. In Lonergan's view, without the revelation that is the outer word, the inner word remains simply "a being in love without a proper object; it remains simply an orientation to mystery that awaits its interpretation" (1974b:77; see 1976a:21; 1974c:146-47). Lonergan explains the way the outer word enriches and nourishes the inner word by analogy to two persons in love. Just as their immediate love comes to fruition in word and deed, so too does the inner word of God's love flooding the individual's heart come to fruition in the historical and communal outer word of scripture and tradition (1969:21). The issue of the relationship between the two, as we have already noted, invites the question of authenticity.

The second enlightenment shift to experience, then, is designed not to do away with tradition--for man the symbolic animal will always have traditions--so much as it is designed to ground it in authentic religious experience. Orthopraxis is intended to sublate, not replace, orthodoxy. As we have already noted, through the inauthenticity of individual adherents a tradition can become inauthentic and require the purification that is "based on conversion ... and opposed to the aberrations that result from the lack of conversion" (1972b:299). This is achieved through a dialectical-foundational mediation, wherein the theological task is to discern and to appropriate those doctrines that are rooted in the authentic commitment of other-worldly love. This is not a matter of applying some objective norm or standard to historical data, but is rather a matter of praxis, of appropriating the knowledge unique to religious living, the faith that Lonergan terms the "eye of religious love". While there is some truth, Lonergan feels, to the Latin tag, nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, the falling in love that sets up a new horizon, engenders a new subject, is a minor exception (1972b:122). In addition to the factual knowledge that moves from below upwards, through experience, understanding and judgment, there is a knowledge that pertains to the fourth level of consciousness, that by an inverse priority flows from above downwards: a "kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of values and the judgments of value of a person in love" (115; see 107, 119, 123; 1976a:51, 64). Moreover, there is a major exception to the Latin tag, the knowledge born of religious love, of God's gift of his love flooding one's heart. Of it Pascal wrote in saying the heart has reasons which reason does not know. Of it Lonergan writes when he describes religious conversion as the gift of God's love taking over "the peak of the soul, the apex animae" (1972b:107; see
1969:12). To the theologian's apprehension of human value there is added the apprehension of transcendent value, an apprehension that grounds the authentic subjectivity that "is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love" (1972b:268).

Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love (1972b:242).

In so far as the theologian is in touch with such love, in so far as it becomes the basis for theology, for the purification of tradition, then it becomes the source of the non-arbitrariness in his or her apprehension of tradition. In this sense orthopraxis sublates orthodoxy. For faith, the eye of religious love, is the base that

unites the religious community, that directs their common judgments, that purifies their beliefs. Beliefs do differ, but behind this difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgments of value, and the judgments of value relevant for religious belief come from faith, the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God's self-disclosure (1972b:119; see 1974c:63, 149-51).

CONCLUSION

We conclude by noting three points regarding Lonergan's proposed integration of religious studies and theology. First, there is the possibility that such integration will benefit scholars of religion as well as theologians. Religious studies has been described as "six characters in search of an author, many enterprises in quest of a coherent principle, and an institution in need of a paradigm (perhaps even a set of alternative paradigms)" /11/. In a related vein Robert Bellah has argued that the success of the academic study of religion hinges on the integration of the personal and social scientific moments in that field. The need is to develop a method for the study of religion that evades the reductionism that comes from aping the natural sciences and the myriad epistemological problems associated with the human sciences (see Bellah, 1970b; and Lonergan, 1974c:141-46). In this respect there seems to be a consensus, if we read Smith, Voegelin and Panikkar correctly, that personalization in the study of religion is necessary--both in terms of the scholar engaged in the study and in terms of the phenomenon studied. Because it provides a means to bring to light the roots of conflicting interpretations as well as the means to move towards their resolution, Lonergan's theological articulation of method as praxis should provide a model
for those who would study religion on the basis of their personal self-transcendence (1980a:194). And, in so far as religious studies move beyond classification of symbols to their meaning and source, Lonergan's analysis of religion as total, authentic other-worldly love will provide models for that task as well (1976a:67; 1974c:143ff).

Secondly, we draw attention to the possibility that on the above account religious studies can participate in the theological specialty of Foundations. For if faith is truly foundational for religion, then any illumination of it by scholars of religion will not be accidental to the process of reflection on religion that Lonergan takes to be theology. Does this mean that all distinctions between theology and religious studies should vanish, turning the latter into theology? Or better, to paraphrase Joachim Wach, does it mean that theology is simply the study of religion, but confined to one tradition? To adequately answer this question the relationship between faith and belief, between the infrastructure and the superstructure of a religion, needs to be better developed, as Lonergan himself suggests (1969:20; 1980b:5; 1972b:119; 1974c:211). Beyond that, the status of tradition in a theology conceived as functional specialties--particularly with respect to Dialectic and Foundations--needs further development beyond what we have offered in this paper. One point, however, can be noted here. Lonergan insists that scripture and tradition are not foundational for theology. They are sources for theology, data; and only in the sixth functional specialty, Doctrines, are the truths contained in these sources reached (1971:229). If this is so, then Foundations--decidedly un-neutral in regard to authenticity--remains neutral in regard to the truth claims of a given tradition. It would follow, then, that the distinction with which we opened this paper, that religious studies leaves to theology normative questions, will only emerge in the sixth functional specialty of Doctrines.

Finally, we must stress the distinctiveness of Lonergan's position on theology and/or religious studies. In the paper we have shown that this stems from his proposals for a second enlightenment, that the stress placed on method as praxis and authenticity in this new context makes possible the integration of these two disciplines. In Lonergan's mind, authentic theology will be facilitated by cooperation with religious studies whereby both put to use the "whole battery" or "ongoing genesis of methods" including Dialectics and praxis (1976a:68). Religious studies, in its capacity as a hermeneutics of suspicion, will scrutinize religious traditions, their histories, the psychology of their believers. Granted, such scrutiny will challenge orthodoxy, and quite probably erode the confidence in certitude and universality of the classicist religion. At the same time, however, it may call forth the new and distinct possibility of orthopraxis and a hermeneutic that recovers what is intelligent, true and good in a tradition to develop it in new ways. The
context for this development is the dialectic that fosters dialogue, as in Heiler's history of religions as the cooperation of religions that for Lonergan "satisfies the cardinal point of method as praxis" (1976a:67). Theology would no longer rest on the assumption that a tradition as given is true, that it embodies authentic religion. And it will turn to the second enlightenment study of religion in religious studies to work out its new foundations. To risk a misunderstanding, I venture that such studies of religion can be thought of a theology's "handmaiden". Where in an older theology a theoretical metaphysics served this function (so Aquinas drew on Aristotle for a conceptual scheme with which to interpret his tradition), in a contemporary methodical theology religious studies could serve the same function. In this vein Ninian Smart has proposed

that traditional natural theology would at least need to be supplemented by a new and softer version; one in which the claims of the varying revelations are related to the experiences of men. What is needed is a general "critique of religious experience"; and this already presupposes that the scientific investigation of religions has been undertaken (1965:262).

If theology and religious studies adhere to the view that religious conversion is foundational to religion, then the handmaiden is by no means subservient; indeed, she becomes an integral moment in the theological endeavor to reflect on religious living. Religious studies becomes the context for theology.
NOTES


/3/ Cf. W. C. Smith's view that each student of religion is "beginning to be recognized and to recognize himself as the exponent or champion of one tradition in a world of other persons expounding or championing others" ("Comparative Religions: Whither and Why?", in M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, eds., The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959], p. 46).

/4/ In 1980b:9, n 14, Lonergan states that he is drawing on Fred Lawrence's 1974 contribution to the Boston College Lonergan Workshop for this notion of a second enlightenment (1981b).


/6/ Cf. Lawrence 1981b, where he suggests that Lonergan, in line with the current emphasis on hermeneutics in theology, has proposed a new understanding of the traditional dictum, faith seeking understanding. Lawrence points out that faith refers, not to beliefs as it did in the traditional account, but to the foundational level of religion that is not confined to the expressions of one tradition but is ecumenical, universal and transcultural (pp. 81-82).

/7/ In focussing on this work we do not intend to imply that Smith's later work on the topic is of little relevance. It is, however, the major source on the topic prior to 1969 when Lonergan presented his comments in "Faith and Beliefs".

/8/ Although permissible in the context of our discussion, it should be noted that Smith in his later writings does not take the terms "belief" and "cumulative tradition" as equivalent. It seems Smith restricts belief to the intellectual dimension of faith, whereas cumulative tradition includes the far wider range of myths, symbols, rituals, etc. Moreover he later says of the term "belief" what he has said of the term "religion": that the idea of belief as important to religious living is a modern invention that, when taken as of central significance, interferes with both personal religiosity and with understanding religious traditions. "I might also sum up the implications of my thesis ... by saying that a great modern heresy of the Church is the heresy of believing" (1976:v; see also 39-40, where he comments on his current as opposed to his earlier position on this question).

/9/ See Panikkar's "Have Religions the Monopoly on Religion?" (1974); cited by Lonergan in 1980b:12, n 23.

/10/ See the responses to "Prolegomena" by Allen (1980) and Robertson (1980). Robertson in particular suggests that an investigation of Lonergan's Christology would be especially relevant to our question. Drawing on Rahner and Ogden, Robertson suggests that Lonergan's position requires that Jesus Christ be conceived not as "constitutive" but rather as "representative" of
salvation, the "normative" and "most adequate" but not "exhaustive" representation of salvation (pp. 17-19; see Robertson's review of Rahner's Foundations [1979], and O'Callaghan [1981]).

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Allen, Christine
1980

Bellah, Robert
1970a

1970b

1970c

1972

1974

1978

Bucher, Glenn
1981

Crowe, F.E.
1980

Eliade, M. and Tracy, David, eds.
1980

Geiselman, J.
1966

Gregson, Vernon
1978

1981
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1973d "Variations in Fundamental Theology." Third (of four) Larkin-Stuart Lectures at Trinity College in the University of Toronto.


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<td>&quot;Religious Studies and/or Theology.&quot; The Donald Mathers Memorial Lectures, Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Ontario.</td>
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Robertson, J.
1979

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Smart, Ninian
1965

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1967

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1954
Consciousness, understood as the awareness of the data of sense and of interiority (Lonergan, 1972:6-10), is the locus of human creativity which has its term in self-transcendence. The operations of conscious activity proceed from experience, through understanding and judgment, to the fourth level, that of decision-making by which we open ourselves to the exigences of religious self-transcendence, self-sacrificing love. Such self-sacrificing love objectified in the law of the cross (Loewe:162-174) permeates and confers a comprehensive pattern on the structures of our entire consciousness. Such a consciousness may be named Christian because we understand and judge the component parts of encountered reality--social, political, ecclesiastical--in the light of the principle of self-sacrificing love.

