LONERGAN WORKSHOP
Volume III
edited by Fred Lawrence
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EDITOR'S NOTE

I would like to say a word of introduction to the articles contained in Lonergan Workshop 3. I am pleased to be able to begin this volume with a major article delivered at the very first Lonergan Workshop by Frederick Crowe. It not only provides a framework out of which to deal with the issue of the evolution of Lonergan's thought on value; but it raises basic questions concerning the implications of the 'moving viewpoint's' further movement into this sphere since Insight. Cathleen Going's essay on person as originating value has attempted to capture in spare yet complex prose the kind of radically inquiring engagement with significant texts carried on so efficaciously viva voce by teams of discussion leaders for thirty years at the Thomas More Institute for Adult Education in Montreal. Something of the same probing attitude is hinted at as well in Joseph Flanagan's meditation on the way we cause ourselves by understanding. This double-pronged dynamic of generalized empirical method which engages self and subject matter at once offers yet again the focus for the writing of Philip McShane (see "The Psychological Present of the Academic Community," Lonergan Workshop 1: 27-68). This time that dynamic is concentrated in outlining a praxis-oriented worldview consonant with the vision being shaped in Lonergan's work on economic theory. Sebastian Moore's article explores this dynamism as operative in, to borrow Newman's phrase, the real apprehension of and assent to Jesus' action in crucifixion and resurrection. Charles Mulligan's reflection resumes a line of thought begun by Joseph Komonchak (Lonergan Workshop 2: 1-53) by articulating the contours of the problematic of pastoral theology as it looks from the perspective of a practitioner who is willing to envisage his task in terms of 'communications' as the end of a functionally specialized theology. Bernard Tyrrell reconsiders the task of Christotherapy in the light of questions that have been raised about it and, in his article, reconceives it in terms of the complementarity between 'height' and 'depth' therapies. Michael Vertin's article explains what is involved when the treatment of theodicy by philosophy of God/theology gets transposed into what Lonergan in Method in Theology has named the 'third stage of meaning' (94-96). Finally, Fr. Lonergan himself has graciously given permission to publish an
essay delivered at the 1980 Lonergan Workshop and prepared for the International Association for the History of Religion.

Fred Lawrence
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AN EXPLORATION OF LONERGAN'S NEW NOTION OF VALUE

Frederick E. Crowe S. J.
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In "Insight Revisited," a kind of intellectual autobiography, Father Lonergan describes, among other developments in his thinking, the change that took place between Insight and Method in regard to the notion of good and value:

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation. . . . It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value. . . . It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions (227) /1/.

This is a very concise statement of what seems to me to be an extremely important development. I propose to study it in this paper and my interest is not, I hope, foreign to that of our symposium. The notions of good and value enter explicitly as a factor in the functional specialty of dialectic, and it seemed to me that a study of Lonergan's advance under this heading, and an exploration or at least indication of a few of the questions it raises, could have some utility for our discussions.

We should not, of course, lose perspective in this exploration. First, it is possible that in some respects we are dealing not with a development of Lonergan's thought, but with a further stage of its manifestation; we know that theological method was his goal when he began work on *Insight* and it is not always easy to decide whether later developments were overlooked at the time of *Insight* or simply postponed as a tactical measure to a later occasion. Next, even when there is development in his thought, the task remains of studying his work again to see whether there is an underlying unity between earlier and later stages that modifies the impact of the development. Thirdly, we should remember that what happened once may do so again; if the three levels of consciousness expanded to four, the four may expand to five, and the five to six. But one thing at a time, and I am content at the moment to study the difference between *Insight* and *Method* which is indicated in the brief, not to say cryptic, remark which I quoted at the beginning of this paper.
There is no grand strategy in my approach, nor do I hope to wrap up the entire question in this paper. Quite the contrary. Early in *Insight* Father Lonergan refers with evident approval to a point in Descartes' method: "Great problems are solved by being broken down into little problems (3)." The bulk of my paper will deal with just such a succession of little problems, and the best I can hope for is that the succession will prove to be a series leading towards a helpful conclusion.

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I would like to begin with a few pointers that may indicate in a preliminary way the extent and character of the change we are investigating. The first is supplied by Lonergan's use of two quotations that may stand as symbols of his changing interests, one for that period in which when he was preoccupied with *Insight* and the other for the period in which he was preparing *Method*. I have examined six larger works Lonergan wrote between 1953 and 1959 and in every one of them, as well as in *Insight* itself, there is a reference to the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas, part I-II, question 3, article 8. That article deals with the desire of the human mind for understanding, a desire that will not be satisfied until there is understanding of what God is, when man will enjoy perfect bliss. I find the recurring reference to this text a clear and useful index to the predominantly intellectual interest that was Lonergan's at this time (1953-4: 9; 1956: 17,19; 1957b: 76, 265; 1967a: 157; 1967b: 191; 1957a: 369) at this time /2/. But then I examined five of his writings in the years between 1968 and 1972, just before the appearance of *Method*, and found that in these as well as in *Method*, the predilection for the Thomist natural desire to see God has been replaced by another; now the text that is regularly quoted is from St. Paul's letter to the Romans, and the passage speaks of God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us (1974b: 129; 1974c: 145; 1974d: 153; 1974e: 171; 1974f: 204) /3/. Interest centers now on love, or on the affective, or on values.

A second pointer is similar, though not so clearcut. Far back in the *Verbum* articles, Lonergan remarked: "For Augustine our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and most our minds are restless until they rest in seeing Him (1967d: 90)."/4/ I think it is fair to detect in this remark, especially when it is seen in the total context of the study, a clear leaning towards the Thomist attitude rather than to
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the Augustinian. And yet in Method, while this reference to Augustine does not occur, I think it fair to say that the thrust of the work is more in resonance with the Augustinian phrase than with the Thomist.

A third is found in the place and role that Father Lonergan assigns to feelings in relation to values. In Insight's account of a possible ethics, feelings are of little relevance except as a likely source of bias. Lonergan therefore explicitly sets them aside:

... it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being and the good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value.

Feelings and sentiments are by-passed for, though one begins from objects of desire, one finds the potential good not in them alone but in the total manifold of the universe (606).

Method, on the contrary, takes up feelings in its second chapter and develops a rather detailed view of them before moving on to incorporate this view into a theory of values.

A fourth pointer comes from an observation on the Index I made for Insight. I notice that in drawing it up I first wrote a mini-essay (the only one, I think, in the Index) on "Experience--Understanding--Reflection" as three levels of cognitional activity, and then gave 27 references to the text. The next entry in the Index is "Experience--Understanding--Reflection--Will," there is no essay, and there are only two references to the text. Clearly the three-level structure is dominant in Insight. But just as clearly a four-level structure has taken over in Method; we meet it already in the first chapter under the heading, "The Basic Pattern of Operations," the levels are identified as empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible (9/5/), and probably no idea in the whole book recurs so often.

It is to be noted, however, in regard to this fourth pointer that the difference is not just in the frequency with which the idea of responsibility occurs. Responsibility now belongs to a new level, as distinct from that of reflection as the intellectual is from the empirical and the rational from the intellectual. That was not the case in Insight. There, deliberation, decision, and the like, do not constitute a new and distinct level, but a continuation or extension of cognitional activity: "... the goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will (1957a: 596)." The accent is so much on the
cognitional that the criterion of the good is seen as self-consistency in the knower between his knowing and his doing /6/, and value is defined as the "possible object of rational choice (601)."

The general lines of the contrast under this heading between Insight and Method are therefore fairly clear. There has been a shift from the cognitional to the affective, from the dynamism of "mind" intent on knowing God to the dynamism of "heart" oriented to him in love and bent on union with him, from a three-level structure of conscious intentionality to one with four levels, from an emphasis on what is reasonable in conduct to an emphasis on what is responsible.

I think we can say also that the outline of the chronological stages in the shift are fairly familiar to all of us. The turn to the subject which was already accomplished in Insight has led to an emphasis on the existential subject, and then to a locating of the criterion for judgments of value in the authenticity of the subject. There are milestones of progress in the Boston College lectures of 1957, with their attention to the horizon of the subject and his existential concerns (1957c); in the Latin treatises of this period with their work on the consciousness of Christ and the theology of the three divine subjects /7/; in the concluding section of the 1964 paper on "Cognitive Structure," with its brief but important linking of subjectivity to objectivity (1967c = Crowe, ed.; 1964: 230-242); most of all, in the Aquinas Lecture of 1968, The Subject: Here we have the explicit abandonment of faculty psychology, the addition of deliberation as a distinct level of the existential subject, the doctrine of the sublation of lower levels by the higher, and other elements that prepare us for the transition brought to completion in Method (1974g) /8/.

The general lines of the contrast and the milestones on the course of development are surely an invitation to further investigation. They tantalize us with a desire for the enrichment that we feel a thorough study of the materials would provide. But I leave that further study to some young and energetic doctoral candidate. My own purpose has been merely to set up a context for the questions that have occurred to me in my attempts to understand Father Lonergan's new position. I turn now to my own series of questions.

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My first question is this: Has Lonergan abandoned the strongly intellectual cast of mind that characterized Insight? Does Method lack intellectual rigor? The question might arise in two ways:
on Lonergan's position, or on the consistency of that position. Those who may not have noticed the explicit stand Lonergan takes for the intellectual might ask the simple question what his position is; but even those who have noticed his defense of intellectual rigor may feel compelled to ask whether that position is consistent with the rest of Method. In one form or the other this question has given very real difficulty to a number of Lonergan's students, and I think it useful to be precise in dealing with it. Let us then postpone the nuanced form of the question to third place in our series, and deal with the simple form, however rhetorical and superfluous the question may seem. Luckily we can handle it with despatch. Method is clear and unequivocal; the intellectual factor is not abandoned, it is sublated, which not only means the retention of the intellectual on the higher level but also confers on it a new value and purpose:

... what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context (241).

This principle is then expressly applied to the retention of truth with its proper intellectual character on the higher level of decision and love:

... this in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. He still needs truth... The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness (242; esp. 316, 340).

But a second question arises immediately: A sublation, our quotation tells us, "introduces something new and distinct." What is this "new and distinct" element on the fourth level of values? Already in a preliminary outline of the contrast between Insight and Method I have anticipated the answer, but it is time to collect the data more thoroughly and analyze them more deeply /9/.

The data from Method, we find, turn into a little cascade of terms. The first listing of the four levels refers to the fourth as the "responsible" level (9). Later it is called "existential (35)." Later still, it is the level "of freedom and responsibility, of moral self-transcendence and in that sense of existence, of self-direction and self-control (121)." It is also the level for the exercise of vertical liberty (40). Again, it is the level of "authenticity" (or inauthenticity) (35), and "the level on which consciousness becomes conscience (268)." We are likewise told
that, "... as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware (9)," that on the fourth level "we emerge as persons (10)," that "... a man is his true self inasmuch as he is self-transcending (357)," but there is a self-transcendence that is "only cognitive (104)," and "knowledge alone is not enough" to determine values on the fourth level (38).

One could go on in the direction of complexity to develop the wealth revealed in this set of terms, or one could go back in the direction of analysis and try to discover an underlying unity. My option is for the second, but first let me delimit carefully the field of inquiry. There is a distinction between the way the operations of conscious intentionality go forward "ordinarily (122)," that is, from the empirical through the intellectual and rational to the responsible level, and an exception to this "ordinary" process which occurs in God's gift of his love in religion (10). In this exceptional case, deliberation and intellectual activity are not prior to the fourth level; they are subsequent (283, 340-341).

I think it would be a mistake for me to try to handle this exceptional case simultaneously with the "ordinary" case of the fourth level. First of all, Father Lonergan himself has begun to talk about the level of love as a fifth level distinct from the fourth (12). If he is serious about that, we must anticipate a further advance that will take us as far beyond Method as that book took us beyond Insight; with that prospect before us we may be pardoned for judging that we have task enough to deal with at the moment. In the second place, my preliminary study indicates that a solution to the present problem is operative analogously on the level of love also. In any case I intend to be faithful to my purpose of breaking big problems down as much as possible into little ones, so I set aside a study of love and values.

The task then is to determine whether there is a way of unifying the rich diversity of terms discovered in descriptions of the fourth level. I find a valuable clue in the source of the shift from third level to fourth. Lonergan's general term in Insight for the force that moves us from level to level was "operator," and the operator in the cognitional field was the "detached and disinterested desire to know" (532) expressing itself in questions (469). Although Method shows a tendency to think in terms more of the whole subject than of the dynamism as the operator (7), there does not seem to be any change in the role of the question: The operator of the shift from first level to second is the
question for understanding, the operator of the shift from second level to third is the question for reflection, and the operator of the shift to the fourth level is the question for deliberation (7, 34-35, 10, 11, 13 and passim). There may be a semantic problem connected with the use of "question" on this last level, but the dynamism is clear enough /13/.

When we ask therefore what is the new and distinct element added on the fourth level we come finally to the structured dynamism of human spirit that is given. It is the openness of human spirit to the intelligible, the reasonable, the good, an openness that reveals itself in successive steps as conscious intentionality, as demand for fulfillment. It seems unnecessary here to seek beyond that given structure for a further foundation and explanation of the content of the fourth level.

It is time now to go back to the question postponed earlier: Is Father Lonergan consistent in his claim that intellectual rigor is retained in Method? The book may assert that truth and intellectual rigor are sublated, not abandoned, but can this position be maintained in the face of all we read elsewhere in the volume on the influence of subjectivity on value judgments? Is the rational element in values and conduct really included, preserved, and carried forward, when the truth or falsity of value judgments "has its criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being (36)"? This is the really difficult question. I have struggled long with it, and I must ask leave to deal with it slowly. Let me therefore subdivide again. We can consider the question either as an objection charging involvement in a vicious circle, or as a more positive request to give a critical grounding to the position of Method. The two aspects are intertwined, but I find it helpful to take them separately. So I turn to the question whether there is a vicious circle involved in Lonergan's view of value judgments, and take it up as the third in my series.

The principle at issue here has an ancient history, going back as far at least as Aristotle's Nicomahean Ethics. Books II to V of that work deal with the moral virtues and, in the general account which precedes consideration of the particular virtues, Aristotle talks about the conditions of responsibility for action. Here a basic principle is that the end, that is, the good or the apparent good, is what we wish for, and the means are what we deliberate about and choose. But an objection arises at once; in the excellent English provided for him by Ross, Aristotle says: "Now some one may say that all men desire the apparent good, but have no control
over the appearance, but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character (Bk. III, ch. 5, 1114a 30f)." The last part of that quotation came into medieval Latin in the form, "Qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei," and is used over and over by St. Thomas /14/.

Aristotle's answer to the objection is that, if each man is somehow responsible for his state of mind, he will also be somehow responsible for the way the good appears to him; in other words, he made himself what he is. Aquinas refines considerably; in his *Commentary on the Ethics* and elsewhere, he distinguishes a universal and speculative knowledge from one that is immediate and practical, and sub-distinguishes the latter according to whether it is under the influence of habit or of the impulse of the moment /15/. But he agrees with Aristotle on the basic point that a man is responsible insofar as he made himself what he is; neither of them, as far as I know, denies the premise of the objection; the end does appear to each man in a form answering to his character.

The similarity of the problem raised by Method to the one faced by Aristotle and Aquinas is surely obvious. Lonergan, as far as I can judge, would not question Aristotle's principle any more than Aquinas did. In fact, he extends its application till it comes to bear on all that lies within a man's horizon. When horizons are opposed dialectically, he says, "What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil (236)." He not only seems to accept and widen the application of the principle, he makes it a positive element in his position rather than an objection to be answered; he glories in it, one might say: "Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity (292, 265,338)." At the same time he keeps using phrases like, "... what truly is good (33)," "... when the values ... really are values (1971: 230)."

And that puts the problem squarely before us in a new form: How escape the vicious circle of judging our judgment of the values we choose as good for us? How do we go beyond the good for me or the good for us, to what is truly good, to what transcends the self? Our problem has transposed that of Aristotle and Aquinas; they were concerned with liberty and responsibility; our problem is epistemological, it concerns the objectivity of our judgments /16/. The need for an answer becomes acute when "we" who are right undertake to tell others they are wrong, and they in turn, convinced of their own rightness, reply in similar vein. And why
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should they not do so? All of us are victims of our past and enclosed within our present horizons, we as well as they, those who are right as well as those who are wrong. Is the whole business just too complex? Should we simply chuck it and go back to saying, God wills it and the Bible tells me so?

I refuse to be so faint-hearted, and I think there is an Ariadne's thread to lead us out of the labyrinth. It is Newman's view, developed by Lonergan, on "the true way of learning." Directly it deals with escape from a vicious circle that apparently encloses our cognitional efforts, but I believe this way of escape will prove very illuminating for escape from the vicious circle that seems to imprison us in our efforts to ground our value-judgments. Let us turn then to Newman and "the true way of learning."

Newman's Grammar of Assent sets forth his opposition to Descartes' way of advancing in knowledge. Where Descartes would begin with a universal doubt and go on to establish all knowledge on this secure basis, Newman would begin from a universal credulity, with the prospect of eliminating error in due course as the truth developed and occupied the mind.

Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything. The former, indeed, seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself; and error having always some portion of truth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect, that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it (294).

The exercise of a certain amount of hindsight enables us now to analyze Newman's statement and find in it an assumption and an explicit program. There is an assumption of what we may call in Lonergan's terms the dynamism of a spontaneously operative cognitional structure; it lies behind such a statement as: "... we may expect, that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward. ..." There is a program which we may relate to Lonergan's self-correcting process of human learning; it appears in phrases like these: "... begin with believing ... discover and discard what is contradictory to itself. ..."

But, whether or not I am correct in finding anticipations in Newman of these two elements of Lonergan's cognitional theory, they are certainly key notions in Insight. There is little need to
delay on the first, the spontaneously operative cognitional structure. Let us simply note that it appears as the ultimate bulwark in our defense against the ravages of the critical problem. That problem is not solved "by demonstrating that one can know." Even to seek such a foundation "involves a vicious circle." More positively, what is the solution? It is "pragmatic engagement" in the process of knowing. There are:

natural inevitabilities and spontaneities that constitute the possibility of knowing . . . by engaging one in the process . . . . The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it (332).

This, I would say, makes explicit the assumption behind Newman's program for learning.

To this fundamental dynamism of human spirit we have now to add a modality of its functioning, Lonergan's extremely important and widely neglected notion of the self-correcting process of human learning. The notion is recurrent in Insight, but what is perhaps the fullest exposition is given in the context of discussing men of good judgment. Good judgment requires a happy balance between rashness and indecision. But how does one strike that balance? "How is one to know when it is reached? Were there some simple formula or recipe in answer to such questions, then men of good judgment could be produced at will. . . . (285)" So what does one do? One gives the further questions a chance to arise. One builds on the previous acquisition of correct insights. But this amounts to a vicious circle: we become men of good judgment by being already men of good judgment! It is here that the process of learning becomes relevant:

So it is the process of learning that breaks the vicious circle. Judgment on the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights. Moreover, this self-correcting process tends to a limit. We become familiar with concrete situations . . . and we can recognize when . . . that self-correcting process reaches its limit in familiarity with the concrete situation and in easy mastery of it (286-287).

Few ideas in Insight are at once so innocent in appearance and so momentous in their consequences. I do not think we will ever get hold of either Insight or Method unless we give serious attention to the role of this self-correcting process. Lonergan's
use of it is most fully acknowledged in the areas of concrete judgments of fact, of the critique of beliefs (713-718), and of the hermeneutic circle (1972: 159, 208-209; 1973b: 92093, 94, 95), but it seems to have a much wider application. Further, it seems to have as competitor only a fixed and indubitable starting-point, a premise which is somehow self-validating and really involved in a vicious circle. In any case, as we turn now to Method and ask how we break the vicious circle enclosing our value judgments within the confines of our own subjectivity, I think we find there an answer analogous to the one we have discovered in Insight for the cognitional problem.

Method does not take up the problems of epistemology as directly as Insight does, and we may have to read a bit between the lines to find a parallel answer. However, it is not difficult to do so in the lines I am about to quote. The context is that of conversion as the foundation for the second phase of theology, and deliberate decision as the human side of conversion. Lonergan says of this conversion:

It is a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-view. It deliberately selects the frame-work, in which doctrines have their meaning, in which systematics reconciles, in which communications are effective.

Such a deliberate decision is anything but arbitrary. Arbitrariness is just unauthenticity, while conversion is from unauthenticity to authenticity. It is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love (268).

That is, it is still the dynamism of human spirit that is operative, not to "prove" the validity of our deliberations and value judgments, but to engage us pragmatically in the decision-making process. As Insight takes its epistemological stand on the "natural inevitabilities and spontaneities" of the mind, so Method takes its corresponding "epistemological" stand on "the demands of the human spirit," demands that now include one for responsibility.

Furthermore, these demands do not achieve results with anything like mechanical efficiency; rather they are effective by promoting our growth towards maturity in moral judgment—a process analogous to that of the self-correcting process of human learning. I can show this most expeditiously by simply quoting a paragraph in Method, and adding my own emphases to bring out the analogy; the paragraph proceeds in two parts, first speaking of the growing that precedes conversion:
As our knowledge . . . increases, as our responses . . . are strengthened . . . our freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity. So we move to the existential moment . . . Then is the time for the exercise of vertical freedom . . .

The next part speaks of the growing that follows conversion:

Such conversion . . . falls far short of moral perfection . . . One has yet to uncover and root out bias. One has to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses . . . One has to listen to criticism and to protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others. For moral knowledge is the proper possession only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still to advance and to learn (240) /17/.

The parallels then between Insight and Method are striking. In each case there is a spontaneously operative dynamism that engages us pragmatically in a process—of knowing in one case, of responsible action in the other. In each case it is fundamentally what we are that determines what we can do, cognitively or responsibly. In each case we become what we are by growing, and that growing is a remedial process, the self-correcting process of learning on the cognitional level, and the ever advancing thrust towards authenticity on the level of responsibility. In each case it is this growth that breaks the vicious circle in which we are doomed to remain enclosed as long as the rules of static system govern us. One might adapt an old proverb here and say, Solvitur ambulando: The problem of walking is solved by walking. Adaptation is required, however, because we are at the moment incapable of walking, present resources not being sufficient; but present resources are sufficient for learning to walk, and that possibility is the possibility likewise of escape from the vicious circle /18/.

Our fourth question asks whether the position just taken is critical. It seems to me that this is little more than a modality of the previous question, the positive counterpart of what had been put in the form of an objection. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to consider it separately, asking what "critical" means, how criticism operates in Insight, how it operates in Method, whether there is an analogy of criticism to be conceived and worked out.

First then our third and fourth questions are closely linked. Antecedently, the very notion of self-correcting process implies criticism, as criticism implies the possibility of correction. Or, one might examine the section on "The Critique of Beliefs" in Insight and observe that throughout this section it is the self-correcting process that is operative (713-718). Surely it is superfluous to dwell on so obvious a point. It will be more
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profitable to examine closely the meaning and role of criticism.

Generally and technically, Lonergan contrasts "critical" with "inquiring," and links them respectively with the two types of question that occur in cognitional process. The "question," he says, means two things:

the attitude of the inquiring mind that effects the transition from the first level to the second and, again, the attitude of the critical mind that effects the transition from the second level to the third (174; also 348).

In this sense criticism seems intrinsic to the very process of forming a judgment. As such it should be as versatile as the capacity itself for judgment, and have as wide an application. We have seen some of these applications in Insight, and there are others /19/. But the exercise par excellence of criticism is in judging our judging, not in the old sense of an attempt to demonstrate that we can and do know, but in Lonergan's sense of understanding and judging the nature of our knowing. From criticism in this sense there results both a position on knowing, objectivity, and reality, one that is consonant with the spontaneously operative structure in man, and as well a rejection of counter-positions, those not consonant with the inevitabilities of that structure. Thus, where commonsense eclecticism cannot be critical and so fails to reach the proper meaning of knowing, objectivity, and reality (420-421), orientation to the objective of the unrestricted desire to know effects the antithesis of positions and counter-positions, and enables one to achieve a critical philosophy or metaphysics (514).

My last paragraph left a loophole. It said criticism seems intrinsic to the process of judging and should be as versatile as the capacity for judgment. In fact, there is a nuance to add. There is one exception to the far-ranging object of criticism and that is rational consciousness itself:

Still, if rational consciousness can criticize the achievement of science, it cannot criticize itself. The critical spirit can weigh all else in the balance, only on condition that it does not criticize itself. It is a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all else but offers no justification for its demanding (332).

When we turn to Method we find a remarkable parallel between this position on the self-justification of rational consciousness and the self-justification of the love of God experienced as a result of religious conversion. Lonergan affirms that being in love in an unrestricted manner (that is, being in love with God)
is the religious conversion that grounds both moral and intellectual conversion; it provides the real criterion by which all else is to be judged; and consequently one has only to experience it in oneself or witness it in others, to find in it its own justification.

He goes on, "Accordingly . . . there is no need to justify critically the charity described by St. Paul in . . . Corinthians (283-284) /20/." The parallel is indeed remarkable but unfortunately I cannot use it in the context of my paper. I have set aside the question of love of God in order to concentrate on the "ordinary" process from the rational to the responsible level, so I have to look further for the position of Method on my question.

The place to look is obviously the chapter on Dialectic, since dialectic occupies the role in the shift to the fourth level that questions for reflection occupied in the shift from third to fourth. Central to our purpose in this chapter are four short sections entitled respectively: "Dialectic: The Issue," "Dialectic: The Problem," "Dialectic: The Structure," and "Dialectic as Method." As in Insight the basic strategy is to allow the spontaneously operative structure inherent in human spirit to unfold, but Lonergan gives more prominence now to the role of encounter with others (247). The specifically critical strategy is expressed as in the earlier book by the two precepts: " . . . develop positions; reverse counter-positions (249)." But again the perspective is that of encounter: differences in horizon which lead to different views on what the positions are, will be handled by dialogue, by the mutual aid investigators offer one another when one understands others by overcoming one's own conflicts and evaluates oneself through knowledge and appreciation of others. Of this method Lonergan says:

While it will not be automatically efficacious, it will provide the open-minded, the serious, the sincere with the occasion to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others but eventually, even about themselves. It will make conversion a topic and thereby promote it. Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of maturation. It is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to love. Dialectic contributes to that end by pointing out ultimate differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one's destiny (253).

The rest of the chapter on Dialectic deals with philosophies that would subvert this program; in other words, the preceding quotation is a kind of final positive word on the way dialectic functions critically.
Is this critical? The question was put expressly by Father David Tracy at the Lonergan Congress of 1970 (1973: 178, 210, 214-220), and Father Lonergan takes up the question in his response to the first volume of the Congress papers. His answer appeals to Insight as an aid to self-appropriation and the consequent option for the positions on knowledge, objectivity, and reality. But in theology we prolong these procedures, for now we have the further problem of values. We cannot evade that problem; neither can we simply assert our own values as the true ones. However,

There exists . . . a third way. One can allow all comers to participate in research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. One can encourage positions and counter-positions to come to light concretely and to manifest to all their suppositions and their consequences. One can expect some to mistake counter-positions for positions and, inversely, positions for counter-positions. One can hope that such mistakes will not be universal, that the positions will be duly represented, that they will reveal themselves as positions to men of good will (1973b: 231).

This response deals with theology, where the prior quotation from Method seemed to have a wider application to the areas touched by dialectic. But they are very similar in their thrust, and I thought it useful to set them side by side with one another.

Let me add some reflections. One factor in Father Tracy's position was the contention that whereas Insight had a critical foundation for intellectual conversion, Method had no parallel foundation for religious conversion and theology (or, presumably, for the ethical field) (210). Perhaps I have done something to meet that point in drawing out the parallel between the two volumes. But I note again that the parallel does not lie in premises available for the philosophical and the theological enterprises, by which we might validate our judgment on our judgments in one case and our evaluation of our evaluations in the other; rather it lies in the fact that each book rejects the demand for such validation and takes its stand on the spontaneous dynamism of human spirit working itself out in time by correction and growth.

Next, have we not to recognize an analogous use of "critical" and "critically founded," so that the critical enterprise on the fourth level of intentionality is not simply univocal with that on the third/? I have already pointed out the need for analogous understanding of "question" in "questions for understanding, for reflection, for deliberation./23/." We have adjectives that do good service for two of the levels when we speak of the
"inquiring and critical" spirit of man; we can add to the list and speak of the "inquiring, critical, and evaluating (or deliberating)" spirit of man. But if we are going to use "critical" on the fourth level we need to take account of the analogy.

There is a parallel development in regard to the use of "objectivity." Ten years ago, in his lecture at Gallarate in Italy on the notion of structure, Father Lonergan outlined the familiar isomorphism of cognitional operations with the ontological constitution of reality, and extended it to the epistemology of the human spirit, that is, to the structure of objectivity (1964c). There is the objectivity of the experiential, of the normative, of the absolute levels; and these three correspond to experience-understanding-reflection in cognitional operation, as well as to potency-form-act in ontological constitution. Now, after Method, when we speak of the objectivity that is the fruit of genuine subjectivity, we have to recognize that this use too is analogous.

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My topic reduces almost entirely to examining the question of judging our judging and evaluating our evaluating. Perhaps it is time to put that question to my own contribution to this Workshop. I have called it an "exploration" of Father Lonergan's new notion of value. If you accept the image of a continent to be explored, then you might say that I have been mapping some details of inland geography. If you prefer more literal language, then I have been trying to understand Lonergan on his own terms and in his own perspective. Further, I have assumed, though I hope I am ready to let the assumption yield to fact, that his thought hangs together, that there is an inner consistency which I must discover under pain of missing his point altogether. The result is the foregoing series of groping questions, reflections, and tentative conclusions.

Two limitations of the paper are the very personal character of my study, which may make it less helpful to those in a different situation from mine, and its confinement to the writings of Father Lonergan himself, and a consequent failure to help locate him in the stream of ongoing thought. I would like therefore in concluding, if I may return to my metaphor, to emerge from my lonely geographical expedition to the inland, to stand upon the shoreline, and to look around me a little more widely. May I suggest two directions that further questions might take? One pertains to metaphysics and I would put this question to both Father Lonergan and ourselves; the other pertains to dialectic and my question is
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directed to those of us who consider *Method* a seminal work and would implement it in a new theology.

The metaphysical question is this: What becomes of the isomorphism of intending subject and intended object in the four-level structure of *Method*? In *Insight* the ontological structure of reality, potency-form-act, has as its counterpart in the knowing subject the three-leveled structure of cognitional activity, experience-understanding-reflection. And this isomorphism has its roots solidly in the doctrines and views of St. Thomas Aquinas (Crowe, 1961). At that stage the good presented no special problem; it is structured, as reality is, on three levels, so that the section on "The Ontology of the Good" speaks of potential, formal, and actual good (1957a: ch. 18, §1.5, esp. 605).

Now, however, we have a problem. Value is not just an extension of the object of cognitional activity. It is a new notion; it adds a new level to intentional consciousness. So we have to ask: Does it correspondingly add a new level to reality? If so, what could that level be? And the difficulty becomes more pressing if we regard love as a fifth level of intentionality.

One can displace the question and ask why we speak of "levels" at all in our analysis of intentional activity. After all, introspection reveals ten thousand activities of mind and heart; we group them on levels, so that understanding and conception are said to belong on one level but reflection and judgment on another. Why? We can try to answer in terms of operators, and say that the operator in one case is the question for understanding, in the other the question for reflection. But that only displaces the problem once again: Why do we assign levels to the operators? After all, even questions for understanding take different forms; for example, what? why? how often? are all questions for understanding.

I know of no better answer to this puzzle than to recognize the "selectivity of intelligence" in the way described by *Insight*:

Properly, to abstract is to grasp the essential and to disregard the incidental, to see what is significant and set aside the irrelevant, to recognize the important as important and the negligible as negligible. Moreover, when it is asked what is essential or significant or important and what is incidental, irrelevant, negligible, the answer must be twofold. For abstraction is the selectivity of intelligence, and intelligence may be considered either in some given stage of development or at the term of development when some science or group of sciences has been mastered completely (30; also 355–356).

To return then to the original question: if isomorphism is still to be affirmed, or even if it is only to serve as a useful model
for thought, what metaphysical element are we going to assign to
the fourth level of reality?

My second question takes us in a quite different direction:
it looks towards our own self-involvement. After all, the whole
thrust of the fourth level is towards such an engagement. Research,
interpretation, history, we have done a bit of them all, and they
sum up as leading to an encounter and a consequent challenge.

We have to be dead serious about this. We have, all of us,
insisted over and over that Insight is to be regarded more as an
invitation to self-appropriation than as a thesaurus of ideas. It
is not the objects of thought that are important in that book,
however brilliantly they may be conceived and explained; it is the
subject who is reading the book that matters, the subject and his
activity which may regard quite different objects from those of
Insight. As Philip McShane said in his introduction to three es-
says of Lonergan he recently edited: "What then is Lonergan getting
at? The uncomfortable answer is that Lonergan is getting at you
and me (1973: 7)." I once made a similar point when I instituted
a comparison between Kierkegaard and Lonergan. Perhaps I am old
enough now to quote myself:

Kierkegaard's message was inwardness as opposed to knowl-
edge. . . . [Yet] the last ignominy, for Kierkegaard, would
be for someone to say [of him], "This author represents
inwardness." As an abstract, everything would be said in
this one word; but in effect nothing would be said, since
the question was not what the author represented but what
the reader would do (1964: 328-28).

I do not think I can say any better now in 1974 than I did then
in 1964 what is needed by the student of Lonergan. The one thing
to be added is that we now have a further level of inwardness, and
that this level puts the matter of self-involvement even more
squarely before us.

But if the challenge is more squarely before us, the way to
meet it is also indicated more extensively: It is the way of col-
laboration that Method so directly takes up; one might say that the
thesis of the book is method and the corollary is collaboration.
It so happens that this Workshop was conceived as one in a series
that might constitute ongoing collaboration, so it seems especially
appropriate to end my paper on this topic.

My own suggestion of a strategy is to plunge at one into an
area of theology in which the method will be tested. No doubt we
still have a great deal to learn at one remove from theology about
the functional specialties and method itself; but no doubt also we
will never finish talking about the latter in our lifetime. We cannot wait so long. What we need is a continual exchange between theological method that prescinds from questions of theology proper, and the theological questions in which the method is tested. I suggest further that it may be easier to get started on that testing than we imagine. For one thing, we do not have to face at the very beginning an enormous task of research; there is already research galore in the dictionaries and tools of scholarship put out by our European confreres. In general they do this sort of work much better than we do; why should we try to compete with them? The trick is to learn to use their research in implementing method. The same applies in its own measure to interpretation; we have theologies galore on a multitude of topics, many of which function as interpretations in Lonergan's sense; the trick again is to learn how to use them methodically.

With history the question is different. Still I think many of us have already worked a good deal on various areas of theology, following the lead given us by Lonergan's *via analytica*. It should not be too hard to adapt that work and use it in the functional specialty of history.

It is in dialectic that the real work begins. Most of us have little experience at such an exercise, at least in the academic world. Moreover it is bound to be painful. Already *Insight* forced us to a laborious work of intellectual conversion, and the giving up of positions long cherished. Still there was never the deeply personal involvement to which *Method* calls us. We are called by that book to examine ourselves existentially, either to be converted or to reappraise our conversion, to examine our values and ourselves in relation to them, to resolve the conflicts that may lead us to differing interpretations of the same gospel message and to different accounts of what is going on in the world.

At the same time the directions for strategy and tactics are set forth in Chapter 10 of *Method* and I have quoted some of them above. I think that, if we are serious about this book—and our very presence here is surely witness to that—then we may not evade the responsibility that is ours in the *kairos* that is given to us.
NOTES

/1/ Originally a paper for discussion at the 35th annual convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association, Montreal, April, 1973.


/5/ The first three names in this listing are not new—all occurred repeatedly in Insight.

/6/ See the Index, s.v., Self-consistency.

/7/ 1964a: especially Thesis 10a, De conscientia Christi; 1964b: especially c. 5: De divinis personis inter se comparatis.


/9/ As I enter more deeply into this question, I should acknowledge the help I have received from prolonged discussions with the following philosophers and students of Lonergan: Ney Alfonso de Sá Earp, Giovanni Sala, Jesus Vergara.

/10/ I omit the question of human love, which Method seems to leave unsettled; p. 122 makes it an exception, along with God's gift of love, to the ordinary process, but pp. 278 and 283 do not make it an exception; see also 1971: 227.

/11/ The same point is made repeatedly in 1973a: 10, 50, 51, 52, 53-55, 58, 67.


/13/ My difficulty is that the term, "questions for deliberation," puts the emphasis on the cognitional factor in fourth-level operations, whereas the fundamental drive comes from a force that moves us beyond the cognitional. One can get round the difficulty by understanding "question" analogously, as indeed it must already be understood analogously in "questions for understanding" and "questions for reflection," but commonly people will not think of the analogous use.
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/14/ For St. Thomas on Aristotle, see *In III Ethic.*, lect. 13; some references in the *Summa theologiae*: I, q. 83, a. 1 obj. 5a; I-II, q. 10, a. 3 obj. 2a.

/15/ See *In III Ethic.*, §§ 518-520.

/16/ There are many differences. Aristotle's approach was negative by way of an objection against his basic principle; ours is positive by way of establishing grounds of true objectivity. His context was that of liberty; ours is that of horizons that determine all judgments and choices. His problem was how to impute responsibility; ours is how to break out of an epistemological circle. His area of study was habits; ours is all that constitutes us existentially.

/17/ Note that the contrast I made between Descartes and Newman derives from Lonergan. It likely lies behind his critique of mistaken beliefs in *Insight* (see the reference to Descartes on p. 716); it becomes explicit in his course, *De intellectu et metodo*, at the Gregorian University in 1959; and it returns with a nuance in the article I quoted above. The nuance lies in a distinction between system and common sense; Lonergan does not make it clear what his view is on the application of the Cartesian method to the field of system, but he leaves no doubt in regard to common sense: "We have no choice but to follow the advice of John Henry Newman—to accept ourselves as we are and by dint of constant and persevering attention, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, strive to expand what is true and force out what is mistaken in views that we have inherited or spontaneously developed" (1973b: 98).

/18/ In fundamental differences of opinion, therefore, the effective procedure can hardly be the simple one of showing your adversary that you are right and he is wrong; by hypothesis, he is likely to be incapable of seeing that. The strategy then will be to ask yourself why he is incapable of seeing what is so clear to you, and then proposing to him considerations that may help him grow out of his dwarfed condition (always keeping an open mind to the possibility that you yourself are the dwarf, that you yourself may need to grow in order to be able to learn from your adversary).

/19/ E.g., the critical distinction of "things" and "bodies," and judgment on the existence of God, (685-86).

/20/ See also 123: "the gift itself is self-justifying," and 290, on love as an "unassailable fact."

/21/ Note that Father Tracy's objection is meant to apply in the field of theology, and that I am taking liberties with his thought when I extend it to the ethical. By my principles the extension is legitimate, since I regard the situation as sufficiently similar in ethics and theology; but Father Tracy may have his own views on that.