Language, Imagination and Prayer

In this paper, I propose to demonstrate that in conscious activity there transpires a dialectic between discursive reason and the symbolic activity of the imagination which I term symbolic reason. Further, the development of symbolic reason is intrinsic to the development of consciousness and is intimately connected with the symbolic function of both myth and language as understood by Ernst Cassirer and others such as Gilbert Durand. I have chosen to elaborate on Lonergan's intentionality analysis using the works of Cassirer and Durand for two reasons. First, Lonergan himself has not systematically developed his understanding of the interconnectedness of symbol and language; and second, the expositions of Cassirer and Durand are compatible with Lonergan's thought. Prayer, understood as a form of symbolic, linguistic activity is the ordinary sphere in which God's transformative action occurs and also occasions the reversal of biases which impede religious self-transcendence. An exploration of these themes of language, imagination and prayer should provide an increased understanding of the process of self-appropriation and simultaneously contribute to the understanding of the work of contemporary theologians such as John Shea who states that "We are the stories of God" (Shea:8), and of Edward Schillebeeckx, who states that "In his very essence, man is a narrative, a historical event rather than a predetermined fact" (Tracy et al.:30).
If the conscious operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and loving are the irrevisable demands of human living (Lonergan, 1972:19) the quality of these operations and consequently the quality of our lives is determined by the activity of the imagination. Imagination provides the contours for spontaneous living which reveal at any one moment who we really are as opposed to who we may say—or even unreflectively believe—we are. The only manner in which praxis can be transformed is by changing the contours of imagination.

Imagination can be described as the reality that mediates the unconscious to consciousness, the activity of which supplies one with images which do not necessitate but do provide the condition for the possibility of insight. Further, although imagination is founded in the materiality of images, the possibilities inherent in materiality transcend such materiality so that imaginative activity may be described as creative and enriching in the same way that intellectual abstraction as conceived by Lonergan is enriching rather than a divesting of non-essential elements in the classical sense of abstraction (Lonergan, 1958:87-89). Such abstracting transcendence reveals the spiritual form of materiality rather than negating concreteness. The enriching form of imaginative activity is symbolic meaning. Thus, imagination presents consciousness with possibilities for meaning—directed living—and is not to be understood as a type of already, out-there (in-here) now, real, reified faculty in the sense of naive realism. Imagination is functional and operational.

So understood, the meaning of which the imagination is the locus can be characterized as generic, temporal and existential (Lonergan, 1972:257). Consequently, it is heuristic and an indicator of the known unknown in that the possibilities presented to consciousness by the imagination lead to a decision which mediates the present into the future.

Language and the Structure of the Imagination

Language is the particular form of symbolic meaning that will be investigated. If it can be said that spontaneous activity is determined by the contours of imagination, it can be further stated that language structures the imagination because in the absence of linguistic activity there is available to us no specifically human or symbolic meaning. Language is the activity which forms the nexus between emotion and thought, between the immediate and mediative, and thus it is the symbolic activity par excellence.

Both Bernard Lonergan and Ernst Cassirer appear to be in agreement on this. In *Method In Theology*, Lonergan states:

The world of the infant is no bigger than the nursery. It is the world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard. It is
a world of immediate experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice. It is the world of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, food and drink, rage and satisfaction and sleep.

However, as the command and use of language develop, one's world expands enormously. For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent or past or future, not only what is factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative (Lonergan, 1972:76-77).

And in Language and Myth, commenting on the emergence of language, Cassirer states:

As soon as the spark has jumped across, as soon as the tension and emotion of the moment has found its discharge in the word or the mythical image, a sort of turning point has occurred in human mentality: the inner excitement which was a mere subjective state has vanished, and has been resolved into the objective form of myth or of speech. ... And now an ever-progressive objectification can begin. ... it is only by symbols (linguistic) that distinctions are not merely made, but fixed in consciousness. (Cassirer, 1946:36).

That such linguistic symbol-making is the decisively human characteristic is substantiated by the experience of persons such as Helen Keller as well as by studies of human pathology (Cassirer, 1947:33-36).

Immediacy, Language, Myth

The importance of Cassirer's understanding for our study, though, is that he proposes that both language and myth have a common source in the feeling experiences of human subjectivity, which experiences tend toward symbolic objectification. This objectification renders the originating experience capable of the enrichment of conceptualization and, as would be said in contemporary studies, available to the public forum. It is this symbolic appropriation of immediate experience that initiates one into the realm of human value and meaning because it objectifies the initial experience. Yet, that to which we choose to grant the status of meaning depends upon the direction of the subject's interest, and is determined not so much by the content of the experience as by the teleological perspective from which it is viewed. Whatever appears important for our wishing and willing, our hope and anxiety, for acting and doing: that and only that receives the stamp of verbal meaning (Cassirer, 1946:37).

Thus can be understood the statement that language structures our imagination, that is, gives to it the shape out of which our spontaneous actions arise.

It is essential to recall that the origin of both language and myth is the emotionally colored experience of immediacy rooted in materiality, and
whereas language proceeds along the path of conceptualization that will ultimately lead to the sciences, mathematics and discursive reason, the language of myth retains the experience of felt immediacy and will lead to religious languages, an objectification of religious experience. The substratum of myth, and consequently of religion, is not thought but feeling (Cassirer, 1947:81). Myths can, therefore, be understood as the hypostatization of feeling. So, in this sense, the myth-making, or if one prefers, the story-making principle of imagination is never superseded by theoretical reasoning. Myth and theory exist in dialectical relationship and each ushers us into the realm of objectivity.

Again and again, in this respect, myth receives new life and wealth from language, as language does from myth. And this constant interaction and interpenetration attests the unity of the mental principle from which both are sprung, and of which they are simply different expressions, different manifestations and grades (Cassirer, 1946:97).

**Language and Society**

Yet, we must not be misled by the process just described into conceiving of linguistic meaning as idiosyncratic. It is primarily a social structure. Although the process of symbolization occurs within each individual, it is incorporation into the symbol system or meaning system of the society or community that effects our personhood, as opposed to individuality. Many authors from many disciplines have stressed the critical function of the community in rendering operative the symbolic potential of the person and ultimately engaging us in the process of transformation.

In this regard, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan states:

In the Oedipus, the child moves from an immediate, non-distanced relationship with its mother to a mediate relationship thanks to the insertion into the symbolic order of the Family. The family institution distinguishes between parents and children, giving them names and places as singular subject. ... Entry into the symbolic order is therefore the precondition of singularity (Lemaire:7).

Of course the point to be made is that initiation into any symbolic system requires recognition of the other as distinct from ourselves whether that be understood as initiative into the Oedipus constellation or into some other story.

And Cassirer:

Indeed, it is the Word, it is language, that really reveals to man that world which is closer to him than any world of material objects and touches his weal and woe more directly than physical nature. For it is language that makes his existence in a community possible; and only in society, in relation to a "Thee," can his subjectivity assert itself as a "Me" (Cassirer, 1946:61).
Finally, to complete this cross-section of disciplines, Lonergan tells us that meaning is located in a common experience, a tradition, and can be transmitted historically.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment, and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself (Lonergan, 1972:79).

So, the appropriation of symbolic activity, specifically that of language, occurs in the context of community which is, in its own right, the locus of symbolic activity. That is why our personal transformation is never simply idiosyncratic and why statements such as the following become significant in establishing the conditions for the possibility of transformation:

I cannot see that we can be of help to individuals if we are not dealing with at least four generations. Like Hefner's reaction to his family's Methodism, Kinsey's reaction to Boy-Scoutism, Nixon's reaction to Quakerism, we each, experiencing the confluence of elements from our history, develop our story (Goldsmith:122).

So, if it can be said that language structures our imagination, it must be further stated that language also structures the imagination of the community and it is the relationship existing between these two entities that gives rise to the transformation of both the person and the community.

Language and Symbol

It was previously stated that language and myth are born of the same principle: feeling. Both result in symbolic meaning, myth along the lines of religious meaning and Mystery (Cassirer, 1947:25) and language along the lines of abstraction, but abstraction as understood by Lonergan, as enrichment. Nevertheless, even myth is expressed in language so that the "momentary gods" give place to ever-present deities. Yet, for religious and theological reflection upon religious language to fulfill its function of creativity it must continually return to the materiality in which it originated. The genius of language is that it transcends materiality, is liberated from it, but never leaves it behind. To do so would cause it to lose its symbolic character and to devolve to the level of sign which is itself a more material form of identification in which meaning-relationships give way to stimuli on the level of cause and effect (Cassirer, 1947:32).

Symbol and Creativity

Although language goes beyond the immediacy of experience and gives
rise to symbolic meaning and can be characterized as temporal rather than spatial, generic rather than specific, and existential rather than extrinsic, it also points beyond itself to that which is beyond language, even the mystical experience of God. "Language moves in the middle kingdom between the 'indefinite' and the 'infinite'" (Cassirer, 1946:81). It is its symbolic character that makes this possible. We can, therefore, attribute to language these characteristics which Gilbert Durand attributes to symbol: a maximum of concreteness which is always an inadequate expression of that which it symbolizes and which, therefore, in the interplay of adequacy and inadequacy gives rise to creative thought in the imagination (Durand:13-14).

Language, then, as structure of the creative imagination, is the birthplace of our personal and communal stories. This understanding of language can be promoted to substantiate the further statement that our stories, personal and communal, structure our imaginations and give to them the form out of which we spontaneously act. Otherwise stated, our undifferentiated feelings take form in the imagination which is the nexus between the unconscious and intentional acts culminating in decisions that open us to religious transcendence. When the control of meaning is that of interiority, our decisions result from the contour of our stories which have been formed by linguistic, symbolic meaning. Yet, these stories, themselves concretely symbolic, are never adequate to the transcendence to which they point. In this sphere of inadequation, we develop creatively. As Hartman, commenting on Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, has stated:

But since the symbolic is never found in purity, but only fulfilled in the totality of the process, and the process is never finished but always proceeding, the search for the symbol itself is never ending but always asymptotic (Hartman:315).

Now, what has been described up to this point is an elaboration of the place of linguistic symbol in Lonergan's intentionality analysis. But the development of conscious intentionality, it is well known, does not unfold in an untrammeled, smooth manner. The symbolic meaning systems of person and community are fraught with sin and bias so that our spontaneous actions and decisions are as likely to involve us in distortions and a flight from understanding as they are to result in the transcendence of self-sacrificing love. This is where the inadequation resulting from the symbolic process becomes tremendously important, for it is in the space created by the symbolic tending toward but never attaining coincidence with ultimacy that transformation occurs. Here, there is the possibility that our imagination and therefore our stories may become Christian. If such transformation occurs, then our spontaneous actions will come to be characterized as increasingly Christian.
Now, we are all familiar with Lonergan's descriptions of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion as well as Doran's description of psychic conversion. What I would like to explore, now, is how prayer, understood as dialogical and linguistic as this has been understood up to this point, facilitates the process of conversion and makes possible the conversion of the imaginative process. As this occurs, our "normative story" (/2/), that story which determines the value of all other stories, becomes the story of Christ, and in that sense can be understood John Shea's statement that "We are God's stories."

Language and Prayer

It is not especially productive to explore why, in the wake of historical-critical studies of both biblical and patristic texts and the rejection of extrinsicism by theologians, dialogical prayer suffered an eclipse. There was a period in which the attitude prevailed whereby many scholars were presented with the choice between developing intellectual excellence in the public forum or of opting for the less rigorous life of "spirituality" whereby the hard intellectual questions could be avoided and we could enjoy a rather comfortable life in a milieu where the "converted" spoke to the "converted." Certainly, if our goal was to attain some degree of intellectual respectability and stature, we would never be so naive as to refer to prayer as "talking with Jesus," because right away we would be confronted with such questions as the distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith.

I suggest that there remains a danger that prayer can be used as an escape from facing real questions, and that "speaking to Jesus" can become as naively positivistic as was the treatment of dogma when some of us studied "dogmatics." However, the fault lies neither with prayer conceived dialogically nor with dogma conceived as revelatory but with a positivistic mentality devoid of any notion of linguistic, symbolic meaning or of any but spurious regard for the place of imagination in arriving at either intellectual or religious self-transcendence.

The genius of Lonergan's methodology in regard to this question is that the control of meaning operative in intentionality analysis allows for the full development of both feeling and thought and succeeds in maintaining the two in creative tension. Theological method is as relentlessly opposed to subjectivism as it is to objectivism, to immanentism as to conceptualism (Lonergan, 1974:69-78).

Now if language is symbolic and the symbolic is that which frees experience from immediacy, that which makes experience available outside the spatial, specific event, and incorporates us into structures of meaning, prayer understood as a linguistic event makes sense. When it is recalled that
linguistic symbols are communal as well as personal and that they lead to
creativity fostering self-transcendence, prayer described as linguistic and
dialogical become comprehensible.

Prayer: Dialogue with the Living God

I suggest that prayer is a dialogue between a real person and the
real, living God, the God of Sarah and Abraham, of Jesus and Mary, of you
and me, and that the language proper to this dialogue is that of symbol,
which objectifies our feelings, emotions and attitudes just as technical
language is the language proper to science. Further, symbolic reason,
governed by the exigences of intentionality, is the control of meaning proper
to prayer, the control which prevents prayer from degenerating into illusion.
Each person's prayer will have unique characteristics because each person
herself brings to prayer a unique and unrepeatable combination of personality
traits, desires, fears. Because, however, all of us share the same humanity,
there are some characteristics of prayer that can be discussed generally.

The One Who Prays

Human persons, you and I, are persons all of whose activities are
anchored in the desires to know truth and to love and do the good. Since
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, logical reason, reason directed toward
exterior and measurable reality, has become the hallmark of science, truth,
and progress. On this view, reality is seen to be proportionate to the human
mind as practicing algorithmic or logical control of meaning, and that which
appears to exceed such control only appears to await further discoveries
which will enable the mind either to assimilate it or to assign it to the realm
of superstition or "soft" science.

In such a schema, careful and precise observation and algorithmic
formulation are valued as the most important activities of the intellect. Now,
in a consciousness formed in a technological world, it is understood that
observation is directed to the unknown as outside, the unknown physically
exterior to us. This has contributed to scientific progress.

What has, however, become more and more apparent since the time of
Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Paul Tillich, Teilhard de Chardin, Karl
Rahner, and especially Bernard Lonergan (to name some representatives), is
that observation, careful and precise, can be directed not only to the ex-
terior and physical world, but to the interior world of consciousness. This is
the world of symbolic language, spirit and psyche. The data of con-
sciousness can also be observed and understood, and knowledge of such data
helps us to organize and guide our lives in a manner compatible with the
demands of the human desires to know and to love in an unrestricted manner.
The rationalists and positivists are correct as far as they go. Their oversight is to equate the totality of reality with that which is externally observable and measurable.

Human consciousness integrates the exterior and the interior. If natural scientific reason puts us in contact with external reality, symbolic reason puts us in contact with our interiority. The symbolic 'logic' of prayer is reminiscent of Pascal's "The heart has reasons which reason does not know." For example, every external and measurable aspect of our lives can appear to be going well. We are professionally successful, our children have friends and are doing well in school. Yet, a nagging, nearly unidentifiable feeling, if we are attentive to it, will alert us that all may not be as well with us as it appears to be. Also, in the realm of symbolic reason, love and hate, directed toward the same person, can exist simultaneously in our hearts. Poets express the experience of love as well as other depth experiences such as death and despair in symbolic language, language which releases many levels of meaning none of which can be expressed adequately in non-poetic, scientific language. Yet, the experience expressed is undeniably real. Further, anyone who has ever loved knows that this experience is always more than the sum of its parts.

Now, symbol is the language of feelings and emotions, of intimacy, the sharing of who we really are with another. Actually, there exists no incompatibility between our symbolic and scientific consciousness, but there does exist a pronounced tendency in our society to develop and value the scientific at the expense of and to the detriment of the symbolic and non-logical dimensions of human life. Consequently, we neglect to notice and appreciate—or we devalue—our most personal experiences, the experiences of our dreams, hopes, desires, fears, angers that are the only entrance we have to knowledge of who we really are.

The immediacy of our feelings and affections provides the momentum that gives depth to our lives (Lonergan 1974:220-221). It is here that we come to terms with who we are, and it is here that our dialogue with the Lord has its roots. And unless we have given some time during our lives to developing this facet of our personhood, it is also that place where we may feel least at home and most suspicious of its importance. This uneasiness is due to the fact that our culture proposes for us as a criterion of intelligence, a notion of objectivity, which is antiseptically devoid of feelings and emotion; a notion of objectivity completely divorced from subjectivity. Yet, upon reflection, we realize that there is no place in the universe where we can stand outside our experience even if we want to.

The first demand of dialogical prayer, then, is to foster attentiveness to our experience. We do this by reflecting on such things as, When am I restless?, When do I feel most at home with myself?, When do certain people
antagonize me?, Why don't I like poor people? Further, we do this by being attentive to the feelings aroused in us by certain archetypal symbols like fire and water. We foster this attentiveness by paying attention to and befriending our night dreams and our daytime fantasies.

For most of us, the most difficult part of nurturing this attentiveness is in giving up first-order control over our imaginations. By first-order control is meant the a priori decision about the meaning an image or symbol will be allowed to have for us. This type of control, in fact, is an obstacle to the operations of interiority, and is, therefore, an obstacle to self-transcendence. In a world which teaches us on every front and at all costs to take charge and to be in control, to give up this kind of control is more difficult than it sounds. Still, only if we allow our real selves to emerge can there be any hope of real dialogue with the Lord, and our real selves emerge in our spontaneous feelings and desires.

The God to Whom We Pray

If prayer is a dialogue, something must be said about our partner in dialogue, God. It seems to me that the expression, praying to God, is somewhat misleading. It implies that God is an object that we pray at, or talk at, or offer sacrifice to. If such is the case, it would make little difference whether we pray to the Christian God or to the sphinx. So, who is the God who reveals himself in Christ? God is the one who established the world order in which we live. He is the author of our search for self-transcendence, the one who at every moment urges us to know and to love. And because this is the order which God has established, St. Thomas Aquinas tells us he necessarily provides us with the help to begin and to sustain human development /3/. God, then, is the environment in which we live, from which we cannot absent ourselves although we can choose to ignore the demands of this love which are, coincidentally, the demands of our humanity.

The Jewish-Christian God is the living God, one who participates in and responds to our lives. If the stories of the Jewish and Christian scriptures reveal anything to us, they reveal that God is involved in human living. If we believe that Christ is not merely a historical memory, but rather that he effectively acts today in human history in order for us to constitute our futures, then the same dynamics of relationship between God and us must exist today as were reported by our ancestors. Relationship is the key word and this is made possible by the linguistic symbol, for even though, as Lonergan has reminded us, meaning is expressed not only in linguistic symbols but also in the pre-verbal bodily actions such as a smile (Lonergan, 1972:57-58), still, only prior linguistic incorporation into a meaning-symbol structure renders the smile communicative.
From the human point of view what is required of us is candor, spontaneity, honesty, risk and desire. Where these are absent, relationships tend toward the superficial and utilitarian, and they will with God, also. God responds to us, but responds as God. Those experienced in prayer tell us that this response comes in unexpected ways, in surprising ways. If human relationship provides us with a paradigm for our relationship with God, it does not provide us with a diagram of how God responds to us. He does not respond according to our human expectations beyond the fact that he is involved in our lives and does respond. God responds to us, but does so in ways we cannot predict, imagine or anticipate. He responds with the freedom, liberality and even demands of the infinite. He breaks through our finitude and in so doing lets us know that indeed it is God who speaks. The biblical stories show this over and over.

The stories of scripture linguistically symbolize this human experience of God and in thus objectifying such experience, make it available to us. An example may be illustrative. In Genesis 32:23-32, we have recounted for us the story of Jacob's wrestling with God. Certainly there is engagement of both partners. If the struggle followed merely human patterns, the stronger partner would surely prevail. And we all know that God is the stronger, and according to human logic, should either vanquish Jacob or "allow" Jacob to win much as older children sometimes allow their younger, more naive siblings to "win" at a game of cards. Yet in such a case we know there is no real engagement or dialogue of the older with the younger. It is manipulative—even if benignly so—from start to finish. As adults, we smile on such situations, but would feel insulted and violated if we found ourselves on the receiving end of such a situation.

The story of Jacob wrestling with God, however, gives no hint that God either displays strength in a devastating manner or is acting condescendingly. It is a real struggle during which Jacob asks his "adversary" to name himself, to identify himself. God responds not by giving a proper name, even that of "God," but by giving Jacob a new name, Israel. In the act of naming, though, God reveals who he is: a giver of names, of life, of progeny. He responds, but as God.

Similarly, in the Christian scriptures, we read in Mark 5:25-34 the account of Jesus' curing of the woman who had suffered twelve years from a hemorrhage. This story is replete with the dynamics of relationship. Jesus becomes aware of the woman's presence. She is an individual personality to him although as yet unknown. Jesus is not a source of amorphous and undifferentiated power. He calls the woman out of the crowd. I'm sure we can relate to the mixed feelings with which she responded to this recognition: a sense of her uniqueness and individuality coupled with hesitation, uncertainty, fear. The climax of the story is reached when the woman "tells the
whole truth." She reveals who she is, there is no pretense, and she is not only cured, but so much more; she is granted salvation. This is the way in which God relates to us. He calls us forth to dialogue and then responds to us in surprising and unforeseen ways. The woman wanted to be cured; she was granted salvation.

Phyllis Trible in her book *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality* suggests that such biblical stories are composed of a vehicle and a tenor (Trible:17). The vehicle is what we find to be true in our experience of relationships; the tenor is in harmony with the vehicle but goes beyond it and follows its own rhythms and patterns. Theologically, we could say that, like the voices in a musical composition, there is distinction without separation. I propose that it is the same in our prayerful relationship with God. The pattern of human relationship is our starting point, and this can be trusted to point us in the right direction--so that we can become aware of the tenor. The tenor, though, God's voice, responds to us according to the dynamics of the divine which are related to, but distinct from the human. If this were not so, we would be dealing with a god proportionate to but not transcending our own humanness.

What we are dealing with in these passages and in Trible's comments is learning the language of God. If prayer is dialogue, each partner must appreciate and comprehend the language of the other. God does not try to change our language. In fact, he respects it, operating through our feelings, for example. But while respecting our being, God also will not be conformed to our rules of syntax and structure. When, in prayer, we enter into the land of Yahweh, our securities, so lovingly nurtured, are no longer significant. Durand notes:

And if you suppress that which is between the "Imparticpable" and the participants--O what emptiness!--you separate us from God, destroying the link and establishing a great and unnegotiable abyss (Durand:111) /4/.