/22/ For example, see the usage of *Method*: "There is to human deliberation a criterion that criticizes every finite good (34)."
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"PERSONS AS ORIGINATING VALUES": A PRIMER (READER)
FROM LONERGAN'S THOUGHT ON THE TOPIC OF VALUES

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The description of persons as originating values caught my attention in a first reading of B. Lonergan's Method in Theology /1/--as have most of the phrases descriptive of person in his works. What I have been wanting to understand, obviously, is person; but L's reference to persons as "originating values" invites me to try understanding something about values--as with the book Insight I began to try to understand something about knowing /2/. So I ask myself a) how to understand Lonergan correctly on the topic of persons as originating values, and b) what to do now together with you at this primitive stage of my own thinking about values. And I see that in relation to both questions to myself, I can take the following steps:

Step I:

I can enumerate for you what I keep trying to use--sometimes as a backdrop, sometimes as basic "testings" (to see if I have understood correctly)--for talk about values/3/:

a. I think over the slowness of the ways persons (some) come to social consciousness, to expanded conscience--i.e. my own slowness, which I know, and what seem to be some other examples/4/;

and

I ponder also the evidence for actuality, in some persons, of global concerns (examples)/5/;

b. I go back over what I think adult education is about: I think it is peer education/6/. I think it has to do not only with learning but also--in a way not suitable for youngsters--with getting aware of one's own learning processes (otherwise: too temporary a project for adults to take seriously!). I think it has limited goals and yet (by reflection on experience, of course) it has to expect what the expansions of those limits can be like; in other words, I think adult education stands on the boundary between insight and judgment, knowing that it is doing that--knowing as well something of what it would be to make the transitions to judgment and to choosing action. So:
I jump ahead /7/ to see if I can say: adult education is: people getting to see that they can be originating values. But after that jump, I pull back to two delicate matters:

- the difference between getting to see the possibility of being and getting to be originating values (I mean: the implications, for educational efforts, of this delicacy);

- if collaborating with development is partly helping persons ("educators" and "educands") to see that "development is a matter of increasing the number of things that one does for oneself" (Lonergan, 1967: 241), how collaborate with a transvaluing of those implied values? Here, as you easily recognize, we are at a basic question, and for some of us a recurrent concern, a) having to do with religion, and b) having to do with the study of religion /8/.

c. (To conclude this first step of mentioning elements of the backdrop I use for consideration of values):

I can tell you which were the few alluring phrases--not understood--which stuck with me from the time of Insight, signalling their bearing on authentic living. They now insist on being brought to bear on reflections on value:

- "the good is concrete"

- "rational self-consciousness" as different from "rational consciousness"

- "personal relations can be studied only in a larger and more concrete context" (than that of Insight) /9/.

To these signals I add--for now--only the phrase:

- persons as "originating values".

Step II.:

The main thing I can do with you at this primitive stage of my thinking about values, is to assemble for you and for myself passages from Lonergan which bear on the topic "persons as originating values"--hoping it may be useful to you and to our discussion to recall or to meet these passages. First, the more obvious ones; then some associations perhaps less obvious. (A; then B.)

Step II (A and B) will be the major portion of this paper, hence its name of "Primer", "first Reader".

I intend to have ready selected passages (copied by reduction xerox) for distribution, and some for use on the spot.

A. - Now in so far as that thrust of the self regularly opts, not for the merely apparent good, but for the true good, the self thereby is achieving moral
Persons as Originating Values

self-transcendence; he is existing authentically; he is constituting himself as an originating value, and he is bringing about terminal values, . . . .

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- "person" is . . . (passages from L's Trinitarian and Christological texts, and from Phil. of God and Theology, pp. 58-59)
- etc.

B. Among associations perhaps less obvious, I intend the following:

- a "proof" about God which emerges from reflection on the good (Lonergan, 1974)
- "analogy" and what can be hoped for from it;
- something on "emergent probability".

As Step III.:

I can ask you some questions--that is, I can share with you some questions of my own--and thereby involve you in composing the last section of my paper for me.

1. The simplest question to ask you is: which passages from your reading of Lonergan would you say must be added, in order to understand a) Lonergan on values and b) values /10/?

2. The story of Proteus lurks behind the account of hr-unan understanding in the book Insight. What alterations would you make in that story to fit it as a parable of the "ethical life", of human living?

3. For years I wondered if anyone else were interested, as I was, in the way the "myth about knowing" (that it is a looking) is fostered by theological traditions about "desire to see God" and "beatific vision" /11/. I have little trouble with the similar Scripture texts (with no pretensions for the technical--but still) I wondered how, in this instance, the "word" (Lonergan: 1972: 112-113) of a religious tradition has been helpful and healing /12/. And then F. Crowe wrote an article about the "vision" terminology (Crowe, 1974a/b).

Now I am wondering what misapprehensions about value and about person are fostered by the prevalence in religious vocabulary of "victory" and "defeat". Even the Resurrection of Christ is said to be a "conquest". I wonder--besides its conveying of the "Protean" character of attempts at authentic living--I wonder what the redemptive word is here /13/, and what one might understand if one did without the talk of "winning". (It seems so close to other imaginative traps which lead to misconceiving grace as interference,
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or to cancelling out "creating" from among human possibilities (Lonergan, 1971; 1975a.) Besides recognizing problems of "communications", and specifically of communications about evil, do you see in the imagery of "victory" blocks set in the way of understanding and of persuasion, of taste and climate for value? And speaking of understanding: understanding is no victory; is persuasion? (For me, this question has something to do with that "adult-development-transformed" component I mentioned as background for reflection on values; cf. Step I, b, my p. 26).

4. There is in ethical reflection—reflection about authentic living—a special version of the inadequacy of imagination. Not only in technical explanation does one transcend one's images (e.g. in cognitional theory, one's images about knowing); one needs to transcend/sublate images for any understanding and any affirmation. But in ethical theory the images available emerge from what has already been done—and one way of expressing (Lonergan, 1957, 1972) the required transcending of images is to say that the concrete relevant good has not been done, has not been brought into being by doing.

Now: how would you say the problems are special to the study of religion? that it is the study of what can be "experience with content but without object" (Lonergan, 1972, 1973)? Can we get a little further together on the implications, for the study of religion, of what we have been adverting to in L. about persons and values? For example: how concretely can we manage to talk, in this respect, about emergent probability?

5. Since we have a Primer here and since, presumably, compilers of reading-books love the selections they have chosen, I can ask finally: what has been your favorite Lonergan quotation—just recently met, or over years? not thinking whether it has to do with values or persons, but just: what has been your favorite one, which you have been expecting to grow into? I can tell you mine:

Objects of desire are manifold, but they are not an isolated manifold. They are existents and events that in their concrete possibility and in their realization are bound inextricably through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being. If objects of desire are instances of the good because of the satisfactions they yield, then the rest of the manifold of existents and events also are a good, because desires are satisfied not in some dream-land but only in the concrete universe. Again, the intelligible orders that are invented, implemented, adjusted and improved by men, are but further exploitations of prehuman, intelligible orders; moreover, they fall within the universal order of generalized emergent probability, both as consequents
of its fertility, and as ruled by its more inclusive sweep. If the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man's invention. Finally, intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, are values; but the universal order, which is generalized emergent probability, conditions and penetrates, corrects and develops, every particular order; and rational self-consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent. Accordingly, since man is involved in choosing and since every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order, the realization of universal order is a true value.

*Insight 805*

And since I am just beginning to think about values, I pair that Lonergan quotation with my current favorite from another literature:

"Awareness is not easy, is it, O Lord of cares?"

A. Prabhu in *Speaking of Sina*

But what has been your favorite?
NOTES

/1/ And I suppose in a first hearing of part of Method about the same time (here at Boston College in 1968).

/2/ We may see, in the course of this week, in which sense the latter (understanding something about knowing) may be said to be the easier task, for what reasons integral to understanding of values, and for whom.

/3/ Good advisers tell us, early and often, to "avoid abstractions", to "speak of what we know". One gets the sense that for thought about what, really, are values, the only chance is within what one knows something about.

/4/ E.g., J. M. Alegría's autobiographical I Believe in Hope or the fears (strikingly similar to Spanish ones) acted out in the first response of Church hierarchy to a new socialist party in Québec in the 1940's; or (as someone pointed out to me) in that fascinating book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, and in spite of its "ecology"-"technology" frame, the intensely individual character of the preoccupations of the narrator. ("The time for individual survival as motivation is long past." Brief to Commission on Graduate Studies in Canada, TMI Research Institute, January, 1975.)

/5/ E.g. "third-world awareness"es, Club of Rome efforts, Canadian George Grant's efforts to think about technology, Voegelin on the "ecumenic age", Lonergan's interest in economics and his readiness to take up, in a recent lecture, such a topic as "healing and creating in history" (1975).

/6/ And adult education--peer education--should be adverted to right now because it is our setting: not in the sense that we are all equally bright, or equally educated or equally benevolent, but in the sense that we are all here as inquirers and that we have a basic good will towards each other's development during this week.

/7/ Remembering: "one has to have concepts in order to get data" (Lonergan adverting to a science-conference remark about the rapidly-expanded world of physics).

/8/ Here I am thinking of the wobbly history in Canada of approaches to the university study of religion, during the dozen years there since "departments of religious studies" were founded to be something different from theology departments" and "divinity schools".

I think also of four stages I mark for myself in Lonergan's (written) relating of his thought to world religions.

/9/ I.e. in a work that would be undertaken out of self-appropriation, expanded and supported by "new" and "higher" collaboration (Lonergan, 1957: 731 and note).

/10/ I bear in mind, as doubtless you do also, that culling and pouring over passages from an author can be "interpretation"; or it can be "logic merely"; or something worse ("mere verbalism"?).
Perhaps it is L's passages on these evils which most of all need to be added to my collection?

/11/ Or, to make possible a shift away from Christian theology, "seers".

/12/ I know it is important here to think of Incarnation as an "act of communication" (Lonergan, 1975b).

/13/ ... "a theology considers the significance and value of a religion in a culture" ... (Lonergan, 1972, xi; 1973)
WORKS CONSULTED

1975
Crowe, Frederick E.

1974a
Grant, George

1974b
Pirsig, Robert
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Morrow

1973
Lonergan, Bernard

1969
Voegelin, Eric
The Ecumenic Age. Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State University

1967

1972

1974

1975a

1975b

1980
Voegelin, Eric
The aim of this paper is primarily pedagogical. I wish to set forth the role of metaphysics as the integrating structure of being. Lonergan defines metaphysics in a more exact way than I have defined it; I have omitted certain specifications for reasons of brevity. I hope to focus on the intrinsic intelligibility of being. To clarify this idea it will be necessary to review briefly Lonergan's theory of knowing, being and objectivity. Once this has been done I shall establish a fundamental distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic knowing of being, based upon the self-constituting function of understanding. By approaching the problem of metaphysics from this perspective, I intend not only to explain the intrinsic intelligibility of being, but also to show how this idea provides the key dialectical perspective for re-orienting the commonsense and scientific patterns of knowing into an integrated knowing of being.

I.
The Structure of Knowing

For Lonergan, knowing is a structure or whole that is composed of three functionally interrelated and distinct phases. We may distinguish between structures that are static and those that are dynamic. In performing certain functions for its maker, a machine keeps repeating the same operations with the same predictable, preordained results. Knowing, on the other hand, is dynamic. It involves experiencing, understanding, and judging; and while these operations keep repeating themselves in cyclical fashion, they do so with varying, surprising, and at times, most unpredictable results. Central to the dynamism of knowing is the desire to question. Questioning ignites the whole process and sustains its momentum.

Without the interference of a question, one could rest quietly like a cow and simply enjoy questionless gazing. With the advent of the question simple, untroubled experiences of self and world
stops and the combination of experiencing and questioning begins. Questioning transforms experiencing into a puzzling experience; and the experience remains puzzling until the operation of understanding occurs. But once insight occurs questioning is still not satisfied until it judges that what understanding proposes about experience is correct. Only when all three—experience, understanding, and judgment—have been performed can we assert that knowing in the full sense of that term has occurred; and even then it is only a limited knowing since questioning relentlessly keeps changing further experiences into questionable experiences.

Questioning, then, triggers and interrelates the whole process or structure of knowing. Experience is what is questioned. Understanding is "of" my experience, and judging is "of" my understanding "of" my experience. The whole structure is relational. Experience is what understanding relates "to" and is "of"; judging is what understanding leads "to" and is judged "by". Each of the three need the other two to complete a cycle of knowing. This knowing cycle, then, is a dynamic, relational whole, structured by three phases of operation, each of which provides the term and direction for the other two. Questioning is the dynamism that initiates and sustains the relationships between the three phases. Having briefly sketched the knowing structure, we next specify certain essential features of the process: that it is paradoxical, performative, responsible, and personal.

The questioning is paradoxical since it implies knowing and not knowing simultaneously. Questioning presupposes a questionable experience but realizing that an experience is puzzling is not just more experiencing of that experience, but experiencing it as questionable. Some aspect of your experience strikes you as enigmatic; you do not understand it and you realize this not-understood experience is not-understood. You are aware of your own not-knowing. The experience sets up a tension within you between a known and a known-unknown. Questioning, then, is paradoxical: a kind of knowing that you do not know.

A second aspect of questioning is that it is a performance. Usually we think of a performance in terms of something like dancing or giving a speech. But questioning is just as much a "doing" as playing a piano; and so are understanding and judging. It is the knower who "does" the understanding. It is you, the knower, who "performs" the act of judging.

Closely connected with the quality of knowing as a performance is responsibility. If you "do" the knowing you feel a sense of
responsibility for what you are about to do or have done. But just as knowing involves three distinct and successive phases so the sense of responsibility has a similar rhythm of awareness. You are more responsible for understanding than experiencing but you feel an even fuller responsibility for your judging since it is more under your control. You cannot make an act of understanding occur whenever you like; you can make its occurrence more or less probable through personal effort and attention, but you may fail to grasp the point, fail to understand despite all your effort. Judging is different. In this activity the grasp of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence is somehow even more up to you and your integrity as an inquirer; and so you feel more responsible for your reflective understanding than you do for your experiencing or your direct insights. As the three phases in knowing succeed and interrelate with one another you, the knower, have a cumulative sense of responsibility. This aspect of knowing leads us to a fourth quality of knowing: It is personal.

Without a careful analysis of the knowing process, most people would think of knowing as something you do in a single act, rather than as an activity involving three different, interrelated phases. Only when we analyze knowing in the process of its becoming a knowing can we distinguish the three successive phases and their interrelationships. The same holds true for the notion of responsibility as regards the three phases. Knowing is easily and spontaneously known as "mine:" It is my experience, my understanding, and my judging; and the three mys readily combine into a single, unified "mine." You are present in a different way within each successive stage of coming to know, but those differences are much more difficult to grasp than the single "you" who is concomitantly present and operating. Knowing, then, is a dynamic, interrelated structure of operations that are paradoxical, performative, responsible, and personal. Now that we have finished the initial sketch of the knowing process, we next focus on the problem of consciousness and self-affirmation.

II.

Self-Affirmation

In the preceding section we described the process of knowing. Because one of the characteristics of knowing was that it was personal, knowing knowing is also self-knowing. This means that our first description of knowing simultaneously involved knowing
ourselves. But why wasn't this fact more obvious in our account? Certainly the self or knower who does the knowing is conscious or present while knowing his own knowing since he was the one who "performed" the knowing. Still the self was not the "object" being investigated; it was performing the "knowing". The self was on the periphery of awareness; it was known indirectly at most. If however one keeps repeating this knowing of knowing while intending to know not merely the three phases of knowing but also the subject of these operations at the same time, then the self as well as the operations of knowing will gradually become known.

Lonergan refers to this investigating one's cognitional operations together with oneself as self-appropriation. The important point to note is that the self is not known directly but only through the operations of knowing. This should be emphasized.

To many readers of Insight it comes as a surprise to hear the author claim that we know one another and ourselves through the very same procedure of having an experience, of questioning it, of forming a tentative idea, and finally of accepting or rejecting the idea as correct or incorrect. The reason is that we have such an immediate and intimate awareness of ourselves that we tend to equate such "awareness" with knowing, whereas Lonergan identifies knowing not with having an "experience of" or "being conscious of" but with the term of the different phases of knowing consciousness or awareness. Knowing involves three kinds of awareness occurring successively and cooperatively, namely, experiential, intelligent and rational or critical awareness. All three kinds of consciousness must operate in consort, with each making a different contribution to our final stage of awareness. There are three types of awareness or consciousness because there are three phases of conscious activity, each of which is distinguishable in its way of performing. Further and more profoundly, consciousness is a quality primarily immanent in the acts and not the objects of the cognitional acts. Neither the lightning you see nor the thunder you hear are conscious; it is the seeing and hearing them that is conscious. Lightning becomes consciously seen because it is received in your eyes, and your eyes can receive the "acts of lightning" only if you are sensibly conscious. Of itself lightning is unconscious; but the same act of lightning in the seeing act is conscious. The one act is thus involved in two different ways: as lightning it is unconscious; as "seen lightning" it is conscious. One act, then, is involved with the subject as seeing, on the one hand, and the object as causing the seeing on the other hand.
The Self-Causing Subject

It is the subject that is conscious, not the object; or, it is the object's act (lightning) that becomes conscious visibly by acting upon the subject's visual potency. The same explanation applies similarly to the other two phases of consciousness or awareness. Besides being sensibly aware of lightning one may become intelligently and rationally aware of it. But the change in awareness occurs on the side of the knower, not of the known. My knowing something does not make it conscious; rather, it makes one aware of it in three different, interrelated ways. Just as knowing is a "change" in the knower and not in the known, so consciousness is in the subject's acts of knowing, and not in the three interrelated levels of the known. We can now apply this explanation of the three types of awareness to the problem of self-knowing.

Just as you cannot see or hear if you are unconscious so you cannot understand and judge without being intelligently and rationally conscious. This means that every knower is implicitly aware of what intelligent and rational consciousness is. But being experientially aware of intelligent awareness is not being intelligently aware of intelligent consciousness. However, since consciousness is a quality immanent within the knower's acts, one cannot understand the acts of understanding without at the same time understanding intelligent awareness. Nor can one understand judging without grasping in the same way the meaning of being "rationally aware".

We can now ask the question which Lonergan asks in the eleventh chapter: Are you aware of yourself as a knower in the sense in which we have explained knowing and awareness? The question is a question of fact, and so it involves the actual conditions as given here and now. The question is not: Were you once a knower or will you be a knower next week? But rather, are you right now a knower? Further, the question is not are you necessarily a knower? But rather, are the conditions for you to perform the conditions necessary for knowing given? Only you can answer the question or avoid answering it. Paradoxically you can hardly escape the answer if you have the experiences and perform the operations. As much as you may not like the effort involved in raising questions, you do question, quite spontaneously. You have also experienced a certain effortlessness when there suddenly dawns on you without your even apparently thinking about it—a flash of understanding—your understanding. Finally, you have judged even if only to judge not to judge. Whenever and only when those certain conditions or experiences have occurred, you are a knower; but there is no way
that you can absolutely guarantee that the conditions will continue to be given.

To 'recap': 1) A person can only know himself "indirectly". You can be conscious or present to yourself experientially, intelligently, rationally without knowing yourself explicitly as consciously present in those ways. 2) The only way to know yourself as a knower is to affirm or judge that you are one. Once that judgment is made, you realize that knowing can only complete and satisfy itself by judging. What knowing is heading for is not just knowing in the sense of understanding, but knowing in the sense of understanding and judging that understanding. 3) You cannot grasp yourself directly because directly and immediately you are a wonderer, a questioner before you are a knower, since knowing involves not just asking questions but answering them—intelligently and critically. So, it is "indirectly" through asking and answering the question about what you do whenever you know that you come to know yourself as a knower. There are no short-cuts. We can now turn to the question: Why is knowing what it is?

III.
The Notion of Being

A straightforward response to this question is: knowing is knowing because it is affirming being. There are two key points to this response: first, the importance of an actual affirmation in the process of knowing; second, the notion of being. I will consider the two points in reverse order.

The first peculiarity about the notion of being is that it is a "notion" and not a concept. Concepts are what you construct in virtue of having understood something, while notions exist before you understand, allowing questions to arise. Notions have that paradoxical quality associated with questioning in which you know something but, unfortunately, what you know is that you do not yet know the to be known. In such a state what you actually know is that if you can understand and judge what gives rise to the question, then you will know. You have a "notion" of the answer because you know your ability to answer the question. You may also anticipate in your notion what qualities the answer may or may not have, and the way to direct your questions to reach the answer. Questioning, then, is an intelligent procedure (or it can be). It does not need to be blind groping; with a "notion" of what you are seeking, you can "grop" intelligently and critically. You not only
know that you can understand what you are intending in your notion but you also know that you can question and verify whether or not that understanding when "performed" is correct, whether or not the conditions as you came to understand them are actually given as you think they are. Questioning, then, is intelligent and critical, because you can ask questions about what you do not yet know but intend to find out. Such anticipatory knowing we call "notional."

To apprehend the notion of being we need to focus on both the objective of knowing and the range of our desire to know. The objective of our knowing is not simply the activity of knowing but the content, the known. We are not satisfied with simply performing knowing acts. We do not question for the sake of questioning. To begin with, we question to understand. But attaining the objective of understanding—the understood—is not yet to reach objective of knowing. Understanding only reveals the possibility of being and the desire to know is not satisfied with knowing possibilities; it wants to know what actually is; and the only way to do that is to judge whether the possible being we think about in understanding actually is or is not the objective of knowing. In short, we want to know being. The way we can do that is to understand and judge correctly. And whenever we do understand and judge something correctly what we know is being: not the possibility of being, not all being, but being, nonetheless.

The second factor to be considered in the notion of being is that it is an unrestricted notion. Because it is unrestricted there is a tendency to think like Kant that being cannot be known until we know all that there is to be known. Hegel, too, fell into this trap when he discovered how all-inclusive the notion of being really is. Lonergan, who takes such pains to discover and break down every restriction that we tend to place on being, is certainly aware of how all-embracing the notion is. He still insists that if we have made a correct judgment about some limited reality or aspect of reality, then we do know being; and we know more about it every time we make another correct judgment. If I say I know you, this does not necessarily mean that I know all that there is to be known about you. I don't have to wait for a completely comprehensive knowledge of you before I can affirm I know you—really and actually. All knowing, if it is correct, is knowing being. This is what Lonergan means when he says that being is "all that is known, and all that remains to be known."

Knowing dogs and cats correctly is knowing being. As we shall see in a later section, it is only what I call an extrinsic knowing,
but it is knowing; and if it is correct knowing, then it is knowing being, knowing the real, knowing the objective of knowing.

The unrestrictedness of the notion of being is more complicated because of the number and type of correct judgements that must be made before we can form a notion of the infinite or unrestricted. In my own experience, most of these judgments are denials of restrictions that we spontaneously and unsuspectingly associate with the meaning of being or reality. They involve the clarification that the notion of the empirical residue can bring to the notion of an objective as unrestricted. I will attempt to deal with this problem in successive sections, and so, for the present it will suffice to note that the objective of knowing has no limits. There are no questions you cannot ask, no answers you do not desire to know. What you ultimately want to know is the completely comprehensive and completely correct answers to all your questions. But is such knowing really possible? It is possible if you can affirm that you actually do have such a potential to know. Is such knowing not only possible but actual? The only way to know that is to actually affirm that it is; but you cannot make such an affirmation until you actually do know all there is to be known. With such knowing you would no longer have a notion of being but a complete knowledge of being.

To return to the question: why is knowing what it is? We can now answer: Knowing is knowing because it is knowing being. I am certain there are still lingering questions regarding this answer to which we will return, but for the present we have established a sufficient context to raise the next question that Lonergan takes up: Granted that we can form a notion of being, is that notion objective?

IV.

The Notion of Objectivity

Thus far we have specified knowing as an interrelated, functional structure involving a series of three dynamic phases. Through these same phases you affirm that you are a knower. We then introduced the notion of being as what we know when we judge correctly, and what we will know through making all the correct judgments to be made. Now we are inquiring into the objectivity of such judgments. We can expect that the notion of objectivity will fall into the same pattern and be specified and by the same unrestricted desire that specifies and interrelates the phases of
knowing and which in its turn is specified by the objective of knowing being.

It may be helpful if we begin with the ordinary notion of objectivity. There are any number of meanings associated with this term beginning with the negative qualification which characterizes objective knowing as what takes place without any interference of the subject. This would mean that knowing is objective when it is not subjective. Knowing is objective when it gets out-there, independently of the subject "doing" the knowing. This ordinary meaning presupposes both a definition of what a subject and object are and what sort of relation between them will or will not make a subject's knowing objective. But we have seen that the subject cannot know himself or herself except through experiencing, understanding and judging; and similarly, objects cannot be known except through the same recurrent cycle of operations. We can add to this that to know the relation or difference between a subject and an object one must also understand and judge that relation or difference. Such statements run counter to the ordinary expectations. Spontaneously one thinks that one does not need to pass through the cycle of cognitive operations in order to know objects. We have already seen the same tendency present when we think we can know ourselves without understanding and judging ourselves. In both instances the "experience" or awareness of self or of objects is mistaken for an understanding and affirmation of self and other objects. This tendency is probably even stronger when it comes to judging distinctions or differences between objects. The fact that you are not an antelope seems so obvious that it does not need to be "known". No understanding is necessary for such an obvious fact; it is immediately evident without having to judge that it is so.

If we take this "spontaneous" tendency of knowing as a basic position regarding the question of objectivity, we can describe the position in the following way: There are objects known by their experienced out-thereness; there are subjects known by their experienced in-hereness; and there is a basic difference between objects and subjects because subjects are in-here and objects are out-there. This position regarding the objectivity of knowing is the position ordinarily held by most people. It seems to me that the key to Lonergan's theory of objectivity is to understand how he accounts for this in-here and out-there within his own perspective. Before doing this I will briefly state his theory.

First, we need to define and affirm some objects. Secondly, we must define and affirm a subject. Thirdly, one must deny that
the subject known is one of the objects affirmed. The interesting feature of this process is that the notion of objectivity emerges not from a single judgment but from a context of interrelated statements. One may object: if the notion of objectivity emerges in a context of judgments, how can one know the objectivity of any one of the single judgments in the series? This is why Lonergan distinguishes between a principal notion of objectivity that is known through the series of judgments and the partial aspects of objectivity which can be known in any individual judgment. I shall take up the principal notion of objectivity first, and then consider the partial aspects.

We can start by defining an object as a being or "structured whole" that is experienced, understood and judged. Next we affirm that several such objects are, and are distinct from one another. Once we have affirmed that there are several distinct objects, we can define a subject as a self-affirming object. Finally, we can judge the relation between the subject affirmed and the objects affirmed, and affirmed to be distinct from one another. From such a series of judgments there emerges a basic set of terms and relations which provide you with a notional structure or context of meaning which can then be employed to judge the objectivity of affirmations whether of subjects, objects, or of the differences between them. In addition to this overall meaning of objectivity there are three partial meanings.

In discussing the partial meanings it will be helpful to return to the ordinary meaning associated with objectivity: objectivity as a negative reference to a lack of subjectivity and a positive reference to something out-there, independent of the subject, something publicly verifiable, and finally, a connotation of absolute-ness and definitiveness. The three partial meanings of objectivity can be associated with these three ordinary meanings. To avoid subjective bias in your judgment one needs an objective norm. Judges claim to find this norm in the words of the constitution and congressional statutes; scientists claim to find theirs in the visible, audible, palpable world around them. In fact, both of them use methods of questioning, understanding, and judging oriented not by an unrestricted objective but by a specialized objective that guides their questions and answers toward the understandings and judgments falling within restricted fields. The point is that you need a method to control the many other desires you experience besides the desire to know and especially the desire not to know. The method may be formulated in a set of rules of evidence as to
what is or is not permitted to enter into a final judgment; or it may be an ingrained habit of checking results in a certain way; but whatever form it may take, one needs some sort of method to know "objectively" so that subjective biases can be minimized.

A second aspect of the ordinary notion of objectivity is its definitiveness, its absoluteness. When a person uses the word in this sense he usually means that his judgment is final and absolute: "It's a fact and that's that." "I am what I am." "I cannot be here and there at the same time." "If today is Monday it can't be Tuesday, also." This ordinary meaning of objectivity may be translated into the more technical meaning of the principles of identity and non-contradiction.

The third and most obvious dimension of the ordinary meaning of objectivity is its givenness: anyone can see it for himself. It is the aspect of objectivity that is most obvious. And yet it is the most difficult, partial aspect of objectivity to explain, because its meaning seems to disappear after you finish explaining it.

One might ask whether the objective as given is outside or inside the knower. The tendency, as we have said, is to assign this aspect of the meaning of objectivity to the outside: to what can be seen, smelled, heard, etc. But what about the "inner" field of the given, what about awareness as inner consciousness or presence? Doesn't consciousness also have a certain givenness to it? Don't we question our inner awareness just as we question what we receive through our senses? If we want a truly comprehensive notion of objectivity, then, the given must include both interior and exterior experience. If we want to talk about the given in this way, then the given cannot mean given just to our eyes or ears; it must also refer to our inner experience as well. Moreover, it cannot refer just to what is now given or has been given since the given cannot be limited to particular places or times, but potentially includes all possible interior and exterior experiences. There is only one way to specify such a totally comprehensive meaning and that is to leave the meaning of the given open to any line of questioning, which means that the given is extrinsic to the process of questioning. It can be related to questioning only by becoming a part of either internal or external experience. The differences in the given cannot be affirmed to be before they are known, because nothing can be known as being that is not understood and judged. The given, then, has an aura of unquestionableness precisely in so far as it is not yet questioned. It is imperative, then, not to confuse this "unquestionableness" with the normative and absolute
aspects of objectivity that constitute the intrinsic ground of objectivity in any and every correct judgment. What I mean by this can be explained only by a careful and detailed examination of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic relations; of why the normative and absolute parts of objectivity are intrinsic or essential to the notion of objectivity; and of why the given as given is extrinsically related to cognitional process. This will be the topic of our next section.

V.
Understanding as Self-Causing

The purpose of this present section is to explain the following statement: Knowing is knowing because it is self-causing. Once one grasps how the act of understanding can generate itself, one apprehends why understanding is the intrinsic, or constitutive form of knowing insofar as it is understanding. The central issue in presenting this explanation is to specify understanding as understanding by distinguishing this operation from that of imagining. The key difference between these two cognitional activities is that understanding is self-constituting and potentially unrestricted, while imagining cannot generate or conceive itself since it has certain intrinsic limitations to its activity. We can begin by contrasting imagining with sensing.

It seems as though we can imagine in an unlimited number of ways. Eyes can only see if there are colors to be seen; ears will only function within a certain frequency range, but we can imagine light in the midst of darkness, sounds that have never been heard, surfaces that have never been felt, and movements that have never been made. There seem to be no limits to what we can imagine. Imagination is capable or replacing and conjuring up any sensation that our senses are capable of receiving and of replacing them in an unlimited number of ways. You can only see and hear when there are sights and sounds. This ability of imagination to transcend the limits of our senses is not, however, as unrestricted as it seems if we compare it to the power to think and understand. Just as our imagining can receive data from our senses and operate in a way that is beyond the limits of sensing so our intelligence can operate on images and transform them in quite unexpected and unimaginable ways. The issue is to specify exactly how this occurs. As a first illustration of this difference between imagining and understanding we can take the example of the point and the
dot. We can imagine a dot but we cannot imagine a point. Even though imagination is so flexible, the geometrician has understood and conceived the meaning of the term, point, in such a way that his imagination is incapable of producing an image that exactly embodies that meaning: a point has no magnitude or size; it has only position. No matter how hard we try to imagine very tiny specks we fail to form a completely accurate image of the meaning of a "point" as it is actually understood. If you think your image of a dot is the meaning of a point, then your imagination is misleading you.

A classic example of this can be seen in Euclid's famous fifth postulate which states that: If a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles are less than two right angles.

Anyone who looks at this diagram may extend the lines in their imagination and make them intersect. But what if the lines x and y were not on the same plane, what if line x was six inches below line y? Then the lines would not intersect even if they were extended indefinitely. Euclid did not "imagine" such a case. His imagining was restricted to a single surface of two dimensions; the third dimension of depth was not included. Euclid could have avoided the flaw in his postulate if he had explicitly limited his meaning by stating that the lines must be on the same plane.

A similar issue arises in the definition of a circle. If one defines a circle as a series of points equidistant from a center-point, then one can imagine a globe of the earth with all the various continents mapped on the surface of this sphere, apply the definition to the outline of Africa, and find that the set of points that trace the outline of Africa will be a circle if one takes the center inside the globe as the centerpoint. The definition of the circle should have included the limiting condition that the points must be co-planer. The point to both examples is to draw attention to the interplay of understanding and imagining in the way we conceive or formulate explicitly what we understand or mean.

The geometrician understands what makes a circle what it is, or, "why" a circle is what it is. He grasps what conditions are
necessary to have a circle. It is understanding that is capable of grasping just what those conditions necessarily are; but in doing so it brings about the difference between the object as grasped by imagination and the object as conceived by understanding in so far as it is understanding.

Recall that the purpose of this section is to specify understanding precisely as understanding. The issue is that understanding can generate the conditions for its own identity because it generates the conditions for its own act. This happens anytime intelligence corrects itself, but it can be noticed especially when it realizes what is at stake in articulating such subtle differences as those mentioned above between two and three dimensional images, and becomes sensitive to the way imagination can "trick" our understanding into misleading meanings.

A more simple and familiar example of understanding generating itself is the student's ability to reformulate what the teacher or the author means in his own images and phrases. Conversely, the key to the teacher's success in communicating her meaning depends on the number of imaginative contexts she can articulate, any one of which might be a "sufficient" condition for grasping the point but no one of which is by itself "necessary" to the meaning intended. The various images and phrases that carry the teacher's meanings are not intrinsic or constitutive for her meaning. The teacher can keep presenting one and the same meaning in a variety of ways. As with the relation between the dot and the point, the dot may be a sufficient condition for understanding the meaning of 'point'; but it is no more necessary than the image of a cart-wheel is for grasping the meaning of 'circle'. What happens is that first the image triggers the apprehensive grasp of the necessity and impossibility in the image; and then once intelligence has apprehended that meaning within the image, it pivots on its own act and expresses or conceives what it has grasped. The first step is referred to technically as "apprehensive abstraction," while the second is termed "formative abstraction". It is in "formative abstraction" or in the process of conceiving and defining that understanding appropriates its own identity as actually apprehending this or that intelligibility by expressing itself. In the geometrical cases of the circle and the intersecting lines, the products of formative abstraction were analyzed. We observed that Euclid's meanings as defined were ambiguous to the extent that he failed to clearly distinguish the imaginative and intelligible conditions for his understanding. Such definitions are not examples
of apprehensive abstraction or of understanding as understanding; instead they combine in one and the same definition, elements from intelligent and imaginative experience. Consequently, such definitions do not clearly illustrate what is necessary or intrinsic to understanding since, as we have just observed, the choice of image is only extrinsically necessary for understanding. Imagination provides conditions or occasions for understanding to operate, but once the intelligence goes into act, it can demonstrate its intrinsic independence of these conditions by conceiving meanings that explicitly exclude imaginative conditions; it thereby clearly shows that sensible and imaginative experiences are not intrinsic to the activity of understanding as understanding.

Let us take the example of a series of numbers as imagined and a series of points as imagined. As imagined these two series form two different groups and fall into two different "imaginative" areas of mathematics. The mathematician, however, can give these "different" images the same meaning. The series of numbers can represent a series of positions and the numbers can be used to define a line or other geometrical figures. Using numbers for points instead of dots has the advantage of making it harder for imagination to lead us to equate points with dots. Such abstractive procedures and their subsequent definitions allow the mathematician to control more carefully the conditions under which his understanding is operating. It allows understanding not only to move itself but also to determine its own normative procedures; more significantly, it gives us an example of how imagination may play a very minor and extrinsic role once intelligence has established its own orientation. Such an example illustrates the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic conditions by demonstrating how our understanding can take over and transpose the conditions of imagination in an even more striking way than occurs when imagination subsumes sensible operations.

As we have noted already, one can imagine sights no longer present. Thus a man who suddenly goes blind could continue to exercise his power to imagine sights. Similarly, a man who suddenly lost all sensible and imaginative experiences could continue to reason and judge, inasmuch as sensible and imaginative data are not intrinsically necessary for understanding to act. Understanding can act on its own. And so, an understander would not necessarily lose his self-identity if he suddenly lost his powers to sense and imagine. Understanding generates its own activity in a way that
is intrinsically independent of sensible and imaginable "givens". Extrinsic dependence is not necessary dependence; it is strictly contingent. As a matter of fact, understanding as we "perform" it does operate with extrinsic or contingent dependence on sensible and imaginable experiences. But it could be otherwise; and any knower who has "appropriated" those abstractive procedures of the intellect that bring imaginative conditions under intellectual control has "appropriated" the grounds of his or her own immortality as a real possibility. We know its reality in the same way we know all reality, by judging that it is so. In the affirmation of self as a knower, we affirm ourselves as experiencers, understanders and judgers. We are now proposing that the self as experiencer stands in the way of a further distinction between experience as necessary and intrinsically constitutive of knowing, being and objectivity, and experience as sheerly contingent and extrinsic to oneself as an intrinsically objective knower of being. On the basis of this distinction, we make a new distinction with regard to both knowing and being.

VI.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Knowing of Being

Previously we had defined the subject as a self-affirming object at the same time as defined what is meant by 'object' in terms of the meaning of being and knowing. But when we defined knowing, no distinction was made between intrinsic and extrinsic ways of knowing being; and so, no distinction was made between intrinsic and extrinsic knowing of the being of objects and subjects. In light of our discussion we can now introduce this basic distinction.

It should be noted that both intrinsic and extrinsic knowing are modes of knowing being. Being defined as the objective of the unrestricted desire to know includes both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of knowing. Being is all-encompassing.

In the first ten chapters of Insight, Lonergan analyzes two basic patterns of knowing—commonsense or descriptive knowing and scientific or explanatory knowing. In the context of the present paper the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic forms of knowing can be taken as equivalent to these two patterns of knowing. In the commonsense pattern we know being extrinsically and descriptively while in scientific knowing the objective is an intrinsic, explanatory knowing of being.
If I were going to analyze these differences in any detail, a number of important distinctions would have to be made; but we can omit them and focus on the tendency of scientific knowing to develop terms that are implicitly defined as subject, object, and the relation between subject and object were defined. We noted that such definitions relate these terms to one another by means of abstractive procedures that demonstrate intelligence's ability not only to "free" itself from the imaginative conditions under which it begins to operate, but to formulate its own imaginative conditions, bringing imagination under intellectual control. The proper intelligibility of the imaginative dot is "caused" by or intrinsically constituted by the intelligent grasp of the meaning of a point. The mind can constitute and intrinsically form imaginative experiences related only extrinsically to its operation. The student who has an intrinsic grasp of the teacher's meaning can generate his own images and phrases to express that meaning. The student's mind structures the implied meanings that articulate the series of sentences within which he expresses his version of the teacher's meanings. The significance of these examples is to underscore the way that the mind reverses the relation between imagining and understanding as it moves from apprehensive to formative abstraction. Initially, the student is dependent on the phrases and images he receives from the teacher to reach an understanding of the relevant data; but if he grasps the meaning of those phrases and images, he can independently conceive these and use quite different modes of expression to carry the same meaning. In doing so he has reversed the relation of dependence; now the images are under his control; his understanding is no longer limited to the sensible and imaginative conditions under which the meaning was originally apprehended. To phrase this reversal of relations in terms of Aristotle's form and matter, we can say that in intrinsic knowing the mind forms the matter of expression; the "extrinsic appearance" of the "matter" in words and images does not constitute the meaning.