A further aspect of dialogical prayer must be noted here. In prayer leading to transformation, the function of the linguistic symbol, the word, is relational, not analytic. The symbol draws us beyond ourselves into God's reality. In prayer, the symbols expressive of felt immediacy draw us beyond ourselves to the development of new relationship with God -- much as in cognitive development the question promotes us from one level of consciousness to another. Although analysis certainly has its place, the function of symbol in analysis is different from its function in prayer. There is at least the danger in analysis that we become enamored of our self-symbolization and never allow these symbols to lead us out of the concerns of our own narcissism.
Robert Doran expresses this so well when he treats of dream and symbol:

There is the potential, suggested and almost sufficiently disengaged by Jung ... that psyche may be brought to join in the dynamism of intentionality toward value, indeed toward the upper reaches of an ascending scale of values. And there is the opposed possibility that psyche may drift in the direction of the loss of the existential subject as the potential for self-transcending authenticity, that the subject may simply come to drift in the direction of the now harsh and now seductive rhythm of psyche and nature and thus fail to achieve genuine humanity (Doran, 1977:168).

The Process of Prayer

Now let us treat the topic of what happens when we pray. If we have developed an attitude of attentiveness to our experience, then we bring to prayer what our experience tells us concerns us most. Many times this is manifested on the level of feeling and/or memory. Since feeling, memory and desire are intrinsically related, our desires, too, often initiate us into the dynamics of prayer. If the Lord would grant me my most profound and personal desire, what would I ask of him? Here, it is important to be as real and as concrete as possible because it is here that we reveal ourselves with all our quirks, peculiarities, sins and loves. To do this we must give up control over what we think we should want to do or be. We may wish to come to grips with dissatisfaction in our jobs, in our vocational choices, in our marriages. We may wish to leave behind certain sorrows or angers that seem to inhibit the creative living of our lives. We may wish to evaluate our position in a corporate structure, the success of which is detrimental to other people and perhaps other nations. In other words, our daily lives, lived in twentieth-century America with its attendant complexities, are the environment of prayer. To step outside of our milieu to pray is to risk creating an artificial--although perhaps initially more consoling--relationship with the Lord. It is to risk illusion and unreality.

Once we have experienced our most personal desire, rather than think about and peruse it in logically discursive fashion, we express this to the Lord just as we would to a friend with whom we are on intimate terms. Sometimes it even helps if we are able to voice our desires and feelings aloud. For, just as poetry is more moving when read aloud and so reveals its infinite nuances in greater measure, so, at times, does prayer.

When we hear ourselves speak, we realize it is harder to say things than to think things and, ultimately, this is a check on our own reality and an aid to our getting more in touch with who we really are before the Lord. And that is the only person with whom the Lord can truly relate--or wants to relate.
Oftentimes, in expressing our desire to the Lord, images and symbols will spontaneously come to mind. These provide momentum and depth. As Bernard Lonergan states in *Method in Theology*, symbols cause or are caused by feelings (Lonergan, 1972:64). They are the vehicles of communication between body and spirit, between our consciousness and unconscious. If negotiated, they are capable of helping us integrate our personhood and of becoming persons whose normative story is that of Christ, whose imaginations are structured by the Christian story par excellence, the death/resurrection of Jesus the Christ.

**Dialogical Prayer and Anthropomorphism**

Perhaps in reading thus far, some have questioned whether this description of prayer as dialogue is not anthropomorphic and primitively mythical rather than symbolically mythical or religious. Since we are human we have no other way to communicate with God or anyone else except through human language and symbols. Since God is the one who has established us as linguistic and symbolic persons who, consequently, achieve our humanness only in relationship, it is reasonable to assume that God, in turn, communicates with us in a way that is congenial to our humanity rather than in a way that intrudes upon it or violates it. It is, however, of utmost importance to remember that our images and symbols, linguistically expressed, point to but are not identical with God.

Far from being a primitive and fundamentalist approach to the biblical revelation, such an imaginative and symbolic process of appropriation frees the revelatory word from the strictures of the past and allows it to be operative in a transformative manner in our contemporary lives. "Only symbolic expression can yield the possibility of prospect and retrospect, because it is only by symbols that distinctions are not merely made, but fixed in consciousness" (Cassirer, 1946:38).

Because the enormous strides made during this century have made us aware of the historicity of the scriptures, we are sometimes inclined to view such an imaginative use of scripture to be somewhat naive. We are all aware that the last thing needed by our contemporary world is a naive espousal of Christianity which results in a simplistic response to the complexities of modern life. Let us devote some thought now to the difference between a fundamentalist approach to the use of scripture in prayer and a symbolic, imaginative approach.

**Fundamentalism and Symbolism**

A fundamentalist approach confuses the symbol with the reality in a physical, spatial, specific and external manner, and, therefore, perceives
truth as bound to the physical, spatial, specific and external. It is something "out-there" to which one can point. Truth so understood becomes an object outside oneself to be acquired; it is the answer to a question or a problem; it is absolute and necessary, irreversible.

A tutored approach, one informed by biblical criticism, but which does not equate the findings of biblical criticism with the entirety of the biblical message, does not confuse the symbol with the reality. Although symbols are considered to communicate, and even to make truth present, and although symbols are allowed to arouse feelings and desires in us, they are not confused with the reality itself. They are the vehicles for the tenor. Within such a perspective, truth is not an object "out-there" to be grasped; neither is it a specific answer to a specific problem, which answer is eternal and immutable. It is temporal rather than spatial, generic rather than specific, and existential and interior rather than extrinsic and exterior.

The Locus of Transformation

Let us return, now, to the story of the woman with the hemorrhage and see how this dynamism of symbolism or of second naiveté unfolds. All of us have some complaint, something with which we have struggled that seems not to have gotten any better over the years. In that, we can identify with the woman. It is this complaint, disease, worry, from which we desire deliverance. So we pray. But the story tells us that Jesus wants to know personally the person cured. Here, if we are attentive to our feelings, we may be surprised to find we don't want this.

Intellectually and in our everyday protests we may say we desire a personal relationship with the Lord, but our feelings when face-to-face with the possibility of such a relationship may reveal to us we want no part of it. We may find we are fearful, hesitant, dismayed. Why can't Jesus just cure us? After all, he is God. What we are really saying is, Why can't Jesus be a magician? Magicians do their work unilaterally. They demand no relationship. Relationships put us on the line. We have to reveal ourselves, expose ourselves, become intimate. This is demanding.

We may then begin to ask ourselves why we are shirking from this relationship. If, at this point, we can honestly say why, this will reveal to us the real situation that exists between ourselves and God. This is the stuff of prayer, the place where transformation occurs, sometimes painfully, always, ultimately, in a liberating manner. And as we change, and are changed, through the development of this relationship, the story will change for us, too. That is why we can return to the same stories time and time again. So you see, the meaning of the story goes far beyond the specificity and extrinsicism of the original account which we can view as something that
happened to that person long ago who was fortunate enough to have encountered the historical Jesus, to give us insight into our existential situation today in which Jesus is as much operative as he was then.

Negative Feelings in Prayer

The reader must have noticed that more attention has been paid to the possibility of negative feelings arising in prayer than of positive feelings. The reason for doing this is threefold:

1. We tend to associate real communication with positive feelings. This is, in part, a function of our culture. We are taught not to tolerate the least discomfort or pain. Pain is treated not as a symptom or as a valuable indicator of "how things are" with us, but as a disease to be conquered or eliminated. Pain is pain. It is never pleasant. Thinking about pain is not the same as experiencing pain. In prayer, when we allow negative feelings such as fear, anger, or shame to arise, we actually experience the fear, anger, or shame. This is not pleasant. It is, though, extremely important. It is important because it reveals who we really are and this enters into and makes possible real intimacy with the Lord.

2. Second, since none of us likes pain, by allowing ourselves to experience it when we could circumvent it by ignoring these feelings or by insisting on producing positive feelings, we are indicating our willingness to give up control of the dialogue and to let the Lord become a partner in our journey.

3. Finally, our vulnerability is the place of transformation and liberation.

The Effects of Prayer

What may we expect to result from prayer? We can expect conversion and the reversal of our biases. We can expect to become increasingly real ourselves, persons who are willing to risk involving ourselves in the complexities and demands of daily life in this century; persons willing to face the apocalyptic realities of nuclear holocaust, of the systemic oppression of the poor and the weak, individually, communally, nationally, of world hunger in an age of abundance.

If we are economists, we become willing to analyze first-world economic systems from the viewpoint of their effect on peace and justice rather than of the maximization of profits. If we are educators, we become willing to examine the dynamics involved in our teacher-student relationships. Do we manipulate students? Do we use them to fulfill our emotional needs? Do we foster their uniqueness or seek to dominate them?
Bias and Conversion

In the introductory sections of this exploration of prayer, it was stated that authentic prayer makes possible and supports us in our quest for self-transcendence, in our desire to actualize the dynamics of human growth. We have mentioned the fact that the unfolding of the dynamics of self-transcendence does not proceed in an entirely smooth manner. In prayer we discover that we are quite adept at resisting self-transcendence. This resistance also follows certain patterns, the patterns of bias. Biases are obstacles to our freedom. They color the decisions we make and, consequently, they result in distortions of our humanness. Rather than discuss the structure of each form of bias--dramatic, personal, group, and general--I will discuss the dynamics of how the conversion effected in prayer, the displacement of "our" stories by the Christian story, occurs.

If we are attentive to our experience and develop and cultivate an awareness of our feelings, we will discover the patterns of our biases. Our dis-ease around men (women), if we objectify it by naming it, may reveal to us a repressed fear of our own sexuality. Spontaneous reactions to the success or failure of a colleague may reveal we are more competitive than cooperative. Feelings of superiority vis-à-vis persons on welfare may indicate the bias of middle class insularity. Our reluctance to devote ourselves to the working-out of long-term solutions to social questions, and our impatience toward those who do, reveal to us the general bias of common sense that leads to social decline.

Since in prayer, the experience of God's love flooding our hearts is the source of our strength (Connolly:1060-63), we have the courage to place these biased stories, the stories out of which we spontaneously act, in dialogue with God's story of Christ. In the inadequation of the two sets of self-symbolization, ours and God's, transformation may occur.

Normative Stories

Each of the major world religions has a "normative story," a story in which inheres the totality of the meaning and purpose of life /5/. A normative story is one which engages the heart, mind and spirit of individuals and communities and directs them toward self-transcendence. For Christians, the normative story is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. To say that this is a normative story is not to deny the actuality of the event of Jesus' death and resurrection. It is to say, though, that understood as a story or symbol which structures our consciousness, the paschal mysteries are more than a historical memory. They are the pattern and dynamism of our daily life. The paschal mysteries exercise a symbolic function on every level of consciousness, but particularly on the levels of experience and de-
cision. This is so because the crucifixion and resurrection as it is received in scriptural images has the capacity to arouse in one the already present drive towards self-transcendence in knowledge and love without binding one to a spatial, specific and external interpretation of the images. It does this by proposing as the norm for one's living the appropriation of this meaning of death-resurrection. Thus, the death-resurrection nexus becomes the norm by which one acts, and such acting results in the transformation of our spontaneous way of acting. When we become convinced that life comes out of death, even now in this world, that in spite of all appearances, love, not hate, has the last word; and when our consciousness is so structured that these convictions become spontaneous responses to situations arising from daily living, we can say that the normative story of Christianity has replaced "our stories," the stories which incorporate our biases.

In our prayer, when we place our biased stories in dialogue with the normative story of Christianity, what we may find is that our consciousness, as revealed in our spontaneous actions and words, is structured more in accord with pagan myths than with the paschal mysteries. An imagination structured by the Promethean myth, for example, would cause us to act as if we were compelled to sneak up on God and in some surreptitious manner wrest from him the divine fire. Such an imagination would lead us to act as if any good thing with which we are blessed is given to us grudgingly, rather than liberally and without measure. We would have "caused" God to bless us by our prayer or good works. Such an imagination would belie the gratuity of God's love and the fact that our most profound biblical stories, creation, fall, incarnation and salvation are all ways in which God expresses his desire to be present--and intimately present--to his creation, especially to us whom he has made a "little less than the angels." Dying to the Promethean story and allowing it to be replaced by the Christian story is one example of life coming out of death.