Scientific knowledge also illustrates the same reversal of form--matter relations. Let us take Mendeleev's specification of certain not yet discovered elements. Mendeleev defined the elements of the chemical universe through his network of relations just as the principal meaning of objectivity is determined through the implicit definition of the terms subject and object, just as being is defined through the relational structure of knowing. All of the known chemical elements were specified in their relations
to one another just as experience, understanding and judging are specified in terms of their relations to one another. At Mendeleev's time there were certain elements that had not been discovered, and he so he left several blanks in his Periodic Table of Elements; and was able to state what the properties of these missing elements would be. Even more significantly, he was able to state what we may call their intrinsic and extrinsic properties. By intrinsic properties I mean those constituted by the relations of the known elements to the unknown elements; and by extrinsic properties I mean those constituted by the way they appear to a person's senses. Intrinsic properties would be such qualities as atomic weight or specific gravity. Extrinsic properties would refer to such qualities as visual, tactile, olefactory, etc. The point of the example is to indicate that the extrinsic properties were caused by the intrinsic relations of the elements to the other elements. Because Mendeleev knew the intrinsic properties of these unknown elements, even though he had never seen or felt them, he knew a priori how these elements would appear to someone's senses. The intrinsic form of the elements grounds their extrinsic, sensible appearances. We can now shift to the extrinsic or commonsense way of knowing these elements.

Lonergan specifies common sense as a method of knowing the particular and the concrete as particular and concrete. I have referred to this method of knowing as extrinsic knowing. The person of common sense can know the same chemical elements known by Mendeleev, but her knowing does not involve such complex, abstractive devices as implicit definitions; she avoids all abstractions because what she wants to know is the concrete and particular, not the abstract and the universal. There are two points to be stressed in considering the commonsense method of knowing. First, because the person of common sense can experience, understand, and judge correctly, what he or she knows is being, but he or she knows it descriptively or extrinsically. Second, if one wants to know being as it exists concretely and particularly, then, he has to follow the method of common sense. Contrary to Galileo and the legion of his followers, commonsense people do not know only the "secondary appearances" of things; they know something real. They do not know universal and explanatory patterns but their method of knowing requires just as much intelligence to acquire and operate as the scientists exhibit in their method of knowing. The critical problem is to understand and interrelate the two methods through a single integrating structure. This is the task of the metaphysician.
The purpose of this paper has been to suggest that the major problem for the metaphysician is to understand the meaning of knowing, being, and objectivity in such a way as to grasp relations between knowing and commonsense knowing on the one hand and between knowing and scientific knowing on the other; and to understand the critical differences and relations between intrinsic and extrinsic knowing. This latter distinction provides the critical basis for reversing the relations between the world as known in relation to our senses through common sense and the world as known by science in its various intrinsic forms.

The metaphysician can go on from such a critical re-orientation of the world of common sense and science to relate this limited universe to its ultimate ground in the unrestricted universe of being. The key to this transition is again the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic necessity. Because self-causing is intrinsic to the very possibility of being a knower, it is true that you cannot have a knower who is not a self-causing understander. Yet there is no intrinsic reason why the knower that you and I cause to exist has to exist or should continue to exist. That we are knowers is only a fact; that there is a universe of objects that are not self-causing subjects is also only a fact. Such "facts" will continue to exist if the conditions necessary for their existence continue to be given. The only self-affirming, self-causing subject that must exist is an unrestricted self-causer to whom nothing is given but who creates all the conditions for his own existence. Such an unrestricted, self-causing being cannot be necessitated to perform any act. Therefore, every conceivable, limited, self-causing subject will be extrinsic to such an unrestricted act. The world is filled with the glory of God but that glory is clearly extrinsic to His own perfection. There is nothing you and I can do that will in any way add to a glory and perfection that is unrestricted.
AN IMPROBABLE CHRISTIAN VISION AND THE ECONOMIC RHYTHMS OF THE SECOND MILLION YEARS

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Introduction:

The term, alienation, is used in many different senses. But on the present analysis the basic form of alienation is man's disregard of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Again, the basic form of ideology is a doctrine that justifies such alienation. From these basic forms, all others can be derived. For the basic forms corrupt the social good. As self-transcendence promotes progress, so the refusal of self-transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline.

Finally, we may note that a religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress. (Lonergan, 1972: 55)

These two paragraphs conclude the chapter on the human good in Lonergan's Method in Theology. The present essay, in its five parts, is located in the Beethoven pause between these paragraphs. One must, however, consider those early chapters of Method in Theology as they recur /1/, sublated, within the general categories. The five sections of this essay are:

1. The vision: Praxisweltanschauung;
2. Its improbability and the unity of proportionate being;
3. A component of the vision: economic Praxis;
4. Economic heresies and accumulating alienation;
5. The deeper challenge of the improbable vision.

The paper serves a variety of needs. In the first place, it is part of a personal foundational search. As such it is continuous with previous efforts (1975, 1977a) and an advance on them: the continuity permits the summary expression of present progress in sections one and two.

A search for foundations involves the subject at least informally in dialectic: sections two and three are only a shadow of the large strategy of assembly, completion, comparison, etc. of the functional specialty dialectic (Lonergan, 1972: 250).
The more immediate need that the paper fills is the provision of a context for the four afternoon workshops on Fr. Lonergan's 130 page (unpublished) *Circulation Analysis*. But the paper is also written with the hope of wider dialogue and collaboration. There is a need to bring together two communities, or more profoundly to bring together in single heads two fields of inquiry that limp when alone /2/. I wish, then, to reach those economists who may sense that accepted economics is as mature as Brahe's astronomy. I wish to open up modernity to young theologians who are willing to labor towards a twenty-first century vision which founds a theology beyond present fantasy.

Section 1: The Vision: *Praxisweltanschauung.*

The vision, *Praxisweltanschauung*, is a controlling construction of the constructions and aspirations of the human spirit /3/. It is an ongoing context /4/ which is a psychological present /5/, reaching and reaching for a harmonious /6/ genesis of subject and world. It is all-inclusive and self-inclusive. It is "an overall view of the stages and variations of human meanings, values, structures" (Lonergan, 1974a: 206) laced together by "a phylogenetic set of schemata" which concretely conjugates sets and sequences of differentiations of consciousness (1972: 273-276; 303-305) within the general form of emergent probability /7/.

In being all-inclusive it is self-inclusive, but in a manner proper only to the third stage of meaning (1972: 93-99) /8/. This proper meaning may be indicated by relating the vision to recognizable theology and to traditional philosophy.

Recognizable theology may insist that it is a reflection on the significance and role of religion in a cultural matrix: but the vision locates that theological reflection as deeply culture-bound and of another age /9/, whatever its praise of modern science or its appropriation of the strategies of nineteenth century history. And it is only by an effort of third-stage self-inclusion, a shift from praise to practice and from appropriation to self-appropriation, that such theological reflection can recognize itself as a product of limited culture.

Traditional philosophy is a span of effort from Parmenides to Hegel and beyond /10/. It is not open-eyedly methodological, historical, empirical, and passionate in its terms and relations. Regularly it arrives at general terms and relations: the Aristotelians have theirs, and even Heidegger cannot regress to the compact consciousness of the early Greeks. But as Butterfield did with
the Renaissance and Reformation /11/, the vision would recognize that tradition as episodic between the first and the third stages of meaning /12/. When terms and relations have meaning in that vision, "their meaning is to be known not by a definition but by a history of questions asked and answers given" (Lonergan, 1974a: 200) /13/: The self-inclusion shows itself in the presence within that history: that construct of present questions, questioners, answers and aspirations.

Normatively /14/, the visionary is any academic of the second million years. The vision involves specializations (McShane: 1977a: 6-45): otherwise the "overall view tends to be either a tentative summary . . . or a popular simplification of issues that are really not simple at all" (Lonergan, 1974b: 60). The vision, a psychological present inclusive of the general categories /15/ includes also the praxi-heuristics of functional specialization. And the functional specialist needs that vision, since "the use of the general categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties" (1972: 292).

The notion of survival /16/ which the thinker-doer is, may thus self-digest into these operative categories of the fuller genesis of the third stage of meaning. An image of this genesis and of this self-digestion is the vortex /17/.

The vision is Christian in origin (Lonergan, 1974b) and in content: at its center is the visionary's ever-growing practical heuristic word of the Word /18/. But there is the content, identifiable as general categories, generated by listening to the Cosmic Word, which makes the vision universalist. And it is this universalist heuristic word of our communal structured quest, within the passionate finality of being, that is now most necessary if we are to restructure theology and life beyond recognition.

There emerges, then, the existential question about one's degree of sympathy (McShane, 1977a: 105-108) with the project and one's commitment to cultivating the achievement in later generations, and in oneself in later years, so that one might eventually borrow Bachelard's words: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house" (61).

And there remains Mystery /19/.

Section 2: The Improbability of the Vision and the Unity of Proportionate Being.

One needs a diagram if one is to think, to construct praxi-heuristically, the unity, the unification, of proportionate
being /20/. "In quaestione longiori atque difficiliori phantasma conveniens haberi non potest nisi per diagramma quoddam adiuvatur ipsa imaginatio; et ideo qui omnia per modum unius apprehendere velit, diagramma quoddam faciat in quo et elementa quaestionis omnia omnesque inter elementa nexus symbolice represententur" (Lonergan, 1961: 80). And the question of the unity of proportionate being is surely long and difficult. In the psychological present of the foundational visionary that question has the form of generalized emergent probability (1957: 115-128; 259-262) which, with diagrammatic underpinning, makes possible and probable the strategic fragmentation of questions and quest. So, for instance, one wishes to think correlatively of the dinosaurs of the biosphere that disappeared 65,000,000 years ago, and of the multinational corporations of the noosphere that appeared at the beginning of the first million years A.D. An imaginative synthesis may generate enthusiasm but it does not carry the thinking subject to a construct of praxis. One is correlating sets of entities \( g(x, p, c, b, z) /21/ \) with global distributions within schemes of emergence and survival over a period of years, with sets of structures, whose focal reality are \( n \) men: \( f(p, c, b, z, u, r) \), with similar distributions. The former distributions of schemes are a history of emergence, survival and breakdown which is still only partly understood; the latter distributions are a contemporary making of man and a communal responsibility /22/.

The diagrammatic underpinning must be such as to pressure one towards explanatory praxi-thinking /23/. Such thinking is a normative concern for the actual in its emergence within the vision of emergent probability. I recall key elements in that vision: the notions of actual, probable and possible seriations. One should recall too that the heuristic form of emergent probability is filled out by science in its broadest meaning. Illustrations related to our particular topic, economics, may help. "The actual seriation is unique" (Lonergan, 1957: 119). Parts of that actual seriation are the "economic rhythms of production and exchange" (118) ranging from the daily rhythms of muscle and machine to the rhythms of booms and slumps associated with the dates ... 1831, 1837, 1847, 1854, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1883, 1890, 1900, ... /24/. Parts also of that actual seriation are the sets of schemes within the academy and the economy that made probable the recurrent thought patterns--to be touched on later--of Marx and Mitchell, Keynes and Hansen.
"The probable seriation has to exhibit the ramifications of probable alternatives" (119). The visionary, seeking to think towards the unification of proportionate being, thinks explanatorily of "all that would occur without systematic divergence from the probabilities" (25). Nor is what might have occurred without consequence to the thinker: reviewing the past in this sense is not nostalgia but relates to the implementation of dialectic associated with selecting and developing positions and leading "to an idealized version of the past" (Lonergan, 1972: 251). But one is not here seeking an ideal associated with the possible seriation: one is seeking from the Cosmic Word the education associated with such questions as, "What precisely went wrong?" "What might have happened if Hansen had stayed with Mitchell's thinking and sensed the burden of statics in Keynes?" "Would Samuelson, who followed Hansen, have not produced two million handfuls /26/ seeding other schemes of thought and policy?". More explanatorily, one asks for "the flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence" (Lonergan, 1957: 466) that contribute to the making or maiming of man. One seeks out the defensive cycles (118) and the manner in which probabilities shift from product to sum (121; McShane, 1970: 230-231). One searches out, thus, thinking within the statistics and schemes of probable seriation, how it was that "from physics to Semitic literature, from Semitic literature to biology, from biology to economics, or from economics to depth psychology, the defenders were left in the unenviable position of always arriving on the scene a little breathlessly and a little late" (733). Such thinking leads to enlarged foundations.

Finally, there is the possible seriation, "still more remote from actuality. It includes all the schemes of recurrence that could be devised from the classical laws of our universe. It orders them in a conditioned series that ramifies not only along the lines of probable alternatives but also along lines of mere possibility or negligible probability" (119). That contemplation is essential to enriched foundations for man's future. It is not a fourteenth century preoccupation with the principle of contradiction. It is, rather, an extrapolation from the forms of our universe, leaping probabilities to envisage elements either of cosmopolis or, on the other hand, of further alienating shifts in "the murderous grotesque of our time" (Voegelin, 1974b: 251). Such praxi-thinking of the possible seriation is not only relevant but reverent: it can both touch on the Impossible Dream and mediate a more generous conception and implementation of the probable and actual seriations of the second million years.
It is within this Praxisweltanschauung of the unification of proportionate being that one can conceive most adequately of the improbability of the vision. The vision within the third stage of meaning may be novel, but the species has recurred throughout history with low probabilities of survival. Praxis would seek out the ranges of schemes of recurrence associated with such low probabilities. It would envisage the relevant shifting of schemes, the conditions for jumps in probability, the strategies that would realize those shifts and those conditions. It would do so with a clear-headed admission of present statistics of growth and adult-growth, and of the present radical deficiencies of the academy. It would do so also with hope in the new dynamism of the Metaxy offered by the crisis and emergence of the third stage of meaning.

Yet it is not "It" but you and I that possibly, probably, actually, will hope and admit, not in any extrinsicist sense, but, in the tension of limitation and transcendence (Lonergan, 1957: 472-477), hope into consciousness and admit into consciousness.


By economic praxis I mean that component of the vision which seeks to mediate the transformation of "the totality of activities bridging the gap between the potentialities of nature, whether physical, chemical, vegetable, animal, or human nature, and, on the other hand, the actuality of a standard of living" (Lonergan, 1944: 2). That seeking is attentive to the actual and probable seriations of schemes of recurrence in all their complexity: here there is an epiphany of the Cosmic Word's refusal to be intuited. Indeed, the schemes of recurrence relevant for economic praxis were long in emerging. As Toynbee notes, part of the new species of society created by the Sumerians involved an economic surplus and surplus production (Toynbee: 53-54). The Romans had their economy and the medievals theirs. But regular rhythmic crises became a fact of economic life only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and it was only in the twentieth century that a clear conviction regarding the central significance of economic rhythms emerged and that a fulsome analytic effort was made:

"... another indictment stands against the vast majority of the economists of that period (1870 on) if it be indeed proper, considering the analytic situation in which they worked, to call it an indictment: with few exceptions, of which Marx was the most influential one, they treated cycles as a phenomenon that is superimposed upon the normal course of capitalist life and mostly as

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a pathological one; it never occurred to the majority to look to business cycles for material with which to build the fundamental theory of capitalist reality" (Schumpeter, 1954: 1145). Such was Schumpeter's conviction, and his two volume work on Business Cycles represents his own effort towards an integral view. The basic analytic achievement is Lonergan's Circulation Analysis /32/. But first, let us note some earlier efforts.

Schumpeter mentions Marx as exceptional. With Schumpeter I distinguish here Marx the economist from Marx the philosopher, the prophet, or whatever (1942: Part one; 1951) /33/. One can draw out from Capital the set of elements "from which follows all the events that we connect with the trade cycle. Neither the labour theory of value nor the ponderous mechanism of the theory of surplus value is necessary to deduce this result" (Smith: 202). Indeed, the real trouble, as Schumpeter pointed out, is that the labor theory of value as a tool of analysis worked very badly and leaves it exceedingly difficult to piece together a coherent view, more than Marx indeed had, of cycles. Nonetheless, he stands out from previous economists of prosperities and crises:

... it must not be forgotten that the mere perception of the existence of cyclical movements was a great achievement at the time. Many economists who went before him had an inkling of it. In the main, however, they focused their attention on the spectacular breakdowns that came to be referred to as 'crises'. And those crises they failed to see in their true light, that is to say, in the light of the cyclical process of which they are mere incidents. They considered them, without looking beyond or below, as isolated misfortunes that will happen in consequence of errors, excesses, misconduct, or of the faulty working of the credit mechanism. Marx was, I believe, the first economist to rise above that tradition and to anticipate--barring the statistical complement--the work of Clément Juglar (Schumpeter, 1951: 50-51).

But Marx stands out also as representing what I might call the mood of praxis:

Reaching the goal would have been ineffectual, analyzing a social process would have interested only a few hundred specialists. But preaching in the garb of analysis and analyzing with a view to heartfelt needs, this is what conquered passionate allegiance and gave to the Marxist that supreme boon which consists in the conviction that what one is and stands for can never be defeated but must conquer victoriously in the end (7).

It was Clément Juglar, however, who brought into focus by his "great book of facts" (Mitchell: 11) the need for a theory of business cycles rather than a theory of crises. He gave his attention mainly to that cycle of roughly ten years' duration with which his name is associated, distinguishing phases in it: 'upgrade',
'explosion', 'liquidation' /34/. He amassed an extraordinary amount of time-series material (prices, interest rates, central bank balances) relating to business oscillations in England, France and the United States from 1696 to his own day. He concluded that one can get behind the various accidents of war, etc., to establish that depressions were adaptations of the economic system to situations created by preceding prosperities. Therefore, the basic problem of cycles' analysis centered on the question of the causes of prosperity. To this question he failed to provide a satisfactory answer.

Let us return to Schumpeter's contribution, a contribution which bears comparison with that of Lonergan. Indeed, Lonergan has already made that comparison, and it is worth quoting at this stage even though its comprehension requires familiarity with Lonergan's analysis and terminology:

Schumpeter and Lonergan:

My real and my circulation phases involve no distinction between growth (mere increase in size) and development (new productive combinations). For Schumpeter these two are specifically distinct—the new production functions create new situations that increase enormously the average of error and bring about the cycles(s).

However, the ideas of capital, credit, interest, etc., that Schumpeter advances appear more clearly and more generally and in more detailed a fashion. The relevance of Schumpeter's insistence on development as opposed to growth is in the concatenation of the phases, e.g. Schumpeter's development can take place in my static phase if DS >0 and if the new combinations are continuously offset by equal liquidations of former enterprises (1942).

Schumpeter focuses his attention on innovation, on new ideas, new men, new techniques. The quotation from Lonergan mentions error as significant in Schumpeter's analysis, and this significance helps to bring out the normative nature of Lonergan's own analysis.

Most people will link up recessions with errors of judgment, excesses (overdoing), and misconduct. This is no explanation at all; for it is not error, etc., as such but only a cluster of errors which could possibly account for widespread depressive effects. Any 'theory' that rests content with this must assume that people err periodically in the way most convenient to the economist. Our model, by showing the emergence of situations in which it is understandable that mistakes of all sorts should be more frequent than usual (i.e., when untried things are being put into practice and adaptation to a state of things becomes necessary, the contours of which have not yet appeared) does away with this and shows the place of the element of error in the various phases of the process, without having to introduce it as an independent, still less as a necessary, element. (Schumpeter, 1931. Vol. 1: 140)
In a footnote, Schumpeter adds "It is believed that our arrangement assigns its proper place, not only to errors of various types, but also to other kinds of aberration of economic action, and makes them analytically workable. The actual quantitative importance of the element of error is, however, a different question. The writer has not been able to answer it to his own satisfaction".

Lonergan centers his attention on the rhythms of the productive process and derives a theory of cycles which does not call for the inclusion of error. Lonergan does in fact treat of error in relation to human inadaptation to the rhythms of economic process.

The comments in the second paragraph of the quotation from Lonergan need the exposition of Lonergan's coherent analysis. Schumpeter's discussion of the "New Economic Space" (134) /35/ created by innovation is a meshing of all that happens in terms of costs, wages, interest, prices, credit. Lonergan's analysis involves a clear separation of elements regularly confused or brought together by economic accountancy. What Lonergan says of interest rates may perhaps be taken as characteristic of his entire analysis: "Traditional theory looked to shifting interest rates to provide the automatic adjustment between the productive process and the rate of saving . . . The difficulty with this theory is that it lumps together a number of quite different things and overlooks the order of magnitude of the fundamental problem" (1944: 86).

Lonergan's analysis reveals the productive process as inherently cyclic in a manner

... not to be confused with the familiar trade cycle. The latter is a succession of booms and slumps, of positive and then negative accelerations of the process. But the cycle with which we are here concerned is a pure cycle. It includes no slump, no negative acceleration. It is entirely a forward movement which, however, involves a cycle inasmuch as in successive periods of time the surplus stage of the process is accelerating more rapidly and, again later, less rapidly than the basic stage. When suitable classes and rates of payment have been defined, it will be possible to show that under certain conditions of human inadaptation this pure cycle results in a trade cycle. However, that implication is not absolute but conditioned, not something inevitable in any case but only something that follows when human adaptation is lacking (19).

An analogy drawn from an earlier typescript throws light on Lonergan's strategy: "A study of the mechanics of motor-cars yields premises for a criticism of drivers, precisely because the motor-cars, as distinct from the drivers, have laws of their own which drivers must respect. But if the mechanics of motors included, in a single piece, the anthropology of drivers, criticism could be no more than haphazard" (n.d.: Section 1, "Viewpoint").
Lonergan moves neither in the manner of the descriptive economist who proceeds to a nuanced general view through descriptive language, nor in the manner of the statistical economist whose terminology is dominated by the proximate possibility of measurement. His analytic approach differs from both these:

Out of endless classificatory possibilities it selects not the one sanctioned by ordinary speech nor again the one sanctioned by facility of measurement but the one that most rapidly yields terms which can be defined by the functional inter-relations in which they stand. To discover such terms is a lengthy and painful process of trial and error. *Experto ordeis*. To justify them, one cannot reproduce the tedious blind efforts that led to them; one can appeal only to the success, be it great or small, with which they serve to account systematically for the phenomena under investigation. Hence it is only fair to issue at once a warning that the reader will have to work through pages in which parts gradually are assembled, before he will be able to see a whole and pass an equitable judgement upon it (Section 2, "Method").

In the afternoon workshops I will attempt to give some insight into that analysis.

Before concluding this section I would note that study of business cycles has continued, but with little of the analytic perspective of Schumpeter or Lonergan. Indeed, the study is regularly influenced by the viewpoint to be described in the next section. So, for example, Arthur Burns, commenting on Hicks' book, *A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle*, remarks: "It is a sophisticated book, not to be confused with vulgar Keynesianism. It shares, however, the aggregative, mechanical, 'real' slant of much of the recent literature on economic theory" (1954c: 267). Burns himself represents a tradition of interest in business cycles which derives from the influence of Wesley Clair Mitchell (1874-1948). Mitchell, as Schumpeter puts it, wanted to explore rather than to turn round and round on a small piece of land. So he moved with complete commitment to the concrete reality of economic process from his thesis on the Greenback episode to a life-long study of the business cycle "which made Mitchell the foremost world authority on the subject" (Burns, 1954a: 97). While he was averse to theory, he gave the National Bureau of Statistics an orientation towards empirical research of business cycles during the twenty-five years (1920-45) of his chairmanship, an orientation which survived under Arthur Burns. The orientation grounds a healthy respect for economic reality and a source of criticism of the ongoing theorizing and practice of the new economics which emerged in the thirties. The present situation is well summed up by Burns: "The only things we can be reasonably certain of in the proximate future
are, first, that our economic system will continue to generate cyclical tendencies, and second, that the government will at some stage intervene to check their course" (1954: 175). One is led to recall a remark of Lonergan's regarding cyclical tendencies, in particular the pure cycle: "one may say that it is solidly grounded in a dynamic structure of the productive process; and one has only to think of the practical impossibility of calculating the acceleration ratios . . . to smile at the suggestion that one should try to 'smooth out the pure cycle'" (1944: 73).

Section 4: Economic Heresies and Accumulating Alienation.

"The business cycle was par excellence the problem of the nineteenth century. But the main problem of our times, and particularly in the United States, is the problem of full employment," (Hansen: 4).

This remark was made by Alvin Hansen, "The American Keynes" in the presidential address to the American Economic Association at their annual meeting, December 1938. As in the previous section I picked out a handful of heroes, so here I name some of the villains who made probable and actual the schemes of recurrence within which emerged the textbook tradition associated with the name of Paul Samuelson and the concomitant inert and alienating schemes of recurrence of contemporary economic thought and practice. I will, however, be brief in this section, for several reasons. In the first place, Joan Robinson has provided a substantial amount of critical comment on the last hundred years of economics and it could not be briefly reproduced (Robinson, 1973; Robinson and Eatwell). In the second place, the tradition in question here is the current climate of opinion. Any undergraduate economist will recognize the names and the theses that I briefly mention. Those who have not had such undergraduate studies would find even lengthier description obscure. But all may recognize in the reports and policies of governments and banks, in the criticisms and suggestions of journals and editorials, the prevalence of that inert climate.

I will begin by noting three points of criticism of the present tradition. In the first place, the tradition includes no serious effort at analysis of the productive process. Secondly, even when it takes on the trappings of a theory of growth, it remains economic macrostatics. Thirdly, inbuilt into it and into its political application, there is a fundamental ideology of alienation.

Joan Robinson regularly returns to the absence of serious analysis in her writings. She characterizes the neoclassical
theory of production as follows:

There is a mysterious substance, let us call it *leets*, measured in tons, which is used in conjunction with labour to produce output. There is a well-behaved production function in leets and labour for every kind of output, including leets. There is no distinction between the past and the future. An investment of leets, once made, can be squeezed up or spread out into a new form, instantaneously and without cost, if it becomes profitable to do so.

What is still more remarkable, leets can absorb technical progress without changing its identity, again instantaneously and without cost, so that new inventions raise the output from a ton of leets, without any investment being required.

All this has been very candidly spelt out by Professor Meade. (In the first edition of *A Neoclassical Theory of Economic Growth* he refers to what I have called leets as 'steel'). It is the essence of Professor Ferguson's concept of 'capital". (1970)

The difficulty of conceiving adequately of capital and of production is not superficial. It is a difficulty of heuristic conception. "The intending that is conception puts together both the content of the insight and as much of the image as is essential to the occurrence of the insight; the result is the intending of any concrete being selected by an incompletely determinate (and, in that sense, abstract) content" (Lonergan, 1972: 11; 1957: 30; 1967b: Index, s.v. Abstraction). As opposed to the impoverished abstraction (Lonergan, 1957: 87-89) "leets" there is an enriching abstraction which holds together /38/, within a general heuristics of process, the aggregate of rates at which goods and services move, directly or indirectly, into a standard of living, without excluding wheat and cotton, bread and dresses, ships and machine tools, management and innovation.

Wedded to the difficulty of conceiving capital, as Robinson notes in the quotation above, is the difficulty of conceiving change /39/. Nor can this be surprising if the accusation of macrostatic thinking is valid.

An early villain was Leon Walras (1834-1910), a hero of Samuelson but also paradoxically a hero of Schumpeter's history /40/. Schumpeter's admiration was based on his recognition of the masterly analysis of economic equilibrium which Walras achieved, by methods cousin to nineteenth century statics, but Schumpeter did not consider this the peak or ideal of economic achievement. "Now, an observer fresh from Mars might excusably think what the human mind, inspired by experience, would start analysis with the relatively concrete and then, as more subtle relations reveal themselves, proceed to the relatively abstract, that is to say, to start from dynamic relations and then proceed to working out static ones.
But this has not been so in any field of scientific endeavor whatsoever" (1954: 964). Later, he speaks of Marshall, despite his extra-static considerations, failing to cross the Rubicon. He notes pointers by Pantaleoni, Pareto, Samuelson: but "they left the main body of economic theory on the 'static' bank of the river" (1160); "no attack on the whole front of Walrasian theory has yet developed" (1161).

Just as one can solve the equilibrium problem of a set of rods and other elements, through the principle of virtual work, so one may solve the equilibrium problem of prices, of demand and supply, through the application of marginal analysis. However, while a set of rods can settle in equilibrium with one rod at a 10° angle to the vertical, it is disconcerting to find the set of economic elements in equilibrium, with the factor employment at 10% off full employment. Keynes arrives on the scene to set that right and

... the old theology closed in again. Keynes himself began the reconstruction of the orthodox scheme that he had shattered. 'But if our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory comes into its own again from this point onwards ... It is in determining the volume, not the direction of actual employment that the existing system has broken down' (Robinson 1973: xv).

As Schumpeter notes, "the exact skeleton of Keynes' system belongs, to use the terms proposed by Ragnar Frisch, to macrostatics, not macrodynamics" (1951: 282). But Keynes' reconstruction bears little resemblance to the theory and practice associated with Sir John Hicks' IS and LM curves, which found its way particularly into the American tradition.

Hansen, whom we quoted at the beginning of this section, is the central figure of that tradition. He began his career closer to the interests of Wesley Mitchell, but became the leading figure in the evolution of American Keynesianism. I do not need to document that tradition here (Breit and Ransom: 89). After Hansen, comes Samuelson. Abba P. Lerner, whose functional finance specifies strategies of government operation, provides another strand. Then there is Milton Friedman of whom Robinson remarks: "There is an unearthly, mystical element in Friedman's thought. The mere existence of a stock of money somehow promotes expenditure" (1973: 87).

Hansen's characterization of the shift of interest in the twentieth century takes on a different hue from the perspective of Praxisweltanschauung and of the third stage of meaning. Then one sees it as an abandonment of the search both for a dynamic economic
theory and for democracy. An image I find suggestive of modern economic theory and government practice is that of a hydrostatic control of a whirlpool /43/. A certain aggregate of elements in the whirlpool "ought" to have a property called employment. Employment is a matter of adjusting valves. It is very remote from the notion of employment as pivoting on communal and individual attention, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility; on the praxis or microautonomy, on coherent economic theory, and on a profoundly different notion of control /44/. So we come to the third point of criticism: the embedded ideology of alienation.

One must be careful how one conceives of alienation. There is no question, within the vision, of talking in popular terms of Alienated Man. I recall here my comments and suggestions of sections one and two. One thinks, then, of alienation in terms of the history of aggregates of persons $H\Sigma f(p_i, c_j, b_k, z_l, u_m, r_n)$, pivoting in one's searching of past and future on some imaginative device. The alienation of the modern politico-economic structure reaches like leukemia into every vein of modernity. You can hear its molecular echoes in radio-news vocal muscles; you can see it in the stagnation of the five o'clock subway people's attention, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility; you can sense it in the corridors of academe: but only if you are laboring towards the vision. "What I want to communicate in this talk on art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is an exploration of the potentialities of concrete living, that it is extremely important in our age when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on economics, politics and education, have been trying to remake man and have done not a little to make human life unlivable" (Lonergan: 1959). But how many of us smell, taste, feel, the unlivability? And even if we do, ever so slightly, how many of us build the discomfort into our academic vortex which is--if we are a third stage meaning--a praxis vortex, a personal vortex of generalized empirical method. And I recall that the present paper is bracketed between a paragraph on alienation and a paragraph on redemptive progress (1972: 55, last two paragraphs).

Section 5: The Deeper Challenge of the Improbable Vision.

"I have urged that so great a transformation needs a renewed foundation, and that the needed renewal is the introduction of a new type of foundation. It is to consist not in objective statement, but in subjective reality" (1974b: 67).
The transformation, then, is of subjects, and I would recall that "this transformation of sensitivity penetrates to the physiological level" (1957: 741-742). I find indeed that there are too many things, everything, to recall, to "remember" /45/ in a novel fashion in this new context, and in order to keep this final section brief I will restrict myself to some few related points.

The transformation in question is the genesis of foundations persons who would mediate the presence of users of the general categories in all functional specialties. In particular, I note here the need for that presence in the genesis of doctrines. My concern in the two previous sections has been with the transformation of economic policy or doctrines. My broader concern is with the transformation of theological doctrines. Moreover, the two transformations mesh: the moral theology of the economic process is not based on a doctrine of the family wage.

Fr. Frederick Crowe has drawn attention, in this matter of the transformation of doctrines, to the notion of transposition in Lonergan's Method in Theology. I share his concern, repeat his "plea to Lonergan students for more concentrated attention on the topic of dialectic" (Crowe: 123) and add a plea for a hard look at the general categories that sublate both Insight and Method in Theology (Lonergan, 1972: 286-288). So, doctrines will be transpositions of dogmas, reached through the use of "the functional specialty, foundations to select doctrines from among the multiple choices presented by the functional specialty, dialectic" (298). But all this involves the "transposition that theological thought has to develop if religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men in all cultures and classes" (132-133). The new subjective realities, incarnate foundations, "provide the basic orientation" (142), an orientation including "the transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing dynamic context" (304), so that "the intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process" (319). Such an intelligibility can emerge in the theologian only through "a long-delayed response to the development of modern science, modern scholarship, modern philosophy" (363), only through three basic differentiations of consciousness, all three "quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval Europe" (317) and, I would add, beyond the horizon of most of contemporary theology.

The message would seem loud and clear. Present foundations, doctrines and systematics belong to another age: they just do not
ground a reaching into the minds and hearts of present and future people. While the issue calls for detailed discussion and exemplification, I must restrict myself to one general point of precision.

The notion of transposition is explicitly introduced in *Insight* (504-506). "True propositions may be merely descriptive; to assign their metaphysical equivalent, they must be transposed into an explanatory form" (504). Moreover, there is also required a structural transposition to move from logic to metaphysics (506). Failure to observe such a strategy "results in the substitution of a pseudo-metaphysical myth-making for scientific inquiry" (505). The communal effort to observe that strategy in the use of, and ongoing genesis of, general categories, is what will eventually lift forward dogma and history to doctrinal adequacy.

Let us return, parenthetically, to the issue of economic doctrines. When we seek light here we are evidently moved, transposed, to a dialectico-genetic grasp of economic policy. Emerging economic doctrines are such only within that grasp, and the relevant grasp is within the vision, *Praxisweltanschauung*: "the appropriate theoretical framework for creativity is open system and so basically transcendental method" (Lonergan, 1976) /46/. Within that view one finds redefined, with third stage meaning integrality /47/, the sequence of economic dogmas terminating with transcendental openness and doctrinal specificity in the present aspirations of men. The old dogmas, thus contextualized, present in their roots and in their fruits, are transposed beyond popular recognition /48/. So, for example, through the foundational grasp of ongoing process—through the use of the general categories—one transposes dogmatic movements in history such as the nineteenth century "imperialist dogma" /49/, or doctrinal drifts in authors like Adam Smith. The imperialist dogma can be identified as a descriptive aversion to the disruption of the phase of basic expansion in the pure cycle, probable within a statistics of emergence of global economic maturity. The movement in Smith can be identified as a heretical enthusiasm for the *prima quod nos* of price, leading to a reliance for salvation through price analysis which fathered Walras /50/. One locates too, not with the vagueness of popular discontent /51/, but with *praxis* precision, the history and future of nationhood (Voegelin, 1974) /52/, government /53/, monopoly /54/, and the significance of upper and lower leisured rentier classes /55/. One locates proleptically: one is seeking the expansion of microautonomy through a poetics (Bachelard) /56/ and ethics (Poole) of Economic Space. One envisages, within emergent probability, the possible
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and probable schemes of recurrence of intermediate technologies and microtechnologies /57/ which would shift in future centuries the global statistics of alienation. In particular, such innovative movements towards microautonomy, within a global economic maturity, would mesh with the eventual epiphany of an economy of aggregate, if not synchronic, pure cycles.

We are still in a Beethoven pause between two paragraphs on page 55 of Method in Theology, and our problem and privilege is to be drawn out of alienation into chemical, psychic, mindful harmony with the compositional energy of history. Henry Simons was not optimistic about the outcome of the struggle between labor and capital, but he still could write: "It is easy to argue that the whole problem is so hard and ominous politically that no effort should be made to solve or even to see it--that the real choice lies between a certain, gradual death of economic democracy and an operation . . . which would cure if successful but is almost certain to kill. I am no forecaster and am not in direct communication with the Almighty. Consequently, I can only maintain that it is immoral to take such absolute dilemmas seriously. Democracy would have been dead a thousand times if it paid much attention to historical extrapolations" (157).

The love of God, the third stage of meaning, and the second million years are on our side.

The foregoing parenthetic consideration of issues of economic policy is evidently not without relevance to the set of necessary developments of doctrines in theology. "It is not in some vacuum of pure spirit but under concrete historical conditions and circumstances that such developments occur, and a knowledge of such conditions and circumstances is not irrelevant in the evaluational history that decides on the legitimacy of developments" (Lonergan, 1972: 320). So we are led again to focus on the present crisis of theology by focusing on what is relevant to evaluational history, to dialectic. Moreover, the crisis in dialectic is necessarily personal, and, in conclusion, I would like to symbolize it in the turning of a page, the turning over of a new leaf.

In Insight the crisis page is page 388: a strategic position is offered which is "startlingly strange" (xxviii) and the beginning of a new way of life. In Method in Theology the crisis page is page 250: a larger strategy is offered inclusive of the strategy of Insight. Turning over that page the theologian is faced /58/ with a task of assembly which includes events and movements of the past four centuries to which recognizable theology has been external
Such are the present schemes of recurrence of contemporary theological education and discourse that probabilities of theologians psychologically present in the fruits of those four centuries are low. The transposition of theology into the end of the twentieth century is comparably remote. The turning of that page, that leaf, is discomforting, can be dreadful.

Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced; and what replaces it, cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait (1967a: 266-267).
NOTES

/1/ I use the word in a Viconesque sense, and in a sense related to the vortex of note 17 below, as well as in the more evident sense: that their content recurs in the list of general categories, Lonergan, 1972: 286-7. The recurrence, obviously, must be in the subject seeking foundations.

/2/ The point relates to generalized empirical method being academic method in the third stage of meaning. See 1978a.

/3/ This echoes August Boeckh's view of philology, as noted by Lonergan, 1972: 210.


/5/ The notion of psychological present is derived from Lonergan, 1972: 177 and developed in McShane, and 1978b.

/6/ The harmony calls for inner dialogue of the six-levelled subject, as well as a third-stage-of-meaning aesthetics of global transformation. Further pointers on this topic are given in section 5.

/7/ "The intelligibility . . . is immanent in world process . . . Emergent probability is a view of world order within the limits of empirical method." (Lonergan, 1957: 128) In what sense the form is normative will gradually emerge. Praxis transforms the notion of empirical method.

/8/ Recall: "The intelligible in the ordinary sense can be understood without understanding what it is to understand; but the intelligible in the profounder sense is identical with the understanding, and so it cannot be understood without understanding what understanding is". (Lonergan, 1957: 649)

/9/ 1680, the beginnings of modern science and of the Enlightenment, is a relevant date. See Lonergan, 1974b.


/11/ 1965: vii: the scientific revolution "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes".

/12/ "The Greeks needed an artistic, a rhetorical, an argumentative development of language before a Greek could set up a metaphysical account of mind. The Greek achievement was needed to expand the capacities of commonsense knowledge and language before Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman could make their commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge. The history of mathematics, natural science, and philosophy and, as well, one's own personal reflective engagement in all three are needed if both common sense and theory are to construct the scaffolding for an entry into the world of interiority". Lonergan, 1972: 261-2.
Illustrative of the attitude is Lonergan's discussion of natural right in 1977.

The precise meaning of "normative" here requires the \textit{praxis} view of the actual, probable and possible seriations discussed in section two.

Lonergan briefly lists these (1972: 286-288). I must insist, however, on the difficulty of this inclusion. "If one wants to know just what forms are, the proper procedure is to give up metaphysics and turn to the sciences" (1957: 498). This page in \textit{Insight} speaks of a division of labor. In the third stage of meaning, with generalized empirical method as academic method, this division and a separate metaphysics become obsolete.

"That notion of survival which is you at core but also you in kilos" (McShane, 1975: 95); the particular chapter, "The Notion of Survival", raises a set of issues relevant to the present essay.

I originally borrowed this notion from Ezra Pound's verticist movement but it is also Jungian. See 1977a: 164, n. 11; 211, n. 171; the work on related topic, psychic conversion, by Doran, 1977.