Conversion, then, is not a function of will power. We can't manipulate or bring it about. It occurs more surely, though, when we lessen our resistance to intimacy by putting our stories in dialogue with the normative stories of Christianity, especially in the story of the death-resurrection which gives meaning to all other biblical stories. We also allow conversion to occur by relinquishing preconceived ideas of how the experience of conversion will occur. In conversion, the contours of our imaginations are restructured.

Imageless Communication

It may happen that prayer begun in the active use of our imaginations ends in wordless communication. Images and words may give way to
co-presence. It is not a question of one prayer being better or "higher" than the other. Nor is it a question of the conceptual giving way to the experiential, for the imaginative encounter with images and symbols is already experiential. It is, rather, a question of allowing ourselves the freedom to respond to the Lord's initiative so that at a particular time he may be for us what he wants to be for us. A metaphor may help.

The musician's ear is so sensitive to movement that it responds to and hears sound that is unavailable to the rest of us. The musician is specially gifted, but only care and love for his gift over long years enable him to actualize it. The metaphor can give us insight into imageless or non-conceptual prayer. All of us have been gifted with God's love and experience a natural attraction to him. Our care and love for this giftedness will enable us--over the months and years--to hear and respond to his voice even when there is no voice to hear. This is one more example, too, of how important it is that we not predetermine for ourselves the pattern of prayer. To give up control is essential. Otherwise, there can be no co-presence.

Hugo Rahner in Ignatius the Theologian has this to say about the person who has experienced imageless prayer:

> he can see, hear, taste and touch the divine, without which all humanity is impossible. And because he has 'exercised' the senses of his soul, he is able once more to appreciate the beauty of words, of the sun and the flowers, the biblical parables and the ineffable things which can be uttered only through primary words and primary gestures (Rahner: 208).

I would like to paraphrase this. After one has experienced imageless prayer, she will have a more profound understanding of the sensible which once again will give rise to images. I think that is why persons whose prayer we feel to be authentic are also those who have their feet firmly on the ground, who seem at home with themselves, their bodies, and who know how to enjoy such sensible pleasures as eating and drinking with friends. The eating and drinking is the same as anyone else's, yet it is altogether different; it is grounded in the experience of communion.

We also know that we can assume a posture of silent communication in order to avoid voicing what needs to be voiced. Instead of communicating our feelings--especially the negative ones--we assign them (psychologists would say, repress them) to the subterranean caverns of our being where they will live a life of their own, draining us of energy and creativity, until they build up enough pressure to erupt into consciousness (Lonergan, 1957: 198). The key, again, is to be honest with ourselves. If we do this we will know when our silence is an experience of presence and when it is repressive. We will allow images to arise spontaneously, but we will not cling to them or try to control them. We will thus allow the Lord to participate in our prayer.
Personal, Private, and Deprivatized Prayer

What has been described up to this point may be called personal prayer. It is prayer engaged in by one person in dialogue with the Lord. I would like, however, to caution against referring to it as "private" prayer. Private prayer has the connotation of being an activity involving only God and an individual, indeed an individual detached from her milieu and daily concerns. We could almost say that private prayer fosters an attitude which is a-temporal and a-historical because the one who prays prescinds from his/her rootedness in a particular social and temporal context "to be alone with God." In such a situation, the concerns of one's work, of one's confusions are thought of more as distractions than as material for prayer. In privatized prayer, sin is "my" sin and grace is "my" grace. There is little notice of systemic grace and sin, grace and sin in which we participate by the mere fact of our involvement in institutions which are oppressive or in institutions which are gracious and liberating.

If, however, what theologians, sociologists, and psychologists tell us is true—namely, that we come to know ourselves and develop our humanity only in communion with others—it would seem unlikely that we would grow in our relationship with God if the others in our lives did not enter our prayer. The personal transformation that occurs in prayer has a social, not purely private, effect.

The example of Thomas Merton will illustrate the difference between privatized and deprivatized prayer. Certainly, by all accounts, Merton's prayer was personal. As a Trappist monk, his life was given to silent dialogue with the Lord. Yet his prayer so sensitized him to the injustices prevalent in the United States, his prayer developed in him such attentiveness to his experience, that he was among the first in our country to speak in support of the civil rights movement and to speak against our military intervention in Vietnam. His prayer was personal, but not private.

If the experience of those whom our tradition acknowledges to be mystics, Bernard of Clairvaux, Teresa of Avila, Catharine of Siena, Thérèse of Lisieux, Charles de Foucauld, is to be trusted, authentic, personal prayer is deprivatized. It leads to the enlarging rather than the narrowing of our horizon of interests, concerns, and involvements. The seeming paradox is that increased depth and focus inevitably result in an expansion of horizon. The reverse is not always true.

Further, the cloister is no barrier to social involvement. The only barrier is a mentality characterized by elitism, and this may occur both inside and outside the cloister, the rectory, the office, the conference room. When
we become fixated on our relationship with God to the extent that our concern for people and social questions is eclipsed, the quality of prayer must be examined. Prayer never distances us from others although at times it may separate us from them physically or geographically.

Prayer and Praxis

Gregory Baum in Religion and Alienation has commented that those who, because of their Christian commitment to the task of bringing about the Kingdom, become engaged in a critique of social ideologies, including that of institutional religion, often end by disassociating themselves from the religious enterprise. They may become simply social activists and/or after a period of social commitment they "settle in," adapting themselves to the status quo which they could not change. This is his observation, not a judgment.

I would like to elaborate on this observation. I suggest that the decisive difference in whether or not we continue our involvement in actualizing the values of the Kingdom--faith, mercy, justice, "the weightier things of the law" (Mt 23:23)--is our fidelity to personal prayer, personal relationship with the Lord. This is so because, for the Christian, only the belief in life out of death, only belief that life and love will prevail over death and hate even when the jury is still out on the question, can sustain him or her in the face of the potential, apocalyptic destruction of our world. Praying in dialogue with Jesus in Gethsemane, an example if there ever was one of someone trusting in the power of life in the face of all odds, can make the difference as to whether we persevere in our dedication to the values of the Kingdom to the extent that they inform our consciousness and our praxis. As previously expressed, only when our imaginations are structured by the Christian normative stories so that we act spontaneously out of them is there the possibility of acting as Christians. Personal prayer, understood as personal relationship, occasions this structuring of consciousness, this conversion that results in an outward flow of vitality and energy. Such prayer defuses our egocentricity and integrates, strengthens, our consciousness so that we act from our center rather than from peripheral concerns and attractions.

The purpose of this paper has been to show that language and the linguistic process is incidental neither to the formation of a Christian imagination nor to prayer which is a dominant factor in the formation of a Christian imagination. If the hypothesis developed in this paper is accepted, there are several inferences that need to be stated which would require further investigation and elaboration.

First, there exists an interdependence between personal and communal stories. As one changes, so does the other.
Second, as our imaginations are restructured so will be our language, and as our language is changed so will be our imaginations. This has obvious implications in the area of inclusive and non-inclusive religious language. The question of the predominance of male imagery in religious language is much too profound to be treated in terms of style and form. It indicates "where we really are" in our religious communities. The difficulty I experienced in writing this paper in retaining a personal notion of God without referring to her as him, is a difficulty I did not completely surmount because I, too, am part of the communal story.

Third, if the logic of symbolic reason operates within the normativity of intentionality, then there need be no fear of allowing imagery and poetry to play a prominent part in our prayer, our worship and our doctrine.

If this is permitted, we personally and communally will be able to join with T.S. Eliot when he writes in "Little Gidding":

With the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
NOTES

/1/ This description of imagination was arrived at in reflecting upon Bernard Lonergan's understanding of image in Insight (Lonergan, 1957:8-9) and Robert Doran's understanding of spontaneous elemental imagination in Subject and Psyche (Doran, 1977:135-36).

/2/ For the use of the term "normative story," I am indebted to Baum, 1975:121-23.

/3/ This is an application of the Thomist principle of contingent necessity.

/4/ This is my translation of the French. I could find no suitable English equivalent for imparticipable, which I have left untranslated.

/5/ Thus, normative stories are akin to anagogic symbols as described by Robert Doran (1978a:138).
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CHRISTIAN IMAGINATION AND CHRISTIAN PRAYER

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The theme of the present Lonergan Workshop is "Christian Imagination: Biases and Transformations." In this exploratory paper I will focus on the Christian imagination as it relates to Christian prayer. I will begin with some introductory comments on the nature of "Christian imagination" and Christian prayer as I understand these realities. Next, I will reflect in turn on (1) a common metaphorical description of prayer, namely, "the lifting up of the mind and heart to God"; (2) prayer to God as "Person," indeed, three "Persons"; (3) prayer to God as "Bridegroom" and (4) image-mediated and imageless prayer. I choose to zero in on these four topics not because there exists some unique interconnection between them, though they are, of course, interrelated in various ways, but because they provide me with a useful vehicle for hopefully facilitating a deeper understanding of the role of Christian imagination vis-à-vis Christian prayer. In my reflections on the first three topics I will begin with a presentation of certain theological views of Dr. Matthew Fox, the director of the Institute of Creation-centered Spirituality. I choose Fox as my "partner-in-dialogue" because his writings are influential today in the area of spirituality and because I find certain significant differences between his views and my own in a number of important areas of theological discussion.

IMAGINATION

What is imagination? Lonergan commonly lists "imagining" as one of the conscious operations which is present as a dynamic component in the process of human knowing (1972:6). He follows Aristotle in the latter's insistence that "thinking ... thinks the forms in ... images" (1941:594). But Lonergan holds that the term "understanding" better translates the Greek of Aristotle than the word "thinking" in the text just cited. In Lonergan's terms, "the image is necessary for the insight" (1957:8) or act of understanding. Insight is "into the concretely given or imagined" (1957:9). Lonergan distinguishes between perceptual images and images which result from the play of imagination (1957:274-275). These latter he refers to as "free images" (1957:274). In his Halifax lectures on Insight Lonergan offers
the following definition of imagining:

When one says one imagines something, one means first of all that there is not something outside one that is causing the image; one is causing the image oneself; one is producing the image. The image is a term immanently produced by the imagination (1980:178-179).

He further adds:

We form images to have some sort of apprehension of what is possible. When we think, 'Well, I can see him doing that' and he is not doing it yet, we are just imagining him doing it. But there is a finality to forming the image, and that is a final object. ... Imagining both produces an image and wants to represent some object, what is imagined (1980:179).

In Method in Theology Lonergan clearly states that "the intending of our imaginations may be representative or creative" (1972:10).

Lonergan in Insight distinguishes between the image as image, the image as sign and the image as symbol.

The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image as standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical 'known unknown'. As sign, the image is linked with some interpretation that offers to indicate the import of the image (1957:33).

In Method in Theology Lonergan refines and deepens his understanding of the image as symbol. There he defines the symbol as "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling" (1972:64). He proceeds to consider the symbol in its relationship to feelings, to affective development, to the realm of the unconscious as well as the conscious. He draws on the work of Mircéa Eliade, Gilbert Durand, Northrop Frye and others (1972:69). Due to the limited goals of the present paper I will terminate my introductory remarks on the nature of the imagination at this point. But I will introduce further nuances regarding the nature of imagining at certain points later in this paper.