"Intus in nobis intelligibiliter secundum emanationem veritatis dicitur verbum nostrum verbi divini et secundum emanationem sanctitatis spiratur dilectio nostra divinae Dilectionis". Lonergan, 1964b. The present essay focuses on general categories. But clearly Lonergan's transformation of Trinitarian theology is the centerpiece of the new Christian vision. I have tried to present it in popular form in 1977b: chapters 5-7.

Central to the entire effort is a fundamental inverse insight. One should link here Lonergan, 1972: 341-42 with the treatment of Mystery and inverse insight in Lonergan, 1964a: 274.

See Lonergan, 1957: 510. \textit{Praxisweltanschauung}, however, changes the meaning of the page--and indeed of the book as gesture. One may speak of "the realization in accord with successive schedules of probabilities of the compound conditioned series of concretely possible solutions", but what does one mean by "realization"? One is not an observer. By \textit{Praxisweltanschauung} one is in ever more disturbing yet peaceful resonance with the finality of being.

Just what one means by, and can say about, such a symbolic indication helps to locate one's position with regard to the improbable vision. The animal is an integrated (zoological forms in the unity of a thing) aggregate of the three lower levels. \textit{pr} denotes forms of physics. How would one symbolize organs and neural networks, etc.? All this may seem farfetched, even foolish. Yet the psychologists are hard at an equivalent, but largely reductionist project (Gaito, ed.). Do the children of light have to always arrive "a little breathless and a little late" (Lonergan, 1957: 733)?

On the notion of collective responsibility, see Lonergan.

A text I have found extremely helpful in opening up the explanatory perspective is "Study of an organism begins from the thing-for-us . . ." (Lonergan, 1957: 464-5) One can replace the word "organism" by plant, dog, man, Christ, universe and strain to
reach the "world invisible" of explanation (394-5). I may refer forward here also to the notion of transposition as discussed in section 5. See note 25.


/25/ Perhaps at this stage I might indicate a diagrammatic underpinning that may help. One needs a solid global matrix, radius measuring time, each layer being a network of elements of schedules of probability at each corresponding point on earth. Six-levelled things within schemes become part of the actual series with the emergence of man. Obviously, one needs Toynbee and Voegelein and Lonergan's sets and sequences of differentiations of consciousness to fill this out. And one needs to complement and balance such diagramming with Lonergan, 1972: 48; 1967a: 42, etc.

/26/ I refer to the two million copies sold of Samuelson's famous textbook. However, had Samuelson thought and written otherwise, the probability schedules would have shifted.

/27/ I recall Maslow's well-known statistic: self-actualization occurring "certainly in less that one percent of the adult population" (204). I recall also Aresteh's view on the absence of research on adult growth: "Unless the psychologist has himself experienced the state of quest of final integration in the succession of identities he will hardly acquire an understanding or incentive for doing research on it" (18).

/28/ I refer to Voegelin's notion of the In-between (1974a/b).

/29/ What is meant by "admission into consciousness" is discussed in McShane, 1977a: Epilogue 124ff. "Hoping into consciousness" is related to the discussion of the Eschaton there.

/30/ I recall the notion of self-inclusion from section 1. Third stage meaning involves a discontinuity in instrumental acts of meaning. Is the component not the composer?

/31/ The use of the word "surplus" in Lonergan's analysis relates more to Toynbee's usage than to that of Marx.

/32/ The analysis was probably completed in 1944. Lonergan's dependence on Schumpeter is not clear. Lonergan's notes include 25 pages of handwritten notes on, and extracts from, Schumpeter, some of which (like that cited shortly in the text) indicate that Lonergan had a developed view then reading Schumpeter.

/33/ Schumpeter distinguishes these various sides of Marx in 1942: Part one, reprinted in 1951.

/34/ Apart from the Juglar, two other types of cycle have been named: the Kitchin, a short cycle of about three years, and the Kondratieff, a long cycle of about sixty years.

/35/ I would note that economic space requires the large six-levelled heuristic of sections 1 and 2.

/36/ The volume by Burns, just cited, is a good example. See, for instance, 1954b and 1954c from which I have already quoted. The British tradition, of course, that Joan Robinson represents, continues to call for serious theoretic effort: "The sad thing is that economists, including many more eminent than Bober, continue
to be defeatist in this way about the possibility of understanding the real world, and gladly retreat into their warm, theoretical wombs, where they are not threatened by facts. What is needed is a reallocation of economic brain-power towards an analysis and interpretation of the real world" (Odling-Smee: 588).

/37/ So titled in Breit and Ransom. This volume, coupled with Robinson, 1973, provides a background to the present section.

/38/ I continue to point to the necessity of the inner word of Prazesweltanschauung. It is useful to recall here Lonergan's discussions of the necessity of inner words (1964b: 105, 290): "Tertia autem verborum necessitas est ut scientias excolere possumus. Nisi enim verba universalia formarentur, totum mundum aspectabilem nunquam scire possemus, sed ad particularia experta vel imaginata religaremur. Item, nisi verba exacte definita formarentur, fluxu quoddam imaginum ad modum mentalitatis mythicae ferremur, cum nunquam clare et distincte constaret de quanam re ageretur" (105).

/39/ One may note that the two difficulties are not unrelated. See Lonergan, 1957: chapter 8, for the contrast between "body", which grounds confusion and blocks thought and "thing", which is the basis of a clear heuristic conception of change, genera and species, aggregates of events and the emergent probability of things.

/40/ "Samuelson feels that Walras and Augustin Cournot carried the development of mathematics in economics to a highly sophisticated level by the turn of the twentieth century. At that point, he claims the study was interrupted by the verbal tradition of the English economists at Cambridge" (Breit and Ransom: 114, n).

/41/ The inner quotation is from Keynes: 378-79. Robinson seeks to rescue Keynes from the Keynesians, and even from himself. She also draws on the Polish thinker, M. Kalecki, who independently arrived at a more coherent position than Keynes. We will refer to Kalecki later. Schumpeter is, to say the least, not over-enthusiastic about Keynes' achievement. I refer here to his essay on Keynes in 1951: 260-91. He even remarks that "Professor Myrdal's gentle sneer at 'that Anglo-Saxon kind of unnecessary originality' is amply justified" (277).

/42/ I pass over this topic entirely here. There is a brief presentation of the theory as "The Hicks-Hansen Synthesis" in Breit and Ransom: 107-10. It originated with Hicks' "Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics': A Suggested Interpretation." It is standard text book stuff. It is bad statics. J. Robinson gives it due treatment (1973: 82-85). In contrast with Hicks' simple relating of increasing interest rate to decreasing investment, there are the refreshingly realistic efforts of M. Kalecki, e.g., "Entrepreneurial Capital and Investment", "Determinants of Investment", both essays reprinted in 1971.

/43/ The whirlpool contains the aggregate of six-levelled vortices of human aspiration and human desperation.

/44/ A. Lowe discusses the problems of microautonomy and control. See McShane 1974: Chapter 10.

/45/ I have treated the topic memory, re-membering, "boning up", in 1977a: 107ff. Again, foundational shifts are normatively integral. One may recall, with symbolic value, Marcel's words:
"the thinker is continually on guard against the alienation (through inertia), the fossilization of his thought. He lives in a continual state of creativity and the whole of his thought is always called in question from one minute to the next" (181).

The point was made by Lonergan in correspondence with me in the summer of 1968. He had been reading Metz's political theology at the time. It was then that he indicated the existence of his Circulation Analysis to me and was seeking an economist who would be interested in working on it.

See note 25. The strategy I indicated in note 23 is useful here. Recall, for example, that the dog is studied by genetic method. An adequate account of the set of organic tracts within the dog's life requires that method and its context of emergent probability. An account handling a "slice" of the dog's life falls far short of this. Think, how, of the larger problem that is associated with the set of dogmatic tracts.

In 1977a: 116-17, I discussed the problem of communication within theology in terms of an 8x8 symmetrical matrix. Unfortunately, contemporary theology, unlike most other modern areas of inquiry, does not have that problem in any acute fashion.

The doctrine is associated with the Englishman John A. Hobson, with Rosa Luxemburg, with Lenin. It relates to the channeling of surplus wealth abroad, to an economics of armament and war, and to a theory of the instability of capitalism. See M. Kalecki, "The Problem of Effective Demand with Tugan-Baranovski and Rosa Luxemburg", 146-55. The problem is popularly discussed in R. Heilbroner, "The Victorian World and the Underworld of Economics", The Worldly Philosophers, 164-204.

See Kaldor: "The difficulty with a new start is to pinpoint the critical area where economic theory went astray . . . I would put it in the middle of the fourth chapter of Vol. I of The Wealth of Nations . . . in (that) chapter, after discussing the need for money in a social economy, Smith suddenly gets fascinated by the distinction between money price, real price, and exchange value and from then on, hey presto, his interest gets bogged down in the question of how values and prices for products and factors are determined. One can trace a more or less continuous development of price theory from the subsequent chapters of Smith through Ricardo, Walras, Marshall, right up to Debreu and the most sophisticated present-day Americans" (1240-41; Lonergan, 1976). Lonergan's analysis shows no hesitation about the significance of prices: "prices cannot be regarded as ultimate norms guiding strategic economic decisions . . . the function of prices is merely to provide a mechanism for overcoming the divergence of strategically indifferent decisions . . . " (1944: 1). Also, internal to Lonergan's analysis is a theory of distribution.

The popular discontent with the quality of life is regularly sublated by economists, without much theoretical underpinning, and with little suspicion of the large educational problem of a microautonomic shift in values. Again, it is essential to locate the scientific and technological advances within the optimism of an emergent probability which recognizes the different sets of statistics relating to the maturation of the lower, middle and higher sciences and technologies in the next 1,000 years.

Were the unifications of Italy, of Germany, of S. A. and of S. S. R. progress or decline?
There is much that is suggestive in Lonergan's unpublished typescripts and handwritten notes. In a file, dating probably from the early forties, of economic notes and clippings, there is a brief scribble: "Either minimum taxes, free capitalist (machine?), violent cycles from above corrected by elimination or social welfare programmes, high taxes, breakdown of capitalist motivation, socialism, or middle way - group economics".

On the unhappy history of the Sherman Act and its reforms, see Letwin. What can be noted throughout is "the relative lack of economic criteria in the formulation of . . . legislation", (Baldwin: 282). The United Kingdom started late (1948: Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act) but "have fallen into almost all the same pitfalls as their American counterparts", (Curwen and Fowler: Introduction). There is required here an integration of Lonergan's analysis with contemporary discussions of degrees of monopoly, both corporation and labour.

". . . the depression has notably augmented the numbers of the unemployed, and so the brilliant expedient of a steep income tax on the rich to provide a dole for the poor will effect the required . . . (adjustment); the upper leisure class of rentiers is recruited from a lower class of unemployed. Obviously an economy that has worked itself into this impasse is not to be regarded as a model of enlightened legislation . . . ." Lonergan, 1944: 125-6.

I think here of an extension from house to city to environment to globe of Bachelard.

There is a large but somewhat stagnant literature on the relation of technology to human living. (For a survey see Gendron.) What is needed, however, is a reorientation of technological innovation within generalized empirical method. See note 51. Schumacher is suggestive.

Method in Theology is method. But Method in Theology recurs in dialectic, and there it is to be faced incanately.
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**Editor’s Appendix:** Additional Works on Lonergan's Economics.

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1980b  

1981  
THE LANGUAGE OF LOVE

Sebastian Moore
Marquette University

The chapters of this paper are as follows:

1. Posing the problematic for a unified soteriology.
2. An analysis of that 'showing of love' which is the intention of the crucified.
3. An enquiry into the human evil that this love encounters and transforms.
4. A further prosecution of the above enquiry, leading to an empathic perception of the human malaise of love.
5. The disengaging of the method, and its formal application to the whole process of the saving action.

1. Posing the problematic for a unified soteriology.

How does Jesus save us by his death on the cross? This question is as old as theology. And it is only ever answered in relation to the understanding of the human predicament that exists in the successive theological generations that tackle it. What Eliot said of Pascal—that there can never be a definitive account of his thought because every age is newly challenged by it—is preeminently true of the death of Jesus as pivotal event in human salvation.

It has for many years been clear to me that it is of the very substance of an adequate account of salvation by the cross, that Jesus was killed. That Jesus died is not the whole story. No account of the death of Jesus, of his dispositions, of his motivation, of his love for humankind, is theologically adequate or would work equally well if Jesus had not died by the hand of man.

This conviction led me to work out the dynamic of our salvation in terms of the transformation of the killers of Jesus (with whom we must identify) into members of him, rather than in terms of what Jesus himself does in the total event. The role of Jesus in this account was to represent what man destroys by his sin, namely himself as an inalienably self-transcending being. Confronted with the crucifixion of Jesus, man awakens to his condition as self-destroyer, and so can be healed of this basic flaw in himself.

It has been pointed out to me that there is considerable obscurity about that last 'and can be healed'. I have increasingly felt this. That final clause makes the typical leap which a theory
not quite adequate to its problematic takes when the end is in sight. The theory does not quite make it.

And the reason the theory does not make it is clear. It locates the redemptive event entirely in the believer, not in the action (in the most comprehensive sense) of Jesus. In Hegelian terms, the theory is a 'Jesus killed' soteriology as the antithesis of a 'Jesus dying' soteriology. The synthesis is required, in which Jesus' acceptance of death is once again central, as in the 'Jesus dying' soteriology, but itself embraces the intention of his killers, which is crucial to a 'Jesus killed' soteriology. In an adequate soteriology, Jesus embraces his killers not merely through an all-embracing love but also in an acceptance of the necessity of their killing him, which acceptance is the form of the all-embracing love, named by the embrace of the worst thing of all.

How this conclusion may be reached is suggested in the following manner. First we must make an in-depth analysis of the universal sinful condition. The root of this condition and the source of all sin is, I argue, that profound self-distrust which has everyone saying, in a corner of his or her being, "I am a slob. I have in me nothing of generosity or of self-transcendence." It is this self-distrust which normalizes the most hideous crimes and pervades with mediocrity the whole of human culture. Secondly, we have to recognize in Jesus one who is wholly without this original sin of self-trust. Thirdly, we have to ask what is involved in the interaction between Jesus, so understood, and ourselves, so understood.

In the first place, the intention of Jesus is to tell us that we, like him, are free: we do not have to think of ourselves as slobs or slaves. But we, on our side, do not hear the message that way. To us, embedded in our immemorial bad self-image, the freedom of Jesus is a threat.

At this concept of threat we have to pause. For threat is woven into the fabric of society. And 'the threat offered by the other person' is a more radical answer to the question, 'What motivates our destructiveness?' than is 'the desire to advance ourselves.' The reason for this is that it is out of our poverty, rather than out of our imagined wealth, that we strike. Our vision of ourselves is so small that we have to make our vision of each other even smaller. It is not an enlarged vision of ourselves that leads us to cut down others, but an impoverished one. The rule 'kill or be killed' is only a crude version of the exiguous dynamic
that is inscribed in all of us who have the slob image of ourselves. It is our wretched view of ourselves that compels us to cut others down.

Preeminently it compels us to cut down him who is totally free of it. But in this case a curious thing happens. Normally the victim, by his resistance, by his non-acceptance of what we do to him, corroborates our wretched self-image. It really is, he seems to say, that sort of world. You really were threatened. It really was 'either you or me'. But in the case of Jesus we hear no such message. For he does not oppose. He accedes to our way of proceeding with him. And so in this instance we find our wretched self-image questioned. Do we have to secure ourselves in this way? Are we such that we can act no other way? We know a moment of freedom from the immemorial human treadmill of treading on each other to maintain a self in which we do not really believe. In this moment we do believe. That freedom which is the heart of Jesus is born in us.

I note that in taking this way I am diverging from the avowed aim of this section, which is to say what Jesus does, not what we experience. But this disjunction does not work in the ultimate analysis (which I am now attempting). For there, we experience what Jesus does. We experience his acceptance of what we do to him, and in this experience are reborn into our freedom, our belonging to his human world where the slob image is no more. 'The death of Jesus' as it appears to the converted killer of Jesus is the death of Jesus as it is intended by Jesus. For we are now in contact with a work of love that understands and embraces our wretched self-image and the impoverished human world that it creates. Beyond the innocence that throws the guilty further into their guilt is the innocence that believes in their innocence, understands their violence as their incomprehension of their innocence, and so communicates his belief in them to them. 'Father forgive them for they know not what they do' describes that vision of man which is in Jesus, out of which his whole work of love proceeds. And thus it is that in a brutal execution that epitomizes the fearful human condition, that epitomizes all the mediocrity in the human condition, the human inability to live the human freedom, we humans discover that we are free, that we are as he is, that we are where he is.

Thus there is no real difference between the believer's sense of being died for by Jesus and his sense of being as Jesus is, of being where Jesus is. The expiation language of Paul and his mystical identification language are one language.
It is in this fundamental way that the death of Jesus constitutes a break in the human continuum, in the web of sin that binds us together in a logic of 'kill or be killed'. The death of Jesus is a break for us. It is our permission to be as God has made us and him.

Further, to get the essential message of the death of Jesus—that we are free—which is to be as Jesus is, is to be dead with him. There is opened for us a way which he takes in response to our powerless wretched self-image. So the death of Jesus becomes, in us who bear its image, the state of freedom from the world that is stamped with the wretched self-image. Thus there is a transformation in the symbolism of death: from death as the symbol of the wretched self-image that inflicts it, to death as the symbol of a new life in the Spirit, freed from the confines of the wretched self-image. This is how 'dying he destroyed our death'.

The center of any adequate soteriology has to be 'that mind which was in Christ Jesus'. It cannot be an event in the believer except as the meeting with that mind. But 'that mind' cannot be described truly except as the course decreed by love in the situation where freedom meets with unfreedom. That course is the central mystery, though we have inklings of it in all these situations where, innocent and faced with one who wrongs us, we sense another way than the way of our pride. How can we describe that course? We call it non-resistance. But, most importantly, it is that non-resistance which shows to the crucifier another way for him to be: and not merely another ethic, another way of living, but another way that he is, another way that we are, the way we truly are.

The basic soteriological question has to be, what crucifies Jesus? What crucifies Jesus is not, at root, 'man's inhumanity to man'. It is this, but to get to the meaning of this most significant of murders we have to go deeper into 'man's inhumanity to man' and say that what crucifies Jesus is our wretched self-image. Once we give this answer, we are led to consider that love in the heart of Jesus which believes in the goodness of the crucifier, understands why he crucifies, and consents to appeal to that deep lost goodness in the only way that is open to it, the way of the cross, the way, that is, of a surprising non-resistance which creates the pause in which we are reborn.

Finally it may be asked whether there is any connection between these speculations and the magisterial thesis of H. Richard Niebuhr in Christ and Culture. The thought of Niebuhr is polarized around the man-centeredness of culture and the God-centeredness
of Christ. Now the failure to be God-centered is not simply a moral failure. It is not simply the not doing of what we ought to do. It is not the disobedience to the precept 'Be God-centered'. It is the failure to realize that I am God-centered, that my life is an expression of the infinite 'I am'. Now let us ask what the refusal to acknowledge God-centeredness existentially is. What is its most radical description? Disobedience? Rebellion? Waywardness? Wilfulness? Idolatry? All these things, but none of them radically. The root is that my life, isolated from its radiant source and center, looks to me a bitter thing, sours to me, appears wretched and sometimes downright nasty. In other words the radical expression of the denial of our center is the wretched self-image out of which all the lesser evils—of disobedience, of rebellion, of waywardness, of wilfulness, of idolatry—stem.

But how can my life be experienced by me as God-centered? Only in an experience of God. Short of this experience, that my life has God for its center is only a theory; and that my life is not a wretched thing is only a theory. This state of realization, of the intimacy of God and of the beauty of one's life, is the condition of Jesus, is his meaning for us. I am inclined now to think that the scholastics were on to something when they denied to Jesus the virtue of faith and had him directly know God. Faith involves the struggle of God's knowledge of us as his dear children with our wretched self-image. In Jesus, the sinless one (and this is far more than a scholastic tradition), there can be no struggle of this kind.

It is out of this self-understanding as a radiance of God that Jesus tells us we are beautiful and, when we cannot believe this, accepts the role of disturber of our wretched peace, and the penalty this invited: and this is the only language in which we can be told what is our worth. We who so readily kill are died for. We who kill because we do not believe in ourselves are died for that we may believe and be to the glory of God the Father.

2. An analysis of that "showing of love" which is the intention of the crucified.

The two indispensable elements for soteriology are:
1. that it is God who saves, and with whom to be united is salvation;
2. that Jesus mediates this salvation by showing us love, "showing love being understood in the primary sense of a man showing love to his wife or to someone in need. Showing love to someone is loving them. It is my love reaching the other person.
How are these two elements combined? The following is a suggestion:

I am self-transcending by nature, a nature I have of God. By nature I desire to know, and by nature I desire to be in love. For this desire to be in love, which sublates the desire to know, to be unrestricted in its operation and, thus unrestricted, to be satisfied, is my salvation. God, as natura naturans, is the cause of my unrestricted natural desire. And in my consciousness he will be the climate of my unrestricted desire. And he will be the object of this desire, the infinite beloved in whom the finite spirit rests.

But the unrestricted desire to be in love encounters a crisis when it continues to operate outside the area where it enjoys the support of human culture, of that vast and intricate web of meanings and communication whereby men and women live. Beyond that area I experience my being-in-the-world as challenged by forces beyond the human, as mortal. For my desire still to be fearlessly lived in this total situation of being human in the cosmos, an extraordinary trust is required. There is a correspondence between the unrestricted desire to be in love and the unrestricted nature of the things that can happen to me, of the shocks that flesh is heir to. That correspondence will be, in the language of scholasticism, only 'material' until a transforming power or spirit makes it 'formal'.

This crisis encouraged by the unrestricted eros of the human when it would live in the total world of man beyond his complex self-formed human world, makes it to be the case that, however healthy a person may be as men count health, he is sick in respect of the ultimate reality. He is unable for, and shies away from the 'harsh and dreadful love' in whom alone he will find peace.

Jesus is the man wholly without this sickness, whole without this sickness. This wholeness of his has to communicate itself to us. If it did not have this need, it would not be itself. Any privatization of Jesus' relationship to our God would destroy it at the root. Of his very nature, Jesus is the word of freedom addressed to every man and every woman that ever lived or will live.

The central task of soteriology, and the measure of the success of any theory or redemption, is set by the question: How does the freedom, the wholeness, the holiness, of Jesus communicate itself to us, pass over into us?

The meaning of 'communicate' here is 'primary' in the same way that the meaning of 'shows love'—in my second element—is primary. But when we envisage the soteriological question in terms
of my last paragraph, we further specify, and we intensify, the meaning of 'showing love.' More simply and truly, we remember that to show love to a person is to offer to enrich that person with what is most deeply myself. Thus the desire of Jesus to communicate his freedom, his wholeness, to people is Jesus' love for people. And when he initiates that communication, he thereby 'shows love' to them. So the soteriological question concerns the structure of that showing, the body-language of love that is appropriate to the situation where the totally free man meets captive man, where the whole man meets sick man, where the way out of our captivity is offered to us.

Much more specifically, how is his freedom ever to begin to be ours? What is the manner of the unlocking in us of the unrestricted desire to be in love? How is he to unlock our desire?

The answer has to be, in the first place, that he provokes our desire to flame up into its full crisis. As Eliot says, "To be restored, our sickness must grow worse." In this crisis, our desire is at its maximum. What is provoked into operation here is the ultimate strategy of fearful man to refuse the deepest destiny of his being, a destiny that is now fully upon us and is driving us into our shell of relative contentment. What is that strategy? It is to condemn, to outlaw, to cast out this man who threatens us with the wrath of God into which our fear converts the love of God.

Now if Jesus were to oppose our rejection, he would thereby maintain for us the situation in which the love of God is wrath. He would maintain us under the wrath of God. His love for God makes this impossible. And this love, in this crisis, is absolutely indistinguishable from that love which cannot bear to see us putting ourselves in God's wrath. In this crisis, his God is God-for-man. He would fail his God if, in this crisis, he kept his God and left us with our wrathful God. And this he would do were he in any way to oppose our rejection, to 'outlaw us back', to send back to us the excommunication that we pass on him.

But it is not enough for him not to oppose our rejection. Were he to stop there, he would be, for a reason that would not be known to us, that showing of love to us, which is the heart of his saving action.

What more Jesus does than merely not oppose our rejection is the most difficult thing of all to describe because it is the heart of our salvation. It is a total self-identification of the lover with the beloved in his plight. It is an empathy with the
need of the sick spirit to push away the healing hand, a need that is not content to push away but must also condemn and outlaw and declare unworthy and hateful. Jesus loves us, not merely in spite of our rejection of him but in our rejection of him. He fully experiences us, as the lover has to experience the beloved, in our rejection of him. He fully engages us, as the lover has to engage the beloved, in our rejection of him. He becomes us in our rejection of him. He takes into himself that inconclusive human misery that builds a wretched security by degrading all who would cure it.

The main point is that this mind-bogglingly positive attitude of Jesus to us in our rejection of him, this attitude that is more than a non-violent response to violence, is the only sign or showing of love that is appropriate to the meeting between the totally free, the God-freed person, and ourselves in our immemorial human plight. And so through this stance of Jesus, and through this alone, can we, in this crisis situation of the human, see that we are loved, and so receive healing. These alone are the conditions for that communication whereby the lover frees the beloved to happen at the frontier and crisis of human consciousness where the ultimate direction of our desire to be in love is revealing itself. I cannot help recalling an amazing statement by Louis Charden, a baroque spiritual writer, in his book, La Croix de Jesus. He is speaking of the various places in the gospel story where Jesus is described as embracing people. It goes something like this: "He put his arms round children, he let Mary wipe his feet with her hair, mais Judas aura la bouche!"

So what Jesus is for us is someone who has shown us that we are lovable precisely where we experience ourselves as hateful. And that, and that alone, is the vision that saves us. Only with him, only in the ultimate human crisis that he provokes, can we fully experience ourselves as hateful. And so only by him can we be saved, awakened where we most resolutely strive to stay asleep.

A largely rejected Lutheran extreme position sees Jesus as victim of the wrath of God. Even this farouche statement has its validity. For it recognizes, at its extreme, Jesus' empathy with the sinful condition that rejects him. In a profound sense, he catches our sickness. The monstrousness of this idea reflects and respects the monstrousness of the love of God: the rationally unmanageable ultimate dimension in which the drama of human salvation is acted out. No man can stand at the center of that drama and live without encountering the wrath of God. His alternatives are: to privatize the love of God, or to suffer the wrath of God. There is no third, and the first is not possible.
It is in the Resurrection that that dimension of God's love is fully revealed. And for the Resurrection to embody fully that dimension, it is necessary that it be more than the divine vindication of the humanly rejected one. It has to be the bringing to life of one dead of our sin, one who in himself embodies our sinfulness. The Resurrection is the revival of one who has undergone the penalty of our sin. Jesus undergoes that dissolution under the wrath of God which our unfreedom invites, and threatened with which we outlaw him to maintain our status 'under the wrath'. So that brought to conversion by the vision of the crucified, we are brought to life, brought on to life, in his Resurrection. We shall never understand that life unless we understand the spiritual death that pervades what we call life and that becomes the great issue when God's man of freedom knocks on the door of the city of man.

A soteriology built on the above lines may contain the answer to a teasing question: How could Jesus, how could this one man love every single human being that ever was or will be?

The answer is to be found in the profound social implication of the guiltlessness of Jesus. This extraordinary freedom encounters a refusal that is one throughout the human race yet takes as many forms as there are persons. The human tragedy, the human loneliness, the human imprisonment, is never repeated. Yet is it ever the same. This is the reason why people who become good counsellors or good ministers have a growing and broadening conviction both of the oneness of the human plight everywhere and of its uniqueness in each instance. And such people--be it noted to our present heuristic purpose--do develop a capacity to empathize with each new client, each new experience being an expansion of a controlling sense of the human captivity. The cause of love, in the minister, is the sense of human potential blocked the way people always do block themselves, the captive spirit awaiting deliverance. A mature person has in his own experience, in his experience of himself, the first-hand datum for this description of the human condition: and in each new encounter, his inner sense of 'the way it is' moves in a new rhythm of empathy.

Our ordinary rational processes associate universality with abstraction: so that to name something common to everybody is to say practically nothing about anybody. But this rule seems to break down, when we consider the universality of the human refusal, loneliness, and sin. The politeness that declines to hear a muted cry for help is a deafness not only to the individual but to the scandalously common. This new and surprising correlation of the
individual and the common, where the human really confronts his or her humanity, suspends the principle that to love everybody would be to love nobody, from which of course is deduced the impossibility of Jesus' loving everybody. Let it be noted also in this connection that an adequate epistemology will deny the proposition, "The more universal the more abstract": for it converges on a concept of being that is a concept, at once, of the most universal and of the totally concrete. How much, I wonder, is an implicitly truncated version of mind-process responsible for the greyness that so easily comes into our theological problematic. There is something in common between all the facts that there are: the growing health and geniality of the mind for whom they are coming to be facts.

Finally, if even we, part captive though we are, can have sufficient freedom, sufficient desire to communicate freedom, to empathize with each newly encountered fleer from freedom, how much more must this be said of him whom we believe to have been totally free of the crippling guilt of man. As is his freedom his love is boundless. Perhaps it could be said that this total freedom knows the human captivity in such strong contrast as to constitute a global vision of man the prisoner, capable of enfolding into itself each and every "version" or "edition" of the tragedy.

3. An enquiry into the human evil that this love encounters and transforms.

For an adequate theory of salvation by the blood of Jesus, it is necessary to have a conception of man's ethical negativity that (a) is thought to be the most radical conception of it that there can be, and (b) relates man the sinner to Jesus crucified in a manner that makes Jesus crucified to be evidently man's salvation from this radically conceived evil.

So what, at root, is man's evil? It is clear, in the first place, that this has to be understood in relation to man's good. It is also clear that 'man's good' means what it says: man's well-being, his flourishing. Man's good is man's flourishing. And how does man flourish? By loving, by transcending himself at that deepest level, called by Lonergan the fourth and sometimes fifth level, where the subject decides for himself. Man's good is to love. And because man is insatiable, his good is to love unrestrictedly. Evil in the human subject, then, is his unwillingness to love unrestrictedly.

But what is the dynamic of this unwillingness? Is it enough to say that the human subject restricts his power to love, or that
The Language of Love

he perverts it, or that he indulges it in a "disordered" manner?

It is certainly true to say these things, but we are left with the teasing question as to why we restrict this power of love in us, why we put brakes on it, why we refuse to be happy. If we refuse to take our enquiry this far, we are left with a dualism between 'the power to love' on the one hand, and 'the restraining subject' on the other: exactly as an inadequate analysis of self-deception leaves us with the dualism, brilliantly indicated by Fingarette, between the deceived and the deceiving subject. We are forced to go further inwards. There has to be an affective conjunction between our tendency to love and our inhibition of that tendency. What is this affective conjunction?

Is it that we are afraid to love, that we are afraid of where loving may lead us? Certainly we are. But no pressure is brought more closely to the heart of loving than could be the menace of an unknown future. Somehow we are unhappy with the very movement of our heart as it senses its freedom to love. We don't like it. We don't like ourselves free. At the root of that misuse of freedom at which moral analysis tends to stop, is a distaste for it.

This fundamental compromising of our freedom in our own eyes succeeds in confusing it. And the confusing of freedom is a more radical concept than the perversion of it or the fear of it. It means, I believe, that I cannot, without a discernment that is of the Holy Spirit, tell apart the movement of freedom itself from the movement that would destroy any person who would seem to stand in its way. It also means that I can regard as a threat to my freedom precisely the person who is addressing himself to it and calling it forth.

This is the meaning of the rejection of Jesus. That rejection is more than the rejection of a call to freedom in favor of a preferred self-centeredness, though that it certainly is. It is a rejection that carries in it all the ambivalence of my sense of freedom. It is the malaise of human freedom in a full dramatic expression. It expresses my resentment at being, in spite of myself, a lover. It is the malaise of love that cannot move. The nearest to it that any philosopher has come is Scheler's concept of resentment: the dull and bitter stirring of a captive love by one who calls to me out of total freedom.

I have to accept myself as the rejector and crucifier of Jesus. Even if Jesus had never been, I have to accept in myself as other-rejecting the malaise in which my freedom half-lives in me. I have to accept myself as partnered by that man on the cross. As
partnered by him not just as accused by him. For as long as he
continues to accuse me, the meaning of my crucifying him is still
hidden from me. I have forgotten that it is the sickness in my
love that has put him up there.

Only if I can accept myself as crucifier out of the radical
ambivalence of my power to love, can I understand his acceptance of
this position as love for me on his part.

And this love which I now recognize is unrestricted. It can
be nothing less than the unrestricted love that man has outlawed.
I have said all that my sick soul has to say about love in out-
lawing, rejecting and crucifying the man without evil in him who
is calling me into my freedom.

With this recognition, the unrestricted love that is my true
identity begins to be born in me.

An adequate soteriology, then, centers on the recognition of
saving love in Jesus on the cross. It will insist that only love
can recognize love: that a concept of our sinfulness that does not
savor of the malaise in our loving, will fail to make of confronta-
tion with the crucified the mise-en-scène for unrestricted love to
be born in us.

A corollary is to be noted. It is said that evil as such has
no reason: that the negative movement at the heart of a person's
being, the sheer No to life, has no intelligibility. While this
has to be asserted lest we reduce evil to anything else and deny
to it its awful negative ultimacy, the contemplation of our salva-
tion from evil by Jesus demands of the theologian the appropriation
of a desperate logic in the matter of our intrinsic freedom and
lovingness. There is an intelligentia amoris that calls for an un-
derstanding of evil that goes deeper into our desperate plight than
does the assertion that evil has no reason.

4. A further prosecution of the above enquiry, leading to an
empathic perception of the human malaise of love.

I think there is a feeling of 'being wrong' that is woven deep in-
to the human condition. I call this generic guilt. 'Generic' means
'underlying and embracing all the different kinds of a thing.'
Thus 'animal' is the genus of which 'man' is a species or kind.
Generic guilt lies deeper than the reasonable guilt you feel over
a wrong you have done, or than the unreasonable guilt you feel over
something you only imagine you have done. It's the feeling that
there's something wrong with you.
The Language of Love

Most anthropologists and other students of the human condition agree that guilt is one of the most important and universal ingredients in man's makeup. It operates an unlimited internal demand for payment, for sacrifice, for expiation. It underlies interracial hatred. It's a lot deeper than the memory of bad deeds. So what is this generic guilt? How do we catch this bug? When? Why? Where?

To get at this thorny question, let us look rather closely and carefully at three examples. A teenage girl decides to leave the family and live on her own. Spoken or unspoken, she hears, "How could you do this to us? You are on your own now. How will you make out? How can you do this to yourself?" Notice carefully that the bad mark attaches not to disobedience but to separation. A little boy plays with a boy in the neighborhood, of whose family the parents disapprove. He's made to feel bad. Notice carefully that the 'bad mark' attached not to disobedience but to making his own choice of friends, no longer acting-out his parents' values. The nun says to the little girl in school, "Why did you do that?" Answer, "Because I wanted to." "Do you always do what you want to do?" Notice carefully that the 'bad mark' attaches not to the bad thing the child has done, but to "doing what she wants to do."

Now in all these examples, an absolutely basic human structure is being operated, namely the peculiar discomfort the human being feels whenever she tries to separate herself from a world in which she has till that moment been enclosed, whether it is family, peer group, religious community, or whatever.

This phenomenon of painful separation recalls and reenacts the drama of the birth of ego-awareness out of the sea of life of which we were originally part. The original sense of guilt, which has nothing to do with morality, is the unease with which the ego pulls away from what might be called the psychic womb. It seems that we cannot assert ourselves without catching this bug. The story of Adam and Eve in the Garden is a perfect mythic representation of this primordial human reality. They stake out their claim for making their own judgment of good and evil, and immediately, automatically, they become ashamed of their nakedness, they feel bad about themselves. Their former life in the Garden, moving in harmony with the whole cosmic flow of life, is the 'psychic womb', what a famous French anthropologist whose name escapes me called 'participation mystique'.

The process of self-separation has the following stages:
2. Stepping out. Taking a bite of that fruit.
3. The silent accusation, "How could you do this to us? How could you dare to improve on us?"
5. Going ahead in spite of this feeling.
6. Consequent intensification of the bad feeling.

As a result of this oft-repeated process, we have a profound distrust of our freedom. It is this distrust of our freedom, this obscure feeling that our freedom somehow offends, that is the cause of all our trouble.

In brief, generic guilt is 'feeling bad about feeling free'. At root everyone thinks he is a slob. That's why billions cling to Chairman Mao, and all the other symbolic personages who seem to offer a way out from the inner horror, the inner slob feeling. 'Original Sin' is original self-distrust, even self-loathing.

At the deepest level, then, guilt virtually equates with being on your own. It is an unhappiness with yourself as an individual, free being. It is a bug that is caught in the very act of breaking free from the psychic womb. It is being on your own and feeling the draught. It is feeling bad about feeling free.

That is the first part of this section. Now I move on to the second part, where I consider how this guilty, self-unhappy part of a person will make him react to another person who seems to him relatively free of it. Simply, how do we view the freedom of others?

Thus ill-at-ease with my freedom, I shall have an attitude to the freedom, real or apparent, of another person, that is complex. It will be composed of: envy, resentment, a sense of being threatened. This requires some analyzing. To begin with, the envy is of a peculiar kind. It is not the usual envy at someone who has what I haven't got. It is rather envy at someone who has something that I feel I cannot have and, even more curious, do not wish to have because I'm afraid of it, namely freedom. The peculiar bitterness that this contradictory situation produces in me I call resentment. Actually Nietzsche, who made a close study of this phenomenon, which Scheler developed further, called it by the French name 'ressentiment', to distinguish it from the more general use of 'resentment' that covers a wide range of bad feelings about a person or an event. 'Ressentiment' is reserved to that bad feeling with which a person who feels unable and therefore unwilling for a certain enjoyment regards another who freely and happily experiences this enjoyment. Conjoined with this unpleasant, uneasy feeling, is the desire to
remove the cause of it, which is the other person. But here occurs the next curious thing. It is not enough for the other person to go away. If he does so, I shall be left with the uneasy feeling that I have missed something, that there really is something I could have, something represented by the curious stranger who has now passed out into the night. You know the way it is when someone tells you an unpleasant home-truth and you angrily say, "No that's not true!" But when he says, "Well in that case you don't want to hear any more. I'll move on," you say, "No, stay, we haven't finished this." That stranger who so disturbs me, I want to keep him around. Like Herod, who put John the Baptist in prison but had him in to preach from time to time. He has so shaken my poor self-assurance, that the only way for me to restore it is to have him come down to my level and deny his own freedom and say to me, "No, there is not this freedom you thought you saw in me. It's an illusion, the way you are is the only way to be, I am an imposter, I'm less real than you." Thus it is that, faced with a really disturbing challenge to our unfree condition, faced with a person of disturbing excellence, we have to think him even less than we are.

This process of reducing the outstanding to a condition less than ourselves, is always occurring. Sometimes, when people are discussing an outstanding individual, someone will suggest a flaw in the character and someone else will amplify the suggestion. This is ressentiment at work, seeing to it that the outstanding person will turn out after all to be a bit of a crackpot. Time Magazine, when it is reporting some outstanding person, will generally contrive to point up some reassuring flaw, thus reducing the threatening person to an inferior position. Solzhenitsyn is disturbing, says Time Magazine. But he's a bit of a crank really. The purpose? To keep intact and normative our fear of greatness and freedom, our generic guilt about ourselves. When the British were exploiting Ireland, a great politician, Charles Stuart Parnell, arose in Ireland's defense. His arguments were cogent, his exposures fearless, his devotion selfless. Then his enemies got what they wanted. In his youth, before he became famous, Parnell had got a divorce, something very much frowned on in those days. This was the occasion for people who knew he was right, who were exposed by him as mean and greedy and exploitative, to say, "Well at least I know how to be faithful to one woman, God bless her: I may not have these highflown ideas about freedom, but I'm not an adulterer!" You see the process? The superior man, the man who towers above us, is satisfactorily put beneath us. That is the work of ressentiment,
generic guilt's self-protection from a disturbing freedom. Thus Jesus is not merely killed, not merely destroyed, eliminated. He is condemned, sentenced by law, judged, declared a criminal. The first Station of the Cross is an indispensable brick in the building of the Christian story.

But now, suppose that, faced with the excelling person, I have the grace not to take the way of ressentiment and guilt-protection; suppose I say "Dammit, he's right. I don't know how he got there. I don't know how anybody gets there, but he's right. He's OK. Freedom is possible." Then, far from feeling threatened by his freedom, I feel freedom growing in myself. I begin to get a sense of self-worth I never had before and would not trade in for the self-worth I preserved by reducing the stranger. This is the experience we may have had, of the exceptional person who found his way past our self-justification and into our heart, and helped us to awaken to huge new possibilities in ourselves. It is an experience very close to religious conversion, which is precisely the liberation from generic guilt.

That very famous and influential book, I'm OK--You're OK, lists four possible combinations: I'm OK-You're OK; I'm OK-You're not OK; I'm not OK-You're OK; I'm not OK-You're not OK. There is a fifth combination, which has really been the theme of this section: I'm not OK--but, for me to be able to feel OK, you, who are very much OK, have got to be less OK than I am.

That the book misses this is no accident. Like the whole 'era of psychological man' of which it is representative, this therapy fails to touch the deeper misery of the human condition: the misery of accepted unfreedom that pervades the whole of human society, the misery that is addressed, and sometimes transformatively touched, by the saint, the prophet, the exceptional teacher. In the shallow world of the psychological age, all moral rebuke by one individual of another is out. It is 'the Parent' in the rebuker speaking to 'the Child' in the rebuked. While much moral rebuke is of this kind, and while we have undoubtedly needed the insights of the Psychological Era to free us from its tyranny, there is that rebuke of the unfree by the free which contains the promise of rebirth.

Christianity is the story of a man free of the universal crippling guilt, and thus in love with man as the expression of God, his freedom his greatest glory. A man so in love with men and women, so passionately convinced of the inner core of freedom which we disguise even from ourselves, that he lets himself be drawn into the logic of our desperate situation to the extent of accepting
our condemnation and its bloody sequel. And so from within our self-constructed prison he communicates to us that we are free. I don't fully understand this. It is the kind of truth that cannot be grasped with the head. Rather it is in the order of that existential truth that occasionally erupts between people at a very advanced stage of conflict and reconciliation. The sort of thing it is is, I think, the very special kind of creative silence sometimes observed by the innocent and injured party, which gives to the offender that space in which he can revive. There is a very special non-insistence on one's innocence that is love's most creative and recreative moment. Ogden Nash hits this mystery of people together with a sublime flippancy. The formula for a peaceful marriage, he says, is "When you're in the wrong, admit it. When you're in the right, shut up!" Jesus' acceptance of the cross imposed on him by our ressentiment, by our crippling guilt, is the only cure there is for that deepest, most generic, and subtlest of human ills.

Before we turn not to the disengaging of the method, let us draw from the preceding some definitions—of goodness, of badness, of guilt:

1. Goodness. What is meant by 'the goodness in a person'? Some likeable quality? This is not radical enough. We have to think in terms of the person himself, not as he appears to us. So the goodness in a person is his desire, his inclination, to go beyond himself through knowledge and love. Everyone has this goodness. It is of the nature of persons. You can't have, or conceive of, a person without it. There is no merit in this goodness. It is not in the order of an act of courage that calls for our praise. Nevertheless it is the essential beauty of humans.

2. Badness. Having laid this foundation, we then can proceed to define badness—whether in thought or action—as a brake put by a person on his goodness, a withholding of his goodness from others. In the act of courage referred to above, the person took the brake off his goodness.

3. Guilt. We then have to ask why people put this brake on their goodness. The reason is that they don't like it, they fear it, they fear where it would lead them. But even more radically than this, some original human trauma makes the free exercise of the will seem an unacceptable enterprise. This trauma is the birth-trauma of the ego out of the psychic womb, the contraction of a generic guilt.

4. The disengaging of the method, and its formal application to the whole process of the saving action.

It is extraordinary what a long time—years, decades—it takes to recognize that one is using a method, and then to say what that method is, and then to use the method to select the topics worth pursuing. Every thinker has a method. The mind is a structured
process. It cannot proceed without order. But until one's method has been recognized and named, its control over one's thinking is sporadic. Sometimes it engages, and sometimes it slips, and one does not even notice the difference, until one has summoned up that toughness which critically encircles one's whole performance and asks, "Just what is it I do?" A certain coyness, a certain pretentiousness, inhibits one from taking this step. For spelt out, my method won't look all that impressive. Why not stay with the subtle allusions, the knowing elusiveness, the other rare games that ego learns not from the cocktail conversation but from the very well-spring of a good intelligence?

At last I am able to state my method. Its principle is that the gospel story has to be interiorized: that until I have discovered in my experience and as a dynamic of my spiritual-psychic existence the important moments in the story—I do not understand them for what they are—moments in God's communication to me.

I must be much more specific here. The gospel story depicts the interaction between individuals and Jesus, ranging from the tears of the Magdalen to the formal charge of blasphemy by the High Priest. According to my method, each of these interactions represents a condition of affection or disaffection in my relations with "the free person", with one who challenges my unfree life with his freedom. Of this challenger, Jesus is the supreme and all-embracing exemplar. But I do not know what he does to me until I attend to those persons who, in the ambit of my ordinary experience, do this thing, excite this envy, this guilt, this fear, this resentment, this love, this hate.

Thus, if the method is to be consistently followed, even an event like the condemnation of Jesus by the High Priest has to find recognition as an attitude experienced as my own. Assuredly that condemnation, to be understood, invokes the religious-political history of Israel and a host of related topics. But no consideration that arises in those contexts can fill a gap, or form a link, in my methodical enquiry. My method demands that I see in Jesus' claim to an intimacy with God that is ontological and not merely moral (i.e. an esteem of God for him that is based on who he is not on what he does) the supreme affront to my consciousness controlled as it is by the two factors of (a) insatiable need to be meaningful and (b) the lack of experienced support from God, these two generating together the existential sense that God's approval has to be earned. My response to this affront is the summation, the consummation of all the resentment that is in me. It is the movement
of my affectivity in this ultimate crisis of my freedom. All the bitterness of mortal man, touched by the Infinite yet hugely and immemorially bent on building his own world, goes into the condemnation of the High Priest as I have to appropriate and understand it. I have to see in that condemnation the concentration of all my disaffection. It is that condemnation that resonates in my memory of blurting out, to another who had touched me too deeply, "Who the hell do you think you are?" This "Who do you think you are?" addressed by the religious authorities to Jesus, is heavy with theological overtones. But in the pursuit of my method, these may not deafen the sense that I had in flinging out that question to a lover.

There were many who did not go along with the High Priest's condemnation and its bloody sequel. But all (with the exception of Mary, I suppose) were touched with the disaffection, the negativity in feeling, that it cleanly represents. The primordial and total disaffection has its many tributaries: of doubt, of disappointment, of despair, of denial, of betrayal, of confusion, of bewilderment, of an incomprehensible guilt, that are superbly characterized in the gospel story. The bleeding victim on the cross constellates all the attitudes open to mortal man as he reacts to the offer of a bewildering freedom.

For my method, the feeling-climate of the spectacle of the crucified is all-important. That climate is disaffection, a negativity in feeling, a bitterness. It encompasses everything in me that has ever said of anyone, equivalently or not in words at all, "Crucify Him!" Certainly it includes sorrow as well. But this sorrow must be inconclusive. For our sorrow at the pain we have inflicted or willed to inflict or wished to inflict can never be wholly without the ressentiment at having been brought to the point of inflicting it, a desire to undo what is done and so to retreat to the blissful time before the evil in me could reveal itself. So sorrow reveals itself as, in part, the flip side of the coin so heavily marked on the other side with our disaffection.

But having used my method of interiorisation to the point of the execution of Jesus, I have to ask: Must not the method also be used for thinking about the Resurrection? If the method is valid, it must. And, now that I am able to be overt about the method, I am discovering that it can.

The question to be asked here is: Do we have any experience of a clean reversal of negative feeling? That is the question here, for it is negative feeling that we are understanding as the climate
of the crucifixion. Are there at least, 'hints followed by guesses' in this area?

The first hint I got here was in connection with a personal mini-archetype that I have been sharing with my theology class. This was the recollection of a clear case of resentment provoked in me long ago by a fellow-cadet in the Navy. This young man—long forgotten until these strange speculations resurrected (!) him—was good-looking, good-natured, and good at everything. Predictably he became the Cadet of the Year. And he aroused in me those emotions which, according to Ernest Becker, we are most loath to acknowledge—those connected with our pathetic but passionately prosecuted self-esteem when this is confronted with the effortless success of the humanly whole. Now the thought that occurred to me was: What if the Cadet of the Year appeared to me in a dream, and smiled acceptance? I have, incidentally, a recurrent dream, of a monastic confrère who has for me an unmitigated, and a thoroughly reciprocated, dislike. Sometimes I dream that we are intimate friends, and awake feeling happy. This is my first hint of the area to which we shall have to look if we are seeking to understand the transformation of affectivity from negative to positive. In this transformation, the loathed (or the feared, or the feared-for, or the distrusted, or the looked-at-with-guilt, or the failed-by-me) passes below the level of conflict and the jangling of egos to a level where persons glow with the quiet light of symbols. It is at this deeper level that feeling originally lives and is changeable, and symbols are the catalysts of this changing.

This thought led me to recall a movie that profoundly affected me, "A Separate Peace" by John Knowles. I bought the book at once and read it. And I got more than I bargained for. For at the very start, Gene (the author), revisits his school fifteen years later and immediately goes in search of 'the tree.' Let me quote the relevant passage straightforwardly:

A little fog hung over the river so that as I neared it I felt myself becoming isolated from everything except the river and the few trees beside it. The wind was blowing more steadily here, and I was beginning to feel cold. I never wore a hat, and had forgotten gloves. There were several trees bleakly reaching into the fog. Any one of them might have been the one I was looking for. Unbelievable that there were other trees which looked like it here. It had loomed in my memory as a huge lone spike dominating the river-bank, forbidding as an artillery piece, high as the beanstalk. Yet here was a scattered grove of trees, none of them of any particular grandeur.
Moving through the soaked, coarse grass I began to examine each one closely, and finally identified the tree I was looking for by means of certain small scars rising along its trunk, and a limb extending over the river, and another thinner limb growing near it. This was the tree, and it seemed to me standing there to resemble those men, the giants of your childhood, whom you encounter years later and find that they are not merely smaller in relation to your growth, but that they are absolutely smaller, shrunk by age. In this double demotion the old giants have become pygmies while you were looking the other way.

The tree was not only stripped by the cold season, it seemed weary from age, enfeebled, dry. I was thankful, very thankful that I had seen it. So the more things remain the same, the more they change after all—plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change. Nothing endures, not a tree, not love, not even a death by violence.

Changed, I headed back through the mud, I was drenched: anybody could see it was time to come in out of the rain.

No reader who remembers hearing "Crux Fidelis" sung will fail to hear some echoes in this description of the one tree among others. And this vision of the tree in all its bleakness prepares us for the information that shortly follows as the novel goes back in time: that Gene's school life was permeated by Phineas, Finny, his opposite, the radiant and daredevil athlete who continually dared Gene into his world. The daily ritualized 'dare' was to climb this tree, inch along one of the branches until one was over the river, then jump. On this occasion, Finny had decided that they should do the jump together. And on this occasion Gene had just come to the realization that in following Finny he was ruining his studies and getting bad grades. Then, standing together on the limb, Gene jounced the limb and Finny, after turning and looking at him "for an instant with extreme interest," fell and smashed one of his legs beyond repair, at least as far as the life of an athlete was concerned. This started a train of events that led horribly to Finny's death by falling down a flight of stone steps.

The thought that occurred to me was: If, on that dank November afternoon fifteen years later, Finny had come bounding into the scene and laughingly embraced Gene, that would be the Resurrection. Of course it would be a literary monstrosity, because it would raise so many questions that the symbolic impact would be stultified, even nullified. But if, somehow, the guilt-laden victim could have appeared so as to activate, cleanly and wholly and only, the level of feeling and symbol, that would be the Resurrection.

The vision of Jesus risen surely operates at the level where negative feeling is transformed. Of that level we have some experience in what Eliot has magisterially called "Death's dream kingdom". Jesus comes to us from far deeper—from "Death's other
kingdom." He appears not just at the level of dream, where what has happened is transformed without remainder, but at a level where what has happened has indeed happened and is with us still, only it is embraced by something larger. It is this larger context, that becomes available with the risen one, which reverses all the negative feeling in the astounded witness.

As the execution of Jesus carries all the negativity there is or can be in human feeling, so his restoration to us reverses all the negativity there is or can be in human feeling. The resurrected one encircles in a newly appearing wholeness all those appalling jagged ends in human life where the dead rebuke the living with the irremediable injustice, the jagged end that a Gene has to carry as a result of that one fateful jouncing of the limb of the tree.

The men and women who saw the risen Jesus were, consciously betrayers or deniers or doubters or cowards or all sorts of mixtures of all these. They were, above all, people involved in that subtlest and most human of turpitudes which voluntarily resumes the normal after being touched by the great. They were, in other words, thoroughly related to the cross, permeating the tree with all the confusion and failure and refusal that go to make up this creature man. And to all this in them the risen Jesus spoke. Nor is his risen glory receivable or meaningful otherwise. "He died for our sins and rose for our justification."

In this light, Jesus' invitation to Peter to reverse his triple denial by a triple statement of love, is profoundly meaningful. It is the reversal of feeling, the essential climate of the risen one, dramatized. Similarly intelligible is John's attributing to the risen Jesus the conferring of the power to forgive sins. The total reversal of the negative feeling does not stop at the person who sees Jesus risen. It goes through him to others. So wherever the risen Jesus is preached, the Holy Spirit, the cause of the new reversal of feeling, falls upon the hearers who come to know, without even seeing, that Jesus is risen from the dead.

Out of this same Resurrection experience come all those dissolvings of polarization celebrated by Paul—of Jew and Greek, Jew and Roman, male and female, freedman and slave. For it is the strong negativity in our feeling that makes a Roman officer look so hateful to a Jew and vice-versa. The community of the human is born. Cosmopolis is conceived.

Only one witness of the risen Jesus was made to travel all the way from hatred to love. This was Saul of Tarsus. The others passed into the new life from averagely human evil. Paul had the
major surgery. And so it fell to him to be incomparably more artic- 
culate about the change than were the others. The tortured yet 
emphatic logic of the Letter to the Romans spells it all out, spills 
it all out--resentiment-laden man, threatened by the Law, allured 
by sin, shadowed by death. The heart of this many-featured release 
is the experience of Jesus our victim, our bad debt, as alive and 
radiant and welcoming.

Finally, it is through the Resurrection experience that the 
love shown by Jesus on the cross is known to be God's love for man. 
In terms of the method, 'God's raising of Jesus from the dead' is 
understood as the empowering of the guilt-executed one, the supreme 
instance of the 'jagged end', with that symbolic power which encir-
cles us and reverses our negative feeling, bringing us to a new 
birth beyond all this world. To see Jesus risen from the dead is 
to have the ultimate human negation (the negation of God as life, 
the condemnation of Jesus) turned around. Jesus rises like the sun 
on the horizon of the soul, ending its perpetual night.
I want to begin this paper by sharing with you my own viewpoint, my own ability or lack of ability to see and understand, judge and decide. This viewpoint will be operative in the rest of this paper and will be the basic cause of its limitations and gifts. My purpose in this paper is highlighting. Just as drama employs darkness and then a lighting that helps one to understand the scene, so I hope this paper will highlight areas of pastoral life that can enrich theory and require in turn the corrective influence of theory. It is an attempt to set the stage for praxis. I do not feel that I have the theological richness needed to accomplish this by myself, though I do it all the time in my work. I guess my willingness and need to be here and share my assorted thoughts with you results from a certain combination of historical consciousness—an awareness that collectively we are part of a basic new development within the American church—and a fright, more properly, an anxiety that results from facing that truth in my own small area of influence. I intend to make this more explicit in elaborating my viewpoint. I then intend to recount some borrowed thoughts on the purpose of theology and the church. Then I will deal with a series of pastoral questions arising from the three conversions, religious, moral and intellectual. This will be followed by a general question regarding the possibility of collaboration. I see myself as a practitioner in this paper. Praxis will be the result of these very tentative and unrigorous sense discussions.

I. Viewpoint

A. First of all, I come with a mixed background. Presently, I am Director of the Office of Human Development of the Diocese of Rochester. In that role I deal mainly with generating and coping with social action efforts by parish-based Human Development Committees. I deal with educating and training of the laity for these committees which remain zealously self-directed. Our office also deals with a housing foundation, diocesan level social problems,
collaborative efforts with ecumenical groups and community organizations, social movement people, the Campaign for Human Development, etc. My background is in philosophy and theology in which some understanding of each came at the same time under Bernard Lonergan in graduate work. This was followed by one year in a parish and two years beginning a doctorate in moral theology. I reread *Insight* and was going to work on a thesis on 'rash judgment' in terms of the four-fold bias. But that was not to be. Two more years in a parish, a stolen year in sociology at Cornell, and then five years ago I came into my present job. There is a staff of 13 at the office. I read a fair amount, mixing news and social problem works with theology. In the diocese I am, at times, asked to deal with church questions in general, usually on either a brainstorming or a crisis basis. One often leads to the other.

B. Our diocese is in an accentuated period of change. We have begun a Diocesan Pastoral Council and most basic questions of change will not be decided until this group considers them. The priests feel quite remote from the Bishop and the Pastoral Center and, as a result, the Priests' Council is reactive. Our inner city schools have closed and there is a question on the table about our Urban School System now, due to financial hardship. We have a Black Ministries and a Spanish Apostolate. Neither has evolved a strong and cohesive approach to ministry. Clergy numbers are declining. The number of clergy with special skills is declining. We have sisters as parish assistants now and this role raises ongoing questions about the potential of women in the church. Lay people ask to become workers in church but we do not know how to let them do it. There is a great deal of parochialism and a great deal of freedom. The Bishop speaks on social justice questions but it seems that he is not heeded. However, sixty-to-seventy percent of our parishes recently held voter registration on a Sunday. There is a Medical/Moral Committee and a Justice and Peace Commission just beginning. It seems very hard to put it all together. We just started Fund Development to supplement a parish tax. A commonly shared fear is that an authoritarian Bishop could put us back where we were before. There is a great desire for independence on the part of parishes which often ends up being isolation. There is a generally shared sense of historical consciousness but it paralyzes decisions or demands authority to quiet the fear. Laity feel generally on the outside, but have begun to strongly interact in parish. Power is seen as residing elsewhere by almost everyone.
C. There is a tremendous need for data and analysis but few of us know where to get it. Parishes have learned about census tracts but, in general, they move on folk wisdom. We need to inter-relate the data on needs with new programs but suspicion and a refusal to see the need for this process block these efforts. We need feedback on what we have begun but the creative phase of rapid development that absorbs much energy and evaluation is seen as somewhat threatening to us, since it would involve others who have a very different perspective on the role of the church. Many do not know how to use the human sciences and have classist suspicions of the elitist nature of the sciences. Many parish organizations do change and grope after different ways of serving. Parishes adopt or drop programs pretty much at will with little reference to authority or the consultative bodies. The church at the diocesan level has suspicions but almost no data about what works and does not work. Feelings run high and strong about items such as schools. The solution tends to be to fend off decision and place responsibility elsewhere.

D. Spiritual Cost of Role Leadership. The demands on the pastoral center come from community organizations, parishes, agencies, internally generated projects. The struggle of priests, sisters and laity to plan cooperatively is extremely difficult and seems endless. Organizationally there are processes to resolve their questions and yet it seems that these processes result in a lack of sureness and the demand for leadership and consultation clash from day to day. An attempt to adopt internal organizational practices at the pastoral center which conform to Christian teaching leads to high conflict internally. Gradually, vision becomes less specified and questions of Christian love and compassion almost require a retreat from seeking solutions to questions. For those who formally serve the organizational church, questions of spirit build to the point where the complexity of the task become an iron cage. Endurance in love becomes a labor and often the spontaneity of love becomes deadened.

E. There is a loss of the critical discipline of theological understanding regarding the policies of the Pastoral Center. What is judged to be true and valued highly is rejected by many, and as a result becomes most difficult to implement. The transience of our lay leadership population obviates the possibility of developing a commonly shared approach. Practical solutions to pressing pastoral problems seem to lock us into the world of commonsense analysis. A theology which was never absorbed in a systematic way begins
to be drained of its strength. Soon the general bias of common sense sets in and theological insight becomes impractical. There is great potential for decline in this trend. For the church as an institution in its policies can lose effectiveness by not practicing and living what it calls people to believe. Institutionally, no space exists for reflection on this situation. The attempts to find groupings on a larger than parish base seem to lead to grouping which rather than bearing meaning, defines itself over against other existing groups. The fragmenting force of the culture works with great power.

Finally, trust can be lost. Personally I find myself struggling with a tendency to plan against future loss. The rise of consultation, the absence of consensus, and the arbitrariness involved in the selection of Bishops can encourage strategies to entrench and consolidate gains so they can withstand future changes. It seems to be a balancing act trying to move forward based on sensitive, intelligent, rational and committed action and then securing every gain against the possible storms that may sweep away what has been done. There is a danger here that lack of faith becomes the ultimate norm for common sense.

II. My Understanding of Church and the Function of "Communications."

Given my viewpoint this will necessarily be the least original part of this paper. It deals with a critical theory arising out of the work on method in theology done by Lonergan. My main contribution to this Workshop is the experience of the person serving in the practical Church. My work places me in daily interaction with both the needs and the demands of the institution and its people. These needs are both internal organization and external in the church's role of responding to the needs of groups, the society, and the culture. I will simply try to present some material from a very useful paper by Joseph Komonchak in which he offers a very stimulating critique of Avery Dulles' book, Models of the Church, and then moves to insights for ecclesiology based on Insight and Method. He offers "grounds for an ecclesiology (which) might begin to be laid with reflection on the constitutive role of meaning." (27). He draws from Lonergan and uses the work of Peter Berger to outline "the social conditions of individual existence: man makes himself by meaning, both as an individual and in community; but, as an individual, he knows the 'real world' largely through the common sense of the community and that social definition of reality,
in turn directs and limits his self-constitution by meaning. (32)" Komonchak goes on to deal with the fragility of the world constituted and mediated by meaning. The world mediated by meaning can be undermined by the biases (psychological, individual, group, and general) and the authentic person or community will always be subject to the resulting distortions. The absence of conversion, and the refusal to recognize the lack of self-transcendence as the root problem can lead to decline. He speaks in particular of religious conversion rooted in God's giving of his love in an unmediated way to the individual. This experience will be expressed in the intersubjective attitudes that result but also it will be interpreted by the spoken and written word. "The outer religious word, then, interprets man's new self to himself, unites him with others similarly graced and provides him with a language through which to relate his unmediated experience to the world mediated by inner-worldly meaning (34)." Thus, this experience can become communal and endure from generation to generation—it becomes historical. Then Komonchak presents an outline of the church:

1. "The church is an achievement in the world mediated and constituted by meaning and values. Its substance is the inner gift of God's love, embodied and interpreted by Christ's message (35)." There is an attraction to community based on fellowship in the spirit, an intersubjectivity of grace. God's revelation in Christ provides interpretation for that experience.

2. "The new Christian fellowship centers around the common experience of God's love in the Spirit and in Christ, in the beliefs or doctrines that interpret that experience and in the common life of service it inspires. This is the substance of the church, the common meaning that makes it a community (36)."

3. Komonchak reminds us that the meaning of the church flows from the redemptive work of Christ and there is a living history and handing on of the stories, memories, heroes, and customs which will form us and help us to get a sense of further forming ourselves. There is a real sense of heritage and cultural strains which offer each successive generation the help that it needs to preserve, deepen and communicate that meaning as a group.

4. "For a community constituted by meaning, doctrines will have a central role (36)." Each age and each culture will raise questions rising from their shared experience of both the tradition and the particular milieu in which they live. These questions will probe both meanings and values and will be constitutive of the individual Christian community. Thus it is wrong to understand
doctrines solely on the level of judgement. Doctrine is saving truth.

5. Thus the church today is the result of the communication of the Christian message through doctrines and through the lively sharing of life and meaning of every sort by which former generations sought to share what they knew, the way they lived in fellowship and the deeds that flowed from their faith. As the church is shaped by this communication so it is called to form itself for the future to continue this basic mission of communication.

6. This mission relates the church to society. Komonchak points out that according to Lonergan, "the word 'society' can refer to any concrete instance of social relationships and that, since the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, it is not inappropriate to speak of a worldwide 'society' (37)." Thus the state is a territorial division of this society and the church is "a process of self-constitution occurring within world-wide human society." (Lonergan, 368)

7. If this definition of society and the locus of the church within society is accepted, then what specifically is the church's contribution to society? Lonergan understands the church as having a particular role in the effort to provide the ideal basis for society which is community. In the complexities of a world-wide society "responsible freedom demands long and difficult training" (Komonchak, 38) and in addition to the lack of attention to this effort, the biases will also distort and undermine the collective endeavor to achieve community. As Lonergan puts it:

There are needed, then, individuals and groups and, in the modern world, organizations that labor to persuade people to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and that work systematically to undo the mischief brought about by alienation and ideology. Among such bodies should be the Christian Church (361).

The church then has an explicitly redemptive role to play. Alienation is basically failure in self-trancendence which legitimates itself in ideology. Self-sacrificing love patterned after that of Christ is the basic meaning the Church communicates which leads to reconciliation of the alienated.

8. Finally Komonchak specifies the distinctive features of the church (34-42). As religious conversion sublates moral and intellectual conversion, so religious community sublates other forms of community.

It seems to me that the purpose of this Workshop centers on an exercise in praxis. We need to begin with a definition of the
term praxis, lest it be identified simply with what is done. Rather it is a critical dialogue in which practice and theory serve as a critique upon each other. "Praxis is correctly understood as the critical relationship between theory and practice whereby each is dialectically influenced and transformed by the other." (Tracy, 243) However, I would like to introduce a somewhat different focus than that which Tracy offers. Perhaps incorrectly, I would interpret his focus to be a critical dialogue on the interrelationship between the believing community and the human society, both on a 'macro'-level. I would like to offer some questions that arise on the diocesan level of the church community in which practice seems at variance with present theory. These questions have more to do with our understanding and communication as church on the 'micro'-level of the parish or community. Perhaps the more basic question to be addressed here concerns where we are to turn for help. It may be that, just as Gerald Ford early in his presidency pointed out the tragedy of the loss of relationship between the academic community and the labor unions, we are dealing here with a weakness in critical communication between the theological community and the local church. It seems at times that the theological community is looking for a means of dialogue with other members of the academic community with a tendency to overlook the gap that exists between the academic community in general and the practical workaday church and society. Not all the resistance on the part of practical church community to the theory of the theologians is due to bias on the part of the people of common sense. At any rate, perhaps the greatest contribution that this discussion might offer is to help me and hopefully all of us, to understand where our questions "fit" into a pattern of theological dialogue.

I would like to turn to a question that arises frequently and, I think, can be rooted in the experience of religious conversion. I use this term in the sense of Lonergan and not perhaps in the manner which it is used by a "born-again" Christian, although I think the question most applies to the latter.

Religious conversion involves the unmediated event of God's love filling the believer's heart. It is not an event that results from a rational process. It is rather something that involves a radical change in outlook on life and the subject will have to seek the help that is needed to understand what has happened and integrate this into all aspects of her life. Resulting from this conversion there is also a spontaneous intersubjectivity. Both the fruits of the spirit and the need to spend time with persons who
have had a similar experience to explore ways of expressing that event and understanding the experience will tend to bring people together to express their love in symbol, and art, words and songs that will be what we call worship. Slowly, of course, there will be an exploration of the implications for life and also the critical function of defining authentic and inauthentic conversion according to the truth of God's revealed word. I will confine my remarks here solely to those whose conversion takes place within a Christian tradition.

I am not speaking simply of the Pentecostal phenomenon here. I am also speaking of those who are attracted to a liturgical community because of the "fellowship in the Spirit" that is found there—the intersubjectivity and community. Let me quote from Method in Theology on the role of the apologist to further illuminate my question in regard to pastoral practice:

The apologist's task is neither to produce in others nor to justify for them God's gift of his love. Only God can give that gift, and the gift itself is self-justifying. People in love have not reasoned themselves to being in love. The apologist's task is to aid others in integrating God's gift with the rest of their living. Any significant event on any level of consciousness calls for adjustments elsewhere. Religious conversion is an extremely significant event and the adjustments it calls for may be both large and numerous. For some one consults friends. For others, one seeks a spiritual director. For commonly needed information, interpretation, the formulation of new and the dropping of mistaken judgments of fact and of value, one reads the apologists.

In both the Pentecostal movement and in many parishes where there is a strong emphasis on community and on the phenomenon of full participation in Eucharist from the beginning of entering into that community is commonplace. Many priests just don't ask questions and allow it to happen. For many it is due to a general lack of commitment to the intellectual demands of faith. They will never ask, never clarify. But for others, it is looked upon as good pastoral practice to encourage this. It seems that in coming from an intellectualist and overly institutionalized approach to Church, ministers ought to be open to allowing years, at times, for a person to move from the expression and sharing of the experience of conversion and religious communion to a carefully examined and critical approach to faith. Oftentimes the alleged fundamentalism of the Pentecostal community could be looked upon as the first stages of a developmental process whereby the scriptures take on a vital and fresh force as profoundly significant and thus the
believer stands at the beginning of conversion with an intentional commitment to a critical examination of beliefs. I believe that the critical study of this area of pastoral practice calls for critical dialogue with theory. The present institutional rigidity of norms simply does not relate to the situation in the field.

I would like to raise the second basic question in regard to the priority of religious conversion. Religious conversion sublates moral and intellectual conversion. Lonergan explains what he means by this term: "... what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context (241)." I think that we need a full expression of this in regard to pastoral practice. The church in America has entered into some major debates with the principles and practices of our society. Recent documents on employment, housing, the aged, and abortion, attempt to deal with these questions in a way that can be comprehended by those who are dedicated to the common good. But in the zeal for relevance in dialogue, the pastoral leadership of the church may be moving in a manner that will reduce the effectiveness of the documents both within the church community and in regard to the society as a whole. For example, in New York State the abortion question came up in the political realm and almost all the teaching of the pastoral leadership was designed from the start to be politically relevant and effective. The present stance of the leadership consists of a heavy reliance on the authoritative teaching of the church as an institution and a too rapid move to a scientific and humanistic approach to the question about how to facilitate the potential for political coalition. As a result we are judged by many as an institution trying to enforce a controverted moral and political position on the rest of the community. The consequent division within our people tends to rest on a political basis—if one is liberal politically then one is very uncomfortable with the approach of the church, and, likewise, if one is conservative politically then one is in favor of the position of the church. Endorsement and support of the position of church leadership is really grounded in one's approach to the role of law in American society. Rarely is the religious foundation for the teaching spoken to, and certainly I have never heard it get related to the ground of being-in-love with God. In the theological community it seems that the liberal
political stance may endorse what has been the approach—again to the neglect of this moral teaching's foundation in religious conversion for the community of the church. I am speaking, in this section, mainly in regard to the internal forum of the church community and trying to get the dialogue within the church off the base of a generalized political persuasion. I think that David Tracy puts well the issue I am trying to raise:

Indeed the major difficulty of the liberal theologian becomes yet more clear in its practical consequences: his nearly complete commitment to the modern Enlightenment view of humanity's rational possibilities prevented him from either grasping theoretically or employing practically the profound and transformative Christian images of man's actual situation of sin and grace and, correlative, the Christian image of a loving and just God whose acts are meant to transform that human situation beyond reasonableness and even beyond tragedy. (241-242)

To close and try to clarify what is a quite imperfectly stated problem: the roots of the Christian approach to society, the role of the church in society as a redemptive institution—both need to be deeply embedded in the inner and outer words of religious conversion. Often it is precisely the rootedness in this event and not in the shallower political traditions of our nation that present an opportunity for impact upon society.

III. Moral Conversion

In dealing with this topic I do not intend to exclude the revaluing influence of the experience of religious conversion. Rather, it will be a change of focus. I believe that among the present population of the church which has been winnowed to a certain extent by the experiences of the past ten years, we have a group of people who, at least on the level of intention and outlook, perceive themselves as morally converted. They live for the sake of others. They strive to place values above their own selfish self-interest. At the same time, however, they live in a consumer-oriented culture which places great emphasis on self-satisfaction and in a competitive culture that makes much of "looking out for number one." I wish to speak again to practical considerations which I hope can provoke a theological response. On the level of communications there is little to offer as wisdom unless that wisdom is generated and grounded in the functional specialties. I wish to deal with three pastoral questions and address one afterthought to the role of seminaries and universities in the church currently.
a) First of all, if my assumption is correct about the fact that we can assume genuine moral conversion in most Catholics who will be influenced by the action or inaction of the church, then we have to pay more attention to the often overlooked statement of Lonergan that: "Such conversion, of course, falls far short of moral perfection. Deciding is one thing, doing is another (240)."

The cry of the pulpit lately is that one must "form one's own conscience". Usually the accompanying helps are the "teachings of the church" and then some examination of the problems that are connected with the teachings of the church. Choose for yourself seems to be the next practical step, at least by implication. Much more must be said if one maintains a healthy respect for the fragile and always imperiled nature of moral growth in a culture riddled with moral decline in many institutions that shape our society. Lonergan points out many of the pitfalls for moral decisions. "One has yet to uncover and root out one's individual, group, and general bias (240)."

Dramatic bias should be explored in depth especially in regard to a profound psychological bias such as basic racism. The present state of many who have comprehended the character of racism within themselves and yet remain unable to deal with feelings and fears resulting from a racist heritage calls pastoral leadership to a specific task that is rarely dealt with. The trend seems to be to focus solely on institutional racism with little ability to comprehend the racism that troubles each of us, black and white. In regard to group bias, the tools for analysis which will move us beyond a liberal analysis of bias seem to be nonexistent. Rosemary Ruether describes this problem well: "The critique of the dominant group ideologies must complete itself with a critique of the latent ideologies of those who aspire to a place in the light. The oppressed are immaculately conceived incapable of sin. The oppressors take on the hues of the new 'devils'. Recognizing a plurality of contradictions forces the 'liberator' to recognize ways in which he/she is also a part of the problem". I will say more in regard to general bias at the end of this paper. "One has to keep developing one's knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the existing situation (Lonergan, 240)." A strong drive to empirical study is contained in this sentence. "One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and its elements of decline." David Tracy expresses these last two points of Lonergan more clearly (and I might add that the clarity also imparts to the reader the frightening complexity of the task):
The revisionist theologian (critical social theory) would imply at least the following factors: strictly empirical analyses of our actual economic, political, cultural, and social situations... rigorous ethical analyses of the possibilities and limitations of the various infra-structural and super-structural components of our social reality; critical retrievals, if possible, or critical inventions, if necessary, of various symbol systems in accordance with their ability both to negate the oppressive forces actually operative in the situation and to project those images of social humanity to which the authentic human being can commit himself or herself. (246-47).

And to finish out with Lonergan's list of critical questions that will translate moral conversion into moral action: "One has to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses to values and their implicit scale of preference. One has to listen to criticism and protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others (240)." I listed all the above steps because I believe that pastors and teachers of morality have adopted a simplistic interpretation of the words "form your own conscience." There is much naive individualism and a certain atomistic personalism in that slogan with little recognition of the graced responsibilities of an institution that is called upon to provide a light of wisdom to persons who are willing to live that way. The solution lies in collaboration.

b) This raises the question of the place for doing theology that responds to pastoral needs. Recently, in our diocese there have been requests for a commission on a) Justice and Peace, b) Medical Moral Practices, c) Housing, d) Criminal Justice, e) Aging. The international Justice and Peace Commission, for example, has been formed at the urging of the Washington office to offer the diocese a focal point in addressing economic, political, social and cultural questions which certainly have to be addressed intelligently at the level of the districts of our members of Congress. But perhaps on this level the task should be discovery of the methods of communication for more foundational work that has been done at a higher level. It is not that such a commission on a diocesan level might not be able to recruit expertise. It is simply a potentially massive reduplication in a completely uncoordinated style that will confine groups such as international Justice and Peace Commissions to marginal influence. Those who can offer vision on the type of collaboration that is needed might be able to offer some help on the scale of planning, should our efforts be local, regional, national or international as church in light of the mission defined by Lonergan.
c) There is also a stylistic question involved in dealing with moral questions. The age when the moral teacher could issue pro-nouncements on moral questions has passed. Surely it is still done. But every time it is done, more and more people are set free from the domination of this form of teaching. However, at the same time, there is a tendency to simply say nothing on these questions since one has a "captive" audience and one is free to dissent in these matters. We need to move to a conscious dialectic within the public forum of the church. We need at the same time to create the freedom for strong statements within the context of the church, but with the definite understanding that this is the position and that all other positions can be expressed in the forum of dialogue that is the church. There must be a critical edge in this discussion, but in concrete matters the ability of each person to apply his or her own criteria must be respected. I believe even the Bishops' statements must be made in this light and there should be an equal commitment on each side to listening. Too often statements are made and there is no forum or no interest in a forum of response. Again, one asks what that forum is like on the various levels of Church? One asks further at what level does a formal intersection with the universities occur?

This leads me finally to a word on seminaries. I believe that they are institutionally outmoded as regards the form of the educational design. The church needs centers of reflection and formation. We need institutions of learning where some of the questions that we face in regard to moral practice can be examined on a collaborative basis. The role of the priest, deacon, or lay church leader will have to be continually revised. Thus, the existence of an institution dedicated solely to the initial formation of priests combined with the basic lack of any institutions in most dioceses and most states where this type of praxis can be designed and experienced seems to undermine any moral leadership that we could offer. I do not think that the basic and exhaustive work described by Tracy can be done in each diocese, but lower level dissemination points will be needed. I feel that the question of seminaries is relevant for they are popularly perceived as places of leadership formation. The universities on the other hand do not seem to be in vital contact with the feelings and questions of the practical builders of church. Perhaps the questions have to be reinterpreted but even there a forum for dialogue would help.
IV. Intellectual Conversion

The prior sections indicate problems which heighten for me the basic question—the institutionalization of the fifth functional specialty. First of all, what is implied in that structure itself? Secondly, when that institution in its present format begins to move into planning, what kind of questions arise and what sort of help is needed?

The structure of the church results from an understanding of the tasks that the church has to perform, the roles that it needs for self-constitution, communication, and interaction with the society as a whole. This structure will result both from the meaning that the church appropriates from its living history, traditions, and the revealed word of Christ. It will also result from the cultures, and the wisdom of the age or the society in which a local church finds itself. But there are many ways in which bias will enter into the structure of that church.

When I studied in the Agricultural School of Cornell University, it was interesting to note that there were departments of poultry science, marketing, agricultural engineering. But there was not even a position that dealt with farm labor. Despite the fact that for many of the crops of the state, farm labor was necessary, there was no chair, no focal point from which to study and reflect on the system of migrant workers that the growers have employed for years. As a result the displacement of labor stemming from the department of agricultural engineering was never studied in anything but economic cost-benefit terms. The effects of that social displacement, the effects of a black farm worker from Florida settling out of the migrant stream into rural upstate New York—these were never examined.