"Christian Imagination"

What is "Christian" imagination? Tersely expressed, Christian imagination is the process of imagining, as I have just described it, insofar as it is impacted in any manner by the Mystery of Jesus Christ, Son of the eternal Father.

Lonergan distinguishes between "the inner word that is God's gift of his love" and "the outer word of the religious tradition" (1972:119). These
two "words" in the Christian tradition relate respectively to "the invisible mission of the Spirit" and "the visible mission of the Son" (1976:76). Obviously, Jesus Christ has profoundly impacted and continues to impact the process of imagining of the Christian and of anyone influenced by the Christian tradition, through his visible mission upon earth. But, since it is in virtue of Jesus' death and resurrection that God bestows the "inner word" of the gift of his love upon human beings of good will, Christ also impacts the process of imagining through the gift of the "inner word" insofar as the latter can be said to influence the process of imagining.

Now it is Lonergan's view that the presence in an individual of love and especially of the gift of divine love dissolves bias, including even "the bias of unconscious motivation" (1975:63). Clearly, the healing of bias through love profoundly affects human imagining in its root functioning and liberates it. Again, Lonergan holds that the transformation of being in love--above all, the transformation effected through the indwelling gift of God's love, flooding the heart--"reveals values" (1975:63). Here the transformative impact of the "inner word" on the imagination is clear. It at once liberates from various biases and disposes the human heart to be open to authentic values and in a very special way to those values disclosed in the "outer word" which is the Eternal Word made flesh in Jesus Christ. I understand, accordingly, the "Christian" imagination as the process of human imagining insofar as it is affected/impacted in its functioning and orientations by the Person and teachings of the historical Jesus Christ and/or by the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit of Christ.

Certainly there are varying degrees of intensity, clarity and richness in which "Christian" imagination is at work in individuals, groups, cultures. Doubtless, it is most powerfully at work in those persons and groups who not only possess the "inner word," the gift of God's love poured forth invisibly into the heart by the Spirit of Christ, but who also explicitly confess that Jesus Christ is Lord and daily advance in the knowledge and love of him.

Christian Prayer

What is Christian prayer? In my books Christotherapy: Healing Through Enlightenment (1975) and Christotherapy II: A New Horizon for Counselors, Spiritual Directors and Seekers of Healing and Growth in Christ (1982) I discuss Christian prayer at length. Here in my initial remarks on Christian prayer I will limit myself to a few sentences on certain key characteristics of this prayer. This terse summary will serve simply as a point of departure for my specific discussion of the four topics I enumerated above.

In brief, then, Christian prayer is a communion in some manner with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. All authentic Christian prayer is
inspired in the one who prays by the Holy Spirit of Christ. The prayer
which the Holy Spirit inspires can be prayer of repentance, petition, thank-
giving, praise. All authentic Christian prayer is adoration, worship because
it is an acknowledgment of the absolute Lordship of the God who is Father,
Son and Holy Spirit.

PRAYER: "A LIFTING UP OF THE MIND AND HEART TO GOD"

Dr. Matthew Fox offers a sharp critique of the ancient description of
prayer as "a lifting up of the mind and heart to God" (1972:xiii-xiv). Fox's
critique invites a counter-critique and in offering one I hope to shed some
light on the role Christian imagination plays in talk about prayer as well as in
prayer itself.

A basic contention of Fox is that "one's understanding of prayer
unmasks one's spiritual quotient, revealing how well an adult experience of
events, persons, and world-view is integrated with one's fundamental beliefs"
(1972:xiii). To exemplify his thesis Fox focuses on the definition of prayer
as a "lifting up of the mind and heart to God" and he proceeds to offer a
number of critical comments about certain implications underpinning this
definition. First of all, for Fox "the word 'up' implies a total cosmology: We
are below and God is up" (1972:xiii). Further, the word "lifting ... carries
on the upward direction motif (the transcendent is somehow above us watch-
ing over us)" (1972:xiii). Fox holds that we owe this understanding of
prayer to John Damascene of fourth century Greece and not to Jewish or
Christian origins in the Old and New Testaments (1972:xiii-xiv). He suggests
that a spirituality based on this understanding of prayer would be "aristo-
cratic, hierarchical in its basic presuppositions (the ups versus the belows
with the former holding special Providential favor) boasting a God-in-the-sky
cosmology" (1972:xiv).

Elsewhere in his writings Fox contrasts the symbol of "climbing
Jacob's ladder" with the symbol of "dancing Sarah's circle" (1979:36ff).
Fox's contrast of these two symbols further illuminates his difficulties with
the ancient definition of prayer we have just been considering. Thus, he
criticizes male Christian mystics for using the ladder "as symbol of fleeing the
earth in order to experience a transcendent, i.e., up-like God" (1979:39).
He rhetorically asks: "Where did Christian mystics get this 'up' oriented
motif in their vision of the spiritual journey?" And he answers: "It is
derived from hellenistic and not biblical sources" (1979:41). Fox states a
preference for the "democratic" symbolism present in the circle (1979:49). He
agrees with Buckminster Fuller's comment that "anyone who is still using the
words 'up' and 'down' is 500 years out of date" (1979:46). Fox opts for a
"panentheistic" God who is "everywhere to us like water to a fish but also
In response to Fox's critique of John Damascene's description of prayer and to his general objection to the use of symbols that express the spiritual journey as an upward movement, I would like to offer two basic observations. The first deals with the issue of the historical sources of inspiration for these symbolic expressions. The second treats the matter of the physico-psychological, spiritual appropriateness of "ascensional symbolism."

Fox, as I have shown, stresses the non-Jewish, non-Christian origin of the "lifting up" metaphor for prayer and more generally of those symbols which depict spiritual progress in terms of a movement upward. I, on the contrary, hold that there are solid grounds in the Old and New Testaments for the use of this type of imagery. Thus, for example, Edmond Barbotin in The Humanity of God (1976) presents a series of texts from the Old Testament which symbolically describe Yahweh as the "Most High" (Ps 27:18) and as dwelling in heaven (Ps 115:16). Yahweh is also depicted as manifesting himself on mountain summits and, indeed, the Psalmist prays: "I lift up my eyes to you, to you who have your home in heaven" (Ps 123:1). In the New Testament the Father is called "Our Father in heaven" (Mt 6:9). Jesus is also described as leading his disciples up to a mountain top where he is transfigured before them (Mt 17:1-8). Above all, there is in the New Testament the imagery of the resurrection, ascension and glorification of Jesus at the right hand of the Father. And, just as the Psalmist lifts up his "eyes to the mountains" (Ps 121:1), to God in heaven, so the author of the epistle to the Colossians exHORTs his readers to "seek the things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God" and to "set your minds on things that are above" (Col 3:1-2). The words of the Psalmist in prayer and the exhortation of the author of Colossians find an almost literal echo in Damascene's definition of prayer as a "lifting up of the mind and heart to God." Finally, contrary to Fox's assertion that the symbolism of a "lifting up of the mind and heart" implies a total cosmology in which "we are below and God is up" I concur with Barbotin in his observation that "in saying that God is in heaven the Bible is not in any way claiming that the divinity is localized in the stratosphere" (1976:76-77) and that "even the simplest Christian is not tempted to locate God in an orbit" (1976:77).

Next, my response to Fox's objection to the use of "ascensional type" symbols involves an appeal to the naturalness and physico-psychological-spiritual suitability of such symbols. Dr. Edward Casey in Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (1976) draws on the classical research of Robert Desoille concerning the use of imagery in psychotherapy. Casey points out that

it is the ascensional movement [of the imagination] that is most crucial in Desoille's view, for its frequency and quality manifest the degree
to which the imagining subject has been freed from the problems that
brought him to psychotherapy in the first place. At the same time,
images of ascension promote the patient's independence of the psy-
chotherapist as guide; as such images become more spontaneously
generated, the need for their inducement by another person is cor-
respondingly diminished. In this way Desoille practiced by means of
guided imagery what Bachelard has called an "ascensional psychology"

In the same tradition Dr. Roberto Assagioli recommends for the deepening of
spiritual growth the use of symbol projection including a "climb to the top
of ... [a] mountain" which can be interpreted "as the ascent of the center of
consciousness ... to ever higher levels, seeking to reach superconscious
levels, and to approach the spiritual Self" (1977:208). Also, Lonergan refers
to the work of Gilbert Durand insofar as it deals with symbols related to such
basic physiological reflexes as "maintaining one's balance, swallowing food and
mating" (1972:69). He remarks the "connected with maintaining one's equilib-
rium there are what Durand calls the ascensional symbols: rising ... going
up the ladder" (1975:34) and that "Durand's analysis of symbols is connected
with very fundamental physiological psychic fact" (1975:34). There is then
solid evidence that the use of symbols of clinging, ascending, etc. has it
roots deep in the physiological-psychic nature of the human being and that
imaginative employment of these symbols is of great value psychically and
spiritually.

Fox in the same book in which he presents the contrast between the
symbolism of "climbing Jacob's ladder" and "dancing Sarah's circle" writes:
"I believe that the truly adult spiritual journey is precisely this: a journey
from dualism to dialectic. From Either/Or to Both/—and" (1979:84). Fox
acknowledges that such dualisms as "in/out" (1979:81), "left/right" (1979:82),
etc. "contain some truth" (1979:82). But, unfortunately in his critique of
Damascene's definition of prayer and of ascensional imagery he fails to carry
through with his "Both—And" principle.

Lonergan in a lecture entitled The Redemption remarks that

the individual apprehension and appreciation of the word of Christ is
apt to be an incomplete view. It isn't wrong, mistaken, because it is
incomplete. It becomes mistaken or wrong only insofar as it tends to
be exclusive (1975:5).

In the context of Lonergan's observation I suggest that an exclusivist employ-
ment of symbols of an ascensional nature in reference to God, prayer and
spiritual development would be unfortunate and could easily lead to the ex-
aggerations and distortions in the Christian's apprehension of the meaning of
spirituality, etc. which Fox denounces. The solution, however, is not to
launch an attack on ascensional symbols as such but to acknowledge their
value and richness, while admitting their limitations and need to be balanced
off with other symbols of a highly diverse nature.

My aim here has been simply to show that it is possible to root the metaphor describing prayer as "lifting up of the mind and heart to God" deep in Scriptural images of the Old and New Testament and also to show that the use of images such as "ascending" and "climbing" to depict and facilitate the spiritual journey is profoundly in harmony with primal physical and psychological orientations. I conclude this section of my paper with an insightful observation of Barbotin:

The divisions of "high and low," "right and left," standing upright and sitting, with the natural meanings they carry are not bound up with any particular state of scientific knowledge [pace Buckminster Fuller]; they belong rather to universal human experience and are valid for man yesterday, today, and tomorrow. ... Such representations can, therefore, legitimately be employed in expressing the Christian faith, since their meaning belongs to everyone's living experience (1976:77).