I believe that we need a critical examination of the structures of the local, regional and national church to reveal to us the same type of information. I would call for this not only because of the potential for the revelation of bias (most especially general bias) but also because of the chaos that is resulting from the breakdown of former structures. We see the rise of consultative bodies, task forces on special social problems, black ministries' offices, and Spanish apostolates, Catholic Charities and parish social action offices, back-up offices for parish councils and pastoral councils—all of this exploding within the central organization of the church. We are at a turning point in regard to the structure of the local church and it seems to me that we
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need to move from a practical commonsense order within that church to a careful study of the meaning of the church, and the ways that meaning can be best expressed and supported structurally. Lonergan says in his chapter on communications: "We have been indicating a method, parallel to the method of theology, for integrating theology with scholarly and scientific human studies. The aim of such integration is to generate well informed and continuously revised policies and plans for promoting good and undoing evil both in the Church and in human society generally. Needless to say, such integrated studies will have to occur on many levels, local, regional, national, international. . . . (366)". The section goes on to describe the need for higher levels of study and finally the need for coordination to make sure that such studies are conducted at the proper levels. In addition to studies, however, there will be implementation and this will not occur at the centers of studies. It will occur in parishes which have been gutted through urban renewal or the wave of self-destruction that now grips the city, at campus parishes, in small rural town parishes. It will be implemented in deaneries, or at the diocesan level. Perhaps those levels are themselves the problem. But if church is church, then please examine and help with the levels of implementation and the structure of the church as people. There is much thought and reflection going on in regard to ministry but the practical format for ministry remains largely unexamined. It seems that the study of this end of church is left alone, left to the builders who have always patterned the buildings after the theology that was prevalent.

Finally, I would raise the question of general bias in regard to the rage for planning that has struck many dioceses. In light of the points that have been contained in this paper (only a small fraction of the major questions facing us) the way that we structure planning will have a tremendous effect on the outcome of that planning no matter how intelligent and critical. If the departments of the diocese such as liturgy, religious education, schools, social action, pastoral ministry, black ministries all plan separately with little contact with one another then good results will be accidental. Policy is concerned with attitudes and ends—the basic directional questions of church. It seems to me at the present time that planning can only be seen as a holding operation waiting for the time when the basic insights about the shape of the practical church become clearer. We need an entry point for renewed theology to interact with the church as it strives to adapt to its renewed role both internally and within the society.
I will close this paper with what is a sign of hope for me. The actions of the Catholic Bishops of this country in celebrating the Bicentennial, I believe, are noteworthy and potentially seminal. A process was established which included a booklet with position papers on the theme "Liberty and Justice For All." These papers touched on many themes: the neighborhood, the native American, the economy, international justice. The booklet was distributed on the parish level with outlines for discussion. A series of hearings were conducted across the country to which any individual or group could come and present testimony. The results of both the parish discussions and the hearings were then assembled and professionals in the human sciences and theology formulated papers based on this data. These papers will then be sent to delegations from each diocese who will suggest revisions. In October in Detroit these delegations from across the country will assemble and vote on these papers. Finally, the American Bishops will issue a five year pastoral plan for justice in May of 1977. While there have been and will be breakdowns in this process, it seems to me that we have here a format for praxis. There are many other questions to be faced by the church. Some require a more than national scale. But without profound reflections on the format for accomplishing the eighth functional specialty the whole purpose of Method will be frustrated. Our theology will remain isolated and marginal. We will resemble the solitary and sad figure of the person who is "all dressed up" but has nowhere to go. I believe that the level on which theology is done today flows out of a tradition that removes it from effects on practical living. I trust that I may not be falling into general bias rejecting the higher viewpoint and the long run. But I would ask that each examine the perspectives from which he or she does theology for the potential biases they may contain.
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"DYNAMICS OF CHRISTOTHERAPY" AND THE ISSUE OF A DE JURE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PLURALISM

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Introduction

The Boston College Lonergan Workshop is now in its fourth summer session of "ongoing collaboration." In the past three summer workshops I have had the privilege of relating what I have called "Christotherapy" to the intricacies of Bernard Lonergan's thought. In successive papers I have dealt with the foundational issue of a Christian psychotherapy (1978), the social matrix of emotional disturbance (1976b, 1981), and the nature of neurosis (1976a). In each paper I have developed my own theory of Christotherapy and related the particular problem area at issue to various elements in Lonergan's thought and method. This yearly opportunity for ongoing dialogue and dialectic has been a major catalyst in my own thinking and has been seminally helpful to me in the development of my current "work in progress" which is tentatively entitled Dynamics of Christotherapy with the subtitle Love-Enlightened Decision-Freedom. I would like to use this present paper as an occasion for presenting a skeletal outline of the structure of my forthcoming book and for relating some of the book's presuppositions and internal developments to the thought of Lonergan and some of his collaborators and especially to the issue of the possibility of a de jure psychotherapeutic pluralism.

Dynamics of Christotherapy

Initial Comments on the Thought of Gaston Fessard

Gaston Fessard's La dialectique des Exercices spirituels de saint Ignace de Loyola (1956) has served as a major source of inspiration for certain grounding insights of the forthcoming Dynamics of Christotherapy. Fessard argues in his work that it is possible to envisage the free act (the act of free moral decision) in terms of four "moments", two of which lead up to the free act and two of which flow out of it. Fessard further argues that it is possible
to envisage the free act (the act of free moral decision) in terms of four "moments", two of which lead up to the free act and two of which flow out of it. Fessard further argues that it is possible through reflective analysis to discern in the dynamic movement of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius--interpreted as centered in an election or decision preceded by two "weeks" and followed by two "weeks"--a specific dynamic representation of the act of decision with its four moments /1/. In Dynamics of Christotherapy I endeavor to show that this same type of process with its four moments is intrinsic to the dynamics of healing of both neurosis and addiction and that key elements in the Spiritual Exercises may be creatively related to and analogously integrated into the dynamics of these two healing processes.

Before presenting the structural outline of Dynamics of Christotherapy I wish to look more closely at Fessard's analysis of the act of free moral decision and its moments and also at his interpretative application of this analysis to the dynamics of the Spiritual Exercises. I will briefly relate this analysis to the process of healing of neurosis and addiction and then present the outline of the book.

Fessard affirms that in every free moral decision it is possible to distinguish two moments which lead up to the decision and two moments which flow out of the decision. To be more concrete, let us use the example of an individual who with the help of grace makes the decision to shift from a basically immoral to a moral way of life. Prior to the decision the individual is faced with the necessity to choose between remaining in a state of sin or of opening himself/herself to grace. Fessard speaks of sin, using Hegelian terminology, as a certain "positing of non-being" and he describes the process leading up to the authentic moral decision both as a negating of the positing of non-being that is sin and as a moving away from the non-being of sin toward the being of grace. The first moment then is the positing of the non-being of sin and the second moment is the negating of this positing by turning toward grace. The movement from the first through the second moment culminates in the conversion or the free moral decision. After the decision the individual still has to struggle with remaining sinful tendencies. But the final aim is to confirm the positive option one has made. Fessard thus describes the first moment after the decision as "the excluding of all non-being" and the second moment as the "positing of being." Whereas the whole process began with the positing of the non-being of sin, it culminates in the full positing of the being of grace.
In Fessard's analysis of the movement of the *Spiritual Exercises* the moment of the election is central and it is preceded by the first two "weeks" of the *Exercises* and followed by the last two "weeks". The *Spiritual Exercises* are usually made by individuals who are already basically converted morally and religiously and so the election is not a matter of choosing between evil and good but between good and better. An individual engages in the dynamic movement of the *Exercises* in order to become optimally disposed for the election in question and to deepen and consolidate the option once it is made.

Let us look more closely at Fessard's analysis of the weeks of the *Exercises* in the light of the decision dynamic with its four moments. In the first week of the *Exercises* the individual considers such sinful posings of non-being as those of the angels, of Adam and Eve, of one person who died in mortal sin. Finally, the meditator considers his/her own sins. The ego's foolish, sinful attempt to affirm its absolute independence and autonomy is gradually unveiled as a lie. Sin is revealed as truly non-being and is seen to culminate in the final absurdity of hell. The fruit of the meditations of the first week is contrition and the experience of mercy due to the divine initiative. This experience leads the individual into the contemplations of the second week in which Jesus Christ is manifested as the image of grace, of authentic being and true freedom. Christ is revealed as the visible image of Love, and true liberty is seen to consists in an obedience which wills what Christ wills, fights for what Christ fights for and hopes for what He hopes. The prayerful engagement in the first two weeks of the *Exercises* should dispose an individual to make his/her election in a state of mind and heart free of bias and open to God's will. But it is not enough to make the election. If the election is to be more than a velleity, it is necessary to die more deeply to whatever sinful attachments or inclinations still remain. The third week contemplations, accordingly, summon the person to what Fessard calls "the excluding of non-being." This consists in uniting oneself in one's decision with Christ in his Eucharistic offering and in sorrowing, suffering and dying with him in a contemplative prayerful union. Then, just as at the end of the first week the divine initiative of grace intervened to enable the individual to pass from the meditative experience of the ultimate fruits of sin in hell to the contemplation of Grace incarnate in the mystery of Christ, so at the end of the third week the divine initiative enables the contemplator of Christ in his passion and
death to pass with Christ from death to life. The fourth week is in Fessard's philosophical terms "the positing of being" par excel-

lence. And, if in the third week the principal fruit of prayer was sorrowing with Christ in sorrow, the main fruit of the fourth week is joy with Christ risen and glorious. The fourth week is as full of the positive and the being of grace as the beginning of the first week was dominated by the negativity of sin and its emptiness.

As a final note to my comment on Fessard, I want to emphasize that in my forthcoming book I make no claim to be a particularly faithful interpreter of Fessard nor do I necessarily imply agreement with the many nuances of his position. Rather, I creatively adapt various insights of Fessard to my own ends and I do so in ways which might not prove to be in harmony with certain aspects of Fessard's own thought.

Next, there is the issue of the relationship of the decision process and its moments as described above to the processes involved in the healing of neurosis and addiction. Here I can only adumbrate what I will be developing at length in my book.

Dr. Andras Angyal and the Healing of Neurosis

In the matter of the stages involved in the process of the healing of neurosis I have found the work of Dr. Andras Angyal (1965) particularly helpful, though I adapt from him as freely as I do from Fessard. In Angyal's view it is important to distinguish various stages in the process of healing of neurotic disturbances. There is the first stage in which the neurotic pattern is dominant. During this period there is the gradual recognition on the part of the neurotic patient of the destructiveness of the neurotic way of being-in-the-world. The neurotic likewise slowly begins to discover that even in the neurosis there is a certain drive for health at work. At this stage there is need for what Angyal calls the "demolition process" in which destructive elements are uncovered and gradually removed and for the "reconstruction process" in which "the person's own healthy self, still encysted in the neurotic structure" (228) is brought to light. Next, Angyal speaks of the "struggle for decision." Here "the patient wavers between the two ways of life that claim his allegiance" (221). This period culminates in the decision in which the patient decides for the shift toward health. But, this is not the end. Although the authentic decision embodies a shift to the healthy pattern, there is still need for combatting the negative--there can be a recrudescence of symptoms even at a very late stage in therapy. The potentiality
for malfunctioning remains and "it is immediately activated when
the patient succumbs to conceit, pride, or self-centeredness and
retreats into his angry, anxious isolation" (260). Still, though
there is need to fight negative factors in the post-decision period,
the ascendancy of the positive becomes ever more dominant. There
is an ever increasing exigence for the cultivation of--and identi-
fication with--the new and healthy way of being-in-the world.

Clearly, Fessard's analysis of the act of decision with its
antecedent and consequent moments finds an instantiation in Angyal's
description of the stages involved in the process of the healing
of neurosis, just as it was previously verified in the case of the
process of the Spiritual Exercises.

Alcoholics Anonymous and the Healing of Addiction

There is finally the relationship of the decision process and
its four moments to the healing of addiction. I was led to the
discovery of this relationship through my acquaintance with the
famous twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous (1952). Later I came
across the writings of Angyal and found that he confirmed what I
had earlier discovered for myself. The first step, then, of the
twelve reads as follows: "We admitted we were powerless over alco-
hol--that our lives had become unmanageable." This parallels rather
exactly the process in the first week of the Exercises where the
absurdity and "hellishness" of the sinful way of being-in-the-world
is existentially recognized and--with the aid of grace--a deepening
contrition results. The second step reads: "Came to believe that
a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity." This
is in marked parallel to contemplative concentration in the second
week of the Exercises on Christ as the image of perfect freedom
through his witness to the kingdom and power of the Father. The
third step reads: "Made a decision to turn our will and our lives
over to the care of God as we understood him." Here is the exact
counterpart of the election in the Spiritual Exercises. Steps
four through ten involve a deeper dying to the self and whatever
negative factors remain. These steps read as follows: "Made a
searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves"; step five:
"Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the ex-
act nature of our wrongs"; step six: "Were entirely ready to have
God remove all these defects of character"; step seven: "Humbly
asked Him to remove our shortcomings"; step eight: "Made a list of
all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to
them all"; step nine: "Made direct amends to such people wherever
possible, except when to do so would injure them or others"; step ten: "Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it." Steps four through ten can be related analogously to the individual's participation during the third week of the Exercises in Christ's Eucharistic offering and his prayerful sorrowing and dying with him. Step eleven reads: "Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we understood him, praying only for knowledge of his will for us and the power to carry it out." This step corresponds analogously to the positive affirmation of the being of grace in the fourth week of the Exercises. Finally, just as the fourth week leads to what is called "the Contemplation for Obtaining Love," which ends the Exercises and in which Ignatius reminds us that love is shown not so much in words as in deeds, so the eleventh step leads naturally to the twelfth and last step which reads: "Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs." Here, once again, Fessard's analysis of the decision process and its moments finds a concrete exemplification in yet another sphere of human healing and transformation.

Outline of Dynamics of Christotherapy

In the light of the background reflections just offered it is now possible to present the structural outline of Dynamics of Christotherapy. The book involves two parts. Part One entitled Foundations contains three chapters. The first chapter deals with the shift involved in moving from Christotherapy (1975) to Dynamics of Christotherapy. In the three year period since I finished Christotherapy I have done a good deal of counseling and working with emotionally troubled and addicted individuals; I have also developed considerably in my reflections on the processes of healing and growth. These experiences and developments are reflected in my first chapter. The second chapter explores the nature of neurosis and addiction. I examine the causations involved in these disturbances and the distinction and relationship between them. A third foundational chapter deals with key principles and existential techniques of Christotherapy. In this chapter I compare and contrast Christotherapy especially with Dr. Thomas Hora's Existential Psychotherapy. This is particularly important since, although Dr. Hora has been a great inspiration for me, his first book, entitled Existential Psychotherapy, (1977) has recently appeared and contains certain philosophical, theological and psychological principles
with which I basically disagree. The second part of the book is tentatively entitled The Process and contains five chapters. These chapters correspond respectively to the two moments which precede the decision (chapters four and five), the decision itself (chapter six) and the two moments which follow the decision (chapters seven and eight). These chapters are more ordered toward praxis and in the mode of pastoral counseling they seek to show how the Mystery of Christ in its various dimensions can be integrally incorporated into the dynamics of the healing of both neurosis and addiction.

This involves the basic thesis of my Christotherapeutic approach which is that there ought to be available for the emotionally troubled and addicted Christian a therapeutic approach which integrates the healing dynamics of the Christian religion and psychology in a holistic fashion.

LONERGAN AND CHRISTOTHERAPY

Introduction

In the remainder of this paper I would like to relate some of the presuppositions and internal developments of Dynamics of Christotherapy to the thought of Lonergan, some of his collaborators and especially to the issue of a de jure psychotherapeutic pluralism.

In his review of my book Christotherapy Dr. Michael Vertin raises a question which equally pertains to the sequel to Christotherapy. Dr. Vertin's question reads: "Is Christotherapy ultimately a specific psychotherapeutic approach alongside others but distinct from them, or is it merely a general psychotherapeutic perspective within which various specific approaches may be taken?" (1976:13). This question of Dr. Vertin can well serve as a jump-off point for the discussion in the second part of this paper.

My intention is that Dynamics of Christotherapy will embody both a specific psychotherapeutic approach and a general psychotherapeutic perspective within which various specific approaches may be taken. Thus, I consider the healing decision dynamic with its four moments outlined above to be relevant both to the existential psychotherapeutic approach I developed in Christotherapy and am continuing to develop in Dynamics of Christotherapy and to the classical depth therapeutic approaches which I did not deal with in Christotherapy. This position represents somewhat of an advance
beyond my viewpoint in Christotherapy and I think consequently that some brief background comments are in order here.

At the time I wrote Christotherapy I was rather antagonistic toward the classical psychotherapeutic approaches, e.g. Freud, Jung, Adler, and argued strongly in favor of the humanistic, existential, present-oriented schools of psychotherapy. I was heavily influenced by Drs. Thomas Hora, William Glasser (1965), Albert Ellis (1971) and others—all of whom were engaged in a strong polemic against what they saw to be basic limitations and inadequacies in the classical, depth-oriented therapies. In the three year period that has intervened between the time of the completion of Christotherapy and the present I have become less dogmatic about the unique excellences of the contemporary approaches to psychotherapy listed above and more ecumenical in my attitude toward the classical approaches. This greater openness and flexibility is due in no small measure to comments of Bernard Lonergan and others made here at the Boston College workshops. Thus, in my forthcoming Dynamics of Christotherapy, though I still articulate what is basically a "height" rather than a "depth" approach to therapy /2/, I seek to incorporate to a greater degree certain depth therapy emphases, such as those which stress the importance of the past, of dreams, of symbols, etc. I also try to show how my approach can be useful to those who seek to integrate the healing dynamics of the Christ-event into a basically depth-oriented psychotherapeutic approach. By this I do not necessarily imply that the depth-oriented therapist will be able to use my approach in the central fashion and to the same degree as will the sympathetic Christian height therapist. But I do believe that my approach can perhaps prove useful in an auxiliary manner, at least at certain developed stages, in depth therapy. My optimism in this regard, however, is contingent on the acknowledgement of the possibility of a de jure as well as a de facto psychotherapeutic pluralism.

In the remainder of this paper I would like in turn to enumerate certain principles of Bernard Lonergan which I think indicate an openness to the possibility of a de jure psychotherapeutic pluralism, to relate some of these principles to current developments in height therapy and to draw certain comparisons between the depth therapy approach of Robert Doran and the healing decision dynamics of Christotherapy in an endeavor to show that complementarity rather than conflict can characterize the depth-height therapy relationship, at least as it is explored within a Lonerganian context.
Lonergan and the Possibility of a De Jure Psychotherapeutic Pluralism

In *Insight* (1957) and even more so in *Method in Theology* (1972) and later articles Lonergan has demonstrated an openness to diverse psychotherapeutic approaches both in his references to and utilization of ideas of various psychologists and psychotherapists and in the articulation of his theory of the nature of human consciousness and psychic development. Thus, in *Insight* Lonergan made use of theories of Carl Jung as well as Sigmund Freud, even though as Paul Roazen has remarked in his recent *Erik H. Erikson* (1976), Jung is still regarded as unscientific by many Freudians (194). Likewise, in *Insight* Lonergan was open to the work of Dr. Karen Horney, even though Dr. Robert Coles has pointed out that Horney was not even on the reading lists during his student period in Boston (Roazen: 193-94). Further, in *Method in Theology* and in more recent writings Lonergan has shown himself open to existential, third-force orientations such as those of Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow and others, even though these latter are completely ignored by many of the more classically oriented psychotherapists. Now it is my belief that Lonergan's openness to ideas of the diverse thinkers just mentioned is rooted in his own basic theory of the nature of psychic development and human consciousness. In what immediately follows I would like to list certain views and principles of Lonergan which I think tend to support the theory that a certain psychotherapeutic pluralism is a *de jure* as well as a *de facto* reality.

Stages in Psychic Development

First, then, a key presupposition for any openness to the notion of a *de jure* psychotherapeutic pluralism is the view that the human psyche develops in various stages and that failures in psychic development can occur at any phase of this development. Erik Erikson, for example, envisages eight basic stages in the psychic development of the human person and he admits the possibility of aberration on each of these levels. Generally speaking, aberrations in the later stages imply earlier aberrations, though this is not always the case.

Lonergan in *Insight* puts a key emphasis on stages of human development and this includes the psychic as well as the organic and the intellectual levels. Thus, for example, in his discussion of sexual development Lonergan acknowledges a prolonged and intricate process which is both organic and psychological. Lonergan
observes that aberrations in this complex area are possible due to multiple factors and that many psychological difficulties have their roots here. Lonergan notes that "accidents, incomprehension, blunders, secretiveness" (197) can occur but that if these occur at random they can be offset "by the excretory function of the dream, by the pressures and attractions of a healthy environment, by suitable and opportune instruction, by some form of inner acceptance of the drive to understanding and truth with its aesthetic and moral implications" (197). But Lonergan also recognizes that "one adverse situation can follow another; the error and waywardness of each previous occasion can make still more probable the mishandling of the next" (197) and this in turn can lead to real psychic aberration and a failure in affective development. Along the same lines, in a more recent article (1973), Lonergan argues along with Paul Ricoeur that besides the archaeological approach to the psyche with its emphasis on finding the roots of present difficulties in the past, there is also the teleological approach which acknowledges stages in development and the possibility of aberrations occurring at various phases of development. As Lonergan puts it: "Besides the archeology that discovers traces of the past in the present, there also exists a teleology along which the present emerged from the past. Moreover, . . . that process of emergence can be disturbed, and such disturbances and distortions, in principle, can be corrected and remedied" (3). Clearly, Lonergan stands on the side of a developmental view of psychic unfolding which acknowledges diverse stages of psychic development and possible aberration. This view is, I suggest, open, at least in principle, to the possibility of varied legitimate psychotherapeutic aids to be determined in accord with the particular stage of psychic development at which the aberration occurred.

The Levels of Human Consciousness and Their Dynamic Interaction

Second, Lonergan's theory of the nature of the psyche and the dynamic interrelationship of the diverse levels of human consciousness suggests, at least in principle, an openness to the possibility of a de jure psychotherapeutic pluralism. Thus, in *Insight* Lonergan emphasizes that: (1) the diverse levels of human consciousness do not exist in air-tight isolation from one another but are rather in an ongoing state of dynamic interaction; (2) the interaction of the levels of psyche and spirit is such that the lower levels have an effect upon the higher levels and the higher an impact on the
lower; (3) the unconscious seeks expression on the conscious level (457); (4) there is need for a cooperation between the unconscious and conscious element in the human psyche (476); (5) the initiative for development can originate on the organic, psychic or intellectual levels (471); (6) there is need for the conscious integration of sensitive desire and fear with the higher levels of intelligent, responsible living (473); (7) there is an exigence for a conscious harmonizing of inertial, integrative, conservative tendencies with dynamic, operational, transformative tendencies (470-73); (8) the unconscious demands of neural patterns and processes are subject to a certain control and selection, e.g. wanting an insight into a given problem penetrates below the surface of consciousness to initiate the unconscious process that produces images needed for insight and that refusal of insight can lead to affective aberration (191-94); (9) the higher integration of intelligence can bring about changes on the lower levels of the psyche and the very highest integration on the religious level of faith, hope and charity can penetrate to the sensitive level of the psyche and exercise a transformative influence (723).

Now, if Lonergan presents a dynamic model of human consciousness in Insight, this is even more the case in Method in Theology and later articles in which he explicitly abandons a faculty psychology approach, acknowledges the vital role of feelings in human living and suggests that besides the movement that passes from the level of experiencing data through understanding and judging to deciding and loving there is also a movement that begins inversely from the level of being in love and then moves downwards. This view of human consciousness as highly fluid in the interaction of its diverse levels makes Lonergan's system especially open to the possibility of diversity in psychotherapeutic approaches, a diversity which is not only factual but existentially valid and worthwhile.

Lonergan and Height Therapies

Clearly, there is no need to demonstrate that Lonergan is open to the depth therapeutic approaches. Both Insight and Method in Theology give abundant testimony to this fact. Now in a previous paper I argued tentatively that the cause of neurosis can be an affective deprivation accompanied by cognitive-evaluative deficiencies or a certain cognitive-evaluative error intussuscepted at a deep psychic level (1980). What I would like to do now is to present some texts which indicate an openness in Lonergan's thought to those height therapies which stress that the deprivation of
affection and the loss of meaning can be a source of neurotic disturbance and that the experience of the power of love and the discovery of meaning can be a source of healing and growth for the neurotic.

As regards the psychotherapeutic healing power of love, Loner- gan writes in a recent talk of the type of development that moves from the level of love downwards and he attributes to love the power to dissolve the bias of unconscious motivation and "to break the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope" (1975:63). Likewise, in another lecture Lonergan acknowledges that for the emotionally troubled individual "a cure or part of a cure would seem to be had from the client-centered therapist who provides the patient with an ambience in which he is at ease..." (1980). This emphasis of Lonergan on the psychotherapeutic healing power of love is in harmony with those height therapies which stress the healing power of love and with Christotherapy. In Dynamics of Christotherapy with its subtitle Love-Enlightened Decision-Freedom a key stress is put on the power of the love of the therapist in the healing of the neurotic, on the power of the love of the group in the healing of the addict and on the power of the love of God mediated in Christ and instrumentally through the people of God in the healing of the sinner.

If Lonergan has acknowledged the power of love in psychotherapy and has expressed esteem for height therapists such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, he has not yet addressed himself to the views of cognitive therapists such as Drs. Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis. Yet, there are some intriguing observations of Lonergan which I think tend to make his analysis of the dynamics of human consciousness open in principle to certain developments in cognitive therapy. In Insight, for example, Lonergan in discussing psychic development acknowledges the possibility that "errors have become lodged in the habitual background whence spring our direct and reflective in- sights" (476) and that in this case reliance on our virtual and implicit self-knowledge for guidance in psychic development would be mistaken and would lead to conflict between the conscious and the unconscious components of psychic development. This statement of Lonergan harmonizes with the hypothesis of cognitive therapy and of Christotherapy that ignorance and error can play a significant role in psychic disturbance. It is, of course, true that whereas in Insight Lonergan stresses that the psyche "reaches the wealth and fulness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence" (726), in Method in Theology
he emphasizes that both the psyche and human intelligence are sublated and unified by the fourth or existential level of consciousness in which values are apprehended and decisions are made. Generally speaking, however, Lonergan's post-Insight developments tend to sublate rather than to negate earlier developments. Thus, in two recent lectures Lonergan cites approvingly a comment of Wilhelm Stekel which is in harmony with the above quotation from Insight and also, I believe, shows that Lonergan's system is open in principle to certain insights of the cognitive therapy of Dr. Aaron Beck as developed in *Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders* (1976). Stekel remarks:

> Our thinking is a polyphony. There are always several thoughts working simultaneously, one of which is the bearer of the leading voice. The other thoughts represent the medium and low voices. . . . In this framework the whole material with which we deal in psychoanalysis is capable of becoming conscious. It is to be found predominantly in the lower voices. To quote Klages, the thing in question is not so much a thing that is not thought as one that is not recognized (1980).

Lonergan gives his own examples of the phenomena to which Stekel and Klages refer (1976:9). And interestingly, Dr. Aaron Beck confirms through his own lengthy research and empirical studies the existence of Klages' thoughts that are truly thought but not recognized.

At this point I would like to look more closely at Beck's approach.

**Lonergan and Aaron T. Beck's Cognitive Therapy**

Dr. Beck, after practicing psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy for many years, came to the discovery in his patients of what he later chose to name "automatic thoughts" (29-37). Beck discovered that besides the thoughts, wishes, feelings, etc., which the patient seeks to articulate in therapy in the free association process there is another stream of thought running parallel to the patient's reported thoughts to which the patient does not tend to advert and which he/she does not report. Beck notes that this latter stream of thought is of a self-referential nature and involves an interior self-signaling, self-criticizing, evaluating which is ultimately a source of as great or greater emotional disturbance than the patient's reported ideational or feeling content. Beck remarks that a key difference between the reported thoughts, feelings, etc., and the "automatic thoughts" is that the latter
tend to emerge automatically and are extremely rapid. These "thoughts" are also specific and discrete. They occur in a kind of telegraphic style or shorthand. They do not arise as a result of reflective, logical, deliberative process but just happen as if by reflex. They appear to be relatively autonomous and in the more disturbed cases are very difficult to turn off. These internal signals take imagistic, visual as well as verbal form. These automatic thoughts generally involve more distortion of reality than do other types of thinking and imagining. These thoughts also tend to be idiosyncratic. But they are peculiar not only to the individual patient in therapy but to other patients with the same type of diagnosis. Beck found that patients do not tend to advert to these thoughts and that conventional free association failed to unveil them. One explanation Beck suggests for this phenomenon is that individuals are habituated to speak to themselves in one way and to others in quite another fashion and that individuals have a life history of not attending in a reflective, explicit way to these thoughts. Further—and this is at the heart of the matter—Beck avers that the automatic thoughts are actually closer to the patient's problems and hence more useful in therapy than most of what the patient explicitly narrates in the free association process. Accordingly, the principal aim in Beck's cognitive therapy is to help the emotionally disturbed individual to advert to and identify his/her maladaptive automatic ideations and imaging, i.e., his/her disturbed self-injunctions, valuations and reproaches, to distance himself/herself from these ideations, to evaluate them objectively and to effect gradually a cognitive/evaluative reorganization along reasonable, responsible lines. Finally, in what is no doubt one of the most controversial arguments in the book Beck maintains that psychoanalytic probing and interpretation has value not insofar as it uncovers hidden symbolic meanings but rather to the extent that it at least indirectly attacks beliefs, etc., which are held without explicit advertence and helps to bring attention to these beliefs. Beck does not believe, however, that the process of free association as such tends to effect advertence to these beliefs. Beck also argues that behavioral therapy is actually a subset of cognitive therapy. In Beck's words: "The use of cognitive processes is not only essential to the techniques of behavior therapy, but it can be argued that the success of this form of treatment depends on producing enduring changes in the cognitive organization. In other words, behavior therapy is effective insofar as it modifies the patient's erroneous beliefs and maladaptive attitudes" (325).
I do not intend here to suggest that Beck's cognitive therapy is the therapy and that there is no room for any other. I do suggest, however, that if Beck is correct that automatic thoughts as he describes them do exist and do cause great emotional disturbance then there is de jure room for a cognitive-evaluative approach and hence for Christotherapy, at least to the extent that it employs the cognitive approach and methods. Likewise, I think that Loner- gan's acknowledgement in Insight of the possibility that errors have become lodged in the habitual background whence spring our direct and reflective insights and his acknowledgement in later writings of the existence of a polyphony of thoughts and of thoughts that are truly thought but not recognized means that his system is open in principle to a cognitive-evaluative therapeutic approach—at least to the extent that the existence and effect of Beck's automatic thoughts, images can be demonstrated.

Robert Doran's Psychic Conversion and Christotherapy

A brief comparison of Robert Doran's apprehension of psychic conversion with key elements of Christotherapy will serve as a means of drawing this paper to a conclusion and as a way of tying together the threads of our earlier discussion.

I would like in turn to sketch certain essential features of Doran's psychic conversion, to look at certain similarities and differences between psychic conversion and the Christotherapeutic process and to suggest the beginnings of an answer to the question of whether the two approaches are in conflict or complementary.

Doran defines psychic conversion as a process in which a person seeks attentively, intelligently, reasonably and responsibly to appropriate his/her psychic spontaneity and irrationality (1976-77). This psychic self-appropriation process involves uncovering the aberrations and developments of the feelings (22) by disen- gaging the symbolic constitution of the feelings in which primordial apprehensions of values occur (17). Doran stresses with Carl Jung that it is above all in the spontaneous symbols unveiled in dreams that feelings can be disengaged, understood, certified, objectified, appropriated (12 and 22). Dreams are the primary text to be read in which the person slowly learns to distinguish symbols which advance his/her orientation toward truth and value from those which mire the person down in myth and ego-centered satisfactions (17). Psychic conversion is thus a matter of mediating or objectifying the primordial immediacy of feelings in an attentive, intelligent, reasonable manner and then of living out one's
verified interpretation of the symbols through a praxis born of responsible decision.

What, then, are some of the similarities between Doran's psychic conversion and the Christotherapeutic process? First, both approaches put key emphasis on insight and verification. Doran stresses the need to arrive at a correct interpretation of the symbols of dreams. Christotherapy tends to emphasize an existential diagnosis and discernment in which generally non-reflexively held beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, automatic thoughts, images are identified, understood and verified at a "gut" level to be either existentially integrative or disintegrative in the psychic and spiritual life of the person. Doran's therapeutic effort to distinguish symbols which advance the person in his/her quest for truth and value from those which mire the person down in ego-centered satisfactions parallels analogously the first two moments in the decision dynamic of Dynamics of Christotherapy in which the sinner, the addict, and the neurotic get insight into the destructiveness of certain modes of being-in-the-world and likewise begin to perceive the integrative quality of authentic modes of being-in-the-world. Second, both approaches assign a central role to responsible decision and praxis in the psychotherapeutic process. Doran writes:

Some dream images, then, promote neural and psychic process to a recognizable and intelligible narrative. The narrative is the basic story of the general theme. The narrative can be understood; the understanding can be affirmed as correct, so that the images function in aid of self-knowledge; and beyond self-knowledge; there is praxis, where the knowledge becomes thetic: What am I going to do about it? The ultimate intentionality of the therapeutic process so conceived is thus coextensive with the total sway of conscious intentionality (12-13).

Doran's approach thus parallels the stress in Christotherapy and much more centrally in Dynamics of Christotherapy on the key role of decision in the psychotherapeutic process and on the need to live out one's decision in an ongoing praxis. Christotherapy emphasizes that once the existential diagnosis and discernment of the first two moments of the decision process have taken place and the decision has occurred then there is need for further moments of praxis in which the person lets go at a still deeper level of anything negative in consciousness [mind-fasting] and seeks to cultivate integrative ways of thinking, desiring, imaging [spirit-feasting]. Third, both approaches acknowledge that [at least at a certain point in the healing process] appeal must be made to the
religious dimension if high level integration is to be achieved. Thus, Doran remarks that "at the farthest reaches of the psyche there stands the image of the Crucified, symbolizing the surrender to the Father in which alone the finality of the psyche as a constituent feature of human subjectivity is achieved" (28-29).

Christotherapy, of course, both in the book Christotherapy and even more clearly and methodically in Dynamics of Christotherapy, with its incorporation into the psychotherapeutic process of key elements of the Spiritual Exercises makes the religious dimension integral to its holistic approach.

We have been focusing attention on certain similarities between Doran's psychic conversion and the Christotherapeutic process. What then are some of the differences between the two psychotherapeutic approaches? First, Doran does not provide clear evidence that he regards affective deprivation and the consequent need for loving affirmation to be central elements in the healing of many neuroses. For Christotherapy, however, as the triadic subtitle Love-Enlightened Decision-Freedom in Dynamics of Christotherapy indicates, the gift of love is viewed as a principal element in the healing not only of neurosis but of addiction and sin as well. Second, Doran puts central emphasis on the mediation of the immediacy of feelings through the interpretation of dream symbols. Christotherapy, however, interests itself more in mediating the immediacy of feelings by seeking to make reflexively focal the non-reflexively held beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, imagings, automatic thoughts, etc., which underlie and mediate feeling responses and psychic moods. Third, Doran does not attempt to integrate--explicitly at least--the healing dynamics of the Christian religion with each of the principal moments or stages of the psychotherapeutic healing process as does Christotherapy. This perhaps explains why Doran refers to the process of healing the wounded psyche as psychic conversion whereas Christotherapy prefers to speak of psycho-religious conversion.

Two Final Questions

First.--Is there basically a complementarity or a conflict between Doran's psychic conversion and the Christotherapeutic process? I believe that the approaches are not necessarily in conflict but rather are complementary. My basic reason for this positive judgment is that I think a good case can be made for the view that there are different levels of the so-called unconscious-conscious relationship and of the immediacy and mediation of feelings.
As regards the unconscious-conscious relationship Lonergan, especially in recent writings, acknowledges that such an expression as consciousness has many meanings (1980). Lonergan quotes Raymond Hostie, for example, as holding that for Jung "consciousness equals reflective consciousness" (1980). Again, as noted earlier, Lonergan cites approvingly Wilhelm Stekel's view on the simultaneous interplay of a polyphony of thoughts and Klages' comment on the thought that is thought but not recognized. These quotations seem to indicate that one can designate as unconscious, at least analogously, not only the strict unconscious of Freud but also those thoughts in the polyphony of thoughts which are thought but not recognized. In this latter case, to make the unconscious conscious would be, in the terms of Michael Polanyi (1958), to make what is subsidiary in consciousness focal or, in Lonergan's own terms in *Insight*, to bring to explicit consciousness the errors that "have become lodged in the habitual background whence spring our direct and reflective insights" (476). Here I might also profitably refer to the theory of Robert Solomon expounded in his recent *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions* (1976). In this fascinating and highly original work Solomon argues among other things that the so-called defense mechanisms of Freud are better understood as strategies of self-deception generally consciously, but non-reflexively employed. Solomon analyzes in turn repression, projection, distraction, denial, rationalization, displacement, and attempts to show in each instance how the phenomenon of self-deception is operative in these mechanisms (392-410). Solomon then proposes a therapy of self-overcoming in which through the wisdom of existential reflection and decision the masks and facades of our strategies of self-deception are gradually recognized and removed and something better and more integral is put in their place (411-429). Solomon does not deny the existence of the strict unconscious in the Freudian sense but he affirms that the so-called defense mechanisms can be consciously, though perhaps non-reflexively operative at various levels of the psyche and spirit. My conclusion from all this is that there are grounds for understanding the unconscious-conscious relationship analogously and that this means that there is also a possibility that diverse psychotherapeutic aids may be employed for making the various types of unconscious conscious. And this is perhaps precisely what is occurring in Doran's psychic conversion and the Christotherapeutic process respectively and what makes them complementary rather than conflictual.
As regards the mediation of the immediacy of feelings, Doran argues that feelings can be symbolically certified, that is, they can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects. I believe, however, that one can certify feelings not only through the primordial symbols released in dreams but in a number of other ways as well. Doran himself, for example, acknowledges the usefulness of the technique developed by Ira Progoff called twilight imaging (8-9) for certifying feelings. Moreover, cognitive therapists argue that feelings can be specified—and moods as well—through the uncovering and identification of automatic thoughts and images. Indeed, feelings as intentional responses "to what is intended, apprehended, represented (Lonergan, 1972:30)" can be certified not only on the symbolic level but on the intersubjective, incarnate, linguistic levels as well. A smile, a touch, a word—all of these carriers of meaning and value can evoke feeling responses and determine moods. Moreover, as I argued at length in an earlier paper (1976a), feeling responses can be mediated by complex interpretative mind-sets and heart-sets (value judgments). As Robert Solomon remarks, "Our consciousness is a thicket of investments and value structures which can be sorted out and recognized only with great difficulty" (402). This means that our feelings and moods which are determined by this "thicket" can only be disengaged and specified in a highly subtle process of existential diagnosis and discernment. In this perspective then there is room for the Jungian analysis of symbols in dreams and for Progoff's twilight imaging. But because of the teleological nature of psychic development and the manifold interpretative mind-sets and heart-sets which mediate and determine feeling responses and moods there is also room for the certification of feelings through the psychotherapeutic techniques of cognitive and existentially oriented therapies as well.

Second Question.--What, in sum, are the factors that make Dynamics of Christotherapy relevant to depth therapy? First, Dynamics of Christotherapy is relevant to depth therapy insofar as it incorporates elements from depth therapy such as an openness to the interpretation of the symbols of dreams, respect for the formative role of the past in the present suffering of the individual, etc. Second, Dynamics of Christotherapy is relevant to depth therapy insofar as it is most often true that individuals who might be said to be troubled at deeper levels of consciousness are also troubled at the higher levels. This means that a person who is in need of depth therapy will also be in need of height therapy.
Third, because of the interaction of the diverse levels of consciousness healing on the higher levels of consciousness through the experience of love and the discovery of meaning can affect the deeper or lower levels of consciousness in a profound and powerfully transformative fashion. Fourth, *Dynamics of Christotherapy* is relevant to depth therapy—at least the depth therapy of Doran—insofar as Doran acknowledges the importance of integrating the Christic dimension into the therapy of the believing Christian—at least at a certain stage in the therapy.

**CONCLUSION**

There is, in my analysis, room for both the depth therapeutic approach of Robert Doran and the height therapy approach of Christotherapy. Lonergan's analysis of the dynamics and interactions of the diverse levels of human consciousness, his support for a teleological as well as an archeological approach to psychic growth and aberration, his openness to an analogous understanding of the unconscious-conscious relationship, his analysis of feelings as intentional responses to what is represented, intended, etc.—all of these views make the option for a *de jure* psychotherapeutic pluralism quite viable. What is needed, then, I suggest, is an ongoing dialogue between the depth and height therapies instead of the more common process of mutual anathematizing. Finally, what is needed is the development of an integral heuristic structure of psychotherapies based equally on the rock of intentionality analysis and on an ongoing empirical testing and evaluation of the diverse psychotherapeutic theories and techniques.
NOTES

/1/ The term "week" involves a period of time but it need not be literally a seven day period.

/2/ I believe this distinction between height and depth therapies was first employed by Viktor Frankl. For my own usage see my paper entitled "Christotherapy and the Healing of Neurosis," 25-28.
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Tyrrell, Bernard J.
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Let me begin by recounting two facts—the first, personal, and the second, familiar to most of you.

(1) For the past few years one of my academic responsibilities has been to conduct an undergraduate course entitled "Philosophy of Religion". Until recently I labored under the difficulty of not having found a really adequate approach to several of the issues treated in this course, a difficulty typically reflected in the students' reactions to my discussion of evil: while admiring my approach for its rigor, many students found it "too abstract", "too theoretical", "lacking concreteness". Still more precisely, for at least a few it was "insufficiently religious" or even "insufficiently Christian".

(2) At the Florida Conference in 1970, the philosophy-of-God that had been outlined by Bernard Lonergan in chapter nineteen of his book Insight was subjected to severe criticism (Gilkey: 77-84; Tracy: 217-221; Ogden: 229-234). The critics, focusing mainly on the account of God's existence and attributes, accused Lonergan of inadequacy for making no appeal to the theist’s concrete context, the context of religious experience. This objection occasioned a later response in which Lonergan agreed that an adequate philosophy of God—and, a fortiori, an adequate theology—must be based upon religious experience and went on at some length to develop his notion of this relationship (1973: 11-13, 41-42; 1974a: 224-225; 1974b: 131-133; 1972: 101-124; 1974c).

Now, it recently occurred to me that Lonergan's later explanation of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy of God, and theology provides the most adequate framework yet available for treating, among other issues, the problems of evil. At least to my knowledge, however, little work had been done to exploit that explanation in this area—i.e. to develop in explicit and detailed fashion an updated "tract on evil". Consequently, I began attempting on my own to determine just what the shape of
such a treatment might be; and to the extent that this allowed me to offer a somewhat revised consideration of evil in my philosophy course during the academic year just ended, I found that the students' earlier complaints tended to dissolve.

The results of this rough and preliminary effort, then, are what I should like to share with you today, as much for my correction as for your enlightenment. Specifically, the aim of this paper is fivefold: (i) to delineate in cursory fashion the problems that are posed for human intelligence, reflection, and deliberation by the fact of evil; (ii) to describe a first approach to meeting those problems; (iii) to recall Bernard Lonergan's mature account of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy of God, and theology; and (iv & v) to outline in two steps a second approach to the problems of evil, an approach suggested by Lonergan's account.

Before proceeding further, however, two important qualifications must be made. First, with the exception of its third section, this paper is not intended to be principally an exposition of Lonergan's views. Rather, it is my own attempt, drawing on a number of resources, to consider an existential problem-set that is of continuing importance. That Lonergan is by far the most dominant of those resources is obvious, and in my footnotes I indicate the pertinent pages of his works; but my overriding intent is systematic rather than exegetical, and (with the exception of the third section) I am not primarily contending that the positions which I articulate accord with what Lonergan himself has said (or, some may wish to argue, would say) on any given matter \(/1\). Secondly, the paper is intended to spell out the general relationship of the problems of evil, on the one hand, and various approaches to them, on the other, but by no means to portray exhaustively either those problems or those approaches. This emphasis on breadth rather than depth means that certain topics perhaps quite familiar to individual readers are treated in very sketchy and incomplete fashion, a feature which it is hoped will not be found unduly distracting.

I. EVIL: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEMS

A. The Fact of Evil

An individual need not be especially perceptive in order to be aware that reality is not perfect. There are the anomalies and breakdowns of nature: earthquakes and tornadoes, floods and
droughts, physical and mental illnesses, birth defects and death. There are the moral failures on the part of other persons, failures to will what ought to be willed and to avoid willing what ought not to be willed. And, most proximate if not always most readily admitted, there are the major and minor aberrations in one's own pattern of choice.

Nor is this all. For besides natural faults and the moral faults of others and of oneself, there is the suffering that these bring in their wake. There is the pain of one injured in a landslide and the grief of one whose child has died of leukemia. There is the agony of one subjected to physical torture and the frustration of one subjected to racial discrimination. And there is the character deformation undergone by one who lies and cheats, with a heightening of his tendency to perform further such acts.

In short, if we label natural faults, moral faults (others' and one's own), and one's consequent suffering "evil", we must say not only that evil is a fact but that it is one of the most obvious and striking features of the topography of reality \( /2/ \).

### B. The Problems of Evil

Let us use the term "problem" to name a question whose answer has not as yet been clearly and unambiguously determined. Again, let us use the term "God" to name a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of religious devotion \( /3/ \). Finally, let us use the term "contradictory" as a substantive to designate something opposed so radically to something else as to exclude totally the latter. (Thus, e.g., untruth is the contradictory of truth. See note 11.)

Now, if one posits that evil really exists, that evil is to be understood as the contradictory of good, and that God really exists, then one is confronted with two problems that may aptly be labelled "the problems of God": (1) How is God to be understood? (2) How ought God be responded to? And whatever the suggested answers to the first (and key) question, one answer that is inadmissible is that God is to be understood as both all-powerful \( /5/ \) and all-good. For if evil is the contradictory of good, then God must be at least either incapable of excluding his contradictory from the cosmos, and thus not all-powerful, or such that evil is not his contradictory, and thus not all-good.

If, on the other hand, one posits that God really exists, that God is to be understood as both all-powerful and all-good, and that evil really exists, then one is confronted with two problems
that may aptly be labelled "the problems of evil": (1) How is evil
to be understood /6/? (2) How ought evil be responded to? And
whatever the suggested answers to the first (and key) question, one
answer that is inadmissible is that evil is to be understood as
the contradictory of good. For if God is all-powerful, then he
excludes his contradictory from the cosmos; so that if, in addition,
he is all-good, then evil cannot be the contradictory of good /7/.

Our concern in this paper is not with the problems of God, as
we have characterized them, but rather with the problems of evil.
That is to say, although some would challenge the adequacy of such
a course /8/, we mean to take it as given that God really exists
and is both all-powerful and all-good, and to consider the fact
of evil within the parameters dictated by those suppositions. And
thus our problems take the following specific form:

(1) How is evil--natural fault, moral fault, and consequent
suffering--to be understood as other than the contra-
dictory of good?

(2) How, in the light of the foregoing, ought evil be
responded to?

II. EVIL: A FIRST APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS

A. "Older Philosophy of God on Evil"

The question "How is X to be understood?" breaks down into
three sub-questions: "WHAT is X?", "HOW does X come to be?", and
"WHY does X come to be?" /9/ Thus, the complex response of tradi-
tional or "older" philosophy of God /10/ to the question, "How is
evil to be understood as other than the contradictory of Good?" may
be presented as a reply to three sub-questions with regard to each
of the following: moral faults, one's suffering from moral faults,
and natural faults and one's suffering from them.

First, then, WHAT are moral faults? They are privations of
right choices. In the broad sense a privation is simply the ab-
sence of some positive factor in a thing and thus is a somewhat
weaker opposition than is a contradiction: in the explanatory order
cold, silence, and darkness are not positive factors but the ab-
sences of heat, sound, and light, respectively /11/. In the strict
sense, however, a privation is the absence of not just any positive
factor but rather of one that ought to be present: blindness in a
human being is a privation, though blindness in a stone is not. It
is in the latter--strict--sense that moral faults are privations:
they are inappropriate defects of will, failures to choose what is
morally mandated and to avoid choosing what is morally prohibited.
HOW do moral faults arise? The issue here is not so much efficient causality as deficient causality. Moral faults, inappropriate "nothings" at the level of human voluntary operation, are due entirely to man: they come about fundamentally because of bad will, a more radical "nothing" at the level of human voluntary disposition. God neither directly nor indirectly wills moral faults but merely permits them.

WHY do moral faults arise? Ultimately, the answer to this question is that there is no answer. There may be excuses of ignorance, passion, or habit, and there may be mitigating circumstances of temperament, age, or social milieu; but properly speaking there are no reasons for moral faults. For moral faults are precisely those non-events which are characterized not by having reasons but by having no reason, not by making sense but by making no sense whatsoever. However, they are permitted by God out of respect for human freedom, a respect that militates against divine intervention even when that freedom is abused.

Secondly, WHAT is one's suffering from moral faults? It is a privation. Though pain, sorrow, frustration, a heightened tendency to moral fault, etc., are surely not without descriptive reality, in the explanatory order they, like cold, silence, and darkness, are not positive but negative: they are the absences of factors required for one's physical and/or psycho-spiritual wholeness, integrity, well-being.

HOW does one's suffering from moral faults come about? Obviously, it arises directly from the moral faults themselves. And it arises indirectly from (a) the human will whence those moral faults arise and (b) the divine will, since God, though neither directly nor indirectly willing the moral faults but merely permitting them, nevertheless wills that suffering follow on them.

WHY does one's suffering from moral faults arise? Insofar as it comes about directly from moral faults and indirectly from the human will, one's suffering from moral faults has no more reason than the faults themselves do--that is to say, none at all. But insofar as it arises indirectly from the divine will, one's suffering from moral faults has the character of punishment--fundamentally, retribution for the faults themselves.

Thirdly, WHAT are natural faults and one's suffering from them? They are privations and their privative consequences. In the explanatory if not the descriptive order, so-called natural disasters, disease, decay, death, and the suffering that follows on them are the often-progressive absences of positive factors,
factors that are necessary for the harmony, health, and perceived well-being of this or that.

**HOW** do natural faults and one's suffering from them come about? They are indirectly willed by God: he wills them insofar as he directly wills the entire cosmic order of which they are parts.

**WHY** do natural faults and one's suffering from them arise? They are for the good of the cosmic order as a whole. That which from the restricted viewpoint of this or that particular thing is but a defect is, from the universal viewpoint of the cosmic order as a whole, a contribution to the perfection of that whole, such that to eliminate the particular defect would be to eliminate a certain amount of cosmic perfection. Thus, somewhat as moments of silence are part of the integral beauty of a symphony, so natural faults and one's suffering from them are part of the integral splendor of the cosmos; or, again, somewhat as pruning a tree occasions the development of better fruit, so natural faults and one's suffering from them occasion the development of such virtues as courage, perseverance, and kindness.

The reply of traditional philosophy of God /12/ to the question "How, in the light of the foregoing, ought evil be responded to?" may be summarized in three steps. First, one should strive to eliminate one's moral faults. Secondly, one's suffering from moral faults, as punishment for the faults themselves, should be willingly accepted. Thirdly, natural faults and one's suffering from them should be eliminated insofar as possible and willingly accepted insofar as such elimination is not possible, all as contributions to cosmic perfection.

**B. Merits and Difficulties**

As regards content, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy of God in its treatment of the problems of evil is the thoroughness with which it exploits the notion of privation. By understanding the various forms of evil not as positive factors but rather as the absences of positive factors which ought to be present, traditional philosophy of God clearly distinguishes evil from good without--as would be inconsistent with the suppositions of God's real existence, omnipotence, and all-goodness--making evil the contradictory of good (and thus of God).

At the same time, the content of that treatment is not without significant difficulties. Let us consider two areas.

First, it is difficult to understand how one's suffering from moral faults could be *punishment for* moral faults. For it is not
obvious even in principle either that an all-powerful God would be bound to require punishment or that an all-good God would desire it. Again, even if the necessity of punishment for moral faults be granted, the frequent (and frequently gross) disproportion between one's actual suffering from moral faults—one's own and others’—and one's own moral faults makes quite untenable the notion that that suffering is an all-powerful and all-good God's punishment for one's own faults. For the relatively innocent (most obviously, children) often suffer much, and the relatively guilty often suffer little and, indeed, even flourish /13/. Nor is it ultimately any less mind-boggling to suggest that God often punishes the innocent instead of the guilty, though in such a way that the suffering which may outweigh the guilt of some individual never out-weighs the guilt of his group (or, in the limit, mankind) as a whole /14/. And, finally, insofar as one's suffering from moral faults cannot be understood simply as punishment for moral faults, the appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept that suffering willingly falls open to challenge.

Secondly, it is difficult to understand how natural faults and one's suffering from them could be necessary contributions to the perfection of the cosmos. For it is not obvious even in principle that an all-powerful God would be unable to cause a finite material cosmos at least equal in perfection to the present one but without natural faults and consequent suffering. Moreover, even if it be granted that in a finite material cosmos natural faults and consequent suffering are necessary to the perfection of the whole, it is not obvious even in principle that an all-good God would desire to cause such a cosmos rather than non at all. Again, even if both preceding points be granted, it is still not clear that the natural defects and consequent suffering with which the present cosmos is actually shot through are not well beyond the minimum to which an all-powerful God would be bound and which an all-good God would choose. And, finally, insofar as natural faults and one's suffering from them cannot be understood simply as contributions to cosmic perfection, the appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept willingly whatever cannot be eliminated falls open to challenge.

As regards method, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy of God in its treatment of the problems of evil is its logical rigor. It systematically seeks clarity in its concepts, consistency in its contentions, and exhaustiveness in its arguments; and if in this or that respect it does not completely achieve these goals, still the direction of its tendency is never in doubt.
On the other hand, traditional philosophy of God has two serious deficiencies in its method. First, its emphasis upon logical rigor is not only vigorous but also virtually exclusive: in its close attention to contents of thought it fails to advert to the concrete conscious subject who is the thinker and thus to take account of how his subjective disposition can affect his response. Hence the not untypical student lament, forcefully if not altogether accurately expressed, "This is too philosophical!" The second deficiency is inherent to philosophy of God as such: there is a systematic prescinding from the contents of formal divine revelation. While quite appropriate to philosophy of God as distinct from theology, this restriction can appear as artificial and even frustrating for the student who as a, say, Christian believer is interested in bringing all of his personal reflective resources to bear upon the problems of evil; and thus he will, not surprisingly, complain about the "non-religious" character of the treatment.

III. LONERGAN ON RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD, AND THEOLOGY

The preceding section of this paper outlined the approach of traditional philosophy of God to the problems posed for human intelligence, reflection, and deliberation by the fact of evil, along with the merits and difficulties of that approach. The present section describes Bernard Lonergan's mature view of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy of God, and theology; and the two subsequent sections, drawing out the implications of that view, will sketch the two stages of an alternative approach to the problems of evil.

A. Religion


The first kind of disciplinary inquiry adopts the static, immobile viewpoint of logic. It concerns itself exclusively with real and/or mental objects, expresses these in terms of abstract concepts, and then seeks to determine the mutual relations of those concepts within a fixed conceptual system. Its ideal is conceptual clarity; and it is likely to maintain that the pathway to genuine objectivity is careful looking and rigorous inferring. It is aptly
illustrated by, among other things, traditional or "older" philosophy in general and philosophy of God in particular.

The second kind of disciplinary inquiry, by contrast, adopts the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method. It concerns itself not merely with real and/or mental objects but also with the dispositions, intentions, and operations of the conscious subject. It employs concrete symbols as well as abstract concepts; and it seeks not merely to relate these to each other within the static systems which they may comprise but also to chart the process from one static system to the next within a dynamic system, a system on the move, a system whose developmental structure is fundamentally a function of the ever-expanding horizon of the conscious subject himself. Its ideal is not just conceptual clarity but, more broadly, conscious and intentional adequacy; and it holds that the pathway to genuine objectivity is, most basically, nothing other than authentic subjectivity—experiencing that is attentive, understanding that is intelligent, judging that is reasonable, deciding that is responsible.

Now, when undertaken with regard to the conscious subject himself, the second kind of disciplinary inquiry—much to be preferred, by reason of its greater adequacy—reveals the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

In general, a conversion is a radical transformation of the subject's consciousness, resulting in a new horizon that is not just a development from but rather involves a repudiation of, characteristic features of the subject's old horizon.

The subject who has undergone intellectual conversion has outgrown the ocular myth that the activity of knowing is fundamentally like seeing, that objectivity results exactly from seeing what is there and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is the "already out there now" waiting to be seen. Through appropriation of his own cognitional performance, he has come to the recognition that the activity of knowing is a formally-dynamic compound of activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging, that cognitional objectivity results exactly from experiencing attentively, understanding intelligently, and judging reasonably, and that the real is the compound content that is thus cognitively achieved.

The subject who has undergone moral conversion has made the discovery that in large part it is he himself who by the choices he makes today determines the self he will be tomorrow, and in light of that discovery has undertaken to replace selfish satisfactions with self-transcending values as the standards to which he refers in deciding and choosing.
And the subject who has undergone religious conversion is in a state of total self-surrender, of complete self-transcendence, that can best be characterized as unrestricted being-in-love. Unrestricted being-in-love is a dynamic state that, though it can and indeed demands to be expressed and fostered by deliberate acts, is perceived as fundamentally prior to those acts, a given, a gift. It brings deep joy and profound peace. And it reveals vital, social, cultural, and personal values not previously esteemed. But of itself it does not involve knowledge in the strict sense: it stands as the major exception to the dictum that nothing is loved that is not already known, for who it is that is loved is not yet known; and thus there remains a conscious pressure in this regard to inquire and understand, to reflect and judge, and, perhaps, to believe. Such a cognitional effort, however, goes forward within a context that is dominated by the fact of the love itself, so that all conclusions that would impugn the unrestricted lovability of the beloved are virtually if not formally ruled out, and this even in advance, as it were, of any inquiry. The effort is not to determine whether there is a beloved who is unrestrictedly lovable, for this is not at all in doubt; rather, it is to determine just who that unrestrictedly lovable beloved is, and ultimately to resolve all other issues in that light.

The distinction between the experience of unrestricted being-in-love and the public body of knowledge, belief, and practice to which one may turn in cognitionally elaborating that experience is the distinction between two aspects of religion. Unrestricted being-in-love is the inner word, the prior word, that is religious experience. It pertains to the world of immediacy: it is the unmediated experience of unbounded love for the mysterious beloved. Of itself, it is highly unspecified in character and thus possesses a fundamental similarity from one group, culture, and age to the next. On the other hand, the public body of knowledge, belief, and practice is the outer word, the outwardly spoken word, that is religious tradition. It pertains to the worlds mediated by meaning: basically, it would presume to name the mysterious beloved. Religious traditions arise and develop in the context of the particular times, places, persons, and events that provide the outward occasions of the inward experience; and thus they are historically conditioned and may vary from one group, culture, and age to the next.

The foregoing distinction, already important for the phenomenologist of religion, has an added significance for the Christian...
Theologian /20/. For the latter, the distinction between the fundamentally transcultural religious experience and the historically conditioned religious tradition is the distinction between the inner core and the outer manifestation of God's gift of his love. The inner core, the inward gift, is offered, at least, to all men; and it is the element common to all religions. By contrast, the outer manifestation, the outer expression of God's gift of his love, is the word of formal divine revelation and summarily the Word who is Jesus Christ; and this is the unique and characteristic element of Christianity. Hence, as cognitively elaborated (and, subsequently, as practically implemented), the religious experience of the Christian expressly involves an intersubjective relationship with God as given in Jesus Christ, a feature that makes that experience specifically different from all other forms of religious experience.

B. Philosophy of God and Theology

Our brief review of Lonergan's notion of religion puts us in position to recall his notions of philosophy-of-God (1973: 1-20; 50-59; 1972: 24-25; 337-340) and theology. (For a guide in what follows, see our chart on page 160).

"Newer" philosophy of God is a discipline which, by contrast with traditional or "older" philosophy of God, proceeds not from the static, immobile viewpoint of logic but from the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method; and thus it concerns itself not merely with objects but also, and more fundamentally, with the conscious subject. Specifically, it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience in terms of its common aspect, the aspect under which the religious experiences of all conscious subjects are similar. That is to say, it is a reflection on unrestricted being-in-love, the inner word—or, as the Christian theologian expresses it, on the inner core of God's gift of his love. Thus, "newer" philosophy of God is theology, taking the latter in the broad sense of "reflection on religion" (1973: 15, 22, 33, 34, 50, 56; 1972: xi, 138-140, 170, 267, 331, 355).

Theology in the strict sense—Christian theology—as envisaged by Lonergan likewise proceeds from the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method. Like philosophy of God it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience; but it considers that experience in terms not merely of its common aspect but also of its specifically Christian aspect. That is to say, it is a reflection both on unrestricted being-in-love, the inner core of God's gift
The Relationship of Religion, Philosophy of God, and Theology according to Bernard Lonergan
of his love, the inner word, and on Christian revelation, the outer manifestation of the divine gift, the outer word whence the Christian cognitively elaborates and practically implements his primitive religious experience. Thus theology in part is methodically and performatively, though not logically, solidary with philosophy of God: indeed, the former can be viewed as the preserving but perfecting sublation of the latter.

IV. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS

A. "Newer" Philosophy of God on Evil

"Newer" philosophy of God is a reflective explicitation of the ultimate implications of the dynamic structure of the conscious subject who has undergone religious conversion. More exactly, it is a reflective bringing-to-light of what is ultimately implied by inquiry, by reflection, by deliberation, and--most basically--by unrestricted being-in-love. It uncovers and manifests the performative self-contradiction in which the subject would be involved, were he to deny that there is an intelligent ground of the universe, a ground that is world-transcending necessary being, the universal moral ground and goal, the unrestrictedly lovable beloved (1973: 52-56; 1972: 101-103). "Newer" philosophy of God thus arrives at a position that includes the affirmations by traditional philosophy of God that God really exists and is both all-powerful and all-good. And, as regards evil, this leads to the further affirmation that although evil really exists it is not the contradictory of good; and that, in turn, eventually gives rise to the traditional conclusions as to how evil is to be understood and how it ought to be responded to. On the present approach, by contrast with the traditional one, however, both the general affirmations about God and evil and the specific theoretical and practical conclusions about evil are grasped as functions not just of the reasonable but also and more fundamentally of the lovable; and they are maintained not as "merely abstract" but rather as finally implied by the eminently concrete and full-blooded religious experience that provides the characteristic tone and color of the subject's entire conscious life. Consequently, though there is no significant advance toward formal resolution of such theoretical and practical difficulties as those presented by the conclusions that one's suffering from moral faults is punishment for moral faults and that natural faults and one's suffering from them are contributions to the perfection of the cosmos, and though these difficulties thus remain as enigmatic
as ever, they now are—to use Newman's terminology—not just no-
notionally but really apprehended as at least virtually resolved
in such a way as not to be at odds with the real existence, all-
powerfulness, and all-goodness of the unrestrictedly lovable be-
loved.

B. Merits and Difficulties

With respect to content, "newer" philosophy of God retains both
the principal merit and the most significant difficulties of tra-
ditional philosophy of God in regard to the problems of evil. For
in understanding evil as possessing privative rather than positive
reality it distinguishes it clearly from good without making it
the contradictory of good and thus transposing the problems of evil
into the problems of God. But, on the other hand, it still is con-
fronted with the theoretical and practical difficulties that flow
from understanding suffering as punishment and/or a contribution
to cosmic perfection.

The superiority of "newer" philosophy of God over its prede-
cessor in treating the problems of evil derives not from its con-
tent but from its method. For inasmuch as it grows out of a re-
flection on the dynamic structure of the concrete conscious subject,
it eliminates the dry, remote, abstract character possessed by the
affirmations regarding evil when they are reached via the tradi-
tional approach. Without in any way sacrificing logical rigor, it
manifests those affirmations as escapable only on the price of de-
nying the unrestricted being-in-love that is the conscious subject's
most basic dynamic feature; and thus it overcomes the objection
that the affirmations are "too philosophical".

Still, "newer" philosophy of God does not take account of the
characteristic (by contrast with common) assertions which the
Christian religious tradition makes with respect to evil /25/; and
thus it remains open to the charge of inadequacy by the conscious
subject who precisely through reference to that tradition has cog-
nitionally elaborated and practically implemented his primitive
religious experience. The discipline in which this deficiency is
rectified, however, is not philosophy of God, it is Christian the-
ology; and to a consideration of its stance regarding evil we now
turn.
V. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS (2)

A. Systematic Theology on Evil

Theology---more exactly, Systematics, in the functionally-differentiated theology that we are presupposing (1973: 21-33)---maintains the concrete, dynamic approach of "newer" philosophy of God, sublating the latter's reflective explicitation of primitive unrestricted being-in-love, the inner word of God's gift of his love, and complementing it with a reflection on Christian revelation, the outer expression of the divine gift.

The theological reply to the question of how evil is to be understood may be indicated briefly by touching three topics: personal sin, original sin, and redemption (Rahner, Schoonenberg, Ricoeur).

Traditional philosophy of God understands moral faults basically as being irrational acts, transgressions of the moral order that is discovered by right reason. "Newer" philosophy of God takes over that notion but goes on to view moral faults more basically as unloving acts, acts in tension with the dynamic thrust of unrestricted loving that underpins the religious subject's conscious life. Theology, in turn, takes over both notions and goes on to specify those unloving acts more precisely as acts tending ultimately toward rejection of God's love offered to men in Jesus Christ; and in this sense it designates moral faults as personal sins /26/. Nor does it view at least a certain amount of suffering from moral faults as surprising: one deserves to be punished for one's sins.

Besides the free, contingent, "ethical" aspect of evil, however, evil as directly or indirectly chosen, evil as personal sin and deserved punishment, there is the necessary, inherited, "tragic" aspect of evil, evil as given prior to one's choice and thus as somehow beyond one's control (Ricoeur: 200-208, 214-218); and theology understands this in terms of original sin. Adam's personal sin has tragic consequences for the entire cosmos, consequences which thus radically qualify the situation in which each individual "born into Adam" exercises his personal freedom. These consequences involve an original state of guilt for all of Adam's progeny, together with a dynamic inclination to ratify that original state of guilt by personal sin. They involve a heightening of natural faults and one's suffering from them. And though they bring to light a solidarity among men, they specify that solidarity as one in which one person may be required to suffer for the personal sins of another.
Correlative to Adam's sinful act and its cosmic consequences, however, is Christ's redemptive act and its cosmic consequences. As Adam's act of lovelessness has deleterious effects on the situation in which human freedom is exercised, so Christ's act of supreme love has salvific effects on that situation. As in virtue of Adam's sin all men are originally sinful and inclined toward personal sin, so in virtue of Christ's vicarious suffering all men are objectively redeemed and given God's gift of unrestricted being-in-love /27/. Thus the concrete conscious subject has not merely the opportunity freely to ratify, appropriate, his state of original sin by acceding to his sinful inclination through personal acts of sin but also the opportunity freely to ratify, appropriate, his state of objective redemption by accepting God's gift of unrestricted loving through personal acts of Christ-like love. And it is precisely insofar as men thus "put on Christ" that creation as a whole tends toward the Day of the Lord in which not just the "ethical" but also the "tragic" aspect of evil will be eradicated.

The theological reply to the question of how, in the light of the foregoing, evil ought to be responded to is threefold /28/. First, one should strive to eliminate his personal sinning, responding instead to God's gift of love by modelling himself on Christ. Secondly, one should willingly accept that suffering which he perceives to be deserved for his personal sins, the "ethical" aspect of suffering /29/. Thirdly, one should willingly accept as well that suffering which he does not perceive to be deserved for his personal sins, the "tragic" aspect of suffering: he should strive to endure such suffering as Christ endured it, meeting the evil that is suffering and sin with the good that is love, returning not evil for evil but good for evil and thus transforming the evil into good by making it an occasion for love /30/.

B. Merits and Difficulties

As to content, theology in its treatment of the problems of evil preserves the chief merit of philosophy of God in that regard by understanding evil as privation. But it also makes a considerable contribution of its own by explicating the Christian revelation that illuminates the way in which fault and suffering are, at a deeper level, sin and punishment and the way in which their positive counterparts are love and redemption. And in this respect it somewhat moderates the incomprehensibility of the "tragic" aspect of one's suffering, the aspect that is beyond one's control, portraying it as a function of solidarity in sin with Adam and as an
opportunity for solidarity in vicarious and loving suffering with Christ. Nonetheless, this two-directional invocation of human solidarity does not set the anguishing theoretical difficulties to rest; and mystery remains.

As to method, theology not only is capable of responding to legitimate demands for intellectual rigor, and not only takes account of the conscious subject in the plenitude of his concrete experience, but also gives full regard to the word (Word) of the Christian religious tradition; and thus it considers the problems of evil in the fullest and most complete way normally available for intellectual inquiry in via.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have recalled the problems of evil, outlined the approach of traditional or "older" philosophy of God to those problems, described Lonergan's characterization of religion, "newer" philosophy of God, and theology, and, again with respect to the problems of evil, sketched briefly the revised philosophical and theological approach(es) which, it seems to me, that characterization suggests.

In order to indicate the unfinished and ongoing character of this little consideration, what better way than to list a series of remaining questions? Thus:

1) Does not a world that is not merely finite but also material necessarily involve a certain number of false starts, breakdowns, and consequent suffering on the part of its sentient inhabitants (e.g., children)? On the other hand, is there not something absolutely wrong about the suffering of children, something that can never be set right by any "reward" no matter how great? How then could a material cosmos with sentient inhabitants (and especially children) be justified under any circumstances?

2) According to the "Law of the Cross", one is willingly to accept and endure that evil which he is powerless to prevent. However, is there not a sense in which such a directive is directly at odds with what it means to be a Christian? That is to say, even when he can do nothing further to eliminate evil, ought not the Christian--precisely as Christian--nevertheless continue, with every fibre of his being, not to accept evil but to rage against it? (It is my understanding that at least certain proponents of "liberation theology" insist upon this point.) /31/

3) Suppose that one grants that "newer" philosophy of God is more adequate than any of the "older" variants. Nevertheless, for the purposes of dialogue with those who steadfastly reject the notion of religious experience in any sense, is it not important that at least some concretely-religious persons continue to do philosophy of God in a
way that, though taking some subjective factors into ac-
count, formally prescinds from the facts of their own re-
ligious experience (as in, e.g., chapter nineteen of
Insight)? Or is such an approach fundamentally outdated?

4) In a functionally-differentiated theology, the objecti-
fication of the authentic subject's position on such is-
sues as knowing, objectivity, and reality is part of Foun-
dations. Does not the objectification of the authentic
subject's position on an issue such as evil in similar
fashion ultimately become part of Foundations, or is it
confined to Systematics?

I thank you for your attention.
NOTES

/1/ The purpose of this remark is not to disavow my very considerable dependence upon Lonergan throughout this paper but rather to minimize the likelihood that any mistakes of mine will be imputed to him.

/2/ Rather than beginning with an abstract, explanatory notion of evil and then trying to find concrete instances, in this section I have attempted merely to elaborate a simply descriptive notion of evil: the task of explanation remains to be done. (On the distinction between description and explanation, see Lonergan, 1957: 291-92; 10-13.) This strikes me as both the preferable way of approaching most topics and an especially useful way of approaching the present topic, given the confusing variety of explanatory notions of evil that have been proposed during the long history of reflection on it.

I suggest the following (at least rough) terminological parallels: my "moral fault", Aquinas' "malum culpae", and Lonergan's "basic sin"; my "suffering consequent on moral fault", Aquinas' "malum poenae", and Lonergan's "moral evil"; and my "natural fault and suffering consequent on it", Aquinas' "malum naturae", and Lonergan's "physical evil". (See Aquinas, 1887: pp. 48-49, and Lonergan, 1957: 666-68.)

My own further distinctions of "moral fault" into "one's own" and "others'" and of "suffering consequent on moral fault" into "one's suffering consequent on one's own moral fault" and "one's suffering consequent on others' moral fault" will, when taken with the previous distinctions, facilitate precise consideration of the question of the concrete relationship of one's total suffering and one's own moral fault. (See above, pp. 154-155).

/3/ I speak broadly of "a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of religious devotion" in an effort to keep my initial discussion open to persons of as many different basic persuasions as possible, both philosophical and religious. The expression, however, is not without its ambiguities; and therefore let the following points be understood: (1) My "supreme being" is taken to be uniquely supreme, not just one of two or more. (2) It is understood to be not merely the greatest of whatever beings anyone (e.g. even a professed atheist) might assert actually to exist; rather, it is taken as having specifically divine characteristics. (3) To speak of the supreme being as "an object" is not to imply that it might not also be fundamentally a conscious subject (or even, as in the Christian theological tradition, tri-subjective). (4) I am not unaware of (and in fact, when speaking more exactly, quite agree with) the Thomist aversion to characterizing the divine as "a" being.

/4/ In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is God to be understood, and is that understanding true? The shorter form of the question, however, illustrates and emphasizes the general point that in the treatment of that which is (taken as) fact, it is understanding that is at a premium: the question of that understanding's truth, while by no means unimportant and of course not ignored, is not the characteristic question of the inquiry. By contrast, there is a prior inquiry that begins from mere data and aims to determine what is and is not fact, and here the question of truth is characteristic. (See Lonergan, 1972: 347-50).

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Though they are sometimes distinguished in discussions of the present sort, in this paper we take "all-powerful" (or "omnipotent") to include "all-knowing" (or "omniscient"); for it seems that a God who did not "know all things" would in an important way be unable to "do all things".

To say that God is omnipotent does not, of course, mean that he is literally able to "do all things", if that expression be taken to include, e.g. creating square circles or willing himself out of existence; for not to be able to do such things is a perfection rather than a limitation. (For a good illustration of a misdirected view of this matter, see Mackie.)

In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is evil to be understood? and is that understanding true? (See above, p. 167, note 4.).

In our view, the heart of the God/evil problem-complexus may be expressed concisely by stating that it is inconsistent to hold all four of the following positions at the same time:

a) God—a supreme being—really exists.

b) God is to be understood as both all-powerful and all-good.

c) Evil—natural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering—really exists.

d) Evil is to be understood as the contradictory of good.

Consistency may be achieved by substituting any one of the following four positions for its correlate in the first set (i.e., the first set becomes consistent if one substitutes a' for a, or b' for b, or c' for c, or d' for d):

a') God—a supreme being—does not really exist.

b') God is not to be understood as both all-powerful and all-good.

c') Evil—natural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering—does not really exist.

d') Evil is not to be understood as the contradictory of good.

Perhaps the most significant contemporary objectors would come from the ranks of the "process" philosophers and theologians, most of whom maintain that God is not all-powerful. (See, e.g., Hartshorne). And, in a somewhat different line, there is Dietrich Bonhoeffer's poignant image of a suffering God, a God who is limited in power but not in concern, a God who "permits" infant suffering only because he cannot prevent it. (Bonhoeffer: 348-49, 361-63).

These three questions, of course, regard X's formal, efficient, and final causes.

The "tradition" here indicated is, broadly, the Aristotelian-Thomist one. The following formulation of the tradition's position on evil is our own, though we rely extensively on Maritain, Journet, and Lonergan, 1957: 666-68. (The basic locus in Aquinas is Summa Theologiae, I, qq. 48-49.) The listing of these works together occasions a further—and quite important—point, however, and to make that point we anticipate part of our later discussion.

One may differentiate three progressively-less-abstract, progressively-more-adequate ways of doing philosophy of God: (1) one which does not explicitly take account of the conscious subject at
all; (2) one which explicitly takes account of the conscious sub-
ject but merely as intellectual; and (3) one which explicitly takes
account of the conscious subject not merely as intellectual but also
as moral and especially as religious. The first way is illustrated
by the approaches of most Neo-Thomists: see, for example, Hawkins.
The second way is illustrated by the approach of Lonergan in chapter
nineteen of *Insight*. And the third way is illustrated by the ap-
proach of Lonergan in his more recent works, such as *Method in
Theology*.

Now, the first two ways may be grouped together over against
the third, inasmuch as the former do not consider the conscious
subject as religious, while the latter does; and it is upon this
difference that Lonergan lays the most emphasis in *Philosophy of
God*, and *Theology*, the work which provided the initial inspiration
for the present paper. It is in that work that he designates the
third approach as "newer" philosophy of God.

What, then, of the difference between the first two approaches?
In *Philosophy of God*, and *Theology*, Lonergan tends on occasion (e.
g. 13) to assimilate the second approach to the first, which he
designates as "older" philosophy of God; and this is the practice
which, in order to focus attention on the other difference, we
adopt in this paper. Thus, any philosophy of God which does not
explicitly take account of the conscious subject as religious is
"older". Moreover, we do not distinguish sharply between the first
and the second approaches in our present formulation of the posi-
tion of "older" philosophy of God on evil. The perceptive reader,
however, will not lose sight of the fact that both in general and
as regards the particular topic of evil the first approach manifests
the characteristic—and eventually somewhat negatively assessed—
features of "older" philosophy of God much more fully than the
second approach does, and that the significance of the differences
which make the second approach much closer to the most adequate—
third—approach is by no means negligible.

"Philosophy . . . distinguishes four types of opposition:
first, the opposition of *contradiction*, which is the most radical,
in which one of the terms automatically excludes the other: not-
man as opposed to man; second, the opposition of *privation*, which
allows the common element of both terms to subsist, but destroys a
generic quality possessed by one of them: in man, blindness de-
strains sight, and in an object black destroys white, assuming that
black is not taken to be a colour, as it is for a painter, but as
the privation of all colour, as it is for the physicist; third, the
opposition of *contrariety* as between two qualities of the same
generic type, such as red and green; and fourth, the opposition of
*relation*, the weakest of all, which does not necessarily involve a
lack in either of the two terms—e.g., the relations of equality or
10, & Bk. X, 4; and Aquinas, 1950: Bk. V, no. 922).

Strictly speaking, the reply is not that of traditional
philosophy of God but rather of traditional natural ethics follow-
ing on philosophy of God (and, as well, on philosophy—of—man). Here
in the text we make this mild distortion in order to stress the
real solidarity of practical with theoretical considerations (or,
in Lonergan's terms, of the fourth level of consciousness with the
first three) on the part of the conscious subject. And on the
solidarity of practical considerations in another line, see note
21.

This disparity—at least apparent—is, of course, one of
the evidences advanced in certain arguments for an afterlife in
which the virtuous are definitively rewarded and the unvirtuous are
definitely punished. (Kant: Part I, Book II, esp. Chapter II, Sections I-IV; Klubertanz: 315-16.) But even if one posited such an afterlife and thus envisioned the unvirtuous but prosperous man finally receiving his just deserts, he would still be left with the difficulty of understanding how the suffering of one who did not deserve to suffer in the first place could ever be "offset" by any "reward", no matter how great.