PRAYER TO GOD AS "PERSON/PERSONS"

In 1972 Dr. Matthew Fox expressed the view that "God is not a person--analogy tells us more what a thing is not than what it is--God lies beyond all experiences of our of person and personality" (1972:18). Fox approvingly cited Gabriel Marcel who wrote that "'God' ... is not 'Someone Who' ... The more non-disposable I am, the more will God appear to me as 'Someone Who'" (1972:18-19). In 1981 Fox again warned that "when we cling to the concept of God as person, we are encouraging ... [the] detranscendence of God" (1981:120). For Fox "Jewish and Christian Scriptures declare that 'God is Spirit,' not person" (1981:120) and he observes that "it was with a metaphysical tradition of personhood in fourth century Greek theology that calling God analogously 'person' took on some meaning" (1981:120). But he concludes that "we today ... would be better off dropping the notion of the personhood of God and finding a deeper understanding" (1981:120).

Now, insofar as Fox objects to the use of the term "person" in reference to God out of a desire to avoid creating the impression that God is a single, solitary person rather than a Trinity, I can sympathize to a degree with his difficulty. But my reading of Fox leads me to believe that he is equally unhappy with a reference to God as three "persons."

Lonergan in an unpublished talk entitled "Consciousness and the Blessed Trinity" wrote:

In the spiritual life of Catholics, in their prayer and penance, in their faith and hope and charity, in their sorrow for sin and their purpose of amendment, they are concerned with persons. The notion that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not persons in the ordinary sense of the word "person" would be extremely difficult for them to
conceive, something they would not attempt. As far as the ordinary Catholic is concerned, there is no doubt that God is a person; that the Father is God and so a person; that the Son is God and so a person; that the Holy Spirit is God and so a person. There is a difficulty in Catholic thought, but it is not a difficulty on the level of religion, of the spiritual life, of the way ordinary Catholics think about God or the divine persons. The only difficulty lies in theoretical theology. It is the question of integrating into systematic thought something that has always belonged to the sensus fidelium (1963a:2-3).

Lonergan made the above remark in 1963. In 1981, however, Matthew Fox in a book on Christian spirituality intended for the "ordinary faithful" and not primarily for professional theologians states that we would now be better off dropping the idea of the personhood of God and seeking some deeper understanding. Clearly, the difficulties of systematic theology have now filtered down into the stream of life of the lay Christian and are profoundly impacting the very way the Christian prays to God.

It is my conviction that the reference to God as "Someone Who," as a "Conscious Subject" and, indeed, as a Trinity of "Conscious Subjects" will survive both in the ordinary prayer language of Christians and in systematic theology. I also believe that the language of "person" as used in reference to God will also survive. What are my grounds for these beliefs? First of all, I agree with Lonergan that in ordinary language what everyone understands by "person" is "someone, not something; a conscious subject" (1963a:2). Further, a "person" is "a subject that not merely knows, but in knowing is aware that he is knowing; that wills, and in willing is aware of his willing" (1963a:2). Moreover, "there is the person as a subject with whom another subject deals" (1963a:2). We do not "adore something; but we do adore somebody. We do not offend something, but we do offend somebody. We cannot repent before something, but we do repent before somebody" (1963a:2). As Lonergan tersely puts it: "The question is: are there three in God who are somebody; are [there] three in God who are conscious subjects?" (1963a:2). Lonergan’s own response to this question is straightforward: "I do not think that the answer to that question is difficult" (1963a:2).

Lonergan proceeds in his reflections on "persons" and the Trinity to show that the God of the Old Testament was revealed as "somebody," that there is a continuity between the God of the Old Testament and the Father of Jesus and that the God of the Old Testament "did not change from somebody to something in the New Testament. On the contrary, the New Testament reveals that the Father was most emphatically somebody, a conscious subject" (1963a:2). Lonergan also shows that the Eternal Word made flesh in Jesus Christ is also revealed as "somebody," as a conscious subject. I might add that in the Gospel of John the Holy Spirit is also revealed as "somebody," as
an "Advocate" (Jn 14:26) who "will teach," who "will lead ... to the complete truth" (Jn 13). Further, the great Creeds of the Church, which are prayers as much as they are collections of theological propositions for belief, constantly refer to the Three who are the one God as conscious subjects. In the Nicene Creed adoration is given to the Holy Spirit as well as to the Father and the Son and, as Lonergan emphasizes, we cannot give adoration to things, but only to conscious subjects. Finally, in the Preface of the Mass of the Holy Trinity we read:

Father ...  
You have revealed your glory  
As the glory also of your Son  
and of the Holy Spirit:  
three Persons, equal in majesty,  
undivided in splendor,  
yet one Lord, one God,  
ever to be adored in your everlasting glory.  


It is true that an inauthentic use of the imagination might lead some Christians in Fox's words to "imagine God as some 'overbig' person" (1981:120) and thus to anthropomorphize God in a destructive fashion. But the solution, in my opinion, is not to seek to eliminate the term "person" from our theological, liturgical and individual prayer language about God. Rather, the proper goal is to arrive at a systematic, theological apprehension of God as Trinity which will at the same time facilitate the elimination of aberrations which have developed in the application of the term "person" to God and legitimate theologically the symbolic apprehension of the Three who are the One God as conscious Subject, as Persons, as Father/Mother, Son and Holy Spirit. I hold that Lonergan has worked out a metaphysics of the Trinity which adequately meets the goals I have just described. In such articles as "The Dehellenization of Dogma" (1974:11-32), "The Origins of Christian Realism" (1974:239-261), and others Lonergan offers a historical, metaphysical, psychological exposition of the meaning of the term "person" which frees it from erroneous interpretations and which justifies and encourages its continued use in the ordinary prayer language of the Church as well.

Saint Paul speaks of the Father as the one "from whom every family, whether spiritual or natural, takes its name" (Eph 3:14). I suggest that likewise, it is in God alone that the notion of personhood is most perfectly realized and that all created personhood takes its name from the divine personhood. It is for this reason, I believe, that Lonergan in reflecting on the Trinity can write that "the three Persons are the perfect community, not two in one flesh, but three subjects of a single, dynamic, existential consciousness" (1974:25). In this theological vision personhood exists in its most perfect form in God where the divine Persons or conscious Subjects possess
everything in common—understanding, loving, willing, power, nature—except their distinction as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In this perspective, just as created goodness only imperfectly reflects the divine goodness and yet can be analogously predicated of God, so also human personhood only imperfectly reflects divine personhood and yet it can be used analogously in reference to the Three who are the One God.

Due to the limitations of this paper, I cannot delve more deeply into Lonergan's historical, metaphysical and psychological reflections on the meaning of "personhood" in the Trinity. I must be content simply to have indicated that at least one major contemporary theologian-philosopher finds no conflict whatsoever in maintaining a rigorous fidelity to the exigencies of a systematic theology of "personhood" while at the same time upholding the validity and excellence of the symbolic apprehension of God as Three Persons—Father, Son and Holy Spirit—in classical and contemporary Christian prayer. In Lonergan's theological reflections on the notion of "person" in its analogous application to the Trinity there is a marvellous differentiation and integration of the respective areas of Christian metaphysics and Christian imagination, of the theological and symbolic apprehensions of God insofar as they impact remotely or immediately Christian prayer. I close this section of my paper with a citation from an article of Lawrence B. Porter entitled "On Keeping 'Persons' in the Trinity: A Linguistic Approach to Trinitarian Thought":

The evidence for keeping the language of "persons" to refer to the distinctions in the Godhead is several. For one thing, this language preserves and conveys with laudable concision and emphasis the distinctive character of the relations within the very nature of the Godhead itself. Secondly, there is the apologetic and probative value of such problematic language. The language of "persons" is instructively provocative as a challenge to the unitarian images of God common to humanistic and philosophical notions of deity. Last, and not least in weight, should be the consideration that the multiple applications and meanings of the word "person" make it an ideal means of preserving a link between theology and life. ... The language of Trinitarian dogmatics should not be rendered unresponsive to the language and experience of worship, law, society, and psychology (1980:547-548).

PRAYER TO GOD AS "BRIDEGROOM"

In 1972 Matthew Fox wrote that "celibates ... must constantly resist the temptation to project human personage onto God to substitute for one's voluntary loneliness" (1972:61). He stressed that "God is not a person in our human understanding and need of person" and that God "will not be 'used' by our loneliness, though one must add at the same time that God will not 'retreat' from our solitude either; he is the one who is 'there all the
time" (1972:61). Fox also warned of the danger of placing "too much emphasis on praying to a God of affective love" and he added that "celibates--who dominate so much of the writings of spirituality--were the only ones to develop a nuptial mysticism as the epitome of prayer experience" (1972:101).

In 1981 Fox entitled a chapter in one of his books "The Sensual Spirituality of the Hebrew Prophets including Jesus" (1981:181) and he placed great emphasis on the vital positive role nuptial imagery plays in the Jewish and Christian traditions' descriptions of God's relationship to his people. Indeed, Fox wrote:

God even speaks sensually in Hosea. So deeply touching to humankind is the "knowledge of God" that the proper meaning of this frequently used phrase in Hosea is sexual union between God and his people. It means "the fulfillment of the conjugal intercourse between Israel and the Lord" comments one scholar (1981:191).

Fox further remarks that "like Hosea, Jeremiah sees a marriage existing between God and his people" (1981:192) and that

it is a testimony to the sensual spirituality of the Jews that their prophet speaking of their God does not hesitate "to describe the impact of God upon his life" with words "identical with the terms of seduction of rape in the legal terminology of the Bible (1981:193).

Thus in 1981 Fox offers us a picture of a God who is "tender toward people" (1981:190), who is "passionate and deeply affected emotionally by the plight of humankind" (1981:189), a God who is "desirous of the pleasure of his beloved" (1981:190) and "who can suffer" (1981:195).

Although Fox remained consistent in his writings between 1972 and 1981 as far as his polemic against the use of the term "person" in reference to God is concerned, his attitude toward the use of nuptial imagery in reference to God seems to have undergone a most radical shift. Yet, I find that I have real problems both with Fox's initial remarks in 1972 about the danger of an excessive emphasis on prayer to "a God of affective love" and the celibate emphasis on nuptial mysticism and with his highly enthusiastic comments in 1981 about God as one "who can suffer," as one who is "passionate and deeply affected emotionally by the plight of humankind," etc.

First of all, I do agree with Fox that a prayer to "a God of affective love" can be inauthentic or excessive if it expresses an "escapist attitude," a flight from affective communion with other human beings. But I also believe that "God is love" (1 Jn 4:16), that God is available to us as "healer," as "comforter," as "friend," as "bridegroom." The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit invite us to enter into the most profound affective communion in knowledge and love with them.

Second, it is true that celibate mystics have often used "nuptial symbolism" to express the epitome of prayer experience. This is understand-
able because, as Fox acknowledged in 1981, Holy Scripture itself utilizes this symbolism to express the intimacy of God's union with his people.

I find it quite significant that both male and female mystics, e.g., Bernard of Clairvaux, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, have felt drawn to employ bridegroom symbolism to describe their experience of most intimate mystical union with God in prayer. What this reveals to me is that the mystics in their symbolic apprehension of God as "bridegroom" radically transcended literalist interpretative tendencies. John of the Cross, for example, reveals in his poetic descriptions of the union of the soul with God a profound transformation of the nuptial symbols, even as they are found in the Song of Songs and elsewhere in Holy Scripture. In Lonergan's terms, a profound "transvaluation and transformation of symbols" (1972:66) is involved. The mystics clearly understand that God is "bridegroom" by analogy. For the mystics the symbol of God as "bridegroom" strains to express an intimate love encounter with God which utterly transcends in excellency, beauty and intensity of communion the love of the human bridegroom for his bride. Moreover, the use of this symbol by the male mystics reveals that their symbolic apprehension of God as "bridegroom" radically transcends the quality of "maleness" present in the "bridegroom" image. Clearly, a most profound transvaluation and transformation has taken place.