/14/ That this aspect of the problems of evil tends to reopen the problems of God is a familiar theme in literature:

For the hundredth time I repeat, there are numbers of questions, but I've only taken the children, because in their case what I mean is so unanswerably clear. Listen! If all must suffer to pay for the eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, please? It's beyond all comprehen-

sion why they should suffer, and why they should pay for the harmony. Why should they, too, furnish material to enrich the soil for the harmony of the future? I understand solidarity in sin among men. I understand solidarity in re-

tribution, too; but there can be no such solidarity with children. And if it is really true that they must share responsibility for all their fathers' crimes, such a truth is not of this world and is beyond my comprehension... Too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most re-

spectfully return Him the ticket."

"That's rebellion," murmured Alyosha, looking down.
(Dostoyevsky: Book V, Chapter IV. Cf. the stance of Doctor Rieux in Albert Camus' The Plague.)

/15/ Recall that this indictment applies to the first way of "older" philosophy of God far more than to the second way. See note 10.

/16/ On the distinction between the gift as offered and the gift as accepted, see note 27.

/17/ The apprehension of values that is an aspect of unre-

stricted being-in-love is designated by Lonergan as faith. It is to be distinguished from knowledge in the strict sense, judgment based upon evidence whose sufficiency one grasps personally. And it is to be distinguished as well from belief, judgment based upon evidence whose sufficiency one grasps not personally but rather through the mediation of one or more other conscious subjects. It is, nonetheless, a precondition of religious belief. (1972: 41-47, 115-24.)

/18/ As regards the order of exposition, intellectual conver-

sion is best treated before moral, and intellectual and moral be-

fore religious. In the concrete order of occurrence, however, reli-

gious conversion commonly precedes moral, and religious and moral commonly precede intellectual. (1972: 241-43, 267-68, 272-81, 283, 327; 1971: 233-34.)

/19/ For a discussion of the common, if very general, features of unrestricted being-in-love, 1972: 108-109.
Lonergan customarily makes this distinction in expressly theological rather than merely phenomenological terms. In a discussion context where one does not wish to presuppose that others have explicit religious stances (such as would justify speaking easily of God's gift, etc.), however, the more minimal approach often is useful.

Of precisely which functional specialty of a functionally-differentiated theology is philosophy of God a performative part? Lonergan argues that it is part of Systematics. (See 1973: ix-x, 13-14, 16, 29-20, 34-35, 40-42, 45-59). And he maintains that natural ethics, as well, is part of that same functional specialty.

Religious conversion modifies the conscious subject's dynamic structure or state, but of itself it brings no new object. (See 1972: 106-107, and 1973: 38-39.) From an exclusively philosophical standpoint it is an open question how many persons undergo religious conversion; but see above pp. 163-164, and esp. note 27.

Note that the procedure of "newer" philosophy-of-God is not fundamentally one of inferring conclusions from premises but of uncovering, explicitating, thematizing what is already performatively, implicitly, operatively present in the concrete conscious subject.

I.e., the descriptive reality of evil is asserted. Recall above, pp. 150-151, and note 2.

More generally, "newer" philosophy of God as such does not take account of the characteristic (by contrast with common) assertions of any religious tradition. On the other hand, one should recognize that a discipline of such "purity" is at least a mild abstraction: concretely, even "newer" philosophy of God does not develop in a vacuum, and virtually all people—even philosophers!—are in fact influenced by the characteristic and not just the common features of their existential religious contexts. (See 1973: 55).

One might argue, of course, that the notion of "sin" as "offense against a (transcendent) person" arises already at the level of "newer" philosophy of God (Ricoeur: 193-200, 209-210).

It is a theological position that every person is given grace sufficient for salvation, but that every person is free to accept or reject that gift. (Lonergan, 1972: 108-109; 1973: 18-20, 36-38.) Now, the metaphysical distinction between grace as given, operative grace, and grace as accepted, cooperative grace, may be translated into the categories of intentionality analysis as the distinction between the two moments of religious conversion: religious conversion as it is defined and as it is achieved, or, again, as it is recognized and as it is accepted. (1972: 241, 283-284; 1971: 225-26.) It is but stating the traditional theological position in contemporary terms, then, to say that every person is given the divine gift of unrestricted being-in-love, with the option of accepting or rejecting that gift.

As natural ethics is solidary with philosophy of God, so moral theology is solidary with speculative theology. And performatively, at least, these all come together in the functional specialty that is Systematics. (Cf. note 10.)

Needless to say, one inclined to conclude that his suffering is personally undeserved should consider whether it is
indeed sinfulness or perceptiveness that he lacks: the traditional view that the greatest saints are the most keenly aware of their personal sinfulness is a venerable one. On the other hand, it is difficult to maintain that absolutely all suffering is personally deserved, since at least the suffering of children is a clear counter-example. Moreover, that position, one of the claims of Job's comforters, appears—if we may play light with the Scriptures for a moment—to be rejected by the most eminent of authorities on the topic! (See Job 42:7ff.)

/30/ Lonergan develops this point beautifully in terms of "the Law of the Cross". (1964: Thesis 17, 552-93) And in the same regard, note the complement to our earlier (note 14) literary excerpt:

"Tell me yourself, I challenge you--answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth."

"No, I wouldn't consent", said Alyosha softly.

"And can you admit the idea that men for whom you are building it would agree to accept their happiness on the foundation of the unexpiated blood of a little victim? And accepting it would remain happy for ever?"

"No, I can't admit it, Brother", said Alyosha suddenly, with flashing eyes. "You said just now, is there a being in the whole world who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? But there is a Being and He can forgive everything, all and for all, because He gave His innocent blood for all and everything. You have forgotten Him, and on Him is built the edifice, and it is to Him they cry aloud, 'Thou art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed.'" (Dostoyevsky: Book V, Chapter IV.)

/31/ For calling my attention to this issue in the contemporary context and impressing its importance upon me, I am grateful to my colleague, Prof. Margaret O'Gara.
APPENDIX A

Contemporary Philosophers on Evil: Some Typical Books and Articles


3. Ahern, M.B., "The Nature of Evil", Sophia, v, 3 (October, 1966), 35-44. (Reply to no. 36 below.)


14. Farrell, P.M., "Evil and Omnipotence", Mind, 67 (1958), 399-403. (Comment on no. 31 below.)

15. Hare, Peter H., & Edward H. Madden, "Evil and Inconclusiveness", Sophia, xi, 1 (April, 1972), 8-12.


APPENDIX B

Lonergan on Evil: A Preliminary List of References

The following list indicates places where Lonergan discusses evil or other topics closely related to it. The list is but a preliminary one and is by no means necessarily exhaustive. Its order is chronological; and where more than one edition is indicated, the pagination is from the later edition.

Besides these items, readily available or at least well known, there is further pertinent material in still largely unexplored files in the Lonergan Center at Regis College in Toronto.

For his assistance to me as I compiled this list I am grateful to Prof. Philip McShane. —M.V.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Work Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aquinas, Thomas</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Summa Theologiae, I. Leonine ed.</td>
<td>Rome</td>
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<td>Camus, Albert</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>The Plague.</td>
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<td>Dostoyevsky, F.</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>The Brothers Karamazov.</td>
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<td>University.</td>
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<td>The Critique of Practical Reason.</td>
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<td>234 in Foundations of Theology.</td>
<td>Macmillan.</td>
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Hegel's philosophy included both a philosophy of history and a philosophy of religion. As the whole philosophy, so also its parts on history and religion were worked out a priori as the necessary implications of Hegel's dialectical logic.

This position was acceptable neither to the German Historical School nor to its offshoot the History of Religions School. To both it was plain that the study of history and the study of religion had to begin with research and that they reached conclusions only when their respective accounts were verified empirically. For this reason it seemed incumbent upon me, in offering a philosophy of religion to members of the International Association for the History of Religions, to present such a philosophy in post-Hegelian terms.

But if I withdraw entirely from the necessity attributed by Hegel to dialectical logic, I would find it difficult to be philosophic about religion if it were not possible to retain something of his comprehensiveness. And such a possibility I find in shifting attention from Hegel's dialectical logic to a philosophic account of empirical method.

Such a shift I find recommended both on grounds of familiarity and on the authority of R. G. Collingwood who was not only a philosopher but also an archeologist and a historian.

First, on grounds of familiarity, for most scientists will find the notion of a dialectical logic not only puzzling but also mysterious. On the other hand, all scientists have personal knowledge of scientific method, practical knowledge of what scientists in their field do and, if not a formulated, at least a tacit understanding of methodical procedure. Many, I fancy, would be surprised to hear that such a personal, practical, tacit attainment may be named a philosophy. But not a few, I suspect, would be relieved to discover that philosophy is not so alien to their attainments as they may have been told.

So much for familiarity. Besides it, there is authority, and I quote Collingwood's *The Idea of History*:

"Philosophy cannot interfere with history according to the Hegelian formula of superimposing a philosophical..."
history on top of ordinary history. . . Ordinary history already is philosophical history. . . . . . within the concrete whole, which is historical knowledge, philosophical knowledge is a component part. . . . (201).

. . . (history is necessary) relatively to philosophy, as the concrete whole of which philosophy is only the methodological moment. . . . (201).

. . . (history is) . . . the consciousness of one's own activity as one actually performs it . . . For even when the events which the historian studies are events that happened in the distant past, the condition of their being historically known is that . . . the evidence for them should be here and now before him and intelligible to him. For history . . . lives only as a present interest and pursuit in the mind of the historian when he criticizes and interprets documents, and by so doing relives the states of mind into which he inquires (202).

Now in these phrases Collingwood is following Croce and breaking from Hegel. He wants the philosophy of history to be, not a distinct history superimposed on ordinary history, but the methodological component present in the consciousness that a scientific historian has of his own performance. Moreover, since Collingwood attributed to history a key role in all science, he considered the methodological component within history to be, not just a "philosophy of . . .," but philosophy pure and simple.

Such a position suggests that other sciences are endowed with a "philosophy of . . ." inasmuch as historians of science thematize their conscious grasp of scientific developments. While I would not urge that this is impossible, I do find it cumbersome. It seems more expeditious to discover that the consciousness of every scientist includes a consciousness of the proper method of his subject. Just as the historian needs such a consciousness of historical method, so too do physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, exegetes, and so on, need to be effectively aware of the methodical exigencies of their respective fields. In this fashion we are led to recognizing as many "philosophies of . . .," as there are distinct sciences with appropriately differentiated methods.

Moreover, this multitude of "philosophies of . . ." will not be a mere pile or heap of unrelated procedures. For methods and procedures are dynamic, and all share a common dynamism that is proper to our common humanity. It is this common dynamism that grounds the real unity and common philosophy of scientists and, as well, enables them to appeal to men of common sense (cf. Lonergan, 1976-77).

Such in bare outline is my proposal. It will be worked out in two main parts. A first part will treat both the common dynamics
discernible in methods generally and the different dynamics in distinct fields of inquiry. The second part will deal with the divergence and the possible unity of results that arise when different methods are employed in the same field, as in religious studies.

Method as General Dynamics: Part One

Method is not to be confused with anything as pedestrian as a recipe, a prescription, a set of directions. For recipes, and the like, lead only to single results. They may be repeated as often as you please, but the repetition yields no more than another instance of the original product. What may be advertised as the New Method Laundry may clean anyone's clothing, but it will never do anything else.

The key instance to method, I feel, lies in the relation between questioning and answering. The questioner, while he does not know the answer, at least intends it. Moreover, the question itself sets a standard that leads to the rejection of insufficient answers; and insufficient answers need not be useless: they may help the questioner to pin down more accurately the precise issue he wished to raise. Further, such clarification may bring to light the existence of intermediate questions that have to be resolved before the initially intended question can be met. There is then an ongoing dynamism in questioning and answering. It heads through insufficient answers to the clarification and, as well, to the distinction of questions; and while this prepares the way to the eventual discovery of relevant answers, those very answers in turn can provide the source and stimulus to a fresh wave of questions.

I have been speaking of this ongoing process as though it occurred between a pair of individuals. But, far more importantly, it can be the common concern of associations of scientists. The members of such associations will have passed successfully through the initiatory ritual of attaining a Ph. D. They will be at home in the technical language which they alone understand and speak. That language will provide the repository of the novel conceptual systems introduced by the pioneers and the renovators in their field. It provides the instrument through which are handed on the ideals that should govern their thinking and the procedures to be followed in their investigations. It is kept alive and up-to-date through congresses, through journals and books, through schools, libraries, and interdisciplinary undertakings. In this fashion questions raised anywhere can be known elsewhere; they can give rise to an array of insufficient answers that successively beg for
a clarification of the issue or issues; and the clarifications will hasten, as far as it possible at the time, the new answers which initial questions may have done more to intimate than to formulate.

I have been stressing what I have noted elsewhere, that a method is not a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt but a framework for collaborative creativity (Lonergan 1972, xi). But now I have to add that (1) questions are of different kinds, (2) each kind has its own immanent objective and criterion, and (3) the objectives stand in an ascending order with each completing what its predecessor had attained.

The first of the kinds is the question for understanding. It arises when one is intelligent enough to experience a lack: one lacks an understanding of some aspect or aspects of the data. As long as that lack continues to be experienced, answers that are proposed and considered will have to be rejected simply because the lack remains. So the objective of the first kind of question is the attainment of an understanding of specified data. The criterion of the attainment of a proper understanding is that answers are proving sufficient, that questions no longer need further clarification, that the initial lack of understanding has been replaced by an insight that grasps why things are so.

The second kind of question is for reflection. Aristotle remarked that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is (An. Post. II 1). Now the open point in this affirmation is the meaning of "necessity." From the beginning of the fourteenth century, by and large, it seems to have been tacitly assumed that necessary knowledge results from the necessary implication of one concept in another. But such a view cannot, I believe, be foisted on Aristotle or Aquinas. For them the primary object of understanding was the representative image, the example, the instance, in which intelligence grasped the intelligibility of what the image represents. Such a grasp is a conscious intellectual event that, at times, is resoundingly satisfactory. Its formulation in concepts is a further process, equally conscious, and intelligently resting on the content of the insight (Lonergan 1967, 25-44).

It follows that over and above the abstract necessity that may be elicited from the implication of one abstract concept in another, there is the most concrete necessity that may be intelligently grasped in representative images and, under due provisos, in sensible data. For example, one can ask abstractly what is an eclipse. But one may also refer to a concrete situation in which a man,
pointing to the darkening of the moon, asks why is the moon darkened in this manner (Cf. *Met.* VII 17). The abstract question demands an abstract answer, and to proceed from the abstract definition to an actual necessity no number of further abstract necessities are enough. There also is needed an understanding of an existing situation into which the abstractions fit. But if the question is put with regard to a concrete situation in which an eclipse actually is taking place, then an understanding of that situation will grasp not only the cause of the darkening of the moon but also the necessity of that effect.

The third type of question regards responsibility. There are responsibilities intrinsic to natural science, others intrinsic to human science, others to religious studies. Our observations, for the moment, must be confined to natural science. In such science there is a responsibility to the data: it is violated when the data are fraudulently produced. There is a responsibility to intelligence or reasonableness, and it is neglected when one overlooks the inadequacy of answers and, no less, when one withholds a qualified assent when further relevant questions are not made available. Finally, there is responsibility regarding the possible products of scientific advance. Because knowing is good, advance in knowing is good. Because the products of science can be turned to evil use by evil will, one's own will becomes evil in approving the evil use.

Such are the three questions, and I have said that their objectives stand in an ascending order. For the second question has its origin in an incompleteness of the first question and answer, and the third question has its origin in an incompleteness of the second question and answer. So our hypotheses and theories remedy our previous lack of understanding; but are they just bright ideas, or do they represent the best available opinion of the day? Still even a consensus in favor of high probability would not preclude a still further question. New knowledge opens up new possibilities, and possibilities may be put to good or evil use; and so the question of responsibility arises out of the question for reflection and the answer to it.

It remains that this triad of questions and answers are only part of the ascensional structure of our intentional activity. Its hidden root is the unconscious, and it is not only the dark abode of primordial desires and fears but also the obscure home of the drive that makes man not merely the symbolic animal but also the self-completing animal. In all animals it is the store of the cognitypes and the dynatypes (Progoff 1973, 182 ff) that release
and guide instinctive activity. But in man's sleep there are not only the dreams of the night that correspond to biological tensions but also the dreams of the morning in which the human subject before waking is already taking a stance towards his coming day. Beyond dreams, there is the daytime unfolding of this process that has been studied from different viewpoints by Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget examined operational development and placed its key in a repeated *decentering* that keeps shifting the center of the subject's activity from himself to his ever enlarging universe. Erikson's approach is from depth psychology and his eight developmental stages are successive and cumulative shifts in what one's *identity* becomes. Kohlberg, finally, attends to morals, distinguishes preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional morality, divides each into two stages, and reveals the defects of each earlier stage as compared with its successor. It happens, however, that the ideas of all three writers have been brought together in a unitary view in terms of *self-transcendence*. The author of this work is Prof. Walter Conn, and I have had the privilege of reading it in galleys. The benefit I must leave to the reader to reap for himself, since a brief reproduction is impossible, and a summary cannot be just.

But before closing this first part of my first section, I feel I should indicate roughly not yet the stages but perhaps the successive degrees of self-transcendence. The *first* is the emergence of consciousness in the fragmentary form of the dream, where human substance yields place to the human subject. The *second* is waking when our senses and feelings come to life, where our memories recall pleasures and our imaginations anticipate fears, but our vitality envisages courses of action. The *third* is inquiry which enables us to move out of the mere habitat of an animal and into our human world of relatives, friends, acquaintances, associates, projects, accomplishments, ambitions, fears. The *fourth* is the discovery of truth, which is not the idle repetition of a 'good look' but the grasp in a manifold of data of the sufficiency of the evidence for our affirmation or negation. The *fifth* is the successive negotiation of the stages of morality and/or identity till we reach the point where we discover that it is up to ourselves to decide for ourselves what we are to make of ourselves, where we decisively meet the challenge of that discovery, where we set ourselves apart from the drifters. For drifters have not yet found themselves. They have not yet found their own deed and so are content to do what everyone else is doing. They have not yet found a will of
their own, and so they are content to choose what everyone else is choosing. They have not yet developed minds of their own, and so they are content to think and say what everyone else is thinking and saying. And everyone else, it happens, can be doing and choosing and thinking and saying what others are doing and choosing and thinking and saying.

But this fifth stage in self-transcendence becomes a successful way of life only when we really are pulled out of ourselves as, for example, when we fall in love, whether our love be the domestic love that unites husband and wife and children, or the love of our fellows whose wellbeing we promote and defend, or the love of God above all in whom we love our neighbor as ourselves.

Method as General Dynamics: Part Two

The first part of our consideration of method as dynamics was very general. It included questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for responsibility. But no attempt was made to say precisely what questions were to be asked. Such an attempt must now be made, and so we turn from the core of methods generally to the differentiation of that core.

Such differentiation is a difficult task and one, I am inclined to feel, that has not been squarely met. Aristotle's deductivist view of science could be verified only in mathematics and, indeed, in the mathematics of the ancient world; it followed that subjects other than the mathematical could be given the name of science only by courtesy (Ross, 14). In the modern period, the success of Newtonian mechanics came to share its prestige with physics, while extending its mantle over physical chemistry, chemistry, and a statistical reformulation of Darwin's 'chance variations' and 'survival of the fittest.'

Such are the natural sciences. They have been extremely successful. But it is important for us to understand the root of that success and the reason why it does not transfer in any thoroughgoing fashion to human studies.

Very simply, the natural sciences, in the measure they are subject to quantitative relations, are in close dependence on mathematics. In turn, modern mathematics has vastly purified mathematical thinking by an insistence on clarity, generality, and precision; and it has handed over to physics notions of space, time, and indeterminacy, that profoundly liberate the scientific mind. There is a liberation from the domination of Euclidean imagination and, as well, a liberation from the domination of the mechanist
determinism that reigned from the heydey of Newton's triumph through the first quarter of this century. As the mathematician, so too the natural scientist can now avail himself of freely constructed yet internally coherent systems.

But a parallel liberation can be bestowed on human studies. One way to this goal is the quantification of statements about human beings. An alternative way is to have philosophy do for human studies what mathematics does for natural science. I may presume that you are familiar with the former procedure, and so I may be content to indicate what the latter entails. In 1923 George Santayana published a book entitled *Skepticism and Animal Faith*. The pair were considered opposites with skepticism the lot of an elite and animal faith the lot of the masses. But neither animal faith nor skepticism is compatible with the general dynamics of method: animal faith asks no questions, and skepticism answers none. For me the real alternatives are animal faith and critical philosophy. On the one hand, animal faith is the fate of everyone who learns in childhood to speak his mother tongue, may entertain no doubt about all he believes he knows, but never has found out for himself and in himself just what are the events that come together to constitute human knowledge. On the other hand, in the measure that one finds out for oneself and in oneself just what these events are, one not merely is a critical philosopher but also one successful enough to be liberated, especially from animal faith in some unknowable thing-in-itself.

I may be asked just what events do come together to constitute human knowing. Very schematically, there are three: first, the givenness of the data, which is the objective of research; secondly, a cumulative series of insights into the data, which respond to the question for intelligence and yield a hypothesis; thirdly, a probable judgment on the adequacy of the insights.

At this point there may return the notion that human knowing is not a threefold compound but a single simple act at least in the field of our own consciousness. Certainly many have thought of consciousness as an inward look, an instance of what they may name introspection, and it is by such a look (they might claim) that we are aware of the givenness of the data, the occurrence of insights, the sufficiency of the evidence. But to my mind this is just a fresh avatar of the intuitions attributed to animal faith. For I believe that the data of sense and the data of consciousness are parallel. The data of sense do not constitute human knowledge but only a first step to such knowledge. Similarly the data of
consciousness are not an instance of self-knowledge but only a first step towards attaining such knowledge. All our intentional acts also are conscious acts. But to advert to them as conscious, we have to deemphasize the intentional and heighten the conscious side of the act. Only when that is achieved can we proceed to gain insight into the relations that unify our conscious acts and then to pass judgment on the validity of the relations.

We have been speaking of the structure of human knowing and the nature of human consciousness only as a preliminary to indicating our main point, namely, that man's world is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, and so a world that includes all mathematics but is not to be mastered within their scope. After all, mathematics embraces only one of the many different fields of meanings.

To this end we propose to speak of the four basic functions of meaning: it is cognitive, efficient, constitutive, communicative. It is cognitive. Human knowledge is discursive, a matter of questions and answers, and so one's knowledge is no better (and no worse) than the questions one can raise and the answers one can give. The world of the infant is no bigger than the nursery, but the world of the adult extends from the present back to its past and forward to its future. It includes not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative. It expresses not only what one has found out for oneself but also what we have managed to learn from the memories of other men, from the common sense of the community, from the pages of literature, from the labors of scholars, from the investigations of scientists, from the experience of saints, from the meditations of philosophers and theologians. It is within this larger world that we live out our lives. To it we refer when we speak of the real world. But because it is mediated by meaning and motivated by value, because meaning can go astray and evaluation become corrupt, because there is myth as well as science, fiction as well as fact, deceit as well as honesty, error as well as truth, that larger world is insecure.

Besides being cognitive, meaning is efficient. We work but our work is not mindless. We imagine, we plan, we investigate possibilities, we weigh pro's and con's, we enter into contracts, we have countless orders given and executed. Over the world given us by nature, there is an artificial, man-made world; it is the cumulative, now planned, now chaotic, product of human acts of meaning.
A third function of meaning is constitutive. Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. Religions and art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, histories, all are inextricably involved in acts of meaning. What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change involves change of meaning—a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or the request. The state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, again, by working on men's minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty.

A fourth function of meaning is communicative. What one man means can be communicated to another in many ways: intersubjectively, symbolically, linguistically, incarnately. But a rich store of common meaning is not the work of isolated individuals or even of single generations. Common meanings have histories. They originate in single minds, but they become common only through successful and widespread communication. They are transmitted to successive generations only through training and education. Slowly and gradually they are clarified, expressed, formulated, defined, only to be enriched and deepened and transformed, and no less often to be impoverished, emptied out, deformed.

The conjunction of both the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning yield the three key notions of community, existence in the sense of Existenz, and history.

Community is not just a by-product of a geographical frontier but the achievement of common meaning. Such common meaning has four degrees. It is potential when there is a common field of experience, and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding as misunderstanding and incomprehension supervene. Common meaning is actual inasmuch as there are common judgments, areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner; but common meaning is diluted as consensus fails. Common meaning is realized by decisions and
especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment, responsibility, and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself. Such is the existential moment.

It is momentous, for it can be authentic or unauthentic, and this can happen in two distinct ways. There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition in which he was raised. There is the major authenticity or unauthenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself. As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Christian, so diverse men can ask themselves whether they are authentically religious, authentically philosophers, authentically scientists. They may answer that they are, and they may be right. But they may answer affirmatively and still be mistaken. On a series of points they will realize what the ideals of the tradition demand; but on another series their lives diverge from those ideals. Such divergence may be overlooked from a selective inattention, a failure to understand, an undetected rationalization. What I am is one thing; what an authentic Christian or Buddhist is, is another, and I am unaware of the difference. My unawareness is unexpressed. I have no language to express what I am, so I use the language of the tradition that I unauthentically appropriate, and thereby I devaluate, distort, water down, corrupt that language.

Such devaluation, distortion, dilution, corruption may occur only in scattered individuals. But it may occur on a more massive scale, and then the words are repeated but the meaning is gone. The chair remains the chair of Moses, but occupied by scribes and Pharisees. The theology is still scholastic, but the scholasticism is decadent. The name of science may be invoked but, as Edmund Husserl has argued, all significant scientific ideals can vanish to be replaced by the conventions of a clique. So the unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity infecting a tradition. For a subject to take the tradition uncritically is for him to realize what objectively is unauthentic but for him subjectively is thought authentic.

So we come to history in its radical difference from nature. Nature unfolds in accord with classical and statistical laws. But history is an expression of meaning, and meaning is open both to
enduring stationary states, to development, the fruit of authenticity, and to aberration that matches the unauthenticity of its source.

A sound development calls for heightened attention, a new insight into the situation, a workable proposal for a changed course of action, and a responsible decision on the matter. Such a sound development not only is an improvement on the previous situation but also a change. Change is apt to awaken further attention, open the way to fuller insight, to a still no less workable proposal, to another responsible decision. As the former change, so this change invites still further change. Progress has begun and it may continue. So Arnold Toynbee in his *A Study of History*—which I have found less a narrative of events than a repertory of ideal types—has depicted a series of challenges and responses with a creative minority taking the lead and the rank and file only too happily accepting that leadership.

But Toynbee also depicted the creative minority ceasing to be creative and becoming merely dominant. He has listed a series of manners in which this shift may come about. But I wish to suggest that our present analysis also throws light on the matter. For it should seem that the creative minority was creative because it hit upon a cumulative sequence of relevant insights. But in such a sequence the point can be reached when immediate benefits (or advantages) are small and the long-term benefits, though great, not only are distant but also difficult to depict and communicate. Then wise counsel does not easily prevail, compromise proposals are highly attractive, responsible decisions fail to win acceptance. The creative minority wishes to remain in the saddle; it can choose to become a merely dominant minority; to go along with the apologists that praise such practical wisdom; to be lulled into the easy security of philosophies that stand on the unreasoning and so irrefutable basis of animal faith. The shift may occur gradually enough to pass unnoticed, but once it has occurred, consistency becomes a force working for its perpetuity.

Such a change in the leadership involves a change in the social situation. As long as creativity was in charge, the situation was becoming increasingly intelligible. The implementation of insights in a situation not only modifies the situation but also suggests still further insights and so still further complementary changes. In contrast, when intelligent proposals are mangled by compromise, their implementation results in an objective surd. It does not make sense. It calls not for further insights but for further
compromises. Only with great difficulty can that call be resisted by a leadership that already has preferred dominance to creativity.

In brief, besides progress there also is decline. As progress rests on authenticity, on the self-transcendence of men and women ready to be attentive, to grow in intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, so decline rests on unauthenticity. Basic decisions are shirked. Judgments lean towards superficiality. Difficult insights are ignored. Problems are referred to committees.

I once remarked that the wheel of progress not only turns but also rolls along. But the wheel of decline has similar but opposite momentum, and a far greater power of acceleration—until things just fall apart.

Philosophy of Religion

Up to now I have been attempting to elucidate what might be meant by the phrase, philosophy of . . . , and I have been doing so by speaking of "method of . . . ;" first I spoke of methods in general as an ongoing dynamic, secondly of the possibility of matching the liberation of natural science through mathematics by using not mathematics but philosophy for a liberation of human studies. What has made natural science successful has been the Galilean proposal to mathematicize nature; what can make human studies no less penetrating seems to be, not the mathematization of man's world, but the discovery that it is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. For it is through meanings that we come to know man's world. It is through meanings that we communicate concerning man's world. It is through meanings that we transform the world of nature into either a more excellent or a more deficient human world. It is through the meanings we accept and the values we embrace that we constitute both ourselves and our communities, our authentic and unauthentic traditions, our heady bursts of progress and our headlong periods of decline, of breakdown, of dissolution and decay.

In all this our aim has been an account of a philosophy of religion, and so we have now to compare the respective relevance of diverse methods to the study of religions. Historically, then, the methods of natural science have been applied in this field; the methods of history also have been applied; and if any problems remain after viewing such work, we have to ask whether an appeal to philosophy would be of avail.

First, with regard to the relevance in religious studies of the methods of the natural sciences, I cannot do better than recall the opening remarks of Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith at a public
lecture in the University of Toronto in January 1968. He acknowledged that much fruitful energy had been devoted to exploring man's many religious traditions and to reconstructing the history of the overt data on man's religious living. Both in detail and in wide compass the observable forms had been observed and the observations had been recorded. But he went on to claim that a further, a more important, and a more difficult question must be raised. To live religiously is not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols but, he urged, it is to be involved with them or through them in a quite special way--a way that may lead far beyond the symbols, that may demand the totality of a person's response, that may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else, to himself, to his neighbor, to the stars.

This special involvement, commitment, engagement, Professor Smith claimed, pleads to be elucidated. If it both inspires and is inspired by religious traditions, religious beliefs, religious imperatives, religious rituals, still it is distinct from them. Members of the same religion are not all equally committed to their religion. The same man may be at one time indifferent to religion, at another profoundly concerned, at a third vehemently hostile. The question is, then, what makes religion come alive? What has happened when it withers and dies? (Lonergan 1970, 45)

In brief, the methods of natural science have contributed much to religious studies, but their contribution is incomplete. What is wanting is an account of the meaningfulness of religious tradition, belief, imperatives, rituals: not indeed of the meaningfulness that would meet the requirements of a logical positivist or linguistic analyst, but of the meaningfulness that can demand the totality of a person's response. Again, it is the meaningfulness that is expressed by a historian of religion, read by those for whom the religion has come to life, and by them recognized as an account of their own commitment.

But what is that meaningfulness? How is it reached? How is it investigated?

It is, I should say, the meaningfulness of striving to become self-transcendent and of making progress on the way. It is the emergence of the self not only from the consciousness of the dream into waking consciousness but into intelligent consciousness that gradually promotes us from being animals in a habitat to becoming human beings in a universe, into the reasonable consciousness that judges in accord with the evidence, into the responsible consciousness that makes its way from individual and group egoism beyond the
bias of 'omnicompetent' common sense to the consciousness of one in love—in love with the family, in love with fellow citizens in this world, in love with God above all.

How is it reached? The process begins with socialization, acculturation, education. Its culmination is within religion. Both the Judaic tradition (Deut. 6:4; Lev. 19:18) and the Christian command followers to "... love the Lord your God with all your heart and all your soul and all your mind and all your strength ... and to love your neighbor as yourself" (Mark 12:29 ff).

Nor are the Judaic and Christian traditions singular in this respect. Friedrich Heiler has listed seven principal areas of unity to be discerned in all the world religions: in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, in Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. But what he devoted eleven pages to narrating, I must compress under seven brief headings with apologies for the omission of many a nuance and qualification (Heiler 1959). The reality, then, of the transcendent, the divine, the holy, the Other. Next, the divine while transcendent also is immanent in human hearts. Thirdly, this reality, transcendent and immanent, is for man the highest good, the highest truth, righteousness, goodness, beauty. Fourthly, the reality of the divine is ultimate love, mercy, compassion. Fifthly, the way of man to God is universally the way of sacrifice, repentance, discipline, prayer. Sixthly, as they seek God, so too they seek their neighbor's well-being, even the well-being of their enemies. Finally, while religious experience is endlessly manifold, the superior way to God is love.

A special fruitfulness seems to reside in the study of ascetics and mystics. Not only did Prof. Heiler write a fundamental work on prayer (Misner), but Raymond Panikkar in a volume of Concilium devoted to fundamental theology, advocated a turn in the same direction. If we wish a theology, he wrote, that has its ground free from the influence of particular places and times, particular cultures and viewpoints, we have to have recourse to the wordless prayer of the mystics representing the world religions. We have to ask them to dialogue, not to clarify their differences from one another, but to let shine forth the interrelatedness constituted by the peace they experience as distinct from any words they may silently or vocally utter (Panikkar 1969).

In somewhat similar fashion the foundations envisaged in my own Method in Theology are simply religious conversion in the sense of a total commitment to religious self-transcendence.
There remains a crucial issue on which, I feel, something must be said, for sooner or later it is bound to confront anyone who investigates the history of religions on the basis of his personal self-transcendence. I shall attempt to state it as briefly as possible in terms of three currently accessible views: materialism, immanentism, critical realism.

My starting point was our questions and answers, and it probably has not escaped you that such a basis fits in very neatly with Feuerbach's contention that man's notion of God is a projection on the sky of idealized human qualities. We seek understanding, and God is all-intelligent; we seek sufficient evidence for our judgments and God is all-knowing; we seek moral excellence and God is goodness and love.

I must be content with two observations. First, such seeking is not static quality but potentiality and finality; and it is potentiality and finality not confined to some category but, on the contrary, scorning any arbitrary burking of questions.

Secondly, I note that the word, projection, recalls the cinematic projector and before it the magic lantern. But the slide or film does not experience, does not inquire intelligently, does not judge on the basis of sufficient reason, does not decide freely and responsibly. In brief, a projection does not differ from George Santayana's animal faith.

So much for a materialist option. Next, I propose to consider both the immanentist and the critical realist options simultaneously, not because the two do not differ, but because one can say much about religious experience without opting for either side of a philosophic difference.

Dr. Eric Voegelin has explained that he got into problems of religious understanding one winter when, at an adult education institute in Vienna where he grew up, he followed weekly lectures by Deussen, the philosopher who translated the Upanishads (O'Connor 153 f). Dr. Voegelin is author of a work in many volumes on Order and History; but his parerga include incisive essays on Greek philosophy and the New Testament. He has set aside the common but strange assumption that reason, for Plato and Aristotle, was much the same as the deductivism of late medieval Scholasticism, seventeenth-century rationalism, nineteenth-century idealism. His contention has been that reason in the Greek classic experience was moral and religious; in Athens the appeal to reason was the appeal of men in an age of social and cultural decay seeking a way to recall their fellows from darkness and lead them towards the light (Voegelin 1974). His account of religious experience centers on
the struggle in the soul and it draws freely on both Plato and the New Testament (Voegelin 1971). He acknowledges pulls and counter-pulls. To follow the former puts an end to questioning. To opt for the latter leaves questions unanswered and conscience ill at ease. The former alternative is what Voegelin means by a movement luminous with truth, or again by existing in the truth, or again by the truth of existence. The latter alternative is existence in un-truth. As he contends, this luminosity of existence with the truth of reason precedes all opinions and decisions about the pull to be followed. Moreover, it remains alive as the judgment of truth in existence whatever opinions about it we may actually form. In other words, there is an inner light that runs before the formulation of doctrines and that survives even despite opposing doctrines. To follow that inner light is life, even though to worldly eyes it is to die. To reject that inner light is to die, even though the world envies one's attainments and achievements (Lonergan 1977, 7).

Voegelin holds that such experiences, while valid as symbols and legitimately made the basis of a "saving tale" to guide our lives, are not to be handed over to hypostatizing and dogmatizing. "There is no In-Between other than the metaxy experienced in man's existential tension toward the divine ground of being; there is no question of life and death other than the question aroused by pull and counter-pull; there is no Saving Tale other than the divine pull to be followed by man; and there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the noetic consciousness in which the movement becomes luminous to itself" (Voegelin 1971, 75).

A little later we read:

Myth is not a primitive symbolic form, peculiar to early societies and progressively to be overcome by positive science, but the language in which the experiences of divine-human participation in the In-Between become articulate. The symbolization of participating existence, it is true, evolves historically from the more compact form of the cosmological myth to the more differentiated form of Philosophies, Prophecy, and the Gospel, but the differentiating insight, far from abolishing the metaxy of existence, brings it to fully articulate knowledge. When existence becomes noetically luminous as the field of pull and counter-pull, of the question of life and death, and of the tension between human and divine reality, it also becomes luminous for the divine reality as the Beyond of the metaxy in the participatory event of the movement. There is no In-Between of existence as a self-contained object but only experience experienced as part of a reality which extends beyond the In-Between (76).

Let me now attempt to say what I make of this. First, I shall quote and comment. I quote: " . . . there is no Saving Tale other
than the divine pull to be followed by man." What is this divine pull? We have explicit references to John 6:44: "No man can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him," and to John 12:32: "And I shall draw all men to myself, when I am lifted up from the earth" (77). The context then is not only biblical but Joannine.

Next, I quote: "... there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the noetic consciousness in which the movement becomes luminous to itself." I ask: What is the movement of noetic consciousness and when does it become luminous to itself? For Voegelin "nous", whence the adjective, noetic, is in the classic experience moral and religious. But in the present context the religious component becomes far more emphatic. For in this movement of consciousness there is "... a mutual participation (methexis, metalepsis) of human and divine; and the language symbols expressing the movement are not invented by an observer who does not participate in the movement but are engendered in the event of participation itself. The ontological status of the symbols is both human and divine" (75). So Voegelin appeals both to Plato who claimed that his myth of the puppet player was an alethes logos, a true story, "... whether received from a God or from a man who knows" (Laws 645B) and, as well, to the prophets promulgating their sayings as the "word" of Yahweh. In brief, we are offered an account of revelation or, perhaps, inspiration.

It is, however, an account of revelation or inspiration that can meet the needs of a philosophy of religion. For as Voegelin further remarked, "The symbolization of participating existence ... evolves historically from the more compact form of the cosmological myth (the reference is to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia) to the more differentiated form of Philosophies, Prophecy, and the Gospel, but the differentiating insight, far from abolishing the metaxy of existence, brings it to fully articulate knowledge."

One may ask whether one is not to confuse this differentiating insight with its fully articulate knowledge and, on the other hand, the repudiated dogmatizing and doctrinalization. There are grounds for such an interpretation for later Voegelin speaks (88) of "... the loss of experimental reality through doctrinalization." Now the luminous experience of existing in the truth is indeed an instance of experimental reality, and a doctrinalization that abolishes the one also is the loss of the other. In that case doctrinalization seems associated with what Newman would have named merely notional apprehension and merely notional assent, which do imply an exclusion of real apprehension and real assent (Newman).
There remains the repudiation of "hypostatization." It seems to me fully justified if applied to Gnostic constitutions of the pleroma through the designation of abstract names, or even, if anyone wishes, applied to the Hegelian dialectical deduction of the universe through an interplay of opposed Begriffe. But behind such applications there is a far deeper issue, and on it I can now do no more than invite you to an examination of Giovanni Sala's comparison of my cognitional theory with Kant's, and of William Ryan's comparison of my intentionality analysis with that of Edmund Husserl. The seminal work seems to me to be Le Blond's *Logique et méthode chez Aristote.*
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Lonergan, Bernard  


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