Third, I find in Fox's recent enthusiastic descriptions of God as a God "who can suffer," as one "who is passionate and deeply affected emotionally by the plight of humankind," etc. a "neo-anthropomorphizing" of God. As Lonergan points out, Clement of Alexandria "bid Christians to abstain from anthropomorphic conceptions of God even though they were to be found in scripture" (1972:307). I believe that as a result mainly of the influence of process philosophy a theological regression is presently occurring in various circles. The writings of Fox are but one example of this regressive, "neo-anthropomorphizing tendency" in current theological reflections about God. It took Augustine many years to break through to the insight that the spiritual is a true sphere of reality and that God is immaterial, pure Spirit. Alfred North Whitehead, the founder of process philosophy, moved in the opposite direction of Augustine to suggest that there is a physical as well as a mental dimension to God. I do not make the judgment that Fox agrees with Whitehead that there is a physical pole in God. But I find it difficult to see how one can hold that God actually feels passion, undergoes emotional suffering without espousing the view that there is a certain physicality, materiality in God. Earlier I cited Fox who warned in 1981 that referring to God as "person" results in the "detranscendence" of God. As I indicated above, I disagree strongly with this position. But I do think that referring to God as one who can literally suffer and experience passion in the very Godhead itself is most certainly to strip God of the attribute of divine transcendence.
Clearly, a truly adequate response to Fox's views about the possibility of the experience of emotional suffering in God would require an exposition and critique of the metaphysical suppositions which at least logically underpin his approach to the interpretation of biblical symbols and the role of the Christian imagination in Christian prayer. I cannot attempt this response here. I recommend to the reader my brief critique of process philosophy in my book Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God (1974). I also strongly recommend Dr. David Burrell's recent article entitled "Does Process Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1982). Burrell's answer to this question is a clear, decisive "Yes!" I agree.

IMAGE-MEDIATED AND IMAGELESS PRAYER

In my introductory comments on Christian prayer I indicated that Christ is present to us by virtue of the indwelling gift of God's love poured into our hearts by his Holy Spirit and also through the events of his incarnation, life, death, resurrection and these events as mediated through Holy Scripture in its powerful symbols, narratives, etc., and through the sacraments and the Church in its multiple dimensions. I used Lonergan's distinction between the "inner word" and the "outer word" to name respectively these two basic modes of Christ's presence to us.

In an unpublished lecture entitled "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer" Lonergan speaks of Christ as mediator objectively through the example of his life, through his suffering and death, through his redemptive work and "in the church that carries on his work" (1963b:12). He also states that besides the account of Christ "as mediator in the objective field" we can also see Christ as mediator in an "immediate" (1963b:12) sense. Lonergan writes:

One's living, one's loving ... is each of us in his or her immediacy to himself or herself. Now in that immediacy, there are the supernatural realities that do not pertain to our nature, that result from the communication to us of Christ's life (1963b:12).

Christ then is immediate to us through the presence in us of the gift of his Holy Spirit and the life which results from the presence of the Spirit. But Lonergan also indicates that

just as we are immediate to ourselves without any self-knowledge, by consciousness, and through our consciousness by philosophic study and self-appropriation we can come to a fuller knowledge of ourselves, so also what we are by the grace of God, by the gift of God, can have an objectification within us. What is immediate can be mediated by our acts and gradually reveal to us in ever a fuller fashion, the fundamental fact about us, the great gift and grace that Jesus Christ brought to us (1963b:13).
Lonergan states that "the higher part of our reality" (1963b:12), the immediacy of the supernatural life within us, "proceeds from being a sort of vegetative living to a conscious living through the mediation of prayer" (1963b:12) and that prayer involves not only self-activity or self-mediation but "self-mediation through another" (1963b:13) and the other is above all Christ. "It is by relying [on], adverting to, the precepts, the example, the love of Christ that we attain our own self-mediation with reference to him in this life of prayer" (1963b:14).

Christ is mediator for us not only through the immediacy of his Spirit's gift of supernatural life within us but also through the mysteries of his incarnation, life, death and resurrection as revealed in the propositions, the stories, the symbols of Holy Scripture. Lonergan states that "Christ crucified is a symbol of endless meaning" (1963b:7). He indicates that the "act ... found in the incarnation and in the death and resurrection of Christ is, above all, a personal communication. It is something directed to each individual soul. It is an object of ... meditation ... and contemplation" (1963b:4). Lonergan states that

as St. Ignatius in the spiritual exercises urges, the retreatant in contemplating the mysteries of the life of our Lord is to do his own thinking on each mystery and to take from the mystery the fruit that suits him, the thoughts that come to him, the affections aroused in his heart (1963b:4).

For Lonergan the redemptive "act of Christ was above all a deed, something that can be seen, imagined, recalled, thought upon" (1963b:4).

Certainly, for Lonergan images as symbols play a very important role in Christian prayer. But he also speaks of a form of prayer in which there is a certain withdrawal "into a cloud of unknowing" (1971:18). In this latter state "one is for God, belongs to him, gives oneself to him, not by using images, concepts, words, but in a silent, joyous, peaceful surrender to his initiative" (1971:18-19). Now for Lonergan this withdrawal of the mystic into a certain "cloud of unknowing" is "a mediated return to immediacy" analogous to the "mediated return to immediacy in the mating of lovers" (1972:77). Certainly, Christ through his Holy Spirit is at work as mediator also in this "mediated return to immediacy" which constitutes the core of mystical prayer. Of course, the specific form of Christ's mediatorial role in prayer is determined in accord with the particular type and quality of the prayer which the particular person praying realizes with God's grace.

Today there is a renewed emphasis on the type of imageless prayer of which the mystics have spoken. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O. holds that the passage from a meditative, discursive form of prayer to contemplative prayer, to the type of prayer which Saint John of the Cross described as "the practice of loving attentiveness" (Pennington, 1980:31) is not something reserved
for just a chosen few (1980:182-184). St. John Climacus in his *The Ladder of Divine Ascent* said that at a certain level of prayer it is important to banish the thoughts that come to us by the use of a single word, e.g., "Jesus" and during prayer not to "let the senses create any images" (Pennington, 1980: 23-24). Pennington in his book *Centering Prayer* suggests that "the name 'Centering Prayer' well expresses the effective imaginative activity that is present in the initial movement of faith and love that brings us to Presence" (1980:42). He says that "the analogy of the center" is one "that evokes less imagination" and is "almost an imageless image" (1980:44). It is interesting that Saint John Climacus with his "ladder" and "ascent" images ended up finally speaking of a type of imageless prayer just as Basil Pennington does, though the latter employs the symbol of "centering."

Father Pennington initially provides three rules for engaging in "Centering Prayer." These rules are:

**Rule One:** At the beginning of the Prayer we take a minute or two to quiet down and then move in faith to God dwelling in our depths; and at the end of the Prayer we take several minutes to come out, mentally praying the "Our Father" or some other prayer.

**Rule Two:** After resting for a bit in the center in faith-full love, we take up a single, simple word that expresses this response and begin to let it repeat itself within.

**Rule Three:** Whenever in the course of the Prayer we become aware of anything else, we simply gently return to the Presence by the use of the prayer word (1980:45).

Pennington also makes some important comments about the role of images in "Centering Prayer." Thus, for example, he states that "it is, in fact, impossible for us to pray at least initially without images, although we can move beyond them" (1980:203). Whenever some distraction or image comes into our prayer once we have moved to the "Center" we simply return to the "Center" by the use of the prayer word, e.g., the word "Jesus." But Pennington also stresses that because "in contemplative prayer, thoughts, images, and sensible affections are left behind" (1980:167) there "still remains in us as integral human persons a need to grow in faith and faith response on the conceptual and affective level" (1980:168). He recommends that the practitioner of "Centering Prayer" like every Christian "daily meet the Word in a deeply personal way and let him speak to mind and heart through life-giving words of his revelation" (1980:167). The practitioner of "Centering Prayer" is called also daily to engage in "the other forms of prayer: the celebration of the sacraments and the Eucharist and communing with the Lord in Holy Scripture" (1980:188).
I believe that the ability to move easily from "Centering Prayer" to other forms of prayer requires a rich integration of one's highly differentiated prayer-consciousness. Lonergan suggests that in the case of Thomas Aquinas "at the end of his life his prayer was so intense that it interfered with his theological activity" and he concludes that "further development might have enabled him to combine prayer and theology as Theresa of Avila combined prayer and business" (1971:19). Analogously, my own experience and reflections lead me to believe that a subtle psycho-spiritual integration of a person's prayer-consciousness can be required for an individual to be able to move easily and without some confusion and difficulty from "Centering Prayer" into other forms of prayer experience such as sacramental and Scriptural encounters with Christ which involve symbols, concepts and appropriate affective, feeling responses. I think that this issue needs much study, especially because today many individuals whose general prayer life consists in a form of "Centering Prayer" are also experiencing the call to make the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius, which include meditations as well as contemplations. This is especially the case since even the "contemplations" as proposed by Saint Ignatius are symbol-mediated. Perhaps it might prove helpful in this general context to consider Saint John of the Cross who was able to move from the highest mystical states of consciousness into a deeply refined aesthetically differentiated consciousness which enabled him to portray the highest levels of mystical encounter with God in the most exquisite and affectively moving symbols. It is difficult to believe that Saint John of the Cross, as he wrote his poetry, was not deeply moved affectively by the symbols which emerged in his consciousness and that the feelings he experienced did not in turn evoke still richer symbols in his consciousness. Clearly, there are many questions, as yet unanswered, which the issue of image-mediated and imageless prayer raises.

I choose to conclude this paper on a note of puzzlement and wondering. But it is most appropriate for a paper at a Lonergan Workshop to end on such a note.

At the beginning of this paper I indicated that my aim was to consider the relationship between "Christian imagination" and Christian prayer from a number of angles. I pointed out that my choice of the four topics of the paper was not dictated by any unique relationship I saw to exist between the four topics. But in closing I must confess to the operative presence of elements of a "hidden agenda" in my choice of topics. In my forthcoming book Christotherapy : A New Horizon for Counselors, Spiritual Directors and Seekers of Healing and Growth in Christ I utilize "ascensional imagery" throughout. I speak, for example, of an "ascent of the spiral of transcendence" (1982:1). Again, I put great emphasis on the need for an ever
deepening growth in the personal knowledge and love of Jesus Christ (1982:168-171). I cite Karl Rahner who affirms that "there must be a unique and quite personal relationship between Jesus Christ and each individual in his faith, his hope, and his unique love" (1978:307). Indeed, Rahner says that this love "must be a quite personal and intimate love for Jesus Christ" (1978:308). In my new book I describe the intimate relationship between God and the Christian, and Christ--the God-man--and the Christian, in nuptial as well as other types of symbolism (1982:171-172; 209-210). I also emphasize that Saint Ignatius prayed personally to each of the Persons of the Trinity and invited those who make the Spiritual Exercises to do likewise (1982:165-166). Finally, I discuss the role of imagination and of Christian symbols in the healing and growth processes which I refer to as "mind-fasting" and "spirit-feasting" (1982:179-182; 241). And so this paper is not only a study of "Christian imagination" and Christian prayer from within a Lonerganian perspective. It is also an incipient apologia for certain themes of Christo-therapy II.
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